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The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

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Canada Signs Chemical Weapons Convention


At a January 13 ceremony in Paris, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall signed, on Canada's behalf, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, known in short form as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC was negotiated over the past six years in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, of which Canada is a member. Once it enters into force, the CWC will prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, retention and use of chemical weapons and their precursors.

"I am honoured to sign this Convention on behalf of Canada and it is my hope that it signals an end to a tragic chapter in world history," said Mrs. McDougall. "Canadians can take special pride in the conclusion of this treaty. The total abolition of chemical weapons has been one of our arms control objectives ever since Canadian soldiers experienced the horror of gas attacks during the First World War."

Canada was one of 130 countries to become an original signatory to the Convention. The major non-signatories include Iraq, Libya and North Korea. The Convention will come into force 180 days after ratification by 65 countries, but not earlier than January 13, 1995. Canada will ratify the CWC sometime during the next two years, once appropriate legislation is prepared and passed.

To implement the Convention, an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is being established in the Hague. The Organization will comprise:

- a Conference of States Parties, composed of all signatories, which will meet on an annual basis;
- a 41-member rotating Executive Council, consisting of States Parties' representatives, elected for two-year terms (the Executive Council will have day-to-day



External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall at the CWC signing ceremony. Photo by Jean-Bernard Porée

SPECIAL ISSUE ON PEACEKEEPING

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External Affairs and
International Trade Canada

Canada

responsibility for supervising the activities of the Organization); and

- a Technical Secretariat headed by a Director-General.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is estimated to cost about US \$75 million per year. It will be financed on the basis of assessed contributions by signatories.

The main component of the Organization's Technical Secretariat will be the Inspectorate responsible for verifying compliance with the Convention. The CWC's verification provisions are the most rigorous ever developed in a multilateral agreement. They allow the Organization to confirm the destruction of chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles and CW production facilities, to monitor closely any continuing permitted production of certain toxic chemicals, to gather information about the global chemical industry, and, when requested by States Parties, to carry out short-notice "challenge" inspections.

Canada has not produced chemical warfare agents since the Second World War and has since destroyed its CW stockpiles. The Canadian chemical industry will be subject to routine monitoring under the Convention. The "National Authority," which the Convention requires be established in each ratifying state as the contact point for the international Organization, will be set up within an existing federal government department. ■

The CWC in Summary

Article I of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) establishes a complete ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons (CW), and calls for the destruction of all CW stocks and CW production facilities within a specified period. Article I also obliges States Parties that have abandoned CW on another State Party's territory to assume joint responsibility for destroying those stocks.

Articles IV and V set out detailed verification measures for the destruction of CW stocks and production facilities. Complete destruction is to be achieved within 10 years. However, because some states might have economic problems organiz-

Canada Welcomes START II

Canada welcomed the signing of the Second Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) by then-US President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on January 3.

"START II represents the single greatest reduction in destructive power ever mandated by an arms control treaty," said External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall. "Canada is delighted that the new spirit of cooperation between former adversaries has resulted in such a tangible gain for world security."

START II calls for massive reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the US and the Russian Federation, to a level of between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads each by the year 2003. This amounts to a cut of roughly 70 percent from current levels. Heavy, land-based multiple-warhead missiles, generally regarded as the most destabilizing, will be eliminated entirely by both parties.

Mrs. McDougall called on other countries of the former Soviet Union with nuclear weapons on their territory (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) to honour their arms reduction commitments. In particular, she urged those states to fully implement their undertakings with respect to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). "START II constitutes a significant boost for the nuclear non-proliferation process. Its signing takes on even greater significance as we move towards the NPT review and extension conference in 1995," the Minister added.

ing a destruction program, the Convention allows for an extension of this period of up to five more years.

For similar reasons, Article V also permits States Parties to convert to permissible civilian use — rather than destroy — certain production facilities. This can be done only under strict conditions designed to prevent possible re-conversion to CW use. In both instances, additional verification measures will be applied to prevent cheating.

As a safeguard against clandestine CW production, Article VI specifies a comprehensive and graduated regime for routine monitoring of government CW-related production activities and of the global chemical industry. Monitoring will be carried out through national declarations supplemented by international on-site inspections by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The basis of the regime is set out in three schedules (lists) of toxic chemicals annexed to the CWC. Facilities producing chemicals listed on Schedule 1 (which covers agents that *have* been used as chemical weapons) for certain approved purposes, such as developing protective equipment or for medical research, will be subject to the most rigorous verification measures. Facilities producing Schedule 2 (toxic chemicals that *could* be used as chemical weapons and their precursors) or Schedule 3 (toxic chemicals that *might* be used as chemical weapons) chemicals,

will be subject to progressively less rigorous measures. All other chemical production facilities deemed relevant to the Convention — estimated to number in the tens of thousands worldwide — will be liable to occasional random inspection.

Article IX establishes a system for short-notice "challenge" inspections. Under this provision, any State Party's facility or site can be inspected if another State Party has reason to believe that the site is engaged in activities incompatible with the obligations and goals of the Convention. The "challenged" state will not be able to refuse such inspections; it must allow the Organization's inspection team access to such sites, although there are several measures available to a State Party to protect (for national security or other reasons) activities it considers unrelated to the challenge or to the scope of the Convention.

Article XII allows the Organization to require a State Party deemed not to be in full compliance with the Convention to take remedial action. In the event that the offending state fails to do so, the Organization can apply a number of penalties, including voluntary sanctions.

In recognition of the UN Security Council's paramount responsibility for matters affecting international peace and security, cases of particular gravity are to be referred to the Security Council for possible further (mandatory) action under the UN Charter. ■

Peacekeeping: A Canadian Contribution to Global Security

The following article was prepared with the assistance of the Department of National Defence.

A central feature of Canada's foreign and defence policy since the Second World War has been the commitment to promote international peace and security. The effective participation of Canadians in peacekeeping operations has contributed directly to the easing of tensions in trouble spots throughout the world. Over 4,500 Canadian Forces and RCMP personnel are currently deployed on international peacekeeping operations and in Somalia, making Canada one of the leading nations in this field.


Purpose of Peacekeeping

Canada recognizes that international peacekeeping has many limitations and should not be viewed as an end in itself. The purpose of peacekeeping is not only to halt conflict, but also to create conditions in which the search for peaceful solutions to the underlying causes of tensions can take place through negotiations. Canada will continue to place considerable emphasis on the interrelationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts in the difficult process of international conflict resolution.

Canada's Involvement

The Canadian Forces have always been in the forefront of United Nations efforts to keep the peace. In fact, Canada is the only country to have participated in all of the UN peacekeeping operations since 1947. We have sent troops to such far away places as Kashmir (1949-79), West New Guinea (1962-63) and Yemen (1963-64). Canadian military personnel have been associated with such politically delicate operations as clearing mercenaries from Katanga and securing the territorial integrity of the former Belgian Congo (1960-64), now Zaire. They have stood between Egyptians and Israelis in the Sinai (1956-67, 1973-79) and assisted Namibia's transition to independence (1989-90).

Canada has also participated in peacekeeping missions not under the auspices of the United Nations. These include the International Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN, 1968-69); two truce supervisory operations in Indochina — the Interna-



Corporal Bob Berlasty checks movement of vehicles in Dragovic, Croatia. Cpl. Berlasty is attached to the 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, which arrived in October 1992 for a six-month tour of duty with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.
Canadian Forces photo by Sergeant Margaret Reid

tional Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC, 1954-74) and the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS, 1973); one truce supervision in the Sinai, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO, since 1986); and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM, since 1991) in the former Yugoslav republics.

Quite distinct from peacekeeping operations was the Korean conflict (1950-53), in which the Canadian Forces fought under the aegis of the United Nations in defence of a victim of aggression. Although the Korean operation did not fall within the current definition of a peacekeeping operation, it nonetheless represented a major action by the United Nations to restore peace. Some 27,000 members of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force served in the Korean theatre of war over a span of three years, the maximum forces committed at one time being more than 9,000. These forces suffered more than 1,600 casualties, including 516 deaths.

Overall, between 1947 and 1992, tens of thousands of Canadians have participated in peace-restoring, peacekeeping and truce supervisory operations mounted by the United Nations, and in truce super-

visory or observer missions conducted outside the UN framework. Since Korea, 83 Canadians have died while serving in peacekeeping forces.

