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Missionaries slain

Rhodesian government guilty of massacre

NEW YORK (LNS-CUP) -- "Seven White Missionaries Slain In Rhodesia" blared the headlines in the western press in early February. Ian Smith's white minority regime lost no time in blaming black guerrillas and described the killings as "an infamous act carried out with all the animal brutality and cowardice which terrorists practice."

Immediately the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front, the political organization associated with the Zim-



Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith would lead us to believe that the liberation movement massacred seven missionaries, despite evidence to the contrary.

imbabwe People's Army, refuted the charges. In a statement broadcast from Maputo, Mozambique, the liberation organization attributed the slayings to the Selous Scouts -- a special elite force of black soldiers within the Rhodesian army.

But massacres against whites are, line-for-line, a bigger story to western press, and the Patriotic Front's refutation was buried, or when mentioned, its validity questioned.

"Seven whites were killed and the guerrilla leadership denied any role in it, but it makes big front page stories for several days," commented

one observer of African affairs. "But Ian Smith orders -- and admits ordering -- his armed force to invade Mozambique and kill hundreds of civilian black refugees, and you can't find the story on the western press."

SELOUS SCOUTS

The Selous Scouts, reports Guardian correspondent Sara Rodrigues in Luanda, are similar to the special forces organized by Portugal during its colonial wars in Africa -- the Flechas in Angola and the Groupus Especialis in Mozambique. According to the Patriotic Front, the Scouts disguise themselves as guerrillas to make it seem as though their actions were the work of the guerrillas.

And the Feb. 7 murder of the missionaries was not the first Selous Scout action. On Dec. 5, 1976, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bulawayo was killed in similar circumstances and on Dec. 19 twenty-seven tea plantation workers near Mozambique's border with Rhodesia were massacred in front of their families. Both attacks were blamed on the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA).

Just prior to the killing of the missionaries -- and perhaps one of the reasons for it, speculates Guardian correspondent Rodrigues, the Rhodesian government suffered an embarrassing bit of press coverage. In late January, Rhodesia claimed that ZIPA had abducted 400 Zimbabwe students from a Protestant mission school and took them to neighboring Botswana for involuntary guerrilla training.

"This too gathered big international headlines for a day," reports Rodrigues, "until the children were located in Botswana and told their story."

It turns out that the students had left on their own accord, having planned to escape several months in advance. They decided to leave because they were under pressure to join the Rhodesian Army, and had withheld school fees for the term in anticipation of their departure. Many of the students reported from Botswana that they were planning to join ZIPA -- voluntarily.

GOV'T FEAR TACTICS

In general, most of the government's stories of "terrorist brutality" find their way into the commercial press as unquestionable fact. A government booklet entitled "Harvest of Fear," for instance, has been widely circulated to the press. Illustrated with grisly photographs of murdered blacks, it accuses the guerrillas of "horrific acts of murder, mutilation, and even cannibalism"

directed at blacks as well as whites."

The minority regime's claims may reach sympathetic ears in the West, but attempts to divide blacks from guerrilla movement with these stories have been far from successful. New York Times reporter John Burns, writing from the Rhodesian capital, Salisbury, grudgingly admits that there is widespread belief that government provocateurs committed the murders.

Burns quotes a young waiter as saying about the missionaries deaths, "The Freedom fighters do not want to hurt friends of the African people." The waiter had gone to a mission school.

ROLE OF THE CHURCH

It is no coincidence that the church is coming under attack by the Rhodesian government, and the Patriotic Front alluded to that in its statement. Throughout southern Africa over the past few years the Catholic and Protestant churches (with the exception of South Africa's Dutch Reformed) have increasingly supported black majority rule.

In Zimbabwe, one of the most outspoken clergy has been Bishop Donal Lamot of Umtali. Last year, the government moved against the Bishop, charging him with failing to report the presence of guerrillas in his mission station. He pleaded guilty, saying at his trial that "I would have to behave the same way" in the future. Lamot was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Mission hospitals are known to treat wounded guerrillas, reports Guardian correspondent Rodrigues. In addition, the churches provide education for more than 1.3 million black primary students and two-thirds of Rhodesia's 40,000 black secondary school pupils.

Given the increasing support from the missionaries, concludes Rodrigues, "it would be ridiculous for the patriotic forces to turn their guns on white nuns and priests."

