

CA1  
EA360  
P66  
1985

DOCS

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

## PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE — FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1985



**PV**

COMPILED AND EDITED BY:

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF  
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA, CANADA


FEBRUARY 1986



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

## PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE — FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1985



COMPILED AND EDITED BY:

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF  
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA, CANADA

FEBRUARY 1986

Dept. of External Affairs  
Min. des Affaires extérieures


25 1986

RETURN TO DEPARTMENTAL LIBRARY  
RETOURNER A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE DU MINISTERE

43 245-442

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT  
PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN  
OUTER SPACE - FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1988



FORWARDED AND EXTENDED BY

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA, CANADA

Dept. of External Affairs  
Min. des Affaires extérieures

82

RETURN TO DEPARTMENTAL LIBRARY  
RETOURNER A LA BIBLIOTHÈQUE DU DÉPARTEMENT

INDEX

STATEMENTS MADE IN PLENARY SESSION

THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>NATION/SPEAKER</u>	<u>DATE</u>
		<u>1985</u>	
CD/PV 288	9	The Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General/România	5.2.85
CD/PV 288	13&17	Mexico/García Robles	5.2.85
CD/PV 288	25-26	USSR/Isayev	5.2.85
		<u>PREFACE</u>	
CD/PV 288	30	<u>Conference on Disarmament</u>	5.2.85
CD/PV 289	9	Federal Republic of Germany/Haggen	5.2.85
CD/PV 289		This volume is a compilation of final records (PVs) of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1985 sessions relating to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate discussions and research on the outer space issue.	12.2.85
CD/PV 291	7-9	Bulgaria/Isakalov	14.2.85
CD/PV 291	14	Japan/Inai	14.2.85
CD/PV 291	24	Kenya/Ritlo	14.2.85
CD/PV 292	10	German Democratic Republic/Pose	19.2.85
CD/PV 292	13&14	Romania/Dătescu	19.2.85
CD/PV 292	16	Cuba/Barbosa Novas	19.2.85
CD/PV 292	27-28	Australia/Schleyer	19.2.85
CD/PV 292	31-33	China/Guo Jiesheng	19.2.85
CD/PV 293	7&10-11	Egypt/Al Farouki	21.2.85



INDEX

STATEMENTS MADE IN PLENARY SESSION

THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>NATION/SPEAKER</u>	<u>DATE</u>
		<u>1985</u>	
CD/PV 288	9	The Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General/Komatina	5.2.85
CD/PV 288	13&17	Mexico/Garcia Robles	5.2.85
CD/PV 288	25-26	USSR/Issraelyan	5.2.85
CD/PV 288	30	Sweden/Theorin	5.2.85
CD/PV 289	9	Federal Republic of Germany/Wegener	5.2.85
CD/PV 290	14	USA/Adelman	12.2.85
CD/PV 290	17&20	Poland/Turbanski	12.2.85
CD/PV 290	22	Mexico/Garcia Robles	12.2.85
CD/PV 291	7-9	Bulgaria/Tellalov	14.2.85
CD/PV 291	14	Japan/Imai	14.2.85
CD/PV 291	24	Kenya/Kiilu	14.2.85
CD/PV 292	10	German Democratic Republic/Rose	19.2.85
CD/PV 292	12&14	Romania/Datcu	19.2.85
CD/PV 292	16	Cuba/Lechuga Hevia	19.2.85
CD/PV 292	27-28	Australia/Butler	19.2.85
CD/PV 292	32-33	China/Qian Jiadong	19.2.85
CD/PV 293	7&10-11	Egypt/Alfarargi	21.2.85

<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>NATION/SPEAKER</u>	<u>DATE</u>
		<u>1985</u>	
CD/PV 295	9	Hungary/Meiszter	28.2.85
CD/PV 295	14-15	Burma/U Maung Maung Gyi	28.2.85
CD/PV 295	19	Algeria/Ould Rouis	28.2.85
CD/PV 295	28	Morocco/Skalli	28.2.85
CD/PV 296	9	The President (Venezuela/Taylhardat)	5.3.85
CD/PV 296	13-14	New Zealand (non-member State)/Lange	5.3.85
CD/PV 296	21-24	Romania/Datcu	5.3.85
CD/PV 296	25-30	Argentina/Carasales	5.3.85
CD/PV 296	32-34	Italy/Alessi	5.3.85
CD/PV 296	41-46	Sri Lanka/Dhanapala	5.3.85
CD/PV 297	10-11	Yugoslavia/Vidas	7.3.85
CD/PV 297	16	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	7.3.85
CD/PV 297	24-30	USSR/Issraelyan	7.3.85
CD/PV 297	31-35	Mongolia/Bayart	7.3.85
CD/PV 297	42	German Democratic Republic	7.3.85
CD/PV 297	46&48	Nigeria/Tonwe	7.3.85
CD/PV 298	13-14	United Kingdom/Luce	12.3.85
CD/PV 298	18	Finland (non-member State)/Tornudd	12.3.85
CD/PV 298	23	India/Alam Khan	12.3.85
CD/PV 299	8-9	Peru/Cannock	14.3.85
CD/PV 300	10-14	Bulgaria/Tellalov	19.3.85
CD/PV 300	22-28	USA/Lowitz	19.3.85
CD/PV 300	29-34	Poland/Turbanski	19.3.85
CD/PV 301	7	Norway (non-member State)/Froysnes	21.3.85
CD/PV 301	16-19	Sweden/Ekeus	21.3.85
CD/PV 301	20-23	Morocco/Skalli	21.3.85
CD/PV 301	28	Belgium/Depasse	21.3.85



<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>NATION/SPEAKER</u>	<u>DATE</u>
		<u>1985</u>	
CD/PV 301	29-32	Mexico/Garcia Robles	21.3.85
CD/PV 302	7-13	USSR/Issraelyan	26.3.85
CD/PV 302	14-17	China/Qian Jidong	26.3.85
CD/PV 303	14-16	France/de la Gorce	28.3.85
CD/PV 303	20-23	German Democratic Republic/Rose	28.3.85
CD/PV 303	27	Zaire/Monshemvula	28.3.85
CD/PV 304	5	Mexico/Garcia Robles	29.3.85
CD/PV 304	6-7	Mongolia (on behalf of the Group of Socialist States)/Bayart	29.3.85
CD/PV 304	7	Italy (on behalf of the Group of Western Countries)/Alessi	29.3.85
CD/PV 304	8	China/Qian Jiadong	29.3.85
CD/PV 304	8	Egypt (on behalf of the Group of 21)/Alfarargi	29.3.85
CD/PV 304	8-9	Canada/Beesley	29.3.85
CD/PV 305	11-12 14-15	Federal Republic of Germany/Genscher	2.4.85
CD/PV 306	8-11	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	4.4.85
CD/PV 306	25	Canada/Beesley	4.4.85
CD/PV 306	41-42	Brazil/de Souza e Silva	4.4.85
CD/PV 307	13-14	German Democratic Republic/Rose	11.4.85
CD/PV 308	12	Iran/Ali Akbar Velayati	16.4.85
CD/PV 308	23-24	USSR/Issraelyan	16.4.85
CD/PV 308	27	Mexico/Garcia Robles	16.4.85
CD/PV 309	14-15	Netherlands/van Schaik	18.4.85
CD/PV 309	24	USA/Barthelemy	18.4.85
CD/PV 310	16	France/de la Gorce	23.4.85
CD/PV 310	25	USSR/Issraelyan	23.4.85
CD/PV 310	26-29	Burma/U Maung Maung Gyi	23.4.85

<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>NATION/SPEAKER</u>	<u>DATE</u>
		<u>1985</u>	
CD/PV 310	31	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	23.4.85
CD/PV 310	39-40	Senegal (non-member State)/Sene	23.4.85
CD/PV 310	42	Algeria/Ould-Rouis	23.4.85
CD/PV 310	51	Mongolia/Bayart	23.4.85
CD/PV 311	11-13	Sweden/Theorin	11.6.85
CD/PV 312	7-8	Yugoslavia/Dizdarevic	13.6.85
CD/PV 314	9-10	Morocco/Skalli	20.6.85
CD/PV 314	11-13&14	USSR/Issraelyan	20.6.85
CD/PV 314	16	The President (Zaire/Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya)	20.6.85
CD/PV 315	6-8	German Democratic Republic/Rose	25.6.85
CD/PV 317	14	Sri Lanka/Hameed	2.7.85
CD/PV 317	18	Zaire/Bagbeni	2.7.85
CD/PV 317	29-30	Canada/Beesley	2.7.85
CD/PV 318	8	USSR/Issraelyan	4.7.85
CD/PV 318	12-17	Federal Republic of Germany/Wegener	4.7.85
CD/PV 319	6-8	Mongolia (on behalf of the Group of Socialist States)/Bayart	9.7.85
CD/PV 320	7-10	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	11.7.85
CD/PV 320	16-20	USSR/Issraelyan	11.7.85
CD/PV 321	7-10	USA/Lowitz	16.7.85
CD/PV 322	15-17	Mongolia/Bayart	18.7.85
CD/PV 322	18-23	German Democratic Republic/Rose	18.7.85
CD/PV 323	16	Spain (non-member state)/Lacleta	23.7.85
CD/PV 323	20-21	Canada/Rochon	23.7.85
CD/PV 324	13-14	Bangladesh (non-member state)/Ataul Karim	25.7.85
CD/PV 325	7	Vietnam (non-member state)/Nguyen Thuong	30.7.85

<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>NATION/SPEAKER</u>	<u>DATE</u>
		<u>1985</u>	
CD/PV 325	11-15	Sri Lanka/Dhanapala	30.7.85
CD/PV 325	19	Poland/Turbanski	30.7.85
CD/PV 325	51	The President (Algeria/Bachir Ould-Rouis)	30.7.85
CD/PV 327	11-12	Japan/Imai	6.8.85
CD/PV 327	25	German Democratic Republic/Rose	6.8.85
CD/PV 329	12-15	Australia/Butler	13.8.85
CD/PV 330	6-9	Italy/Alessi	15.8.85
CD/PV 330	12-14	Pakistan/Ahmad	15.8.85
CD/PV 330	19-20	Burma/U Maung Maung Gyi	15.8.85
CD/PV 330	26-29	Netherlands/van Schaik	15.8.85
CD/PV 330	34	China/Qian Jiadong	15.8.85
CD/PV 331	8-9	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	20.8.85
CD/PV 331	20-22	United Kingdom/Edis	20.8.85
CD/PV 332	11-12	Sweden/Schori	22.8.85
CD/PV 332	16	USA/Lowitz	22.8.85
CD/PV 332	22-24	USSR/Issraelyan	22.8.85
CD/PV 333	7-13	India/Dubey	27.8.85
CD/PV 333	16-17	USSR/Issraelyan	27.8.85
CD/PV 333	24	Venezuela/Ter Horst	27.8.85
CD/PV 333	30	Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (Egypt/Alfarargi)	27.8.85
CD/PV 333	32-33	France/Jessel	27.8.85
CD/PV 334	5-7	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist States)/Rose	29.8.85
CD/PV 334	10	China/Qian Jiadong	29.8.85

<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>NATION/SPEAKER</u>	<u>DATE</u>
		<u>1985</u>	
CD/PV 334	13	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist states)/Rose	29.8.85
CD/PV 334	14	The President (Argentina/Campora)	29.8.85
CD/PV 334	15	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist States)/Rose	29.8.85
CD/PV 335	7	Algeria/Belaid	30.8.85

1875

Received of the Treasurer of the  
Board of Directors of the  
City of New York  
the sum of \$1000.00  
for the year ending  
December 31, 1875

Witness my hand and seal  
this 1st day of January  
1876

Mayor of the City of New York



(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the  
Conference and Personal Representative  
of the Secretary-General)

"The prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is also on your agenda, continues to be an objective of major concern. The international community is legitimately interested in preserving outer space for peaceful purposes. Consequently, I trust that the Conference will be able, in its deliberations, to contribute to the achievement of mutual understanding and agreement. The consideration of this subject, like that of nuclear war and nuclear testing, illustrates very clearly the close linkage between bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations at the present time. Everything should be done to ensure that the approaches in one strengthen the prospects of progress in the other.

CD/PV.288

13

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Much the same occurred in relation to the item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", the resolution on which, No. 39/59 of 12 December, received the largest numbers of votes in favour, 150, with none against and a single abstention. In this resolution, the General Assembly stated that it was "gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space, in particular the impending danger of exacerbating the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security", and reiterated that "the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of such an arms race in all its aspects.

What I have referred to as the "justified impatience and ill-concealed indignation" reflected in many of the latest General Assembly resolutions, amply illustrated by the paragraphs I have just quoted, seem even more visible in the two documents to which I referred at the beginning of this statement, although without identifying them as I shall now do in chronological order: the statement made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 12 December 1984 before the plenary of the General Assembly when the latter took up consideration of the First Committee's reports concerning disarmament, and the New Delhi Declaration, adopted in the Indian capital a week ago, on 28 January, by the Heads of State or Government of six countries situated on three continents and two sub-continents: Argentina, Greece, India, Sweden, Tanzania and Mexico. In view of the importance which, in my opinion, these two documents possess, it is extremely desirable that they should receive suitable treatment; in this first statement I shall deal exclusively with the former, and shall deal with the latter in my next statement.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

With regard to the demilitarization of outer space, the statement employs equally pressing and vigorous terms:

"The time is equally pressing for talks on space weapons. It seems that, where weapons are concerned, the only way to halt a race is to prevent its starting. Once the race is under way, agreement is far more difficult. And the winner enjoys only a few, insecure moments of victory before the other side catches up, leaving both to look back over yet more wasted human effort and ingenuity. There is no final advantage in the arms race. It is therefore crucial that a ban on weapons in the new theatre, outer space, be concluded at the earliest possible time, before it is once again too late."

The statement on which I have been commenting ends by putting forward a number of opinions, including the following:

"The role of the Secretary-General under the Charter requires him to confront any matter which may threaten international peace and security. It is my belief that nothing poses a greater threat to the international community than the continuing arms race, above all the nuclear arms race..."

"Many words have been spoken in the cause of disarmament. We are all aware of the goals, as outlined in the Final Document of the first special session..."

"Every person on this earth has a stake in disarmament. In the nuclear age, decisions affecting war and peace cannot be left to military strategists or even to Governments. They are indeed the responsibility of every man and woman. And it is therefore the responsibility of all of us in this chamber to break the cycle of mistrust and insecurity and respond to humanity's yearning for peace."



(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Ideas such as those which abound in the statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations upon which I have just finished commenting deserve, in our opinion, serious reflection, especially on the part of the representatives of the nuclear-weapon Powers, above all those of them possessing the biggest arsenals of these terrible instruments of mass destruction, as we begin this session in the year of the fortieth anniversary of the birth of the United Nations and of the destruction of Hiroshima through the explosion of the first atomic bomb. It is to be hoped that this reflection may provide salutary inspiration for this Conference on Disarmament to be able fruitfully to undertake the work entrusted to it.

CD/PV.288  
25-26

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Lastly, while speaking of the priority issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament it is impossible to overlook the question which life itself has today placed at the centre of the struggle against the nuclear threat, the struggle for disarmament. I mean, of course, the question of preventing an arms race in space.

The Soviet Union's view that to resolve the problem of the non-militarization of space is today of prime importance to the cause of preventing nuclear war and curbing the arms race received practically unanimous support at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly. The dialectics of the nuclear space age are such that unless a solid barrier is erected against an arms race in space, there can be no hope of halting it effectively on Earth. The Soviet delegation therefore proposes to seek the establishment by the Conference of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in space. The basis for the mandate of that body should be the provisions contained in General Assembly resolution 39/59, adopted on the initiative of the socialist and non-aligned countries by the votes of 150 States, or virtually the whole international community.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

ABM systems are not the solution to security problems. This reality is reflected in the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prohibits the development, testing or deployment of systems, or components of systems, whether sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based, which are intended to counter strategic ballistic missiles. The Treaty itself recognized that "effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons". No prohibition, however, exists today as to other space weapons, such as ASAT-weapons.

There is a close link between development of ASAT-weapons and ABM systems. The construction of dual capacity weapons, which can be used both against satellites and ballistic missiles, is indeed feasible. Development and testing of ASAT-weapons could be used to circumvent the ABM Treaty.

It is encouraging that the Soviet Union and the United States have included prevention of an arms race in outer space in their forthcoming negotiations.

Development, testing and deployment of all space weapons must be banned and such a ban must totally prohibit ASAT weapons -- existing or planned -- and include the destruction of existing ones. Awaiting a treaty banning such weapons all States should refrain from testing, developing and deploying ASAT weapons. The use of ASAT weapons against another country's space craft is already forbidden in international law.

All countries, not only the super-Powers, have a stake in the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Conference on Disarmament should respond to the request by the General Assembly, and begin its work towards an international treaty or treaties banning all space weapons, including weapons directed against targets in space and from space to earth by setting up an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. My Government hopes and expects that both super-Powers will co-operate in this endeavour.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The realm of outer space and the rules to apply to its peaceful and military uses are an important case in point. We should make it clear that the multilateral consideration of this topic, especially within the framework of our Conference, remains highly significant at a time when outer space issues have also been placed on the bilateral agenda. In the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty the international community has proclaimed mankind's common interest in the progressive research and use of space for peaceful purposes. We endorse that interest, but cannot close our eyes to the fact that the use of outer space is also of considerable and growing importance from the security aspect. Satellites from many countries are already performing important functions and, indeed, some of them an indispensable role for strategic stability. The safeguarding of these essential resources against attack is thus an important issue and an issue that must elude the competence of only a limited number of countries.

In taking this task in hand we should concentrate on specific verifiable rules that would enhance stability and prevent an arms race in space, building on those treaties and tenets of general international law that are already in force. These agreements and rules need to be developed further. The aim should be to agree on a verifiable regime ensuring the safe functioning of satellite systems so as to increase stability and strengthen mutual confidence.

This is not the place to repeat the full list of tasks regarding outer space which my delegation had spelled out before the General Assembly last October and a general reference may suffice. However, I would also like to refer to suggestions made by other delegations. For instance, in a statement of 12 June of last year the delegation of France called for improvements in the present system of registration, as well as for an agreement on the multilaterally recognized immunity of certain space objects. Proposals such as those also clearly belong in the category of multilateral diplomacy, as does the over-all field of the future outer space legal regime. I certainly purport to return to these issues as soon as the special subsidiary body of our Conference to which such items could be entrusted -- and which ought to be set up as soon as possible -- is in place.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

The situation on outer space arms control has also changed materially since last year. Next month will begin the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations on defence and space weapons. This Conference could begin its complementary multilateral work with a comprehensive examination of existing multilateral agreements. There is much that the Conference can usefully consider in this vital area, as reflected in the mandate for an ad hoc committee proposed by a group of Western States. But the insistence of some members on a negotiating mandate threatens to leave the Conference on Disarmament out of the space arms control picture altogether.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Unfortunately, the present situation, though undoubtedly less pessimistic than a year ago, can still not be described as favourable for disarmament efforts. In order to describe the situation, let me quote the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, K.U. Chernenko, who, at the beginning of this month, said:

"Has the United States abolished even one of its programmes aimed at achieving military superiority? No. On the contrary, the arms production line is working at full capacity to achieve this goal. Or has the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe stopped? No again".

The full text of the quoted interview can be found in document CD/548.

As has been unambiguously demonstrated by the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, an overwhelming majority of States share the view of the urgency of undertaking decisive disarmament endeavours on Earth and on the inadmissibility of the arms race in outer space. A similar opinion has been recently expressed by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania in their Joint Declaration of New Delhi. These issues have undoubtedly become the most burning questions of our time. Over 60 resolutions on various disarmament aspects adopted by the General Assembly last year serve as a convincing proof of the growing uneasiness of world opinion over the continuous spiral of the arms race. As many as 23 of those resolutions are of high significance for the Conference on Disarmament, since they entrust specific responsibilities to this single multilateral negotiating body. Even a cursory analysis of these resolutions make it evident that most of them are directly or indirectly related to nuclear weapons, thus outlining the desired priorities for our work.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Some items on our agenda, though separate and apparently independent, fall into line with efforts to prevent nuclear war. A nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are -- if achieved -- the best guarantee of avoiding nuclear catastrophe. This applies likewise to prevention of an arms race in outer space. Though extremely complicated in the technological sense, the interrelationship between the further militarization of outer space as envisaged in some strategic initiatives and nuclear arms is strikingly clear with regard to its destabilizing effect.

CD/PV.290

22

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The specific measures suggested in the Declaration stem from a serious study of all the elements involved that has made it possible to carry out a sound and realistic choice of measures which actually deserve priority attention. Thus, in the Declaration we find the following evidently pertinent exhortations:

"We reiterate our appeal for an all-embracing halt to the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Such a halt would greatly facilitate negotiations. Two specific steps today require special attention: the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a comprehensive test ban treaty.

"Outer space must be used for the benefit of mankind as a whole, not as a battle-ground of the future. We therefore call for the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons. An arms race in space would be enormously costly, and have grave destabilizing effects. It would also endanger a number of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

"We further urge the nuclear weapon States to immediately halt the testing of all kinds of nuclear weapons, and to conclude, at an early date, a treaty on a nuclear weapon test ban. Such a treaty would be a major step towards ending the continuous modernization of nuclear arsenals."

The implementation of the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" which, paradoxical as it may be, is being advertised as a panacea for guaranteeing peace and security would, as a matter of fact, expand the arms race into outer space, and would inevitably increase sharply the danger of nuclear war and make the arms race irreversible.

It is high time that the Conference on Disarmament substantiated the claims about its own potential and fulfilled the intention of its founders that it should be a negotiating mechanism for reaching concrete agreements.

At the same time, it should be noted that the Conference is unlikely to overcome its difficulties if ideological considerations are introduced in the disarmament negotiations, and, instead of the question of prevention of nuclear war, we discuss which society is open and which one is not, or if negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space are replaced by a dispute as to which government is democratic and which one is not. It is high time that it was understood that the Conference on Disarmament has no chance of succeeding in fulfilling its tasks if one delegation continues to stick to the uncompromising principle of "take it or leave it".

No other conclusion can be drawn from the statement made last Tuesday by an authoritative representative of a leading Western nuclear-weapon State, Mr. Adelman. Obviously, this statement failed to meet the developing positive spirit in the Conference. My delegation believes that such statements could hardly contribute to the creation of an atmosphere propitious to our work. We reject the attempt to divert the attention of this Conference towards unfounded and one-sided interpretations of the issue of compliance with the existing disarmament agreements. We disagree with the approach which, on the one hand, seeks to create the impression that that delegation is ready to make headway on certain agenda items, notably the prohibition of chemical weapons, and on the other hand, embarks on voicing groundless accusations, thus poisoning the atmosphere of the negotiations, and insisting that its own draft convention should be the only basis for the Conference's work.

To heal the international situation, to cease the arms race, to prevent militarization of outer space, to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth, all this is in the interests of each and every nation. In our opinion, this same lofty spirit permeates the Delhi Declaration, signed by State and Government leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania. We welcome it as a continuation of their joint document of 22 May last year, and as a new contribution to the disarmament efforts. We consider it of utmost importance that in New Delhi special emphasis was placed on the necessity of taking immediate measures so as to exclude the possibility of use of nuclear weapons and to prevent nuclear war.

The analysis of the decisions of the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly clearly points to an increase in the aspirations and readiness of the overwhelming majority of United Nations Member States to reach genuine measures for disarmament. We look upon the General Assembly resolutions relevant to the agenda items of this Conference as a new stimulus for imparting more practical features to its work. The implementation of these recommendations would entirely correspond to the over-all policy-course of the Socialist countries on Conference issues, as reflected in the Communiqué of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Berlin on 3 and 4 December 1984, where it is stated, inter alia,

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

"The Ministers supported serious negotiations on all issues under discussion at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament with a view to reaching concrete arrangements in that forum."

...

The Bulgarian delegation endorses the view that this Conference is called on to exert active efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The solution of this problem is of key importance for the prevention of nuclear war and curbing the arms race.

Our delegation considers it necessary for the Conference to take a decision to set up an ad hoc committee on the question of prevention of an arms race in outer space. The basis of this ad hoc committee ought to be laid down by the provisions contained in resolution 39/59 of the United Nations General Assembly, introduced on the initiative of the socialist and non-aligned countries, and adopted almost unanimously. In our view, the Conference has no moral right to ignore the political will of 150 Member States of the United Nations.

CD/PV.291

14

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

I should now like to comment on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We welcome the announced commencement of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union which are to cover space arms as well. At the same time, as I have tried to emphasize in the earlier part of this intervention, we feel it will be extremely meaningful and useful to take up this matter at this Conference as a subject of multilateral concern and prepare for possible arrangements to take preventive measures in view of the rapid advances in space-related technology. We consider that it is one of our urgent tasks to establish an ad hoc committee for careful examination of this question.

In considering the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we should start with an accurate understanding of what kind of military activities are conducted there at present and can be foreseen in the future, what implication these have for the maintenance of national and international security and what problems are posed by the need for verification. Since space activities involve the latest achievements in science and technology, it will be impossible to keep such discussions completely in a non-technical arena.

As my country is making efforts to develop technologies for peaceful uses of outer space, we have a great interest in this subject and we intend to make endeavours so as to contribute to the work of this Conference in this regard.

(Mr. Kiilu, Kenya)

My Government has expressed the hope that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is a matter of some urgency. Today, it has become apparent that there is an overriding necessity to arrest the process of militarization of outer space from assuming irreversible proportions. The first step in this direction should be to discontinue any existing programme to nuclearize outer space militarily. It is regrettable that the consideration of this matter by the Conference has met with apparently insurmountable difficulties, especially in reaching an understanding over the framework of the mandate of the ad hoc Committee on the item. This impasse only postpones any chance of reaching acceptable and binding legal instruments that would ensure that outer space is preserved as the common heritage of mankind and not another arena of military competition. It is the view of my delegation that although the super-Powers bear a special responsibility with regard to the demilitarization of outer space, the subject remains a collective and a multilateral one on which States share the responsibility to take appropriate measures in this direction.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The international community voted most convincingly in favour of General Assembly resolution 39/59, which aims at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This mirrors the growing awareness that the militarization of outer space must be precluded if the risk of a nuclear war is to be reduced. However, there are attempts to make this Conference and the world believe that it is necessary to carry the arms race to outer space in order to reduce the risk of a nuclear war. We regard this as utterly misleading.

Like the Secretary-General of the United Nations and representatives of many States, we call on the Conference on Disarmament to address this issue simultaneously with the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States, and to deal with substantive matters, and not to get distracted by discussions on peripheral problems. Anyone who has set his sights on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons does not need new expensive and destabilizing space weaponry. What it takes is the political willingness to arrive at accords with the other side to prevent an arms race in outer space and to stop it on earth.



(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

Notwithstanding the far-reaching scope of this goal, announced in the Soviet-United States statement of 8 January 1985 here in Geneva, we believe that it is necessary -- as an expression of the desire to reach appropriate agreements -- to halt immediately the production and deployment of new nuclear weapons and to refrain from any action aimed at the militarization of outer space. To continue to deploy nuclear weapons and stockpile new means of mass destruction under the cover of negotiations would, in fact, be tantamount to an attempt to appease public opinion in order to continue the policy of armament.

CD/PV.292

14

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

We also support the proposals for the establishment of subsidiary bodies with a view to beginning negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Under the present circumstances, to begin multilateral negotiations on these questions in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, represents a true and unavoidable test of credibility.

CD/PV.292

16

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

Every day we are witnesses to the fact that the arms race is constantly being spurred on anew, thus absorbing vast resources. The most widely mentioned, and latest, example is the United States programme for the militarization of outer space, which has been rejected by the majority of the international community as well as by eminent sectors within the United States itself, because it opens a dark chapter in the policy of seeking military superiority and negotiating from a position of strength.

Billions of dollars spent on this and other projects will further add to the spiral of senseless expenditures in a world in which millions of human beings are dying for lack of food or proper medical care, and this must be repeated over and over again, because this poignant reality cannot be left out of the great debate of our time.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The question of preventing an arms race in outer space is one in which the relationship between bilateral negotiations between the two Great Powers and our work within this Conference is most sharply focused. Australia wants to see agreements concluded which will ensure that there is no arms race in space. We acknowledge the particular interest and responsibility of the two Great Powers in this context, but we are certain that the global nature of the problem involved and the need for all States to be engaged in this great objective means, assuredly, that the Conference on Disarmament has a role to play.

If the Conference does not become actively engaged in the issue of preventing an arms race in space, the prospect of viable agreements being reached will be diminished. This in turn may effect the possibility of bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union being arrived at.

My delegation will work positively with others in seeking to establish a subsidiary body of the Conference, with a relevant programme of work, which will engage the multilateral community in fostering agreements to ensure that there is no arms confrontation, no arms race in space. We must take care in this work to ensure that, while it proceeds, stability in the strategic balance is maintained. We have no doubt that if that balance were to be disturbed, the possibility of reaching the agreements that we all want with regard to outer space, would be greatly threatened; and, specifically, it will be important for us to recognize in our work on space the important contribution which reconnaissance, early warning and communications satellites make to strategic stability.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Another urgent matter which is closely linked with nuclear disarmament is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The extension of the super-Power rivalry from the land, sea and airspace into outer space poses a new threat to mankind. The peoples of the world call for an immediate halt to the arms race in outer space and for its demilitarization, so that outer space can be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind. We are now at a critical juncture for stopping the arms race in outer space. It is not yet too late for the world community to make immediate efforts to reverse this dangerous trend. If we do not act right now, and allow space weapons to be developed unchecked, the consequences will be too dreadful to contemplate.

During the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, great efforts were made by many delegations for the demilitarization of outer space. The resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (A/39/59), sponsored jointly by 16 countries, headed by Sri Lanka and Egypt and including China, was unanimously adopted with only one abstention. This is a significant achievement scored at the last session of the General Assembly, which testifies to the grave concern of the countries of the world over the dangerous development in outer space. The resolution calls upon all States, those with major space capabilities in particular, to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. It calls on our Conference to establish, as soon as possible, an ad hoc committee, with a view to undertaking negotiations and urges the USSR and the United States to advise the Conference regularly of the progress of their bilateral negotiations.

In view of the complexities of the issue and in order to facilitate the negotiations, the Chinese delegation has proposed that our efforts be focused first of all on ensuring the elimination of all weapons from outer space, in other words, banning the research, testing, development, production, deployment and use of all outer space weapons, including anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile weapons, and destroying all such existing weapons systems.

As is the case in other areas of disarmament, the super-Powers that possess far greater military capabilities than other countries logically also bear special responsibilities for the cessation of the arms race in outer space. We hope that both in the bilateral and multilateral negotiations, they will show a sense of responsibility towards humanity, and make constructive efforts to ensure that the outer space be freed from an arms race and used only for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

On the basis of this principle, Egypt has fully supported the Joint Statement issued by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Tanzania, Sweden, Mexico, India and Greece on 28 January 1985, calling on the nuclear-weapon States to halt the arms race and to undertake appropriate urgent measures to prevent an arms race in outer space and to achieve a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests.

CD/PV.293

10 -11

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

Whereas we ought to concentrate all our efforts on halting the arms race and its reverse, we are facing today the escalating probability of the militarization of outer space as a result of the increasing competition between the States possessing advance space technology which enables them to enter in a race aiming at the development of their weapons systems in outer space. The extension of the arms race to outer space is a source of deep concern to the international community, and especially to third world countries, to which the use of outer space for military purposes constitutes a great danger, with all its threatening implications for their security, while they do not possess the capability to ensure themselves against such threats.

Based on these facts, Egypt has always worked hard in order to bring the international community to assume its responsibilities to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space and to ensure that it will be strictly used for peaceful purposes. Egypt, together with Sri Lanka and the non-aligned and other neutral States, has exerted all efforts which led to the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/59 concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space. That resolution reiterates, in paragraph 5, that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space. In paragraph 8 of this resolution, the General Assembly has requested the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its session in 1985, with a view to undertaking negotiations for this purpose. There is no doubt that the adoption of one resolution only on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, with 150 votes in favour and none against, is vivid proof of the existence of international consensus on the danger which the tendency to militarize outer space represents, and the urgent need to face it, before it is too late, by letting the Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, assume this task. Thus, we hope that no obstacle will prevent the Conference on Disarmament from implementing the tasks which the General Assembly has entrusted to it.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

This part of my statement about the priority issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament cannot be terminated without mentioning the question of the urgent need to prevent an arms race in outer space. My delegation will seize the opportunity to deal with this problem in a more detailed manner at a later stage. Today I would limit myself to expressing my Government's full support for the untiring efforts of the Soviet Union aimed at resolving the problem of the non-militarization of space. We are firmly convinced that the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prevention of nuclear war have become inseparable prerequisites of all efforts aimed at curbing the arms race in general. The Hungarian delegation, therefore, deems it an urgent necessity to set up an ad hoc committee to deal with the issue on the basis of the relevant resolution of the last session of the United Nations General Assembly.

CD/PV.295

14

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

Prevention of an arms race in outer space is also a matter of urgent concern in view of the operational capabilities that are now being developed by the space Powers which, if not prevented in good time, would mean the escalation of the arms race in outer space, and the deployment of ASAT systems would be the forerunner of such a race. The arms race syndrome is such that once it is initiated it would be difficult to halt and reverse it. An arms race in outer space would undermine the prospects of nuclear disarmament, act as a catalyst to stimulate it and increase the risks of a nuclear war.

If mankind is not to be exposed to further dangers of a nuclear war, the route to take is through the reduction of nuclear arsenals on Earth and the prohibition of all weapons in space. It is illusory to think that the deployment of new weapons systems in space can remove the threat that nuclear weapons pose upon Earth.

The responsibility of the international community encompasses the broad dimensions of legal and political objectives that are necessary in accordance with the principles enunciated in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which states inter alia that:

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

"States shall carry on activities in outer space in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding."

It cannot be denied that space issues are very complex and the special responsibility of the space Powers should be recognized, as it is incumbent upon those who have at their disposal the means to conduct an arms race in space to take the necessary steps to prevent such a race from occurring.

Ambassador Théorin, Head of the Swedish delegation, in her statement on 5 February stated that:

"The most important reason for multilateral negotiations is that our world does not belong to the nuclear-weapon States alone. It belongs to all nations and peoples, to present as well as to future generations. It is not acceptable that our future should lie in the hands of the nuclear-weapon States."

Inspired by the appropriateness of this remark, we also venture to say that outer space does not belong to the super-Powers, for it has been recognized as the province of all mankind. Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty states:

"Outer space ... is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use of occupation, or by any other means."

Therefore, the multilateral approach to negotiations would require the strengthening of the existing legal regime in a comprehensive manner in order to prevent the appropriation of outer space for the purpose of conducting an arms race.

(Mr. Ould Rouis, Algeria)

The spectre of an armaments race in space also is becoming nearer. Everyone agrees that through its destabilizing effect, militarization of space can only increase the fragility of a balance which is already precarious and will seriously aggravate existing tensions. Any delay in embarking on negotiations on this matter, as we all know, can only reinforce hesitations, and make the conditions for an agreement or a narrowing of differences more difficult.

The adoption of General Assembly resolution 39/59 by 150 votes, without any opposition, even apart from the concerns which it expressed, in our eyes represents a positive step suggesting the possibility of a consensus on the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Conference.

CD/PV.295

28

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

There is another subject which occupies the attention of the international community, i.e. the prevention of the arms race in outer space, which, it should be recalled, constitutes the common heritage of mankind and should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.

With regard to the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, we note that for several months a certain momentum for negotiations has developed on this issue. The harbinger of this development was the adoption by the General Assembly in autumn 1984 of resolution 39/59, which was approved by a very large majority of Members of the United Nations and with no opposition.

Paragraph 8 of the resolution "requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its session in 1985, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

On the militarization of outer space, the entire world has learned with great interest of the decision of the United States and the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on space weapons on 12 March 1985.

These new developments are a source of great satisfaction to us. They are also for the Conference on Disarmament an encouraging reason for it to assume its responsibilities arising under both resolution 39/59 and paragraph 80 of the Final Document, which calls for international negotiations on this issue.

(The President)

Another important task to be performed by the Conference on Disarmament and for which it has received an express mandate from the General Assembly concerns the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are aware that this question is included in the agenda for the negotiations between the two principal nuclear Powers, but in this field also, regardless of the delicate negotiations which are to take place at the bilateral level, it is necessary for the Conference to carry out the task assigned to it. The world has been watching with profound concern the progress that is being made in research and testing with a view to the development of space weapon systems. Outer space is being transformed into a new dimension of the arms race having the special characteristic that both the arms race and the environment in which it will take place will be, as is the universe, infinite, and will absorb unlimited human and material resources.

CD/PV.296  
13 -14

(Mr. Lange, New Zealand)

Last year was a bleak year for disarmament negotiations at the global level and particularly in the bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers. As a result of the Soviet Union's regrettable decision to walk out of the two sets of negotiations being conducted in this city and then its failure to meet in September last year to discuss space weaponry, a whole year passed without the two sides even sitting down together at the bargaining table. New Zealand was not alone in speaking out against the unacceptability of that situation. There can be no justifiable reason for refusing to talk on these vital issues.

We learned with great satisfaction of the agreement reached in January this year for the resumption of comprehensive arms negotiations between the two major Powers. We are pleased that the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been included in the agenda.



(Mr. Dăescu, Romania)

In a few days, the city of Geneva will be the scene of the opening of the Soviet-United States bilateral negotiations, the objective of which, as indicated in the Joint Statement of 8 January 1985, is "to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth ...".

Another fact of considerable significance and relevance to our Conference is the constant and alarming increase in the use of outer space for military purposes. In contrast, the efforts that have been made and, above all, the results so far achieved through negotiations aimed at limiting and reversing this dangerous competition have been conspicuously meagre.

While we, in this Conference on Disarmament, are beginning a new debate on the prevention of the arms race in outer space, more than three-quarters of the satellites that are circling our globe are military or have military functions. According to SIPRI, by the end of the year 1983, 2,114 satellites had been placed in orbit for military purposes, covering a range of activities relating to photographic and electronic reconnaissance, surveillance of the seas, early warning of the launching of ballistic missiles, military communications, navigation and meteorology. All of these activities are designated by the Symbol C3.

The militarization of space has become a reality that forebodes a dismal and unpredictable future. And yet 18 years ago, on 27 January 1967, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was signed at London, Moscow and Washington. Eighty-five States have acceded to that Treaty which entered into force in October 1967.

(Mr. Dăscu, Romania)

The increasingly extensive military use of space proves that space technology currently forms an integral part of the conventional and nuclear weapons systems of the super-Powers. Since these activities are highly instrumental in improving the accuracy and, consequently, increasing the destructive power of missiles, facilitating the conduct and command of military operations and obtaining information of a military nature, they help to intensify the arms race and increase the danger of a nuclear war.

The tremendous advances that have been made in the military uses of outer space have led to the appearance of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT).

Once they become operational, these anti-satellite weapons, which have already been tested or are in the process of being tested, will constitute a new and highly dangerous stage in the arms race and will have unforeseeable implications for international peace and security.

The increasing dangers of the use of space technology for military purposes are a matter of international concern. The problems of the arms race in outer space were tackled within the framework of the Soviet-United States bilateral negotiations in 1978 and 1979. Various aspects of this question were also discussed by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the General Assembly of the United Nations. Finally, in 1982, the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space was placed on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

Several contributions and proposals on the subject of outer space have been submitted in our Conference. I wish to refer, in particular, to document CD/476 of 20 March 1984 entitled "Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space against the Earth", submitted by the delegation of the USSR; document CD/375 of 14 April 1983, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", submitted by the delegation of France; document CD/410 of 9 August 1983 entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", submitted by the delegation of Mongolia; and document CD/418 of 23 August 1983 containing a statement by the Group of 21 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In the light of Romania's position of principle with regard to disarmament problems, as set forth in document CD/545, and with a view to making a constructive contribution to this exchange of views, the Romanian delegation wishes to make a few comments.

First of all, we believe that questions concerning outer space should be approached on the basis of the recognized principle that space is the common heritage of mankind and should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. Consequently, the fundamental objective of our efforts should be to stop any use of outer space for military purposes. In other words, steps must be taken to ensure the complete demilitarization of outer space. Given the current existence of a multitude of military applications for satellites and the fact that space systems already constitute integral parts of some weapon systems and, in particular, of nuclear weapons systems, the pursuit of this fundamental goal must be regarded as a process of gradual adoption of practical measures conducive to the achievement of that final objective. This process must go hand in hand with the adoption of positive measures to achieve disarmament on Earth, particularly in the field of strategic weapons.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

Acceptance of the concept of this process must be accompanied by the declaration of a moratorium on all military activities in space. Such a moratorium on the development, testing and installation of new space systems of a military nature would constitute the requisite background for the adoption of measures aimed at the achievement of the final objective, namely the complete demilitarization of outer space.

As emphasized in Working Paper CD/545, "Romania considers it necessary for the United Nations to shoulder the responsibility for the conclusion of an international treaty on outer space. One possibility which could be envisaged would be the organization of a world conference and, possibly, the creation of a special agency for the defence of outer space".

Since 1959, the United Nations system has included a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space with two subsidiary bodies: the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee and the Legal Sub-Committee. Since its establishment, the Committee has served as a focal point for an exchange of data and information of a general technical nature. This body also supervised the preparation of legal documents relating to space that have been adopted by the United Nations. Reference should also be made to the fact that, at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (1978), France proposed the establishment of an international satellite agency to monitor disarmament agreements and zones of conflict. The implications of the establishment of such an agency formed the subject of a study prepared under the auspices of the United Nations (Document A/AC.206/14 of 1983).

Due to its primarily deliberative nature, the present framework of the United Nations system is unable to ensure access by all States and, in particular, by the developing countries, to peaceful space technology. Consequently, the practical applications and, primarily, those relating to remote sensing and telecommunications are left to commercial organizations such as INTELSAT and LANDSAT. Again, although the idea of the establishment of an international satellite agency is definitely of interest from the military standpoint, it does not meet the needs of the developing countries for free and direct access, on easy terms, to space technology.

This highlights the special importance of establishing a specialized United Nations agency for outer space with the two-fold task of ensuring the widest possible access by all States to space technology and undertaking various control and surveillance operations that are currently being carried out exclusively by the space Powers. Such a body would have to reconcile a wide variety of political, legal, military, economic and commercial requirements.

For this reason, we are firmly convinced that the Conference on Disarmament should play a major role in the negotiations on this subject. We support the

(Mr. Dateu, Romania)

idea of the establishment, without delay, of an ad hoc committee for the immediate initiation of negotiations on the prevention of the arms race in outer space.

In our view, the consultations that have taken place on this subject have clearly shown the possibilities for the achievement of a consensus in this respect in this Conference. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that an agreement in principle has been reached on the establishment of such an ad hoc committee.

It is widely accepted that we can begin our activities in this connection with a study of the present state of affairs, in other words, of the existing legal commitments and the proposals submitted by various States.

It is also widely believed that this exercise should lead to the adoption of practical measures aimed at the prevention of all aspects of an arms race in outer space, as has frequently been emphasized by the General Assembly of the United Nations. We would like to see this idea expressed as clearly as possible in the terms of reference of the ad hoc committee.

The only remaining problem is to reach agreement on a universally acceptable text expressing the consensus that could already be clearly detected, one year ago, in this Conference.

We are confident that this will soon be achieved.

As a constructive contribution by my delegation to this process, I would like to assure you, Mr. President, of our flexibility with regard to the actual phrasing of the terms of reference of the ad hoc committee. This attitude derives from our keen interest in having practical negotiations as soon as possible on the prevention of the arms race in outer space.

International law, as an instrument of peace, is lagging too far behind in comparison with the frightful momentum of the forces of destruction that already exist in arsenals or are in the process of being created in laboratories.

It is here in this Conference, which is universally accepted as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, that practical measures and effective, operative instruments of international law must be devised, tested and proposed to the international community.

This is the task to which the members of this Conference should devote all of their efforts.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina)

When, in early 1982, the then Committee on Disarmament decided -- not without some difficulty, as you will recall -- to include in its agenda the item "prevention of an arms race in outer space", the news was received with great satisfaction by persons who take an interest in disarmament and in the preservation of outer space as a geographical area for exclusively peaceful activities for the benefit of mankind.

This was regarded as a good sign because multilateral activity in this field seemed to be at a standstill. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, had been concluded 15 years previously and, since then, only the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies had been adopted, but it was considered to be only of relative importance.

Only the bilateral approach produced any results. Negotiations on anti-satellite systems were held in 1978 and 1979, but they were interrupted without achieving any tangible results. The 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems was an important achievement, but SALT I and II dealt only marginally with outer space questions.

Such issues were also scarcely touched upon in the 1973 International Telecommunications Convention. There was, however, an obvious need to deal in greater depth with the topics discussed in 1967.

It is paradoxical that so little international activity was going on in an area where scientific and technological progress was being made so rapidly and at a time when it was more than obvious that major confrontations on land would inevitably spread to outer space and would, if they were to be won, require the development of new and sophisticated means of destruction.

Despite this obvious fact, the discussions -- which had, as I said above, reached a standstill in 1982 -- continued to stagnate. The inclusion of item 5 in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament was not followed by substantive debate in any subsidiary body. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was also unable to deal with important and related aspects of this multifaceted question.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

In this disturbing context, it is a matter of particular importance that the United States and the Soviet Union, the two major space Powers, have decided, during the bilateral negotiations that are to begin on 12 March, to discuss the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The mere fact that such an important problem is on the negotiating table is in itself a positive development. As everyone is aware, however, the range of questions covered by this problem is so broad and complex that, even with the best will in the world, the discussions will be lengthy and difficult. In view of the scope and variety of outer space issues, purely bilateral negotiations — even between the two space Powers — can in no way cover, much less exhaust, all the many aspects of this problem, which directly or indirectly affects other States and the international community as a whole. It must be borne in mind that, although two countries have achieved definite superiority in this field, they are not the only occupants of outer space. Other States are gradually becoming increasingly involved in space activities. European countries, the European Space Agency, the People's Republic of China, Japan and even developing countries show by their acts that this new environment is of interest to all.

The Conference on Disarmament thus continues to have an important role to play in the discussion of topics with regard to which a multilateral approach is not only appropriate, but essential.

It must not be forgotten that the rules governing the various environments in which mankind's activities are being carried out, i.e. land, sea, air and, now, outer space, require a genuinely multilateral approach, no matter what scientific and economic advantages some countries or groups of countries may have.

It must also be recognized that the outer space agreements concluded thus far are only the very first steps on the long road ahead, on which there is still a great deal of ground to be covered.

Although we should not underestimate the importance of the 1967 Treaty, rightly called the Magna Carta of Space, and of other international agreements, even a superficial analysis of the scope of such documents clearly shows that they do not cover broad sectors of outer space activity. There may be differences of opinion on which aspects most urgently require international regulation. There may even be differences of opinion on whether a particular problem or activity does or does not require further or more extensive regulation, but I believe that no one may reasonably maintain that the existing legal rules are complete or adequate and that no new instruments therefore have to be negotiated.

Ambassador Peter Jankowitsch, Chairman of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, rightly stated that a brief analysis of the existing rules on space weapons control gives a picture which is certainly incomplete and to which there is no over-all approach. This becomes clear if it is taken into account that the treaties and agreements in question are not exclusively and specifically aimed at the control of weapons in space; they do contain rules of this kind, but they are by-products of other concepts.

It is obvious that the Conference on Disarmament is concerned with only part of the outer space problem, namely, that relating, as stated in agenda item 5, to the "prevention of an arms race in outer space". In my view, the agenda item is correctly worded, since there may still be some basis for saying that such an

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

arms race has not really begun. There may still be some slight hope of preventing it. What definitely cannot be prevented — as is, in a way, implicitly recognized, by its absence, in the title of item 5 — is the militarization of outer space, which has already begun. That should, of course, not prevent the Conference on Disarmament from considering this problem and trying to find some means of controlling it.

It is now high time the Conference on Disarmament gave specific content to the item it included in its agenda nearly three years ago. It is urgently necessary to establish a subsidiary body that is willing and able to assume a task that is not only difficult and complex, but absolutely essential.

The ad hoc committee of the Conference is under a moral obligation to set up a subsidiary body which should begin its work with a substantive examination of the problems involved in the use of outer space for military and warlike purposes and decide which ones are and are not taken into account in existing legal instruments. If it finds that some of these problems are taken into account, it then has to determine whether the relevant rules are satisfactory or adequate.

The 1967 Treaty has been described as a "framework" agreement which would serve as a basis for further agreements or protocols covering specific questions. It must, in any event, be used as a starting point for the further legal efforts that have to be made.

It should be recalled that there are already proposals and initiatives that are awaiting study, such as the draft Additional Protocol to the 1967 Treaty submitted by Italy in 1979, the two draft Treaties submitted by the Soviet Union in 1981 and 1983 and the proposal made in 1983 by the Union of Concerned Scientists in the United States. In addition, the Conference on Disarmament has heard very interesting statements in recent years and many delegations have offered ideas and suggestions that deserve careful consideration.

On the basis of a preliminary in-depth study by the ad hoc committee of the Conference, we would have to decide how to fill all the gaps that are bound to remain; to determine not only which questions are to be negotiated first, for negotiations will certainly be necessary, whether on the basis of one or more agreements, but also whether they should be discussed simultaneously or one after another and whether they should be dealt with separately or jointly; and to consider such other matters as the possible relationship between multilateral negotiations and the bilateral negotiations that will be going on at the same time.

In this connection, the first question that will have to be discussed is that of satellites and their protection. This is, of course, not an easy problem and it may be worth commenting on because it is typical of the overlapping between civilian and military matters that characterizes the outer space problem.

As far as the general public is concerned, satellites are the most obvious example of the way outer space is used, since they directly affect daily life. Television programmes, weather forecasts and communications in general are everyday examples of the benefits to be derived from the peaceful uses of outer space through satellites.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The fact of the matter is, however, that three quarters of the satellites that have been placed in orbit serve a military purpose. By late 1983, over 2,000 military satellites had been launched.

We are all aware that military satellites may serve various purposes. The most common ones are reconnaissance satellites, which perform a wide range of tasks. It is estimated that 40 per cent of the satellites now in existence take photographs of what is happening on Earth. Potential enemy territory is subjected to careful and constant scrutiny and possible military objectives can be precisely identified. The oceans and seas are constantly being monitored and ships and even submarines can be located with great accuracy. Electronic reconnaissance satellites are designed to detect the enemy's military communications, up to 80 per cent of which are transmitted by satellite.

It has repeatedly been stated that, in the final analysis, such satellites have a stabilizing effect. They can be used to verify compliance with disarmament agreements and constitute so-called "national means of verification", which are specifically provided for in some bilateral conventions. They can also give advance warning of surprise attacks and, compared with the radar systems they have partially replaced, they can double the amount of available reaction time.

These and other additional reasons appear to indicate that it is appropriate and even necessary to guarantee satellite protection and hence to prohibit anti-satellite systems.