Recent Commitments

Canada has recently been involved in the following UN-sponsored activities.

Iran-Iraq

The United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was established in 1988 to monitor the ceasefire at the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. Canada provided 15 officers as observers or staff officers for the duration of this mission. During the early months, Canada contributed a communications squadron of 525 troops responsible for setting up the Observer Group's communications requirements along the 1,200 kilometre border between the two countries. On February 28, 1991, the UN Security Council allowed the UNIIMOG mandate to lapse.

Namibia

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was created in March 1989 by the UN Security Council as a military/civilian operation to supervise Namibia's transition to independence.

Canada contributed 301 logistics and support personnel to the operation, which was located outside the Namibian capital of Windhoek. The operation was successfully completed in March 1990.

Central America

The United Nations Observer Group in Central America, known by its Spanish acronym of ONUCA, was created by the UN Security Council on November 7, 1989, to monitor the peace process in that region. At the operation's peak, Canada provided 175 personnel and eight medium and light helicopters. In late January 1992, ONUCA was disbanded.

Haiti

Eleven Canadian Forces officers participated in the UN Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONU-VEH), charged with verifying Haiti's election process. The Canadian observers were part of an unarmed multinational group formed for a four-month period in November 1990. Brigadier-General Gabriel Zuliani, a Canadian Forces officer, was in charge of security aspects of ONUVEH. More recently, Canada provided military advice on peacekeeping to the Organization of American States (OAS) in its efforts to return democracy to Haiti after the September 1991 coup.

Present Commitments

Canada is currently committed to the following activities (figures are as of January 28, 1993).

India-Pakistan

Canadian participation in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) involves the provision of a Hercules aircraft to assist in the twice-yearly moves of UNMOGIP headquarters between India and Pakistan.

Middle East

The Canadian Forces currently participate in two UN operations in the Middle East: the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

UNTSO was the first United Nations peacekeeping mission. It was formed in 1948 to observe and maintain the ceasefire and to assist in supervision of the General Armistice Agreements concluded between Israel on one side and Egypt, Leba-

non and Syria on the other. Canada has been active in the mission since 1954 and contributes 13 officers as observers or staff officers. The mandate is open-ended.

UNDOF was established on the Golan Heights by a UN Security Council resolution in 1974. The 180 Regular and Reserve Force members serving with the Canadian contingent provide logistics, communications and technical support to the UN force. Most members are located at Camp Ziouani on the Golan Heights and in Damascus, Syria, while small detachments are deployed throughout the Area of Separation on the Heights. The mandate is due for renewal every six months (May 30 and November 30).

Cyprus

Canada has contributed peacekeeping troops to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) since 1964. The Canadian battalion is responsible for a sector that includes the city of Nicosia, where opposing factions are often only metres apart. Operations involve manning observation posts along the ceasefire lines, conducting mobile patrols within the sector, investigating ceasefire violations, mediating disputes between the opposing forces and conducting humanitarian relief tasks. This mandate must be renewed every six months (June 15 and December 15).

On December 11, 1992, Canada announced that it will withdraw its peacekeeping force from Cyprus, starting in June (see p. 9). In the meantime, Canada is maintaining a contingent of about 500 military personnel on the island.

Sinai

In response to a request by the governments of Egypt and Israel, Canada agreed in 1985 to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) based in the Sinai Peninsula, separate from United Nations commitments. Until 1990, Canada provided eight helicopters plus aircrew and support personnel. At that time, the size of the force was reduced and the MFO asked Canada to withdraw its eight helicopters. There are currently 27 Canadians serving with this mission.

Afghanistan-Pakistan

Canada was one of 10 countries to provide military observers to the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), which commenced in May 1988. In March 1990,

with the expiry of the UNGOMAP mandate, the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP) was created. A Canadian is one of 10 officers employed in a military advisory role to OSGAP. OSGAP is intended to serve as the basis for any future peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan.

Iraq-Kuwait

The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), established in April 1991, is stationed within a demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border. The Canadian contingent consists of 29 Canadian Forces members, the majority of whom are military engineers, whose task is to clear mines and unexploded ordnance from the demilitarized zone. The mandate is due for renewal semi-annually (April 9 and October 9).

Western Sahara

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established in April 1991. Canadian Major-General Armand Roy was the mission's first Force Commander. The military component of MINURSO consists of 33 Canadian Forces members as observers, movement control and support personnel.

Angola

Canada currently has 15 Canadian Forces members with the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). Established in June 1991, UNAVEM's mandate is to verify the ceasefire and demobilization arrangements agreed to by the government of Angola and the forces of Angolan resistance. This mandate expired in January 1993.

El Salvador

In late January 1992, the members of the observer group that had been part of ONUCA relocated to El Salvador to monitor that country's ceasefire. The move was part of an overall expansion of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNOSAL). The mission's mandate has been extended until the end of May 1993 to ensure the successful completion of the peace process. There are presently five Canadian Forces officers in El Salvador.

Cambodia

The United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) began in 1991.

The Canadian contingent consisted of logistics personnel, administrative support staff and several staff officers. The Canadians were involved in arranging communications relating to the ceasefire and in establishing mine awareness training and demining programs to enable the resettlement of refugees. UNAMIC was the precursor to a much larger force of approximately 16,000 peacekeepers, known as the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The UNAMIC operation ceased in May 1992 as UNTAC commenced. The Canadian UNTAC contingent is now 214 strong and consists of engineers, a transportation logistics unit, a naval contingent and additional headquarters personnel.

Ex-Yugoslavia

Canada is providing some 1,050 personnel to the 13,000-strong United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR I), including an infantry battalion, a combat engineer regiment, military observers and members of the RCMP. The Canadian contingent deployed in late March 1992. Its mandate is to carry out vehicle and foot patrols, establish check points, and perform area and perimeter protection, as well as to maintain routes, carry out mine clearance operations and look after the construction and maintenance of shelters in Croatia.

The Canadian peacekeepers were temporarily

deployed to Sarajevo airport to allow the airlift of humanitarian relief supplies into that city. The battalion returned to Croatia after being relieved by a larger force of French, Egyptian and Ukrainian units. Canadian Major-General Lewis MacKenzie was the first Chief of Staff for the force and later served as Sector Commander Sarajevo.

Another contingent of 1,250 Canadian troops has been dispatched to Croatia to be part of a protection force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR II). Canada is considering a UN proposal to deploy this battalion in Sarajevo. One company of the Canadian contingent with UNPROFOR II has been temporarily redeployed to Macedonia pending the arrival of military personnel from the Nordic countries.

Canada has also been participating in the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) since September 1991. The ECMM's mandate was originally to help broker a ceasefire. It now monitors the ceasefire and any other agreements made between the Serbians, Croatians and Moslems. Unlike the UN contingent, whose movements are restricted to the four UN protected areas, the ECMM is able to operate throughout all of the former republics of Yugoslavia. Twelve Canadians currently serve with the ECMM.

Somalia


On December 3, 1992, the UN Security

Council adopted Resolution 794, which paved the way for a US-led coalition of countries, called the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), to use all necessary means to "establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."

Canada supports Resolution 794 and is contributing to UNITAF, which now numbers over 30,000 troops from 21 countries. The Canadian contingent of over 1,300 military personnel was in the field by the first week of January, replacing Canada's earlier commitment of up to 750 military personnel for peacekeeping duties with the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Resolution 794 authorized the suspension of UNOSOM's deployment. The Secretary-General will likely decide when and where to employ UNOSOM peacekeepers only when order has been re-established in the country.

The main body of the Canadian contingent consists of 900 soldiers from the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (Petawawa, Ontario). The Canadian battalion is presently situated in Belet Huen and is expanding its field of responsibility to include outlying areas. It is supported by Canadian Forces armoured vehicles, a signals platoon, engineers and support staff. In addition, a Canadian Forces supply ship, HMCS *Preserver*, is stationed off Mogadishu to provide logistical and medical support.

Current Canadian Peacekeeping Deployments



Canadian Centre for Global Security / by Trevor Johnston

Canada's Involvement in International Peacekeeping

Canadian participation in international peacekeeping forces and observer missions since 1947 (as of January 28, 1993).

