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THE ROLE OF THE DIPLOMAT

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THE ROLE OF THE DIPLOMAT

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EVOLUTION	1
2. CONSEQUENT CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY	10
3. A NEW ROLE FOR THE DIPLOMAT PART I: SUBSTANTIVE ROLE	25
4. A NEW ROLE FOR THE DIPLOMAT PART II: CO-ORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT	38

CHAPTER 1

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EVOLUTION

"The middle years of the twentieth century find the world in a process of change probably more profound and more sweeping than any which has overtaken it since the mediaeval world broke up in ruins and the foundations of the modern world were laid in the 15th and 16th centuries."

E.H. Carr, What is History?

It is now a commonplace to say that the world is changing with unprecedented speed. Changes of such pervasiveness have occurred as to cause some historians to ask whether a new stage or epoch has been reached which demands a new kind of history and a new name. Professor Barraclough has used the term "contemporary history" to point out the essential difference in quality and content of the period now emerging from that which went before, hitherto known as modern history.* Changing attitudes are also evident in historians' interpretations of the first half of this century.** According to Barraclough, anyone looking down on the world of the 1960's and comparing it with fifty or more years ago will probably find few things more striking than the changes which have taken place in the structure of international relations. In a world that is undergoing such profound attitudinal and structural changes, it would be unreasonable to expect that the substance and methods of diplomacy could long remain unchanged. The assessment of the Duncan Report*** in preparation for the future that "The assumption of 'no change' is the one (assumption) which is surely going to be wrong" applies to diplomacy itself as well as to the environment in which it serves.

* An Introduction to Contemporary History by Geoffrey Barraclough

** Volume XII of the New Cambridge Modern History (1898-1945) was judged out-of-date and a new edition begun shortly after publication in 1960

*** Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation, London, 1969

Before embarking on a study of possible changes in diplomatic practice and organization, it would appear desirable to take a brief look at some of the symptoms of change in the international environment. Our task is going to be more difficult if, as suggested above, the course of history is moving out of a period of transition and into an essentially new and different phase. Without attempting to forecast the shape of things to come, we may nevertheless try to indicate some of the differentiating features which separate the new period from the old and show how some of the primary concerns of the future are likely to differ from those which occupied our attention in the not very distant past.

To begin with the framework or terms of reference through which we consider our international relations are in process of change. One reason is that whereas modern history was essentially European history or history seen from a European perspective, contemporary history is essentially world history. It has been suggested that more clues to the future may be found in Nkrumah's autobiography than in Eden's memoirs and more points of contact exist in the world of Mao and Nehru than in that of Coolidge and Baldwin. According to a significant body of opinion, an assessment or outlook which concentrates on the European predicament, while correct within its own limits, may be misleading in balance and perspective. The course of events in Europe itself may be understood differently when viewed against the world-wide process of change.*

* Barraclough writes: "The European conflicts of the first half of the 20th century were more than a continuation of earlier European conflicts. From the end of the 19th century Europe was involved simultaneously in the problems inherited from its own past and in a process of adoption to a new world situation, and both aspects of its history must be taken into account. It is easy to place disproportionate emphasis on the unsolved

One of the most significant developments affecting the conduct of international relations occurred between 1945 and 60 when no less than 40 countries with a population of 800 million achieved their independence. A new relationship - of parity rather than domination - was established between Europe on the one hand and Asia and Africa. Moreover relations with the newly-independent states were of a different character than had existed between the independent states in pre-war times: the emphasis was on helping the new states by all means available to preserve and govern themselves. By the early 1960's the problems of underdevelopment were regarded sufficiently seriously to cause substantial aid efforts to be mounted by most of the developed countries; by comparison, issues such as German re-unification fell into the background.

Further changes in perspective are illustrated by the inadequacy of many traditional notions of geopolitics, e.g. that the power of states can be reckoned simply by taking inventories of their military hardware, wealth, foreign exchange, etc. Today there operate within the modern states-system

problems of nationalism, as they developed in Europe since 1815. These problems, particularly the growth of German nationalism, were one factor in the situation; but equally important was the awareness that the position of Europe in the world was changing and that it would be irretrievably lost unless something were done to restore it. We can see this conviction emerging and gathering strength - particularly but not exclusively in Germany. ... But it was never simply an expression of German nationalism. Rather its foundation was the conviction that policies which aimed merely to defend established positions were fighting a losing battle, and that a more positive reaction was necessary. This reaction has been called 'the last attempt to re-organize modern Europe'. The form it took was an attempt to weld together in the heart of Europe the core of a German-dominated empire strong enough to compete on terms of equality with the other great world powers of the time, imperial Russia, the United States and the British empire. Its outcome was the wars of 1914 and 1939."

constraints so powerful that even the strongest of its member governments are required to yield. According to what James Eayrs has called the "paradox of power", it is the Great Powers which seem to be experiencing the greatest difficulty in achieving their respective national goals. Contests involving these powers, e.g. the U.S. and North Vietnam, USSR and Czechoslovakia, or USSR and China continue with results which are far from clear-cut. According to Eayrs, there are three likely reasons for this: the dread of the Great Powers of thermonuclear war; the fact that they are only free to engage in guerilla-type war, which for them is extremely frustrating^{*}; and the heightened constraint of public opinion, assisted by modern communications.^{**} In contrast to the Great Powers, the smaller countries have come into their own like never before, thereby enhancing the variety and complexity of international life. Especially in the UN General Assembly where "the mighty are put down from their seats and those of low degree exalted" the small states frequently have seen themselves as the custodians of international morality. Many significant initiatives have in fact originated with the smaller states. Moreover it is suggested that since they have few if any vested interests in the international system as it is, the smaller states continue to have a role to play as innovators.

* Aurelio Peccei sees the "once triumphant, sharp logic of war (as) all but sealed in Vietnam.... to all practical ends, its objective - victory - is now foreclosed ... This is a total reversal of past situations, opening up unlimited perspectives, and bound to generate new trends in man's thinking, new approaches to the world's problems." The Chasm Ahead p.xv

** Fate and Will in Foreign Policy by James Eayrs

The new pattern differed from the old in the prominence of China, unmistakably advancing towards the status of a world-power, and also in the gradual but identifiable change in relations between the communist and non-communist worlds: "a change due not to the settlement of outstanding issues or the abatement of ideological differences, but to the realization that the old issues were no longer the insistent issues, and that in any case there was no practical alternative, in the world as it was, to some form of co-existence."^{*}

Other important factors of change - the rise of "mass democracy", the challenge to liberal values and the growing impact of technology - all impinge in one way or another on the traditional role of diplomacy. It is the interaction of all these and other factors mentioned above which is attributed with bringing about the transition from the old world to the new:

"Only when the constellation of (European) political forces became involved with constellations in other parts of the world; only when the conflict between peoples and governments interlocked with the conflict of classes ...; only when social and ideological movements cut across frontiers in a way (or at least to an extent) that was unknown in the period of nation states: only then did it become clear beyond all dispute that a new period in the history of mankind had arrived."^{**}

Whereas most observers have depicted the drama of contemporary history as a tremendous conflict of principles and beliefs, a "clash of irreconcilable ideologies comparable to the struggle between mediaeval Christianity and Islam", the position in retrospect may appear a good deal more complicated. The chief significance of the ideological struggle may have been to set the stage for more far reaching changes - the emancipation of the people of Africa and Asia

* G. Barraclough, op. cit., p. 31

** ibid, p. 18

for example - and its relevance to conditions of the later 20th century and to such problems as the feeding of the burgeoning world population is increasingly questionable. While there is no doubt that the conflict between the new and old ideologies profoundly affected the character of contemporary history, it may also be true that "the ideological conflict is no longer so distinctive a feature of contemporary history as is often assumed, nor is it always much more than useful propaganda for the pursuit of other objectives". A marked feature of the international scene in the postwar years was undoubtedly the increased flow and power of propaganda based on crude ideological lines, which took advantage of the new methods of mass indoctrination and the spread of literacy. On the other hand, the new social philosophy provided a further component to the new world situation as it challenged the dominant liberal values of the old. It was an expression of the new forces which social and economic change had released, a doctrine designed to meet the needs of a new age.

