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
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
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OXFORD PAMPHLETS
1914

TURKEY IN
EUROPE AND ASIA

WITH A MAP

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MAP

Between pages 12 and 13

TURKEY IN EUROPE AND ASIA

TURKEY is an incalculable Power, the most paradoxical that ever was or, let us hope, will be ! At the present moment her national indebtedness—funded, floating, and unprovided—is approaching two hundred millions sterling. The more annual charge on a part of that debt, the part covered by loans, amounts to about a third of her actual revenue, which is not one-seventh of her liabilities. It is scarcely two years since she emerged from a war for existence, which added above a whole year's revenue to her debt and more than that to her liabilities, robbed her of one-tenth of that revenue and an eighth of her population by the loss of Macedonia and the Isles, and demonstrated her incompetence to wage war under modern conditions. After the war, fast tied and bound as she was already in international shackles, she riveted yet others on herself by perpetuating foreign monopolies, and mortgaging what was left of her economic liberty to Paris bankers and the Government which so subtly and effectually controls their operations. Drained of money, men, and repute, she seemed the one State in Europe which could not stir. *E pur si muove !* Here she is at it again, confronting, with allies who can give her only scant assistance from afar, a first-class military Power which can strike her on one flank, while allies, not less powerful to hurt, strike her on the other. She will surely be beaten. If she were any other of the secondary Powers she would be annihilated. But, being Turkey, she holds a charmed life.

When you have said that she is practically bankrupt ; that the population of her immense territory is less than thirty to the square mile and steadily falling below this beggarly average ; that a good half of it is profoundly disaffected ; that her government is at present in the hands of a body of men who represent, not her Asiatic elements of strength, but the European Byzantinism which is her weakness ; that the great majority of her people is in opposition to the Government—when you have said all this, you have stated Turkey's national account quite correctly on the debit side ; but there remain ' moral ' assets to credit, which, even as things are at the present moment, may compensate.

The least potent of these is the protection hitherto secured to her by the mutual jealousies of each and all of the Powers. Obviously, this has lost value in the actual international situation. If Russia were to move on Constantinople now, Great Britain would hardly wish to thwart her ; and whether the former captured it or was forestalled by a Teutonic occupation, the result to the Ottoman Empire would be about the same. Indeed, even were the Great Powers disengaged, it is doubtful whether any of them would fight nowadays to keep another out of Constantinople, or, for that matter, to keep out a secondary Power of the Balkan group which might be able, alone or with allies, to dispossess the Turk. The strategic and economic importance of Constantinople has long been declining *pari passu* with increase in the power and speed of ships. Even had the Turks taken measures to develop the possibilities of their natural intercontinental land-routes by making the Marmora region a focus of railways and roads, and bridging the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, the all-sea and half-sea routes would still have kept and increased the pre-

ponderant importance which they have already won. As it is—well, every one knows how far, on either the European or the Asiatic side, the Marmora region is a focus of railways or roads ! Moreover, not only the international but the local importance of Constantinople has diminished. The wars of two years ago dealt a knock-out blow to her Balkan position. The control of the peninsula, which she so long dominated, is now in commission at Sophia, Salonica, Belgrade, and Athens. So far as European territories are concerned, Constantinople is become hardly more than the chief town of the small, sparsely inhabited district of Southern Roumelia, which is run by the Government at an annual loss of about half a million.

More potent are the other 'moral' assets of Turkey. These are first (strange to say !) her financial position, and, second (almost stranger !) her prestige. These have saved her from annihilation in the past times and again, and may save her yet. Let us see what they mean, and what limits, if any, there are to their potency.