Operation	Mandate	Location	Dates of Canadian Participation	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK)	Supervise elections in South Korea	Korea	1947-48	2	—
United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Supervise ceasefire between India and Pakistan	Kashmir	1949-79	27	—
United Nations Command Korea (UNCK)		Korea	1950-54	9,000	—
United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization Palestine (UNTSO)	Supervise General Armistice Agreements (formed in 1948)	Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria	1954-	22	13
*International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)	Supervise withdrawal of French forces	Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	1954-74	133	—
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)	Supervise withdrawal of French, British and Israeli forces	Egypt (Sinai)	1956-67	1,007	—
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Ensure no infiltration across Lebanese borders	Lebanon	1958	77	—
Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC)	Assist in maintaining law and order	Belgian Congo (now Zaire)	1960-64	421	—
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	Maintain peace and security	West New Guinea (now West Irian)	1962-63	13	—
United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)	Observe withdrawal of Egyptian troops	Yemen	1963-64	36	—
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Assist in maintaining law and order	Cyprus	1964-	1,126	514
Mission of the Representatives of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	Observe withdrawal of OAS forces	Dominican Republic	1965-66	1	—
United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	Supervise ceasefire	India-Pakistan border	1965-66	112	—
*Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN)	Observe ceasefire	Nigeria	1968-69	2	—
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)	Supervise redeployment of Israeli and Egyptian forces	Egypt (Sinai)	1973-79	1,145	—
*International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)	Supervise truce	South Vietnam	1973	248	—
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Supervise redeployment of Israeli and Syrian forces	Syria (Golan Heights)	1974-	230	180
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces	Southern Lebanon	1978	117	—

*Operation outside UN framework

Operation	Mandate	Location	Dates of Canadian Participation	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution
*Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	Prevent violations of peace treaty (Camp David Accord 1979)	Sinai	1986-	140	27
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	Confirm withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1988-90	5	—
United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	Supervise ceasefire and withdrawal of forces	Iran-Iraq	1988-91	525	—
United Nations Transition Assistance Group Namibia (UNTAG)	Assist transition to independence	Namibia	1989-90	301	—
Grupo de Observadores de les Naciones Unidas en Centroamérica (ONUCA)	Verify compliance with Esquipulas Agreement	Central America	1989-92	175	—
Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP)	Military advisory unit	Afghanistan, Pakistan	1990-	1	1
United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH)	Observe 1990 Haitian elections	Haiti	1990-91	11	—
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)	Monitor demilitarized zone	Iraq, Kuwait	1991-	301	29
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Monitor ceasefire	Western Sahara	1991-	—	33
United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)	Monitor ceasefire	Angola	1991-	—	15
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNOSAL)	Investigate human rights violations, monitor progress leading to military reform	El Salvador	1992-	—	5
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)	Monitor ceasefire and establish a mine awareness program	Cambodia	1991-1992	103	—
*European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM)	Monitor and report on the implementation of ceasefires	Yugoslavia	1991-	—	12
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Facilitate communications, establish mine awareness program, provide transportation and other logistical support	Cambodia	1992-	—	214
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	Conduct observation patrols, clear mines, construct and maintain shelters	Yugoslavia	1992-	2,400	2,302
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)	Distribute relief supplies	Somalia	1992-	—	—
*Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF)	Establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations	Somalia	1992-	—	1,361

*Operation outside UN framework

Peacekeeping in the "New World Order"

The following are excerpts from an address by External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall at a seminar on "Canada's Agenda for International Peace and Security" in Ottawa on February 8.

These discussions could not be more timely. Every day, the "New World Order" seems to fall further into disarray. Somalia and the Balkans are stark visual images that have already scarred our future memories of this decade. The return of murderous quarrels in Angola, India and Pakistan, the excuse of religious dogma for widespread, vicious attacks against other ethnic groups and women, and strife in parts of the former Soviet Union provide us with almost universal evidence of the incapacity of human beings to live up to the ideals of peace and harmony that they themselves have helped to establish.

The international community and its institutions were seemingly caught off guard by the rapid and widespread descent into instability that followed the end of the Cold War. No doubt, as the Berlin Wall was enthusiastically knocked to the ground, there were entrails to be read, portents of disintegration to come.

Was the international community not paying attention? Did it ignore warning signals that could have led us towards policies and actions of a different kind? Possi-

Canada's commitments to the United Nations, to multilateralism and to peacekeeping are not at issue. We will continue to be activists when it comes to peace and security, especially through the UN.

The real focus of this seminar must be a hard look at how we can best support the UN and other organizations in achieving and maintaining peace and security in the world.

We cannot ignore the rapid and profound changes that are taking place in the world, nor can we pretend that these changes do not have significant implications for Canada and the international community. For some 40 years the developed world concentrated its attention, its energy, its ingenuity, on managing superpower rivalry. The goal was to avert another world war and, in that respect, we were successful.

But the legacy of our efforts during the Cold War is mixed. It has left us with a number of serious problems, not the least of which are vast arsenals of strategic and conventional weapons. More positively, it has left us with sophisticated alliances and global crisis management systems — possibly somewhat too primitive — to address the new reality.

In recent years, some of the worst excesses of the Cold War era have been addressed. We have worked hard to make real progress on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, verification and confidence-building.

The signings of the START agreement and the Chemical Weapons Convention offer glimmers of hope that we are headed in the right direction. But we have more — much more — to do, especially in light of the diversity and magnitude of the new challenges we face.

Today the international community is called upon to intervene in a multitude of localized or regional conflicts caused by ethnic and religious hostility, the re-emergence of virulent forms of nationalism, famine and the abuse of human rights.

It was with these new threats to international peace in mind that the UN Secretary-General put forward his *Agenda for Peace*. I have, at every available opportunity, including at the UN General Assem-



External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall

bly last year, expressed Canada's support for this report — the most comprehensive since the Charter — because I believe that it maps out creative and effective approaches to international peace and security.

I know that many of you are familiar with the *Agenda for Peace*, so I will not go into great detail about it tonight. However, I do think it is useful to recap briefly the distinct approaches the Secretary-General has outlined, if only to ensure that in our discussions we are all using the same vocabulary.

First, **peacekeeping** — something we are very familiar with in this country, thanks to Lester Pearson. Peacekeeping usually involves military and civilian operations that are carried out with the consent of the parties to a dispute. It may also include assistance to resolve the dispute, such as the missions in Angola and El Salvador. But even this basic definition has been expanded in recent initiatives — for example, with the provision of military escorts for humanitarian aid in the former Yugoslavia.

Second, **peacemaking**. Peacemaking involves diplomatic action, such as the London Conference on Yugoslavia, to prevent or resolve conflicts. Some people tend to

The increased risk of peace missions does not make them less necessary or less desirable.

bly, but I, for one, regard those brief few months of relaxed international tensions as a different kind of portent — a brief vision of what our world can be like if we truly accomplish what we thought we had achieved then: a new level of stability, harmony and hope.

The question the international community is wrestling with now in this period of volatility is, where do we go from here? And the situation Canada happily finds itself in is that our expressed perspective, our skills and our steadfastness to our own ideals may be what the world needs in the face of these dauntingly complex challenges.

As we begin our discussions here today and tomorrow, one thing should be clear:

confuse this with enforcement.

Enforcement is military action, such as the Gulf War and the operation in Somalia, to enforce an end to a conflict without the consent of the parties involved.

Next is **preventive diplomacy**, which is diplomatic action to prevent disputes from turning into conflicts, such as our recent efforts in Kosovo. Another example is South Africa, where Canadians are part of a joint Commonwealth/UN effort to build confidence and trust among domestic parties who are trying to build a new post-apartheid South Africa.

Finally, the *Agenda for Peace* talks about **peacebuilding**. This is post-conflict action to build and support structures that help to prevent a recurrence of violence or conflict.

In our discussions about these approaches and the role Canada should play, we must address a number of developments and issues that may restrict our abilities to contribute to the peace process, now and in the future.

For example, there is now an unprecedented number of UN missions for peace, and others are possible under the aegis of regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Another factor that must be kept in mind is that peace missions today are riskier than ever. The classic precondition of a complete ceasefire has given way to new political realities in complex situations such as the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.

In many situations, we just cannot wait any longer for the beginnings of political settlement before acting, nor can we allow ourselves to be held hostage by factions that see no advantage in peace. Intervening without being invited by all parties to a dispute has made the job of attaining peace riskier, both politically and militarily.

