

doc
CA1
EA
97P62
ENG

CANADA



**PRACTICAL DISARMAMENT,
DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION
MEASURES FOR PEACEBUILDING**



APRIL 1997

Canada

**PRACTICAL DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION
MEASURES FOR PEACEBUILDING**

April 1997

ERRATA

<i>Page</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Read</i>
i, Table of Contents, line 12	United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation	United Nations International Study on Firearms Regulation
iii, line 2	Secretary General	Secretary-General
iii, footnote 1, line 1	Secretary General	Secretary-General
vi, line 15	Firearm Regulation	Firearms Regulation
1, line 9	more alarming that the monetary cost	more alarming than the monetary cost
1, line 11	Boutros-Boutros Ghali	Boutros Boutros-Ghali
1, footnote 3, line 2	para. 60	para. 61
3, footnote 9, line 2	(September 1997)	(September 1996)
5, line 4	Firearm Regulation	Firearms Regulation
6, line 20	<u>United Nations International Study on Firearms Regulation</u>	<u>United Nations International Study on Firearms Regulation</u>
7, line 2	Firearm Regulation	Firearms Regulation
7, line 24	In Ottawa, in October 1997, ...	In Ottawa, in October 1996, ...
7, footnote 20, line 1	the Firearm Study	the Firearms Study
9, footnote 27, line 1	Twelve case studies were carried out:	Twelve case studies were planned:
19, line 11	other incidence of unrest	other incidents of unrest
22, line 26	9 Sept 1992	9 September 1992
23, line 15	Against these commitments, however, it was the assessment	Against these commitments, however, was the assessment
24, line 30	Secretary General	Secretary-General
28, footnote 72, line 1	1992-1195	1992-1995
29, line 7	Secretary General	Secretary-General

34, line 29	Secretary General	Secretary-General
36, line 24	Central to the work of the Mission ...	Central to the work of the second Mission ...
36, footnote 103, line 2	the Centre for Disarmament Affairs	the UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs
37, line 5	service	services
42, line 25	to effectively plan, coordinate and implement	to plan, coordinate and implement effectively
42, line 33	to fully assess	to assess fully
47, line 15	to effectively respond	to respond effectively
47, line 26	to better coordinate	to coordinate better
49, line 3	to competently design and launch	to design and launch competently
49, line 19	to fully assess	to assess fully
50, line 11	to seriously constrain	to constrain seriously
54, line 22	<u>Programme</u>	<u>Programmes</u>
54, line 27	to fully assess	to assess fully
55, line 27	training by UN	training by the UN
56, line 8	ensure a sustainable DDRP in long term	ensure sustainable DDRPs in the long term
57, Annex A, line 8	decision for DDR	decision for DDRP
58, line 17	1997	1996
58, line 21	Ghali, Boutros-Boutros	Boutros-Ghali, Boutros
58, line 23	Ghali, Boutros-Boutros	Boutros-Ghali, Boutros
58, line 26	Ghali, Boutros-Boutros	Boutros-Ghali, Boutros
58, line 28	Ghali, Boutros-Boutros	Boutros-Ghali, Boutros
59, line 1	Ghali, Boutros-Boutros, "Report of the Secretary-General on International Regulation of Firearms", presented to the General Assembly by UN Document E/CN.15/1997/4 (March 1997).	Annan, Kofi, "Criminal Justice Reform and Strengthening of Legal Institutions: Measures to Regulate Firearms: Report of the Secretary-General", UN Document E/CN.15/1997/4 (7 March 1997).
59, line 14	1992-1195	1992-1995
61, line 5	of on the small arms and light weapons study	on small arms

b 3138495 (E)

CANADA

Dept. of External Affairs
Min. des Affaires extérieures

RETURN TO THE NATIONAL LIBRARY
RETOURNER À LA BIBLEIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE



57427328

**PRACTICAL DISARMAMENT,
DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION
MEASURES FOR PEACEBUILDING**



APRIL 1997

F
A
A
I
I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	v
ABSTRACT	vi
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. BACKGROUND TO UNDC'S CONSIDERATION OF GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICAL DISARMAMENT MEASURES IN THE CONTEXT OF PEACEBUILDING	3
United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms ...	3
UN Register of Conventional Armaments	5
United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation	6
Anti-Personnel Mines and the Ottawa Process	7
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project	8
Selected Complementary Regional Efforts	9
III. SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION EFFORTS	16
Introduction	16
United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) ..	16
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) ...	18
Second United Nations Operation in Somalia, (UNOSOM II)	21
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	27
Mali/Sahara-Sahel Experience	36

	PAGE
IV. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS CONTINUUM	42
General	42
Aim	42
Technical Assessment	42
The Continuum	43
Conditions for Success and Obstacles to Overcome	44
V. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS	47
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS	52
ANNEX A	57
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	58

PREFACE

Canada shares the view articulated in 1995 by the United Nations Secretary General that there is an urgent need for practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts with which the United Nations is actually dealing and with the weapons -- especially small arms and light weapons -- that are actually killing thousands of people each year¹. This is an important subject that has received relatively little attention until recent years.

Two recent initiatives by the United Nations General Assembly bear special mention in this context. The first is the establishment by Resolution 50/70 B of an United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. This Panel, which is to report to the General Assembly in the autumn of 1997, is examining the types of small arms and light weapons that are actually being used in conflicts with which the United Nations deals, the nature and causes of excessive and destabilizing accumulations and transfers of such weapons, and the ways that such excessive and destabilizing accumulations and transfers can be prevented and reduced. The Panel constitutes an important opportunity to explore these issues and to determine a set of practical measures to address these concerns.

The work of the Small Arms Panel will have direct relevance to the second initiative in the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) which seeks to explore a comprehensive approach towards certain practical disarmament measures for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security, especially in areas that have suffered from conflict. Following from General Assembly Resolution 51/45 N, the Disarmament Commission's work stresses the importance of such practical disarmament as a basis for effective rehabilitation and social and economic development.

Canada is a strong supporter of both these initiatives and has also taken the lead in international efforts to achieve a global ban on anti-personnel landmines. It is critical, particularly to the success of peacebuilding in post-conflict environments, to address the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the former combatants. Effective programmes in this regard have several benefits:

- they reduce the chances of renewed hostilities at the same level of violence and destruction;
- they help preclude the use in criminal activities of left-over military-style weapons and the social and economic disruption that can flow from such activities;

¹ "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations", A/50/60, 3 January 1995.

- they provide the basis for the re-establishment of confidence in social institutions, such as the judicial system and police, as well as a secure environment for normal peaceful interaction; and
- mine and explosive ordnance removal, in particular, can re-open territory for peaceful use.

Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy has identified peacebuilding:

"... as a package of measures to strengthen and solidify peace by building a sustainable infrastructure of human security. Peacebuilding aims to put into place the minimal conditions under which a country can take charge of its destiny, and social, political and economic development become possible."²

Integral to and necessary for the success of peacebuilding activities are practical disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures.

The following report has been prepared as background for the discussions on the subject of consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures at the 1997 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It is being made available to assist officials and researchers in their work on this subject, as part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's policy to share the results of independent research undertaken by the Verification Research Program.

The views presented in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of Canada or of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade
Ottawa
April 1997

² "Building Peace to Last: Establishing a Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative", Statement 96/46, 30 October 1996.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade wishes to acknowledge the work performed concerning this report by Ms. Peggy Mason, BGen. (ret'd) Ian C. Douglas and Col. (ret'd) Douglas Fraser of the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security, Ottawa, Ontario.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to survey selected relevant international experience and to outline a generic model for the effective planning and implementation of the practical disarmament, demobilization and reintegration aspects of the consolidation of peace process. The paper takes as its reference point the call by then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* to begin immediately the search for effective solutions, particularly on a regional basis, to the urgent and pressing need for practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts with which the United Nations is actually faced and the weapons -- particularly small arms and light weapons -- that are causing much of the carnage in these conflicts.

The paper, in Section II, briefly examines various multilateral initiatives relevant to the small arms and light weapons issue, including the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, the United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation, efforts toward a total ban on anti-personnel mines, and a major UNIDIR project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution. Selected complementary regional efforts at confidence building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution are also briefly reviewed in relation to the OAS, the ARF and the OAU. In addition, efforts within the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD to develop guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation are considered for their impact on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration aspects of peacebuilding efforts.

In the third Section of the paper, specific disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts in the context of four United Nations peacekeeping operations and one United Nations advisory mission are examined with a view to identifying lessons learned.

On the basis of the foregoing survey and analysis, the guiding principles for, the basic elements of, and the possible obstacles to, an effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme are elaborated and a continuum of appropriate activities described in Section IV. The result is a generic model for the effective planning and implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration aspects of peacebuilding operations.

The report provides a summary of its Principal Findings in Section V and a listing of its recommendations in Section VI.

I. INTRODUCTION

The contemporary significance of micro-disarmament is demonstrated by the enormous proliferation of automatic assault rifles, anti-personnel mines and the like. Competent authorities have estimated that billions of dollars are being spent yearly on light weapons, representing nearly one third of the world's total arms trade. Many of those weapons are being bought, from developed countries, by developing countries that can least afford to dissipate their precious and finite assets for such purposes, and the volume of trade in light weapons is far more alarming than the monetary cost might lead one to suspect.³

Boutros-Boutros Ghali

On 3 January 1995, the Secretary-General issued his *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*⁴ in which he reviewed developments since the publication of *An Agenda for Peace*⁵ in June of 1992. In Part III of the *Supplement* entitled "Instruments for Peace and Security", after citing considerable progress in several areas of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, the Secretary-General concentrated on what he termed "micro-disarmament"; that is, "practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands."⁶

The Secretary-General drew attention to the experience of the United Nations in the assembly, control and disposal of weapons in the context of comprehensive peace settlements in which it has played a peacekeeping role and underscored the equal relevance of micro-disarmament to post-conflict peacebuilding. He highlighted two categories of light weapons: first, small arms, which, he stated, "are probably responsible for most of the deaths in current

³ "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations", A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, para. 60.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ UN document A/47/277, 17 June 1992.

⁶ "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", para. 60.

conflicts" and, second, anti-personnel mines. Noting the many causes for the proliferation of small arms, and the "exceptional difficulty of controlling the illicit flow of small arms", he urged that the search begin now for effective solutions, particularly on a regional basis.⁷

⁷ In paragraph 63, the Secretary-General lists the following causes: "...the earlier supply of weapons to client states by the parties to the cold war, internal conflicts, competition for commercial markets, criminal activity and the collapse of governmental law and order functions (which both gives free rein to the criminals and creates a legitimate reason for ordinary citizens to acquire weapons for their own defence)."

II. BACKGROUND TO UNDC'S CONSIDERATION OF GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICAL DISARMAMENT MEASURES IN THE CONTEXT OF PEACEBUILDING

While the United Nations had been engaged in activities bearing on the subject for some time, the Secretary-General's comments were a bold attempt to put the issue of small arms and light weapons squarely on the international arms control agenda.

These earlier initiatives have been summarized in detail elsewhere, particularly in respective German and Canadian studies:

- *Brief 7: The New Field of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons*⁸, and
- *Light Weapons and Micro-Disarmament*.⁹

It is the purpose of this Section, therefore, to build upon these earlier studies and to report on the most recent developments.¹⁰

United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms

By its resolution 50/70 B of 12 December 1995, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report, with the assistance of a panel group of qualified experts¹¹, on the question of small arms and light weapons for submission in the autumn of 1997. The resolution focuses the report on:

"(a) the types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations;

(b) the nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade; and

⁸ Bonn International Centre for Conversion, September 1996. Based on a study prepared for the German Foreign Office.

⁹ The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, with the assistance of Mr. David Declercq. (September 1997)

¹⁰ In some cases, as with some of the discussion of the OAS and the OAU, earlier developments not found in the above noted Reports, are also included.

¹¹ Note that the resolution refers to a "panel group of qualified governmental experts" so that the words "panel" and "group" and "Expert Group" are used interchangeably in this discussion.

(c) the ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflict;

with particular attention to the role of the United Nations in this field and to the complementary role of regional organizations...."

The Panel completed its first session in June 1996 and since then has travelled to South Africa and El Salvador in order to hold discussions with experienced practitioners in the field. Midway through the second session in January, 1997, the Chairman of the Panel, Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki, several Panel members and the consultant to the group attended a Workshop on Progress in International Efforts to Constrain Light Weapons, held in Ottawa, Canada¹². The Workshop was an opportunity for these members of the Panel to focus on proliferation of light weapons in the context of specific peacekeeping experiences.

While it appeared there were still some concerns on the part of certain Member States on the relationship of this type of examination to the inherent right of self-defence, there was general agreement among Panel members on the need to study light weapons problems in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. The Panel is concentrating its efforts on Africa, Central America and South-West Asia; areas it sees as the most pressing in the near and mid-term. Despite many similarities in situations, each region is different and the panel anticipates difficulties in establishing global norms that will be widely applicable and acceptable. Regional approaches may well offer the most opportunity for progress in addressing the problem of light weapons proliferation. On the other hand, the cross-border aspect of arms transfers and the need of many affected states for multilateral assistance in building the capacity to effectively respond to this problem suggests the need for an overarching global approach. The expert group has noted the existence in some areas of a potentially dangerous combination of cultures -- those of violence and of weapons ownership -- which is particularly troubling.

