

doc
CA1
EA
94A67
ENG

DOCS
CA1 EA 94A67 ENG
Jacobsen, C. G. (Carl G.)
Arms and society : Russia's
revolutionary arbiter
43270238

JAN 20 1995

RETURN TO DEPARTMENTAL LIBRARY
RETOURNER A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE DU MINISTERE

43-218-2386

ARMS AND SOCIETY: RUSSIA'S REVOLUTIONARY ARBITER?

C.G. Jacobsen

Dir. Eurasian Security Studies ORU, Carleton University Pol.Sc.

Report to Cooperative Security Competition Program,

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, January 1994

Russia's military has been both victim and agent of the revolutionary changes that have swept the lands of Muscovy since 1988. Though wreaked by dynamics that defied control, it has emerged as perhaps the most important arbiter of (still uncertain) societal cohesion, and purpose. To appreciate the complex interplay of often contradictory nationalist, ethnic-separatist, socio-economic and other dynamics that shaped the years from withdrawal from Empire to Boris Yeltsin's (second) coup in September 1993 and beyond, the topic must per force be sub-divided into period and thematic sub-sections. The analysis looks first at the forces and events that led to the failed coup of August 1991, and Yeltsin's successful usurpation of power shortly thereafter. This is followed by a thematic overview of the economic dynamics (budgetary collapse, conversion and arms trade imperatives) that span these and later events. Finally, the analysis turns to the milestones that shaped the 1993 emergence of a new, far smaller, but again ambitious Great Russian Army--once again accepted as Russia's revolutionary arbiter, but now free of the social compact that had bound it through previous eras of Russian history.

*

Military transformation as weather-vane for the turmoil that swept through and changed the lands of Rus from 1988 to 1993 is uniquely appropriate. Since Peter the Great, under Tsars and Commissars, the Army was integrated into a larger, composite leadership. Its officers served on the highest councils of State, and Party. It participated in policy formulation, and frequently also implementation, in economic, social and other realms. Its stewardship of the Orthodox Church under Peter, its "school of the nation" role and purpose, and the fact that it was called on to provide leadership for Michail Gorbachev's attempt to generate civilian high tech industries, are symptomatic. Conversely, civilian state and Party leaders served on military councils, affecting, and in turn being affected by military decision-making, concerns and ethos.¹

In other words, the Army was always part of and never apart from the nation's leadership; the concept of military coup or regime was alien to its culture and tradition. Russian history resounds to the memory of peasant rebellions against the established order, to names like Stenka Razin and Emelian Pugachev. Yet the Army, as an institution, always remained loyal.

¹An earlier version, covering 1988-92, appears in European Security, no 4 (Winter) 1993. This extensively revised and expanded manuscript--see especially economic and final [1993] sections--received grants from Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Cooperative Security Competition and Professional Partnerships Programs; their support is gratefully acknowledged.

ARMS AND SOCIETY: RUSSIA'S REVOLUTIONARY ARBITER?

C.G. Jacobsen

Dir. Eurasian Security Studies ORU, Carleton University Pol.Sc.

Report to Cooperative Security Competition Program,

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, January 1994

Russia's military has been both victim and agent of the revolutionary changes that have swept the lands of Muscovy since 1988. Though wrecked by dynamics that defied control, it has emerged as perhaps the most important arbiter of (still uncertain) societal cohesion, and purpose. To appreciate the complex interplay of often contradictory nationalist, ethnic-separatist, socio-economic and other dynamics that shaped the years from withdrawal from Empire to Boris Yeltsin's (second) coup in September 1993 and beyond, the topic must **per force** be sub-divided into period and thematic sub-sections. The analysis looks first at the forces and events that led to the failed coup of August 1991, and Yeltsin's successful usurpation of power shortly thereafter. This is followed by a thematic overview of the economic dynamics (budgetary collapse, conversion and arms trade imperatives) that span these and later events. Finally, the analysis turns to the milestones that shaped the 1993 emergence of a new, far smaller, but again ambitious Great Russian Army--once again accepted as Russia's revolutionary arbiter, but now free of the social compact that had bound it through previous eras of Russian history.

*

Military transformation as weather-vane for the turmoil that swept through and changed the lands of Rus from 1988 to 1993 is uniquely appropriate. Since Peter the Great, under Tsars and Commissars, the Army was integrated into a larger, composite leadership. Its officers served on the highest councils of State, and Party. It participated in policy formulation, and frequently also implementation, in economic, social and other realms. Its stewardship of the Orthodox Church under Peter, its "school of the nation" role and purpose, and the fact that it was called on to provide leadership for Michail Gorbachev's attempt to generate civilian high tech industries, are symptomatic. Conversely, civilian state and Party leaders served on military councils, affecting, and in turn being affected by military decision-making, concerns and ethos.¹

In other words, the Army was always part of and never apart from the nation's leadership; the concept of military coup or regime was alien to its culture and tradition. Russian history resounds to the memory of peasant rebellions against the established order, to names like Stenka Razin and Emelian Pugachev. Yet the Army, as an institution, always remained loyal.

¹ An earlier version, covering 1988-92, appears in European Security, no 4 (Winter) 1993. This extensively revised and expanded manuscript--see especially economic and final [1993] sections--received grants from Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Cooperative Security Competition and Professional Partnerships Programs; their support is gratefully acknowledged.

There were mutinies, notably the 1825 Decembrist (Guards) revolt against the accession of Nicholas I; the Petrograd garrison's defection in 1917; and the Kronstadt (Fleet) revolt of 1921, which, as Lenin said, "lit up reality better than anything else", and led to Lenin's New Economic Policy. Yet the changes they wrought reflected the larger dynamics of which they were part, not the nature of their metier—they were societal agents, not military.

Nevertheless, history reminds us that notions of role and duty are not always synonymous with status quo; they may also serve forces of societal change. The Army as a whole has never truly led such forces of change. But it has in the past signalled the death of the old order, as when Marshal Alexsey Brusilov and many of the Tsar's finest officers "stood down" in 1917, and it has been decisive in defining the new, as when these officers rallied to the Red Army after the Polish invasion, in 1920.²

In August 1991, also, the Army effectively "stood down", thwarting the coup plotters' attempt to revive the old order. The voices of Russian President Boris Yeltsin at the Russian Parliament, Vice President Alexander Rutskoi on Moscow's Ekho radio, and Mayor Anatoly Sobchak in Leningrad signalled societal change. But it was the physical intervention of some of the armed forces' premier units that protected, and thus confirmed change.

By Summer 1992, and even more pronouncedly in September 1993, when Yeltsin suspended legislature and constitution and declared personal rule, the Army had also become instrumental in defining the evolution and nature of that change. To understand the winds of change, the crucible of revolution, and the nature of the new, emerging order, however, one must first go back to 1988.

*

From Revolution Controlled to Revolution Unleashed

Elected General Secretary in 1985, Michail Gorbachev hoisted the banner of Revolution Controlled. His election signalled acceptance of the thesis first put forward by Michail Suslov, the Party's old ideologue, in 1977, that there was now dangerous contradiction between a fossilized Party-rule superstructure and a much better educated, more sophisticated population base; the former **must** be reformed, to reflect the demands and aspirations of the latter. Gorbachev embraced Nikita Khrushchev's failed slogans of "Return of Socialist Legality...and Leninist Norms", and re-packaged them in calls for **Glasnost** (openness) and **Perestroika** (re-building). His goal was that of Czechoslovakia's Alexander Dubcek, crushed by Soviet tanks in 1968: Communism with a Human Face--or Social Democracy.³

The socio-economic attempt to rebuild was four-pronged.⁴ There were campaigns against corruption and alcoholism (the initial focus also of former General Secretary Juri Andropov's reform agenda, before his untimely death in 1983). There was a significant freeing of central controls and increased acceptance of independent entrepreneurship, at least in the services and small business sectors. Administrative and production facilities seen to be inefficient were reorganized--though, as with Khrushchev's similar efforts, the new constructs often

addressed symptoms rather than the disease, and usually had little effect. Finally, resources were funnelled to "industries of the future", in a conscious, and military-supported attempt to build a civilian high-tech industry to complement and synergistically interact with the hard-pressed advanced branches of military industry.

Military support for this effort, for Gorbachev's across-the-board arms control and reductions campaign to end the confrontational nature of East-West relations and secure Western trade, aid and investment opportunities, and for withdrawal from foreign involvements--in Afghanistan, Mongolia and Eastern Europe--, derived from two doctrinal revolutions.

The first, confirmed by Leonid Brezhnev's Tula Speech and the emergence of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov as Chief of the General Staff in 1977, relegated nuclear arms to the role of ultimate deterrent, and focused future efforts on the combined operations potentials of new conventional and other more revolutionary technologies (laser, high energy particle beam, etc.) that promised nuclear effect, but with far more precision, and far less collateral damage. Nuclear threat spectres were in effect said to have been check-mated; the focus was switched to other threats that might be relevant in the 21st Century. Ironically, the Gulf War in early 1991, with its "smart" weaponry, which some saw as victory over Soviet arms, was victory only over largely obsolescent Soviet arms, and, in fact, validation of Ogarkov's charter for the future.

The second doctrinal revolution, more intimately associated with Gorbachev's name, was that calling for only "sufficient defence", "defensive defence", and acceptance of "mutual security"; the old **zero-sum** view that insecurity for one meant security for the other was now seen as dangerous delusion--prescription for arms race, and war. The doctrine first emerged indirectly, in an article (co-authored by Andrey Kokoshin, Moscow's foremost civilian strategist) re-evaluating the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle of World War 2. It gave artillery barrages the primary credit for victory--though **tankisti** were credited for the pace and extent of later German withdrawals.

The article was seminal. It struck at the core thesis of Soviet nuclear and non-nuclear doctrine since the war: that good defence rests on readiness to preempt offensively. The doctrine now developed owed its intellectual roots to Western conflict theorists shunned by their own governments, notably Anatol Rappoport, to SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) and the Report of the Palme Commission (chaired by former Swedish Prime Minister Oluf Palme). It was also a logical extension of Ogarkov's doctrine. To his premise of nuclear stalemate and new, high-technology future needs--an expensive recipe, as the latter costs far more than the former--, it brought particular attention to the theoretically unlimited range of new defence technologies, and a dimension of time luxury that was absent from Ogarkov.

The changes were crucial. Ogarkov may have identified the technological requirements of future wars, but the continuing immediacy of his threat spectre allowed no question of Moscow's oldest dogma--that maximum in-place force must be deployed along the periphery

of empire. This was dictated by the constraint of abysmal communication and transportation infrastructures, vitiating prospects for reinforcement. In the context of 1000-year ethnocentric memories of periphery war, this always translated into larger armed forces' structures than might otherwise have been necessary. Thus also in Eastern Europe: "bought with the blood of 20 million", the perceived need for hegemony echoed the names of Hitler, the Kaiser, Napoleon, and Charles, and the fact that east of the Tatra, the land runs flat to Moscow; the visceral nature of the demand was reflected also in the fact that the "Iron Curtain" was a near-replica of a line first drawn on the map by Catherine the Great, as the line east of which Moscow could afford no hostile dominion.

The new doctrine negated the premise that underlay periphery force deployments, in Tsarist and Soviet days, and that made maximum buffer extensions a strategic necessity, whatever the cost. It established the military rationale for withdrawals, and for substantive reductions not only in the nuclear arsenal, but also, and more importantly, in conventional force numbers--by far the costliest part of the defence establishment. It ipso facto thus also provided leeway for continued funding of high-tech aspirations even in the context of significantly declining overall defence budgets.

*

Withdrawal and Contraction; change unleashed. Gorbachev's December 1988 UN Speech announcing unilateral Soviet army manpower cuts of 500,000, was followed, in 1989, by withdrawal from Afghanistan, the announcement that the Soviet defence budget would be cut by 14%, and withdrawal of Soviet support for East European client regimes--their deathknell. Negotiations on total troop withdrawal schedules were begun that year with Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Mongolia.

The scale and pace of subsequent withdrawal rates was wrenching; the revolution wrought imposed its own dynamic and momentum--its impact was, in fact, eerily reminiscent of that of the Petrograd Soviet's 14 March 1917 Order Number One. The Soviet contingent in Afghanistan, withdrawn by February 1989, totalled about 115,000. The 73,500 troops in Czechoslovakia and 65,000 in Hungary, plus 50,000 from Mongolia, and some of the 50,000 in Poland and 350,000 in Germany were out by 1991. The withdrawal from Poland was completed in 1992 (except for 2000, to facilitate troop transports from Germany). That from Germany was scheduled for 1994 completion.

The return of nearly 700,000 (Army and Air Force, with weapons, logistics and all base removables)⁵, most of whom could not be absorbed by a now contracting force structure, was wrenching for morale and discipline. 36,000 homes would be paid with German financing, but most returnees were condemned to grossly inadequate and crowded housing, or tent cities. There were already 175,000 military families without proper living conditions before the withdrawals from Czechoslovakia and Hungary began; with these withdrawals and others, from Poland and Germany, the number swelled to 275,000.⁶ And housing was not

the only problem. As many as a quarter of a million children also returned, to already-bursting class sizes.

