


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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

WORKING PAPERS

1986 SESSION



WP

COMPILED AND EDITED BY:

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA, CANADA

JUNE 1987



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
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
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CHEMICAL WEAPONS WORKING PAPERS

1986 SESSION

This volume covers official documents (working papers) relating to Chemical Weapons submitted in plenary to the Conference on Disarmament during its 1986 session. It is compiled to facilitate discussion and research on this issue.

Note that the index is a chronological listing while the documents themselves are arranged in numerical order by number.



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OTTAWA, CANADA

JUNE 1987

43-246-020

CHEMICAL WEAPONS BURNING PAPERS
 SUBMITTED TO CD 1986
 CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX

Serial	Reference	Country	Description	Date
<u>1986</u>				
323	CD/643	CSR/CGR	Letter dated 23 September 1985 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic transmitting the joint text of the letters sent by Mr. Brian Humphrey, General Secretary of the Socialist	27.9.85
<u>PREFACE</u>				
<u>WP</u>				
<p style="text-align: center;">This volume covers official documents (working papers) relating to Chemical Weapons submitted in plenary to the Conference on Disarmament during its 1986 session. It is compiled to facilitate discussions and research on this issue.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Note that the index is a chronological listing while the documents themselves are arranged in numerical order by CD number.</p>				
324	CD/644	FRG	Letter dated 23 September 1985 from the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany transmitting the text of the Declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, signed by the Vice Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic	27.9.85
325	CD/645	HUN	Letter dated 28 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Hungary addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Declaration of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation adopted at the meeting of the Political Committee Committee held in Sofia on 22 to 23 October 1985	2.12.85
326	CD/646	CSR/CGR	Letter dated 11 December 1985 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic transmitting replies to the letter of Brian Humphrey of 27 September 1985	11.12.85

CHEMICAL WEAPONS WORKING PAPERS
SUBMITTED TO CD 1986
CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX

Serial	Reference	Country	Description	Date
			<u>1986</u>	
323	CD/643	CSR/GDR	Letter Dated 25 September 1985 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the German Democratic Republic Transmitting the Joint Text of the Letters sent by Mr. Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, and Mr. Lubomir Strougal, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, to Mr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 13 September 1985	27.9.85
324	CD/644	FRG	Letter Dated 16 October 1985 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany Transmitting the Identical Replies of Mr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic	21.10.85
325	CD/645	Bulgaria	Letter Dated 28 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting the Text of the Declaration of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization Adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held in Sofia on 22 to 23 October 1985	3.12.85
326	CD/646	CSR/GDR	Letter Dated 11 December 1985 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic Transmitting Replies to the Letters of Helmut Kohl of 27 September 1985	11.12.85

Serial	Reference	Country	Description	Date
327	CD/648 CD/CW/ WP. 128	Bulgaria/ Romania	Letter Dated 10 January 1986 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Chargé d'Affaires A.I. of the Socialist Republic of Romania Transmitting the Declaration Appeal by Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania and Todor Zhivkov, President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Concerning the Creation of a Chemical-Weapon-Free Zone in the Balkans	10.1.86
328	CD/649	USSR	Letter Dated 20 January 1986 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Transmitting the Statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, made on 15 January 1986	20.1.86
329	CD/650	UN SecGen	Letter Dated 1 February 1986 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the President of the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting the Resolutions on Disarmament Adopted by the General Assembly at Its Fortieth Session	29.1.86
330	CD/651	AHCCW	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons on its Work During the Period 13-31 January 1986	31.1.86
331	CD/654	CD	Decision on the Re-Establishment of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons	7.2.86
332	CD/664 and Corr. 1	Pakistan	Fact-Finding Under the Future Chemical Weapons Convention	13.2.86
333	CD/667	USA	Letter Dated 14 February 1986 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the United States of America Transmitting the Text of a Document Entitled "Joint Statement" Issued by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 21 November 1985	14.2.86

Serial	Reference	Country	Description	Date
334	CD/668	USSR	Letter Dated 14 February Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Transmitting the Text of a Document Entitled "Joint Soviet/United States Statement" Issued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on 21 November 1985	14.2.86
335	CD/671	USSR	Letter Dated 20 February 1986 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Transmitting the Text of a Message Dated 18 February 1986 from the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, to the Conference on Disarmament	20.2.86
336	CD/672	Viet Nam	Letter Dated 14 February 1986 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam Transmitting the Text of a Document Entitled "Statements by Vietnamese Leaders Concerning the Statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, made on 15 January 1986	21.2.86
337	CD/675	FRG	Letter Dated 7 February 1986 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany Transmitting Notes of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in Response to the Replies of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Concerning Talks on the Problem of Chemical Weapons	7.3.86
338	CD/677	Canada	Letter Dated 12 March 1986 Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference on Disarmament, Transmitting a Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons	12.3.86

Serial	Reference	Country	Description	Date
339	CD/679	Canada	Working Paper on the Identification of Chemical Substances	13.3.86
340	CD/685 CD/CW/ WP. 132	USA	Amendment to CD/500, Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	3.4.86
341	CD/686	Poland	Letter Dated 3 April 1986 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament By the Chargé d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Poland Transmitting the Text of the Communiqué of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in Warsaw on 19-20 March 1986	4.4.86
342	CD/689	Canada	Letter Dated 10 April 1986 Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament From the Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting a Compendium of All Chemical Weapons Documentation of the Conference During the Period 1983 to 1985	11.4.86
343	CD/696	Soviet Union	Statement by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on Soviet television	29.1.86
344	CD/697 CD/CW/ WP. 135 and Corr. 1	Belgium	Order of Elimination of Chemical Weapons Stocks and Method for Comparing These Stocks: Elements of a Possible Solution	20.5.86
345	CD/698 CD/CW/ WP. 140	Australia	Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and Their Precursors by the Civilian Chemical Industry. Trial Inspection of an Australian Chemical Facility	4.6.86
346	CD/699	Bulgaria	Letter Dated 6 June 1986 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria Transmitting the Text of the Message of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov to the Conference on Disarmament	9.6.86

Serial	Reference	Country	Description	Date
347	CD/700 and Corr. 1	Hungary	Letter Dated 12 June 1986 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic Transmitting the Text of the Communiqué Issued on the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, Held in Budapest on 10-11 June 1986 and the Appeal by the Same States to the Member States of NATO and to all European Countries	16.6.86
348	CD/702	Norway	Letter Dated 16 June 1986 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament From the Permanent Representative of Norway Transmitting a Research Report Entitled "Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention. Part V. Sample Handling of Chemical Warfare Agents"	16.6.86
349	CD/703	Norway	Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention: Procedures for Verification of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons	16.6.86
350	CD/704	Norway	Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention: Evaluation of Methods for Identification of Arsenic Containing Chemical Warfare Agents	16.6.86
351	CD/706	Netherlands	Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons: Report on the Workshop on the Verification of a Chemical Weapons Ban Held in the Netherlands from 4 to 6 June 1986	20.6.86
352	CD/711 CD/CW/ WP. 145	USA	Letter Dated 9 July 1986 from the United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting a Document Entitled "Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program" Prepared by Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD	9.7.86
353	CD/713 CD/CW/ WP. 146	Japan	Some Quantitative Aspects of a Chemical Weapons Convention	14.7.86

Serial	Reference	Country	Description	Date
354	CD/715	United Kingdom	Chemical Weapons Convention: Verification and Compliance - The Challenge Element	15.7.86
355	CD/719	Finland	Letter Dated 25 July 1986 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament From the Permanent Representative of Finland Transmitting a Document Entitled "Air Monitoring as a Means for Verification of Chemical Disarmament; C3 Field Tests, Part II"	25.7.86
356	CD/727	AHCCW	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament	21.8.86
357	CD/729	USSR	Letter Dated 20 August 1986 Addressed to the Conference on Disarmament by the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Transmitting the Text of the Speech of the General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, made on Soviet Television on 18 August 1986	25.8.86



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/643

27 September 1985

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 SEPTEMBER 1985 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND THE DEPUTY HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TRANSMITTING THE JOINT TEXT OF THE LETTERS SENT BY MR. ERICH HONECKER, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY AND CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, AND MR. LUBOMIR STROUGAL, PRIME MINISTER OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, TO MR. HELMUT KOHL, CHANCELLOR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, ON 13 SEPTEMBER 1985

On 13 September 1985, Mr. Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, and Mr. Lubomir Strougal, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, sent letters to Mr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is proposed in the letters that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany enter into negotiations on the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe.

We request that the enclosed text of these letters be reproduced as a document of the Conference.

(signed)

Milos Vejvoda
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of
the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic to the United Nations
Office at Geneva

(signed)

Walter Krutzsch
Minister Plenipotentiary,
Deputy Head of the
Delegation of the German
Democratic Republic to the
Conference on Disarmament

JOINT TEXT OF THE LETTERS SENT BY MR. ERICH HONECKER, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY AND CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, AND MR. LUBOMIR STROUGAL, PRIME MINISTER OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, TO MR. HELMUT KOHL, CHANCELLOR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, ON 13 SEPTEMBER 1985
(Translation)

"The Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic believe that there is a practical possibility that chemical weapons will be eliminated and, above all, that a chemical-weapon-free zone will be set up in Europe. This would be a way to arrive at the removal of the chemical weapon stocks existing in the region and to ensure that no new, extremely perilous types of such weapons, notably binary weapons, will be deployed on European soil. This very approach was reflected in the talks between the SED and SPD on the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons, which climaxed in the presentation of the political initiative known to you.