The steady progress of industrialization led to a continuing rise in urban populations, the advent of new mass societies and pressures on the existing social and political systems. Governments were seized with new concerns and driven into new areas of activity, with the result that a new philosophy of state intervention, of social welfare and ultimately of planning was born. New conceptions of the state and its functions grew up and continue to unfold.

It was inevitable that the effects of these changes would sooner or later make themselves felt in the way governments relate to one another. The increasingly complex web of international agreements, aid to underprivileged countries and finally the prospect of more shared activities

including planning to confront the "challenges of modern society" and problems of the "human environment" - all reflect developments which have occurred within national societies.

It was inevitable too that sooner or later the pressures of the new society would be exerted in other ways on international life. The custom that foreign affairs was "a specialized and esoteric study, the secrets of which lay beyond the scope of ordinary laymen's experience and judgment" was undermined by the broadened party political system and finally by improved travel and communications, which greatly increased the public's awareness and their desire for articulation and self-expression.

The effects of the new social order on all forms of human self-expression are not difficult to see. Revolutionary changes of outlook have led to the collapse of traditional forms of art and a wave of experimentation in every branch of artistic expression. The principal difference in outlook has been characterized as a changing reaction to technological civilization, from its "rejection as incompatible with culture" to "acceptance of its challenge". As interpreted by Barraclough, a generation inspired by the potentialities of science and technology

"broke through the humanist barrier and took possession of the field. It was an irreversible victory ... (the scientific tasks) could only be achieved by teamwork - that is to say, if people were ready to accept a measure of discipline and conformity formerly rejected as incompatible with human dignity. The result was a new attitude to man's place in the world."^{*}

It is apparent that significant artistic and cultural movements no longer necessarily radiate from Europe and that at least some aspects of the new outlook are world-wide in character. Whether the new values will lead

* *ibid*, p. 253

in the forthcoming era to a more unified culture, it is still perhaps too soon to say. However it does seem likely that greatly enhanced cultural diffusion will continue to add to the sense of community among substantial parts of the world population.

The transitional period from the old world to the new was one which experienced a breakthrough in scientific knowledge and achievement, an alliance between science and technology which brought with it "the power to change for all time the material basis of our lives on a scale inconceivable only fifty years ago". Conceivably, technological change was the dominant factor in the whole process of change, acting as a solvent of the old order and a catalyst of the new. According to Peccei, "We live in the most revolutionary period of human history ... The prime driving force of this revolution is no longer religious belief, ideology, economic pressure or social justice - but technological change. This makes it altogether different from the revolutions of the past."^{*} In particular, by doing away with distances, equalizing information and creating new awareness of common problems and threats, the new technologies determined that isolation in our crowded planet is going to disappear.

Whether the technological revolution will lead to hope or despair depends on man himself: he has to master his technology and cause technological progress to serve his basic goals. To do this, according to Peccei, will require new institutions and probably new political philosophies, more responsive to change, overlapping national boundaries and jurisdictions.

* op. cit.

Herein lie the important implications for the future of international relations. New planning of world-wide scope is urgently needed. The object of these new efforts will be to help us gain control of the future.

CHAPTER 2

CONSEQUENT CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY

"The conditions on which the old diplomacy was based no longer exist."

Harold Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method

What is diplomacy? How has it performed in the past? And how are the traditional forms, methods and agencies through which it has operated likely to be affected by the changes we have sought to identify in the international environment?

The story of the evolution of diplomacy up to recent times has been eloquently told by Harold Nicolson.* According to Nicolson, the nature of diplomacy practised by the European powers was heavily influenced after 1919 by what he refers to as the American method. Writing in the 1950's, Nicolson forecast the unfolding of a new stage in the development of diplomacy, corresponding, it now appears, with the new stage of history identified by Barraclough (Chapter 1). Concerning the intervening period beginning in 1919 and continuing through the 1950's, Nicolson wrote: "I prefer - since the Americans have not yet discovered their own formula - to call it 'The Transition between the Old Diplomacy and the New' ".

The Old Diplomacy or so-called "French method", which emerged out of Byzantine and Italian strains and prevailed in Europe through the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, is characterized by Nicolson as follows:

* The Evolution of Diplomatic Method 1954; Diplomacy, 1939, third ed. 1963; and a number of published articles.

"it was courteous and dignified ... continuous and gradual; it attached importance to knowledge and experience; it took account of the realities of existing power; and it defined good faith, lucidity and precision as the qualities essential to sound negotiation. The mistakes, the follies and the crimes that during those three hundred years accumulated to the discredit of the old diplomacy can, when examined at their sources, be traced to evil foreign policy rather than to faulty methods of negotiation. It is regrettable that the bad things they did should have dishonoured the excellent manner in which they did them .. as a method of negotiation, it was infinitely more efficient than that we employ today."

Other important characteristics of the Old Diplomacy listed by the same author were its concentration on Europe; the assumption that Great Powers were greater than Small Powers, which in turn implied a third principle: that the Great Powers were responsible for the conduct of the Small Powers; the establishment in every European country of a professional diplomatic service on a more or less identical model; the generally accepted rule that sound negotiation must be continuous and confidential. Officials of the respective diplomatic services possessed similar standards of education, similar experience and a similar aim and tended to develop a corporate identity. According to Nicolson, they all believed, whatever their governments might believe, that the purpose of diplomacy was the preservation of peace. Implicit in the state of public indifference to the conduct of foreign affairs was the confidence that successive governments would do their utmost to preserve that greatest of all national interests. If a situation arose in which the vital liberties, rights, possessions or interests of the country were menaced by any threat of external force, the majority of the country would support the Government in its determination to resist that menace by the use of military power.

* *ibid*, pp. 72-73

An ambassador negotiating a treaty according to the methods of the Old Diplomacy was not pressed for time. A negotiation that had reached a deadlock could be dropped for a few months without hopes being dashed or speculation aroused. The agreements that in the end resulted were no hasty improvisations or empty formulas, but documents considered and drafted with extreme care.

From Nicolson's sketch of traditional diplomatic practice, we return to the question: Have the essential characteristics of the Old Diplomacy changed sufficiently to warrant a new name as implied in the phrase "The Transition between the Old Diplomacy and the New"? The term New Diplomacy has been current in the United States since 1961 and more recently figured in the Report of the Duncan Committee on British Overseas Representation. What changes have occurred in diplomatic practice and what are the essential characteristics of the so-called New Diplomacy?

