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

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

THE GERMAN EMPEROR
AND
THE PEACE OF THE WORLD

THE GERMAN EMPEROR
AND THE
PEACE OF THE WORLD

By
ALFRED H. FRIED
(NOBEL PEACE PRIZE)

With a Preface by
NORMAN ANGELL
Author of 'The Great Illusion'

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO

Printed in 1912.

PREFACE

BY NORMAN ANGELL,
AUTHOR OF 'THE GREAT ILLUSION'

THE Anglo-Saxon world, especially the English section of it, owes an act of justice to the Kaiser William. For nearly a generation he has been represented as something very nearly approaching an irresponsible energumen; the premier English satirical paper has urged him to 'try and be a little gentleman'; he has been lampooned and ridiculed, in season and out of season, with reason and without reason.

But how has the Emperor taken his revenge for this? We now know that throughout he has consistently stood as the friend of England and of the Anglo-Saxon world;

has incurred not once but many times the hostility of many sections of his own people because of this friendship, and has added to the already great difficulties of his position by his fidelity to it.

Is it not time, therefore, that the English-speaking world tried to judge of this ruler in the light of facts instead of prejudice and prepossession ?

For this, among other reasons, I am particularly glad to see this book of my friend, Alfred Fried, in an English dress. Fried, who is a lifelong Pacifist, having for years worked in the face of contumely and misrepresentation, has certainly no prejudice in favour of the Emperor William, and the system and philosophy he represents. Fried's testimony is therefore all the more valuable for its impartiality. But, indeed, his testimony speaks for itself, and it should, once for all, destroy the legend that the ruler of the

nation which, almost alone of all great nations of the world, has consistently maintained the peace for forty years, is that disturbing element in the world peace which ignorance has so long represented him to be.

That the Emperor may have misread and misinterpreted the motives and intentions of other powers, and, it may be, England among the number, is merely to say that he is like every statesman whose mind is dominated by the current political conceptions of Europe. Modern European politics might be described as the science of misunderstanding: every statesman disclaims emphatically, and probably quite sincerely, any intention whatsoever of aggressive action upon his neighbours —and every statesman in Europe has for twenty years been feverishly preparing to resist the attacks of neighbours, who, as loudly and as emphatically as himself, have disclaimed any intention of ever making any

such attack! This welter of misinterpretation is due to the absence of anything resembling a science of international polity based upon the facts of the modern world, of any real understanding of those facts. The way to clear up a misunderstanding is to understand it. And there is no general comprehension in Europe of the character of the relations which unite nations, of the real factors underlying their necessary co-operation. As I have said elsewhere, the whole case of the relation of military power to social and economic advantage, the extent to which the general well-being of one can be advanced by military domination over another, or to which the interlacing of interests checks the effective imposition of such domination, is at present simply unknown to the minds now most active in European politics; which is proven by the fact that existing political and economic literature still employs the

terminology of international conditions which have in fact disappeared.

That is why the intrinsic importance of the evidence revealed in these pages does not reside in the particular view which the Kaiser may have taken of various schemes of world or European Federation, but does reside in the spirit and motive which has prompted his interest in those schemes. The fact that he had manifested such an interest demonstrates that his position has convinced him of the grotesque absurdity of the existing condition of things. It is unlikely that any such short cut as a mechanical contrivance, any federation scheme, will solve this difficulty—it seems decreed that mankind shall make no real advance, except that which it has earned by the sweat of hard thinking, of better understanding—and some of the proposals mentioned here as having received the Emperor's attention are certainly, as the

author of this book probably agrees, fantastic and foolish enough. But it is both suggestive and encouraging that the Kaiser, of all men, should have realized the urgency of tackling this problem.

And a word as to the author of this book. The fact of Alfred Fried's life and work is a curious commentary on those who would urge that German-speaking Europe is necessarily impervious to pacifist endeavour. Fried has, among other things, created what is undoubtedly the most efficient periodical of the Pacifist movement in the world: and that periodical appears in the German tongue. That there are immensely powerful strongholds of reactionary thought in Germany no one would deny, but to represent Germany as an intellectual entity distinct from and shut off by a Chinese wall from the general European movement of opinion, is disproved by the facts contained in this book and by

the work of its author : by the fact that the fountain head of Prussianism should himself be so susceptible to, and should show such interest in all schemes aimed at finding a way out of the present condition ; and the fact that organized pacifism as represented by Fried's work and his paper are products of Germany. These are two things which give an immense encouragement to those of us who hope to see the creation of a more informed European opinion ; and it is these two facts which give to this little book its interest for the English-speaking public.

NORMAN ANGELL.

INTRODUCTION

SHORTLY before his death, Ernest Renan, in replying to an enquiry addressed to him by the editor of a certain periodical, expressed a hope that he would live long enough to see how the Emperor William would turn out. That was in 1892. At that time the young Emperor was regarded in most European countries, and also across the seas, as a man bent upon winning the laurels of war. The Americans dubbed him 'War Lord.' The Emperor has now sat for nearly a quarter of a century upon the throne of the Hohenzollerns, and, so far, the history of his reign has not been stained with war. The operations in China and South-West Africa were, indeed, of a warlike character, but they

were not wars. Ernest Renan, and with him millions and millions of men, certainly expected that things would take quite another course.

In the meantime, people have become accustomed to refer to the Emperor as 'Peace Emperor.' He is extolled, not alone by Germans, but by foreigners as well, as the champion of European peace. Within the last few years, however, a current of opinion has set in which ascribes another ambition to the Emperor, and sees in him the founder of a secure condition of international life based upon right and reciprocity. A great longing for such a condition is filling the world. A powerful movement strives for the formation of a community of Civilized States, and wherever some event of world-wide import is about to occur mankind turns to him who may bring it to completion. As the German people in the last century looked

for a unificator, so is the civilized world to-day seeking for an organizer. The critics of materialist history cannot deny the presence of this feeling since Ostwald has revealed to us the cataclystic influence of great men. The prominent position, which William II has won for himself in the world, attracts the gaze of all hopeful beings. A large part of the civilized world, including the best men of the time, hold him capable of being more than the champion of armed peace. He is credited with an earnest wish to fulfil the hopes of the time, and he is being fortified in this desire. There are also not wanting voices which encourage him to proceed to deeds and to organize peace on a new basis, to create a universal Hohenzollern Empire, which in his own words, would be founded 'upon the mutual confidence of all nations, striving towards the same end.'

It is remarkable. So much has been

written about the Emperor, his inclinations have been explained, his acts chronicled, and his words interpreted, but no account has been given of his attitude towards a world peace, with which he is most closely connected. If he had waged a war, our libraries would be filled with descriptions of his deeds; but as he has only peace, and nothing but peace, to show after ten years' work, it has hitherto not been considered worth the trouble to throw light upon his acts of peace.

I do not wish to fill up the gap. My object in the following pages is to make a contribution towards stopping it—a contribution which owed its origin to the excited discussion of certain utterances alleged to have been made by the Emperor during the funeral ceremonies in London. I wish in the first place to prove, by comparing the Emperor's word and acts, that the idea of a

European rapprochement is not so strange to him as some in their blindness would have us believe. It is also my desire to define more clearly the idea of securing peace and thus to deprive the problem of a 'peace alliance' of the terrors which it apparently still has for many people. I desire, finally, to demonstrate how the spirit of the age has affected the Emperor, and how his ideas upon peace have gradually developed with the years. The world, which is to-day under the despotism of the telegraph, is too short-sighted to be in a position to give their proper value to facts occurring at different times, were they ever so important, in order to draw the right conclusion from the mass. This little book is intended to meet this want. It will depict the Emperor in his attitude towards a world peace, in his views for the promotion of a community of States in the modern sense, and, so far as is possible from the available

material, to explain to the world how the 'WAR LORD' is developing into a 'PEACE-MAKER.' It is a book of hope, and must not be taken as anything else.

A. H. F.

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THE EMPEROR AND THE FEDERATION OF CIVILIZED NATIONS

CHAPTER I

THE EMPEROR AND THE FEDERATION OF CIVILIZED NATIONS

ON May 20, 1911, the Paris newspaper, *Le Matin*, published an interview which its editor, M. Lauzanne, had had with the French Foreign Minister, just after the latter's return from the late King Edward's funeral. In referring to a conversation with the German Emperor, the Foreign Minister made the following statement: 'With the sincerity and persuasiveness which are not the least attractive of his characteristics, the Emperor expounded his favourite theory—that the peoples of Europe should, in the interests of humanity and civilization, live in peaceful co-operation with one another, and join in forming a great and peaceful Federation.'

This statement caused a great sensation

throughout the whole civilized world, and was discussed at length in the Press of every nation. The peace problem was once more unshelved, most of the newspapers greatly exaggerating and distorting the Emperor's views. As is usual when visions of peace loom on the official horizon of Germany, the Pan-German Press showed great agitation, and, as was to be expected, an official *démenti* was not long withheld. On May 25, the semi-official Wolff Agency issued the following communication: 'The foreign Press is at present discussing a statement made by *Le Matin* to the effect that the German Emperor had spoken to Monsieur Pichon of the possible formation of a European Confederation. It is correct that the Emperor assured Monsieur Pichon of his belief in the maintenance of peace throughout Europe, and of his own firm intention to further that end by every possible means; but the question of forming a European Confederation did not arise during the conversation, such an idea being far from the Emperor's mind.'

Upon comparing it with the *Matin's* statement, one is bound to admit that the Wolff Agency note did not refute that which constituted the really essential point of the reported interview. Only the words 'European Confederation' were contradicted, but the real meaning underlying the Emperor's words —the necessity of a Union between the nations of Europe in the interests of humanity and civilization—was in no wise denied. Such a Confederation would naturally suggest to most minds a constitutional Union similar to that of the German Empire, the Swiss Republic, or the United States of America. It goes without saying that an idea so absurd never entered the Emperor's mind.

The *Matin* subsequently declared that the Wolff Agency note really denied nothing, and insisted upon the veracity of its own statement. 'It had never stated that the Emperor had uttered the magic words 'European Confederation,' but the theory expounded by the Emperor was, in reality, the expression of such a scheme.'

It does not much matter, however, whether the *Matin* was right or wrong. The fact remains that the Emperor has, on many different occasions, expressed the same views, and has always been keenly interested in what one may rightly term his ' pet theory.' It is of no small importance to find out exactly what the Emperor really thinks of this great problem, and, consequently, necessary to refer to his previous utterances on the subject.

The idea may be traced to him as far back as the middle nineties. At first it was still permeated by warlike views, but gradually the Emperor's thoughts became more pacific, tending towards an international understanding for the promotion of peace and the maintenance of order.

The very first expression of the Emperor's views may be traced to a photograph which he presented to the Secretary of State, von Stephan, on January 7, 1891, on the occasion of the latter's sixtieth birthday. This photograph bore the following inscription: ' At the

end of the nineteenth century, the world is governed by trade. Trade is throwing down the barriers that separate the different nations and is bringing about a revolution in the relations between nations.' These words form the basis of Pacifism, of international co-operation. The development of industries and of international trading has brought the interests of all nations together and must unite them more closely.

In 1895, the Kiel Canal was thrown open to traffic. Warships from every civilized nation had met there in order to inaugurate the event. During the festivities in Hamburg, the Emperor made the following speech in reply to an address presented by the Hamburg Burgomasters :

'We are joining together two seas. Our thoughts turn towards the sea—the symbol of eternity. Seas no longer separate us, they bind us together and are themselves bound together by this new link, for the blessing and peace of all nations. The mailclad giants assembled to-day in the Kiel waters symbolize

peace, the co-operation of all civilized nations in their great mission of civilization. And as we look across the endless sea, we cast, too, a glance upon the sea of nations. The eyes of the whole world are lifted questioningly towards us. They sue for peace. Only in peace can the world's trade be developed, in peace only can it prosper. We desire to maintain that peace and will do so. . . .'

On November 20, 1895, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* published a detailed description of the well-known picture by Professor Knackfuss, at the foot of which the German Emperor had inscribed the following words:

'Nations of Europe, protect your most cherished possessions.' The picture was described in the following manner:

'Upon a rocky plateau stand allegorical figures representing the different civilized nations, over which the Cross—the sign that leads only Christians to victory—spreads Its lustre. In the foreground stands France, her left hand screening her eyes. She seems

heedless of impending danger. On the other side, Germany, armed with shield and sword, follows attentively the growth of disaster below. Russia, a beautiful woman with long locks, rests her arm familiarly upon the shoulder of her well-armed companion. Next to this group stands resolute Austria; she extends her right hand invitingly towards the hesitating figure of England, whom she wishes to win over to co-operation in her work. Italy stands between them, and, like Germany, looks down upon the increasing disaster with concern. This procession of noble figures is brought up by two curly-headed maidens carrying spears. They represent the smaller nations. Opposite the group stands the Archangel Michael. In his right hand he holds the flaming sword, his face is turned towards the group of women; energy is stamped on all his features; his right hand points towards some horrible danger; he seems to implore them to prepare for a Holy War. At the foot of the plateau extends the great plain of European civiliza-

tion, across which thunders a majestic torrent. Mountain peaks rise above the horizon and in the distance are cities crowned by the steeples of churches of various creeds. In the foreground looms the Hohenzollern Citadel. Ominous clouds are drawing together and darken the skies. Along a road rush Asiatic hordes, lit up by flames from a burning city. Clouds of smoke rise from the conflagration. The Danger, in the form of Buddha, stands out of the gloomy picture, borne by a Chinese Dragon representing the Demon of Destruction. Visions of horror gather around the banks of the stream and in a short time it will no longer form a boundary.

In a speech delivered by the Kaiser at a review of troops in Gorlitz in honour of the Russian Czar, was a passage that clearly shows the trend of the Emperor's thoughts, and which may, at the same time, be taken as an indication that the plan of a Hague Conference was already in the Czar's mind, and that he had discussed it with the German Emperor. In referring to his guest, the

Emperor stated: 'In thorough agreement with me, his efforts tend towards bringing together the various nations of Europe in their own mutual interests, and in order to guard their most sacred possessions.'

In a telegram which he sent to President Mackinley, who had, on July 5, 1900, telegraphed his condolences on the occasion of the murder of Ambassador Ketteler, he said :—

'I extend to your Excellency my most sincere thanks for your warm words of sympathy on the occasion of the murder of my representative in Peking. I feel in them the throb of the pulse of mutual interest, common to all the civilized nations of the world.'

In July, 1902, the Emperor sent to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, Lord O'Brien, who had offered a prize for the international boat-races at Cork, in which a Berlin Club took part, a telegram of thanks for the hearty reception accorded to the Berlin representative. He expressed a hope that the visit might be renewed and returned . . . 'be-

cause such manifestations are excellent for the furtherance of goodwill and brotherhood between nations.'

The Emperor has repeatedly taken occasion to refer to sport as bringing nations into closer contact. His most distinct reference to this was expressed in a speech which he delivered at Cuxhaven on June 21, 1904, in reply to Dr. Mönckeberg, who had urged the necessity of struggling forward in all domains of activity. It was on this occasion that he alluded to the growth of international solidarity and to the influence which this growing solidarity had upon politics. He said, 'I believe I may add, that every impartial observer of events throughout the globe must realize that the solidarity between civilized nations is gradually increasing in many different spheres. This solidarity is forcing its way into the programmes of rulers and into the minds of self-governing communities. It is being fostered in various ways—by earnest political deliberation, by congresses, by sport. In connection with

sport, we may truly say that there is a deep meaning in innocent play. Well, Gentlemen, we are together here to measure our vigour, our intellect, our crews and our boats on the crest of the waves. Together with our colours, the Union Jack, the Stars and Stripes and the Tricolour will flutter in the breeze in peaceful contest and partnership. I thoroughly believe, Gentlemen, that there is not one among you who does not share with me the opinion that during this Kiel week the solidarity to which I referred will be fostered more strongly than ever. If the merchant, the manufacturer, and the farmer, are able to progress, they owe it to this solidarity, which gives them confidence in the future, and that is the most essential factor of their progress.'

In his famous speech at Bremen, on March 22, 1905, we again find a passage which confirms the idea of a Federation of Europe. In that speech he declared that he did not strive to dominate the world : he showed how great Empires had always crumbled to pieces : but he also frankly advocated the *si vis pacem*

para bellum policy (. . . 'our hand on the sword, our shield before us, and . . . come what will!'). His speech ran as follows:—

'The World-Empire of my dreams will include those who extend to the newly-built German Empire the most complete confidence that could be placed in a peaceful and honest neighbour. If history should mention a German World Power or a Hohenzollern omnipotency, we do not wish it to be said that it was obtained by the point of the sword, but by the mutual confidence of nations striving towards the same ideal, to describe which we may use the words of a great poet: "Outwardly limited, inwardly unlimited."'

A typical statement was that made by the Emperor to the French military attaché in 1907, who thanked him for the wreaths laid upon the tombs of the French victims of the 1870–1 war. He said: 'L'Europe est trop petite pour être divisée.' (Europe is too small to be divided.)

In later years, the Emperor seems to have

considered more keenly than ever the possibility of a Federation of Europe. In June, 1907, during the Kiel week, Professor Mabilleau, of Paris, President of the International Mutual Society, had a conversation with the Emperor, and in 1908 he published in the French weekly, *L'Opinion*, an article referring to that conversation. He said that the Kaiser dreamt of a united Europe under German hegemony, but that he did not desire to draw any other benefit from that hegemony than that of furthering the peaceful advancement of all peoples.

In July, 1908, Sir Max Wæchter, whose whole life has been devoted to agitation for a Federation of Europe, published in the Copenhagen newspaper, *Politiken*, an account of a conversation which he had had with the Kaiser. This conversation also took place at Kiel. 'The Emperor,' he said, 'was from the outset particularly amiable. He said that he knew me by name, and that he had always been most keenly interested in the scheme of a Federation of Europe, which

would put an end to the enormous waste of military expenditure and customs duties. . . . That evening, the Emperor conversed with me at length and invited me to dinner on the following day on board the *Hohenzollern*. I sat at the Emperor's right, and he engaged in a very animated conversation with me, asking me to expound my scheme to him in detail. He repeatedly expressed his approval, and finally said: "I lend my hand to any plan that can help to promote the great cause of peace."'

At an official banquet at Strasburg on August 10, 1908, the Emperor drew attention to the firm basis upon which the peace of Europe rested. Not only did the consciences of the rulers and statesmen of Europe stand bail for peace before the whole world, but 'it is the desire, the will of the peoples themselves, to make use of the great achievements of civilization for their development, and to compete with one another peacefully.' This speech was all the more important since the Kaiser only referred to armaments as a last resort towards advancing the cause of peace.

During the summer of 1909, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant and several of his countrymen were on several occasions the guests of the Kaiser on board the *Hohenzollern*. Their conversations often drifted to political matters. In a remarkable letter dealing with his Kiel visit, which Baron d'Estournelles de Constant published in the *Temps* of June 29, 1909, is the following passage: 'The Emperor has, on the whole, remained very faithful to his original scheme of a Federation of all civilized states, and if he once spoke of a Yellow Peril it was solely in order to draw attention to the divided state of Europe in the face of New Worlds, which had so many natural advantages over the older one.' He declared: 'We only wish to solve problems dividing the civilized world, to render it more easy for nations to live in harmony, to group together the forces of Europe, for it may be necessary later to use these united forces in the interests of a common economic policy.'

