




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

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
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OBSERVATIONS
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
In a Letter to a Friend.

Φυσει πασιν ανθρωποις υπαρχει, των μεν λοιδοριων και
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αχθεσθ. Demosth. περι Στεφανου.



L O N D O N,
Printed for R. MONTAGU, in *Wild Street* near
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OBSERVATIONS

On the probable Issue of the

CONGRESS at AIX LA CHAPELLE.

SIR,

YOU ask my Opinion of the Congress at *Aix la Chapelle*, whether it is only Matter of Form to amuse the World for another Year, or whether they will actually make up a Peace, and what sort of a Peace that will be? I am sorry I cannot satisfy your Curiosity. The Preliminaries are but just come over, and not an Article of them has yet transpired. However it should seem as if the Plenipotentiaries were met to settle something besides Rank or Precedency. I wish they may. Peace is at present the universal Wish. But as to what Share Old *England* will have in the Peace, it is hard

to conjecture. Whether our Ministers will do the Nation Justice, *should* be best known, when we *see* what they do. But I defy any Man to draw Conclusions in their Favour from *any thing* they do, for every Step they *can* take will be liable to so many Objections, that it will, at all Events, be much easier to blame, than defend them. You will be convinced of this, when I lay before you some of the Reasonings, which will probably be urged *at all Events*. *Englishmen* have a Right to say what they please, and private Calumny is said to be the Province of another Sex; the proper Objects therefore of this valuable Privilege in *Men*, are public Persons. Upon those you may reputably vent all the Malice, Envy, and Bitterness, that agitate your Breast. You will have the Thanks of your Country, and may delight your own Mind with the lasting Satisfaction of having neglected your *private* Affairs, to attend to what more nearly concerns you, the *Public*.

The first Question to be considered is, are we ripe for a Peace? For though it is generally desired at present, perhaps when we come to possess it, we may take more Time to deliberate, and hit upon many Objections

jections, which we are too weary of the war to think of at present. Is the Clamour for Peace a just Plea for *hurrying* or *patching* it up? One would have thought our Ministers had too much Experience to regard popular Clamours. It is well known, that a Faction can circulate them by one Post throughout the Kingdom. Perhaps the M——y may be at the Bottom of this, and, to justify their Measures, put the People upon demanding them. But these Arts won't satisfy a judicious Examiner. Such a one will say, is this the End of War, to spend Thirty Millions, and then make a Peace? Have we almost ruined the *French* Trade, why not pursue that Advantage? the interior Parts of *France* are perishing for Want; their Finances are reduced by their Losses in Trade; and their Men must in another Year be sent from making Conquests, to till the Ground at Home. Would not a wise Ministry, at War with such a Nation, make the most of these Distresses, and wait till Necessity obliged them to leave the *Low Countries*, and then follow 'em to the Gates of *Paris*? Were we indeed at a Loss for the Sinews of War, that might amount to an Apology. But surely there

can be no Want of Money, whilst Eight Millions are subscribed instead of Six. The Wealth of this Nation is not so easily exhausted. I make no doubt but, to gain national Honour, the War might be carried on for some Years longer, by *voluntary Contribution*. What then can move a M——r to make such long Strides to a speedy Compromise? Very little Penetration may discover the Reason. In War there is a Demand for the public Money; Peace affords more Opportunity for Embezzlements. War is continually attended with Hazards, one unlucky Event may forward an *Inquiry*, and I leave you to guess, whose Interest it is to avoid *Inquiries*. In Peace, the Affairs of State move on in one regular Course; nothing is expected from Government but the usual Protection of our Lives and Properties. Ministers take Care to estimate this at its full Worth, and may riot for many Years unimpeached in the Spoils of their Country.—Thus you see, how justly they may be censured for making a *Peace*.

On the other hand, great are the Objections if they should continue the *War*. A War on the *Continent* was never our Interest.

est; we are sure to be *Losers*, if we are ever so much *Gainers*; for Money is constantly exported for the Payment of our Forces, and none of the Plunder, if all the Towns in *Europe* were taken, is brought to public Account. The hiring of Mercenaries, is so much Money given to the Subjects of other Princes, to preserve the Lives of His Majesty's Subjects, in a foreign Country and Cause. At Sea indeed we seem to have some Encouragement. But the Wealth that is there acquired falls into private Hands, the Public is still obliged to go on borrowing Millions, to pay our Sailors for the Trouble of enriching themselves. And how the Wisdom of our M——rs will furnish them farther *Ways and Means*, is hard to conceive. We see, that though the Subscription for Six Millions was soon filled, it was only a Puff. The Payments are put off, and perhaps may again be put off *sine die*. Had Ministers but the Hearts of other Men, they would bleed for the Miseries of the Public. Thousands become Bankrupts daily, and Ten thousands incessantly groan to see the Millions that are raised upon a sinking Country. There must be secret Reasons for not hearkning to Terms long ago. Time will shew what they

were; but if we are deaf to all Proposals now, it will immediately be concluded, that our M——y make a Trade of the War, or that something *foreign* is aimed at, or that they behave too contemptuously to such powerful Enemies, as the *French* and *Spaniards*, or that they are too ambitious of the good Opinion of their Countrymen in insisting upon popular Points; for if the Nation be ruined, it is indifferent, whether a good or bad Ministry ruins it, whether the Measures that precipitate us into Poverty and Slavery be founded on good or evil Motives. The World will, in either Case, claim a Right to censure, and will most infallibly and zealously exercise that Right.—Thus in either Case, it is apparent, how very culpable is the Conduct of our A——n. They must either make Peace or continue the War, and which ever Step they take, are sure to do wrong. But supposing, what seems at present most probable, that of Two Evils they will chuse the less, and consent to a general Pacification, let us consider the principal Articles, which may or may not be agreed to, and you will without Partiality judge, before any Treaty is concluded, that
it

it must be a bad one, or at least cannot be meritorious.