In Nicolson's assessment, the application of the principles of liberal democracy to the conduct of international relations (chiefly under American influence and beginning with President Wilson's role in the Paris peace negotiations) was the dominant factor affecting the traditional practice of diplomacy and starting the transition from the old methods to the new. The Old Diplomacy was obliged to adopt the ideas and habits of the systems which it represented. When the old theories of diplomacy appeared to be adopting new shapes, it was not the diplomats who were undergoing a change of heart but the political systems which they represented:

"On the one hand, the ordinary citizen, being convinced that the masses in every country shared his own detestation of war, attributed the breach of the peace to the vice or folly of a small minority, which must in future be placed under democratic

control. On the other hand, when the Americans arrived as the dominant factor in the coalition, they brought with them their dislike of European institutions, their distrust of diplomacy and their missionary faith in the equality of man.*

The American approach was embodied in President Wilson's statements prior to the Paris Peace Conference that in future there should be only "open covenants of peace openly arrived at" and "diplomacy should proceed always frankly and in public view". According to Nicolson who himself attended the Conference, Wilson's sermons on "open diplomacy" laid the seeds of chaos which later impeded and sometimes obliterated the processes of rational negotiation between nations. Nevertheless, Wilson's statements were prophetic of a new trend that was subsequently to be reinforced by other developments noted in Chapter I, most noticeably in technology, transportation and communications.

The Old Diplomacy of persuasion, compromise and patient conciliation was to be dealt additional blows. In 1961 Nicolson wrote -

"Since 1914 the structure of the world has changed. Compared to present struggles, the rivalries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sink into insignificance The old standards, conventions and methods of international negotiation have been discredited. Had it not been for the invention of the atomic bomb, we should already have been subjected to a third world war..."

* Ibid, p. 84. That many Americans continue to hold a dislike for traditional European diplomacy and remain puzzled by its more modern American variant is pointed out by Charles Thayer, former U.S. Ambassador, in his book Diplomacy: "In the older countries of Europe, diplomacy has long been accepted as an indispensable and respectable method of defending one's international interests. In the U.S., however, despite oratorical references to 'The First Line of Defence', it has more often been regarded as an expendable weapon, like a hand grenade to be tossed among the enemy occasionally, chiefly to create confusion ... This attitude is not so odd as it may appear. Only in the generation since World War I has ordinary diplomacy been practised by the U.S., and then only spasmodically. European diplomacy has been associated in the public mind with Machiavellianism and cardsharpping, the American version with striped pants and cookie pushing. It has been regarded by many as a necessary evil rather than a positive force. Wrapped in unnecessary mystery by its own practitioners, its purposes, functions and methods have seldom been fully grasped."

"Conventional morality, even the creation of confidence, has no part in this scheme of things. Truth itself has lost its significance... The modern diplomatist must realize that he can no longer rely on the old system of trust; he must accept the fact that his antagonists will not hesitate to falsify facts and that they feel no shame if their duplicity is exposed. The old currency has been withdrawn from circulation; we are dealing in a new coinage."^{*}

Thus we can see how various forces conspired to cast doubts upon the continued practicability of traditional diplomacy, reflected in the writings of its most loyal and enthusiastic practitioners. Already nine years ago, in Nicolson's record, we read that "Again and again have I heard the slogan that ambassadors today have ceased to count." (See also the footnote by a British ambassador in 1957.) Questions about the role of ambassadors, then as now, we may be sure did not relate to the more utilitarian functions

* Article in Foreign Affairs, October 1961. Apart from still current conflicts, Sato's A Guide to Diplomatic Practice notes also the ill effects which Nazism had on European diplomatic practices: "With the advent of Hitler the usually accepted practice of diplomacy received some rude blows from which, in some respects, it has never recovered ... There has been a growing tendency, since 1933, to supersede the professional diplomat by the creature of the local ideology and to substitute for the discreet exchange of notes, tendentious press conferences and abuse over the air.... What are left of the old canons of diplomacy are continuously subject to change, both deliberate and unconscious. Increasing questioning and criticism in parliament and press; a growing tendency for Ministers dealing with foreign affairs to travel about the world and take into their own hands consultations which a few decades back could, and would, have been conducted by the heads of the diplomatic missions concerned; the vastly increased speed and facility of communication between the Foreign Office and Her Majesty's Missions abroad; the growing habit of parliamentary and other groups of paying visits to foreign countries - all these tend to undermine the confidence and independence of members of the Foreign Service and in some cases to usurp, in favour of the activities of an amateur hotel and travel agency, time and money formerly, and more usefully, devoted by members of Her Majesty's Embassies, Legations and Consulates to the cultivation of local contacts". Introduction to the fourth edition by Sir Nevile Bland, 1957.

performed by the heads of mission and their staffs: such functions as the promotion of commercial interests, protection of property and assistance to travellers; the questioning was directed to the traditional forms and concepts of diplomacy, to the so-called "old canons", represented in this discussion by the phrase Old Diplomacy. Was, and is, such widespread skepticism justified in terms of the traditional or Nicolsonian model of diplomacy?

It has been suggested that the traditional concept of diplomacy with its emphasis on the "ordered conduct of relations" may continue to have relevance within alliances or in groups of like-minded countries. On the other hand, where "diplomacy" seems to be needed most, i.e. where the differences between the two parties are as profound as between the West and the Soviet world, the USSR and China, the Arabs and Israel, in Korea or Vietnam - where the political assumptions, economic beliefs, etc. are so far removed as to be incomparable - the very basis of the Old Diplomacy is abolished.

Whether or not we accept this argument, it does appear that some former conceptions of negotiation, the central theme in the historic interpretations of diplomacy, are of diminishing, even vanishing, utility: for example, the notion which portrays negotiation as a kind of high school debating league where individual countries are brought together to score points against one another - as if, at a certain point in the argument, Mr. Brezhnev might say to Mr. Nixon (or via their representatives) "All right, you've got me! What are your terms?" Similarly, the seemingly naive notion that the spirit of togetherness working among the envoys could somehow bring new insights and a new spirit of reconciliation is today open to much doubt.

Nor are there so many opportunities for the sort of dealing between nations which occurred (and in which Canada played an important part) after the 1956 Suez War or at certain stages in the Cyprus dispute. Notions of this kind of dealing or manifestations of "influence" still persist as shown by the lingering assertion in the Duncan Report published last summer that "Political relations between governments are significant when one or other party is in a position to exert political influence." (page 46). If Britain were unable to exert more compelling influence in Rhodesia or Nigeria where it had a good deal going in its favour, it is unlikely to have significant influence in Ethiopia or Indonesia and therefore might conclude, with the logic of the Duncan Report (pages 46 and 47), that it had no "political relations" worth mentioning with those countries. Where the bargaining process may on the surface still seem to have relevance - e.g. the SALT talks, Vietnam negotiations, Russian - Chinese talks, etc. - the "offers" tabled at such negotiations are most likely not the work of the men-on-the-spot, and the outcome of the negotiations is probably as much or more determined by such factors as popular constraints, analysis conducted outside the negotiations and by parallel communications afforded by a host of private, semi-official and official channels. It was the improvement in communications which led Nicolson, already in 1939, to observe that "the qualities of personal initiative, enterprise and responsibility are less severely strained in the new diplomacy than they were in the old".