The fact that such intervention is riskier does not make it less necessary or less desirable. Sometimes we must act to put an end to morally reprehensible practices. In other cases we are trying to stop human rights abuses. At times we also may wish to prevent localized conflicts from engulfing other countries or regions. But, no matter what the motive is, when troops are sent uninvited into a territory, the chances for injury or even death increase.

I assure you — we approach this with

Canada to Withdraw from Cyprus

On December 11, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall and then-Defence Minister Marcel Masse announced in a press release that Canada has decided to withdraw its peacekeeping contingent from the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in mid-1993. Canada has been serving in UNFICYP since 1964 and currently has over 500 troops involved, responsible for the critical Nicosia sector. Prior to Canada's 1992 contribution to peacekeeping in the former Yugoslav republics, Canada's largest peacekeeping force was in Cyprus. More than 30,000 Canadian Forces members have served on the island.

"Peacekeeping must never be considered as an end in itself or as a substitute for political leadership, honourable compromise and negotiation," said Mrs. McDougall. "Whether or not Canadian troops remain in Cyprus, it is the Greek and Turkish Cypriots who bear the ultimate responsibility for resolving the dispute."

"Canadian peacekeepers have made a long and successful contribution to keeping peace in Cyprus for 28 years. It is time for other nations to step in and do their part," said Mr. Masse. "Our soldiers will continue to use their expertise to advance the cause of peace elsewhere around the world."

Over the years, the government has carefully reviewed the situation in Cyprus and encouraged a permanent resolution to the conflict. Mrs. McDougall has held numerous consultations on the Cyprus issue with the UN Secretary-General, with the main parties to the conflict, and with the countries contributing troops to UNFICYP, including Britain, Denmark and Austria. Denmark announced in June 1992 that it would be withdrawing its peacekeeping contingent by year's end. Britain and Austria have announced plans to reduce their numbers of military personnel in Cyprus.

"In deciding to withdraw our troops, we are not saying that the United Nations should put an end to its peacekeeping mission in Cyprus," said Mrs. McDougall. "That is a matter for the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the parties involved to consider. We will continue to support the Secretary-General's ongoing efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated solution."

Canada will maintain its peacekeeping contingent in Cyprus through the next round of UN-sponsored negotiations. Canadian troops will be withdrawn in close consultation with the UN, beginning in June. The withdrawal is scheduled to be completed by September.



Canadian peacekeepers on duty in Cyprus.

Canadian Forces photo by Lt. K. Mair

Paying for the Peacekeepers

Canada's assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping have historically ranged from C \$4-15 million a year. By 1991-92, they had risen to C \$32 million and will be about C \$100 million in fiscal year 1992-93. The UN's overall budget for peacekeeping operations funded by assessments (as opposed to voluntary contributions) has risen from a historical figure of some US \$100 million per year to almost US \$3 billion. This compares to the UN regular budget of roughly US \$1 billion. Each time a new peacekeeping operation is mounted, Canada and other Member States are charged their assessed share of the costs of the operation, whether or not they participate directly by deploying personnel.

Voluntary funding presents dangers insofar as it is likely, over time, to erode the UN's financial base and weaken the commitment of Member States to the broad range of UN activities. In Canada's view, all peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy activities should be financed from assessed contributions.

no scales on our eyes and only after thorough analysis, particularly by our military.

Another very serious consideration, as we look at the future of peacekeeping, is cost. The price tag for Canada's assessed contributions to the UN has grown sharply from \$8 million to almost \$90 million annually — in other words, more than a ten-fold increase in a few short years.

Add to that the costs associated with maintaining several thousand troops in various missions abroad, as well as the costs, for example, of civilians acting as electoral observers and the costs of the RCMP in various peace operations, and the price tag is even higher...

Peacekeeping costs are like icebergs — the costs for soldiers and supplies are only the tip, while under the surface is a whole other range of costs. For example, even the most modest contribution of troops abroad must be backed up logistically and otherwise by resources at home.

Clearly, whether future peacekeeping missions are fully funded or not, our financial obligations are growing and will continue to grow. We are already bumping up against resource ceilings for our involvement in missions.

Our financial constraints force us to think hard about the reasons we are involved and the objectives we want to achieve. Other difficult questions also present themselves. Is there a payback to Canada for shouldering our fair burden — and more — of the costs of peace and security? Should there be? Does our involvement serve broader national interests? What are they?

These questions lead us into other areas that reflect the changing needs and require-

ments of each new peace mission — needs very much associated with the human dimension of each operation.

As the Prime Minister remarked at Harvard University in December, "There is a need to bolster the capacity of the United Nations to respond to humanitarian and political emergencies."

Fundamentally, we cannot lose sight of the fact that international initiatives to restore and maintain peace and stability must take into account and respond to the desperation and suffering of the individuals who find themselves trapped in an area of conflict.

Weapons cannot simply be replaced with other types of weapons, forces with other types of forces. The cycles of violence and hatred must be broken with new forms of intervention.

This will place increasing demands on the UN and other organizations and their members to reshape current systems for dealing with hostilities and crises. The United Nations is already under considerable pressure to adjust to these new realities — and we must work with the UN in making its organization and its systems more responsive.

There was a time when peace operations — whether they involved peacekeeping or enforcement — were essentially military operations. But when you consider expanded activities such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding, a much wider range of people, expertise and resources is required.

Consider for a moment the operation in Cambodia: in addition to soldiers, there is a need for legal experts, medical personnel, civil servants and other civilians. We can expect this demand for civilian agents for peace to grow.

Fortunately, in recent months, some of the traditional inhibitions that used to prevent other countries from participating have disappeared. An increasing number of permanent members of the UN Security



Canadian troops with the Unified Task Force in Somalia. The Somali operation, conducted by a non-UN multinational force in support of a UN resolution to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations, illustrates the changing nature of peace missions.

Canadian Forces photo

Council, many Third World countries, and other countries with constitutional restraints, such as Japan and Germany, are now more willing to play an active peacekeeping role. Russia and Ukraine both have troops that can and are being made available for peacekeeping. It will be important, as the participant base is broadened, to ensure the highest possible standards and uniformity of purpose.

These recent developments have important implications for the management of Canada's role in international peace and security. While holding firm to our commitment to the UN and other multilateral peace and security efforts, we must ask ourselves some direct questions and consider the available options for how best to adapt our commitment to the new realities.

For example, in light of the increasing number of countries willing and able to provide troops for peace missions, we might consider how to increase and improve our ability to provide planning, training, command and logistical support.

We could place greater emphasis on Canadian participation in the front end of operations — that is, in the planning phases — where expertise is needed by international organizations and where our involvement could be as effective but less resource-intensive.

We could also place a greater emphasis on training. Since we virtually invented peacekeeping, why not put our experience and expertise to good use, helping other countries who are new to the field?

We might also consider placing greater emphasis on our participation in preventive actions and preventive diplomacy. It was a report by Canadian Ambassador David Peel that led to the creation of a special CSCE mission to Kosovo.

The idea would be to focus our involvement increasingly on the knowledge and skill dimensions of peace and security activities.

No one suggests that it will be easy in a world where deeply-

felt hatreds dominate in many regions, and where democratic values are only superficially understood in others. And the international community may have to re-examine its traditional definitions of sovereignty in order to take preventive action where trouble is looming.

But we must get on with the task. The lives of millions of people around the globe rely on our abilities to find new ways to deal with old problems.

Canada has contributed human and financial resources to every peacekeeping mission since the founding of the UN. Can we continue to do so, taking into account our finite resources and the rapidly expanding demands? How do we reconcile our pride in our past involvement in peace and security, and our stake in the future of peace and security?...

Canada must consider how to adapt its traditional commitment to peacekeeping to the new realities.

Support for peace and security operations has been, and continues to be, a pillar of Canadian foreign policy. It has given us not only a distinctive role in the world, but also an influence in international relations that goes well beyond the normal reaches of a middle power...

Lester Pearson, in his Nobel Prize lecture in 1957, remarked quite pointedly that "the grim fact is that we prepare for war like giants and for peace like pygmies." I would like to think that we, as Canadians, at least have learned some lessons over the past 35 years. By discussing how we can best serve the cause of peace in the years to come, there is no guarantee that we may become "giants," but at least we can avoid the alternative. ■

Regional Peacekeeping: The CSCE

As the result of a Canadian initiative, the 1992 Helsinki Document, The Challenges of Change, makes provision for peacekeeping by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The relevant paragraphs are excerpted below.