The returnees also exacerbated the separatist and inter-ethnic dynamics unleashed by withdrawal from Empire and the concomitant introduction of more democratic structures and procedures. Thus many settled in the Baltic Republics, and Kaliningrad--some because their roots were there; others because of better housing and quality of life prospects. The influx of Russian military retirees added fuel to the forces of exclusive nationalism and separatism. These, again, inflamed Russian nationalism, and Russians' very different concepts of historical rights.⁷

Glasnost filled in the "white spots" of Stalinist and later history, from Red Army atrocities when re-absorbing the Baltic states after the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, to more recent brutalities of hazing and racial discrimination and worse (one report attributed all or most of 6-10,000 military deaths from "suspicious circumstances" between 1985 and 1990 to this *dedovshina*). In the new context of political tolerance, dissidence was nurtured, and spread. Conscription intakes fell, as separatists in the Baltics, Georgia and elsewhere openly urged defiance.⁸

Local crack-down attempts, in Tbilisi in April 1989 and Baku in January 1990 served only to inflame local passions. The deaths of Tbilisi became the banner that brought V. Gamsakhurdia to the Presidency--where the former dissident and Shakespeare scholar transformed himself into dictator, and racist; when driven from office, though, he acknowledged no irony in effectively allying himself with the very minorities whose rights he had suppressed. His chameleon-like proclivities, and cavalier attitudes towards civil rights, proved not un-representative of the emerging class of "democratic" politicians, especially those now emerging in the former Baltic republics (see below).

Tbilisi was also symptomatic of the counter-trend. The commander in charge of the crack-down, Colonel-General Igor Rodionov, an Afghan war veteran, vilified by democrats, was lionized by advocates of re-imposed discipline--by force if and when necessary. The former, led by reserve officer Vladimir Lopatin, secured significant representation in the first elected Supreme Soviet, or parliament, but so did those riding the backlash against anarchy and dissolution, notably Colonels Alksnis and Petrusenko, the "Black Colonels". The latter achieved notoriety for a November 1990 ultimatum to Gorbachev, demanding his resignation if his reforms could not be made to work within 30 days. The two demanded a "Committee of National Salvation".⁹

Reaction against separatism also spawned the re-establishment of Cossack "Hordes", purportedly independent, but with clear ties to Russian nationalist forces, within and without the military, and three new Ministry of the Interior Special Forces type internal security formations.¹⁰ The premier of these was the Omon. The initial organization of Omon, in particular, appears to have been somewhat haphazard. Its emergence represented the confluence of two phenomena: now-unemployed ex-Army Paratroop and Special Forces

officers and soldiers unable to integrate into the civilian economy and seeking a new role for which their expertise might still be relevant, and Moscow's increasing concern as to the ramifications of lost social control. But, with regard to the crack-downs of December 1990-January 1991, there remains uncertainty as to whether the dog wagged the tail, or vice versa.

The culmination of that crack-down, in Vilnius, Lithuania, in January 1991 [nine people died] is variously ascribed. The newly emerged independent military union **Shchit** (Shield), claimed that Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, former Commander of the Airborne Assault Forces and now Deputy Minister of Defence, was the "officer in charge", and that "the President must have known about the planned action".¹¹ A highly respected Western specialist arrived at a different conclusion: he saw the Vilnius Omon detachment at the time as, in effect, a **Freikorps**, composed of Russian ex-paratroopers from the region; he noted that the Landsbergis government had recently permitted former Lithuanian Nazi divisions to enact reunions in the capital; to chauvinist Russians, who remembered also Landsbergis' father's welcome to German troops in 1941, this was provocation beyond endurance.¹²

In any case: in December 1990 Colonel-General Boris Gromov, Hero of the Soviet Union (and of Moscow's withdrawal from Kabul), and Commander of the Kievan Military District, accepted appointment as Deputy Minister of the Interior, with the mandate to reign in and/or (re-)organize existing Omon and like units, and expand these into a national network of special forces security troops. He resigned his commission in January 1991 to take up his new duties, apparently foregoing Army leadership prospects and a Marshal's baton for a policeman's job--the last wish of any soldier. When asked why, he answered simply: "fear of the Afghanization of Soviet society"; what did he mean?: "**Grazhdanskaya Voina**" (Civil War!).¹³ It was a measure of profound concern.

*

Military reform, democracy and reaction: the attempted coup. The armed forces, as also the KGB--and as any army or security organization would be--, were leery of those who advocated democracy within its ranks, support for military trade unions and/or for independent Republic/new state force structures.¹⁴ Those most insistent on such themes, such as Lopatin, and General Konstantin Kobets of the General Staff, were encouraged to find new homes. Lopatin became Russian President Yeltsin's chief military advisor, Kobets his "defence minister in waiting".

The Army was not wedded to establishment ideology, though (in 1990) 75% of officers were Party members, and another 15% were members of the Komsomol, the Party's "youth" wing. To most, the Party had symbolized patriotism. When the Party 'recommended' abrogation of article 6 of the Constitution, which had given it its monopoly on power, in February 1990, the Army was content to embrace successor symbols; 1990 saw military parades again blessed by Orthodox priests. The staff and role of the Military Political Administration, the Army's "political" arm, was cut by an initial 25% (18 high-ranking officers were cashiered for corruption and incompetence).

The Army would not fight for counter-productive ideological baggage. But it would fight for its memories, and sense of patriotism. The charge that Marshal Georgi Zhukov had risen through the ranks in the 1930s "on the bodies of people he had denounced" was, perhaps, the last straw. The Army rallied around the Karen Rash manifesto:

"the military should feel they are the background and sacred institution of a thousand years (of) statehood... At the turning points in history, the military proved the main, real hope of the people and frequently fulfilled assignments that at first glance appeared inappropriate... Thus Peter 1 ordered in 1722 that the military run the Orthodox Church... Zhukov is the embodiment of the 'Soldier as Russian Patriot'"¹⁵

The Army accepted the need for change, and, in particular, the need to adjust to new fiscal realities (see below), but it preferred managed change, and it preferred "centrist" change. Early reform focused on two domains.

The first concerned the character of tomorrow's army, and whether to retain conscription, or embrace, rather, the concept of a purely voluntary "professional" force. Proponents for the former favoured the British or American example; they found prominent advocates, from both military and civilian ranks.¹⁶ Opponents referred to Russia's traditional "school of the nation" concepts, and French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau's reported admonishment: "those who rely on mercenaries deserve to be slaves"; they echoed the arguments of the Swedish reformers who pioneered the conscription route in reaction to the rogue armies of their day--to ensure social representativeness, and, thus, they thought, societal control. They argued that the cost of a purely professional army would be prohibitive, and that its vaunted advantages were in any case illusory; they pointed to the professionalism of conscript armies (with contract cores) such as those of Germany, Norway or Switzerland.

The end result (crystallized after the failed coup of August 1991) was a compromise, weighted toward the latter models. Conscription would be retained, to safeguard mobilization prospects, but the percentage of the cohort that was actually called up would be limited; initially, as in Poland, to 25%. Conscription would be cut, to 18 months (24 for Naval service), with liberal alternative service and amnesty provisions. The professional core, serving on 3-5 year contracts (after successful graduation from a 6-month military school), would be expanded to a peacetime norm of 75% within 5-7 years--though this aspiration was finance-dependent; the initial target of the Russian Defence Ministry established early 1992 was 50%.¹⁷

The formula promised heretofore unknown Russian ethnic homogeneity (This was already emerging, *de facto*: 1991 draft fulfillment ranged from 100% in the RSFSR, Belorussia and Azerbaidzhan to 12.3% in Lithuania and 8.2% in Georgia; the proportion of native Russian speakers had already risen from a low of 42% in 1989 to 66.5% in 1990).¹⁸ It also promised a healthier, more selectively recruited Army.¹⁹

The second initial reform domain concerned electoral accountability. Former Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev's governmental formula of job stability and allowing each

functional branch of society maximum authority in its domain, a reaction to Khrushchev's constant reorganization and personnel turn-over, contributed directly to the ossification, stagnation and corruption that ultimately doomed the regime. Its effect on the military may not have been as dire, because external challenges (such as Afghanistan) forced constant re-evaluations, and because newly established civilian think tanks, notably the Academy of Sciences Institute for the USA and Canada (founded in 1967), provided alternative sources for security analysis and threat evaluation. Nevertheless, the General Staff crucially acted as de facto Secretariat to the supreme Defence Council (chaired by the Secretary General of the Party), and thus did to a large extent control the agenda and presentation of issues.

1989 saw the establishment of other actors with formal rights of input: a new Department of Arms Control and National Security within the Party Central Committee (headed by General Alexander Storodubov, of the GRU, it drew its staff from Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Academy of Sciences); a new arms control, disarmament and national security planning body within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (headed by Victor Karpov); and an expanding Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, now renamed the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Global Security (co-chaired by Andrey Kokoshin, Deputy Director of the Institute for the USA and Canada, and Director of the Soviet Committee for the Monitoring of Unilateral Arms Reductions). Defence Council membership, previously restricted to the Secretary General (and Commander in Chief), the two or three Party Secretaries and Politburo members with immediate responsibilities in defence-related fields and the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chairman of the KGB, now swelled close to 20. It was given a civilian Secretariat, which received input from all of the above. It was in effect being transformed into something akin to Washington's National Security Council.²⁰

Other 1989-90 changes also evoked the US model. The newly elected Supreme Soviet appointed a Committee on Defence and State Security, with Subcommittees on Defence and Armed Services, Defence Industry, and State Security. With help from an experts group drawn largely from Kokoshin's 'shop', the former, under its chairman Evgenii Velikhov, established procedures for annual presentation and vetting of defence budgets and policy. In late Summer 1989 it authorized Kokoshin to negotiate an agreement with Les Aspin, then chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in Washington, that would see each body invite the other side to respond to the threat spectre presented in their defence ministries' annual 'posture statements'.²¹

Gorbachev's new Supreme Soviet based Presidency also established an American-style Chief of Staff position; Vladimir Lukin was appointed Chief of the Scientific and Analytical Staff of the Office of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Lukin, a former colleague of Kokoshin at the Institute for the USA and Canada, had transferred to the Foreign Ministry under Eduard Shevardnadze, serving first as deputy director of its Far East division, and then as director of long-range planning. However, the originally envisioned nature of his new position fell victim to Gorbachev's move to a self-sustaining Presidency with a larger Presidential Council of senior advisors. This, in turn, was transformed in November 1990 into a 'super-cabinet' Council of the Federation, made up of the Soviet President (its

Chairman), Republic Presidents, and the Chairmen of the Supreme Soviet and its two chambers. Lukin, in the meantime, was elected to the new Russian Parliament, in April 1990. He became Chairman of its Foreign Affairs Committee, with primary responsibility for Russia's negotiations with other Republics--the attempt to weave a new foundation for the confederation of the future.²²

The 1989-90 elections of separatist movements and governments in a number of Republics, from the Baltics to Georgia, reflected the accelerating dynamic of galloping, exclusive and centrifugal nationalisms, riding the crest of socio-economic alienation, and testing and challenging the declining authority of the centre. They doomed Gorbachev's vision of a social democratic successor federation, and dictated the much more decentralized essence of his final effort to engineer a looser confederacy of states, with central authority restricted to security, fiscal and foreign policies.

Public concern was manifest, and rising. Tatyana Zaslavskaya's All-Union Centre for the Study of Public Opinion on Socio-Economic Questions found that three quarters of respondents wanted "firm order in the country, stability and confidence in the future" (though there was no apparent consensus on how these motherhood and apple pie aspirations should be implemented); 10 percent wanted return to the Stalinist system. Calls for "stability of laws.. continuity of obligations.. and protection against crime and social disturbance", and admonitions that such is equally crucial "in a market economy", proliferated.²³ In January 1991, *Izvestia* concluded: "An increasing number of people can be prompted to think that a firm hand is the only way to firm order".²⁴

The conservative, and chauvinist momentum was reflected in the establishment of a second 'independent' military Union, the Russian Arms Union, which advocated a "sovereign, democratic Russia with a strong Russian(!) executive".²⁵ But the preference and sentiment of the military leadership, accustomed to equating Russian and Soviet interests, were most graphically displayed in May interviews with Oleg Baklanov, First Deputy Chairman of the Defence Council, and Radionov, now Commander of the General Staff Academy, and in a hard-line July manifesto, "A Word to the People", signed by General V. Varennikov (Commander in Chief of Soviet Ground Forces), Gromov and others.²⁶

They attacked those "who do not love their country"; the state [is] "sinking into non-existence.. Our home is already burning to the ground.. [We will not] allow a fratricidal war or the destruction of the Fatherland". Baklanov emphasized that "enormous organizational experience has been accumulated in the armed forces and defence industry of which society can take advantage"; "[They have] demonstrated ability to create an entire economy [and have] much greater organizational experience than.. newly appointed politicians who are incapable of ensuring even garbage collection on the streets of Moscow, cannot feed or clothe the population, or plan a city management strategy". Radionov maintained: "Despite the.. anti-army uproar, the army remains the people's favourite.. [They] have developed a certain scepticism towards many structures, but not toward the army".

The August coup plotters had reason for confidence. The Army appeared to have expressed its support. Gromov's signature to the July manifesto presumably gave confidence to his Minister, Boris Pugo, a central member of Emergency Committee (he later committed suicide). Achalov, the Deputy Defence Minister charged with combatting public disturbance, and thus defence liaison with Gromov, may or may not have been responsible for the earlier Vilnius crack-down (see above). But as Commander of Airborne Forces, his previous post, he had orchestrated a pre-November Revolution Day exercise in Moscow that appeared designed to show his troops' readiness to answer a call to "duty"; his Minister, Dmitrii Yazov, another Committee member, must have felt equally assured.