Like all other outer space issues, however, this question is not an easy one. One characteristic of space objects is their duality: they may serve civilian or military purposes; they may be used for peaceful, defensive or offensive purposes; and in some cases their activities may even be extremely difficult to define. Consequently, one of the first points that will have to be considered in connection with the prevention of an arms race in outer space is a way of satisfactorily defining what a space "weapon" actually is. The miniaturization of nuclear devices which are not very powerful, but are extremely accurate adds a new dimension to this problem.

As I said, the problem of satellite protection is a complex one because, although satellites may have stabilizing effects and may be regarded as serving a useful purpose, there is no doubt that, during armed conflict, they would be an extremely valuable means of monitoring enemy movements and locating targets, as well as of guiding and correcting missile trajectories and launch paths. It is obvious that, in such a case, the temptation to destroy the enemy's satellites would be hard to resist. It must not be forgotten that, for years, the Soviet Union has been testing an anti-satellite system and that the United States is now testing another more sophisticated system. The same technologies may, moreover, be used both for anti-satellite systems and for defensive anti-missile ballistic systems. This is why it has been maintained that it serves no purpose to prohibit the former and allow the latter.

In view of this situation, the solution to the problem of satellite protection will be no easy matter. The right balance will have to be struck between safeguarding the positive results of satellite activity and preventing the development, under cover of legality, of military systems whose mere existence gives those who possess them decisive superiority in any conflict that may occur.



(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

In the discussion of this topic, account must be taken of the French proposal for an international satellite monitoring agency, whose establishment would, as has been determined, be technically, legally and financially possible, although, as usual, the necessary political will is lacking.

There is so much to be done in this field and so much is expected of serious and responsible multilateral negotiations that there can be no justification for any further delay in the initiation of this process.

As has been said on so many occasions -- and all the more so in the case of outer space -- developments are taking place at a pace that is all out of proportion with the efforts that are being made to give them a proper legal framework.

It is worth giving an obvious example of the foregoing. The problem of satellite protection, to which I have just referred, was, not long ago, the main -- although obviously not the only -- topic of concern in the outer space field. In the past couple of years, however, President Reagan's so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" has come to dominate the scene. This is neither the time nor the place to describe what the initiative covers and involves. The discussion of the topic that began on the day following 23 March 1983 was heard throughout the world and an even more intense and passionate debate is taking place in the United States itself, an open society which can freely and publicly discuss the advantages and disadvantages and even the feasibility of an initiative that is likely to change the current situation radically.

By reading articles, speeches and statements -- or even some of them, since they seem to be in inexhaustible supply -- we may have a fairly clear idea of what is at stake and what the twenty-first century holds out for us, if in fact the world survives until then. I would, of course, not venture to pass judgement on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the initiative, not only because I lack authority to do so, but also because it is so complex and involves so many variables that no definite and concrete conclusions can be reached in respect of it at the present time. It is all still at the research stage -- and will be for several years to come -- but it will presumably shed light on many of the unknowns we now face.

There is, however, no doubt that this initiative has introduced a new dimension in the outer space field and that no bilateral or multilateral efforts to deal with the outer space problem can leave aside or ignore the new situation. The prospects it offers are enormous and important and the international community cannot fail to take them into account in the framework of international efforts to bring outer space under regulation. Many of the procedures and technologies that are now the subject of ordinary, day-to-day discussion are perhaps not new and have, in the past, been reviewed in specialized publications and articles, but there is no denying the fact that the Strategic Defence Initiative has focused attention on them and has made them more important than ever before.

It is obvious that we are on the eve of a new phase in the space race. This is an undeniable fact, whichever way we look at it. We will witness renewed space activities that will require investments of thousands of millions, in whatever currency. I believe that we can rightly ask whether such incalculable expenditure is really justified in a world that continues to face and is still unable to solve problems of food, health, housing and education.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The future will have an answer to this question. In the meantime, we, in our particular field of endeavour, face the need to undertake a long-delayed task: that of preventing an arms race in outer space.

We will thus be complying with a demand that has repeatedly been made by the international community. Resolution 39/59, adopted at the most recent General Assembly, eloquently reflects such general concern, which the Delhi Declaration of 28 January 1985 expressed in the following terms: "Outer space must be used for the benefit of mankind as a whole, not as a battle-ground of the future. We therefore call for the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons. An arms race in space would be enormously costly and have grave destabilizing effects. It would also endanger a number of arms limitation and disarmament agreements".

Nothing must delay the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Conference to deal with agenda item 5. I think we all realize that this is urgently necessary and essential. We have lost enough time now and we have to get down to work.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Prevention of an arms race in space -- the topic to which, in accordance with our work programme, today's meeting should be devoted -- is one such item. It is to it that I intend to devote the major part of my statement.

It is certainly significant that the prevention of an arms race in space should have been included in the bilateral negotiations, within the broader context of a reaffirmation of the link between the role of defence systems and reduction of offensive nuclear armaments. In the view of the Italian Government, the bilateral negotiations should set themselves the short-term objective of a radical reduction of nuclear-weapons and the longer-term objective of avoidance of competition likely to lead to an uncontrolled militarization of space, which might have destabilizing consequences. It is desirable to establish some discipline for the military use of space so as to contribute to the strengthening of strategic stability. The ABM Treaty of 1972 constitutes, from this standpoint, a stable reference point that should serve as point of departure for the bilateral negotiations which should then develop in the future. The undertaking to observe

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

the ABM Treaty and effective verification of observance of the obligations arising from that Treaty form the basis for a constructive discussion of the role which anti-ballistic-missile systems can play, in the future, as a means of strengthening deterrence and increasing stability.

This whole subject must be dealt with, moreover, in a realistic manner. It is well known that space has long been used for military purposes. In so far as this use has stabilizing effects, it has never been challenged. Remote detection ensures protection against enemy attack by permitting observation of large-scale military movements or preparations, as well as verification of disarmament agreements. The satellites employed for these purposes are an important factor of stability. Their protection is therefore necessary and must be ensured by effective and verifiable agreements or by discouraging any attack likely to prevent the satellites from performing their functions.

While discussion of the most appropriate means of preventing an arms race in space is about to begin between the two major space Powers as a primary element of a more extensive negotiation on nuclear disarmament, this does not mean that the Conference on Disarmament has no role to play in this field. Moreover, my own delegation, like the other Western delegations, strongly maintained at the most recent session of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which was held in Vienna last June, that the Conference on Disarmament was indeed the body competent to discuss this question.

The Conference on Disarmament has so far been deprived --- owing to a difference of views, which I consider far from insurmountable, regarding the mandate of a subsidiary body --- of the possibility of undertaking serious and practical work on this matter. My delegation believes that in view of the scope and complexity of the subject, the Conference can perform its own function as a multilateral body without interfering in the forthcoming bilateral negotiations. General aspects of space law are a matter of justifiable interest to the international community as a whole. In particular, it would seem useful for this Conference to begin discussing in detail the scope of the existing rules relating to the peaceful use of space, as well as any deficiencies in those rules.

There are also specific and practical aspects on which, as the distinguished representatives of Romania and Argentina pointed out at today's meeting, the Conference can and should work and on which proposals and suggestions have been made by several delegations, including the Italian delegation.

A thorough, practical discussion, free of propaganda aims and conducted in a subsidiary body given an appropriate mandate, would not only be useful to the Conference, but might make a far from negligible contribution to the bilateral talks.

The time has therefore come to modify an approach which has proved, during the last two sessions, to lead to paralysis. The problem is not one of deciding whether or not to include future negotiations in the mandate of a subsidiary body, but rather of responding immediately to the need to study the question as a whole, to identify more clearly the areas in which a multilateral negotiation body such as ours can make a useful contribution -- in other words, to move on from discussion of the formal organizational aspects to a substantive work programme.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

The rapprochement of positions which took place at the latest session of the General Assembly of the United Nations should certainly not be over-estimated. It is quite clear that there are still differences of view on highly important aspects of this question.

The rapprochement is nevertheless a good sign; it should serve to convince us that, if we are capable of initiating a process of discussion on the basic problem of the military use of space and of examining objectively the various positions on this subject, we shall thus have created the conditions for progress towards the negotiation of multilateral agreements. The latter are more likely to be the result of a collective effort to consider the various aspects of the problem of space than the consequence of a formal instruction contained in a mandate. In this field, as in others, we must benefit from past experience and recognize that the gradual approach is the one most likely to enable us to attain our objectives.

CD/PV.296

41

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

My delegation has denied itself the opportunity of participating in the general exchange of views in the first few weeks of the Conference because the positions of the Sri Lanka delegation on the various items of our agenda remain well known and unchanged. Today the Conference commences its discussion on item 5 of the agenda, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is a subject with which the Sri Lanka delegation has been closely associated for some time both here and in the United Nations General Assembly. My delegation supported the proposal to move the discussion of this vitally important subject on our agenda to an earlier date in the work programme of our current session in view of the importance of the subject. We have watched the subject in its transition from what appeared to be a slice of science fiction to being perhaps today the single most important development in the arms race.

A week from today there will begin in this city the bilateral talks between the United States and the USSR, the declared objective of which, according to the Joint Statement issued on 8 January 1985, will be "... to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth and limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability". This decision to have the talks include the prevention of an arms race in outer space comes in the wake of the abortive attempt to inaugurate similar talks in Vienna last year. These talks could not have come at a more opportune moment than now when the world is poised at the edge of a precipice threatening to hurl us all into a bottomless pit of an arms competition in space more horrifying and expensive than any known in the history of mankind. My delegation cannot but welcome the bilateral talks. We endorse the statement of the Group of 21 made in the Conference on Disarmament on 19 February. If, however, our optimism is tempered with caution there is good reason for this. We have witnessed previous bilateral talks ending in stalemate or being prolonged endlessly with no practical results. In fact, according to

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

the World Security Council, a California-based Non-Governmental Organization, United States and Soviet diplomats and negotiators have met on over 6,000 occasions since 1945 with a view to ban weapon systems. Yet they have not eliminated one weapon system.

There is more reason for our caution than this. Ever since the Joint Statement of 8 January, we have heard with dismay conflicting statements on the interrelationship among the various aspects of the agenda for the talks. More depressing has been the undiminished desire to continue with space weapons programmes, indeed to accelerate them and even advance by two years their date of testing. What reason have we in this single multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations for optimism in the face of this? Will we at least be assured that the parties to the talks will do us the courtesy, and fulfil the obligation, of informing the Conference on Disarmament of the progress of their talks? My delegation for its part considers this need for regular information on the bilateral negotiations an essential requirement in order that the link between bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations can be maintained. The message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the 1985 session of the Conference on Disarmament referred specifically to this aspect: "The consideration of this subject like that of nuclear war and nuclear testing, illustrates very clearly the close linkage between bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations at the present time. Everything should be done to ensure that the approaches in one strengthens the prospects of progress in the other."

The Conference on Disarmament has a vital role in the talks on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We were glad to note that the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, speaking on 12 February, recognized this by stating, "This Conference could begin its complementary multilateral work with a comprehensive examination of existing multilateral agreements. There is much that the Conference can usefully consider in this vital area ...". There are indeed many multilateral treaties relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space which have first to be examined in the context of modern developments in space weapons which impinge on them. This task and the negotiation of an agreement or agreements to remedy the inadequacies in existing treaties to prevent an arms race in outer space is one in which all nations should be engaged on an equal basis. This is only one aspect of the work that can be usefully undertaken in an ad hoc committee on agenda item 5.

We approach our task of negotiating on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on Disarmament this year in a more propitious climate. I refer specifically to resolution 39/59 of the most recent United Nations General Assembly in which my delegation, together with the Egyptian delegation, were closely involved. The unique significance of this resolution, in contrast to its predecessors, is the fact that it was the only resolution adopted on the subject despite there being four resolutions at one stage, and that not a single Member State voted against it. The number of 150 Member States voting for the resolution, with one abstention, is impressive not because we are playing a simplistic numbers game but because it does reflect a wide international consensus on a crucial issue. In essence the resolution represents the undisputed universal commitment of the international community, speaking with one voice, to the basic principles underlying the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There is no doubt that the resolution represented the highest common factor among all delegations that the Charter principle of the renunciation of the threat or use of force in international relations should be implemented in the arena of outer space. What is of particular relevance to us

(Mr. Dhananala, Sri Lanka)

is the acknowledgement in the resolution that the Conference on Disarmament has the primary role in negotiating multilateral agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the request that the Conference should consider this question as a matter of priority, intensify its consideration of the matter and establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its 1985 session with a view to undertaking negotiations.

We are now faced with a crucial test. The Conference's response to resolution 39/59 is of vital importance. The initial consultations which began last month revealed a congruence of views on the need to move forward on this item and establish an ad hoc committee. The Group of 21 has its proposals but has indicated a willingness to look at other proposals. There is little time to lose and our exercise must be imbued with a sense of urgency. The development of research programmes on space weapons is being accelerated. We are under no illusions about being in a state of innocence. It has been estimated that since the first military satellite was put into orbit more than 25 years ago nearly 2,000 spacecraft or some 75 per cent of all spacecraft have been launched for fully operational military functions. In other words, three out of four satellites in orbit are military. Until recently all these served non-offensive purposes, providing support for military operations on Earth rather than being a means to attack or destroy enemy targets. Now for the first time we are on the threshold of introducing offensive-purpose spacecraft and thus the "weaponization" of space is an imminent danger. We are fortunately also at a stage when we can prevent this weaponization of space if there is the political will to do so on the part of those who have the capability to weaponize space. Weaponization can take place under different guises. The experts will doubtless argue exhaustively on the distinction and possible relationship between offensive systems and defensive systems. The crucial difference appears to my delegation to lie in the intention and not so much in the technical aspects. It is rather like the distinction between a nuclear test for peaceful purposes and a nuclear test as part of a nuclear-weapons programme. Equally blurred is the line between deterrence and provocation. The fundamental point is that these research programmes seek to produce space systems which are inherently destabilizing. There are no "good" weapons and "bad" weapons. Expert opinion is that most space weapons can be used for both ASAT offensive and BMD defensive purposes. Anti-satellite weapons developments will have the effect not of creating stability but rather of causing distrust and instability. The fact that these systems could destroy satellites using beam-weapons with little warning time will inevitably lead to attempts by one side to pre-empt the other. It also increases dangerously the risk of war by technical error or even the accidental collision of satellites. First-strike scenarios will re-emerge to replace mutually-assured destruction and standard countervailing strategies, making a fragile peace still more so.

As I have stated earlier in this forum, surely the prevention of an arms race in outer space is an easier task than attempting to control and decelerate such a race after it has begun. We are being fed a daily dose of sophisticated propaganda on the virtue of ballistic missile defence systems in space. They are even portrayed as being systems with the potential of rendering nuclear weapons obsolete as if a once-and-for-all outlay of \$26 billion will end the present annual cost of \$1,000 billion on armaments and buy us the long-awaited insurance from the horror of nuclear war, including the proven prospect of a nuclear winter and the extinction of normal human life as we now know it. The cogent arguments that have appeared against the weaponization of space and the defence systems envisaged have focused on one programme — the much publicized Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) announced by the United States. These arguments are lucidly

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

expressed in the New York Times editorial which was reproduced in the International Herald Tribune of 25 February 1985. However, these arguments are equally applicable to any country contemplating unpublicized but similar programmes. We have not after all had any unilateral renunciation of the weaponization of space comparable to the declaration of non-first-use of nuclear weapons. The strategic doctrines of both super-Powers do incorporate new military space technologies. We recognize that the arguments being advanced against SDI emanate from different sources and for different reasons. Some oppose SDI because it runs counter to the strategic theories advanced in support of the possession of nuclear weapons which will be rendered obsolete by the weaponization of space and which may even provoke a conventional war. There is no such thing as the ultimate weapon system. It does not stand to reason. As long as there is no agreement on general and complete disarmament there will be weapon systems and an arms race based on theories of deterrence and on the inevitable desire of one party to achieve superiority over the other. This will involve the deployment of resources and scientific expertise on designing new and better weapon systems and defence systems. A defence shield based in space may succeed in achieving superiority for some time but it will only be a matter of time before a similar if not better system is developed by the other side. A perfect leak-proof defence system is thus a mirage. The rationale and the impetus for an arms race in space are the same as for an arms race on Earth and no amount of sophistry can obscure this basic fact.

It follows from the above that we must move to act speedily on preventing an arms race in outer space now. From the consultations that have proceeded it appears clear that there is consensus on the need to establish an ad hoc committee. What is in dispute is the mandate. A considerable amount of useful work was accomplished last year in evolving a mandate acceptable to all sides but these efforts ran aground on what appeared to my delegation to be a simple desire to assert the fundamental goal of our efforts. We accept that we are assembled in this Conference in pursuance of paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We recognize that this is therefore the single negotiating forum on disarmament. And yet some of us refrain from acknowledging that our objective in discussing the prevention of an arms race in outer space is the negotiation of an agreement or agreements on the subject. The bilateral statement of 8 January 1985, stated unambiguously that: "The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth and limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability". If the objective of the bilateral talks on space could be stated in such clear simple terms, what is the difficulty of doing so in this multilateral forum? The argument is advanced that the basis for negotiations must first be reached before we can negotiate. At no stage has the Group of 21 rejected the need for an exploratory stage in order to identify issues. But this task is very clearly a prelude to the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space. Why else would we indulge in this time-consuming process of defining the issues and exploring the subject? We do not know how long this exploratory stage will last but we are prepared to accept such a stage because we know that there is a final objective and a destination in the journey we are embarking on. We have to look down the road we are to take to ensure that

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

it is not a blind alley. The space Powers do not argue that the Conference on Disarmament is irrelevant in the negotiations of a ban on space weapons. They would be grossly mistaken if they did so. The nuclear-weapon-States realize the dangers of horizontal nuclear proliferation. It must also be realized that the weaponization of space is not a capability that will forever be a monopoly of two nations. We are today witnessing a vertical proliferation of space weapons which has to be arrested now.

The work programme awaiting the ad hoc committee is a formidable one. We have heard today some interesting proposals for consideration. My delegation stated in this forum two years ago that we subscribed to a comprehensive approach to the subject. I am convinced that the reiteration of our proposals is not redundant as they could still be considered as a possible point of departure or as terms of reference for consideration in an ad hoc committee. Of course they may be altered or revised as the case may be in examination of the subject in pursuit of an ultimate ban on any kind of space weapon or weapon system in its entirety. It is relevant to quote the elements of this approach as it was set out then: (i) it looks at the issue as a single integrated one that is made up of several aspects; (ii) it addresses itself to sealing off outer space in its entirety as an arena of the arms race; (iii) it calls for the setting up of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament as the vehicle for carrying out negotiations to draft an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent the extension of the arms race into outer space; (iv) it is flexible in its formulation, providing for taking up on a priority basis, if that is called for, particular aspects of the issue within a comprehensive, all-inclusive framework; (v) by being comprehensive it is not discriminatory or weighted to one side; and (vi) it has the expressed support of the States Members of the United Nations and of this Conference.

A vast body of technical expertise exists within the international scientific community which could be called upon to assist the ad hoc committee in its task. This expertise is not confined to the space Powers alone. Again, two years ago the Sri Lanka delegation in this forum proposed that the task of a subsidiary body would include, inter alia: (a) the prohibition of the stationing in orbit around the Earth, on any celestial body or at any other location in outer space of any weapon which has been designed to inflict injury or cause any other form of damage on the Earth, in the atmosphere or on objects placed in space; (b) the prohibition of the testing, production, deployment or use of any space-based, air-based or ground-based weapons system which is designed to damage, destroy or interfere with the functioning of any space-craft of any nation; and (c) the examination of the feasibility of extending Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 to include a ban on all kinds of weapons from space, including all weapons based in space for use against any target and all anti-satellite weapons regardless of where they are based. Our task is not an easy one but it is also not an impossible one. The research that is going on is consuming vast amounts of resources and manpower. The bilateral talks begin next week despite the continuation of these research programmes and the existence of at least one ASAT system in space. We must — in this fortieth anniversary year of the United Nations — endeavour to end this headlong rush into a twenty-first century arms race in outer space by exercising not only our instinct of self-preservation but also the intelligence and the great reserves of the human spirit that demand that we act together for our common survival. An arms race in space is a technological obscenity.



(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

It is an opportune moment, when the bilateral talks are about to begin and we are considering complementary multilateral negotiation on preventing an arms race in outer space, to consider interim steps to make outer space a weapon-free zone. My delegation would support: first, a moratorium on the testing and development of space weapons as an immediate step thus ensuring that the AEM Treaty of 1972 is kept intact; next, in pursuance of the new United States Law signed by President Reagan on 30 October 1984, more East-West ventures in space should be developed and implemented as confidence-building measures pending the conclusion of a United States-Soviet space co-operation agreement embracing joint ventures in space medicine, space biology, space rescue, planetary science, manned and unmanned space exploration. We will then be set on an irreversible path of co-operation rather than confrontation in space. It will generate a change in political climate apart from harnessing scientific ingenuity for peace and not for conflict.

My delegation would also support an agreement on non-first use of ASAT weapons. What is the alternative? The world-renowned space writer, Dr. Arthur C. Clarke, who addressed the Committee on Disarmament in 1982 as a member of my delegation, has written in the context of discussing the possibility of projectile or beam weapons intercepting and destroying ICBMs in their boost phase: "Even if a 90% kill rate could be achieved, what would that imply? It has been pointed out that a full-scale thermonuclear exchange would be equivalent to 'World War Two once a second, for the length of a lazy afternoon'. So if a ballistic missile defence system was a brilliant success, it might merely give you World War Two every ten seconds. Either way, the result would make 'The Day After' look like an optimistic exercise in wishful thinking."

CD/PV.297

10 -11

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

The Conference on Disarmament should act promptly and resolutely to prevent a new chapter of the arms race from being opened in outer space. We must not allow one more chance to be missed again. We should like to express our concern about the unforeseeable consequences if the development of space weapons technology is not checked in time, before it causes serious strategic and political disturbances in the world. We should not like to enter into discussion whether a fool-proof nuclear missile defence system is technically feasible, nor to question the motives to commence its intensive research. One thing is certain, however: this will accelerate the arms race. There already exist some concrete proposals for the Conference's work concerning outer space. On the basis of these and any other proposals which may be submitted as well as an agreed mandate and programme of work, the ad hoc committee should start its deliberations without delay.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

One can say that practically all effective disarmament measures would contribute to the lessening of the danger of nuclear war. Be it the achievement of the NTB, greatly assisting the cessation of the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons and the development of new models and types of such weapons; or prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons or the prevention of an arms race in other high-risk areas, e.g. outer space. All these measures would undoubtedly contribute to averting the threat of nuclear war. We are also ready to consider various confidence-building measures, such as the prevention of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, the avoidance of the possibility of surprise attacks etc. But we continue to maintain that all these confidence-building measures can contribute towards the diminishing of the nuclear threat only in conjunction with far-reaching political undertakings in that field.

Mr. Issraelyan (Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics)

Today the Soviet delegation would like to advance some considerations regarding one of the priority issues on the agenda of this Conference, namely that of preventing an arms race in space.

It is well known that the age of peaceful space exploration began on 4 October 1957, the day when the Soviet Union launched the world's first artificial Earth satellite, presenting our planet with a tiny man-made "moon". More than a quarter of a century has since elapsed. During those years man's labour and creative genius have sent into orbit thousands of satellites, reached the Moon and sent unmanned research craft to distant planets. Over 140 envoys of mankind have voyaged in outer space. The first among them was our countryman Yuri Gagarin. His spaceflight on 12 April 1961 marked one of man's greatest victories over the forces of nature. Following Gagarin's trail went entire crews of space travellers, and then for the first time man dared to leave his spacecraft and walk in space.

At first spaceflights were conducted for the sole purpose of research, but later they became progressively oriented to serve more practical, "earthly" needs. Satellites, rocket probes, interplanetary unmanned research spacecraft, manned spacecraft and orbital stations enabled mankind to learn much about the Earth and its surroundings.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Space technology has provided breakthroughs in communication and navigation, in geodesy and map-making, in long-term weather forecasting and monitoring of the environment, in studying natural resources and spotting the crews of ships and aircraft in distress. The COSPAS-SARSAT system for the search of vessels and aircraft in distress can be an example of successful international co-operation in the use of space for the benefit of mankind. The system, developed by the joint efforts of the USSR, the United States, Canada and France, has already helped to rescue over 350 people from different countries.

Space technology has helped astronomers to "see" the hidden side of the Moon and take pictures of Venus and Mars, to gather fascinating data about the Sun and to travel as far as Jupiter and Saturn.

Another example of fruitful co-operation among different States in the peaceful exploration of outer space is the space station aimed at Venus and Halley's Comet and launched from the Soviet Union in December 1984 in the presence of a number of foreign guests including representatives of the European Space Agency and the French minister of scientific research and technology. Participating in this daring project, known as "Vega", along with France and the Soviet Union, are Austria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia.

The prophetic words of our great countryman Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, who believed that space exploration would bring mankind "mountains of grain and oceans of power", are beginning to come true. That man of wisdom and foresight also formulated another precious thought: "Man is acquiring a universal sea, granted to him as if deliberately in order to bind all people together into a single entity, a single family ...".

Exploration of space, penetration into its depths and utilization of its unique properties, and the development of space technology itself, constitute an entirely new and highly specific area of human activity. On the one hand, enormous opportunities for progress are offered to mankind, but on the other hand, activities in this area can bring the world infinite woe. It all depends on how we use these technologies, since there is no basic difference between rockets designed for peaceful space research and those used for military purposes.

Regrettably, space is associated not only with the names of Gagarin and Armstrong, or with joint international research projects and television linkups between peoples of various continents. Space can also be the source of mortal danger for the whole of mankind, if turned into an arena of enmity and confrontation.

To be sure, the international community has not just arrived at this conclusion. It was precisely in recognition of the potential dangers of space militarization that a number of treaties now in force were drafted to include provisions foreclosing certain possible avenues for an arms race in space. Those agreements have established some prerequisites for continuing the efforts to ensure a peaceful regime of outer space. However, the subsequent course of events has proved them far from sufficient. But why is it precisely now that it becomes more urgent than ever to take radical steps to ensure that mankind could live without fearing that the outer space it has yearned to reach for millenia will be the source of its destruction? Why do the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, in particular at its latest session, call for immediate action towards that end? What has happened? The answer to this question is close at hand. It was the adoption by the United States of its vast space militarization programme that made the entire world realize that all the horrors which hitherto belonged to the realm of theoretical speculation or pessimistic science fiction now clearly threaten to become a present-day reality.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The "Star Wars" programme announced by the President of the United States in his March 1983 address envisages the development of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements, as well as the creation of antisatellite weapons. It is on these two goals, along with the planned military use of the Shuttle spacecraft, that the United States Administration's efforts to spread the arms race into outer space are concentrated.

The programme envisages the deployment of a multilayered ABM defence system composed of several tiers and designed to "shield" United States territory. It is planned to develop a system capable of destroying the other side's missiles in the boost phase, at the very beginning of their launch into space towards their targets, or later as they fly through space, as well as during the final stage of their trajectory at re-entry into the atmosphere. According to the system's advocates, it will allow the United States effectively to defend itself against a massive nuclear strike and thus render nuclear weapons themselves "impotent and obsolete". They even go as far as to portray the deployment of combat systems in outer space as something of a panacea, as virtually the only way to achieve nuclear disarmament and to ensure universal peace, stability and prosperity. Let us now, however, look and see if this is indeed the case and if the global prospects offered by those programmes are indeed so bright.

The first question to be raised is that of stability and international security. The Soviet Union has consistently favoured the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms and eventual nuclear disarmament, but it remains a fact of life today that stability in the presence of nuclear weapons is assured by the over-all military and strategic balance. To maintain strategic stability is, in particular, the purpose of the 1972 ABM Treaty concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States, which is, as is well known, of unlimited duration. The deployment by either side of a new large-scale ABM system with space-based elements would actually mean seeking to create a "shield" for protection against the retaliatory strike after a first strike has been delivered. Expert analysis demonstrates that any such calculations are totally groundless and that a nuclear aggression can achieve nothing but a global nuclear conflagration which will incinerate everyone including the aggressor. Yet for all the delusiveness of such hopes, the very temptation of committing an aggression with impunity would be a psychological poison which would erode stability.

The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to competition in the buildup of any armaments, including space weapons. It is all too obvious, however, that in the face of a threat from space it will be forced to take actions reliably to guarantee its security. The choice is not ours, but we shall have to act to redress the strategic balance. The equilibrium will be redressed, but at a higher level of armaments. Will the security of all nations, including the United States itself, be enhanced once it rests on still greater piles of weaponry? We believe that this question too has an obvious answer.

In this connection we cannot disagree with the opinion expressed by such authoritative United States statesmen as McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith. In their view, one definitely cannot avoid the conclusion that "Star Wars" would not mean increased security but rather an indisputable and considerable buildup of offensive and defensive systems on both sides. They are convinced that this is not a recipe for eliminating or limiting the threat posed by nuclear weapons, but one for an infinitely expensive, long and dangerous competition.

This assessment is shared by the world-famous American scholars Hans Bethe, Richard Garwin, Kurt Gottfried and Henry Kendall, who have concluded, upon analysing the "Star Wars" programme, that "it is difficult to imagine a system more likely to induce catastrophe than one that requires critical decisions by the second, is itself untested and fragile and yet is threatening to the other side's retaliatory capability".

Later on we intend to make some further comment on the sincerity of statements describing the "Star Wars" programme as being aimed at nuclear disarmament, but for the present we wish to stress another point of considerable importance. It is perfectly clear that an arms race in space, along with increasing the risk of a global nuclear catastrophe, would also pose other additional threats to the security of all nations. For once systems designed for antisatellite and antimissile operations are deployed in space, their use for other purposes cannot be ruled out. With the advent of new generations of attack space systems they would be transformed into dangerous offensive arms hovering permanently over the planet and capable of instant action against any region or State, any aircraft or vessel.

Let us now address the question of how the "Star Wars" programme would affect the process of disarmament. For our part at least, it is becoming our strong conviction that the stationing of attack systems in space would have the most damaging consequences for that process. One of those would be in the sphere of verification which, incidentally, is so often invoked by the United States itself. It is quite obvious that compliance with a ban on a certain category of weapons can be much more easily verified before they are developed and tested.

Another consequence of the spread of the arms race to outer space would be the undermining, through an inevitable and unprecedented buildup of other types of weapons, primarily strategic offensive arms, of the over-all prospects of arms limitation and reduction.

And finally, one cannot fail to mention the international legal implications of the militarization of outer space. A comprehensive ABM system with space-based elements can be made operational only at the cost of abrogating the ABM Treaty, broad-scale research and development effort, or the testing of the system's individual components, will objectively undercut this vitally important Soviet-American agreement. This was actually recognized by General Abrahamson, head of the United States ABM programme, who stated on 17 December, 1984 that as soon as the comprehensive ABM system was at least partly developed and ready for operation, the United States would have to reach agreement with the USSR on the modification, in other words, changing of the ABM Treaty, since some of its provisions would enter into conflict with the tasks of the system.

For the sake of acquiring a comprehensive ABM system the United States is prepared to tear down a number of other international arms control and disarmament agreements as well. For instance, the deployment of X-ray lasers may jeopardize the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty which prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in space, in the atmosphere and under water. X-ray lasers can be produced using nuclear explosions and would, of course, not be deployed without considerable testing.

The deployment of X-ray lasers would violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which prohibits the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In any case that Treaty would be violated in spirit since it provides that space must be used for peaceful purposes only. Orbiting an ABM system cannot be regarded as a peaceful activity since it can also be used for offensive purposes, that is, as an antisatellite weapon.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In analysing the pernicious implications of the United States course at militarizing outer space one certainly cannot overlook the fact that it involves enormous waste of financial, material and human resources. From 1986 to 1989, the United States "Star Wars" research programme alone will absorb 26 billion dollars. As for the creation of a multilayered ABM system with space-based elements, its estimated cost amounts to 1.5 - 2 trillion dollars. Naturally, this cannot but considerably aggravate and multiply the world economic problems of today. Considering the economic difficulties encountered by many countries, and the developing countries in the first place, in solving acute global problems such as combating famine and disease, one can hardly regard the above-mentioned expenditures as justified or motivated by humanitarian concerns.

These are some of our considerations regarding the dangerous implications of the implementation of the "Star Wars" programme. A legitimate question arises, and I think we are not the only ones to ask it: do we all wish or need to pay that price for being saved from the nuclear threat? Especially since it turns out that the threat will not diminish as a result, but may instead be much increased.

Apparently, the matter is that the "Star Wars" programmes pursue quite different aims. There can be no doubt that the space militarization plans the United States is working on are of a clearly aggressive nature. This was underscored by A.A. Gromyko, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, in a statement to his constituents on 19 February 1985: "Today our country is giving warning as loudly as it can about a new threat to humanity. This threat stems from a plan for militarizing outer space which has been put forward by Washington... It dramatically heightens the threat of nuclear war. That is why we raise with such urgency the question of preventing the militarization of outer space. Any efforts to camouflage the substance of that plan, by labelling it as 'defensive', must not mislead anyone."

The calculation behind the fine-sounding term "Strategic Defence Initiative" is to put up a shield for protection against a retaliatory strike after having delivered a first strike. If this is not the case, one might reasonably wonder about the purpose of the unprecedented buildup of the United States strategic nuclear arsenal parallel to the development of space-based systems. MX ICBMs are being produced, Pershing-II missiles deployed in Europe, B-1 bombers built, and approval has been obtained to develop and produce the new "Stealth" bombers, cruise missiles and Trident-2 SLBMs. And the United States Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger does not even think it necessary to conceal the fact that all of those strategic armament programmes are designed to dramatically increase the United States nuclear first-strike capability.

The following legitimate question may also be asked: if the plan is to rely on defence, why then deploy first-strike nuclear systems at the borders of the Soviet Union and of its allies?

Proponents of the new ABM system dream of using various new types of weapons such as infrared, ultraviolet and X-ray lasers, high-energy particle accelerators, generators of ultra-high-frequency radiation and the like. Judging from the information made public in the West, those "space-age" weapons are already at various stages of development.

True, they are now trying to persuade us that the "Strategic Defence Initiative" is limited to research and development which, it is being claimed, do not yet present any serious danger of resulting in the deployment of a comprehensive ABM system.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Such assertions are hard to believe since it is obviously not for the love of pure science or technological progress that billions of dollars are spent on research and development programmes. The testing of large-scale ABM defence components already conducted or envisaged by the Pentagon is directly aimed at reaching a stage where the only thing missing would be a decision to go ahead with the practical deployment of the systems in question. The Soviet Union would thus be faced with a certain United States capability to deploy on short notice a comprehensive ABM defence system. No references to "research" can change the substance of the matter.

It would be naive to expect that the programme, once started, would be confined to the research stage. Progress in the field of military technology unfortunately has an inherent momentum that triggers the deployment of weapon systems as soon as it becomes technically feasible. What, for example, would be the point in the November 1984 decision to establish a unified space command of the United States Armed Forces, if the acquisition of actual space weapons was not envisaged? Meanwhile, a military space operations centre is being set up and a special military Space Shuttle launch complex is under construction, the Shuttle programme having been actually placed under Pentagon supervision.

Another testimony to the fact that the research in question is by no means abstract or preliminary, or conducted "just in case", but rather a well-organized effort subject to, and even in advance of, a definite schedule, was provided by the United States Assistant Secretary of Defence F. Ikle, who recently stated before the Senate sub-committee on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces that the strategic defence initiative is not just a backstage option in United States defence activities, but has a central role.

An equal threat to international stability is posed by the United States drive to acquire antisatellite weapons, including an ASAT system. Those weapons are particularly dangerous since they can be eventually used as dual-purpose systems, that is, not against satellites only, but also to intercept and destroy nuclear-missile warheads.

Confidence between States is far from strengthened by statements like those made by Mr. Ikle whom I have just mentioned. He has also said quite openly that the use of antisatellite systems as a component of a first strike to destroy all or many of the enemy's "key" satellites should considerably impede a retaliatory strike. One could not be more explicit and straightforward.

The Soviet Union most emphatically points to the need for urgent measures to prevent the militarization of outer space.

However, we do not stop at warning of the threat which looms over the world; we are putting forward concrete proposals for a radical solution of the problem of preventing an arms race in space. The Soviet Union submitted relevant draft treaties for consideration by the world community in 1981 and 1983, and followed up on them in 1984 with a new initiative entitled "Use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of mankind".

In particular, the Soviet Union proposes that no attack weapons of any kind -- conventional, nuclear, laser, particle beam or any other -- should be placed and deployed in outer space, whether on manned or unmanned systems. Space weapons, however based, should not be developed, tested or deployed either for anti-ballistic-missile defence or as antisatellite systems or for use against targets on Earth or in the air. Any such systems already in existence must be destroyed.

(Mr. Issraclyan, USSR)

The use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, as well as from Earth against objects in space, should be prohibited for all time. The USSR proposes that agreement be reached on a radical solution of the question of preventing the militarization of space -- on banning and eliminating the whole class of space attack weapons, including anti-satellite and anti-missile space-based systems, as well as any land-based, sea-based or air-based systems designed to destroy objects in space.

Agreement on banning and eliminating the whole class of space attack systems clearly lends itself to reliable and effective verification of compliance by both sides with their obligations. Verification is made easier if only because of the fact that our proposal calls for a complete ban on developing such systems and the elimination of the few that have already been developed.

These are briefly some of the Soviet Union's ideas regarding the possible ways of preventing arms race in space. As to where this problem should be addressed, we are in favour of negotiating appropriate adequately verifiable accords as early as possible and are therefore prepared to deal with it on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis.

We hope that the Soviet-United States negotiations beginning next week will produce effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and halting it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability. What is most important, however, is that both sides in the negotiations should display goodwill in working towards an agreed aim and prove willing to accept reasonable compromise while strictly observing the principle of equality and equal security. K.U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, stated in this connection that "we intend to conduct (the negotiations) in a businesslike and constructive manner. Let us hope that the United States too will assume an honest and responsible attitude".

The Soviet delegation intends to take the same kind of constructive position at the negotiations in the ad hoc committee of our Conference which, as we hope, will be established according to the mandate recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations.



(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

I should like to devote my address today to one of the most important matters on the agenda for the Conference, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The importance of this question was re-emphasized at the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which adopted resolution 39/59 requesting the Conference on Disarmament to expedite its consideration. The Assembly recommended the establishment at the beginning of the present session of the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in space. It also urged the USSR and the United States of America to initiate immediately and in a constructive spirit negotiations aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

This important decision of the Assembly was taken by an absolute majority of Member States of the United Nations as a result of their consideration of the Soviet Union initiative on the utilization of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind. It confirmed that the world community considers prevention of the militarization of near space as an extremely pressing problem urgently requiring solution.

On the basis of the Soviet initiative, agreement was reached in November 1984 between the USSR and the United States of America to undertake new negotiations with a view to achieving mutually acceptable agreements on the complex of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons. As we know, in the course of the meeting that took place here in Geneva on 7 and 8 January 1985 between Mr. A.A. Gromyko, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, on the one hand and Mr. J. Shultz, United States Secretary of State, on the other, an important agreement was reached concerning the subject and objectives of the Soviet-American negotiations on the problems of space and nuclear weapons, which are to be considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

The goal of the negotiations, as agreed by the two parties, will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

This new, integrated approach to the problems of non-militarization of space and nuclear disarmament is dictated by life itself, by the situation that has actually arisen. It is quite evident that progress in arms limitation and reduction is incompatible with the existence of an arms race in space, plans for which, in the form of large-scale missile defenses, are being hatched in Washington. The implementation of these plans would not merely lead to nothing, but would negate what it has been possible to achieve on Earth. Hence the net result for the world as a whole would be negative.

An indication of the United States aspiration to further utilization of space for military purposes is provided by the updated combat instructions of the American Air Force, reissued in 1984 as a basic "aerospace doctrine". According to the Washington Post for 15 January 1985 this document was signed by Air Force Chief of Staff, C. Gabriel and represents a development of the "military space doctrine" of 1982, which emphasizes the need to develop space-based weapons and train "space forces".

One cannot but be struck by the fact that already in the 1982 doctrine it was stated that the Air Force would maintain the technical superiority of the United States in the aerospace field and ensure its potential for conducting protracted military operations in the space environment.

Judging by the updated text of the doctrine, the United States military leadership now intends to go farther along the road to militarizing space. In the instructions it is emphasized that a space-based weapons system is designed for hitting targets on Earth and in space, for gaining control of space and ensuring superiority in space. As is apparent from the text of the instructions, in the opinion of the United States Air Force arms control must not be allowed to stand in the way of military preparations. Thus it is bluntly stated that the space environment offers unlimited potential and opportunity for military operations, of which the Air Force must take advantage.

On the basis of a Presidential Directive of 1982, the United States of America intends to deploy in space anti-missile devices and various kinds of antisatellite system and to place in orbit ultra-new types of weapon, including lasers and death rays, designed to hit targets on the ground, in the air and at sea.

The United States policy on the militarization of space was taken further, as we know, in the President's speech of 23 March 1982 announcing the so-called "Star Wars" programme.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

In November 1984 the decision was taken to establish a unified space command for the United States armed forces. A space centre is being constructed for directing military activities in space, and a military launching site is being built for reusable vehicles of the Shuttle type, the programme for whose utilization is virtually under the command of the Pentagon.

Space weapons, as seen by those who have not renounced their schemes for achieving military superiority, are designed to play the role of key element for a nuclear-first-strike capability.

That is precisely the aim of the "Star Wars" programme, designed for the attainment of military superiority throughout space. This plan spells death for mankind, for its aim is the practical development and deployment over United States territory of an extensive anti-missile defence system. The calculation behind such a system is obviously to be able to strike the first blow and escape or effectively neutralize retaliation. It is difficult to believe in the assertion of the advocates of the militarization of space that this is a question of defence. A reduction in the vulnerability of one's strategic weapons, with the aim of destroying one's adversary's launching installations, is tantamount in practice to disruption of the existing balance and establishment of a new first-strike capability. This is precisely what the ABM Treaty, which is designed to avert nuclear aggression, is directed against.

This deduction is also confirmed by the fact that the American plans for deployment of anti-missile systems are accompanied by a build-up of their offensive strategic forces. Besides, the system of missile interception devices is planned not for defence against a first strike, but precisely as a means of reducing the effect of a retaliatory strike, whose strength would be diminished as a result of the destruction of part of the other side's missiles while still in their silos during the so-called preventive attack.

As we know, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, concluded in 1972 between the USSR and the United States of America, prohibits the establishment of anti-missile systems on the territory of either of the two countries. This decision is of enormous and fundamental importance from the viewpoint of containing the nuclear arms race in all sectors, consolidating strategic stability and reducing the risk of war.

It is precisely this fundamental provision of the ABM Treaty that is being undermined today, and an open and undisguised policy of torpedoing the Treaty has been adopted.

It is not, then, a question of defence against nuclear devices but of a new weapon for backing nuclear aggression.

Emphasis must be laid on the danger that the establishment of a comprehensive ABM system will also undermine a number of important multilateral agreements. Among them is the 1963 treaty banning nuclear tests in three environments, the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

In the United States of America there is no end to the calls, some of them at the governmental level, for the implementation of plans to extend the arms race to space, for the establishment of a large-scale ABM system, and for

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

utilization of the forthcoming Soviet-American negotiations to legalize such plans. Noteworthy in that respect is the special brochure entitled "The President's Strategic Defence Initiative" distributed by the White House in January of this year. In it the militarization of space by the end of the present century is raised to the rank of official United States policy.

The Conference on Disarmament must not let itself be lulled by arguments about how the new space ABM system is at the research and development stage in the United States.

Sober-minded scientists in the United States of America itself are rightly pointing out that the work already proceeding on the implementation of this programme constitutes in itself a provocative, destabilizing move irrespective of its final outcome.

Nor can the question of a ban on antisatellite weapons be left out of account. The deployment of such weapons would lead to abrupt destabilization of the situation, increase the threat of surprise attack, and undermine efforts to promote trust among nuclear States.

The destruction of one party's satellites that perform important observation and communications functions would allow the attacking side to think in terms of "blinding" the adversary, catching him unawares, and weakening his possibility of reprisal in case of nuclear aggression. Thus an attack on a satellite would be an aggressive act: an act that could very well be considered as a preparation for a nuclear first strike.

The United States Administration, as we know, has refused to resume the Soviet-American negotiations on anti-missile systems conducted earlier. At present, under the ASAT programme, work is proceeding on the development of a special antisatellite missile launched from a high-altitude F-15 fighter aircraft. The first tests have already taken place on this system.

Urgent measures must be taken to ban the militarization of space before the process becomes irreversible. The point is not only that it is considerably more difficult to remove weapons from arsenals once they have become a reality than to prevent their creation. It has to be borne in mind that the extension of the arms race will raise it to an unprecedented pitch of intensity in other sectors too, particularly that of strategic offensive weapons. The spread of the arms race to space would undermine prospects of limiting and reducing armaments in general.

The militarization of space, unless it is stopped in time, will swallow up enormous material and spiritual resources and will bring in its wake an unprecedented growth in military expenditure, severely limiting the possibility of allotting resources for the social and economic needs of States. An arms race in space will pose considerable obstacles to international co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of outer space and the turning to account for peaceful purposes of the results of scientific and technical progress in this area.

With regard to peaceful co-operation among States in the exploitation of space and peaceful space programmes in general, there stand as obstacles in their path not only shortage of means and resources but also the suspicion, fear, enmity and secretiveness that inevitably accompany military preparations.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Only assured prevention of the militarization of space will make possible its exploitation for purposes of creation, not destruction. It would also open up the way to pooling of countries' efforts in this area. There can be no doubt that in space effective co-operation for peaceful purposes is possible between countries with different social structures and different levels of economic development and culture. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that such co-operation is conducive to an improved climate in relations between States.

The Socialist countries are proposing that the road to space be barred to weapons, that this problem be solved rationally, that no loophole be left for the militarization of space.

Concrete measures to that end were reflected in the proposals which they put forward last year in the United Nations and which obtained wide support from the overwhelming majority of States. One of these proposals is the draft treaty prohibiting the use of force in space or from space against the Earth, submitted by the Soviet Union in 1983.

This measure would also imply, in particular, a complete ban on antisatellite weapons, including destruction of any existing such systems. In an endeavour to facilitate arrival at agreement, the USSR has unilaterally proclaimed a moratorium on the deployment in space of antisatellite weapons until such time as other countries take similar action.

The business of outlawing the militarization of space will brook no procrastination. It is essential at all costs to start making some headway with it. The Conference on Disarmament must, we are convinced, use all its authority for that so as to insure that the exclusion of space from the sphere of the arms race becomes a strict norm in the policy of States, a generally recognized international responsibility, and that all the roads to the militarization of space, without exception, are safely closed.

It should be noted that in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, emphasis was laid on the need for further measures to be taken and appropriate international negotiations conducted with a view to preventing an arms race in space.

In the Final Document of the second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Utilization of Space for Peaceful Purposes, held in Vienna in August 1983, it is stated, in particular, that extension of the arms race to space is a threat to all mankind and must therefore be prevented.

I should also like to draw the attention of the Conference to the authoritative statement of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, in which he made, in particular, an earnest appeal for the non-militarization of space, emphasizing that it was crucial "that a ban on weapons in the new theatre, outer space, be concluded at the earliest possible time, before it is once again too late".

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. I am confident that your diplomatic skills and experience, which you have proved as the representative of Venezuela, will be of great value in our quest for tackling the important and difficult problems before us. I wish you every success in the discharge of your responsibilities and pledge my delegation's full support and co-operation. I wish also to thank Ambassador Lowitz for his consistent efforts and able work as President of the Conference during the month of February. Mr. President, the participation of the representatives of the Conference on "Women and Peace" this morning demonstrates the profound concern of peoples over the increased danger of a nuclear war and the keen interest of the world-wide peace movement in the subjects of our agenda. It reminds us that all the delegations at this Conference have the responsibility to seek concrete and urgent measures for the prevention of a nuclear holocaust. The measures we are talking about are the freeze of nuclear arsenals, legally binding commitments by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. To achieve such measures, people are calling, everywhere on this planet, for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, about which my delegation wants to say the following.

It is very appropriate that the nuclear test ban issue should stand at the top of the Conference agenda. It is the topic with the longest history of diplomatic efforts and public and scientific discussion. Its direct bearing on the most important challenges of our time is obvious: a ban on all nuclear-weapon testing would clearly signal an end to the nuclear arms race, especially the qualitative aspect of that race, and facilitate the beginning of nuclear disarmament.

The subject matter of the treaty has been thoroughly prepared. From a technical point of view, it is not as complicated as other arms limitation and disarmament issues. The world is well aware of the importance of such a ban and has been demanding the immediate halt of all testing everywhere for several decades. In fact, it is with good reason that this matter has been given highest priority in the recent Delhi Declaration.

The conclusion of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests would be fully in line in our opinion with the purposes of the Joint United States-Soviet Statement of 8 January 1985, according to which all armaments limitation and reduction efforts should lead to the complete and general destruction of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

What is more, new concepts are now being freely propounded, especially in the West, that nuclear weapons are here to stay; and that what should now be of concern is overseeing the orderly shift of the dangerous super-Power rivalry from nuclear arms on Earth to new defence systems in outer space! To buttress this concept, it is suggested that the principal Powers, far from engaging in an uncontrolled arms race, were, in fact, managing their rivalry with such sophistication that the world need hardly worry about a possible nuclear war.

48

(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

In making a case for urgent practical steps towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, my delegation hopes that such a treaty might help prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons into outer space. The world community through a number of resolutions, including the United Nations Declaration of 13 December 1963, have determined that outer space be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. The principal nuclear-weapon States are Parties to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which quite explicitly required States to use outer space for peaceful purposes only. My delegation does not therefore see how a "defence system" operating, from outer space to neutralize the other side's Earth-based deterrent could be regarded as lawful. Treaty obligation or not, my delegation believes those experts who argue that any superiority gained by one side from military research in outer space would be as illusive and ephemeral as similar advantages have been in other areas in the past.

My delegation agrees that scientific research must continue in outer space, but it is also convinced that that research need not be undertaken for a military purpose. In our view, a policy which seeks to do that will only destabilize the very concept of deterrence, which the policy makers themselves claim is essential for their security. The Nigerian delegation therefore enjoins all States to respect their international obligations and international public opinion, and keep outer space free of all types of weapons and other facilities designed for military purposes. An ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate should now be set up for the purpose.

(Mr. Luce, United Kingdom)

On the other items on the agenda of this Conference there is less common ground. We must strive to increase it. On the question of prevention of an arms race in space, there has been one major development: the United States and the Soviet Union are embarking on bilateral negotiations with this as their objective. Much has been said about the United States Strategic Defence Initiative. It is only recently that the extent of Soviet development and deployment of defences against ballistic missiles has been placed in sharper focus. But we know that the Soviet Union has devoted considerable resources to efforts in this field over a period of many years. My Government's position on this has been made clear by my Prime Minister. We fully share the objective of the bilateral negotiators to prevent an arms race in space. But we also believe that, in view of Soviet activities, it is only prudent that the United States Strategic Defence Initiative research programme should go ahead. Such research is, of course, permitted under the existing United States/Soviet treaties.