While anti-personnel mines are included in the category of light weapons, the Panel has decided that, given the separate negotiations now underway, it will not deal with this aspect.

¹² The Workshop was organized by the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security, (CCIPS) an independent body formed to promote innovative Canadian policies in the field of international peace and security in keeping with Canada's internationalist tradition. Other panel members in attendance included Ambassador André Mernier of Belgium, Ambassador Pasi Patokallio of Finland, Colonel Wolfgang Richter of Germany and Mr. David Declercq of Canada. Dr. Edward Laurence is the Panel's consultant. The assessment in this report of the state of play in the Expert Group to this point is taken both from the Report of that workshop (Douglas Fraser, *Progress in International Efforts to Constrain Light Weapons: A Canadian Perspective*, (Ottawa: CCIPS, 25 January 1997)), and from discussions with some of the Experts.

The Panel has also noted the parallel activity taking place under the auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Council and the Vienna-based Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. The latter Commission has undertaken the United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation, using a project team under a Canadian Coordinator.¹³ While this Study focusses on "law and order" issues, common ground with the Panel on Small Arms has been identified in the area of export controls and destabilizing accumulations of military-style small arms. There may also be commonalities with respect to the utility of embargoes and sanctions. The Panel therefore anticipates making cross-references to the Vienna process in its final report.

It is too early to properly assess the progress of this Panel -- it will only begin to consider its recommendations on the margins of a workshop to be held in Tokyo at the end of May. With its diverse composition and differing priorities, finding a meaningful consensus will not be easy. Nonetheless, given the magnitude and urgency of the problem of light weapons, and the strong call to action by then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, it is to be hoped that the Panel will seize this singular opportunity to make decisive progress by reaching agreement on concrete, practical recommendations.

UN Register of Conventional Armaments

Pursuant to resolution 50/70D of 1994, a UN Group of Governmental Experts is meeting once again¹⁴ to review the operation of the Register and its possible expansion. The first of three sessions was held in March 1997, with two further sessions in June and August respectively, before the report is presented to the General Assembly in the autumn of 1997. Japan has announced that, in conjunction with Bradford University, it will host a seminar and intersessional meeting for the Expert Group from May 12-24 in Tokyo, where members will have an opportunity to consider the 1996 reports, due April 30, 1997.

The UN Register was an important practical step by the United Nations to create operational instruments of transparency at the global level. While limited in scope, it has enjoyed a reasonable level of support with approximately 90 states reporting in each of the first three complete years of reporting (1993-1996) since its creation. Participation is low from certain regions, in part for political reasons,

¹³ This Study, the Report of which has just been released, is briefly discussed *infra*. The Canadian Coordinator is Mr. Jim Hayes of Canada's Department of Justice, who also participated in the CCIPS Workshop.

¹⁴ The first review was in 1994.

as in the case of the Middle East.¹⁵ Other Member States, particularly in Africa, have made it clear that the categories of weapons to be reported (which exclude small arms and light weapons) have little relevance to the security concerns of that continent. To the surprise of many, the register has revealed information that was not known before¹⁶ and has helped foster better national procedures for the monitoring and reporting of conventional arms transfers. Perhaps most important, however, the Register has proven to be an important stimulus for security dialogues, both governmental and 'second track',¹⁷ at the regional and sub-regional levels.¹⁸

Proposals for expanding the register include the addition of holdings and procurement through national production, as well as the inclusion of the types and models of weapons at the same level of reporting as transfers. Other Member States continue to favour inclusion of weapons of mass destruction while still others argue that the first priority is to expand the participation in the current register. Given this continuing difference of views, prospects for an expansion of the scope of the register or a measured improvement in the qualitative nature of the data remain modest. On the other hand, it may be possible to make certain institutional improvements with respect to both a consultative mechanism and the role of the UN Secretariat in promoting the register.

United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation

Pursuant to a resolution passed in June of 1995 by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),¹⁹ the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division at the

¹⁵ In this region, only Israel and Jordan submitted data for 1995. Several others took a deliberate decision not to do so in light of concerns about the lack of expansion of the register to include weapons of mass destruction.

¹⁶ See: *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward Laurence and Herbert Wulf editors (Bradford Arms Register Studies No. 4, 1994), Chapter 4.

¹⁷ For a discussion of "second track" dialogues in the Asia Pacific context, see *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Confidence-Building*, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (February 1997) at pp. 7-9.

¹⁸ See, for example, the sections *infra* in relation to the OAS Hemispheric Security Committee and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

¹⁹ Document E/1995, chapter II, paras 9-20

United Nations Office in Vienna carried out a United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation.²⁰ The Report of the Secretary-General was finalized on 7 March 1997.²¹

Firearms regulation is motivated primarily by a desire to prevent crime and promote public health and safety while disarmament efforts are primarily motivated by a desire to prevent threats to international peace and security whether through aggression across borders or through the spillover of internal conflicts across borders. In addition, disarmament efforts also find justification in preventing the negative social and economic consequences of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons -- including small arms and light weapons. Both processes share a common concern about the negative consequences of illicit trafficking in military-style small arms. Both recognize that trade in small arms is legitimate; the challenge is to regulate effectively, not eradicate, the firearms/small arms trade.

Among the recommendations which are relevant to micro-disarmament is a request to the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, and the Wassenaar Arrangement²², respectively, to advise the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice on measures to address proliferation of military small arms in the civilian population of member states.²³ It is also recommended that the Commission give high priority in post-conflict peacebuilding to technical cooperation projects designed to re-establish or strengthen the rule of law relating to the regulation of firearms use by civilians.²⁴

Anti-Personnel Mines and the Ottawa Process

In Ottawa, in October 1997, Canada hosted the first International Strategy Conference on Anti-Personnel (AP) Mines for representatives of 74 governments as well as numerous non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and international

²⁰ As noted earlier under the discussion of the Panel on Small Arms, the Firearm Study used a project team under a Coordinator from the Department of Justice in Canada.

²¹ UN Document E/CN.15/1997/4.

²² The Wassenaar Arrangement provides for information exchange among some 35 mainly, but not exclusively, industrialized countries. It is intended to promote "transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations." See: Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Armaments and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, *Initial Elements*, 12 July 1996, para. I (1).

²³ Annex I, p. 8, para. 8.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.9, para. 12.

humanitarian agencies. The purpose of the Ottawa Process is to work with as many countries as possible to develop a comprehensive treaty banning the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines by December 1997. 50 countries signed the Ottawa Declaration in October, calling for a global ban. Canada's objective is a treaty signed by a broadly-based group of countries which will establish a new international norm against these weapons. To this end, practical work has begun on the treaty in Vienna, February 12-14, in Bonn, April 24-25, and with a series of further meetings planned for Belgium, Norway and Canada.

In December 1996, 156 countries voted for a resolution in the General Assembly, calling for an international treaty to ban AP mines. There were no negative votes cast and 10 countries abstained.²⁵

While the UK, France and the USA indicated in January their preference for the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the primary negotiating forum for a total ban on AP mines, they have stated that the CD and the Ottawa Process are "mutually reinforcing tracks" leading to the same goal of a total ban. Canada, and other supporters of the Ottawa Process, continue to believe that it offers the best chance for a timely and successful negotiation of a total ban. To date, the CD, a consensus body, has not agreed to a mandate for such a negotiation.

Successful conclusion and effective implementation of a global treaty banning anti-personnel mines would in the long term obviously be profoundly important for peacebuilding efforts. Dealing with mines that are currently deployed throughout the world, with their terrible consequences for consolidating peace in specific countries, will remain an on-going problem for years to come.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project

Between 1994 and 1996 UNIDIR conducted the first phase of a major project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution which focussed on the management of arms in peace processes.²⁶ Field experiences were gathered from personnel involved in the demobilization and disarmament of warring factions; a review was undertaken of a number of peace operations where disarmament and

²⁵ Belarus, China, DPRK, Israel, Pakistan, ROK, Russia, Syria and Turkey abstained. The resolution was 51/41 S.

²⁶ Significant project funding was obtained for this phase from the Ford Foundation and a number of individual countries.

demobilization were attempted²⁷; demilitarization approaches and techniques were examined and the role that disarmament of belligerents can play in the resolution of internal conflicts was discussed. In the final volume of this project, entitled *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*²⁸, six policy papers are presented on substantive issues related to the linkages between the management of arms during peace processes and the settlement of conflict. Many of the findings from this UNIDIR project are incorporated into Section III of this paper.

While phase one of the project focused on the relationship between demobilization and disarmament on the one hand and conflict *resolution* on the other, the next stage will address the role of demobilization and disarmament in conflict prevention strategies. Thus the UNIDIR project on Disarmament, Development and Conflict Prevention in West Africa is an enquiry into concrete, practical ways of improving the security situation in the area, thereby facilitating the conduct of development projects, starting with the case of Mali.²⁹

Selected Complementary Regional Efforts

The General Assembly resolution, mandating the establishment of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, drew particular attention not only to the role of the United Nations in this field but also to the "complementary role" of regional organizations.³⁰ It is therefore useful to briefly examine certain relevant developments in four regional contexts: the Organization of American States (OAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).³¹ Mention will also be made of relevant statements at the 1997 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Ministerial Meeting in New Delhi in April 1997.

²⁷ Twelve case studies were carried out: UNTAC (Cambodia), UNTAG (Namibia), UNPROFOR, (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina), UNOSOM and UNITAF (Somalia), UNAVEM (Angola), ONUSAL (El Salvador), ONUCA (Nicaragua), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNOMIL (Liberia), UNMIH (Haiti), the 1979 Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and peacekeeping in the region of Southern Africa. A thirteenth volume studied "Psychological Operations and Intelligence" in relation to the management of arms in peace processes.

²⁸ UNIDIR/96/46, 1996.

²⁹ As of early 1997, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and the United States have provided funding for phase two of the project.

³⁰ See paragraph 1.(c) of Resolution 50/70 B (1995).

³¹ The OECD is not a regional organization as such; its membership spans many regions and continents and its focus, while originally European, has now expanded to include industrialized and developing countries. Nonetheless, it is included here because, as yet, it is not a global body.

Organization of American States (OAS):

In 1991 the OAS established a Committee on Hemispheric Security. Its work programme includes developing various confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the UN standardized international reporting mechanism for military expenditures, exchanging information on defence policies and doctrines, observation of military exercises and communications between border authorities. Of particular relevance to the issue of micro-disarmament, the Committee is considering a consultation process "with a view to proceeding towards limitation and control of conventional weapons".³² This consultation would build on the work of the Rio Group³³ which, at its meeting in September 1996, "carried out a dialogue about the convenience of reaching measures to prevent an arms race in Latin America and the Caribbean...."³⁴ The Rio Group has also finalized a Draft Convention "against the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms ammunition, explosives and other related materials"³⁵ which is currently the subject of discussion in an OAS working group.

The OAS, in addition to being extensively involved in demining activities in Central America, has been promoting a global ban on the production, trade, transfer and use of AP mines. To this end, at the OAS General Assembly in Panama in June of 1996, a resolution was passed declaring the Western Hemisphere "an anti-personnel-land-mine-free zone".³⁶

³² See p. 2 of "Regional/Subregional Approaches, Sharing Security Perspectives, Confidence Building Measures, Capacity Building", a paper presented by Ambassador Carmen Moreno de Del Cueto, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the OAS and Chair of the Hemispheric Security Committee, to a Symposium on Military Expenditures in Developing Countries: Security and Development, jointly sponsored by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the Government of Canada. This symposium is discussed *infra*.

³³ The Rio Group comprises fourteen members of which the following twelve are permanent: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. In addition, Central America is represented by the country designated by that region as its coordinator and CARICOM is represented by its current chair.

³⁴ Press Release issued September 4, 1996 by the Rio Group and quoted by Ambassador Moreno at p. 2 *ibid*.

³⁵ *Ibid*.

³⁶ See AG/Res. 1411 (XXVI-0/96) entitled "The Western Hemisphere as an anti-personnel-land-mine-free zone."

Another OAS programme in a post-conflict situation is its International Support and Verification Commission in Nicaragua (CIAV).³⁷ Over the past six years, this Commission has been actively involved in assisting the country with the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants from the Nicaraguan conflict, an initiative which has grown to include all those directly affected by the conflict.³⁸ This has been achieved with a multi-faceted programme, including human rights monitoring and verification, institutional development in former areas of conflict and social and economic development programmes. The OAS has also had a mission in Suriname, since 1992, to assist in the peace process and has been deeply involved with Haiti since 1991. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH), in cooperation with the United Nations peacekeeping mission (UNMIH, then UNSMIH), has been working to rebuild the democratic institutions of Haiti since March of 1993.

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF):

Since its inaugural meeting in Bangkok in July of 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum³⁹ has identified a range of potential issues for "further study" including confidence and security-building, exchanges of unclassified military information, maritime security and preventive diplomacy. A "Concept Paper" prepared by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)⁴⁰ in 1995 elaborated confidence-building measures that could be pursued in the short term, including making use of existing global mechanisms such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms. It also called for the exploration of a regional version of the Register.