Yet, their assurance was misplaced. The *Afghantsy*, crucially, did not go along.²⁷ When his Minister joined the August plotters, surely assuming activation of Gromov's special forces security troop network, Gromov gave the contrary signal of no signal--this was not the emergency for which he had prepared; the Moscow *Omon* organized the defence of the "White House", the Russian Parliament, and Yeltsin. General of the Army Pavel Grachev, Achalov's successor as Airborne Assault commander, had been Gromov's First Deputy in Afghanistan; with Gromov he had successfully orchestrated the last large-scale operation of the war--breaking the siege of Khost--; like Gromov, he was awarded Hero of the Soviet Union. Now he joined Colonel General Evgenii Shaposhnikov, the Air Force Commander-in-Chief who threatened to bomb the Kremlin if the putchists did not surrender. The Commander of the KGB's elite *Alpha* assault unit (General Karpukhin, another Afghan veteran) also refused the call, as did the *Vitebsk* KGB airborne division.²⁸

They were not the most senior *refusniks*; those were General Yuri Maximov, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops, Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General Vladimir Lobov, the former Warsaw Pact Commander, who was to become Chief of the General Staff. Others effectively stood down, notably Chief of the General Staff, General Michail Moiseev, whose promotion by Gorbachev to Defence Minister was rescinded by Yeltsin. Some army and navy units answered the putchists' call, accepting their claim to legitimacy. But, under the circumstances, none did or could take decisive action. The *Afghantsy* were the shock-troops, so to speak. They decided the outcome. There is no doubt that Yeltsin, Sobchak and others of the opposition would have been arrested or worse in short order had they decided differently.²⁹

The fascinating question is: why? They had been prepared to answer a call by Gorbachev (Gromov's ties to Gorbachev can be traced to his time as Commander of a Motor Rifle Regiment in the North Caucasus, 1975-78; Gorbachev was member of the District Military Council).³⁰ Yet they were not prepared to defend less certain legitimacy; they were not prepared to prop up a now widely discredited ideology and largely de-legitimized system. They were conservative rather than liberal, and contemptuous of the apparent incompetence of many democratic politicians. But they were ready to transfer their sense of patriotism to another banner, that of Russia. The urgent, pleading, defiant and ultimately persuasive voice of Russian Vice President Rutskoi (another member of the *Afghantsy* brotherhood!), on radio Ekho, clearly had a bearing on events.

In the immediate aftermath of the failed coup the *Afghantsy* faded from public eye. The limelight was on leadership cleansing. With the appointment of Shaposhnikov as Minister of Defence came the stated intention to retire 80 percent of the officer corps. Lobov charted "radical reform"--with the emphasis on unified structure, and firm, central (and civilian) control.³¹

But disagreement quickly surfaced, both with regard to the meaning of the formula, and the mechanics of its implementation. Lobov was soon persuaded that more autonomous Republic/New State military structures must be accommodated before they could be co-opted--into a "system of regional and international security" that would ensure "the country's nationwide security on the basis of the preservation and radical restructuring of its single military-political space"; the new states should, *de facto* as well as *de jure*, replace the old Military Districts (except in Central Asia, where local conditions were seen to dictate, rather, a regional composite); the General Staff should be the supreme military coordinating body, with direct access to the highest civilian authority.³² Shaposhnikov, however, continued to insist on "unified armed forces", with status-of-forces agreements negotiated between the Centre and individual republics--a federate rather than confederate model, and with the Centre (Commonwealth of Independent States) Ministry of Defence as its apex; Lobov was compelled to retire, for "health reasons", in December 1991.³³ A few months later, however, Russia's decision to emulate Ukraine and the more assertively sovereignist New States in establishing its own distinct armed forces organization and structure, effectively vindicated Lobov's confederate course.³⁴ It also set the stage for yet another "generational" passing of the baton, the second in less than a year. This time, the *Afghantsy* were direct beneficiaries.

At the end of the process of retirements, reassignments and review (and propelled also by the dynamic and political impact of unfolding events), "five of the top seven Russian Defence Ministry posts have been filled by former commanders in Afghanistan"; by the following year the *Afghantsy* were also playing a dominant role in the formulation of doctrine (see below).³⁵

*

From Revolution Unleashed to New Successor State(s)

The real revolution unleashed was of course sparked by what in hindsight is most accurately described as the second, successful coup, when, with Gorbachev at the Russian Parliamentary lectern after his return from Crimean house arrest, and under the glare of TV lights, Yeltsin banned the Communist Party with the flourish of a pen--and proceeded to dictate the composition of the government. Gorbachev's power was emasculated. The act unleashed the last remaining fetters holding the forces of galloping nationalism. It unleashed the forces of separatism, and hasty Western recognition--often extended with little appreciation for either the territorial entities or the nature of the governments that were recognized. Lithuania, for example, had been expanded and given Vilnius (today's capital)

and regions with Russian and Polish populations by Stalin as salve for absorption; Khrushchev had given Russian-majority Crimea to the Ukraine without even a nod to the legal requirement of Supreme Soviet ratification; the Uzbek government that proclaimed democratic independence supported the coup, and proclaimed independence only in order to preserve old power structures.

The rush to dissolution, the engendered fears of 'Yugoslavia's' writ large, the attempt to construct and maintain a successor confederacy, attendant internal and external security dynamics, and the later emergence of a more assertive, nationalist Russia and a new military doctrine, will be addressed later. But, first, a focus on economic underpinnings:

*

Economic problems; military-civilian conversion; arms sales. The cost and immensity of the withdrawals from Empire, Afghanistan, East Europe and Mongolia quickly burst the budget; Gorbachev's projected 14.2% cut became 6%, the first year.³⁶ The beginning of price liberalization, and consequent rising prices, did not help. The 1991 defence budget of 96.6 billion rubles was 36% higher than in 1990, but had less purchasing power.³⁷

As mentioned, Gorbachev's 'new industrial' civilian economic structures and agencies drew proven managerial experience from military industry. Yet such management alone proved insufficient, without the context of that industry's discipline. Soon new civilian ventures were moved under the military-industrial umbrella.³⁸

The removal of the bureaucratic divide between military and civil industry did not remove the legacy of advantage. According to Vice President Rutskoi: in 1991 the military employed 80% of the country's scientific expertise; military industry represented half the national income; the purchasing power of the defence ruble was 4 to 5 times higher than that of the civilian ruble; its relative advantage was reflected in the fact that military industry was the only sector in the economy to over-fulfill consumer production targets.³⁹ Clearly this chasm between the two spheres needed to be bridged.

Meanwhile, the logic of relative advantage showed. About 40% of military industrial output had gone to the civilian sector, at least since the 1960s; its more advanced production facilities had always been relied on for a wide range of civilian products, from refrigerators and TVs to photographic equipment, computers and video systems (however primitive by the standards of some). At the end of 1991 defence industries produced 3000 types of consumer goods, worth 13 1/2 billion Rubles, with a significant proportion slated for export (the degree to which military industry is also a crucial "civilian" exporter is all-too-often unappreciated in the West).⁴⁰ By 1989 the civilian percentage of military industrial output had risen to 50%; a year later it approached 60%.⁴¹ By 1992, with defence procurement, research and development slashed (down about two thirds from 1991 levels), the figure rose to 80%.⁴² Amidst real and sometimes successful pressures to diversify and privatize, and overall economic decline, defence industry assets increased.⁴³

It was typical and symptomatic that when Moscow's Department of Energy and Energy Efficiency in 1993 began the task of "making the city's plethora of factories and power stations fuel efficient, energy conscious operations", it was to defence industries that they turned--to develop:

"heat meters, (equipment) to check energy consumption levels, electricity meters, new building insulation, a super-strong glue for pipe repairs, an experimental heat pump, and an automated system for boiler operations."⁴⁴

Defence industries were not unaffected by the general phenomenon of New State barriers and tariffs severing traditional supply lines (component manufacturing was usually provided by one monopoly; it was normal for different components to be made in different Republics). In the defence sector such fracturing was less severe than in many others. The "share of the Russian Federation" ranged from 67% of the total number of defence enterprises to 90.2% of Research and Development.⁴⁵ This conferred bargaining leverage. In view also of the fact that this sector maintained distinct all-(ex-)Union ties and presence, through 'Commonwealth' sanction and/or through "all-Union" Officers Assemblies and other networks, New-State restrictions could often be circumvented.

Early efforts to convert to civilian purpose the excess capacity caused by rock bottom military procurement (the nuclear sphere, cut 39.3%, was partially exempt, but overall procurement shrank to just 2.9% of total military expenditures) were, in fact, unimpressive.⁴⁶ A tank factory might build prams, or demonstrate a tank's ability to haul harvesters, but this was scarcely a cost effective use of factory capacity, the trained workforce or, indeed, the tank. So also with artillery shells re-made into lamps.⁴⁷ And if such output still appeared cost-effective when compared to civilian industries, this said more about the prospects of the latter than those of the former. In fact, military industries converted to civilian production saw their output fall by 30% in 1991, and another 30% in 1992.⁴⁸ The military faced a growing unemployment problem, in its industries as in its fighting and support formations.⁴⁹

At the same time defence spending continued to fall in real terms, by 6 % a year. Overall military investment dropped 33 % (one estimate went as high as 50%) in 1991, though high technology investment escaped the chopping block; it was protected.⁵⁰ Conversion costs were estimated at US \$150 billion; arms exports, with a hoped-for \$10 billion annual potential, appeared the most promising source of funding.⁵¹ Overall exports were down, for the fourth year in a row. GNP shrank by 12 % in the first nine months of 1991; industrial production was down 6.4%.⁵²

Privatization was scarcely the issue. Defence industries suffered the same prospect as other heavier industry; the only conceivable outside buyers were corrupt ex-Party *nomenklatura*, or the mafia (whose primary purpose was the laundering and legitimizing of ill-gotten gain), or foreign suitors, who tended to be ruled out for reasons of security. Military industry management teams chose instead, as did most of their more successful civilian counter-parts, to effectively privatize themselves.⁵³ Now operating under far looser central strictures and

control than before, and increasingly appreciative of the advantages and potential that this entailed, they began to transform their associations and combines into 'big business'. As such, they opposed divestiture--opposing sell-off of any part that either was or might prove profitable. Their favoured solution was co-operation with other big business at home and, in sharp reversal of earlier bias, with those abroad; they also favoured a more concerted arms sales effort, if necessary encompassing state-of-the-art technologies not previously made available to foreign clients.

Conversion remained essential, yet conversion enterprises lost 3.3 billion rubles in 1991, while the cushioning all-Union stabilization fund disappeared. It was also painfully slow, not least because of the costs involved. By mid 1991, out of 3500 defence production facilities, only 422 were in the conversion program, of which only 56 were due to be entirely converted to civilian output; total conversion had in fact only been completed in 5 cases.⁵⁴ A year later brought the assertion that "every military plant in Russia is undergoing some conversion", though only 10% were scheduled to convert 80-100% of their output; the schedule, funds permitting, was implementation over 15 years.⁵⁵

Again, the preferred solution: "cooperation in conversion between the Defence Ministry and enterprises in our military-industrial complex and Western partners" (especially German and US), and high-tech arms sales.⁵⁶ Anatolii Volsky, Head of the Industrial and Scientific Union which spearheaded the "industrialists' lobby", noted that although COCOM, the Western list of proscribed high tech exports, had been relaxed, it still effectively thwarted prospects of Western aid to the conversion effort.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Moscow's Institute for the USA and Canada and Stanford University's Centre for International Security and Arms Control did succeed in helping to coordinate a variety of joint US-Soviet business ventures, especially in defence; by mid-1991 600 Soviet defence industry concerns were exploring exports and alternative technological applications.⁵⁸ Kokoshin, who was also one of the more important 'mid-wives' behind this effort, listed Soviet strengths, and primary sales prospects: space technology, rocket building, aviation industry, ship building, high quality steel and composite materials, [some] oil production and oil rig equipment, and laser technology.⁵⁹

The new Yeltsin government sanctioned aggressive arms sales; Rutskoy would oversee the effort; 50 % of arms sales exports would go to subsidizing the costs of conversion.⁶⁰ By late 1991 arms sales had become the sole source of funding for conversion, and a crucial contributor to the extraordinary housing construction program necessitated by troops withdrawals.⁶¹ The Law on Conversion of Defence Industries of March 1992 established a new conversion fund from enterprise contributions, but this (and related foreign investment--\$300 million by May 1992) remained grossly inadequate. Mikhail Malei, Yeltsin's presidential counsellor on conversion noted bluntly: Russia "cannot afford to be more scrupulous than others, say the US or France, in selling arms in international markets".⁶² The only question concerned the distribution of sales income, whether it was to be spread equally to all claimants. Malei thought the 40% most competitive enterprises, those able to sell their products abroad, should subsidize the remaining 60%. Kokoshin advocated from

whom to whom; to maximize investment efficiency available funds should go primarily to those who proved able to compete, be they military or civilian exporters.⁶³

Released from bureaucratic interference, defence industry and science were told to achieve self-sufficiency.⁶⁴ They were also implicitly charged with the task of ensuring against an uncontrolled brain drain of defence scientists.⁶⁵ US and EEC concern that some nuclear scientists, in particular, might find their way to the highest bidder led to some subsidization--notably US funding for 100 nuclear fusion researchers in Moscow.⁶⁶ Yet such aid remained strictly limited (between one and two thousand Soviet scientists were thought to have the skills necessary to design nuclear weapons), not least due to concern that it did ipso facto also constitute the shoring up of a weakened but still very potent competitor.⁶⁷ Moscow clearly appreciated that this aid could be no more than a limited, short-term palliative.