Peacekeeping constitutes an important operational element of the overall capability of the CSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management intended to complement the political process of dispute resolution. CSCE peacekeeping activities may be undertaken in cases of conflict within or among participating States to help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort at a political solution.

A CSCE peacekeeping operation, according to its mandate, will involve civilian and/or military personnel, may range from small- to large-scale, and may assume a variety of forms, including observer and monitor missions and larger deployments of forces. Peacekeeping activities could be used, *inter alia*, to supervise and help maintain ceasefires, to monitor troop withdrawals, to support the maintenance of law and order, to provide humanitarian and medical aid, and to assist refugees.

CSCE peacekeeping will be undertaken with due regard to the

responsibilities of the United Nations in this field and will at all times be carried out in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The CSCE, in planning and carrying out peacekeeping operations, may draw upon the experience and expertise of the United Nations.

The Chairman-in-Office will keep the United Nations Security Council fully informed of CSCE peacekeeping activities.

The Council, or the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) acting as its agent, may conclude, because of the specific character of an operation and its envisaged size, that the matter should be referred by the participating States to the United Nations Security Council.

CSCE peacekeeping operations will not entail enforcement action.

Peacekeeping operations require the consent of the parties directly concerned.

Peacekeeping operations will be conducted impartially.

Peacekeeping operations cannot be considered a substitute for a negotiated settlement and therefore must be understood to be limited in time.

Requests to initiate peacekeeping operations by the CSCE may

be addressed by one or more participating States to the CSO through the Chairman-in-Office...

The CSO will exercise overall political control and guidance of a peacekeeping operation.

Decisions to initiate and dispatch peacekeeping operations will be taken by consensus by the Council or the CSO acting as its agent.

The Council/CSO will only take such decisions when all parties concerned have demonstrated their commitment to creating favourable conditions for the execution of the operation, *inter alia*, through a process of peaceful settlement and their willingness to cooperate. Before the decision to dispatch a mission is taken, the following conditions must be fulfilled:

- establishment of an effective and durable ceasefire;
- agreement on the necessary Memoranda of Understanding with the parties concerned; and
- provision of guarantees for the safety at all times of personnel involved...

All participating States are eligible to take part in CSCE peacekeeping operations... Participating States will be invited by the Chairman-in-Office of the CSO to contribute, on an individual basis, to an operation case-by-case...

Costs of CSCE peacekeeping activities will be borne by all CSCE participating States. At the beginning of each calendar year, the CSO will establish a reasonable ceiling for the cost of peacekeeping operations to which the CSCE scale of distribution will be applied. Beyond that limit, other special arrangements will be negotiated and agreed to by consensus...

The CSCE may benefit from resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organizations, such as the European Community, NATO and the Western European Union, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peacekeeping activities. Other institutions and mechanisms, including the peacekeeping mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States, may also be asked by the CSCE to support peacekeeping in the CSCE region.

Decisions by the CSCE to seek the support of any such organization will be made on a case-by-case basis, having allowed for prior consultations with the participating States which belong to the organization concerned. ■



Members of a CSCE mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina to inspect places of detention, with their ECMM escorts, on a police boat going around the front lines from Dubrovnik. Canadian representative Tom Boehm, of EAITC, is second from the left. The mission took place from August 29 to September 4, 1992.

Shaping a New Europe: The CSCE

The following is a summary of the conclusions of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Council meeting held in Stockholm December 14 to 15, 1992. External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall attended on behalf of Canada.

The Ministers consulted on a broad range of issues, in particular the aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the crisis in parts of the former Yugoslavia, other regional crises and issues, together with the strategy and structure of the CSCE.

In the light of serious threats to peace and security in the CSCE area, the Ministers agreed to pursue a strategy of active diplomacy. They will provide the necessary resources.

The Ministers expressed their continuing commitment to use the CSCE to consolidate human rights, democracy, the rule of law and economic freedom as the foundation for peace, security and stability, and to prevent, manage and solve conflicts in the CSCE area.

The Ministers condemned the extended use of force in Europe, which has bred ever more violence and hatred. They strongly rejected continuing flagrant violations of human rights. They committed themselves to act to counter the growing manifestations of racism, anti-semitism and all forms of intolerance in the CSCE area.

Important aspects of the CSCE strategy include:

- strengthening the CSCE's operational capabilities through structural reforms and the appointment of a Secretary-General;
- emphasizing the CSCE's ability to provide early warning through the appointment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities who will enjoy the full political support of all participating States;
- active use of missions and representatives as part of preventive diplomacy to promote dialogue, stability and provide for early warning;
- enhancing opportunities for the peaceful settlement of disputes through the approval of a comprehensive set of measures to this end. The Ministers stressed their expectations that participating States will avail themselves increasingly of these mechanisms;

- effective use of missions and representatives in crisis areas as part of a strategy of consultation, negotiation and concerted action to limit conflicts before they become violent;
- cooperating, as appropriate, with international organizations and with individual participating States to ensure that the broad spectrum of CSCE mechanisms and procedures, including peace-keeping, can be applied;
- increased efforts at treating the root causes of conflicts by applying all aspects of the human dimension of the CSCE and by involving non-governmental organizations and individual citizens more directly in the work of the CSCE;
- making all governments accountable to each other for their behaviour towards their citizens and towards neighbouring states, and holding individuals personally accountable for war crimes and acts in violation of international humanitarian law;
- greater use of the Forum for Security Cooperation as a place for negotiation and dialogue that can ensure continued progress in reducing the risks of military conflict and enhancing stability in Europe; and
- an active program to help newly-admitted participating States to participate fully in the structures and work of the CSCE.

Editor's note: This last was the result of a Canadian initiative. ■

CFE Update

With few exceptions, provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe are being implemented successfully. Equipment destruction is taking place, albeit more slowly than expected, and meetings of the Joint Consultative Group are providing a valuable forum for discussing Treaty-related issues.

Participants have discovered that the arms reduction procedures and associated verification activities are more costly than initially anticipated, leading to some desire for changes. States burdened with high reduction liabilities have proposed revisions to Treaty-mandated destruction processes. These are being reviewed from the perspective of maintaining the standards of irreversibility and verifiability established by the Treaty.

Inspecting states have noted that a greater degree of coordination by all participants would also reduce costs. More attention to timely notification and scheduling of sequential destruction events is anticipated. Over 100 destruction events were scheduled in the first three months of the reduction phase, but more effort will be required to reach the goals established for the first full year of activity.

The increased level of cooperation between States Parties engendered by the CFE process was shown in late January at a NATO-hosted seminar in Brussels. Participants welcomed NATO offers concerning participation by all states in CFE inspector-training courses, and in forming joint inspection teams. Preliminary discussions were also held on the possibility of opening up NATO's CFE database to use by all CFE signatories.

Canada Trains South Korean Inspectors

Eleven senior South Korean military officials were in Ottawa from December 14 to 18 to learn about conventional forces inspection techniques. The verification training seminar, conducted by officials of the

Department of National Defence, EAITC, and Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, was designed to assist South Korean efforts to reduce arms and build confidence on the Korean peninsula.

"For many years now, Canada has specialized in the field of verification techniques," said External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall when announcing the seminar. "As part of the government's efforts to prevent excessive conventional arms build-ups worldwide, I am pleased that we can share this information with our Korean colleagues."

Canada has been strongly supportive of the two Koreas' attempts to improve their mutual relations. In December 1991, North and South Korea signed an "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation," which provides, among other things, for steps to build confidence and reduce arms, with appropriate verification. The two have made some progress in implementing the agreement, but significant difficulties remain.

The Ottawa seminar, which was arranged at the request of the South Korean



Korean participants with their Canadian hosts during the Conventional Forces Inspectors Training Seminar, held in Ottawa in December 1992.

government, provided an opportunity for Canada to pass along the lessons learned from its experience in verifying conventional arms control agreements. Department of National Defence staff have conducted inspections in six countries under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and three under the CSCE Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures. They have participated in approximately 60 trial inspections with Canada's allies.