"Next to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons are the most dangerous means of mass destruction. It is a matter of utmost urgency to prohibit and completely eliminate them. What is needed are resolute efforts both on a global and regional scale. The Governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia have consistently been advocating a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Moreover, they are convinced that regional agreements on the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones would be concrete steps towards confidence-building and a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. For this reason, the Governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia are prepared to conclude an agreement with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany that would result in the elimination of chemical weapons on the territories of these countries, which are situated right along the dividing line between the two politico-military alliances.

"In making this proposal, they - neighbours of the FRG - want to encourage in Central Europe arms reductions as a form of concrete action to safeguard peace and security.

"We strongly believe that the proposal submitted by the two Governments can lead to a relevant agreement. Such an accord would be important in strengthening security in Europe and would add to the joint efforts aimed at eliminating the risk of the use of chemical weapons in Europe.

"The Governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia invite the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to enter into negotiations on the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons, which should comprise the territories of these three States, to begin with. In these negotiations, the GDR and Czechoslovakia would be ready to put forward their ideas on the problems involved. It is their understanding that the FRG for its part will present specific proposals and reflections of its own and that the agreement on the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone should be open to all other interested States for accession."



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/644

21 October 1985

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 OCTOBER 1985 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TRANSMITTING THE IDENTICAL REPLIES OF MR. HELMUT KOHL, CHANCELLOR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The Conference has been apprised of the contents of letters to Mr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, by the Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, respectively (cf. document CD/643). In the letters, negotiations on the establishment of a limited zone free of chemical weapons were proposed.

Mr. Kohl replied to these letters on 27 September 1985. The substantive portion of his letters of reply - identical in both cases - is attached. I would be grateful if the text could be circulated as a Conference document.

In his letters Chancellor Kohl underlines the overriding significance the Federal Government attaches to the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive world-wide ban on chemical weapons, and holds the view that all unresolved questions relating to the proscription of chemical weapons should be discussed within the framework of these negotiations. In the view of the Federal Government, the current threat emanating from chemical weapons relates not only to specific regions - as, for instance, Europe - but to other parts of the world as well, making it imperative that all efforts be concentrated on the rapid conclusion of a world-wide chemical weapons ban, not least in the interest of neutral and non-aligned countries outside of the proposed zone.

(Signed) Henning Wegener
Ambassador

Bonn, 27 September 1985

I have noted with interest your letter of 12 September 1985 proposing that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany enter into negotiations on chemical weapons with the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the German Democratic Republic. As you know, the Federal Government is resolutely working in the appropriate forum, namely the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, for a treaty establishing a comprehensive ban and has presented a number of concrete proposals which have received much attention; in particular, it introduced a comprehensive verification model into the negotiations in 1982. In 1979 and 1984, it held international seminars on the subject of verification, which were attended by diplomats and experts of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. In 1985, the Federal Government continued its efforts for a treaty establishing a comprehensive, world-wide ban on chemical weapons. It is convinced that there is no expedient alternative in the continuation of these efforts.

In conformity with the policy of the Federal Government to achieve, through negotiations, co-operative solutions in the field of disarmament and arms control serving to safeguard peace with lasting effect, I suggest that our delegations enter into talks within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in order to discuss the still unresolved questions concerning a treaty for a world-wide ban on chemical weapons. By jointly working for a solution to this central problem, our Governments can make a valuable contribution to promoting the ongoing Geneva negotiations.



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/645 */

3 December 1985

ENGLISH

Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 28 OCTOBER 1985 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE
DECLARATION OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY
ORGANIZATION ADOPTED AT THE MEETING OF THE POLITICAL
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE HELD IN SOFIA ON
22 TO 23 OCTOBER 1985

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Declaration adopted by the top-ranking representatives of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, held in Sofia on 22-23 October 1985.

I should like to request you to have the text of this letter and the Declaration circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) KONSTANTIN TELLALOV
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative

*/ Reissued for technical reasons.

GE.85-65124

The States represented at the meeting recall their proposals, addressed to the NATO member countries and still in effect, for direct talks concerning:

- Freeing Europe from chemical weapons.

They support the efforts of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the creation in Central Europe of a zone free of chemical weapons.

/...

CD/645
English
Page 8

In present-day conditions, the objective of a total ban and elimination of chemical weapons, including their particularly dangerous binary version, acquires even greater importance and urgency. This objective is quite achievable, as is the solution of the problem of monitoring the observance of the respective international agreement, given a mutual demonstration of realism and good will. The participants in the meeting are of the opinion that an international agreement on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons would help in the common efforts for their total prohibition and are ready to take part in the drafting of such an agreement.



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/646

11 December 1985

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 DECEMBER 1985 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TRANSMITTING REPLIES TO THE LETTERS OF MR. HELMUT KOHL OF 27 SEPTEMBER 1985

On 8 November 1985, the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the German Democratic Republic, sent replies to the letters of Mr. Helmut Kohl of 27 September 1985, concerning the proposal of the two respective countries to start negotiations for the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe. It is suggested in these replies that parallelly with the Geneva talks, proposed by Mr. Helmut Kohl, consultations among the representatives of the ministries of foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic be undertaken.

We request that the enclosed text of the replies be reproduced as a document of the Conference.

(Signed) Miloš Vejvoda
Ambassador

Permanent Representative
of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic to the
United Nations Office at
Geneva

(Signed) Harald Rose
Ambassador

Permanent Representative
of the German Democratic
Republic to the
United Nations Office at
Geneva

Reply of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
to the letter of Mr. Helmut Kohl of 27 September 1985

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic took notice of the letter of the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Dr. Helmut Kohl of 27 September 1985 on the question of chemical weapons.

As it is known to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has always actively promoted and consistently stood for elaborating and adopting at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in the shortest possible time, of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons as well as for destroying them on a global scale.

In accordance with it the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is ready to accede to the proposal made in the letter of 27 September 1985, that a delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have, at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, talks on the problem of chemical weapons. Here the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic proceeds from the fact that mutual connection between a global and regional agreement on chemical weapons should be discussed primarily. At the same time the solution of open question of the convention on complete and general prohibition of chemical weapons might be sought.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is however, firmly convinced that owing to the danger of the production of a new kind of chemical weapons - the binary weapons - and to their threatening deployment in the middle of Europe - even all possibilities for regional measures must consistently be used. It therefore proposed together with the Government of the German Democratic Republic to create a zone without chemical weapons in Central Europe. Such a measure would not only support the global prohibition of chemical weapons but it would correspond to the interest of strengthening security and would be a constructive contribution to détente disarmament and strengthening of confidence in Europe.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic suggests that the representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs authorized by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic start paralelly with the Geneva talks proposed by the Federal Chancellor Dr. Helmut Kohl, consultations for discussing the questions connected with the creation of a zone without chemical weapons. The place and the time of these consultations might be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany the assurances of its highest consideration.

Reply of the Government of the German Democratic Republic
to the letter of Mr. Helmut KOHL of 27 September 1985

The Government of the German Democratic Republic welcomes the interest in a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which Dr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, expressed in his letter of 27 September 1985.

As the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany knows, the German Democratic Republic has, at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, consistently been pronouncing itself for the early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as well as on their destruction. It is actively involved in the work of the relevant committee and has submitted specific proposals on how to solve a number of substantive issues. For this reason, the German Democratic Republic is, of course, ready to take up the proposal put forward in the letter of 27 September 1985 to the effect that the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament should conduct talks on the chemical weapons problem. It is the position of the German Democratic Republic that such talks should be focused on the interrelationship between global and regional accords on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At the same time, solutions could be sought to a number of unresolved issues relating to a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons.

However, the Government of the German Democratic Republic is firmly convinced that, in the face of the imminent danger of a new kind of chemical weapons - binary weapons - being produced and stationed in Central Europe, no opportunity must be missed for regional measures to prohibit chemical weapons. That is why it has proposed, jointly with the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. Such a regional measure would not only promote a worldwide ban on chemical weapons but would also be apt to make a constructive contribution to détente, disarmament and confidence in Europe for the sake of greater security. The participation of the two German States in the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the heart of Europe would be a concrete step towards ensuring that never again will a war start from German soil and that only peace will emanate from there.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic proposes that, parallel to the talks between the delegations in Geneva suggested by Federal Chancellor Dr. Helmut Kohl, authorized representatives of the foreign ministries of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic should commence consultations on the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone. The time and place of such consultations could be agreed through diplomatic channels.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/648
CD/CW/WP.128
10 January 1986
ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 10 JANUARY 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA AND THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA TRANSMITTING THE DECLARATION-APPEAL BY NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA, AND TODOR ZHIVKOV, PRESIDENT OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, CONCERNING THE CREATION OF A CHEMICAL-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE BALKANS

We have the honour to transmit herewith the DECLARATION-APPEAL by Nicolae CEAUSESCU, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Todor ZHIVKOV, President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, concerning the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans, signed at Bucharest, on 22 December 1985.