Three years later the leading statesmen of two other European powers alluded to the

necessity of a Federation of Europe. One of them was Lord Salisbury, the other, Count Goluchowski, the Prime Minister of Austria-Hungary.

Lord Salisbury urged a Federation of Europe during his whole lifetime. On November 10, 1897, he delivered the following memorable speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet at the Mansion House, which, in view of the German Emperor's utterances, is of the greatest importance: 'The idea of a Federation of Europe,' he stated, 'is still in its embryonic state, but it is the only way that will enable civilization to protect itself from deplorable ravages. See how armaments are increasing everywhere. Armies are daily being rendered more powerful, and the machinery of destruction more efficacious. For their own security, all nations are now compelled to take part in this competition. The only way to prevent some terrible conflagration is for nations to face the questions that may divide them in a friendly spirit, until such time as they can unite under an

International Constitution, powerful enough to ensure a lengthy period of commercial prosperity and lasting peace.'

At the opening session of the Hungarian delegates a few days later—November 20, 1897, Count Goluchowski expressed similar views. He concluded his statement on the political situation with the following words: '. . . We may hope for and expect this all the more since Europe has apparently reached a turning-point in her development. The solving of the great problem of the material well-being of nations, which becomes more pressing from year to year, is no longer a distant Utopia. It is near at hand. The disastrous competition which, in all domains of human activity, we have to submit to from over the seas, and which we will also have to encounter in the future, must be resisted if the vital interests of Europe are not to suffer, and if Europe is not to fall into gradual decay. Shoulder to shoulder we must ward off the danger that is at our doors, and in order to prepare for this we must draw

upon all the reserves that stand at our disposal. This problem is a great and difficult one, and if the present symptoms do not deceive us, it is a problem that will leave its mark upon the coming era.

'Religious warfare filled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; during the eighteenth century liberal ideas took root; the nineteenth century has been an epoch of struggle between nations; but the twentieth century will be a century of struggle for existence in the domain of economics. The nations of Europe must unite in order to defend their very means of existence. May that be understood by all, and may we make use of those days of peaceful development to which we look forward with confidence, to unite our best energies.'

We will pass over the following years, during which the first Hague Conference and the Czar's manifesto brought the idea of a Federation of Europe into the very midst of political discussion. We will, however, mention certain American references which must

certainly have influenced the Kaiser more than any.

During the Peace Congress held in New York from the 14th to the 17th of April, 1907, and which was attended by several prominent diplomatists of both continents, Andrew Carnegie declared 'that the psychological moment for a decisive step onwards had arrived.' Personally, he said, he was convinced by the idea of an international Peace League and the formation of an international police, which would not be used for attack, but solely for the defence of the civilized world. It was not a new idea, but simply an extension of what had already been done in that direction. Only lately, six nations—Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan and the United States—had joined forces in China under the leadership of a German general for a common purpose, which purpose had been attained. International peace could be secured in a like manner. Nations thus united could, with the immense forces at their disposal, quell any attempt

to break that peace. But, even then, force of arms would only be used as a last resort. All commercial and financial intercourse with the attacking nation would first be stopped.

In a speech entitled 'The Wrong Path,' which Carnegie delivered to the New York Peace Society, he again referred to the scheme of a Peace Union of Nations. 'If only for the protection of nations against each other,' he stated, 'the present piling-up of armaments must, sooner or later, end by a Union which will comprise the most advanced nations of the world. The interest of every civilized nation lies with universal peace, since the world's trade, by reason of the commercial intercourse between nations, now amounts to over twenty-six milliards of dollars. No nation can be allowed to break the world's peace. Differences must be settled amicably. All civilized peoples have acquired the right to be consulted when the world's peace is endangered and there is a risk of man perpetrating that greatest of all crimes, the

slaying of his brother.' Carnegie expressed the hope that a Conference of Nations for the formation of an international Peace League might soon be brought about. 'Meanwhile,' he said in conclusion, 'it is the duty of all those who hate War and love Peace, to preach the great and precious truth, that lasting peace can only be secured through an international Peace Union, and, if necessary, by using compulsion upon those nations who refuse to join it, in the same way as compulsion is used upon individuals who refuse to obey man's laws. And this Peace Union will finally be brought about by an International High Court of Justice. It must in the end, come to that, for it is the right path.'

Ex-President Roosevelt also referred to a Peace Union in the course of his speech at Christiania on May 5, 1910, when he received the Nobel Prize. In this speech he alluded to three different ways of ensuring universal peace. Firstly, by a general arbitration agreement, as extensive and as binding as possible,

with mutual guarantees as to the territories of the agreeing parties. Secondly, by the extension of the Hague Arbitration Court, and thirdly, by an international limitation of armaments, especially of naval armaments.

'Finally,' he continued, 'it would be a great achievement if those nations honestly desiring peace, were to form a Peace League, not only for the purpose of preserving peace among themselves, but also (and, if necessary, by resorting to force) to prevent others from breaking the peace. The greatest hindrance in the way of the Hague Peace Tribunal are the lack of executive power and of a police able to enforce the decisions of the Court of Arbitration. In every community—no matter how large—the authority of the Law depends upon the actual or possible display of force, the presence of a police, upon the fact that people are always at hand, willing and prepared to enforce judicial and legislative decisions. In savage communities, where brute force still prevails, an honest man has to protect himself, and until other

means of ensuring his personal safety are established in those communities, it would be foolish to expect him to surrender his arms, whilst men dangerous to the community retain theirs. He must not be prevented from protecting himself until the community is organized in such a way as to relieve every individual in that community of the necessity and duty of using force against force. And so it is with nations. Every nation must be prepared to defend itself, so long as there does not exist a kind of international police capable of preventing the use of force. As things are at present, a power strong enough to impose peace could best be created by a Union of those nations sincerely desiring peace and themselves not thinking of attacking others. Perhaps such a Union might only be able to ensure peace within certain limits and under certain conditions, but the ruler or the statesman who founded that Union would win for himself a great place in history, and would earn the gratitude of the whole of humanity.'

These few examples will show that the idea of a closer union between civilized nations for the guarantee of peace is one that has long held a large place in the minds of the greatest politicians. The German public has always shown a certain reserve in discussing this problem; it still believes that these ideas are only expounded by 'visionaries' and irresponsible individuals. They may be astonished to hear that it is to-day a problem affecting the whole world, a problem to which the greatest men devote their attention and one in which they place great hopes. The German Emperor, who has always shown keen interest in all pregnant questions, could not remain indifferent to this one. The similarity between his views and those of prominent statesmen and scholars cannot pass unperceived. All these references to the question by prominent men have influenced the Emperor. Ex-President Roosevelt's views, expressed shortly before he went to Berlin (where he must have conferred at length with the Emperor), are the same as those credited

to the Kaiser when he spoke to Monsieur Pichon in London, immediately after having met Roosevelt. One conversation simply confirms the other. The Ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Loevland, expressed this view in the *Dagblad* of May 24, 1910. He said :—

'If we assume that the Kaiser availed himself of an opportunity to inform the French Government confidentially that the time was ripe for a European Peace organization, it will be more easily understood when we consider that he had met Roosevelt in Berlin, who had just developed the same thesis before the Nobel Committee in Christiania. There is every reason to believe that both men found, in the course of their conversation, that they held ideas in common, to which the Kaiser, in his own particular way, has also given expression.'

It seems clear, therefore, that the Emperor really did speak to the French Foreign Minister in the way described by the Editor of the *Matin*, and it can be taken as certain that the

Emperor discussed fully the greatest problem of the day—the peace of the civilized world.

Another important circumstance confirms this supposition :

Since he mounted the throne, the Emperor has been the most prominent figure in international politics. He has drawn upon himself the attention of every nation, of every government. At first, anxiety, doubt and fear of his impulsive temperament and of his militarist views brought him into prominence, but soon, confidence gained ground in every direction. It was gradually perceived that the Emperor was the man who could ensure peace throughout Europe.

As early as 1897, the late William T. Stead wrote as follows in the *Review of Reviews*, in one of his articles dealing with the Federation of Europe :

'A Federation of this kind requires a leader, if not a ruler. That leadership might well be entrusted to the German Emperor, with England on his right and Russia on his left.'

That was thirteen years ago. Europe's combined action in China, under the leadership of a German general, could not then be foreseen. That action was the first and most conclusive proof of the ability of Europe to join forces when necessary, and of her readiness to respond to German initiative. It is certain that such a Union would be rendered still more easy if destined for peaceful enterprise in the interests of civilization.

On the occasion of the speech from the Throne which the Emperor delivered in November, 1905, Bertha von Suttner wrote as follows :—' The Emperor said : " The peace of the German people is to me a sacred matter." ' Nobody has the right to doubt the sincerity of those words. Unfortunately, however, only that peace was meant which is preserved by reference to a sharp sword and dry powder, and by the longest possible duration of peace for his own people, instead of for others. And it is just towards that high ideal, which forms the problem of civilization of the twentieth century, that the Emperor, in the plenitude

of his power, can use his influence decisively. I believe that he should, in spite of the inter-parliamentary visits and meetings that have taken place, in spite of all Hague Conferences, call together a Council of the leading statesmen of the civilized world, whose programme would be an entente cordiale of all those who earnestly desire peace—the creation of a four, or seven, or ten Federation (Bund)[1] within which the right of conquest, of invasion —the real dangers—would be eliminated. If only an energetic ruler like Germany's Sovereign would make a sign, the time would now be ripe for that which Henry IV already planned, Napoleon once formulated as a project, and Nicholas II of Russia, by his manifesto of 1898, tried to pave the way for.

In later years Carnegie was the man who most clearly and pressingly drew the world's attention to the German Emperor, and alluded to him as the Saviour of the civilized world.

[1] *Literal translation* may mean 'a Federation of four, seven, or ten States.'

In his speech at the New York Peace Congress of 1907, to which we have already referred, he stated that the formation of a Peace League seemed no longer a dream. All that was needed was a strong man. 'Perhaps President Roosevelt will fill the rôle. By his nature, by his past, he would be most fitted for it.' 'At the present moment, however,' continued Carnegie, 'the power to end war does not appear to be in his hands, but in those of the German Emperor. An appeal from him to form a Federation for that purpose, would induce more than six nations to join gladly. And as happened with the league in China, so would it be more than just that in *this* great League a German general should be the leader. Much has been written, much has been said about the German Emperor. It has been stated (I consider unjustly), that he threatened the world's peace. But, remember, that he has now been nearly twenty years upon the throne without being responsible for bloodshed. His sin may have been a sin of omission, since he has

failed to fulfil his mission—the abolition of war. Do not let us turn our eyes away from this man of destiny, and let us hope that his true mission will be revealed to him. No man has yet received a mission so lofty. If his true vocation were clearly revealed to him, I, for my part, believe that he would live up to it. I cannot believe that any mortal can refuse this godly mission of rendering such a glorious service to humanity. No victory is as great as that of Peace. The day has passed when the dealing of Death and Destruction was looked upon as a deed of heroism.

A year later the Interparliamentary Conference was held in Berlin. This was in itself a great event, since it was the first occasion in its twenty years' existence on which this great meeting for the promotion of peace had taken place on German soil. At this Conference, the American delegate, Bartholdt, read in the Reichstag, on September 18 (where the meeting was held), a letter from Carnegie, running as follows:—

'If I were in Berlin and could speak, all

my thoughts would naturally be concentrated on one subject. It seems to me that it should be easy to abolish war between civilized nations as a means of settling international disputes. In Berlin there exists one man who has only a word to say.[1] If only the Emperor of Germany would fulfil that task, every one would follow. *He* has it in his power to abolish war between civilized nations. He only needs to call together England, France, and the United States to join him in declaring that since the world has become one great organism, and since each part of that organism depends upon the others—the world's trade amounts to thousands of millions yearly—the day has passed when one civilized nation can be permitted to break that peace which is so near to the hearts of all. International disputes must be settled by Courts of Arbitration. Not one of the nations I have mentioned would refuse such an invitation, and the Emperor would have rendered to the

[1] Or, 'got to speak the word.'

World a service which no man has ever rendered before.'

This view of Carnegie's is to-day that of countless millions in every corner of the globe. A large portion of humanity now believes in the mission of the Emperor for the re-establishment of European and universal order. This belief is in itself a striking sign of the times, and it would not exist, if the ardent longing of humanity were not for a change in international relations. It could not have set in if the Emperor had not himself gained the confidence of humanity. He could not have gained that confidence if he believed so little in the idea as the Pan-German press would have us believe. Kaiser William is convinced of the necessity of a united Europe. He is considering it. Perhaps, some day he will answer the call of the American whom he admires so much. Perhaps he will fulfil the hopes of countless millions.

'Who would be better fitted,' I wrote in 1905, after the Emperor's speech in Bremen, 'to put an end to this state of chaos, to destroy

this illusion, to recall humanity to consciousness, than that prince who is himself the most international of princes, who constantly travels Europe and knows her culture, who is at home on those seas that link nations together, who has proclaimed the international solidarity of the civilized world, and who, more than any one else, is convinced of the value of peace? There is an Empire to build, such as has never yet been built, an everlasting Empire that would secure for its builder the most glorious place in history and make the nation that gave him birth the leading one—the Empire of Civilization, built upon Reason and Right.'

THE EMPEROR AS A PACIFIST



CHAPTER II

THE EMPEROR AS A PACIFIST

THE great disappointment which the German Emperor has given mankind is, generally speaking, due to the fact that a large number of people of all nations regard him as the man naturally called upon to establish by an act of organization the peace of Europe, or the whole world, on a firm basis—a disappointment, however, in a favourable sense. When he, a youthful Potsdam officer, mounted the throne of the Hohenzollerns and, turning first of all to the Army, cried: 'I and the Army belong to one another, are born for one another, and will steadfastly hold together, come peace or storm, as God wills it,' he was considered in every country of the earth as a great War Lord, who was likely to seek to make his name by warlike

deeds. This view was supported by all kinds of speeches made by the Emperor and imbued with the military spirit. But as time went on and Germany emerged from serious crises as a guardian of peace, and modern ideas found increasing utterance in the Emperor's speeches, international sentiments towards him changed in corresponding manner. Early apprehension made way for directly opposite feelings, giving place to broad deep-rooted confidence; that which in the case of another personality would have been reckoned as a matter of course was esteemed in him to be a notably good quality. He will soon have reigned a quarter of a century without having taken up arms. True this represents no act of pacifism; the non-existence of war is by no means a pacifist peace, which only comes about when, by an organized agreement between the different States, war is regarded as something extraordinary and not as a regular political instrument. The pacifist conduct of peace does not exclude the employment of force, but this,

too, would then be used in the service of right. It would be an instrument of organization and by the infrequency of its application would no longer oppress the people. The merit of never having gone to war is always one-sided. Even the supporters of war admit the fact when they claim that 'the best man cannot live in peace if it does not satisfy his ill-disposed neighbour.' If the Emperor has carried on no war for almost twenty-five years, one must, in the light of this opinion, grant a little merit to the neighbour, a principle which can be applied in its entirety to the Wilhelm peace era. Some years ago the point was touched upon by Anatole France at a great public meeting in Paris. After alluding to the indisputable love of peace by which the French people is animated, he said:— 'One swallow does not yet make a summer nor can a single nation yet impose peace upon the world.' That is undoubtedly the case; but then, is the sign of peace to be perceived in France alone? Let us look at Germany. She is a military country with

a magnificent army, the finest army in the world. Ours is equally good, as indeed is that of every other nation. But Germany has something more. She possesses a soldier Emperor, a great soldier, a perfect soldier to the backbone. The Emperor is the idol of the troops: he is the Hohenzollern soldier, the Lohengrin soldier, he has the mind and moustache of a soldier. His position and his character destined him for war. He has composed music, delivered speeches, written poetry, painted pictures, done a little yachting and studied sculpture and theology. He has in short done everything except wage war. And why? Because apparently there has been some change in Germany, as well as in the rest of Europe.'

Therefore, the Emperor, considered merely as a Prince who does not make war, is only a child of circumstances, the product of his time which has determined that he must avoid war. But the above does not make him a pacifist. Mr. Carnegie on one occasion when he met the Emperor at Kiel endeavoured

to convert His Majesty tc pacifist views. The Emperor replied that he was, like Mr. Carnegie, a guardian of peace, but after another manner. 'But,' answered Mr. Carnegie neatly, 'everything depends upon the manner. Allow me to tell you a little story. One day a carriage and pair was passed by a tandem going at breakneck speed. Later on the driver of the first vehicle remonstrated with his fellow-driver, for frightening people by such reckless conduct. "Why," said the tandem whip, "I had two horses like you, but they were put to in a different way." "Ah! that's just it," retorted the first coachman, "there is a big difference between holding my hands in this way (making a gesture of prayer) and this (putting his fingers to his nose)."'

Yes, indeed, everything depends upon the method. And it is a pleasing trait in the Emperor's character that he does not allow himself to be blindly led by facts, but endeavours to derive what profit he can from them. Everybody who has studied his utter-

ances of the last few years must admit that his pacifist tendencies have become more marked. Since about 1907 nothing short of a pacifist ambition may be discerned, as for instance, in his speech in London in that year in which he expressed the hope that history would acknowledge his efforts to avoid war. In olden times it was the aim of princes to figure in history with the laurels of war, and such an aim may not have been far from the mind of William II at the beginning of his reign. In London he spoke no longer merely of the 'maintenance of peace,' that hackneyed phrase so much in vogue during the last twenty-five years. On the contrary, he declared that it was his duty to 'promote' peace, and 'place it upon a firm footing.' Bertha von Suttner herself wrote at the time: 'More we do not ask. Peace will certainly be maintained for a time by a sense of fear, but nobody can assert that it will be "promoted" and "placed upon a firm footing" by such a feeling.'

From many minor characteristic actions it

can be seen that the Emperor does not stand so far aloof from the great pacific movement which, in the words of Professor Zorn, of Bonn, can no longer be dismissed with a disdainful shrug of the shoulder, as many ardent German spirits of to-day believe, and wish to make others believe them to do.

One of the most prominent peace advocates in Europe is Prince Albert of Monaco, who has long been on intimate terms with the Emperor, and who is, not unrightly, regarded as one of the most effective intermediaries between Germany and France. Prince Albert of Monaco, has taken an active part in the peace movement. In the year 1903 he called the International Peace Institute into being, having in the previous year invited the International Peace Congress to meet in his dominions. Nearly every year a meeting takes place between the Emperor and the Prince, at which, as is known to privileged persons, the peace movement and modern peace problems are exhaustively discussed. This is confirmed by the fact

that the Prince dedicated to the Emperor the German edition of his memoirs, which appeared in 1903 under the title: *A Seaman's Career*. The dedication, which breathes a pacifist spirit, is given in facsimile and runs as follows: 'I have dedicated the German version of this book to His Majesty the Emperor William II, the sovereign who protects labour and science, thus preparing the way for the realization of the most noble desire of the human mind, the union of all the forces of civilization to establish an inviolable peace. Albert, Prince of Monaco.' In writing to thank the Prince, the Emperor, as I know on the authority of a personage who has seen the letters, not only concurred in the views attributed, but, going much farther, made manifest his love of peace and his intention to serve the cause of civilization and concord.