Where negotiations have not succeeded in recent years, e.g. the Wilson - Ian Smith talks, Jarring mission, etc. - rather than raising doubts about the skills or "good faith" of the negotiators concerned - the failures have served to underline the diminishing utility of traditionally-inspired

negotiations in a world where, in terms of the Old Diplomacy, major issues tend more often than not to be non-negotiable. While we cannot foretell the shape of things to come, what does seem to hold increasing force among the features of the new period are the greater use of information media and other direct approaches which seek to take advantage of the public's growing awareness and need for participation. As noted in a recent American book, probably without great exaggeration as a foretaste of a new era in diplomatic history:

"It is no longer possible for high-level statesmen to glide through the lofty avenues of diplomacy, trailed by first, second and third secretaries in perfect protocol alignment. A government, to survive, must supplement formal government-to-government relations with an approach to the people.

"To meet this challenge, governments around the world have turned to a totally new concept of international diplomacy. This is the age of public diplomacy, the era of people-to-people dialogues, the day of human communications."*

We shall return to this subject in Chapter 3.

Another development identified by Nicolson as signifying a new phase in the evolution of diplomacy was the gathering momentum of "diplomacy by conference". Although he did not portray it as such, this continuing trend may be symptomatic of another more fundamental development, obscure but nonetheless real, which Nicolson described as the movement from a conception of exclusive national interests to one of common international interests.

Thus he wrote:

"If one concentrates upon the continuity of diplomatic theory rather than upon its discontinuity, one is impressed by the fact that in spite of the several different shapes which it assumed, and in spite of dramatic periods when violence momentarily became more authoritative than reason, it is possible to recognize a distinct upward curve of progress.

* Diplomatic Persuaders, edited by John Lee

What is the nature of that progress? I should define it as follows: 'The progress of diplomatic theory has been from the narrow conception of exclusive tribal rights to the wider conception of inclusive common interests'."*

"Progress" came slowly, over many centuries, as a result mainly of the steady development over time of the conceptions and influence of international law, and the growth of international trade and commerce. Most significant progress was made under the impulse of a common external danger as, during the First World War, Nicolson tells how

"agreement between the several Allied Governments on matters of immediate importance could not rapidly be secured by the ordinary methods of diplomatic communication. It became essential that at regular intervals the Prime Ministers or experts of the several Powers should meet round a table and discuss the urgent problems of strategy and policy ... There were in addition innumerable technical problems, such as food and transport, in regard to which all the Allies were faced by common dangers and common necessities. They were obliged to pool their resources and to agree upon the priorities of their respective needs. A whole network of inter-allied committees, or permanent conferences, was therefore created... These international committees became in course of time something more than a mere war-time machinery of co-ordination. They constituted a fundamental innovation in what until then had been the usual practice of international negotiation. In the place of a national policy expressing itself by competitive and conflicting diplomacy, you had a common international interest imposing the need of international co-operation. Nor was this the only difference. Instead of national policy trying to impose itself from above upon the facts of a situation you had a system by which the facts imposed themselves upon a policy. It was found that a body of international experts, when dealing under the pressure of a common danger with very concrete facts, acquired a more continuous standard of mutual confidence and co-operation than professional diplomats had ever managed to achieve."**

* Diplomacy by H. Nicolson, Chapter II

** ibid, Chapter VII

The hopes placed in this new kind of intercourse were not to be fulfilled at once, however, as subsequently we read that "once the common danger had been removed" - disintegration set in; "the popularity of diplomacy by conference ... declined".

Further impetus was provided by the growing importance of commerce and of such international problems as currency and finance. Again we note that

"many of these important matters of controversy and discussion required technical knowledge of the problems that they covered, and that the ordinary diplomatist did not possess that specialized knowledge of currency or finance which would enable him to negotiate upon such subjects. The excellent practice thus arose of entrusting such negotiations to Treasury experts and of maintaining, as financial attachés to certain embassies, men who had spent their lives in the study of these particular problems."^{*}

Following the First World War, the most important innovation in international co-operation was the League of Nations, which based itself upon a covenant or body of rules and principles, agreed to hold regular meetings at a definite time and location and set up a permanent secretariat of trained international experts.

The League was replaced by the United Nations, and a large number of other, in some cases related, international organizations for political, economic, social and scientific co-operation have continued to spring up and grow. The increasing number and variety of international conferences, while providing more points of contact between governments, also provided more direct means of communication between people of different lands in common fields of activity: it created in effect a new kind of communications network on functional lines, for the benefit of state and society.

* *ibid*, Chapter VII

The relationship between two countries had become increasingly one of information and material flow, with a consequent de-emphasis of its more formal side. The apparent logic of international organizations generated great expectations among the newly emergent nations. With the increasing attention being paid to social problems in the developed countries, we expect that they will be seeking new and additional means of co-operation through the expansion of existing institutions and formation of new ones - including possibly bodies of a novel kind, which have not existed hitherto. Two examples are the recently-formed NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society and the steps being taken to improve co-operation in science and technology between the EEC and EFTA countries. As noted by Sir Kenneth Clark in a recent book and film series on Civilisation when explaining the contiguous appointment of two Italian bishops to the Archbishopric of Canterbury in the twelfth century, when a particular field of activity is important to us, then internationalism becomes acceptable. Such internationalism exists today in science and technology (as, in the twelfth century, it existed in ecclesiastical affairs) and seems likely to become common in approaches to social and environmental problems.

These developments are bound to have an impact on diplomacy and the conduct of relations. Indeed they are one of the distinguishing characteristics of the "New Diplomacy" as it is envisaged by the Duncan Committee:

"Diplomacy is probably still thought of mainly as the conduct by diplomats of relations between two governments. But the performance of similar functions by non-diplomats and the development of the activities of both diplomats and non-diplomats on a multilateral rather than bilateral basis, has now become a marked feature of the international scene. We have referred to this in Chapter I as the 'New Diplomacy'. Meetings on a bilateral or multilateral basis performing a quasi-diplomatic function have of course been known for a long time. But it has recently become increasingly the practice

to place such interchanges into an institutional context. We have in mind both lines of development - the increasing regular contact at all levels between specialists from various countries in the complicated techniques of modern life and the switch to multilateral organizations of the scene of activities which would previously have taken place bilaterally ... One of the most striking instances is the shift in focus in financial diplomacy to the Group of Ten and the OECD.

"Diplomatic functions have therefore been affected in two ways. In the first place, a great deal more is now being done by non-diplomats ... Secondly, the subjects which diplomats themselves have to master, particularly in discussions in international organizations, have greatly widened."^{*}

There are other aspects and interpretations of the New Diplomacy with which we shall be dealing in Chapter 3. To assist in this further discussion and for those who are inclined towards models, we have attempted to design a model of the "world system" and the place of diplomatic and related government machinery in that system. It should be emphasized that such a model is only a simplified "thinking tool" and does not attempt to represent fairly all the intricacies and subtleties of such a large and complex system. In particular, we have not attempted to indicate any lines of authority or communication (some will occur to the reader) but, mainly to keep it simple, have presented only the elements of the system as we see it in a spatial relationship. A short description of the model follows in this chapter. However its use is not essential to the arguments, analysis and judgments put forward in the remaining chapters of this study. It can thus be omitted.

* Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation, 1969, p. 59. In the introduction of their Report, the Committee noted significantly that, at least among the developed countries in Western Europe, North America, Australia and Japan, "none of us will be able to conduct our domestic policies effectively (by the mid-1970's) without constant reference to each other."