Following its 1995 Ministerial meeting, the ARF provided for the convening of an intersessional group (ISG) on confidence-building.⁴¹ In the meetings of the ISG an incremental approach to confidence-building continues to be followed, with

³⁷ This mission is also discussed in the case study, *infra*, in relation to the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) in 1989-90.

³⁸ Initially, the CIAV mission - in the context of assisting ONUCA - involved only the National Resistance fighters.

³⁹ The ARF is a region-wide security dialogue mechanism. However, as yet, the DPRK is not a member nor are the countries of South Asia.

⁴⁰ ASEAN was instrumental in the creation of the ARF and functions as its *de facto* Secretariat.

⁴¹ Note that there are also ISG's dealing with cooperation in peacekeeping training and search and rescue, respectively.

emphasis on defence contacts and exchanges and the publication of defence policy "white papers".⁴²

Organization of African Unity (OAU):⁴³

On 30 June 1993, the OAU established a "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which committed it to cooperating closely with the United Nations in relation to peacemaking and peacekeeping."⁴⁴ This mechanism, with substantial external funding, has been active in preventive (and quiet) diplomacy in a variety of contexts including *inter alia*, the Comoros, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan. The OAU has deployed military observer missions in Burundi and elsewhere. Its peacekeeping capacity, however, is limited by serious financial and logistical constraints.

The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) is unique among peacekeeping missions in that unarmed UN observers deployed in parallel with a regional peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, the latter being dispatched under the authority of the sub-regional group, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).⁴⁵

The development of the OAU conflict prevention mechanism in turn facilitated the creation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. Intended to be a vehicle for regional development and integration, SADC too has energetically engaged in preventive diplomacy and its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, inaugurated in June 1966, is focussing on the development of a "regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies".⁴⁶

⁴² The only measures which go beyond transparency to impose tangible restraints are to be found in the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, signed by all ten members of ASEAN. However, its protocols are yet to be signed by any of the five declared nuclear powers, with the US leading opposition to the treaty's coverage of continental shelves and exclusive economic zones.

⁴³ For a detailed discussion of the work of the OAU in conflict prevention, management and resolution, see for example, the chapter by Professor emeritus, Douglas G. Anglin, "Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa", in *Conflicts Around the World: 1995-1996, Rapport annuel sur les conflits internationaux, Etudes Stratégiques et Militaires* (Institut Québécois des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Université Laval, Québec) at pp. 113-155.

⁴⁴ OAU, *Resolving Conflict in Africa*, Addis-Ababa: OAU Information Services Publication Series (II), 1993.

⁴⁵ ECOWAS is the Economic Community of West African States. ECOMOG is the ECOWAS Military Observer Group.

⁴⁶ See Anglin, *op. cit.*, p.146.

Regarding landmines, the OAU and the ICRC organized in Addis Ababa, in April 1995, a seminar on international humanitarian law and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, where a common African position, calling for a total ban, was elaborated.

OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC):

Discussions on the impact of complex emergencies on development assistance have occurred in a number of donor forums including the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as well as within the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development⁴⁷. There has been a growing realization of the need both to coordinate better the international response in such cases and, more fundamentally, to integrate conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding strategies into development assistance programming.

On the basis of a special task force set up for this purpose, the Development Assistance Committee has made it a priority to work out policy guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation.⁴⁸ This work is almost complete and is expected to be approved at a meeting on 5-6 May 1997. The aim is to help improve the development efforts of OECD countries in cooperation with developing countries in the complex field of security and development.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee and the Government of Canada jointly sponsored a symposium in Ottawa in March of 1997 entitled "Military Expenditures in Developing Countries: Security and Development". In addition to DAC member countries, the Canada/OECD Symposium included representatives of developing countries and non-governmental organizations. The Concluding Statement of the Chairs included, *inter alia*, the following conclusions:

Under "Key Issues Raised":

"2. (e) Harmonized, responsible behaviour with respect to the supply of military goods is critical, and the supply of small arms, in particular requires special attention.

(f) There needs to be further consideration of donor support for micro-disarmament. While still a matter of debate, it was generally agreed that the appropriateness of donor support in this area would be

⁴⁷ The review of the Rwanda experience, from the perspective of donor agencies, was a particular catalyst.

⁴⁸ OECD DAC document DCD/DAC(96)31/REV2. Note that these guidelines are still in draft form.

dependent on the situation. In some cases, particularly in Africa, this issue has become a critical development issue in which more research and follow-up is needed."

Under "Next Steps - Key Elements of an Agenda":

"3. (b) Support and encouragement by donors for the evolution of sound regional and subregional dialogues and structures for cooperation and security.

(e) The international community needs to take parallel steps to promote harmonised, responsible behaviour in the international supply of military goods. These can include steps to:

"... seek support for broadening the acceptance and coverage of arms export, disarmament and transfer arrangements, especially in the difficult but vital area of small arms..."⁴⁹

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Ministerial Meeting:

In the "Disarmament and International Security" section of the Declaration issued after their meeting in New Delhi in early April 1997, the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, *inter alia* agreed that, in the context of regional disarmament initiatives, the "question of accumulation of conventional weapons beyond legitimate requirements of states for self-defence should also be addressed, taking into account the special characteristics of each region."⁵⁰ The Ministers went on in paragraph 39 to "express particular concern about the proliferation of small arms...", and to urge states "to take steps to deal effectively, through administrative and legislative means, with the increasing problem of illicit transfers of weapons, particularly small arms...."

The Ministers also welcomed the growing consensus against the indiscriminate use and transfer of anti-personnel landmines and the efforts to eliminate them. At the same time they underlined that any negotiations "should take into account the legitimate right of States to use landmines against the risk of aggression until such threats have been removed or alternatives become available. They also called "for urgent and specific measures" to ensure that affected

⁴⁹ DCD/DAC(97)11/REV1, paragraph 3. Note that a portion only of paragraph 3 (e) has been excerpted.


⁵⁰ Section H, Paragraph 35.

countries had full access to material, equipment and technology for mine clearance.⁵¹

Comment:

This brief review of selected developments at the regional level indicates a growing interest in both the problem of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and in the development of regional mechanisms for cooperation in addressing security related matters.

⁵¹ Paragraph 40.



III. SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION EFFORTS

This section on specific post-conflict peacebuilding experiences will examine the missions listed below with emphasis on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations. It will include a brief outline of the mission chronology followed by observations on the main lessons to be learned.

- United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), 1989-90;
- United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992-1993;
- Second United Nations Operation in Somalia, (UNOSOM II), 1993-95;
- United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 1992-94; and
- Mali/Sahara-Sahel Experience⁵², 1993-ongoing.

Introduction

Historically, and with the partial exception of the Congo operation from 1960-63, UN peacekeeping operations typically involved monitoring the separation of forces according to an agreement which had been accepted by the belligerents. With the deployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) in 1989, the UN embarked on the first of many "modern" peacekeeping operations, characterized by their complexity, their multiple dimensions and the diversity of peacekeeping partners -- both military and civilian -- needed for the successful implementation of the peace agreement. In such circumstances, with mandates encompassing humanitarian relief, support for the reconstitution of civil authority and the monitoring of elections, UN missions became a "key player in an evolving search for a solution, rather than a passive monitor of a previously agreed settlement or arrangement."⁵³ Among the many new dimensions of the mandate, was the implementation and monitoring of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures agreed to by the parties

United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)

The ONUCA mission was established in 1989, as a result of the CONTADORA peace process and the Esquipulas II Accord, in five Central American

⁵² In one very narrow sense, the Mali/Sahara-Sahel experience can be considered post-conflict in light of the rebellion by the Tuaregs in Northern Mali. However, it is more properly viewed as a largely preventive action for both Mali and its immediate neighbours.

⁵³ David Cox, "Peacekeeping and Disarmament" at page 84 in *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, Volume 96/46.

countries, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Costa Rica. In particular, the Nicaraguan Resistance (the "Contras") and the government forces (the "Sandinistas") were tired of war and its toll in lives and resources and, with the end of the Cold War, external military aid was diminishing. While the political climate was thus propitious, the length of, and the atrocities committed during the war in Nicaragua had created deep animosity between the protagonists.

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operational plan for the Contras in Honduras and Nicaragua was an *ad hoc* effort, produced in country by ONUCA and was implemented in concert with an Organization of American States (OAS) team called the Comision Nacional para la Consolidacion de la Paz (International Commission of Support and Verification) or CIAV, which was responsible for the civilian aspects of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (DDRP). The plan did not include the Sandinista army which had agreed *inter alia* to a later reduction in its strength. The plan called for the addition of a Venezuelan battalion to the approximately 200 military observers of ONUCA in order to effect the DDRP. There was to be one DDRP site in Honduras, the Contra base camp at Yamales, and eight others spread throughout Nicaragua. The plan only extended to the early stages of DDRP operations and did not include the longer term development phase of the reintegration into civilian society of the ex-combatants. In the short term this was less of a problem than it might have been as there had been relatively little destruction of the infrastructure and the government promised land plots to the ex-combatants, who were generally subsistence farmers. Ultimately, however, the government had difficulty fulfilling its commitment given legal challenges over the ownership of the lands in question.

It is worthy of note that the original plan called for demobilization before the national election. This did not happen and the Contra forces were therefore still in place when Violetta Chamora and her coalition defeated the Sandinista government. Shortly after the election, given the lack of any further "cause" for the Contras to pursue and USA support for the peace process including substantial financing, Contra disarmament and demobilization began and was completed in a relatively short period of time.

Initially the quality of weaponry turned in was very poor. By the end of the process, however, at the last collection site, the most sophisticated of the Contra weaponry -- the US supplied ground to air "Redeye" missiles -- were handed over. On the other hand, although ONUCA had no baseline data against which to verify such allegations, anecdotal evidence at the time -- since confirmed -- suggested that, for every weapon turned in, there were another two or three hidden away in the bush.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ See for example the discussion at pages 34-35 of the "Nicaragua Case Study" in *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Nicaragua and El Salvador*, UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project.

Observations:

ONUCA is generally regarded as a successful mission, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration aspects of which were facilitated by the election of a government acceptable to the main force to be demobilized. An *ad hoc*, incomplete plan was successfully implemented through the cooperation of the UN and the OAS/CIAV mission backed by USA financing and the government's offer of land plots to ex-combatants.

With the partial exception of Namibia, ONUCA was the first UN peacekeeping operation with a substantial disarmament operation as part of its mission. The international presence in the form of an infantry battalion of 800 soldiers able to protect the assembly areas and to prevent collected weapons from theft or repossession prior to their disposal and the focus on family -- not just the individual soldier's -- requirements at the assembly areas were vital confidence builders in convincing the ex-combatants that the process was a genuine one. The destruction of the weapons turned in and the conversion of some of them into prostheses provided tangible evidence that the peace would be sustainable. ONUCA's disarmament task was also considerably facilitated by the agreement reached by the Central American Five -- as part of the Esquipulas Accords -- to refrain from transferring arms across regional borders.

From a longer term perspective, however, the assessment is more sobering. The incomplete disarmament process together with the failure to properly reintegrate the ex-combatants has led to the situation where significant numbers of Contras and Sandinistas alike are, at best, unemployed, and at worst, part of criminal gangs armed with military-style weapons.

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

UNTAC was deployed to oversee the implementation of the Paris Peace Agreement of 1991, a comprehensive settlement signed by the parties to the conflict and backed by a broad international consensus which included the five permanent members of the Security Council and all key regional players.

Pursuant to the Comprehensive Political Agreement, UNTAC assumed direct control or supervision over a range of civil administration functions⁵⁵ in order to ensure a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair elections. Military tasks included monitoring the cease fire, verification of the withdrawal of foreign

⁵⁵ These functions included exercising administrative control over Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Finance, Public Security and Information.

forces and their weapons, extensive demining⁵⁶ and the disarmament and demobilization of all combatants. As with Central America, the Peace Agreement included a regional consensus to halt cross-border arms trafficking. In contrast to the detailed disarmament and demobilization provisions, the Declaration on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction was considerably vaguer with no specific aid commitments although it did specify the establishment of an International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) to coordinate contributions from the international community.

The size, comprehensiveness and complexity of the UNTAC mandate taxed the UN's organizational capacity, leading to a delay in its deployment, during which numerous cease-fire violations and other incidence of unrest took place.

Disarmament in Cambodia was a core element of a military mandate which was itself a central part of the overall peace implementation process that would culminate with "free and fair" elections. A Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG), made up of representatives from all the Cambodian parties and chaired by the UNTAC Force Commander was established to resolve contentious issues and to serve general liaison purposes on military matters. By far the most significant part of the military mission was the cantonment and disarming of some 200,000 government and opposition forces, 70 per cent of whom were to be demobilized and reintegrated into Cambodian society and the rest to join a new national army to be created by the post-election government. In addition, although not to be cantoned, some 220,000 government militia had to be disarmed.⁵⁷ The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process was to take place in the broader context of UNTAC's mandate to ensure the security of Cambodian borders and territorial waters and to repatriate some 350,000 refugees, who like the soldiers and internally displaced persons, would need massive resettlement support.

