



CANADA

# CANADIAN WEEKLY BULLETIN

INFORMATION DIVISION • DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS • OTTAWA, CANADA

Vol. 20 No. 18

May 5, 1965

## CONTENTS

Peace Keeping and Disarmament .....	1
Oil from the Pacific Ocean .....	3
Seaway Statistics .....	3
Civil Service Age-Groups .....	3

National Library and Archives .....	4
Trade in Securities .....	4
Fitness Programme for Family Campers .....	4
Aid to Prospectors .....	4

## PEACE KEEPING AND DISARMAMENT

*The following address was delivered on May 3 by Mr. Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the special session in Geneva of the eleventh general assembly of the World Veterans Federation, held to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations:*

...This is a solemn anniversary for all of us. It is an anniversary of the hopes and aspirations which repose in this great organization. It is, above all, an anniversary of our collective determination to build a better world order.

The first condition of such a world order is peace. And it is no coincidence that the first pledge to which we subscribed in the Charter of the United Nations is a pledge of peace — a pledge "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". I have no need to dwell on the undiminished urgency of that pledge in a gathering of world veterans.

We have come a reasonable way along the course we charted 20 years ago. But a long and arduous road stretches before us. The end of that road is still far from being in sight. It is important, therefore, to be clear where our steps should be directed.

### RECORD OF PROGRESS

I have spoken of reasonable progress on the road to peace. In the very difficult situation which is confronting us in Vietnam today, this may seem like an excessively optimistic statement. But if we cast our glance back over the past two decades, I think that the record will bear me out. In that period, we have faced a large number of situations of conflict or potential conflict. Many of these situations could

have led to war. In the event, they did not lead to war. They did not lead to war because the international community did not permit them to lead to war — and because there were mechanisms by which the international community was able to insulate such situations against the hazards of escalation and to bring them within the ambit of peaceful resolution.

That, as I see it, is the essence of the idea of peace keeping as it has evolved within the framework of the United Nations. I do not think there can be any doubt about the immense importance of that conception in a world in which instability and insecurity are still prevalent. Nevertheless, the future of peace keeping is now at issue. Only a few months ago, the United Nations narrowly avoided a confrontation over that issue. I am glad to say that saner counsel prevailed. A special committee is now looking into all aspects of peace keeping with the object of arriving at a sound and broadly acceptable basis for the future.

### ELEMENTS OF A CONSENSUS

I am hopeful that at least the basic elements of a consensus will emerge from the work of the committee. Such a consensus, as I see it, might be reached on some or all of the following propositions:

*First*, the United Nations must be restored to financial health. This is a matter of liquidating past debts. I should hope that it is also a matter of not permitting a recurrence of the present situation in the future.

*Second*, the United Nations must be enabled to maintain the capacity to act in emergencies. The

(Over)

primary responsibility in this regard is acknowledged to rest with the Security Council. But if the Security Council is unable, for any reason, to act in such a situation, the General Assembly should not be prevented from recommending appropriate action to safeguard the peace. For all governments have, in the last resort, a common interest in taking measures to halt the spread of local conflicts before the major powers are confronted with the alternatives of retreat or world chaos.

*Third*, there should be an acceptance of the principle of shared responsibility in financing peace-keeping operations in all cases where the permanent members of the Security Council agree to their being undertaken. In those cases, the General Assembly would apportion the expenses, taking due account of the principle of capacity to pay. If a permanent member were to object to an operation, some modification of the principle of shared responsibility might have to be accepted.

*Fourth*, there is a need for continuing efforts to improve the technical capacity of the United Nations to act in situations of emergency. This has its counterpart in suitable arrangements being made by member states to co-operate with the United Nations before such situations arise.

Canada, for its part, will continue to do all it can to strengthen the peace-keeping capacities of the United Nations. We shall do so by working towards a settlement of the wider political issues in the Special Committee. We shall also do so by improving, where possible, the practical arrangements which must be made in any event if the United Nations is to continue to respond to requests for the provision of international forces to preserve or restore peace around the world.