Suppose *Gibraltar* to be given up and *Minorca*, how natural and just will be the general Indignation! What! *Gibraltar*! the Price of so much Blood and Treasure! the Bulwark of all our *Mediterranean* and *Levant* Trade! Surely the M——rs think meanly of a People whom they expect to acquiesce in such a Concession. Should a ministerial Hireling urge, that Peace is extremely desirable, and that some other Advantage may be procured in the Room of this; the Answer is ready, The Peace that is bought at a Price so inestimable, is a Prostitution of the Nation. No Advantage is equal to *Gibraltar* and *Minorca*. All the *French* and *Spanish* Possessions in the *East* and *West Indies* will not counterbalance them. It is better to be at War Forty Years, and each Year to expend Ten Millions, than thus to betray the Honour of the Nation: National Honour is not easily recovered. The Minister who sacrifices it to a temporary Expedient, will shew the Nation the Importance of it, when Foreigners no longer esteem and revere us, as a brave and free Nation, but look down with disdain upon a People
weak

weak enough to exchange the most valuable Rights of their Posterity, for a Mefs of *Soup Maigre*. — Or suppose *Gibraltar* and *Minorca* to continue ours, it will then be observed, where is the mighty Merit of this? They were ours before the War, and it is a poor Satisfaction for Thirty or Forty Millions, to boast of being just *in statu quo*, with respect to our Possessions. But besides, tho' *Gibraltar* and *Minorca* be valuable Possessions, it must be confess'd they have cost us dear, and it is not very clear, that they have answer'd all the ends of supporting them. We experienced to our comfort at the beginning of the War, how prodigious a *Levant* Trade the *French* had acquired, and Ships of ours have been taken within Sight of *Gibraltar*, in Spite of any thing the Men of War there stationed could do to save them. Would not a wise Administration have considered all this, and have taken some valuable Equivalent, either in Money or Dominion? But our Misfortune is, that our M——rs consider their present Reputation more than public Utility. They fall in with every popular Humour, tho' to the manifest Detriment of their Country. This indeed would be a tolerable Motive, were it the
only

only one. They consider their Reputation merely for the Sake of their Power, and as this Measure contributes to strengthen their Power, it is not to be doubted but they would pursue it at the Hazard of their Reputation. Do not the vast Sums annually expended in the Support of *Gibraltar* and *Minorca* pass thro' ministerial Hands? Is not the Disposal of all Places Civil and Military there, a very valuable Branch of ministerial Power? And can it be expected, that certain M——rs will purchase the *Indies* for their Country, at the Expence of any the least Part of their *Power*?

Suppose *Cape Breton* to be the Price of an Accommodation, how loudly and warmly will public spirited Men declaim against such a Measure? It is plain, they will say, that we are the mean Suppliants for Peace. Was ever Minister so infatuated, without any Necessity, without any Distress, to part with the only Acquisition made during the War? and for what? for a paltry Peace, granted perhaps on the Enemy's Side, with a view to be broke, as soon as that important Island shall have been restored. *Cape Breton* appear'd to be one of the brightest Jewels in the Crown of *Great Britain*.
Except

Except for the taking of *Porto Bello*, the Nation never rejoic'd so heartily as at the Conquest of *Louisbourg*. All Ranks of Men were gratefully sensible of the Importance of *Cape-Breton*. Women and Children naturally shouted and said, *Cape-Breton* for ever! Has the *Vox Populi* then no Weight with their present Governours? Are they determin'd upon every Occasion to mortify the People with Proofs of their Insignificancy? Surely a Power, so injudiciously conducted, must fall by its own Weight. Or if Insolence be not the Motive of such a Step, what other Motive can be assign'd? It is fresh in every one's Memory what was suggest'd in the Anti-ministerial Writings upon the Convention with *Spain*. The Conclusion seem'd obvious, that if the Minister could not possibly mean the Good of his Country in that Measure, he must have meant something else. Time indeed has amply disculpated the Great Man against whom this was insinuated. But how are we sure, that Time will do any Thing for his present Successors? They may be very honest uncorrupt Men, but they are Ministers, and it is an undeniable Maxim in political Writings, that whilst a Minister is
in

in Power, every Charge, which it is *natural* to throw out against Men of Power in general, it is *just* to throw out against him.

Or supposing that *Cape-Breton* should not be given up, why was it kept? Would it not have been of more Advantage to the Nation to have had *Dunkirk* or *Calais*, or some other Addition to our maritime Strength in *Europe*? What will *Cape-Breton* furnish us with? We know by Experience what we must send thither, Regiments, Men of War, Ammunition, and Money. In Return we shall receive perhaps some Ships laden with Cod-Fish, a Commodity not valued in a Country, where the *Protestant* Religion is profess'd, and a Commodity, which the *French* will sooner turn *Protestants*, than purchase at our Hands. We have heard indeed, that some certain Persons value themselves upon taking *Cape-Breton*, and the public-spirited Zeal of a noble D— upon that Occasion was admirably expos'd in a late notable Apology. Perhaps it was to flatter that noble Person, that *Cape-Breton* was so strongly insisted upon. And are national Points to be determin'd by the Judgment of Individuals? Had not the rest of the Nation an equal Right to be consulted?—

Or

Or, Was it to please the — ? That indeed will silence all Opposition to the Measure, but still will not exempt those, who submitted to a superior Judgment, from the Suspicion of doing it upon the mean Motive of preserving their Power. — Or, Was it to court the People? There is not a more dangerous Member of the Community than the Minister who courts Popularity. The very Word *Ambition* is derived from unwarrantable Practices of that Sort among the *Romans*. No Man ever courted the People, but with a View to undo them. The same Temper of Mind, which in private Life is Benevolence, when exerted towards the Nation, is Treason. The honest disinterested Man seeks nothing but strict Justice, and is indifferent to the Opinion of the World.— Or lastly, Was it for the Good of the Nation, that *Cape-Breton* remains with us? This indeed seems a laudable Motive; to *take* and *bold* should be for the public Good. But in the first Place, we are not sure, that it is for the Good of the Nation; and in the next, if it were, yet it is not Uprightness in our M——rs to keep it. It has been mentioned already what we send thither, and what we may receive in Return. But there is
another

another Light, in which if we consider it, our Opinion of that Conquest will considerably abate. It has been observed to be an Accession of Power to the People of *New-England*, and who knows, what any Accession may tempt them to? We may then chance to repent of what seems now to gratify our national Vanity. Yet if we never repent of it, the Intention of our M——ry is still exceptionable. Had they merely the Good of their Country in View, even the *Weekly Journalists* would, upon proper Consideration, become their Advocates. But the ingenious Pamphleteer before quoted, lets us into a Piece of secret History, which will for ever defeat their Pretensions to public Spirit. He tells us another noble D— was weak enough to own, that he had an Eye to the Thanks of Posterity. It is manifest from hence, how selfish are the Motives of all their Measures, they will not do Evil, that Good may come of it, and they will not do Good, unless some Good come of it to themselves.