CHAPTER 3

A NEW ROLE FOR THE DIPLOMAT
PART I: SUBSTANTIVE ROLE

"The future of the past is in the future
The future of the present is in the past
The future of the future is in the present"

John McHale, The Future of the Future

What, we may ask, is a diplomat, if not a "negotiator" in the traditional or Nicolsonian sense? An indication of the possible range of his field of activity is contained in a recent study carried out at the RAND Corporation:

"Foreign Affairs never was primarily a question of reinsurance treaties and diplomatic covenants. This is perhaps clearer to-day than in the past. To be sure the diplomatic game still includes such stuff, but increasingly it also includes the wide range of particular programs and policies that we are engaged in elsewhere in the world: defence, trade, economic assistance, information gathering and dissemination, international financial matters, and scientific co-operation, among others. All of these activities together is what foreign affairs is about. Moreover, trends in technology, economics and culture all make inevitable a high, and probably growing, level of international involvement which will persist despite our current flirtation with some of the trappings of neoisolationism."^{*}

The trend towards diplomacy by conference discussed in the previous chapter, the multiplicity of new institutions which cut across national boundaries and greatly enhanced communication enabled governments to refer to one another in a variety of ways through a large and expanding number of channels. But more than that. Henry Kissinger notes that, while the number of participants in the international order increased, their technical ability to affect one another also vastly grew and the scope of their purposes expanded: whence the "revolutionary character of our age".^{**} Examples from

* "Policy Analysis in International Affairs", H.S. Rowen and A.P. Williams, RAND P 4243, November 1969

** American Foreign Policy by H.A. Kissinger, 1969, p. 53

Canadian experience are not hard to find. The Canadian Ambassador in Bonn wrote in 1964 that "one of the most striking aspects of the Canadian Government's activities in Germany in recent years has been their proliferation." According to the Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs, Canada was officially represented in 1968 at 105 conferences. By mid-1969 there were twenty-two Federal Government departments and agencies with members serving overseas (which might therefore be considered to possess a foreign service of their own, though not in most cases a career foreign service). The numbers of employees serving overseas in 1969 are surprising: Treasury Board, 59; Defence Research Board, 41; National Research Council, 12, National Health and Welfare, 189; National Revenue, 33; National Film Board, 52; Public Works, 33; Veterans Affairs, 21; in addition to the departments which conduct major operations overseas, i.e. External Affairs, Canadian International Development Agency, Industry, Trade and Commerce, National Defence, Manpower and Immigration. Of all the employees of the Canadian Government overseas, excluding major military personnel under treaty and peacekeeping commitments, only 36.5% were employees of the Department of External Affairs. These figures do not include representatives of provincial governments, municipalities, corporations, scientists, professors, etc. and officials who travel and work overseas but are normally resident in Canada. The scope of Canadian purpose in the international environment clearly has expanded.

As noted above, foreign affairs comprises many classes of problems of widely differing character; to-day it embraces the operations of many government agencies. The question must therefore be asked: Is what is needed to replace the traditional diplomat simply a "technomat" i.e. a technician

or manager equipped to assist in the support, execution and direction of a broad range of government programmes overseas - commercial, aid, cultural, technological, etc? The technomat would interest himself in the political affairs of the country in which he resides only when political trends and events had some relevance to specific Canadian interests and programmes. For guidance on political reporting, he might have in mind the "rule of thumb" suggested by the Duncan Committee for the majority of British posts: background reporting should be limited to "an occasional forward-looking assessment" such as might form the substance of a "short annual review".^{*}

It is interesting to examine the role of a diplomat in the context of Rowen's and Williams' study on policy and programme analysis. The authors draw attention to the different qualities of programmes and activities which fall under the heading of foreign affairs. For certain types of programmes where specific activities are carried out involving the expenditure of funds, a detailed and fairly exact analysis is possible. One could describe the proximate "outputs" of these programmes, sometimes quantitatively, compare alternative ways of achieving the proximate outputs - perhaps invent new ones - and generally enhance programme effectiveness relative to programme costs by choice of alternatives. This would appear to be the case for such

^{*} Op. cit., p. 54. Some might think the explanation for this apparently radical formula lies more in (i) the current size of the British Foreign Service and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office budget which, at £ 64 million (1968-69) excluding contributions to international organizations, cultural and information programmes, is more than three times that of the Department of External Affairs; and in (ii) Britain's balance of payments problems (alleviated since publication of the Duncan Report); than in (iii) a careful examination of the utility and real costs of reports relative to overall programme expenditures. The closure of 11 small British posts was reported March 2; another 240 posts remain.

programmes as trade, certain technical assistance which has a measurable output and possibly immigration. Other programmes are somewhat less amenable to direct and concrete analysis of the cost-effectiveness type, e.g. assessment of an information programme is likely to be no small task, but some concrete measure of its achievement is at least conceivable. However, whatever the ease or difficulty in analyzing programmes in this sense, programmes are not ends in themselves. They relate to such broader Canadian purposes as economic growth, enhancing social justice and quality of life, strengthening our security, etc. Assessing programmes in terms of their contribution to such broader objectives may be quite difficult. For that reason, it is often not attempted at all. The objectives themselves are sometimes vague, the functional relationships connecting programme activities to these objectives are difficult to specify, and relevant data are often poor or even non-existent. But clearly it is these higher purposes that are of greatest interest to policy-makers.

Other problems do not involve programme activities at all, or do so only in small part. Such policy areas might include efforts towards arms control and disarmament, attempts to decrease the probability of conflict in the Middle East or improve our trade relations with foreign countries (as distinct from sales promotion). Thus along with specific programmes must be included a wider set of non-programme aspects.

Questions have been raised in the context of the Foreign Policy Review and related Defence Review about the extent of our foreign commitments, the structure and size of our military forces, size and character of our aid programmes, and the allocation of resources among regions and countries. Are our various programmes mutually consistent? What are the theories or beliefs and the underlying evidence to support them? What contrary hypotheses and

programmes might be advanced and what is the evidence for them?

These are legitimate, indeed necessary, questions. But foreign policy and programmes in the past have not been constructed in a unitary way nor subjected to the kind of systematic process suggested here. Rather, they have tended increasingly to become an assemblage of largely independent components, and some important ones receive relatively little analysis. There is a shortage of analysis which cuts across budgetary categories and organizational lines. *

* The scope of the analytical problem can be further illustrated from budgetary considerations. To take the U.S. example, "The Department of State, the U.S. agency charged with co-ordinating foreign affairs, receives less than one-half of one percent of the total budget, much of this for administrative expenses and salaries of Foreign Service personnel. But many of the problems do not come packaged in the way Congress appropriates funds or the executive branch administers them. Yet budget decisions are policy decisions. Budget decisions on bilateral versus multilateral aid, military lift capacity versus foreign bases, nuclear versus non-nuclear military forces, food aid versus money, Latin America versus Africa, all have profound policy implications. The fragmentation of budget decision-making within many agencies means the absence of a consistent policy input to these decisions ... Schelling has commented:

'When Secretary McNamara assumed office, he was at least 15 years ahead of where the Secretary of State is now in having a recognized budget. There is a 'defence budget'; there is not a 'foreign affairs budget'. Both legally and traditionally the defence budget is fairly clearly defined; around the edges there are the Atomic Energy Commission, some space activities, perhaps the Maritime Commission, that one may wish to lump into a comprehensive 'defence total' and over which the Secretary of Defence does not exercise direct budgetary authority... The Secretary of Defence makes an annual comprehensive presentation of his budget... it is a 'State of the Union' insofar as national security is concerned. The Committees in Congress that deal with the defence budget have no doubt about what budget it is they are considering.

