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

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
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THE COLONIAL POLICY OF CHATHAM

BY

W. L. GRANT

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THE COLONIAL POLICY OF CHATHAM.

(A paper read on 18 April, 1911, before the Historical Section of the Ontario Educational Association).

"Il reste énormément à faire sur Chatham"; an infinity of work on Chatham still remains to do, said to me in 1905 Mr. Emile Bourgeois of the Sorbonne. Since then something has been done. Lord Rosebery's hook on "Chatham; his early life and connections," throws new light on the devious crooked ways by which alone in the eighteenth century a great man not born in the purple could rise to power; to our knowledge of Chatham as an Imperial statesman it adds nothing. How far previous to his assumption of power in 1756 had Pitt studied the colonial question? As Paymaster-General he must have known something of its military aspect; in one of his later speeches there is a reminiscence of Pepperell's Louisbourg expedition of 1745; a letter in the Chatham Papers in the Record Office., received by him in February, 1756, speaks of him as "better acquainted with the American affairs than any other person in the Kingdom," and a letter of his own of 3rd June, 1756, in the Grenville Correspondence, tells us that he dreads to hear from America. Save for these references and for a stray paper or two in the Chatham Papers there is no way known to me of discovering how wide or deep had been his colonial studies up to 1756.

In 1905, a German Professor, Herr Von Ruville, published a bulky three-volume Life, which has been translated into English. Dr. Von Ruville's book, unsatisfactory in almost every way, is especially so in colonial matters. The plain truth is that Dr. Von Ruville is a German plantigrade, utterly unfit to understand a great man. His sufficient condemnation is that his favourite statesmen are Lord Bute and Lord North. He has indeed fulfilled anew the Oracle given to Croesus; he set out to destroy a great reputation, and has succeeded; but the reputation is not that of Pitt, but of Von Ruville. His work should be read, if at all, in the English translation, in which a number of errors are corrected, and which contains an introduction by Prof. Egerton, which glitters like a jewel of gold in

a swine's snout. Dr. Von Ruville has read widely in the printed sources, and has dipped into the MSS.; in the Newcastle Papers especially his reading is fairly thorough; when nothing more than painstaking stupidity is needed, his work is of value; he has verified the dates of the writing and of the receipt of a number of letters, and for that we owe him thanks. But on colonial matters he is not only obscure but inaccurate. For example, in 1774 was passed the celebrated Quebec Act. This quasi-establishment of the Roman Catholic religion, and the great extension of the boundaries of the French province angered the Americans, and Chatham, their spokesman in the House of Lords, opposed the Act. What does Dr. Von Ruville say of his speech?

"What gives this tolerably insignificant speech an interest for us is the circumstance that Chatham never even mentions (völlig unbeachtet lässt), the clause in the bill which largely affected the great quarrel between the Mother Country and her colonies, namely, the new frontier delimitation." (Von Ruville, iii, 281, trans. iii, 311, orig.).

Now I am no believer in the theory that a biography should be a panegyric; I am rather of the opinion that the character of a man or of a movement is best described by a sympathetic enemy; but a biographer should at least be fair. We have but a very imperfect report of this speech of Chatham, comprising in all about 700 words, or rather less than two pages of an ordinary book. Yet in that imperfect report we find: "He was likewise very particular on the bad consequences that would attend the great extension of that province. . . . He exposed the train of fatal mischiefs attending the establishment of popery and arbitrary power in that vast and fertile region now annexed to the province of Quebec, and capable of containing, if fully peopled, not less than thirty million souls. . . . He pathetically expressed his fears that it might finally lose the hearts of all his Majesty's American subjects." Thus in a report of 700 words, 78 are taken up with the subject which Dr. Von Ruville says is not even mentioned; those 78 twice contain the expression "he was likewise very particular on," "he exposed the train of fatal mischiefs," sentences which evidently sum up long paragraphs of the speech; his words contain one of the earliest prophecies of the

greatness of the west,—for it is one of the marks of Chatham's greatness that from all his speeches fire is somewhere struck out;—yet Dr. Von Ruville says that he does not mention the subject. *Ab uno disce omnia.*

Chatham's strategy during the Seven Years' war, and the importance in it of America has recently been very admirably treated by Mr. Julian Corbett. Perhaps Mr. Corbett attributes to Chatham too complete a plan, working out to too complete perfection. It is hard to believe that everything went with such chess-board accuracy. But for a learned and sympathetic discussion of the question, and for a luminous exposition of the splendid co-operation between army and navy which was essential to the plans of Pitt, it cannot be too highly recommended.