The planning for the disarmament and demobilization process was greatly facilitated by the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) which began work in Cambodia in November 1991 and eventually comprised some 800 civilian and military personnel. Building on the UNAMIC base, from 17 November to 16 December 1991, the UN Military Survey Mission to Cambodia was in the field and

⁵⁶ Estimates of mines ranged from 2 to 10 million with a dense concentration in more than half the country, claiming 100 to 700 victims per month. Many of them were the small, plastic anti-personnel mines, the M-72, which is very difficult to find with a metal detector.

⁵⁷ The UN military survey mission report of December 1991 stated that the total small arms of all factions amounted to 320,443 pieces, with 1,053 heavy weapons including tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery and 80,729,175 rounds of ammunition of various types.

developed a detailed plan which was submitted in a report to the Secretary-General on 24 December 1991.

This report noted a number of serious practical problems affecting the feasibility of the DDRP, ranging from inaccessible and otherwise unsuitable cantonment areas chosen by the parties, and the inability of the parties to provide food, shelter and medical care for their forces at the regroupment sites in time for the proposed DDRP schedule, to the incapacity of the fragile Cambodian economy and infrastructure to absorb the demobilized soldiers, or even the presence of a force the size of UNTAC. The final imperative was the need to have all necessary arrangements in place before the onset of the rainy season.

Data on the troop levels and weapons complements, force structure, organization and operating locations were provided by the respective Commanders-in-Chief of the four Cambodian parties and were used without modification by planners in New York and UNTAC in the field.

By mid-June 1992, some 55,000 troops -- 80 per cent of whom were government forces -- had arrived at the cantonment areas. By that time, however, it was also clear that the Khmer Rouge were not going to cooperate in the disarmament process with the result that the cantonment process came to a halt and was never resumed. In the circumstances, convinced that it could not prevail by undertaking coercive measures against the Khmer Rouge, the UN nonetheless proceeded with arrangements for the election and redeployed UNTAC military forces to protect and support the electoral process. With the weight of the international community behind it, UNTAC successfully supervised the participation of over 90 per cent of registered voters in an election declared free and fair first by UNTAC itself and then by the UN Security Council on 2 June 1993. UNTAC's mandate officially ended on 24 September 1993 with the formation of the new Cambodian government.

Observations:

UNTAC was an operation of unprecedented scale and complexity requiring an organizational capacity, permanent planning staff and possibly even a standing operational headquarters which the UN simply did not have. Without question, the delay in the military deployment prejudiced what was already a daunting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mandate. It is at least arguable that, had there been a strong military presence from the outset, there might have been more opportunity to keep the Khmer Rouge within the process by means of systematic inducements and persuasion.⁵⁸ In this regard the Force Commander,

⁵⁸ This is argued by David Cox, *op cit.*, at pages 106-107.

General Sanderson, believed that the Mixed Military Working Group was an important tool not only for the resolution of tactical field problems, as originally envisaged, but also as a forum for broader conflict resolution efforts.

Whether or not the disarmament aspects of the process might have succeeded, it seems clear that the reintegration dimension was significantly underfunded with the international community allocating \$2 billion for the deployment of UNTAC but only half that amount in pledges for the restoration of the entire Cambodian economy. UNTAC itself had not budgeted for the demobilization dimension, relying instead on the parties to provide basic necessities for their forces and for the voluntary development assistance programme managed by ICORC to help reintegrate the expected 140,000 ex-combatants. Although planning was undertaken in conjunction with the International Labour Organization, the UN Development Programme and Non-Governmental Organizations, in the end, due to budget and capacity problems, UNTAC was only able to offer short term training to 25,000 men over a phased period of time.

Even if UNTAC had successfully disarmed the major combatants, weapons control outside the cantonment sites would have been formidable. More than twenty years of conflict had left Cambodia not only physically, but psychologically, permeated with military weaponry. Surveys at the time of Cambodians from every walk of life, including the professions, indicated that guns were a symbol of pride and power, to the extent that nobody thought their elimination was a good idea.⁵⁹ Nonetheless, when ordinary citizens started to be robbed by heavily armed ex-combatants, some UNTAC battalions did start to take discrete measures to confiscate weapons from individuals. And, with the increase in violence before the election, Yasushi Akashi, using his administrative powers as head of the transition authority, did take steps first to require the registration of privately held guns and then the banning of their possession. At one stage UNTAC also contemplated a buy-back programme but concluded that the supply of weapons throughout the country, supported by a thriving black market, was simply too great.⁶⁰

Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)

In the late 1980's a northern revolt against the government of General Siad Barre, who seized power through a coup d'etat in 1969, encouraged southern opposition groups to take up arms against the regime. In 1989 these groups came together under one politico-military umbrella, the United Somali Congress (USC) and by mid-1990, had made sufficient gains that the government army and General

⁵⁹ See for example, Jianwei Wang, "Case Study" at page 75 in *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia*, UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, Volume 96/17.

⁶⁰ Wang, *ibid.*, at p. 76.

Barre could only claim a tenuous territorial control of the capital, Mogadishu. In a desperate bid to hold on, the government opened its massive military arsenal and armed the general population.⁶¹ This last-ditch strategy failed and, by mid-January 1991, the disintegration of Somalia was complete with the largely uncoordinated departure of General Barre and his supporters from Mogadishu. His exit created a power vacuum in the capital. The USC, which had played a principal role in driving Barre from Mogadishu, had splintered into two major factions and its key leaders, General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, had become bitter adversaries. They each turned to their respective sub-clans to organize mass support and the resulting civil war killed 30,000 people in the capital as well as laying waste to large areas of it.

A severe drought in 1992 combined with the violence of the Mogadishu warlords to create a humanitarian emergency of hitherto unseen proportions. By mid-1992 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated that malnutrition was afflicting 95 per cent of the entire population, with 70 per cent severely affected. International humanitarian relief organizations poured into Somalia but were soon overwhelmed by the magnitude of the suffering and the sheer lawlessness that prevailed.

By resolution 794 of December 1992⁶², the UN Security Council declared the anarchical situation in Somalia to be a threat to international peace and security and, acting under Chapter VII, authorized a US-led coalition to use all necessary means to secure a conducive environment for the distribution of humanitarian aid in Somalia. Its mandate was for six months with the operational plan calling for the withdrawal of USA forces to begin in three.

The first elements of the 37,000 strong Unified Task Force (UNITAF)⁶³ began deployment on 9 Sept 1992. In a very short time, at least in those areas where UNITAF was deployed⁶⁴, sufficiently secure conditions were created for the effective distribution of humanitarian relief. By 27 February 1993, in accordance

⁶¹ Mohamed Sahnoun, in *Prevention in Conflict Resolution*, 1994 at p.9, estimated the number of weapons in the city at more than 500,000.

⁶² The UN had been trying since April 1992 to fully deploy UNOSOM I, under Chapter VI, when the deterioration in the security situation convinced the Security Council that a more robust force was required.

⁶³ Of this number, some 28,000 were from the USA.

⁶⁴ See, for example, Adibe's discussion at pp.57-58 of the reasons for the geographic limitations under which UNITAF operated, together with the sources cited there including Barry R. McCaffrey, "US Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations", in Dennis J. Quinn (ed.), *Peace Support Operations and the US Military*, 1994.

with its timetable, the USA began to withdraw its forces and the UN to prepare for the transition back to a peacekeeping mission.

In January 1993 diplomatic efforts to achieve a stable peace agreement led to the signing by 14 Somali political movements of a declaration establishing a binding cease-fire subject to the creation of a "mechanism for disarmament". In a separate agreement, the factions approved the mechanism, which called for the placing of heavy weapons under international monitoring, cantonment and disarmament of militias and the disarming and "rehabilitating" of bandits and other armed elements.⁶⁵ At the UN-sponsored Addis Ababa Conference of National Reconciliation in mid-March 1993, the parties and international donors agreed to a two-year transition during which local and central government structures were to be rebuilt and the parties to seek to resolve their differences through peaceful means. The Conference also supported the disarmament mechanism agreed at the earlier Addis Ababa meeting.

Against these commitments, however, it was the assessment of the Secretary-General that "the unique features" of the situation in Somalia continued to prevail:

"There is still no functioning Government in the country. There is still no organized civilian police force. There is still no disciplined national armed force. ...[T]he atmosphere of lawlessness and tension is far from being eliminated."⁶⁶

In such circumstances, the Security Council authorized UNOSOM II to operate under Chapter VII with the authority to use force to create a secure and stable environment while, at the same time, seeking to promote and advance the cause of national reconciliation. The new mandate encompassed the whole territory of Somalia and specifically included disarmament. UNOSOM II, therefore, with a predicted total strength of 28,000⁶⁷ personnel, was given a geographic responsibility and disarmament and nation-building tasks beyond the mandate of its much stronger predecessor, UNITAF.

The expanded mandate included the following military tasks:

- monitoring of the cease-fire agreement,

⁶⁵ See "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on The Situation in Somalia", S/25168, 26 January 1993, Annexes II and III.

⁶⁶ "Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council", Document S/25354, New York: United Nations, 3 March 1993, p.21, para. 100.

⁶⁷ Outside UNOSOM II, and under the sole command and control of the United States were an additional 18,000 troops, including a Quick Reaction Force.

- preventing the resumption of violence including appropriate action against any faction that violated or threatened to violate the cessation of hostility,
- maintenance of control over the organized factions after their disarmament and encampment in transition sites,
- securing and maintenance of a register of small arms seized from all unauthorized armed elements in Somalia,
- maintenance of security of ports, airports and lines of communication required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance,
- protection of personnel and equipment of UN and humanitarian agencies,
- continuation of the de-mining programme, and
- assistance in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.

The mechanism for disarmament agreed at the Addis Ababa Conference called for the establishment of sites where heavy weapons would be stored and transition areas where militias would billet while they turned in their small arms and received guidance and training for civilian occupations. UNOSOM II had responsibility for cantonment security, a right of inspection of transition sites and was also entitled to confiscate or destroy the weapons of factions who did not comply with procedures to be agreed upon among the parties themselves. Nonetheless, the plan for "continuous and irreversible disarmament" developed by a joint planning group from UNITAF and UNOSOM II was largely a voluntary and consensual one and included the concept of material inducements.

It soon became abundantly clear that UNOSOM II could not carry out its extensive disarmament and demobilization tasks on a country-wide basis so it decided to focus its efforts on areas under its direct military and political control. A steadily deteriorating security situation, including sporadic outbursts of violence from May 1993 onwards, led to a further revision of the plan restricting disarmament operations to those jointly authorized by the Special Representative of the Secretary General and the Force Commander on the basis that conditions existed for a successful operation.

At the same time as the disarmament plan was increasingly fragmented, the mission faced rising opposition from humanitarian agencies over an aspect which was central to the voluntary and consensual aspect of the disarmament plan -- the offering of material inducements. Many donor agencies continued to believe, as

they had with the original UNITAF plan of "food for guns", that linking disarmament to material compensation was morally repugnant because it amounted to rewarding the militias and the warlords for their mistreatment of ordinary Somali citizens. In the event, UNOSOM II reluctantly abandoned these proposals and developed a new approach with two rather limited objectives:

- minimizing the threat of organized violence designed to advantage one faction vis-à-vis the others; and
- re-establishing as soon as possible some basic institutions of law and order, especially civilian police and the judicial system.

To this end, yet another disarmament plan was devised which called for a staged approach, beginning with the selection and preparation of specific areas or zones for DDRP operations, moving next to the cantonment of heavy weapons and related activities in those areas, then to the actual disarming of all militia and, finally, in stage four to the disengagement of the militias within each of the designated areas. It was in this last phase that nation-building activities by UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were to become fully operational. The new plan was warmly received by the UN humanitarian representatives as well as the rest of the relief and donor community who were attracted by its regional focus, incremental approach, and most importantly, the shifting of the main resource burden for humanitarian agencies to the final stage of the process. For the military, the deployment of operational units phase by phase to carry out the disarmament and demobilization tasks, represented a realistic approach given the mission's shortage of manpower and armaments for the tasks at hand.

Implementation began in June of 1993 with UNOSOM II hoping to begin to deal with the seven active heavy weapons storage sites set up under UNITAF and containing large but unspecified quantities of weapons. Although UNITAF had not had a mandate to disarm the militias, its mission to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief called for confiscation of weapons where appropriate. UNITAF had also persuaded the militias in Mogadishu to place their heavy weapons in "authorized storage sites" under their control but subject to inspection by UNITAF. Upon the arrival of UNOSOM II, there was considerable resistance to turning over these stores to UN control. Because of its limited intelligence capability and incomplete information on the sites, UNOSOM II lacked the capacity to effectively monitor them and had become increasingly concerned about the status and safety of these weapons.

On 5 June intelligence reports indicated that weapons were being removed from General Aideed's authorized weapons storage site. To verify these reports, inspection monitoring teams were dispatched to known cantonment sites in South

Mogadishu and the immediate vicinity. After inspecting these sites, the teams forcibly entered the premises of a long suspected weapons storage depot and, in the ensuing confrontation, two Somalis loyal to General Aideed were killed. Shortly after, 27 UN peacekeepers were killed in what appeared to be a carefully planned ambush.

The attack on the inventory team led to UN Security Council Resolution 837 of 6 June 1993 which provided the mandate for the next phase of disarmament in Somalia, a **coercive** one focussed particularly on General Aideed and his militia who were believed to be responsible for the attack.