In the week that the seven missionaries were killed, the government troops killed 12 black "curfew breakers" and 16 others, 8 of them who were said to have been "running with terrorists."

These nameless victims take their place with the thousands of other casualties of Rhodesia's desperate fight to maintain minority rule. Last year, in perhaps the government's most bloody action, Rhodesian troops attacked the Nyzaonia refugee camp in Mozambique, and acknowledge killing 350. The Mozambican government put the toll at 673.

CIA bribes to leaders exposed

They were the best world leaders money could buy. And the CIA bought as many as it could.

Last week the names of a few became public. They read like a who's who of world affairs: King Hussein of Jordan. Willy Brandt of West Germany. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya. Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire -- to name a few. They all were on the CIA's payroll at one time or another, and many are probably still getting bribes.

The most detailed exposures were of the 20-year long relationship between Jordan's King Hussein and the CIA. He got "millions of dollars" over the years and his current subsidy is \$750,000 a year, according to a report in the Feb. 18 Washington Post.

After the report was published, several other bribe operations were revealed.

Among the more interesting names was that of Holden Roberto, head of the Angolan FNLA, one of the two imperialist-backed neocolonial forces which tried to defeat the progressive MPLA in gaining political control of Angola during 1974-75. The FNLA, backed by the U.S. and Zaire's CIA-implicated President Mobutu, was within firing distance of Luanda in November 1975 before being turned back by the popular forces.

Although it had been open knowledge that the so-called "liberation leader" had been on the CIA payroll, it had never been confirmed before. In the wake of the latest revelations, the New York Times quoted a CIA official as saying Feb. 18 that "Roberto received an annual retainer of \$10,000 from the CIA from 1961 until the conclusion of the Angolan



"Please don't thank me. I would have accepted a kickback from anyone."

civil war last year."

Other names surfaced via informants who had been deleted passages in the book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," by former intelligence officials Victor Marchetti and John Marks. The book says that Guyanan Premier Forbes Burnham got CIA money, which probably has since been discontinued. Other names listed are former Mexican President Luis Echeverria, Venezuelan President

Carlos Andres Perez and former Chilean President Eduardo Frei.

King Hussein, whom the U.S. views as a most reliable ally, was among those who earned the money well. Hussein expelled the Palestinian Liberation Organization from its Jordanian base in 1970, refused to join the 1973 war against Israel (after consulting with the CIA station chief in Amman) and has supplied intelligence to the U.S. on

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Spain: out of the 18th century

by A. Ruiz Salvador

Sooner or later, while away from Spain, every Spaniard has been asked the question: What is going to happen when Franco dies? An obvious, but also a surprising question for many a Spaniard who, at best, might have asked himself - what would happen if Franco were to die. Suddenly faced with the certainty of the when the death of the General no longer a remote possibility, the startled Spaniard - often for the first time in his life - had to speculate about a future for which he had not been prepared. Wish-

had shown its scorn for Franco and all he represented, as well as its hope that November 20th was indeed a new beginning. Europe would not tolerate Francoism, as it had not tolerated Franco: it was willing to bet on Juan Carlos, but was also warning that it was now up to the King and his Government to convince everybody that Spain was no longer Franco's Spain. The message delivered, the Western world as well as Spain remained at the end of 1975 in a wait-and-see situation.

Compared to the previous 36, to say the least,

book written by his cousin and private secretary.

The Arias Navarro Government, of course, acted - newspapers were confiscated, political rallies were broken up by the police, political leaders were arrested, pro-amnesty demonstrations were dispersed by rubber bullets. There were deaths and there was torture - but to no avail. A country that refused to be intimidated any longer after 36 years of repression, simply could not be stopped; it became obvious that the lid could not be put back on again, that the Francoist political system didn't work because it did not allow room to work from within. The King called on Adolfo Suárez to preside as premier over the dismantlement of the system itself. The question of whether Francoism could survive without Franco was answered in July 1976 - No.

There were bad omens for Francoism earlier in the Spring, what we may call its Ides of May: The Osasuna soccer team from Pamplona (Spain's political ultraright capital) went down to third division - and there is no fourth. Franco followers tried to stage a demonstration on the 6 month anniversary of his death at the Plaza de Oriente, and it took a single policeman to disperse them. The Francoist Parliament appointed Suárez, virtually an unknown then, and not the other candidate as an M.P. - considering that the defeated candidate was the Marquis of Villaverde (Franco's son in law), who had summarized his platform in one line ("To vote for me is to vote for Franco"), the defeat, in its symbolism, was hard to ignore, and the King made his move.