The British Prime Minister and President Reagan have agreed on four points: first, the United States and Western aim is not to achieve superiority, but to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet developments; second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation; third, the over-all aim is to enhance, and not to undercut, deterrence; and fourth, East/West negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive weapons on both sides. These four points will form the basis of our approach to subsequent discussions on this subject.

In future debate, we should avoid simplistic slogans about preventing the militarization of outer space. Ever since the first ballistic missile test, space has been militarized. And some military uses of space, such as means to verify compliance with arms control agreements, make a positive contribution to strategic stability. My Government continues to believe that, as a first step, the Conference should set up an ad hoc committee on this subject with an exploratory mandate, on the basis of the draft co-sponsored by my delegation last year (CD/527). Let us consider together in this Conference all existing international agreements, proposals and future initiatives affecting military uses of outer space. I hope that agreement can be reached soon on such a mandate, so that detailed work may start without further delay.



(Mr. Törnudd, Finland)

The Conference included on its agenda an item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" three years ago. In General Assembly resolution 39/59, the Conference on Disarmament was requested to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to establish an ad hoc committee with a view to undertaking negotiations on the issue. We hope that the Conference could solve the problems delaying the detailed consideration of this question.

An arms race in outer space must be checked in time. The competitive development of space weapons may otherwise lead to increased insecurity and a threat for all nations.

Outer space must not become a new domain for a dangerous arms build-up. The exploitation of outer space must be reserved for the benefit of mankind. It is therefore in the interest of all nations that the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States yield agreements on its effective prevention. Nor can the Conference on Disarmament evade its responsibility in this respect.

The existing body of regulations concerning arms control in space is clearly incomplete. The issues related to the military applications using outer space for such functions as early warning and verification are not resolved. While the use of satellites for these and civilian purposes increases, a comprehensive legal framework covering their use is missing. Its creation should be supplemented by resolute action to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

(Mr. Alam Khan, India)

Another crucial issue on the agenda of the Conference relates to the arms race in the outer space. During the past three or four years, developments in this regard have taken place at such a pace that any further postponement of effective action to prevent the introduction of new weapons in space will result in our forfeiting the opportunity to do so for ever. The development of weapons systems in outer space is still in its early phase, even while the dangerous implications of these weapons systems have become all too obvious. For example, it is very difficult to dispute the fact that the weaponry being planned for deployment in space is integral to the nuclear forces of the major Powers on Earth and that it will take us to a stage of total armament. It is also recognized by most people that the promise of rendering nuclear weapons obsolete or ineffective by developing these weapons is at best wishful thinking, and at worst indistinguishable from the further bolstering up of a first-strike capability. This is apart from the staggering magnitude of the expenditure involved in building such weapons systems which cannot but be ruinous for the world economy. It also seems inevitable that in order to defeat the purpose of these new weapons systems, counter-measures will be devised which would only result in the further intensification and development of new categories of nuclear weapons. Moreover, here is one weapon development programme which can seriously destabilize the present situation even before it is completed, for example, by triggering, out of an acute sense of insecurity, a pre-emptive first strike. This is simply because neither of the major nuclear-weapon Powers would be prepared at any stage to allow the other to develop the capacity to neutralize its offensive forces.

The failure to arrest the development of the arms race in space will trigger a chain reaction which will be difficult to control. The Conference on Disarmament should, therefore, start discussions on the plans to develop both ASAT and new ABM systems, and how they affect the existing international legal régimes, and work towards negotiating effective agreements for prohibiting the introduction of these weapons and for the elimination of those which are already in existence. This exercise can proceed simultaneously with the bilateral negotiations on this issue.

(Mr. Carlock, Peru)

My delegation would like to make some comments on another topic which causes us particular concern, namely agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

We have recently seen the initiation and development of a discussion on the Strategic Defence Initiative of President Reagan of the United States of America. We have been told that the development and implementation of this initiative would make nuclear weapons obsolete and would therefore make it possible to eliminate them from the arsenals of the major Powers.

As is obvious, any measure which will allow us to free the world of the threat of nuclear war must have our full support. The consequences of this new initiative, however, are not at all clear to my delegation at least, and we would like to bring up here some of the questions which have arisen in our minds.

First of all, we are surprised that the Government of a country should intend to spend enormous sums of money on a defence programme which would render nuclear weapons useless, while at the same time it informs us that it will continue to make nuclear tests because they are indispensable for modernizing its arsenals. We find a clear contradiction in this.

Secondly, what is the point in spending billions of dollars to achieve nuclear disarmament when we could attain the same objective in this forum at an incomparably lower cost, if only there was the necessary political will and decision to do so?

Finally, we observe that those who defend this initiative, who are now claiming that their aim is to make nuclear disarmament possible, are the same people who not long ago maintained that only nuclear deterrence has prevented a world war in the last 40 years. We wonder whether they have changed their opinion on the need for nuclear deterrence or whether a world war does not worry them provided only conventional and space weapons are used.

Naturally, as we have said year after year in this forum, Peru is opposed to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. But we do not believe either that the stationing of weapons in space will guarantee peace and security, and the implications for the traditional strategic debate which we have mentioned cause us considerable concern.

We have put these questions somewhat ingenuously, for the eventuality that it might indeed be possible to build a "shield" which would totally prevent nuclear weapons from penetrating the territory of a State. It has not yet been demonstrated, however, that this is technically feasible.

(Mr. Carnock, Peru)

If it should ultimately prove impossible, there is still the possibility of building partial defences which would ensure the safety of the silos or launching platforms for nuclear weapons. In that case, the importance of nuclear weapons would be reinforced, contrary to the declared objective of the Strategic Defence Initiative.

The possibility that a State could fully preserve its capability for retaliation while another State or States could not do so is foreign to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and would create the inevitable temptation for any one of the parties in a hypothetical conflict to make preventive attacks.

All this means that the situation now emerging would be much more unstable, the inclination to use nuclear weapons much greater, and civilian populations would continue to be as vulnerable as they are now, or even more so.

In conclusion, this topic which is so much tied up with a number of the items on our agenda requires all our urgent attention. As has been said, perhaps the only way of stopping an arms race is to prevent it from beginning.

As the Delhi Declaration put it so eloquently, "Outer space must be used for the benefit of mankind as a whole, and not as a battle-ground of the future".

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

In my statement today I should like to speak on item 5 of our agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Preventing the militarization of outer space is nowadays a task of primary importance. Its accomplishment is central to the efforts of the international community to reduce the danger of war, in particular nuclear war. The outcome of these efforts will determine, to a great extent, the prospects of achieving meaningful agreements in other areas of arms control.

Strategic stability in the world today depends on our chances of success in the endeavour to spare outer space from becoming a new, and potentially most dangerous, arena of the arms race. It is incumbent upon all of us actively to work in order to reverse, before it is too late, the tendencies leading to the militarization of outer space.

The international community is not beginning the struggle for peace in outer space from scratch. Thanks to the vision and the efforts of those who have believed, and still believe, in preventive disarmament measures, the 1960s and the 1970s have witnessed the foundation of the international legal basis for guaranteeing the peaceful use of outer space.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Of undeniable importance in this respect are:

The 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water;

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies;

The 1972 Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems; and

The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

These are significant achievements in the efforts to limit the military uses of outer space.

Nevertheless, the task of completely excluding outer space from the sphere of the arms race remains unaccomplished. Its importance has sharply grown in the light of the latest developments resulting from the revival of some old hopes of using outer space for the achievement of military superiority. These acts call into question the possibility of undertaking further steps in the field of arms control in outer space. Similarly, serious concern has arisen that the relevant disarmament agreements would probably come into real danger.

Ongoing military programmes and preparations to acquire the capacity of waging "Star Wars" have brought about considerable concern world-wide. The so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" has become the subject of intensive discussions in the broadest political and scientific circles, for it constitutes an unprecedented challenge to the aspirations for peace of all peoples.

The "Strategic Defence Initiative" is officially presented as a futuristic programme to build a ballistic missile defence, with some of its elements based in space, which would reputedly render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". This initiative is widely perceived, however, as the latest attempt to impose upon the international community yet another dangerous militaristic concept, whose possible realization is fraught with innumerable risks for the future of all mankind. The real motivation of this "Star Wars" project seems, once again, to be that endless search to achieve strategic superiority by the United States over the Soviet Union, which would in practice be also the military superiority of NATO over the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The "defensive" terminology used to conceal the nature of this programme cannot hide the truth. And the truth is that, should the United States "Strategic Defence Initiative" be implemented, it would undermine the very foundations of international stability, peace and security. Similarly, it would adversely affect the efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and to develop further the international legal régime in the field of disarmament.

The majority of the international community remains unconvinced that the United States "Strategic Defence Initiative" is just scientific research, with no serious military and political implications.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The United States Congress has been asked to approve 5.7 billion dollars this year, after 1.4 billion last year, for "research" on what is envisaged as a three-tier anti-ballistic missile system. This is almost a threefold increase only for one year. Thirty billion dollars are planned for this purpose for the period of the next five years. Spending such huge sums has always been a serious indication that research activities are intended to enter, at some point, the stage of testing, production and deployment of the newly-created weapons.

Besides, a Joint Outer Space Command of the United States Armed Forces has already been set up. A command centre is under construction with a view to carrying out military operations in outer space.

Fred C. Ikle, United States Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy, stated that the "Strategic Defence Initiative" was not an optional programme, at the margin of the defence efforts, but that it was central to United States military planning well into the next century. The officer in charge of this programme, Lieutenant-General James A. Abrahamson, announced that the implementation of the project was going at such a fast pace that the first tests of space weapons with the use of the Shuttle type spaceships were envisaged as early as in 1987, two years ahead of the planned schedule.

In the large press-coverage of this issue last week, it was clearly stated that "Research under way at United States Government and military contractors' laboratories leaves no doubt that the "Star Wars" concept is far more than fantasy, or at least more than the political gambit that some have suggested it is."

Serious concern has been caused by the fact that the United States space-based anti-missile programme, which is advertised as a non-nuclear strategic defense, could serve several major offensive functions, which reveal its intended purpose.

Leading experts in this field have drawn our attention to the fact that this reputedly defensive system can be used as:

- (a) A defensive adjunct to an offensive nuclear attack-- a shield allowing nuclear-armed missiles to be launched in a first strike while the defense is held in reserve to cope with a retaliatory response;
- (b) A weapon to destroy enemy space satellites which have become an increasingly important part of the military strategic systems;
- (c) A means to unleash lightning-fast offensive strikes from space against relatively "soft" ground targets, such as planes, oil tankers, power plants, etc., causing instantaneous fires and damage that could "take an industrialized country back to an 18th-century level in 30 minutes"; and
- (d) A tool which after being further improved could be used to destroy the concrete and steel silos that protect strategic missiles underground, thus becoming itself a first-strike weapon.

As unrealistic as it may seem, the hope to create a fool-proof anti-missile system could, unfortunately, engender in some military-minded people a dangerous illusion that a nuclear attack could be launched with impunity. This may induce such people to consider nuclear war rationally thinkable, which would make nuclear war itself more probable.

As pointed out by the eminent United States scientists Hans A. Bethe (a Nobel Prize Winner), Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried and Henry W. Kendall: "Even if

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

space-based ballistic missile defense did not have a cataclysmic birth, the successful deployment of such a defense would create a highly unstable strategic balance. It is difficult to imagine a system more likely to induce catastrophe than one that requires critical decisions by the second, is itself untested and fragile, and is threatening to the other side's retaliatory capability".

The assertion that the envisaged United States anti-missile system is non-nuclear and defensive is devoid of any foundation. This system is designed directly to serve and supplement the strategic nuclear offensive forces. Various components of this system are based on the use of nuclear explosions for their energy supply. Moreover, parallel with the creation of a nuclear shield there continues the implementation of the programmes for the deployment of nuclear weapons with a first-strike capability, such as the MX ballistic missile, the Pershing-II missiles in Western Europe, the B-1 and "Stealth" bombers, the Trident II submarine missiles, etc.

The question naturally arises as to why it is necessary for the United States to introduce these nuclear systems, if its real intention is to switch to a non-nuclear strategy that is defence-oriented.

As to the contention that the "Strategic Defence Initiative" would eventually render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete", it is becoming more and more clear that the purported aim is to make Soviet nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete", while leaving the United States offensive nuclear arsenal virtually untouched, and even strengthening it.

The implementation of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" will deal a destructive blow to the efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament. It is widely expected that the establishment of a strategic defense system would open the way to an unlimited build-up of offensive nuclear forces.

McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith pointed out in their recent publication entitled: "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control", that: "There is simply no escape from the reality that Star Wars offers not the promise of greater safety, but the certainty of a large-scale expansion of both offensive and defensive systems on both sides. We are not here examining the dismayed reaction of our allies in Europe, but it is precisely this prospect that they foresee, in addition to the special worries created by their recognition that the Star Wars program as it stands has nothing in it for them. Star Wars, in sum, is a prescription not for ending or limiting the threat of nuclear weapons, but for a competition unlimited in expense, duration and danger".

The logic of these words is merciless. When one side creates a "nuclear shield" and deploys first-strike nuclear weapons, then the other side would be compelled to undertake all the necessary steps to counter the implicit threat to its own security, including through the expansion of its strategic nuclear forces. With reference to this aspect, Senator Edward Kennedy rightly pointed out last January that it was not necessary to be a Newton to understand that the first law of the nuclear-arms race requires that each action by one of the sides breeds a counter-action by the other.

Should the "Strategic Defence Initiative" be carried out it would not only dermine but break apart the existing elements of the international régime of non-militarization of outer space.

A direct threat would be made to the 1972 Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, prohibiting the development, testing and deployment of systems or components of anti-missile space-based defence, as well as the deployment of anti-missile defence systems covering the entire territories of

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

the States Parties. The conclusion of this Treaty of unlimited duration marked an important step in strengthening strategic stability, which led to the achievement of the SALT 2 agreements. The violation of the ABM Treaty, which the United States "Strategic Defence Initiative" objectively aims at, would lead to a sharp destabilization of the strategic environment, prejudicing the prospects for further agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament.

The 1963 Moscow PTB Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in outer space would also be in jeopardy. Carrying out such tests is envisaged as a means of energy supply for the X-ray laser components of the ABM system presently developed in the United States.

The new negotiations initiated last week in Geneva between the USSR and the United States on the whole complex of questions concerning outer space and nuclear weapons -- both strategic and intermediate-range -- are a hopeful gleam that the issues on which depends the security of all nations can be efficiently settled. These negotiations open up a new, perhaps a last, opportunity to prevent a dangerous militarization of outer space, and to create an environment conducive to making significant steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

In the Joint United States-Soviet Statement of 8 January this year, it was stated that "The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability". Success at these negotiations seems to be contingent upon the adherence by both sides to its agreed subject and objective. Only a strict observance of all elements of the Joint Statement may advance the negotiations with a view to achieving "the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere".

My delegation and, I suspect, many others, are impressed by the constructive and comprehensive approach of the USSR to the non-militarization of outer space. The Soviet Union's readiness to radically solve this problem permeates its 1981 and 1983 draft treaties and its initiative submitted to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly entitled, "Using Outer Space Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes for the Benefit of Mankind".

Another expression of this constructive position has been given in the speech of 11 March by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Gorbachev.

The Conference on Disarmament is entrusted with the important task of working out agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space. We believe that all delegations are duty bound to co-operate in embarking upon serious practical actions.

The best ground for proceeding in this respect is to set up an ad hoc committee on item 5, as stipulated in General Assembly resolution 39/59, which 150 States voted in favour of, with none against. The urgent need to adopt measures on the non-militarization of outer space is more than evident. In our opinion, the Conference should make every possible effort to resolve the procedural problem by the end of March, and initiate substantive work under this item.

We believe that this is possible if each of the three Groups makes its own contribution with a view to reaching a compromise that would pave the way for the Conference to fulfil its responsibility as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.



Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): In my remarks today, I want to address an item added to our agenda relatively recently, but which is of considerable importance to my delegation, as it is to all of the States represented here. The Conference on Disarmament has had under consideration the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space for only four years. Work on this issue in this and other forums has attracted the attention of the world community because of the role that the boundless environment of outer space increasingly plays in our daily affairs.

One cannot overestimate the benefits to the world that have resulted from the peaceful uses of outer space, which began some thirty years ago, and have multiplied to the point that instantaneous, global telecommunications made possible by artificial earth satellites are almost taken for granted. We also tend to forget how recently we have developed the ability to monitor the world's weather system in near-real time, to track the progress of major storm systems, to provide early warning to citizens, and to aircraft and to ships on the high seas. Most of us have probably seen the striking photographs which remote sensing satellites send back to Earth. These assist in locating natural resources, and in averting natural catastrophe from erosion or land misuse.

At the same time, we must very frankly acknowledge the fact that, in parallel with the great benefits from the peaceful uses of outer space that I have mentioned, and the myriad of other such uses far too numerous to describe here, outer space has long occupied an important role in the military activities of States and alliances of States. This role has included communications, navigation and monitoring the activities of military forces on the Earth's surface. Early warning against the possibility of large-scale attack by nuclear forces is another military activity of fundamental importance.

I think it is fair to say that all of the States represented in this chamber have a stake not only in the peaceful uses of outer space, but in the military uses as well. All of us, I believe, can agree that the monitoring by satellite of a number of international agreements in the arms control area, such as the bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, is an important application of space technology that directly serves international security and stability. Co-operative measures, such as the "hot-line" agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, also rely on the use of space -- in this case to provide the communications links.

All of us can recognize as well that outer space has been the location of military activities related to the testing of weapons, and, in at least one instance, the Soviet ASAT weapon system, the operational environment of an existing system for the destruction of satellites. Moreover, every time an intercontinental ballistic missile is tested, from the first such test by the Soviet Union in 1957, the trajectory of the missile's flight passes through outer space. The fact of operational ballistic missile forces possessed by a number of States is, of course, directly relevant to the security of every nation.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

It is evident that the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is not a simple matter. It has many aspects, and all of them need to be considered. One such aspect of considerable importance is a development that many delegations here have already welcomed. That is the convening of bilateral negotiations between my country and the Soviet Union on 12 March here in Geneva, having the objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth. A number of interventions in the Conference have stressed the special responsibilities of the two major Powers; due to the extent of their involvement in outer space, and have urged them to give special attention to the arms control issues that involvement implies. Indeed, this is exactly what we hope will take place in these bilateral negotiations. One of the three negotiating groups in which the bilateral negotiations will take place will address defence and space weapons.

However, to say that two Powers presently have the greatest involvement in outer space does not mean that other States do not also have a presence and a role in that environment. Everyone recognizes that States and consortia including China, France, Japan, India, and the European Space Agency, have launched their own satellites into outer space. Many other States have made use of launching facilities of those States or consortia which offer them and similarly now have satellites operating in orbit. Thus, there is unquestionably a multilateral dimension to the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, and the Conference on Disarmament needs to address this question in depth.

My delegation has joined with other Western delegations in proposing, as a compromise, that the Conference decide to establish an ad hoc committee, to identify, in the first instance, through a thorough and substantive examination, issues relevant to our agenda item. The Committee would take into account all existing agreements, and also take into account existing proposals and future initiatives.

In his statement of 12 February, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, addressed the question of an ad hoc committee. He suggested that the Committee undertake the task, complementary to work in the bilateral negotiations, of a comprehensive examination of existing multilateral agreements.

We recognize, Mr. President, the useful consultations which, under your guidance, have been continuing on the question of establishing a subsidiary body, and we hope that these consultations will soon bear fruit so that the Conference can get down to work within the framework of an ad hoc committee.

As long ago as 1982 my delegation spoke in a plenary meeting of the Conference on the important role played by present commitments in arms control agreements in ensuring international peace and stability. These agreements include the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; and the

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

1972 bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. My delegation will have considerably more to say on agreements such as these, within the context of the work of the ad hoc committee. At this point, let me simply note that the present network of international agreements respecting the outer space environment already provides exceptionally important, legally binding limitations on military activities in that arena, and my Government considers compliance with those obligations to be of the greatest importance.

Let me turn now to a related issue which has been very much in the forefront of public attention over the past several months, a subject which was raised by the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, in March of 1983, and which is known as the Strategic Defence Initiative. I think it important to address this issue here today because so much has been said that is either misleading or plainly wrong. We need to consider the Strategic Defence Initiative on the basis of fact, not fantasy.

The essential idea in the Strategic Defence Initiative is this: suppose that research could demonstrate the feasibility of constructing a defensive system that could render far less potent, or even harmless, the threat posed by nuclear-armed ballistic missiles? Would it not be better, in this event, to agree to restructure the basis of strategic stability, from one relying ultimately on the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons to one relying on a defensive system that posed no such threat? Would this not be a more stable system of international security, of deterrence of war, than the present one? And would it not contribute toward the objective -- an objective that we all fully share -- of the total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere?

We should ask ourselves: why not open the floodgates of creativity for ideas to increase the chances that nuclear weapons will never be used, to ensure that a nuclear war -- which can never be won -- will never be fought? These are objectives to which all members of this Conference have committed themselves for many years: the search for international security, the attempt to bring ideas and diplomacy to bear on the most crucial problem of our age. I hope, then, that States represented here will not leap to criticize, but rather will consider carefully what my Government has in fact proposed. After all, if members of this body have attacked the theories of mutual terror or mutual assured destruction as inadequate or even immoral, is it responsible now for them to insist that defensive systems cannot and should not be devised that would lead to an escape from these theories and toward nuclear disarmament? Is it not defeatist a priori to deny that technology can serve stabilizing and not only first-strike scenarios?

In his statement on 12 March, the distinguished Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Richard Luce, succinctly described the basis of the programme of research on which my Government has embarked. He cited four points as agreed between the

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher, and President Reagan. I believe these points bear being described again:

First, the objective of the Strategic Defence Initiative is not to create a situation in which the United States or the West would somehow achieve superiority. Rather, the objective is to seek a situation of balance, taking into account developments by the Soviet Union.

Second, any deployment of weapons related to the Strategic Defence Initiative would, in view of our obligations under existing treaties, in particular the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, have to be a matter for negotiations.

Third, the objective of the Strategic Defence Initiative is to enhance the deterrence of war, not to increase the prospects of conflict.

Fourth, we seek, in our negotiations, to strengthen international security and to bring about reductions in the levels of offensive nuclear weapons on both sides.

With regard to these four points, I want to stress that the United States has taken, and continues to take seriously, its obligations under existing arms-control agreements. Consistent with this position, the United States has not conducted and has no intention of conducting any of the research under the Strategic Defence Initiative in a manner inconsistent with its treaty obligations, particularly its obligations under the ABM Treaty. In fact, as numerous statements by officials of the United States Government have made clear, one of the objectives of our bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union is precisely to stop and reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty.

I think it is salient to note, in this connection, that the obligations assumed by the parties to the ABM Treaty do not include limitations on research. Research is not prohibited by this agreement, and, in fact, the United States has engaged in a limited research programme on technologies related to defence against ballistic missiles for many years, extending back to the entry into force of the Treaty and before.

This, of course, is also the case with the other party to the Treaty. However, our assessment is that the activities of the Soviet Union in the area of defensive technologies have been considerably greater than our own. Indeed, we estimate that over the last two decades their commitment of resources to strategic defence has been roughly comparable -- I repeat roughly comparable -- to the very high levels of their expenditures on offensive forces and has been many times higher than United States expenditures on defensive systems. Moreover, the Soviet Union continues to deploy a system of anti-ballistic missile defences, while the United States has not done so for nearly a decade.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

The Soviet Union has also engaged in a programme to upgrade the capabilities of their ABM system. The investment of the Soviet Union in advanced technologies related to missile defence has also been considerable, for example, in the area of directed energy systems such as high-energy lasers.

Naturally, in the Soviet Union such programmes are not the subject of parliamentary or public debate. Who in the USSR raised doubts about the Soviet space initiative? We have no way of knowing. We here all know well that Soviet weapons become the subject of debate -- outside the Soviet Union -- after they have been deployed. In the West, we discuss weapons long before we decide to produce them.

As explained in document CD/561, introduced by my delegation on 12 February, my Government has concluded that the large phased-array radar under construction by the Soviet Union in Siberia at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of its obligations under the ABM Treaty. Moreover, other Soviet development activity and deployments of "air defence" surface-to-air interceptors with potential capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles raise more questions regarding Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty. In short, those who would complain about the actions of my Government with regard to research on defensive technologies would do well to direct their attention, their analysis, their questions, and their complaints elsewhere.

As a simple matter of prudence, my Government's investigations into strategic defensive technologies are needed to ensure that it is in a position to balance the developments by the Soviet Union to which I have referred. Such research constitutes an essential "hedge" against a developing potential by the Soviet Union to "break out" suddenly from the constraints imposed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It serves, as well, as a response to the erosion of the strategic balance caused by the continuing build-up by the Soviet Union of offensive arms. The United States cannot afford to allow a unilateral advantage to the Soviet Union that might open the door to a potential first strike. The activities of the Soviet Union must and will be taken into account so as to correct and stabilize the military balance. The United States will, of course, raise this issue in the bilateral negotiations and in other diplomatic channels.

On 5 March, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, made a statement to this body on the same agenda item to which I am speaking today. I welcome his reference to important co-operative efforts in the peaceful uses of outer space, not the least of which is the SARSAT-COSPAS rescue system, which my country has joined with the Soviet Union, Canada and France in developing and operating. The United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Bulgaria have now also joined this system. These efforts are heartening evidence of how States can work together to advance the international framework of co-operation. The scientific missions to explore Venus and Halley's Comet on its close approach to the sun next year are other fascinating and profitable ventures in international co-operation.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Therefore, it was with some concern that I listened to other parts of Ambassador Issraelyan's statement, in particular his characterization of threats to international security supposedly arising from "vast space militarization programmes" recently adopted by the United States, including the Strategic Defence Initiative and the United States development programme for an anti-satellite weapon system. This characterization of the present situation can only be described as bizarre.

It was not the United States that first tested intercontinental ballistic missiles transiting through outer space. It was not the United States that developed a fractional orbital bombardment system using nuclear warheads -- a system with no Western counterpart. It is not the United States that for over a decade has deployed and continued to test an operational anti-satellite weapon system. It is not the United States that maintains and is improving an operational anti-ballistic missile system. It is not the United States that has constructed a radar in violation of the obligations of the ABM Treaty. In sum, it is not the United States whose military development, testing and procurement have given a basis for fears that sudden abandonment of the ABM Treaty may be envisioned and plans for a first strike might be in preparation.

As stressed in document CD/561, non-compliance with arms control agreements now in force is a matter of crucial importance to my Government. But non-compliance is equally important to the world community. For whatever insistent calls may be issued here and there for sweeping new disarmament measures, often without regard to their verifiability, each of us here knows full well that arms control without confidence in strict compliance by all parties is a contradiction in terms. Such arms control does not add to world stability and security. It directly undermines these goals. Accordingly, the Conference on Disarmament surely has a vital stake in upholding the integrity of arms control agreements currently in force.

Let me generalize now on the actions of the Soviet Union that I have cited in the field of strategic offense and defense. As a whole, they have created a definite current imbalance and they threaten future strategic stability. But the Soviet Government did not raise the alarm over the "militarization" of space when it undertook its vast strategic buildup. Only now, when there is concern that this arsenal could be rendered less potent, or even harmless, is the militarization of space decried by some. This is understandable -- transparent, but understandable.

We welcome the expression of resolute opposition by the Soviet Union to competition in nuclear or any other arms. This is entirely consistent with our own position. The United States has made clear that if our research into defensive systems indicates their feasibility, survivability and cost-effectiveness, the deployment of such systems will be the subject of discussion, consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty, and consistent

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

with the Treaty's provisions for amendment. As President Reagan recently described it, our long-term commitment is to "internationalize" missile defences if they can be made effective. It is, thus, without foundation to suppose that the United States, by its efforts, seeks to increase and not reduce prospects of a nuclear confrontation.

I have already pointed out that the United States intends to undertake its research activities in full compliance with its Treaty obligations. Ambassador Issraelyan has argued that it would be "too naive" to assume that a programme of research would not inevitably lead to deployment because of "inherent momentum" in military technology. I can only speak for my Government on this account: we see no such inherent momentum in any piece of equipment or technology, and we trust that there is no such mechanistic or "inherent" momentum in the military technologies for defensive weapons under research in the Soviet Union. We trust that Ambassador Issraelyan does not mean his remarks to be an announcement of future deployment of defensive systems in contravention of the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the Outer Space Treaty, because of some inherent momentum in military technology.

I also take issue with Ambassador Issraelyan's claim that the United States programme to develop an anti-satellite weapon system is a particularly dangerous threat to international stability because of a potential dual-purpose role, as both an anti-satellite and an anti-nuclear missile warhead system. Rather, the United States programme is a measured response to deter Soviet use of their operational ASAT system and to provide a capability to counter Soviet satellites that, while not weapons themselves, can help target terrestrial forces of the United States and other nations. And the specious claim that Western deployments of intermediate-range weapons in Europe are deployments of "first-strike" nuclear systems merits no rebuttal except to say that the deployment by the Soviet Union of its SS-20 missiles with over 1,200 warheads is being met with a measured and much smaller response.

I share Ambassador Issraelyan's hopes for a completely successful outcome to the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union that began last week. I also echo the intention he voiced to be constructive in ensuring successful work in the Conference on Disarmament. That intention will be best served by avoidance of polemics.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that my delegation is heartened by the receptiveness being indicated by so many delegations to the compromise mandate proposed for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to undertake serious, practical work to consider arms control and disarmament measures applicable to outer space. The time to establish a Committee is surely now.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Since this is the first time that I take the floor under your Presidency, let me congratulate you both on assuming this important function and the effective way in which you are carrying it out, which testifies to your personal and professional qualities. I would also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Lowitz, for his contribution to the Conference's work during his Presidency in February. In my statement today I also would like to dwell on item 5 of our agenda, prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Ever since the first man-made object reached the Earth's orbit the international community has been confronted with the question of how to limit outer space exploration to exclusively peaceful purposes. One of the earliest initiatives designed to foreclose military utilization of outer space was the Soviet proposal of 15 March 1958 to conclude an agreement banning the use of outer space for military purposes, the elimination of foreign military bases, and the establishment of a United Nations agency for international co-operation in the study of outer space. This proposal became a spring-board for subsequent initiatives, many of them embodied in various United Nations resolutions. Together with several reports of various international organizations and of scientific institutions all over the world, arguing the need for the prevention of militarization of outer space, they are the proof that many have seen the imminent danger and tried to prevent it. It is due to these efforts that an important Treaty on rules governing the activities of States in outer space was concluded in 1967. The Treaty served as a basis for a number of important conventions together creating an international legal régime regulating various activities in this new domain of human activity. The most important achievement of that period was a prohibition of deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

Though an important step forward, all the existing regulations did not, however, prevent the use of outer space for military purposes.

That is why the world community expects early progress in working out further international guarantees to safeguard space from an arms race. This attitude was best indicated by the overwhelming vote last year for General Assembly resolution 39/59, a single resolution dealing with prevention of an arms race in outer space adopted by 150 votes, with only one State choosing to abstain. The political importance of this event was amply commented by Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka in his statement of 5 March 1985, where he said: "It is impressive not because we are playing a simplistic numbers game but because it does reflect a wide international consensus on a crucial issue. In essence the resolution represents the undisputed universal commitment of the international community, speaking with one voice, to the basic principles underlying the prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, it has to be said openly that it would be too demanding or even unrealistic in this state of world affairs to expect an agreement prohibiting all kinds of military activities in space or all kinds of military utilization of space objects. Such an all-embracing agreement would require a much more propitious international climate and could be achieved together with comprehensive and far-reaching disarmament measures on Earth.

What seems to be now within our reach and, moreover, what seems to be a much more urgent task is the need to foreclose the imminent new stage of militarization of outer space, i.e., the introduction of weapons into the space environment and turning it into yet another future battlefield. An indication of how to tackle this truly vital question may be provided by the Soviet proposal of August 1981 to conclude an agreement on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space; as well as another Soviet initiative of March last year in which



(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

a draft treaty was proposed on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. My delegation wholeheartedly supports these proposals and invites other delegations to give serious thought to them. Should the world community choose to neglect these and similar proposals, it would soon come very close to an ominous stage in which it would confront a rapid expansion of capabilities for future war activities, encompassing both Earth and outer space at a distance of several thousand kilometers away, activities carried out with help of semi- or fully- automated weapon systems, capable of attacking objects in orbit, and from orbit targets on Earth.

The alarmistic tone I am using is not accidental. It is a matter of fact that one of the leading Great Powers had undertaken an unprecedented scientific and technical research programme with a view to developing over several years to come a strategic system of weapons in order to make its territory an unpenetrable fortress while preserving its enormous offensive capability. The scale of effort connected with the realization of the United States Strategic Defence Initiative, measured in terms of the money allotted to it, is several times bigger than the famous Manhattan Project or the Moon landing programme, the two biggest research programmes ever undertaken by the United States. The budget allocated already to this strategic programme and planned for the next five years indicates clearly that it is going to be intensified year by year. While in 1986 it will cost over \$2.5 billion, in 1990 it will reach over \$8.5 billion, and during the next five years a total of not less than \$26 billion is to be spent.

The entire programme was launched under the guise of its impeccable morality, its purely defensive character, and its unquestionably beneficial nature for the strategic stability and disarmament, and we have heard arguments, even today, to that effect. The most deceitful of all these claims is that the realization of the SDI will enable the eradication of nuclear weapons or, at least, will render these weapons obsolete. The arguments forwarded so far in order to substantiate this claim are less than convincing. All of them are based on shaky grounds, whether political or scientific. No one knows what will be in forty or fifty years from now. There are, however, several consequences of the realization of the SDI which can now easily be foreseen or are already known, all of which are dangerous for the world's security.

The United States drive toward the creation of several categories of space weapons will have disastrous consequences for the world's political, military and economic stability. These are not merely hollow words: I would like to elucidate the grounds on which this statement is based.

The plan to create a "defensive shield" is being portrayed in the United States as a protective, non-provocative undertaking. It may be seen as such, however, only by a layman. To anyone who understands the intricacies of the strategic balance of today, it is obvious that when a State possessing a modern, that is highly accurate and reliable, offensive arsenal acquires a monopoly in a strong strategic defence, it gains a superiority and is able to use its nuclear forces first with small or no fear of a retaliatory strike.

It is said by the present United States Administration that it has no desire to achieve such a first-strike capability, that there are no sinister motives behind the Strategic Defence Initiative. However, careful students of the strategic developments over the last three decades cannot help disagreeing. After all, one can hardly deny that ever since the first American strategic bombers came into service the underlying logic of the subsequent developments has been to achieve

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

superiority over the Soviet Union, the ultimate goal being the achievement of a first-strike capability. The steps in these developments are well-known: first, diversifying the strategic forces from bombers to land-based intercontinental missiles, to submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and now to sea- and air-launched cruise missiles; second, providing these weapon systems with maximum accuracy and reliability thus enabling them to attack even the hardest military targets; third, multiplying the nuclear warheads on the strategic missiles by MIRV-ing them; fourth, deploying medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe, with range permitting them to strike the territory of the Soviet Union and with deep penetration capability enabling them to destroy targets of strategic importance, like ICBM fields or underground command centres; and fifth, establishing plans to develop mobile, thus less vulnerable and super-accurate, intercontinental missiles as well as the "stealth" strategic bombers. And after following all these steps comes the last and ultimate one-- the strategic "defensive shield", creating a chance of rendering the retaliatory Soviet strike in a potential nuclear conflict ineffective.

It is difficult to overstate the dangers ensuing from the prospect of achieving the first nuclear strike capability. The stability of strategic situation would be shattered; any serious international crisis invoke a danger of pre-emptive strike; there would be a permanent suspicion on the part of the opposing States.

Should the development of a strategic defence system by one State become a fact of life it would not only give this State a strategic superiority but it would also inevitably cause a profound change in the military balance on the theatre and regional levels. The balance of forces on these levels would always be measured against the background of the ultimate power of the strategic first-strike capability possessed by one of the States. Moreover, systems able to knock out ballistic missiles and warheads in flight would be more than capable of destroying so easy a target as the opponent's satellites. At times of crisis or even limited conflict it would be plausible to expect these satellites to be destroyed, thus influencing not only the nuclear but also the conventional command and control capabilities of the prospective enemy. These and other actions could be expected to go unpunished, given the existence of the monopoly in strategic defence systems. Thus, the prospect of a nuclear war may become less worrisome and more tempting for a State enjoying the strategic superiority. In such a military setting, and taking into account the existing strong ideological and political controversies, it is not so far-fetched to assume that the danger of a nuclear war would increase, and this alone is a sufficient reason to be afraid of and to oppose the United States plans for the militarization of space.

It is more than natural to expect that a State possessing a nuclear arsenal would, if exposed to the prospect of eradication of its retaliatory capability, do its utmost to prevent such an outcome. As the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union, V. Issraelyan, stated in his statement of 7 March 1985:

"The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to competition in the build-up of any armaments including space weapons. It is all too obvious, however, that in face of a threat from outer space it will be forced to take actions to reliably guarantee its security. The choice is not ours, but we shall have to act to redress the strategic balance. The equilibrium will be redressed, but at the higher level of armaments".

And that is another reason for which the strategic military stability of today would be jeopardized by the realization of the United States military programme in space. It would mean simply the beginning of a new round in the strategic arms race, both in space and on Earth, the cost of which would be forbidding.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The net result of the new round in the strategic arms race provoked by the United States space programme will be on the one hand the deterioration of the world's security and, on the other, the deterioration of general economic conditions. Since the expenses connected with the realization of the early stages of the new United States plan are to reach an order of magnitude of scores of billions of dollars, and at the more advanced stages hundreds of billions, it does not require too much imagination to foresee the enormous drain those expenses will be on world economy. The most obvious victims of this diversion of financial, material and human resources into the military field will be the developing States.

Apart from the deterioration of over-all military stability, the space defence programme is bound to open up a "Pandora's box" of new, unpredictable technical possibilities permitting further, across-the-board sophistication of existing weapons and the creation of entirely new ones. Thus, the development of sensors for space surveillance, tracking, acquisition and kill assessment may equally well serve the guidance systems of future "fire and forget" missiles and other types of conventional and nuclear weapons. Efforts put into the research on the so-called directed energy weapons, like high energy lasers and particle beam weapons, may give birth to new categories of weapons to be deployed on Earth. A similar outcome is possible from the research into the so-called kinetic energy weapons, like the electromagnetic launcher known as a "rail-gun", or high velocity missiles. The new generation of computers and various communication links needed for the future management of the space defence system can also serve as the backbone of any modern weapon system to come. One could foresee the development of new protective materials, new deceptive and jamming systems, new propulsion systems to increase the manoeuvrability of various categories of weapons. The prospective space systems will need entirely new and powerful electrical sources, like small nuclear reactors, new charge batteries and capacitors. Several of the systems envisaged will require special coolants and various sophisticated construction materials. All this and other new technology will find an immediate application in any land-, air- or sea-based weapon system of today and tomorrow, intensifying the qualitative nuclear and conventional arms race.

In order to assess properly the scale and nature of the programme now put in motion one has to remember that the funds devoted to it are only a part of the military research and development budget of the United States, which doubled during the last five years to reaching about 35 billion dollars in 1985. All this research effort is now intensified and **focused** on space applications but nothing will prevent the new discoveries from being applied to mastering war-fighting in any other environment. It must be remembered that new discoveries in militarily applicable technology create the so-called follow-on imperative, that is, a quest for following the achievement in basic technology with actual weapons improvements which, in turn, give a boost to the development of counter-weapons, since it must be assumed that an adversary does something similar, and may be ahead. Thus, the new discoveries generate an accelerating spiral of research and development efforts, having no regard for any external political or military circumstances, although these circumstances may be invoked as justification of the efforts. Generally speaking, the military research and development undertaken by the United States, notably in connection with the SDI programme, is full of potential technical improvements which will negatively affect international security.

Still another major reason why the international community has to take a stand against the prospects of intensified militarization of outer space is that, if not stopped, it will jeopardize the structure of existing disarmament treaties and of various disarmament negotiations. The first victim of the programme may become the bilateral negotiations on space, strategic and medium-range weapons.

It has been repeated several times in this very hall how great are the hopes all of us hold in connection with these talks. While welcoming them and wishing them success, we have to nevertheless point out that it would seem to be a fruitless undertaking if one of the negotiating parties carried out vigorous efforts entirely contrary to the aim of the negotiations. And because of the direct linkage between the three subjects negotiated, the failure in one of them would be tantamount to a collapse of all three. Equally devastating would most probably be the impact of such a failure for the prospects of overcoming the dangerous situation in Europe, where an increasing number of lethal weapons are amassed.

Notwithstanding the perils to the ongoing disarmament negotiations, the insistence on the realization of the Strategic Defence Initiative would most probably sound the death knell for several existing arms control treaties. The Treaty immediately endangered is the bilateral 1972 Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. Although the Treaty permits research, the scope and intensity of the research activity in connection with the United States defence initiative is too large to be deemed compatible with the spirit of the Treaty. Even more important is the fact that if the research undertaken is to provide an answer about the practicability of the whole idea, it will have to encompass testing of the prototype systems and this will already be in open contravention to the letter of the agreement. That this is a real possibility is indicated by the reports that the United States Administration is foreseeing a need for re-negotiation of the Treaty.

The proponents of the space "protective shield" claim that it will consist of a non-nuclear-weapon system. However, it is also reported that about 10 per cent of the funds devoted to the new space programme went into the area of nuclear weapons. Among various exotic weapon systems to be developed there is the idea of the so-called X-ray laser weapon, which is to receive its energy from a nuclear explosion. Substantial research is also devoted to other ways of channelling nuclear explosive energy into deadly beams. If proved true, these reports herald the prospect of abrogation of two important disarmament agreements, namely the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

All in all, it seems plausible to assume that the realization of the SDI would unavoidably create an international atmosphere foreclosing the chance to achieve tangible results in any disarmament forum existing today and would endanger the existence of the modest disarmament agreements in force, achieved with such effort.

The major argument readily arising against the system of space weapons is that it will, in all probability, have a clearly negative effect on the whole international co-operation in peaceful exploration of space. It can hardly be imagined that in view of growing military competition in space, in which any scientific development might have some military implications, it would be possible to plan and execute common international scientific and technical activities. The chances of less developed States, possessing no indigenous space technology, benefitting from international space co-operation for their development would shrink substantially. And the civilian space systems operated by other States able on their own to deploy them in orbit, would be continuously endangered by the space weapons deployed by a State which may have no regard for the rights and interests of others.

The considerations I have offered today on the issue of space weapon systems planned by the United States point to one single conclusion-- the prevention of an arms race in outer space is increasingly urgent. The urgency and gravity of the problem is unquestionable. We need therefore a quick decision on the

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

establishment of the appropriate organ of the Conference on Disarmament devoted entirely to this problem, namely, the Ad hoc Committee, with an appropriate mandate. But it would be difficult if not impossible without flexibility and readiness to compromise demonstrated by all the delegations. Thus we should search for a mutually acceptable solution, having in mind that the ultimate purpose of our efforts is a future agreement or agreements preventing an arms race in outer space. The work of such an organ would complement in an important way the negotiations carried out on a bilateral basis. The interaction created between the multilateral and bilateral efforts would be profitable for all the parties concerned and would permit a considerable improvement of the international climate.

CD/PV.301

7

(Mr. Frøysnes, Norway)

Similarly, the Norwegian Government attaches the utmost importance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and in this connection my Government is of the opinion that a determined effort to strengthen and uphold existing international arms control agreements is of the greatest significance.

Norway hopes that the resumption of bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States will have a positive effect also on the multilateral disarmament process, adding another number of small steps to our journey. As the single forum for negotiations on global disarmament, this Conference deals with many of the same major issues from the global perspective. From a Norwegian point of view, I would like to identify four major elements in such a global approach.

Firstly, the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes is obviously in the interest of all mankind. Accordingly, the Conference on Disarmament should also significantly contribute to preventing an arms race in outer space.

I note that this Conference since 1982 has had these issues on its agenda. In our view, the time is now ripe for the Conference to define the necessary terms of reference and initiate concrete work in this field. We are therefore in favour of establishing an ad hoc committee to identify issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As bilateral negotiations are now underway in this field, we feel that it is equally important for the multilateral efforts to get started. At this stage of the process there is an urgent need to examine recent technological developments in relation to existing international legal instruments. In this way we may be able better to identify loopholes that should be removed.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

Outer space has already, since soon after the first space flight in 1957, been used for military purposes. That does not mean that arms have been placed in that environment. As we understand it, space has until now been free from arms. The military use of space has so far been for the purposes of gathering intelligence or enhancing the performance of Earth-based weapon systems. Satellites used for such tasks are directly or indirectly elements of such weapon systems. Apart from early warning and intelligence gathering the functions of satellites are mainly for transmission purposes such as electronic and photographic reconnaissance, navigation and communication. Some are furthermore important to disarmament and arms limitation efforts, inter alia as means of verification of disarmament or disarmament related agreements.

The gradual militarization of space has thus been a fact for close to 25 years. We are now facing a new situation of weaponization of space or rather of an arms race in outer space. Space systems having a direct capability of destruction are now emerging as elements of research and development in the weapons programmes. Great amounts are being spent on research for the purpose of anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare.

The two leading space Powers are already developing systems for attacks on satellites in relatively low orbits. Some are not far from the stage of their possible deployment. The risk is imminent that the functioning of the systems, which are for the moment perhaps not very effective, will be improved and that the space powers will develop ASAT weapons and extend their capacity to carry out ASAT warfare also into high orbits, where the geostationary satellites are placed.

The bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States are intended to cover the question of preventing an arms race in space. All efforts to this effect are welcome. However, the parties to the bilateral talks will most probably concentrate their negotiations on items directly linked to their strategic weapon systems. Thus it appears self-evident that with regard to space they will devote special attention to Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems, such systems being intimately linked to the question of balancing their offensive strategic systems. In this context also ASAT systems will most certainly be considered.

It is however obvious that a meaningful comprehensive agreement on the prevention of an arms race in space cannot be reached exclusively on a bilateral level. An ASAT ban not adhered to by all States with a future ASAT capacity would make many important satellites potential objects of attacks. It would also leave the satellites of the Soviet Union and the United States themselves vulnerable to attacks by ASAT weapons of a third State. A multilateral approach to ASAT weapons thus would or should be in the interest also of the two major space Powers.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

The military role of the satellites, including the dual tasks exercised by many of them, should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that many satellites are important elements of civil and peaceful programmes, especially in the field of communication, meteorology and geophysics, and that they play essential roles for the verification of disarmament and arms-control agreements. It must also be recognized that many States here represented, not only the two major space Powers, have considerable space programmes and have made large investments in peaceful space activities. Virtually all States are making substantial use of space programmes in one way or another, especially for communications. Considering that a growing number of States are acquiring knowledge and experience of space activities one cannot for much longer assume that the United States and the Soviet Union will be the only ones capable of developing ASAT systems.

It is important to elaborate legally binding international instruments prohibiting ASAT weapons and ASAT warfare. Because all States are directly or indirectly involved, the Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with its responsibilities, must immediately consider in what way it can take action to this effect.

In this connection I wish to stress that it is virtually impossible to draw a line between the peaceful and military tasks of a satellite in a way that could be legally viable for the purpose of treaty-making. Therefore we do not think it meaningful to try to make any distinction between peaceful and military satellites in this context.

Useful steps could be taken to come to grips with inadequacies of existing international treaties. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in earth orbits and on celestial bodies. This provision however does not impose restrictions on other types of military space systems. As a complement to the provisions of the multilateral Outer Space Treaty, the bilateral SALT II agreement, observed though not formally in force, forbids development, testing and deployment of systems for placing nuclear weapons in orbit, etc. Also according to the SALT II agreement the parties have undertaken not to interfere with a Party's national means of verification. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 bans the testing of nuclear weapons inter alia in outer space. In the ABM Treaty of 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union undertake not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are "sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based".

This body of international and bilateral treaties is thus quite extensively blocking the use of nuclear weapons as space weapons. However, other areas of space weaponization are poorly covered in the existing treaty system. If no steps are taken with regard to concluding new international treaties or agreements, the road to the arms race in space will be wide-open.

The main task of the Conference, however, should be to aim at achieving a total ban on ASAT weapons. That implies a ban on development, testing, production and deployment as well as on use of such weapons.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

Interim measures may also be contemplated. For instance, some specific types of weapons or actions may be prohibited. An agreement on non-first-use of ASAT weapons or unilateral undertakings to that effect would be of help while negotiating. A moratorium on testing could be agreed upon at an early stage.

The proposal by the delegation of France, that the Soviet Union and the United States could pledge to extend to the satellites of third countries the provisions concerning the immunity of certain space objects on which they have reached bilateral agreement, is also of interest.

Non-use of nuclear weapons for ASAT purposes is relatively well, though not completely, banned in the agreements I have just mentioned: the SALT-agreement, the Outer Space Treaty and in the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Corresponding arrangements for prohibiting the deployment and use of space weapons not relying upon nuclear explosion techniques should be contemplated. Also in this context a development of the notification procedures of the 1975 Registration Convention could perhaps also be considered as a collateral measure in the efforts to strengthen the capacity to detect and identify testing of ASAT weapons.

It has been pointed out by international experts that the same technologies can be used in both ASAT systems and ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems. Thus the case could be made that it is no use banning one of these systems and letting the other one go ahead.

A ban on ASAT weapons may thus be circumvented by development of BMD systems, which could probably rather easily be transformed to use for attacking satellites. The BMD systems, as we know, must be able to go into action on very short notice and must obviously be much more advanced than ASAT weapons as the movements of their targets are not easily predictable, especially if these targets are launched from submarines or other mobile platforms. Targets for ASAT weapons are comparatively easy to attack as satellites move in a calculated orbit, which gives a prospective attacker ample time for preparation and targeting.

BMD-systems are of course already banned in accordance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty -- the ABM Treaty. However, that Treaty covers ABM interceptor missiles, launchers and radars, i.e. anti-missile systems in the form in which they existed at the time when the Treaty entered into force. Systems which are now considered for research purposes also include laser and particle-beam weapons. The Parties to the ABM Treaty have, according to an agreed interpretation, undertaken, in the event that ABM systems based on other physical principles (than those referred to in the Treaty) are created, to make such systems subject to discussion and agreement.

A comprehensive ban on ABM systems is desirable from the point of view of prohibiting the emergence of new ASAT weapons. Even if the Conference on Disarmament could well be a forum for such deliberations when dealing with ASAT problems, it must realistically be recognized that questions of BMDs and interpretations of or amendments to the bilateral ABM Treaty will be treated in the bilateral talks.



(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

The preambular part of the ABM Treaty contains the following paragraph: "Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons". Against this background the launching by the United States of a research programme for the Strategic Defence Initiative raises questions as to the compatibility of the SDI with the spirit of the ABM Treaty.