New production, promotion and sales alliances emerged, complementing the few that already existed, such as **Glavkosmos**, established in 1985 to promote space commercialization; and now marketeer for joint Russian-Kazakh space launch services (employing SS-25 boosters) and potential seller of SS-18 and SS-24 ICBMs.⁶⁸ **Skorost**, designed to amalgamate Yakovlev and other aircraft design and manufacturing efforts, **Dianond**, another combine of research and production facilities seeking optimization of profits and opportunities, **Navycon**, a naval share-holding company whose subsidiaries are joint stock companies of the Fleets, and other military joint stock companies pursuing investment, conversion and communications prospects, spearheaded the new trends.⁶⁹

The former Flight Control Centre in Kaliningrad was converted into a Stock Exchange for military industries; it later amalgamated with some of the other military-industrial exchanges that soon sprouted (including **Konversiya** and **ESTRA**), to form the **Military-Industrial Bureau**, to trade specialized instruments and materials, electronics, chemical, metallurgical and construction industry products for consumer goods.⁷⁰ Limited military industrial stock offerings were now apparently available to foreign investors.⁷¹ Direct foreign investment was also welcomed. General Electric and Seneca [its French partner] agreed to invest in PS90 turbofan engine production and development, in Perm; India negotiated involvement in the development of the first supersonic VTOL, the Yak-141, and its R-79 engine; Sukhoi sought investors for its Su-37 multi-role combat plane.⁷²

Rolls Royce entered into partnership with Tupolev to provide British engines and American avionics to the new medium range Tu-204 (this 214 passenger competitor to Boeing 757 and Airbus A-340, was launched at the June 1993 Paris Air Show) and later models.⁷³ Pratt & Whitney signed and later extended (joined by Collins Avionics, of Rockwell International) a joint engine-avionics-airframe venture with the Ilyushin Design Bureau and other Russian suppliers and components manufacturers, offering aid-to-certification and global marketing of Russian planes, titanium sponge, semi-products and finished parts; the first result, a \$700 million sale of 320-seat Il-96s to Partners, a Dutch leasing company, was announced in June 1993.⁷⁴ France's Groupe Snecma joined with Mikoyan, grafting Larzac engines and Snecma's servicing reputation to the MiG AT, to produce up to 600 advanced military

training jets for Russian and foreign forces.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, Dowty/Smiths Industries of the UK married FADEC (full-authority digital engine controls) to a Ukrainian/Russian engine design, thus further improving prospects also for Russian engine manufacturers.⁷⁶

1993 brought the merger of perhaps the most dynamic rocket developers and manufacturers (in part because over-ambitious, competitive marketing threatened necessary cooperation), into "The first Russian rocket-space firm". They were the design office Salyut and the Khrunichev research and production centre, the developers and marketers of the Proton (UR-500K) launcher. The former had already "concluded contracts for the development of rocketry with the Indian organization for space research, the German aerospace agency DARA, the firm DASA and with the international organization Inmarsat for launching a communication satellite". The latter had signed contracts with Motorola for three Proton launchings, and with Lockheed "for the sale of its rockets on the world market". The amalgamation was expected to secure launch contracts with Immarsat, Intelsat, Eutelsat and Asiasat, the right to launch at least 12 American satellites before the end of the decade--and perhaps a far larger number (negotiations proceeded on Motorola's planned 66-satellite global cell phone network)--, and increase the number of geostationary satellites by at least a third.⁷⁷ The indirect pairing of the Indian space agency and Lockheed ultimately ran afoul of US laws, with some damage to Russia's reputation for reliability--offset by confirmation of its commercial priorities, and improved prospects for COCOM bypass (see below).⁷⁸

Soviet and later Russian military hardware-for-sale exhibitions were held at home and abroad. The Conversion-91 exhibition in Bologna, Italy, for example, was said to have been a particular success, as were Mosaeroshow '92 in Moscow, the IDEX '93 defence exhibition in Abu Dhabi, and others--including the Farnborough Air Show and Le Bourget.⁷⁹ Items for sale included MiG 27, 29 and 31, Su 25TK (ground attack) and 27, Tu 22 bombers, Il 76 AWACS-type planes and aviation technologies.⁸⁰ The 'private' International Chetek Corporation of Moscow even offered peaceful nuclear explosion devices.⁸¹

By Fall 1991 all plane types were on offer, including the previously top secret "wing-in-ground effect ekranoplane"; aircraft industry exports alone were now projected at US\$70 billion over the next 4-5 years.⁸² The Mi-26 heavy assault and Mi-28 attack helicopters were added to the list in 1992.⁸³ So also were the dual purpose 85 RU homing torpedo/anti-ship missile, the 3M-80 supersonic air-to-surface anti-ship missile ("vastly superior to any Western anti-ship missile currently in existence or even still on the drawing board"), the highly impressive S-300 anti-missile defence system (its six hits in six tries demonstration at the IDEX '93 defence exhibition in Abu Dhabi came as Israeli reviews downgraded the Patriots' Gulf War record to just one possible hit), and other state-of-the-art systems.⁸⁴ Once-secret technologies now for sale also included a number of space advances said to be superior to their Western analogues--certain nuclear reactors, high strength high temperature alloys, space engines that use magnetic fields, and space stations.⁸⁵ US defence officials and industry expressed interest in (and began testing) a range of Soviet defence products, from advance optics, engineered materials and high energy magnets to gallium arsenide--and the ekranoplane.⁸⁶

An initially negative US government decision, reflecting protectionist US space industry concern, was revised in February, 1992, with negotiations proceeding [also] on purchases of helicopters, selected anti-missile and advanced fuel rocket technologies, and nuclear space engines; France and other top-rank defence producers appeared equally interested.⁸⁷

There remained deterrents to some potential sales. Western competitors assiduously spread the Gulf War "lesson" of inferior Soviet arms, though the defeated, older vintage arms were scarcely representative of those now offered; some airframes were also judged too heavy, and hence fuel inefficient.⁸⁸ Aircraft, helicopter and missile sales were furthermore hampered by service and spare parts availability and delivery concerns.⁸⁹

1991 sales values were estimated at US\$4.5 billion, including 553 tanks, 658 armoured vehicles and 1,783 missiles of various types.⁹⁰ This was dramatically down from the pro forma highs of previous years (topped by 1986' \$24.8 billion), yet those figures were unreal in that most sales then were non-commercial; furthermore, only a small portion of the payments that did accrue reached either military-industrial producers or other Armed Forces agencies.⁹¹ Now most did.

1992 exports were initially down significantly from 1991; 21 % of defence enterprises were said to be "near bankruptcy".⁹² But a concerted sales effort turned the tide. Sales announced through the year included missile guidance technology, rocket engines, S-300 surface-to-air missiles with anti-missile capabilities, 24 SU-27 fighters (subject to on-going bargaining: later reports spoke both of larger numbers and cancellation), 400 T-72 tanks, unspecified warships, tank, rocket and uranium enrichment technology, two 300 megawatt nuclear power plants to be completed over 12-13 years, and agreement-to-employ 200 Soviet scientists to China (China also expressed interest in purchasing the Varyag aircraft carrier being fitted out at Ukraine's Mikolaiy shipyards, with 22 Su-27, but this deal was not consummated); three diesel submarines, 110 planes, including SU-24 and MiG-27, 29 and 31 fighters, 12 Tu-22 bombers, 2 Il-76 AWACS and nuclear power plants to Iran; helicopters, armoured personnel carriers and rifles to Turkey (initiating a US\$ 300 million arms sale package); T-72 tanks to Syria; SA-10 anti-air missiles to Libya; a Zhdanov cruiser, 30 MiG-29s, a ballistic missile rocket booster and missile technology to India (this latter deal, which proceeded despite US protest, and sanctions against Glavkosmos, was later terminated in return for greater-value access/sales to US space programs--viz above); two squadrons of MiG-29 fighters to Malaysia; combat jets to Saudi Arabia and Taiwan, for US\$14.6 billion; infantry combat vehicles to Abu Dhabi; S-300 missiles and other weapons to the United Arab Emirates (they were also interested in Su-25TK ground attack planes); plus heavy lift helicopters to Pacific rim oil and other operators; finally, Indonesia expressed interest in Scud missiles; the Philippines in MiG-29s; and South Korea in S-300 missiles, multiple rocket launchers, Su-25 ground attack planes and Su-27 fighters.⁹³ 1992 arms exports were estimated at 10 to 12 billion dollars; there were also related natural resource sales, including uranium exports worth \$800 million.⁹⁴

1993 brought confirmation of China's Su-27 purchase (26 were bought), Thai interest helicopters and, perhaps, MiG-31 high altitude interceptors, Malaysian in "new technology to be used in the MiG-29", and other initiatives and follow-up.⁹⁵ Some sales appeared bargain-basement when compared to competitors' price structures, but market shares and inroads were gained, and production facilities saved (prior to the Chinese sale and South Korean interest, Sukhoi's Su-27 production line was down to two orders).

Minimal relief on the home front also appeared on the way. Government orders for military hardware were slated to increase by 10% in 1993; they would include a new medium range bomber, responding to the Army's southern concern, and "a fundamentally new, standardized missile of the next generation".⁹⁶ The corner was turned. Yet new domestic orders, while providing relief to scientific/technical elites and employment prospects, would clearly not, in and off themselves, suffice to secure longer-term viability. Foreign sales remained crucial.⁹⁷

Many of these took the form of long term contracts. Deliveries remained and will remain below late-Cold War averages. But, as noted above, these tended to be concessionary, to clients and allies. Post-1991 sales contracts were commercial (though sometimes with part-barter options that appealed to some buyers) and with no automatic or necessary restriction on purchasers. Traditionally Western arms markets were fair game--favoured game, in fact, in view of their generally superior credit.⁹⁸

With energy and other traditional natural resource exports facing short and medium-term prospects of decline or stagnation (they were shackled by a crumbling infrastructure, development of new extraction prospects lagging behind the depletion of old, and/or jurisdictional wrangling about resource ownership and control), military industry exports in fact emerged as the single most important earner of convertible currency. It was also clearly more important than even the most illusory hope of Western aid and relief.

It was a potential that Moscow quite simply could not afford to blunt, no matter Western concern. The expressed Western fear of destabilizing consequences in the Third World was in fact seen as hypocritical, and self-serving, in view of the West's own vigorous arms sales efforts.⁹⁹ In any case, Moscow could afford no other course.

The Rush to Dissolution; Attempts at Containment; External and Internal Security Dynamics to end 1992. In hindsight, Yeltsin's "counter-coup" after the crumbling of the Emergency Committee in August 1991, was most remarkable for Gorbachev's resigned acceptance. As in Eastern Europe in 1989, when Gorbachev's preferred goal of forcing transition to reformist governments of his own ilk failed, he could have commanded enough military and organizational loyalty to enforce his will; yet, when faced with the choice of brute force or abdication, he again chose the latter. It was, perhaps, his finest hour. But the choice also meant impotence. His authority was usurped. Formal dissolution of the old Union did not come until December. Real dissolution came quicker.

The Baltics declared independence, as did Russia(!), the Ukraine, and other Republics, and the momentum did not stop. 'Autonomous' regions declared independence from Republics, and ethnic enclaves and even cities followed suit.

Galloping nationalism severed ties of economic logic, fuelling unemployment and inflation. By early November there were 20 million unemployed (many working unpaid); 80% were women.¹⁰⁰ The unleashing of *laissez-faire* price and regulatory reform in January 1992, and their extension through subsequent months jolted these figures upward, fuelling the arguments of those who espoused order.¹⁰¹ The nationalist beast also severed ties of military logic. Within six weeks the Ukraine and Kazakhstan had fudged pledges to be nuclear-free; 'their' missiles ranked them third and fourth among the world's powers. Azerbaidzhan 'annexed' Soviet forces on its soil, briefly becoming a nuclear power *de jure* (though not *de facto*); nuclear forces also remained on the territories of other new states.

Three arguments drove advocacy of a successor confederacy. The first derived from economic imperatives; nearly 80% of the economy of the USSR was trans-Republic (Russia was least dependent, yet for it also disruption of old ties was costly).¹⁰² The second derived from concerns about nuclear security or, rather, the insecurities and dangers of diffusion. The third turned on the extraordinary ethnic mix of the old empire. Unlike British, French and other empires that could be easily disentangled, the Soviet/Russian was more like its Austro-Hungarian cousin, whose ethnic mix continues to reverberate; there are 25 million Russians with roots and homes in other successor states (11 million plus in the Ukraine alone), as well as millions of Ukrainians and other nationalities beyond the boundaries of 'their' new states.

Three counter-arguments propelled dissolution, and separatism. The first was nationalism--and its exclusive variety, which demanded rights for self not conceded to others. The second was reaction against decades or centuries of bureaucratic insensitivity to local concerns, and the perversions and mistakes that this engendered. The third argument, distinct yet intertwined, was the legacy of empire, of Moscow's on-again off-again attempts to Russify others (and, in the Soviet era, of analogous attempts by Republican majorities, Georgian, Uzbek and others, to absorb 'their' ethnic minorities).

The Commonwealth of Independent States agreement, signed by Russia, Belarus and Ukraine and joined by Kazakhstan and others in December of 1991, accepted the principles of economic common market and unified strategic command--but without all-Union authority. Gorbachev's insistence on minimal central powers was ignored. The head-less construction remained (and remains) mired in contradictions and uncertainty. There was no early agreement on monetary or fiscal policy, or on the structure or funding of other 'common' domains.

Through the Fall of 1991, in response to US President Bush's embrace of nuclear arms cuts, Gorbachev (supported by Yeltsin and the Republics), offered even sharper cut-backs.¹⁰³ Ukraine and others also agreed that nuclear warheads would be transferred to Russia--in part

because this appeared the precondition for Western aid. By early 1992, however, harmony faltered. At the CIS Summit in February eight of the eleven agreed to a unified force (after two years). But Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaidzhan refused. In March Ukraine suspended nuclear transfer because of professed concern about their fate in Russian hands; she still had 1420 strategic and 2390 tactical nuclear warheads.¹⁰⁴

Yeltsin's post-coup comment that Republics had the right to independence, but borders might then have to be redrawn, was subsequently muted. But the threat's withdrawal rested on the unspoken premise that Ukraine would subscribe to a looser Union—as suggested by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's sponsorship of the Commonwealth. Hence the phenomenon (that Fall) that saw Russian leaders in Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea, including Admiral Kasatonov, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, urge a yes vote in the referendum on Ukrainian independence: independence then meant Kravchuk and the Commonwealth; a no would lead to further radicalization and, ultimately, a more *independista* government. Hence, also, the later concern in Moscow when Kravchuk appeared intent on sabotaging the assumptions that underlay the Commonwealth; Gorbachev was among those who feared that, far from using independence as legitimizer for Commonwealth membership, Kravchuk was in fact using the latter to secure the former.