In the spring of 1902 the Eleventh Universal Peace Congress sat in Monaco, the Prince being present at all the deliberations and frequently speaking himself. When the Prince

met the Emperor in the summer of that year he told His Majesty of the Congress. In the Agenda of the Congress was a proposal for the erection of a peace flag. This proposal did not come up for consideration and was put back until the following meeting. The idea interested the Emperor. He then and there began to draw on the back of a menu card, and laid before the Prince a design for such a flag. This, so far as I can remember, had a red ground divided into four fields by a white cross. Three of the fields were powdered with stars, while the fourth, at the top on the left, was intended to bear the national colour of the nation flying the flag. The original design is in the possession of the International Peace Institute in Monaco. The Prince, who was authorised by the Emperor, sent the flag to the Managing Committee of the Peace Congress which submitted it to the Congress at Rouen in 1903. Naturally the matter did not remain secret. The newspapers took it up and the Chauvinist organs were not wanting in ill-natured com-

ments. Thus it happened that at the Rouen Congress the French delegates were obliged to make known their fear that if they accepted an international peace flag designed by the German Emperor, their action would open the floodgates of Chauvinism in the country. Very animated preliminary discussions took place on this point, and as there seemed to be no prospect that the Imperial design would be adopted unanimously and without debate at a plenary sitting, the scheme ultimately fell through. When the resolution came up to be dealt with, nobody rose to support it, and the next business was accordingly proceeded with. Officially, the flag was not laid before the Congress as having been designed by the German Emperor. Therefore, if it had been found possible to maintain silence, the international peace movement would be marching to-day under a banner presented to it by the ruler of the greatest military state. It would then have been entitled to call the Emperor William its protector. It is certainly to be regretted that matters did

not get as far as this. The flag question which, it may be mentioned, was regarded by a large number of pacifists as a side issue, did not appear in the agenda of subsequent congresses. The adoption of the Imperial peace flag is therefore still possible, and to-day would, undoubtedly, no longer give rise to misgivings in the minds of the French delegates. But, that the Emperor had previously interested himself in the Peace Conference is shown by an utterance of his to M. Vereschagine, when, in the nineties of the last century, the latter exhibited in Berlin his series of pictures of the Napoleonic period. These works were historically accurate in their treatment, despite the ghastly horrors of the campaign in Russia, and, pointing at one of them, the Emperor is stated to have remarked: 'With that, my dear sir, you are doing more effective work against war than any Peace Congress.'

Another well-known pacifist with whom the Emperor maintains a close correspondence, and of whom he has a high estimation,

is the French Senator, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. When King Edward was at Kiel, in the summer of 1904, Baron d'Estournelles was also invited there. During his stay of over a week he was received almost daily by the Emperor, and on one occasion it is said that he spent a whole day in his Majesty's company. About this time the strained Anglo-German situation was at its height, and the object of King Edward's visit was to put an end to it. The Pan-German Press made a most regrettable display. It rejected any idea of a compromise and proclaimed aloud that the King came to Kiel only as a sportsman and had gone away with empty hands. One must be very thankful to such organs for not having sullied the fair fame of Germany by want of tact during the stay of the distinguished guest on German soil. King Edward did not go away with empty hands. His presence in itself indicated a pacifist success, to which the visit of Baron d'Estournelles no doubt contributed. On July 12, the Anglo-German

arbitration treaty was made public. It was the precious fruit of those days at Kiel. Baron d'Estournelles wrote to me at the time: 'The honour of having brought about the Anglo-German treaty belongs to King Edward of England, who takes his rôle of peacemaker most seriously, and to the Kaiser. The Emperor, it is true, dearly likes to hold idealists up to ridicule, but he agrees with them so far as to begin to recognize the work of the Hague Court. He has been caught by the idea and it will soon absorb him.' This arbitration treaty marks the starting point of German Imperial policy on the road of pacifism. At the moment, however, more was planned. In order to demonstrate to the Kaiser that the Anglo-French agreement of April, 1904, was not directed against Germany, efforts were made to arrive at a close agreement between Germany, Great Britain and France. In August of the same year the *Berliner Morgenpost* contained the following announcement: 'Further negotiations have been begun be-

tween London and Berlin as well as between Berlin and Paris, the significance of which, in the event of an understanding being reached, will hardly be less than that of the Anglo-French entente of April 8, last; indeed, having regard to the war in the Far East, the effect of the negotiations is likely to be of greater moment than that instrument. The Emperor William and King Edward have taken steps together to pave the way to an Anglo-Franco-German rapprochement, which, however, must not be confused with a coalition against Russia. The visit to Kiel of the well-known French deputy, and advocate of the idea of arbitration tribunals, was connected with this movement, and one will not be far wrong in assuming that the object of the journey of Baron von Hammerstein to London, which was undertaken at the express desire of the Emperor, is not alone to study problems of Local Government, but is also intended to smooth the path towards a policy of international cordiality.'

I applied to Baron d'Estournelles for

an explanation of this announcement and he wrote to me as follows in the middle of August: 'A rapprochement between France and Germany, inevitable as it is, will be of profit to both nations, to Germany more so than to France. Such a rapprochement may seem to be impossible to-day, but two years ago the same was said of an Anglo-French understanding. Who would have foreseen two months ago that Germany would conclude an arbitration treaty with Great Britain? And yet, to-day, the treaty is a reality. (Here follows the before-mentioned utterance regarding the conclusion of the Anglo-German treaty.) It was he (the Emperor) who painted a prophetic picture, "The Yellow Peril," which was so scoffed at ten years ago. It is a matter of common knowledge that the picture bore the inscription: "Nations of Europe! Unite to protect your most cherished possessions!" To-day that peril is more apparent than it was a decade ago and the unity of European nations has therefore become all the more necessary. For

Germany, for reasons I have a thousand times repeated, it is more indispensable than to France. On this account the union will become a real thing. All that is wanted is that public opinion should prepare itself for it, and that the urgency for granting all possible concessions should be recognized on both sides so that the rapprochement may be lasting and final.

'It is true that at Kiel I frequently had occasion to talk to the Emperor, and to my colleague of twenty-five years ago, Count Buelow, and I never concealed my idea. I do not flatter myself that my views were shared, but the Emperor takes an interest in everything, and cannot therefore remain indifferent to the only means of effecting a European union which he desired, and the necessity of which he was the first to demonstrate. For certain reasons I am unable to say more on this point. Perhaps I may be mistaken. A superficial observer may say that at Kiel there are many ironclads, arsenals, cruisers, torpedoes and admirals. Quite so,

but there are other unseen considerations: the cost of these excessive armaments, the expenditure, the taxes, compulsory service and the competition of the United States, which profits by all those unproductive burdens under which European producers are groaning. It is daily and more clearly understood that as soon as an agreement is arrived at, these burdens, instead of growing, will appreciably diminish. An armed peace will gradually become a thing of the past in the face of sound reason, and in the domain of politics as in that of science, force will give way to reason and will be overborne.'

In an obituary notice of King Edward, published recently in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, Baron d'Estournelles confirmed the views that had been entertained as to the significance of those days at Kiel. He described how he was encouraged by King Edward when he advocated a Franco-German understanding at Kiel. It must be admitted that this understanding came to nothing at the time, but the events in question must have played an

important part in shaping the conversations of the Emperor.

It was then that a proper appreciation of the pacifist problems dawned upon him, and the views, which he held before, during and after the first Hague Conference, upon the jurisdiction of arbitration courts and an international understanding, must have undergone a radical change at Kiel in 1904. Thenceforth, he always kept in mind Baron d'Estournelles, whom in the beginning he probably regarded as an 'idealist,' and when, on November 13, 1904, the latter, who had hitherto been a member of the Chamber of Deputies, was elected a Senator, His Majesty sent him a congratulatory telegram. In the following year Baron d'Estournelles was received by the Emperor in Berlin, and had a long and evidently important interview with him, but the French politician never revealed what occurred at the meeting. It is not until the summer of 1909 that we again find the French peace pioneer in proximity to the person of the Emperor. In the spring, Baron d'Estour-

nelles gave a notable address in one of the magnificent apartments of the Upper House of the Prussian Diet, upon the Anglo-German understanding, and in July he was on board the yacht *Ariadne*, at Kiel, in company with Prince Albert of Monaco, and the Deputies MM. Gaston Meunier and Jules Roche. The Emperor exchanged visits with the French politicians and invited them to lunch on board the *Hohenzollern*. It is certain that in the presence of such prominent peace promoters as the above-mentioned Frenchmen and Prince Albert, pacifism must have been touched upon. Baron d'Estournelles gave his impressions of his visit to Kiel in a letter published in the *Temps* on June 29, 1909. 'I am convinced,' he wrote, 'that he (the Emperor) sincerely loves peace, and that he believes in his mission to maintain it. A man who, even if he is a sovereign, lives every day in the company of his children, does not play with war. He understands, better than anybody else, its tragic risks. Who knows whether the Tsar, if he had been a

few years older, would have allowed himself to be carried away as he was five years ago ? ' Baron d'Estournelles proceeds to record the impressions of prosperity and industry which he gained in Germany, and then deals with the ever growing burden of military estimates. In this connection he writes: ' Side by side with the factories, over which flies the triumphant flag of German competition, are to be seen the great ironclad squadrons, the smallest unit of which costs as much as would ten such factories. A certain confusion, however, begins to be noticeable—not in government circles, I hasten to state, but among the mass of the people, in the gigantic reservoir of German activity. And with the expectation that the fusion of civilized states will in the end come to pass, the conviction prevails that any country which directs its efforts towards the ruin of other countries will assuredly ruin itself. Rightly the question is asked: Can such a state of things continue unchecked ? Only twenty years ago there would not have been wanting so-called statesmen who

would have answered: "A fine big war would put an end to it." Such a reply is no longer possible. It is not even comprehensible, since everybody knows that "a fine big war," far from bringing relief, would only aggravate the present evils and bring in its train so many undreamed of and terrible consequences, that only a fool would desire it. What then ?—'

I have reproduced this passage of Baron d'Estournelles' communication because it gives a clue to the possible subject of conversation at Kiel. Kiel is the greatest harbour in the German Empire, but it would seem that, since 1904, it has become a haven of peace, whence the pacifist ideas of official Germany have derived their origin. The Anglo-German arbitration treaty was followed in November, 1904, by the signature of an arbitration treaty with the United States. On that occasion the Emperor sent a telegram to President Roosevelt which plainly betrayed the change in His Majesty's views on the arbitration problem. The message

ran: 'The arbitration treaty, which we are both about to sign, will be a new and powerful instrument in uniting America and Germany in friendly relationship for the benefit of civilization, and may it help to promote the feelings of mutual esteem and comradeship of two great young nations and prove of lasting advantage in securing their peaceful development.' There is an appreciable difference between the note here struck and the tone of the German utterances at the Hague Conference, and nobody was more surprised at the change than the German pacifists themselves, who had not believed that things had developed so quickly.

The telegram may also be mentioned here, which the German Emperor addressed in September, 1908, to the Interparliamentary Conference in Berlin. A deputation from this conference was subsequently received at Potsdam. The telegram was as follows:— 'To the Parliamentarians of all civilized nations assembled in Berlin, I express my most cordial thanks for the greetings com-

municated to me by Your Excellency, and I hope that the gathering, which is being attended by so many distinguished men from all parts of the world, will find itself at home in my capital, and for its part will strive for the maintenance of the blessings of universal peace which I have so particularly at heart,—WILLIAM, I.R.'

In the meantime, the number of arbitration treaties to which Germany is a part has not increased. Indeed, at the second Hague Conference the Empire once more proved to be an obstacle to the extension of the ideas of arbitration. To the annoyance of the other thirty-two countries represented, Germany as a leading power, acting in consort with Austria-Hungary and the Balkan States, wrecked the proposed general arbitration treaty which contained a few obligatory provisions. But the feeling in favour of arbitration counts, and the comprehension of its great importance has enormously increased since then. With the exception of a few persons who do not wish to understand

the new development, the scholars and diplomats to-day rival one another in acknowledging the significance of the great problem. But if Germany is far behind in the movement she is no stranger to the practice of arbitration. No list of warlike achievements will be graved upon the monumemt of William II, but the number of arbitration cases in which Germany has been concerned during his reign is no longer small. In 1899, the dispute between Germany, the United States and Great Britain, was settled. In February, 1904, Germany stood as plaintiff against Venezuela, before the Hague Court; in May of the same year she took action in the Court against Japan in conjunction with some other European powers, and in 1909 the serious Casablanca question was solved in a pacific manner at the Hague by the very tribunal that Germany had at first so strongly opposed. Moreover, it was Germany herself that suggested arbitration. The Casablanca affair was one which a decade ago would have sufficed to plunge two nations into war.

That it did not do so (in 1909) may be taken as a new manifestation of the spirit of the age, and it is to the credit of the Emperor that he did not seek to oppose this spirit as many princes in their blindness did in bygone times. In addition to these cases the pacifist era of William II is distinguished by quite a number of compromises in regard to Togo, the Kamerun and the Congo. Then again, alongside these agreements, figure the peace treaties which (and this is also an achievement of modern times), were not concluded after bloody wars, but were entered into under the influence of reason, with the object of avoiding conflicts. To this category belong the Algeciras agreement of April, 1907, which put an end to a dangerous dispute by placing matters upon a legal foundation, the Morocco agreement concluded with France in Berlin on February 9, 1909, the North Sea and Baltic treaty which is of vital importance to the future organization of Europe, and the two Hague agreements of 1899 and 1907, with their highly important provisions intended

to ensure peace and prevent war. If one considers that all these deeds of peace have been performed within the space of the last ten years, it must be admitted that the reign of the Emperor is already richer in pacifist activity, than the life of any German prince has been.

These deeds alone suffice to indicate the pacifist tendencies in the life of the Emperor, but it will also be well not to forget that the sentiments by which the Emperor is influenced also find expression in the utterances of the personages who form His Majesty's entourage. One of these personages, Herr Ballin, the Manager of the Hamburg Amerika Line, on being asked by a local Peace Society whether there was really a war party in Hamburg, to which he himself belonged, sent the following reply: —'That is an assumption so wild, and so offensive, that I do not consider it worth repudiating. Even a successful war would deal such a blow at my life work, the development of the Hamburg Amerika Line, that the wounds could scarcely be healed within a lifetime.'

Herr Dernburg, Ex-Secretary of State for the Colonies, was for a considerable time a member of the German Peace Society, both before and after he was called to office. Prince Buelow has repeatedly made known his favourable disposition towards the arbitration movement, and never so clearly as in his speech at the opening of the Interparliamentary Conference in Berlin, on September 17, 1908. The then Imperial Chancellor said: 'Germany, with the rest of the civilized world, knows how to appreciate the services you are rendering to a good cause—you have attained more than was at first expected. Led by distinguished men you have pursued your task of obtaining guarantees for peace and goodwill among men. I may say without exaggeration that from year to year you have been increasingly successful . . . in Germany we take a lively interest in the problems which have been tackled by the Interparliamentary Union and particularly in the arbitration question . . . the love of peace does not denote want of love for one's country.

There are patriots who endeavour to obviate conflicts by combating the always harmful ignorance of unhealthy rancour, of often blind hatred, and of not unusually fallacious ambitions. He who acts in this way gives proof of a patriotism which smooths the way and removes obstacles, and in this way facilitates the upward progress of mankind towards the common ideal of all times.'

On March 15, 1910, Baron von Schoen, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a man who through the Morocco agreement of February 9, 1909, has earned the eternal gratitude of history and the transient hate of the Pan-Germans, was able to announce in the Reichstag that the present Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, shared the views enunciated by his predecessor in office before the Parliamentary Conference. The new Chancellor himself declared in the Reichstag on March 16, 1910, 'that he would not lend himself to a policy of treaty breaking, and even General von Einem, ex-Minister of War, told the Reichstag two days later that 'if things

go on as they are going, if relations with England improve, and if an Entente Cordiale is established with France, it will perhaps be possible to consider the advisability of decreasing the strength of the Army.'

Another personage who enjoys the confidence of the Emperor, Dr. C. G. Harnack, recently wrote in a widely-read publication: 'A new kind of intellectual communication, I might also say a standard of political ethics, is necessary to us. It is forming itself, struggling into existence. The Peace Societies are in this connection of great importance, and their pioneer work is by no means premature. May all diplomats smile upon them, even if they consider them as visionaries.' The fact that men so speak who have been called upon by the Emperor to take up the reins of power, and who form his inner circle of acquaintances, enables me to form a crude idea of His Majesty's own sentiments. But we also find a noteworthy alteration in the activity of German diplomacy. That envoys of the German Emperor attend and even

deliver peace speeches at meetings and banquets of Peace Societies is perhaps little known in Germany. Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States, undertook a long journey to Chicago in 1909 to deliver an address before the American Peace Congress there—an address which, although a great one, was confined to generalities of the subject before the Congress. But in the Ambassador's speech at the banquet which followed, he struck the pacifist note, extolling trade between nations as the basis of their friendship, and declaring that the shipping traffic between Hamburg and New York did more to consolidate the friendship between Germany and the United States, than any Ambassador, even if he made two speeches in one day at a Peace Congress, as he himself had done.

As late as March 22, of this year, Count Bernstorff spoke at the Congress of the American Peace and Arbitration League in New York, although he defended Germany's naval armaments, and alluded in somewhat

lukewarm terms to the Emperor's love of peace.

Count Wolff-Metternich, the German Ambassador in London (now retired), has penetrated more deeply into the world of pacifist ideas, and he has had more frequent opportunities than his colleague in Washington to participate in works of peace. In recent years Count Wolff-Metternich has on several occasions come forward in connection with the movement of Anglo-German understanding. On March 17, 1910, he was present at the annual meeting of the British Arbitration League, a Peace Society, at which he delivered a notable speech. His most important utterances are to be found, however, in his speech at the Emperor's banquet at the Hotel Cecil, in London, on January 28, 1910, which revealed a remarkable inclination to regard things from a pacifist point of view.

One passage may be reproduced here: 'Owing to the advanced stage of development, and the great sensitiveness of the modern system of credit, the increasing facilities

offered for placing capital abroad, and the extensive use which has been made of such facilities, the forcible oppression of a trade rival would be impossible without injury to the aggressor's own interests. Let us for a moment suppose Great Britain to be involved in a Continental War. The first news of such an event, we are told by experts, would so shake the frail structure of credit upon which the strength of the London market is based, that there would be a financial panic, which, again in the opinion of experts, must infallibly cause the insolvency of the great financial institutions. In a few days more wealth would be destroyed than could be restored by the most successful war.'

This is only one passage from a thoroughly pacifist address in which the Ambassador recognized the close connection between all parts of the enormous fabric of economics as few diplomats have done, and, acting upon this hypothesis, demonstrated the impossibility of war from the point of view of clear reason. This is a train of thought which de-

rives its origin in pacifist science, and leads direct to the recognition of the necessity for an organization of the civilized world, for the protection of its manifold common interests. How did Count Wolff-Metternich come to this knowledge ?

Shortly before he delivered the speech in question there fell into his hands a little book, entitled *Europe's Optical Illusion*, and written by a British journalist, Norman Angell. This work must be dealt with at some little length, first of all in order to explain how Count Wolff-Metternich's speech was influenced by it, but also for much more weighty reasons.

Count Wolff-Metternich found Norman Angell's views so worthy of note that he sent the book to the Emperor, who is stated to have read it with great interest, and to have been deeply impressed by it.