Turkey's financial position, put bluntly, has been for many years the unsatisfactory but oddly protective one of a debtor, with certain imperfectly realized assets, who is so deeply involved with powerful creditors, but so utterly unable to repay the principal, that their best hope of recouping themselves is to keep him going by further loans. He is not actually bankrupt ; and it is his creditors' interest that he should not be so in form. Accordingly, they not only continue to finance him, but shut their eyes to continued extravagances up to a point. Turkey's chief creditor is France, who held nearly sixty per cent. of the Ottoman Debt before the Balkan Wars, and found thirty millions more for her profligate debtor afterwards. Germany stands second with something

over twenty per cent., and Great Britain comes third with the remainder to her dubious credit. Two of the members of the Triple Entente, therefore, will think a great many times before they push matters to extremes with Turkey; and well does Turkey know it! It is all very well for Russia to propose, as a matter of course, to throttle the unedifying Old Man, but not for France.

If any considerable part of this enormous debt were represented by national plant which, taken over *vi et armis*, might be developed to return a profit on its cost, well and good. But Turkey has taken good care to expend nine-tenths of her loans on transitory and purely unremunerative things. The situation, therefore, is this: whoever, be it Russia or any one else, dispossesses the Turk in any considerable part of his Empire must not only take over a dead weight of virtually unsecured debt, but face the prospect of putting at least as much again into the country before it has the slightest chance of becoming a paying concern.

So the Ottoman Empire has been, and perhaps still will be, allowed to go on its way. It possesses considerable material assets, capable of being developed to far greater value. Although about half its immense extent is desert, steppe, and mountain, the other half includes broad areas of exceptional fertility which produce commodities of exceptional value, such as silk, tobacco, fine wool, and various fruits. Almost all the Empire lies in the most favoured part of the northern temperate zone, and it would be hard to find on the globe districts of greater natural possibilities than the littoral valleys and great upland plains of Asia Minor, the plains of North and Middle Syria, the interfluvial region of Southern Mesopotamia, and the lower basins of the left-bank affluents of the Tigris. Add extra-

ordinary variety and wealth of unexploited minerals in the mountain districts of Asia Minor and Kurdistan, an intercontinental situation and a long sea-board indented with some of the finest natural harbours in the world, and your sum total will represent a potentiality of prosperity which accounts for the fact that the most improvident, uneconomical, and destructive administration in history can still draw profits from Asia. In spite of secular waste, in spite even of the disasters of two years ago, the Ottoman revenue shows progressive elasticity, especially in customs returns from oversea trade, ill as the system of collection is conceived to encourage any trade. Thanks mainly to more careful and honest administration of this department under British supervision, over five millions sterling (nearly twenty per cent.) were added to the revenue between 1908 and the outbreak of the Balkan War, and recovery from the set-back of that war was already pronounced before the present trouble began. One could do almost anything with territories which, having been treated as Asiatic Turkey has been treated, still, in a measure, thrive !

Thus the very desperation of Turkey's financial position has been hitherto a protection to her. The certain loss involved in foreclosure, added to the opposition which any one creditor, who proposed such a course, expected to meet from the rest, has not only deterred all, but left them no choice but to agree to bolster her up. Will this continue to be Turkey's case ? Obviously, if of her own motion she should commit bankruptcy by repudiating her international debt (as, it is stated, she proposes at the present juncture), it will not. Once bankrupt, she loses all protection whatever from her financial position. Not less obviously, the actual inter-

national situation renders it possible and probable that two of her creditors, holding together nearly 80 per cent. of her debt, may agree to foreclose jointly, irrespective of any one else. The question whether they should proceed to do so or not would be influenced no longer by financial interest in keeping Turkey going, but by quite other considerations, to the chief of which we shall come in a moment.

Short, however, of suicide by bankruptcy, will Turkey find her financial position protect her as heretofore ? At an increasing rate during recent years her great creditors have exacted, in return for loans, not merely security for high interest and repayment of capital, but also exclusive concessions in which their nationals may invest. For example, the thirty millions which French bankers agreed to lend to Turkey after the Balkan Wars, imposed extraordinary conditions in the shape of concessions to French capitalists to construct railways, roads, harbour-works, and the like, almost all over the Ottoman Empire. By the present state of war these concessions are all cancelled. France in particular, therefore, stands to lose heavily, even should the interest and capital of her actual loans prove still to be secure. That is to say, a situation has arisen in which one at least of the belligerents may find that its prospective national loss outweighs any gain to be expected from the continued solvency of Turkey ; and even, therefore, should the latter think better of burning her financial boats, she is not unlikely to find the protection which her financial position used to afford her dangerously diminished or even destroyed.

