

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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Extracts from a Statement by the Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, P.C., M.P., Minister of National Defence, to the Opening Session of the Special Committee on Defence, Ottawa, June 27, 1963.

... Canada's defence policy is an extension of its foreign policy. In particular, we have been members of and closely identified with three international organizations which have made demands on our armed forces and made it possible for us to contribute to the maintenance of peace. These organizations are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the North American Air Defence Command and the United Nations.

NATO

Canada was one of the original 12 (now 15) nations signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, and played a leading role in the formation of the alliance, the members of which are, in the words of the Treaty, "determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples ... (and) are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security". NATO continues to be an essential foundation of Canada's foreign and defence policies.

NATO was the response of the free countries of the West to Communist expansion in Europe after the Second World War, and to the impasse that arose in the United Nations when, by the use of its veto in the Security Council, the Soviet Union obstructed Western efforts to make that organization an effective instrument for peace. Faced with the threat to their security and to the basis of their civilization, the Western powers resolved to group themselves in an alliance that would indicate clearly their determination to resist aggression, from whatever quarter it might come, and to maintain peace.

In the years since its inception, NATO has built up in Europe a formidable military force. This force is composed of contributions from member nations. At the outset it was planned that a large army of 90-100 divisions should be built up. For a number of reasons, both political and economic, this goal has never been achieved and it is unlikely that it will be in the future. To redress the balance of power, a family of tactical nuclear weapons have been employed. The existence of these tends

to neutralize any advantage a potential enemy might have through greater manpower. The NATO land force in Central Europe of approximately 28 divisions has a considerable capacity, although there are a number of critical deficiencies from the standpoint of reaching desired goals. This force is backed up by the striking power of the West's strategic forces, mainly the United States Strategic Air Command.

The United States Strategic Air Command is probably the most powerful and best organized military force in the history of the world. Supplemented now by the "Polaris" missile-firing submarines, it has adequate capacity to deliver nuclear weapons to strategic targets. Canada has assisted the operational effectiveness of this Command by providing refuelling bases, communications links and "overflight" privileges. We will continue to provide these facilities to the extent required.

At the same time that the free world has an adequate or better capacity in strategic forces, there remain demonstrable deficiencies in its conventional and tactical capacity in Europe. The doctrine of "measured response" requires a strengthening of conventional capacity in order to reduce the necessity for immediate or early use of nuclear force and to allow the time necessary for political consultation and decision. At the same time, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe has been given responsibility for military targets in his sector. This includes, of course, Soviet missile launchers posed against Western Europe. To meet this responsibility he has a requirement for additional tactical nuclear capacity.

Force goals for the alliance are set by negotiation and agreement between members of the alliance. In consultation with the Supreme Commander, individual countries decide the nature and extent of their contribution...

Canada has had a good record for fulfilling its defence commitments in NATO. Our contribution to the defensive strength of the alliance includes ships and maritime patrol aircraft earmarked for the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, an air division of eight, formerly 12, squadrons and an army division, of which one brigade group is stationed in Europe. These forces do not operate in isolation, but as part of larger integrated forces united for a common purpose.

Maritime Forces

From the beginning of NATO, there was an apparent and pressing need for strong naval and maritime forces in the Atlantic. The Atlantic Council agreed that a separate command must be formed to preserve the integrity of the Atlantic Ocean and, in December 1950, the Council decided to appoint a Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic as soon as circumstances would permit. After much planning, the first international ocean command in peacetime was formed in January 1952, with headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia.

To enable the NATO Atlantic Commander to carry out his peacetime duties, forces are periodically placed at his disposal for combined training. Unlike the Commander of the NATO forces in Europe, SACLANT has no permanently assigned forces; instead, he has to depend on forces earmarked for assignment to his command in an emergency. The reasoning for this arrangement is that the maritime powers of NATO maintain flexible naval forces and maritime air forces to protect their national interests on the high seas in time of peace. Such forces are highly mobile and it was decided, therefore, that the Atlantic maritime powers would maintain their own naval forces and maritime air forces in peacetime and transfer control of an agreed number of units to SACLANT on the declaration of an emergency.

By the end of 1959, Canada was able to provide one carrier and 29 escorts to be readily available to SACLANT for duty in the North Atlantic in the event of an emergency. In addition, 14 escorts stationed on the West Coast and 10 minesweepers were provided for the Canada-U.S. region.