The question of a more separatist agenda intertwines with the separatist conundrum: nationalist passions made concessions to central authority career threatening (even on matters of obvious self-interest); yet without concessions there could be no central authority. And no fetters on Republican independence meant no fetters on Russian independence; a Russia unfettered would always be more likely to have irredentist ambitions.

Ukraine was the crux—for its size, and for its ethnic mix. The nationalist imperative was evident in its demand that ex-Soviet units swear allegiance to Kiev, its seizure of the Army's main communication network (in January 1992¹⁰⁵), its demands for the transfer of the Black Sea Fleet, and its assertions of nuclear independence.¹⁰⁶ Yet change was sometimes less than apparent, and challenges were sometimes set aside rather than pursued.¹⁰⁷ Ukraine's rejection of a Commonwealth Army, for example, was followed 15 days later by a Kravchuk defence of cooperation with Russia; addressing a separatist audience, he noted that "when there is frost on Thursday in Moscow, it reaches Kiev by Friday".¹⁰⁸

Nuclear uncertainties remained; Ukraine retained strategic air and missile capabilities, though tactical warheads were transferred over the Summer. When Presidents Yeltsin and Bush signed START 2 in January 1991, Kiev's promised and necessary pre-requisite ratification of START 1 remained outstanding.¹⁰⁹ The potential for serious discord lessened, however, with the emergence of a state 'corporatist' consensus in Kiev, and the October 1992 appointment of Leonid Kuchma as Prime Minister (Kuchma was director of the missile production plant that developed the Soviet space shuttle). The consensus had ties to the 'industrialists' lobby' emergent in Moscow (see below).¹¹⁰ Kuchma also had ties to Moscow's new defence elite—he knew Gromov, for example, from the latter's days as Kievan Military District Commander.

As separatist dynamics reached into Russia itself, Moscow initially looked inwards. Yeltsin voided the first independence declaration within Russia, by tiny Chechen-Ingush in the Fall of 1991, and dispatched Interior Ministry troops. But they were withdrawn, by Parliament, because of fear that an interventionist precedent could be used elsewhere to legitimize action against Russian minorities, and to assuage Ukrainian concern (prior to the then-imminent referendum) that nascent Russian nationalism might precipitate divisive action beyond its currently-defined state borders. Early caution was also reflected in the March 1992 decision to withdraw from Nagorno-Karabach. There was neither military nor political stomach for involvement in others' conflict: Gromov, re-appointed to his old Caucasian command for the purpose, reprised his Afghan exit.

Yet a somewhat more confident and assertive Russia was also emerging. Tatarstan's independence referendum on 21 March, Russia's second, also appeared the last. Although Moscow refrained from punitive measures, other than to declare the act illegal, the post-script was different. The next day Tatarstan's President was conciliatory, perhaps mindful of Chechenya's problems and dissipating resolve: "Our first step will be... tighter union with Russia... new relations with a reformed Russia"; the referendum would save Russia, not destroy it.¹¹¹

Nine days later, on 31 March 1992, Russia's remaining 84 regions signed a new Union agreement, spelling out decentralization of powers, areas of joint jurisdiction, and areas under federal control--monetary policy, financial and currency regulation, the federal budget, energy distribution, nuclear power, defence and security.¹¹²

The next day, in response to attacks against the secessionist Russian-dominated Dniester Moldovan Republic, Yeltsin decreed the ex-Soviet 14th Army in Moldova to be Russian--denying jurisdiction to Moldova and the Commonwealth. Its Chief-of-Staff (Major General Sitnikov) welcomed the decision, and declared readiness to act. It was Russia's first military intervention in support of its diaspora. This time Parliament did not demur. The precedent was set.

The new course was reflected also in the final report of the Parliament's Lukin-chaired Foreign Affairs Committee on the status of Crimea: its 1954 transfer to Ukraine had never been ratified, and was therefore illegal. The effort to shore up the Commonwealth as Soviet successor umbrella lost priority; 'Russia First' was the new creed. Lukin moved to Washington as Russia's new Ambassador. Russia's Defence Minister displaced Commonwealth Defence Minister Shaposhnikov in the Ministry building in Moscow. The designation and shaping of Russia's new Defence Ministry was itself a signal event. When the idea of an independent Russian Army and Ministry was first muted, Marshal Shaposhnikov himself appeared the obvious candidate to many: he was young (born in 1942); he was a pilot (and thus a break also with the old leadership's Army credentials); and had been Yeltsin's choice first as post-coup Soviet and later as Commonwealth Defence Minister.

Other favoured choices included Lobov (succeeded as Chief of the General Staff by Leningrad MD Commander, General Victor Samsonov, in December 1991), Kobets, or Kokoshin, should a civilian be chosen.¹¹³ In the end Kokoshin, whose inter-ethnic/state views parallel Lobov's, was made First Deputy Minister, and civilian liaison. But the Ministry went to Pavel Grachev and the Afghantsy.¹¹⁴ They had saved Yeltsin during the August days. They also held high the banner of national and pan-national Russian interest.

Grachev brought Gromov back to Moscow, as the other First Deputy Defence Minister. Three other former Afghan commanders, Colonel Generals Victor Dobynin, Valerii Mironov and Georgii Kondratev, were also brought in--giving five of the Ministry's top seven positions to Afghan veterans.¹¹⁵

They were distinguished by their youth; Grachev is six years younger than Shaposhnikov. And they were distinguished by the assertiveness of their patriotism. Grachev served notice that he "would not allow the honour and dignity of Russians to be insulted on the territory of any other state"; Mironov affirmed that this duty to the diaspora extended to Russians in the Baltic.¹¹⁶ In the West, Major General Lebed, newly appointed Commander of the 14th Army and also Afghan veteran, warned against "fascist" Moldovan attempts at Genocide against the Russian population.¹¹⁷ In the East, the General Staff joined those who warned against territorial concessions to Japan before Yeltsin's planned visit to Tokyo (the visit was postponed); they followed up by directing the Navy to reinforce Southern Kurile military units--and to double personnel and (short-range) missiles on Iturup by 1993.¹¹⁸

Shaposhnikov followed suit by making it clear the CIS would neither need nor accept Western peacekeeping forces.¹¹⁹ Black Sea Fleet vessels were sent off Abkhazia, disregarding protests by Ukraine and Georgia; the action underlined Moscow's rejection of Kiev's claim to the Fleet.¹²⁰

The draft of a new military doctrine asserted Moscow's right to protect Russian-speaking minorities in Soviet successor states, with force if necessary, and to mount "peacekeeping" operations (with the uncertain proviso that such action be approved by the Commonwealth).¹²¹ This was a mandate the Afghantsy presumed.

The change also addressed the nature of the new Army. It was, of course, to be smaller; the Defence Law of 24 September 1992 decreed that numbers be capped at one percent of the population by 1 January 1994.¹²² The April Declaration on Priorities of Military Policy had already confirmed a conscript/volunteer mix. This was soon weighted towards the latter, spurred by conscript avoidance rates, which reached 95% in Moscow and 70% nationally in early 1993 (these were stemmed neither by the 1992 service cut from 24 to 18 months, nor the 1993 consideration of a further cut, to 12 months), and disinclination to prosecute and convict. Promises of higher salaries and fringe benefits--housing, free transportation, uniforms and food--brought 110,000 accepted volunteers by September 1993, and plans for another 50,000 by year's end, 150,000 more in 1994, and a volunteer component of 50% by year 2000. The Armed Forces would be recast.¹²³

The Defence Law underlined the Russia First focus, with no mention of the CIS. The ultimate threat perceived was civil war; Article 10 provided legal basis, in extremis, for military assumption of government power. It noted that defensive forces **must** have offensive complements. Troops must be high-mobile.

Strategic forces had already been streamlined, as they downsized, into four components: the Strategic Rocket Troops, the Strategic Naval Forces, the Air Force and the Main Directorate of Space Systems, and apparently ranked in that order (the separate Air Defence service, the PVO, was abolished).¹²⁴ They were now assigned a 360 degree (tous azimuths) deterrence posture that would assume no one external enemy.

Kokoshin spotlighted emergent thinking in an interview with Krasnaya Zvezda in March 1992.¹²⁵ He first noted the abiding fundament: the development of doctrine must be a joint civilian-military undertaking. He underlined the fact of profound, continuing socio-economic crisis; the "war" between Whites and Reds must end. Finally, he focused on military prescription. He called for "high technology" Air Force, Strategic Rocket Forces and Navy (coastal forces complementing air and land forces, plus strategic missile carriers in the Barents and Okhotsk Seas), and "small but efficient general purpose forces"--centrally based rapid deployment forces. Their strategic reserve core would be "several airmobile brigades", with their own army aviation, fire support, electronic warfare, intelligence and counter optico-electronic systems.¹²⁶ Kokoshin's prescription echoed the Afghantsy agenda: high tech; focus on the potency and prospects of new and evolving technologies, and emphasis on spetsnatz and special forces on the ground.

*

New Order Apparent. Russia's new military was significantly leaner.¹²⁷ Yet it was determined to maintain quality, local and regional interventionary capacity and global strike potential: "Russia's Armed Forces must be able to wage warfare of any character or kind and on any scale".¹²⁸

The new military leadership was forged in and by the war in Afghanistan. This made it particularly sensitive to the problems and difficulties of counter-insurgency campaigns and needs. It instilled and reinforced bias favouring 'smart' weaponry and elite units. Finally, it sharpened patriotism and pride--and appreciation of the dangers of dogma. The Afghantsy succeeded in Afghanistan; they left a government in control of every city, base, and major artery. Their government ordained withdrawal for political and foreign policy, not military reasons. The Afghantsy took pride in the fact that their withdrawal was not like that of US forces from Vietnam.

In the wake of the failed August 1991 coup the KGB had been reduced from 490,000 men to 35-40,000, as its military and counter-intelligence units (together with most special forces Interior Ministry troops), were transferred to the Army.¹²⁹ The association was accepted but dreaded by the Army, for it eliminated the threshold that protected it from early and

necessary involvement in civil conflict. The return of these units and troops to the Security Ministry (which the Law on Security of May and the Law on Federal Organs of State Security of June 1992 established as KGB successor, together with the now separated Foreign Intelligence Service¹³⁰) thus reestablished the State's internal security option, sought by Yeltsin, while allowing the Army to distance itself—which would stand it in good stead during the October days of 1993.

Civilian control was not questioned—though, as suggested by our discussion of Russian strategic culture, above, the word control is to some extent deceiving. The Russian Parliament established successor oversight Committees to those of the now defunct Supreme Soviet. The party watchdog Military Political Administration was abolished, replaced by a President-appointed and Parliament-sanctioned Higher Certification Commission "responsible for overseeing personnel questions within the new Defence Ministry".¹³¹

A new, more conservative centre-right consensus appeared to have emerged. The days of the most sweeping reform and 'democracy' advocacies and debates were over. The Higher Certification Commission was chaired by Yurii Skokov, an ally also of Rutskoi, Khazbulatov and the "industrialists' lobby", and Secretary of the Russian Security Council—which was given increased powers by Yeltsin in July 1992.¹³²

The consensus was best summarized by The Strategy for Russia, produced by the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy in August 1992. The Council "unites politicians, businessmen, civilian analysts and journalists of what is usually described as the liberal outlook... [it represents] the most sophisticated trend of the mainstream democratic opinion which would be happy to have a democracy in Russia but ready and willing to admit the necessity of an authoritarian rule and enhancing of statism (*gosudarstvennost*)".¹³³ Vladimir Lukin (who may have been among The Strategy..s authors) characterized its message as "enlightened patriotism".¹³⁴

*

From Order Undermined to Yeltsin Coup and Consequences: New Order? The apparent new order of Fall 1992 soon dissipated, however, amidst ever-more rancorous breakdown of relations between Yeltsin and Parliamentary leaders—erstwhile Yeltsin allies who now turned against the Presidency. End-1992 and early 1993 saw a War of Decrees whereby each institution sought to negate the other's initiatives and promote its own agenda. In March Yeltsin tried to impose Special Rule, but failed when Army and Security Ministers opposed extra-legal action, by President or Parliament.

Yeltsin fired Security Minister Barannikov (as he had his reformist predecessor—who now supported Barannikov) and the Security Council's Skokov, who was equally critical.¹³⁵ He barely escaped impeachment. The Yeltsin-decreed referenda that followed, on 25 April, revived his authority; majorities confirmed confidence, supported his economic program, and called for early Parliamentary elections. Yet they showed a certain precariousness of

support. The question of early Presidential elections, which Yeltsin opposed, was rejected by only 49.8 to 49.1 percent, notwithstanding the government's dominance of TV and media; nearly 40% abstained.¹³⁶ Parliament disdained the results. Yeltsin's smearing of opponents as Communists and fascists elicited scorn--and reverse character assassination. The War of Decrees continued, amidst growing public disenchantment with both institutions.

Refusing to accept the Parliamentary supremacy that was fundamental to the now (after more than 300 amendments) post-Soviet constitution, Yeltsin tried through the Spring to negotiate a strong-Presidency constitution with regional leaders. The procedure was unconstitutional, and entailed a certain burning of the bridges to Parliament. This in turn gave regional leaders inordinate leverage, which they used to extract fiscal and other powers that ultimately made a mockery of Yeltsin's purpose. To submit this "constitution" to a referendum (as initially promised) would have eviscerated his power even more than would submission to Parliament.