The third and last 'moral' asset, prestige, is less calculable and more elusive, but at the same time more effective and less easy to dispose of. It is in part secular

and in greater part religious. The first element is implied in that name *Roum* by which the western dominion of the Turks has been known ever since the Seljuks won Asia Minor. Apart from the prestige of their own early conquests, the Ottomans inherited, and in a measure retain in the Near East, the traditional prestige of the greatest Empire which ever held it. They stand not only for their own past but also for whatever still lives of the prestige of Rome. Theirs is still the repute of the imperial people *par excellence*, chosen and called to rule.

That this repute should continue, after the sweeping victories of Semites and subsequent centuries of Ottoman retreat before other heirs of Rome, is a paradox to be explained only by the fact that a large part of the population of the Near East remains at this day in about the same stage of civilization and knowledge as in the time of, say, Heraclius. The Turks, be it remembered, were and are foreigners in a great part of their Asiatic Empire equally with the Greeks of Byzantium or the Romans of Italy ; and their establishment in Constantinople nearly five centuries ago did not mean to the indigenous peoples of the Near East what it meant to Europe—a victory of the East over the West—so much as a continuation of immemorial ‘Roman’ dominion still exercised from the same Imperial centre. Since Roum first spread its shadow over the Near East, many men of many races, whose variety was imperfectly realized, if realized at all, by the peasants of Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, have ruled in its name, and the Ottomans, whose governmental system was in part the Byzantine, made but one more change which meant the same old thing. The peasants know, of course, about those Semitic victories ; but they know

also that if the Semite has had his day of triumph and imposed, as was right and proper, his God and his Prophet on Roum—even, as many believed, and some may be found in remoter regions who still believe, on all mankind—he has returned to his own place south of Taurus ; and still Roum is Roum, natural indefeasible Lord of the World.


Such a belief is dying now, of course ; but it dies slowly and hard. It still constitutes a real asset of the Ottomans, and will not cease to have value until they lose Constantinople. On the possession of the old imperial city it depends for whatever vitality it retains. You may demonstrate, as you will, and as many publicists have done since the Balkan Wars and before, what and how great economic, political, and social advantages would accrue to the Turks, if they could bring themselves to transfer their capital to Asia. Here they would be rid of Roumelia, which costs, and will always cost them, more than it yields. Here they could concentrate Moslems where their co-religionists are already the great majority, and so have done with the everlasting friction and weakness entailed in jurisdiction over preponderant Christian elements. Here they might throw off Byzantinism as a garment and no longer be forced to face two ways, but live and govern with single minds as the Asiatics they are. Vain illusion, as the Turkish Imperialists know ! It is Empire that would fall away as a garment so soon as the Near East realized that Turks no longer ruled in the Imperial City. Enver Pasha and the Committee were amply justified in straining the resources of the Ottoman Empire to cracking-point two years ago, not merely to retain Constantinople, but also to recover Adrianople and a territory in Europe large enough to bulk as Roum. Nothing that happened


in that war made so greatly for the continuation of the old order in Asiatic Turkey as the reoccupation of Adrianople. The one occasion on which Europeans in Syria had reason to expect a general explosion was when premature rumours of the entry of the Bulgarian army into Stamboul gained currency for a few hours. That explosion, had the news proved true or not been contradicted in time, would have been a panic-stricken, ungovernable impulse of anarchy, conscious that an old world had passed away and ignorant what conceivable new world could come to be. The perilous moment passed, to be succeeded by general diffusion of a belief that the inevitable catastrophe was only postponed. In the breathing-time allowed, Arabs, Kurds, and Armenians discussed and planned together revolt from the moribund Turk, and, separately, the mutual massacre and plundering of one another. Arab national organizations and nationalist journals sprang to life at Beirut and elsewhere. The revival of Arab Empire was talked of and names of possible capitals and kings were bandied about. One Arab province, the Hasa, actually broke away from the Turks. Then men began to say that the Bulgarians would not advance beyond Tchataldja : the Balkan States were at war among themselves : finally, Adrianople had been re-occupied. And all was as in the beginning. Budding life withered in the Arab movement, and the Near East settled down once more in the persistent shadow of Roum.