The seminar complemented a growing bilateral defence relationship between Canada and South Korea. In June 1992, EAITC officials participated in a verification workshop in Seoul. In September, the Korean National Defense College visited Canada, followed by Korean Minister of Defense Choi Sae-Chong in October, the first visit to the other by a defence minister of either country. South Korea has been actively involved in the non-governmental track of Canada's cooperative security dialogue initiative in the North Pacific. Canada expects the December seminar to lead to further practical cooperation in security and related fields, including other aspects of arms control as well as peacekeeping.

In March 1992, Canada hosted a similar five-day verification workshop for representatives of countries of the former Soviet Union. That seminar, conducted in cooperation with the Netherlands and with the assistance of NATO, focused on verification requirements of the CFE Treaty. ■

First Committee Meets Canadian Goals

The First Committee of the 47th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 47), held in the fall of 1992, was a general success. As at UNGA 46, delegations continued to break down the ideological divide that had stymied past sessions, and to pursue a more pragmatic approach. For the first time, the Committee adopted over 60 percent of its resolutions by consensus. Canada achieved all of its objectives, with the related resolutions passed either by consensus or by a strong majority vote.

The Canadian delegation, led by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason, entered the session with six main goals.

CWC

Canada aimed to promote a resolution calling on UNGA to adopt the draft Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to set an early date for its signature. There was some concern that countries would continue to pursue CWC negotiating objectives through modifications to the resolution text and that others might try to incorporate a higher national or group profile. Canada, along with Germany and Poland, successfully led the campaign to ensure that the Committee passed by consensus — with a record 144 co-sponsors — a resolution endorsing the Convention and specifying a January 1993 signing date.

NPT

Working with others, Canada hoped to ensure a smooth launch of the process leading to an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the Treaty's Fifth Review Conference in 1995. The First Committee passed a resolution mandating the formation of a Review Conference Preparatory Committee, which will hold its first meeting in New York from May 10 to 14. One hundred and thirty-three countries voted in favour of the resolution, no country opposed it, and only Cuba and India abstained. In the subsequent General Assembly vote, the "yes" count increased to 168, although India afterwards requested that its vote, mistakenly cast as "yes," be changed to an abstention.

Transparency in Armaments

Canada wanted to follow up on the UNGA 46 establishment of a UN arms register, which is a key component of Canada's action plan to prevent excessive build-ups of conventional arms. At UNGA 47, the Canadian delegation campaigned in favour of a resolution endorsing the report of a panel of experts, which specifies procedures for the register's operation (see *Disarmament Bulletin 19* for details). This will enable 1992 reports to be submitted on schedule, by April 30, 1993. The resolution was adopted by consensus.

Verification

Canada took the lead in drafting a resolution that called, in effect, for an update of the Canadian-initiated 1990 UN study of the UN role in verification. The aim was to take account of lessons learned from the experience of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), and to consider how verification could facilitate UN activities with respect to preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. The resolution met with some opposition from countries that, *inter alia*, questioned the usefulness of studying the UNSCOM experience at this stage. Canada crafted an amended resolution that delays the proposed study while Member States' views are solicited. The amended resolution passed by consensus.

Canada Pays 1993 UN Contribution

On December 31, 1992, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall announced that Canada has paid its annual assessed contributions to the 1993 Regular Budget of the United Nations and of the major UN specialized agencies.

"By making payment before the end of the year," said Mrs. McDougall, "Canada wishes to show our support for the essential work of the United Nations in international peace and security, humanitarian assistance, and furthering human rights and development throughout the world. Payment of UN dues in full and on time is a treaty obligation, and Canada calls upon all Member States to meet their obligations in a timely fashion." The Minister stressed that the UN continues to face a serious financial crisis that threatens its ability to carry out the new tasks that it is regularly asked to take on, particularly in the field of peacekeeping.

Canada's assessed contribution to the UN's Regular Budget for 1993 stands at 3.11 percent, or US \$31,743,607. Canada has also paid its 1993 assessed contributions to the major UN specialized agencies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition to its contribution to the UN's Regular Budget, Canada pays assessed contributions of about US \$80 million a year to 10 UN peacekeeping operations.

CTBT

The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) is a long-standing Canadian objective and Canada aimed, at UNGA 47, to generate further support for this objective, buoyed by the French, Russian and US testing moratoria. The CTBT resolution was adopted by a vote of 159 in favour, one opposed (US) and four abstentions (China, France, Israel, UK). This exceeds the favourable margin achieved at UNGA 46, where the vote was 147 in favour, two opposed (France, US) and four abstentions (China, Israel, Micronesia, UK).

Cut-off

Canada introduced its traditional resolution calling for the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In light of the recent (and prospective) large-scale dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the US decision to unilaterally cease production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, Canada hoped for even broader support than in the past for this

resolution. In the event, the vote was 164 in favour, none opposed, and three abstentions (India, UK, US). France later requested that its "yes" vote be changed to an abstention. This compares favourably to the UNGA 46 tally of 152 in favour, two opposed (France, US) and three abstentions (China, India, UK).

In addition to taking the lead or acting as an original co-sponsor on several important resolutions, including the above, Canada was instrumental in brokering the deal that enabled the UN Disarmament Commission resolution to pass by consensus and played a key role in launching the process of UN arms control and disarmament reform.

With the end of the Cold War, the major powers appear less interested in entering into multilateral arms control negotiations resulting in legal commitments. Instead, they seem to favour unilateral undertakings at a political level. Canada, among others, believes that multilateral institutions provide a more stable environment in which to achieve security. The changing UN role in international security — and unease among some non-aligned

delegations about the growing influence of the Security Council — underlay First Committee deliberations and had the positive effect of making delegations focus and cooperate on ways of dealing with the reform process.

During UNGA 47, Canada also successfully chaired both the Barton Group and the newly-constituted Group of Democratically Oriented States (GODOS). This last, like the Barton Group, provides a forum for consultation on resolutions. GODOS has a broadly-based membership that cuts across traditional East-West and North-South dividing lines.

The First Committee will reconvene from March 8 to 12 in New York for a special session with the purpose of reassessing the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery. Member States will examine the respective roles of the First Committee, the UN Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, and will look at ways to enhance the efficiency of these bodies. The aim is to reach agreement on recommendations for action. ■

Reassessing the UN Disarmament Machinery

In a decision adopted by the General Assembly at UNGA 47, Member States were asked to provide their views on UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report entitled "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in The Post-Cold War Era." Below are excerpts from Canada's official response, focusing on the roles and functioning of the UN disarmament machinery. See Disarmament Bulletin 19 for further Canadian reaction to the Secretary-General's report.

We strongly agree with the Secretary-General that the time is ripe for a thorough reassessment of the UN disarmament machinery in order to ensure that it is able to meet new realities. A useful starting point is to recall the main functions of each of the three multilateral arms control and disarmament (ACD) bodies — the First Committee, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) — then to identify problems in the effective carrying out of these roles, and finally to identify practical means of responding to these problems.

The First Committee

In Canada's view, the role of the First Committee — a global, deliberative body — is to identify priorities on the multilateral ACD agenda and to build support and momentum as an essential first step in the broader process of international norm-building as it relates to arms control and disarmament. This process not only contributes to the identification and promotion of broad principles, but increasingly — as the arms register so graphically demonstrates — focuses on concrete steps that the international community can take towards the achievement of these broad goals or norms.

The First Committee continues to provide a useful framework for the UN membership to elaborate and clarify positions on a variety of ACD issues. Rationalization of the First Committee's work is progressing by, for example, combining the debate on disarmament and international security items. We should now take the logical next step of combining action on these two sets of items. Only then will we

have fully integrated our consideration of means — ACD measures — with our desired end — the maintenance of international peace and security.

We need to accelerate the task of rationalization, of setting concrete and practical priorities, and of ensuring fewer resolutions and more genuine dialogue. Now that East-West polarization is over, there is the possibility for greater functional cooperation on specific issues among delegations from differing groups and perspectives...