The views embodied in this book are summarised by the author himself as follows :—

What are the fundamental motives that

explain the present rivalry of armament in Europe, notably the Anglo-German? Each nation pleads the need for defence, but this implies that some one is likely to attack, and has a presumed interest in so doing. What are the motives which each state fears its neighbours may obey?

They are based on the universal assumption that each nation, in order to find outlets for expanding population and increasing industry, or simply to ensure the best conditions possible for its people, is necessarily pushed to territorial expansion and the exercise of political force against others (German naval competition is assumed to be the expression of the growing need of an expanding population for a larger place in the world, a need which would find realization in the conquest of English colonies or trade unless these were defended); that a nation's relative prosperity is broadly determined by its political power, nations being competing units; advantage in the last resort going to the possessor of preponderant military

force, the weaker going to the wall as in the other forms of the struggle for life.

The author challenges this whole doctrine. He attempts to show that it belongs to a stage of development out of which we have passed. It is no longer true that the commerce or industry of a people depends upon the expansion of its political frontiers; that indeed a nation's economic and political frontiers no longer coincide; that military power is socially and economically futile, and can have no relation to the prosperity of the people exercising it; that it is impossible for one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another; or to enrich itself by subjugating or imposing its will by force on another; that, in short, war, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which peoples strive.

He establishes this apparent paradox by showing, in so far as the economic problem is concerned, that wealth in the economically civilized world is founded upon credit and commercial contract (these being the outgrowth of

an economic interdependence due to the increasing division of labour and greatly developed communications). If credit and commercial contract are tampered with in an attempt at confiscation, the credit-dependent wealth is undermined and its collapse involves that of the conqueror; so that if conquest is not to be self-injurious, it must respect the enemy's property, in which case it becomes economically futile. Thus the wealth of conquered territory remains in the hands of the population of such territory. When Germany annexed Alsatia, no individual German secured a single mark's worth of Alsatian property as the spoils of war. Conquest in the modern world is a process of multiplying by X, and then obtaining the original result by dividing by X. For a modern nation to add to its territory no more adds to the wealth of the people of such nation than it would add to the wealth of Londoners if the City of London were to annex the county of Hertford.

The author also shows that international

finance has become so interdependent and so interwoven with trade and industry that the intangibility of an enemy's property extends to his trade. It results that political and military power can in reality do nothing for trade; the individual merchants and manufacturers of small nations exercising no such power compete successfully with those of the great; Swiss and Belgian merchants drive English from the British Colonial market; Norway has, relatively to population, a larger mercantile marine than Great Britain; the public credit (as a rough and ready indication, among others, of security and wealth) of small states possessing no political power stands higher than that of the great powers of Europe; Belgian three per cents. standing at 96, and German at 82; Norwegian three and a half per cents. at 102, and German at 81.

The forces which have brought about the economic futility of military power have also brought about its futility as a means of enforcing a nation's moral ideas or social in-

stitutions upon a conquered people. Germany could not turn Canada or Australia into German colonies, stamp out their language, laws, literature, etc., by 'capturing' them. Quick intercommunication by a cheap press, widely read literature, etc., the necessary security of the material possessions, enables even small communities to become articulate and effectively defend their special, social, or moral possessions even when military conquest has been complete. Moreover, the fight for ideals can no longer take the form of fight between nations, because the line of division on moral questions are within the nations themselves and intersect the political frontiers.

Norman Angell regards as comparable only with astrology and witchcraft, the opinion held by a British newspaper that Great Britain would be enriched by the destruction of Germany. 'What,' he asks, 'does the destruction of Germany mean? Does it mean that we must slaughter 60,000,000 or 70,000,000 men, women and children in

cold blood? But if only the fleet and the army were destroyed, there would still be 60,000,000 workers who would set about the task of making up their losses with increased energy. They would compete with us even more keenly than before. If we could really wipe Germany out of existence, we would at the same time, destroy such a considerable part of our clientèle that the most hopeless panic would break out in London.'

'What does this all mean?' cries Norman Angell, 'and am I not right when I say that the whole question is obscured by a harmful phraseology which did once have some bearing on the facts, but has now lost all meaning?'

It is evident that the foreigner does not buy our products and refuse Germany's because we have a larger navy. If one can imagine the representatives of an English and of a German firm in Argentina, or Brazil, or Bulgaria, or Finland, meeting in the office of a merchant in Argentina, or Brazil, or Bulgaria, or Finland, both of them selling cutlery, the

German is not going to secure the order, because he is able to show the Argentinian, or the Brazilian, or the Bulgarian, or the Finn that Germany has twelve Dreadnoughts and England only eight. The German will take the order if, on the whole, he can make a more advantageous offer to the prospective buyer, and for no other reason whatsoever, and the buyer will go to the merchant of whatever nation, whether he be German, or Swiss, or Belgian, or British, irrespective of the armies and navies which may lie behind the nationality of the seller. Nor does it appear that armies and navies weigh in the least when it comes to a question of a tariff bargain. Switzerland wages a tariff war with Germany and wins. The whole history of the trade of small nations shows that the political prestige of the great ones gives them practically no commercial advantage.

Another example of Norman Angell's views :

If the statesmen of Europe would tell us how the military power of a great nation is used to advance the commercial interest of

its citizens, would explain to us the *modus operandi*, and not refer us to large and vague phrases about 'exercising due weight in the councils of the nations,' one might accept their philosophy. But until they do so we are surely justified in assuming that their political terminology is simply a survival —an inheritance from a state of things which has, in fact, passed away.

Angell goes far to pricking the sentimentality of conquest in the same way. Does any one think of paying deference to the Russian moujik because he happens to belong to one of the biggest empires territorially? Does any one think of despising an Ibsen or a Björnsen, or any educated Scandinavian, or Belgian, or Hollander, because they happen to belong to the smallest nations in Europe? The thing is absurd, and the notion is simply due to inattention. Just as we commonly overlook the fact that the individual citizen is quite unaffected materially by the extent of his nation's territory; that the material position of the individual Dutchman as a citizen of

a small State will not be improved by the mere fact of the absorption of such State by the German Empire, in which case he will become the citizen of a great nation; so in the same way his moral position remains unchanged; and the notion that an individual Russian is 'dignified and enlarged' each time that Russia conquers some new Asiatic outpost, or Russifies a State like Finland, or that the Norwegian would be 'dignified' were his State conquered by Russia and he became a Russian, is, of course, sheer sentimental fustian of a very mischievous order.

Norman Angell alludes in his work to the practice of duelling—a survival of the period of personal anarchy, which in so many countries is regarded as indispensable to personal prestige, just as armies and navies are supposed to be necessary to uphold national prestige, but he also shows that this idea has so far died out in the Anglo-Saxon world, that in Great Britain and America duelling is looked upon as nothing better than a subject of ridicule, though the system

was abolished in those countries only two generations ago. He draws from this circumstance the conclusion that the immoral practice of war will disappear just as quickly.

The writer makes interesting references to similar optical illusions which were formerly common in Europe and which were also overcome. The wars of religion were settled, not by treaties, but by the conviction that wars caused by religious difficulties were not only useless, but, from a logical standpoint, ridiculous. The great revolutions of history originated in a revolution of ideas, and such a change is now going on in the domain of international relations. Greater difficulties have been overcome before now. In the religious wars, in the duelling system, instinct, passion, temperament and fanaticism were concerned. In the conflict of the present day there is only material interest, or more properly, that which is regarded as the basis of material interest. *So* soon as it is perceived that all the international con-

flicts which are to-day disturbing the world owe their existence to an optical illusion, reason will gain the upper hand.

Angell has developed the thesis as follows:—

When the division of labour was so little developed that every homestead produced all that it needed, it mattered nothing if part of the community was cut off from the world for weeks and months at a time. All the neighbours of a village or homestead might be slain, or harassed, and no inconvenience resulted. But if to-day an English county is by a general railroad strike cut off for so much as forty-eight hours from the rest of the economic organism, we know that whole sections of its population are threatened with famine. If, in the time of the Danes, England could by some magic have killed all foreigners, she would presumably have been the better off. If she could do the same thing to-day, half her population would starve to death.

If on one side of the frontier a community is, say, wheat producing, and on the other coal-producing, each is dependent for its

very existence on the fact of the other being able to carry on its labour : the miner cannot in a week set to and grow a crop of wheat; the farmer must wait for his wheat to grow and must, meantime, feed his family and dependents. The exchange involved here must go on, and the expectation that each will in due course be able to reap the fruits of his labour be fairly obvious, or both starve : and that exchange, that expectation, is merely the expression in its simplest form of commerce and credit ; and the interdependence here indicated has, by the countless developments of rapid communication, reached such a condition of complexity, that the interference with any given operation affects not merely the parties directly involved, but numberless parties having at first sight no connection therewith.

The vital interdependence here indicated, cutting athwart frontiers, is largely the work of the last forty years, and it has during that time so developed that it has set up such complex financial interdependence of

the capitals of the world, that disturbance in New York involves financial and commercial disturbance in London, and, if sufficiently grave, compels financiers of London to co-operate with those of New York to put an end to the crisis, not as a matter of altruism, but as a matter of commercial self-protection. The complexity of modern finance makes New York dependent on London, London upon Paris, Paris upon Berlin, to a greater degree than has ever yet been the case in history. This interdependence is the result of the daily use of those contrivances of civilization which date from yesterday—the rapid post, the instantaneous dissemination of financial and commercial information by means of telegraphy, and generally, the incredible progress of rapidity in communication which has put the half-dozen chief capitals of Christendom in closer contact financially, and has rendered them more dependent the one upon the other than were the chief cities of Great Britain less than a hundred years ago.

To the scaremongers who dream of German soldiery looting the Bank of England, Angell replies : —

What would be the result of such an action on the part of a German army in London ? The first effect, of course, would be that as the Bank of England is the banker of all other banks, there would be a run on every bank in England, and all would suspend payment. But, simultaneously, German bankers, many with credit in London, would feel the effect ; merchants the world over threatened with ruin by the effect of the collapse in London, would immediately call in all their credits in Germany, and German finance would present a condition of chaos hardly less terrible than that in England. The German Generalissimo in London might be no more civilized than Attila himself, but he would soon find the difference between himself and Attila. Attila, luckily for him, did not have to worry about a bank rate, and such-like complications ; but the German General, while trying to sack the Bank of England,

would find that his own balance in the Bank of Germany would have vanished into thin air, and the value of even the best of his investments dwindled as though by a miracle; and that for the sake of loot amounting to a few sovereigns apiece among his soldiery, he would have sacrificed the greater part of his own personal fortune. It is as certain as anything can be that, were the German army guilty of such economic vandalism, there is no considerable institution in Germany that would escape grave damage —a damage in credit and security so serious as to constitute a loss immensely greater than the value of the loot obtained. It is not putting the case too strongly to say that for every pound taken from the Bank of England, German trade would pay many times over. The influence of the whole finance of Germany would be brought to bear on the German Government to put an end to a situation ruinous to German trade.

So much for Norman Angell and his remarkable book. The question now arises:

What effect would such a work have upon the Emperor? The answer cannot be given, and there remains only an assumption. Can it have had upon his Majesty an effect other than that which it has had upon every other modern man who possesses a knowledge of international interests, and which enables him to recognize the necessity of peace among nations? Could he refuse to entertain these arguments? Even if he did not accept them all, he must at least have recognized the justice of as many of them, as did his Ambassador in London.

The pacifist pen-picture of the Emperor would not be complete without a reference to his efforts, the object of which is to establish mutual understandings with foreign nations, and to facilitate intellectual intercourse. The exchange of professors between Germany and the United States, arranged by His Majesty, is the most momentous step in this direction. He introduced this idea to the United States Ambassador on New Year's Day, 1905, and since then the innovation has

given the most satisfactory results. It has brought about a clearer appreciation of, and a deeper interest in Germany among Americans, and in Germany people are beginning closely to follow the progressive development of the Union. This institution which annually permits the exchange of the best intellects of both nations, and enables them to impart their great knowledge to the studious of their respective countries, forms in the interest of peace and understanding a very pleasing complement to diplomacy. The scholar, as envoy, takes the place of the courtier and the warrior.

From this mosaic it is easy to see that the object of the sketch is to show that the spring time of pacifism is leaving its traces upon the German Emperor, that he is gradually leaning more and more towards the pacifist idea, has been caught by it and ponders upon its meaning. These currents are flowing towards him from all sides and he cannot avoid them, nor does he wish to do so. The ideal of a great undisturbed peace, which the world

believes him to be capable of realizing, is gradually forming in his mind, and is beginning obviously to influence his actions.

It may be assumed with certainty that he will not disappoint mankind.

THE EMPEROR AND THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE

CHAPTER III

THE EMPEROR AND THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE

WHEN, immediately after the death of Bismarck, the Tsar issued his famous manifesto, summoning the civilized world to meet in conference 'as a favourable omen for the coming century,' to discuss the problems of alleviating the burden of armaments, the proposal was coldly received in Europe, and particularly in Germany. In the great military states of the Old World armaments had become an institution in which no change could be brooked, and this view prevailed not only among the governments but in the various non-socialist political parties. A similar opinion was held with regard to the principle of arbitration which, as an international innovation involving certain obligations, was

regarded as incompatible with the sovereignty of the state, and with all the traditions of German Imperial policy, although Bismarck did not scruple to apply it in a few cases where it suited his purpose. There is no reason to recall why the entire German press greeted the summons of the Tsar with scepticism and even with derision, and how not a single voice was raised in the Empire in favour of the Tsar's proposals and the projected Conference of nations. There is at present but little authentic material available to show what attitude the German Emperor adopted towards the Tsar's manifesto and the Conference. Unfortunately the memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe break off just at the point where they might have enabled us to form a correct idea of his Imperial master's views regarding the work done at the Hague. I say unfortunately, because it seems clear enough now that at a critical moment of the Conference the Emperor intervened in such a happy manner that the world was spared a great disaster, and Germany a

still greater. For what we know on the subject of the Emperor's sentiments as regards the results of the deliberations at the Hague, we are most indebted to Mr. Andrew D. White, the then United States Ambassador in Berlin, who was on terms of close intimacy with the Emperor, and who gives us with great minuteness his impressions and experiences of the international council. From these memoirs it is apparent that the Emperor did not under-estimate the significance of the Conference, although, as Mr. White gathered from his Majesty's own words, the idea did not particularly appeal to him. Shortly before the departure of the Ambassador for the Hague, where he assumed the leadership of the American delegation, he was summoned by the Emperor, who discussed with him the points of the programme of the Conference which, in his opinion, were likely to lead to animated debates. Mr. White admits that in many cases his views and those of the Emperor did not coincide, but in quite a large number of others he found himself

in complete agreement with His Majesty. 'What will be particularly needful at this Conference,' said the Emperor, 'is common sense. I have sent Count Muenster, my ambassador in Paris, to the Hague, because he possesses that quality in a high degree.' In this the Emperor, as we shall see later, was mistaken. Count Muenster, who afterwards obtained the title of Prince in recognition of his work at the Hague, may have been endowed with common sense, but he was utterly unable to grasp the problems of the new era which dawned at the Hague. If we knew exactly what happened at the interview between Mr. White and the Emperor there would no longer be any uncertainty as to the Emperor's attitude towards the Conference. But it would seem that it was not possible to reconcile this attitude with the views held by Mr. White, which were of a progressive character, as otherwise the Ambassador would not have hesitated to take us more fully into his confidence. But, when he published his memoirs in 1906, he said he considered that

'the time had not yet come' to make known the details of the interview to the world at large. He goes so far as to tell us, however, that before his departure for the Hague, a statesman in close touch with the Emperor told him that His Majesty regarded an arbitration court as an encroachment upon his prerogative. This can scarcely be wondered at when one takes into consideration the hazy ideas regarding arbitration which were held in Germany at that time. But it can be assumed that the Emperor gained a little information upon the problem during his conversation with Mr. White and gave the matter some consideration. But that the interview between the Emperor and Mr. White was not altogether fruitless may be gathered from the fact that before the Ambassador left Berlin, Prince Buelow, the then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was able to assure him that the German delegates would act in concert with their American colleagues in all matters of importance. This assumption is also supported by the speech of the Emperor on the

opening day of the Conference at Wiesbaden on the occasion of the Tsar's birthday. I give the text: 'To the toast of the health of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, which, as it is my yearly custom, I give with heartfelt pleasure, I add to-day my most cordial congratulations upon the opening of the Conference which is due to his initiative. Honoured Count (turning to the Russian Ambassador), it is my hope that His Excellency Baron von Staal and Count Muenster, those two trustworthy and experienced statesmen, true to the ancient and cherished traditions which bind my House with that of His Majesty, and the Russian people with the German, and acting in accordance with the directions they have received from the Emperor and myself, will lead the Conference to an issue and will give His Majesty every satisfaction.'

Mr. White himself speaks of the excellent impression that this speech had upon the diplomats assembled at the Hague. 'The feelings of scepticism which at first pre-

vailed are apparently being dissipated with ever-increasing rapidity,' he writes. 'The speech which the Emperor William has in the meantime delivered at Wiesbaden, inspires us with renewed hope for a favourable solution to the arbitration question.'

Count Muenster went to the Hague with the conviction that 'the summoning of the Conference was a political trick on the part of Russia, the most abominable trick that has ever been played.' He believed that the object of the manœuvre was to place Germany in an awkward position, and he was also of opinion that arbitration courts would only prove injurious to German interests. 'Germany,' said Count Muenster, according to Mr. White, 'is prepared for war as no other country is; Germany can mobilize her army in ten days, a performance that could not be equalled by France or Russia or any other State. An arbitration court would, however, give an enemy time to make his preparations. Therefore it would only place Germany at a disadvantage.'

Later on, Count Muenster went so far as to refer to the arbitration idea as 'humbug,' and he also sought to close the debate on the ground that the question was not included in the Russian programme. But, as Mr. White aptly observes, the Count also regarded telegraphs and telephones and bacteriological research as humbug. 'There is no doubt,' adds the Ambassador, 'that Count Muenster, in spite of all his excellent qualities, is imbued with ideas that held good fifty years ago.'