TOWARDS THE 18TH CENTURY

On October 23, 1975 - during the period between the September executions and the death of Franco - the *Christian Science Monitor* published a cartoon in which Don Quixote (symbolizing Spain) was telling his constant companion: "Come, Sancho, it is now time to move forward into the 18th century". Indeed, Suárez has become Spain's benevolent despot: our "all for the people but without the people" enlightened



Franco and heir-designate, Prince Juan Carlos, saluting a Madrid rally in early 1975 before Spain moved forward into the 18th century.

ful thinking has probably determined many an answer, but in fact, the question could only be answered with a laconic "he will be buried"; and more than one pessimist did probably caution about the ominous possibility of a resurrection three days later. The question, simply, could not be answered.

Franco died, or rather, was finally allowed to die on November 20, 1975; after 36 years of dictatorship, the Spanish Government felt that the Spaniards needed at least 36 days of continuous medical bulletins on Franco's deteriorating health in order to make a mental transition from Franco's Spain to a Spain without Franco. During the carefully planned agony of the General, the coun-

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try as a whole had to deal with the question, with the when and not with the if; and from November 20th, with the now: What is going to happen now that Franco's gone?

Premier Arias Navarro remained in power and assured the country that the political system engineered by the General was working smoothly, and would continue to do so. A few days before, Franco's death however, Juan Carlos' announcement of the end of the 36 year ban on the use of regional languages (Basque, Catalanian and Galician) was interpreted as a sign that Spain was now ready to address itself to the issues that the General had for so long tried to repress.

Even before Franco was buried, then, the question was in everybody's mind: Can Francoism survive without Franco? Symbolically, the only head of state present at his funeral was Augusto Pinochet and, with the exception of the United States, the Western democracies boycotted the ceremony; two days later, led by the president of the French Republic, the 'free world' attended almost en masse the crowning of King Juan Carlos. Within a week, then, the Western world

1976 was a very good year. Early in January the King went to Catalonia and delivered a speech; Rodolfo Llopió (former secretary general of the Socialist Party), Sánchez Albornoz (former president of the Republic), Salvador de Madariaga (former ambassador of the Republic), as well as several anarchists and communists, returned to Spain after 36 years in exile. The second anti-terrorist trial never took place and an amnesty was granted.

WANTING A MILE.


These signs of a new policy of national reconciliation were welcomed, if only as an indication that the long era of absolutism and repression was ending. But for a country that could not have dreamt of such developments a few months before, these concessions were no longer sufficient. There were too many "buts": Santiago Carrillo (secretary general of the Communist Party) was denied a passport to return to Spain. Furthermore, an amnesty that applied only to 12% of the political prisoners amounted to a mini-amnesty. As Franco had always said, and his followers continued to warn, "If you give them an inch they will ask for a mile." But wasn't Spain entitled to that 'mile' in the first place?

Arias Navarro's neo-Francoist Government lasted until early July, helplessly presiding over what we may call "the greening of Spain". During the first six months of 1976 the country caught a glimpse of its political future and put Franco in the past. They acted as if the Government and its fool-proof system didn't exist. Without freedom of speech or assembly, Spaniards talked, the illegal political parties held rallies, and the banned trade unions met directly with management. Another pillar of the system collapsed when the model Nadiuska went topless. In a country where human anatomy was to be hidden - by decree -, where kisses and adultery could not be seen or heard of in films, this was revolutionary. Furthermore, the symbolic uncovering of Nadiuska heralded a new era of exposure: C.I.A. agents' names were released by the press, the Spanish connection in the Lockheed affair was unveiled, the wrongdoings of former Franco cabinet ministers were reported, and a rather negative image of the General himself was revealed in a

A country that refused to be intimidated any longer after 36 years of repression, simply could not be stopped.

despot. It should not be forgotten that Spain has not held elections since February 1936, and that every Premier and Cabinet minister since then (including Suárez) has simply been appointed; but it is to his credit that, according to his plan, his will be the last non-elected Government of Spain. This, and the creation of the first non-appointed in more than 40 years, is what the May 1977 general elections are all about.