In other parts of the country, however, the cooperative approach to disarmament continued.⁶⁸ The Cease-fire and Disarmament Committee, with representatives from all 15 political factions functioned moderately well in certain areas. Many Commanders operating outside Mogadishu stressed the importance of cooperative relations with local authorities and pursued cooperative disarmament with some degree of success including the establishment of weapons free zones and *ad hoc* agreements for carrying and storing arms.

In Mogadishu UNOSOM II took the military initiative and in a series of carefully planned precision air and ground military actions, disabled or destroyed weapons located in three previously authorized storage sites as well as one clandestine facility. The success of these operations encouraged others which took place in an atmosphere of ever increasing violence. Heavy casualties on both sides resulted and ordinary Somalis previously sympathetic to the UN's efforts began to rally behind General Aideed.

On 3 October while on a mission to capture senior members of Aideed's militia, 23 US Army rangers were killed, 75 others wounded and a US helicopter pilot shot down and captured together with a soldier from UNOSOM II. Although the United States initially responded by increasing its firepower in Mogadishu, resulting in the successful apprehension of 740 suspected Aideed followers, this was very shortly followed by the announcement of its intention to withdraw its forces completely from Somalia by March of 1994, to restrict their involvement in the meantime to force protection missions and to concentrate on political negotiations with the Somali factions.

This change in US policy secured the release of the hostages taken in the Ranger incident but it also spelled the end of the coercive disarmament phase and began the pattern of troop withdrawals by key UN member states that ultimately necessitated the termination of UNOSOM II.

⁶⁸ See for example, the discussion by Cox, *op cit.* at pp.127-128.

Observations:

The United Nations in its *Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operations in Somalia, April 1992 - March 1995*,⁶⁹ concluded *inter alia* that a UN peacekeeping force is unsuited for non-voluntary disarmament and demobilization. The importance of including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration requirements in the peace agreements and implementing them in close coordination between the military, political and humanitarian components of the mission with NGO concerns duly taken into account was stressed. In addition, the UN cautioned that "demobilization is an expensive exercise and Member States need to provide resources that will enable the demobilized personnel to be reintegrated into the community."

The Report draws the fundamental link between disarmament and a secure environment. People will be unwilling to disarm without a functioning police force to protect them. Many ordinary Somalis were ready to disarm in return for security but UNOSOM II did not have sufficient personnel to provide such a guarantee. Beyond this, disarmament is intimately related to a functioning political process which seeks genuine reconciliation.

UNOSOM II's disarmament efforts were also undermined by the extremely porous nature of Somali borders and, in sharp contrast to both Central America and Cambodia, the absence of a regional consensus to constrain arms traffic.

As with UNTAC, the slow deployment of UNOSOM II meant that the fragile consensus reflected by the Conference on National Reconciliation was largely dissipated before the main UN force had established itself.

United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)

Peace negotiations began in 1988 between the Mozambique government Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) and the rebel forces Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) to end the longstanding civil war. By May 1992 the UN joined the process including Military Observers to provide technical advice on cease-fire demarcation and on demobilization. At the time of the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome in October 1992, RENAMO forces controlled wide areas of the countryside and one large town; the economy was in ruins and the country in the grip of a crippling drought. Most importantly, perhaps, each side had come to the realization that it was probably incapable of achieving military victory over the other.

⁶⁹ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Germany *et al* in cooperation with the UN DPKO, *Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned in Somalia, April 1992-March 1995*, Sweden 1995 at pp. 75-78.

The GPA required the United Nations to perform a comprehensive range of tasks including *inter alia* the verification of the cease-fire, supervision of the withdrawal of foreign forces and overall supervision of the peace implementation process. This in turn included disarmament and demobilization, the reintegration of the ex-combatants into civil society, the return of refugees and displaced persons, oversight of elections and an extensive focus on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Mozambican economy. The timetable specified in the Rome accords called for the DDRP to be completed, and the elections held, within one year. The UN was also asked to provide assistance for both mine clearance activities and the establishment of a national demining capacity. A total of \$11 million of the ONUMOZ budget was set aside for this purpose and an additional \$7.5 million was contributed to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) trust fund for demining activities.⁷⁰

In December 1992 the Security Council authorized ONUMOZ and between March and May, 1993 UN forces began to arrive in numbers⁷¹. On 29 March 1993, with the demobilization process hardly begun, the ONUMOZ mandate was extended for a further year and the new date for elections set at 27-29 October, 1994. In November 1993 the Assembly Areas began to be opened and by November 1994, 57,540 government and 20,538 RENAMO soldiers had been demobilized from a total of 91,691 registered. The demobilization process was thus substantially complete when the once-delayed elections were held in tense but well-monitored conditions. The FRELIMO candidates prevailed and RENAMO, now a fully functioning political party, accepted the results. The UN mission was closed in December 1994 with complete withdrawal by January of 1995.

In the UN's own estimation, demobilization was the "most difficult and dangerous phase of the ONUMOZ mandate" with considerable uncertainty about the number of troops to be demobilized and both sides reluctant to give up their best units until the very end of the assembly and demobilization process.⁷²

Government or RENAMO forces were to register with the UN at their respective Assembly Areas (AAs) or, exceptionally, at non-assembly areas (CTNAs). Those not wishing to join the yet to be created integrated national defence force of Mozambique (FADM) were to be demobilized and reintegrated into

⁷⁰ Mozambique is classified as "severely mine affected". In the first 18 months after the signing of the GPA, at least 1000 people were killed in mine accidents and there are an estimated 8,000 amputees. International Red Cross Committee (ICRC) data for 1992-93 indicated that the most common locations for mine blasts were bush paths, then roads, tracks and fields, respectively.

⁷¹ ONUMOZ reached its peak military strength of 6,576 on 30 November, 1993.

⁷² "The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1195", in *The United Nations Blue Books Series*, Volume V, at para 127.

civilian life. In this task, ONUMOZ was assisted by a Technical Unit (TU)⁷³ which incorporated the institutional know-how and expertise accumulated by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in its two years of work developing a comprehensive demobilization and reintegration programme for the Government of Mozambique prior to the GPA and the establishment of the peacekeeping operation.⁷⁴ The TU was to assist the Special Representative of the Secretary General in the implementation of the demobilization programme and to collaborate closely with the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) in its running of the AAs. The TU was responsible for the distribution of food, medicine and other essential services in the AAs, the organization of a database and the issuance of personal documents for the ex-combatants, the supply of civilian clothing, the organization of transport to the settlement areas and for the establishment of a solid link with the provincial and district authorities responsible for the civilian dimension of the demobilization process.⁷⁵

Given the number of soldiers expected to be processed in the AA's, and the unsuitability of many of these sites for this purpose⁷⁶, ONUMOZ envisaged a multi-phased approach with data on the soldiers being maintained in a centralized, computerized registration database. The expected length of stay in each AA was to be approximately three weeks. The reintegration package, developed in light of the responses to the SDC questionnaire, was to include three months back salary upon departing the AA and coupons for three further months upon arrival in the settlement area. Government soldiers serving 10 years or longer were eligible for a pension. Both RENAMO and government soldiers were entitled to disability benefits. Upon demobilization, each soldier was to receive a "reinsertion package" containing clothing, food and an agricultural kit. Donors provided funding for the transportation home and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) was contracted to implement it. The underlying assumption of the reinsertion

⁷³ One of the important features of the peace implementation process was UN chairmanship of key supervisory bodies set up pursuant to the GPA, such as the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (SCS) and its subsidiary Commissions, including the Cease-fire Commission and its Technical Unit.

⁷⁴ A representative of the SDC served as the Unit's chief. Among other things, the TU utilized data from an extensive SDC questionnaire ascertaining the needs and aptitudes of the soldiers to be demobilized which they had distributed to 16,000 government soldiers in the Spring of 1992.

⁷⁵ In addition to the SDC, the TU had staff seconded from such international organizations as the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), the European Community (EC), the World Food Program (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), SwedRelief and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

⁷⁶ Many of the RENAMO sites were chosen for their strategic significance rather than their suitability for cantonment. Problems with them included mined roads, or no roads at all and lack of access to water.

programme, again based on the work of SDC, was that **autonomous reintegration** should be encouraged as much as possible without special projects targeted at ex-combatants, as these, it was feared, would frustrate those not entitled, while at the same time unduly raising expectations and discouraging personal initiative among the ex-combatants.⁷⁷

Significant problems, both political and practical, combined to seriously retard the implementation of the DDRP. These included the deterioration in the political climate during the slow deployment of the peacekeeping operation which exacerbated the reluctance of the parties to commit themselves fully to the process, the unsuitability of many of the AAs chosen by the parties and the sheer inability of RENAMO to participate as envisaged in the GPA without significant assistance. Determined to ensure that RENAMO, unlike UNITA in Angola, would not be able to keep both its military and political options open going into the election, the Secretary-General sought and obtained from the parties an agreement to a new election timetable and, from the Security Council, an extension of the ONUMOZ mandate.⁷⁸

Once the initial problems were overcome and the DDRP finally begun in earnest, ONUMOZ was confronted with a quite different problem -- significantly larger numbers of combatants seeking to demobilize than had been anticipated. Far fewer soldiers opted to join FADM than either RENAMO or the Government had expected. Funds had to be found to pay the additional pensions and reintegration benefits for which no provision had been made. The international community ultimately proved equal to this task. In the meantime, however, the delays occasioned by this financial shortfall were exacerbated by the difficulty the parties had in coming to grips with the lowered numbers available for the unified defence force. Fearful of being unable to supply their desired number, each party withheld the lists detailing which soldiers were to be demobilized and which were to join the FADM. The result was that, rather than spending about three weeks in the AAs, soldiers languished there for extended periods. While the UN put the time to good use through various educational efforts, the frustration often led to outbursts:

⁷⁷ See Eric Berman's discussion of the SDC studies and conclusions at pp. 78-79 of *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*, UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, Volume 96/22. He outlines the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plans developed by SDC for the Government of Mozambique at pp. 57-58.

⁷⁸ In paragraph 86, p.26 of *The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume V, op.cit.*, the Secretary-General states, "This conclusion [that Mozambique's planned elections should not take place until the military aspects of the Agreement had been implemented] was reinforced by the events following Angola's elections in the preceding weeks; there, the failure to complete demobilization had enabled the loser of the election to launch an all-out war."

"Unmet demands for back pay, displeasure with their spartan accommodations and meagre rations, and distrust that they would indeed receive that which they had been promised, all contributed to the registered soldiers' unruliness. But most of all, they wanted to go home and restart their lives."⁷⁹

Disturbances at non-Assembly registration areas, known as CTNAs⁸⁰, were even more problematic. Although a higher percentage of Government soldiers reporting to the CTNAs did want to join the FADM than their AA counterparts, the overall numbers were once again much below what the parties had expected. In addition, soldiers began to create "spontaneous CTNAs" by setting up roadblocks and demanding the same food and benefits they believed other soldiers were receiving.

The mounting tension and violent outbursts convinced the UN and the international donor community, ever mindful of what had occurred in Angola, that substantially more was required in the way of reintegration benefits. The result was the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) for soldiers registered and demobilized at either the AAs or the CTNAs and, as of June 1994, even the approximately 14,000 government soldiers demobilized before the GPA was signed. The RSS provided payments representing a further 18 months' pay, together with a country-wide information and referral service, an occupational skills development programme and a fund to promote the involvement of ex-combatants in activities in their respective communities. Administered by the UNDP, its budget eventually amounted to \$31.9 million, of which \$27.6 million had been pledged, but only \$8.9 million received, by the end of the ONUMOZ mandate.

The disarmament mandate for ONUMOZ, in line with the GPA and the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council of 3 December 1992, was to place under United Nations control all weapons and ammunition, to have destroyed under close UN supervision all weapons not required by the new armed forces and to introduce from the outset a programme for the removal of weapons from the civilian population.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Berman, *op.cit.*, p. 72.

⁸⁰ The areas, mainly military installations, were meant to facilitate registration by soldiers who did not require billeting.

⁸¹ See in particular Part III, paragraph 18(b)(i)-(iii) of the Secretary-General's Report of 3 December, 1992.

ONUMOZ collected from the military and paramilitary forces, as well as from the general population, a total of 189,827 weapons.⁸² The numbers were well below expectations and generally of poor quality.⁸³ After complaints and indications of secret weapons caches, the Cease-fire Commission secured an agreement to introduce a post-demobilization "verification process" which led to the discovery of "substantial numbers of weapons, including tanks, anti-aircraft guns, mines, armoured personnel carriers and mortar bombs abandoned or stored throughout the country."⁸⁴ However, by the UN's own admission, the time was then too short before the end of the mandate to complete the task.⁸⁵

A limited amount of arms, ammunition and explosives was destroyed, while the remainder was transferred to the new Mozambican Defence Force.⁸⁶ The mission could do no more because it had no budget for destruction⁸⁷ and no donor could be found to fund the programme.⁸⁸

After severe delays in the implementation of the demining programme⁸⁹, in May 1994 the UNOHAC Deputy Director took charge of the coordination and management of an accelerated programme and the Mine Clearance Training Centre began operations. By the end of the mandate, ONUMOZ had trained 450 Mozambicans for 10 de-mining teams and they had cleared some 40,000 square metres and disabled over 555 mines.⁹⁰ In addition, of the approximately 1,579,555 refugees repatriated, all had been made aware of the existence of landmines and most had received information on how to live with the menace. At the termination of ONUMOZ, the government of Mozambique had not yet

⁸² UN Blue Book, Volume V, *op.cit.*, Part II C., paragraph 11b of the "Final Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", dated 22 December 1994.