It is therefore not surprising that while the first feelings of superiority disappeared, as far as the majority of the delegates were concerned, after the opening sittings, and gave way to mutual confidence and a hope that success would be achieved, the German representatives maintained their attitude of distrust, and strongly opposed the inclusion of a partially obligatory arbitration treaty and the establishment of a permanent arbitration court. At the sitting of the arbitration court committee of June 6, Professor Zorn,

the German scientific delegate, who had up to that time vigorously supported the proposal for such a tribunal, surprised all present by declaring that he could not record his vote in favour of it. This change of front gave rise to a feeling nothing short of dismay. The British delegate, Lord Pauncefote, and Mr. White, telegraphed to their respective governments to inform them of this volte face. It was rumoured that the German Emperor was opposed to any form of arbitration court, and was seeking to win over his allies to his side, and on June 13 credit was given to a statement that the Emperor disapproved of the whole conference and had requested his allies to support him. This statement was made by no less a personage than the Count Nigra, the Italian diplomat, who was personally an enthusiastic supporter of the proposal for an arbitration court. Recording his impressions at the time, Mr. White writes: 'A catastrophe seems to be approaching.' He remarked to a brother diplomat that the ministers should open the

Emperor's eyes to the fact that he was, by his opposition to an arbitration court, creating a feeling of resentment such as no minister could afford to permit. 'You are right,' answered Mr. White's friend, 'only there is no minister in Germany who is courageous enough to tell the Emperor that.' Mr. White now seems to have considered the moment opportune to speak clearly to the German delegates, and noteworthy is his interview (on the morning of June 15) with Count Muenster, to whom he explained the harmful effect of his attitude, and whom he completely brought round in spite of the resistance of the German representative at the opening of the conversation. An extract from Mr. White's account of this interview will not be without interest. After mentioning that Count Muenster's prejudices showed signs of disappearing after the erroneous nature of his views on the arbitration court and the scope of the proposed arbitration had been demonstrated to him, the Ambassador proceeds: 'I now made still more

urgent representations to him with regard to the situation. I told him that the advisers to whom the Emperor gave his confidence—men like himself, and His Majesty's closest counsellors—should not lay the young sovereign open to the obloquy, reproaches and enmity with which he would be overwhelmed by all nations, when it became known that it was he who had wrecked the Conference and the proposed tribunal. I even took the liberty to tell the Count what the Emperor had said of him, and how His Majesty had declared that common sense would be needful at this Conference. When I saw that my words pleased him, I pursued my course, telling him that it was in the first place his duty to do everything in his power to shield the Emperor from disaster. I pointed out the intellectual gifts and talents of the sovereign, and I did not conceal my great admiration for the Emperor's lofty ideals, the perspicacity and the statesmanlike abilities of which he had once again recently given a proof. I extolled his tact in public affairs and the

pleasant manner which endeared him to all classes, and I concluded by expressing regret at the fact that such a monarch would be exposed to the hatred of the entire world.'

Mr. White next speaks of the impression made upon Count Muenster by his representations. As the interview went on the American became more insistent. His words may be read in full in his memoirs. The result was splendid, for he had succeeded in completely winning over Count Muenster. On the following morning the latter appeared at Mr. White's residence in a state of obvious consternation, due to the receipt of an official communication from Berlin, in which the German Government made known, once and for all, its unyielding opposition to any court of arbitration. 'He was quite upset at the literal acceptance of his own former views.' The decisive sitting was postponed. Count Muenster decided to send Professor Zorn to Berlin, and he also requested Mr. White to take action. The result was that Dr. Holls, of the American delegation, accompanied Professor

Zorn, taking with him a letter from Mr. White to Buelow. This very important communication must be given textually. It ran :—

June 16, 1899.

DEAR COUNT VON BUELOW,—

In view of my friendly relations with you, and with your honoured father twenty years ago, I trusted that you will allow me to address to you a few unofficial and candid observations upon the interests of our two governments at the Peace Conference. A good understanding has existed between your delegates and ours from the very beginning. On this point your assurances have been fulfilled to the letter. Now, however, on the most momentous question with which we have to deal—the most momentous indeed, which has ever been before any modern conference or congress—the arbitration court question, we seem to have reached the parting of the ways. It is common talk here that Germany is opposed to the proposal; that she

is in every way hostile to it, and that it is her intention, either by herself or with the assistance of one of her allies, to do all in her power to obstruct any plans that may be advanced for an arbitration court, plans which open up to the world a prospect of settling disputes by means other than the spilling of blood.

No reasonable man imagines that this will render war impossible for all time, or that disputes which are a question of national sentiment or involve the honour of a nation, contraction of its boundaries, or any other domestic question, can be submitted to such tribunals. Nobody here dreams of suggesting that arbitration decisions should be obligatory in any but minor cases, where they would really be of service to the government. But even these obligatory provisions would be struck out of the draft proposals if your government insisted upon it. Our chief solicitude is that an arbitration court should be available at all times for any nation that has the cause of peace at heart, thus

providing a sheet anchor, as it were, for the peoples who live in momentary dread of war.

I wish, furthermore, to remark that a rumour has been circulated here that Russia, in summoning the Congress, was animated, not by worthy, but by treacherous motives. But even if this were so, why should it have a decisive influence upon Germany's attitude? Should it not rather cause Germany to put herself at the head of the arbitration movement and take up the reins?

If Germany decided to do that she would certainly be regarded by the whole world as the leading Power in Europe; she could then proclaim with justice that she had taken Russia's proposals *au sérieux*, that she had established a practical arbitration court, and that she had submitted to the Congress proposals for the protection of private property in naval warfare, which neither France nor Russia wished to accept. Besides, Russia would have desired to keep the proceedings secret, while Germany from the beginning would have voted in favour of transacting

business frankly and freely in the eyes of all the world.

These three points would speak in your favour. You would be able to stand forth as the Power which had taken more vigorous action in favour of peace than any other Continental country, not excepting France and Russia. But, if you neglect the opportunity to take the initiative here, you will be a stumblingblock to the arbitration court question. What then? The other Powers will continue their efforts to establish the best possible arbitration tribunal, but any drawbacks it may have will be attributable to Germany and the German Emperor. But success or no success, the Tsar will be greeted from one end of the world to the other as a saviour, in fact, as a saint, while the resentment against the German Emperor will be overwhelming.

This resentment will be felt not only by the class which always fishes in troubled public waters, and hopes that a failure of the Conference will supply it with some effective

weapons, but also by the middle classes, the most powerful section of the population in all states. Without a doubt the relations between Germany and us, which have recently begun to improve, will become worse than ever, and in nearly every state there will be an outburst of bitter hatred against the German Empire. . . . Can the advisers of a monarch, endowed with such superior intellectual qualities, allow him to be threatened by such a flood of political vituperation, by such a torrent of resentment and hatred? Is it possible that such a high-minded monarch, such a gifted man, can be exposed to reproaches of this kind? In my opinion his advisers should prevent this, and should urge him not to play in the eyes of the world the mischievous part of antagonist to a project, the realization of which is ardently desired by millions upon millions.

From all parts of the United States touching proofs of sympathy, unique in my experience, are being shown. This very morning I received a copy of a prayer from

the most conservative of all Protestant communities, the American branch of the Anglican church. In this prayer, which has been read in all churches, the Almighty is beseeched to give His blessing to the great work of the Peace Congress. The desire to which this prayer gives expression is also felt in many other American communities and in an untold number of families, and I understand this is likewise the case in Great Britain and in some parts of the Continent.

Granted that these people may have hoped for and expected too much. Nevertheless, the sympathies displayed by them must not be under-estimated.

Moreover, I have heard on the best authority that a leading French socialist has prophesied to one of the French delegates that the Congress will end in a magnificent fiasco. Neither the sovereigns nor the governments, he urged, were very anxious to put an end to bloodshed, nor had they any intention of yielding to the efforts of the peoples in the direction of peace. The annoyance and re-

sentment that would be caused by the failure would only open new roads to the socialist goal. Once again it may be granted that this is a wild assumption, but it cannot be denied that these words are characteristic.

It is held that arbitration courts limit sovereignty. That can hardly be the case in so far as the German Empire is concerned. Did not Germany most readily submit to an arbitration court in the very complicated political dispute with Spain, and did not the Emperor William I personally undertake the rôle of mediator between the United States and Great Britain in the north-west frontier question ?

Permit me once more to observe that the draft proposals go no further than to provide for optional arbitration, and that it will always lie with the German Emperor to decide as to which questions shall be submitted to the court and which shall not.

It has also been argued that the time required for the preliminaries to arbitration

would enable Germany's enemies to arm. If this were so, would not the Emperor and his government, if necessary, be free to mobilize the whole army ?

As you may see, there is question here not of an arbitration court which will be permanently active, but of a *modus vivendi*, according to which the signatory Powers would be permitted for a limited period to choose two or more judges from an international panel, who would proceed to the Hague when their services were required, but who would only be in receipt of stipends so long as they were actually acting in their judicial capacity. These stipends would be paid by the parties to the case.

As to the machinery of the court, it is proposed to constitute a body composed of the diplomatic representatives of the signatory Powers at the Hague, under the chairmanship of the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs. This body will also appoint and exercise supervision over the secretaries and other necessary officials. The Powers, between

which a dispute existed and which were prepared to submit their difference to the tribunal, would inform the council of their wishes and would intimate to it the persons before whom they desired to lay their case. The council would then inform the judges chosen. Apart from some details which could easily be omitted, the draft proposals are so far of an entirely optional character. There are no obligatory provisions whatever. Each of the signatory Powers is free to resort to such a tribunal or not. Undoubtedly a concession of this kind can be made to the fervent desire of the whole world, and national differences may be removed by other means than the sacrifice of life.

The importance of the facts will excuse my insistence. Please do not think that it is none of my business. I speak to you as man to man, not only in the interests of the good understanding between the United States and Germany, but also in the interests of the welfare of the whole world, in the hope of opening up a prospect of success for the de-

mand for an arbitration court by which all nations are inspired.

I remain, dear Count von Buelow,

Yours, etc.,

ANDREW D. WHITE.

P.S.—Please consider how many minor questions your government and mine could settle if such a tribunal existed; questions which are being thrashed out by our parliaments, where they are approached with feelings of prejudice, and where they are made to serve party purposes. I have in mind, for instance, Samoa, the *barrel*[1] and sugar duty, etc., which continually keep the two countries on the *qui vive*. Do you not admit that the submission of such matters to the proposed tribunal, far from undermining sovereignty, would free the ruler and the Foreign Office from the trammels of Parliamentarianism? It is by no means improbable that such a tribunal would give a decision in your favour; every discerning American would

[1] This might mean 'tonnage dues.'

then say: 'Good, after all the speeches in Congress we were apparently in the wrong.' There would be nothing more to do, and the litigants would part on the best terms.

(Signed) A.D.W.

The steps taken by Count Muenster and Mr. White proved to be most useful. The feeling against Germany at the Congress had already become very acute. The journey of the delegates to Berlin caused an adjournment of several days, Dr. Holls had interviews with Prince Hohenlohe and Count von Buelow, and the latter submitted Mr. White's letter to the Emperor. At the instigation of Prince Hohenlohe, Dr. Holls also sought to obtain an audience of the Emperor, and for this purpose went to Hamburg. He was not able to see His Majesty, however, as he was on a yachting cruise and Dr. Holls was unable to await his return.

Mr. White says that Dr. Holls' reports were very encouraging. As a matter of fact, the difficulty was solved. Germany with-

drew her opposition to the optional arbitration court and made concessions with regard to a permanent tribunal.

What part Dr. Holls and Professor Zorn played in bringing about this result is uncertain. Professor Zorn characterises as a myth the idea that Germany accepted the permanent tribunal under the influence of America, although he admits that Mr. White used his undoubtedly great influence in Berlin in that direction. According to the Professor, a meeting of several hours' duration, at which he was present, took place at the Foreign Office in Berlin, under the presidency of Count von Buelow. The Secretary of State considered that there was some foundation for his (the Professor's) misgivings, and directed him to draw up a report at once, and left without delay for Kiel to see the Emperor. It was through the decision of the Emperor himself that Germany accepted the permanent court, by which the first Hague Conference was saved from failure. Professor Zorn remarks: 'The historical significance

of the Emperor's decision is obvious, it is being more generally recognized, and its greatness will be even more highly appreciated hereafter.'

That the decision was taken through the Emperor is scarcely to be disputed. It does not matter what influences actuated him to take such a happy step at the critical moment. Undoubtedly, the representations of Mr. White were not without their effect. By themselves, or through the intermediary of Count von Buelow, they may have made the situation clear to His Majesty. On the other hand, the Emperor might have opposed all influences; that would have hampered the development of peace jurisprudence for many a long day.

THE EMPEROR AND ARMAMENTS

CHAPTER IV

THE EMPEROR AND ARMAMENTS

TO-DAY, the Emperor William is still a supporter of the theory '*si vis pacem para bellum.*' He is opposed to war, but he represents the opinion that war can only be avoided by exerting to their utmost the defensive forces of the State. This method of reasoning is quite correct when the sole consideration is to avoid war, and when an administration takes into account only the interests of its own country and does not regard itself as called upon to pay attention to the other members of the family of nations. The method is wrong so soon as it is recognized that the interests of all parts of the civilized world in the maintenance of peace are identical, so soon as it is admitted that the chief thing is not to avoid war but in the first place to

organize the common life of civilized states in such a way that war can no longer be looked upon as a political factor. We have already made sufficiently clear the Emperor's views on this point. It is not incongruous that the Emperor, although acknowledging the solidarity of the civilized world and the necessity for a peace union of States, should not permit the strength of the army and navy to be impaired. It must be kept in mind that it was inexorable facts that first brought the new international structure and its requirements to the notice of the Emperor, and that an alleviation of the burden of armaments can only be an indication of an advanced State organization. Only when this organization has reached a certain stage of development can relief be obtained from military imposts. Then this relief becomes automatic. The apparent contradiction is thus explained. When the Emperor advocates an organization of States, he advocates, even if indirectly, a decrease in armaments. And he is quite in the right, so long as no other

guarantees are forthcoming, in leaving unaltered the military strength of the State which has been entrusted to his care. In the speech delivered by him at Bremen, in 1905, in which he rejected a 'barren hegemony,' and expressed a desire to see the world empire of the Hohenzollerns based, not upon conquest or the sword, but upon the mutual confidence of nations striving towards the same goal, the Emperor said: 'When I came to the throne I swore that, after the heroic times of my grandfather, bayonets and cannon would, so far as lay in my power, be put aside, but that these bayonets would be held sharp and these cannons ready, so that when cultivating our garden and extending our beautiful house, we should not be disturbed by envy and jealousy from outside.'

There is no doubt that the method of keeping peace expounded in this passage—the only method known to Europe up to a short time ago—is continually on the verge of breaking down. It can no longer be regarded as of a provisional nature. The

necessity for armaments is generally recognized, but it is also admitted that there are other ways of maintaining peace and that the development of these new guarantees for peace must be pursued with the same energy that has hitherto been expended upon armaments. The conviction is gaining ground that States cannot maintain the competition of armaments for all time, and that the day must come when it will stop in some directions and ultimately cease in all parts of the community of nations. Provision must be made for this day. Men must meet circumstances half way and not merely bow to their force.

The race of naval armaments, which began in the last decade of the nineteenth century, has done more than anything else to establish this conviction. The purely technical conditions of naval defence and the much heavier cost of the weapons used, revealed more clearly than the military preparations the paradoxical nature of unlimited competition in armaments. In the days when the German naval policy was still young, the Emperor

in the above-mentioned speech at Bremen, in 1905, was able to say that with the launch of every German warship a further guarantee for peace upon earth was afforded. We may pardon the soldier Emperor, who took pride in the young and growing sea power of Germany, this erroneous view. The error was admitted at the time by experienced diplomats. Herr vom Rath, a retired Councillor of Legation, tells us in the *Deutsche Revue* that Herr von Holstein, who was for years the soul of the Foreign Office in Berlin, wrote as follows in regard to a pamphlet by Admiral Galster: 'The pamphlet interested me greatly. Yes, the chief thing is to demonstrate the falsity of the insidious idea that each ship adds to the might of the German Empire when it only obliges Great Britain, not to mention France, to lay down two vessels more. Then, where is the increase of German power? It is a question of simple arithmetic.' Herr von Holstein wrote these words in 1907. He would hardly have expressed himself so

strongly if he had remembered that two years before, the theory regarding the power-creating and peace-making capacity of each German warship was supported by the Emperor himself. Herr von Holstein had always held that the competition in ship-building could not go on. Herr Harden writes on this point: 'The fleet alone! That was the bitterest trouble of his declining years. So long as we continue to build at the now favourite pace, there will be no progress with international policy or with finance. We want only submarines, mines, small cruisers, torpedoes, destroyers, technically-perfect weapons and coast defences. We must arrive at an understanding with Great Britain, naturally with all the calm to be expected of a great Power, and we must not wait for the matter to be taken before the Hague Court, where we might be outrated or, at least, put in the wrong. . . . Whoever mentioned the Navy League to him was sent away with a flea in his ear. Admiral von Tirpitz, the Naval Secretary,

was to him a man of malign influence, and when an agitation for battleships was started in the press and in Parliament he at once suspected that the makers of armour plate, and shareholders in shipbuilding concerns, had a hand in it.'

Since then there has been an increasing tendency towards the conviction that things cannot go on as they have been going. When the question of the reduction of armaments was raised in the Reichstag at the end of March, 1907, even the Imperial Chancellor himself was obliged to admit that 'the idea was in itself not at all a bad one,' and the conservative member, the Hereditary Prince von and zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg, expressed the view that a proposal from Great Britain for naval disarmament would not be curtly rejected. He admitted, however, that it would be difficult to discover a formula, and he believed 'that historical developments would have to be awaited. Much has already been done that was regarded as impossible of accomplishment twenty or

thirty years ago. And who knows that circumstances will not one day bring about the result which we are now vainly endeavouring to secure by treaty ?' That is an openly pacifist point of view. Moreover, during the same debate, the leaders of the Centre and National Liberals no longer rejected the possibility of a discussion on the limitation of armaments. The voices in favour of an understanding on armaments are daily becoming more numerous and influential, and a politician of such pronounced Nationalist views as Frederick Naumann, recently declared that "the longer disarmament is delayed the more it will cost us."

This is an indication that the indefensible nature of the '*si vis pacem para bellum*' theory is recognized not alone in the democratic world in Germany, but also in the widest circles. The revolution of opinion has only recently begun to take definite shape. There are still many strong adverse currents, but there can be no doubt that they will ultimately disappear, as invincible logic is on

the side of those who see the necessity for a decrease in armaments. The Emperor will certainly not be the last to appreciate this necessity. Let him examine with a critical eye the growth in the expenditure on armaments during the last twenty years. In 1899 a confidential report was drafted by order of Lord Salisbury showing the annual cost of armaments in Europe. From this document it appeared that from 1883 to 1888, that is, in less than six years, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Russia, Spain, and Italy spent nineteen milliards of marks upon their land and sea forces. Lord Salisbury communicated the report to the Emperor William, who was so surprised at it that he immediately expressed the intention of calling a congress to discuss practical means of assuring peace.

This statement has been incorporated in numerous books, and articles in periodicals, without being contradicted. It explains the assumption that the Emperor is not indifferent to the naval and military expenditure of the

European Powers, which has grown so much more rapidly since 1888 than it did before. How far His Majesty has progressed in his views on the armament problem is revealed by an article entitled 'Modern War,'[1] which appeared in the *Deutsche Revue*. The Emperor, as is generally known, read this article to the Generals who attended upon him on New Year's Day, 1909, and His Majesty added the remark that his views coincided in every way with those expounded by the writer, who subsequently turned out to be Count von Schlieffen, the ex-Chief to the General Staff. The German General laid emphasis upon the altered circumstances which had introduced entirely new factors in warfare and the whole system of international politics. In doing so he was only repeating the arguments set forth by Johann von Bloch ten years ago in his copious treatise entitled 'War.' This fact was entirely overlooked by the entire press, which devoted considerable attention to the article in

[1] "Der Krieg in der Gegenwart."

question. On account of this, the essay merits particular attention, and I cannot refrain from pointing out that the Emperor, by endorsing General von Schlieffen's conclusions, accepted in part the ideas enunciated by Johann von Bloch.