Even if the SDI is a defence system, the development of massive BMD systems, by any of the two major nuclear Powers would by the other be seen as utterly destabilizing. One State, if in sole possession of the system, would not be seriously threatened by retaliation from the other side after a first strike on his opponent. It would be difficult to imagine that States would not take counter measures such as adjustments of their strategic systems, thus changing the very assumptions on which the BMD systems were conceptualized. Examples of such counter-measures, alternatively or in combination, could be:

- The number of offensive ballistic missiles and their MIRVing could be greatly increased in order to overwhelm the defence.
- Modifications of the ICBM arsenal could be put into effect, e.g. by shortening the boost phase of the missiles and applying decoys and protective measures.
- The offensive strategic systems could be adjusted by large increases of the numbers of airborne weapons, especially submarine-launched and air-launched cruise missiles etc.
- Systems for attack on, for example, the satellite components of the defensive system could be developed.
- Similar defensive systems could be developed at enormous costs leading to a new situation the effects of which could be difficult to predict.

It is difficult to draw any other conclusion from this scenario than that measures and counter measures with regard to BMDs will over time neutralize each other at ever higher levels of armament while demanding extremely heavy costs, and therefore, the success of the bilateral negotiations of the Soviet Union and the United States will be of vital importance. It is equally important that the Conference on Disarmament without undue delay should take on its responsibility in this field.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

The hope we entertain with regard to these negotiations is equalled only by our conviction that action must be taken urgently to prevent an arms race in outer space. We know that the race for the militarization of space has indeed begun. Our efforts must therefore be aimed at halting it before it reaches an uncontrollable stage.

We may recall in this connection that since 5 October 1957, when the Soviet Union launched its first Sputnik, other Powers have in turn embarked on space exploration. This competition has involved an impressive number of scientists and researchers, and swallowed up fabulous sums of money. The International Peace Research Institute, based in Stockholm, calculates that the two Great Powers alone spend \$40 billion annually. The Institute adds since 1957 these investments have led to the launching of over 3,000 satellites, 2,000 of which for military purposes. The latter provide the two Great Powers, the main rivals in this race, with the communications, guidance and espionage services they require. Furthermore, every conflict which has broken out in the world has led to the launching of one or more satellites for the surveillance of the theatre of operation.

Technological progress and an obsession with being overtaken by the other rival have inexorably fuelled this race not for the exploration of space but for its domination, and in fact to ensure a better military coverage of the Earth. It is with regret that today we see that these activities have been undertaken in violation of the relevant provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaties.

The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies provides, in article IV, that "the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes". Without entering into the controversy surrounding the term "peaceful use", we wish to stress that we have always considered it to mean "non-military uses". This is also the interpretation made by the great majority of delegations during the discussions which led to the Outer Space Treaty.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

Thus, failure to respect the provisions of this Treaty by the States which possess the means of space exploration has led to a dangerous widening of the scope of the arms race, which has shifted from the Earth into space. Outer space has thus become a second arena for potential confrontation between the Great Powers, instead of remaining the common heritage of mankind and of serving as a sphere for broad international co-operation in scientific and technological matters.

At a time when two out of three space launchings are for military purposes, the militarization of space crossed a new threshold in the early 1980s with the development of anti-missile weapons. These new armaments, which are the regrettable aftermath of the breaking-off of the United States-Soviet Union ASAT negotiations in 1978, are a fresh development in space military strategy. They threaten not only the system of military data collection by satellite, but also other satellites for civilian or peaceful purposes.

Some of these weapons are still at the design or experimental stage, such as Earth-based laser-beams aimed on target by a mirror, or space stations which would send out chemical or X-ray laser-beams from small nuclear explosions. There are also particle beams which can disorganize the electronic systems of enemy missiles or destroy their nuclear warheads; and finally, satellite-launched missiles or clusters of missiles.

If none of these weapons is operational as yet, other weapons are: this is the case of what military experts usually call "killer satellites". As is well known, these new weapons, which experiments have shown to be effective, are small satellites placed on orbit either by a launcher or by supersonic aircraft, which destroy their targets, i.e. spacecraft, by exploding on approach or by crashing into them.

We have considered it worthwhile to recall these well-known facts in order to show that the arms race in space is not something to be forestalled but something to be halted by concrete measures which must be taken very urgently.

In view of the importance of this issue, the Royal Academy of the Kingdom of Morocco, whose members include such outstanding figures as Mr. Henry Kissinger of the United States, Huan Xiang of the People's Republic of China, Nobel-prizewinner Ahmed Abdussalam of Pakistan, Pedro Ramirez Vasquez of Mexico, Boris Piotrovski of the Soviet Union and many others, last year devoted one of its meetings to the "Deontology of the conquest of space". Here is the conclusion of the Paper given on this occasion by the distinguished professor René Jean Dupuy: "The Second Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Use of Space, UNISPACE 82, echoed the world's anxiety; it addressed a fresh appeal to the two super-Powers, inviting them to resume negotiations in order to curb the arms race in space. Appeals of this kind are made in the United Nations with the regularity of ritual conjuration. The proclamation of space as the common heritage of mankind could not alone be accompanied by a farewell to arms. Mankind becomes a subject of

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

international law once it becomes aware of its vulnerability ... Today it is mankind itself which is discovering that it is perishable, while the endless realms of space are criss-crossed by metal boxes whose rays burn brighter than the sun, and death-dealing cylinders slide through the peaceful depths waiting for the sign".

This disturbing picture painted by Professor Dupuy confirms, if need there be, that the threat to our planet from the militarization of space is quite as dangerous as that of nuclear weapons.

In the same way as the theory of nuclear deterrence has led to the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, so the theory underlying and now tending to intensify the militarization of space is the catalyst of the arms race in space.

According to the physicist Kosta Tsipis, director of science and technology programmes at the famous Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the militarization of space could lead to a triple arms race involving offensive weapons, defensive weapons and retaliatory weapons.

This scenario of a triple arms race is worrying on more than one score.

Firstly, this race will have harmful effects on the international relations and strategic balance between the Great Powers. In case of conflict, the other countries will suffer as much as the antagonists.

Secondly, it will seriously jeopardize the areas where international co-operation has allowed the peaceful use of space. These areas include: intercontinental satellite communication, which obviously helps to bring peoples closer together; satellite meteorology and atmospheric and climatic studies; air and sea navigational safety; and remote sensing to explore the Earth and take action in agriculture, mining resources, hydraulic engineering, geology, map-making and the environment, etc. These few areas of international co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space will thus be sorely tried and even threatened by any future satellites searching for potential targets. This is all the more alarming as at present there is no means of distinguishing a military satellite from a civilian satellite.

Thirdly, at a time when tens of millions of human beings are threatened with starvation, and when scores of Third World countries are crushed by their debts, this arms race and the expenditures it requires seem both anachronistic and insane. Furthermore, some experts go so far as to maintain that the new space weapons require such a high level of spending as must distort the very structure of economically strong countries, with a ruinous impact on the entire world economy. Professor Mahdi Elmandjra, the Moroccan futurologist and member of the Royal Academy, adds the following in this respect: "The development of the space power of some countries increases the political, military, economic and sociocultural dependency of the others, and widens yet further the gap between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'". Almost 30 years after the launching of the first Sputnik, the advent of man's conquest of space is now overshadowed by its militarization.

the international community watches with alarm as space weapons pass from the realm of science fiction to that of tragic reality. What is more, we have seen for some time that the Great Powers have a growing tendency to accept the militarization of outer space as a commonplace.

In response to this situation, it is the Conference's pressing duty to set about the task for which it was set up: the negotiation of disarmament agreements, in particular with regard to outer space. This is what it is requested to do in paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as in several United Nations resolutions, including resolution 39/59, which states:

"The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space."

To this end, the resolution requests the Conference to set up an ad hoc committee on the item at the beginning of this session.

In this connection, the Moroccan delegation welcomes the constructive attitude of the members of our Conference who have said that they are in favour of establishing an ad hoc committee on this matter. Nevertheless, this attitude must be translated into an agreement on acceptable wording of a mandate for the Committee. We are pleased to note that consultations on this subject seem to be taking place in a realistic and responsible atmosphere. It may therefore be hoped that the goodwill with which we are all inspired will enable our Conference to overcome the remaining differences on the content of the mandate in question.

Mutual understanding and a spirit of compromise are all the more necessary in that outer space is a new area of negotiations for our Conference. That is indeed why we have no objection to the future body beginning by identifying the issues to be negotiated, in particular, those connected with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are also in favour of a thorough review and critical analysis of existing international agreements, whether multilateral or bilateral, to determine the reasons which have allowed them to be violated.

While expressing our readiness to concur in the formulation of a mandate which would bring all delegations closer to the objective and purpose of our Conference, we nevertheless remain convinced that the final goal of our work in this field should be clearly and unmistakably defined: it is to negotiate one or more agreements for the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.

The agreement or agreements should provide for the prohibition of all space weapons, including anti-satellite weapons, in order to preserve outer space as the common heritage of mankind to be used only for peaceful purposes. This objective should be attained by the prohibition of the development, testing, manufacture, deployment and use of such weapons, and also by the destruction of existing weapon systems.

Lord Chalfont of the United Kingdom stated on this subject before the Royal Academy of Morocco at its session last year, "I consider it to be the duty of mankind to stress the need for a binding international convention as rapidly as possible. If we do not succeed in this purpose, the arms race in outer space will enter a stage in which events will happen dangerously fast."

We hope that this warning by Lord Chalfont will be heard by our Conference.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

Finally, I shall deal briefly with the other agenda items. Belgium is a space power through its participation in the European Space Agency; it contributed to drawing up the compromise draft mandate in document CD/527, under which the Conference on Disarmament could begin work under agenda item 5. This is an area the security applications of which are long-standing and some of them have a stabilizing influence. It does not lend itself to misleading generalizations or clear-cut positions. Detailed exploratory work will be necessary to identify the points on which precise disarmament measures are useful, possible and verifiable. Belgium would like this work to begin as rapidly as possible.

(Mr. Gracia Robles, Mexico)

The authors of the Declaration included in the "two specific steps" which today require special attention "the prevention of an arms race in outer space". On this subject they had the following to say:

"Outer space must be used for the benefit of mankind as a whole, not as a battleground of the future. We therefore call for the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons. An arms race in space would be enormously costly, and have grave destabilizing effects. It would also endanger a number of arms limitation and disarmament agreements."

It is precisely in connection with this topic, which was discussed at length in the three statements I have just mentioned, that I would venture to make the suggestion to which I referred a moment ago. So that it may be weighed up in all objectivity, I should like first to recall some specific facts, some of which we have witnessed in this very chamber, that provide a suitable context for the issue.

As is well known, in a speech delivered on 23 March 1983 the President of the United States, Mr. Ronald Reagan, propounded what is officially known as the "Strategic Defence Initiative", which the newspapers and radio have baptized the "Star Wars" programme. He presented this initiative as something which was designed to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" and would consist essentially of a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development programme to begin to attain "our final objective of eliminating the threat caused by strategic nuclear missiles".

I confess that personally I have not the slightest doubt about the sincerity of the author of this initiative at the time when he spoke the words I have just quoted. On the other hand, however, it must also be confessed that this initiative has become one of the most controversial issues in the international arena and that

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

in the enormous amount of literature produced over the last two years from governmental and academic sources the amount provided by the opponents of the initiative as opposed to its supporters has been in a ratio of perhaps more than two to one.

Leaving this aspect aside, I consider that the decisive factor here must be the reaction which the initiative in question has produced in the opposit camp. In this connection, at our meeting the day before yesterday, we heard a very good illustration when the distinguished representative of Poland said in his statement:

"The plan to create a defensive shield is being portrayed in the United States as a protective, non-provocative undertaking. It may be seen as such, however, only by a layman. To anyone who understands the intricacies of the strategic balance of today, it is obvious that when a State possessing a modern, that is, highly accurate and reliable offensive arsenal, acquires a monopoly in a strong strategic defence, it gains a superiority and is able to use its nuclear forces first with small or no fear of a retaliatory strike."

These words appear to be in substance identical to those spoken by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Lowitz, in his statement at the same meeting, when he said:

"The United States cannot afford to allow a unilateral advantage to the Soviet Union that might open the door to a potential first strike".

Ambassador Turbanski then recalled the words spoken, also in this chamber, by Ambassador Issraelyan on 7 March. He used words very similar to those I have just quoted:

"The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to competition in the build-up of any armaments including space weapons. It is all too obvious, however, that in face of a threat from outer space it will be forced to take action to reliably guarantee its security. The choice is not ours, but we shall have to act to redress the strategic balance. The equilibrium will be redressed, but at a higher level of armaments."

The foregoing shows once again, I think, that a distinguished professor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University was quite right when he recently said at a Conference held in Washington, referring specifically to nuclear weapons, but in terms which are also applicable to space weapons:

"Every nuclear Power is confronted by the virtually impossible task of making an essentially incredible threat credible. The result is an endless arms race in which the greatest creator of mutual fear is research aimed at developing new nuclear weapons, which each side is frantically pursuing in the hope of breaking through the defences of the other side while at the same time improving its own. The result, as we well know, is that the rate of arms innovation has left the negotiating process far behind."

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

If, then, we must resign ourselves to facing up to reality, which unfortunately often does not coincide with magnanimous projects, perhaps in the case with which I am dealing now it might be possible to explore the procedure to which I shall refer below.

I shall begin by recalling, in order to give a clear idea of the basis for our suggestion, that the President of the United States said in reply to a question put to him during a television appearance on 21 October 1984 by someone who asked if he was serious in proposing to share with the Soviet Union the technology involved in the Strategic Defence Initiative (and here I shall quote the original English of his reply for the sake of greater accuracy):

[Speaking in English]: "Why not? What if we did and I hope we can, we're still researching. What if we come up with the weapon that renders those missiles obsolete? There has never been a weapon invented in the history of man that has not led to a defensive, a counter weapon. Now, some people have said: Ah, that would make a war imminent because they think that we could launch a first strike because we could defend against the enemy. But why not do what I have offered to do and ask the Soviet Union to do? Say look, here is what we can do, we will even give it to you, now will you sit down with us and once and for all get rid -- all of us -- of these nuclear weapons and free mankind from that threat? I think that would be the greatest use of a defensive weapon."

In the light of facts such as those I have reviewed in this statement, it would seem inevitable that unless rapid and effective preventive measures are taken a frantic arms race in space will take place between the two main space Powers. It is obvious that there is a deep mistrust between those Powers, which means that each of them interprets the projects and acts of the other in that sphere as attempts to ensure for itself a superiority which would bring the capability to carry out the dreaded first strike. That is why we think it would be extremely desirable to do immediately what the President of the United States has offered to do once technological research has produced an effective space defence system: to invite the Soviet Union to participate in the planned research on a footing of absolute equality of rights, as well as a member State of the Group of 21, since this is undeniably an issue which, particularly because of the danger it brings of increasing the possibility of a nuclear holocaust, is of interest not only to the space Powers or nuclear Powers but to all the peoples of the Earth.

We hope that serious consideration may be given to our suggestion both in the bilateral negotiations which began in this city on 12 March and in the ad hoc committee which we think should be set up without further delay by the Conference on Disarmament to deal with item 5 of its agenda concerning precisely the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We are convinced that, as I said at the beginning of this statement, to carry out our proposal would bring incalculable positive results, as its objective is shared not only by the six States which signed the Delhi Declaration but also by the 40 member States of the Conference on Disarmament and, I would venture to say, all members of the international community. I would define this objective as



(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

being to make an effective contribution to creating the essential trust between the two principal nuclear Powers and between the two main military alliances, so that in this year which marks the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations it will at last be possible to make what are referred to in the Final Paragraph of the Delhi Declaration as "the first concrete steps to avert the threat to the survival of humanity".

CD/PV.302

7

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The discussion on agenda item 5 of the Conference on Disarmament, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", has substantiated the assessment, expressed by the Soviet delegation on 7 March, that this is a priority matter which should be resolved without delay.

The very fact that this item has been spoken on by most members of the Conference points to the urgency of the issue and to the international community's concern for preserving space as an area of peaceful activity of mankind, as well as to the global nature of this problem which affects the interests of all States, big and small.

A number of interesting points deserving a close examination have been made by the representatives of socialist countries as well as by many representatives of non-aligned States.

An analysis of these statements, and of developments in the last few days which have a bearing on this problem, leads to the following preliminary conclusions.

Firstly, virtually all delegations have emphasized the importance of the existing international agreements limiting military uses of outer space and have called for preserving and strengthening those treaties and agreements.

Secondly, there is a broad recognition of the need for additional international legal measures to safeguard space against penetration by the arms race, as well as of the role to be played in this respect by the Conference on Disarmament.

Thirdly, virtually all delegations have no doubt as to the need to work out within an ad hoc committee of the Conference effective measures to prevent the arms race from spreading into outer space. In this connection the overwhelming majority of member countries attach great significance to the United Nations decisions, in particular General Assembly resolution 39/59, containing specific recommendations to the Conference on this score.

Fourthly, unanimous satisfaction has been expressed at the beginning of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear and space armaments.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Fifthly, participants in the discussion have voiced serious concern at the attempts by the United States to make use of outer space for upsetting the parity which exists in the world correlation of forces and achieving military superiority. In this connection well-substantiated criticism was offered of the United States plans for space militarization, the most sinister reflection of which is the "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI). In fact no delegations, apart from some of the United States' closest allies, expressed approval or even understanding of these plans which are a threat to peace.

The Soviet delegation fully supports the assessment of such plans made here by the representatives of States which signed the well-known Delhi Declaration which has been circulated as Conference document CD/549.

We also share the concern of the delegation of Sri Lanka in connection with "the undiminished desire to continue with space weapons programmes, indeed to accelerate them". A similar concern was expressed by the Swedish delegation. Its statement reflects a just and well-founded anxiety about the future of the most important arms limitation agreement, the 1972 ABM Treaty, and points to the dangerous possibility of dual-purpose weapons being developed which would have both anti-satellite and anti-missile capabilities. We agree with the Swedish conclusion that "development, testing and deployment of all space weapons must be banned".

Finally, we fully associate ourselves with the ideas contained in the striking and detailed statement delivered on this subject by Ambassador Turbanski of the Polish People's Republic.

In this unanimous assessment of the situation, the statement made by the distinguished United States representative Ambassador Lowitz sounded a false note. Ambassador Lowitz reiterated the assertion that the implementation of the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI) would enhance international security and render nuclear weapons obsolete and useless. At the same time Ambassador Lowitz claimed that the United States did not intend to go beyond the research and development stage, and would leave the actual deployment of space weapons to be negotiated with the USSR.

However, these two assertions are contradictory. Altogether, the statement of the representative of the United States raised a large number of questions and comments for the Soviet delegation which we would like to share with our colleagues. I have recalled one of these, which is the contradiction which we have pointed out.

It seems to us that the question of whether the "Strategic Defence Initiative" would strengthen peace, stability and international security has already been answered by most of the speakers in our discussion, and in a quite unambiguous manner at that. Quite obviously not, since the advent of space attack systems would sharply destabilize the strategic situation, act as a catalyst to an arms race in every direction, dramatically increase the risk of nuclear catastrophe and completely disorganize the arms limitation process.

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

An equally unanimous doubt was expressed by the overwhelming majority of delegations with regard to the assertion that the development of space weapons would lead to the elimination of nuclear arms. This is blatantly disproved by the aggressive actions of the United States itself, which is continuously stepping up nuclear programmes in spite of public assurances of its desire to eliminate nuclear weapons. Indeed, on the one hand we are told that "reductions in the levels of offensive nuclear weapons on both sides" are being sought, while on the other new programmes are adopted to deploy the even more advanced and powerful MX missiles. Here again there is a clear contradiction. The thesis recently put into circulation is that nuclear weapons are in fact not going to be eliminated until the end of the so-called "transition period" of several decades during which the United States intends to develop the new exotic systems for space warfare. One cannot help recalling once again in this connection President Reagan's address on 23 March 1983 in which he stated that the deployment of ABM systems in space, "if paired with offensive systems ... can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy".

The distinguished representative of the United States was trying to persuade us here that his country's "Star Wars" plans are purely defensive and will not "create a situation in which the United States or the West would somehow achieve superiority". But is this really the case? None other than the United States Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger stated explicitly on an NBC television programme on 27 March 1983, that the United States Administration's only motive was "fear of a retaliatory strike". This means the United States needs an anti-missile shield not for defensive purposes but to enable it to deliver a nuclear first strike from behind the shield. What is this if not a quest for military superiority? I wish to point out yet another contradiction or inconsistency in the United States position. We are told that the Strategic Defence Initiative will have a stabilizing effect. Then, according to the logic of the advocates of the SDI, it would seem that in order to obtain this desirable effect, both of the opposing sides, the United States and the Soviet Union, should possess comprehensive ABM systems. However, Washington statesmen unabashedly claim that the situation will only be stable if the system is possessed by the United States alone, and the sooner the better. Should the Russians be the first to acquire such a system, then according to United States Secretary of Defence Weinberger, "the world would be a very dangerous place indeed ... it would strongly resemble a world in which the Russians had nuclear weapons and the United States did not".

So much for the "stabilizing" role of defensive weapons hypocritically discussed in Washington. It is perfectly obvious that the advantages of a comprehensive ABM system if developed by one of the sides are well understood there, and it is precisely for this reason that such a system is so persistently sought for the United States. This also exposes the purpose of the efforts to ascribe, without adducing any proof, to the Soviet Union their own dangerous intentions in this area, to camouflage their actions aimed at eroding the balance and obtaining strategic superiority over the USSR.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We are told, inter alia, by the United States representative to this Conference, that the United States is engaged in pure scientific research and that "any deployment of weapons related to the Strategic Defence Initiative would in view of United States obligations under existing treaties, particularly the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, have to be a matter for negotiations". Here again, however, there are many contradictions. For example, while the United States envoys to foreign capitals, as well as the United States representative to this Conference, claim that their country's space programmes will not go beyond the stage of research, the President of that country states that "this is a historic programme for our national defence ... and we intend to carry it through". One would like to believe, of course, that the \$26 billion programme was drawn up purely for the love of science and that the true United States position in this regard is articulated by Ambassador Lowitz rather than by other high officials in Washington who have repeatedly asserted, and continue to assert, that the United States intends to implement the "Star Wars" programme.

The facts, however, suggest that we are actually witnessing the first steps towards the acquisition of a new class of weapons, towards an arms race of truly cosmic dimensions.

Recently the United States President expressed his wholehearted enthusiasm about the progress of the so-called "research" on the development of space attack weapons. It is also not concealed that the ultimate aim of this so-called "scientific research" is to tear down the ABM Treaty and to violate the international commitments of the United States. It is odd that the United States representative tries to portray such a policy as serving the interests of the international community of nations. In fact the interests it serves are those of the United States military-industrial complex which is already reaping considerable profits from the SDI. The interests of the world community are something quite apart.

The SDI is being advertised to us as designed to enhance deterrence of war. I would like to quote in this connection an excellent assessment of the deterrence concept provided by our distinguished colleague Ambassador Dubey in an article which appeared in the February 1985 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. He wrote: "Deterrence is the biggest conceptual deception devised in all history. It feeds on fear and suspicion and has the effect of eroding trust and confidence. It condemns people to co-exist with the means of their own destruction. In fact, nuclear deterrence is not even a doctrine of security. It is a doctrine used for maintaining dominance, hegemony and the status quo. Security is invoked only as a camouflage in order to mobilize and maintain popular support for deterrence and for its direct outcome, the nuclear arms race."

These are the questions which occurred to us, and to many other delegations, in connection with the statement of the distinguished Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Lowitz. While reserving the right to go back to this subject if necessary, we would like to offer today certain considerations on another issue which we frankly did not intend to reopen were it not for certain statements made in this hall.

Some delegations have urged us in their statements to avoid polemics. Meanwhile they not only came out with gross distortions of historical facts and of the Soviet position on the prevention of arms race but also circulated as documents of this Conference materials which cannot be called anything other than downright falsification. We have already had an occasion to comment in sufficient detail on the document CD/561 and will not reiterate all of the points we made on that score.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Let me therefore address only some of them.

The first is one to which we have always responded and which naturally cannot go unanswered this time either. It concerns the assertion that the Soviet Union is responsible for ever new spirals in the arms race. Again we are obliged to turn to the facts, and we shall employ only the facts.

Above all, we must point out that in order to lay the blame for the arms race on the Soviet Union, the United States has resorted throughout the post-war period to the same, and I would say elementary, tactic aimed at the forgetful. Today we see it applied once again. The pattern is primitively simple: a non-existent "gap" is "discovered" in those categories of weapons where the United States is about to thrust forward, references are made to apocryphal Soviet systems, to mysteriously emerging "windows of vulnerability" and, accompanied by this theoretical uproar, new broadscale military programmes of their own are adopted. After a while, once the programmes are under way, it is declared with a straight face that all the "Soviet threats" had been plainly invented just to stir up public opinion.

Thus, in the 1950s, on the pretext of having "fallen behind in bombers", the Pentagon obtained large allocations from Congress and set in motion a crash programme for the construction of strategic bombers. After an armada of these aircraft had been built, however, it was "discovered" that the number of Soviet bombers had been deliberately exaggerated three to four times over.

In the early 1960s, a howl was raised about a "United States missile gap", and the United States initiated a massive deployment of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Then, after more than a thousand of these had been deployed, it turned out that the Soviet "missile threat" had been exaggerated 15 to 20 times over.

Simultaneously, an American programme was launched to build 41 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). At the time, no one in the world had them. And already in the mid 1960s, the Pentagon began fitting submarine-launched ballistic missiles with multiple re-entry vehicle warheads.

At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the United States was the first to begin arming strategic ballistic missiles with highly accurate multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), thus starting a new spiral of the nuclear arms race. This sharply increased the total of nuclear warheads. Yet now Washington alleges that in the 1970s the United States was "inactive" and showed "restraint". The "restraint", apparently, manifested itself in adding an average of three nuclear warheads per day to the United States strategic delivery vehicles. Whereas in 1970 United States strategic delivery vehicles could carry just over 5,000 nuclear warheads, at present this figure exceeds 12,000.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

It was also in the 1970s that the United States took the initiative in launching a crash programme for the development of a new type of strategic weapon -- the long-range cruise missile. Now it is implementing plans for the deployment of many thousands of air-, sea-, and ground-launched missiles of this type. In 1981 the United States President ordered the full-scale manufacture of neutron munitions.

And today, the United States has embarked on a programme for a comprehensive strategic arms build-up until 1990. The programme extends to all the components of the strategic offensive forces, and includes deployment of new MX and Midgetman intercontinental ballistic missiles and new strategic bombers, construction of Trident nuclear-powered missile submarines, and escalated production of various types of cruise missiles. The United States plans to bring its strategic capability up to 20,000 nuclear warheads by 1990.

Who, then, is throwing down the gauntlet? Who has saddled the world with the arms race?

The United States is playing the same sort of dishonest game with regard to the militarization of space. For instance, it is now trying to represent matters as if it had never worked on anti-satellite weapons itself, but is only trying to close the gap now, after some kind of Soviet "edge" has been discovered. All the facts that do not fit this pattern are naturally being dismissed. But they are there, and nothing can be done about them: it was in fact the United States that first initiated the militarization of outer space. The development of anti-satellite systems under the Spacetrack programme began in the United States as early as 1958. Only a year later, in 1959, a United States Bold Orion missile launched from a B-47 bomber intercepted an artificial Earth satellite. Ever since that time the work on United States military space programmes has virtually never been interrupted. Over 60 billion dollars have been spent on them since the end of the 1950s. Major research has been conducted since into the development of interceptor satellites (The BAMBIE and SAINT projects), anti-satellite systems have been deployed on Kwajalein and Johnston Islands in the Pacific and at the Vandenberg Air Force base in California, and missiles to intercept target satellites have been launched repeatedly.

In this connection, I would also like to raise another subject involving a distortion of the facts. To our complete surprise we learned recently that the Soviet Union had never before raised the question of preventing an arms race in space but, in fact, rushed to do it as soon as the United States adopted its new "Star Wars" programme.

Even if this assertion betrays a mere lack of background knowledge, it certainly does little credit to its author. Still worse, however, would be a deliberate distortion of facts by someone possessing such knowledge. May I recall that as early as 1958 the Soviet Union put forward a proposal to prohibit the use of outer space for military purposes. In the same year 1958, at the thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union proposed to set up an international committee for co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space. We have since repeatedly raised this question both in the United Nations and elsewhere. For example, at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1963 the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, stated: "The peoples have the right to expect that the new sphere entered by man, the boundless ocean of space, will never become another staging area for warfare, destruction, and death. Their eyes turned on the interstellar depths, are full of hope that the conquest of space will serve peaceful purposes only."

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet Union has invariably taken the initiative and participated in the most active fashion in the elaboration of all the existing treaties which closed off certain avenues of an arms race in outer space.

Our position of principle regarding this issue remains as consistent as before. Lest anyone still have any doubts on this score, we are ready to set it forth in a clear and coherent form once again. Seeking to avert an arms race in outer space and thus to lessen the danger to mankind of the threat of nuclear war, as well as to contribute towards attainment of the goal whereby the exploration and utilization of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes, the Soviet Union specifically proposes:

First, to prohibit the use or threat of force in outer space and the atmosphere and on Earth through the utilization, as instruments of destruction, of space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in space in any other manner.

Second, to prohibit the use or threat of force against space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner.

Third, not to test or deploy by placing in orbit around the Earth or stationing on celestial bodies or in any other manner any space-based weapons for the destruction of objects on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

Fourth, not to utilize space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner as means to destroy any targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

Fifth, not to destroy, damage, or disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States.

Sixth, not to test or create new anti-satellite systems and to destroy any anti-satellite systems that may already exist; not to test or use manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes.

To this end we are ready to engage in concrete negotiations. Wishing to create a favourable atmosphere for such negotiations, the Soviet Union has declared a unilateral moratorium on the launching of anti-satellite weapons into outer space for as long as other States act in kind.

This is the constructive programme for solving the problem of the prevention of arms race in space put forward by the Soviet Union. We are prepared to negotiate on it within an ad hoc body of this Conference, just as we are prepared to consider any other concrete proposals aimed at that goal. At the same time the Soviet delegation strongly disagrees that the role of this forum be confined to a mere examination and consideration of the existing agreements which in some way or another affect outer space. We shall not allow a subsidiary body of the Conference to be turned into a smokescreen for carrying out a space militarization programme, for preparing for "star wars".

Comparison between the two lines of approach to the prevention of arms race in space reveals that one of them -- namely ours -- aims to prevent space from being militarized and turned into a new sphere of arms race, at reducing nuclear weapons until they are completely eliminated. The other one, that of the United States, aims at the broadest possible utilization of space for military purposes, at starting a new round of the arms race, including the race in nuclear arms. Whatever tactics are used by the advocates of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" in their attempts to make black pass for white, the stubborn logic of facts must point to a single conclusion: the space militarization plans or so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" dramatically increase the risk of nuclear war.



(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

In my statement today, I would like to set forth some ideas of the Chinese delegation on item 5 of our agenda, namely, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". As our colleagues may have already noted, the Chinese delegation has submitted a Working Paper (CD/579) on this item.

This is the fourth year since "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" was included in the Conference's agenda as a priority item. However, despite repeated appeals of many delegations, the situation in actuality remains the same as from the very beginning. No subsidiary body has ever been established, not to mention any substantive negotiations. While one shadow -- the shadow of the nuclear threat -- is still hanging over the heads of the people of the world, yet another is rising on the horizon and looming larger with each passing day. The pace of an arms race in outer space, far from slowing down, is on the contrary being intensified and accelerated.

The two States with the greatest space capabilities, not content with the thousands of military satellites already launched and the space weapons systems they each possess, are still pouring huge amounts of human, financial and material resources into research and development for new and more sophisticated types of space weapons. One openly proclaims that it is determined to go on with its research on strategic defensive weapons, and according to news reports, also intends to increase funds for a so-called Advanced Strategic Missile Systems programme. The other, while upgrading its offensive strategic weapons, has also, for years, been engaged in developing defensive space weapons. If this arms race in outer space between the two super-Powers is to continue unchecked, people cannot help asking: What kind of end will it lead to?

The history of the development of weaponry tells us that an arms race by itself knows no limit. In his statement on 5 March, Mr. Dhanapala, the distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka, rightly pointed out: "There is no such a thing as the ultimate weapons system." On 23 October 1984, in the First Committee of the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the Chinese representative also said with great anxiety that "The arms race now going on between the super-Powers in outer space is in fact an extension and development of their nuclear arms race. It is bound to lead to an even more complicated situation of alternate escalation in which each side would try to outdo the other in the race between offensive weapons systems and between defensive weapons systems, as well as between the two kinds of weapons systems."

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Scientific and strategic studies have increasingly proved that it is impossible to eliminate weapons by developing a new type of weaponry, or to terminate an arms race by starting a new arms race. An arms race in outer space can only bring greater instability to our world, further aggravate the present international relations and increase the danger of war. If such a race cannot be halted, then before long, there will emerge in the world a new type of armed service, the Space Force, to match the existing Ground, Naval and Air Forces, and in the eventuality of a war, there will be, apart from land, sea and sky, a new battlefield, namely, outer space. As is pointed out in the book "Countdown to Space War", published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "If the two super-Powers go to war anytime after, say, 1990, it is very likely that the war would start in space." What a horrible picture this is!

This is exactly why the people of the world are so much concerned about the arms race in outer space and so urgently demanding the prevention of such a race. It is by no means accidental that the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted by as many as 150 votes in favour and only one abstention the resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (A/39/59). It fully reflects the profound anxieties and misgivings of the peoples of the world, including the Chinese people. China played a part in the elaboration of the above-mentioned resolution. It is in the spirit of this resolution that we have submitted the Working Paper now before you. We hope it will contribute to the work of the Conference. Allow me now to briefly introduce it.

Our Working Paper sets forth first of all our basic position on the issue of outer space: China is opposed to any arms race, and hence also to an arms race in outer space; China holds that the exploration and use of outer space should, in the interest of mankind, serve to promote the economic, scientific and cultural development of all countries. Outer space is universally recognized as the common heritage of mankind. The principles of "non-militarization of outer space" and "the exclusive use of outer space for peaceful purposes" are not only embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, but also expressly stipulated in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Proceeding from its consistent policy for peace, China fully endorses these principles.

The militarization of outer space involves not only space weapons but also the satellite systems which have been established over the years for military purposes. It follows, therefore, that in principle space weapons with actual lethal or destructive power and military satellites of all types should be limited and prohibited to achieve the "non-militarization of outer space". Our Working Paper underscores this point, and we consider that this should be our ultimate objective in preventing an arms race in outer space.

Of course, in the same way as the complete prohibition and total destruction of all nuclear weapons cannot be achieved at one stroke, we cannot expect to realize "non-militarization of outer space" overnight. We all know the complexities of military satellites and the divergence of views as to their limitation. We have, therefore, out of practical considerations, proposed in our Working Paper to leave aside the issue of military satellites to be considered and resolved at an appropriate time in future; and to make the

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

"deweaponization of outer space" our primary objective at the present stage in our efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. This includes the prohibition of developing, testing, producing, deploying and using any space weapons and the destruction of all existing space weapons. In our view, such an objective is not excessive and should be attainable.

In order to facilitate negotiations on the prohibition of space weapons, it is necessary to clearly define what space weapons are. We had tried to do so before and our Working Paper does so again. We do not consider our idea perfect. We only hope it can be of interest to all delegates for further discussions. If consensus could be reached on this key issue, it might serve as a good beginning.

Our Working Paper reaffirms the importance of the major existing international legal instruments concerning outer space, especially the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which contains clearcut provisions prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the Earth. However, it must be admitted that all these international legal instruments have their limitations, and are therefore far from being adequate to fundamentally prevent an arms race in outer space. This is why the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament specifically states in paragraph 80 that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies." With the development of space technology and the acceleration of arms race in outer space, it is necessary to analyse and examine the relevant existing international instruments, and to formulate new provisions and conclude new agreements. This has become the general desire of the international community, to which we fully subscribe.

Our paper reiterates that the United States and the Soviet Union should bear special responsibilities for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This is self-evident, as they alone have the greatest capacity for outer space activities and are right now intensifying their efforts in the development and testing of space weapons. What we stress in particular is that they should demonstrate genuine political will and conduct negotiations in earnest to yield results conducive to international peace and security. Like many other delegations, we too are of the view that they should keep the Conference on Disarmament appropriately informed of the progress of their bilateral negotiations.

Multilateral negotiations and bilateral negotiations are mutually complementary. Our Conference should also speedily get into action without any further delay. The relevant resolution adopted at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to establish as soon as possible an ad hoc committee to engage in negotiations. It is regrettable that the spring part of our session is already more than half-way through, yet the establishment of an ad hoc committee on outer space remains elusive. We should do all we can to break the present deadlock on the question of mandate. In this connection, China always takes a flexible approach. We share the view expressed by the Sri Lankan and other delegations that the mandate of the ad hoc committee should contain a clear objective, namely to conclude an

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

agreement or agreements, and at the same time may include an exploratory stage to identify issues. We sincerely hope that all delegations will display the same spirit of compromise and co-operation prevalent at the adoption of General Assembly resolution 39/59, so that an early agreement can be reached on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

On the question of disarmament, to this day disarmament negotiations are invariably outpaced by arms races. This should not be allowed to happen to outer space issues. We should try our best to prevent the current situation from deteriorating any further before an agreement is reached. To this end, the Chinese delegation has proposed in the concluding part of its Working Paper that all States having space capabilities refrain from developing, testing or deploying outer space weapons in order to create conditions and an atmosphere propitious to negotiations. It is our hope that our proposal will receive a positive response from all sides.

These, then, are the main contents and the underlying considerations of the Working Paper submitted by China. Any comments will be welcome, and we are ready to explore the issue jointly with all parties.

Time is pressing, but it is not yet too late. On the whole, space weapons are still in the stage of research and testing, and no huge outer space arsenal is in existence. The existing treaties, agreements and other relevant accords concerning outer space, in spite of the many loopholes and inadequacies inherent therein, **have none the less** provided a certain legal basis for our work. The various proposals put forward by Sweden, France and many other countries have also provided us with material for careful study. Let us seize the opportunity and work together to ensure that outer space -- the common heritage of mankind -- be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not one day be destroyed.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

On the other hand, on other items, among the most sensitive on our agenda, our consultations have not yet led to decisions which would enable them to be considered in suitable conditions. I am thinking in particular of item 3, prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, and item 5, prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Today I should like to make a few remarks on these two items.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is now a paramount concern of the international community. What is at stake for us is the preservation of the conditions of strategic stability, which guarantees security. Never before have we heard so many statements devoted entirely or partially to this issue, to which the French Government attaches the utmost importance. Its views have been presented to the Conference on various occasions, and in particular in the statement made in plenary on 12 June last year.

We note first of all that outer space is now being used for military purposes. This is something which is undoubtedly irreversible, and indeed has a positive side to it. This is the case of observation and communications satellites, which in fact help to maintain strategic stability. Other military uses of space, however, may have a destabilizing effect, and we consider that they should be strictly limited and controlled.

Anti-satellite weapons are a first example of this; the Soviet Union already has a system which can reach low-orbit satellites; the United States are developing another system. As it is practically impossible to distinguish between military satellites and satellites for civilian purposes, we consider that arrangements must be adopted to ensure the immunity of satellites, or at least of high-orbit satellites which are the most important for strategic stability.

It now appears, however, that new, tremendously far-reaching developments could call into question the present factors of equilibrium: the stationing of weapons in space; the deployment of new anti-satellite weapon systems; and the development of new defensive anti-ballistic systems, which could also be used against satellites.

The two major Powers are currently engaged in research in these areas. The research programme of the United States -- the Strategic Defence Initiative -- was the subject of a very valuable statement last week by our distinguished colleague of the United States. We note that the programme does not violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which permits research. The programme's purpose is to explore the possibility of an alternative to the present system of strategic equilibrium based

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

on nuclear deterrence. The French Government, however, cannot dispel a number of questions arising on the subject of this research. These questions refer in particular to the future of the 1972 Treaty, which remains one of the foundations of the strategic balance, to the degree of reliability of the new defensive systems, to possible counter-measures, and finally and above all to the risk of instability which could arise from calling into question the existing conditions of equilibrium, which is necessary to security.

In this connection, the main concern of the French Government is to maintain nuclear deterrence as an essential factor of that balance. In an address delivered in Helsinki on 23 March before the Paasikivi Society the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, said the following: "France considers that nuclear deterrence is necessary for world peace, in particular in Europe. The recent crisis in military equilibria, which is not insurmountable, should not degenerate into a crisis of deterrence".

We note that the United States, like the Soviet Union, is planning to deploy new strategic weapon systems. This would appear to confirm, in our opinion, that nuclear deterrence remains valid, for a period whose duration cannot be determined.

Negotiations have begun in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union. They concern both nuclear weapons and the prevention of the arms race in outer space. We attach great importance to these negotiations and hope that they will be successful. We note that there is an obvious relationship between the limitation of military uses of space and the efforts to restore the balance of offensive strategic forces of the two major Powers and substantially to reduce their levels.

These two Powers obviously have a primordial responsibility for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. However, their responsibility is not exclusive; it is a matter which directly concerns the entire international community, and that is why it is included in our agenda. Thus, for the first time our Conference is faced with the problem of the relationship to be established between bilateral action and multilateral action. In our opinion, this relationship should take the form of a serious discussion in the Conference of the various aspects of the subject, and some of the statements we have heard here mark the beginning of such a discussion. It should also take the form of suitable reports provided by the two negotiating Powers, in accordance with the recommendations contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Finally, and above all, it should take the form of substantive work on issues of common interest which should be the subject of multilateral undertakings. The French delegation has proposed to this end the consideration of two specific issues: the limitation of anti-satellite systems, and the strengthening of the existing declaration arrangements established by the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 14 June 1975.

We keenly wish that the Conference may establish without delay the necessary ad hoc committee for such work. The consultations which have taken place suggest that an agreement is today within reach. The terms of the mandate will in any event make it possible to undertake the necessary initial work: the examination of existing agreements and of the gaps in the legal régime governing space is unquestionably a very useful preliminary stage. However, what is most important, in our opinion, is to take up as rapidly as possible the consideration of the proposals which have been tabled.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

The French delegation has repeatedly explained the reasons why the nuclear factor remains a fundamental condition of the strategic stability necessary to security. It has noted with interest that among the criticisms from a very wide range of sources voiced against the American Strategic Defence Initiative, one of the points most frequently advanced concerned the risk of destabilization which the SDI allegedly raises. We interpret this criticism as an implicit recognition of the stabilizing role of deterrence.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, public awareness of the risks involved in the militarization of outer space has grown considerably in the last few years. Everywhere in the world, people are demanding that outer space not be turned into a new sphere of confrontation and competitive armament. It should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, that is, for the benefit of mankind. Therefore, the world places high hopes in the new Soviet-United States negotiations, whose declared aim -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its termination on Earth -- enjoys extremely wide support.

The Conference on Disarmament should make a specific contribution to the struggle to prevent an arms race in outer space. What we need is a parallel bilateral and multilateral approach to that vital issue: firstly, because the extension of the arms race to outer space poses a threat to the security of all peoples and endangers their inalienable right to use space for peaceful purposes; secondly, because the two States with the greatest space capability are not the only ones in a position to utilize outer space today, and the number of countries with a space capability is certain to rise in the years to come; and finally because a series of States with an advanced level of technological development in the utilization of outer space has reached the threshold where they could, objectively speaking, use outer space for military ends.

All this underlines how urgent it is to arrive at international agreements to halt the efforts to militarize outer space. In accordance with resolution 39/59 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament should thus no longer procrastinate, and should instead commence its work on agenda item 5 within the framework of an ad hoc committee.

In order for us to be able to tackle our task with a chance of succeeding, it would be extremely helpful if we could agree on general starting points.

First, what we must recognize above all is that the extension of the arms race to outer space does not consist in a spatial dimension alone. Rather, it goes hand in hand with the development of a new class of weapons, which could be used both for offensive and defensive purposes. The creation of such weapons could only be likened to the appearance of nuclear arms.

Second, what should be realized, too, is that the militarization of outer space envisaged by the United States Administration must be interpreted as a crucial element in the plans to obtain a nuclear first-strike capability. I will come back to that aspect later on in my statement.

Third, equating the militarization of outer space with its current military use, thus belittling the gravity of the problem, can certainly not be regarded as helpful. The militarization of outer space would not only be characterized by a tremendous increase in the number of military operations in outer space but also by the deployment of weapons capable of destroying targets both in space and on Earth.

Finally, we should awaken to the fact that there is no automatic mechanism between research and new scientific and technological findings on the one hand and their military application on the other. It always requires a political decision, whatever the case may be. So, it was not the pressure of science that has made the United States subordinate virtually all its space research to military plans.



(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Rather, the driving force behind it has been and still is the ambition to gain military and strategic superiority and the ideologically rooted disbelief in the ability of the other side to meet the challenge.

What is advertised as the dawn of a new future is utterly reactionary in nature. The advances in science and technology have long been pressing for action to make peace lasting through disarmament based on equality and equal security. The application of the latest scientific and technological findings calls for peaceful co-operation among States. Obsessed with traditional imperialist power politics, certain forces are seeking to outrit this historical necessity for the benefit of arms-manufacturing corporations, that is, to the detriment of peoples and countries.

The Joint Communiqué issued on 21 March 1985 after the visit of my country's Foreign Minister to the Soviet Union contains the following passage of relevance to our topic: "The plans to militarize outer space, as announced by Washington, pose a serious threat to mankind. If these aggressive plans were carried out, an unchecked arms race would invariably be triggered in all spheres, and any limitation, not to speak of reductions, of strategic offensive weapons would be rendered impossible, and the risk of nuclear war would dramatically increase." The only acceptable alternative is greater security for States by preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating it on Earth.

Time is pressing, for the broad lines of the militarization of outer space are already becoming visible. They consist in the development of novel offensive satellite weapons and space shuttle systems for military payloads and in massive research, development and testing of anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile systems.

Allow me to revert to the real purpose of the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative. This name has been chosen to camouflage the true nature of the matter. As we have heard, the champions of armaments in space claim that space weapons would lessen the risk of war and provide more security, since they would make the possession of nuclear arms superfluous. To illustrate this approach the United States House of Representatives has just decided to build 21 additional MX missiles. People are to be led to believe that the new weapons under the SDI would be directed exclusively against arms and not against man. However, this claim does not stand up to close examination. But let the facts speak for themselves: The supposedly defensive system, popularly known as the "Star Wars" system, could serve several major offensive functions. It is commonly recognized that it could be used as a defensive adjunct to an offensive nuclear attack, allowing nuclear-armed missiles to be launched in an offensive strike, while the defence is held in reserve to cope with any retaliatory strike; it could attack and destroy space satellites, which are far easier targets than ballistic missiles; and this system could unleash lightning-fast offensive strikes from space against relatively "soft" ground targets such as planes, oil tankers, power plants and grain fields, causing instantaneous fires and damage that could, in the words of one proponent of the system, "take an industrialized country back to ~~an~~ eighteenth century level in 30 minutes".

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The assumption has also been made that the so-called strategic defence system might ultimately prove able to destroy the concrete and steel silos that protect missiles underground, thus providing a first-strike weapon that could disable an opponent's missile before it could be fired.

The weapons we are talking about are destined to be another element of an assured first-strike capability, which is the centrepiece of an attack-oriented nuclear strategy. The doctrine of the "assured destruction of the enemy" is to be complemented by the doctrine of the "assured survival of the attacker". This in effect, is the crux of the matter.

The plans and the research work for such an attack system in outer space are enough to produce by themselves a destabilizing effect, not to mention the consequences which the development and deployment of such arms would have. In this context, a question inevitably arises: Why is a new jump in armaments of unprecedented dimensions required, if one has set oneself the aim, as laid down in the Joint Soviet-American Statement, to eliminate nuclear arms once and for all? We are still waiting for a convincing answer from the "Star Wars" strategists.

The Joint Statement of 8 January stresses the indivisible interrelationship between the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons down to their complete elimination. We are being made to believe that nuclear disarmament could be achieved while the "Star Wars" plans are being carried out. But since time immemorial, humanity has known the interaction between means of attack and means of defence, which, by the way, furnished the basis for the SALT process and ultimately led to the conclusion of the ABM Treaty. This basic consensus must not be left aside. The development of space-based anti-ballistic missile systems will result in an enormous acceleration of the arms race in all types of weaponry. The consequence would be an increasing risk of war and truly astronomical expenditures in terms of material and intellectual resources. Any going back on the aforementioned basic consensus is bound to undermine the international treaties concluded on the basis of that consensus.

If the arms race in outer space is to be nipped in the bud, research and development in the space weapons field must be prohibited. The proponents of space armament are trying to divorce research from development and testing. This approach is misleading. A closer look at the proposed anti-ballistic missile and anti-satellite systems reveals that their development follows two scientific-technological paths, which have partly left the stage of research already. Tests of those systems are scheduled for the near future. The term "technology demonstrations" has been invented to disguise the fact that they violate the ABM Treaty.

One of the paths is the development of various types of detection equipment, of computers, and of nuclear and non-nuclear interception systems. The other path pursued is the development of totally new kinds of laser, particle-beam and other weapons. At a particular point in time, the two paths of development are to be fused together.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

What is more, nobody can seriously believe that billions of dollars are invested in research activities, without their results being used for the development, production and deployment of pertinent weapon systems. For this reason, it was but a logical consequence for the United States Administration expressly to commission a "research and development programme" on 23 March 1983. Only naive people can console themselves with the supposed readiness to share the research findings with the other side. Anyone who puts simple ballbearings on an embargo list today is definitely not willing to make available to his alleged enemy his latest and most expensive technology for "future use". But this is not the real problem; what is imperative is to agree on the immediate stop of any research into those weapons. Other countries which volunteer money and research capacity for the militarization of outer space in the belief that they might derive technological benefits from such a step place a heavy responsibility on themselves. Would not precisely the peaceful use of outer space open new horizons for the scientific and technological progress of all countries?

The political decision to do research into space weapons and to develop them must be reversed and turned into the resolve to keep space free of weapons. Such a step would require an agreement to prohibit space-based anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as all types of ground-launched, air-launched and sea-launched weaponry designed to destroy targets in space. What is needed, in other words, is the conclusion of verifiable treaties to prevent an arms race in outer space. Given political will, we are convinced that the issue of verification can be solved adequately.

Since the moment the prevention of an arms race in outer space was placed on the agenda of our Conference, a host of interesting suggestions have been made and initiatives undertaken by various countries. It was the Soviet Union that put forward the most comprehensive proposals. Just take the two draft treaties submitted to the Conference in 1981 and 1983, respectively. One aims at the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, and the other seeks to ban the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth.

In his statement last Tuesday, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, expounded the far-reaching concepts of his country. It must be regretted that these thoughts cannot yet be the subject of negotiations conducted within the framework of an ad hoc committee of the Conference.

It is common practice for treaty negotiations to be started with a discussion of what is already there, with an analysis of the proposals made so far and with a definition of the issues to be resolved in the process of negotiation. But this is not sufficient. Nor is it the most important thing. What is important, however, is to reach agreement on concrete and effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. The most direct way to go about it is the drafting of relevant treaties. This is what my delegation considers to be the most important task of our Conference.