But for the student of colonial history the Chatham of the Seven Years' war is unimportant. Then he did little save rob France. What we have to ask, and what has been too little asked, is: How would Pitt have organised his winnings; could he have prevented the later disruption; he could win an Empire, could he have organised and maintained it?

Here we are at once confronted with a difficulty. From his resignation on 5th October, 1761, to his death in 1778, with the exception of the brief ministry of 1766-7, when he was tottering on the brink of insanity, Pitt passed his life in opposition, and his speeches, delivered in opposition, are critical rather than constructive. This is intensified by the character of the man. Not only did he consciously surround himself with mystery, but there was about him that touch of the infinite, those high instincts which even the greatest cannot fully express. He gave to all his contemporaries an impression that great as were his exploits, great as were his speeches, the man himself was greater than either and never fully expressed himself. In this he is the exact opposite of the typical eighteenth century politician. We know exactly what Walpole or Chesterfield would have done or said under any set of circumstances; even Burke fully articulated his thought. This Chatham never did; and so one suddenly gets from him a stray sentence which opens up such vistas that one feels that his letters and speeches have, as Goethe said of one of his own works, more in them than the author himself knew. Thus in trying to make

out his ideas, we can but piece together scattered acts and sayings, and must be content with a result on which we cannot dogmatise. This I tried to do in *Queen's Quarterly* for July, 1908, taking as my text a compilation of the various scattered reports of his speech on 9th December, 1762, on the Preliminaries of the Peace of Paris; let us now see what can be learned from his attitude on one or two later questions.

When in 1769, after his long illness, Chatham returned to the House, he found that the American situation had greatly altered for the worse. It was not so much that anything had been done, as that feelings on both sides had become exasperated; the little rift had widened into a chasm. Power was falling, as often in time of discontent, into the hands of extremists. For the cry of "No taxation without representation," the colonists, in part at least, had substituted the more ominous watchword, "No legislation without representation." In many an American heart the desire for complete independence was beginning to grow conscious. In Great Britain too the feeling had grown bitter. American lawlessness had roused the spirit of Imperial domination, the spirit that brooks no doubt of its mastery. "America must fear you before she can love you," said Lord North in November, 1768, in the debate on the address, "I am against repealing the last Act of Parliament, securing to us a revenue out of America. I will never think of repealing it, till I see America prostrate at my feet." "We can grant nothing to the Americans," said in 1769 Lord Hillsborough, Secretary of State for the Colonies, a new office created in 1768, "except what they may ask with a halter round their necks." "They are a race of convicts," said Dr. Johnson, "and ought to be thankful for anything we allow them short of hanging." Against this, which there can be little doubt was the dominant feeling in the nation, Pitt stood firm. He realised at once the importance to the Empire of the American colonies, and their uselessness if kept by force. All through these years, his great desire was to get back to the days before 1763, when things were running smoothly; to repeal the obnoxious Acts; to get time for deliberation; and then calmly and quietly to make such arrangements between loving mother and dutiful daughter as should seem best. Unlike most of the Whigs, he makes no attempt to palliate the lawless-

ness of the Americans, but he claims that the lawlessness, however reprehensible, is not due to any double dose of original sin, but is like the wild words used against them in England, the result of the heated and unnatural condition of the body politic. On 9th January, 1770, in his first speech in the House (Chat. Corr. iii, 369 sq.), he uttered words of calm wisdom, which throw a light on his character differing greatly from our usual idea of the headstrong, impetuous, unhesitating man of genius:

"I profess myself entirely ignorant of the present state of America, and therefore I shall be cautious of giving any opinion of the measures fit to be pursued with respect to that country. It is a maxim which I have observed through life, when I have lost my way, to stop short, let by proceeding without knowledge, as I fear a noble Duke has done, from one false step to another, I might wind myself into an inextricable labyrinth, and never be able to recover the right road again. As this House has as yet no materials before it by which we may judge of the proceedings of the colonies, I strongly object to our passing the heavy censure upon them, which is contained in the word *unwarrantable* contained in the proposed address. . . . I reserve myself to give my opinion more particularly upon this subject, when authentic information of the state of America shall be laid before the House; declaring only for the present, that we should be cautious how we invade the liberties of any part of our fellow-subjects, however remote in situation, or unable to make resistance. Liberty is a plant which deserves to be cherished; I love the tree, and wish well to every branch of it. Like the vine in the Scripture it has spread from east to west, has embraced whole nations with its branches, and sheltered them under its leaves."