Those who are acquainted with von Bloch's work, and have followed his propaganda, will have often noticed with astonishment the manner in which Count Schlieffen's views and those of the Russian State Councillor exactly coincide. It is unfortunately impossible to give the text of the Count's article, but the following précis will give an idea of their close resemblance.

Count Schlieffen first draws for us a picture of the race of armaments. The Peace of Frankfort has only put an end to the Franco-German struggle as far as outward appearances are concerned. A conflict continues beneath the surface. Each country is straining every nerve to outdo the other in the matter of armaments. But confidence in the new army was never so great as to en-

courage an attack by either of the rivals. Even when one of them had secured predominance for the moment, the other was given time to make up for lost ground. The other Powers were obliged to join in the race, and in a few decades the Franco-German competition had led to nearly all armies being provided with somewhat similar weapons. The manufacturers of arms celebrated their greatest triumphs. The perfecting of weapons brought no relief. Everybody was convinced that he would be able to annihilate the enemy, but nobody knew how he was to escape destruction himself. The rifle was brought to such a state of perfection that it dominated practically every inch of ground from the muzzle to the object aimed at. Hand-to-hand fighting and attacks in strength became impossible. War can no longer be carried on from behind breastworks; it has become a tedious siege operation, a war of moles and continual burrowing. Night attacks must play an important part. Formation must be more

open in order to escape as far as possible the effects of the enemy's fire. This in its turn has led to an extension of the firing line. The battlefields of the future must therefore be of enormous extent, and battles will last much longer. For days sectional actions will have to be fought. The greatest weight will be laid upon turning movements and flank attacks. The part played by the cavalry will be completely altered. The unwieldy masses of troops and the protracted nature of siege operations will prolong a campaign. This will strangle agriculture and trade. The cost of war will increase beyond all bounds and the maintenance of armies will swallow up millions.

We read all this in Bloch's work eleven years ago and we can read it again in the article of Count Schlieffen, which has won the approval of the Emperor William. Count Schlieffen also puts before our eyes a battlefield of the future with the same striking fidelity as Bloch. The awful wilderness in which only the thunder of cannon can be

heard; the enemy is almost invisible; no mounted man appears. This is quite in the style of Bloch's masterly pen picture. Count Schlieffen also draws attention to the social confusion which would be caused by war. The influence of the industrial worker upon an army seems to him not to increase its efficiency. The General does not wish to enter further into the social aspect of war, but from the military point of view he goes somewhat more fully into the matter than Bloch, as he has been able to draw upon the experiences of the past seven years which the Russian publicist unfortunately did not live to see.

The most interesting passages of Count Schlieffen's article are those in which he deals with the military isolation of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Let him speak for himself: 'After the war of 1870–71 France and Germany erected defences on the new common frontier, the one to prevent a fresh invasion and the other to guard against retaliation. Germany confined herself to improving the newly-won fortresses of Strass-

burg and Metz, while France threw up an almost unbroken barrier along the Upper Moselle and the Meuse, which was designed to cover the whole Eastern frontier from Switzerland to Belgium. That Germany, peacefully disposed as she was, was constantly thinking of a raid upon the smiling plains of the Seine and Loire, was generally taken for granted, and it was thought that if her road was entirely blocked she would seek to avoid the obstacle by advancing through Switzerland or Belgium. To obviate such an attack on her right flank, France hastened to fortify all the passes of the Jura. On the left, Belgium came to her assistance by obstructing the great natural road along the Meuse and Sambre with great earthworks around forts, and by making Antwerp an impregnable citadel behind them. Holland, too, did all in her power to support the efforts of her neighbour, in order to protect herself, and France as well, from an onslaught on the part of Germany. But that was not sufficient. Not so very long ago Italy lost some provinces

to France, and it was considered likely that she would take advantage of a German descent upon France to regain them. Therefore, all roads and paths over the great mountains separating France from Italy had to be defended. Italy on her part regarded the French fortifications as a threat rather than as a defence, and began, without loss of time, to build fort for fort, battery for battery, and trench for trench, so as to oppose to the fortified wall on the western slopes of the Alps a similar system on the eastern side. Hardly twenty years had passed since the Franco-German war when a Chinese wall, stretching from the Zuyder Zee to the Mediterranean, was thrown up with the intention of preventing any repetition of that dreadful invasion. But it was still within the bounds of possibility that the Italians on this side of the wall would cross the Alps to join hands with their German allies, and, with them burst, like an overflowing river, into the coveted land, in spite of the fortified barrier and an army millions strong. In

this urgent danger Switzerland was not found wanting. The passes of the St. Gothard, the approaches along the valley of the Rhine and the Rhone, and even paths between inaccessible glaciers and mountains, whose tops are lost among the clouds, were fortified, and garrisons were provided for the forts in the regions of eternal snow.

'The supposed lust for conquest which was frustrated effectually in one direction must naturally seek satisfaction in another. If Germany was prevented from marching to Paris she would be obliged to take the road to Moscow. Russia, therefore, also felt it incumbent upon herself to throw up fortifications against Germany. Streams, rivers and swamps facilitated the work. The German provinces beyond the Vistula were practically shut in in a broad marshy ditch, the few passages through which were defended by earthworks and guns. Naturally similar defensive measures were taken against Austria, the ally of Germany, and in the end the states of the Triple Alliance were cut off

on the east as well as on the west from the rest of Europe. In the North, Denmark has converted Copenhagen into a great citadel, thus assuming control of the approaches to the Baltic. Great Britain possesses a gigantic floating fortress which she can erect at any moment in the North Sea, and for which she has secured a sally port leading through a harbour in Jutland into Schleswig itself. The establishment of fortifications has proved to be so infectious, that even the allies, Austria and Italy, strengthened their defences one against the other. The iron band which was forged around Germany and Austria was broken at only one point, namely, in the Balkans, but the gap has now been filled up by Turkey, Servia and Montenegro, while Bulgaria and Rumania have been driven into the arms of Austria.

'There is the military situation in Europe. In the midst stand Germany and Austria unprotected, while all around, behind ditch and rampart are the other Powers. . . . It is not a foregone conclusion that these passions

and desires will be translated into deeds of violence. But, undoubtedly, vigorous efforts are being made to bring all these powers together for a general attack upon the centre. At a given moment all the gates are to be opened and the drawbridges let down. Then devastating hosts are to fall upon Germany and Austria from across the Vosges, the Meuse, the Koenigsau and the Niemen, the Bug, and even the Isonzo and the Tyrolese Alps.'

Count Schlieffen's arguments may be summed up as follows:

The sanguinary war between Germany and France, particularly the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, has caused a feeling of enmity between the two countries that will not be dissipated for many years. This enmity brought the general competition of armaments to a head. Armies have become so big and weapons so powerful that a war between equally matched States opens up a prospect of unparalleled cruelty and enormous waste. The monetary cost will be counted in milliards and the sacrifice of life by the hundred

thousand; economic existence would be paralysed.

In such circumstances no one concerned has the courage to invoke a decision by arms. To avoid such a course armaments are being continually increased and an extra turn is even being given to the endless screw. Milliards diverted from useful purposes are sacrificed to protective armaments, but there is no security. Germany feels herself threatened, surrounded by a coalition of Powers, who in their turn consider that they are menaced, and accordingly shield themselves behind a rampart surrounding Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The spectacle presented by Europe is a terrible one. The attitude of the Powers borders upon insanity. So far General Schlieffen follows his great predecessor who wrote it all on the wall before he died. But the soldier does not dare to follow the arguments of the strategically expert business man to their logical conclusion.

Bloch produces proofs when he says that

this cannot go on. We must turn back and find another way. Schlieffen cannot even suggest such a course. His remedy is simpler; it is to keep on arming.

This seems almost incredible. A man who admits the anomaly can recommend no other solution than to allow it to continue.

After describing the military isolation and declaring the danger arising from it to be very great, he adds: 'It (the danger) does not appear so serious when one gets closer to it.' This he explains in the following passage: 'Great Britain cannot destroy German commerce without gravely injuring her own. It is well understood that it would be to her best interest to "let live" her hated rival, who, however, is at the same time her best customer. . . . Russia, in full possession of her strength, resisted all the enticements of her ally to make an attack. Whether, now that she is more intimately acquainted with the conditions of modern warfare, she finds such an attack more alluring, must be regarded as doubtful. France has decided to take her

deliberate revenge only in the company of good friends.

'All entertain misgivings as to the enormous cost and the possible heavy losses, as well as to the red spectre in the background. Compulsory military service which destines high and low, rich and poor, as food for powder, has calmed the passion for fighting. The security and comfort felt behind the walls of apparently impregnable fortresses damp the ardour for sorties and fighting in the open. The arms factories, the gun foundries, the steam hammers which temper the armour plates, have produced more friendly countenances and have been the cause of more sincere rapprochements than all the peace congresses put together. Then, again, everybody is careful not to attack a numerous and well-armed enemy, just as one thinks twice before resorting to a laboriously acquired destructive weapon when one is not quite certain as to one's ability properly to wield it. But when all misgivings and difficulties are removed, a general advance is decided upon. Then comes the momentous question: Will

the others come? Will the distant allies arrive at the proper time, or may I not be exposed, alone and deserted, to the assault of a superior force? These doubts necessitate a halt and the postponement of revenge, and the already loosened sword must fall back into the scabbard.

We hear the shout 'The coalition is ready,' from across the Channel, but nevertheless it is extremely doubtful whether it will proceed to warlike acts. Indeed, such a step is by no means called for at present. But for the more distant struggle, whether it will be decided with arms in the hand or by other means, a united nation of brothers at least to face the foreigner is as needful as a great and powerful army led by a strong hand and inspired by boundless confidence.'

Count Schlieffen says then quite distinctly that the *terrible* danger which lies in the accumulation of armaments is minimised by the 'enormous cost,' 'great losses' and the 'red spectre' which are feared by all. This effect may also be partly due to the greater

allurements of a peaceful existence which he touches upon in a rather perfunctory manner, and to the effect which the great social dislocation, entailed by conscription, is found to have. In conclusion he openly confesses that he sees salvation in gun foundries, and stakes Essen against the Hague. Broadly speaking, he says what the pacifists have so often maintained: that the great risks of war have made a conflagration improbable.

But they did not content themselves with that view, and did not, like Count Schlieffen, regard the further increase of armaments as the only way out of an illogical situation worthy of thinking beings. They regard this situation as being at least as dangerous as war itself. They combat not alone war, to which the risks act as a deterrent, but also that kind of peace which knows no other way of warding off the dread alternative than the complete exhaustion of nations, the dissipation of their strength, and the destruction of their civilization. Count Schlieffen is a Utopian when he thinks that peace can long be pre-

served by his method of gun factories. He would certainly be somewhat embarrassed if he had to describe to us the condition in which Europe will find itself in twenty, or even ten years, if the burden of armaments continues to increase at the same rate as it has done hitherto.

General Schlieffen has quite unconsciously appropriated as a basis for his own arguments the foundations upon which pacifism rests. But he does not know how to draw conclusions. And no wonder! He is no sociologist. He regards arms, not as a means of defence, but as a means of becoming stronger than his opponent in order to be able 'to crush and destroy the enemy.' His judgment is influenced by his profession and his vision is clouded by his narrow conceptions. He does not see around him the hard-working masses of the people all striving towards the same end—security, peace and happiness,—or States animated by a single and common interest; he discerns nothing but 'enemies.' Germany is, to him, the only country, and when he

speaks of danger it is to that danger by which Germany is threatened, that he alludes. If he could free himself for a moment from his professional prejudices he would easily perceive that the facts advanced by him belie his arguments. He depicts for us Germany and her allies enclosed in a ring of fortresses, by a Chinese wall erected in the middle of Europe. But fortresses are not offensive weapons; they are meant for defence. The States which have thrown up this fence must feel themselves threatened in some way. They are protecting themselves against Germany. Fear of Germany has united them. They do not think that Germany is so ready for peace as the ex-Chief of the General Staff of the most powerful army in the world would have them believe. But we do not wish to dispute the point. Our only object is to endeavour to adapt ourselves to the opposite view. We have no desire to doubt that Germany is ready for peace. But in such matter it is not the intrinsic nature of things

alone which counts; appearances also have to be reckoned with and appearances are against the Empire. Germany has the greatest army in Europe and a constantly growing population; she is building a powerful fleet; she has made her last conquest in Europe and is doing her best to hold it; her diplomats are making mistake after mistake in opposing every innovation. The Pan-Germans divide up the world as a German heritage. A portion of the German press invariably adopts a threatening and overbearing tone. Certainly, Germany may require this great army on account of her position, and may honestly believe that a strong navy is indispensable for the protection of her commerce; the Pan-Germans may carry little weight with the government, etc., etc. All this we grant, but, considered from the other point of view in detail and as a whole, it is a danger that must be guarded against. Such a situation, which is not national but international, must be viewed from both sides if a logical conclusion is to be arrived at. And there is only one

logical conclusion if one does not wish to cause an explosion of all this stored-up energy, or to see Europe, mutilated, lacerated, and corrupted, destroy its civilization, its riches and its social system.

'The coalition is complete' are the words put into the mouths of the English by Count Schlieffen. That is also an error. The coalition has just begun. It will be complete on the day when Germany and her faithful allies enter it. The coalition is in itself a step forward. It reduces the number of mutually hostile groups to two. There is no longer a question of fathoming the differences of these two groups. A solution should not be difficult to find. Each country fears the other and the best powers of the nations are being dissipated.

On the one hand any collapse is feared, and on the other hand it is recognized that this dread of persecution cannot be endured for twenty years longer. A peace alliance must come—perhaps out of storm and stress, out of mighty convulsions and out of confusion.

But, one day, the European organization, the development of which has already begun, must fall as a ripe fruit from the tree. Then the coalition will be complete, only it will have another object and will go under another name. The statesman or Prince who will accomplish this will be a hero.

It is impossible that the Emperor William, after accepting the military standpoint of the ex-Chief of the General Staff, should not come to conclusions similar to those set forth above. The Chief of the General Staff only considered the military aspect; but the Emperor must go further. And he can do so. He will also examine the situation from the political side. Perhaps, the fact that he has repeatedly emphasized the necessity for a closer agreement between nations is based upon his understanding of the military situation and the armament problem which is so intimately connected with it.

Perhaps he is working with a view to changing the nature of the coalition, which General Schlieffen fears, by the entry of Germany into

it so that it may no longer be dreaded. Perhaps he is the great statesman, the hero, who will effect this and fulfil the expectations of Europe.

These are certainly hypotheses, but they are based not upon hypotheses but facts. The Emperor William is a problem that must be explained. To arrive at an understanding of him, his actions, his utterances and his mental processes must be taken into account. So far, the Emperor ha . .peared to us as an inexplicable paradox. He has always been in the front rank of the moderns when it is a question of technical innovations, new means of communication and the establishment of records in this direction, the perfection of guns, rifles, battleships and torpedoes, the building of roads, the digging of canals and the construction of railways. But in purely intellectual matters he has hitherto been a conservative. Such a combination of radical modernism and conservatism in one and the same person is in itself not unusual. There are quite a number of intellectual revolution-

aries who maintain an attitude of aloofness and ignorance towards all technical progress, men who have struck broad paths in the domain of science, but who will not abandon the paraffin lamp and the quill pen, who abhor the telephone, look upon the motor car with horror, and even avoid the railway. In the case of the Emperor William, the contrary state of mind, the preponderance of an inclination towards the modern in mechanics, opposing the modern in the intellectual sense, cannot be regarded as abnormal. And there is all the less ground for complaint, inasmuch as close observation of the Emperor's method of reasoning and his actions enables us to mark a degree of progress which shows that he no longer excludes the possibility of an intellectual advance.

The new method of securing peace is an intellectual one; with the technical alone it can no longer be done. In addition to firearms we require treaties facilitating communication, thus drawing peoples closer together. In addition to armour plates we require

arbitration agreements, and in addition to fortresses, arbitration courts which must be constantly strengthened. The instruments of peace provided by modern pacifism are to-day themselves arms, and the State which neglects such arms drops as far behind as the State which is slow in building 'Dreadnoughts.'

War material formerly provided the only means whereby a State could enforce its views upon another State. Unconsciously it is to-day fulfilling another aim. A change has supervened which must be taken into account by even the most enthusiastic supporter of armaments. War material is no longer an instrument to carry out the will of a State; it is used only to protect the State against the will of another being imposed upon it. That is a radical change as compared with former times. And those who maintain that armaments are something immutable are unaware of the fact that they have quite altered, that they are to-day an institution which to-day serves other ends than formerly, while being based upon the same old reasons. And

those who are labouring under this mistake are still less aware that armaments are obviously approaching still greater changes. War material which to-day is the defence of the individual State, will later become the defence of the community of States. It is incredible that the spirit of the social age should fail to produce a working combine where this would be to the greatest social advantage. We see the picture of the future dimly outlined before us. We may perceive symptoms of the change—the fact that European troops co-operate in Crete, China and Morocco, for the purpose, not as has been wrongly supposed, of waging war, but of performing police duties in the name of a common civilization. And so we may discern the solution of the great problem by which all peoples and all civilized nations of the earth are to-day opposed. An inward change in armaments will go on. A community of States is about to be formed. When it has reached the highest stage of development it will assume the duty of protection which the indivi-

dual members can only perform in an illusory fashion by exerting their whole strength, and will carry it out for the common weal with the greatest possible saving of energy.

All facts are pointing in this direction, and they cannot for ever remain concealed to this far-sighted man at the helm of State.

THE EMPEROR AND FRANCE

CHAPTER V

THE EMPEROR AND FRANCE

THERE are three distinct periods in the relations between Germany and France since the great war. The first extends from the peace of Frankfurt to the accession of the Emperor William II, and is the period of icy cold and the ever present possibility of renewed hostility. The second period concludes with the Paris Exhibition of 1900; it is the thaw, the rapprochement begins and develops rapidly. The third period, which has not yet come to an end, begins in 1900, and it is the season of genial sunshine. A decided action is taken in the direction of an understanding, and the possibility of a final reconciliation comes to the fore.

The Emperor cannot be denied the merit

of having since his accession adopted an attitude of studied and tactful courtesy towards the French which was bound to bring about a revulsion of feeling in France. From the beginning His Majesty has always been regarded with sympathy by Frenchmen. His impulsive temperament resembles the Gallic. And while some of his actions had a jarring effect across the Vosges, others so flattered the French national character that the disagreeable was soon forgotten in the pleasant and agreeable. By degrees the personality of the Emperor began to exercise such a charm upon the French that he became almost popular, and a foundation for a more speedy understanding between the two nations was then laid.

When the Emperor William took up the reins of government he was no longer able to prevent the non-participation of Germany in the International Exhibition of 1889, but in the same year he performed an act of friendly courtesy by furnishing a military escort for the remains of the

French revolutionary General Carnot, which were exhumed at Magdeburg and conveyed to the Pantheon in Paris. This pious act was the first definite step towards a rapprochement of the two peoples since the war. When the International Labour Protection Conference summoned by the Emperor met in Berlin, in 1890, the French Government was represented. His Majesty entered into close relations with M. Jules Simon, the intellectual leader of the French delegation, and when the possibility of a Franco-German war was touched upon in one of the conversations which he had with him, the Emperor made the following noteworthy utterance: 'Anybody who seeks to drive these two nations into war is in my opinion a fool and a criminal.' In these words lay a programme which did not fail to make a great impression in France. M. Jules Simon was also the first Frenchman to be able to give his countrymen a character sketch of the young Emperor. Through his experiences in Berlin he was able to give them a clearer idea, from the human point of

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

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view, of a monarch whom they only knew by his reputation as a soldier.