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

We also warmly welcome the Soviet-American initiative of 8 January concerning the commencement of negotiations on 12 March in connection with space and nuclear weapons. We hope that the endeavours made at that bilateral level and within the context of this Conference will be mutually complementary.

Like the high seas, outer space constitutes the common heritage of mankind and, in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, should therefore be used solely for peaceful purposes to ensure scientific and technical progress for the benefit of all. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space should be applied strictly. The General Assembly has assigned to the Conference the task of studying, as a matter of priority, the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

My delegation wishes to express concern at the fact that, while the first part of the Conference's session is drawing to an end, due consideration has not yet been given to the establishment of an ad hoc committee. We appeal to all members of the Conference and, in particular, to the nuclear Powers to make every effort to reach an agreement as soon as possible. It is absolutely imperative that all members should participate actively in the negotiations, bearing in mind the recommendations of the tenth and twelfth special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation is delighted that the Conference on Disarmament has at last been able to reach consensus on the mandate for an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and also that this has occurred this month during which you, Mr. President, have guided our work so effectively. We consider this to be a well-deserved reward for your tireless and well-inspired efforts over the last three weeks.

Of course, my delegation would have preferred the mandate originally submitted by the Group of 21 last year in document CD/329/Rev.2 of 20 July 1984, which corresponds faithfully to resolution 39/59 adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1984 by 150 votes to none with a single abstention, because in that mandate reference was explicitly made to the fact that the Conference on Disarmament should set up an ad hoc committee "with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

If we accepted the mandate we have just adopted, it was both because we consider that for the conference to work constructively flexibility and co-operation must be displayed by all its members, and also because in our opinion this mandate does not essentially differ from the preceding one. For, obviously, negotiations aimed at the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as referred to in the latter, could not be something which would take place suddenly, but rather would call for time and effort. The adverbial phrase "with a view to" clearly indicated this. In any event, it would have been inevitable that there would be a first exploratory stage, and that "as a first step at this stage", as provided for in the mandate we have adopted, it would be necessary to examine, "through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space". This was a fundamental element for the delegation of Mexico to agree to participate in the adoption of this mandate by consensus. The other element to which we attach similar importance is that, as is clear from the explicit reference in the last line in the mandate, the stage referred to in the mandate must not be -- as some delegations have in the past claimed with regard to the mandate of the working group set up in 1982 on a nuclear test ban -- I repeat, must not be open-ended; instead, in our opinion, it must end at the same time as the session of the ad hoc committee for 1985. Next year the negotiations should begin which should lead to the "conclusion of an agreement or agreements", as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): In connection with the decision just taken on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 of the agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", and the approval of its mandate as contained in document CD/584, the Mongolian delegation, speaking on behalf of the socialist countries, wishes to make the following statement:

The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is indisputably one of the most important priority topics on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The maintenance of peace and security in outer space is today of direct importance to the maintenance of peace on Earth. The prevention of the militarization of outer space is therefore one of the priority problems facing mankind, whose future depends on whether this problem is resolved.

The socialist countries welcome the Soviet-United States negotiations which started in Geneva on 12 March 1985. They note with satisfaction the agreement reached between the USSR and the United States of America that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and intermediate-range -- with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

Proceeding from their position of principle, the socialist countries, both in the Conference on Disarmament and in the United Nations General Assembly and other international forums, have consistently stood and continue to stand for an early solution to this vitally important problem.

This view of the socialist countries, which is shared by the overwhelming majority of States throughout the world, received virtually unanimous support at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly. In resolution 39/59, the General Assembly reiterated that "the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

As before, the socialist countries have from the very start of this session of the Conference actively championed the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 5 with a mandate that would enable it to conduct the necessary work on the development of measures designed to facilitate the prevention of an arms race in outer space. However, since, owing to the position of a small number of States, a situation arose in which it proved impossible to agree on such a mandate, the socialist countries, considering the prevention of an arms race in outer space to be a question of the first importance, showed considerable flexibility and agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the basis of the formulation suggested by the President of the Conference.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

In doing so they proceeded from the firm conviction and recognition of the need to break the deadlock on the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, whose solution brooks no further delays or procrastination.

From this point of view, the socialist countries express satisfaction in connection with the decision to establish an Ad Hoc Committee. We proceed from the fact that the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee represents only the initial stage of the consideration of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and that practical negotiations aimed at reaching specific agreements on this agenda item will begin within the Ad Hoc Committee in due course.

In conclusion, Mr. President, allow me on behalf of the group of socialist countries to express to you our sincere gratitude for your untiring and energetic efforts to find a compromise and to harmonize different points of view, efforts which have ultimately led the Conference on Disarmament to the adoption of a mutually acceptable decision on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): The result which we have today confirmed by our unanimous adoption of document CD/WP.172 crowns more than two years of efforts. It rewards the determination, goodwill and perseverance of all delegations which have actively taken part in the consultation process, and in particular the skilful and effective work you have undertaken as President for the month of March, with the valuable assistance of the secretariat.

On behalf of the group of Western countries, I wish to express our satisfaction at the decision we have just taken, and to voice our certainty that the mandate we have adopted will allow fruitful work. The substantive consideration of the issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space is an essential first step for any further work in this field. It is only the developments in our work in the Ad Hoc Committee and the consensus which emerges during that work which will be able to guide us towards further stages.

On behalf of the Western countries, I should like to give an assurance that we shall take part in this examination with all the seriousness which the question deserves. We consider it very important that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee which we have just set up should take place in a constructive atmosphere; it should allow us to hold a wide-ranging and thorough discussion and lead us to the concrete identification of all the problems relevant to the prevention of an arms race in space.

I am sure that the decision we have just taken today is a wise one, and that the new subsidiary body will undertake necessary and important work.

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China) (translated from Chinese): I really see no need to add any more at the moment. Like other speakers, I can only express my delight at the fact that our Conference has finally made a breakthrough on a priority item that has been deadlocked for years. At the same time, I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation once again to all the delegations for their spirit of compromise and co-operation during recent consultations, and particularly to you, Mr. President, for your untiring efforts and contribution to our Conference. I extend to you my warm congratulations. Of course, we understand that what we have achieved is only a beginning; the arduous task is yet to come, and thus we must continue our efforts. The Chinese delegation is ready to seek further progress in co-operation with other delegations.

Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Thank you, Mr. President. At this time, just before you relinquish the presidency, we are all delighted that, as a result of your endeavours, it has proved possible to finalize the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We are all aware, Mr. President, of your long and tireless efforts to achieve a consensus on the draft mandate. It was a difficult task but, as a result of your endeavours, we have reconciled all the differences of opinion. From the substantive standpoint, Mr. García Robles expressed the views of the Group of 21 on the mandate of the Committee in an extremely capable manner. All that I can add at this moment is that the Group of 21 has manifested a fully responsive attitude and has made numerous concessions. However, this does not imply that it has abandoned the fundamental objective of that Committee, namely the formulation of specific and tangible measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. Although a modest beginning has been made today, this does not mean that we have renounced the principal and supreme objective. All that we can hope is that what you have achieved today by way of consensus will motivate the work of the Committee in a manner conducive to the achievement of real progress so that, by the end of our session in 1985, we can produce a report for submission to the General Assembly in which we can say that the Conference on Disarmament has begun to carry out its task of preventing an arms race in outer space in an earnest manner, giving cause for optimism that the Conference will eventually succeed in its mission and achieve the final objective of preventing an arms race in outer space.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Thank you, Mr. President. Speaking as I am for the first time under your presidency, it gives me very great pleasure, as it does those of my colleagues who have spoken, to be congratulating you in having contributed so much to the success of our efforts going back for such a long time.

I think that I should explain also that I am speaking at this time on this unusual occasion because of the importance that my Government attaches to this issue, and I would like to make the following points concerning the mandate:



(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

Firstly, we consider that it is a realistic mandate and that it is, as expressed so elegantly by the distinguished representative of Mexico, an exploratory mandate, but, nonetheless, one that permits concrete work.

My second comment therefore is that it is not a narrow or restrictive mandate, but one that should enable us to begin some action, some concrete work, almost immediately.

My third comment is that it refers quite correctly to the relevance of existing agreements and existing proposals, and future initiatives, and this in itself is extremely important in terms of the kind of initial approach we take. We have to begin there without stopping there.

My next comment is that the mandate does take into account, and as we see it, both complements and accurately reflects the realities concerning the bilateral negotiations already under way between the United States and the USSR, but does not undermine or undercut or prejudge or in any way interfere with those negotiations, and that we consider to be absolutely central.

The next point I should like to make is that it does reflect, as we see it, the many expressions of hope and expectation that we have heard in this room that the bilateral negotiations would augment, accelerate, reinforce and contribute to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. That is what we all hoped would prove to be the case and this is evidence that it is having exactly that effect, and this is a message of great importance to all of us, to our Governments and to the peoples that our Governments represent.

The next comment I would make is that it reflects very great credit on all of the members of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly, if I may say so, the two major space Powers, but also the co-ordinators who have worked so hard and so skilfully to achieve this objective and, as I mentioned earlier, it reflects great credit on you Mr. President and also, I know, the Secretary-General and his staff, and in this instance on the Conference on Disarmament as a whole.

I have one or two other comments that I should like to make; without opening a discussion, I would merely express the hope that this mandate will not expire at the end of 1985 if we have not completed the kind of preliminary work that we want to see started immediately. I mention this almost en passant, because I would hate to see us go through another long waiting time before we move into whatever may be the next phase of our work.

I have another comment, and it is this; quite clearly under anyone's interpretation of the mandate it is directly related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the very agenda item under which it appears, and I can assure you, Mr. President, even in your absence, that the Canadian delegation will be very actively participating in the work of the Conference on this matter.

My final comment is one that sums up nearly all I have said already. It is our view that it is hard to visualise a decision that would be possible for the Conference on Disarmament to make at this stage -- certainly a procedural decision -- which would have greater impact on our own work and on public opinion. It is like a breath of fresh air. It is, indeed, as suggested by the distinguished representative of China, a breakthrough.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The United States-Soviet agreement of 8 January 1985, in which it was decided to resume negotiations, is a document of outstanding political import and great moral significance. It sets forth in advance, in clear and precise language, the negotiating aims:

"The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms both strategic and intermediate range with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth and limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability."

Seldom has a joint declaration by East and West met the expectations of people throughout the world to such an extent as this one. For this reason, the Joint Declaration will be the yardstick by which the progress of the negotiations will be measured.

The Federal Government unreservedly supports these negotiating aims. On 27 March 1985, it stated that it believed the purpose of the negotiations, in line with the negotiating aims formulated by the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva on 7 and 8 January, to be:

to prevent an arms race in space and terminate it on Earth and to strengthen strategic stability;

to reduce greatly and limit strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons in line with the preamble to the ABM Treaty and Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

to ensure that both mutual research into new anti-missile systems and questions concerning anti-satellite systems lead to co-operative solutions;

to reaffirm the ABM Treaty as long as no other bilateral agreements have been reached.

The Federal Government is in no doubt that the research programme of the United States Government accords with the ABM Treaty and that it is also justified on the grounds of Soviet research.

The Federal Government recalls the declaration of 8 January 1985, which states that the questions under negotiation in Geneva will be considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

In these efforts, special significance will attach to the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons. Our goal remains stability with as few weapons as possible.

...

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

Outer space has long been a part of the arms control process. When it comes to safeguarding peace, there must be no gaps left. It is in the interest of all of us that the use of space for peaceful purposes should not be jeopardized. It is an undeniable fact that outer space has long been used for military activities. In this context, it should be remembered that certain satellites serve to ensure strategic stability and are indispensable, particularly to the verification of arms control measures. What is crucial today is that drastic reductions in nuclear arsenals must be agreed and that an arms race in outer space must be prevented by means of foresighted arms control measures. We therefore welcome the fact that this very objective is the agreed aim of the United States-Soviet negotiations.

The Conference on Disarmament cannot replace these extremely important bilateral negotiations, but it can usefully supplement them. What is called for is a "constructive parallel approach". We are prepared to play an active part in the discussion on space issues here in this multilateral framework.

Let me recall in this context the statements made by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany to the General Assembly and to the Conference on Disarmament, which outlined the potential area for multilateral arms control in respect of outer space: the initial task would be to take stock of the existing arrangements and to identify issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in space. In these efforts, particular consideration should be given to the protection of satellites, which is essential if stability is to be ensured.

We therefore welcome the success achieved in agreeing on a mandate for an ad hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament. This creates the chance to pursue the constructive parallel approach to which I referred.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The problem of non-militarization of outer space is precisely the item on which I am going to speak today. Like many speakers before me, I would also like to stress the urgency and importance we attach to this question. It is indeed one of the central issues of disarmament talks, which was fully confirmed by the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolution. We therefore welcome the fact that the prevention of an arms race in outer space has also been included on the agenda of the bilateral Soviet-American talks which started a couple of weeks ago in this city. Our approach to this question is determined by the fact, that in recent years sharply increased the real danger of various systems of space weapons leading to the saturation of outer space with weapons capable of destroying objects both in outer space and on the Earth.

Ever since this item was inscribed on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament we supported the idea that this Conference should start negotiations on specific measures which would effectively prevent the spread of an arms race into space. For this reason we have always supported and, together with other socialist countries, proposed the establishment of an ad hoc committee with an appropriate, negotiating mandate. We continue to maintain that a subsidiary body with such a mandate could most effectively deal with the problem in question.

Last Friday we finally established the Ad Hoc Committee for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The mandate it was accorded is not considered completely satisfactory by the group of socialist countries or by the Group of 21. But in order to explore all possibilities to move forward these two groups again, and not for the first time, demonstrated a constructive and flexible approach. We would like to hope that if all delegations displayed a similar attitude, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee could bring some positive results.

The specific contents and programme of the Ad Hoc Committee's work will, certainly, have to be agreed by all participants. But it seems quite obvious that to some extent we will have to continue the same type of activity we have been engaged in for some time in the plenary. Indeed, going through the records one finds a great number of statements evaluating the existing treaties which put certain barriers to the spread of arms into space. One could conclude that a general concordance of views was achieved on what the positive aspects of these treaties are. Existing loopholes were also pointed out. We welcome the fact that practically all statements agree that further measures are necessary.

We would not think that the adopted mandate calls on us to simply point out abstractly what has not been covered by the existing instruments. It would be appropriate to look, albeit preliminary, at what would be the most suitable way of solving the remaining problems. As an example I could give the question of the prohibition of the use of force against targets in space and from space against the Earth. None of the existing treaties contains a comprehensive prohibition of the use of force which we, and hopefully others as well, consider desirable. Should we

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

then limit ourselves to simply discovering this fact? We can do better by also examining what would be the best way, in view of the existing treaties, to put an effective ban on the use of force in the relevant field.

In accordance with the adopted mandate the Ad Hoc Committee should pay due attention to the existing proposals related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this connection my delegation would like to stress the importance it attaches to the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth submitted to the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly and last year to the Conference on Disarmament as document CD/476. Its provisions suggest a feasible and comprehensive solution to the problem of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. It proposes to prohibit the testing, deployment or use of any space-based weapons for the destruction of objects on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space, and to avoid interference with space objects of other States. It also contains provisions for not testing or creating new anti-satellite systems and destroying any existing anti-satellite systems, as well as not testing or using manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes.

Some confidence-building measures have also been proposed, for example, by France. My delegation would be willing to look at them in the Ad Hoc Committee. But we consider that confidence-building measures in each field should assist the relevant legal instruments. Thus, more specific consideration of confidence-building will be possible as we move towards a more structured discussion on possible new agreements related to outer space.

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should not delay unduly the commencement of its substantive work. We can hardly expect much to be achieved during the spring part of the session. But at least the organizational framework of the Committee's work should be set up so that we do not have to lose much time on the procedure in summer.

In connection with the efforts to prevent the militarization of outer space, time is indeed a decisive factor. In view of the fast development of space technology it may well happen that several years from now we shall be speaking not about the prevention but about the cessation of the arms race in outer space. We would prefer very much to avoid such a modification of one of our priority items. A large number of delegations expressed serious concern in view of the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative of the United States. We fully share this concern. Let me stress that we do not evaluate developments in the arms build-up by declared intentions and even less by the outright distortion of facts. Rather, we evaluate objectively their possible consequences. Ambassador Lowitz in his statement of 19 March tries to convince us that the SDI will not only bring no harm to international security, but will contribute to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

everywhere. However, we cannot by any stretch of imagination share his conclusion. The problem is that we do not see the SDI in terms of the "open floodgates of creativity" but in the real world and in relation to the whole panoply of the American offensive potential.

The Defence Minister of France, Charles Hernu, at the Defence Seminar in Munich, said, that, "the strongest probability is still that the deployment of defensive systems would relaunch an offensive arms race". The United States is very quick in its "response" to its own defensive programme. It is not relying only on the existing offensive arms, but it is building new offensive arms such as MX missiles, Trident-2 and cruise missiles with a high strike accuracy. And still newer and even more penetrating offensive weapons are planned. Funds will be sharply increased for the so-called Advanced Strategic Missile Systems programme. Its aim is to render impossible defence against the United States nuclear missiles through the use of advanced decoys, zig-zagging warheads and other devices. This programme fully supports the conclusion of many military experts that, as defensive systems are developed, offensive systems will be developed to circumvent them. Funds are increased regularly for these new, more penetrating offensive weapons. This fiscal year they were accorded 98 million dollars, next fiscal year it will be 174 million and still the following year 216 million dollars. Most of the increase would be used for advanced "penetration aids" to help United States missiles reach their targets. Whatever may be the declared intentions, there is only one objective conclusion: one cannot build defensive systems and at the same time expect a reduction in offensive weapons.

It is not entirely unjustified that the SDI is commonly referred to as "Star Wars" concept. Though it may fulfil some defensive functions, its main impact and consequence is of an aggressive nature. The real danger of this approach is that although the SDI cannot be regarded as an effective means against a massive first strike, it may create illusions about possible defence against retaliatory strike. Since military experts in Pentagon must also be aware of this, missile defence will most probably encourage first-strike strategic policies.

While investing billions of dollars in the SDI, United States officials keep on asserting that it is limited only to research. But one has to wonder where the research starts and where it ends. The idea of strategic defence did not appear in March 1983. According to Rocketdyne's Vice-President of advanced programmes, R.D. Paster, "Rocketdyne has been involved in technology in that area for over 10 years". One cannot see in isolation the accelerated efforts to develop and put into practice laser and other directed energy weapons which were not only studied, but tested as well. In May and June 1983 the United States Air Force tested a laser weapon. At a test site in California, placed on board a C-135 aircraft, it succeeded in destroying navigational systems of five Sidewinder antiaircraft missiles. On 10 June last year, at an altitude of 160 km above the Pacific, an ICBM warhead was intercepted, for the first time, by a missile. Did this test have no relation to the SDI programme whatsoever?

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

In defending the need for the SDI, United States officials argue that the Soviet Union is devoting large resources to its own defensive programmes. But as we all know such United States estimates are usually highly overestimated, as was the case, confirmed even by authoritative American sources, with the "so-called window of vulnerability" that Trident-2 and cruise missiles were designed to overcome. It would be interesting to know the ratio of this overestimation "Made in the USA" justifying the need for the SDI.

There are many other disquieting aspects of this programme. One of them is the inevitable extensive computerization. Finally, the defensive response would be out of human hands. According to military experts, the response would be activated by computer before the United States commanders even knew that something happened, which might easily be an error of the computer system.

Much has been said in the United States about the non-nuclear nature of the strategic defence programme. We have heard these words. But will they not be forgotten if, as one may suppose, American researchers come to the conclusion that X-ray lasers are most suitable for the purpose of the system while other options are less adequate? Where is the guarantee that eventually hundreds of atomic bombs would not be stationed in low orbit over the Soviet Union or any other country? We consider that the best guarantee would be not to develop a system which may once bring such a temptation to military planners.

As often happens in some western countries, political considerations and genuine security needs are not the only criteria for deciding on military programmes. The military-industrial complex with its own interests, having nothing in common with the vital interests of the peoples of western countries, also has its say. In the case of the SDI its representatives are well-known. They are Rockwell International Corp., TRW Corp., and Boeing Corp., working on lasers; Grumman Corp., dealing with the space-based radars; Martin Marietta Corp., with its vintage missile interceptors; and the computer companies, IBM and Honeywell and many others. All these companies know only too well that the readiness of the United States Government to spend tens of billions of dollars on the SDI just in the next few years will bring them huge profits. They are not concerned with the possible tragic consequences of their activity. But the international community, and all realistic and responsible politicians, cannot afford this "luxury". We expect the Conference on Disarmament, as a multilateral body on disarmament negotiations, to bring its contribution to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

However, we did finally achieve an important breakthrough, in agreeing on 29 March on a mandate on outer space, after two years of discussion. I should like to refer to that event, not only because of its intrinsic importance, but because it could serve as an example for us on other issues.

Turning to outer space, the mandate proposed may not include all that everyone here would wish, and I am sure that is the case; it may even be regarded by some as the least common denominator. Nevertheless, it not only permits but calls for substantive action from this Conference. As pointed out in my statement on 29 March, it is a realistic mandate in that it is exploratory at this stage, but it nevertheless should not be regarded as a narrow or restrictive one as it provides the basis for immediate concrete work. If this Conference is to play a positive role in moving forward on the sensitive and important issue of outer space, surely the time has come to begin serious work on the basis of this agreed mandate.

As pointed out in my statement on 29 March, the consensus on the outer space mandate reflects great credit on all the members of the Conference on Disarmament, indeed, on the Conference itself, but particularly on the major space Powers. I believe we have succeeded in resolving this important procedural question, which had been outstanding for so long, because of a conscious attempt to determine the area of existing common ground, and to respond flexibly in doing so with a view to expanding it as we go along.

As a first step, Canada already has in train a study on relevant aspects of international law and existing treaties and agreements applicable to outer space. This is a subject which should, in our view, be addressed immediately under the proposed mandate. We are fully prepared to share the results of our research, and we hope that our study might help to get the work of the Conference on Disarmament started quickly.



(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

This morning I heard with great interest the statement made by the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, my good friend Ambassador Vejvoda. I found many interesting points and ideas in his speech. However, I have to make a couple of comments on an assertion made in that speech, and I shall quote from the speech for the record. "Last Friday we finally established the Ad Hoc Committee for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The mandate it was accorded is not considered completely satisfactory by the Group of Socialist countries as well as by the Group of 21". I have two comments to make on that statement. First, my delegation is not aware of any pronouncement made by the Group of 21 qualifying that mandate either finding it more satisfactory or less satisfactory. Second, my delegation as a member of the Group of 21 finds that the mandate is a satisfactory one.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

There exists, in effect, a flagrant inconsistency between the actions of the Group of Experts and the non-action of the Conference on that score. We would very much like to see this discrepancy overcome in a constructive manner. In this context, we should remember how favourably all the delegations, without exception, responded to the Joint Communiqué of 8 January of this year. It is certainly not sufficient only to support in words the objective of "preventing the arms race in space and terminating it on Earth". Real deeds are needed here at the Conference and elsewhere to attain this noble objective.

Therefore, I wish to put on record that my country wholeheartedly endorses the most recent proposals by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, concerning a moratorium on the creation of space attack weapons, the freeze of strategic offensive weapons and the cessation of the deployment of United States medium-range missiles in Europe and the countermeasures of socialist States.

The unilateral moratorium which the Soviet Union has proclaimed just now on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles and the countermeasures taken in response to the stationing of new American missiles in Western Europe furnishes proof of the Soviet Union's goodwill.

The Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, said about the Soviet initiative: "This is another message from Moscow, whose purpose is to avert the danger of an all-devastating nuclear war, to strengthen general security and to ensure stable peace. What becomes clear in a convincing fashion is how seriously the Soviet Union is striving, with humanity's interests in mind, not to start an arms race in outer space, to terminate it on Earth and to initiate a radical reduction of nuclear armaments, with the ultimate goal being their complete liquidation. It is only to be hoped that the latest Soviet proposals meet with a constructive response conducive to the efforts to safeguard peace. As far as the German Democratic Republic is concerned, I can declare that we will give them our full approval and support."

(Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The space arms race has certainly created a global concern. The international community can accept no excuse for the nuclearization of outer space.

Those who are bent on the prevention of any type of effective negotiations in this regard by basing their argumentation in advance upon the "impossibility" of the control of the agreements concerning the limitation of the space arms race, are purposely directing the affairs in a manner in which they will have a free hand to pursue the space militarization policy and thus gain military advantages.

CD/PV.308

23-24

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Mr. President, I should like to take advantage of the fact that I have the floor in order to raise a question which is outwardly organizational but, from our point of view, extremely important. Cases have become more frequent within the Conference of late when the work of its subsidiary bodies is slowed down because of lack of agreement within particular groups of States concerning candidatures to the chairmanship of ad hoc committees of the Conference on whose establishment a decision of principle has been achieved. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prohibition of Radiological Weapons has been out of operation for over a month because the group of Western countries has put off the decision of the question of a candidate for the Committee's chairmanship. Now we are confronted with a similar situation with regard to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. This practice, which is becoming customary, cannot but give rise to anxiety.

Bearing in mind that we have only a few days at our disposal until the end of the spring session, it would be most important, if only in a very preliminary manner, to exchange views concerning the nature, content and programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space in the summer of this year. This will help us to prepare ourselves better for the forthcoming work of the Committee. We therefore think it extremely necessary to hold at least one meeting of the Committee before the end of the spring session. We propose that such a meeting should be held on Friday 19 April at 10.30 a.m. If by that time the Group of 21 succeeds in solving the question of its candidate for the office of chairman, the meeting will be held under his chairmanship. If that is not the case, we suggest that, as an exceptional measure and without creating a precedent for the future, the President of the Conference for the current month should be requested to chair this meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space. We request you, Comrade President, to take a decision on this proposal of the USSR delegation as soon as possible.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I wish only to refer to the suggestion made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, at the end of his statement to the effect that if by next Friday there is still no consensus on who can be elected chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, we should hold an informal meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on that day, which, as he suggested, without in any way establishing a precedent, would be chaired by you, Mr. President. I think that would allow us to have an idea of which aspects of this very important issue we should all reflect upon and prepare our positions for the beginning of the summer part of our session.

CD/PV.309

14

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

It would be too early now already to expect tangible results to be derived from the hesitant beginning of a changing climate. In fact, notwithstanding today's favourable weather reports, we cannot say that spring has arrived in this room. Yet, we agreed on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Despite continuing controversies, concrete talks on chemical weapons are steadily pursued. Systematic discussions on the broad subject of "Prevention of Nuclear War, including All Related Matters" seem to be within reach. If you forgive me the metaphor, borrowing again the image from the natural environment surrounding us: it continues to be chilly, but that does not prevent us from picking some flowers.

Important as it may be that the two countries with by far the greatest military space capabilities sit down together for negotiations on preventing an arms race in space, space activities are not exclusively undertaken by those countries. Use of outer space, including military use, has, in fact, global dimensions and represents above all a global responsibility. It is only fitting that the world community as such addresses the problems posed by modern space technologies. Indeed, outer space asks for a multilateral approach parallel to the bilateral negotiations.

My delegation, therefore, was happy to note that during the spring part of the session, at long last, agreement has been reached on the terms of reference for the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It was due to perseverance and flexibility of delegations that, after two years of deliberations, it was possible to obtain this result. Now finally, the work can start. Perhaps we can draw one conclusion from the protracted negotiations that lie behind us: if we must bridge profound differences of views we had better do so on the basis of actual work to be conducted in a suborgan rather than place our hopes on the strength of one or another formula in its mandate.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

My delegation is aware of the sensitive nature of military activities in outer space. But we sincerely hope that in the Ad Hoc Committee we can avoid polemics and that we shall take up work in a constructive and businesslike manner. The amount of work lying ahead of us is quite considerable.

It seems to us a prerequisite that we shall first analyse relevant international law, so as to determine the existing legal constraints on the military use of outer space. It would be important to hear from those delegations whose governments have a major military space capability what interpretation they give to existing international law. Such an analysis should have to be juxtaposed to present or foreseeable developments with regard to military space technology, thus enabling the Conference to identify and define possible loopholes and deficiencies, as well as ways and means to redress them.

It is, I think, common knowledge that the greater part of satellites nowadays orbiting the earth serve exclusively or in part military purposes. Without entering into the details of the different functions of those satellites we are on safe ground, I presume, in stating that present military use of outer space involving satellites has, on balance, played and will continue to play a stabilizing role.

Under existing international law some categories of those satellites already enjoy a certain degree of protection. The legal protection provided for in the so-called non-interference clauses of existing arms control treaties may serve as an example.

The Ad Hoc Committee, in our view, should on a priority basis focus its analytical work on the existing legal constraints on anti-satellite warfare in order to establish whether or not these offer adequate protection of those satellites that have a stabilizing function. We realize that this is not an easy matter. Questions such as what makes a satellite a stabilizing one, what to do with dual or multiple purpose satellites, how to define anti-satellite systems etc., are not easy to answer, nor may it in the end be possible to come up with solutions that are generally applicable. Yet we should, as soon as possible, embark on this task, so as to pave the way for concrete solutions, which no doubt will be needed.

My delegation intends actively and constructively to participate in the work of this new subsidiary body of the Conference. At a later stage we intend to come back in more detail to the various issues covered under this agenda item.

(Mr. Barthelemy, USA)

To begin, the United States delegation would like to register its satisfaction at the decision that the Conference was able to reach late in the month of March to establish a committee dealing with agenda item 5, prevention of an arms race in outer space. We recognize the spirit of compromise displayed by delegations in reaching this important decision. When we return in June, my delegation pledges its best effort to build on that demonstration of our ability to make practical decisions within this body and to move our work forward. We will come prepared to enter fully into the consideration of the issues relevant to preventing an arms race in the environment of outer space.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

The French delegation welcomed with great satisfaction the agreement reached on the establishment and mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee to consider item 5 of the agenda. The mandate allows the Conference to proceed to a thorough discussion in a particularly complex field of capital importance. In addition to the consideration of treaties in force, the discussion should include the study of proposals which should, in the normal course of events, lead to multilateral undertakings. We therefore consider that, parallel to bilateral negotiations, an important role should devolve upon the Conference on Disarmament.

CD/PV.310

25

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Lately the Conference has more and more frequently received messages calling for the prevention of an arms race in space. Among them are letters from 34 prominent scientists, including Carl Sagan and Richard Garwin, from the Savoie Committee for World Disarmament (Annemasse, France) and from the participants in the Göttingen Congress "Scientists Warn Against Militarisation of Outer Space", held in July 1964.

The messages to the Conference are evidence of the high hopes placed in its work by the public all over the world. Those hopes represent a great responsibility for Conference members before the world and before history. To live up to that responsibility is, in our opinion, the task of the delegations taking part in our work. We owe it to the memory of those who gave their lives for peace and liberty four decades ago.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

My

delegation therefore considers it appropriate to devote our statement to a particular item that relates to item 5 of the agenda, which is Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

For more than two decades issues concerning outer space, in both its military and civilian aspects have been dealt with at the international level, as well as bilaterally between the two super-Powers. Such efforts have contributed to the conclusion of important international agreements, which has led to the progressive development of conventional international space law. At the same time, we have also witnessed the rapid development of outer space technology and the inherent dangers of an arms race in outer space have been growingly realized by the international community, which has found expression in a number of resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, the latest of which was resolution 39/59 adopted at the thirty-ninth session. The overwhelming support for this resolution clearly emphasizes the international community's concern to prevent an arms race in outer space.

In so far as this forum is concerned, the item relating to outer space was inscribed on the agenda since 1982, and although much useful work could have been accomplished by the establishment of a subsidiary organ, which was favoured by a majority of delegations, circumstances were such that it was only during this session that an ad hoc committee could be established. In spite of this fact we cannot say that the Conference has not devoted attention to this issue, for discussions in the plenary and views expressed therein, have made valuable contribution, particularly by way of defining the issues involved and the measures necessary. Meanwhile, we have also witnessed during the brief span of three years, events outside this forum taking their shape and form in such a manner that emerging trends in technology and the imperatives of strategic defence are already beginning to make their impact felt even before the physical deployment of weapons. Timely and urgent measures are necessary if we are to prevent events from overtaking efforts to curb a new and still more dangerous round of the arms race taking place in outer space.

The gravity of the situation in which the arms race in outer space should be dealt with in its interrelationship to nuclear disarmament issues has led to negotiations being conducted bilaterally between the Powers concerned, and it must be recognized that this is a positive development which is in accord with their special responsibilities. No doubt, these negotiations deal with issues that are



(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

sensitive in nature which vitally affect their perceived security interests. At the same time it is also important to look at this issue from the broader perspective that concerns the security of the world at large to which the super-Powers also belong. The realization of this fact should have a bearing on the need to maintain a meaningful and positive interaction between the bilateral and multilateral processes.

We cannot deny the fact that the Great Powers play a predominant role in outer space activities. At the same time a growing number of countries that possess the necessary technical capabilities are participating in outer space activities. A vast majority of countries, however, will not be in a position to pursue space activities of their own in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, there is practically no country in the world that has not benefited in many ways from peaceful uses of outer space. It is therefore important to see that existing international co-operation be maintained and further enhanced in the interest of all nations irrespective of their state of development, and to keep outer space as an arena free from potential military conflicts. In this context it would serve us well to bear in mind that existing conventional international law defines outer space as the province of all mankind, and states that activities in outer space should be carried out in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in the interest of maintaining international peace and security.

More importantly, besides the untoward consequences that an arms race will have on peaceful activities, there are also serious implications that would affect international security at large. This is particularly relevant from the aspect of prevention of a nuclear war. All of us in this Conference are well aware of conceptual differences in the consideration of item 3 of our agenda, which is considered as an issue of utmost importance and urgency. An arms race in outer space would add a new dimension to the prevention of a nuclear war, and would seriously compound the difficulties that the international community will face in its efforts to reduce the risks of such a war. We can say with a certain degree of certainty that outer space is still mainly free from weapons, although components of the weapons systems that enhance the effectiveness of weapons on Earth, both nuclear and conventional, are now well established in outer space, and the militarization of outer space through the use of satellites is an accomplished fact. Early-warning satellites that can warn of an imminent attack can also ensure that an attack is not imminent. Satellites are now so much part of the modern military systems that the deliberate destruction of a satellite or to cause it to malfunction could be considered as an act of aggression, and consequently the threat posed to international security would indeed be grave.

Therefore, while the arms race continues unremittingly on Earth itself the potential threat of the extension of an arms race in space would add a new danger to mankind. The magnitude of such a threat is not too difficult to see, although the technological aspects of these issues are indeed of a very complex character. For this reason, it would not be too difficult to see that prevention of an arms race in outer space cannot be treated in isolation from nuclear disarmament issues. It does not appear to be conceivable that the arms race can be halted and effective measures on nuclear disarmament undertaken if preventive measures are not possible, while there is still time, to prevent an arms race in outer space.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

We see today a situation where the compulsions of technology and radical new doctrines that are incompatible with traditional concepts of disarmament are threatening to undermine both in spirit and letter existing international law, which has placed serious constraints on an arms race in outer space of which the ABM Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 play the central role.

At the same time, the situation today is such that further measures are necessary to strengthen existing agreements in order to forestall the arms race in outer space before it is too late.

Traditionally, under disarmament terminology, weapons are classified according to the nature of their destructive effects. They are in a broad sense accordingly spoken of as conventional weapons or as weapons of mass destruction. New types of weapons are now emerging which are unconventional in technology but are considered as having a non-mass-destructive effect. These unconventional weapons of non-mass destruction are threatening to make a full-scale arms race in outer space feasible.

The technological momentum of the arms race has a life of its own and there is a great deal to be said about the role of technology in lending impetus to the arms race. The pattern that is all too familiar is that the arms-race syndrome begins in its research environment. Research in the qualitative improvement of existing weapons as well as research on new types of weapons are indeed an incipient process which is the initiation phase of the arms race. It should be stressed that while research on weapons constitutes an initiation of the arms race in its incipient process, statements of intentions cannot help but aggravate the situation. Disturbing trends are such that political repercussions are beginning to make themselves felt even before the arms race in outer space has actually taken place. This trend is clearly evident when we witness the action-reaction process at the political level. On the other hand, there are also certain positive signs. In this regard, my delegation cannot fail to note what the representative of the USSR said on 7 March:

"We hope that the Soviet-United States negotiations beginning next week will produce effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and halting it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear weapons and strengthening strategic stability."

We are also encouraged by the remarks which the representative of the United States made in his statement on 19 March when he said:

"I share Ambassador Issraelyan's hopes for a completely successful outcome to the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union that began last week. I also echo the intention he voiced to be constructive in ensuring successful work in the Conference on Disarmament."

My delegation believes that the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space during March of this year is a positive development as this should make it possible to get down to a serious and business-like approach to our work. We do not wish to say that the mandate does not fulfil the requirements that are prescribed in the draft presented by the Group of 21, which to my delegation must remain as a further objective as a matter

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

of principle. But what is more important is the political commitment which is so necessary, particularly of those who have the special responsibilities to see that an arms race does not take place in outer space. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space under its mandate is to examine, as a first step at this stage, substantively, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is my delegation's view that the Committee should be able to complete the first step of its work through an examination of the relevant issues to prepare the ground for further work that is of a more concrete nature during next year's session of the Conference. Paragraph 3 of the decision on the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee explicitly provides for an examination of the parameters that are relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We consider that such an examination should proceed in a balanced manner covering all broad aspects of the issue in their inter-relationship.

An examination of existing international treaties should give us a deeper comprehension of the legal constraints that have been put in place under such agreements, which should provide us with a useful source of reference and a broader perspective on how we should further proceed in order to establish a comprehensive régime on outer space.

At the same time, it is also necessary to make an assessment of the implications of the activities that are taking place particularly with regard to scientific and technological developments which are likely to spur an arms race in outer space. Such an examination would be necessary when we look at the fact that although existing treaties were quite effective at the time of their entry into force, the present situation is such that emerging trends in technological developments as well as strategic doctrines are threatening to erode their effectiveness.

We should also say that the examination of existing treaties and the assessment of their implications relating to technological and scientific developments on outer space would only be meaningful if we also conducted an in-depth exploration of further measures that are necessary, be they legally specific, or be they interim or preparatory in nature. There are already before the Conference a considerable number of suggestions and proposals advanced by delegations during the three years of consideration of the issue in the plenary. And this should serve as a useful point of reference in dealing with this new dimension of the arms race which has introduced new elements while efforts are still being made to ensure the survival of mankind through the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament on Earth itself.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The socialist States call on those nuclear Powers which have not yet done so to follow the example of the Soviet Union and renounce the first use of nuclear weapons. They draw attention to the particular danger inherent in the plans for extending the arms race to outer space, and confirm their determination to do everything in their power to reach an agreement without delay on measures which would ensure that in the end space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.

CD/PV.310

39

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

The progress made in the search for a peaceful order means that we must constantly evaluate the prospects and limitations of disarmament, taking into account existing military capabilities and respecting the legitimate security interests of all countries concerned. That is why the Senegalese Government attaches the highest importance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Because of its destabilizing effects, the prevention of an arms race in outer space is among the foremost concerns of the international community. In the first place, the militarization of space would seriously endanger the fragile strategic balance which is already very precarious on Earth. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is therefore in our opinion a pressing matter, before the process of militarization of that environment becomes irreversible.

Obviously, the exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes is of interest to all mankind. As a Sahelian country threatened by desertification and drought, Senegal attaches special interest to satellite telecommunications and meteorological observation technology, as well as to all the possibilities, undreamed of today, offered by the future use of space which must not be jeopardized.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

Besides, the adoption by unanimity, save for one abstention, of General Assembly resolution 39/59 reflects the concerns shared by all United Nations Member States and explains the consensus which has emerged within the Conference for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with the problems connected with the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Here it is necessary to congratulate the Group of 21, which last year submitted document CD/329/Rev.2 in accordance with the General Assembly resolution, and which in a spirit of compromise made concessions so as to allow the adoption of document CD/WP.172 which will make it possible to consider substantive issues.

The initial task should be to take stock of existing arrangements in the light of recent technological developments, bearing in mind the provisions of positive international law, and to identify the issues connected with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The next stage should be directed towards negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, for the prevention of an arms race in space. It is regrettable, however, that the consideration of the issue by the Conference has run into the difficulty of defining the mandate for the ad hoc committee set up to study this item, as this difficulty only delays the possibility of reaching agreement on binding acceptable legal instruments which would ensure that outer space, like the sea bed, is reserved for peaceful uses as the common heritage of mankind instead of becoming a field of competition for military purposes.

Inevitably, even if the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union which have just resumed in Geneva cover the question of nuclear weapons and space weapons in their interrelationship, it remains true that the prevention of an arms race in space involves the collective responsibility of all States, which must take appropriate measures at the multilateral level to work together with the nuclear Powers to ensure collective security and peace in the world.

Meanwhile, the two questions raised by the French delegation concerning the limitation of anti-satellite systems and the strengthening of the régime for the declaration and registration of space objects established by the Convention of 14 June 1975 deserve an answer.

The spirit of understanding which we think we have seen in the Ad Hoc Committees augurs well for the outcome of the Conference's work. The setting up of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 5, prevention of an arms race in outer space, should be entered on the positive side of our Conference's balance sheet. The delay which had taken place in the consideration of this issue, despite the pressing appeals of the international community, could not continue any longer without seriously compromising the credibility of our work.

In its efforts to conjure the threat of an arms race in outer space, the international community has entrusted a primary role to the Conference to undertake negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement or agreements in this area. This objective, already set out in paragraph 30 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, remains fundamental. We are sure that the Conference can make an effective contribution to the adaptation of law in order to avert confrontations which would be fatal to the world's future and guarantee the utilization of space for exclusively peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind. However modest the beginnings of the Ad Hoc Committee set up on the basis of document CD/584, we hope that they will guide the Conference towards positive results. We hope that all members of the Conference will deploy the necessary efforts to enable the Ad Hoc Committee to bring its work to a successful conclusion.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

While carrying out the pleasant duty of expressing our congratulations and best wishes, we also feel it necessary to voice our regret and disappointment that the Ad Hoc Committee responsible for dealing with the issues of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been unable to begin its work although it was set up nearly four weeks ago. There can be no justification for such a state of affairs, particularly in present circumstances where the problem of the non-militarization is growing particularly acute. We are all aware of the danger of an arms race in space, and of the irreparable consequences it could have for all mankind. Have we not made enormous efforts so that an ad hoc committee, which we have wanted for so long, could at last be set up?

Needless to say, the mere act of setting up subsidiary bodies is not an end in itself. In their wish to enable the Ad Hoc Committee to get started before the end of this first part of our session, a large number of delegations wanted to hold a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee under your chairmanship last Friday. If I remember rightly, on that day you announced that there was no consensus on the subject and that consultations were continuing. Today we have reached the last day of this spring part of the session, and it seems that those consultations have failed. In the circumstances, I can only appeal to our colleagues to make use of the time remaining before the resumption of the session to prepare ourselves better so that we can enable the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 5 to start well and progress smoothly.

CD/PV.311

11

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The decision to establish an ad hoc committee on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is one of the most positive recent events in the Conference. The slow development of the bilateral talks and the

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

potential threat against the ABM Treaty gives added urgency to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. It is in the interest not only of the future of this Conference but of the world community that the Ad Hoc Committee be given a chance to start its work immediately from the outset of this part of the 1985 session of the Conference on Disarmament. No narrow national interest should be allowed to block the Conference from taking on this challenge.

When dealing with disarmament we usually have to work with areas where the arms race is already under way. To stop it then is difficult, not least since a lot of vested interests are involved. But in the case of outer space we have a real opportunity to prevent an arms race if we act quickly.

Of particular interest is the question of ASAT-systems and ASAT-warfare. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have developed or are developing systems capable of attacking satellites in relatively low earth orbits. These systems threaten spacecraft used inter alia for verification of arms limitation agreements. The next step is the extension of ASAT-capacity to reach targets in higher orbits, and eventually the geostationary orbit, where early warning and communication satellites are placed. Such a development may also threaten important civilian satellites, in particular in the field of communication and remote sensing.

No doubt attacks on civilian spacecraft would be regarded as very serious. The destruction of satellites which are central for the strategic balance could have disastrous consequences. ASAT-developments are of great concern also because the technology used can be applied for ABM purposes.

The Conference on Disarmament must elaborate an agreement, or agreements, to prevent an arms race in outer space. All ASAT-weapons should be banned. Such a ban should prohibit development, testing, deployment and use of ASAT-weapons and provide for the destruction of existing such weapons.

The Conference should examine current international rules and regulations pertaining to the use of weapons in space. These rules are, however, by no means sufficient. Therefore, different approaches should be investigated on how to prevent the weaponization of outer space. It should also carefully analyse the trends with regard to the development and use of weapons in space and elaborate practical proposals, including draft treaties. The present mandate is sufficient to fulfil the initial stages of this task.

There are many fields in which human basic needs are far from satisfied. There is an urgent need to channel existing resources in the field of research and development to areas where the greatest advantages for the peoples of the world can be achieved. To put vast resources into the development of space-based weapons systems would constitute a development adverse to the possibilities of meeting urgent human needs.

Those who argue for ballistic-missile-defence systems may think that this is a way out of the dilemma of nuclear deterrence. They may believe that a technological breakthrough at last will give a foolproof defence of populations. This is an illusion. In reality it is a vain search for security that again will lead to greater insecurity for all of us.



(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Security in the nuclear age can never be reached through technological or military developments. Nor can more emphasis on the technology of destruction give lasting security. Only human beings, by agreement, can give us security. The super-Powers should seek to protect their interests not through confrontation but through common security. We need negotiated political solutions, and not unilateral technological approaches. The only answer to the increasing threat of a nuclear war is a process of agreed nuclear disarmament. This is the road to peace and survival.

CD/PV.312

7-8

(Mr. Dizdarevic, Yugoslavia)

Nuclear weapons do not ensure either peace or security. Nor are the latter ensured by any other weapons. Even new weapons in outer space presuppose a further increase in nuclear arsenals, whose end cannot be foreseen by anyone for the time being. Hopes placed in the eventual possibility of gaining unilateral advantages are just as vain as in the case of other weapons. If the intention is, as we are told, to finally eliminate nuclear weapons through outer space systems, then why should this not be done with the existing arsenals on Earth?

What is then the point of setting aside such vast resources and engaging scientific and other potentials which could be used for the much more needed purposes of development. Because the establishment of new systems in outer space would, in the final analysis, make all, even many developed, countries dependent on the super-Powers. Instead of becoming the arena of a new arms race, outer space should be accessible to peaceful uses, in the interest of the entire international community.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

With regard to the agenda item concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the agreement on the setting up of an ad hoc committee on this agenda item is a source of satisfaction to my delegation. We consider that the creation of this ad hoc committee comes at a crucial time in international relations.

The arms race in space is reaching a point at which it is more and more difficult to control, thus increasing the dangers which could stem from it. The Secretary-General of the United Nations rightly recalled in his message to our Conference last February that "the international community is legitimately interested in preserving outer space for peaceful purposes".

It is now imperative for the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate "a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space" as stipulated in General Assembly resolution 39/59.

To this end, and in order to implement the terms of that resolution and carry into practice the relevant provisions of the Final Document, the Conference on Disarmament and the subsidiary bodies it has set up for this purpose should in their work rise above all short-term considerations.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In the first half of the 1980s not a single bilateral or multilateral agreement has been concluded in this field. Progress in past and present disarmament negotiations has been deliberately blocked, and the work done at a number of important bilateral negotiations of the 1970s, unilaterally broken off by the United States, has been disrupted. The United States has so far hampered the ratification of several important agreements reached during the period of détente. At the same time the destructive policy of the United States with regard to most treaties and agreements now in force for the limitation of strategic weapons has become more active. The White House decision on the SALT-2 Treaty convincingly shows that what has prevailed in this case too is the United States claim arbitrarily to decide which obligations should be observed and which should not. The Soviet Union, naturally, will not attune itself to this line.

The "Star Wars" programme has become the distinctive "crown", the concentrated expression of such efforts. It greatly multiplies the threat of nuclear war, accelerates the arms race and sharply lessens the chances of reaching agreement on disarmament problems.

Mr. President, shortly before the resumption of the work at our Conference the second round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms began. The significance of these negotiations was stressed by many speakers at the meetings of the Conference on Disarmament.

...

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet position is clear and consistent. We are invariably ready to search in a businesslike manner for mutually acceptable solutions and we substantiate this readiness with concrete proposals on all the aspects of negotiations -- such as, for instance, our proposal on the introduction, by both sides and for the entire duration of the talks, of a moratorium on the development (research included), testing and deployment of attack space weapons and on a freeze on their strategic offensive arms accompanied by the cessation of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe and, correspondingly, of the build-up of the Soviet countermeasures. Continuing this line, the Soviet Union has unilaterally stopped, until November 1985, the further deployment of its medium-range missiles and suspended other countermeasures in Europe. These steps of ours, as well as other unilateral measures by the Soviet Union, have not been reciprocated by positive efforts. The United States has also rejected these proposals.

Furthermore, in violation of the January agreement relating to the prevention -- i.e. banning, forestalling -- of the arms race in space, our partners in the negotiations are trying to work out certain "rules" for such a race, and in addition they utterly refuse to discuss this question together with the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms. However, the Joint Soviet-American Statement on the results of the meeting between Andrei A. Gromyko and George P. Schultz clearly states that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The sides also agreed that the objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability.

This initially agreed position is the only one that can guarantee success at the talks and, in the final analysis, lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere. This agreement should be strictly complied with in all its parts. The interrelationship of space and nuclear arms set forth in it reflects an objective reality, a true state of affairs. There simply cannot be any other approach. It is impossible to carry out any radical cuts in strategic arms without an agreement on the prevention of an arms race in space.

Unfortunately, there is much evidence that the United States wishes to force through, at any cost, its plans for the development of a new type of weapon, namely, attack space weapons, which may not only undermine the Geneva negotiations but also rule out the prospect of stopping the arms race at all.

Speaking on the situation at the Geneva talks, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, stressed: "The arms race and talks on disarmament are incompatible -- this is clear to anyone who does not resort to hypocrisy and does not pursue the goal of deceiving public opinion. The Soviet Union will not support such a course and those who are now embarking on political games rather than serious politics should be aware of this. We would not like a repetition of the sad experience of the previous talks."

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet Union is sincerely interested in a successful outcome of negotiations on nuclear and space arms. Our country will continue persistently to strive for positive results, taking into account the legitimate interests of both sides. We will judge the other side's intentions by its practical deeds. We hope that the United States position will shift towards a constructive and businesslike approach. This is all the more urgently necessary in the interests of preventing an arms race in space and its cessation on Earth. No one will succeed in proving what cannot be proved -- that an arms race in space is a good thing.

Today, probably more than ever before, urgent practical steps are needed to stop and reverse the arms race before an irreversible situation emerges. In our view, all peaceloving States should raise their voice against the militarization of space, and for its peaceful exploration, for the benefit of mankind, rather than to its detriment.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

I should now like to refer to the prevention of an arms race in space. For well-known reasons, during the first part of the session great efforts had to be exerted to adopt the decision on establishing a subsidiary body of the Conference on this question. We express our satisfaction with the fact that the Conference was able to take such a decision, and reaffirm our readiness to co-operate with other participating States in implementing the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate. At the same time the Soviet delegation must point out that the substantive and general examination provided for by the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee should, as we agreed, firstly, be carried out on issues relevant precisely to the prevention of an arms race in space, and secondly, be the first step at this stage of the work. We will firmly oppose any attempts to replace the subject or the final objective of that examination.