By early Summer, notwithstanding instances of often petty rancour (Yeltsin reacted to Rutskoi criticism by depriving him of car and privileges--much as he had previously done to Gorbachev), there were signs of possible reconciliation. Khazbulatov defended Shaposhnikov, Yeltsin's choice as new Security Council Secretary, against attacks from conservative/nationalist Parliamentarians. Yeltsin over-rode radical calls for the ouster of centrist Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin, for the latter's proclamation of a currency reform that undercut savings and neighbour-state finances. The reform's consequent effect of strengthening successor state leaders who sought influence within a collegial tent (and return to a Rouble zone), rather than estrangement and uncertainty without, strengthened moderate power and prospects for compromise.

Yet the principle differences, over Presidential powers and economic prescription, as also the psychological residue of loyalties lost and "betrayed", remained unresolved--together with the related issue of Yeltsin's preference for rule-by-decree (evident even when the Parliamentary majority was sympathetic, as when it elected him; and later his designated successor, as its Speaker). Yeltsin's opponents, crucial to the defence of Democracy in August 1991, were of course not the Communists of later propaganda. They had no wish to return to the oppressive and corrupt system bequeathed by Brezhnev (which, incidentally, had about as much to do with communist ideals as Pinochet's Chilean dictatorship had to do with Plato). No military or industrial leader wanted to return to the days when decisions were made by bureaucrats in Moscow. But they equated Yeltsin's Big Bang privatization program with laundering and legalizing of the mafia's and the old *apparat's* ill-gotten gains, with the further enriching of these groups, and also foreign interests, through bargain basement sell-off of Russian assets (who but they had the money to buy?), and, in general, with throwing the baby out with the bath-water in terms of national and moral values.

Yeltsin's opponents did not want to return to the old. Rather, they looked to Japan and the Asian tigers, and the prescription for German and French economic success, namely state-private planning and coordination. Allied industrial managers might ask for subsidies to avert

bankruptcy. But their goal was to themselves become multinationals, players on the global scene—not to resubmit to "command economy" management.

They had no wish to return to East-West confrontation. They supported cooperation with Washington on most issues. They favoured the UN, and peacekeeping, but also more vigorous pursuit of what they deemed intrinsic Russian interests. They were dubious about sanctions against Serbia and Iraq, which they saw as counter-productive to their ostensible and original purpose. And they advocated greater attention to Asia and the Pacific Rim.

Yet gridlock continued (though, as will be seen, propelled ever-more by personal rather than policy disputes), with its corollaries of increasing economic and political anarchy, increased public disenchantment with due process, and increased elite concern and impatience. The latter centred on two issues. Ukraine's Spring-Summer 1993 descent into hyperinflation underlined the urgency of economic reform, and the dangers of money-printing palliatives. At the same time the backdrop of civil wars along the periphery of the old Union underlined the dangers that attended centrifugal tendencies within Russia as well.

Yeltsin's and Parliament's wooing of the Armed Forces became more assiduous. Yeltsin's sweeping list of Summer promotions was preemptive and decisive; it brought Ruskoi's final, irrevocable break with the Presidency. He noted that Russia's far smaller forces now had more Generals than the Soviet mastadon, charged Yeltsin with buying off rather than reforming, and castigated both Yeltsin and the Army leadership as innately corrupt.¹³⁷ The charge was exaggerated; Generals dismissed far outnumbered Generals added.¹³⁸ In light of later events it may also have been fatal. Its indiscriminate sweep alienated the Afghantsy reformers, his most natural army constituency.

The Yeltsin coup that followed was well prepared; by August "The edict [to dismiss Parliament] lay in my safe and waited for its time to come".¹³⁹ The run-up wrenched fundamental change in political constellations and parameters. The apparent new order of mid and late 1992 had rested on compromise between Yeltsinite fast-reform advocates and the slow-reform/social compact program of the Civic Union; the departure of Acting Premier Yegor Gaidar, architect of the fast-reform blueprint, and his replacement by Viktor Chernomyrdin, a Civic Union associate, though with Gaidar allies retaining core portfolios, was seen to herald the new compromise course. With the formula's implementation stymied by political gridlock, however, and ever-more concerned by inflation and the Ukrainian example, Chernomyrdin himself and a growing subsection of the Civic Union constituency became persuaded that monetary discipline and faster reform was essential. Gaidar's return as Deputy Prime Minister in September 1993 signalled Chernomyrdin's and others' acceptance of the need for a more radical approach.

The other element of the new consensus focused on the need to reverse now galloping centrifugal dynamics. Yeltsin's 1992 acceptance of the Army's nationalist agenda on the Kuriles and Moldova, and of its self-proclaimed guardianship of the Russian diaspora, had appeared resigned rather than supportive. By Summer 1993, however, Yeltsin took the lead

in hoisting the Russia First banner. In the process, his courtship of the Army (see also below), which may initially have been viewed as little more than tactical insurance to safeguard position and policy, became integral to the definition both of a markedly different personal status, and a markedly different policy.

Yeltsin welcomed the attendant/intended consequence of Chernomyrdin's currency reform. The initially sparked reintegration of Successor States within the Rouble Zone was reversed when it became clear that Moscow's monopoly control of fiscal and monetary policy would eviscerate their sovereignty. The potentially centrifugal ramifications of the reversal were negated by larger dynamics. Regional conflicts and fears, finely calibrated by Moscow, compelled Central Asian and Caucasian support for Russian peacekeeping, and CIS entry by previously recalcitrant Georgia and Azerbaijan. The end result was Russian security dominance, without the concomitant of societal and economic obligation (an emergent analogue to US-Central American relations?)

Yeltsin also welcomed Chernomyrdin's role in securing expanded rights for Ukraine's Russian population, through the end-June negotiations that followed the Donbass strikes.¹⁴⁰ He condemned Estonia's anti-Russian citizenship law (a sharp letter to the UN Secretary General referred to "ethnic cleansing"), and encouraged subsequent autonomy votes by Narva and other Russian enclaves. Where Shaposhnikov as CIS Defence Minister had previously asserted CIS' sole authority to conduct peace-keeping and -making within the borders of the former USSR, Yeltsin now (the CIS post was folded into Russia's Ministry in May¹⁴¹) dispatched his Foreign Minister to assert Russia's successor claim, and press for UN funding.¹⁴²

Yeltsin's determined courtship of the Army, which began after Skokov's resignation, extended also to Security and Interior Ministries and troops. Weekly, and often more frequent meetings with Defence Minister Grachev placed the latter among Yeltsin's most intimate advisors. The Army received disproportionate funding increases, and (as noted) an increasingly positive Presidential embrace of its domestic and "Near Abroad" agenda. Shaposhnikov's later resignation from the Security Council Secretaryship (because of limited access to Yeltsin) confirmed the fact that much of its role and function was now subsumed within the new direct relationship between Yeltsin and Grachev. The independence accorded the Army leadership was also reflected in Kokoshin's Defence protocol slip from second to third, behind the Chief of Staff.

Finally, Yeltsin's nationalist credentials were signally reinforced by his meeting with Ukraine's President Kravchuk a few weeks before the coup--when he threatened cut-off of energy exports if past bills were not paid. Kravchuk agreed in principle to transfer Ukrainian assets in lieu of payments due--assets specified included strategic nuclear forces and the 50% of the Black Sea Fleet that their previous June meeting had slated for Ukrainian ownership (sparking Army protest).¹⁴³ Initial Russian reports presented a fait accompli, a garnishing of a delinquent's assets. Ukrainian transcripts, and subsequent Russian government pronouncements, were more circumspect; Kiev insisted particularly that mobile

SS-24 missiles were excluded, and that the deal in any case represented no more than a yet-to-be-negotiated possibility.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, in the context of Ukraine's debt and bankruptcy, the agreement in principle charted a resolution of nuclear and Fleet frictions that satisfied Russian nationalist demands, in a way that also assuaged at least some Ukrainian sensibilities. [Its nuclear provisions were effectively confirmed in January 1994, when Ukraine's Parliament ratified Kravchuk acceptance that all missiles would be transferred to Russia within three years.]¹⁴⁵

The September coup, when it came, thus succeeded because of elite impatience with the ramifications and dangers of continued *status quo*, because of impatience with democratic niceties and widespread public apathy, and (perhaps most startlingly) because Yeltsin coopted core segments of his opponents' constituencies.

The coup freed Yeltsin from the tedium of legality. His dismissal of constitution and Parliament was followed (after the carnage at the Ostankino TV building, when Internal Security troops fired on the pro-Parliament mob that tried to storm it, and the bloody assault on Parliament) by dismissal of the Constitutional, or Supreme Court, all elected republic and district assemblies, and finally also municipal governments, the country's last elected bodies. Khazbulatov, Rutskoi and other Parliamentary leaders and supporters were jailed. The formal censorship imposed with the coup was lifted, but only after the banning of opposition Parties and newspapers. Yeltsin's apparent authority was as absolute as any Tsar's; his cavalier 6 November dismissal of promised June 1994 Presidential elections reinforced the notion (the promise, made during the crisis days of Parliamentary defiance, may always have been tactical rather than strategic, goading Parliament--which insisted on simultaneous Parliamentary and Presidential elections in February--into the scripted denouement¹⁴⁶).

But the appearance of total control was illusory. Yeltsin was beholden to the **boyars** (noblemen) who secured his victory, committed to core elements of their agendas, and dependent on them for policy implementation. His post-coup strong, some would say imperial Presidency constitution (which also eliminated secession rights) proceeded towards referendum judgement coincident with decreed **Duma** (Parliament's pre-1917 name) December elections, themselves legitimized only by the presumption of constitutional passage. Yet the limits to his personal authority soon became evident. Yeltsin was forced to reverse his ban on opposition parties and papers, though jailed Parliamentary leaders were not allowed to stand for election, and to rescind his dismissal of early Presidential elections.¹⁴⁷ Core reform allies decried the "dictatorial" prescription of the submitted constitution, and insisted that, even if passed, it **must** be amended.¹⁴⁸

Yeltsin retained control of national television. Favouritism was blatant: the Gaidar-led Russia's Choice pro-Yeltsin "shock therapy" reform party was given ten times the exposure of any other; during the first twelve days of the campaign Gaidar was given 144 times more air time than Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the dissident reform Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin, or Yabloka bloc (Lukin resigned his Washington ambassadorship in the run-up to Yeltsin's September coup).¹⁴⁹ In fact, the void left by Rutskoi's incarceration had been filled: even a

post-election pro-reform majority, if it could be assembled, would clearly be closer to Rutskoi's prescription than to Yeltsin's. Any consequent pro-reform government would **perforce** demand amendments similar to those championed by Rutskoi.

The ultimate irony, perhaps, was the fact that constitutional passage (during the campaign the "goalposts" moved in response to polls suggesting widespread apathy, from necessary approval by a majority of voters to approval by 50% plus one of a voting minimum of just half of the electorate) would be secured by voters who otherwise supported Communist/nationalist and conservative anti-Yeltsin parties. On election day, 12 December, a CNN exit poll suggested only 37 percent would have supported Yeltsin for President; Yeltsin's office announced he would avail himself of the new constitution's provision that he serve out his original term--there would be no early Presidential election.¹⁵⁰

By January 1994, after the first sessions of the new Duma, it was clear that the faster-reform consensus was no longer sustainable. Yeltsin embraced Chernomyrdin's move back to the slower-reform prescription of late 1992; Gaidar again left the government, as did its other "monetarist" Champion, Finance Minister Boris Fedorov.¹⁵¹ Shock therapy might or might not be economically optimal; it was clearly not politically viable. The new-old prescription was essentially Gorbachevian, and Rustskoian; its defining Russia First (and Larger Russia) parameters were quintessentially Rustskoian.

Aggrandized by an apparently aggrandized Presidency, Yeltsin was diminished, for he could scarcely smear "his" Parliament as he had smeared its predecessor. His new Parliamentary dismissal prerogative was emasculated by the likelihood that its early exercise would result in even harsher voter back-lash. He was, in fact, more beholden than before.

On January 30th the Duma elections were reprised in Crimea. A Russian secessionist swept to the Presidency, crushing his pro-Kiev opponent--and hostile media coverage.¹⁵² Sentiment in Eastern Ukraine (promised a Spring poll) had followed a parallel momentum since the Summer strikes. Theirs were Russian and Russified populations that clearly fell within the Yeltsin-sanctioned "protection" mandate of Russia's new defence doctrine (see also below)..

*

Arms and Society; course set? Of the **boyars** who secured Yeltsin's victory, none was more important than the Army, the final arbiter of the 3-4 October showdown, and now the country's only real arbiter. And it emerged thus in a context that was unique to Russian history. Through Tsarist and Soviet times it had as previously described been integrated into larger composite leaderships, through ties of organization and family. Now the Party which had defined that integration for nearly three quarters of a century was gone. The successor structure of elected legislative authority and oversight bodies was an early casualty of the War of Decrees, succeeded only by the personal conclaves between Yeltsin and Minister (and Defence Collegium; see below). The Presidency as primary oversight authority was integral

to the December 1993 constitution. Yet Yeltsin commanded neither the administrative nor political cadres needed to effect new integrative and supervisory structures.

More extraordinary still, the Army's unprecedented authority and independence was achieved through only minimal exposure to and responsibility for the coup's bloody denouement. Indeed, the Army's official posture had been one of institutional "neutrality" (as was that of the Church). It was a posture dictated by the absolute concern to maintain Army unity; Rutskoi still had supporters. Grachev provided decisive personal support to Yeltsin. And the Army's neutrality was clearly benevolent to Yeltsin's course, in that it did not take contrary action. But the troops involved in the eye-to-eye carnage at Ostankino and the White House were of the Ministries of the Interior and Security--the limited and select support provided by the Army was decisive, yet it was at one remove.¹⁵³ The Army as such was remarkably untainted. Thus it not only emerged as the ultimate arbiter of the nation's fate; it did so with a surprisingly strong claim to non-partisanship.