We can be sure that some mechanism, whether it be nation states acting on their own, regional groupings or alliances, or the United Nations itself, will continue in the years ahead to be required to do this job. If it is to be well done, we need the broadest possible consensus of world opinion and the United Nations is the best place for us to find that consensus.

#### NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Peace keeping is one dimension of the problem of maintaining peace and security in the world today. Disarmament is another.

For the first time in human history, we have achieved something close to absolute military power. We have come to assume that the destructive power we wield will deter us from ever using it. That, at any rate, is the assumption that lies at the root of the conception of "nuclear deterrence". But this is not a state of things we can look upon with any degree of complacency.

In the first place, we are faced with the prospect of a diffusion of nuclear capability. Secondly, it is surely paradoxical that, in a century which has seen man achieve greater control over his environment than any preceding century, we should not be able to build a better and more peaceful world order except under the compulsion of the law of fear.

These considerations underline the need for early progress in the field of disarmament.

...I suggest that the principal problem in the field of disarmament before us today is now to limit the further spread of nuclear weapons. And, when I speak of the spread of nuclear weapons, I mean an increase in the number of states possessing independent military nuclear capabilities.

So far, we have pursued this objective in two main directions. First, we have acted to safeguard the transfer of nuclear materials and equipment from one country to another in order to ensure that they are used only for peaceful purposes. The atom, of course, is capable of a wide range of peaceful uses of which the supply of energy is only one. We must anticipate that, as time goes by, the atom will become an increasingly important agent in the scientific and technological revolution we are witnessing all around us. There is no sense in inhibiting that development. Indeed, there is every reason for encouraging it.

But we cannot ignore the fact that the atom can be used for war as well as for peace. As the peaceful uses of the atom become more widely diffused, more and more nations are inevitably being placed in a position of having the potential capacity to produce nuclear weapons of their own. This situation is coming about without these countries necessarily wishing to acquire a military nuclear capacity. It is coming about without any conscious determination on their part.

It is, nevertheless, a situation of which we have had to take account. And we have taken account of it by attaching safeguards, wherever possible, to transactions in nuclear materials and equipment. Such safeguards are now a feature of most bilateral agreements covering peaceful co-operation in nuclear matters. At the same time, a system of international safeguards has been evolved by the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply to transactions conducted through it as well as to transactions specifically placed under its supervision for safeguards purposes by member states....

But the use of safeguards is not universal in application. It seems to me, therefore, that we must direct our efforts towards closing this gap by making safeguards applicable on as comprehensive a basis as possible to nuclear materials and equipment entering into international commerce. To the extent that this can be done through the International Atomic Energy Agency, I am sure that international confidence in the system will be enhanced.

#### AIM OF COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT

The partial test-ban treaty concluded two years ago is another step we have taken towards halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Its extension, accompanied by acceptable arrangements for verification, to include underground testing would help to consolidate progress in that direction. Recent advances in the technique of seismic recording and analysis encourage me to believe that the technical capability to distinguish at long distance between earthquake signals and those of an underground explosion

(Continued on P. 5)

## OIL FROM THE PACIFIC OCEAN

The following statement was made recently by Mr. Arthur Laing, the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, as a result of the announcement by Shell Oil Co. of Canada Ltd. of a drilling programme for the 1966 exploration season on their Pacific Coast oil and gas permits:

I am delighted by the news that the Shell Oil Co. is proceeding with actual drilling exploration of their Canada Oil and Gas permits off the Pacific Coast of Canada. Shell are the holders of more than 11,000,000 acres of permits granted by the Federal Government off the Pacific Coast of Canada.

The Shell exploration programme brings the development of Canada's resource potential in the non-renewable energy field to a new level. The discovery of oil and gas on the Pacific Coast of Canada would revolutionize the whole marketing structure for hydro-carbons in the Pacific area and would open vast new markets to Canadian production particularly in the United States and Japan.