We would request you kindly to make the necessary arrangements to have this Declaration circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Liviu PAUNESCU
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

(Signed) Konstantin TELLALOV
Ambassador

DECLARATION-APPEAL

by Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Todor Zhivkov, President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, concerning the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans

The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, and the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov,

Having surveyed the development of the international situation and particularly the problems concerning the strengthening of peace and security in Europe, and expressing deep concern regarding the serious tension which persists on this continent and throughout the world,

Observing the grave dangers entailed by the continuance of the arms race and the testing, production and deployment of new nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction,

Emphasizing the need to make every effort to free Europe from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction,

Reiterating the determination of their countries to work resolutely towards the transformation of the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone, a zone of peace and co-operation, and expressing themselves in favour of the initiation and development of new activities and initiatives to that end,

Conscious of the fact that research upon and the testing and production of chemical weapons have, in recent years, continued to expand and in the belief that this further increases the danger of the destruction of civilization and life on Earth,

Considering that the conclusion of an international, effective and verifiable convention would contribute to the total ban of chemical weapons, affirming that their countries are willing to participate in the preparation thereof and welcoming all efforts to establish a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in the Balkans,

Declare that Romania and Bulgaria are strongly opposed to chemical weapons as a means of mass destruction;

Solemnly appeal to the Heads of State and Government of the Balkan countries, to unite and combine the efforts of all the States of the region with a view to transforming the Balkans into a chemical-weapon-free zone;

Propose that negotiations be undertaken without delay for the establishment of an agreement among the Balkan countries banning the testing, production, acquisition and storage of all chemical weapons on their territory.

The proclamation of the Balkans as a chemical-weapon-free zone would be an important step towards freeing Europe entirely from a category of extremely dangerous weapons and would help to strengthen confidence and co-operation among the countries and peoples of the region.

The implementation of this appeal could make an effective contribution to the endeavours to achieve a general and total ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks, and could serve as a stimulus to the negotiations taking place to that end.

The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria are convinced that the DECLARATION-APPEAL for the transformation of the Balkans into a zone free not only from nuclear weapons but also from chemical weapons, will receive a positive response from the Heads of State and Government of the region, and that a responsible approach towards the lives of their peoples and the general interests of peace and security in the Balkans, Europe and the whole world, will prevail over any differences in systems or other differences.

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU

President
of the Socialist Republic of
Romania

TODOR ZHIVKOV

President
of the State Council of
the People's Republic of
Bulgaria

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/649

Extract

20 January 1986

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 20 JANUARY 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TRANSMITTING THE STATEMENT
OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, MADE ON 15 JANUARY 1986

I enclose herewith a statement by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, dated 15 January 1986. I should be grateful if you would make the necessary arrangements to have the statement circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. Issraelyan
Member of the Collegium of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
of the USSR, Representative of the USSR
to the Conference on Disarmament

IV.

The Soviet Union considers the complete elimination even in this century of such barbaric weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons to be an entirely feasible task.

At the talks on chemical weapons within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament signs of progress have recently appeared. However, these talks have been unreasonably protracted. We are in favour of intensifying the negotiations in order to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of the existing stockpiles of those weapons, as agreed with President Reagan at Geneva.

With regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, as in other disarmament matters, all participants in the talks should take a fresh look at things. I would like to make it perfectly clear that the Soviet Union is in favour of the early and complete elimination of those weapons and of the industrial base for their production. We are prepared for a timely declaration of the location of enterprises producing chemical weapons and for the cessation of their production and ready to start developing procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base and to proceed, soon after the convention enters into force, to the elimination of the stockpiles of chemical weapons. All these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections.

A radical solution to this problem would also be facilitated by certain interim steps. For example, agreement could be achieved on a multilateral basis not to transfer chemical weapons to anyone and not to deploy them in the territories of other States. As for the Soviet Union it has always strictly abided by those principles in its practical policies. We call upon other States to follow that example and show equal restraint.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/650

29 January 1986

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1986 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS FORTIETH SESSION

I have the honour to transmit herewith the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its fortieth session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament. The relevant provisions of those resolutions are reproduced in the Annex.

For the information of the Conference, I also have the honour to transmit herewith other resolutions and decisions dealing with disarmament matters, which were adopted by the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

In addition, other resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its fortieth session, which are related to disarmament matters, are listed in the Annex.

(Signed) Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

(9) In resolution 40/92 A, operative paragraph 3 urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a view to achieving accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to intensify the drafting process of such a convention for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-first session.

(10) In resolution 40/92 B, operative paragraph 3 urges again the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its session in 1986, the negotiations on a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction and to reinforce further its efforts, inter alia, by increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the 1985 mandate; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its forty-first session.

(11) In resolution 40/92 C, operative paragraph 3 urges the Conference on Disarmament to accelerate its negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/40/92
16 January 1986

Fortieth session
Agenda item 63

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/40/932)]

40/92. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

A

Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ which states that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represents one of the most urgent measures of disarmament,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to their destruction,

Convinced of the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would significantly contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Stressing the continuing importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed sixty years ago at Geneva, 2/

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65.

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the earliest conclusion and implementation of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Taking into consideration the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its session in 1985 regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons and, in particular, highly appreciating the work of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons,

Expressing profound concern at recent decisions on the production of binary chemical weapons, as well as at their intended deployment,

Deeming it desirable for States to refrain from taking any action that could delay or further complicate negotiations and to display a constructive approach to such negotiations and the political will to reach an early agreement on the chemical weapons convention,

Aware that the qualitative improvement and development of chemical weapons complicate ongoing negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons,

Taking note of proposals on the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones aimed at facilitating the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and at contributing to the achievement of stable regional and international security,

1. Reaffirms the necessity of the speediest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

2. Appeals to all States to facilitate in every possible way the conclusion of such a convention;

3. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a view to achieving accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to intensify the drafting process of such a convention for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

4. Reaffirms its call to all States to conduct serious negotiations in good faith and to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons on the territory of other States;

5. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

113th plenary meeting
12 December 1985

B

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to their destruction,

Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 2/ and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972, 3/

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, which incorporates, inter alia, the report of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, 4/

Convinced of the necessity that all efforts be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. Takes note of the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its session in 1985 regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons and, in particular, appreciates the work of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the progress recorded in its report;
2. Expresses again its regret and concern that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;
3. Urges again the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its session in 1986, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts, inter alia, by increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the 1985 mandate;

3/ Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/40/27 and Corr.1), sect. III.D, para. 96.

4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-first session on the results of its negotiations.

113th plenary meeting
12 December 1985

C

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 2/ and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington, on 10 April 1972, 3/

Noting with concern reports that chemical weapons have been used, as well as indications of their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals,

Expressing concern over the increasing risk that chemical weapons may be resorted to again,

Noting international efforts to strengthen relevant international prohibitions, including efforts to develop appropriate fact-finding mechanisms,

Recalling its resolution 39/65 A of 12 December 1984 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,

Rededicating its efforts to protect mankind from chemical and biological warfare,

1. Reaffirms the need for strict observance of existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons and condemns all actions that contravene those obligations;
2. Welcomes the ongoing efforts to ensure the most effective prohibitions possible on chemical and biological weapons;
3. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to accelerate its negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction;
4. Calls upon all States, pending the conclusion of such a comprehensive ban, to co-operate in efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons.

113th plenary meeting
12 December 1985

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/651

31 January 1986

Original: ENGLISH

Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 13 - 31 January 1986

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament at its 333rd plenary meeting, held on 27 August 1985, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons resumed its work on 13 January 1986 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski (Poland). Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs, continued to serve as Secretary of the Committee, assisted by Mr. Michael Cassandra, Associate Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs.
2. The Ad Hoc Committee held 8 meetings from 13 - 31 January 1986 and 7 scheduled, open-ended consultations with full secretariat services. Furthermore, a number of ad hoc consultations were also held during this period. In accordance with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee as contained in the Report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly (CD/642), the Chairman undertook consultations in preparation for the resumed session.
3. The representatives of the following States, not members of the Conference, participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.
4. In accordance with its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee during this period continued its work on further elaboration of the Convention utilizing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on its 1985 session (CD/636) as well as relevant proposals and papers put forward by delegations.

5. The Committee accepted the Chairman's proposal to consider during the session the following three issues:

- (a) Article II (Definitions and Criteria), point 4, in the context of Article VI (Permitted Activities);
- (b) Article II (Definitions and Criteria), point 5, in the context of Article V (Measures on Chemical Weapons Production Facilities);
- (c) Article IX (Consultation, Co-operation and Fact-Finding).

The Chairman was assisted by Mr. Petar Poptchev (Bulgaria), Mrs. Elisabet Bonnier (Sweden) and Mr. Frank Elbe (Federal Republic of Germany) in conducting the work on issues (a), (b) and (c) respectively.

6. The work of the Committee resulted in further clarification or development of the issues involved.

(a) The issues of Definitions, Criteria and Lists for relevant precursors were considered in their interrelationship.

The starting point for analytical work on defining key precursors was Article II, 4(a), on page 7 of CD/636. With a view to further refining the three criteria, the general approach, reflected in CD/636, was reaffirmed and at the same time it was recognized that the formulations for the criteria are not definitive and are still evolving.

Criteria for defining [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components for chemical weapons systems] were also discussed. While views appeared similar on several key points, it was not possible to present a common version of a complete set of criteria for this category of chemicals.

Work was also undertaken on a list of chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes.

The result of the negotiations on the various aspects of issue (a) is annexed in the form of a chart, entitled "Integrated Approach for Listing Relevant Chemicals", which reflects the progress of the work so far and is subject to development and revision.

This Integrated Approach represents a general method for a first joint effort to screen the relevant chemicals. A number of delegations contributed to elaborating it both by offering concrete examples of chemicals and analysis and by structuring and formulating its parts so that it would reflect the complex set of interests and viewpoints of the members of the Conference on Disarmament.