What shall we say, if the Conquests in the *Netherlands* should be restored to the House of *Austria*? We need not be at a Loss what to say. Will it not be evident, that

that poor *John Bull* has all this while been the Dupe of that Family? That our Treasures have been exhausted, our Men taken from the Service of their Country, and our Councils engrossed by that insatiable House, which might long ago have secur'd the Tranquillity of *Europe* by a moderate Concession to an active and powerful Adversary. If indeed the *Netherlands* in *Austrian* Hands, were a Barrier against the Encroachments of *French* Ambition, it might be our Interest to make such an Article the *sine qua non*. But we have seen the Indifference of that illustrious House to all their Possessions in the *Low Countries*. *M. Saxe* has claim'd immortal Honour, for taking defenceless Towns, or making a pompous Entrance at Gates that were cordially opened to him. The *Q. of H.* all the while kept her Eye upon *Silesia*, which she had *lost*, and was very well satisfied with Affairs in *Flanders*, whilst *British* Troops, and *British* Mercenaries sacrificed their Lives in surrendering Dominions, which she might have *kept*. In Return for this, such is our unbounded Complaisance to our Allies, we are stipulating for the Restitution of those Countries to her, instead of demanding

manding the Surrender of some *French* Settlement, or the reimbursing of some of our Millions, or some great Concession in Point of Trade. What can move our M——rs to so absurd a Conduct? Is it public Faith? Certainly those Words still retain a pleasing Sound, though they have long since lost their Meaning. But is it credible, that M——rs will be the Guardians of public Faith? It is rather to be apprehended, that that amiable Name is made the Cloak of private separate Articles. Is it because our national Interest is concerned in such a Restitution? It has been already shewn it is not; but if it were, the World knows better, *whose* Interest is the Object of our Negotiations. In short, whatever is the secret Motive of such a Step, you plainly see the Objections to it are unanswerable.

Supposing the *Netherlands* to remain in the Hands of the *French*; — I am thunder-struck at the Supposition. Shall *England* then, after an Opposition which has done us immortal Honour, contribute towards enslaving the rest of *Europe*, towards aggrandizing the only Power, of which we have the least Ground to be jealous? It will never be believed. All the Authority of

Gazettes, all the Faith of *History* and *Records*, shall never convince the World of so improbable a Fact, as that the Patrons of the House of *Austria* suffer her Dominions to be dismembered; that the eternal Enemies of the House of *Bourbon* yield to her so vast an Increase of Power. Had it not been better never to have sent any Forces abroad? For then perhaps the *French* might have continued roving about the Empire, and taken an *Electorate* or Two by way Satisfaction for their just Demands. Besides how will our good Allies the *Dutch* be pleased, to see a Neighbour, very formidable before, rendered more so by the only Power, which, next to themselves, had Reason to oppose it. May not the *French* Faction in *Holland* revive? may not an unstable Mob desert a Cause, left to them alone to maintain? and may not we become the Derision of *Europe*, when, after all our swaggering about the *Balance of Power*, we shall be obliged to bow the Neck to the universal Monarch? Surely whoever advised or forwarded a Measure like this, was influenced neither by common Honesty, nor by common Sense.

Or

Or supposing again, that the *Austrian Netherlands* should be yielded to his *Britannic Majesty*; then a Question arises, is it in his Royal or his Electoral Capacity? Not in the latter, for they are no Part of the Empire; and of what use those Dominions will be to the King or People of *Great Britain*, I am weary of Conjectures. We can only shew what great Expences this Nation will incur in maintaining them, and let the Mercenaries of a ministerial Faction point out, if they can, what Advantages will accrue to us from thence, either in Trade or Power. The Fortifications of all the Towns in *Flanders* are demolished by the *French*. It is impossible, with the greatest Oeconomy, to repair them under Seven or Eight Millions. Then a new Form of Government must be established; Legislators must be sent over at a prodigious Expence; those Legislators, like the *Roman Decemviri*, will naturally abuse their Power, then the People will rebel, and then it will be necessary to hire Troops of all the Princes in the Empire, and to continue the 30,000 *Russians* in *British* Pay, in order to prevent a Revolt. Besides this, an almost incredible Number of Places must unavoidably be

created. There must be a Governor General, a Governor of every Town; a Custom House must be built at *Ostend*, a Post House and an Excise Office every where else, about Five hundred Missionaries must be sent over to convert the People from *Poper*y, and public Diversions must be set on foot, to keep their Minds from attending to Affairs of Government. Besides all this, such an Acquisition would give us an Interest upon the Continent, which the Child that is yet unborn may rue. The Quarrel of every Prince within some hundred Miles must become our Quarrel, for we must make all the Princes we can our Allies, in order to continue in tolerable Security. Then again their High-Mightinesses the *Dutch* would look with an evil Eye at our growing Greatness. They sat unconcerned at a *French* Invasion, because the *French* meant only to take their Towns and murder their Wives and Children; whereas we should be apt to break in upon what is more dear to them, their Trade. This would be an insuperable Jealousy, and could not fail to vent itself, in a very few Years, in an irreconcilable War.—Now can any one imagine, why our M——y insist upon so dangerous an Acquisition

Acquisition? Take one Thing for granted, and the Difficulty is solved. If they never act but with sinister Views, if their Country is the last Thing in their Thoughts, or never in their Thoughts, they will embrace an Opportunity of extending their *Importance*, by undertaking such a Labyrinth of Business, and their *Interest*, by disposing of such a Multitude of Places. One thing more might be mentioned, but Decency forbids it. However, a Hint may not be amiss. Consult the Map, and see what the Distance is between the *Austrian Netherlands* and *Westphalia*. A Word to the wise is enough.