### AN EMPLOYMENT BOON

The technology relating to off-shore drilling is highly specialized. I hope that, when all the facts are in, it will be possible for some Canadian company or group to receive the contract to build the drilling platform and to provide all the related services. The job of constructing the drilling platform will take a year and provide many hundreds of man-years of labour which would be an employment blessing to British Columbia. The acquisition of the technology for off-shore drilling would be an important one for Canada....

The Prime Minister has announced that the question of legal jurisdiction over off-shore resources as between the Federal Government and the provincial government has been referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for a decision. This action is necessary in order that exploration companies be not deterred in their search by uncertainty as to title. The action of Shell Oil Company in announcing an exploration programme following so quickly the Prime Minister's announcement is a very satisfactory indication of the attitude of the industry....

\*\*\*\*\*

### SEAWAY STATISTICS

Record advances on practically all fronts were achieved by the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1964, it was announced in the annual report of the Seaway Authority tabled recently in Parliament. The season was the longest since the opening in 1959.

Combined traffic on the entire Montreal-Lake Erie system rose to an all-time high of 55.8 million tons from 45.6 million the previous season. Ship transits numbered 10,036.

Cargo traffic on the Montreal-Lake Ontario section, which is subject to tolls, totalled 39.3 million tons, a 27 percent increase over the 30.9 million tons in 1963. Toll revenue was \$19.1 million in 1964, an increase of \$4 million, or more than 26 per cent, over 1963. Of this joint Canadian-U.S. revenue, the Authority's share was \$13.5 million, a \$2.8-million increase from 1963.

### SUBSTANTIAL OPERATING LOSS

Despite the general improvement in all areas of activity, the Seaway continues to operate at a substantial loss. The report analyses the position as follows:

"For the six years since the commencement of navigation on the Seaway, the total interest cost charged against operations has amounted to \$85.5 million. During this period the Welland section, a vital part of the system which continues to be toll-free, has accumulated an operating loss aggregating \$19.3 million. On the other hand, although revenues and traffic have been lower than originally forecast, for each of the six years the Montreal-Lake Ontario section has produced operating profits which aggregate \$39.0 million at the end of 1964.

"These profits, however, fall substantially short of the Authority's annual financial obligations, which, accordingly, have continued to increase. These factors have so far made it impossible for the Seaway as a whole to be self-supporting, as was originally planned.

"A proposal for the alleviation of the burden of the operating and interest cost of the Welland section by Parliamentary appropriation has been made, but a successful long-term solution to the Seaway's problem as a whole is essential to its present and future financial health."

Since the preparation of the report, the proposal for the alleviation of the burden of the operating and interest cost of the Welland section by Parliamentary appropriation has been approved.

\*\*\*\*\*

### CIVIL SERVICE AGE-GROUPS

A quarter of the 17,869 people hired by the federal Civil Service during 1964 were more than 40 years old, according to the Civil Service Commission. The Commission, which is the central personnel agency for the Service, said that this yearly percentage of new employees in the over-40 age-group had stayed about the same for the past three years.

Of the 4,596 who were more than 40, 3,346 were between 41 and 50, 1,174 were between 51 and 60, and 76 were more than 60. The total number of new employees was 2,466 more than in 1963. Most of these were under 30; 4,077 were 20 or younger and 5,920 were between 21 and 30. The Commission appointed 9,019 women and 8,850 men. The balance in favour of women was in the clerical and related classes, where 7,760 women and 3,225 men were hired during the year.

## NATIONAL LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES

On May 10, Governor-General Vanier officiated at a cornerstone ceremony at the National Library and Archives Building in downtown Ottawa. Mr. Maurice Lamontagne, the Secretary of State, presided. A meeting of the National Library Advisory Council, which includes representatives of all 10 provinces, had been arranged to coincide with the ceremony.