Since July - without haste but also without pause - Franco's Spain has been the object of continued on page 3



Human rights in Indonesia

by Corrie Douma

"We are like leaves on a tree, just waiting to fall to earth and become one with it. Help us to get our freedom back, to rejoin our unprotected families. Help us at the very least to be brought to trial so that this soul destroying uncertainty can end. Whatever they want, we are ready to sign, so long as we can be released". -statement of an Indonesian prisoner quoted by Yap Thiam Hien, defence lawyer and former political prisoner (Aug. 13, 1975).

Recently Amnesty International (Canada) via its Indonesian Coordination Group received a press statement from the Indonesian Embassy in Ottawa, made by the Chief of Kopkamtib, Indonesia's Security Police. The statement was dated December 1 1976 and announced the release of 2,500 detainees, most of them held since 1965 without charge or trial. They all belong to the B category, which comprises those prisoners, whom the government suspects of having been involved in a coup in 1965, but against whom no court case can be made by lack of evidence. -

There are 3 encouraging aspects here:

1. The fact that the Embassy sends this press statement to the Coordination group of Amnesty International and has recently become more responsive to Amnesty groups which have adopted Indonesian prisoners, is a major change. For several years groups have requested information from the Embassy, but never received a reply until

recently. Due to Canada's large aid program (\$200 million) and Amnesty's presentations to responsible cabinet ministers expressing concern that Canada was in fact supporting a repressive government, the Indonesian government has been forced to take the objections of many Canadians seriously.

2. It seems that finally, after many years of adverse publicity about the human rights situation in Indonesia, the government is planning the release of prisoners in stages. It is clear acknowledgement that prisoners can be released and are not a threat to security as has been claimed all along.

3. The press statement coincided with a ceremony which was attended by charges d'affaires of several countries, and 150 of the 2,500 prisoners to be released were present and swore allegiance to the government. All this publicity seems to indicate a firm commitment by the government to release political prisoners.

However, Amnesty International's reaction has been cautious. First of all we would like to have lists of the names of released prisoners. Secondly Amnesty is well aware that many thousands are still being held in camps and prisons. According to the statement, the government will release 10,000 persons in 1977, 10,000 in 1978 and "the rest" in 1979. According to the government "the rest" would be about 11,000. The Indonesian government's statements on numbers has been most

confusing in the past and grossly understated. Thirdly, the press statement announces the establishment of resettlement centers for political prisoners in different places for people who originally came from these areas, except for those from Java. These people will, due to the density of the population, be transmigrated to the island of Buru and other islands. The budget would not allow the establishment of resettlement areas all at once. In very plain language, the government admits that it will force political prisoners to transmigrate, a policy which is totally unacceptable and contravenes internationally accepted norms of human rights.

Although it is probably sensible to encourage transmigration in Indonesia, it should be directed at free citizens, and not be forced upon unfortunate people who have already suffered so many years of imprisonment.

The island of Buru, mentioned in the press statement, has been the subject of a special Amnesty International campaign. At least 13,000 prisoners have been transported there. Families of prisoners have been 'offered' the possibility of joining their loved ones there, and in some cases reports of intimidation of families have reached Amnesty International's International Secretariat. The concerns of isolation, lack of educational facilities, and the atmosphere of imprisonment have naturally made people extremely reluctant to go to Buru voluntarily.

Nothing less than the immediate release of all political prisoners and the discontinuation of forced transmigration of political prisoners will satisfy human rights groups such as Amnesty International, and no amount of public relations efforts by the Indonesian government will pacify them.

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Suárez's mothballs; the three Francoist national days (October 1, April 1 and July 18) were removed from the official calendar; the King's portrait took Franco's place in all public offices; General Goded street in Barcelona was renamed Pau Casals'. And yet, even if a few inches were given, Spaniards still wanted their "mile":- **Amnistia** was a word painted on walls and printed on countless T-shirts, but when it was granted on August 4, freeing 400 political prisoners, the issue was still alive - about 160 persons (85% of them Basque) were not granted freedom. Neither was the legalization of all political parties granted; the official policy still being that the Socialist Party is illegal but could be legalized; on the other hand, the Communist Party is and will continue to be illegal as far as the Government is concerned.