That is the lesser element in Turkey's protective prestige, dependent on the retention of Constantinople and doomed to disappear the moment that the Ottoman State relinquishes Europe. Meanwhile there it is for what it is worth ; and it is actually worth a tradition of submission, natural and honourable, to a race of

superior destiny, which is instinctive in some millions of savage simple hearts.

What, then, of the other, the greater element ? The religious prestige of the Ottoman Power as the repository of Caliphial authority, and Trustee for Islam in the Holy Land of Arabia, is an asset almost impossible to estimate. Would a death struggle of the Ottomans in Europe rouse the Sunni world ? Would the Moslems of India, Afghanistan, Turkestan, China, and Malaya take up arms for the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph ? Nothing but the event will prove that they would. They have never done so yet. They have never shown much sign of disposition to do so in any of the crises through which the Ottoman Power has been passing this century and more. Quite recently, indications (such as the manifesto of the Agha Khan) do not point to any prevalent conviction that the fate of Islam is bound up with that of the Turks. Jihad, or Holy War, is a difficult and dangerous weapon for Young Turks to wield : difficult because their own Islamic sincerity is suspect and they are taking the field now as clients of a *giaour* people : dangerous because the Ottoman nation itself includes numerous Christian elements, indispensable to its economy. Still, since one cannot be sure, one cannot, in Great Britain's position, be too careful. The recent Italian attack on an Ottoman possession did lead to a truce of Allah between bitter traditional foes, the Turks and the Arabs in the Yemen, and to active and durable co-operation between the two in the hinterland of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. During the Tabah dispute in 1906, Egypt gave abundant signs that, heartily as she used to hate Turks and Turkish administration, her memory of that enmity was less strong than her sense of solidarity with the leading Moslem Power in its opposition to our Christian selves.







The Ottoman Sultanate undoubtedly can count on its prestige based on religion appealing widely, overriding counteracting sentiments, and, if it rouses to action, rousing the most dangerous temper of all. It is futile to deny, and dangerous to disregard, its possibilities. Especially is it futile to pooh-pooh it because Mohammed V is not of the Koreish, and owes his Caliphate to a sixteenth-century transfer. These facts are either unknown or not borne in mind by half the Sunnites on whom he might call, and weigh far less with the other half than his hereditary dominion over the Holy Cities, sanctioned by the prescription of nearly four centuries. Still less does it avail to quote opinions expressed by Moslem *litterati* in India or elsewhere, that George V, since he rules more Muslamîn than Mohammed V, is the true Caliph ! The vast majority of the Sunni Faithful do regard the Ottoman Sultan as armed with Caliphial authority, so far as any exists. The only question is whether under any possible circumstances that belief would lead to combined action, and if so, to what ? The importance of the religious element in Ottoman prestige lies just in our complete inability to answer that question !

One thing, however, can be foretold with certainty. The religious prestige of an Ottoman Sultar, who had definitely lost control of the Holy Places, would cease as quickly and utterly as the secular prestige of one who had evacuated Constantinople : and since the loss of the latter would probably precipitate an Arab revolt, and cut off the Hejaz, the religious element in Ottoman prestige may be said to depend as much as the secular on Constantinople. All the more reason why the Committee of Union and Progress should not have accepted that well-meant advice of European publicists ! A

successful revolt of the Arab-speaking provinces would indeed sound the death-knell of the Ottoman Empire. No other event would be so immediately and surely catastrophic.