It is planned to have the building, which will cost nearly \$10 million, occupied in time for Canada's centennial celebration in 1967. It is expected that it will be finished in time to permit occupation and the cataloguing of books and documents in advance of the centennial.

### DIMENSIONS

The building will have a 304-foot frontage and will extend 210 feet towards the Ottawa River. It will contain an approximate gross floor area of 540,000 square feet. There will be nine full floors above the ground level and four mezzanines, as well as three floors below ground. The height of the building from street level will be 130 feet.

The structural frame will be reinforced concrete and the exterior walls will be faced with Canadian granite to conform with the material used in the walls of the nearby Supreme Court Building. Air conditioning will be installed for the protection of books.

### CAPACITY

The Library will be capable of accommodating about two million volumes, as well as many manuscripts, on its 15 stack levels, three of which are below ground. One of the many features will be a 400-seat theatre and assembly hall that will form an annex on the west side. It will protrude about 85 feet, with an 80-foot front, and will be 40 feet high.

Exhibition halls and offices, reading rooms and rare-book displays are all part of the building plan. The Public Archives will occupy a considerable area and offices are also to be provided for the Royal Society of Canada.

\*\*\*\*

## TRADE IN SECURITIES

Transactions in outstanding securities between Canada and other countries during February resulted in a net capital outflow of \$25.8 million, a continuation of the trend of the three previous months, though considerably below the revised January net-outflow figure of just over \$39 million. The geographical distribution of net flows of capital repeated the January pattern, with outflows of \$15.5 million, \$9.7 million and \$0.6 million to the United States, Britain and other countries respectively. In January the net purchase balances with these areas were respectively \$27.7 million, \$7.4 million, and \$3.9 million.

### CANADIAN SALES

Trade in outstanding Canadian securities resulted in a net repurchase balance of \$21.9 million. Bonds

and debentures attracted \$4.7 million of net foreign investment but the sustained repatriation of equities amounting to \$26.6 million accounted for the net purchase balance. In the previous month, the net repatriation of \$41.4 million in Canadian securities included net outflows for both classes of securities—\$0.8 million for bonds and debentures and \$40.6 million for equities.

### FOREIGN SALES

Trade in outstanding foreign securities led to an additional \$3.9 million outflow of Canadian investment, with the net acquisition of \$4.8 million in common and preference stocks and the surrender of \$0.9 million in bonds and debentures. Geographically, this net outflow was directed almost entirely to the United States, mainly for the purchase of the equities of that country. Transactions with residents of Britain were nearly in balance, while a net sales balance of \$0.5 million occurred in trade with other countries.

\*\*\*\*

## FITNESS PROGRAMME FOR FAMILY CAMPERS

The National Fitness and Amateur Sport Programme has invited every Canadian to try his hand at outdoor living. Family camping is the latest subject for attention in the "How To" series of the Department of National Health and Welfare, which administers the Programme. Through films and instructional texts, the Department is providing expert guidance on a number of sporting and recreational activities.

The first demonstration of the family-camping "How To" kit was held recently in Toronto. The proceedings included the premiere of "Family Camping", a 28-minute colour film illustrating the wide variety of pleasures offered by the Canadian outdoors, such as travel by car or canoe in Ontario's Georgian Bay or trial riding in the Rockies.

Other sections of the kit offer hints on the practical side of camping, from pitching a tent to cooking over an open fire. Four filmstrips in colour and a camper's manual, on these subjects and many others, were also unveiled.

The French version of the kit, "La famille sous la tente", was shown recently at Montreal's Family Camping Exhibition.

\*\*\*\*

## AID TO PROSPECTORS

The Federal Government has streamlined its Prospectors' Assistance Programme in Canada's North, National Resources Minister Arthur Laing announced recently. This year again, his department has earmarked \$60,000 to encourage prospecting in the Yukon and the Northwest Territories. But this aid will now be provided under general regulations, instead of under individual contracts. "This will give local screening boards greater control of the Programme and speed its operation", says Mr. Laing.