'Not so the Secretary of State, whose own budget of about a third of a billion per year corresponds, to take a very crude analogy, to the budget that the Secretary of Defence might present for the Pentagon building and the people who work in it.' "

Rowen and Williams, op. cit.; quotation from T.C. Schelling "PPBS and Foreign Affairs", memorandum prepared for the U.S. Senate, 1968.

It is necessary to consider our foreign operations along functional (or global) lines, as extensions of domestic ones. Something of this sort already exists in the division of responsibilities between departments in Ottawa. Another possibility in this vein now being considered - more interesting and useful from the point of view of deciding overall policy - is the division of activities according to subject fields or "policy themes", e.g. economic growth, democracy and social justice, etc. which cut across departmental lines. From an analytic point of view, J.W. Burton has suggested that world affairs are best analyzed by considering systems first, and then the role of states.^{*} However, as the conclusion of the last sentence suggests, it is equally necessary to consider our foreign operations as a whole, for it is only then that we can understand how Canada is perceived abroad - the meaning of Canadian identity - and only then can we command the full sense of Canadian purpose. This need for an overall perspective is most apparent at the country (or regional) level. If the decisions taken and executed by different agencies in a given country (or region) are in conflict with one another (as they sometimes have been and continue to be) our policies will be clouded and our effectiveness impaired. Programmes and policies serving global objectives have to be tailored to the conditions obtaining in individual countries, and programmes in foreign countries usually must be acceptable to the host governments. In addition, the feedback from our foreign activities frequently will arise from national or regional authorities who, however, may not necessarily respond in kind.^{**}

^{*} Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules by J.W. Burton, p. 10. The author considers this the reverse of a traditional approach.

^{**} A further illustration that there are two ways of viewing overseas operations is apparent by observing that particular operations, e.g. overseas cultural activities, may be considered as both (i) a contribution to

Yet the government structure at present is not such as to ensure both functional and geographic regulation and command of its activities. The geographic deployment of missions on the one hand, and the functional separation of departments in Ottawa on the other hand, appear to intersect in the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa and in certain other regulatory bodies including the PMO, PCO and the Cabinet with, however, as yet, inadequate means for transfer and control (forward and backward) between two essentially different structures represented by the government establishments in Ottawa and abroad. ~~***~~ The necessary basic elements for successful transfer and control between the two ends of the government channel are seen to exist, at official level, in the Department of External Affairs where the operating divisions are of two kinds: functional and area divisions. At Cabinet level, the integrative function is performed by the Prime Minister, and by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

~~***~~ (Cont'd)

Canadian cultural growth, which might result in their being related to educational, cultural and recreational activities in Canada and (ii) a means of creating goodwill and understanding for Canada abroad as a basis for the more successful carrying out of other foreign operations. Indeed most (but not all) Canadian activities might be positioned in a 2-dimensional matrix, where the co-ordinates denoted functional and geographic classifications; the Canadian programme in a particular field, e.g. culture, science, trade, or in a particular country (or area) could then be determined by vertical or horizontal integration of the programme elements.

~~***~~ A further complication is introduced by the fact that many officials now serving overseas report directly to their home departments, thereby inhibiting country (or regional) co-ordination and putting a further burden on existing interdepartmental machinery in Ottawa, i.e. interdepartmental committee structure, PCO and Cabinet.

However, the growing number of departments and agencies concerned with "foreign affairs" and the variety and scope of Canadian interests and activities has placed an increasing burden on the existing structures in Ottawa, as indeed on the foreign offices in other developed countries. In the United States, for example, the point of intercept has tended to shift between the Department of State and the White House (or National Security Council) Staff, and sometimes it has tended to move toward the Department of Defence and the Office of International Security Affairs.

Since policy formulation and analysis can be usefully examined only in relation to the mechanism for reaching and implementing policy decisions, we have touched in this chapter on organizational or structural problems. Further discussion of these problems is contained in the following chapter. For the remainder of the present discussion, we shall be concerned with the substantive role of the diplomat in the complex and rapidly developing situation of which an outline has now begun to appear.

Underlying the thesis that the diplomat should in future be a "technomat" is the assumption that it is possible to pursue policies central to Canadian interests (e.g. aid, cultural, economic, technological) while giving only minimal attention to general political matters. The assumption appears to gather strength from the currently popular assertion that foreign interests and objectives are an extension of domestic ones: which, however, underestimates the cybernetic or feedback effect of our foreign activities, the multitude of ways in which actions initiated outside Canada can affect us and the generally dynamic character of the international environment. There is scarcely any major development abroad which may not affect life at home at some stage and in some way in most countries, and which does not therefore require us to respond in some way.

Much information about the outside world is required if a satisfactory analysis of the complex problems discussed above is to be carried out and comprehensive, realistic alternatives put before the government. Implicit in much of what Canadians try to do abroad are assumptions about the ways in which institutions work, the strength of forces making for change or for stability, the prospects for increased economic growth, the effects of such growth on political stability, the consequences of increased urbanization and so forth. Yet only infrequently at present do we examine these matters in depth and when we do so it is usually on rather narrow, albeit often important, questions: the status of a certain dissident group, agricultural progress, etc. Usually neglected is a systematic effort to get deeper and broader understanding of the societies with which we deal.

While the relative stability of political institutions in the West may allow us more or less to take them for granted, we cannot afford the luxury of ignoring them in any less developed country. Instability and its causes, the incidence of military governments, one party rule, struggles for power, the relevance or irrelevance of democratic forms and sometimes international connections are all factors which will have broad effects in social, economic and cultural life and which will, therefore, affect Canadian programmes, policies and interests even if we have few formal political entanglements with the countries in question. These political institutions must, accordingly, be studied in their own right.

In addition, political structures have a life of their own rooted in historical tradition, education, law and a variety of other factors. Political structures (parties, courts, governmental institutions, etc.) must be viable themselves or technological, developmental and other economic

factors will have no chance of giving them vitality and stability and may even promote their disruption or perversion (e.g. the effect of rapid development on Japanese political life in the first half of the twentieth century). The background and effect of technical programmes which Canadians design and implement, therefore, cannot be understood without careful and objective study of a country's political affairs.*

Clearly there is a good deal that can be done both on "programme" and also on broader "policy" matters to improve the quality of analysis bearing upon decisions. A start on setting out the requirements for analysis was made in a report of a study carried out last year in the Department of External Affairs.** There are two points of clarification which should be made here. First, the term "analysis" ought not to conjure up visions of computers: what is meant by analysis is more orderly, comprehensive treatment of problems and this is a job for people,

* Jean-Pierre Goyer, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, observed in the House of Commons, October 30, 1969, that "In practice, different aspects of international life cannot be separated into watertight compartments. They are completely interrelated. As soon as countries deal with one another at the governmental level, it becomes impossible to separate just one aspect, such as education, culture or technical assistance, from all the other aspects of the relations between them. Intellectually you might draw a distinction between traditional foreign policy and more recent aspects of international relations, technical, cultural or social. In actual fact, these are all aspects of a single whole. The business of an inter-governmental conference on education may be joined in a hundred ways to other fields, such as: co-operation in Francophonie or some other group, international aid policy, bilateral relations with the other countries, economic and commercial problems, international cultural or social co-operation. Political problems are constantly coming up at so-called technical conferences ..."