The main value of the Integrated Approach is to provide a means to facilitate further discussion in order to establish complete aggregated lists A, B and C. The usefulness of the Integrated Approach can be seen in two additional perspectives:

The preliminary lists will need to be considered several times over in relation to the corresponding régimes A, B and C, which remain to be elaborated, and may need to be adjusted to achieve proper alignment between the lists and régimes. Secondly, the application of the Integrated Approach during the next stages of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons would enhance the completion of the process of perfecting the criteria for identifying key precursors and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems] and draw up their respective definitions.

This process should be further pursued in search for the successful solution of the whole matter concerning the establishment of sound criteria for identifying relevant chemicals.

(b) The work on the issue of chemical weapons production facilities was of an exploratory nature and aimed at gradually identifying which kinds of production facilities or parts of facilities should be included for the purpose of the Convention in the definition of a "chemical weapons production facility". This process is at a very early stage and the summary of the work presented below is made without prejudice to present or future positions of delegations.

It was agreed that facilities producing munitions, devices or equipment as well as filling facilities should for practical purposes be put aside to be dealt with at a later stage, and that as a first step, efforts should be concentrated on facilities producing chemicals for chemical weapons purposes.

As regards the general approach to the issues, the following views were expressed:

- that there is a close connection between what will eventually be defined as a chemical weapons production facility and the measures that will be applied;
- that the definition of a chemical weapons production facility is predicated upon the definition of a chemical weapon;
- that great care must be taken so that production for peaceful purposes is not hampered while at the same time it is ensured that production of chemical weapons is effectively terminated;
- that this aim will be best achieved through a carefully worked out combination of non-production regimes and regimes for eliminating chemical weapons production facilities.

As a starting point delegations tried to find some preliminary and tentative answers to the two following questions:

- What kind of facilities or parts of facilities would cause concern from the point of view of the Convention?
- Which criteria would be useful for determining what to include in the definition of a chemical weapons production facility?

For practical purposes the discussion was focused on, but not limited to, an outline of a hypothetical facility containing a long series of stages involved in the production of a super-toxic lethal chemical only for chemical weapons purposes, from storage of precursors, through production of a dual purpose precursor to the production of the chemical for chemical weapons purposes.

As regards the first question it appears that all units involved in such a production chain did not arouse the same amount of concern, and that the closer one got to the units involved in the production of the toxic chemical itself for chemical weapons purposes, the greater the concern.

It appeared that those stages of the production chain directly involved in the actual production of the toxic chemical itself for chemical weapons purposes would need to be included in the definition of a chemical weapons production facility and eventually be effectively and irreversibly eliminated through measures which remain to be elaborated. The issue at hand was rather how to determine which those stages were. This question was reverted to later during the work.

The views of delegations varied as to what extent units or plants involved at earlier stages of the production chain, i.e., mainly the units connected with precursors and key precursors, should be included in the definition. Units connected with precursors appeared to cause somewhat less concern than those connected with key precursors. An inconclusive discussion took place as to whether or under which circumstances concerns of delegations would be met if these units or some of these units would fall under non-production regimes rather than regimes for the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities.

Major importance continues to be attached to the general purpose criterion. On that basis an initial broad categorization of all kinds of facilities into three groups can be made, namely facilities that have produced chemicals (a) exclusively for chemical weapons purposes, (b) exclusively for non-chemical weapons purposes and (c) for both purposes (including facilities converted from chemical weapons production to production for peaceful purposes).

Several delegations suggested that facilities under point (b) above, which have no connection whatsoever with production of chemical weapons but which from a technical point of view could be used for such production, should be excluded from the definition of a chemical weapons production facility and rather be dealt with in the context of non-production. This suggestion was not further dealt with.

A number of delegations expressed the view that, although important, the general purpose criterion needed to be supplemented in some cases, inter alia, in cases involving production of chemicals, especially of super-toxic lethal chemicals, that were used or could be used for dual purposes, and that a further discussion was needed on how to apply it.

Various supplementary criteria were suggested. The following list of proposed criteria does not indicate any priority order, nor is it exhaustive, nor is it shared by all delegations.

1. Types of chemicals produced, i.e., chemicals defined as chemical weapons or contained in lists still to be elaborated.
2. Quantities of chemicals produced
 - (a) Whether the quantities produced are consistent with purposes not prohibited by the Convention
 - (b) Proportions of production used for chemical weapons and non-chemical weapons purposes respectively.
3. Technological and chemical proximity to the chemical for chemical weapons purposes, and its toxicity.
4. Geographical proximity, i.e., the location of various units or plants vis-à-vis those producing the toxic chemical for chemical weapons purposes.
5. Present and/or past production.
6. The relevant history of the plant.
7. Possibility for alternative uses not prohibited by the Convention.

As the next step of the analytic process, the same production chain as before was discussed in greater detail and the usefulness of the various criteria suggested was explored.

In this phase of the deliberations it was deemed useful from a methodological point of view to start by focussing the attention on the very end of the production process trying to identify units or parts of units directly involved in the production of the super-toxic lethal chemical, and to thereafter gradually move the focus towards the earlier processes involved. In this context the concept of "final production stage" was introduced and some initial attempts were made to identify more precisely what would be included in such a concept. However, the time available did not permit the issues involved to be further pursued during this session.

(c) With regard to Article IX delegations agreed that any further drafting exercise on this article would not be likely to lead to further progress during January 1986 as no significant changes in positions on fact-finding had occurred. To facilitate such progress, there was a general desire to engage in a broad dialogue that would allow delegations to explain philosophies and security concepts with regard to their positions on a system of on-challenge verification.

Many delegations participated in the discussions on the various positions on fact-finding and explained their national views with regard to establishing a system of on-challenge verification. Some delegations supported the approach to Article IX as contained in Alternative I of CD/CW/WP.106. Other delegations underlined the necessity for a strictly mandatory approach as contained in CD/500. Still other delegations considered that on-challenge on-site inspections should be carried out, in the final analysis, only with the consent of a State Party in regard to which the request was made.

In the course of discussions a number of areas were identified which deserve more thorough consideration in the future. These areas are:

- fact-finding and national security;
- means for preventing abuse of fact-finding provisions;
- fact-finding and military threat from chemical weapons;
- clarification of terminology with regard to fact-finding;
- adversarial and co-operative approaches in fact-finding;
- relationship of the various organs under a chemical weapons convention with regard to fact-finding;
- time-frames in the process of fact-finding;
- consequences of turning down a request for fact-finding;
- consequences of a proven breach of obligations under a chemical weapons convention;
- precedents in international agreements with regard to fact-finding.

7. The present report should be considered together with the Committee's report as contained in CD/636 and should equally be utilized in the further elaboration of the Convention.

INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR LISTING RELEVANT CHEMICALS */LIST 'A'

Part I: Initial list of chemicals which satisfy all the three criteria 1/ for key precursors

1. Chemicals containing one P-methyl bond (mainly halides of anhydrides, esters and salts)
2. N,N-Dimethylphosphoramidic dichloride
3. Diethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidate
4. Bis (2-hydroxyethyl)sulphide (thiodiglycol) 4/
5. Arsenic trichloride 5/
6. 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid and its esters
7. Quinuclidin-3-ol

Types of chemicals to which the chemicals listed in col.1 belong and among which additional key precursors could be found

1. Chemicals containing one P-methyl, P-ethyl or P-propyl (normal or iso) bond
2. N,N-Dialkylphosphoramidic dihalides
3. Dialkyl N,N-dialkylphosphoramidates
- 4.
- 5.
6. Phenyl-, alkyl- or cyclo-alkyl-substituted glycolic acids
7. 3- or 4-hydroxypiperidine and their derivatives

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

Part II: Chemicals which do not meet all the three criteria 1/ for key precursors, but possess features that would warrant their inclusion as an exception in List 'A'

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

Aggregated list of key precursors (as a result of the discussions) to which regime 'A,2/' should be applied

1. 3/

2.

3.

Aggregated list of relevant chemicals (as a result of the discussions) to which regime 'A,2/' should be applied

*/ This paper is subject to development and revision. It is recognized that the preliminary lists will need to be considered several times in relation to the corresponding regimes 'A', 'B' and 'C' (to be elaborated) and may need to be adjusted to achieve proper alignment between the lists and regimes.

Part III

A. Chemicals which according to the views of some delegations satisfy all three criteria^{1/} and should be listed in Part I and which according to the views of other delegations do not satisfy all three criteria and may be listed in Part II.

1. N,N-Diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride 6/
2. N,N-Diisopropylaminoethan-2-ol 6/
3. N,N-Diisopropylaminoethane-2-thiol 6/

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

B.

3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-ol 7/

Alkyl, cycloalkyl alcohols etc.

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

NOTES TO LIST 'A'

- 1/ The general approach to the criteria is reflected in CD/636. The formulations for the criteria are not definitive and are still evolving.
- 2/ To be elaborated.
- 3/ It is necessary to consider further:
 - (a) listing the entire family or only listing specific types of derivatives within the family
 - (b) possible analogs
 - (c) use in peaceful industries
- 4/ It was pointed out that whether or not regime 'A' should be applied to this chemical depends on the nature of regime 'A'.
- 5/ This chemical meets all three criteria for a key precursor. However, it is used for military purposes not related to chemical weapons (i.e., electronics). It is necessary to consider further whether regime 'A' should be applied or not.
- 6/ It is necessary to consider further whether this compound meets all three criteria for key precursors and thus should be placed in Part I of List 'A' or whether it should be included in Part II of List 'A' as an exception.
- 7/ Views differ as to whether this compound:
 - (a) meets all three criteria for key precursors
 - (b) should be placed in Part II of List 'A' as an exception, or should be placed in List 'B' as an especially dangerous key precursor.