(Continued) (Over)

Formerly, the Programme was administered from Ottawa, where the Resources Division of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources handled every individual contract. Launched in 1962, it provides \$30,000 to assist prospectors in the Yukon and the same amount for prospectors in the Northwest Territories. Each participant may receive up to \$900 to cover approved expenses during the fiscal year. Of this amount, a maximum of \$350 may be used to purchase food and other supplies; the rest is for travelling expenses.

To qualify for aid, an applicant must undertake to carry on prospecting for at least 60 days. He then must keep a record of his work, to be turned in after its completion.

\* \* \* \*

#### PEACE KEEPING AND DISARMAMENT

(Continued from P. 2)

will shortly prove to have been significantly improved. I am hopeful that on that basis, and provided the need for at least some "on-site" inspection can once again be accepted in principle by all concerned, it may be possible to arrive at a comprehensive test-ban agreement which would command general support.

The more comprehensive application of safeguards to transactions in nuclear materials and equipment and the extension of the partial test-ban treaty to cover underground tests would each represent an important advance along the path of containing the spread of nuclear weapons. Even taken together, however, they would be unlikely to prove adequate to the task of effectively dissuading additional states from manufacturing or otherwise endeavouring to acquire control of nuclear weapons.

It is true that, with the passage of time, it has become clear that the nuclear powers themselves have no intention of allowing their nuclear weapons to contribute to the creation of further independent nuclear capabilities. From their point of view, such a development would, at best, serve only to complicate the strategic picture. At worst, it could upset the nuclear balance.

#### INDICATIONS OF RESTRAINT

Of course, those powers have as yet done nothing to reduce their own vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Steps have, however, lately been taken by two of them to reduce the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and by a third to decrease its planned rate of increase in the output of such material. Those are welcome indications of restraint.

In the foreseeable circumstances of the next ten years, there may be as many as a score of states which could, if they were to make the necessary political decision to do it, acquire an independent military nuclear capability by manufacturing their own nuclear weapons. It seems axiomatic to me that, if these nations are to be expected to continue their voluntary abstention, if they are expected to go even further and make a formal international commitment to refrain from producing them in future, then the

military nuclear powers must accept responsibilities of their own. They must not only demonstrate increasing restraint in the nuclear field. They must also make renewed efforts to achieve early progress in the direction of general disarmament, including the reduction and, eventually, the elimination of all national stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

Canada is one of the countries that have the resources and the technical and industrial capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. I should like to believe that our abstention from the pursuit of a military nuclear programme may have served to encourage other non-nuclear states in following a similar policy. In the event, no middle or smaller powers have embarked on a programme of that nature and the expensive investment it would involve in nuclear weapons carriers of one sort or another. The world cannot, on the other hand, be certain how long that state of affairs will continue.

#### PROPOSALS FOR NON-ACQUISITION

Under the circumstances, it is encouraging to observe that some non-nuclear states have come forward with proposals for agreement on the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, either generally or on a regional basis. Proposals on these lines have been developed in Africa and Latin America, two vast continents where there has far been no domestic production, or national possession, of nuclear weapons but where nuclear science may be expected to contribute significantly to economic development and social progress.

These proposals are to be welcomed as offering a fresh prospect of limiting the further spread of independent military nuclear capability. The idea of non-acquisition is not, however, free of difficulty. In particular, I think there has been a growing awareness that it may not be practicable to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons through the agency of non-acquisition agreement in those areas of the world where non-nuclear states are apprehensive of the aims of a neighbouring nuclear - or potential nuclear - power.

#### GUARANTEEING NON-NUCLEAR STATES

Accordingly, it may be necessary first - or simultaneously - to guarantee the security of such non-nuclear states, at least against nuclear attack by the nuclear state concerned, if they are to be expected to forego the option of becoming nuclear powers on their own at some future date. Collective security arrangements have in large measure already provided a guarantee of this nature for the allies of the great nuclear powers. The non-aligned and neutral nations do not enjoy similar guarantees, and it is within their ranks that the spread of nuclear weapons is more likely to take place within the next decade.