Suppose a Provision should be made for Don *Philip*; the World has a Right to suppose any Thing, but so unnatural a Supposition as this will hardly be entertained by an *Englishman*. How comes Don *Philip* to assume more Importance in the Affairs of *Europe*, than Prince *Charles* of *Lorraine*, or his Royal Highness the Duke? He was originally no Party in the Quarrel, and all we know of him is, that he headed an Army unsuccessfully against the King of *Sardinia*. So that the History of our War with *Spain* is likely to be this: His Catholick Majesty commissions some Pirates to

B 3

provoke

provoke us to Hostilities, War is formally declared, Ships are taken on both Sides, and just as the *Spanish* Nation is on the Brink of Ruin, and the *British* at the Height of Power, both in Money and Fleets, we prevail upon that great Prince to condescend to a Peace, by providing a Sovereignty for a younger Branch of his Family. So absurd a Prodigality of Power can hardly be matched in History. Not content to be the Knight Errants of *Europe*, to exert all our Strength gallantly in the Cause of a *Dulcinea* in Distress, we officiously intrude upon the domestic Affairs of other Princes; *England* offers herself as the Nurse of every fatherless Child in the World. But as Nurses are generally *old Women*, and seldom Women of the profoundest Intellects, I shall blush to hear the light Things, that will be said of my Country at *Paris*, and the haughty Treatment we shall be exposed to at *Madrid*. Now let any one judge, upon what Motives such a Measure will be founded. It cannot be an Act of Policy, because any needless Concession to an Enemy is impolitic. Does it proceed from the Overflowings of ministerial Charity? Tradition informs

informs us, that Ministers were the first Authors of that golden Maxim, *Charity begins at Home*. The most reasonable Way then to account for it, is, to make it Matter of Justice, that is, *Don Philip* pays for his Settlement, and therefore it is highly fitting it should be admitted. But how much, or to whom he pays, we are not at Liberty to guess.

Or supposing *no* Provision to be made for *Don Philip*, it will then be amazing, that we should agree to a Peace; for had not the *Spaniards* been in extreme Distress, they would never have given up this darling Point. What a fine Opportunity is here lost of humbling that insolent Nation! Or if it was expedient upon other Accounts to make a Peace, where was the great Harm or Inconvenience of gratifying a Crown, whom it is our Interest to be well with, in so trifling a Demand? Wherever he had been settled, he could not have been of Consequence enough to disturb the public Tranquillity. He would naturally have concluded, that those, who had Power to give him Dominions, had Power to take them away. It seems as reasonable to make him King of *Corfica*, as the *Baron*

de Neuboff; and considering the inestimable Value of our Trade with *Spain*, it was strange Policy to reject such easy Terms of a lasting Accommodation. But what think you of giving him the *Austrian Netherlands*? Some such Thing has been hinted in our public Papers, but our sagacious M——rs are above taking Hints from the Writers of News. The *Spaniards* had formerly a Property in the Low Countries, and were then perpetually at Variance with *France*. Here we had a lucky Opportunity of reviving that natural Animosity, which those, who act for the Public, have unaccountably neglected. Unaccountably, because no Reason can be assigned, but such as tends to our lasting Dishonour. Our M——rs enter'd perhaps into the vulgar Notion, that *Spain* might provide for her Children herself, that *Don Philip* concerns us no more, than the younger Son of *Kouli Kan*, and they, having so many Friends of their own to provide for, were unwilling to encumber themselves with the Settlement of a Stranger. This it is to have short-sighted Men at the Head of Affairs. Or if they disown these Reasons, it will be fair to conclude they had others. If the Settlement of *Don Philip* was to be a Purchase

Purchase, it is obvious, since it does not take Place, that *Spain* would not come up to the Price.

If the Duke of *Modena* be restored to his Dominions, give me Leave to call it a Violation of public Justice. In Society the Members, that abuse their Power, forfeit it. By the Law of Nations, Princes and States are but Individuals of the great Community of the World: And what has been the Conduct of this serene Duke? He has made use of his little Strength to raise Disturbances in *Italy*, of fatal Consequence to the common Cause. The King of *Sardinia* might long since have enjoyed an honourable and lasting Peace, but that the *Spaniards* relied upon such Partizans; as this officious Prince. The Queen of *Hungary* might have doubled her Forces in the *Netherlands*, had not the Troubles of *Italy* engaged them. Besides, what is the Demand of his Highness? He has play'd a Game at Hazard, and now calls upon the Princes of *Europe* to make good his Losses. Had *Spain* been victorious, he must have been a considerable Gainer. Is it not common Equity, that by her Disappointment, he should be a considerable Loser? It is indisputably right, that he should
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be deprived of his Dominions *in terrorem*. If thro' any Compassion on our Side we acquiesce in the contrary, such Compassion, oppos'd to Justice, is Weakness. But it is extremely ridiculous to talk of Compassion in public Persons. The only Spring of their Actions is Interest, and tho' it be sometimes difficult to shew how that Motive operates, we may always conclude, if it chance not to be *apparent*, that it must be *latent*.

If the Duke of *Modena* be *not* restored to his Dominions, I must confess his Case is hard. It is well known that Party-Engagements are inviolable. The Man who deserts those Attachments, tho' ever so clearly convinc'd of their Iniquity, becomes immediately infamous. And can it be expected that Princes will have less Regard to their Reputation, than private Men? His Serene Highness, without doubt, was in the *Spanish* Interest from his Infancy; and shall we make no Allowance for Prejudice of Education? Or suppose he espous'd that Cause since the Maturity of his Understanding; may not a small Share of Conscience be constitutional to Persons of his Rank? And must he be ruin'd, because he acted up to his Conscience? Or if, like some few private Men,
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he happen'd to mistake, and flatter himself he was joining the stronger Side, does it not follow, that if Things had appear'd differently to him, he would have attach'd himself to his *Sardinian* Majesty? In this Case, he is punish'd for not foreseeing the Chances of War. It is to be observ'd, that he owed nobody Allegiance, and cannot therefore in Justice suffer, for taking which Side he thought fit. If public Justice be the Rule of our M——y's Conduct, why do they not begin at Home? Why is not every Man's Life and Conversation inquir'd into, and every Offender brought to condign Punishment? We should meet with much greater Criminals, than the Duke of *Modena*, to render the Objects of our Passion for Justice. But this is not the Motive, and what it is, has been already hinted, at the End of my last Paragraph.