In 1959, Canada approved the construction of a further six escort ships - the "Mackenzie" Class - to replace older vessels in commission, so that there would be no reduction in the naval commitment.

Technological improvements, aimed at increasing the anti-submarine effectiveness of our forces, have been steadily introduced. The conversion programme now under way for the seven "St. Laurent" Class ships includes the fitting of variable-depth sonar, together with the installation of a platform and operating facilities for an anti-submarine helicopter.

With the development of nuclear submarines, however, the problems of anti-submarine warfare have been greatly increased. As in other areas of advanced military technology, the "offence" is more effective than the "defence" at the present time. Increased importance is being given to research and development in anti-submarine devices. One new contribution to the pool of knowledge on this subject will be the development of a prototype hydrofoil craft which has just been authorized. It is but one of the options being studied with great interest by this department.

In addition to naval forces, Canada agreed that the RCAF should earmark 40 maritime patrol aircraft to SACLANT. "Lancaster" aircraft were joined for this assignment by "Neptunes" in the latter part of the 1950's, with the long-range "Argus" coming into service as a replacement for the former aircraft in 1959.

Army

For some years the Canadian Army has maintained a brigade group in Europe. It is part of the Northern Army Group. Canada has also agreed to supply the balance of a division in the event hostilities should occur. The agreed time-lapse before the reserve brigade would be available, however, and the unavailability of

shipping brings into question the effectiveness of this "reserve" under conditions prevailing in any future war. A review seems warranted to determine whether the commitment should be changed or whether steps should be taken to substantially increase the "reality" of the reserve components in today's circumstances.

Air Force

The Royal Canadian Air Force has maintained in Europe one air division. Until recently it consisted of 12 air-defence squadrons at four bases. In 1959 the Government of Canada agreed to change the role of the air division from air defence to strike reconnaissance and obtained the concurrence of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to a reduction from 12 squadrons to eight. Each base will now accommodate two squadrons instead of three. This change was agreed to by SACEUR because the new aircraft, the CF104, is a very sophisticated aircraft which requires more technical support than the aircraft it replaces, and because of the demanding nature of the strike role. The strike role is one requiring the ability to drop atomic bombs on enemy military targets in the event of hostilities.

... This brings up the question of NATO nuclear policy. As far back as December 1955, the NATO ministerial meeting demonstrated the clear intention on the part of all member governments to see the Atlantic forces equipped with the most modern weapons. In 1957, the NATO Council stressed the fact that the U.S.S.R. was steadily proceeding with the development of its own nuclear armament. The foreign ministers affirmed the right of the alliance to the possession of modern arms necessary in its defence against aggression.

The heads of government, meeting in December of the same year, publicly confirmed the NATO decision to establish stocks of nuclear weapons which would be readily available for the defence of the alliance in case of need. Again, in February 1959, NATO authorities affirmed that, after the required bilateral agreements had been reached, the United States had delivered nuclear-capable weapons for the nuclear deterrent to NATO forces in Europe and that this transfer was being continued.

The dependence upon nuclear weapons against both strategic and tactical targets has been brought about for two basic reasons - the marked superiority in Soviet manpower vis-à-vis NATO forces in being, and the knowledge that the Soviets have similar weapons in operation. This dependence, however, has not reduced the requirement to increase the conventional capability of the alliance, but NATO authorities have never called for this requirement to be met at the expense of its nuclear capability. Thus, at the ministerial meeting in December of last year it was agreed "that it was necessary to increase the effectiveness of conventional forces", but it was also agreed "that adequate and balanced forces, both nuclear and conventional, were necessary to provide the alliance with the widest

possible range of response to whatever threat may be directed against its security". As members of the Committee are aware, at the recent meeting of ministers here in Ottawa it was agreed to establish an interallied nuclear force in NATO which was considered to be a measure leading to an increase in the effectiveness of the nuclear capability at the disposal of the alliance....

The acceptance by Canada of the strike role for the air division and the acquisition of the "Honest John" rocket for our brigade group in Europe has committed us to signing a bilateral agreement with the United States of America to permit the immediate availability of nuclear devices. This does not make us a member of the "Nuclear Club". It only fulfills the general undertaking given by us and other member countries at the heads-of-government meeting in December 1957 and the specific undertaking of Canada, in 1959, to accept the strike role. In signing a bilateral agreement, we will be doing what the majority of our NATO allies have already done and we will be implementing the commitment given to the NATO Council in 1959.