⁸³ See the "Final Report of the Cease-fire Commission (CCF)" at p.13.

⁸⁴ UN Blue Book, Volume V, para. 151.

⁸⁵ UN Blue Book, Volume V, para. 152.

⁸⁶ UN Blue Book, Volume V, para 11b.

⁸⁷ Final Report of the Cease-fire Commission at p.12.

⁸⁸ Berman, *op.cit.* at p. 75, footnote 60.

⁸⁹ The Secretary-General attributed some of the delay to the slow approval of the national mine clearance plan by the Cease-fire Commission and to the difficulty in identifying suitable contractors.

⁹⁰ UN Blue Book, Volume V, *op.cit.*, p.298, para.28.

established its national mine clearance authority which, when operational, was expected to take at least seven to ten years to complete its work.⁹¹

Observations:

The ONUMOZ experience in Mozambique demonstrates the negative consequences of an unrealistically early deadline for the completion of the disarmament and demobilization phase on the one hand and the danger in keeping ex-combatants in the cantonments too long on the other. It underscores the heavy resource requirements -- both human and financial -- for a successful DDRP and the difficulty in designing an effective programme even where a great deal of advance effort goes into determining the needs and the capacities of the ex-combatants. One of the many lessons learned from Angola which was successfully applied by UNOMOZ was the need for sufficient peacekeepers to make the demobilization process a credible one. In Angola UNAVEM had one Blue Helmet for every 333 combatants; in Mozambique the ratio was one in ten.⁹²

The issue of the timing of demobilization in relation to the creation of the unified national defence force remains problematic, particularly if there is little desire among the ex-combatants to stay in the new force. Other countries have experienced the opposite problem, with so many opting in that the new force places an undue financial burden on fragile post-war economies.⁹³ At the very least, the ONUMOZ experience demonstrates the need to determine as early as possible in the planning process whether the expectations of the party leaders as to the future composition of the unified force accord with those of the combatants themselves.

One of the key's to the success that ONUMOZ was able to achieve was its broad mandate which provided for the creation of effective mechanisms both to coordinate the activities of the diverse range of actors involved in the peace implementation process and to resolve disputes and make adjustments in light of changed circumstances. In addition to the decision by the Cease-fire Commission to postpone the elections, other important adjustments included the UN taking over Chairmanship of the deadlocked Commission responsible for the formation of the

⁹¹ UN Blue Book, Volume V, *ibid.*, pp. 52-53, paras. 180-184.

⁹² *The World Bank Discussion Paper* No. IDP-130, "Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies", October 1993 at p. 41, Table IV.1.

⁹³ *The World Bank Discussion Paper, ibid.*, at p.101. See also the difficulties in general that have been experienced by countries seeking to create a unified defence force in post-conflict situations, as discussed by Berdal, *op cit.*, at pp. 51-53.

FADM and the addition of civilian police⁹⁴ to the mandate, although the latter had initially been rejected by the parties during the negotiation phase.

As with UNTAC and UNOSOM II, the long delay in the initial deployment of peacekeeping contingents meant that alleged cease-fire violations could not be effectively verified and demobilization could not begin. The delay, however, was not all occasioned by logistical and procedural problems in establishing a military and administrative presence as complex as that to be undertaken by ONUMOZ. The Government of Mozambique, in the words of the Secretary-General, "needed time to address concerns in the National Assembly about the implications for national sovereignty of such a large and comprehensive international operation." In addition, the negotiation of the status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) between the United Nations and the government -- which would permit the movement of United Nations military personnel without prior government approval -- was not signed until 14 May, 1993.⁹⁵

RENAMO was reluctant during the peace process to accept government administration and authority over the areas that it physically controlled. It was equally reluctant to set up in the capital, Maputo, until it was provided with sufficient housing, transportation and communications facilities so that it could properly function, in accordance with the Peace Agreement, as a duly constituted political party.

Time was needed to train members of the rebel force to enable them to effectively participate in the various Commissions overseeing the peace implementation process. More broadly, RENAMO needed time and money for the transformation to a political party with a presence not only in Maputo but in the provincial capitals as well. This was a serious problem which severely impeded the proper functioning of the various Commissions and which was ultimately solved by a truly unique mechanism, a Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement⁹⁶, established by the UN and placed under the full control and authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General. This mechanism, with an initial contribution from Italy in May 1993 of almost \$6 million, provided a degree

⁹⁴ See paragraphs 156-159 of the UN Blue Book, Volume V, *op.cit.*, for the importance of the UNCIVPOL component.

⁹⁵ UN Blue Book, Volume V, *op.cit.*, at p. 27, para. 91.

⁹⁶ UN Blue Book, Volume V, *op.cit.*, at pp. 31-32, para.104.

of flexibility far beyond what is normally possible when UN funds are being expended in the field.⁹⁷

Commentators have stressed⁹⁸ that the very general nature of the GPA, especially with regard to the disarmament and arms destruction aspects, gave both parties too much room to manoeuvre in interpreting the plans. Disarmament, which at first had been thought by the Secretary-General to be as much a precondition for holding elections as demobilization, eventually became a lesser priority than other aspects of the mandate. While "creative responses were developed -- and the money found to support -- supplemental reintegration programmes, additional food for the AAs and a separate trust fund for RENAMO to keep the process on track, the disarmament train was allowed to derail."⁹⁹ Indeed, the very success of the "verification phase", created at almost the last minute by the Cease-fire Commission, highlights what "could have been rather than what was."¹⁰⁰

The Government of Mozambique, originally a reluctant participant in the ONUMOZ disarmament process, now faces a monumental task. One three-week joint operation with South Africa in locating and destroying caches of weapons yielded 25 sites containing over 1,000 rifles and some 800 hand grenades, land-mines and mortars and launchers. They are believed to be "the tip of the iceberg" and an important factor in the increase in violent crime in neighbouring countries as the cross-border trade in assault rifles escalates.¹⁰¹ There is also mounting evidence of serious social problems as the generous allowances provided under the RSS begin to run out:

"In Mozambique, a steady stream of demobilised soldiers in search of employment have, since early 1995, moved from rural communities (where they had been transported in 1994 as part of the demobilisation package) to urban areas where there has since been a marked increase in social unrest and criminal activity."¹⁰²

⁹⁷ Mats R. Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars", *Adelphi Paper* 303, at pp. 67 68 discusses the "marked reluctance [of donors] to finance security sector reform..." and goes on to note the criticism by the government, NGO's and some donors of the special Trust Fund created to help RENAMO become a functioning political party.

⁹⁸ See for example Berman, *op. cit.*, at page 84.

⁹⁹ Berman, *ibid.*, at page 85.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Berman, *ibid.*, at page 84, footnote 11.

¹⁰² See Berdal, *op. cit.*, at p.40.

The Mozambique National Mine Clearance Commission was finally established in July 1995 and became operational the following year, with ongoing technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). By January 1996, in relation to the estimated 2 million mines in Mozambique, 1,750 mines areas had been identified and 12,675 mines cleared.

Mali/Sahara-Sahel Experience¹⁰³

In late 1993 the President of Mali identified a problem with the proliferation of illicit light weapons in his country, a problem which was a major contributor to instability and violence there. He requested the United Nations Secretary-General to assist in defining the scope of the problem and identifying ways in which it could be alleviated. In essence, he wanted advice and assistance on how to collect and control those illicit light weapons.

In response to that request, the Secretary-General approved an Advisory Mission and a team was dispatched in August of 1994. The mission met with many sectors of Mali society, with governmental and non-governmental organizations, with local UN agencies and with diplomatic representatives in the country. As a result of the Mali exercise, a second mission was authorized in 1995. Senegal, Mauritania, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad were visited during the course of that mission. The essential conclusions of the second mission were the same as the first (see *infra*), with an increased emphasis on the sub-regional approach and cooperation among the countries concerned. It also needs to be noted that, at the same time, certain governments were also struggling to reach accords with dissident elements among their populations.

Central to the work of the Mission was the preparation undertaken by the host governments. The governments provided, in advance, a memorandum giving their assessments of the problem. The governments each established a National Committee on the Proliferation of Light Weapons to, *inter alia*, act as the focal point for interaction with the Mission. They provided facilities for meetings, interpretation services and ground and air transport within the country.

The Mission examined the security situation in each country and the reasons for socioeconomic unrest, the status of agreements between the government and dissident organizations, problems of refugees and internally displaced peoples, banditry and the phenomena of 'auto-defense' (self-defence), all issues related to the proliferation of illicit light weapons: It tried to determine the scope of the

¹⁰³ The basis for this case study is interviews with the Secretary to the Advisory Mission, Mr. Douglas Fraser, then a political officer in the Centre for Disarmament Affairs. Original unpublished conference materials, particularly the Final Declarations, were also consulted. Peggy Mason was herself a participant in the July 1996 Bamako meetings.

problem through an examination of the situation concerning smuggling, thefts, illegal sales, misuse of traditional weapons and national legislation related to the foregoing.

The Mission also discussed the state of the security forces and the customs service in order to understand their roles and their capacity to carry out those roles. It studied the current efforts being made by governments to alleviate the situation, including measures undertaken in cooperation with neighbouring states, and the assistance being provided by donor states, the United Nations and its agencies, non-governmental organizations and others.

The Mission concluded that:

- There was indeed a problem with illicit light weapons but it was very difficult to quantify the problem due to lack of accurate information. Typical users and types of incidents were identified. Origins and sources were difficult to identify but both external and internal sources were a major factor. National legislation was generally adequate but needed to be updated and enforced.
- There was a lack of human and material resources within governments to help them control the security situation. Human resource requirements revolved around better training and the payment of adequate compensation for tasks performed. Material requirements included such items as computers, communication equipment, electronic screening facilities at key entry points, and all-terrain vehicles.
- The lack of security was fuelling the demand for weapons. The availability of weapons was fuelling the cycle of banditry and violence which in turn was bringing structural development virtually to a halt and preventing any progress on socioeconomic problems.
- Until this latter situation was redressed, there was little or no opportunity for the collection of light weapons in the sub-region. On the other hand, it was possible for the Mission to make a number of recommendations concerning the **control** of light weapons.

These measures of control, necessary to create a climate allowing collection, translate into the need for a 'security first' approach.¹⁰⁴ At first glance this might seem to be in contradiction with an arms control exercise, but on closer

¹⁰⁴ The full terminology was 'a proportional and integrated approach to disarmament and security'. Nevertheless, 'security first' seems to be preferred as the 'shorthand' title.

examination a good case can be made for this method. 'Security first' really relates to **personal** security which, in turn, is essential to structural development. Provision of that personal security is a basic responsibility of government. It follows that the government must have the capacity to do that. The governments in the sub-region were strapped for resources, had competing demands for those that did exist, and needed external assistance.

Security assistance is always a sensitive subject, no more so than in Africa at this time. It is important then to highlight two other conclusions of the mission:

- that the assistance envisioned does not involve weaponry and the emphasis is on security forces other than the defence establishment; i.e., police, gendarmerie, national guard and customs officials, and
- that the assistance, from whatever source, needs oversight by a neutral authority.

Therefore the Mission made two sets of recommendations. The first comprised those actions that the individual governments might take on their own with minimal external assistance. The second comprised actions that might be taken or coordinated by the United Nations. The first recommendations included: improved internal controls and procedures, tightening up national legislation, and better training for the security forces.

Regarding action by the United Nations, it was clear that work needed to be done to obtain the **resources** to implement any recommendations. In that light the UN intended, first, to coordinate closely with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), whose mandate to assist in human security and good governance might be the vehicle for the delivery of these recommendations, and, second, interact with major donor states who are active, or wish to be active, in the sub-region and solicit their support for this 'security first' approach.

In sum, the second set of recommendations included fostering a sub-regional approach, arrangements for monitoring and supervision, and assistance in training, developing confidence-building measures, and standardizing legislation and customs procedures.

Building on those recommendations, the UN Department of Political Affairs and the UNDP established a small team in Bamako to coordinate action on the recommendations and, for Mali and Niger, to assist in the disarmament,

demobilization and re-integration of former Tuareg rebels.¹⁰⁵ This cooperation had very good results in Mali, including the launching of reintegration programmes for those Tuaregs being absorbed into the armed forces, the civil service and civil society. In March 1996 there was a major ceremony in Timbuctu, 'La Flame de la Paix', when 2642 rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, and pistols -- all sevicable -- were destroyed by fire.

In July 1996 a follow-on meeting of all the participating countries was held in Bamako on the topic of civil-military relations. The seminar had as its aim the improvement of relations between the civil and military sectors through a better understanding of the responsibilities of each sector and their responsibilities to each other. Topics included the relations between the various elements of the security forces; the duties of the armed forces and other security elements to the state; the relationship between the armed forces and civil society; the development of defence policy in a democratic society; and international and national defence strategies in a democratic society. The conference was another positive step in confidence-building in the sub-region.