** "The Shaping of Foreign Policy" by W.H. Barton and K.J. Merklinger

not computers. The second point is concerned with "forecasting". The latter is certainly no panacea and, seen in context, is simply one part of the analytical process. Nor is there very much that is new in forecasting: serious assessments from overseas missions and memoranda to ministers have always endeavoured to present advice in the light of what was thought likely to occur in future, albeit more attention is now being given to the future and to the "normative" or goal-setting aspect of forecasting. What is decisively new, however, is the determined search for better methods of analysis to deal with the complexity of international life. In addition, due to the comprehensive nature of change outlined in Chapter 1 brought about by technological civilization, it has become necessary to seek a frame of reference firmly anchored in the future.

It can thus be seen that the complete diplomat is more than the "technomat" described earlier. As Michael Donelan has noted in his interesting review of the Duncan Report, each country, beyond its commercial, financial, social and military policies, has also a foreign policy which (as stated earlier) is the sum of all of them, but on a higher level of politics.* According to Donelan, what the British people want of their government in its dealings with other countries is

"a set of arrangements among the states of the world under which their chosen activities can flourish at home and abroad. These arrangements run from some which touch their daily lives more or less closely, such as social welfare, immigration, communications, commercial and monetary arrangements, to others which affect them more remotely and generally such as military agreements. But all these arrangements constitute a framework within which they get on with the business of living in contact with their fellow citizens at home and with foreigners abroad...

* International Affairs, October 1969, "The Trade of Diplomacy" by Michael Donelan. The "higher level of politics" as expressed here refers to the techniques and politics of making arrangements for the regulation of life, while the "first political level" refers to the pursuit of life itself within these arrangements.

it is here that the distinctive function of the diplomatic service lies ... Its function is to control the making of (arrangements) so as to maintain a desirable pattern of relations between states."

The word "control" perhaps represents a watershed between the Old Diplomacy and the New. For if by "control" is meant "power and influence", the phrase is more characteristic of the Old Diplomacy, while if it has a cybernetic connotation, denoting the regulation of systems toward the achievement of national goals, then it is more characteristic of a New or Future Diplomacy. The terms "relations" and "goals", as the preoccupations of diplomacy and objects of "control", are also generic to the Old and New Diplomatics.

The reader, when seeing the title of this chapter, "A New Role for the Diplomat", may have wondered whether the diplomat was going to be asked to abandon an outmoded profession and join, in effect, a new one. It will be recognized that what have been identified as the requirements for a New Diplomacy represent relatively little which the Canadian diplomat has not already mastered or which he does not now perform to some degree, i.e. analysis, understanding and reporting on political institutions, etc. The phrase "New Role" is used in the sense of a new perspective and definition of his task; also, the requirement for analysis of a systems-type cited earlier is perhaps a new element.

On the other hand, in this chapter we have not attempted to do justice to the many tasks which the diplomat is required to perform which are more characteristic of the Old Diplomacy than of the New, and also to the important ways in which he is able to support and assist both directly and indirectly

in the execution of specific "programmes" of the Canadian Government overseas, i.e. defence, trade promotion, aid, culture, information, technology. The importance of an information programme as an integral part of the foreign affairs programme will be apparent from observations made in Chapter 2 on direct communication. Missions might also have a larger role to play in future in providing information on technological advances abroad.

CHAPTER 4

A NEW ROLE FOR THE DIPLOMAT
PART II: CO-ORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT

"Some actions of great promise have been taken by the Nixon administration to improve the analysis of foreign policy issues... One area of major concern remains. It is the role and organization of the Department of State."

H.S. Rowen and A.P. Williams[★]

"In essence, the role challenge to the Department of State and the FSO corps has to do with co-ordination and leadership. The Department and the corps have been asked to exert greater managerial influence over the spectrum of foreign affairs policy formulation and operations."

John E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat

In Chapter 3, we described the role of the diplomat as comprising three tasks:

- (i) to support and execute specific programmes overseas, e.g. defence, economics, trade promotion, aid, culture, information, technology;
- (ii) to provide analysis, advice and information of an essentially political nature;
- (iii) to carry out "systems analysis" of the overall foreign affairs programme, to safeguard its unity and enable it to serve the broader objectives of the Government.

★ "Policy Analysis in International Affairs", RAND P-4243, November 1969, p. 48

The second and third tasks, and to some extent the first, may be said to constitute the substantive role of the diplomat. To these must be added the "great and urgent" task of co-ordinating and directing (or managing) the diversified activities of the government overseas. It is this quality and responsibility, together with policy formulation to which it is related (included under (iii) above), that can give to the Foreign Affairs Department the characteristics of a staff agency, as well as an operating one.

Two recent statements serve to illustrate the emphasis being placed elsewhere on management and leadership in to-day's foreign operations. In his "State of the World" message to Congress February 18, President Nixon noted that

"The variety and complexity of foreign policy in to-day's world places an enormous premium on the effective implementation of policy. Just as our policies are shaped and our programmes formed through a constant process of interagency discussion and debate within the National Security Council framework, so the implementation of our major policies needs review and co-ordination on a continuing basis. This is done by an interdepartmental committee at the Under-Secretary level chaired by the Under-Secretary of State."

In Britain, Lord Shackleton, Government Leader in the House of Lords, observed in debate on the Duncan Report November 19 that

"... during the last few years there has been a steady amalgamation of the instruments of government which Britain has evolved to meet her overseas requirements... these changes are directly related to the very dramatic changes in the world at large and the increasing complexity of the management of our external relations."

In Canada, similar questions on overall management and effectiveness in foreign affairs are being studied by the Foreign Operations Task Force.

In the final chapter of his study on "a professional group under the stress of change", John Harr offers a "managerial strategy" which he suggests would allow the Department of State to face the challenge of active management of the full spectrum of U.S. foreign policy and operations. He observes,

"... the FSO corps ... are confronted with potential and actual new knowledge developed elsewhere. Coping with new knowledge in an applied way for social purposes increasingly requires organization and organization requires management... This is seen even in medicine, where one of the familiar solutions to the crisis in the profession is to call for teams of salaried specialists operating in comprehensive health centres to replace solo, fee-for-service practice.

"... the management challenge was virtually forced on the State Department and the Foreign Service. For 15 years the Department and the Service both acted as if the problem did not exist, and rationalized this attitude in the policy-operations dichotomy. Then the challenge was posed directly and bluntly in ... (President) Kennedy's letter, the Herter Report, National Security Action Memorandum 341, and the Country Director re-organization...

"There is need in the FSO corps for a triumvirate - the diplomat, the manager and the specialist... The strengths currently lie in the diplomatic skills, the major weakness is in managerial skills and outlook. Functional specialization is a long way from full development, yet it is accepted and considerable progress has been made...

"The managerial challenge is a unique one for the FSO corps. As Mosher has indicated, all professional groups are confronted with a managerial challenge. Yet one suspects that few - not yet at least - are being called on to adopt a managerial concept in a large-scale way as a central element of the substance of the profession. The challenge is a difficult one. Professional groups tend to look on management needs as alien and diversionary, a kind of necessary evil at best...

"Something is askew here. Instead of re-inforcing the view of many professionals that management is an evil force to be contested, precisely the opposite point of view would seem to make more sense. If practitioner personnel are going to dominate their professions, they will have to manage them. Good management is becoming more and more important in order to multiply

the resources of the professions to deal more effectively with larger and more complex problems for social purposes. There is no evidence to support the view that management and professional practice are necessarily mutually exclusive...