A number of questions have been raised about the strike role being truly "tactical" because of the ability of the weapons carrier, the CF104, to penetrate into enemy territory. The designation "tactical" is basically related to the type of target rather than to the weapons carrier used, although in common usage the range of the vehicle often does have a relation to target assignment. The targets which would be assigned to our air force are military targets only. This type of target could involve military bases (including dockyards and airfields), radar installations and military command and control centres, depots and dumps containing fuel or other supplies directly supporting enemy combat forces, key road, rail or waterway facilities used for supporting the combat area, etc. The yield of the bomb assigned would depend on the particular target, but in most of these cases would be relatively low-yield - a very small fraction of figures which have been used in the House and in the press. "Tactical" targets do not include population centres as such. Now, I am not suggesting that all civilian populations would be left untouched by the use of these tactical weapons, but I am saying that all targets assigned to the air division will be of direct and immediate significance to a possible battle in Allied Command Europe.

I know some Honourable Members are concerned about the moral aspects of these assignments. It is a matter of concern to all of us. As a member of NATO, we have agreed to a strategy of nuclear deterrence. As long as we remain a member of the alliance we cannot separate ourselves, morally, from the general policy. We rely on the protection of the Strategic Air Command and approve of its constant flights over our territory. Additionally, we have sold the uranium for most of the free world's arsenal and would, no doubt, sell more for military purposes if our friends were interested in buying it....

It is important to bear in mind that NATO is a defensive alliance and that the forces assigned to it in the European theatre are for defensive purposes. The more effective these forces are, the more credible is the deterrent to any aggression in that area.

NORAD

In the fall of 1957, the North American Air Defence Command came into being. It is charged with the responsibility of protecting, in so far as that is possible, the North American land mass from attack by air. The headquarters of this command is located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The commander-in-chief is U.S. General John K. Gerhart, and the deputy commander-in-chief is Canadian Air Marshal Roy Slemmon.

To assist this command in its function, information is funnelled into its headquarters from a network of warning lines and control stations. These include the Pinetree radar system, roughly along the Canada-U.S. border, the Mid-Canada Line approximately along the 55th parallel, the Distant Early Warning Line along the northern periphery of the continent and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, with stations in Alaska and Greenland and under construction in England.

These systems have been altered and augmented from time to time in accordance with changing requirements and circumstances. For example, it was agreed in 1959 that seven additional heavy radars should be constructed in Canada as reinforcement for the Pinetree Line. A number of exposed Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) combat centres located on U.S. Strategic Air Command bases and considered redundant are being abandoned. A new hardened SAGE centre near North Bay is just nearing completion. Additional changes are contemplated.

The air threat to North America consists of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), submarine or ship-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's), and manned bombers. At the moment there is no protection against ballistic missiles. The United States has under development an anti-missile missile known as the "Nike-Zeus", but no decision has been taken to put it into operational service largely because of the considerable cost involved. Development is continuing of potentially more effective means of anti-missile protection.

At this moment, the active air defence is limited to the anti-bomber field, and a considerable effort is expended in this direction. If members of the Committee recall statements I made when in opposition, you may wonder why I now support the use of some of our resources for this purpose. The opinions I expressed during the last few years were based on knowledge of the threat made available to us at that time -- 1959. The estimates have subsequently turned out to be incorrect. The rate of Soviet missile production anticipated at that time has not materialized.

In consequence the bomber threat remains at this date a very much larger proportion of the total threat than was expected. On the basis of present information I feel that active air defence is a proper demand on part of our resources.

Our contribution to the active air defence consists of a substantial participation in the radar warning lines, five squadrons of CF-101B ("Voodoo") interceptors, and two squadrons of "Bomarc" surface-to-air missiles.

At the outset Canadian authorities had noted that the initial U.S. plans for the installation of these missiles confined them completely within the bounds of the continental United States. Canadian comments on these U.S. plans expressed concern that this proposed deployment would result in conduct of the air battle over the most densely-populated areas of Canada, particularly in the area between Montreal and Toronto. The proposition was advanced that this undesirable situation could be easily rectified without any compromise to U.S. air defence by moving a small portion of the planned "Bomarc" deployment further northward. In particular, it was proposed that the two "Bomarc" squadrons programmed for a site in northern Michigan and another in northern New York State, just south of Montreal, should be deployed further north.