Taking advantage of the presence of delegations from the countries of the sub-region, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) sponsored a one-day workshop as part of their Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Programme. The purpose was to plan for a major seminar on Disarmament, Development and Conflict Resolution in West Africa in November 1996.

Meanwhile, in October 1996, a ministerial level meeting of donor and recipient states was held in New York to consider, *inter alia*, the 'proportional and integrated approach to development and security' approach. The meeting endorsed the concept, albeit not without reservations by some and sufficient funds were pledged to continue with the process of sub-regional dialogue¹⁰⁶.

The UNIDIR meeting was held in Bamako as scheduled and twelve West-African states considered the issues of 'Prevention of Conflict, Disarmament and Development' and elaborated a common approach for future regional cooperation. At that meeting the concept of a **moratorium on the importation, exportation and production of light weapons** was discussed and delegations agreed

¹⁰⁵ For these activities, some funds -- sufficient to undertake, but not complete, these activities -- were obtained from bilateral donors and certain international development agencies which had become persuaded of the need for security-related funding in appropriate circumstances.

¹⁰⁶ The funds pledged fell short, however, of those necessary to fully implement the 'security first' approach.

to present the concept to their governments in preparation for a sub-regional conference on the subject.

Subsequently, in March 1997, the conference was held, again in Bamako. Regrettably, of the twelve countries represented at the November Conference, only six attended. On the other hand, in addition to the United Nations family, there were representatives from the Organization of African Unity, sub-regional organizations, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the USA. Of particular note was representation from the Wassenaar Arrangement, the post-Cold War mechanism for information exchange among some 35, mainly industrialized countries, intended to promote "transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations".¹⁰⁷

The Final Declaration, although failing to agree on concrete steps toward a moratorium, did charge the Government of Mali to pursue the modalities of such a concept with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In addition, the Government of Mali was tasked to work with the United Nations on a possible "Programme of Coordination and Assistance for Security and Disarmament" on behalf of the states of the sub-region.

Observations:

This process may seem to be a somewhat indirect route to the collection and control of illicit light weapons. Two points are important in this context. When the mission met with Malian President Konare at the end of its first visit, he made the point that, for a fraction of the money spent on the UN mission in Rwanda, security assistance could prevent the spectre of such a calamity in his country. Secondly, the experience of the UN in recent years has proven that new and innovative approaches were necessary. The 'Mali Process' thus continues, albeit at a slow pace. Continued leadership by President Konare, together with continuing support from the UNDP, backed in turn by sufficient donor response and creative approaches by the UN Secretariat, still hold out promise for a return to stability in the sub-region.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the Mali/Sahara-Sahel experience:

- the implications of the link between the security situation in a state and its capacity for development are slowly gaining recognition;
- confidence-building measures **within** states may be as important as

¹⁰⁷ Consultation sur la proposition du moratoire sur l'exportation, l'importation et la production d'armes légères en Afrique, "Déclaration finale", 26 mars 1997.

those between states;

- heads of government must demonstrate leadership in order to inspire external support;
- states and external actors must agree on, and work toward, common goals;
- an integrated approach by UN agencies is necessary and can deliver results; and
- a moratorium on the import/export/manufacture of light weapons will be difficult but dialogue on the objective, in and of itself, may build confidence as a precursor to more ambitious steps.

IV. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS CONTINUUM

General

In the aftermath of conflict, the consolidation of peace requires a focus on both short-term emergency stabilization measures and on the achievement of a sustainable peace over the long term. Vital to both these phases is a comprehensive and integrated approach to practical disarmament measures, particularly the collection, control and disposal of small arms and light weapons including mines, demobilization and reintegration into society of former combatants, and the development of responsible arms management programmes both nationally and in cooperation with neighbouring countries. In the immediate post-conflict phase, disarmament is a vital confidence-building measure which will allow the peace process to continue. Over the longer term, a responsible arms management programme which includes restraint in the production, procurement and transfer of arms will be essential to the consolidation of peace.

Aim

The aim of this section of the background paper is to outline some of the basic elements of, guiding principles for, and possible obstacles to, an effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme in the context of peacebuilding operations.

Technical Assessment

Post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDRPs) are politically, institutionally and logistically complex and sensitive operations, demanding considerable financial, human, technical and organizational capacities. In order to effectively plan, coordinate and implement such programmes, expertise and support will be required from the international community not only on the political, diplomatic and military aspects of designing and negotiating the DDRP, but also from donor countries and institutions, humanitarian and development agencies, and non-governmental organizations. It will be equally important to ensure that the parties themselves are fully involved in the planning and implementation phases and that every effort is made to reinforce local capacities and expertise.

To this end, an **integrated technical mission** to fully assess the specific requirements of the DDRP is required as early as possible in the peace negotiation process with expertise in the following areas:

- the political/diplomatic dimension,
- military peace (stability) operations,
- humanitarian relief,
- economic reconstruction including, for example, expertise in agriculture, education and training (including the very difficult problem of reintegrating former child soldiers), and
- international financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and regional development banks.

The assessment by the technical mission must include identification of the necessary and sufficient conditions -- political, military, socioeconomic -- for the process to proceed, with particular attention to the responsibilities to be assumed by the existing government or "authorities" as well as the other parties to the conflict. International donor fatigue and dwindling resources against a backdrop of increasing demand require that a detailed, budgeted plan with measurable goals be agreed by all relevant parties before a decision is made by the international community to proceed further.

The Continuum

The diagram attached as Annex A, entitled "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Aspects of the Peace Process Continuum", sets out how implementation of the DDRP might take place along a continuum of interrelated and often overlapping activities from the emergency stabilization phase to the long term development phase.

A strong programme of public information, including both sensitization and reconciliation aspects, must support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration continuum from the outset. This is essential to ensure cooperation of all parties, including local authorities and military leaders and to keep expectations regarding reintegration assistance under reasonable control.

The process of assembling and demobilizing former combatants and preparing them for a return to civilian life offers usually the first, and arguably the best, opportunity for weapons collection and destruction. The process will start slowly with the quality of the weapons initially surrendered being very low, and only improving as confidence in the process grows. While such "front end" disarmament may be seen as the optimum approach, it must be stressed that, where appropriate, disarming will be an ongoing process and mechanisms must

therefore be created which allow for it to proceed at any stage of the peace process continuum.

In war-torn societies deeply imbued with the culture of the gun, incentives will be required both from the international community and the national authorities to sustain and enhance the disarmament process. This aspect of the DDRP is one of the most delicate and difficult and will require much careful thought and planning in light of the specific circumstances of the society in question. Experience to date suggests that community support for, and input into, the programme is particularly important. "Buy-back" or other disarmament incentive programmes must also take place in the context of a larger weapons management programme including cooperation with neighbouring countries on customs and other procedures to prevent the DDRP being undermined by the importation of new weapons into the country.

To date, in most cases of post-conflict disarmament and demobilization, emphasis has been placed on the emergency stabilization phase to the detriment of the development phase. It is essential that the DDRP be planned and implemented as an integrated and often overlapping continuum within the overall peacebuilding process, with importance being attached not only to the disarmament and demobilization aspects at the front end but with equal attention paid to the reintegration aspects of the programme. If widespread banditry and other forms of criminality are to be avoided and a sustainable peace created, it is essential that demobilized combatants and disarmed citizens-at-large have viable socioeconomic options sufficient to keep them from returning to the culture of the gun.

While the attractiveness of keeping weapons surrendered for further use by the national military may be argued, it is suggested that, as a general rule, such weapons should be destroyed. The confidence building effects, both inside and outside the country/region, as well as the tangible security benefits which will accrue over the longer term as a result of the public destruction of these weapons will generally far outweigh any benefits that might have accrued by retaining them.

Conditions for Success and Obstacles to Overcome

In light of the foregoing description of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration aspects of the peace process continuum, the following elements can be identified as essential to the success of the DDRP, over both the short and the longer term:

- the commitment of the parties to disarmament and demobilization as an integral part of the peace implementation plan, with as much detail as possible in the peace agreement on the specific obligations to be undertaken;

- the commitment of neighbouring countries and other relevant parties to a responsible arms management policy for the country/sub-region in question;
- a broad and flexible mandate for the implementing body with mechanisms for effective coordination of the diverse players involved and for resolving difficulties in implementation;
- adequate resources, both human, and financial, including sufficient peacekeepers to make the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process credible in security terms and sufficient funds to make the disarmament and reintegration aspects sustainable in financial terms;
- sufficient planning and management capability to competently design and launch both the overall peace operation and the DDRP component as soon as possible after the parties have achieved a peace agreement;
- a recognition by the peace implementation body and international donors that substantial completion of the disarmament component of the mandate is fundamental to the longer term stability of the country/region in question; and
- a long term commitment by the international community to post-conflict economic reconstruction and development, to enable the economy in question to absorb reasonable numbers of ex-combatants and ordinary civilians alike.

Conversely, possible obstacles and constraints to effective implementation would include the following:

- lack of sufficient commitment by the parties themselves to the peace process and/or to its disarmament and demobilization components;
- lack of sufficient priority by the peacekeeping operation to weapons collection and destruction;
- insufficient funding commitments by international donors early enough in the negotiating process to permit proper planning of the DDRP and its incorporation into the peace agreement;
- unwillingness of international development agencies to fund weapons destruction and other security-related programmes; and

- lack of sufficient follow-on funding to continue essential aspects of the DDRP, including weapons destruction and regional/sub-regional weapons management, customs and police training, after the termination of the peacekeeping operation.

V. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Regional Approaches, Confidence Building, and Capacity Building

- The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has particularly important implications for the consolidation of peace process. There is a growing interest in both the problem of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and in the development of regional mechanisms for cooperation in addressing security-related matters.
- Despite many similarities in situations, each region is different and it may be difficult to establish global norms in relation to the control of light weapons that will be widely applicable and acceptable. Regional approaches may well offer the most opportunity for progress in addressing the problem of light weapons proliferation. On the other hand, the cross-border aspect of arms transfers and the need of many affected states for multilateral assistance in building the capacity to effectively respond to this problem suggest the need for an overarching global approach.
- Confidence-building measures **within** states may well be as important as those between states.
- Leadership by heads of government can inspire external support.
- Support and encouragement by the international donor community can foster the evolution of sound regional and subregional dialogues and structures for cooperation and security.

An Integrated Approach to Security and Development

- The implications of the link between the security situation in a state and its capacity for development are slowly gaining recognition.
- There has been a growing realization of the need both to better coordinate the international response to complex emergencies and, more fundamentally, to integrate conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding strategies into development assistance programming.
- There is also growing realization that states and external actors must agree on, and work toward, common goals in relation to peacebuilding.

- An integrated approach by UN agencies to peacebuilding can deliver results.

Responsible Arms Management Policies

- Regional or sub-regional restrictions on the import/export/manufacture of small arms and light weapons is difficult to achieve but dialogue by the states in question and other relevant parties on the objective may build confidence as a precursor to more ambitious steps.
- Coherent, responsible behaviour with respect to the transfer of conventional weapons is essential to addressing the supply of small arms and light weapons, in particular, and the practical problems of disarmament in the consolidation of peace process.
- Steps by the international community to promote such coherent and responsible behaviour in the international transfer of conventional armaments can have positive results for the consolidation of peace, including:
 - (a) broadening the acceptance and coverage of arms export, disarmament and transfer arrangements, especially in the difficult area of small arms and light weapons; and
 - (b) broadening support for responsible arms management policies developed at the regional, sub-regional and national levels.

Essential Conditions for Successful Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes

The following essential conditions apply over both the short and the longer term:

- the **commitment of the parties** to disarmament and demobilization as an integral part of the peace implementation plan, with as much detail as possible in the peace agreement on the specific obligations to be undertaken;
- a **broad and flexible mandate** for the implementing body with mechanisms for effective coordination of the diverse players involved and for resolving difficulties in implementation;
- **adequate resources**, both human, and financial, including sufficient peacekeepers to make the disarmament and demobilization process

credible in security terms and sufficient funds to make the disarmament and reintegration aspects sustainable in financial terms;

- a **sufficient planning and management** capability to competently design and launch both the overall peace operation and the DDRP component as soon as possible after the parties have achieved a peace agreement;
- a recognition by the peace implementation body and international donors that **substantial completion of the disarmament component of the mandate is fundamental to the longer term stability** of the country/region in question; and
- a **long term commitment by the international community** to post-conflict economic reconstruction and development, to enable the economy in question to absorb reasonable numbers of ex-combatants and ordinary civilians alike.

The following list of essential elements of a successful DDRP derive from the experience reviewed in this paper, the essential conditions for success listed above, and the DDRP generic model outlined in Section IV and Annex A:

- an **integrated technical mission** as early as possible in the negotiation process to fully assess the specific requirements of the DDRP with expertise in all relevant areas (political, military, humanitarian, financial developmental);
- a strong **programme of public information**, including both sensitization and reconciliation aspects, in support of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration continuum from the outset;
- agreed **procedures for weapons collection and destruction** during the process of assembling and demobilizing former combatants, as well as mechanisms for implementing disarmament as an ongoing process throughout the peacebuilding continuum;
- carefully planned **incentive programmes** to sustain and enhance the disarmament process with appropriate community support and input, that are implemented in the context of a **larger weapons management programme** including cooperation with neighbouring countries on customs and other procedures;

- recognition of the short-term confidence building effects and the longer term security benefits to be derived from the **public destruction of weapons** collected during the implementation of the DDRP; and
- DDRP planning and implementation as an **integrated and often overlapping continuum** within the overall peacebuilding process, with importance being attached not only to the disarmament and demobilization aspects at the front end but with equal attention paid to the **reintegration aspects** of the programme over the longer term.