It is important that the exclusion of space from the sphere of the arms race should be a mandatory norm of State policy, a generally recognized international obligation. This would be in keeping with the vital interests of mankind, and would be highly significant for lessening the threat of war and for the general improvement of the international situation.

(The President)

I now wish to put before the Conference the question of the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee established under agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". As I noted during the informal meeting, there is agreement on the nomination of His Excellency Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. May I take it that the Conference approves of this appointment?

It was so decided.

CD/PV.315

6

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

I am sure that it would have a positive impact on our work if progress were made in the second round of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the whole complex of nuclear and space weapons. What my delegation considers as most important at this juncture is that the agreed objective of the negotiations between the two sides, as announced on 8 January this year, should be pursued further and eventually reached.

One of the two sides is, however, trying to ignore this very objective and the interrelationship between the three subjects of the negotiations. The side concerned should realize that the Soviet Union has presented far-reaching suggestions on all the three issues and taken unilateral initiatives in an effort to promote the negotiating process. A case in point is the proposal that, for the duration of the negotiations, a moratorium should be imposed on space attack weapons, including research, development and testing, and that strategic offensive weapon stocks should be frozen. Furthermore, there is the Soviet commitment not to be the first to deploy anti-satellite weapons in space and its unilateral moratorium on the deployment of their medium-range missiles and the suspension of other countermeasures in Europe. And then there is the Soviet Union's strict observance of the provisions of the SALT-2 Treaty, even though it was not ratified due to the United States' attitude.

A constructive response to these actions of goodwill would be welcomed everywhere. Past experience has shown that progress can be achieved only if one strives for sincere co-operation and accommodation of interest. Any policy of

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

strength is, however, doomed to failure and will make results impossible. It is in this connection that my delegation wishes to put on record that it fully subscribes to the demand that the stipulations of the 1979 SALT-2 Treaty be complied with. There are alarming signs of it being gradually undermined and discarded. We know perfectly well why the Soviet Union is being accused of alleged treaty violations. It is all too obvious that one side seeks to obtain a free hand for an unbridled offensive strategic arms build-up and, at the same time, to bring inadmissible pressure to bear on the other side by constantly threatening no longer to abide by the limits laid down in SALT-2.

Since the spring part of the session, the controversy over the spread of the arms race to outer space has moved even further towards the centre of international politics. All the sides in question are agreed -- and they do voice that agreement -- that weapons in space cannot be divorced from nuclear weapons on Earth. However, they view this interrelationship from diametrically opposed angles. The SDI champions want the world to believe that the militarization of outer space is needed if the Earth is to be rid of nuclear weapons. But we say: Let us make every effort to halt the nuclear arms race on Earth by appropriate agreements and let us make absolutely sure that space is not turned into a zone bristling with arms as well.

The spread of the arms race to outer space will render the reduction and liquidation of strategic nuclear weapons impossible for two reasons. Firstly, those demanding the so-called shield are by no means prepared to give up the sword. It must seem a delirious thought to them to be able to dominate the world through supremacy in space. Nuclear war cannot be prevented that way. On the contrary, the risk of such a war breaking out would increase dramatically. Secondly, the other side cannot stand idly by. It will be forced to respond to such a development.

With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to quote in this context Erich Honecker, Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, who said in a speech a few days ago: "The prevention of the militarization of outer space is, indeed, one of the most urgent necessities today. If space were included in the arms race, as envisaged in the plans of the Reagan Administration, ... it would be impossible to limit or end the build-up of arms on Earth".

The plans providing for the militarization of outer space are aimed at torpedoing the disarmament process. New accords would no longer be possible and existing ones would become mere scraps of paper. The consequences would be extremely perilous, with the world permanently living on the brink of a nuclear war. For that reason, the setting-up of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament whose job is to deal with ways to prevent an arms race in outer space, is a fortunate development. Time for action is pressing. From the very outset, my delegation will, therefore, insist that the agreed mandate should be strictly complied with and not be interpreted in a one-sided fashion. It can only serve our cause, if we quickly move on from general discussions to treaty negotiations.

In view of the huge ongoing programmes, under which new strategic offensive weapons like the MX, Midgetman, Trident I and II, Pershing-2 and various types

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

of cruise missiles as well as tactical arms are being fitted with new nuclear warheads, including neutron weapons, and in view of the plans to devise nuclear-powered anti-missile X-ray lasers, a nuclear-weapon-test ban is something that cannot be put off any more. An agreement to that effect will remain high on the agenda. I wish to reaffirm that my delegation is ready to participate in serious negotiations in search of solutions acceptable to all the sides involved. Let us pull no punches. The most important prerequisite for progress is a change in the position of the United States. The least that can be expected is political willingness to attain a treaty through negotiation. So long as there is no indication of that willingness, there will be no results. I should like to make it perfectly clear that my delegation regards certain activities as substitute action destined to distract attention from the real situation. Those activities are definitely not helpful. In order to notice American opposition, we would not have needed the statements that have been made at this Conference. The tests of totally new arms and of nuclear devices, which are to serve as energy sources of new space attack weapons, are running at full tilt and say more than words ever could why negotiations are being obstructed at this forum. The Conference can neither shirk its responsibility for the preparation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty nor can it ignore that it has an effective contribution to make to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.



(Mr. Hameed, Sri Lanka)

Sri Lanka has played an active role in seeking the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We welcome the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on this subject as we look forward to constructive work being undertaken under the Chairmanship of Egypt. An examination of the existing body of international law on this subject should not lead to mutual recrimination about violations. Rather it should focus on the lacunae we must cover in a new treaty. We have already lost valuable time. Today we talk of prevention of an arms race in outer space; tomorrow we may, post facto, be compelled to talk about arms control and disarmament in space. Such is the reality of our time that while we are unable to agree on disarmament measures the arms race continues to encompass fresh dimensions. Already commercial interests are vying with each other for contracts for the research on new weapon systems to be followed inevitably by their actual manufacture. The military-industrial complex is transnational in its scope and will compel the blurring of national nuances on this extension of the arms race.

We hope and trust that they will be found to be a useful working tool. both by its very talk as by its very substance, this demonstration illustrates, we believe, not only the nature of past work but also certain achievements on matters relating to outer space. It illustrates also of course, that there is a daunting range of issues and problems to be addressed falling squarely within the terms of our mandate. I urge that we get down to the task at hand as quickly as possible, and we hope very sincerely that this modest contribution by the Canadian delegation will assist us in the process.

(Mr. Bagbeni, Zaire)

The climate of confidence among nations would be appreciably improved by the conclusion of agreements on measures to put an end to the arms race and furthermore to avert an arms race in outer space. General Assembly resolution 39/59, in operative paragraph 8, requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on that issue at the beginning of its session in 1985 with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.

Operative paragraph 9 of the same resolution urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to initiate immediately and in a constructive spirit negotiations aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and to advise the Conference on Disarmament regularly of the progress of their bilateral negotiations so as to facilitate its work.

In operative paragraph 5, the same resolution reiterates that our Conference, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has a primary role to play in this sphere.

The international community is aware of the general interest of all mankind in exploring outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and using it for strictly peaceful purposes. In my opinion, the work of the ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be oriented in that direction.

Despite the existence of a legal framework, which besides is now outdated, in this area, the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space seem to overlook the fact that they have agreed, under article III of that Treaty, that their space activities should be carried on in accordance with international law including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

I might also mention, in passing, your own statement; and the statement of the distinguished representative of Zaire, and those of China and Mexico, as providing further stimuli for all of us, but particularly on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I would like just to note also the importance, in itself, and also as a precedent, of the decision of China to reduce its armed forces.

Turning to the outer space question, I think all members of this forum took special satisfaction at our success earlier this year, after much effort, in reaching agreement on a mandate for this subsidiary body. That agreement reflected, as we saw it, a constructive spirit of compromise and a wide-spread appreciation of the importance and urgency of concrete work on issues directly relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The difficulties which were experienced and which are still being experienced in reaching agreement on a work programme should not discourage us. While such problems give us cause for concern, there are also signs of progress behind the scenes. Certainly, if we are to have any success at all, we must sustain the spirit of readiness to achieve a mutual accommodation which enabled the Ad Hoc Committee to come into existence in the first place. We also take great satisfaction in our wise choice of Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, a close friend and colleague of many year's standing, as Chairman of that Ad Hoc Committee. It will be recalled that in an earlier statement, I undertook, on behalf of the Canadian Government, to table a working paper -- perhaps a series of working papers -- on outer space, at the appropriate time. As part of our preparation for participation in discussion of that issue, the Canadian Government has compiled a comprehensive, two-volume compendium of the working papers and final records of the Conference which relate to outer space questions.

This compendium is similar to those we have tabled in the past on chemical weapons and, more recently, on radiological weapons. We are pleased to announce that, as a modest, but we hope practical, contribution to our deliberative efforts, particularly to the widespread desire for concrete documentation, and having drawn on the much appreciated assistance of the secretariat staff, copies of this compendium will shortly be provided to all members of the Conference, it not today, then we hope, tomorrow.

We hope and trust that they will be found to be a useful working tool. Both by its very bulk as by its very substance, this documentation illustrates, we believe, not only the extent of past work but also certain achievements on matters relating to outer space. It illustrates also of course, that there is a daunting range of issues and problems to be addressed falling squarely within the terms of our mandate. I urge that we get down to the task at hand as quickly as possible, and we hope very sincerely that this modest contribution by the Canadian delegation will assist us in the process.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

For the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, in other words, for a qualitative arms race, the United States currently allocates vast sums, the equivalent of five times the "Manhattan" project, which led to the development of the atomic bomb, or two and a half "Apollo" projects. These huge funds are intended to achieve a new major breakthrough in military technology -- a breakthrough in all directions: defensive as well as offensive weapons, nuclear and conventional, space and laser-beam, kinetic and all others. It will be a race towards new, unexplored perils which will many times exceed the danger of military nuclear technology, even though mankind has not yet been able to cope with the latter. Obviously, such dangerous developments should be stopped and reversed. We are convinced that the conclusion of an international agreement, based on the accommodation of mutual interests, for the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction would be an effective step towards this goal.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

At the end of the spring part of our Conference's session we could allow ourselves a limited amount of satisfaction when it became possible to establish an Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Our sense of accomplishment was heightened when the Conference found consensus on a chairman. I would like to take this opportunity -- when I speak on the record -- to congratulate Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt who, in the view of all delegations, appears uniquely suited to take on that important chairmanship. It appears also fitting to thank those delegations who initially had other qualified candidates in mind but then also agreed to this felicitous choice.

This, however, is the point where our self-satisfaction should end. We are now well into the penultimate month of this annual session and no concrete work on the outer space issues has been initiated. On the other hand there is universal agreement that the matter is urgent. There is equally consensus that the regulation of outer space and the prevention of a future arms race in that environment cannot be left entirely to the important bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers that have recently been launched. A great many aspects of the future outer space régime can only be handled by the international community at large. The Conference on Disarmament has affirmed over many years that it is the right forum to accomplish this task. Other international fora like the United Nations Outer Space Committee have so far allowed the Conference on Disarmament to take precedence, but they watch closely to see whether we will have the strength and competence to take in hand the work we have claimed for ourselves. Let us not indulge in illusions: should we fail to meet the expectations which we have consistently fostered ourselves, if the Conference is unable to substantiate its pretensions of competence in this domain, others will put forward their candidacy to do what seemingly we cannot achieve. Under these auspices it is regrettable that the Conference is still engaged in fancy procedural foot-work. It is particularly astounding that especially those who have proclaimed over months the dramatic consequences of a militarization of outer space, and have asserted that the heightening of the danger of nuclear war as a result of actual or future space activities goes unchecked only because a special working body of our Conference has not been established, are now speechless and have no useful contribution to make.

However, Chairman Alfarargi has a right to expect that delegations now embark on real and intensive substantive work. A formally adopted work programme

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

which such substantive work could follow would certainly be useful, and the flexible outline of such a programme proposed by the distinguished delegate of Italy would seem to fit the purpose extremely well. Yet, my delegation is not prepared to countenance lengthy formalistic argument about the precise terms of such a work programme, especially since it is a logical proposition that any work programme that might conceivably be chosen would have to commence with a survey of existing international legislation relating to space, its scope and meaning, and the lacunae which would first have to be identified before any further disarmament activities can be considered. However one looks at the problems before us, we must all first know what is already prohibited and where the areas of uncertainty lie before we can collectively decide what additional prescription should govern the future of outer space. My delegation would therefore propose that the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 5 should set out, as of its next meeting, to deal with this important substantive area. In order to document the impatience my delegation feels at the slowness of the process so far, I intend to use my present intervention to outline some of the issues that will have to be addressed.

The first important task of the Ad Hoc Committee would be to clarify the ambiguities which we have allowed to persist throughout our long-drawn discussions in plenary on the subject. Many delegations have affirmed, often in a solemn manner, that the "militarization of outer space" must be prevented. However, outer space has been a playground of military uses at least since the first testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles and satellites of the most diverse provenance and purposes decades ago. The primary fact is that outer space is not virginal in respect of its military use. On the other hand, outer space is not an environment totally devoid of legal prescription and is therefore not open for any degree of further intensification of military use. What then does "militarization of outer space" concretely mean for the work of our Conference? Do we not need a sober and manageable assessment of the military use to which outer space is already subjected at this juncture, an analysis of the compatibility of such existing military uses with international legislation already in effect, an agreement on the various kinds of abuses from military purposes that should be prevented in the future?

One can turn the question around. What forms of use of outer space are compatible with the principle of "peaceful use of outer space"?

Article 3 of the Outer Space Treaty of 27 January 1967 implies that all States Parties, in the exploration and use of outer space, are bound by international law including the United Nations Charter. The logical consequence is that no State can dispose of the space objects of another State. A satellite in orbit in outer space enjoys a protection against interventions of other States comparable to that of a ship on the high seas. But what are the precise connotations of this protection? Do we already have in the present international legislation adequate provisions for the immunity of satellites? Would it matter whether the space object traverses air space or outer space and where -- after years of controversial debate on the subject -- would the dividing line between the two environments fall? To what extent may States invoke Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in the case of unlawful attack by, or on, satellites?

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

These are key questions, questions of basic relevance for existing and future military arsenals. Treaties that have been concluded over the years in an effort to minimize or preclude the introduction of weapons, military bases and other military establishments into space -- from the Partial Test Ban Treaty to the ABM Treaty of 1972 -- are replete with ambiguities and interpretative controversy.

Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Outer Space Treaty applies exclusively to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in complete orbit, not, however, to similar weapons systems in fractional orbits like space ferries, outer space mines and killer satellites that would be capable of blinding, diverting, interfering with or destroying other satellites by virtue of conventional explosives or by ramming or other kinetic effect. The Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty do not generally prohibit all military activities. For instance, a stationing of conventional weapons in outer space is not outlawed by these instruments. Also, there is no prohibition of laser or particle beam weapons. In addition, only the moon and other celestial bodies have been declared weapon-free zones, borrowing the prescription from the Antarctic Treaty. It appears that conventional weapon tests in outer space, the establishment of military installations and the conduct of military manoeuvres outside of such celestial bodies have not yet been the subject of explicit prohibitive norms. However, it is evident from the nature of such activities that, in all probability, they take place in the very relevant strategic space zone near the Earth. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 only deals with the testing of a nuclear explosive device in peacetime, and does not purport to regulate the use of nuclear weapons -- for instance, for the interception of geostationary or other satellites in high orbit -- under conditions of war. I leave open to what extent a multilateral assembly can be the ultimate judge for the interpretation of bilateral treaties like the ABM Treaty. Yet, the ABM Treaty is equally selective in its attempts to prescribe certain activities. Because of the dual-capability of the means of warfare which it attempts to constrain its interdiction of ballistic missile defence are equally relevant for the protection of satellites. But the scope of the prohibition is quite unclear. One could presume, for example, that the permitted upgrading of air defence rockets could provide an important loophole, in that such systems could be used for the interception of non-strategic rockets.

As indicated above, one of the haziest areas is the interpretation of the term "peaceful uses", employed both in the Outer Space and the Moon Treaties. Over the years, different schools of thought have developed over the question whether the term proscribes "military" -- in a broad sense -- or only "aggressive" uses. This needs clarification. One important feature of the Outer Space Treaty is that in its operational articles it is stipulated only for the moon and other celestial bodies that they may be used for peaceful purposes; space as such is not subjected to this particular requirement. This means that the total demilitarization of the moon and other celestial bodies contrasts with the only partial demilitarization of outer space as such. One could arrive at the assumption that all activities in outer space -- with the exclusion of those that are specifically prohibited in article 4, paragraph 1 -- are assumed to be non-military and therefore automatically peaceful.

However, this distinction would not seem to apply to satellites that are evidently designed for military use. The Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1975 requires in its article 4 the notification of

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

information on the general purpose of satellites, once launched, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. However, if one believes the notifications that have so far been made according to this provision, none of the registered satellites would seem to have had a military function, while it is more or less of public knowledge that approximately 80 per cent of all satellites serve military or predominantly military purposes in outer space. Here, however, it must be stated clearly that these satellites do make an uncontested and important, indeed, indispensable contribution to the stabilization of military relationships by rendering possible the observation, reconnaissance and communication, early warning, control of military movements, surveillance of the compliance of treaties and crisis diplomacy. If, indeed, the "military" use of a satellite is limited to these stability-serving functions can one then in good conscience qualify the space object as designed for "non-peaceful purposes"? Other examples of a variety of satellites that would partake of this ambiguity are the satellite search systems that form the object of the Soviet-American Agreement concerning co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes dating from the year 1977. Obviously, these search systems are identical, whether they serve "peaceful" or "military" purposes. The detection of satellites is -- in each of these cases -- the prerequisite for rescue and operations for "peaceful purposes", or for capture or destruction, in other words, obviously aggressive purposes.

From these few examples it becomes utterly evident that there is a great amount of ambivalence which makes it extremely difficult to distinguish between peaceful and non-peaceful objects and uses in outer space. This ambivalence stems in part from technical factors. In most cases technology is neutral and does not indicate the purpose for which it is used. If our aim is the future construction of a protection régime for satellites this is a particularly relevant insight.

Any attempt at distinguishing between anti-satellite and space defence systems is equally beset by ambivalences. Killer satellites, launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles could be defensive just as well as offensive. A defensive use would be their deployment against a nuclear warhead, but the same weapon would be used offensively if it would be targeted at a space-based missile intercept system in order to open the path for offensive nuclear missiles from the same side. All these ambivalences prove one important point: that the international legislation for outer space which we already possess is important and covers many possible military applications in space. On the other hand it has grave lacunae -- which remain to be identified in detail -- and on the whole must be adapted to the dynamics of new space weapons technology.

A similar need for updating concerns verification techniques, so indispensable for the building of confidence. The insufficiencies of substantive legal prescription for the desired degree of demilitarization of outer space and celestial bodies correspond to the lack of suitable procedures for the verification of compliance with substantive obligations. It should be noted in this respect that none of the treaties regulating outer space has so far provided for an effective monitoring and compliance system. However, it is evident that if States are to agree to new treaties which aim at the use of outer space wholly or predominantly for "peaceful purposes", stringent provisions of verification, preventing an abuse of space technology are of the absolute essence. Even if such



(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

verification techniques can be identified and agreed upon, one grave problem remains, their quasi-monopolistic possession by only a few countries while the majority of signatory States will in all probability not dispose of the necessary technical prowess to verify by themselves. The involvement of international verification organizations is therefore an urgent requirement for such future international legislation. Despite the considerable cost such mechanisms may entail the projected International Satellite Monitoring Agency, planned and developed by France, or -- in a regional context -- the European Space Agency might be called upon to take on practical responsibilities in this field.

I have so far dwelt upon some of the ambiguities and seeming contradictions of the present outer space legal system. The few examples I have used should be enough to demonstrate the need to embark on a thorough analysis of the existing legal framework. The purpose of this urgent exercise should, however, not only be to find out where international lawyers and parties to the various treaties disagree, and to take stock of their differences of view. Our objective should be in each individual instance to assess the military and arms control implications of the conflicting views, then to harmonize our own positions and to come up with recommended consensus interpretations on what the existing treaty law says in terms of prohibition, and in terms of activities still permitted.

Our mandate in the Ad Hoc Committee compels us to focus on this exercise in particular. In the view of my delegation the required activities will absorb a good amount of time even if we embark on substantive consideration of these issues in earnest and without further loss of time.

Yet, both in terms of giving the necessary thrust and orientation to this indispensable legal survey, and to allow us to plan ahead, one might already at this juncture ask what direction further arms control measures and eventual multilateral negotiations could usefully take.

There are three general avenues that could come to mind.

The first approach -- often discussed -- would be the prohibition of particular, precisely defined space systems or, alternatively, the establishment of ceilings on their number. Both approaches would present evident problems. Ceilings combined, where necessary, with reductions of existing systems, might very largely be meaningless since certain important -- and conceivably stabilizing -- space tasks could probably be fulfilled by a few systems only. Other tasks would require a precise number of space systems, for instance, of satellites. If a ceiling were fixed in such a manner as to render a particular desirable space task impossible, the limitation might be counter-productive. If, however, the ceiling would be so high as to exceed the needed number, it would have no limiting effect. The total prohibition of whole categories of space systems would be an awesome task, and while in all probability needed, at some point in time, difficult to accomplish as a first step in future negotiating activities.

There are, however, two approaches that appear more realistic and promising at a relatively early stage. One would be the establishment of a protection régime for space objects, inter alia, by the improvement of the obligation to register such objects on the one side, and the legal immunization of satellites --

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

or certain types of satellites -- on the other. My delegation has already made these suggestions on earlier occasions and is pleased to note that in this respect there is a large coincidence of views with proposals the French delegation has submitted. I expect that we will detail our views on this subject in due course.

The other approach would be the establishment of a code of conduct for outer space, a sort of a traffic code for space objects. On the basis of a general consensus on the interdiction of the threat or use of force in outer space -- in agreement with Article II of the United Nations Charter -- this code could, as a confidence-building measure, contain a number of rules of behaviour which would be complied with in the interest of the security of all. Such code of conduct could contain the mutual renunciation of measures that would interfere with the operation of space objects of other States, the establishment of minimum distances between space objects, speed limits imposed on space objects that approximate one another, as well as related measures. The idea of a traffic code for increasingly used environments is not a new one. Already in 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union concluded an agreement designed to prevent incidents on the high seas. The philosophy on which this agreement was based -- and the excellent record of mutual consultations that the parties to the Treaty have established over the years -- could be an important guide for the negotiation of a similar agreement for outer space.

The necessity for the early introduction of such a comprehensive code of conduct would also seem to result from the somewhat preoccupying "overpopulation" of outer space, caused in large measure by the continued presence of elements of "space garbage", burned-out booster stages and other objects that cannot be reliably traced. The danger of the collision of an active satellite, or even more so, a manned space vehicle with elements of this space debris must increasingly be considered as a serious danger. The problem is compounded by the fact that it may take days or even weeks to discover the causes for the sudden demise of a space object. In situations of acute conflict the failure of one State to explain for itself the loss of one or several of its satellites designed to play a major role in crisis management could lead to misinterpretation, a breakdown of communication between adversaries and possibly dangerous actions, spiralling into a serious conflict. The envisaged code of conduct could also provide for enhanced duties of consultations among States in such cases, with a view to clearing up the situation and to show the peaceful inclination of all concerned. The number of States that are actively involved in space programmes is still limited at this time, but will certainly grow. There are also States that do not conduct a programme of their own at this time, but operate space observation stations on Earth. It is obvious that all of these States should be parties to the establishment and implementation of this traffic code. A code of conduct for outer space is therefore ideally suited for negotiations in a multilateral context like the Conference on Disarmament.

It is the hope of my delegation that these preliminary remarks and suggestions may contribute to a more rapid focusing of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It is imperative that the remaining weeks of this annual session be well used to surmount the first hurdles on the path which I have charted.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Today I wish, on behalf of a group of socialist countries, to submit for consideration by the Conference on Disarmament the Working Paper entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", the text of which is contained in document CD/607.

This Working Paper reflects the socialist countries' sincere desire to safeguard space from the arms race and use it exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind, and to ensure that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament on agenda item 5 advances as rapidly as possible.

The world has recently come to an extremely dangerous frontier: the arms race, which has reached unprecedented dimensions, is not only intensifying but also threatening to spread to outer space. The danger that space will become the springboard for aggression and war is increasingly real. Programmes are being carried out to develop space weapons that are intended to destroy objects in space and attack targets on Earth from space. These activities, which stem from calculations on achieving military superiority, are likely to make an arms race in space irreversible and seriously destabilize the situation, and they heighten the threat of nuclear war. The onset of an arms race in outer space will undermine the prospects for arms limitation and reduction as a whole. The militarization of space, if it cannot be halted, will swallow up enormous material and intellectual resources, thereby doing great damage to the peaceful development of mankind and the solution of pressing global problems, and create insurmountable obstacles to international co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

It is necessary to prevent this fatal course of events, and not to allow space to be turned into a source of military danger. The exclusion of space from the sphere of the arms race must be a strict norm in the policy of States, and a universally recognized international obligation.

The socialist States consider that strike weapons of any kind -- conventional, nuclear, laser, particle-beam or any other form -- whether in manned or unmanned systems should not be introduced into or stationed in space. Space weapons should not be developed, tested or deployed either for anti-missile defence, or as anti-satellite systems, or for use against targets on Earth or in the air. Such systems which have already been developed should be destroyed. In other words, the socialist States propose that agreement should be reached on the prohibition and elimination of an entire class of weapons, namely, attack space systems, including space-based anti-missile systems and anti-satellite systems.

Strict compliance with the indefinite 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems between the USSR and the United States is of particular significance for the prevention of the militarization of space.

The socialist States attach great importance to the absolute and strict implementation of multilateral agreements limiting the use of space for military purposes. These include the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1967, and the Treaty banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water of 1963.

Given present developments, urgent measures must be taken to prevent an arms race in outer space. These measures may be worked out and adopted through both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. The socialist States consider that bilateral and multilateral negotiations complement each other.

The socialist States express satisfaction at the fact that the Conference on Disarmament was able to take the decision to set up an ad hoc committee on item 5 of its agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". They are ready to co-operate with the other States members in the implementation of the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate.

In the view of the socialist States, in carrying out its mandate the ad hoc committee should as a first step at this stage concentrate on examining the following issues:

(a) Political, military, economic and other consequences of the extension of the arms race into outer space.

(b) Significance of existing international agreements relating to the limitation of military activity in outer space for the prevention of an arms race in space.

(c) Proposals by States members of the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Under this point, consideration should be given in particular to the proposals of the USSR on the conclusion of

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space (1981), the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth (1983) and on the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind.

The socialist States express the hope that the successful fulfilment of its mandate by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space will enable the Conference on Disarmament rapidly to embark upon negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, for the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, as it was recommended to do by the United Nations General Assembly. Only the guaranteed prevention of the militarization of space will make it possible to use space for creative rather than destructive purposes, and open the way for uniting the efforts of all States for the peaceful use of outer space.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

This Conference, together with many other fora of multilateral and bilateral negotiations, has been negotiating disarmament for decades now. Though progress has been slow, a number of important agreements was achieved and they have been complied with. It is, however, disquieting to note that this period may be coming to an end, since the wisdom of observing disarmament treaties has been questioned on a number of occasions. This applies to the SALT II agreement as well as to the two Soviet-American agreements concerning the limitation of underground nuclear tests and peaceful nuclear explosions. But of most serious concern is the fact that a political gamble is under way to make use of recent developments in technology in a way that would threaten a number of important disarmament agreements, in the first place the ABM Treaty of 1972. I am, obviously, referring to the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative, introduced by the present United States Administration. The very announcement of this initiative, which has nothing in common with a sincere, realistic quest for security, and the pushing of its implementation, have already had and continue to have a negative impact on the development of Soviet-American relations and East-West relations as a whole. This has become quite evident during the first round of the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the complex of issues concerning space and nuclear weapons. From what we hear the second round is as well decisively marked by the stubborn persistence in the implementation of the SDI. One side apparently tends to forget that only an agreement covering all three fields, that is, strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear weapons and space weapons, can prevent a situation where limitations in one or two fields are undermined by the absence of limits to scientific and technological development in the third field.

The implementation of the SDI could become a very dangerous precedent in so far as it would reopen the same channel for the arms race which was closed by the ABM Treaty 13 years ago. It is not too surprising that various and often differing interpretations of the ABM Treaty have been advanced recently. One of them would have us believe that the Treaty allows tests of space arms. And this is not just a personal opinion of an expert in the field. Such a conclusion was reflected in the Pentagon statement issued in April of this year. The report lists 15 major experiments which, according to the Pentagon, could be conducted without violating the ABM Treaty. It also includes experiments that would test weapons based in space and designed to shoot down incoming enemy projectiles.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

When justified doubts were raised in this regard, a "flexible" explanation was offered -- these weapons would be destroying anti-satellite weapons and not anti-ballistic missiles. The Associate Director of the Federation of American Scientists, John Pike, reacted to the explanation saying, that such a test would be "a waste of money", because the Air Force already knows how to shoot down anti-satellite weapons.

Allusions are being made by the proponents of the SDI about alleged violations of the ABM Treaty by the Soviet Union. The United States emissaries are quite active and lecture the public on this score here and there. But in spite of many words, not a single piece of serious evidence has ever been presented, to the best of our knowledge. Moreover, just a few days ago the Secretary-General of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, invited the United States to reaffirm, together with the Soviet Union, its commitment to the régime of the ABM Treaty, a Treaty of unlimited duration. He said further, and I quote from M. Gorbachev's reply to the message from the Union of Concerned Scientists: "The Soviet Union is not developing any space strike weapons, a large-scale ABM system, or the basis for such a system; it is abiding strictly by its obligations under the Treaty both as a whole and in its several parts; and it is unswervingly observing the spirit and the letter of that most important document. We invite the United States leadership to join us in this matter and to renounce the plans being nurtured for the militarization of outer space, plans which will inevitably lead to the scrapping of that document, the key link in the entire process of nuclear arms limitation".

The fears that the arms race will be transferred into outer space are not quite new. On numerous occasions we have heard in this Conference and in its preceding Committee delegates from the East, from non-aligned countries and also from the West expressing their apprehension that an arms race in outer space, and namely the SDI, would have enormous unfavourable consequences for mankind. Since then we have been subjected to extensive United States propaganda, starting with the slogan that the SDI will make the nuclear weapons obsolete, claims that it will remain at the research stage only, and recently that it is nothing but an idea, far from implementation etc.; but it is hard to believe all those arguments, the goal of which is just to calm down the world public opinion. We remember well that when the SDI was announced it was stated that the USSR could never catch up because it is behind in the necessary technology. So it was clear from the beginning that this project is in fact a result and a manifestation of the continuing long-term effort to upset the military-strategic balance on a qualitatively new basis. It is the culmination of efforts to achieve military superiority over the USSR, to intercept a retaliatory nuclear strike, to build new means of blackmail and dictate terms. Even if we were willing to admit that the SDI has something in common with defence, it is only too obvious that its basic purposes are offensive because the intended defence has one and only one ambition: to increase the overall offensive potential. Recent intensive development also of the offensive potential in the United States itself is the best confirmation of this simple truth. And what will undoubtedly be the consequences of the SDI?

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

In a broader sense, the SDI will throw doubt on all the existing Soviet-American agreements in the sphere of arms limitations. Apart from the ABM Treaty, it would also jeopardize a number of multilateral agreements such as the Moscow agreement on a partial test ban of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the NPT. With the advancement of research and tests within the SDI programme, more and more detrimental consequences to the existing arms limitation agreements will inevitably appear. Here I would like to stress "research and testing". Usually results of research are immediately tested. One has to wonder if it could be possible to clearly and definitely separate research from testing. If that could be possible, then obviously, this should be reflected in a considerable reduction of costs of the programme. There are, of course, other possible consequences. It is quite clear that faced with the strengthened defence-offence capacities in outer space none would be willing to reduce its ballistic-missile potential. This will make it more difficult to achieve arms control agreements both in the bilateral talks in Geneva as well as in other fora. Thus, the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war would be further increased.

A good example in this respect is given by the research on X-ray lasers. Speaking on the SDI, United States Administration officials usually emphasize the use of non-nuclear devices to destroy missiles in space. Nevertheless, research on X-ray laser space weapons, powered by a nuclear bomb, continues actively. A couple of weeks ago an important advance in developing these weapons was reported, consisting in increasing the brightness and thus the power of the X-ray device by focusing its rays. The X-ray laser, which has been under development for nearly five years at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, exploits a nuclear explosion as a power source. Where is the guarantee that American military planners will resist temptation to make use of the recent advance and that nuclear weapons will finally not be introduced into outer space? Anyway, until now we have not witnessed too much moderation in efforts to use scientific and technological progress for military purposes. Views have already been expressed by eminent politicians and experts that the SDI means further vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Further, one cannot overlook the risk that if either or both the strongest nuclear Powers were to further develop ballistic missile defence-offence, the other nuclear-weapon States might be tempted to take corresponding measures also in the nuclear field, thus further increasing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The widely critical, or at least highly reserved, attitude towards the SDI, including among the United States allies, is one of the reasons why the Reagan administration seeks approval of the West European allies in NATO concerning the participation of their countries in the SDI, primarily in the form of a pledge that they will not question it but will support it, that they are ready to bear its full impact on their own interests both in Europe and in the world without grumbling. What is in question is not the accessibility to the as-yet dubious scientific and technological progress brought by the implementation of the SDI to the development of the civilian economy, but the unlimited opportunity "to drain" the West European scientific and technological potential. That means not big orders stimulating West European economic development but small crumbs falling from the American military and industrial complex and, what is more important, it would be the means of skimming the cream of the scientific and technological progress in Europe.



(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The economic consequences of the implementation of the SDI would be truly unprecedented. It would lead to a massive diversion of material, human and financial resources from civil to military purposes. Such a diversion would certainly multiply current world economic problems with the substantial reductions of activities in the social sector. Further increases in the already massive military expenditures will have adverse effects not only on the economies of the countries directly involved but also on the rest of the world, particularly on those with the most limited resources.

There is one more highly negative aspect of the implementation of the SDI that is also of an economic nature. The more resources are invested and thousands of people become dependent for their careers on the project, the more difficult it would be to stop it, and it would thus gain a momentum of its own.

The more one analyses the SDI project and its possible consequences the more one comes to the conclusion that a completely different approach is needed, especially with respect to outer space. An outstanding example represents the moratorium on the placement of anti-satellite weapons in outer space initiated by the USSR two years ago, and its readiness to abide by it for as long as the other States act in the same way. This moratorium creates favourable conditions for the achievement of an agreement to put a total end to efforts to develop new anti-satellite systems and for such systems already possessed by the USSR and the United States, including those whose testing has not yet been completed, to be scrapped.

With respect to outer space we consider that bilateral and multilateral negotiations should complement each other. We therefore welcomed the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and we are fully prepared to co-operate with the other delegations in the Conference in the implementation of its mandate. Our more specific views on how this should be done are contained in the Working Paper of a group of socialist countries, CD/607, introduced on Tuesday by Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, whom I would like to greet today, on the National Day of Mongolia.

Let me conclude by expressing the firm belief of my delegation that the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space is in a position to do useful work already in the course of the present session. What is needed is a constructive approach on the part of all delegations based on the understanding that the prevention of an arms race in outer space corresponds to the vital interests of all nations.

Space must be used for all humanity for peaceful purposes, for communication, education, information transfer and surveying natural resources. That is the field in which scientists of the whole world must co-operate. The Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, having in view this noble task, is going to organize an international colloquium on that subject. We hope that it will bring incentives for peaceful co-operation in space of all, East and West, North and South. This would certainly be more to the benefit of mankind than any star-wars plans whatsoever.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, today the Soviet delegation would like to address the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is not our first statement concerning that issue. However, being aware of its importance and topicality, we would like to reiterate our position on it bearing in mind the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee has started its work.

On 9 July a group of socialist countries submitted a Working Paper summarizing ideas regarding the programme of work of the Conference in this area. I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Ambassador of the Mongolian People's Republic, and through him the whole Mongolian people, on the sixty-fourth anniversary of the People's Revolution. The socialist countries proceed from the understanding that pernicious developments fraught with a real threat of an arms race in outer space can and must be stopped, reversed and, finally, ruled out by political means, through the adoption of effective urgent measures negotiated at both bilateral and multilateral talks. We are convinced that our Conference is capable of making a major contribution to accomplishing this task.

It is universally acknowledged that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is at present one of the central issues of modern international relations. Numerous governmental and non-governmental international fora, including the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, as well as discussions in the world press and various negotiations, prove this fact. It is unlikely that anyone would dispute that the future of mankind depends to a large degree on how this issue is resolved.

There is a question why the prevention of an arms race in outer space has become so urgent now, several decades after the launching of satellites into space, as well as the flight of many spacecrafts.

While nuclear energy was first used for military and only then for peaceful purposes, the exploration of space, ushered in by the launching of a Soviet satellite in 1957 during the International Geophysical Year, has from the very beginning followed the path of peace and international co-operation.

For almost three decades now, peaceful co-operation in space has been serving the interests of mankind, as an effective means to solve many global problems, including those of economic development. These problems are, in particular, the exploration and wider use of the Earth's natural resources, the struggle against natural disasters, ensuring food supplies, the improvement of transport and communications, and the development of new materials and technologies. Opportunities and prospects are here practically as unlimited as outer space itself.

And now mankind is facing a real threat of the development and deployment in space of strike weapons designed to destroy objects both in space and on Earth or in the atmosphere from space, and the deployment of weapons, however they may be based, designed to destroy space objects. This creates a situation that is essentially different from the present one because of the appearance of a new type of weapons, namely, attack space weapons which are global weapons with qualitatively new purposes and specifications.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The reality of today is -- and, as the discussion shows, many delegations are interested in this aspect -- that at present there are no offensive space weapons in the arsenals of States. Their communication, navigation, early-warning and other satellites are not weapons in the proper sense of the word. They do not pose the threat of a direct attack in space or from space. They cannot "shoot" or destroy other objects.

Allegations that the militarization of outer space began long ago, almost simultaneously with the launching of satellites of different kinds, and that the arms race in space has continued from that time, do not tally with the facts.

With the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative, the United States has declared to the world that it is going to turn outer space into a new arena of military confrontation. I would like to specify at once that in referring to the SDI we are not being polemical but going by the objective fact that at present it is the only programme which furthers the proclaimed intention of deploying a new type of weapon in space.

The Soviet Union does not have such programme or such intentions. Mikhail S. Gorbachev stressed in his reply to a message from the well-known American organization, the Union of Concerned Scientists, published the other day, that "on behalf of the Soviet leadership I should like to state in all certainty that the Soviet Union will not be the first to take weapons into space. We shall make every effort to persuade other countries too, and above all the United States, not to take such a fatal step, which would inevitably increase the threat of nuclear war and spur on an uncontrolled arms race in all directions".

This important document contains the principled position of the Soviet Union on the key issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its cessation on Earth. At the request of the Soviet delegation the text of Mikhail Gorbachev's reply will be distributed as an official Conference document.

The authors of the SDI, justifiably called the "Star Wars" programme in the United States itself, are trying to convince the world that the implementation of this programme or, in other words, the spread of the arms race to outer space, would allegedly contribute to strengthening peace, preventing nuclear war and even eliminating nuclear weapons. The United States Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, argues this in an article in today's Herald Tribune.

The Soviet Union, as well as the overwhelming majority of States, opposes the militarization of space because, in their view, the implementation of the SDI would have the most fateful consequences for mankind, including the United States.

The Soviet delegation believes that a clear perception of the consequences of the spread of the arms race to outer space is of primary importance for a businesslike and purposeful analysis of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We put the question in this way because we wish to show objectively the urgent and important character of the situation, to explain why the task we

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

face calls above all for a broad political approach, for a display of political will, for the understanding that there is no reasonable alternative to peaceful co-operation in space. It would not be necessary to speak so extensively of the consequences of the militarization of space, if there were no attempts to present the prospect of "Star Wars" as a factor that would strengthen international security.

As for the militarization of outer space, it would begin with the launching into space of offensive weapons designed to destroy objects in space and from space in the atmosphere or on Earth, or with the deployment of weapons designed to destroy space objects. The spread of the arms race to outer space would have various negative long-term consequences: political, military, economic and others. In today's statement I shall refer to the major military-strategic consequences.

First, the emergence of offensive space weapons would accelerate the arms race in all directions, including strategic weapons. It would greatly multiply the arsenals of both sides, cause structural changes in the armed forces and sharply increase the level of military confrontation and the likelihood of nuclear war.

The specific nature of offensive space weapons would play a significant role in such developments. Deployed in geo-stationary orbits and equipped with manoeuvring systems, these weapons can appear over the territory of any State, posing a threat to its security at any moment. In addition, space weapons will probably have enhanced combat readiness and act almost instantly. They can be targeted on objects both in space and in the atmosphere and on Earth.

Naturally, one can imagine that by means of new types of weapons one will succeed in developing a system -- and even according to optimistic calculations it would take decades -- which would be capable of destroying quite effectively the missiles that exist today. However, these missiles will be modernized accordingly. Absolute weapons, which are what is being aimed at, cannot exist: the creative nature of technical progress, science and technology denies the absolute. Moreover, no technology, even the most sophisticated, can guarantee either security or disarmament, for these are political problems and cannot be resolved by technical means.

Secondly, strategic stability would be gravely undermined.

The scope for the emergence of crisis situations, as a result, among other things, of misinterpretation, incidents or technical failure, would be substantially expanded. By way of example, if now the failure of a satellite can only be the result of technical faults, when space is saturated with armaments it could be misinterpreted as the result of premeditated activities by the other side.

Practically, space weapons are designed automatically to hit their targets. While modern weapon systems allow a certain amount of time to evaluate the situation, hold consultations and prevent the irreparable, with the presence of offensive space weapons war can break out instantly, literally at lightning speed. Political confidence would thus be reduced to the level of reliance on technology, and its capabilities.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Thirdly, the spread of the arms race to outer space will disorganize the process and machinery of disarmament talks, and undermine the prospects of limiting and reducing armaments as a whole.

The Soviet-United States negotiations on nuclear and space weapons may become one of the first victims of the "Star Wars" programme. As we have already said, the unconstructive position of the United States at these negotiations is hampering mutually acceptable agreements. Those who hope to use the SDI as a means of pressure on the Soviet Union are grossly mistaken. We will not again allow the negotiations to be used as a blind for military preparations.

The negative effect of the SDI in spurring on the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, can already be felt at other talks. The Conference on Disarmament witnesses this phenomenon in the discussions on practically all agenda items.

Fourthly, the policy to militarize space shatters the present system of treaties restraining the arms race on Earth and preventing it in space.

The United States, for instance, already does not conceal that when the stage comes of taking the decision to deploy the weapons created under the SDI programme it will unilaterally break the ABM Treaty. In principle, the United States will face the same dilemma with regard to a number of other international legal documents limiting the military use of space.

The consequences of an arms race in space to which we have referred are by no means all, but the foregoing is enough to understand that it will lead to the destabilization of the situation and a greater threat of a nuclear war.

That is why the socialist countries have suggested that the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 of the agenda should discuss -- in strict compliance with its mandate -- the political, military, economic and other consequences of the extension of the arms race into outer space.

The socialist countries have proposed that the Ad Hoc Committee should concentrate its attention on the significance of existing international agreements relating to the limitation of military activities in outer space for the prevention of an arms race in space, as a second topic. We seek a businesslike discussion with a clear purpose -- to determine which channels of such a race are already closed off and which should be closed off to guarantee its prevention, so that we may effectively tackle the main problem, which is to work out urgent practical measures.

A similar businesslike approach underlies the third element of our outline for the programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee, the discussion of the proposals on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We propose that in this context the following Soviet proposals should be studied: the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space (1981), the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth (1983) and the proposal on the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind (1984). Naturally, we are also ready productively to discuss other proposals and initiatives in keeping with the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and to find practical solutions for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We are ready to co-operate constructively with other participating States to implement the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. It is from this position of constructive co-operation that we approach the draft programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee submitted by the Group of 21. The orientation and the specific provisions of this document have very much in common with those of the socialist States. In our view, this is no mere coincidence but a proof of a similar approach to the substance of the problem. This similarity has been demonstrated at the Conference from the very beginning of the discussion of problems relating to the prevention of an arms race in space.

The stance of the Western countries produces a quite different impression. It obviously leads away from the mainstream of work and is designed to produce a protracted discussion which will not lead to concrete measures in the foreseeable future. In proposing, in particular, that the agreements limiting the use of space for military purposes be reviewed, the group of Western countries is, apparently, more interested in finding areas of understanding and differences in views on the application of existing agreements, in other words, in the legalization and regulation of the arms race in space, rather than its prevention. Hence the appeals for an in-depth lengthy examination of existing agreements, to engage in "intellectual exercises", stem from.

However, the mandate does not provide for such work. In addition, some of these agreements have their own review mechanism. The Conference on Disarmament -- even bearing in mind all its potential -- can hardly provide such a universal mechanism. And there is no practical need for it. The task of the Ad Hoc Committee can be successfully accomplished without such considerable detours.

This should also be pointed out in connection with the statement of the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany at the plenary, in which he referred to a wide range of questions. Both the Working Paper of the socialist countries and our statement give answers to some of them. However, we are going to comment on further issues raised in the statement at one of the next meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee.

We have presented some views of the Soviet delegation concerning the guidelines for the Conference's activities this year in relation to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Soviet leadership considers it most important that space should serve peace. The Soviet Union basically considers that the task of the prevention of an arms race in space and its cessation on Earth can be practically resolved, given the political will and the sincere desire of all participants to achieve this historic goal.

(Mr. Lowitz, USA)

Today I will address briefly the fifth item of our agenda, that of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I had not intended to speak in plenary this summer on this item inasmuch as I made a rather comprehensive statement in the spring and the work of the Outer Space Committee at long last is beginning. However, I am compelled to respond to the remarks made at our previous plenary meeting by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyn, and to statements made by representatives of other delegations of the socialist group.

The United States believes, and has always believed, that outer space should only be used for peaceful purposes. To this end, here in Geneva the United States is engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, including the negotiating group on defence and space arms. My delegation is also participating actively in the work of our own Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In this Committee, the United States stands ready to discuss issues relating to outer space in a manner consistent with and complementary to the bilateral negotiations. But in our work in the Conference on Disarmament we believe it is prudent to avoid actions that would prejudice the possibilities for success of the bilateral negotiations.

The United States delegation supports the mandate for, and the recently agreed work programme of, the Outer Space Committee, and compliments the persistent efforts of its chairman, Ambassador Alfarargi, that have belatedly borne fruit in the programme of work. My delegation is pleased that the relevance of existing agreements to the prevention of an arms race in outer space will be examined and assessed as a part of this work programme, because the work of the Committee will be most successful if it is founded on a full understanding of, and appreciation for, the present legal régime, as well as on a commitment to uphold it. It is appropriate that the Committee will also consider proposals for future initiatives on the prevention of such an arms race.

Unfortunately, portions of the Soviet statement and those of its allies cannot be construed as contributing constructively to our work on agenda item 5. I have in mind particularly the polemical attacks against certain United States research activities, which are, as well, inaccurately described. The activities referred to are those of the Strategic Defence Initiative.

. . .

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

In my statement of 19 March of this year I outlined both the nature and purposes of this programme, but in light of these new assertions, I shall state them once again. The Strategic Defence Initiative is a programme to explore technologies that might someday be useful in providing a defence against nuclear ballistic missile attack. The Soviet Union and some others have chosen to exploit this Conference by making it a forum for the campaign to pressure the United States to agree to unilateral renunciation of strategic defence research, even as the Soviet Union continues to increase its arsenal of offensive strategic weapons. It is clear that this approach is designed to draw attention away from the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to deal seriously with strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms control issues.

Delegations of the socialist group have also chosen once again to use the open legislative process of the United States and the western press as sources of information in support of their arguments, apparently in the mistaken belief that the United States delegation would somehow be embarrassed. We wish that such a press were available throughout the world, and that persons everywhere were free to express their views, even when they disagree with their Government.

Given this situation, my delegation believes that it is necessary to put the debate on outer space issues in a more accurate perspective. First, it should be recalled that in the area of ballistic missile defence, there already exists a treaty regulating United States and Soviet activities in outer space -- the 1972 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, commonly referred to as the ABM Treaty. This Treaty provides, in article V, that each party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems which are space-based. The Treaty in no way limits research activities.

Second, the President of the United States has stated and directed that the United States strategic defence research programme be and remain consistent with all provisions of the ABM Treaty. The United States programme is a research programme, nothing more. It is consistent with article V, and all other provisions, of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union also has a research programme that involves such technologies. Indeed, when the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, both sides made public statements to the effect that they understood that research would be allowed. The Soviet statement was made by then defence minister A.A. Grechko, speaking at the session of the Supreme Soviet Presidium ratifying the ABM Treaty, and printed in Pravda on 30 September, 1973:

"The treaty on limiting ABM systems provides for a quantitatively small development of ABM facilities by the USSR and the United States, and prohibits the handover of these facilities to other States or the deployment of them outside the countries' national territories. At the same time it imposes no limitations on the performance of research and experimental work aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country against nuclear missile attack."

Third, in stating that the strategic defence initiative is only a research programme, I wish to emphasize that there has been no decision made to carry research into the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems or components. Indeed, our expectations are that a decision as to the desirability and practicality of doing so is unlikely to be made for many years. Moreover,



(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

President Reagan has stated that the United States will proceed beyond research only if three conditions are met. First, any defensive system must be survivable -- that is, it must not be vulnerable to being attacked itself. Second, such a system must be cost-effective -- it must be cheaper to build at the margin than are the offensive systems it is designed to offset. Third, the system would only be built if it contributes to stability.

One might wonder why the representatives of the Soviet Union and its allies are attempting to focus the outer space debate in this Conference solely on the United States Strategic Defence Initiative. Perhaps they are seeking to divert attention from the massive build-up of Soviet strategic offensive forces during the past 15 years, a build-up which is unprecedented. Perhaps they are seeking to draw attention away from the Soviet strategic ballistic missile defence programmes. Indeed, one might conclude from the polemical statements we have heard that the Soviet Union has no programme comparable to the United States research programme. Such a conclusion would be incorrect.

The military doctrine of the Soviet Union emphasizes that offensive and defensive forces must interact closely to achieve Soviet aims in any military conflict. The Soviet Union is heavily involved in strategic defence, including operational systems as well as research programmes. In fact, over the last two decades, the Soviet Union has spent roughly as much on strategic defence as on strategic offence -- and those strategic offensive expenditures have been enormous. There is only one operational ABM system in the entire world; this is the system that the Soviet Union has deployed around Moscow. This system is currently being upgraded, with a likely completion date of sometime around 1987. The Soviet Union also has a national air defence force, a large political leadership survival programme, and nationwide civil defence forces and programmes.