LIST 'B'

Part I: Chemicals defined as [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons system]

Types of chemicals to which the chemicals listed in col.1 belong and among which additional [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems] could be found

Aggregated list of the relevant chemicals (as a result of the discussions) to which regime 'B' 1/ should be applied

1. Methylphosphonic difluoride (DF)

1. Alkylphosphonic difluorides

- 1 (a) Methylphosphonic difluoride
- (b) Ethylphosphonic difluoride 2/
- (c) n-Propylphosphonic difluoride 2/
- (d) iso-propylphosphonic difluoride 2/

2. 3/

2. Alkyl alkylphosphonochloridates

2.

3. Ethyl 0-2-diisopropylaminoethyl-methylphosphonite (QL)

3. Alkyl 0-2-diisopropylaminoethyl alkylphosphonites

3.

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

Part II.

3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-ol 4/

Alkyl, cycloalkyl alcohols etc

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

NOTES TO LIST 'B'

1/ To be elaborated

2/ These chemicals have been listed here on the basis of technical information provided by one delegation.

3/ It has been suggested to list isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate as an especially dangerous key precursor.

4/ Views differ as to whether this compound:

(a) meets all three criteria for key precursors

(b) should be placed in Part II of List 'A' as an exception, or should be placed in List 'B' as an especially dangerous key precursor.

Aggregated list of the relevant chemicals
(as a result of the discussions) to which
regime 'C' 1/ should be applied

Part I: Chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes

1. Phosphorus oxychloride
2. Phosphorus trichloride

Part II: Chemicals to be considered further for inclusion in list 'C'

- Di- and trimethyl/ethyl esters of phosphorous (P III) acid
- N,N-Disubstituted aminoethyl-2-halides 2/
- N,N-Disubstituted aminoethan-2-ols 2/
- N,N-Disubstituted aminoethane-2-thiols 2/
- Sulphur mono- and dichloride
- Carbonyl chloride (phosgene)
- Cyanogen chloride
- Hydrogen cyanide
- Tricloronitromethane (chloropicrin)

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

NOTES TO LIST 'C'

- 1/ To be elaborated
- 2/ Except N,N-diisopropyl compounds

Decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee
on Chemical Weapons

(Adopted at the 337th meeting held on 6 February 1986)

The Conference on Disarmament, keeping in mind that the negotiation of a Convention should proceed with a view to its final elaboration at the earliest possible date, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolutions 39/65 C and 40/92 B, and in discharging its responsibility to conduct as a priority task the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to ensure the preparation of the convention, decides to re-establish, in accordance with its rules of procedure, for the duration of its 1986 session, the Ad hoc Committee to continue the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as future initiatives with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible. This agreement, if possible, or a Report on the progress of the negotiations, should be recorded in the report which this Ad Hoc Committee will submit to the Conference at the end of the seconde part of its 1986 session.

The Conference also decides to appoint Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Chairman of this Ad Hoc Committee.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/664

13 February 1986

Original: ENGLISH

PAKISTAN

FACT-FINDING UNDER THE FUTURE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

1. During the 1985 session of the Conference on Disarmament, Working Group C of the Chemical Weapons Ad hoc Committee dealing with Compliance issues was, inter alia, able to partly elaborate article IX of the future CW Convention. The article in question deals with Consultation, Co-operation and Fact-Finding. While the two paragraphs of article IX formulated at the 1985 session deal with consultation and co-operation, the subject of fact-finding remains to be elaborated.

2. The objective of this working paper is to place before the Chemical Weapons Ad hoc Committee suggestions for provisions relating to fact-finding in the hope that these could become the basis for further discussions on the question.

3. It may be pertinent to mention here that in the view of the Pakistan delegation the provisions of the future CW Convention ought to be comprehensive and unambiguous and based on the principles of non-discrimination and universality of application.

4. In preparing its draft the Pakistan delegation has used the phrase "fact-finding" at all places, preferring it over phrases like "challenge inspection", "challenge procedure" and "on-site inspection". The basic reason is that the phrase "fact-finding" not only aptly describes the situation being elaborated but also sounds less aggressive. The phrase, one might say, is less in an adversarial context as compared to its above-mentioned alternatives.

5. While recognizing that a Consultative Committee would in all probability be established as the highest body under the convention to oversee its implementation, the Pakistan delegation is of the opinion that all requests for fact-finding should in the first instance be addressed to the Executive Council (which should in any case have delegated authority to carry out the functions of the Consultative Committee when the latter is not in session). The Executive Council being a smaller body and being permanently in session could be expected to act with greater speed. Thus the issue of fact-finding should come before the Consultative Committee in the event that the Executive Council fails to get it resolved in a satisfactory manner.

Article IX Consultation, Co-operation and Fact-Finding

1. As in CD/636

2. As in CD/636.

3. A State party unable to or having failed to clear, through bilateral means, its doubts about another State party's compliance with the convention shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain an explanation from the other State party in order to clarify the matter. The Executive Council shall forward a request of this type to the State party concerned within 24 hours of its receipt. The State party receiving the request for clarification shall give its reply, clarifying the situation directly to the requesting State party or to the Executive Council within seven days of the receipt of Executive Council's communication. In case the explanation is sent to the Executive Council it shall forward the same to the requesting State party within 24 hours of its receipt. Should further clarification be required the procedure may be repeated.

4. Any State party to the Convention can submit to the Executive Council a request to send a fact-finding mission to another State party in order to clarify and resolve any situation considered to be ambiguous or which gives rise to apprehensions about a possible breach of an obligation deriving from the provisions of this Convention. A request of this type shall be accompanied by concrete elements supporting the doubts of the requesting State party.

5. On receipt of a request of the type indicated in paragraph 4 above the Executive Council shall begin an examination of the request within two days of its receipt.

6. The Executive Council shall, within four days of commencing discussion on the request decide whether or not to send a fact-finding mission.

7. The State party requesting for a fact-finding mission (hereinafter called the requesting State party) and the State party proposed to be subjected to the fact-finding procedure (hereinafter called the receiving State party) if not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to send a representative each to take part in the proceedings of the Executive Council while the matter is under consideration, without the right to participate in the voting on the subject. In case either of the above States parties is a member of the Executive Council its representative shall not take part in the voting on the request.

8. The Executive Council while considering a request for a fact-finding mission can call upon the States parties directly concerned or any other State party to supply any other information it deems relevant.

9. In case it is decided not to send a fact-finding mission the requesting State party will be informed accordingly within 24 hours of the decision. The requesting State party shall have the right to make another request for fact-finding provided it can furnish some additional information not included in the first request. In such an event the procedure outlined in paragraphs 5 and 6 will be repeated.

10. In case it is decided to have recourse to fact-finding the Executive Council shall, within 24 hours of the decision notify the receiving State party that a fact-finding mission was proposed to be sent to the receiving State.

11. The receiving State party shall treat the request in good faith and respond to it within a period of four days. It shall have the following courses of action open to it:

(a) Comply with the request of the Executive Council and allow the fact-finding mission to visit the relevant facilities and sites.

(b) Undertake to submit a comprehensive enquiry report about the situation causing concern within a period of seven days and request the Executive Council to pend the departure of the fact-finding team till it (the Executive Council) had considered the enquiry report from the receiving State. In case the receiving State party detects a situation of the kind suspected by the requesting State it shall in its report to the Executive Council indicate the corrective action taken by it or proposed to be taken by it to restore full compliance with the Convention. In case the receiving State party fails to submit its enquiry report within seven days it shall allow the further implementation of the fact-finding procedure.

(c) Under exceptional circumstances refuse to allow the fact-finding mission to visit the facilities/sites it is required to inspect. A refusal of this type shall be accompanied by a detailed explanation of its reason.

12. In case the receiving State party opts for the alternative outlined in 10 (b) above and submits a report within seven days the Executive Council shall give immediate consideration to the report and decide within four days of its receipt as to whether the explanation satisfied the concerns raised. In the event that the explanation given and the action taken or proposed to be taken by the receiving State party is found satisfactory the requesting State party shall be informed accordingly within 24 hours of the decision. If the explanation is found unsatisfactory the Executive Council shall, within 24 hours of arriving at this decision, renew the request for sending a fact-finding team.

13. In case the receiving State party opts for the alternative outlined in 10 (c) above the Executive Council shall assess the explanation taking into account all relevant elements including possible new elements received after the original request and decide whether it was satisfactory. In case it finds the explanation satisfactory, the Executive Council shall accordingly advise the requesting State party within 24 hours of the decision. If the Executive Council finds the explanation unsatisfactory it shall within 24 hours of its decision, send another request to the receiving State party.

14. The receiving State party shall respond to the second request within two days of receiving it. In case it again refuses to permit the fact-finding team to undertake its mission, the Executive Council may after re-examining the explanation request an extraordinary session of the Consultative Committee to consider the emergent situation. Absence of a response from the receiving State party shall be construed as its willingness to allow the fact-finding team to proceed with its mission.

15. The Consultative Committee shall have at its disposal an inspectorate of at least ... members in the Technical Secretariat and have the competence to engage more inspectors as and when needed and for as long as their services are required. The inspectors, who shall be persons of high standing in the fields of chemistry, chemical technology and medicine, shall serve in their personal capacities and consideration will be given to equitable geographical and political distribution while selecting them.

16. Each fact-finding team shall consist of at least three members. It shall however not include a national of either the requesting State party or the receiving State party.

17. The fact-finding team shall furnish a written report to the Executive Council within seven days of having completed its mission. The fact-finding team shall however have the right to submit preliminary or interim reports during the fact-finding exercise. In case of differences among members of the team each inspector shall have the right to have his individual views reflected separately in the report.