It was obvious that Suárez didn't want to further alienate the Right, whose votes he needed to pass through Parliament his Law of Political Reform, a euphemism for doing away with the Francoist system from within the system. His strategy worked and, to everybody's surprise, Parliament approved the Law overwhelmingly and in doing so, the system committed political suicide, a possibility for which Franco was not prepared. At this point - and always within the system - all Suárez needed was the country's consent, and the third referendum in post-Civil War history was scheduled for December 15, 1976. By that day, as if they were needed, Suárez had taken measures to make sure that a strong "yes" for his reformist programme was forthcoming.

DESTROYING FRANCO'S SPAIN

The Right, of course, had asked for a "no" vote: Franco - their posters read - "would have voted No". Some of their leaders had been allowed to address the country through the government media, their own newspapers, and in public meetings. It was Suárez's policy to ban those channels to the illegal Socialist and Communist Parties, who advocated abstention on the grounds that a "no" vote would help the Right, and a "yes" vote would simply rubber-stamp a Government's programme that, to this date, remains good in principle but a mystery in its details and implications. The groups advocating abstention were denied access to radio and television, their meetings were broken up by the police, and their spokesmen arrested. It is indeed ironic that after almost 40 years without the right to vote, in December 1976 Spaniards were denied

the right **not** to vote.

On the 15th, Suárez got his "yes", but he also had to face the high percentage of abstentions: 74.4% of the eligible voters did cast their vote, while 25.6% abstained. In total, 17,614,895 votes were cast:

16,593,460 (or 94.2%) Yes

453,167 (or 2.6%) No

with the remaining 3.2% as "blank" votes.

Two main factors emerge from these figures: (1) The Francoist Right no longer exists as a political force; on October First, 1975 - according to official figures at the time - one million people cheered Franco at his Plaza de Oriente's last hurrah. A year later, half that number voted "no" - as Franco would have voted. (2) 45.7% of the eligible voters in the Basque country abstained; and if we consider that the Catalonian percentage of abstention was 22.9%, we should conclude that for Basque people the issue of a general amnesty was fundamental: both Catalonians and Basques



can now speak, print and teach in their language; their flags and anthems are no longer forbidden; but 85% of the remaining political prisoners are Basque, and more than 500 live in exile across the border. The hope that "by Christmas all Basques would be home" (such was the line from a song) never materialized; no further amnesty was granted. And there is no doubt that if the referendum were to be held today, Basque abstentionism would be even greater.

Santiago Carrillo was arrested on December 22. Given the choice of returning to France or facing the T.O.P. (Public Order Court), he chose to face the charges of illegal entry (no passport had been granted to him) and illegal association. On the 30th, though, he was freed on bail and the T.O.P. was dismantled by Government decree. The next step will be the legalization of the Communist Party before the May elections. This is what the opposition is asking Suárez to do, and the Premier - no longer politically concerned

about the Right - will probably respond favorably.

There will also be a general amnesty: Banning the inquisitorial T.O.P. amounts to declaring that it should never have existed in the first place; and its dismantlement should mean that amnesty is forthcoming: after all, it was the T.O.P. which put most of the political prisoners in jail in the first place, and it was up to T.O.P. to decide who should fall within the scope of the August amnesty. Only those who had "not by their actions brought about the risk of death and injury" were to be freed; and because of this decision, and its extremely loose interpretation, Ernesto Alajarin, for example, arrested in 1968 and condemned to 12 years for "complicity" in a group called the United Resistance Front, remains in jail.

Were the four members of the Intxausti family endangering life or limb when they harboured the men who killed a bus inspector - after, and not before, the crime? Was Diego Elorrieta causing a risk of death or injury when he gave the key of his cottage to an E.T.A. activist? None of them have been released, furthermore, about 60 political prisoners have never been tried at all, reports John Hooper of the **Manchester Guardian**. Some people were imprisoned for crimes which did cause or risk death or injury, but it should not be forgotten that their cases were tried under a system where accused and convicted were synonyms, and the sentences outrageously harsh: José Begiristain - reports John Hooper - was accused of burning down the mayor's house, the prosecution asked for the death sentence, but it was commuted to 40 years. Will Begiristain remain in prison until the year 2008 for an alleged crime?

Paradoxically, political prisoners may be freed without the Government granting a new amnesty: with T.O.P. out of the picture, a more generous interpretation of last summer's decree could empty the jails and send everybody home, most for good. A few might get out on bail and be reined under normal law procedure. If violence breeds violence, the period of Spanish History in which their actions (or reactions) were committed - if indeed they were - can't be overlooked by the law.