If *Genoa* be restor'd to Tranquillity, and to the Marquisate of *Final*, it is evident, that we are willing to leave open a Door for future Contentions. The Way, which Nature points out for preventing Mischiefs, is, to deprive dangerous Men of the *Power* of doing it. We shall never deprive the *Genoese* of the *Inclination*. They are now not only
become

become Dependents upon *France* and *Spain*, but will for ever retain their Resentments against the House of *Austria* and *Savoy*. It will hardly be said, that the *Genoese* are not a formidable Power. The State that could take up Arms successfully against a terrible Enemy, in Possession of its Capital, and that at a Time, when it was low enough to send Deputies to implore Mercy, must be formidable in a flourishing Situation. Where then is the Judgment and common Sense of not subduing such a People, for the general Good? If the Marquisate of *Final* be yielded to them, I must bid adieu to Politics, for a Measure like this cannot be coolly or patiently consider'd. In the first Place they have no Right to *Final*, and in the next, we have guaranteed it to another Power. The Republic of *Genoa* took it by Way of Security for a considerable Loan; is it not reasonable they should surrender, as soon as the Debt is discharged? And with what Face can we secure, by Treaty, a most notorious Piece of Iniquity? But the second Objection is yet stronger. We are bound by Treaty to take it from them. Are Treaties then no better than Waste-Paper, or are they solemn Covenants guarded by public Faith, and

and enter'd into upon the personal Confidence Princes have in each other? The Terms of this Treaty have been exactly fulfilled on the Part of his *Sardinian* Majesty. What a Reproach will it be to this Nation, if there be any Failure on our Part? We boasted of having found Means to fix the Resolution of that brave Prince. He has been surprizingly faithful. And shall we in Return yield to his Enemy the only Price of his Fidelity? It is making such a Sport of Honour and Justice, as the present Disturbers of *Europe* would blush at. There must be secret Motives to this. Statesmen as well as other Men will naturally do right, without some Temptation to Wrong. The Temptation in the present Case, for we know of none immediate, must be the Prospect of future Broils. There is always Something to be got in a Bustle, and you cannot imagine our great Men to be so blind to their own Interest, as to make such a Peace, as shall leave no Room for a War, whenever their Thirst of Power or Want of Money, shall make one necessary.

Or supposing the Peace of that Republic should *not* be restored, and the Marquisate in Question be secur'd to the King of *Sardinia*;

Sardinia; you see how manifest is our Inattention to Trade. None but a M——y, who had suffer'd all Love for their Country to be absorbed in Self-interest, would see a People, with whom we have carried on a most advantageous Commerce, sink into irretrievable Ruin. Besides the *Genoese* have something to recommend them to the peculiar Regard of *Great Britain*. They are a free People, and have asserted their Liberty and Independency with a Spirit worthy of universal Imitation. This, one would imagine, should endear them to a People who to this Day reap the Benefit of a noble Stand made by their Ancestors, in the same glorious Cause. But how can it be expected, that this should be a Plea with those, whose Power is only in Danger from Liberty? As to the Marquisate of *Final*, they have had long Possession of it; the Laws relating to Mortgages amongst us are founded in Reason and Justice, therefore universally binding. If the Debt be not paid within a certain Time, it is plainly equitable and right, that the Mortgagee should foreclose. As to the Treaty of *Worms*, and the Loss his *Sardinian Majesty* sustains, there are two or three old Maxims in Civil Law, which
 explode

explode that Pretence. *Conditio iniqua alteri per alterum inferri non debet. Amittere rem non videntur, quibus propria non fuit. Si quis alium daturum facturumve quid promiserit, non obligabitur. Transferre in alium nemo plus juris potest, quam ipse habet.* It being so evident then, that the Republic of *Genoa* ought to be supported, and *Final* to remain in their Possession, there is but one Reason why the contrary is consented to by us. It may prevent future Disturbances, to put so considerable a Property into the King of *Sardinia's* Hands, and as Peace secures Ease and Life to the Soldier, so it gives lasting Power and Wealth to the M——r.

The next Article under our Consideration is *Dunkirk*. If the Fortifications of that Harbour be demolish'd, we seem to have insisted upon a needless Point. What Use has been made of *Dunkirk* during the War? Very little in Comparison with what was apprehended. *St. Sebastian*, or *Toulon*, or *Brest* might have been worth demanding the Surrender or Demolition of, and we might undoubtedly have gain'd one of those or any other Point, by receding from our Demand in this, But because *Dunkirk* was the popular

pular Cry thirty or forty Years ago, our M——rs think, that to satisfy the People in so moderate a Request will cover a Multitude of political Sins. But Men who make Reason the Rule of their Judgment, will say, that the Harbour of *Dunkirk* has cost the *French* an immense Sum of Money, that without Doubt they would rather pay twice what they have expended, than demolish Works of such lasting Consequence, that therefore it would have become us to have taken a large Sum in lieu of such a Concession, or, as *Dunkirk* can do us no Hurt, we might have insisted upon their repairing the Fortifications they have razed in *Flanders*. This would have displayed our Power, and done Justice to our Imperial Ally. But then it would not have had that Air of Popularity, nor have serv'd the ministerial Purpose of *pleasing* the People, in order to *undo* them.

On the contrary, if *Dunkirk* be not fill'd up and demolish'd, it will be plain, that the Clamour for such a Step formerly was not in Earnest, or if it was, that we admit into our Treaty one of the great Eye-sores in the Treaty of *Utrecht*. It is astonishing to see the different Force of Arguments

guments at different Times; that the Disciples of that great Minister, whose Eloquence was never so conspicuous, as in his Demand of this Measure, should in less than Half a Century see Things in quite another Light. The Sale of *Dunkirk* has been always esteemed one of the most infamous Acts of *Charles the Second's* Reign. Shall we confirm that national Disgrace, and make it irrevocable, by suffering the Place to be made impregnable? *Dunkirk* must be demolished. No Whig-M——r can ever have the Front to propose a Peace to P——t, of which that is not a Preliminary. Whatever Use it may have been of in this War, the *French* certainly foresaw great Advantage from it, or it would not have been in its present Condition. It may distress us hereafter, for you may take it for granted, the Peace now made will not be perpetual. It is an Article, which the People will never dispense with. They universally and justly expect it, and if they should be disappointed in this, it will not be unreasonable, if they expect to see *French Louis d'ors* current on this Side the Water.