In 1891 there was a slight return to the period of frosty estrangement. The Emperor Frederick went to Paris and was insulted by the mob, but the condemnation which this discourtesy met with in the greater part of the French press showed that public opinion strongly disapproved of it. The affair resulted in the issue of more stringent passport regulations in Alsace-Lorraine, which caused much offence in France, but when the compulsory provisions were repealed in the autumn of the same year, the Emperor quickly regained his popularity as it became known that he himself was responsible for the concession. At the launch of the ironclad *Weissenburg*, at Stettin, in the following December, His Majesty spoke of the 'chivalrous enemy,' an honour which quickly made the French forget the moment of discord. On October 18, 1893, Count Muenster, the German Ambassador, sent the following telegram to the widow of Marshal MacMahon,

who had just passed away: 'Immediately on learning of the great loss you have sustained, His Majesty, the German Emperor, directed me, as a testimony of his deep sympathy, to lay a wreath upon the coffin of the gallant and noble Field-Marshal. In expressing to you my sincere personal condolences, I shall be glad if you will kindly inform me when and where I may discharge my mission.' This telegram moved M. Jules Simon to advocate, in the *Figaro*, a *treuga dei* between Germany and France until the end of the century. The *revanche* was not to be abandoned but only postponed for a number of years. On June 24, 1894, President Carnot was struck down in Lyons by the hand of an assassin. I believe that this deplorable event marked a turning point in Franco-German relations. The Emperor William made known his sympathy in cordial words, and while France was still staggering under the blow these found a sympathetic echo throughout the country. The first telegram of condolence to reach Paris was from His Majesty. It was

addressed to the widow of the murdered man, and ran: 'Her Majesty, the Empress, and I are deeply moved by the terrible news we have received from Lyons; be assured, madam, that all our sympathy and our feelings go out to you and your family at this moment. May God give you strength to bear this crushing blow. Worthy of his great name, M. Carnot has died like a soldier on the field of honour.—WILHELM I.R.'

Shortly before this, two French naval officers who had been arrested at Kiel on suspicion of espionage were sentenced by the Imperial Court to long terms of fortress imprisonment. They were pardoned by the Emperor immediately after the assassination, and it was pointed out that the Emperor, by this act, wished to give the French nation a special mark of his sympathy with it in its grievous loss. The news was received with unfeigned enthusiasm in France, and Casimir Perier, the newly-elected President called personally upon the German Ambassador to thank him for this act of grace on the part

of the Emperor. In December of the same year, Herr von Schwarzkopfen, the German military attaché in Paris, laid wreaths upon the graves of the French soldiers who died at Vincennes in 1870. The year 1895 was a fruitful one for the rapprochement movement. Marshal Canrobert, one of the opponents in the Franco-German war, died in January, and the Emperor sent telegrams of sympathy to the son and the son-in-law of the deceased. One of these ran as follows: — 'I and my Guard Corps sincerely share in your sorrow at the death of the heroic defender of St. Privat, who has won our constant admiration.' In June came the festivities at Kiel in connection with the opening of the North Sea and Baltic Canal, in which French warships participated. The 'Association Littéraire Internationale,' to all intents and purposes a French organization, met in Dresden, and for the first time, French painters were represented at the Berlin Art Exhibition. When the French Atlantic liner *La Gascogne* was long overdue, and serious

apprehensions were being felt as to the vessel's fate, the Emperor made enquiries several times. The convulsions in Asia brought about the first common political action of both States. Russia, France and Germany formed a triple alliance to protect themselves against the Peace of Shimonoseki.

On June 7, 1896, the German Ambassador in Paris officially informed the French Government that the German Empire would participate in the Paris Exhibition of 1900. Next day the death of Jules Simon gave the Emperor still another opportunity of sending an exceedingly sympathetic telegram of condolence, to which President Faure sent a cordial reply.

On May 4, 1897, the disastrous bazaar fire occurred in Paris. Many people of the best society lost their lives, and a telegram of sympathy from the Emperor was answered without delay. Moreover, His Majesty contributed a sum of 10,000 francs (£400) to the charities in aid of which the bazaar was held. The sinking of the French warship

La Bourgogne, in 1898, called forth another demonstration of sympathy from the Emperor.

In the beginning of 1899, the Emperor William had a slight illness; President Faure sent the French Ambassador in Berlin to Potsdam to make personal enquiries. Immediately after his recovery the Emperor showed his appreciation of this attention by calling at the Embassy. President Faure died on February 18, and the Emperor telegraphed to his widow: 'Deeply moved by the news of the death of your husband, the President of the French Republic, I hasten to express to you my sincere sympathy with you in your terrible loss. The Empress joins with me in hoping that Almighty God will give you strength to bear your trial.' A military deputation was sent to Paris to attend the funeral. In July, the Emperor inspected the French training ship *Iphigénie*, at Bergen, during his northern tour, and on this occasion he telegraphed to President Loubet, expressing his satisfaction at what he had seen. He also invited the French officers

and cadets to the *Hohenzollern* on the following day. This act of courtesy was treated at some length by the French newspapers and was well received. On August 18, the Emperor unveiled on the battlefield of St. Privat a monument, which he described as the guardian of the fallen heroes of both armies. Speaking of the French soldiers he said, 'Bravely and heroically for Emperor and country the French soldiers also sank into their glorious graves, and when our banners dip before the monument of bronze or rustle sadly over the graves of our dear comrades, may they also wave over the resting-places of our foes, whispering softly to them that we are mindful of the deeds of the brave dead. With deep gratitude towards the God of Battles for the aid vouchsafed to our great Emperor, let us to-day picture to ourselves the souls of all those who met in the heart of the conflict on this field, assembled in eternal bliss around the Throne of the Supreme Judge, and looking down upon us here.'

On August, 1899, Réjane appeared for the

first time in Berlin. Five years before that the Antoine theatrical company had made a beginning in Berlin. On the very day when Wagner's 'Tristan' was given in Paris before an enthusiastic audience, the French actress, at the desire of the Emperor, participated in a gala performance in the Royal Theatre in Berlin. In the same year the French and German diplomats co-operated in complete harmony at the Hague Conference in the great work of peace, and a few weeks later, on September 17, French and German troops fought together against the native rebels near the village of Lama, in Togo.

The year 1900 was now approaching and with it the dawn of a new era. In May took place the opening of the Paris Exhibition, at which Germany was extensively represented. The exhibits sent by the Emperor excited both astonishment and esteem in the minds of the French. Thousands of Germans went to Paris and were very well received. On the boulevards, German was heard on all

sides, and there was no longer any trace of hostility or feelings of revenge. In summer occurred the well known events in Peking, and French and German troops fought side by side under a German commander in the operations for the relief of the Legations.

In May, 1901, two French officers, General Bonnal and his aide-de-camp, accepted the invitation of the Emperor, who treated his guests with every mark of distinction. At a military banquet His Majesty alluded to them in the following terms: 'To-day the Brigade is particularly honoured by the presence in its midst of two officers of the French army. This is the first time, just as it is the first time that German and French troops have fought shoulder to shoulder against a common enemy, in the brotherhood of arms and in true comradeship. To both the officers and their whole army, hurrah! hurrah! hurrah!' General Bonnal thanked His Majesty in moving words and in conclusion called for cheers for the German army and its soldier Emperor.

Once more on the occasion of the disaster at St. Pierre, Martinique, in May, 1902, the Emperor telegraphed to the President and also made a donation of ten thousand marks for the relief of the sufferers. From this time onwards events calling for the Emperor's sympathy followed closely upon one another. Whenever a great Frenchman passed away, the Emperor was the first to express his sorrow, and similar attention was shown by him on the occasion of the mining disaster at Courrières, and the accidents to the *Patrie* and the *République*, the warship *Jena* and the submarine *Pluviôse*. French artists began to appear in increasing numbers in Berlin, and were personally honoured by the Emperor, and prominent Frenchmen were his guests in Berlin and Kiel.

The crisis of 1905 put Franco-German relations to some little strain, but it may be regarded as a test which showed their strength, and friendly arrangements were the result of the Morocco dispute. In the mean-

while the movement in the direction of an understanding was gathering strength on both sides. Societies were being formed and periodicals founded which, like the Berlin *Continent*, had the object of furthering the work. The publication in question is believed to have won the particular favour of the Emperor. There is no concealing the fact that a great obstacle stands in the way of such an understanding, but it cannot be denied that in spite of this obstacle it has been possible to make considerable progress. When M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, took up his post in Berlin in 1907, the Emperor answered his address in the following terms: 'M. l'Ambassadeur, I wish you welcome. The work which you desire to complete, namely, that of developing the relations between Germany and France, will have all my sympathy. My government and I will do our best to assist you to perform your task. To establish an understanding between two great nations, who are both able, and whose destiny it is to spread civilization among

the peoples of the earth, is an aim, the accomplishment of which is worthy of the efforts of all high-minded persons in France and Germany.'

In the meantime, an international treaty was concluded in which the German, Danish, French, British, Dutch and Swedish governments mutually guaranteed their territories on the North Sea. In this treaty is embodied a Franco-German agreement to which sufficient attention has not been paid. When it is remembered that this treaty was not concluded between all the above-mentioned Powers collectively, but that every Power entered into an undertaking with each of the other countries concerned, the preamble assumes a special significance when it is applied to France and Germany alone. It runs in this case: 'The governments of Germany and France are guided by a desire to strengthen their existing bond of neighbourly friendship and thus to contribute to the maintenance of universal peace.'

Just think what that means. It is the

first real peace treaty between Germany and France. It is a further official confirmation of the disappearance of Franco-German opposition. This treaty may at some future time be of the highest importance so far as Germany and France are concerned. Have not both nations thereby mutually guaranteed their territories bordering upon the North Sea? Why should it not be possible one day to extend this guarantee to all the frontiers of the contracting parties and consequently to the Franco-German border?

The Emperor has quite frankly spoken to a Frenchman with regard to the crux of the Franco-German difficulty. This Frenchman was Professor Mabilleau, who has already been mentioned, and who has given us a detailed account of his interview with the Emperor in the Paris journal *Opinion*.

According to the Professor His Majesty said: 'What good to me is one province more, acquired by destruction, hatred and misery? Germany can gain nothing by breaking the

peace which has brought her only blessings during the last thirty-seven years.' Only when honour and existence were concerned should force be resorted to, only when an European coalition threatened the liberty of Germany and the welfare of her people should there be a fight. The Emperor, as Professor Mabilleau tells us, then enlarged upon the good likely to result from a free exchange of views between France and Germany; leaving the Peace of Frankfurt out of the question, and the salutary effect which a Franco-German entente would have upon other States such as Austria, Italy and Spain.

The article continues: 'The Emperor William thinks and feels before all as a German, but he is aware of his great responsibility as the leading member of European society.'

The Emperor's utterances on this point are given textually:

'What a paradox there is in the outwardly correct relations of these countries! Do they wish for revenge? No. As they are not

preparing for this, and as they do not intend to organize an attack, but wish rather to go about their business confident in peace, so there shall be peace! But why do difficulties become so acute on every occasion, though nobody profits thereby? Between us there is only one national policy; a close alliance which will protect the rights of each of us and put an end to fratricide.'

'And Alsace-Lorraine,' rejoined Professor Mabilleau. 'Let us not speak of it,' answered His Majesty. 'It lies with you to show yourselves strong and skilful enough in the council of nations to receive that compensation on the map of Europe twenty years hence. You must know yourselves whether your honour, your whole policy and your whole future are to depend upon the regaining of a small corner which I cannot give you and you cannot wrest from us. Is European civilization only a sentiment?'

Things have gone far indeed, when a Frenchman can publish such words in a French periodical. It shows the possibility of a rational

and calm discussion of a fact which the world must recognize as accomplished if it wishes, once for all, to pass the crisis of violence which has so convulsed our times. It is on the cards that the Emperor will, in the end, succeed so far in his friendship with leading Frenchmen that Franco-German co-operation will go on without any revision of history.

The reputation which the Emperor has already won for himself in France is made manifest by the somewhat unusual proposal made in 1904 by Vacher de la Pouge, in a series of excellent articles in the *Européen*. He suggested a union of Germany and France after the example of Austria-Hungary, with the Emperor William as ruler.

'Germany herself,' he writes, 'can be the nucleus of an Empire of the West, and the formation of such an Empire is the only means of preventing the decline of the whole of Europe. The fate of occidental civilization depends upon the rapprochement of both countries. The idea, paradoxical as it may seem, is perhaps not so difficult of realization.

The Republic has not given France what she expected, and it only holds its own, thanks partly to the impotence of the monarchical parties, and the slight esteem in which the representatives of the old dynasties are held. If the nation, weary of the Republic, should for any reason turn again to the monarchist idea, William II would be preferred as Emperor to an Orléans without prestige or an unknown Bonaparte.'

In the following number of the *Européen* M. Henry Mazel deals with the suggestion exhaustively: 'The proposal of Vacher de la Pouge,' he says, 'merits attention. A France-Germany, based on the Austro-Hungarian model, would indeed furnish a peaceful and honourable solution to the problem of Alsace-Lorraine. "What?" it will be said, "William, German Emperor and King of France?" Why not? Wherever the Germanic and French races have been able, they have organized themselves into mixed language States, like, for example, Switzerland and Belgium. This will sooner or later be the case

with Alsace-Lorraine. And with such a development in prospect all plans, the object of which is to divide the annexed provinces according to language, must be disapproved. That would be the worst possible solution for Europe, for France, and for Alsace-Lorraine herself, who wants to remain, and must be, one. Why, therefore, cannot a great Franco-German Empire be formed in imitation of Franco-Germanic countries, an Empire which in order to avoid any invidious distinction could be called the Western Empire? Bayonne and Dantzig would then have no more cause not to understand one another than have to-day Zurich and Geneva, or Antwerp and Liège. Alsace-Lorraine would naturally cease to be a German "Reichsland," and would receive the same measure of autonomy as Germany on the one side and France on the other. Her garrisons would be composed exclusively of natives, and military uniforms should not include either the képi or the spiked helmet. This detail would contribute more than anything else to general harmony. Alsace-Lor-

raine would then become a pledge of union between France and Germany—the natural arbitrator in all disputes. She would once more be the heart of Europe as she was in the Carlovingian times. The Emperor of the West would usually reside within her borders, and the Emperor William would then have no more loyal subjects than the people of Alsace-Lorraine. But can this dream be realized? Is the idea inacceptable to the Germans? Who would oppose it most strongly here? What obligations would the union place upon us? Should the Western Empire be a confederation or a simple alliance, a new Triple Alliance? What guarantees would have to be given to the Emperor William, who would certainly desire to be a ruler *de facto* as well as *de jure*. All these questions are delicate and difficult, but in my opinion they are not insoluble. Why should the *Européen* not gain as many views as possible upon the subject? There are possibilities to which the mind should be made accustomed.

These are certainly fantasies, but they help us to form an idea of the probable results of a discussion of the great problem of a Franco-German understanding, and of the reputation of the Emperor in the neighbouring country of France. They clearly indicate that there is a possibility of a positive Franco-German policy, and that the Emperor's efforts to arrive at such a policy can no longer be regarded as hopeless. The attainment of this aim will bring the third period in the relations of the two great States to a close, and bring nearer the union of all civilized States.

THE PROBLEM OF THE PEACE ALLIANCE

CHAPTER VI

THE PROBLEM OF THE PEACE ALLIANCE

IT is a curious fact that any announcement of an attempt or of an intention to place international life upon a firmer foundation, is greeted by a large section of public opinion with an outburst of indignation, and by others with the superior smile of spoon-fed wisdom. And this is the case at a time when no prince and no responsible politician opens his lips without extolling the advantages of peace, when no occasion, such as the birth of an heir to the throne, the visit of a neighbouring prince, the death of a king, a regimental parade, etc., is allowed to pass without a stereotyped reference to peace. Nobody sees the paradox of speaking of peace and at the same time constantly reckoning with the possibility

of war, for which preparations are being made while nations are bleeding to death. But to think of putting an end to this glaring anomaly once for all, and of making peace a reality, is regarded as nothing better than a crime in some quarters, such as the Pan-German press, which heaved a sigh of relief when the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (*North German Gazette*) sought to give a denial to the account of the conversation between the Emperor and Monsieur Pichon, while in others, the idea is looked upon as the 'Beautiful Dream' of which the poets sing. With the holders of the first-mentioned view it would be superfluous to argue. They simply dash their heads against the inexorable wall of facts. And what answer could we give them? They maintain that war is a school of all the virtues and of morality, but they seem to forget that if this were so, the German nation, after forty years of peace, would long ago have sunk into the mire of immorality, and that the other countries, which have been spared the scourges of war for a much longer

period, have arrived at a high state of civilization. They do not see that war, considered as a sporting institution, has to-day become too complicated, too dangerous and too costly and that everything possible is being done to avoid it, which would be a crime, if war exercised a salutary influence. Moreover, they are apparently ignorant of the fact that new and powerful factors have appeared with an interest in the prevention of war and that in many cases conflicts, even those which affect honour and vital matters, can, at the present time, be settled by agreement in a manner consonant with reason and worthy of humanity.

These apostles of war, who are for ever emphasizing the fact that there are situations where it is the moral duty of a nation to take up arms, forget that they are proclaiming the sacredness of a war now scarcely possible in the very heart of civilization and increasingly impossible in the fringe of civilization. Of course, a nation as a whole is justified and bound like the indi-

vidual citizen to defend itself when its life is threatened. The citizen, who is attacked by a robber on a lonely road in an isolated wood, has a right to resist his assailant and to kill him. But where, within the bounds of civilization, are such lonely roads and isolated woods still to be found, where there are marauding highwaymen of politics? In the centres of civilization all nations have a common interest in the maintenance of security, and a 'highwayman' state can no longer carry on operations, and in the outskirts of civilization the States that want to make themselves rich at the expense of others, and would be able to annihilate a country or a nation, find that such a policy is becoming increasingly unprofitable and daily more difficult to pursue. In Europe, fresh conquests are practically impossible, and in the case of partially civilized States, a conqueror can only apply compulsion in agreement with the other members of the international community. This kind of war, suited to a nation struggling for its existence, is an anachronism,

as it is becoming ever more impossible to threaten the life of a people. To preach the sacredness of such a war and to mould the whole life of the State upon such principles is comparable only to the madness of a community which would to-day throw up walls and gates to protect their common property from the 'Barbarians.'

On this account it is all the more imperative to reason with those who do not want 'to believe.' They hear the cry for peace on all sides and find it ridiculous because the preparations for war are being pushed ever further. As if such a convulsion could be expected to follow directly upon a speech at a banquet! Such orations are merely symptoms, and so are armaments. Armaments will not suddenly cease to exist, neither will there ever be an end to peace speeches. But that does not mean that the present situation will continue for all time. We cannot say that, we who only yesterday regarded the airship and the aeroplane as utopian and have now found a solution to those problems.

To masquerade as doubting Thomas is, today, one of the most risky professions. Any morning something may become a reality that seemed incredible the day before. In the domain of mechanics the Thomases are already very chastened in spirit. In politics they still enjoy some little reputation, but this will not b for long. Here, too, it is being impressed upon orators with increasing force that they must begin to think, and that the reprehensible game of confusing cause and effect—the blindman's buff of doubting every progress and development—must cease once for all.