The day will come when all political prisoners will be freed and all political parties legalized, and my guess is that such a day is upon us: the May elections wouldn't have any meaning unless the last remnants of Franco's Spain have disappeared by the time they are held. And when the day comes, Don Quixote will tell his constant companion: "Come, Sancho, it is now time to move forward into the 20th century".

Puerto Rico:

When is a colony not a colony?

by Don Kniseley

Puerto Rico has been subject to some degree of outside control since the 16th century. Though only 3600 square miles in area and offering little in the way of natural resources, Puerto Rico's strategic military location in the Caribbean has ensured its continued political domination.

The Spanish settled on the island five hundred years ago in their frantic search for gold. They established a garrison there, from which they could maintain vigilance over all travel to and from the Caribbean. (Over a period of several generations.) They also managed to eliminate or assimilate all native islanders. The colony (originally called Borinquén) soon came to have an economy based on sugar cane, with labour being supplied by African slaves. Things changed little until the eighteenth century, when the first independence movement appeared and was quickly quashed.

The dream of an independent Puerto Rico persisted, however, and was almost realized in 1897. However, as soon as the weakening Spanish Empire severed colonial ties, the island was invaded and captured by the U.S. in the final act of the Spanish-American war (1898).

After two years of military occupation, the U.S. Congress passed the Foraker Law, which brought nearly all Puerto Rico affairs under the official control of the U.S. government. Discontent with the U.S. presence and influence led to the Jones Act of 1917, which made all Puerto Ricans U.S. citizens. Until 1952 however, Puerto Rico was formally and unquestionably to remain a U.S. colony.

The present commonwealth status of Puerto Rico has its roots in U.S. Public Law 600 of 1950. It allowed Puerto Rico to establish its own constitutional government, subject to approval by a majority of Puerto Ricans in a referendum and by the U.S. Congress. This law allowed the U.S. to maintain that Puerto Rico was no longer a colony, because its people had "effectively exercised their right to self-determination . . . by freely and fully participating in the establishment of a Commonwealth associated with the United States." However, the essential nature of the relationship remains unchanged. Decisions regarding such issues as wage standards, tariffs, defense, currency, and immigration are made in Washington without direct Puerto Rican representation.


Operation Bootstrap

U.S. political and economic dominance has meant on the one hand that Puerto Rico has enjoyed one of the highest per capita living standards in Latin America. Assuming the "trickle down" theory

of capitalist development, it is true that some workers have benefitted from substantial U.S. investments.

On the other hand, the huge U.S. economic presence has meant that Puerto Rico has served as a pool of cheap labour for American corporations. It has also ensured that Puerto Rico produces goods primarily for export on an inflated international world market rather than for its own development.

One reason for the present level of U.S. investment is the program Puerto Ricans adopted to counteract a sagging sugar industry in the late



Puerto Rican people at a pro-independence demonstration.

1940's. Partly on the advice of U.S. officials, it was decided that rapid industrialization was the answer. In order to secure the capital for this industrialization Munoz, the first elected governor of the island, launched a program of irresistible incentives to U.S. business. Operation Bootstrap exempted almost all firms from Puerto Rican taxes for up to ten years. This, coupled with the large labour supply, low wage rates, and exemption from U.S. federal income taxes (part of the 1917 Jones Act) meant that companies locating in Puerto Rico have enjoyed phenomenal profits. Astonishingly, ten percent of the worldwide profits received from direct U.S. investment come from Puerto Rico, and annual profit rates as high as 90% have been reported.

Despite their continued popularity over the years, both Munoz (a political folk hero who began his public career as a socialist) and Bootstrap have primarily served U.S. investors and a small Puerto Rican elite. That industrialization and growth in GNP have been substituted for real development is evidenced by the fact that income disparity is higher in Puerto Rico than in America.

But even economic growth has waned in recent years. Some firms have relocated in search of even cheaper labor in other Latin

tries.

Other reports indicated that the CIA liaison with Hussein was only a part of the U.S.' network of intrigue in the Mideast. Saudi Arabian officials as well as Iranian leaders have long had close ties with the CIA, the Feb. 22 Washington Post reported.

Other world leaders reported to have received CIA bribes at one time or another are: Chiang Kai-shek, the Dalai Lama of Tibet and Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus.