This being so, it is odd that the Committee, which has shown no mean understanding of some conditions essential to Ottoman Empire, should have done so little hitherto to conciliate Arab susceptibilities. Neither in the constitution of the Parliament nor in the higher commands of the Army have the Arab-speaking peoples been given anything like their fair share ; and loudly and insistently have they protested. Perhaps the Committee, whose leading members are of a markedly Europeanized type, understands Asia less well than Europe. Certainly its programme of Ottomanization, elaborated by military ex-attachés, by Jew bankers and officials from Salonica, and by doctors, lawyers, and other *intellectuels* fresh from Paris, is conceived on lines which offer the pure Asiatic very little scope. The free and equal Ottomans are all to take their cue from Turks, and from Turks only of the Byzantine sort which the European provinces, and especially the city of Constantinople, breed. After the revolution nothing in Turkey struck one so much as the apparition on the top of things everywhere of a type of Turk who has the characteristic qualities of the Levantine Greek. Young officers, controlling their elders, only needed a change of uniform to pass in an Athenian crowd. Spare and dapper officials, presiding in seats of authority over Kurds and Arabs, reminded one of Greek journalists. Turkish journalists themselves treated one to rhodomontades punctuated with restless gesticulation, which revived memories of Athenian cafés in war-time. It was the Byzantine triumphing over the Asiatic ; and the most

Asiatic elements in the Empire were the least likely to meet with the appreciation or sympathy of the former.

Are the Arab-speaking peoples, therefore, likely to revolt, or be successful in splitting the Ottoman Empire, if they do? The present writer would like to say at once that, in his opinion, this consummation of the Empire is not devoutly to be wished. Bad, according to our standards, as Turkish government is, native Arab government, when not in tutelage to Europeans, has generally proved itself worse, when tried in the Ottoman area in modern times. Where it is of a purely Bedawin barbaric type, as in the Emirates of Central Arabia, it does well enough; but if the population be contaminated ever so little with non-Arab elements, practices, or ideas, Arab administration seems incapable of producing effective government. It has had chances in the Holy Cities at intervals, and for longer periods in the Yemen. But a European, long resident in the latter country, who had groaned under Turkish administration, where it has always been most oppressive, bore witness that the rule of native Imams, who shook off the Turkish yoke in his time, only served to replace oppressive government by oppressive anarchy.

The substitution of Arab administration for Turkish, therefore, would necessarily entail European tutelage of the parts of the Arab-speaking area in which Powers, like ourselves, have vital interests—Syria, for example, Southern Mesopotamia, and, probably, Hejaz. The best-named, in particular, would involve us in a very ticklish and thankless task. We might put in Egyptians as caretakers, but hardly with much hope of success without a leaven of Europeans, whose residence in the Holy Land would excite unappeasable susceptibilities; and we had better think many times before we exalt an imperfectly

controlled Khedive into Trustee of Islam ! Conceivably, the Shereefial House of Mecca, advised by Indian Moslem officials, might be capable of securing well-being in Hejaz ; but this House has never yet proved itself a satisfactory substitute for the Turk. On the whole, where every alternative course bristles with such difficulties and dangers, one can only be thankful for the Turkish caretaker and loth to see him dismissed.

An Arab revolt, however, might break out whether the Triple Entente desired its success or not. What chance of success would it have ? The peoples of the Arab part of the Ottoman Empire are a congeries of differing races, creeds, sects, and social systems, with no common bond except language. The physical character of their land compels a good third of them to be nomadic predatory barbarians, feared by the other two-thirds. The settled folk are divided into Moslem and Christian (not to mention a large Jewish element), the cleavage being more abrupt than in Western Turkey and the tradition and actual spirit of mutual enmity more separative. Further, each of these main creed-divisions is subdivided. Even Islam in this region includes a number of incompatible sects, such as the Ansariye, the Metawali, and the Druses in the Syrian mountains, Shiite Arabs on the Gulf coast and the Persian border, with pagan Kurds and Yezidis in the latter region and North Mesopotamia. As for the Christians, their divisions are notorious, most of these being subdivided again into two or more hostile communions apiece. It is almost impossible to imagine the inhabitants of Syria concerting a common plan or taking common action. The only elements among them which have shown any political sense or capacity for political organization are Christian. The Maronites of the Lebanon are most

conspicuous among these ; but neither their numbers nor their traditional relations with their neighbours qualify them to form the nucleus of a free united Syria. The ' Arab Movement ' up to the present has consisted in little more than talk and journalese. It has never developed any considerable organization to meet that stable efficient organization which the Committee of Union and Progress directs throughout the Ottoman dominions.