That without willing and glad co-operation, paper bonds are of little avail, is one of the platitudes which men are constantly forgetting. In former years, in the debate on the repeal of the Stamp Act, when George Grenville tried to entangle him in a discussion on virtual representation, in a comparison between the colonies and the former Palatinates of Chester and Durham, Pitt brushed it away with one sweep of his arm: "I come not here, armed at all points, with law cases and acts of Parliament, with the statute book doubled down in dog's-ears,

to defend the cause of liberty. . . I am past the time of life to be turning to books to know whether I love liberty or not." So later, on 20th January, 1775, on a motion to withdraw the troops from Boston: "It is not repealing this act of parliament, it is not repealing a piece of parchment, that can restore America to our bosom; you must repeal her fears and her resentments; and you may then hope for her love and gratitude."

The words of wisdom were unheeded. The situation grew worse and worse. Finally, on 1st February, 1775, Chatham, stung by the taunts of the Government that he criticised their acts but had no definite ideas of his own, produced in the House of Lords a bill, embodying his plan for settling the troubles in America. (See *Chat. Corr.*, iv, App. Almon, Anecdotes of the life of Lord Chatham, ii, 275). On first reading it is a curious production. The House is asked to affirm not only definite proposals, such as are usually found in an act of parliament, but also abstract principles, to decree lines of policy. It shows, as nothing else could so well do, the highly rhetorical turn of Chatham's mind, which brings rhetoric and a declaration of first principles even into Acts of Parliament. Professor Egerton, in a moment of impatience, once dubbed it "a mixture of Franklin and fustian," and assuredly there is in it not a little fustian, and something of the worthy Benjamin. But when we look below the strangeness of the form we find that it is a very practical document indeed. *W. W. D. Green*, in his admirable *Life of Chatham*, has suggested a comparison with Burke's resolutions for conciliation with the Colonies, presented in the House of Commons not quite two months later (March 22, 1775). It is not to underestimate the great Irishman to say that in grasp of the essentials of the situation, Chatham, now a worn-out invalid, is superior to Burke at the height of his powers.

The central fact of the situation was that the once jarring colonies had united under the stress of a common grievance. A common wrong had done what a common pride had never been able to do, and had bound them together. The aim of British statesmen had been realised in a way they dreamed not of; a common Congress of eleven colonies had met at Philadelphia. But this Congress was an irregular, if not an unlawful assemblage. Burke therefore does not mention it; lays stress

on the good points of the Americans. Not so Chatham; with the true insight of a statesman he makes no effort to avoid realities. He sees, with that uncanny intuition of his, that America has become a nation, "a mighty continental nation" he calls it; a nation which has found in its congress an articulate voice. On this he fastens, regularises it, makes it the chief part of his scheme of unity. Burke had shown, by appeal alike to history and to logic, the impossibility of getting any regular revenue voted by the jarring provincial Assemblies. Who is to force them if they refuse? How manifold will be the heart-burnings if some give and others delay? But when it comes to a remedy Burke has nothing better to propose than that they shall be left to give what they see fit, the old system of requisitions which had broken down during the Seven Years' war. Chatham solves the question by the mechanism which the Americans themselves had created. He assigns to the delegates to the Philadelphia Congress, which the Americans themselves had called, "the making of a free grant to the King, his heirs and successors, of a certain perpetual revenue and to this end be it further hereby declared and enacted, that the General Congress . . . is hereby authorised and empowered . . . to adjust and fix the quotas and proportions of the several charges to be borne by each province respectively. . . . Always understood, that the free grant of an aid as heretofore required and expected from the colonies, is not to be considered as a condition of redress, but as a just testimony of their affection."