"... the challenge is clear and the stakes are high. Without some such fundamental and far-reaching effort, the public will not be as well served as it could be, the FSO corps will become a declining professional group, and the Department of State will come more and more to resemble the Ottoman Empire of the Federal Government."^{*}

The advantages to be gained from holding Heads of Post responsible, as managers, for all operations in their country (or countries) of accreditation have been apparent for some time. In May 1961, President Kennedy wrote to all U.S. ambassadors and heads of mission giving them sweeping authority and responsibility for supervision:

"You are in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission, and I shall expect you to supervise all of its operations. The Mission includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, but also the representatives of all other United States agencies..."^{**}

According to McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy thereby deliberately sought to rub out the distinction between policy and operations, to reverse the "policy-operations dichotomy" in which a long line of Secretaries of State had sought refuge:

"Secretaries of State saw their main role as advising the President on foreign policy matters, and the career diplomats were concerned with the classic functions of diplomacy - observing, reporting, negotiating... though keeping the new functions at arm's length, State Department people thought

^{*} The Professional Diplomat by John E. Harr, 1969, pp. 325-349

^{**} The full text of Kennedy's letter is contained in The Professional Diplomat, pp. 356-360

that they could maintain control by handing down policy from the top and providing administrative services at the bottom. In both cases, the control has turned out to be very remote."^{*}

A renewal of Kennedy's very firm mandate for ambassadors was contained in a similar letter from President Nixon to heads of post, dated December 9, 1969, in which he urged that all possible measures should be taken to improve and tighten the processes of foreign policy implementation abroad. In Canada, the Glassco Commission observed in 1962 that

"An ambassador or high commissioner is not just the Head of the External Affairs mission; he has the overriding answerability to the host country for the manner in which Canadian Government activities are conducted, and so should exercise a general supervisory role. Unfortunately this has never been clearly stated for the guidance of departments, nor may it be said that Heads of Post make it a practice to concern themselves with the affairs of other departments. Surveys made point to the conclusion that departments stoutly resist any local direction to their own affairs, although accepting a subordinate role in matters relating to representation and diplomatic privilege."^{**}

The Commission noted that the prevailing situation had already resulted in a "compartmentalization that is wasteful and weakens Canada's representation abroad". All the evidence presented in this study leads to the conclusion that a new and clear mandate for Canadian Heads of Post is urgently needed.

The co-ordination and effective management of activities abroad, as in Ottawa, would in our view also be promoted by the integration into one service of all those "who intend to make a career in foreign affairs, who are performing work at a professional level within the purview of a re-defined

^{*} "The Management Crisis" by John E. Harr, published in The Annals, November 1968, provides a concise exposition of the State Department's problems in attempting to face the challenge of management between the years 1961 and 68

^{**} Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, Volume 4, p. 136.

profession of diplomacy and who meet certain minimum qualifications".^{*} Such a "consolidation" would enrich the External Affairs career category, afford greater opportunities for executive development and provide a broader base of career officers from which to select executives for senior management positions. It would serve to indicate that, in the words of one foreign service officer, "diplomacy had moved from the chamber music to the symphonic scale". Moreover, the likelihood of achieving a unified foreign affairs policy and programme would appear to be enhanced if persons responsible for the execution of major segments of the programme were brought within a single agency.

On the other hand, care should be taken to avoid the dilution of specialist skills, e.g. in trade promotion, manpower and immigration, etc. Training in these and other specializations might be promoted by more frequent assignments and secondments both into and out of the Foreign Affairs Department.

Finally, the new Foreign Affairs Department created by such steps would appear to require a new Act. Paragraph 4 of the present Act, which defines the Powers and Duties of the Department of External Affairs, is unchanged (except for the designation "Minister" in place of "Secretary of State", the use of present in place of future tense and dropping the phrase "from time to time") from the original Act^{**}, paragraph 3, which came into force in a traumatic and certainly historic moment on June 1, 1909. The opening clause of paragraph 4, and the only unqualified and certain guide

^{*} Criteria suggested by John Harr when proposing the merger of State, AID and USIA. The Professional Diplomat, p. 343

^{**} Documents of Canadian External Relations, Volume I, p. 3

to the Department's Powers and Duties both then and now, was in 1909 a sensitive point and subject of exchanges between the Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Governor-General, Earl Grey, and others on the British and Canadian sides; it reads:

"The Minister, as head of the Department, has the conduct of all official communications between the Government of Canada and the Government of any other country..."

In his first draft of the Act sent to Laurier February 6, 1909, Sir Joseph Pope had suggested, in place of the "conduct of all official communications...", the phrase "direction of all matters relating to the external affairs of the Dominion...", while in a subsequent draft he proposed "supervision of all matters in connection with the external affairs of Canada..." In the event, however, even the final wording "conduct of communications" was to cause difficulty.

W.H. Walker wrote to Pope as follows:

"I cannot bring myself to interpret the phrase 'conduct of communications', even if qualified as you suggest, to mean anything else than an actual carrying on of correspondence by the Secretary of State (Minister responsible for the Department of External Affairs)..."

"But assuming that this is not the Government's policy it seems to me that the language of the Bill might be brought more into harmony with what I believe is your own view and the view which I understand Sir Wilfrid to advance in his explanation, by substituting 'direction' or 'superintendence' for 'conduct'. I can quite see that neither substitution is altogether satisfactory, for, in view of the procedure now followed, according to which his Excellency (the Governor-General) actually makes the communications, both are open to objection of implying an inversion of the relative positions of the Governor and Minister and a control exercised over the former by the latter."^{*}

* Under-Secretary of State: Semi-official Correspondence, March 12, 1909. For this and other quotations in this section see The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs, "Origins of the Department of External Affairs" by James Eayrs

The Governor-General sensed that the wording of the Act might weaken the authority of his office, as recorded in Pope's diary:

"His Excellency is much worked up over the wording of the External Affairs Bill as brought down, particularly Section 3 ..."


Earl Grey wrote to the Colonial Secretary as follows:

"I called the attention of Sir Wilfrid as soon as it was drafted to the fact that the word 'conduct' in clause 3 did not correctly interpret the speeches made by himself and Mr. Aylesworth in the debate on the introduction of the Bill... He unreservedly agreed with all I said, and undertook that the word 'care' should be substituted. Although he made a note at my request in his pocket book, he must have forgotten to give any instructions in the matter, with the result that the bill has passed the Commons and the second reading of the Senate in its unamended form.

"I saw Secretary of State (Murphy), Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Minister of Justice (Aylesworth) this morning and pointed out to them the importance of amending the Bill in this direction in Committee of the Senate..."

James Eayrs records that whatever promise Laurier may have made to amend the bill in the manner desired by the Governor-General, he did not keep it. The bill became law, and the Minister of the new Department became responsible for the "conduct" rather than the "care" of diplomatic correspondence. The latter part of clause 3 (now clause 4) contained also the phrase "conduct and management of international and intercolonial negotiations..." which, however, seems to have attracted little attention, possibly because it was subject to the qualification of "other duties as may from time to time be assigned to the Department by the Governor..."

While it perhaps represented a significant victory for the politicians of 1909, it seems to us that the phrase "the conduct of all official communications..." does not any longer satisfactorily represent the functions and responsibilities that must be carried by a modern Foreign Affairs Department.



Joseph Pope's original suggestion, "the direction of all matters relating to external affairs...", which may have been blocked in 1909 by political considerations, appears more in keeping with the enlarged scope and responsibilities of foreign affairs to-day, and with the role envisaged for the diplomat in the course of this study.



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