The UNDC

The UNDC's primary role is to allow focused discussion of a limited agenda without the pressure of voting on resolutions. Its function encompasses conceptual discussion, consensus-building with respect to arms control and international security-related issues (e.g., transfer of technology), as well as the identification of global and regional measures for negotiation elsewhere. The UNDC also prepares *(continued on p. 17)*

Resolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament and International Security Adopted at UNGA 47

Resolutions Supported by Canada

RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
*47/39 (Germany)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	Consensus
*47/44 (Germany)	The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields	Consensus
*47/45 (Canada)	Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification	Consensus
*47/47 (Mexico)	Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty	159-1-4
47/48 (Egypt)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	Consensus
47/49 (Pakistan)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	144-3-13
47/50 (Pakistan)	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	162-0-2
*47/51 (Venezuela)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	164-0-2
47/52A (Peru)	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee	168-0-0
*47/52B (Russia)	Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	Consensus
*47/52C (Canada)	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	164-0-3
47/52D (Kenya)	Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	Consensus
*47/52E (Australia)	Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques	Consensus
47/52F (Indonesia)	Relationship between disarmament and development	Consensus
*47/52G (Peru)	Regional disarmament	Consensus
47/52H (Russia)	Study on defensive security concepts and policies	Consensus
*47/52I (UK)	Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe	Consensus
*47/52J (Pakistan)	Regional disarmament	168-0-1
*47/52K (Indonesia)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	Consensus
*47/52L (Netherlands)	Transparency in armaments	Consensus
*47/53A (Nigeria)	United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Program	Consensus
*47/53B (Singapore)	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia	Consensus
47/53D (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	Consensus
47/53F (Cameroon)	Regional confidence-building measures	159-1-1
*47/54A (Canada)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
47/54B (UK)	Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters	Consensus
*47/54C (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	Consensus
*47/54D (UK)	Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures	Consensus
47/54E (Belgium)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	Consensus
*47/54F (France)	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research	166-0-2
47/56 (Sweden)	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	Consensus
47/58 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	Consensus

*Resolution co-sponsored by Canada

RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
*47/60B (Russia)	Maintenance of international security	79-0-84
47/61 (Mexico)	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	Consensus
47/76 (Kenya)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	Consensus
Decisions		
I (Colombia)	International arms transfers	Consensus
II (Peru)	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	Consensus
III (Togo)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	Consensus
IV	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session	Consensus

Resolutions Opposed by Canada

47/53C (India)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	126-21-21
47/53E (Mexico)	Nuclear arms freeze	121-19-27

Resolutions on which Canada Abstained

47/43 (India)	Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	128-3-30
47/46 (Mexico)	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	118-2-41
47/55 (Qatar)	Israeli nuclear armament	64-3-90
47/59 (Indonesia)	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	129-3-35
47/60A (Indonesia)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	122-1-43

A resolution on the "Question of Antarctica" (47/57) was also adopted by a vote of 96-1-9. Canada, along with 61 other countries, did not participate in the vote.

*Resolution co-sponsored by Canada

Reassessing the UN Disarmament Machinery (continued from p. 15)

the groundwork for the CD through the development of principles as well as by providing, at least potentially, a degree of focus for the CD agenda.

We believe that a mechanism is required to provide a greater degree of linkage between the UNDC and the CD in order for UNDC deliberations to become more relevant and results-oriented... In the longer term, when membership of the two bodies is more similar, the merging of the two may be feasible, especially if cost factors can be overcome. Greater linkage between the UNDC and the CD will, however, be problematic as long as membership of the CD remains restricted and UNDC membership universal.

Within the UN, the reform process in the UNDC is most advanced. For example, we are well on the way to achieving a

rolling, three-item agenda which, on the one hand, ensures a degree of predictability while, on the other, allows us to incorporate contemporary issues in a timely manner.

Beyond this, the UNDC is at the stage where it has too much time to engage in general debate but — without more advance preparation by delegations — too little time for in-depth dialogue on complex issues in which there exist some rather fundamental differences of view. In order for the Disarmament Commission to live up to its full potential, every effort must be made to circulate focused working papers — preferably reflecting joint efforts of a number of countries spanning differences of view — in advance of the session so delegations come prepared for in-depth dialogue.

The CD

The primary role of the Conference on Disarmament is to negotiate global arms control and disarmament instruments. The CD can also usefully conduct pre-negotiation discussions, as it currently does on a nuclear test ban and outer space. Conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention has, however, temporarily exhausted a meaningful agenda for that body. Negotiation in the CD of a treaty to eliminate all nuclear testing in all environments for all time remains a priority objective. There should be strong verification provisions building on the work of the Group of Scientific Experts to establish global monitoring mechanisms.

CD procedures and membership are closely linked but subsidiary to its substantive negotiating agenda. We have recog-

nized for some time that the current CD membership, and possibly the CD itself, no longer reflect the changing international security environment. We are in favour of broadening CD membership to admit those states that have formally applied.

We also hope that the CD can energize movement on the issue of transparency in armaments. We hope that the current session of the CD will provide productive debate on this issue as well as with respect to radiological weapons and outer space.

The Secretary-General suggested in his report that the CD take on the role of a permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. Canada has reservations about the notion of having the CD take on such a role. The focus of the CD should not be diverted away from being the sole body in the United Nations with the authority to negotiate global arms control agreements.

Conclusion

The three multilateral ACD bodies have distinct, yet complementary and inter-related, functions. In Canada's view, the resumed session [of the *First Committee, March 8 to 12*] therefore offers a unique opportunity to:

- (1) reaffirm the distinctive roles of each of the three multilateral ACD bodies and of the Office for Disarmament Affairs as the "focal point" for multilateral ACD activity;
- (2) provide additional impetus to the ongoing work of rationalization of the three ACD bodies; and
- (3) provide for focused consideration of practical ways to enhance the effective interaction of these bodies...

We agree with the Secretary-General's assertion that...the process of conflict resolution must be supported by concrete arms control and disarmament measures.

Beyond this, is the need to liberate the term "arms control and disarmament" from its Cold War preoccupation with numbers of weapons. As important as this is, arms control and disarmament is now seen both to embrace and to constitute part of a far broader process of confidence-building, of transparency, of accountability and, most importantly, of promoting less reliance on weapons and more reliance on genuinely cooperative mechanisms for creating and enhancing international peace and security. ■

Focus: On Peacekeeping

Focus is written primarily for secondary school students.

The end of the Cold War has led to an increase in demand for international peacekeepers. The number of United Nations peacekeeping operations launched in the last four years is as great as the total number launched in the previous 40. Almost every evening, television screens are filled with pictures of peacekeepers at work in Yugoslavia, Cambodia or elsewhere. This recent recognition of the importance of peacekeeping is no surprise to Canadians, who have been strong supporters of the concept since its beginning. But the nature of peacekeeping is changing, raising new questions for Canada and the international community.

The Origins of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter. The founders of the UN thought that maintaining international peace and security would be the task of the great powers in the Security Council, using their military forces as well as those of other UN members. However, this arrangement depended on agreement among the great powers, which soon became impossible because of East-West tension.

Between 1945 and 1956, the UN created a number of truce supervisory groups, including in the Middle East and in Kashmir, on which Canadians served. The first UN peacekeeping force was established in November 1956 during the Suez crisis. When fighting broke out between Israel, Britain and France on the one side and Egypt on the other, the Security Council was deadlocked. Canada's External Affairs Minister, Lester Pearson, proposed the formation of a UN force to separate the fighting parties and maintain peace in the area until a political settlement could be reached. The General Assembly approved his suggestion and the UN Secretary-General appointed a Canadian, Major-General E.L.M. Burns, to head the new UN Emergency Force (UNEF).

Canada contributed to UNEF until the force was removed at Egypt's request in 1967. Mr. Pearson, who later became Canada's prime minister, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his role in the Suez crisis.

Traditional Peacekeeping

Since the birth of UNEF, peacekeeping has been used to reduce tensions in more than 20 conflicts around the globe. It has played a particularly important role in the Middle East, the Belgian Congo (now Zaire) and Cyprus. In general, a peacekeeping operation is characterized by the following:

- a multinational force, under UN command, loaned by countries not involved in the dispute and thus seen as impartial. Typical providers of peacekeeping forces include Australia, Austria, Canada, Ireland, Norway, Poland and Finland;
- advance consent of all the fighting parties. It may seem surprising that hostile countries and factions would ask for or agree to UN intervention. In practice, though, peacekeeping has often provided parties with a face-saving alternative to continued fighting;
- arrival of peacekeepers only *after* a ceasefire has been achieved; and
- no use of force, except in self-defence. UN peacekeeping forces are only lightly armed. They are allowed to use force only if they are attacked or if armed persons try to stop them from carrying out their orders.