That claim was further strengthened by post-coup suggestions, first by Yeltsin aid (General) Dmitrii Volkogonov and later by Yeltsin himself, that Grachev had in fact been reluctant to intervene against Parliament--perhaps out of "fear that others in the military leadership would not stand behind him"--; "in the event, according to Yeltsin, the military leadership as a whole proved more reliable than the Defence Minister".¹⁵⁴ Since Grachev was not asked to resign, and did not, one might surmise that the suggestions were in fact designed to 'de-taint' him. But if that was their purpose, their consequence clearly reinforced the image and reality of non-partisanship.

The worst case spectre Latin-Americanization suggested by pre-coup socio-economic dynamics and the attendant post-coup possibility of Caesarism was perhaps a less likely scenario. On the one hand, the socio-economic understanding that secured sufficient Centre support for the coup to proceed, was sympathetic to Yeltsin's fast-reform agenda, yet did also assuage the Centre's primary concerns. On the other hand, the Army clearly remained preoccupied by the continuing problems of transition and transformation, and focused on the task of modernization.¹⁵⁵ Its officer corps, freed from the ties that bound them to society, remained bound to the culture that decreed such ties.

Yeltsin was clearly beholden, and acknowledged this in his post-coup declaration of immediate priority to the task of ratifying the new defence doctrine. The gap between Yeltsin promises (including a coup-timed doubling of officer salaries) and actual government largesse would be bridged.¹⁵⁶ Yet military leaders were fully cognizant of economic realities--the backlog of housing and social costs associated with still continuing withdrawal (from Germany) and contraction dynamics, and wage and alternative employment allure pressure on the leadership's determination to save and develop high tech potential.¹⁵⁷

This led to acceptance of prospects for an even smaller Armed Forces structure, but with concomitant stress on higher quality. This in turn meant higher-quality draftees (increasingly unlikely, in view of draft dodging's social acceptability) or faster conversion to all-volunteer

troops. The latter proceeded, and accelerated--in part because of the success of an appeal for female applicants, drawn not just to the medical services, but also to non-traditional areas such as air defence (causing some male back-lash).¹⁵⁸ By Summer 1993, Grachev was foreseeing an all-volunteer elite force of just 1 million.¹⁵⁹ The conscription umbilical cord to society at large was severed.

The new doctrine, when formalized, mirrored 1992's draft: tous azimuts preparedness; threats against the rights and interests of Russians in the Near Abroad were explicitly listed as warranting Army response, as were outside efforts to interfere in Russia's internal affairs and attacks on Russian military installations on foreign territory; first use of nuclear weapons was sanctioned against nuclear weapon states (this clause, which mirrored long-standing NATO policy, was also a wake-up call to Kiev); offensive operations were given a formal green light; the restriction on armed forces manning was rescinded.¹⁶⁰ Afghantsy priorities had received across-the-board approval, plus markers for a less financially strapped future (*viz* the final point).

Meanwhile, socio-economic circumstance also accelerated the Army's move away from past divisional and service structures. Armies and Divisions would be replaced by Corps and Brigades (thus concluding one debate). Old service divisions would be transcended. "Joint Commands" were created in the Far East and the now amalgamated Siberian and Transbaikal Military Districts, with their Commanders given Deputy Minister status and more independence--signalling a move away from the strict central control of past tradition and practice. Grachev had heralded the change in January, when he called for reamping old MD structures:

"Instead... it would be advisable to set up four to six armed forces with geographic designation (for example Western, Central, North Caucasus, Volga-Ural, Siberian and Far Eastern strategic commands)... military districts that exist... could be transformed into mobilization districts".¹⁶¹

The North Caucasus received priority attention, reflecting the Afghantsy's primary threat spectres--against, through or from Russia's Caucasian and South Central Asian underbelly.¹⁶² Integrating (also) Cossack formations, Border Troops and Interior Ministry units, it was strengthened by an airborne division, two airborne and three motorized rifle brigades, air transport and combat forces, and parts of the old Nineteenth Independent Air Defence Army.¹⁶³

A new Service-equivalent (and probably also Deputy Minister) Mobile Forces Command integrated aeromobile, air mobile potential and related forces, and high-readiness ground components; it was subdivided into an Immediate Reaction Force, with parts slated for North Caucasus service, and a somewhat "heavier" Rapid Deployment Force.¹⁶⁴ To this was added a specially designated elite Peacekeeping division, with a regiment in Moldova, and a battalion in Ossétia.¹⁶⁵

Traditionalists like Ground Forces Commander Vladimir Semenov opposed the "bleeding dry of the other services and branches of the armed forces", and argued the continuing relevance of older structures and combined operations concepts.¹⁶⁶ But the *Afghantsy*'s more decentralized, more flexible, more mobile and higher-tech prescription for future war prevailed.

The prescription dictated maintenance of military research and development, increased "smart" weapons production and more sophisticated command, control, communications and intelligence systems.¹⁶⁷

The prescription's primary immediate concern, to combat southern threats--ie fundamentalist Islam--also cemented much-improved relations with China; Beijing's concerns about Islamic resurgence in Sinkiang led to vigorous support for a Russian posture that would protect and secure a secular buffer. Russian-Chinese military cooperation, signalled also by a rapidly expanding Chinese market for Russian arms exports and joint-development ventures; was most startlingly summarized by the signing of a five-year military cooperation agreement, and Grachev's 11 November commentary that "the two countries hoped to restore the close ties that had once united the Soviet Union and China" (though a formal alliance was not envisioned).¹⁶⁸

The Army's Near Abroad agenda was in fact remarkably successful. The Moldovan intervention model of 1992 (surgical intervention, direct or indirect, to check anti-Russian dynamics and establish pro-Russian players, with generally arms-length follow-up limited to that needed to perpetuate a now more dependent status quo) was successfully repeated through the southern conflict regions. In Tajikistan Russian forces provided just sufficient logistic and special forces aid to defeat the insurrectionist democratic-Islamicist government, then limited subsequent involvement to sealing the Tajik/Afghan border; after Abkhazia was given sufficient support to deny Georgian control, Russian "protection" of rail lines and port facilities saved Tbilisi from defeat at the hands of ex-President Gamsakhurdia's rebels, and brought Georgia into the CIS; concomitantly, Moscow's successful, pre-emptive denial to Turkish and Iranian intervention suggestions, combined with continuing Armenian Nagorno-Karabach military success (with ex-Soviet arms and at least some covert Russian support) and Turkish military instructors' failure to turn the tide, brought Azerbaijan also into the CIS--the price for Russian aid sufficient to blunt, though not [yet] reverse Armenian gain.¹⁶⁹ The principle of a Russian security zone, though without Empire's attendant costs of social and political responsibility was established. Whether the low cost 'Central Americanization' formula could be perpetuated was another matter; the sophisticated *real-politik* balancing that bought it would need constant attending, and that in turn would require a consistency of purpose and a degree of socio-economic home stability that could not be presumed.

*

The Russian state's pre and post-coup acceptance of the Afghantsy prescription, the now positive procurement trend and new funding prospects augured well for continuing Army transformation and reform.¹⁷⁶ But the question of a new, viable social compact is clearly tied to still-uncertain prospects for stability and legitimacy following the December 1993 elections, and to the socio-economic success of the new/old economic reform prescription. If state structures fail to support and finance, the spectre of Caesarism (and the Freikorps implications of independent, extra-legal funding) may find new converts.

END-NOTES

1. See eg C.G. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR, London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1990; chapters 3;7,27,31,38,42 and 43.
2. A. Levitskii, "General Brusilov", Voennaya byl, January 1968, p 19; see also David R. Jones, "The Youth of General A.A. Brusilov: the making of the unconventional, conventional professional", address to The Royal Military College, Kingston, March 1992--and available from same.
3. When asked the difference between Gorbachev's Spring in 1987 and Dubcek's in 1968, Soviet spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov's answer was to the point: "19 years"!; see Charles Gati, "Gorbachev and Eastern Europe", Foreign Affairs, Summer 1987, p 972.
4. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power..., *op cit*, Chapters 7, 27 and 42.
5. The scale of the effort are indicated by the following: 73,500 troops, 1220 tanks, 2505 heavy vehicles, 1218 artillery pieces, 77 planes and 146 attack helicopters from Hungary [Vladimir Skutina, Rusove Prichazeli a Odchazeli, Prague: Region, 1990]; 49,700 troops (originally 65,000), 50,000 dependents, 27,146 combat vehicles (including 860 tanks, 600 self-propelled artillery pieces and 1500 armoured infantry vehicles), and 560,000 tons of material (including 230,000 tons of ammunition and fuel) from Hungary (Zoltan Barany, "A Hungarian Dream Comes True", Report on Eastern Europe, 7 March 1990); withdrawals from Germany alone would require 12,850 trains: each composed of 80 cars [Report on Eastern Europe, 10 May 1991].
6. Report on Eastern Europe, 7 September 1990.
7. C.G. Jacobsen, "Inviolable Borders: prescription for peace--or war!?", European Security, Vol 1 No 1, Spring 1992.
8. Izvestia, 22 July 1991, reported a near 10% short-fall, not counting 200,000 (annual) student deferments. See also "Student deferments and Military Manpower Shortages", Report on the USSR, 2 August 1991.
9. ref: Sovinform Hypermedia on-disk release Soviet Military Series #1; 1989-91: Transformation & Transition, Carteron University Soviet National Security ORU, 1991.

10. The OPNAZ motor rifle divisions (74000 men in 1990); the SPETZNATZ (about 2500); and OMON (8000, as off May 1991)--see Report on the USSR, 31 May 1991.
11. Moscow News, March 3-19 1991.
12. David R. Jones, Director of the Russian Institute of Nova Scotia and the Russian Microproject [and editor of the Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual(s) and The Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet Military History and Affairs]; presentation to Carleton University's Inst. of Soviet and East European Studies, March 1991; available from author.
13. 'Soviet Military Series #1: 1989-91: Transformation & Transition', op cit.
14. Up to 40% of Shchit members were demobilized as part of troop reductions in 1990; Mark Galentti, "Civil Society in Uniform", Russia and the World, no 17 1990.
15. Karen Rush, "The Army and Culture", Voenna-Isttoricheskii Zhurnal, Jan-April 1989; see also ft.nt. .
16. See ic report on Deputy Air Defence Commander General V. Andreyev's advocacy of a "professional army", in FBIS-SOV 91-213; and "Renegade Russians Grab for Military Control" [on Lopatin proposals], The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jan/Feb 1991.
17. New Times (Moscow), October 1991; see also Izvestia, 14 September 1991, and Report on the USSR, 25 October 1991; also RFE/RL Research Report, 20 March 1992.
18. Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1992.
19. Note ia M. Feshbach and S. Dorman, "Demography, Nationality and Soviet Military Recruitment Problems", in D.R. Jones, ed., Proceedings of the Third Bedford Colloquium on Soviet Military-Political Affairs, forthcoming, 1992 (from the Russian Research Centre of Nova Scotia).
20. See C.G. Jacobsen, "Dramatic Changes in Soviet Defence Decisionmaking", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, PRIO/SAGE, June 1990; and "Soviet Defence Decisionmaking in Flux: A Postscript", BPP, March 1991.
21. ibid
22. ibid
23. Literaturnaya Gazeta, 12 September 1990.
24. Izvestia, 18 January 1991.
25. Report on the USSR, 24 May 1991.
26. Sovietskaya Rossia, 23 July 1991; see also article [from Jane's Intelligence Review] in The Globe & Mail, 20 August 1991.
27. See also "The Role of the Security Forces", Report on the USSR, 6 September 1991.
28. For a good early analysis, see J. Jukes, "Younger military leaders reflect new political philosophy", Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, November 1991.
29. Soviet Military Series # 1: 1989-91, op cit; also, i.a., The New York Times, 23 August 1991.
30. ibid; Gorbachev had been a member since 1969.
31. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 10 Sept. 1991; also New York Times, 1 Sept. 1991.
32. Jacob Kipp, "The Uncertain Future of the Soviet Military, From Coup to Commonwealth: The Antecedents of National Armies", European Security, Vol 1, no.2 (Summer 1992), pp 207-338; Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 October 1991.
33. Kipp, ibid.

34. Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 April 1992; "we [must] first divide and then unite."
35. RFE/RL Research Report, 21 Aug 1992, p 9.
36. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 3 June 1991.
37. ibid
38. Julian Cooper, "Management of the Defence Industry: the Soviet Union", in Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power..., op cit.
39. Moscow News, #39 1991, and Radio Rossi 6 March 1992 (re consumer production targets); for in-depth background information & analysis, see C.G. Jacobsen, ed., The Soviet Defence Enigma: estimating costs and burden, Oxford: OUP, 1987.
40. Moscow Radio, 10 August 1991; exact export percentages are unclear, but the fridge figure of 40% may be representative.
41. Moscow Radio, 18 October 1991.
42. Moscow Interfax 13 October 1991; also Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 January 1992, and RFE/RL Research Report, 14 August 1992.
43. Izvestia, 9 September 1991; see also International Defence Review, no 7 1991.
44. M. Miscavage, "Keeping Russian Industry..." Business/ Finance: The Moscow Tribune, early July 1993.
45. Moscow News, #9 1992, op cit; article on "Defence Complex of ex-USSR and Russian Federation".
46. RFE/RL Research Report, 10 April 1992; International Defence Review, #7 1991; submarine production, for example fell from 10 in 1990 to 4 in 1991. Downsizing was also evident in faster retirement rates.
47. Kommersant, 2 March 1992.
48. Tass, 29 February 1992.
49. ibid; conversion efforts were expected to cause the lay-off of one million workers by mid 1992. See also V.S. Ritter, "Soviet Defence Conversion", Problems of Communism, Sept.-Oct. 1991; A. Alexander, "The Conversion of Soviet Defence Industry", RAND P7620, Santa Monica, CA, January 1990; and K. Ballantyne, "Soviet Defence Industry Reform: the problems of conversion in an unconverted economy", CDPS Background Paper #36, Ottawa, July 1991.
50. Moscow News #9 1992; Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 March 1992.
51. Moscow News, #9 1992; "Restructuring of Defence proves Problematic".
52. Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 February 1992.
53. Kommersant, 2 March 1992, reports on the MIC joint stock company Kala's attempt to effect the "illegal act" of "nomenklatura-led privatization".
54. Tass, 20 December 1991; International Defence Review, #7 1991.
55. RFE/RL Research Report; 14 August 1992; Reuters, 7 May 1992.
56. Izvestia, 20 Oct. 1991; quoting General K. Koblenz.
57. Le Monde; 10 September 1991.
58. AW&ST, 2 September 1991.

59. Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 March 1992.
60. *ibid*; also Moscow News, #7 1992, on government decree giving defence industry free access to foreign markets; and Izvestia, 22 February 1992.
61. Róssiskaya Gazeta, 28 February 1992.
62. Reuters, 7 May 1992.
63. ITAR-TASS, 8 April 1992.
64. Moscow News, #26 1991.
65. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 27 November 1991.
66. New York Times, 6 March 1992.
67. New York Times, 1 March, 23 March and 28 March 1992; Aviation Week & Space Technology, 20 January 1992.
68. Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1992; Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 October 1991 and 20 January 1992.
69. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 November 1991, on aerospace enterprises' pursuit of alliances, at home and abroad; Moscow Radio, 2 November 1991; Tass, 20 December 1991.
70. Izvestia, 4 July 1991; Ekonomika i zhizn, no 27, July 1992; RFE/RL Research Report, 31 July 1992.
71. FBIS-SOV-91-212, 4 November 1991; one military-industrial investment firm put 10% of its stock up for sale.
72. "Russian Engine Firms Strive to Realign", AW&ST, 30 March 1992; International Herald Tribune, 7 September 1992.
73. RFE/RL Research Report, 28 August 1992.
74. The Economist, 19 June 1993.
75. International Herald Tribune, 12-13 June 1991.
76. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 April 1992.
77. Moscow News, 2 July 1993; The Economist, 20 February 1993.
78. *ibid*.
79. Moscow News, #39 1991, *op cit*; Military Technology, no 4 1993 (note the variety and quality of Russian defence industry advertisements!).
80. FBIS-SOV 91-160, 19 August 1991; Interfax, 21 November 1991; Manchester Guardian Weekly, 3 November 1991, on offers of MiG 29 to the Pentagon for US\$25-million each.
81. New York Times, 7 November 1991.
82. AW&ST, 18 Nov 1991, *op cit*; Moscow News, #43 1991.
83. RFE/RL Research Report, 28 August 1992.
84. Military Technology, no 4 1993, *op cit*, pp.16-17 and 64-69.
85. New York Times, 4 November 1991.

86. AW&ST, 19 August 1991; International Defense Review, pp 685-703.
87. See "Soviet Wars Chiefs Want to Buy Soviet Anti-Missile Advances", New York Times, 8 February 1992; also NYT, 19 February 1992, and Le Monde, 10 February 1992; and AW&ST, 10 February, 30 March, 6 April and 2 November 1992.
88. AW&ST, 18 Nov. 1991, op cit.
89. Le Monde, 18 December 1991.
90. The Montreal Gazette, 26 Sept. 1992 [from The Independent, London].
91. New York Times, 21 July 1992; RFE/RL Research Report, 23 October 1992: Malei estimated previous peak value at \$14 billion, of which only \$4-5 billion was cash.
92. Krasnaya Zvezda, 26 March 1992.
93. "Moscow is Selling Weapons..", New York Times, 18 Nov. 1991. See also i.a. RFE/RL Research Report, 6 March, 28 August, 4 and 25 September, 9 October and 18 December 1992; AW&ST, 9 March 1992; Kyodo, 4 May 1992; Ottawa Citizen, 17 May 1992; IHT, 7 Sept. 1992; The Guardian Weekly, 27 December 1992; also New York Times, 3 May 1992 and 23 June 1993; Military Technology, no 4 1993, op cit; and IDR, Sept. 1993, op cit.
94. RFE/RL Research Report, 14 August 1992.
95. Moscow Tribune, 7 and 9 July 1993; The Economist, 17 July 1993.
96. ITAR-TASS, 11 September 1992; RFE/RL Research Report, 27 November 1992.
97. See Stephen Foye, "Russian Arms Exports after the Cold War", RFE/RL Research Report, 26 March 1993; and Peter Almquist, "Arms Producers Struggle..", RFE/RL Research Report, 18 June 1993.
98. New York Times, 18 Oct. 1992, ibid.
99. ibid.
100. CBC-The Journal, 6 November 1991.
101. See eg Jonathan Steele's "Bitter and Betrayed" and "Russian Right Unites Against Yeltsin", The Guardian Weekly, 16 February 1992, and "Russia, right stuff", The Economist, 29 February 1992; for more detailed coverage: "Russian nationalism"; CBC Radio feature report, 10 November 1991.
102. For comparative statistics on inter-Republic trade subsidization and dependence, see Guardian Weekly, 1 March 1992.
103. See i.a. New York Times, 1 Oct. 1991; and Report on the USSR, 25 Oct. 1991.
104. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 26 March 1992.
105. New York Times, 5 January and 9 January 1992. When Major General Bashkirov, the renegade Commander of a CIS Strategic Air Division, refused to transfer to, or, indeed, land at a Russian base, he was fired by Shaposhnikov, but 're-hired' by Kravchuk; RFE/RL R.R., 6 March 1992.
106. Guardian Weekly, 6 October 1991; New York Times, 23 October 1991; FBIS-SOV 91-213, 4 November 1991. Note also Natalia Fedusyak (from Kiev), "Ukraine may keep N-weapons", Canadian Press, 29 March 1992. Ukraine's June refusal in March to commit to transfer of all nuclear arms to Russian soil by 1 July 1992 (for CIS disposal and/or destruction, as mandated by arms control agreements and IMF and other Western aid conditions), was presented as response to uncertainty concerning Russian dispositions, and not indicative of changed commitment; see New York Times, 1 April 1992.

107. Ukraine's oath of allegiance was avoided by some [a number of air force and other mobile high tech units left for Russian soil], and ignored by others [Tass, 17 March 1992 report on the 'mutiny' of Lvov military school cadets]; yet others acquiesced because it released pay, and food—a commercial arrangement, rather than principle, buying conditional loyalty, but no more.

108. Reuters; Montréal Gazette; 29 February 1992.

109. See eg The New York Times, 3 January 1993.

110. See The Economist, October 3 and 17 1992.

111. New York Times; 22 March 1992.

112. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 April 1992; also Los Angeles Times, 18 and 19 April 1992.

113. The Movement for Democratic Russia and Military for Democracy both recommended Kokoshin; see RFE/RL Research Report, 6 March 1992.

114. Grachev described his appointment as a "temporary compromise"; see RFE/RL Daily Report; 22 May 1992.

115. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 June 1992.

116. Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army", RFL/RL Research Report, 21 August 1992.

117. Sovietskaya Rossiya, 7 July 1992.

118. RFL/RF Research Report, 18 August 1992.

119. BBC, 13 July 1992.

120. RFL/RL Research Report 3 April 1992: Kiev claimed 91% of the Black Sea Fleet [its definition of the non-strategic component]; CIS Naval Cdr. Admiral V. Chernavin [and Moscow] was willing only to transfer 20.22%.

121. See Stephen Foye, op cit, p 12; and Scott McMichael, "Russia's New Military Doctrine", RFL/RL Research Report; 9 October 1993.

122. See A.A. Danilovich, "On New Military Doctrines of the CIS and Russia", M.A. Gareev, "On Military Doctrines and Military Reform in Russia", and C.J. Dick, "Initial Thoughts on Russia's Draft Military Doctrine", in The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, vol 5 no 4, December 1992.

123. G. Schoenfeld, "Troops or Consequences", Post-Soviet Prospects, CSIS, no 21, September 1993.

124. Moscow Radio [all-Union], 19 November 1991.

125. Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 March 1992.

126. Kuranti, 15 April 1992; see also Kipp, op cit, p.233.

127. The Navy's 60% reduction in submarine procurement rates in 1991 was symptomatic, as was its more rapid retirement of older vessels [in the Pacific 29 older nuclear submarines were retired in 1989-90 and another 29 in 1991—leaving 40 newer models]; Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 October 1991.

128. Col. Gen. Rodionov[?], "Some Approaches to Elaboration of Russia's Military Doctrine", Voennaya Mysl special issue, July 1992.

129. See in Le Monde, 15 October 1991, and New York Times, 10 November 1991.

130. See also A. Rahr, "The Revival of a Strong KGB", RFE/RL Research Report, 14 May 1993; and V. Yasman, "Where Has the KGB Gone?", RFE/RL Research Report; 8 January 1993.

131. Foye, RFL/RL R.R.; 21 Aug. 1992, op cit.

132. Izvestia, 10 July 1992; see also RFE/RL R.R., 8 May 1992, for a background report on the 'industrialists' lobby"; and New York Times, 25 October 1992, for a profile on Khazbulatov.

133. "The Strategy for Russia: Some Theses for The Council For Foreign and Defence Policy's Report", Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 August 1992. Quotes from A. A. Kalinin (Member, Defence Committee of the Moscow City Council), "On the Meaning and Preliminary Results of the Recent Debates in Defence and Security Issues in the Late USSR and New Democratic Russia"; unpubl. manus., October 1992—available from author.

134. V. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament", Foreign Policy, Fall 1992, p.66.

135. RFE/RL R.R., 14 May 1993, op.cit.

136. The Economist, 1 May 1993.

137. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 17 June 1993.

138. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7 July 1993.

139. German ARD TV interview with Yeltsin, 12 November 1993.

140. For Ukrainian coverage, see Golos Ukrainy, 29 June 1993, pg.1.

141. See in International Herald Tribune, 16 June 1993; the Supreme Command of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces would be replaced by a "united headquarters for coordinating military cooperation".

142. see eg The Economist, 28 August and 18 September 1993; also RFE/RL Research Report, 9 April 1993, for background; and ITAR-TASS, 1 March 1993, for Yeltsin's first embrace of this posture: "the time has come for...the United Nations to grant Russia special powers as guarantor of peace and stability in this region".

143. See eg Fred Hiatt, "Economic Disaster Speeds Ukraine Pact", Guardian Weekly, 12 September 1993.

144. Ukraine's obfuscation brought Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev's 7 December assertion that "Sevastopol had always been a Russian naval base and would remain so...the Maastricht agreements providing for Ukraine to hand over the fleet to Russia in exchange for debt relief [must] be honoured... Russia would "not allow" another nuclear state on its border"; Interfax, as reported in RFE/RL Daily Report, 8 December 1993.

145. See eg Guardian Weekly, 6 February 1994.

146. Jonathan Steele (Guardian Moscow correspondent), "Yeltsin's Conspiracy; Evidence suggests Russian leader set Parliament up for a fall", Ottawa Citizen et al., 29 November 1993.

147. Yeltsin interview, Izvestia, 15 November 1993.

148. Interfax; RFE/RL Daily Report, 6 December 1993.

149. RFE/RL Daily Report, 26 November 1993; ITAR-TASS, 2 December 1993.

150. CNN, 12 December 1993.

151. Ref eg New York Times, 27 January 1994.

152. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, The Independent, & New York Times 31 January 1994.

153. Tanks and soldiers from the elite Taman and Kantemirovsky Divisions and airborne forces from Tula gave decisive support; see Fred Hiatt, "Neither Russia nor its army are likely to ever be the same", Washington Post, 5 October 1993. But the troops inside the Otkankino building that opened fire on the pro-Parliament mob that attempted to seize control were Omon; the commandos who stormed (into) Parliament were Alpha.

154. RFE/RL Daily Report, 15 November 1993; [German] ARD TV, 12 November 1993.

155. See esp. J.W.R. Lepingwell, "Is the Military Disintegrating..?", RFE/RL Research Report, 18 June 1993.
156. In mid-August government payments were 2 trillion Roubles in arrears; see Schoenfeld, on cit.
157. Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 March 1993.
158. Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 January and 10 April 1993; see also Voenno-ekonomichesky zhurnal, no 3 1993.
159. ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1993.
160. Kommersant-Daily, 17 November 1993; Izvestia, 18 November 1993.
161. Rossiiskie vesti, 4 January 1993.
162. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7 May 1993.
163. Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 March 1993; Segodnya, 10 March 1993; RFE/RL Research Report, 18 June 1993.
164. Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 December 1992, presents peacetime and wartime organizational structures; see also Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 May 1993.
165. Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 and 12 May 1993.
166. Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 December 1992 and 28 April 1993.
167. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 June 1993.
168. RFE/RL Daily Report, 12 November 1993; on the military cooperation agreement, see also ITAR-TASS, 9 November 1993.
169. RFL/RL Research Report, 9 April 1993; ITAR-TASS, 11 November 1993; the Ottawa Citizen, 23 November 1993; see also coverage of doctrine, above.
170. see eg "Privileges promised to the defence industry", Moscow News, 2 July 1993; and ITAR-TASS, 25 November 1993.



LIBRARY E A/BIBLIOTHEQUE A E



3 5036 20039705 0

DOCS
CA1 EA 94A67 ENG
Jacobsen, C. G. (Carl G.)
Arms and society : Russia's
revolutionary arbiter
43270238

RESS®

507
YELLOW
TANGERINE
ROYAL BLUE
EXECUTIVE RED

R CODE

COMPANY LTD.
CANADA