Meanwhile, the North American Air Defence Command had come into being and, operating through these channels, little difficulty was experienced in persuading the U.S. to locate the northern Michigan squadron to North Bay, Ontario, and the northern New York State squadron to La Macaza, P.Q. From the NORAD point of view, this deployment was desirable not only because it moved the defence line outward toward the periphery of the ground-radar system, but also the two "Bomarc" squadrons, previously programmed for location at SAC bases in the U.S.A., were moved to more isolated locations.

Many of the early tests of the "Bomarc" were not successful, and it was also subject to electronic counter measures. Consequently, a number of observers, myself included, were extremely critical. More recently the defects have been solved and a device has been developed to overcome the effects of electronic counter measures. It is now an effective anti-bomber weapon - as good as anything we have available. Like Mr. McNamara, the U.S. Defense Secretary, I believe that after approximately \$3 billion has been invested in the "Bomarc" system, practically all by the United States, the effectiveness of the system is sufficient to justify the maintenance costs involved.

In order to be effective, however, the "Bomarc" must be armed with an atomic warhead. No conventional warhead exists and none was ever developed. The advantage of the nuclear warhead is twofold. First, it has a good "kill" capacity, in that a direct hit is not required. Second, the bomb or bombs carried by the attacking bomber can be rendered harmless by "cooking". If a high explosive warhead was available it might bring down the bomber but the resulting explosion from the bombs being carried would be devastating in comparison.

It is expected that enemy bombs are designed with "dead-man" fuzes. These fuzes permit the bombs to detonate on impact even though the aircraft or other device which is carrying them has been shot down in flames or has disintegrated in the air. There is, therefore, considerable advantage in the use of nuclear air defence warheads, which will kill the weapon and not just the carrier.

In all, there are more than 40 regular fighter-interceptor squadrons in the NORAD system, of which five are the recently re-equipped RCAF CF-101B squadrons. The CF-101B "Voodoo" aircraft are designed to carry both conventional and atomic air-to-air missiles. At present the Canadian squadrons are armed with the conventional missiles only. The advantages of having atomic missiles available are obvious, since the "kill" capacity of the "Genie" atomic rocket is several times greater than that of the conventional "Falcon" rocket.

The bilateral agreement now being negotiated with the United States will permit the stockpiling in Canada of nuclear devices to be immediately available in an emergency. It should be remembered that these weapons are purely defensive. They do not constitute a threat to other nations. NORAD forces go into defensive action only after absolute proof is established that the North American continent is under attack by aggressor forces.

Another point, the "Voodoo" interceptors would not be flying round during day-to-day operations with nuclear rockets aboard. Normal training and operational interceptions would be done, as they are by the USAF, with aircraft equipped with high explosive -- not atomic -- rockets.

The nuclear-equipped Canadian interceptors would only take off under the authority of the Canadian Government subsequent to the release of the weapons themselves by the President of the United States. Similarly, the "Bomarc" could not be fired without the prior approval of both the U.S. and the Canadian Governments. And, I repeat, both weapons systems would only be put into action if North America was under attack.

United Nations

It is an important aspect of Canadian defence and foreign policy to support the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. Apart from UN action in Korea, Canada, over the years, has undertaken a number of military commitments to the United Nations. In November 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East was formed to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Egypt. Since the inception of this force, Canada has made a major contribution of Canadian Army personnel and has furnished an air-transport unit operated by the RCAF. At the present time, there are over 800 members of the Canadian Army and some 80 RCAF personnel serving in UNEF. It should be noted here that we recently agreed to contribute to the

UN force -- made up, in part, from personnel in UNEF --, which is being sent to Yemen in an effort to stabilize conditions in that country.

In accordance with the Security Council Resolution of July 14, 1960, the Canadian Government approved a request by the Secretary-General for the provision of a signals unit to provide communications facilities for the United Nations headquarters in the Congo, and the first Canadian element arrived in that country in August of that year. In addition to signals personnel, we also supply a small number of staff officers at United Nations headquarters, a provost section operating under the direction of this headquarters, and representatives of the RCAF are in the Congo in support of United Nations air operations.

The RCAF supplies aircraft for personnel and equipment not only to and from Egypt, but also for our forces in the Congo. At the present time there are some 280 Army and 24 Air Force personnel in the Congo.

Canadian servicemen also form part of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in Palestine. The duty of this team is to observe and maintain the cease-fire ordered by the United Nations Council in 1949 and to assist the parties to the General Armistice Agreements in the supervision of the terms of the General Armistice Agreements concluded severally between the Governments of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria on one hand and Israel on the other. There are a total of 18 Canadian Army officers on this team.