American countries. Dependence on so many imports has meant higher and higher prices for essential commodities. This trend has been accomplished by decreasing bargaining power in terms of exports. For apart from its sugarcane, Puerto Rico essentially only "exports" its labor. It has become a processing station for U.S. raw materials -- chiefly petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals. Partly as a result of this situation, the recent worldwide recession took on catastrophic proportions in Puerto Rico. Unemployment is presently

dissatisfaction with commonwealth status and bolstered independence forces. This was reflected in last year's general election, in which Carlos Romero Barcelo and the New Progressive Party came to power at the expense of the long-standing Popular Democratic Party. Although Romero has long been an advocate of eventual statehood, many feel the electorate voted for change rather than for inclusion in the U.S. Nevertheless, the election may have prompted President Gerald Ford to suggest that Puerto Rico become a 51st state.

Both Ford and his successor, President Carter, have in recent months publicly reaffirmed Puerto Rico's right to political self-determination. Both have also intimated that the U.S. would be quick to respond positively to any change in status desired by the majority of islanders. Most Americans and Puerto Ricans no doubt concur with such a democratic notion, but the prevailing conditions make it unlikely that a change either to statehood or to independence will come so easily.

The island's population is culturally homogeneous. There will certainly be a reluctance on the part of some to further assimilation brought about by statehood. Another factor could be the two-fifths of all Puerto Ricans who live in the continental U.S., mostly in New York City. There is a strong nationalist faction among these "mainlanders" which would probably become a militant, perhaps a violent, force against U.S. statehood. In addition, there would probably be some degree of opposition on the part of the U.S. public to the annexation of Puerto Rico, on account of the massive federal funds necessary to alleviate the island's economic difficulties.

A concerted movement for independence as opposed to statehood, may also result in armed struggle in Puerto Rico. Carlos Gallisa, leader of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, publicly voiced that eventually in a recent speech, much to the chagrin of the then governor Hernandez Colon and the U.S. State Department. One is tempted to draw an ironic parallel with the American Revolution of 1776 in which a minority of dissidents led the colonies in armed insurrection.

If dependence became a reality, the island might be faced with a monumental logistics problem. Puerto Rico's high population density already compounds its social ills and few more inhabitants can be tolerated. If sizeable numbers of mainlanders chose to return to an independent homeland, the result might be chaos.

The exigencies of the present, then, point to political change in Puerto Rico; change, at best unpleasant for some, at worst convulsive to the entire island and its emigrants. But, though a change in political status may be a prerequisite for economic development in Puerto Rico, neither statehood nor independence will guarantee substantive improvements in the quality of life for all Puerto Ricans. The danger exists that, whether nation or state the island will remain a hinterland dependent upon and feeding the dominant American economy -- a colony of lesser degree.

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other Arab nations and personalities. Jordan was also used as a conduit for funneling money to the reactionary forces during the Lebanese civil war, to the Kurdish rebels in Iraq and to the reactionary government in Oman.

Curiously, the revelations about Hussein came on the same day as U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was scheduled to meet with him as part of a 6-day tour of Mideast coun-

around 20% by conservative estimates. Nearly half of the population depends on U.S. Department of Agriculture food stamps.

Status Quo, Statehood, or Independence?

The issues of Puerto Rico's economy and its political status are inexorably linked. Since the passage of Public Law 600, the U.S. has insisted that all questions about Puerto Rico are an internal matter. This view has come under fire in recent years as a result of the United Nations' Resolution 1514, which calls for complete de-colonization of all non-self-governing territories. Such territories may then determine the nature of their political relationships with other countries.

The crucial question is whether the conditions set out in Resolution 1514 have been sufficiently met with respect to Puerto Rico. The U.S. State Department is quick to point to repeated plebiscites in which Puerto Ricans have overwhelmingly rejected statehood and independence in favour of commonwealth status. Opponents claim that no more than one third of all eligible voters participated in these referenda, and that none has been subject to international supervision.

The U.S. government plays down intervention by the U.N. and would likely veto any 'intolerable' decision taken by the Security Council with respect to Puerto Rico. Debate in the de-colonization committee, however, has unified the Third World in calling for Puerto Rican independence. It has also fuelled the dormant independence movement within Puerto Rico.

The current economic malaise has

Editor	Harvey MacKinnon
Associate Editor	Lynn Stow
Contributing Editor	Jim Robson