I am afraid you are almost weary of Negotiations. Indeed it will require an able

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Hand to make a political History of the present Times palatable to Posterity. But give me Leave, Sir, to discuss two or three Suppositions more, and your Patience shall be at Liberty. Supposing *Spain* to give up all Right of searching our Ships upon any Pretence whatever; it will then be said by honest and impartial Men, that Might overcomes Right, that we had indisputably no Pretensions to carry on a contraband Trade, and that the *Spaniards* never attempted to search, 'till they found that such a Trade was carried on. Has not every private Man a Right to search for his own Property? Do not Custom-house and Excise Officers practise it daily by Authority? Does not a Lord Chief Justice's Warrant empower any Man in the Kingdom to enter any House, and search for whatever he presumes to be concealed? Power may make a public Act valid, but it can never render it meritorious, else Rapine, Violence, and Oppression would usurp the Name of Merit. An honest Master cannot applaud the Zeal of his Steward, who makes Advantage of his Neighbour's Distresses to draw him into a disadvantageous Bargain. His Zeal for his Master may be commendable, but Justice is an Obligation

ligation prior even to Fidelity, and a good Man must disapprove of Fidelity, that is carried on at the Expence of Honour and Conscience. What can such a Servant propose to himself? If he means to win his Lord's good Opinion, it is probable by his using bad Methods to arrive at it, that he intends to make a bad Use of it, when acquir'd. And it has fallen within the Experience of most Men, that a Servant, who distinguishes himself by a forward officious Zeal of this Kind makes but a pitiful Figure. It is commonly concluded, that he has a Habit of Injustice, which mixes with every Act of his Life, that he cannot avoid doing Wrong, even when he intends to do Right. I must leave the Application to you, for Time obliges me to make haste and

Suppose, that the *Spanish* Claim to search our Ships is upon any Pretence, *admitted*, or not mentioned in the Treaty. Then I have only this plain Question to ask, For what did we declare War against *Spain*? If my Memory does not fail me, it was not merely for Depredations, but for a pretended Right of searching and visiting any Ships of ours, that should fall in their Way within certain Degrees of Latitude. So that we

give up the only Pretence we had for making War, and thereby acknowledge the War to have been originally unjust and unnecessary on our Part; we revive the heavy and pressing Complaints of our Merchants, and by that Time Peace has procured Riches, we shall again be ripe for all the Miseries of War. The Justice of the *Spanish* Claim is not at all to the Purpose. The *Sword* is the *Ratio Regum*, which we ought never to have sheath'd, 'till this fundamental Article of a Peace had been granted. The Freedom of Navigation is so essential to Trade, that it is hard to conceive, how we can expect to be a trading People after having departed in the least from that invaluable Liberty. We may still continue to sneak from Coast to Coast, but our Flag, which at present claims universal Respect, will then be obliged to put up with every Indignity, and perhaps to strike to a *Spanish Guarda Costa*, or an *Algerine Rover*. A Nation has a Right to every Advantage it can obtain. The little Rules of *Meum* and *Tuum* are admirably calculated to keep private Men in Order. But it betrays Narrowness of Spirit, when the Servants of the Public stick at any Thing that may advance the

the Public Interest. It is for the Welfare of the Community, that they are entrusted with Power, and those Administrations make the best Figure in History, under which most Conquests and Acquisitions have been made. But this might be resolved into something else, as you may depend upon it, it will.

If the Peace we make be exclusive of the Empress Queen, we then annul and disown every Measure of ours for Six or Seven Years past. The *French* had no Inclination to a Rupture with us. All they desir'd was to reduce the House of *Austria*. We thought the Design iniquitous, and thought ourselves oblig'd to prevent any Violation of the Pragmatic Sanction. This it was that first gave Umbrage to his most Christian Majesty; and are we then reduced to the shameful Necessity of retracting all our Menaces, Professions, and Resolutions? Have we already forgot those Groans of *Germany*, which but Seven Years ago pierced our Ears, and melted our Hearts? Is the Ballance of Power, which for Thirty Years past has engross'd all our *Attention*, at length become our *Sport*? The *Instability* of such a Conduct would be infamous, if the *Injustice* of it were

were not amazing. Did we *exalt* the Empress Queen for no other Purpose, but to *abase* her? Of what Use will the Empire be to her, if a *French* Army is to overawe the several Circles, to influence the Diet, and to invade her Dominions at Pleasure? Had we attack'd her as Enemies, her *Pandours*, *Croats*, and *Talpatshes* would have known how to receive us. But she has not, in the most uncultivated Part of her Dominions, a Subject so wild and barbarous, who will not be shock'd to hear of our Desertion of his Sovereign. Her Constancy and Magnanimity in the Height of her Troubles entitled her to the Protection of a generous People; but what Sort of Generosity that is, which is cool'd at the first Temptation of separate Advantage, let the *Enemies of Great Britain* say.

If the Peace we make be exclusive of the King of *Sardinia*, then we ill requite that illustrious Prince for his faithful Attachment to the common Cause. We must never expect an Ally upon any Terms, if this be the Treatment our Allies have to expect from us. Was it for this that he sent his Forces over the *Var*, that he hazarded his Person in Battle, that he never surrender'd a Town
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'till the last Extremity? He was frequently tempted to a separate Peace, but neither the Security of his Dominions, nor the seeming Good of his Subjects, could prevail with him to be unfaithful to his Allies. Such a Prince, considering his Power and Situation, merited all the Subsidies and Stipulations we could make in his Favour. His Friendship hereafter might have amply compensated any Expence or Concession it might have cost us at present. But it is our Misfortune, that Futurity is no Part of the Concern of our M——rs. One temporary Expedient is to them worth a Thousand lasting Benefits to the Nation. This is the Origin of all our Mismanagements past, present, and to come.