At the present moment this Committee has concentrated in Southern Syria a very considerable force of second-line troops stiffened with German officers, and has secured the co-operation of a majority of the Bedawin tribes of the Syrian and North Arabian deserts by gifts of arms and money. Whatever demonstrations this force may be bidden attempt against the Suez Canal and the Delta, it has, quite possibly, in reality, been collected and concentrated just where it is—at a half-way point between the Syrian and Arabian areas—rather to overawe and keep quiet the Arab-speaking Ottomans than in the hope of achieving a reconquest of Egypt. In any case, so long as it remains effective where it is, it makes a rising either in Syria or the Hejaz very unlikely to happen, and even less likely to succeed.

Whether that force will be able seriously to attack Egypt and what would happen if it did, a layman may be excused from prophesying. It has often been pointed out that the stretch of desert between Gaza and the Nile Delta has never availed by itself to save Egypt from invasion by land ; but, on the other hand, no invader has tried to pass it since parts of its most practicable track and the western ends of all its paths can be reached by naval guns with high-explosive shells. An advance on Egypt from El-Arish, without free use of the coast-track, would have to be made with none but

light artillery and on a very narrow front. Small raiding parties might (with luck) pass our lines and reach the Canal's bank some fifteen miles west between the Bitter Lakes and Kantara, and, if not prevented or observed by patrols (the last not a very probable contingency in view of the strength with which we are now holding this line), could place camel-borne mines in the channel which might sink one or more ships and close the waterway. This seems to be about the limit of effective Turkish action, short of a successful sympathetic rising of the Egyptians themselves.

Per contra, it is easy for Powers which hold the sea to throw a force into Syria. The strip of practicable country between the coast and sheer desert is little more than a hundred miles wide at many points, and both the supplies and the retreat of the Syro-German army of Ma'an would be quickly at the mercy of a few thousand men with good artillery. Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo would be obvious main points to occupy, and with the coast controlled from the sea, Ottoman dominion in Syria, and probably in Arabia as well, would be at an end in a week. If Bedawins continued militant, their exclusion from Syrian and Lower Mesopotamian markets would soon bring them to heel. Even their thin life cannot go on without certain necessities and luxuries, which Arabian oases do not supply. The settled folk, even in the towns, would give little or no trouble, and considerable elements might be expected to greet a French or British expeditionary force with ebullient enthusiasm destined to cool after some years' experience of even-handed western justice, regularity in tax-collection, and sanitary prejudices.

In the rest of the Ottoman Empire what may or will happen in the event of the War being fought to a finish ?

That is, to a finish of the present Turkish policy and armament. Asia Minor will stand by the Turkish cause, even if Europe and Constantinople, and even if the Holy Places and all the Arab-speaking provinces, be lost. Its allegiance does not depend on either the tradition of Roum or the Caliphate, but on essential unity with the Ottoman nation. In fact, Asia Minor *is* Turkey. There the Ottoman nation was formed ; there, prepared equally by Byzantine domination and by Seljukian influence, the great mass of the people long ago identified itself insensibly and completely with the tradition and hope of the Ottomans. The subsequent occupation of the Byzantine capital by the heirs of the Byzantine system, and their still later assumption of Caliphial responsibility, were not needed to cement the union. Even a military occupation by Russia or by any other strong Power would not detach Anatolia from the Turkish unity ; for a thing cannot be detached from itself. But, of course, that occupation might cause the unity itself to cease to be after long years.