Soviet strategic defence programmes are not restricted to the more traditional approaches. For many years, the Soviet Union has been conducting research into advanced technologies for strategic defence, including technologies in support of high-energy lasers, particle-beam weapons, radio-frequency weapons, and kinetic energy weapons. This research is similar to that in the United States SDI programme. How is it that the Soviet Union and its allies suggest that the United States programme is somehow wrong or destabilizing when the Soviet Union has a long-standing programme that does much the same thing?

The United States delegation believes that the polemical approach to outer space issues is mistaken. The use of phrases such as avoiding the "militarization" of space is obviously counterproductive to the efforts of this Conference. Surely all of us in this Conference realize that many activities in space have a military character. The United States admits that it has military activities in space, but we point out that the Soviet Union does too. During the early days of space exploration the Soviet Union publicly and explicitly flaunted the military potential of their efforts. And we all know that today there is only one operational space weapon system -- the Soviet anti-satellite system.

Similarly, polemical statements to the effect that there is a need to establish an arms control régime in space are counterproductive and misleading. There already is a broad arms control régime applicable to outer space -- indeed, that régime is far more comprehensive than the arms control régime on earth.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

The Outer Space Treaty already prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in space. The Limited Test Ban Treaty already prohibits nuclear explosions in space. And the ABM Treaty already prohibits the deployment of ABM systems in space. We find it surprizing that a member of this Conference can first dismiss this legal régime; second, argue that there is little need to consider this legal régime; and, finally, accuse the United States of undermining it.

In addressing the issues of outer space too much of the Conference's time has been spent in artful posturing, devoid of substance. I hope that his will not continue in the future. Our work here in the Conference on Disarmament demands a serious, reasoned and constructive approach. The United States stands ready to proceed on this basis.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia)(translated from Russian): In my statement today I should like briefly to refer to agenda item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

During both the spring part and this summer part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament we have heard many statements concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and this is absolutely justified. The arms race has spread to virtually every sphere of human activity and now threatens also to extend into space.

Anyone with a clear grasp of the reality of our time understands that the result of the arms race in space, the creation of new types of strategic weapons — offensive space systems — means an increase in the danger of the outbreak of a mutually annihilating conflict.

The militarization of space would be a mighty catalyst of the arms race in all areas and would undermine the very possibility of an arms limitation and reduction process. If it is not prevented today, the appearance of weapons in space will mark a qualitatively new stage in the arms race with uncontrolled and possibly irreversible processes. Despite the fact that the arms race has not yet spread to space, the political decisions to carry out the "Star Wars" are already plaguing the world and destabilizing the situation. The development of offensive space weapons would have, to say the least, negative consequences for all mankind, and would inevitably result in diminished security for all countries, including those possessing such weapons.

It will also certainly trigger off a chain reaction for the development of a continuing series of new weapon systems which will further complicate the strategic balance and further increase the degree of uncertainty which is already inherent in the modern strategic situation because of the very nature of nuclear weapons. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the growth of uncertainty for one side inevitably leads to the same for the other, as the first side will be obliged, to take the necessary retaliatory measures in order to reduce the degree of uncertainty created for it. Naturally, with such a course of events, the world would not be delivered from nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear disaster would only increase. It would be a mistake to proceed from the principle that a State can safeguard its security at the expense of others' security. The only possible approach is strict compliance with the principle of equality and equal security.

Owing to the existence of a dialectical link between strategic offensive and defensive weapons, the question of the development of space anti-missile systems largely determines the possibility of the achievement of agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, and in future also at the multilateral level, for the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons, and the adoption of measures for their re-organization in the direction of enhanced strategic stability. In this connection it should be stressed that the goal of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva, as was agreed by the two sides in January this year, is to prevent an arms race in space and terminate it on Earth, and to limit and reduce nuclear arms. As we understand it, there are two aspects here, each of which is extremely important. Above all, the subject of the negotiations is to prevent, to bar the militarization of space, and not to allow it in this or that form. It is perfectly clear that here there can be no two points of view. And the other major element is that it is stressed that there

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

is a single correct and positive relationship between space and nuclear weapons, which is to say that the prevention of an arms race in space would facilitate agreement on the reduction of nuclear weapons, and vice versa.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the USSR and the United States were negotiating on strategic weapons, they jointly recognized that there is an unbreakable link between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. It was no accident that in 1972 the Soviet Union and the United States simultaneously signed the Treaty on the limitation of ABM systems which is of indefinite duration, and the first agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons (SALT I). What was necessary and right in the early 1970s has today become even more relevant at a time when plans are being prepared to convert space into a source of lethal danger. In this connection, we were unfortunately not convinced of the contrary by the statement of the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Lowitz, to which my delegation as usual listened with great attention last Tuesday. Ambassador Lowitz said, "the Strategic Defence Initiative is a programme to explore technologies that might some day be useful in providing a defence against nuclear ballistic missile attack".

In our view this means that the Strategic Defence Initiative pursues a quite definite goal, the development of an anti-missile system for the territory of the United States.

In this way, the programme, even if it is "purely a research programme", is already by its very nature incompatible with the ABM Treaty. The facts show that the appropriations for the SDI, which are far in excess of what would be required for scientific research, include in addition to research, expensive design work for new weapons as well as the testing of their components and sub-systems, which is directly contrary to the above-mentioned Treaty.

Like the overwhelming majority of the world's States, Mongolia is firmly in favour of the adoption of practical measures in order to erect a solid barrier in the path of the extension of the arms race to an area where it has hitherto not existed, outer space. This problem is one that can be wholly solved.

The Mongolian approach to this problem is reflected in Working Paper CD/607 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", which I submitted on behalf of a group of Socialist countries on 9 July. Without going into details, I should like merely to stress that the Socialist States propose that agreement should be reached on the prohibition and elimination of an entire class of weapons, namely, offensive space weapons, including space-based anti-missile systems and anti-satellite systems. It is urgently necessary to resolve this question, before the next spurt is made in the space arms race, with incalculable consequences. The experience of negotiations on the limitation of large-scale weapon systems shows the difficulties which arise once weapons have already been developed, deployed and stockpiled.

The current situation requires that the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space should effectively carry out its work on the consideration of the issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and go on to the next, fundamental stage, which consists of negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Together with working out new measures for the prevention of an arms race in space, it is very important to preserve and strengthen the foundation which already exists in this field. This applies first of all to the Soviet Union-United States Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972, which is of indefinite duration, as well as multilateral agreements such as the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963, the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1967, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques of 1977, and others.

It is no less important, on this foundation, to ensure that the exclusion of space from the arms race should become a strict norm of the policy of States, and a universally acknowledged international obligation. This is the aim of the peaceful initiatives of the USSR such as the proposals for agreement on the prohibition of the stationing in space of weapons of any kind (1981), the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth (1983), and the use of space exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of mankind (1984). It is also worth recalling that in August 1983 the Soviet Union declared a unilateral moratorium on being the first to launch anti-satellite weapons into space, which is still in force now.

The Mongolian Delegation sincerely believes that with the political will of States it is possible to prevent a space arms race. This would ensure that space could be used for creative rather than destructive purposes. The guaranteed prevention of the militarization of space would make it possible to unite the efforts of all States in the peaceful use of outer space.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

States tried to institute a ban on chemical weapons only when they had already claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people. Efforts to prohibit nuclear weapons were not undertaken until hundreds of thousands of people had already been killed by them in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If space weapons are created and used, there will hardly be anyone left to negotiate on their elimination. However, if we all join forces, we have still a chance to prevent the militarization of outer space.

Our Conference is well capable of making a significant contribution to this end. My delegation was guided by this awareness when it agreed to the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. Although it is less than what we had originally imagined, it still defines as the ultimate goal, approved by consenses, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We should lose no time in getting the work of the Committee started and in preparing concrete negotiations.

It is my delegation's impression that the discussions on how the Committee should proceed have revealed at least three different approaches.

The first apparent approach is that the Committee should engage in endless debates to interpret existing treaties. Some may even be seeking to cast doubts on clearly worded treaty provisions or justify their violation by interpreting them in an over-nice, legalistic and bizarre manner. Apart from the legal objections one would have to raise to such an attitude, that type of approach will definitely never lead us to our joint goal.

...

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The second approach some delegations seem to have opted for is to combine interpretation exercises with proposals which boil down to toleration of the deployment of a great variety of space weapons and, at best, to agreement on rules to govern an arms race in outer space. That approach is incompatible with the mandate and would practically legalize the deployment of attack weapons in space. It is not control of the arms race that we need but its prevention.

The third approach, supported by the majority of delegations at this Conference, including my own, is to keep space clear of any weapons altogether. This is precisely what Working Paper CD/607, submitted by a group of socialist countries, is all about. These days, you will hardly find an international governmental or non-governmental forum concerned with world peace and disarmament which is not dominated by the theme of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Examples are the meeting of the Bellerive Group here in Geneva, the latest SIPRI Conference in Stockholm, the Symposium on "Survival in the nuclear age", held in New York earlier this year under the sponsorship of the Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies and Parliamentarians for World Order, the recent session of the Committee on Outer Space and, last but not least, United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/59, adopted with the votes of 150 States, with only one country abstaining.

In striving to reach the agreed goal, as formulated in the mandate, we will have to begin by analysing the situation such as it is -- a situation marked above all by plans to militarize outer space. Those plans have far reaching consequences, which cannot even be fully appreciated as yet. They will affect the entire fabric of international life. It is obviously intended to place science and technology under military control and to undermine peaceful international exchanges for purely selfish and hegemonic reasons. The programmes providing for the development of space attack weapons have even now adverse effects on international co-operative efforts to explore and utilize space for peaceful ends. By the way, this is another aspect which the Ad Hoc Committee should study in greater detail. The military and political consequences for the security of peoples are, of course, uppermost in everyone's mind. The military consequences for mankind's security and survival are the most serious, however. There are three aspects of particular relevance in this context. Firstly, the militarization of outer space represents the most dangerous and by far the most expensive round in the arms race ever to be undertaken in human history. Secondly, an arms race in space would take us closer to the brink of nuclear war and undermine stability in international relations in an unprecedented way. Thirdly, the arms race on Earth would be accelerated in all important areas and disarmament deferred to the realm of never-never.

Allow me, Mr. President, to comment briefly on these three aspects. As far as the objectives and the nature of the arms build-up programme for outer space are concerned, the development of so-called defensive weapons is neither a defensive nor an isolated endeavour. Rather, it is aimed at creating a crucial element of an integrated nuclear-strike capability. We find this reflected in an undisguised manner in the Official Air/Land Battle strategy, in the United States Army's Field Manual 100/5 and in the published extracts from the Guidelines Document 1984-88.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The purpose is to attain military superiority, which will ultimately manifest itself in the ability to make a nuclear war feasible and winnable. The nuclear weapon threat, which has not produced the desired results since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is to become a most effective tool of blackmail and world hegemony. In other words, virtually all nations could be threatened with nuclear destruction.

In the frequently-quoted Star Wars speech of 23 March 1983, we find the following interesting statement concerning space weapons: "If paired with offensive weapons, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy ...". It is precisely that combination of new types of nuclear offensive weapons and the development of space attack weapons that is going on. Facts substantiating this conclusion have repeatedly been presented at this Conference.

It is, therefore, obvious, Mr. President, that the aim pursued with the space armaments plans is not to render nuclear weapons meaningless or to remove them from arsenals, as is constantly being advertized, but to make those arms fit for use, without the attacker having to fear a counter-strike.

This brings me to the second issue, namely, the relationship between the arms race in outer space and the risk of nuclear war.

In the statement I delivered on 25 June, I underlined that my delegation attaches great importance to all the steps designed to lessen the risk of a nuclear war breaking out.

Any winnable nuclear war concept and any move in that direction, however illusory it might be, could take us to the abyss. Space arms, which play a key role in that concept, constitute a deadly threat to all States, for several reasons:

The first reason is that a posture of real or perceived military superiority might tempt a country to embark on adventurism in its international dealings. For instance, the desire to impose one's own will upon other nations could set off global conflicts and lead to hopeless situations capable of triggering a nuclear world war.

The second reason is that it is the nature of the planned space war system to function only in combination with a first disarming strike. A majority of States call for the renunciation of the first-use of nuclear weapons as a decisive step towards averting the risk of nuclear war. Space arms, however, would make the first-use of nuclear weapons and a so-called preventive strike more likely.

This is by no means the only reason why space weapons presuppose readiness for a nuclear first strike. Those arms are fairly vulnerable themselves. There would be no chance for them to stay intact in any protracted, gradually escalating military conflict. To all intents and purposes, they could be protected only if a surprise attack was launched against the counterweapons of the other side. By building launchers for space attack weapons, the nuclear first-strike doctrine would literally be cast into steel and concrete.



(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

It is very remarkable, indeed, that the Star Wars strategists, in their most recent statements, no longer speak of comprehensive protection to be provided by means of the so-called SDI concept. The emphasis now is on protecting military targets. This view is less illusory, to a certain extent, but shows also the enormous dangers resulting from that concept. The discrepancy between far-reaching military ambitions and the demagogic protestations that mankind will be protected against the threat of nuclear war is becoming more and more obvious. An absolute missile defence shield would make a nuclear first-strike possible but would not necessarily require it. A limited shield, however, would virtually imply a first-strike and destabilize the entire international situation.

The third reason is the additional danger of the outbreak of an "unintentional" nuclear war. Considering the crucial role satellites are playing in the whole space warfare set-up, their accidental breakdown could easily touch off a devastating atomic war. The approximately 30 minutes still remaining today for counterstrike preparations in the event of strategic attack would be reduced to almost zero. One would have to respond without checking the circumstances that led to the alarm. Apart from that, space weapons are equally suited for subversive and regionally limited military activities, which pose a threat to all the countries alike and which may well result in a world-wide conflict.

To sum up, the implementation of the space arms build-up plans would dramatically increase the risk of nuclear war and make it a sword of Damocles permanently hanging over mankind. It has been claimed that the so-called SDI was a means to overcome the perilous doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Quite the reverse is true. In a recently published article, Fred Charles Iklé, United States Under-Secretary of Defence, wrote that the nuclear deterrence doctrine must be updated and carried on into the twenty-first century.

It stands to reason that even under these new conditions a nuclear war would have no winner but endanger humanity's survival. Even a highly efficient anti-missile defence system could not, according to experts of repute, guarantee protection for the civilian population. Nuclear fall-out, the destruction of the whole fabric of international economic relations, as well as cataclysmic environmental changes would do extremely severe damage to all regions. Nor would the attacker be spared the atrocious consequences resulting from the use of nuclear weapons: just take the scientifically-founded theory of a nuclear winter. It is certainly an interesting fact that there is no-one to dispute this argument.

It is also of great importance to analyse the effects the plans to militarize outer space would have on the arms race as a whole, both in qualitative and quantitative terms.

One effect would be a general acceleration of the arms race in all spheres. There would also be very specific consequences such as the creation of extensive infrastructures for the deployment and use of space weapons. Last but not least, the results obtained through space weapons research would give a powerful impetus to the so-called conventional arms race.

The following facts will corroborate this view. First, the space militarization programme goes hand in hand with an increased nuclear build-up. Both are inexorably linked together.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Second, the planned space attack weapons are but the tip of the iceberg. Components of space weaponry are to be based on submarines and are not to be deployed in space until their use. Naval and air force capability is presently being created for the protection, support and supply of those systems, with more of that being planned for the future. The region close to the equator would acquire particular significance in that context, since important satellite orbits can best be reached from there. The expansion of existing military bases and the establishment of new ones are under way around the globe. Three of the high-powered electronic telescope and television-camera units are already in operation in New Mexico, Hawaii and South Korea. The fourth unit is being built on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. As these developments unfold, one can be certain that further so-called "areas of vital interest" will be created into which the arms race will be carried.

Third, major additions to the Star Wars plans are also being made in what is usually referred to as the conventional field. Take, for instance, the deployment of the "Patriot" system in Western Europe and the development under the Air/Land Battle strategy of a "reconnaissance strike complex". What is more, the Star Wars technologies must be expected to spark off a virtual technological revolution in the conventional area.

The German Democratic Republic is greatly worried about those developments. Efforts to achieve a system of collective security in Europe and in the world at large will be torpedoed by them. Today, there is but one way left to arrive at lasting peace and that is the termination of the arms race on Earth and its prevention in outer space.

My delegation gives very careful consideration to every proposal designed to prevent an arms race in outer space. In our opinion, the Conference on Disarmament has been presented with interesting initiatives. If we succeed in agreeing on the principal issue, which is to prevent the deployment of attack weapons in space, opportunities will be opening up for taking confidence-building measures to ensure that outer space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes in the interests of all peoples.

The present treaties on outer space are of great importance. A number of military activities are already banned under them. This basis must not be touched. We need additional measures to rule out once and for all the possibility that weapons will be carried into space. My delegation is opposed to attempts to flog those treaties to death and, all of a sudden, to call into question provisions that allow of no interpretation whatsoever.

It is from this perspective that my country is looking into the proposals submitted by the members of the Conference. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic fully supports the draft treaty presented by the Soviet Union in 1983 (CD/476), as well as the subsequent Soviet initiatives which constitute a whole programme of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. That programme is an explicit affirmation, as well as the concretization and application of the non-use of force principle enshrined in the United Nations Charter. The Soviet proposals provide for the prohibition of the use of force in space and from space, and from the Earth against targets in space. Under this approach, a whole class of armaments -- space attack weapons, including anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile systems based in space, intended to hit targets in outer space -- would be banned and eliminated. At the same time, it would be the safest way to verify that the obligations undertaken are actually fulfilled.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Simultaneously, the USSR declared in a unilateral moratorium in 1983 not to be the first to deploy anti-satellite weapons in space.

The Soviet proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States should, for the duration of their negotiations, proclaim a moratorium on space attack weapons, including research, development and testing, and freeze their strategic offensive arms must be seen as a crucial step towards concrete progress in preventing the militarization of outer space.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic is of the view that all the suggestions submitted to this Conference in an effort to prevent an arms race in outer space should be included in the discussions as quickly as possible. At the same time, it must be regretted that proposals that deserve to be considered are withdrawn for incomprehensible reasons, although they have become even more relevant now.

The future does not lie in the stars, as we are being made to believe. It lies, without any doubt, in the hands of mankind. The Conference on Disarmament has an important mission to fulfil in that context. There are no attack weapons in space as yet, but time is pressing.

CD/PV.323

16

(Mr. Lacleta, Spain)

Before concluding, I should like to mention the satisfaction of the Spanish Government at the fact that it has been possible to set up an Ad Hoc Committee to concern itself with agenda item 5. My Government fully shares the concern expressed by many other delegates at the danger that the arms race may spread to outer space. Our satisfaction at the initiation of negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and our desire for a fruitful outcome of the negotiations is enhanced by the possibility that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament matters, may have begun to consider these issues in accordance with a mandate accepted by all the participating States.

Mr. ROCHON (Canada): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor this morning to comment briefly on the progress which this Conference has made in implementing the mandate which we have undertaken regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We all recognize at first hand the variety of problems we seem destined to face in this Conference in re-establishing ad hoc committees to deal with issues of long standing. These problems are, of course, very evident in the case of outer space, which is new to our agenda. I would therefore like to express the appreciation of my delegation to Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt for the adept manner in which he has overcome these difficulties. In particular the work programme for which he deserves full credit is simple and direct. In addition we have been encouraged by the results of the Ad Hoc Committee's first week of substantive meetings and look forward to continued progress.

This week, the Ad Hoc Committee has begun its review of existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We do not share the view of some delegations that such a review is an unnecessary or unproductive exercise. On the contrary, we see it as one of the essential steps to the fulfilment of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. Not only will it help underline the full scope of the questions involved, but more importantly it will help to ensure that what we do here will be in conformity with, and not at cross purposes to, existing treaties and international law. In the final analysis time spent now in this activity should speed up rather than delay the successful results of our deliberations.

Yesterday, our delegation circulated in the Ad Hoc Committee an advance copy of an official document of the Conference, CD/618, entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space". This Working Paper which is intended to assist the Ad Hoc Committee in advancing its work has been submitted to the secretariat for translation and reproduction and will shortly be officially distributed to all delegations. In essence it is a distillation of a study undertaken by the Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill University in Montreal, at the invitation of Canada's Department of External Affairs, as part of a deliberate programme by the Government of Canada to include non-governmental organizations, where possible, in the arms control and disarmament process.

The Working Paper identifies more than 20 international agreements, including the United Nations Charter itself, which are of significance to the process in which we are now engaged. The paper does not put forth nor represent a Canadian Government position on any issue. Rather it seeks to provide a broad interpretation of a variety of views in a balanced, non-provocative manner, so as to provide a useful data base for the benefit of each member of this Conference.

The Working Paper highlights a number of areas in international outer space law which are deserving of our attention. During the period between the end of our present deliberations and the commencement of our activities in 1986, my Government will be making full use of this survey when reviewing Canadian policy relevant to arms control and outer space and to the work and the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. It is our hope that this Canadian Working Paper will similarly constitute a reference point for other governments in their own review of the subject matter.

(Mr. Ataul Karim, Bangladesh)

The Bangladesh delegation also associates itself with all those delegations which have expressed their concern at the possibility of the militarization of outer space. In the light of our past experience, all of us are aware of the possible implications of not arresting any trend in this direction at this stage. It is the position of my delegation that it is desirable to stop this possibility from becoming a reality rather than addressing the problem when it has gathered its own momentum. If the international community fails to undertake determined efforts in this particular field now, it will be infinitely more difficult to solve the problem at a later stage, as has been the case with other weapons systems. The Bangladesh delegation naturally welcomes the recent decision of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc subsidiary body to deal with the all-important subject, the success of which may significantly contribute to the preservation of outer-space as a common heritage of mankind to be used for peaceful purposes only. We are encouraged to note that a number of delegations in the Conference have already presented their precise ideas on different issues in this regard which should receive priority attention. We hope that the dialogue so initiated would increasingly assume a more constructive form and efforts would be made to deal with all aspects of the possible militarization of outer space in their totality.

(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Viet Nam)

My delegation wishes to address the subject of the comprehensive programme of disarmament because we are halfway through the second disarmament decade, and a resolution adopted by the latest United Nations General Assembly -- resolution 39/148 I -- calls for a report on the subject at its next, fortieth session. It would also be, in our opinion, a contribution to the fortieth anniversary both of the great victory over fascism and, thereafter, the founding of the United Nations. These two anniversaries compel us to reflect on our overriding responsibility to work for the achievement of the lofty objective both of the Organization and of this Conference, which is to ensure international peace and security, more than ever threatened by nuclear war and a new spiral in the nuclear arms race. In particular, "star wars" plans are the cause of fully-justified alarm and it is absolutely essential to stop them at the research stage if mankind is to be spared the danger of a catastrophe which would be fatal to its very survival. On the eve of the fortieth anniversary of the dropping of the first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and with the resurgence of fascism and militarism in various continents, the prevention of nuclear war is more imperative than ever.

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

I speak today on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space -- a familiar theme in the statements of my delegation given the deep and serious interest we have consistently taken in this subject. In the past the gravamen of our arguments had been that this body should establish an ad hoc committee on this item. We do have an Ad Hoc Committee now with an agreed mandate on which we reached consensus. Under the able guidance of Ambassador Alfarargi a work programme was finally fashioned taking into account the various proposals of the groups. The work in the Ad Hoc Committee has entered its third phase, examining "proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space". It is a useful stage to take stock of what we have done in the Committee and what we can still do in the limited time before us.

My Foreign Minister speaking here on 2 July warned us, and I quote, "An examination of the existing body of International Law on this subject should not lead to mutual recrimination about violations". I am sorry to record that our fears have been realized and we have witnessed much of the valuable time of the Committee taken up with well-worn arguments on alleged sins of omission and commission of the two sides in a tiresome East-West debate. At the same time we have been encouraged by some positive contributions in the work of the Committee. I refer in particular to the survey of existing agreements which are relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and an identification of the legal principles we would like to see embodied in a future comprehensive treaty banning an arms race in outer space. My delegation would like to congratulate the delegation of Canada on the very useful Working Paper -- CD/618 -- it has presented surveying the existing body of International Law relevant to arms control in outer space. We are particularly impressed by the non-partisan and objective approach of the Paper, apart, of course, from its sound professionalism and thoroughness. The identification of principles or rules in international law as embodied in multilateral and bilateral agreements

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

is a laudable effort. The interpretation of these and their applicability to the prevention of an arms race in outer space may not, however, be acceptable to us all. Varying interpretations of the current legal framework can be bridged and the Ad Hoc Committee must work towards this end. The focus on United Nations General Assembly resolutions as a reflection of customary law or, and I quote, "at least indicative of the directions in which that law is evolving" is especially welcome as we recall that resolution 39/59 was adopted by 150 States in the international community with none voting against. We also welcome the statements made in the Ad Hoc Committee renouncing the use of force in outer space and emphasizing the need to uphold and strengthen the existing legal régime.

What the Canadian Working Paper reveals as a major weakness in our existing international law relevant to outer space is the need for definitions that are precise and agreed upon multilaterally. What indeed are "peaceful purposes" and what is "militarization" when we know that although three out of four satellites in orbit are for military purposes, not one of them was registered as having a military function under the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space? How are "hostile acts" different from "uses of force"? It is not only legal terms that must be defined clearly and without ambiguity. There are also technical terms. The Ad Hoc Committee must attempt to agree on definitions or descriptions of the various space systems which are relevant to the question of the weaponization of outer space. A classification of the various systems will be necessary to show which of them are covered under the current principles of law and which are not and whether they should be dealt with as individual components or as a group in the future. This will of course imply an up-to-date acquaintance with the "state of the art" in the field of space weapon technology. As an example, within ASAT systems we can consider low-altitude and high-altitude systems and dedicated ASAT systems and ancillary ASAT systems. It is the view of my delegation that we can agree on these definitions and classifications without controversy but the need for technical expertise and the co-operation of the space Powers is obviously vital. My delegation would like to support the suggestion that we seriously consider establishing outside the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee a group of experts who can assist us in this task on a continuing basis. An exercise of this nature will certainly help the Ad Hoc Committee to establish clear criteria for prohibited and permitted activities in space. This will obviously help to delineate the complex subject areas under discussion in order to arrive at an agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space.

As we approach the third phase of our work in the Ad Hoc Committee we must examine how we can not only ban an arms race in outer space but also ensure that outer space does serve a peaceful purpose by preserving peace and stability as stipulated in Article III of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Thus we may have to devise ways and means in a treaty to assure all States of the inviolability of space-systems which are mutually agreed as being necessary for confidence building purposes, verification of arms control agreements and for early warning. This is the politically realistic thing to do apart from the technical and other benefits it will confer. For this obviously the registration of such systems and the declaration of their purposes is necessary before any assurance of inviolability can be considered. The concept of not interfering with the national technical means of verification of other States and the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the use of military reconnaissance satellites as an essential component of these means already exists in the SALT II Treaty between the United States and USSR. We have to explore how we can ensure inviolability for



(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

space systems which satisfy mutually agreed definitional descriptions as outer-space objects for permitted purposes. Surveillance for prescribed verification purposes must be distinguished from intrusive systems with reprehensible motives which must of course be prohibited.

Another area in which my delegation thinks we can commence work with a good prospect of making substantial progress is high-altitude ASATs. A ban on these, including their development, deployment and testing, is feasible at the present stage when only low-altitude ASATs are in existence. Inevitably we have to engage in a collective quest for clear definitions of what we mean by high-altitude ASATs. If we accomplish this, existing national technical means of verification can undertake the task of verifying compliance with the ban. These means of verification possess facilities for precise determination of the orbits of space objects and can detect testing of guidance and homing mechanisms necessary for ASATs. Such a ban may seem to be of peripheral value considering the fact that it will not interfere with current military and defence strategies which a ban on BMD systems would. Nevertheless working on such a ban of these destabilizing weapons is an important step where, according to our view, agreement is more likely than others. Progress in this area could well provide the encouragement and impetus to move into other fields. Failure to do so will call in question the bona fides of delegations so dogmatic and implacably opposed to any negotiation that they will reject the opportunity of looking for an agreement even in a non-controversial area. It will also open the way for developing beam weapons to strike early warning satellites orbiting at 36,000 km in a fraction of a second, increasing the risk of an accident in the crowded geostationary orbit.

So far I have dwelt at length on what we are doing and can do on banning an arms race in outer space in this multilateral negotiating forum. What of the bilateral talks going on in Geneva which concluded its second round on 16 July? The stated aim of these talks is "... to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth and limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability". We have of course not received any formal notification of these bilateral negotiations although I am glad that through informal briefings some delegations have been kept informed of the broad outline of the talks. These briefings and the public statements that have been made merely confirm the fact that no progress has been made in preventing an arms race in outer space. Newspaper speculation on an agreement to conduct research has been quickly denied. More disturbing are the reports that offers of substantial nuclear-weapon reductions are not being pursued because of an absence of parallel progress in the area of outer space. We cannot assess the veracity of these reports but it is clear that no progress has been made in the bilateral talks aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. This is a matter of deep disappointment to my delegation, although when we welcomed the commencement of these bilateral talks we did so in a spirit of cautious optimism. Our concern is because we have always recognized the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations and their mutually reinforcing potential. This despite the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has the primary role in negotiating a multilateral agreement on this subject as stated in resolution 39/59. Disappointment and frustration in the bilateral arena can, regrettably, rub off on the approaches adopted in the multilateral arena with the latter being used as a public platform. We earnestly hope this will not happen and that the political will to negotiate will be as

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

sincere and strong in both the bilateral and multilateral fields so that a prevention of an arms race can be achieved quickly. The proposed Geneva Summit in November this year between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will, we trust, address inter alia the subject of an arms race in outer space and arrive at an agreement in principle on its prevention.

In my statement of 5 March this year I referred to the "sophisticated propaganda on the virtue of ballistic missile defence systems in space" and the extravagant claims being made about them. These claims continue to be made but behind the superficial sophistication lie several fallacies. The first is the alleged *raison d'être* of the system which is said to be defence. My delegation advanced arguments to show that perfect invulnerability is an unattainable goal. Thus one of the three criteria advanced is flawed ab initio. Defence systems may buy time or work successfully for some time as a political weapon. The inherent dynamics of the arms race will, however, render the system obsolete in a time span that could be shorter than envisaged now. That is the ultimate reality and we must view the arms race in that perspective and not in terms of an Administration's term of office or a leader's life span. One side has already announced its decision not to be drawn into a competition to build a bigger and better defence system but rather to concentrate on refining a weapon system with a capability of penetrating the defence shield. If today the possession of an arsenal that can destroy your enemy several times over is not considered a sufficient deterrent then how can a defence system with a 90 per cent kill rate of your opponent's ICBMs in their boost phase be a better insurance policy? The justification of a weapon system on the grounds of self-defence is a timeless one. Every increment of the quality and quantity of armaments in history has been justified by the same reason. Mr. President, I can do no better than to quote from the nineteenth century German classic, "On War", by Carl Von Clausewitz who wrote, and I quote, "Even in a defensive position awaiting the enemy assault, our bullets take the offensive. So the defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows".

Another argument that is advanced is that the work on the weaponization of space is only in the research stage and that this is not prohibited by existing treaties. The argument is a specious one for we know that when billions are spent on research the next phase of development including manufacture, testing and deployment is the logical corollary. This is true for any country engaged in such research whether publicized or not. Armaments research is not confined to the laboratory or the drawing board. We cannot, it is true, ban research on weapon systems. Nor could we verify such a ban even if we did. The fact of ongoing research leading inevitably to the development of weapons is a powerful political weapon which may have demonstrated its leverage in restarting bilateral negotiations. But for how long will the efficacy of this political weapon last? It would be naive to assume that the other side is idle. My delegation has already drawn attention to the fact that there has significantly been no unilateral renunciation of the weaponization of space comparable to the declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons. There has not even been a formal and unambiguous proposal on the part of those who have an operational ASAT system for an agreement on no first use of ASAT weapons although a freeze has been proposed. We cannot prohibit research in a credible manner but if we have a moratorium on the testing and development of all space weapons -- whether strike weapons or defensive systems -- we would have created the right climate of confidence for negotiations both bilaterally and multilaterally. There is a real danger of a proliferation of

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

Ballistic Missile Defence Systems in the world all in the name of defence and the disingenuous claim of ridding us of nuclear weapons. The Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka warned in his statement of 2 July, "Already commercial interests are vying with each other for the contracts for the research on new weapon systems to be followed inevitably by their actual manufacture. The military-industrial complex is transnational in its scope and will compel the blurring of national nuances on this extension of the arms race".

Mr. President, it may appear to some that I quote English poetry in my statements as frequently, or almost as frequently, as my friend and colleague Ambassador Beesley cites Grotius — and all in the cause of disarmament. But I have pondered long over the lines of poetry engraved over the entrance to this historic Council Chamber. They are lines from "The Wreck of the Deutschland" written 110 years ago by an English religious poet Gerard Manley Hopkins to commemorate the drowning after a shipwreck of five nuns exiled from Germany. The lines are as follows —

"Thou mastering me  
God, giver of breath and bread  
World's strand  
Sway of the sea Lord of living and dead  
Over again I feel  
Thy finger and find thee"

Mr. President, there will be no "living" among humankind to experience this strong faith in a deity let alone poets to write odes on the wreck of our planet, unless we act now to prevent an arms race in space and terminate it on Earth.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

A particularly fresh example of the United States drive for technological superiority is its Strategic Defence Initiative which, despite the explanations to the opposite, has to be interpreted as a preparation for an offensive, nuclear first-strike capability obtained through an invalidation of an opponent's retaliatory strike. I had the opportunity to dwell on this subject in my statement of 19 March of this year.

CD/PV.325

51

(The President)

This month a new subsidiary body, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, has been able to start its work. This is important even though it represents an exploratory stage in fields which, I hope, will be the subject of concrete negotiations in early 1986. To a large extent we owe this first success to Ambassador Alfarargi who has shown great perseverance and imagination in outlining the issues to be discussed at this stage.

I consider the outcome of the discussions on this question as proof that despite differing positions it is possible to start a debate and negotiations on all questions if the necessary effort is made and if the spirit of dialogue and the determination to succeed are there.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

One may refer here to the issues of multilateral verification in the case of vertical proliferation, such as the upgrading of nuclear warheads and proliferation and refinement of means of weapons delivery as well as their countermeasures. There is a considerable debate today about verifiability regarding number, quality, location, etc. of ballistic missiles, anti-ballistic missiles, anti-tactical ballistic missiles, etc., and the associated command and control systems on the ground, in the atmosphere, or in outer space. A good part of the means of detection and analysis and thus of verification in this domain is performed through national technical means or NTM. Some aspects of NTM capabilities such as various imaging systems and electronic listening devices are closely guarded military secrets which makes multilateralization of verification rather difficult. This is not the place or time to elaborate on the problems regarding technologies involved in the various NTM, their limitations or possible solutions. A considerable amount of argument is already available in open literature. It is worthwhile to take note that a certain amount of mutual co-operation among the parties of, let us say, the SALT/ABM Treaties, starting from the pledge not to disturb the operation of the NTM of the other side, is becoming an accepted ingredient. At the same time ideas such as an independent international verification satellite is mentioned as one of the possible approaches to multilateralize the process, and to ensure a wide-range of participation in verification, although legal, technical and financial problems need to be carefully examined and a well-established international organ will have to emerge in order to assure the cost-effective operation of the satellites in question.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Please permit me to make some remarks on agenda item 7, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons". This agenda item has a long history. When the United Nations 10 years ago for the first time accepted the text of a resolution on this subject submitted by the Soviet Union, it was its foremost task to oppose the increasing aims of using the achievements of science and technology for military purposes. An end should be put to the qualitative arms race from that angle too.

In the meantime the further development of arms technology proved the necessity of preventive measures to be taken by States in order to stop the arms race. Deplorably, the Conference was not able to intensively deal with that task. Certain States time and again have tried to pass off the whole matter as utopian. But what has really happened?

Let me give an example. When we, very early on, pointed to the possibility of particle beam weapons being developed, this warning was considered unrealistic. Today, those and other new types of weapons constitute the basic elements of the plans to militarize outer space.

We believe that the Conference is highly responsible for any new development being identified in time and its use for military purposes prevented.

Therefore, my delegation welcomes the proposal made by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Victor Issraelyan, on 7 July 1985 according to which all States members of the Conference on Disarmament should pledge -- through a joint declaration or unilateral declarations, immediately following the identification of any new type of weapon of mass destruction, to start negotiations on its prohibition, with the simultaneous introduction of a moratorium on its practical development. A group of qualified experts, meeting on a periodical basis, should be entrusted with the task of detecting and identifying new types of weapons of mass destruction. This group would keep these matters under continuing supervision and, if necessary, make recommendations on issues requiring concrete negotiations.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): One of the areas of vital significance for disarmament and arms control negotiations on which the First Committee of the General Assembly was able to nearly find consensus last year was that of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Resolution 39/59 was adopted in the plenary by 150 votes for, none against, one abstention. That resolution states that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. It shall not become an arena for an arms race. The resolution also states that the Conference on Disarmament has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement, or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It further urges the Soviet Union and the United States to initiate immediately negotiations aimed at preventing such an arms race.

Regarding the bilateral negotiations, it is significant that the stated aims of those negotiations include -- "to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth and limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability".

It would seem, therefore, that in both the bilateral and the multilateral forums there is a basic conviction that an arms race in outer space must be prevented.

In calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space we, like most States represented here, are fully aware that outer space has already been subjected to certain military activities. We are also aware that through a variety of existing agreements, a number of military and hostile uses of outer space are already prohibited.

Thus, when analysing which other areas of outer space might be susceptible to the negotiation of prohibitions or controls, an essential quality of such negotiations should be to identify agreements which would be balanced, verifiable and would contribute to overall stability.

In the Australian view, major areas for consideration are those relating to measures to protect satellites from attack and the possibility of a related ban on ASAT systems, and ballistic missile defence systems.

Regarding ballistic missile defence systems current research efforts by both super-Powers in this area are viewed with concern by my Government. We are aware that such research does not contravene the ABM Treaty. That Treaty permits both research and the construction on each side of a point defence system of up to one hundred ABM launchers. Nevertheless, deployment on a nation-wide scale would be a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. I want to emphasize that Australia regards the ABM Treaty as one of the most important arms control agreements in existence today. We are aware that there are grounds today to ask whether the ABM is being fully complied with, and this is a matter of serious concern to my Government.

In his statement to the Conference on Disarmament on 16 July, the United States representative, Ambassador Don Lowitz, emphasized that the strategic defence initiative is only a research programme and that there has been no decision to carry research into the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems or components. There is no doubt that the underlying purpose of present United States research on the possibility of developing a capability to intercept all incoming ballistic missiles is a positive one. Conceptually,

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

it seeks to replace the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, based on attack, with the notionally more acceptable concept of assured defence for all.

What is not clear, and this has been the subject of considerable debate, is whether such a goal can be achieved practically, and whether efforts to achieve it might unintentionally create a more unstable situation than that which it seeks to replace.

In the same statement, Ambassador Lowitz pointed out that President Reagan has stated that the United States will proceed beyond research only if three conditions are met. That is: any defence system must be survivable -- it must not itself be vulnerable to attack; such a system must be cost-effective -- it must be cheaper to build at the margin than are the offensive systems it is designed to offset; and the system would only be built if it contributes to stability. Let me address these three points briefly.

First, the question of vulnerability. Although one cannot prejudge the outcome of any research programme by either side, it is nevertheless the case that even if defences could be developed that were perfect against currently deployed offences, the task of developing offensive counter-measures would be relatively easy. Thus, the defence system would have to be able to overcome a complete range of possible counter-measures in order to remain effective.

The development of effective defences against a dynamic and competitive threat would always be more difficult than developing offences that can penetrate them. Furthermore, the technology required for such counter-measures are in a much more advanced stage than those required for a ballistic missile defence system itself. Much of the necessary technology already exists.

While such contentions may remain speculation until the complete results of research are known, if one draws on the history of the arms race over the last forty years, it seems likely that the development of counter-measures will indeed take place. Indeed, their development has already been spoken of in public.

Second, the cost effectiveness of any system again is hard to monitor although a number of investigators have estimated that the cost of an ABM system for either side could eventually reach two trillion dollars. This estimate, combined with what we already know is being spent on at least one side's research programme, at least calls into question whether such vast systems will indeed meet this criterion, the criterion of cost effectiveness.

The third, and perhaps the most vital, question is whether such a system and its construction would contribute to stability.

This is a hotly debated question and we have heard many opinions on different aspects of it. My delegation wonders whether in fact a "Star Wars" system would be effective even in a situation in which both super-Powers deployed nearly impenetrable defences. Unlike the present situation, where both super-Powers possess abundant assured destruction capabilities and when, therefore, the addition of tens of hundreds of warheads would not significantly alter the nuclear situation, if in contrast both countries had impenetrable defences, then acquiring the ability to penetrate the adversary's defence with ten warheads, for example, would provide the potential for enormous destruction.



(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The country that first acquired even a small capability to penetrate the adversary's defence would have attained an important coercive advantage since it could threaten nuclear attack with impunity and effective retaliation would not be possible, granted the adversary's inability to penetrate its own defence.

I have raised a few of our concerns about the development of ABM systems but I want to stress that in doing so we are aware that there are other approaches to this question, which is an extremely complex one. That complexity is a major part of the problem. The stakes at issue do not permit us to accept uncritically scientific assertions based on hypothesis. There have been too many examples of cast-iron scientific hypotheses in the nuclear age which were subsequently nullified.

It is partly for these reasons that my Government has, to date, declined to endorse certain proposals for research in space-based defensive technologies. Instead we prefer the more logical, simple and compelling way of solving the problems that an ABM system seeks to resolve. The way to eliminate the threat of ballistic missiles is to eliminate ballistic missiles themselves. It is in this context that we support strongly the goal of the bilateral negotiations to negotiate deep reductions in the numbers of offensive weapons possessed by each side. This is what is needed and it should not be qualified or relativized in terms of other concerns.

Specifically, an agreement on strategic and intermediate forces should be sought without making them conditional on an agreement on space weapons, or, for that matter, on chemical weapons. Specifically against, with regard to space, agreement to strengthen the ABM Treaty and to control future deployment options should be sought rather than seeking to block research.

A second area which demands consideration is that relating to measures to protect satellites from attack. Delegations will recall the proposal which was made by the Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr. Hayden, when he addressed the Conference on Disarmament on 7 August last year. He referred to the French initiative tabled in the Conference on 12 June 1984 which called for the "prevention of destabilizing military developments without affecting military activities in space that contribute to strategy stability and those which may be instrumental in monitoring disarmament agreements".

Mr. Hayden proposed that the Conference, in its exploration of the issues relevant to arms control in outer space, consider the possibility of measures to protect from attack all satellites (early warning, communications and the like) which contribute to the preservation of strategic stability and which can be instrumental in monitoring disarmament and arms control agreements. He also suggested that the same protection be extended to the ground stations essential for the operation of those satellites.

It is arguable that some -- but not all -- elements of this proposal are already encapsulated in those provisions of the ABM Treaty and SALT Accords which prohibit interference with national technical means of verification. These are, however, bilateral and not multilateral agreements.

The implementation of our proposal would constitute an important confidence-building measure and would directly support present and future arms control and disarmament agreements. Above all, the proposal is directed at contributing to the maintenance of stability until the required disarmament agreements make this no longer necessary. The ultimate outcome of the proposal

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

might be an understanding, possibly codified in an international agreement, to the effect that satellites which promote international stability and serve to monitor disarmament agreements should not be attacked.

In making this proposal we are aware that a number of difficulties are involved. For example: How are we to decide which satellites contribute to stability and which do not? How might such an international agreement be related to a treaty banning the development, testing and deployment of ASAT systems? How are we to establish which ground stations are essential to the operation of those satellites? How could we verify such an agreement?

My delegation does not purport to have all the answers to all of these questions. On the first question, perhaps one possible aid in determining which satellites (if not all satellites) should be protected, would be through the provision by States launching satellites of detailed and specific information regarding the purpose of an object launched into space. As a number of delegations have suggested, both in their plenary statements and in the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space, the present régime for the registration of space objects could be improved upon by the competent organ dealing with that question.

On the same point, if a consideration of the functions of satellites were to lead us to the conclusion that some categories of satellites are inimical to stability then presumably for the same reason, that is stability, those satellites should be banned. Verification of such a ban and indeed of any agreements in outer space, as was noted above, is also a problem for all but those few States with their own national technical means. Accordingly, verification of compliance with existing and future outer space agreements should be done by an independent international agency along the lines, for example, of the projected International Satellite Monitoring Agency.

I want to record my delegation's appreciation of the skill with which Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt has presided over the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space. The work done this year has brought us further in our exploration of the issues vital to the negotiation of a future agreement or agreements on this question. Thus, what has been achieved will facilitate our work in the Committee which we hope will be established again as soon as the Conference on Disarmament resumes work next year.

Our colleague and friend, the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Jayantha Dhanapala, made a most impressive contribution to our consideration of the outer space issue in his statement of 30 July. He also confessed to his penchant for poetry, which has now become legendary. I cannot match him in that, but I can suggest that our approach is at least partly reflected in Shakespeare's observation that "the future is not in our stars but in ourselves". We must shape that future free of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

My statement today will be devoted to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a subject to which my Government, as is well known, has long attached special importance. In this connection I would recall that Italy was one of the first countries to work for a multilateral dialogue in the field of arms control in space. My Government did not confine itself to acceding to all international instruments in this sphere, but also in 1978 took the initiative, at the first special session on the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, of proposing new measures to prevent an arms race in space, a proposal which was reflected in paragraph 80 of the Final Document.

We have persevered in our efforts despite the difficulties caused by the deterioration of the international climate leading, inter alia, to the breaking off of the talks on anti-satellite weapons between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. In the circumstances, and pending the resumption of the bilateral dialogue, as happily occurred this year, we have been guided by the conviction that our best course was to continue the discussion within the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament in order to find a common denominator that could establish a basis for future progress. We have never under-estimated either the primary role of the major space Powers or the importance of preliminary work in both the political and legal spheres at the multilateral level: the latter to facilitate a better knowledge of the problems and the identification of those aspects deserving the attention of the international community as a whole.

We therefore witnessed with a feeling of satisfaction and confidence the launching, after several years' efforts, of the activities of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Even if this occurred quite late in this session, therefore only allowing for nine meetings to be held on substantive problems, the discussions may be said to have been most useful. A carefully balanced programme of work has allowed a first exchange of views, under the enlightened chairmanship of Ambassador Alfaragi of Egypt, on the general aspects of the militarization of space, the relevant legal régime and the proposals made so far to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space.

In my delegation's opinion, the mandate that has governed our work has proved suitable for a first, essential stage of identifying issues and exploring them in greater depth. The scope and seriousness of the discussion proved that with the present mandate a general study of the substance of the issues connected with agenda item 5 could take place without restrictions and in a concrete manner.

The discussions showed once again the great complexity of the issues to be discussed, while establishing their outlines more clearly. Some of these problems were lucidly described by the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, in his remarkable statement on 30 July: I am referring to differences of interpretation of the present legal system, the need to agree on precise definitions, the need for a better knowledge and classification of space activities, research and identification of aspects where further progress is both necessary and possible. All this offers a wealth of material for future work by the Ad Hoc Committee.

Space is a new and important frontier for human conquests and we depend on it for an increasing number of activities contributing to man's well-being. These activities have been mentioned repeatedly in this forum and I shall not dwell on them. During this same period the military sector has also become more and more dependent on space: we know that very often military developments have preceded civilian developments, and that there has always been a close link between these two aspects of space activities.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

The Italian delegation considers that the arms control process, at the bilateral as well as the multilateral levels, should have two objectives: firstly, to encourage the use of outer space for peaceful purposes or for certain specific political-military purposes such as verification and control; and secondly, to limit the military use of space to activities which should strengthen stability. My Government therefore agrees that it is necessary to promote a better knowledge of space activities, to give priority to measures to strengthen confidence among States, to study the possibility of strengthening the legal régime for the protection of satellites, and to improve international co-operation in the verification of agreements by satellite, as advocated in a French proposal with which we are all familiar.

The fortieth anniversary of a tragic page in the history of mankind, the use of the first atomic bombs, has rekindled the discussion on the relationship between science and war: a debate which also concerns the space sector and has to some extent infiltrated into the Ad Hoc Committee's work.

We think it would be not only illusory but contrary to common sense to try to use the context of disarmament to curb, in a kind of modern obscurantism, scientific research which stems from man's irresistible thirst for knowledge. The role of arms control is not to place an anathema on research, which will continue in any case, but to agree on measures which should channel the results of such research towards objectives of stabilization, to avoid their use for aggressive purposes, to narrow the margin of error or of risk, and finally to extend their benefits to the entire international community.

The discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee, although brief and thus perhaps somewhat superficial, has nevertheless opened the way for consideration in greater depth of the more significant problems relating to the prevention of an arms race in space. The analysis of proposals has only just begun; with the sole exception of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union, the proposals submitted so far have been only preliminary and certainly call for further elaboration by their authors. With regard to all these proposals, as well as any submitted in the future, my delegation continues to emphasize the importance of verifiability: all initiatives must be assessed from the standpoint of the political, legal and technical possibilities of ensuring compliance with the proposed measures. This is all the more true in space, where the novelty of the problems in terms of legal arrangements and technical complexity render all negotiations on effective verification systems particularly tricky. The in-depth study of the problems, concepts, existing agreements and proposals should therefore be pursued, as it has proved useful and promising. The assistance of experts might be valuable in developing and supplementing the consideration of the various aspects and thus enabling a basis to be laid as rapidly as possible for concrete progress at the multilateral level.

The present mandate certainly allows us this possibility, and it would be a real mistake at the next session to use up the Ad Hoc Committee's valuable time in a new discussion on its content. It would be even more serious to endanger the continuity of the Ad Hoc Committee's work. I myself am inclined to believe that substantive problems are more important than structural problems; however, in the specific case of the prevention of an arms race in space, the fact that we have been able to set up an ad hoc body in this negotiating forum represents a valuable asset for multilateral diplomacy, and one which must be preserved.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Before finishing with this question, I should like to express our very sincere wish that the bilateral negotiations, to which the Italian Government attaches the importance, will meanwhile make headway and that the Conference on Disarmament will be duly kept abreast of them.

CD/PV.330

12

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

I would now like to turn to outer space. As the delegation of a non-aligned and developing country, we are particularly gratified that the Conference has finally commenced substantive work aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space. Over the past three decades, outer space has come to be used as a testing-range for intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as for the stationing of surveillance satellites. Lately there has been an unprecedented profusion in the deployment of anti-satellite weaponry programmed not only to destroy but also to obstruct the functioning of competitive satellites. Even more ominously, there now exist plans to introduce sophisticated ABM weapon systems in outer space. By contrast, the ideal of preserving this zone for peaceful purposes in the interest of mankind has receded into the background.