Would the Bill, if passed, have been satisfactory? "It would not have sufficed to content the Americans," says Mr. Frederick Harrison, in his short life of Chatham. Unlike Mr. Frederick Harrison, I was not there at the time, and so cannot say. The *New York Journal* said of the Bill: "The friendly appearance and perhaps design of a great part of the Bill would have a powerful tendency to divide and weaken us." (Quoted W. D. Green *William Pitt*, p. 349). Jefferson, as he read it, hoped that it would prove a solution. But it was not to be. Lord Sandwich, speaking for the Ministry, said: "The proposed measure deserves only contempt, and ought to be immediately rejected. I can never believe it to be the production of any British peer. It appears to me rather the work of some

American." The Bill was not suffered to lie upon the table, but was rejected by a vote of 61 to 32. Their Lordships had heard William Pitt and Jemmy Twitcher, and had chosen. Seven weeks later the House of Commons rejected Burke's resolutions by 270 to 78. Before Chatham again appeared in the House blood had been shed; the *immedicabile vulnus* which he feared had been inflicted.

Mr. Harrison's verdict probably rests on the emphasis with which the proposed Bill, a Bill intended to bring about peace with America, asserts the prerogatives of the mother country. This was doubtless in part designed, as Chatham told Benjamin Franklin, to make it more acceptable to Parliament. It was primarily designed as a basis for discussion; had it been adopted, and had Chatham come into power, during the discussion more might have been yielded to the Americans. But it is also true that Chatham saw that unless the Empire is sound at the heart, strength at the extremities avails little. Speaking in November, 1770, on the quarrel with Spain over the Falkland islands, he had said: "I cannot conclude without endeavouring to bring home your thoughts to an object more immediately interesting to us than any I have yet considered; I mean the internal condition of this country. We may look abroad for wealth or triumphs or luxury; but England, my Lords, is the mainstay, the last resort, of the whole Empire. To this point every scheme of policy, whether foreign or domestic, should ultimately refer." Chatham was no believer in the theory that the colonial is a better Imperialist than the Englishman, that it is for the colonies to dictate the policy, and for the Mother Country to be satisfied with the privilege of paying the bill. The very first clause in the bill lays down the right of parliament to regulate Imperial trade. "Be it enacted that the colonies of America have been, are, and of right ought to be, dependent upon the Imperial Crown of Great Britain, and subordinate unto the British parliament, and that the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons, in Parliament assembled, had, hath, and of right ought to have, full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the people of the British colonies in America,

in all matters touching the general weal of the whole dominion of the Imperial Crown of Great Britain, and beyond the competency of the local representative of a distant colony; and most especially an indubitable and indispensable right to make and ordain laws for regulating navigation and trade throughout the complicated system of British commerce, the deep policy of such prudent acts upholding the guardian navy of the whole British Empire."

Chatham is resolute for the maintenance of the Navigation Acts: on their necessity he insists again and again; a few days before, when, on the debate on the withdrawal of the troops from Boston, Lyttleton urged that the Americans aimed at their repeal, Chatham at once said: "If the noble lord should prove correct in suggesting that the views of the Americans were ultimately directed to abrogate the act of navigation and the other regulatory acts, so wisely calculated to promote a reciprocity of interests, and to advance the grandeur and prosperity of the whole Empire, no person present, however zealous, would be readier than himself to resist and crush their endeavours."

Chatham then was a Mercantilist. But for him the idea of Mercantilism was not that of a Mother Country exploiting her colonies, or at best aiding their prosperity only for the same reason that a farmer fattens his chickens, but the idea of an Empire economically self-contained, an Empire in which each part produced that which it was best fitted to produce; the Mother Country, with her abundance of cheap and skilful labour, produced manufactures; the colonies, with abundance of farm and forest land, and fisheries at their doors, supplied the raw materials; and so the whole Empire, using that which every part supplied, according to the harmonious working in measure of every part, grew steadily toward perfection.