When a UN Member State, a group of states or the Secretary-General proposes establishment of a peacekeeping operation, three basic conditions must be met. First, the parties to the conflict must be agreeable to the idea. Second, the proposal must enjoy broad international support; specifically, it must be adopted by the Security Council. This means that at least nine of the 15 Security Council members must vote in favour of the proposal, and that none of the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) vote against it. Third, Member States must be ready to volunteer the troops needed.

Once these conditions are met, the Secretary-General makes the arrangements to establish the force. This involves choosing a force commander and asking Member States to provide troops, supplies and equipment, transportation and logistical support. The Security Council must approve these arrangements.

Soldiers involved in a UN peacekeep-

ing mission wear UN blue berets or blue helmets with the uniforms of their own countries. They serve under the operational command of their commanding officer (who takes orders from the Secretary-General) but they remain under the commands of their own countries in matters of pay, discipline and promotion.

The aim of a peacekeeping force is to maintain a ceasefire and prevent a resumption of fighting so that the warring parties can try to work out a settlement to their dispute. Peacekeeping is not an end in itself, but must be part of a wider political process to bring a conflict to an end.

Peacekeepers can do many things. They may be assigned to observe a situation and report on it to the Secretary-General. They may be asked to investigate ceasefire violations or to supervise troop withdrawals. They are also used to patrol buffer zones. In addition, peacekeepers often provide emergency medical services, assist in the resettlement of refugees, and work to restore normal civilian activities in war-torn areas.

Peacekeepers can prevent fighting from breaking out by blocking the movement of troops and arms, and by reminding fighting parties that the eyes of the world are upon them. However, for peacekeeping to work well, there must be a peace to be kept and the peacekeepers' role must be clearly understood and welcomed by the local parties. If local support is lacking, peacekeepers can find their freedom of movement and use of technologies tightly constrained. Moreover, if not all armed groups are supportive of the UN presence, the peacekeepers may wind up in situations where they are under fire and cannot do their job.

The UN is not the only operator of peacekeeping forces. Regional bodies, including the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of American States, and the European Community, have also launched peacekeeping missions, though on a much smaller scale than the UN.

Canada and Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is a particularly Canadian contribution to the UN. In addition to proposing the first organized peacekeeping force, Canada is the only country to have participated in all of the UN peacekeeping operations (see pp. 6-7 for a list). More than 87,000 Canadians have served

abroad in UN operations, and more than 80 have died while on peacekeeping duty. Canadian troops have also participated in peacekeeping and observer operations outside the UN. Because it is detached from most disputes in a way that major powers cannot be, Canada is viewed as an objective participant. It also has the diplomatic, economic and military resources to make a significant contribution to peacekeeping missions.

Canadian troops have developed a reputation as being among the world's best peacekeepers. They are needed for their technical skills as engineers, logisticians, communicators, commanders and staff planners. They are also wanted for their combat skills in riskier operations.

Each request for a Canadian contribution to peacekeeping is considered on its own merits. Canada's decision on whether or not to participate is based on the following guidelines:

- there must be a threat to international peace and security, as determined by the Security Council;
- the main parties in the dispute must agree to the peacekeeping mission and to Canada's participation;
- the operation should be linked to an agreement by the parties to work towards a political settlement;
- the operation must be accountable to a political authority, such as the Security Council;
- the operation must have a clear and realistic mandate; and
- the operation must have sufficient funding and logistical support.

Peacekeeping's Future

The end of the Cold War has made possible an end to fighting in many regional conflicts (e.g., in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Central America) leading to a demand for peacekeepers. It has also allowed the emergence of conflict in previously tightly controlled areas (e.g., Yugoslavia), further spurring the demand for peacekeepers. Most importantly, the end of the Cold War has made Security Council agreement on UN intervention more likely.

As the UN becomes more involved in maintaining global peace and security, peacekeeping is taking on new forms. Peacekeeping missions today have broader roles, more players and more clearly defined mandates than peacekeeping operations in the past. Whereas

peacekeeping traditionally aimed mainly at containing conflict, peacekeeping is now part of a range of conflict-resolution activities that often blur into each other. In addition to peacekeeping, these include:

- preventive diplomacy, or activities designed to prevent disputes from arising in the first place, to keep them from worsening or to keep them from spreading. Examples include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections and monitoring;
- peacemaking, or activities designed to bring hostile groups to agreement peacefully. Examples include the provision of good offices, negotiation, mediation and arbitration;
- enforcement, or military activities designed to make states comply with a Security Council resolution; and
- peacebuilding, or activities — once the conflict has ended — designed to strengthen peace and prevent conflict from starting again.

Recent peacekeeping operations are much more complex than earlier ones. Peacekeeping missions today contain not only the traditional military forces, but also police, electoral officials, human rights officials and other civilians. Peacekeepers are increasingly being used to monitor human rights, organize elections, resettle refugees, supervise disarmament and rebuild economies.


In Namibia in 1989, the UN operation not only monitored a truce but also undertook a wide range of military, political, humanitarian, economic and social functions. The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNOSAL) is playing a major role in restructuring El Salvador's police and in monitoring human rights violations. In Cambodia, the UN peacekeeping force is providing a transitional government. Protection of humanitarian relief operations was a new task for UN troops in northern Iraq, and is the main mission of the (non-UN) multinational force in Somalia.

There is a growing belief that the UN should be more willing to intervene in conflict situations, particularly where there is a clear need for humanitarian assistance. As things now stand, however, the UN can hardly cope with existing peacekeeping demands, let alone consider new ones. Although it is an increasingly frequent and important UN function, peacekeeping is still handled as if it were a rare emergency activity. The UN staff for overseeing peacekeeping operations is small, scat-

tered in many locations, and overworked. As well, peacekeeping does not receive enough funding. Many Member States do not pay a fair share of peacekeeping expenses, pay late or do not pay at all.

The UN Secretary-General has prepared a report called *An Agenda for Peace* that looks at ways to strengthen the UN capacity for preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping. Some of his recommendations include allowing the UN to intervene in situations that would in the past have been looked on as being a state's internal affairs. As well, he proposes that well-armed "peace enforcement units" should be at the disposal of the UN, able to deploy to trouble spots in 48 hours or less.

As one of peacekeeping's "old hands" and major contributors, Canada will have much influence in the debate on the future direction of peacekeeping. Already Canada has made clear that the peacekeeping tradition should be enlarged to protect people as well as states, as proposed by the Secretary-General. Canada has also called on all UN members to pay their peacekeeping bills promptly. Canada will continue to make a strong contribution to international security through peacekeeping, a contribution that includes people, equipment, experience and ideas.



Canadian Forces Master Corporal Hugh Mackenzie takes down the name of a Serbian from whom soldiers confiscated a C-79 automatic weapon while on peacekeeping patrols in the UN Protected Area. As part of the UNPROFOR mandate to demilitarize the area, locals are not allowed to carry automatic weapons. Canadian Forces photo by Sergeant Margaret Reid

Forecast

Arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, April through July 1993.

Ongoing: CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE Joint Consultative Group, Vienna

Ongoing: Open Skies Consultative Commission, Vienna

April: Middle East Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, Washington

April 19-23: CWC Preparatory Committee, The Hague

April 19 - May 10: UN Disarmament Commission, New York

May 10-14: NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee, New York

May 10 - June 25: CD in session, Geneva

July 10 - September 2: CD in session, Geneva

Acronyms

ACD — arms control and disarmament
 CD — Conference on Disarmament
 CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
 CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
 CSO — (CSCE) Committee of Senior Officials
 CTBT — comprehensive test ban treaty
 CW — chemical weapons
 CWC — Chemical Weapons Convention
 EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
 ECMM — European Community Monitoring Mission (Yugoslavia)
 GODOS — Group of Democratically Oriented States
 NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
 OAS — Organization of American States
 RCMP — Royal Canadian Mounted Police
 START — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
 UNDC — UN Disarmament Commission
 UNEF — UN Emergency Force (Middle

East)
 UNFICYP — UN Force in Cyprus
 UNGA — UN General Assembly
 UNOSAL — UN Observer Mission in El Salvador
 UNPROFOR — UN Protection Force (Yugoslavia)
 UNSCOM — UN Special Commission (on Iraq)
 For additional peacekeeping mission acronyms, see pp. 6-7.

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