The far-reaching consequences of an arms race in outer space are self-evident. Not only will there be a drastic transformation of this zone into a new arena of competition and conflict, but the deployment of space-based weapons will accelerate the arms race both vertically and horizontally, at the cost of international legislation relating to outer space, existing arms control agreements and perhaps the disarmament process as a whole. At the same time, the evolution of an entirely new generation of weapons as well as their counter-force systems are bound to magnify the prevailing asymmetries in military capabilities between the super-Powers and their respective allies, on the one hand, and the non-aligned and neutral States on the other. While the former would be equipped

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

to deal with the consequent strategic implications, the non-aligned and neutral countries would become even more vulnerable than they are at present. Furthermore, new weapons technology resulting from the development of space weapons may proliferate into regions that do not directly involve the two super-Powers, thereby further destabilizing regional as well as global security. More importantly, the rapid pace of development in space technology will necessarily intensify the discriminatory control and use of outer space than exists today, since the super-Powers would be able to enhance their surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities at the expense of the non-aligned and neutral States in particular.

In our evaluation, the existing legal régime relating to outer space is a valuable and significant code of conduct in this zone. We are cognizant of the highly constructive proposals that have been presented to strengthen and amplify this juridical structure. However, we must emphasize that the existing framework of space law is neither adequately comprehensive in nature nor suitably composite in substance, especially against the background of recent trends in the uses of outer space. It is necessary, for instance, to clarify prevailing ambiguous concepts as an essential preliminary step towards a lasting and comprehensive legal régime and, for the sake of ensuring peaceful uses of outer space, to extend the existing scope of demilitarization beyond the Moon and other celestial bodies to encompass outer space as a whole. Equally important will be the task of identifying the dividing line between air space and outer space apart from resolving the question of jurisdiction therein. At the same time, it would be necessary to clarify the status of geo-stationery objects as well as objects in fractional orbits.

In the view of my delegation it is necessary to recognize certain fundamental pre-requisites which are crucial for a comprehensive and workable international framework geared to preventing an arms race in outer space. Firstly, the space Powers must realize that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and therefore any activity in this zone is a concern of the entire international community. The non-aligned and neutral States therefore cannot accept inequitable arrangements for the use of outer space. They would like to see this area as a zone of peace, to be used for mutually beneficial peaceful purposes.

Secondly, the space Powers must demonstrate the necessary political will not only to avoid further militarization of outer space and redress damage already done in this regard, but also to recognize that the pursuit of their interests in this sphere cannot take precedence over the interests of the international community.

Thirdly, the Conference on Disarmament must act in consonance with other relevant multilateral forums to improve and amplify the existing legal régime with regard to outer space in a manner that would be consistent with the political, economic and technological developments that are underway in the international system.

Lastly, the existing inequitable use of outer space must be rectified through the establishment of an international monitoring agency that conducts

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

surveillance and reconnaissance activities by space satellites and disseminates relevant data on a non-discriminatory basis. Such an organization would be useful in promoting international security by providing advance information on crisis situations to the international community. It could also be used as an independent and impartial mechanism to verify compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements in a manner that would overcome the credibility gap which characterizes the prevailing uses of national technical means for verification. Such an arrangement would also be beneficial to those countries that do not possess adequate national means of verification.

The delegation of Pakistan realizes that our quest for a comprehensive and universally acceptable framework to prevent an arms race in outer space is not going to meet with success in the near future. Consequently, certain interim measures in our view could contribute towards minimizing the militarization of outer space. In this context we endorse the proposals calling for a moratorium on testing, production and deployment of new space weaponry such as high-altitude anti-satellite weapons and systems involved in deploying a space-based ballistic missile defence.

As is generally known my delegation attaches great importance to item 6 of our agenda, commonly referred to as negative security assurances. It has, therefore, been a matter of great disappointment to us that the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this item was so delayed as to render it largely meaningless.





(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

against the effectiveness of the existing body of international law, particularly the two most important treaties, which are the bilateral ABM Treaty of 1972 and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. However, we feel that the amount of time that is spent on the examination of legal documents should be commensurate with our objective, which is to find further appropriate measures.

These two treaties which I have mentioned above are central to our consideration but differ in approach and emphasis. The ABM Treaty constitutes a bilateral arms limitation treaty while on the other hand the Outer Space Treaty goes further than the mere limitation of arms, as its purpose is to maintain international peace and security and to promote international co-operation and understanding, and thus its interpretation in spirit should preclude all weapons from outer space. However, the textual interpretation of Article 4 confines the prohibition to weapons of mass destruction, and therefore lends itself to the interpretation that those weapons that are not prohibited are permissible.

As my delegation sees it, the main objective of the Outer Space Treaty is to maintain outer space as an environment where all activities will be conducted, as is stated in the treaty, in accordance with international law, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. At the time of its entry into force the treaty was sufficient to effectively maintain these principles but the prospects of an arms race in outer space through the emergence of new technology are now threatening the continued maintenance of such principles. An objective approach in its multilateral dimension would therefore appear to be more in the nature of seeking further measures to maintain the principles embodied in the outer space Treaty which should encompass broad legal and political objectives than as an arms limitation measure per se which, in the final analysis, would require a comprehensive approach. However, the issues involved are too extensive and the political implications too complex to allow a direct approach to a comprehensive formula and it would appear that partial measures, both formal and informal, through bilateral and multilateral contexts, should constitute steps toward the ultimate goal in order that events do not overtake efforts to keep outer space as an environment free from arms competition.

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

Since we approach the end of this session, I intend to address a few concrete issues, which require our attention, also in the time to come. I shall deal with certain aspects of outer space, as well as with our future work on chemical weapons. At the end I shall briefly touch upon new types of weapons of mass destruction.

With others, my delegation considered it of great importance that at the end of the spring part of the session the Conference could finally agree on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We were satisfied that during the summer part of the session the new Committee could, after some initial difficulties, agree on a meaningful work programme, enabling the Committee to take up the consideration of the substance of agenda item 5. On the whole, we think that the Committee, under the very able chairmanship of Ambassador Alfarargi, has done rather well. The exchange of views, especially on the present legal régime with regard to outer space, has been interesting and enlightening.

Nevertheless we regret that at times polemics crept into the deliberations. As Ambassador Dhanapala put it, much of the valuable time of the Committee was taken up with well-worn arguments on alleged sins of omission or commission on issues which, as we all know, are on the agenda of the bilateral talks that at present are being held in Geneva. Such diatribes tend to distract us from tasks on which in our view the Committee should initially focus its attention.

We believe the Committee should first analyse existing international law with regard to the military uses of outer space, and try to establish common views on what is and what is not covered by it so as to ascertain what additional international legislation might be needed. That task was taken up in the Committee but it is far from being finished.

Outer space surrounds all people on our globe. What happens in outer space is therefore of concern to all of us. The use of outer space for peaceful purposes, holds promise for the whole of humanity. Military use of outer space is of global importance as well, as it can, as we know, have far-reaching consequences, both positive and negative, for international peace and security. A multilateral approach with regard to military activities in outer space, therefore, seems to us as justified as, for example, the multilateral work in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) with regard to civilian uses of that environment. Such a multilateral approach seems to us a necessary complement to the ongoing negotiations of the two major space Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Conference on Disarmament has indeed to play a role of its own, parallel with and complementary to the bilateral negotiations, and hopefully consistent with these negotiations, as was rightly observed by Ambassador Lowitz.

More and more countries have made their entry into outer space and possess satellites of their own. The continued unimpeded functioning of those satellites is essential for further international co-operation in outer space. The protection

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

of those -- civilian -- satellites is of course essential for such international co-operation, and ought to be brought about through a multilateral approach.

Of particular concern to us are satellites which, on account of, for example, their contribution to greater transparency, crisis-management and early-warning against nuclear attacks, perform a stabilizing role. The search for arms control in this field is a very complex task. One of the complicating factors is, of course, that not all satellites play such a stabilizing role. A complementary multilateral approach with regard to the protection of those satellites, and as a consequence with regard to anti-satellite-systems, seems to us of particular importance.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in research related to strategic defence systems, including space-based systems. Research activities in this area certainly deserve multilateral attention as the possible development of such systems could eventually have far-reaching consequences for international peace and security, the arms control process and the arms race. But we should realize that those are long-term perspectives, whereas in the short-term anti-satellite systems may threaten satellites that contribute to the maintenance of stability. Therefore, such anti-satellite systems deserve our special attention. As the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe observed: "In the case of anti-satellite systems, the future is now. ... By contrast any development beyond the research stage of defences against ballistic missiles, the most immediate nuclear threat, is many, many years away".

We believe it is indeed important to recognize the different time-scales involved. At the same time we should be aware that there are certain technological overlaps between the development of strategic defence systems and anti-satellite systems. This confronts us, from an arms control point of view, with a dilemma. For a long time to come, it will not be possible to express a final judgement on the contributions of strategic defence systems to stability. ASAT measures that prejudge strategic defence possibilities will eventually have to be discussed along with strategic defence systems. But this should not, in the Netherlands' view, imply that in the meantime ASAT development could continue unrestrained. With this dilemma in mind we wonder whether, for the short-term -- i.e. in any case until the moment that a first assessment of strategic defence can be made -- provisional limitation of certain ASAT systems, in conjunction perhaps with test prohibitions, should not be considered.

We feel that this is an area where the Conference on Disarmament can play the kind of complementary role I suggested earlier. Parallel to the bilateral negotiations the Conference could make a meaningful and constructive contribution to the prevention of an arms race in outer space in these fields. We could, in a structured manner, take up those aspects of the problem that deserve further multilateral consideration.

An important first step would be a thorough analysis in this Conference of the existing body of international law relevant for military use of outer space. Such an analysis, made against the background of present and possible future military activities in outer space should enable us to trace grey-zones, deficiencies or "loopholes" if you wish, of the present legal régime relating to outer space. A particularly interesting illustration of such an approach was recently given in the statement Ambassador Wegener devoted to this subject roughly a month ago. Statements made by delegations in the Committee also showed

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

that such an approach could be a fruitful one. Thanks also to the useful working papers on the present legal régime relating to outer space which the Canadian and United Kingdom delegation provided us with, we certainly do not lack basic background material.

The Netherlands, like others, holds the view that certain parts of customary international law apply to the entire environment including outer space. We are also of the opinion that the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations obliging States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other State apply to outer space as well.

Since the 1960s a number of international agreements have come into force which limit the military use of outer space in more specific terms. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty takes a central place in this respect. This Treaty prohibits the stationing in outer space of objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass-destruction. It provides for a complete demilitarization of the moon and other celestial bodies. Nevertheless, not all military activities in outer space are prohibited by this treaty. Military satellites for observation, communication, navigation and early-warning purposes for example are not prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty.

The greater part of present-day military satellites are of great importance for the maintenance of international peace and security. Our concern for new military activities in outer space that would entail the risk of an arms race should not obscure this very basic fact. Military satellites, such as the ones I mentioned, or those that observe crisis areas or play a role in verifying compliance with existing disarmament agreements, are essential. The claim for full demilitarization of outer space is therefore in our view neither realistic nor desirable.

Other important treaties should also be considered. Let me just mention a few. An important multilateral agreement is the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibiting inter alia nuclear testing in outer space. The bilateral SALT agreements, in particular the 1972 ABM Treaty, deserve our particular attention. These agreements introduced the concept of non-interference with national technical means (NTMs), a notion that includes satellites.

In short, we feel that a thorough analysis of the present legal régime with regard to outer space should first give us an insight into what is covered. We should subsequently have a close look at military activities and developments in outer space. Only then shall we have laid the basis on which possible concrete measures in this area could be considered. The key question guiding us in these endeavours should in our view be whether the military activities under consideration can be considered to be stabilizing in nature or rather destabilizing and therefore increasing the risk of an outbreak of war.

In this vein our attention could be focused on possible ways to eliminate the threat posed to satellites that play a stabilizing role. It could be considered, for example, whether it is possible to build upon the principle of non-interference with national technical means as agreed in the bilateral framework of SALT. Questions to be studied would relate to the precise nature of the existing protection of NTMs, the possible extension of such protection to other categories of satellites as well as to such satellites possessed by countries

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

other than the United States and the Soviet Union. Such protection then ought to be linked to constraints on ASAT developments, as I mentioned before.

Finally on this subject, the concept of confidence-building measures could play an important role also in the sphere of outer space. The 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space could serve as a basis for a broader and more detailed exchange of information on space activities. The prior notification of the launching of space objects and on-the-spot observation of such launchings could be considered in this context. We took note with interest of the suggestions made by the Ambassador of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad, on this point.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Here I have also to touch on the issue of outer-space weapons. This is a question of utmost urgency and importance. Recently, when meeting with guests from the United Kingdom, Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China said that "star wars" plan must not be carried out because it would cause a qualitative change in the two super-Powers' arms race, and that the "star wars" plan was different in nature from adding a few nuclear warheads or changing a few new types of missiles. This is China's basic position regarding the issue of outer space. Proceeding from this position, China is firmly opposed to an arms race in outer space, stands for "the non-militarization of outer space" and proposes to achieve first "the demilitarization of outer space" at the present stage. Once again we urge the countries with space capabilities to refrain from developing, testing and deploying outer-space weapons, so as to create a propitious atmosphere for the negotiations on the cessation of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

I would like to note with satisfaction, albeit very modest satisfaction, that when our annual report comes to the United Nations this autumn a careful and patient reader will find also some positive aspects. These relate mainly to our work under agenda items on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and on chemical weapons.

The mere fact of the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space reflects growing concern at the threat of the spread of the arms race to outer space, which would have serious political, military, economic and other consequences. The militarization of outer space would inevitably entail destabilization of the strategic situation, an increased threat of the outbreak of nuclear war, speeding-up of the arms race in all areas and growth of nuclear arsenals, and undermining of existing treaties and of the prospects for arms limitation and reduction. It would also hamper peaceful uses of outer space and create obstacles for international co-operation in this sphere.

The Ad Hoc Committee, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, succeeded in adopting a practical and useful work programme, enabling it to discharge its mandate. Issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space were considered, as well as existing agreements related thereto. A look at the existing treaties confirmed that it is prohibited to carry out any nuclear explosions and to deploy nuclear weapons or any other type of weapons of mass destruction in space, that it is prohibited to establish military bases, installations and fortifications, to test any type of weapon and to conduct military manouvres on celestial bodies. It is furthermore forbidden to develop, test or deploy space-based ABM systems or components. At the same time it was noted that the possibility of the deployment in space of weapons that are not weapons of mass destruction has not been closed off. And this is the channel which might be used for the deployment of offensive space weapons.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space were also considered. In this context the relevant Soviet proposals of 1981, 1983 and 1984 were widely referred to. A number of delegations approached this part of the programme constructively and submitted their own proposals. Let me mention, for example, the Swedish working paper of 1 August, which brings into focus a number of ideas. My delegation could support many of them, though some further clarification would be necessary. We welcome first of all the spirit of such an approach, oriented towards negotiating new, specific measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. However, there were also delegations which, in our opinion, didn't choose the best way to consider existing proposals. The Outer Space Committee is not the proper place for a bold, unsubstantiated refusal, especially if no counter proposals are offered.

One of the conclusions we draw from the work done this year is that the United States plans for strategic defence based in outer space are incompatible with the efforts to prevent the militarization of outer space. This project would result in the development and deployment in space of a new class of armament — offensive space weapons. This, in turn, could in the long run undermine all efforts aimed at the prevention of the militarization of outer space. As far as the future activity of the Ad Hoc Committee is concerned, we maintain that it should move, as soon as possible, towards practical work on negotiating new specific agreements on outer space. We attach great importance to the fact that there are no offensive space weapons at present. This is also our great opportunity, which must not be lost. Once these weapons are introduced into outer space, the task of removing them from there would be incomparably more difficult than the one we are facing now.

We have just learned from the Press about the new initiative of the USSR for the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly for the prevention of the militarization of outer space. We heartily welcome it and believe that it will play an important role in further endeavours to reach that goal.

(Mr. Edis, United Kingdom)

On outer space, the Conference was able this year to establish an Ad Hoc Committee and begin serious work; on radiological weapons and the protection of nuclear facilities, there was a more sensible examination of the issues at stake; and on the comprehensive programme of disarmament we succeeded in clearing up some of the outstanding points in the draft text.

Outer space was the newest and in many ways the most challenging issue confronting the Conference this year.

As the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, has noted, President Reagan's vision in his statement of March 1983 made a decisive impact in several respects. It focused interest on existing military activities in space, and on new weapons systems which might theoretically be deployed or aimed there. It also drew to public attention the very considerable research under way in the Soviet Union on a range of potential measures.

At present, space is used by a limited number of military systems. Firstly, by communications, early-warning, and reconnaissance satellites, which add significantly to the effectiveness and credibility of mutual deterrence. They are efficient and cost-effective and make a unique contribution to stability. Secondly, by reusable launchers: by their nature they are, however, too limited, too costly and too vulnerable to pose a threat of aggression. The Soviet Union is now developing a similar system to the space shuttle, and we are hearing less condemnation from that quarter. Thirdly, there is the potential transit of space for the delivery of nuclear warheads by ballistic missiles based on Earth, which we must seek to ensure remains an unrealized potential. Fourthly, there is the problem of anti-satellite systems, exacerbated by the Soviet deployment over the past decade of a capability in this field, which it is only prudent for the West to balance.

As regards future systems, which in the words of the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, are many, many years away, the United States is publicly, and the Soviet Union more covertly, engaged in research programmes, which are permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty. On this issue, Her Majesty's Government's policy is clear. At Camp David last December, Mrs. Thatcher agreed with President Reagan on four points:

The United States and Western aim is not to achieve superiority but to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet deployments;

Strategic Defensive Initiative-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation;

The overall aim is to enhance, not undermine deterrence; and

East/West negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.



(Mr. Edis, United Kingdom)

It is in this spirit that we welcome the initiation of bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union aimed inter alia at preventing an arms race in outer space. We must all hope that these negotiations between the two major space Powers will produce results.

Against this backdrop of existing and potential military use of space, and the opening of the bilateral negotiations, the Ad Hoc Committee of this Conference has begun its work of examining issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Committee has made a good start to its work under the calm and able chairmanship of Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt. It was right that the Committee's programme of work should encompass an examination of existing agreements. A full understanding and appreciation of the present legal régime in outer space is essential before additional measures which may be necessary can be considered. Substantive contributions on this topic were made by several delegations, but it would only be fair to single out the wide-ranging documentation tabled by the delegation of Canada (CD/618). My own delegation made a contribution to the process by tabling a working paper entitled "Principal international agreements which apply or otherwise relate directly or indirectly to outer space" (CD/OS/WP.7). In view of the encouraging comments that we received on this paper, we have now decided to table it as a document of the Conference, as CD/637.

It was clear from the Committee's examination of existing agreements that there already exists a considerable body of international law and practice, both multilateral and bilateral, bearing on the question of outer space. Indeed, it was remarked with justification that the arms control régime in outer space, which does not at present constitute a permanently inhabited area, is in many ways more comprehensive than that on Earth; for example, in banning the use of nuclear weapons in space and from space to Earth. Military activities on, and military activities from the Moon and other celestial bodies are also forbidden. And at least implicit immunity is accorded by existing agreements and practice to certain satellites which constitute national technical means of verification. These conclusions seemed to be common ground in the Committee, although the limited time permitted did not allow for exhaustive examination of the subject.

The Committee's look at existing proposals and future initiatives was also necessarily preliminary and tentative, though a number of interesting proposals meriting further examination were made. These included the establishment of a "rules of the road" agreement for outer space; the possible multilateralization of existing bilateral agreements, for example, in relation to the immunity of certain satellites; international monitoring of satellites; and the possibility of constraints upon elements of anti-satellite activity.

One point that came very clearly out of the discussion, especially of the latter two points, was the sheer complexity as well as the importance of verification in relation to additional measures of arms control in outer space. This applies particularly with regard to proposals of a far-reaching nature. In space as on Earth, proposals for unverifiable blanket bans are not only useless but, worse than that, they are disingenuous and potentially dangerous too. What we should be searching for are not easy propaganda gestures, but rather realistic

(Mr. Edis, United Kingdom)

and practical measures which build on the existing legal régime and which will complement agreements which we all hope will emerge from the bilateral negotiations.

We believe that the Ad Hoc Committee has made a generally constructive and co-operative start to the work set out in its mandate. In the limited time available, very useful work has been done. We look forward to further work on this important and complex subject at our next session.

CD/PV.332

11

(Mr. Schori, Sweden)

This is the message of the Delhi Declaration, adopted last January by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden. The Delhi Declaration demands a stop to the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. It particularly underlines the need for measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, as well as the demand for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Efforts to bring the arms race to a halt are not made easier by the threatening expansion of the arms race in outer space. It is very difficult to fully evaluate the consequences of these new trends. However, the use of force against space objects would most probably, and already in a short-term perspective, seriously threaten space functions which play a stabilizing role.

The consequences of attempts to develop a watertight defence system against intercontinental ballistic missiles are slowly dawning upon us. Even if it is so far only a question of research on space-based defence systems, the large financial, scientific and intellectual resources to be allocated to the project create a sense of automatic development. We cannot now make

(Mr. Schori, Sweden)

reconnaissance into the future, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the bringing of space into the military confrontation and tension can only lead to a new and dangerous upturn in the seemingly endless arms race. Space should be preserved for peaceful uses and peaceful co-operation.

Anything that may endanger the existence of the ABM treaty risks to have a destabilizing effect on international relations and should thus be avoided until a better and more stabilizing arrangement can be found in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States have, inter alia, the declared purpose of covering the question of the prevention of an arms race in space.

However, it is obvious that a meaningful comprehensive agreement on the prevention of an arms race in space cannot be reached exclusively on a bilateral level. An ASAT ban not adhered to by all States with an ASAT capacity would make many important satellites potential objects of attacks. It would also leave the satellites of the Soviet Union and the United States vulnerable to attacks by ASATs of a third State. A multilateral approach to ASAT weapons would thus be in the interest of all nations. The decision to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is therefore one of the most positive recent developments in the Conference.

CD/PV.332

16

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

In the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, its Chairman, the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargi, guided its work well as it began an exploration of the issues under its mandate and within its programme of work. It is, accordingly, with great regret that we have witnessed the unfortunate exercise in which the Committee has become ensnarled in preparing its report, despite the dedicated efforts of the Chairman and the secretariat. This certainly does not bode well for the future. My delegation will want to consider carefully the full range of outer space issues during the break, bearing in mind the complementary nature of our efforts to the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, today the Soviet delegation would like to draw attention once again to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. No one, I think, would question the fact that this issue has aroused heightened interest at the present session of the Conference. It has been one of the central issues. This year there has hardly been a single plenary meeting at which one delegation or another has not expressed its attitude towards this urgent problem of our time. On the credit side of the session that is now drawing to a close, we must, undoubtedly, place the creation of a subsidiary body on agenda item 5, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, under the chairmanship of the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargi. We wish to express our satisfaction with the work of the Committee and our gratitude to its Chairman, who has done a lot for progress in the discussion of the question of preventing an arms race in space.

The Soviet delegation has on many occasions stated its attitude to this problem in general and to specific aspects of it. We have done this at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the Ad Hoc Committee. The participants in the Conference are well aware of the Soviet Union's concrete proposals, including those in the form of draft treaties. Many delegations have expressed their views and comments concerning the Soviet proposals and some of them could, it seems to us, be conducive to further progress in the work of the Conference in this key area.

Today, the Soviet delegation has taken the floor to inform the Conference of a new, important proposal which the Soviet Government made a few days ago.

The USSR has proposed the inclusion in the agenda for the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly of the question of "International co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization" and has submitted a specific draft resolution to the General Assembly. At the request of the Soviet delegation, the texts connected with the submission of that proposal will be circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament, CD/639.

In submitting this initiative, our country proceeds from the belief that humanity is today faced with a choice: either outer space will make an ever greater contribution towards improving the living conditions of the inhabitants of the planet Earth or it will become a source of a new mortal danger to them. We are convinced that the only intelligent choice can and must be to prevent the militarization of outer space and preserve it for peaceful activities and broad international co-operation.

To put it briefly, the essence of our new initiative lies in the tabling of a concrete, forward-looking programme for the combining of the efforts of States for the peaceful use of space. We proceed from the belief that large-scale international co-operation in this sphere can become a reality only if there is no militarization of space, if, that is, States renounce the development (including research), the testing and the deployment of offensive space weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In our opinion, international co-operation in the exploration and peaceful use of outer space could be conducted in the following fields in particular:

Basic research into outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and the launching for that purpose of interplanetary spacecraft;

The application of the results of space research, experiments and the use of space technology in, inter alia, fields such as biology, medicine, materials science, weather forecasting, climatic and environmental studies, global satellite communications systems, remote sensing of the Earth with a view to obtaining data for use in geology, agriculture, and exploitation of the oceans and seas, and the search for, and detection and rescue of victims of accidents at sea and in the air;

The development and utilization of space technology, including large orbital scientific stations and manned spacecraft of various types;

Long-term programmes for the use of space might include the following: the industrialization of near space, in the sense of the merging of space complexes of various types with States' terrestrial economies; the operation of orbital factories and plants for the manufacture of new materials and industrial products in a deep vacuum and zero gravity.

Naturally, all such activities by States would have to be carried out with due regard for and in compliance with the existing treaties aimed at preventing an arms race in space and on the basis of the principles deriving from the Charter of the United Nations, which include, in particular, the non-use of force or the threat of force; the settlement of disputes by peaceful means alone; the equality, respect for the sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States; co-operation in good faith, mutual assistance and due regard for the interests of other States.

In order to facilitate international co-operation by States in the exploration and use of outer space and in view also of the desires expressed by a whole range of States for the establishment of specific organizational forms of such co-operation, the Soviet Union considers that there could be created a world space organization for international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization.

As the Soviet Union sees the matter, that organization would be responsible for ensuring, on the basis of mutual advantage, non-discriminatory access by all States to the results of scientific and technical advances connected with the study and peaceful exploration of space. It could undertake international projects connected with the pooling of efforts and resources for the purposes of outer-space research and the use of space technology. An important element in the activities of such an organization would be the provision of comprehensive assistance to developing countries, which do not have adequate technical or material resources at

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

their disposal, as regards access to the exploration and use of outer space and the application of the practical results of such activity for the purposes of their economic and social development in accordance with their needs and without any conditions infringing their sovereignty. The proposed world organization could assume the role of co-ordinator on an international scale of the activities of other international organizations in the field of space.

In our view, such an organization could facilitate the effecting of the requisite verification of compliance with the agreements already concluded or to be concluded with a view to preventing an arms race in space. Such functions for an international organization would, in our view, be consistent with the repeatedly expressed wishes of a whole range of States.

With regard to practical matters, the USSR proposes the convening not later than 1987 of a representative international conference with the participation of, inter alia, the States having major space potential in order to review all aspects of the problem of international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization with a view to agreeing on the main lines and principles of such co-operation. The same conference would also consider the question of setting up an international space organization for international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. The establishment in practice of that organization could be undertaken following the reaching of agreements effectively ensuring the non-militarization of space.

The Soviet Union's new proposal testifies yet again to the fact that our country, in a spirit of goodwill and conscious of responsibility for the fate of humanity, calls upon all countries to proceed jointly to the discharge of this truly historic task. We trust that the world's States will give every attention to the Soviet Union's new initiative. We are profoundly convinced that there is simply no other reasonable alternative than to institute co-operation among States in the peaceful exploration and use of space under conditions of its non-militarization.

Instead of plans for "star wars" the Soviet Union proposes a programme for "star peace" in which all the States on our planet could take part. Each of them would make its contribution to this noble programme and would derive benefits from it.

The new Soviet initiative is in the interests of the world community, of all countries and peoples. It is non-confrontational and is not aimed against anyone. Its implementation requires first and foremost a broad political approach and the setting aside of stereotypes and considerations connected with the search for instantaneous advantages and unilateral benefits. It is important that the positive experience acquired in the sphere of the peaceful exploration of space should not be cancelled out by military rivalry in this sphere.



(Mr. Dubey, India)

to naught and this Conference, which is solely responsible for translating the international community's concern with the development of deadly weapons into disarmament measures, remains locked up in a semantic battle as to the meaning and interpretation of the relevant phrases and provisions of the existing agreements.

We are no doubt grateful for the intelligence and patience of our colleague, Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, who performed his duties as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space with great skill and dedication. Despite his best efforts to take its work forward, the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee lacked unity of purpose and focus. Consequently its report ends up by merely emphasizing the urgency of the subject and reiterating the determination of the Conference to exert all efforts to make progress in the 1986 session. The report reflects, to say the least, a collective involuntary self-deception on the part of the Conference in comprehending the true measure of the threat posed by space weapons to the international community. It is almost like an escape from reality -- a reality which is inexorably taking shape in the speedy gestation of the most dangerous space weapons ever conceived by mankind.

When the Conference resumes its work in 1986, it will not even have two years before the so-called research, as some reports point out, is slated to cross over to "testing and development of integrated systems". One can easily visualize that, in another two years, we shall be confronted with yet another set of refined semantics about what is "test" or what is "experiment" and what is field test in one mode or the other. All kinds of resources and ingenuity will be applied to make the second stage also look as innocuous as the first stage is made out to be, until the space-weapons systems are in place.

The non-aligned and neutral States have consistently taken the position that the development of space weapons and of an arms race in outer space must be prevented at all costs. They have called for undertaking negotiations within the forum of the Conference on Disarmament for reaching an agreement or agreements for this purpose.

This position is based on their firm belief that the planned space-weapon systems, some of which are already at an advanced stage of development, will take the nuclear arms race to a higher and qualitatively different level of escalation, may very well result in total armament and will be a positive disincentive to the current arms limitation and disarmament effort. A similar view was expressed by the distinguished representative of China, Ambassador Qian Jiadong, in his statement in the Conference on Disarmament on 15 August, when he said: "The 'star wars' plan was different in nature from adding a few nuclear warheads and changing a few types of missiles".

On the other hand, one of the super-Powers, the United States of America, has gone to great lengths in expostulating how the development of defensive weapons or the Strategic Defence Initiative was necessary for doing away with the nuclear menace for all time to come. It has, in the same breath, also emphasized how the development of these weapons is necessitated because of the alleged research efforts by the other super-Power, i.e., the USSR, to develop such weapons in a clandestine manner.

The USSR, for its part, has stated that it is not developing a large-scale ABM system or the basis for such a system. Moreover, that State has affirmed its



(Mr. Dubey, India)

readiness to enter into negotiations to conclude a comprehensive agreement prohibiting what it calls a whole class of space attack weapons and to destroy the existing ones. This country has also, among other things, declared a unilateral moratorium on the launching of ASAT weapons in outer space which will remain in force so long as the United States acts in the same way. At the same time, in response to the United States Strategic Defence Initiative, the USSR has declared that in the face of a threat from space, it will be forced to take action reliably to guarantee its security. "The choice is not ours", to quote the USSR representative, "but we shall have to act to redress the strategic balance".

The members of the Western military alliance have taken differing, and at times ambivalent positions on whether they would support or remain aloof from the research effort connected with the "star wars" plan. Some of these countries have decided for the time being to remain aloof while others have declared that the "research programme is justified, politically necessary and in the interest of the overall Western security." The other day in this Conference, we heard a distinguished representative of a Western military-alliance country dismissing the new ABM system as a long-term problem and expressing his delegation's inability to express judgement on the contribution that it could make to stability. In any event, most of the members of this military alliance seem to be united in opposing any attempt which would foreclose the so-called defensive option. In the meantime, the multinational companies in these countries are busy making preparations and establishing contacts for climbing on the band-wagon and sharing a part of the largesse of the United States research programme irrespective of its implications and consequences for mankind. After all these political considerations are not expected to enter into the calculus of the profit motives of these companies. As Mr. George Ball, the former United States Under-Secretary of State, has said, "Star wars are now being generated not by ideology, but by good free-enterprise greed".

For any third country which is opposed to the extension of the arms race in outer space, it is clearly hypocritical to acquiesce into the research for the "star wars" weapons while pretending that actual weapons development would not come about.

The non-aligned and developing countries cannot afford such an ambivalent position because they would be mortgaging the future of their nations if they did not take an unambiguous position on this issue -- that is, go on emphasizing the importance and urgency of commencing negotiations for concluding an agreement or agreements to prevent the extension of the arms race in outer space. This position has been consistently supported by nearly 150 Member States of the United Nations for the past two years. It, therefore, came as a surprise to us when the other day we heard the distinguished representative of the United States say in this chamber: "Similarly, polemics to the effect that there is a need to establish an arms control régime in space are counter-productive and misleading". The censure contained in this remark is addressed not only to the position of the 150 Member States of the United Nations and hence to the general will of the comity of nations, but also to the American people themselves, a majority of whom, according to a poll taken in January 1985 for the Los Angeles Times, oppose the SDI. We do not see how genuinely-held views of as many as 150 Member States to undertake negotiation of agreement or agreements as an urgent objective in this

(Mr. Dubey, India)

field can be regarded as polemical or an attempt to mislead anyone. On the contrary, we wish that all States would join in this effort, for we believe that the interest of all States will be served through the implementation of the recommendation of the General Assembly as contained in resolution 39/59.

In this context, we would like to make it absolutely clear that, as far as the arms race in outer space is concerned, the overriding question for us is not whether we are taking sides politically with one or the other military alliance. Neither in our fervent support for the negotiation of new agreements, nor in our strong opposition to the on-going plans for the introduction of new space-weapon systems are we guided by any consideration other than that of preventing the introduction of an entirely new dimension into the nuclear arms race. As our Prime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, said in a television interview in June: "When we criticize 'star wars' and the SDI, it is equal for everyone, it is not just for the USA. We criticize it if the Europeans are doing it or if the Soviet Union is doing it or if anybody else is doing it". To turn the issue of the prevention of the arms race into outer space, which is a disarmament issue, into an issue of East-West politics, is nothing but an attempt to silence the critics of these weapons systems and to divert attention from the main issue.

In the entire debate on "star wars" which has gone on in the developed countries for the past two-three years, there is hardly any reference to the concerns of the non-aligned and developing countries. Both the protagonists and opponents of this weapons system have debated the issue essentially from the point of view of the security interest of the East and the West and East-West conflict. This is, of course, characteristic of the basic world-view of most of the countries of the North according to which the concerns and interests of the nations of the South are regarded as inconsequential and hence not worthy of being taken into account in the formulation of their major policy decisions. This is particularly so when it involves the development of new weapon systems, be that nuclear weapons or outer-space weapons. These weapons have been developed in utter disregard of the overwhelming body of world public opinion and derive from an obsession with the security interest of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies to the exclusion of, and, indeed, at the cost of the security and other interests of the majority of mankind.

We are aware of the set of shifting -- and sometimes even contradictory -- objectives advanced by the advocates of the strategic defence to be pursued under the "star wars" plan. These have included complete protection of population; the protection of nuclear weapons only; giving up nuclear deterrence, which is now being admitted as being based on an error, and making nuclear weapons impotent; bolstering deterrence by providing it with a defensive arm; and using the outer-space weapons as a lever for getting concessions in the present talks between the super-Powers. For us, irrespective of the objectives to be pursued, the consequences of the development and deployment of space weapons are fraught with grave dangers. The question is not whether the space weapons would enable the super-Powers or their allies to liberate themselves once and for all from the shackles of deterrence or to further strengthen deterrence. The question is what the arms race in outer space is going to do to the on-going nuclear arms race, to the imminent threat of nuclear war and to the independence and sovereignty of the non-aligned States.

(Mr. Dubey, India)

We do not believe that the space weapons would be only defensive, just as we do not believe that the existing nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence. Just as we do not find any difference between the nuclear deterrent and a nuclear-war-fighting ability, similarly we fail to see how the so-called strategic defence is going to be any different from the present offensive strategy based on the massive accumulation of nuclear arsenals. Just as the illusion of the nuclear deterrence has thus far led to the escalation of nuclear-weapon stockpiles, the pursuit of new space-weapon systems will also result in a new phase of the arms race both in space and on Earth. It is bad enough for mankind to have been brought to the precipice of a nuclear holocaust on account of the mad pursuit of the chimera of deterrence. To combine this with the quest for a strategic defence makes an already complicated situation infinitely more complex, if not intractable. We oppose the new space-weapon system because it is based on a security doctrine which we do not subscribe to and which we regard as the principal factor responsible for the nuclear arms race. We oppose these weapons on the same ground as we oppose the use of nuclear weapons as an instrument of warfare. There are already enough nuclear weapons on earth to destroy it many times over. Let us try to reduce them instead of adding to them in pursuit of such dangerous and dubious objectives as the bolstering of deterrence or achieving parity or superiority.

It should, therefore, be no surprise to anyone if non-aligned and neutral countries do not see great relevance in the debate about the workability of the "star wars" plan. We would expressly wish that the Conference on Disarmament avoid this trap. Our objective assessment is -- and for coming to such an objective assessment no research seems necessary -- that all attempts to render nations defensible from nuclear attacks by building a new weapons system are bound to fail and that such an attempt will only succeed in accelerating the arms race in offensive nuclear weapons. The problem is not whether this or that weapon is technologically feasible, but rather the clear technological inevitability of countermeasures. The implications of the new chain of action-reaction which the "star wars" plan will set in motion are exceedingly grave not only for the countries whose protection is being promised but also for the developing world, which will remain outside the pale of this protection of dubious feasibility or validity.

The advocates of the new weapons system have claimed that it would provide an incentive for concluding an arms control agreement between the super-Powers. To expect the new weapons system to achieve arms control presupposes a degree of understanding between the super-Powers which is, alas, a rare commodity today. If there is such an understanding at all, then why should they go in at all for acquiring the new ABM system and why should they not instead agree to a mutual reduction of the existing nuclear arsenals? The most likely scenario, unfortunately, is that the present mutual distrust will continue. As a matter of fact, the very decision to develop a new ABM system is directly related to the prevailing distrust. The "star wars" plan itself has the clear effect of eroding confidence. There is hardly any prospect for an agreement on arms control or disarmament in a "star wars" environment. In my statement last year I spoke about how the strategic defence option would lead to the total or ultimate arms race, thereby making disarmament impossible. The validity of this argument is

(Mr. Dubey, India)

for anyone to see, particularly in the light of the statement from an authoritative source in the USSR that offensive weapons can very cheaply overwhelm any new ABM system which can be created.

We are faced with a situation where transition is far more crucial than the final point of arrival. For inherent in the transition is mistrust and hence an accelerating arms race and instability. If we decide to plunge into such a transition, the chances of our surviving and reaching the haven of the ideal offence-defence mix are indeed very slim.

No matter how we describe the first part of the transition -- research or weapons development -- there is no doubt that, so long as the option to develop space weapons is kept open, a renewed arms race both in outer space and on Earth is inevitable. This has been brought home by recent allegations being traded by the United States and the USSR regarding each other's intentions and capabilities with regard to the development of new weapons systems. This has effectively come in the way of any progress in their bilateral negotiations. The account given by each side about the progress of the negotiations confirms this conclusion. In fact, one of the eminent advisers to the United States team on bilateral negotiations advised the Western allies that they must not panic "even if it (i.e. the United States) does not achieve any agreement with the Soviet Union in the next four years".

As non-aligned nations, we are clearly not overly concerned about the demise or the bolstering of the doctrine of deterrence which is likely to follow the development and deployment of the new ABM system or about the fear in Europe that an American defence system will decouple the defence of Europe from that of the United States. These fears and expectations flow from the premise that nuclear weapons are weapons of war and can, therefore, be used to guarantee national security. We are fundamentally opposed to this position and we believe that nuclear weapons can never be used as weapons of war. They are weapons of mass destruction. The manner in which the super-Powers have gone about developing their nuclear arsenals and the doctrines and strategies for their use make it very difficult to distinguish between their use as a deterrent and their use for waging a nuclear war. As a matter of fact, the new defence system will have the potential of dramatically enhancing the usability of the present nuclear arsenals. This will be so because of the reduced fear of retaliation and because of the general uncertainty and instability that the development of these weapons is going to create. Professor Sydney D. Drell of Stanford University, a well-known expert in this field, has very rightly said: "A mixed defence-offence posture designed to deprive the opponent of first-strike capability is itself likely to look -- in motivation and in capability -- uncomfortably like a first-strike posture". There is also a possibility that a total or partial assurance of invulnerability may lead to localized nuclear wars, especially as the third-generation nuclear weapons are developed.

The technologies associated with the new ABM system will give the super-Power possessing the system an unrestrained capacity to watch and manipulate events in the world from outer space. The super-Power concerned will acquire foolproof systems to kill satellites and to hit any target on the surface of the Earth. It will also acquire laser or particle-beam weapons to destroy

(Mr. Dubey, India)

these targets. This will be verily a system of policing the world from a space gendarmerie. These technologies can be used not only against the offensive nuclear missiles of the nuclear-weapon States, but also against any other targets on land, sea and in the air. Should the vast majority of the nations of the world accept this total dependence and possible total subservience?

In view of these considerations, it is unrealistic to expect that the non-aligned States would be satisfied with a discussion of an aimless nature of the meanings of words like "research" and "militarization" and of the relevant articles of the existing agreements. For them, their security -- and, indeed, that of the world -- lies in preventing the development of these new weapons. Therefore, the supreme task, a task equalled only by that of the prevention of nuclear war, before the Conference on Disarmament is to negotiate an agreement or agreements for banning the development of such weapons.

One of the space-weapon systems, that is ASAT systems, are already at an advanced stage of development. For my country, as for many others, satellites are a part of a peaceful effort for the benefit of our people. We are directly concerned if weapons are developed to destroy satellites. It is indeed disconcerting for us to see that, in the Conference on Disarmament, instead of undertaking negotiations for an agreement for banning such weapons, efforts are being made to distinguish between the various kinds of satellites and various activities of satellites and demands are being made to have perfect verifiability before considering any ban on anti-satellite weapons. In our opinion, the only sensible course open for us is to ban the testing, development and deployment of all kinds of ASAT weapons and destroy existing such weapons. In such an approach, there is no scope for any partial agreement. We also believe that, if such action is taken before these weapons are further developed, the problem of verifiability will be manageable. In our opinion, the extent of verification is a function of the kind of treaty that is to be negotiated and to be verified. We also feel that, in the ultimate analysis, verification is a matter of trust and political will and therefore it cannot be seen only in technical terms. If we must have foolproof verification before any disarmament treaty can be negotiated, then the very nature of the present weapons system will ab initio render most disarmament efforts fruitless and the prospect for peace in the world indeed very grim. What is worse is that there is an increasing tendency these days, including in the case of a treaty to ban the ASAT-weapon systems, to put the verification cart before the disarmament horse in an attempt to permit the uninterrupted development of the new weapon systems in pursuit of the illusion of deterrence, parity or superiority.

In conclusion, the simple fact is that the arms race in outer space can be prevented only if there is a genuine desire and the requisite political will on the part of those who are developing such weapons and their allies to prevent such an extension of the arms race. This is possible only if these countries decide forthwith to forgo the so-called defensive option and explicitly commit themselves to negotiations of a new agreement or agreements for this purpose.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Another, negative trend in the development of international relations has also been clearly apparent in the world. The arms race has continued, development of the so-called "strategic defence initiative", meaning preparation for "star wars", has been actively instituted, and new, yet more dangerous kinds of weapon, especially binary chemical weapons and others, have been coming on to military assembly lines. Naturally, the opposition between those two tendencies could not but affect the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

On the one hand, as a result of the persistent efforts of socialist and non-aligned States, the Conference on Disarmament finally embarked upon the consideration of one of the most urgent problems of our time, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We wish to express our satisfaction at the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this question and the great interest shown in it by States represented in the Conference. The main result of the Ad Hoc Committee's work must be considered the broad recognition of the enormous danger with which the transfer of the arms race to outer space is fraught. The overwhelming majority of States have expressed concern that the realization in practice of the so-called "strategic defence initiative" would have irreparable consequences for the fate of humanity.

(Mr. Ter Horst, Venezuela)

We were also able to establish the Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which was expertly guided by Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt. It is to be hoped that it will be possible at the 1986 session to move forward towards the achievement of substantive agreements in that Committee, which, like everyone else, we hope will be re-established.

Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, I have pleasure in submitting to the Conference document CD/641 containing the first report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space of which I have had the honour to be Chairman during the present session.

The Ad Hoc Committee began its work on 24 June 1985 and, notwithstanding the limited amount of time remaining before the closure of the session, has been able to accomplish a great deal as a result of its intensive work at 20 meetings, bearing in mind that this was the first session of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The Ad Hoc Committee adhered to its programme of work comprising the following three items:

(a) The political, military, economic and other consequences of an extension of the arms race into outer space.

(b) The importance of existing international agreements concerning the limitation of military activities in outer space with a view to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(c) Proposals of States members of the Conference on Disarmament concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In order to deal with these items in a balanced manner, the Committee allocated an equal number of meetings to the consideration of each item.

Part III of the report reviews the points of view that were expressed concerning these three items. Although this part of the report reflects differing viewpoints concerning the future work of the Ad Hoc Committee, part IV of the report, entitled "Conclusion", indicates a consensus in the Committee, concerning the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and the consequent need to make every effort to ensure the resumption of the substantive consideration of this agenda item at the next session of the Conference.

I hope that the Committee's endeavours have helped to lay the foundation for its work at future sessions in a manner conducive to the faithful discharge of its mandate.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to all the delegations for their valuable and earnest contribution to the Committee's work and for the spirit of flexibility and co-operation that they manifested and without which we would not have been able to achieve the results obtained. I am referring in particular to the co-operation and endeavours of the group co-ordinators. Our gratitude and appreciation are also due to Miss Aida Levin, the Committee's Secretary, whose devoted co-operation and efficiency were instrumental in facilitating the Committee's work. I hope that you will also permit me, Sir, to convey my deep appreciation for the kind words that have been expressed in this forum concerning the Committee and its work.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

Another question of the first magnitude is that of outer space. Our session succeeded, not without difficulty, in reaching agreement initially on a mandate, subsequently on a Chairman and finally, by virtue of the skill shown by the latter, on a programme of work. The Committee was consequently able to tackle the substantive questions and to engage, during a few brief weeks, in exchanges of views and the start of a dialogue. We have ourselves expressed or reiterated our wishes and proposals in this connection. We have also drawn up a fairly long list of questions: we hope to receive replies to them when the discussion is able to resume, and it should resume as soon as possible. We know, and I have pointed out in the past, how important are the current bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States in this respect and we have also expressed our concern to avoid anything that might prejudice them. However, it is quite obvious that, apart from their bilateral aspects, the problems of outer space also comprise multilateral aspects; that is, after all, why we all agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should take up the question. But who could claim that, after a few weeks, the Conference has completed the topic, that it has exhausted the subject-matter falling within its competence? We cannot imagine that anyone, for any reason whatsoever, would oppose the continuation at the next session, of the work begun in the Ad Hoc Committee. Neither Governments nor public opinion would understand that and we are full of hope that the work begun in such a promising, albeit difficult, manner during this session will be continued next year. That is also what Ambassador Alfarargi, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, said in the statement he has just made.



(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The Soviet Union proposed moratoria on all issues that are the subject of the bilateral negotiations, including research and development for the creation of space attack weapons.

Already in 1983 the Soviet Union assumed the obligation not to be the first to deploy anti-satellite weapons in outer space. This year it unilaterally suspended the deployment of medium-range missiles and other countermeasures in Europe. The Soviet Union also announced a moratorium on all nuclear explosions with effect from 6 August 1985 which would remain in force beyond 1 January 1986 if the United States for its part joined in that step. We have noticed with deep satisfaction that this significant measure was widely supported within this Conference.

The recent Soviet proposal on the main directions and principles of international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization is another most timely step to use outer space for the benefit of mankind and to prevent an arms race in that area.

What those and other proposals have in common is that they are realistic, take into account the interests of all parties and proceed from the principle of equality and equal security.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Most delegations paid greatest attention to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. That fact deserves to be stressed in particular. It reflects an ever growing awareness of the adverse consequences of the militarization of outer space for the security of mankind. We noticed that the majority of delegations at the Conference rejected the adventurous "Star Wars" plans and favoured the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes.

The broad discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee showed the urgency of starting as soon as possible negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals and future initiatives as requested in United Nations resolution 39/59. We consider the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth as a solid basis for such negotiations. Speaking of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we wish to thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, for the great efforts undertaken by him. The socialist countries regret very much that due to the position of one group of States the Conference was again prevented from establishing relevant Committees for negotiating on priority questions, such as a nuclear-weapon-test ban, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of nuclear war.

CD/PV.334

10

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

The establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space is a positive aspect of the current session. The Committee has done useful work under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt. The exchange of views on issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the preliminary deliberations on relevant international legal instruments as well as proposals put forward by various delegations have helped to make a good start for future deliberations and negotiations. However, from the profound differences of opinion of various delegations in the course of the session, particularly the differences which emerged during the discussions on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, one can see that arduous tasks still lie ahead on the prevention of arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

In Working Paper CD/WP.100/Rev.1 on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference which was elaborated by a group of seven, including the representatives of Argentina, China, France, Hungary, the Soviet Union, the United States and Yugoslavia in their personal capacities, and which the Conference took note of last year, the view is expressed that the Conference should decide the future of subsidiary bodies, including their chairmanship, in the process during which their reports are adopted. This would allow the subsidiary bodies to start substantive work from the very beginning of the Conference's sessions. Prolonged procedural discussions could, therefore, be avoided.

That is the reason why the socialist countries put forward their suggestion to include in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for its 1985 session a recommendation concerning the chairmanship of that Committee in 1986. We consider this as a normal practice for which precedents do already exist.

With all this in mind, and in conformity with the principle of rotation, the socialist countries gave their consent to include in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons the recommendation for the candidature put forward by the Group of Western Countries in connection with the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for next year.

We assume that the same principle will be applied to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In that regard the Group of Socialist Countries wishes to inform the Conference that Ambassador L. Bayart of Mongolia will be its candidate for the chairmanship of that Committee for the 1986 session, as reflected in document CD/641.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We now take up the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space contained in document CD/641. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): On behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries, I wish to make a statement concerning the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament. The socialist countries reaffirm their position already stated in connection with the adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that the Chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should rotate, as is the case with other Committees of the Conference on Disarmament. That is the reason why the socialist countries put forward their suggestion to include in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, for its 1985 session, and contained in document CD/641, a recommendation concerning the chairmanship of that Committee in 1986. We consider this a normal practice for which precedents already exist. With this in mind, and in conformity with the principle of rotation, the socialist countries gave their consent to including in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the recommendation for the candidature put forward by the group of Western countries, in connection with the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, next year. We did this, however, on the assumption that the same principle would be applied to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I informed the Conference already that Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia would be the candidate of the Group of Socialist Countries for the chairmanship of that Committee for the 1986 session.

CD/PV.335

7

(Mr. Belaid, Algeria)

Within the context of its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has made possible an exchange of views from which it appears that there is a widely shared belief that this environment should be reserved for exclusively peaceful purposes for the benefit of all States and all peoples.

It is to be hoped that the difficulties encountered in the adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee will not turn out to be an advance indication of difficulties in the commencement of substantive work on the drafting of an agreement or agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.





LIBRARY E A / BIBLIOTHÈQUE A E



3 5036 01029412 5