Indeed, this had always been the ideal of Mercantilism, however imperfect the machinery which carried it out. If colonial tobacco was enumerated among the articles to be carried to British ports only, it was given a heavy preference in the British market over tobacco from Spain, and the British tobacco-grower was prohibited from embarking upon this lucrative industry. On this I may pause for a moment. There is nothing in the soil or climate of southern England

unfitted for tobacco growing, and in the seventeenth century a flourishing tobacco growing industry had grown up in the west midlands. It was ruthlessly destroyed. In editing the Records of the Privy Council I have found that between 1650 and 1685 warrants for the rooting up of English-grown tobacco were sent to no less than 22 of the counties of England. First the sheriff and his posse was employed; the people of Winchcombe in Gloucestershire, "gathering themselves together in a riotous and tumultuous manner, did not only offer violence but had like to have slain the sheriff, giving out that they would lose their lives rather than obey the laws in that case provided." (*Acts of the P.C., Colonial Series, Vol. I, 673*). Then the local militia were ordered out, and when they proved slack in the destruction of their neighbour's crops, the small regular army was employed, and year after year troops of cavalry trampled down the ripening tobacco. In every instance the reason for this destruction is expressly stated to be "the better encouragement of all English planters to go on cheerfully in the advancement of any of the English plantations" (148); or "the encouragement of navigation, the benefit of his Majesty's plantations, and support of his foreign plantations" (673). A similar attempt about the middle of the eighteenth century was stamped out with equal severity.

Similarly, if the colonies were forbidden to engage in advanced iron manufactures, a bounty and a preference was given upon iron ore and pig iron. In every case where a restriction was laid on a colonial manufacture, in the same year a bounty or a preference was given on a raw material. To quote from Mr. G. L. Beer, the most recent American writer on the subject: "Such subordination did not, however, imply a sacrifice of the colonies, for their economic development was in general not deflected from its normal course. Nor, on the other hand, did it mean absolute predominance of British interests. As has been pointed out, these had been obliged, in a number of instances, to yield to the welfare of the Empire. It is significant that Great Britain denied the insistent requests of English ship-builders for protection against the colonial industry, because such a measure would have interfered with the expansion of British sea-power as a whole. In fact, it would be difficult to estimate whether colony or metropolis was called upon to

bear a greater proportion of the sacrifice demanded by the prevailing ideal of a self-sufficient commercial Empire." G. L. Beer, *British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765*).

This distinction between the Empire as a whole and the separate parts of which it was composed is the justification of Chatham's otherwise untenable distinction between internal and external taxation. Logically, there can be no doubt that George Grenville and Lord Mansfield were right, and that the taxing power is simply part of the legislative power; that if the latter be admitted, the former follows. But there is a difference between local taxation for local objects, and Imperial regulation of Imperial trade. The question obviously arises, must not the body which legislates for the whole represent the whole? Is it fair that Imperial trade should be regulated by a body in which the colonies are unrepresented? From this also Pitt did not shrink. The idea of a great Pan-Britannic federation had evidently made a deep impression on his mind. Writing to his friend Lord Shelburne on Oct. 24, 1773, he says: "I hope government will have wisdom and humanity enough to choose the happy alternative, and to give to America a constitutional representative, rather than hazard an unjust and impracticable war." In the Chatham Papers are two schemes for the representation of the colonies in an Imperial parliament; the more important of these has been printed, with notes, by Mr. Basil Williams in the *English Historical Review* for October, 1907. The various colonies were to have about fifty members, elected not by direct vote, but by their local assemblies. The other scheme proposes fifty M.P.'s and ten peers for the Continental and West Indian colonies.

But Chatham further saw that such a representation was practicable only if England put her own house in order; he reversed the argument of his opponents; to say, as did Soame Jenyns, that because seven-eighths of the people of England were unrepresented in the House of Commons, therefore the colonies were as well represented as the great majority of the English people, was, as Chatham said, "frivolous"; to argue that if seven-eighths of the people of England were unrepresented, therefore the time was ripe for a change in the representation, was a perfectly sound argument; one which he emphasized for the balance of his life, and one which, given a

temporary rebuff by the errors and follies of the French revolution, triumphed in 1832. "We are not now settling a new constitution, but finding out and declaring the old one," said Lord Mansfield, in the discussion on the repeal of the Stamp Act. Herein Mansfield was technically correct, and there can be no doubt that under the old constitution Parliament had the power to tax the colonies. Mansfield goes on to press the point. "Every objection therefore to the dependency of the colonies on Parliament, which arises to it upon the ground of representation, goes to the whole present constitution of Great Britain; and I suppose that it is not meant to remodel that too!" But it was; and it had to be done. Here we come upon a new side of Pitt, Pitt the Radical; the man who for the last eight years of his life fought two great battles, the battle of the colonies and the battle of parliamentary reform; and who fought them both on the same ground, that they were necessary alike to English liberty, and to the British Empire. He was a Radical because he was an Imperialist; his home policy and his colonial policy were interrelated parts of one harmonious whole.