For that reason alone, it seems to me probable that there will be an increasing tendency to correlate a guarantee of that nature with proposals which take as their point of departure the terms of the Irish resolution. That resolution, adopted at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of the United

(Over)

Nations; constitutes the only norm of non-dissemination which up to now has been generally accepted. It calls on all states to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing a reciprocal set of undertakings: an undertaking by the nuclear states not to relinquish control of nuclear weapons, or to transmit the information necessary for their manufacture to states not possessing such weapons; and an undertaking by states not possessing nuclear weapons to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring control of such weapons. There is a pressing need, in my judgement, for the elaboration of an international agreement or agreements on that basis.

TACIT UNDERSTANDING

This would mean starting with a notion of how to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons that is well known and whose limitations are fully understood. The adoption of the reciprocal pledges contained in the Irish resolution would not result in any nation being deprived of such provisions for its security - nuclear or otherwise - as it may currently enjoy. And the nuclear powers would only be giving formal recognition to a tacit understanding which has governed their relations for the last few years - namely, that they will not hand over the undivided or independent control of nuclear weapons to states which do not already possess them.

I have in mind, for example, as part of such an overall system, an extension of the present safeguards procedures. As these procedures stand, they apply essentially to assistance derived by one country from another in the peaceful uses of the atom. They do not, on the whole, apply to a country's

peaceful nuclear programmes to the extent that they are carried out without outside assistance. That may be one direction, therefore, in which we could move forward, looking to the day when nuclear and non-nuclear states alike might be prepared to put all their non-military nuclear programmes under the safeguards procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

PROBLEM OF CONTROL TRANSFER

There is another direction in which progress may be possible. The present safeguards procedures are designed to prevent the manufacture of nuclear weapons. They do not relate to the transfer of control of such weapons. That suggests that the time has come when it might be useful to consider some supplementary mechanism which would deal with situations where there has been an alleged or suspected transfer of control of nuclear weapons by one state to another. I can envisage a role being played by the Security Council or regional organizations, as the case may be, in the operation of such a mechanism.

In recognition of the acceptance of those constraints and their contribution to the building of international confidence, it should, surely, not be beyond the collective genius of the nuclear powers to provide those non-nuclear states which are either non-aligned or neutral and which evidently regard the option of being able to become nuclear powers at some future time as a factor contributing to their national security with a credible guarantee against nuclear attack. This would not, of course, alter in any way their non-aligned or neutral status....

\*\*\*\*\*

GUARANTEEING NON-NUCLEAR STATES

Accordingly, it may be necessary, first - and I think it is necessary - to guarantee the security of such non-nuclear states. It is not sufficient to say that nuclear states will not use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. It is necessary to say that nuclear states will not use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states in a way which would result in the non-nuclear states being unable to enjoy their national security. This is the point of the Irish resolution. It is not sufficient to say that nuclear states will not use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. It is necessary to say that nuclear states will not use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states in a way which would result in the non-nuclear states being unable to enjoy their national security. This is the point of the Irish resolution. It is not sufficient to say that nuclear states will not use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. It is necessary to say that nuclear states will not use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states in a way which would result in the non-nuclear states being unable to enjoy their national security. This is the point of the Irish resolution.

INDICATIONS OF RESTRAINT  
In the past, those powers that have been working to reduce their own inventories of nuclear weapons have, however, largely been faced by two of them to reduce the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and by a third to decrease its planned rate of increase in the output of weapons material. Those are welcome indications of restraint. It is the hope of the non-nuclear states that the nuclear powers will be able to make these commitments in a way which would result in the non-nuclear states being able to enjoy their national security. This is the point of the Irish resolution.