The voices of those who demand a change in international life and who are showing new paths are increasing daily, as are the States and leaders who actually follow such paths. But all this has been powerless to alter preconceived opinions. First it was private individuals who endeavoured to arouse the world, and they were laughed at simply because they *were* private individuals—honest men and small societies—and it was mali-

ciously said of them that their object was to throw the world off the broad and easy way. 'When you have statesmen, princes and scholars on your side, we will believe you' was the general cry, and statesmen, princes and scholars were not found wanting to support the idea of a new order of things in the common life of nations. They were, however, also held up to ridicule. 'Yes,' said the unbelievers, 'these, too, are dreamers, or perhaps even swindlers or treacherous rogues, who wish to harm the other nations. They must first show by deeds that their intentions are honourable.' Deeds were forthcoming, and here was a dilemma. At first dead silence was observed regarding them, but, as this did not do, ridicule was tried and emphasis was laid upon the small effect they had had, it being entirely forgotten that without the support of public opinion, and owing to their experimental nature, they could hardly have created a greater impression. 'They are only isolated deeds, unimportant events,' it was argued. 'They cannot alter the course of

things, and behind them there must be concealed more evil intention.'

And so people became accustomed to a so-called method of reasoning which would seem to resolve itself into this: Peace is something good. The means at our disposal to preserve it are inadequate. To think of other means is a crime.

That was naturally sheer nonsense, but people got used to it. Anybody who advocated a better way of maintaining peace was considered to be a lunatic when he was a private individual, and a criminal if he was a public man. In the presence of such opinions, any progress towards a better method of assuring peace was disavowed, and any natural failure of tentative efforts was received with jubilation, as a proof of the whole idea. The second Hague Conference, it was daily reported in the press, had failed to solve the problem of armaments. It was argued from this that any other solution was superfluous, but it was conceded, not consciously, but through force of habit and on account of

mental indolence, that the question was not discussed at all at the second Hague Conference, as the matter was not allowed to be brought up. A mistake may be made in calculating the orbit of a comet, a wrong medical diagnosis is possible, but there can be no mistake regarding a fact as to the existence of which one can convince oneself by a brief reference to numerous publications and reports. But people do not want to be convinced. They prefer to remain blind. In this manner is being opposed to-day the greatest movement of our times, the mighty bloodless revolution of the twentieth century, which is proceeding under our very eyes. In this manner it is being sought not to bar the progress—for that cannot be barred—but to prevent contemporaries from reaping the benefits of progress. The thirsty are blindfolded on the very brink of the well, and they are deluded into the belief that they are in the desert and are destined to perish.

This is the condition of our public opinion when it objects to the attribution to the

Emperor of a desire to assure peace. Thus, some German newspapers recently characterised as an impudent calumny a statement made by the late W. T. Stead, in an article on the Empire, to the effect that His Majesty was ambitious of bequeathing to his subjects the memory of a reign which was not stained by a single war. Mr. Stead, they declared, had represented the Emperor as 'a peace enthusiast after Bertha von Suttner's own heart.'

Why is the Emperor not being supported in attaining his ends? Why is he not receiving the cordial assistance of public opinion which even an Emperor needs when he wishes to convert ideas into deeds? Why is the possibility not recognized in these views of the Emperor of making Germany the leading State (in an intellectual sense), the German people the happiest in the world, and the Emperor a hero of undying fame?

I have here in mind, not those who possess a real or supposed interest in belittling peace and who hope to derive greater profit

through 'William, the War Lord,' than through 'William, the Peacemaker,' but those others who do not believe in progress simply because they do not take the trouble to learn to see. And we *can* learn to see. He who looks through a telescope or a microscope sees nothing at first. He must learn to see in the physical sense just as our contemporaries, who place no faith in a new method of assuring peace, must be taught to acquire mental vision. I once called pacifism a problem of mental optics. I meant that it had not to create anything new, but was intended to convey to the mind a sense of a natural process. It has to teach to see. And the reason why the Emperor's plans are not being supported is simply that most of his countrymen and contemporaries cannot see. On this account they imagine everything to be quite different to what it really is, and they believe that one's intentions are altogether different from what they really are. They think that there is an intention to create something, which, as a matter of fact, already exists.

They see spectres which are the children of their own brains, and at these they tilt. They do not see the reality and therefore do not understand.

The Emperor has frequently spoken of a 'peace alliance' between civilized states, of a closing of the ranks of modern nations in the cause of peace. But, according to those antagonistic to this view, he spoke of the 'United States of Europe,' and of a 'Federation.' They cannot regard a rapprochement of nations as being anything else. The old formulæ of the period of romance (which progress has long rendered antiquated), are still applied in this intellectual workshop. No reasonable man to-day thinks of heaping the nations into one conglomerate mass under a central authority which would naturally threaten the independence of individual states. But those who oppose the ideas of the Emperor still believe that by a rapprochement and a peace alliance are meant such a conglomeration and formidable union.

But there is no need to tell them that it is quite another matter, that the characteristics of States, far from being destroyed, will have further undreamt-of possibilities of development. Then there is a question, not of doing away with the independence of individual State structures, but rather of placing it upon a surer footing. Advantages, such as every patriot desires, are claimed, but in the now customary blindness only disadvantages are suspected.

This is regrettable, but it is really not of such importance as one would think. For what the Emperor wills remains only to be carried out, not to be begun. The foundations already exist; it is visibly growing and daily becoming more tangible. It is neither 'United States' nor 'Federation' that is taking shape; what we see rising above the political horizon are the organized States of the civilized world.

'Federation' and 'organization' are two things as far asunder as the poles. The conception of federation dates from the

era of violence and represents the only progress towards closer relations between states which was possible in an age of violence. It was either the preponderance of a state which, after a war or through a war, forced the weaker nations to federation, or it was the apprehension felt by a number of small states regarding the intentions of a larger group, that induced them to take such a step. The idea of federation is the offspring of violence; it is usually the outcome of a war feared or already concluded.

The idea of organization is based upon totally different principles. It presupposes not might but right. The independence of States is one of its axioms and no single country is placed in a position of superiority. The chief considerations in 'organization' are, alone, the generally acknowledged common interest and the advantages to be expected from the saving of energy through common action. Organization does not mean an immediate flinging away of armaments and in itself is not peace. It denotes rather

condition from which peace results, and this in turn may have as a natural consequence a diminution of the burden of armaments.

And this condition already exists. It is not an idea which from its very conception has to be converted into reality; it is a reality to which the ideas of men have only to accommodate themselves.

The importance of the problem lies in the fact that it is a matter, not of creating something, but only of suiting human institutions and conduct to a condition of things for which by their nature they are fitted. Therein lies its invulnerability and the certainty of its future. This, too, renders it more easy to secure the laurels which accomplishments will bring. The organization of civilized states is proceeding and has been developing with ever-increasing rapidity during the last few decades. It has made the nations dependent upon one another, and it has given rise to great problems, which extend beyond the bounds of states and must be settled upon an international and not a national

basis ; problems of a kind that are born daily and daily disposed of internationally. This process, which is still noticed only by a few, but to which all are subject, has already created an international administration. The organization of States to-day has at its disposal over eighty administrative bodies run by the community. Shall I enumerate them all here ? I have referred to them in my book, *International Life at the Present Time*[1] (B. G. Teubner, Leipsic), and in the *Annuaire de la Vie Internationale* (IV year, Brussels, 1908–1909), founded by me. They are treated in great detail. International boards have already been established to deal with the following matters: communication in the more restricted sense (railways, navigation, telegraphy and aviation) ; commerce (coinage and measures, conventions, finance commissions, exchange, and information regarding customs duties, etc.); civil law (marriage, divorce, guardianship, assistance to litigants, copyright, etc.) ; international law (arbitra-

[1] Das internationale Leben der Gegenwart.

tion treaties, arbitration courts, prize courts, etc.) ; police (fishery guard, restrictions of the sale of spirits, measures for combating epidemics, slave trade, the white slave trade traffic, etc.); science (seismic, marine and geographical research, the standardization of drugs, prison systems, etc.)[1]; social economy (prohibition of night work for women and the use of phosphorus, etc.) ; agriculture (protection of birds, seal protection, protection of African fauna, the establishment of an Agricultural Institute, etc.) ; war (regulations for land and sea warfare). In a word, nearly thirty-six international offices, commissions or central bodies are to-day working on behalf of the international community.

To these must be added the still unorganized activities of States in the political and social domains. The many acts of "give and take" between nations, and above all the mutual interdependence of trade and economics which have invisible but indissoluble

[1] Besides the international scientific bodies referred to here, there is an incalculable number of private organizations engaged upon this work.

bonds between the different countries. Then again, there is the already growing number of international conferences and congresses of governments at which matters common to all are discussed and dealt with, meetings which follow one another almost without intermission. It is thought that, to give these gatherings the status of a world parliament, the discussion of international affairs should take place in a building destined for the purpose, and be conducted by permanent delegates like in the national parliaments, where the chosen representatives of the peoples and of their respective governments are wont to meet under one roof. In the wider field of international politics something like a world parliament is already at work, which differs from national parliaments only in outward appearances, but for this very reason the similarity between the work done by it and that of the national assemblies is not recognized. The Government congresses which are summoned for various reasons and meet at different places to-day, follow upon one

another so quickly that so far as the performance and effect are concerned, they excel the national parliaments. Here also must be taken into account the web of diplomacy which holds sections together, and has become a powerful factor in international organization, although the men who hold the offices of diplomatic representatives are not always able to cope with the increased responsibilities thrown upon them by the march of events. Intercommunication between nations is daily becoming easier, and although the opportunities for friction are thereby increased, such intercourse tends to enhance the power and will to counteract such friction and to avoid discord in the whole organism. In the ordinary way only the friction is felt and the necessity and inevitableness of war is therefore still believed in. The remedy, which is provided by the organism itself and can remove most causes of friction, is not noticed. The more numerous the points of contact, the greater will naturally be the collision of interests. The machinery would, however,

have come to a stop at the very beginning and a catastrophe would have occurred were it not that the very cause of the evil itself provided the remedy. Closer international relations led to an international entente, which entente sprang quite naturally into being. It was the outcome of necessity. Such closer relations would be inconceivable if they did not enormously widen the grounds for an understanding. The vitality and naturalness of the process which is now going on is demonstrated by the fact that with the evil it provides the remedy. The existing organization hourly leads to understandings, and offers thousands of ways of avoiding conflicts, while men continue to emphasize the necessity of war and wish to make a rule for the few cases where human ignorance clashed with natural development and cried aloud for an appeal for war, although they were only exceptional ones arising from nascent conditions.

So it is that men everywhere look to the past and cannot appreciate the present.

They see the unending armaments, but they are unable to discover the clear signs of co-operation and its effects. They see the Dreadnoughts and super-Dreadnoughts, those products of insanity, but not the international institutions and actions; they are waiting for the next war and do not perceive how widely peace is already established.

That which exists may be repudiated, but its existence cannot be denied. Dead silence may be preserved with regard to the fact of the international organization that has been called into being, but there is no getting rid of the organization itself; and even when the Emperor spoke of the necessity of a peace alliance, and the rapprochement of the European and of all the civilized states, his only intention was to awaken the conscience of mankind to a sense of the natural processes which were going on, and to stir them to a course of action consonant with the natural trend of events. In this he has shown himself to be a truly practical politician, for only he has claim to such a title who does not act

contrary to nature and who bases his conduct upon the natural. He only is a visionary, who seeks to oppose natural development and waits until he dashes out his brains against the solid wall of facts.

How, then, is peace to be brought about? Not by preliminary disarmament as most people still believe. This is an error which leads them to oppose all peace movements. Peace can be established, not by direct but by indirect methods. The foundations upon which peace is based must be present. These foundations are already provided by the organization of States. We have to-day a condition of practical peace, since numerous serious disputes are settled by agreement; since some disputes, in consequence of the mutual interdependence of States, do not assume that dangerous character which makes war possible, and others are nipped in the bud; and since there exist individual groups of States, which support one another, and, through the mutual influence which they exercise, act as a deterrent upon war, the

latter has become a general evil involving even the nations not directly concerned while peace is in the interest of all. This condition of partial peace has only to be further developed. The general desire for peace must be converted into acts. The Emperor needs only to take the governments of all civilized States at their word, and none of them will, or can, decline to support him in founding a strong peace alliance. The Emperor has only to take the great step to give the spirit of the times a definite shape. He has only to make the existing organization visible, and to perfect it by some outward sign.

How can this be done? Here, too, the path has been marked out. At the beginning there would not be much to do that is new. The great Pan-American movement shows how a whole continent (where indeed, different conditions prevail and where the historical basic principles are other than ours), can organize itself and produce the organism which it requires. Europe might take as a model the Pan-American conferences and the

Central Bureau of the America Republics in Washington with its international administrative council. It only needs to imitate these institutions and to make the necessary alterations to fit them to European conditions.[1] The new institutions need not be altogether European; they might be made world-wide at once or only European to such an extent that they may later on be amalgamated with the Pan-American system, and with the institutions of a similar kind which are to be formed in Eastern Asia, so as to form a universal whole.

The political problems might be put aside altogether for the moment. It was, perhaps, the only mistake of King Edward, and the cause of the misunderstanding of his great object, that he did not take this into account. Economic and social international life will first have to be provided with institutions and the new political system will develop from

[1] See my book *Pan-America. Development, Extent and Significance of the Pan-American Movement.* (Berlin. Maritima Publishing Company, 1910.)

them. The very fact that political problems are always thought of first, and that the difficulties inherent in them are obvious, makes many doubt the possibility of a general rapprochement.

It is forgotten that these difficulties must be first smoothed out and disputes adjusted before a complete agreement can be reached in this domain. The indirect way is the only right one in pacification. It is not a question of putting an end to a conflict, the brutality of which is apparent to-day, but rather to give it another character so that we may more easily dispose of it.[1]

Re-awakening of a consciousness of the

[1] The efforts to arrive at a political '*Zusammenschluss*' (Union) must not be regarded, however, as superfluous. I have only meant to convey that its success and its effect are dependent upon the state of international organization. To-day, already, political peace agreements are possible in the form of a union to avoid war, an agreement to restrict armaments, a general arbitration treaty, a permanent international court, etc. But the significance and effects of such agreements are strengthened and enhanced by the development and economic and social rapprochements on account of the mutual confidence to which they give rise.

international organization now going on might be hastened in two ways :

(1) The holding of an International Congress at regular intervals.

(2) By the establishment of an International Central Office.

The Congress would discuss the common interests of the civilized world at large, or perhaps at first those of Europe alone. There would be no need for it to come to a decision all at once. No State should be obliged to bow to the measures decided on by such a Congress, but all should participate in the discussions. At the beginning the Congress would have no other object than to exist. Its effects would soon be felt. Give first the form, the matter is already available. It would confine itself to questions of form, and political matters would be temporarily excluded. There can be no doubt that a Congress on the lines indicated is possible to-day. There is a sufficiency of problems of common interest, and there are many more than is thought of those questions which

cannot be settled at all except by international deliberation. The suggested Congress would have to sit at regular intervals, and if it at first limited itself to debating international trade problems, much would already be done. For instance, the questions of international bankruptcy and banking laws, or the possible granting of more extensive customs facilities. Then there would be various points of international civil law, the protection of foreigners, protection against unjust taxation, extradition, international police, etc., all questions which are to-day being thrashed out. The Congress could next devote its attention to general questions of communication. It would standardise the aviation laws, accelerate and cheapen railway and shipping services, and discuss the question of a universal coinage system, and universal postage rates. New questions would come up for deliberation, such as the international preservation of natural resources, and the scheduling of such resources, etc. There would also be discussed the extension of the international sanitary

system, the adoption of a uniform course of study in schools, the international recognition of degrees, the exchange of teachers and scholars, protection of workmen, international colonization, treatment of natives, etc.

It can be seen that no revolutionary matters would come before such a Congress. The latter would certainly come quickly to new problems which are scarcely dreamt of to-day, but which will render international co-operation and general confidence possible in the end. The chief question would be the regularity of the Congress; that is all that is really new and revolutionary in it. Through this regularity of meeting, people would become accustomed to the idea of international co-operation, and a consciousness would be formed of the independence of all the members of the family of States, and of the nature of its organization. Political questions would gradually be approached, and, in the words used by the Emperor at Cuxhaven, in 1904, it would come to pass that the solidarity

of the civilized nations would little by little pass to the councils of statesmen.

Side by side with these conferences there would have to be a central office which would take their place during the recesses. It would also emphasize their permanency. The office would have a very modest beginning, as modest as that of the International Bureau of the American Republics in Washington. Perhaps as a bureau for commercial information or as an official enquiry bureau for Europe or for the whole world. This office would afterwards prepare for the conferences, carry out their decisions, prepare the necessary material, and see to all the preliminaries. Such a World Office, or at first a Pan-Europe Office, would bring the international administration and international co-operation to the notice of all.

These demands are not impossible of fulfilment. The time is fully ripe for such institutions. They could be established to-morrow, and they would signify universal peace. These newly-planted seeds would not fail to

take root and flourish. They would bring about the international rapprochement, the peace alliance, the strengthening of the community, the security of individual members, and the relief of all from the crushing burden of isolated efforts to ward off danger. In less than twenty years these institutions would be regarded as universal blessings. The Emperor, if he only took the initiative, might live to be hailed as the saviour of Europe, the universal sovereign and the Great Pacifist.

Over twenty years ago, when he came to the throne, he made a start. It was when he summoned the International Labour Congress to meet in Berlin. The attempt was a failure, but every triumph is preceded by failures. But the attempt was in the direction in which facts are trending to-day. It showed that the Emperor's mind was working in the same direction even so long ago. Those were other times, times from which we are separated by a century, as to-day the world moves further in two decades than it formerly moved in a

hundred years. The time is ripe. The summoning of such a world conference, the establishment of such a central office, would not be a failure to-day; that is borne out by the two Hague conferences. Who would have foreseen a few years ago the success attained by the cause of arbitration at the Hague? The world would be pacified after a short space of years. States would have grown accustomed to dispose of the most weighty questions by discussion and mutual concessions, and war would be treated as a crime, and as an attempt against the interests of humanity. Consequences, which cannot be estimated to-day, would ensue.

And the Emperor could do this. He could accelerate the great movement of our time. He could link his name for ever with this great time, and win the most precious laurels. If he does not, history will never forget that the most remarkable monarch, the most prominent personality of the age, was unable to grasp the possibilities of its greatest problem, like Napoleon those of steamships,

and Frederick William IV those of railways.

But the Emperor wishes to take the step. His utterances show it; he has already recognized the problem, and he sees the possibility of its solution, and the necessity. He is hindered only by the men who surround him, and who have not kept pace with him in their development. He is hindered by those who have an interest in the past, and who have always existed, and by *Romantiker* who wish to put back the clock.

But the clock will not be put back. The hour will come when the Emperor will throw off his fetters, when he will perceive that it is now time to carry out the promise he gave when he said: I 'only wish that European peace lay in my hands. I should certainly take care it should never be disturbed.' It now lies in his hands. The world and history await a deed!

THE END

Butler & Tanner, The Selwood Printing Works, Frome and London