Possible Obstacles and Constraints to Effective Implementation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes

The following obstacles and constraints have the potential to seriously constrain the effectiveness of DDRPs:

- a **lack of sufficient commitment by the parties** themselves to the peace process and/or to its disarmament and demobilization components;
- a **lack of sufficient priority by the peacekeeping mission** to weapons collection and destruction;
- **insufficient early funding commitments** by international donors during the negotiating process to permit proper planning of the DDRP and its incorporation into the peace agreement;
- international development agencies' **unwillingness to fund weapons destruction and other security-related programmes**, and
- a **lack of sufficient follow-on funding** to continue essential aspects of the DDRP, including weapons destruction and regional/sub-regional weapons management, customs and police training, after the termination of the peacekeeping operation.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in the Peace Process Continuum

- **DDRPs are politically, institutionally and logistically complex and sensitive operations**, demanding considerable financial, human, technical and organizational capacities.
- **Expertise and support from the international community** are essential in order to plan, coordinate and implement effectively such programmes. In addition to expertise and support relating to the

political, diplomatic and military aspects of designing and negotiating the DDRP; financial and developmental assistance from the international donor community, humanitarian agencies, and non-governmental organizations have proven equally essential.

- Ensuring that the parties themselves are fully involved in the planning and implementation phases, and that every effort is made to reinforce local capacities and expertise, are equally important.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Regional Approaches, Confidence Building, and Capacity Building

Within the framework of the **United Nations** as well as at the **international, regional and sub-regional levels**, there should be:

- continued support for, and promotion of, regional approaches focussing in particular on confidence building and transparency in military matters;
- renewed focus on regional arms registers including small arms and light weapons as well as on standardized reporting mechanisms for military budgets;
- UN (particularly UNDP and World Bank) promotion of the role of the international donor community in supporting and encouraging the evolution of sound regional and sub-regional dialogues and mechanisms for cooperation and security.

The Need for An Integrated Approach to Security and Development

Within the framework of the **United Nations** as well as at the **international level** in general, there should be:

- an integrated approach by UN agencies to security and development challenges; and
- a leadership role by the UNDP and World Bank to promote an integrated approach to security and development.¹⁰⁸

At the **national level** there should be:

- recognition of the need for, and the development of, appropriate mechanisms for the integration of conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding strategies into development assistance programming; and

¹⁰⁸ See also the recommendations below concerning effective coordination and adequate resources.

- to this end, sponsorship of dialogue between developed and developing countries with appropriate participation by both the security and development communities.¹⁰⁹

Responsible Arms Management Policies

Within the framework of the **United Nations** as well as at the **international level** in general, there should be:

- promotion of a multilateral dialogue at the global level with the aim of broadening the acceptance and coverage of arms export, disarmament and transfer arrangements, especially in the area of small arms and light weapons;
- promotion by the UN, regional and sub-regional organizations, of regional and sub-regional dialogue to heighten awareness of, and facilitate cooperation in relation to, small arms controls including the possibility of cross-regional meetings to share experiences; and
- promotion of exchanges between UN bodies studying various aspects of small arms/firearms control including the UN Small Arms Panel and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.

At the **national level** there should be:

- intensified discussions on supply-side issues to ensure policy coherence, and consistency of policy application on issues related to military export controls in relation to small arms and light weapons;
- promotion of discussion in all appropriate forums between suppliers and recipients of conventional armaments, particularly in relation to small arms and light weapons transfers; and
- support and encouragement for exchanges among national and international bodies responsible for various aspects of the control of small arms and light weapons.

¹⁰⁹ See also the recommendation concerning adequate resources.

The Terms of Peace Agreement: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Aspects

In the context of preparing for the negotiation of a peace agreement in a peacebuilding context, there should be:

- involvement of the UN (or representatives of the appropriate international implementing body) as early as possible in the negotiating process;
- provision of technical advisors to assist in negotiation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration dimensions of peace agreements;
- development of generic guidelines or "protocols" for the disarmament dimension of peace agreements;
- development of standard operating procedures for implementation of the disarmament aspects of peace plans, supported by appropriate data bases; and
- development of a generic DDRP model as a guide for negotiation, implementation and training.¹¹⁰

At the national level there should be:

- use of a generic DDRP model in national peacekeeping training programmes.¹¹¹

The Need for A Generic Model for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in the Context of Peacebuilding

In order to plan and implement effectively the DDRP aspects of peacebuilding, a generic model, such as that set out in Section IV and Annex A of this paper, is recommended. Such a generic model should include:

- an **integrated technical mission** as early as possible in the negotiation process to fully assess the specific requirements of the DDRP with expertise in all relevant areas (political, military, humanitarian, financial and developmental);

¹¹⁰ See the sub-section below containing recommendations concerning the generic model.

¹¹¹ See also the recommendation below regarding training in relation to coordinating mechanisms.

- a strong **programme of public information**, including both sensitization and reconciliation aspects, in support of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration continuum from the outset;
- agreed **procedures for weapons collection and destruction** during the process of assembling and demobilizing former combatants, as well as mechanisms for implementing disarmament as an ongoing process throughout the peacebuilding continuum;
- carefully planned **incentive programmes** to sustain and enhance the disarmament process with appropriate community support and input which are implemented in the context of a **larger weapons management programme** including cooperation with neighbouring countries on customs and other procedures;
- recognition of the short-term confidence building effects and the longer term security benefits to be derived from the **public destruction of weapons collected** during the implementation of the DDRP; and
- DDRP planning and implementation as an **integrated and often overlapping continuum** within the overall peacebuilding process, with importance being attached not only to the disarmament and demobilization aspects at the front end but with equal attention paid to the **reintegration aspects** of the programme over the longer term.

Terms of Peace Agreement: Coordinating Mechanisms

Within the framework of the **United Nations**, there should be:

- reinforced efforts to improve coordination through continued focus on the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) coordinating role and the "framework for coordination" among the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and DHA, and through pre-mission training by UN of senior staff from all necessary disciplines (military, police, humanitarian, human rights, finance, and development).

At the **national level** there should be:

- incorporation into national peacekeeping training programmes of a component on cooperation/coordination aspects among all partners (military, police, humanitarian, human rights, finance, development) in modern peacekeeping operations.

Adequate Resources for Effective Planning and Implementation

Within the framework of the **United Nations** as well as at the **international level** in general, there should be:

- a leadership role by the UNDP, World Bank and other appropriate specialized agencies to heighten international awareness in general and in the international donor community in particular of the importance of sufficient resources, adequate planning and an integrated effort from the outset to ensure a sustainable DDRP in long term; and
- sponsorship by the UNDP/World Bank of joint meetings of the security and development communities on issues of adequate financing in relation to the DDRP aspects of peacebuilding.

At the **national level** there should be:

- sufficient focus on the resource implications of an integrated approach to security and development, particularly in relation to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration aspects of peacebuilding.

Planning and Management Capability

Within the framework of the **United Nations**, there should be:

- continued implementation of the rapidly deployable headquarters concept.

At the **national level** there should be:

- support, both human and financial, for the UN rapidly deployable headquarters concept.

Areas for Further Research

There needs to be further consideration of donor support (international development assistance) for the disarmament dimension of the consolidation of peace process. While still a matter of debate, it is generally agreed that the appropriateness of donor support in this area will be dependent on the situation. In some cases, particularly in Africa, this issue has become a critical development issue in which more research and follow-up is needed.

ANNEX A

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION
ASPECTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS
CONTINUUM

END OF CONFLICT

- cease-fire agreement
- negotiation of peace agreement including decision for DDR
- technical mission to aid in planning of DDRP

INTEGRATED
MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PKO

UNDP, OTHER UN
AGENCIES, BILATERAL &
MULTILATERAL
DONORS, WORLD BANK,
NGO'S, LOCAL
COMMUNITIES

**EMERGENCY STABILIZATION
PHASE**

**PEACE AND
DEVELOPMENT
PHASE**

CEASE-FIRE

- public information programme begins

ASSEMBLY

- registration of forces, weapons, census and surveys, counselling, socialization

DISARMAMENT

- weapons collection/destruction

DEMOBILIZATION

- discharge or transportation

NEW UNIFIED ARMED FORCES

REINSERTION

- resettlement package

REINTEGRATION

- EDUCATION
- TRAINING
- INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION
- ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

WEEKS/MONTHS

MONTHS/YEARS

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Articles, Books, Research Reports

Anglin, Douglas G., "Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa", in *Conflicts Around the World: 1995-1996, Rapport annuel sur les conflits internationaux, Etudes Stratégiques et Militaires*, (Québec: Institut Québécois des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Université Laval, 1997).

Berdal, Mats R., "Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars", *Adelphi Paper* 303.

Chalmers, Malcolm; Greene, Owen; Laurence, Edward and Wulf, Herbert editors, *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, (Bradford Arms Register Studies No. 4, 1994).

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, with the assistance of Amitav Acharya, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Confidence-Building*, (Ottawa: February 1997).

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, with the assistance of David Declerq, *Light Weapons and Micro-Disarmament*, (Ottawa: September 1997).

Fraser, Douglas, *Progress in International Efforts to Constrain Light Weapons: A Canadian Perspective*, Report of a Workshop organized by the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security, (Ottawa: CCIPS, 25 January 1997).

Ghali, Boutros-Boutros, "An Agenda for Peace", UN document A/47/277, 17 June 1992.

Ghali, Boutros-Boutros, "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations", UN document A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995.

Ghali, Boutros-Boutros, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on The Situation in Somalia", S/25168, 26 January 1993, Annexes II and III.

Ghali, Boutros-Boutros, "Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council", Document S/25354, New York: United Nations, 3 March 1993.

Ghali, Boutros-Boutros, "Report of the Secretary-General on International Regulation of Firearms", presented to the General Assembly by UN Document E/CN.15/1997/4 (March 1997).

Laurence, Edward and Sarah Meek, *The New Field of Micro -Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Brief 7, (Bonn International Centre for Conversion, September 1996). Based on a study prepared for the German Foreign Office.

McCaffrey, Barry R., "US Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations", in Dennis J. Quinn (ed.), *Peace Support Operations and the US Military*, (1994).

Sahnoun, Mohamed, in "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia", in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, volume 5 (1994).

Stiftung, Friedrich Ebert *et al.*, in cooperation with the UN DPKO, *Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned in Somalia, April 1992-March 1995*, Sweden 1995.

"The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995", in *The United Nations Blue Books Series*, Volume V.

The World Bank Discussion Paper No. IDP-130, *Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies*, October 1993.

UNIDIR Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*, Volume 95/30 (1995).

UNIDIR Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, Volume 95/41 (1995).

UNIDIR Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Volume 96/7 (1996).

UNIDIR Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia*, Volume 96/16 (1996).

UNIDIR Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, *Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa*, Volume 96/21 (1996).

UNIDIR Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*, Volume 96/22 (1996).

UNIDIR Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Liberia*, Volume 96/32 (1996).

UNIDIR Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, Volume 96/46.

UNIDIR Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Nicaragua and El Salvador*, Volume 97/1 (1997).

Other Materials

DCD/DAC(97)11/REV1, containing the "Concluding Statement of the Chairs", Symposium on Military Expenditures in Developing Countries: Security and Development, jointly sponsored by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Government of Canada (Ottawa 18-19 March, 1997).

"Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement", (New Delhi: April 1997).

Moreno de Del Cueto, Ambassador Carmen, "Regional/Subregional Approaches, Sharing Security Perspectives, Confidence Building Measures, Capacity Building", a paper presented to the Symposium on Military Expenditures in Developing Countries: Security and Development, jointly sponsored by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Government of Canada (Ottawa 18-19 March, 1997).

OAS General Assembly Resolution AG/Res. 1411 (XXVI-0/96) entitled "The Western Hemisphere as an anti-personnel-land-mine-free zone", (June, 1996).

OAU, *Resolving Conflict in Africa*, OAU Information Services Publication Series (II), (Addis-Ababa: 1993).

OECD DAC document DCD/DAC(96)31/REV2 containing draft guidelines on "Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation", (1996).

Press Release issued by The Rio Group on September 4, 1996 reporting on its meeting of September, 1996.

UN Economic and Social Council Resolution E/1995 on international regulation of firearms (1995).



UN General Assembly Resolution 50/70D on Transparency in Armaments (December, 1994).

UN General Assembly Resolution 51/41 S on an international treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines (December, 1996).

UN General Assembly resolution 50/70 B of on the small arms and light weapons study (12 December, 1995).

UNIDIR project on *Disarmament, Development and Conflict Prevention in West Africa*, 1997-ongoing.

5000
CA1 DA 97002 ENG
Mason, Peter
Practical disarmament,
dismobilization, and reintegration
resources for peace building. --
50127006