18. In case the report of the fact-finding team establishes that there existed an ambiguous situation or that a breach of the Convention had taken place, the Executive Council shall within 24 hours of receiving the report advise the receiving State party to take remedial measures to remove the cause(s) for ambiguity/complaint. The Executive Council shall also communicate the report to the requesting State party within 24 hours of its receipt. Copies of the report will be made available by the other State parties within a period of 15 days.

19. The receiving State party shall upon receipt of Executive Council's communication immediately take all steps necessary to bring itself in full compliance with the Convention and inform the Executive Council of the action taken by it or proposed to be taken by it within seven days of having received the communication from the Executive Council.

20. In case the receiving State party fails to or refuses to comply with the advice of the Executive Council the latter shall call for an extraordinary session of the Consultative Committee to consider the emergent situation.

21. An extraordinary session of the Consultative Committee held in pursuance of paragraphs 14 or 20 above shall decide what action to take, including the possibility of referring the question to the United Nations General Assembly and requesting the latter to take appropriate action under the United Nations Charter. The Consultative Committee, while referring the matter to the United Nations General Assembly shall have the right to recommend any action/measures it deems appropriate to cope with the situation.

22. Use of Chemical Weapons, shall be treated as the most serious breach of the Convention. The Executive Council on receipt of a duly substantiated complaint regarding the use of chemical weapons shall act with utmost despatch. It shall within 48 hours of receiving the complaint inform the State parties concerned that a fact-finding team was being sent to the area/location where chemical weapons were alleged to have been used. The fact-finding team shall proceed to the relevant location(s) by the fastest means possible. All States parties, including those directly concerned, shall extend all possible assistance to the fact-finding team in reaching and visiting the site(s), ascertaining the facts, and in the transport of samples or material for evidence related with the possible use of chemical weapons. The fact-finding team shall file its report at the earliest possible and in any case within three days of having completed its work. In case the report of the fact-finding team establishes that chemical weapons had been used, the Executive Council shall within 24 hours call for an emergency session of the Consultative Committee. The Consultative Committee shall convene within a period of one week and consider (a) measures to help the affected State party and (b) measures against the chemical-weapon-using State.

PAKISTAN

FACT-FINDING UNDER THE FUTURE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION

On page 3, subparagraph (c)

third line: replace the word "reason" by "reasons".

On page 4, paragraph 18

penultimate line: replace the word "by" by "to".

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/667

Extract

14 February 1986

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 FEBRUARY 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "JOINT STATEMENT" ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON 21 NOVEMBER 1985

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a document entitled, "Joint Statement" issued by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 21 November 1985 at the conclusion of the meeting between the President of the United States Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva, 19-21 November 1985. I would request that you make arrangements for the Statement to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Donald Lowitz
United States Representative
to the Conference on Disarmament

In the context of discussing security problems, the two sides reaffirmed that they are in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter.

The two sides agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of such a chemical weapon ban, including the question of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/668
14 February 1986

Extract

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 14 FEBRUARY 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF
A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "JOINT SOVIET/UNITED STATES STATEMENT"
ISSUED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON 21 NOVEMBER 1985

I have the honour to transmit herewith a document entitled "Joint Soviet-United States Statement", of 21 November 1985, which was issued at the conclusion of the meeting between General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev and President of the United States Ronald Reagan in Geneva from 19 to 21 November 1985.

I would kindly request you to make the necessary arrangements for the Statement to be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(signed) V. ISSRAELYAN

In the context of discussing security problems, the two sides reaffirmed that they are in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter.

The two sides agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of such a chemical weapon ban, including the question of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.

20 February 1986

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

LETTER DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE DATED 18 FEBRUARY 1986 FROM THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV, TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

I have the honour to transmit the text of the Message dated 18 February 1986 from the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, to the Conference on Disarmament.

I should be grateful if you would kindly make the necessary arrangements to have this Message circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(signed) V. ISSRAELYAN

MESSAGE FROM THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV, TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

I extend greetings to the representatives of States who have gathered for a regular session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Soviet Union takes a most responsible approach to its participation in the Conference on Disarmament, because it understands that disarmament is the main avenue towards establishing new and equitable international arrangements and building a safe world. It is precisely disarmament which, by releasing enormous material and intellectual resources, would permit their use for constructive purposes, for achieving economic development and prosperity.

Mankind has come to a watershed in its history, when it has to choose which road to follow: either it will overcome the inertia of the past, when security was regarded above all in terms of a position of strength and of military and technological solutions, or it will remain hostage to a race in nuclear, chemical and, in future, other equally awesome weapons.

The Soviet Union is also proposing that chemical weapons be completely eliminated by the end of this century. The unduly protracted negotiations to conclude a convention on this matter should be vigorously accelerated.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/672
21 February 1986

Extract

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 14 FEBRUARY 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "STATEMENTS BY VIETNAMESE LEADERS CONCERNING THE STATEMENT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, MADE ON 15 JANUARY 1986"

I have honour to transmit herewith a statement of 21 January 1986 by His Excellency Mr. TRUONG CHINH, Chairman of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, and a statement of 16 January 1986 by His Excellency Mr. PHAM VAN DONG, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

I should be grateful if you would kindly make the necessary arrangements to have these statements circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, in connection with the statement which I intend to make in plenary concerning item 8 of the Conference's agenda.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) NGUYEN THUONG

Ambassador,
Permanent Representative

STATEMENTS BY VIETNAMESE LEADERS CONCERNING THE STATEMENT
OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, MADE ON 15 JANUARY 1986

2. On 16 January 1986, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, PHAM VAN DONG, made the following statement to the TASS correspondent on the subject of the important statement by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mr. Gorbachev: "The Soviet Union's constructive spirit pervades the programme, which contains measures designed to rid our planet of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, and opens up for mankind the marvellous possibility of achieving its age-old dream of building durable peace on Earth. These comprehensive peace proposals concern the fate of the generations of today and of tomorrow. The USSR's decision to extend its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear testing is eloquent proof of its clear, unvarying position and of its goodwill.

The appeal by Mr. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, for an end to all threat of nuclear war is gathering widespread support from all sectors among all peoples throughout the world.

CD/672
page 3

This appeal will spur on the anti-war forces even more in their struggle for peace, life and the noble objectives of peaceful co-existence.

This major document is of historic importance. The Vietnamese people wholeheartedly supports the realistic peace programme put forward by the USSR for the total elimination of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction and for the complete prohibition of the deployment of such weapons in space.

Together with the progressive forces of the world, we appeal to the United States of America and the other nuclear-weapon Powers to follow the example of the USSR and join in its initiative so as to advance together along the road towards the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and thus strengthen the peace and security of the peoples of the world.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/675

7 March 1986

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 FEBRUARY 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TRANSMITTING NOTES OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN RESPONSE
TO THE REPLIES OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE
CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC CONCERNING TALKS ON THE
PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

On 8 November 1985, the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the German Democratic Republic sent replies to the letters of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Helmut Kohl, of 27 September 1985, concerning the proposal of the two respective Governments to start negotiations for the establishment of a limited zone free of chemical weapons in Europe. On 23 December 1985 the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany responded to these replies by notes to the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the text of which is attached to this letter. I would be grateful if the text could be circulated as a Conference document.

It may be of interest to delegations to note that a round of talks in Geneva, as agreed by the respective Governments, will be initiated during the week beginning 10 February 1986. It results from the previous exchange of letters that these talks, at the level of heads of delegation will cover all unresolved questions relating to the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

(Signed) Henning Wegener
Ambassador

The Federal Government welcomes that the Government of the (German Democratic Republic) (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic) has accepted the proposal made in the letter of the Federal Chancellor of 27 September 1985 concerning talks between the respective Delegations to the Conference on Disarmament on the problem of chemical weapons.

The Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany has already submitted suggestions concerning dates to the Heads of the Delegation of the (German Democratic Republic) (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic). More details are to be discussed at the level of delegations.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany feels also encouraged by the decisions of the Geneva summit of 21 November 1985 concerning a worldwide ban on chemical weapons to make - within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament - a contribution to the relevant problems by accompanying talks. As is well known, the United States of America and the Soviet Union reaffirmed that they are in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons, and agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter. Further the two sides agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on all aspects of such a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. The Federal Government shares the conviction expressed in this declaration that all efforts must be directed at reaching the goal of a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/677
12 March 1986

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 MARCH 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, TRANSMITTING A HANDBOOK FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 1/

In my Plenary statement of 4 February, 1986 before the Conference on Disarmament, I announced that a Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons is being made available to delegations. A brief description of that document is included in my Plenary statement of 11 March.

Fifty copies of the handbook are being delivered to your office for distribution to all CD delegations. I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for their distribution through the secretariat. Additional copies can be obtained from the Canadian Mission.

(Signed) J. Alan Beesley,
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
for Disarmament

1/ A limited distribution of this Handbook in English only has been made to the members of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Permanent Mission of Canada at Geneva.

Original: ENGLISH

CANADA

Identification of Chemical Substances

1. Any convention on chemical weapons will have to deal with a considerable number of chemical substances and a method of unambiguous identification of these chemicals is required. To partially satisfy this requirement, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has come to rely on the IUPAC (International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry) nomenclature system. There is some question as to whether the structural formula of the chemical substance is also required. In fact, both the IUPAC and structural formula approaches are useful in bringing some precision to the discussion of the various chemicals of concern to the future Convention and, in the latter case, to visualizing relationships between toxic chemical compounds. The purpose of this paper is to suggest an additional approach, based on Chemical Abstracts Service registry numbers, which could be of considerable utility to the unambiguous identification of chemicals and to the manipulation of the eventual data flow related to implementation of the Convention.