The first duty of such a reformed parliament would be the reform of the Navigation Laws. So much he admitted to Franklin in 1775; so much he had long before told Parliament. "Omitting the immense increase of people by natural population, in the northern colonies, and the emigration from every part of Europe, I am convinced that the whole commercial policy of America may be altered to advantage. You have prohibited where you ought to have encouraged, and encouraged where you ought to have prohibited. Improper restraints have been laid upon the continental colonies in favour of the islands." (Speech on the Address, 14 January, 1736). Pitt was the close friend of Alderman Beckford, the leader of the powerful coterie of West India merchants, powerful alike in the city of London and in the House of Commons, but in defence of America and following his insight he throws all such ties aside.

But there is some evidence that Chatham was prepared to go even further. Less than three months after his plan had been rejected by the House of Lords, Lexington was fought; blood flowed between mother and child; the *immedicabile*

vulnus was inflicted; his plan of 1775, as he admitted, became impracticable. As the colonies proved of stouter stuff than had been thought, as France showed more and more evident signs of joining in the fight, the call for Chatham grew louder and louder. North begged of the King to put Chatham at the head. His old enemies, Henry Fox, now Lord Holland, and Mansfield, joined in the cry. Bute broke his long silence, and urged that the man who once before had saved England should again at her need be called upon. This possibility was the chief reason which so long kept France at least nominally neutral. (See H. Doniol, *Histoire de la participation de la France dans l'indépendance des Etats-Unis*). The King, with his usual dogged courage and lack of humour, refused to allow Chatham to form a ministry, though he offered to let him come into the ministry as a subordinate to Lord North, provided he did not insist upon a personal interview with his Majesty. It was thus the King who in the last instance rendered impossible the one remaining hope; it was his sullen and rancorous hatred which refused to heed the cry of the nation. "In my judgment," says Lecky, one of the sanest of historians, "this episode is as criminal as any of those acts which led Charles I. to the scaffold."

What would Chatham have done had the half-insane ploughman at the head of the state been overruled? The Whigs, who had from the first been despondent, who had declared success to be impossible, and if possible ruinous, were now beginning to argue that with France so menacing the only thing to do was to admit the independence of the Americans. Herein Chatham refused to agree with them. In this, says Macaulay in his famous essay, he was wrong. "He had repeatedly, and with great energy of language, declared that it was impossible to conquer America, and he could not without absurdity maintain that it was easier to conquer France and America together than America alone." Let us at least see what he would have done. Writing on 20 March, 1774, a private letter to his friend Shelburne, Chatham speaks of "general declared rights of the British Parliament, which I must forever treat as rights in theory only." On Oct. 17, 1777, occurred the surrender of Burgoyne; on Dec. 2 the news arrived in England, and was confirmed on Dec. 12; Shelburne at once sent word to Chatham at Hayes; and Chatham, "all gout," as

he says, and at dinner, left the table to send off a reply, which has been printed by Lord FitzMaurice, editor of the *Life of Shelburne*, in *MacMillan's Magazine* for July, 1894 (vol. lxx, p. 193). In it occurs the phrase, "I will as soon subscribe to transubstantiation, as to sovereignty (by right) in the colonies." Putting together these two sentences, both of them from private letters, do they not go to show that Chatham was revolving some such system as that which now binds the self-governing colonies to the Empire, by rights asserted in theory only, though their own sovereignty by right is denied. I do not suppose for a moment that Chatham had worked this out into a connected theory, or that he would have been satisfied with an Empire such as the present, in which the colonies are allowed to tax the goods of the mother country to an extent which has sometimes involved practical discrimination against her; but that he had in view this practical freedom, though nominal subjection, seems to me from these passages to be highly probable. If you say that such a theory was outside the horizon of any statesman of that day I shall not reply that he is a rash man who would set bounds to the horizon of Chatham, but shall content myself with a quotation from Charles Townshend, who hit off our present Imperial system to perfection, when he said that he refused to consider the colonies in the light of "our allies in war, our rivals in time of peace." What Charles Townshend could image, though only to reject, can hardly be considered outside the range of Chatham.