If the *Dutch* should be no Parties to this Peace, you will say, they deserve it. I grant they do. But Nations are not to resent like Individuals. *Public Interest* should be the Standard of political Conduct, and surely no one will say it is *our Interest* to be at Variance with the *Dutch*, or to leave them a Prey to the all-grasping Ambition of *France*. We may soon bid Farewel to *our* Naval Strength, if the *French* acquire so considerable an Accession to *theirs*, as the

United Provinces. It is true the *Dutch* have been too cautious of giving Umbrage to *France*. The least Degree of Vigour on their Part Four Years ago, might by this Time have fix'd the Tranquillity of *Europe* upon a solid Basis. But are we, who have so sensibly felt the Want of their Assistance, to disable them from ever giving it hereafter? A childish M——r may act in this Manner from Pique or Resentment, an avaricious one from Motives of private Interest, but an honest faithful Steward for the Public, would, for the Sake of the Public, act with Respect to the *Dutch*, as if they were our dearest Friends, and had laid us under perpetual Obligations.

Supposing the Peace to be general, to take in the *Empress*, *Sardinia*, and *Holland*, one obvious Conclusion will be drawn, that we could not do much for ourselves, when we had so much to demand for our Allies. Or at least, if the Enemy are low enough to grant whatever we ask for them, how much more might have been obtain'd for ourselves without them? I honour the *Empress Queen*, I esteem the King of *Sardinia*, and heartily love the *Dutch*, but *omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est.*

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Our first Attention should have been to ourselves, and after every possible Point had been gain'd, it might then be lawful to think of Allies. If that should prove too late, and we be told, that as much had been already yielded to us, as our Superiority could entitle us to, why then it is an easy Matter to extricate ourselves. Let them use their own Power to support their own Pretensions. Our Interest is engaged at Home, and whenever a Minister wears out the Interest of his Country in the Service of Foreigners, there is a violent Presumption, that he is consulting some Interest of his own at the Bottom.

I think we have now waded thro' most of the Difficulties, that will attend the approaching Peace. As my Disgust to our M——rs is not personal, you see I have represented Matters with the greatest Candour and Impartiality. I never draw my Pen but for the Service of my Country, and when I think my Country is in Danger, it is a Rule with me to give no Quarter. I attack a M——r on every Side, and never leave him, 'till he has not a Subterfuge or an Evasion left. If you think some of my Arguments might have been stated in a stronger

stronger Light, I believe all of them might, but you are to consider, that if there be a Defect on one Side, probably there may be on the other, for upon the whole my Study has been to keep up a Balance. It was not my Design to send a finished Piece, but only to furnish you with some Hints against every Event, and to lay down a Plan of Operations against Persons in Power more effectual, than any of the anti-ministerial Writings since the Memory of Man. I don't doubt in the least, but that some Part of my Plan may have been anticipated in Secret already, that there are Pamphlets prepared for the Press, against every possible Article of the Treaty, for you see how very easy it is to explode all the Proceedings of the Congress, before we know any thing of them. But just as my Indignation is, I cannot deal unfairly even by a Minister. It is for this Reason, that I chuse to lay before them the best Arguments they will have to encounter, in Case they make a Peace, or in Case they continue the War. Whether any Thing I have said be answerable, or whether I have departed in the least from Truth, or have in any one Instance contradicted myself, I leave to them
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to consider. The Purity of my Intention and the Goodness of my Cause will obviate any Imputation against either my Veracity or Consistency.

But perhaps you will say, that a Measure cannot be equally right and wrong, equally expedient and inexpedient; That it is but reasonable to conclude, that if so much is to be said *against* taking or not taking any Step, there may remain something to be said *for* taking or not taking it; That therefore Reasonings upon political Subjects are very fallacious; That as private Men can have but an imperfect Knowledge of the Premises, it is presumptuous in them to draw warm Conclusions; That all the Charms of Power will never tempt a prudent Man to accept it, if he must stand or fall by the Judgment of Pamphlet-Writers and Journalists; That these great Authors themselves have been known to change Sides, and that in such a Case the World must be at a Loss, which of their Opinions to follow; That as to the present Ministry, they came into Power with the universal Approbation of their Fellow-subjects; That they have not hitherto distinguished themselves by any Act of
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Male-administration ; That though the Supplies have been prodigious ever since they entered upon Power, yet other Ministers must have raised the same ; that they found the Nation involved in Difficulties, which no small Grants of Money nor moderate Skill could have extricated it from ; That it seems equitable and candid to suppose, they will make as good a Peace as they can ; That it is easy to imagine they will have some Regard to their Reputation, and some to their Power, and that both in great Measure depend upon the Uprightness and Disinterestedness of their Conduct ; That therefore you shall chuse to consult your own Happiness, and the Peace of your Country, by leaving to *their* Management, Affairs, of which you are not a competent Judge, and in which there is no reasonable Presumption, that they will violate their Trust.

Indeed, my dear Friend, you make me smile. Your Language is sensible enough, but it is quite out of the Way of the World. You talk like an honest private Man, studious of Peace, and attentive to your own Business. But then, consider, you have no Fortune to raise upon the Ruins of a Minister's,

ster's, or you have no Prejudices against our present Establishment, or you have never asked a Favour, and therefore have not been disappointed, or you are not in the Pay of a Printer, whose Press cannot stand still, though the Times should not furnish it with Facts. You would be of a very different Opinion, if your Mind was under the Influence of any or all of these Considerations. Only suppose that you determined upon the Ruin of a Minister; you have flattered yourself that your Resolution is public spirited, that the Church and State are in Danger from his Power; that the Means, by which he acquired, and those by which he supports it, are detestable; then consider every Measure of his, as founded in Ambition, and tending to private Purposes; and as it is commonly more grating to fix upon Men the Imputation of Folly than Knavery, if you find any Difficulty in the latter, the Spirit within you will prompt you to the former; you will discover nothing but an uninterrupted Series of Blunders, scandalous in Persons who pretend to Negotiation, and lamentably ruinous to the Public. Then you will gnash with your Teeth to think, that Persons of your, or your Patrons