Such an occupation, however, would probably not be seriously resisted or subsequently rebelled against by the Moslem majority in Asia Minor, supposing Turkish armaments to have been crushed. The Anatolian population is a sober, labouring peasantry, essentially agricultural and wedded to the soil. The levies for Yemen and Europe, which have gone far to deplete and exhaust it of recent years, were composed of men who fought to order and without imagination steadily and faithfully, as their fathers had fought ; but without lust for war, or Arabian tradition of fighting for its own sake, and with little, if any, fanaticism. Attempts to inspire Anatolian troops with religious rage in the late Balkan Wars were failures. They were asked to fight in too

modern a way under too many Teutonic officers. The result illustrated a prophecy ascribed to Mukhtar Pasha, of Yemen fame. When German instructors were first introduced into Turkey, he foretold that they would be the end of the Ottoman army. No, these Anatolians desire nothing better than to follow their plough-oxen, and live their common village life, under any master who will let them be.

Elements of the Christian minority, however, Armenian and Greek, would give trouble with their developed ideas of nationality and irrepressible tendency to 'Europize'. They would present, indeed, problems of which at present one cannot foresee the solution. It seems inevitable that an autonomous Armenia, like an autonomous Poland, must be constituted ere long ; but where ? There is no geographical unit of the Ottoman area in which Armenians are the majority. If they cluster more thickly in the vilayets of Angora, Sivas, Erzerum, Kharput, and Van, i.e. in easternmost Asia Minor, than elsewhere, and form a village people of the soil, they are consistently a minority in any large administrative district. Numerous, too, in the trans-Tauric vilayets of Adana and Aleppo, the seat of their most recent independence, they are townsmen in the main, and not an essential element of the agricultural population. Even if a considerable proportion of the Armenians, now dispersed through towns of Western Asia Minor and in Constantinople, could be induced to concentrate in a reconstituted Armenia (which is doubtful, seeing how addicted they are to general commerce and what may be called parasitic life), they could not fill out both the Greater and the Lesser Armenias of history, in sufficient strength to overbear the Turkish and Kurdish elements. The widest area which might

be constituted autonomous Armenia with good prospect of self-sufficiency would be the present Russian province, where the head-quarters of the national religion lie, with the addition of the actual Turkish provinces of Erzerum, Van, and Kharput. But, if Russia had brought herself to make a self-denying ordinance, she would have to police her new Armenia very strongly for some years ; for an acute Kurdish problem would confront it, and no concentration of nationals could be looked for from the Armenia Irredenta of Diarbekr, Urfa, Aleppo, Aintab, Marash, Adana, Kaisariyeh, Sivas, Angora, and Trebizond (not to mention farther and more foreign towns), until public security was assured in what for generations has been a cockpit. The Kurd is, of course, an Indo-European as much as the Armenian, and rarely a true Moslem ; but it would be a very long time indeed before these facts reconciled him to the domination of the race which he has plundered for three centuries. Most of the ' Turks ' of Eastern Asia Minor are descendants of converted Armenians ; but their assimilation also would be slow and doubtful. Islam, more rapidly and completely than any other creed, extinguishes racial sympathies.

The Anatolian Greeks are less numerous but not less difficult to provide for. The scattered groups of them on the plateau—in Cappadocia, Pontus, the Konia district—and on the eastward coast-lands would offer no serious difficulty to a lord of the interior. But those in the western river-basins from Isbarta to the Marmora, and those on the western and north-western littorals, are of a more advanced and cohesive political character, being imbued with nationalism, intimate with their independent nationals, and actively interested in Hellenic national politics. What happens at Athens has long concerned them more than what happens at

Constantinople : and with Greece occupying the islands in the daily view of many of them, they are coming to regard themselves more and more every day as citizens of Graecia Irredenta. What is to be done with these ? What, in particular, with Smyrna, the second city of the Ottoman Empire and the first of ' Magna Graecia ' ? Its three and a half hundred thousand souls include the largest Greek urban population resident in any one city. To these problems I call attention, but venture no solution.

Nor, indeed, in anything else concerning the Ottoman Empire does the present writer presume to be among the prophets. He has but tried to set forth what may delay and what may precipitate the collapse of an Empire, whose doom has been long foreseen, often planned, invariably postponed ; and, further, to indicate some difficulties which are bound to confront heirs of Turkey on the morrow of her death and will be better met the better they are understood before her final agony—if this is, indeed, to be !

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