With this theory and in these circumstances, what would he have done? What was the plan which he and Temple came down to the House to propose, on that last day when death sealed his lips. The evidence is found in two passages, one from Almon's *Anecdotes*, which are known to contain reminiscences of Temple, the other from Lord FitzMaurice's *Life of Shelburne*. "The first part of the plan was, to recommend to his Majesty to take Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick immediately into his service. Lord Chatham's desire in this design was to make an impression upon France on the continent; in order to prevent her sending the assistance to the Americans which he knew the French court had promised. Another part of the plan was to recommend a treaty of union with the Americans—that America should make peace and war in com-

pany with Great Britain; that she should hoist the British flag, and use the King's name in her courts of justice. . . . He conceived an opinion that when America saw the impossibility of deriving any assistance from France, the Congress would accept of those terms." (Almon, ii, 353). "From the conversation between Lord Shelburne and Mr. Eden it would appear that his (Chatham's) idea was to withdraw the English troops from all the continent of America except a few strongly fortified and easily held positions on the coast, and then to concentrate all the military and naval resources of the country on the struggle with France. He would have repealed at one stroke all the vexatious legislation, which had estranged England from her colonies, and he would then have trusted to these common ties of race, religion and language, on which Shelburne had insisted, to make it possible to come to terms." (FitzMaurice, *Life of Shelburne*, iii, p. 26). Now while we have here the gist of the matter, I question if any plan ever put itself before Pitt quite like that. Everything, as I pointed out in his plan of 1775, always appeared to him through a mist of gorgeous but not disfiguring rhetoric. Let me try to translate these two extracts into the plan of 1778, as I imagine it to have presented itself to his mind.

He would have recalled the fleets and troops from America, and have left the hot fires of civil strife to die down. Meanwhile he would have gathered in his hands, as once before, the resources of England. Heedless of seniority or of party claims, he would have placed the best men at the head of army and navy. He would have breathed into them, as once before, his own unconquerable spirit, so that the commonplace man became a hero, and the hero became invincible. The spirit of Hawke and Wolfe and Clive should have lived again. This restored army and navy he would have hurled, as once before, on the fleets and on the colonies of the House of Bourbon, on France, and if she had made but a sign, on Spain. As once before, he would have torn from them their colonies; from France, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Desirade, Marie Galante, their stations in India and on the Slave Coast; from Spain, Cuba and the Philippines. He would have driven their fleets from the sea, till they were captured or sunk, or skulked obscure and impotent at the head of some remote river or estu-

ary. And then, when on each remotest island and on every loneliest sea, the Red Cross blazed, majestic and alone, then he would have turned to the colonies, and said: "Choose now. Will you be one with us, with every right save that of independence, and with our right of sovereignty asserted but in theory alone, with your commerce bound only by laws passed in a parliament reformed at home, and in both Houses of which you are represented? Or will you face, alone and unaided, the whole might of victorious Britain?"

It was not to be. *Dis aliter visum*. The brain was as clear as ever, but the racked and tortured body was broken at last. At the end of his introductory speech he sat down. The Duke of Richmond replied with moderation and dignity. Chatham made a vain attempt to rise, suddenly caught at his heart, and fell back in a faint. As soon as possible he was carried to his beloved Hayes, where after lingering for a few weeks he died; in his dying hours, with his old dramatic instinct, calling on his son to read to him the tale of the mourning of Troy for Hector.

Was the plan impracticable? "A federal union between the American Colonies and Great Britain floated as some think before the mind of Chatham. Such a union might have lived with Chatham; with Chatham it would have died." (Goldwin Smith: *The United States*, p. 70). It is idle to speculate on what might have been; yet had Chatham been given five years to carry out his plan, he might have handed on the torch to his son, and he to Canning. To him liberty and Empire were no catchwords, but winged spirits with tongues of flame. May we not indulge the fancy that his genius might have united them in indissoluble union, and so prevented the long years of hatred and misunderstanding now happily at an end.

W. L. GRANT.