2. With the advent of computerized searching of the chemical literature, the Chemical Abstracts Service of Columbus, Ohio, has devised a simple numerical system for substance identification. This is the registry number, a number of the form $[N_1 \dots N_4 N_3 - N_2 N_1 - R]$. For example, the nerve gas VX has the number [50782-69-9]. A unique number is assigned to every new chemical compound on its first appearance in the literature. Older substances have also been assigned numbers, to the extent that virtually all chemicals now have a registry number. In any event, registry numbers can be assigned to substances that do not have them as long as the existence and chemical identity of the substance are documented in a publication or other information file which is readily available to the public.

3. Use of the registry number as an identifier would allow a Technical Secretariat to set up computerized databases of all chemicals of concern to the Convention. Use of chemical names or structures for construction of such databases is much more difficult and requires great care when entering long and complex names. For example, the chemical name for sanitoxin is 2,6-diamino-4-(((aminocarbonyl)oxy)methyl)-3a,4,8,9-tetrahydro-1H,10H-pyrrolo(1,2-C)purine-10,10-diol, while its registry number is simply [35523-89-8]. There is never a problem with data entry of registry numbers since the last digit is a checksum which is always calculated automatically on entry according to an established formula so as to verify that the registry number being used is a valid one.

4. Databases are already in existence that relate registry numbers to names and structures of compounds and vice versa. The Technical Secretariat could set up other databases involving chemical properties, declarations of stocks, declarations of facilities, time-tables and methods of destruction, etc., all using the compound registry numbers of the key parameters for information retrieval.

5. To illustrate the utility and simplicity of the registry number system, a table listing some chemicals of concerning to a Convention with their registry numbers is attached. Of course, like specific name, the registry number can only be used to identify a single, specific compound and not a generic group of compounds.

REGISTRY NUMBERS OF SOME CHEMICALS
OF CONCERN TO A CONVENTION

SERIAL	NAME	REGISTRY NUMBER
1	O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (Sarin)	[107-44-8]
2	O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate (Soman)	[96-64-0]
3	O-Ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate (Tabun)	[77-81-6]
4	O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethylmethylphosphonothiolate (VX)	[50782-69-9]
5	Bis(2-Chloroethyl)sulphide (H)	[505-60-2]
6	Bis(2-Chloroethyl)methylamine (HN2)	[51-75-2]
7	2-Chlorovinyl dichloroarsine (Lewisite 1)	[541-25-3]
8	3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ)	[6581-06-2]
9	Saxitoxin	[35523-89-8]
10	Phosgene	[75-44-5]
11	Hydrogen cyanide	[74-90-8]
12	Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF)	[676-99-3]
13	3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-ol (Pinacolyl alcohol)	[464-07-3]
14	N,N-Dimethylphosphoramidic dichloride	[677-43-0]
15	N,N-Diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride	[96-79-7]
16	Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulphide (Thiodiglycol)	[111-48-8]
17	Quinuclidin-3-ol	[1619-34-7]
18	Trichloronitromethane (Chloropicrin)	[76-06-2]
19	Phosphorus oxychloride	[10025-87-3]
20	Arsenic trichloride	[7784-34-1]

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Amendment to CD/500, Draft Convention on the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons

In order to make clear the U.S. intention that no imbalance in inspection obligations is intended or contained in the U.S. draft chemical weapons convention (CD/500, April 18, 1984), the following textual changes are made to the provisions in Article X (Special On-Site Inspection):

Replace subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b), dealing with facilities for which a special on-site inspection may be requested, with the following:

"(a) Any location or facility subject to systematic international on-site inspection pursuant to Articles III, V and VI.;

"(b) Any military location or facility or any other location or facility owned by the government of a party.;

"(c) Any type of privately-owned location or facility described below: (This last category shall include relevant privately-owned facilities used for the provision of goods and services to the government of a party. It is intended that this provision reach any privately-owned location or facility that in the future might be suspected of being used for activities in violation of this convention. The specification in this convention of such locations and facilities should be a reasonable one. Article X is intended to encompass all relevant locations and facilities regardless of the economic or political systems of parties.)"

Note: the material in parentheses in subparagraph c is explanatory and does not represent proposed text for the convention, which is to be developed in the course of the negotiations.

The U.S. would welcome any suggestions about ways to improve the procedures and formulations as long as an equivalent level of confidence is maintained. The United States is ready to work closely with others to ensure that the "open invitation" approach applies equally to all economic and political systems.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/686
4 April 1986

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 3 APRIL 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF POLAND TRANSMITTING THE TEST OF THE
COMMUNIQUE OF THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY
HELD IN WARSAW ON 19-20 MARCH 1986

I have the pleasure to transmit herewith the text of the Communiqué
of the Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
States parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in Warsaw on 19-20 March 1986.

I should like to request you to have the text of this letter and the
... Communiqué circulated as an official document of the Conference on
Disarmament.

(Signed)

Jerzy Zawalonka
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

The States represented at the meeting urge the total elimination of chemical weapons from the European continent. In that context they support the proposals made by the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in Central Europe and the Balkans respectively.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty consider that the total elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production before the end of the century is wholly feasible. There is a need to intensify negotiations on an international convention concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing chemical weapon stocks. They favour multilateral agreement that chemical weapons should not be transferred to anyone or deployed on the territory of other

States. The States represented at the meeting, which themselves follow this policy, call upon the NATO countries to display similar restraint.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/689
11 April 1986

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 APRIL 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT,
TRANSMITTING A COMPENDIUM OF ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS
DOCUMENTATION OF THE CONFERENCE DURING THE PERIOD 1983 TO 1985^{1/}

As you will recall, in my Plenary Statements before the Conference on Disarmament on February 4 and March 11, 1986, I announced that my delegation would be making available to CD participants, a compendium of all chemical weapons documentation of the Conference during the period 1983 to 1985 inclusive. As you know, an earlier set of CW documents covering the period 1969 to 1982 was distributed by Canada in 1983.

Arrangements have been made for the delivery to the documentation office at the CD today, of 46 copies of this compendium which consists of 5 volumes including plenary speeches and working papers for the period concerned, as well as a comprehensive index covering all CW documentation since 1969. I would be grateful if distribution of these documents could be arranged through the Secretariat as was done in the past for earlier documents of this nature.

(Signed) J. Alan Beesley,
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative

^{1/} A limited distribution of this Compendium in English only has been made to the members of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Permanent Mission of Canada at Geneva.

STATEMENT BY M.S. GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION, ON SOVIET TELEVISION

CD/696
page 5

To put it bluntly, certain Western politicians were pursuing very specific aims: to block the opportunities for balancing international relations and to sow new seeds of mistrust and suspicion of the socialist countries.

All this came out quite clearly, even at the meeting of the leaders of "The Seven" held recently in Tokyo. Of what did they speak to the world, of what dangers did they warn humanity? Of Libya, groundlessly accused of terrorism, and of the Soviet Union, which seemingly "undersupplied" them with information about the accident at Chernobyl. And not a word about the most important thing: how to stop the arms race, how to save the world from the nuclear menace. Not a word in response to the Soviet initiatives, to our concrete proposals on the cessation of nuclear tests, on freeing humanity from nuclear and chemical weapons, on reducing conventional arms.

Working Paper by Belgium

Order of Elimination of chemical weapons stocks and method for
comparing these stocks: Elements of a possible solution

CD/636, Appendix I, Annex IV, under II A states that the elaboration of principles for the order of elimination could build on the following principles:

- undiminished security for all States during the entire elimination phase,
- applicability irrespective of the actual composition of stockpiles and of the methods chosen for the elimination.

On a preliminary basis, CD/636, Appendix I, annex IV, II B, states that the order of elimination would be such that the entire elimination phase be divided into a number of elimination periods.

However, as recognized in the same paragraph, the methods for comparing stockpiles of different composition remain to be elaborated. It is to be hoped that progress in this area could be achieved this year. This paper contains elements of a possible solution, in order to contribute to the discussion.

1. A concept of chemical weapons for the purpose of the elaboration of a destruction order

The concept of "chemical weapons" applies to two distinct categories of material elements:

- (a) relevant chemicals (either inside munitions, devices and equipment or in bulk),
- (b) munitions, devices or equipment: when empty, these are only taken into account in the elimination process if they are specifically designed for C.W. purposes.

*/ Reissued for technical reasons.

It is suggested that, taken separately or together, these material elements can be identified unequivocally as aimed to serve an intention of chemical armament.

For this reason, the elimination of empty munitions, devices or equipment that are not specifically designed for C.W. purposes but could have been earmarked for C.W. purposes, is to be considered optional. However, if filled with relevant chemical substances, munitions, devices and equipment have become integral parts of chemical weapons and should therefore be eliminated, irrespective of whether they have been specifically designed or not.

The question of what constitutes a relevant chemical either contained in munitions, devices, equipment suitable for use as chemical weapons or earmarked (in bulk) for chemical armament, needs to be further elaborated.

2. Order of destruction of chemical weapons: Principles

(a) The order should be clearly established according to rigorous rules that leave full autonomy to the parties where it is not necessary to limit this autonomy. No State party should be asked to accept an order of destruction that would notably decrease its security but each party will have the recognized right, either unilaterally or in concert with other parties, to accelerate the destruction process, to anticipate obligations, if it wishes to do so.