tron's Ability or Integrity should be destitute of Employment, or that the Public should be destitute of you; then you will naturally exclaim, and declaim, and rail, and stigmatize, and vilify, till there is not a Word in the Language correspondent to the Bitterness of your Heart.—Or suppose yourself to have Prejudices in Favour of a certain abjured Family; then you can have no Patience with the Measures of a Government you dislike. You will mistake Obstinacy for Constancy, Prejudice for Patriotism, and an Aversion to Places under the present Royal Family, for a noble Spirit of Independency. With these natural Mistakes you will gloriously persevere in an undeviating Opposition to all Administrations; you will determine to censure the Events of Forty Years hence, and would publish a Protest against them immediately, if human Foresight would furnish you with Matter. — Or suppose yourself disappointed in any Favour you solicited from the M——y; would not the Image of a great Man in your Mind be totally reversed, the Moment he fails, or seems to fail, in his Friendship to you? As your Opinion of his Virtues was somewhat
heightened

heightened by your Expectations, a Disappointment must sink it at least in Proportion. You will then judge, that his seeming Benevolence deceived you, and, as in the Warmth of Gratitude you thought him all Perfection, it is natural in the Heat of Resentment to make him a Monster of Pride, Insolence, and Ignorance. Then you will immediately connect your own Cause with that of the Public, you will judge it impossible, that the Minister can be a Friend to his Country, who has not proved a Friend to *you*, and if he is not a Friend to his Country, I know you so well, you will warmly oppose him, even though your Prejudice were not personal.—Or supposing once more, that you were in the Pay of a Printer; in such a Case it is but Justice, that in your Writings you should consult *his* Interest. He tells you, that you have no Genius for Poetry, that Obscenity and Blasphemy indeed would sell, but both those Subjects have been pretty well exhausted, that Politicks afford perpetual Matter, that in *defending* the M——y you would make but an indifferent Figure, that Men are delighted and entertained with Raillery or Reproach, for those only breath

Malice,

Malice, but Vindications are fulsome, for they favour of *Flattery*, therefore the Province he has to assign to you is, to attack the Character and Measures of Statesmen. You would answer perhaps, that as you have a good Opinion of the present M——y, it will be impossible to write with any Spirit against them. His Reply is, that you may borrow, or imitate what has been said against former Ministers, that ill Language will make Amends for Dulness, and Misrepresentation supply the Place of Wit; but that, however, if you have any Scruples of Conscience, Persecution is not his Principle, and you must excuse him, if he employs somebody less delicate in Affairs of this Nature. Now would you, or any Man alive chuse to be starved? Tis true, it is hard, but there are thousand Hardships in Life. You immediately submit, enter upon your Office, study, borrow, invent, and falsify; Habit facilitates your Work, till at length, having a very good Opinion of yourself, you believe what you have writ to be true, and resolve, in conscientious Regard to Truth, to devote your Days to so laudable an Undertaking, till you find *sufficient Reason* to desist or change Sides.

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Now, Sir, what is become of all your *Candor, Reason, and Truth?* You see that your Opinion of the Safety of the Constitution in the Hands of it's present Guardians will get you nothing, but the Satisfaction of being in the right, and perhaps, a quiet peaceable Life. I wish you long to enjoy it; but I beg of you let the World take it's Course. You that don't know the World, may very sensibly wonder at what is said and done in it, but suppose yourself to be in the Situation of any discontented, or disappointed, or disaffected Writer or Speaker, and you will find it probable, that you would write, and speak, and act, as they do; you would see every Thing in the Light they do, and therefore would think it your Duty to oppose the M——y, till the *Reasons of your Opposition* were removed. Besides your present Way of judging would be fatal to Mankind in various Respects. It would impose a profound Silence upon a large Body of Men, and it would deprive the rest of great Entertainment. Every Man in this Kingdom has his certain Share of political Knowledge, which being of a frothy and windy Nature, puffeth up more, than any other Knowledge.

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ledge. The Patient is in exquisite Torture till he gives it vent, and frequently the Explosion is loud enough to make Kings and Ministers tremble. Now is it possible to conceive a greater Act of Tyranny, than a Law to prohibit the Use of all Carminatives, or to make Eructations, or any other Relief, in flatulent Distempers, criminal. Such would be the Effect of agreeing with you in Opinion! A Company of this Sort under those Restraints of *Truth* and *common Sense* must be a melancholy Spectacle. To see the Mixture of Impatience and mutual Commiseration strongly expressed in the Tumor of their Bodies and Distortion of their Features, would move a Man of the least good Nature to start some Paradox concerning the Peace, or the Administration, in order to give them Ease.— Then again consider, that Malice and Envy, and other natural Dispositions, in the Hearers of this Conversation, would be deprived of their proper Aliment. How uneasy must be the Sensation such Men would experience in their Ears! They would miss the Sound, they had been so long accustomed to, and because they heard no other Sound so vehement, would lose great Part

of their Understanding and Spirits, by imagining they had lost one of their Senses. — What a Deficiency would such a Stagnation of Politics occasion in his Majesty's Revenues! all the Trades, that at present administer to Politicks, would sensibly decay. The Custom House, the Excise and Stamp Offices, Taverns, Coffee-houses, Vintners and Brewers would unanimously deplore this Practice, of leaving the State to those, who preside in it, as a general and heavy Calamity: — Moreover the Liberty of the Press, that invaluable Birthright of *Britons*, which our Ancestors had before the Conquest, and which we hope to retain to the End of the World, must be in imminent Danger. As it is a Privilege not founded in *Law* but in *Custom*, and Customs, by our Constitution, lose their Force after a long Disuse, this new Reasoning of yours would in a certain Number of Years, deprive us of this, the most inestimable Species of Liberty we can transmit to our Posterity.

In short, Sir, your Manner of judging is big with every Kind of Mischief: it threatens our Trade, our Liberties, and Constitution, and even breaks in upon the little innocent Enjoyments of social Life. It is therefore, that;

that from an inviolable Attachment to the Good of my Country, I shall perpetually endeavour to discountenance and oppose all Attention to Reason and Truth, on political Subjects; and I make not the least Doubt, but those Gentlemen, who shall think fit to write against the Ministry on Occasion of the present Peace, will give them no Quarter, especially if it be a good one, but in Spite of all the Impertinence of *Reason* and *Truth*, will have the Courage and Perseverance, never to depart from this undeniable Maxim, that whilst the Affairs of *Europe* and of this Kingdom are in their present, or *any other* Situation, the Minister is an Enemy to his Country, who takes *any Steps*, who either dares to conclude a Peace, or presumes to continue the War.

I am,

SIR,

April 29. 1748.

Yours, &c.

F I N I S.

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