The United Nations Military Observer Group was formed as the result of a resolution by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in August 1948. The Military Observer Group is made up of representatives from various countries and, of the total 35 officers involved, Canada supplies eight.

Although the truce team in Indochina is not under United Nations control, it is, I think, related to the peace-keeping operations of that organization. The Truce Commission is composed of representatives from Canada, India and Poland and has been functioning continuously since 1954 under the terms agreed to by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. There are at the moment 75 representatives of the Canadian Army, two from the RCN and two from the RCAF in Indochina.

In addition to the Canadians serving abroad on behalf of the United Nations, since September 1960 an army battalion has been available in Canada for United Nations service. Plans have been made and exercises have taken place in order that this battalion could be provided on short notice in the event of a request being received. The 1st Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment, has been designated as the main element of the group. This battalion took over the responsibility from the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment, in April 1961.

From time to time suggestions have been made that we should turn over part of our armed forces to the UN. To date there has been no inclination on the part of the UN to accept this kind of offer, and the maintenance of a standby battalion which would be available if required seems to be the best alternative in these circumstances.

Canadian Defence Policy

As I said at the outset, Canadian defence policy is an extension of our foreign policy. We provide contributions to the collective defence of the free world and to the maintenance of peace. Our contributions are pooled with those of other nations through the agencies of NATO, NORAD and the United Nations.

Our contributions at this time are those which have been agreed to in the past. They are as I have set them out for you. It is the policy of the Government to make effective those weapons systems which have been acquired as part of the Canadian contribution, including making immediately available nuclear devices required to make our contribution credible. Furthermore, it is the policy of the Government to undertake a thorough review of our defence policy and commitments in order to determine the best and most effective contribution we can make to the collective defence of the free world and to the maintenance of peace in the years ahead.

In order to facilitate the review, certain action has been taken. All major procurement programmes are being reconsidered. In particular, any procurement programme which would tend to limit future policy or interfere with the exercise of future options is being carefully reviewed.

One of these programmes is the General Purpose Frigate Programme. It is a project involving the expenditure of large sums of money. For this reason all present and likely future options have to be carefully considered before proceeding.

Another major programme under review is the acquisition of additional CF-104 aircraft for "backup" to the eight squadrons being formed in Europe. We are considerably concerned about the effectiveness of the four squadrons to be located on the two French bases at Marville and Grostenquin. As members of the Committee know, the French Government has so far not permitted the stockpiling of nuclear weapons for NATO on its territory. In consequence, the weapons for the four squadrons would not be readily at hand, and those aircraft to be maintained on quick-reaction alert would have to be deployed to other bases. This raises the further question of vulnerability. In view of these problems, it is considered desirable to review at once the alternatives which may be available now or in the future. The CF-104 is specially designed for the strike role and does not readily lend itself to other employment. Consequently, we intend to carefully review the question before proceeding with any additional procurement.

To assist in the review of current procurement programmes and in the consideration of future policy, a special advisory group has been set up in the Department under the chairmanship of Dr. R.J. Sutherland, Chief of Operational Research in the Defence Research Board. This group has undertaken a number of studies intended to demonstrate the reasons for and against a particular course of action and to list the available options. It does not make recommendations. This committee, which has been functioning for some weeks now, reports directly to the Minister.

As soon as a review of existing procurement programmes is complete and decisions taken, which I hope will be within a few weeks, the general review of future policy will commence. It is intended that it will be a most thoroughgoing study. We will consider not only the best tasks and contributions which Canada can make in future years but also how they can be most efficiently organized. The recommendations of the Glassco Commission are being studied and will be considered in the context of future policy. The relations between our forces and those of our allies will be considered. In this connection I am pleased that General Lemnitzer, the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe, will pay a visit to Ottawa on July 23, and that we will have the opportunity to discuss mutual problems. It is also fortunate that the general review of NATO strategy being undertaken by the Standing Group will be going ahead simultaneously with our own studies. This should greatly facilitate our appreciation of future requirements of the alliance and the best use of available resources to meet those requirements. An interim report by the Standing Group is expected to be available in time for the ministers' meeting in December. Assuming this to be the case, it is hoped that notwithstanding the considerable scope and magnitude of our studies we will be in a position to reach conclusions early in the New Year. I am sure that the views of this Committee will be most helpful in assisting us to determine the best role for Canada to play in future years....

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