(b) The destruction of chemical weapons will be spread over a number of periods, with minimal established quantities of the stocks to be destroyed within each period.

The application of the principle of undiminished security will be reflected mainly through a comparison between chemical substances provided that:

- (i) chemical substances contained in munitions, devices or equipment designed for their use as C.W. will be eliminated during the same period as their containers,
- (ii) relevant chemical substances in bulk are to be destroyed during the indicated periods. Corresponding proportions of the stocks of empty specifically-designed munition shells, devices or equipment, that have been declared as relating to these chemicals in bulk, will be eliminated during these periods. Each portion of the stocks of specifically-designed containers to be eliminated will be calculated according to, on the one

hand, their capacity in chemical substances and, on the other hand, the amount of related chemical substances in bulk to be destroyed during the same period (i.e. dividing the latter by the former),

(iii) if, at the time of declaration, a disproportion exists between the stocks of chemical substances in bulk and the corresponding empty specifically-designed munitions, devices or equipment, the following rules will apply:

- chemicals in bulk are eliminated irrespective of whether corresponding specifically-designed empty munitions, devices or equipment exist in the stocks of the State party concerned,

- empty specifically-designed munitions, devices or equipment for which no corresponding stocks of chemicals in bulk exist, will be destroyed in the course of the first period,

(iv) for the purpose of destruction an LD.50 will be attributed to key precursors to supertoxic lethals and other lethal chemicals by multiplying the LD.50 of the corresponding end product */ by some factor to be agreed upon,

(v) multicomponent weapon systems will be treated according to the characteristics of the end product aimed at (LD.50 whenever appropriate),

(vi) all harmful chemicals are to be considered equivalent,

(vii) there will be no distinction among chemical products according to the nature of their containers.

(c) Over the entire elimination phase, the order of elimination for lethal substances and the one for harmful substance will be considered independently:

(i) the destruction of lethal chemicals will be planned at a minimum rate (expressed in quantity/period), the equivalence of which will be determined with the help of principles stated in CD/CW/WP.130 of China. At the end of any period the amount that actually remains to be destroyed has to be smaller than or

*/ If more than one toxic combination is possible, the most toxic will be taken into account.

equal to the amount that can remain according to the planned minimal rate.

To determine the equivalence of products that have different lethality, the notion of equivalent weight is introduced.

Mustard is arbitrarily chosen as reference compound (compound Y). In order to calculate the equivalent of the weight of compound X the lethality of which is represented by LD.50, this weight is multiplied by a factor

$$\left[\frac{(\text{LD.50})_Y}{(\text{LD.50})_X} \right] \text{ where } \text{LD.50}_Y \text{ represents}$$

the LD.50 of Mustard.

The total of Mustard equivalent weight will be divided by the foreseen number of elimination periods, the result of which will give the minimal quantity of Mustard equivalent weight to be destroyed during each period (planned minimum rate).

- (ii) the total weight of harmful chemicals to be eliminated will be divided by the foreseen number of elimination periods, the result of which will give the minimal quantity of mustard equivalent weight to be destroyed during each period.
- (iii) the question of the order of destruction of relatively small stockpiles must be examined separately.

In order not to effect the security of States possessing such stockpiles there may be a need to allow these States to retain some small minimum stockpile until the final elimination period(s).

3. Example

(a) State A processes chemical weapons, and declares them according to the table in annex 1.

(b) Number of items and weight per item allow the calculation of weight of chemicals.

If data on purity are available, they will be taken into account in order to arrive at the effective weight of chemicals in annex 1.

(c) The effective weight of lethal chemicals is transformed into an "equivalent Mustard weight" according to the principles described above.

(d) Items (5) and (6) are harmful chemicals.

The total amount is 1,650 tons.

If nine destruction periods are accepted, a minimum of 183.3 (1,650 : 9) tons of harmful chemicals have to be destroyed during each period (annex 2 - graph 1).

(e) The amount of lethal chemicals is 31,550 tons of equivalent Mustard weight.

If nine destruction periods are accepted, a minimum of 3,505.6 tons (31,550 : 9) of equivalent Mustard weight have to be destroyed during each period (annex 2 - graph 2).

(f) The destruction of the items (3), specifically designed for the spray of thickened soman, will be carried out proportionally with the weight of soman (in thickened form) that is destroyed in a given period (see also annex 2 - graphs 1 and 2).

(g) The capacity of empty devices (3) for use in conjunction with (2) i.e. 400 tons is smaller than the bulk amount of (2). Therefore none of the items (3) will be destroyed during the first elimination period but the destruction of the items (3), specifically designed for the spray of thickened soman, will be carried out proportionally with the weight of soman (in thickened form) that is destroyed in a given period (see also annex 2 - graphs 1 and 2).

(h) According to these guidelines State A introduces the following destruction plan (all values in equivalent tons of Mustard).

period	HARMFUL			LETHAL		
	planned destruction	planned to remain	max allowed to remain	planned destruction	planned to remain	max allowed to remain
1	300 tons (6)	1 350	1 466.7	4 900 tons (5)	26 650	28 044.4
2	300 tons (6)	1 050	1 283.4	4 750 tons (4)	21 900	24 538.8
3	300 tons (6)	750	1 100.1	3 500 tons (8)	18 400	21 033.2
4	200 tons (7)	550	916.8	4 000 tons (8)	14 400	17 527.6
5	200 tons (7)	350	733.5	3 000 tons (1)	11 400	14 022.0
6	200 tons (7)	150	550.2	4 000 tons (2) + 381 items (3)	7 400	10 516.4
7	150 tons (7)	0	366.9	4 000 tons (2) + 381 items (3)	3 400	7 010.8
8	-	0	183.6	2 500 tons (2) + 238 items (3)	900	3 505.2
9	-	0	0	900 tons (9)	0	0

For each period the State has planned the destruction of a weight of chemicals that is \geq the amount required.

STATE A: DECLARATIONS

ITEMS OR WEIGHT	DESCRIPTION	EFFECTIVE WEIGHT OF CHEMICAL	EQUIVALENT MUSTARD WEIGHT (a) (Tons)
(1) 100,000	Artillery shells x 2 kg Sarin/Shell (no data on purity available)	200 tons Sarin	3,000
(2) 500 tons	Tickled Soman in bulk (containing 70% Soman)	350 tons Soman	10,500
(3) 1,000	Specifically designed spray-tanks for use in conjunction with (2) with a capacity of 400 kg payload each.	-	
(4) 10,000	Aerial bombs x 500 kg Mustard/bomb (purity 95%)	4,750 tons Mustard	4,750
(5) 5,000 tons	Mustard in bulk (purity 98%)	4,900 tons Mustard	4,900
(6) 1,000 tons	BZ in bulk (purity 90%)	900 tons BZ	-
(7) 15,000	Rockets x 50 kg Adamsite/rocket (no data on purity available)	750 tons Adamsite	-
(8) 500 tons	Methylphosphonyl difluoridate (DF) x 0,5 (b) bulk (no data on purity available)	250 tons Soman	7,500
(9) 10,000	Binary Artillery shells x 3 kg Soman/Shell (no data on purity available)	30 tons Soman	900



(a) Equivalent weight : Mustard (as an example) is taken as the basis for transforming the weight of other lethal chemicals in equivalent mustard weight

The following values are assumed as LD 50 :
 Sarin 0,2 mg/kg
 Soman 0,1 mg/kg
 Mustard 3 mg/kg

In order to obtain the "equivalent Mustard weight", the weight of Sarin has to be multiplied by (3 : 0,2) = 15, and the weight of Soman by (3 : 0,1) = 30

(b) DF is a key precursor. Its real LD 50 value (some ... mg/kg) is not used but an LD 50 value is calculated, based on the most toxic agent (that is known) that can be formed with this precursor (Soman, in this case).

The amount of Soman is calculated by multiplying the amount of DF with 0,5, according to the stoichiometry of the reaction considered.



Graphical display of destruction obligations and plans.

WORKING GROUP B

Working Paper by Belgium

Order of Elimination of chemical weapons stocks and method for
comparing these stocks: Elements of a possible solution

CORRIGENDUM

Page 4, Section 3, Example, point (a) should read:

"State A possesses chemical weapons ..."

*/ Reissued for technical reasons

AUSTRALIA**VERIFICATION OF NON-PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND
THEIR PRECURSORS BY THE CIVILIAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY:
TRIAL INSPECTION OF AN AUSTRALIAN CHEMICAL FACILITY**Introduction

The future Convention will ban the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. States Parties will, however, have the right to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. It is recognized that it will be necessary to monitor the civilian chemical industry to ensure that chemical weapons are not produced or their precursors diverted for purposes in contravention of the Convention.

Considerable work has already been done in examining the general principles involved in establishing a suitable inspection régime and in identifying those chemicals whose diversion could pose a risk to the Convention (e.g. the papers CD/353, CD/439, CD/445, CD/500, CD/514, CD/575, CD/627 and CD/632).

Consideration is currently being given in the Chemical Weapons Committee to listing chemicals which will be banned or subject to a system of monitoring. Criteria have been put forward to determine which listed or designated chemicals will require a more or less stringent monitoring régime. The Netherlands paper CD/CW/WP.133 of 11 April 1986 makes a significant contribution to this process.

It is envisaged that the system of monitoring will consist essentially of the collection and exchange of data covering the production, consumption and use of listed chemicals. This will be particularly important in relation to dual-purpose chemicals which could either be diverted directly for purposes prohibited by the Convention or could be used as precursors in the manufacture of prohibited chemicals. A process of materials accountability will need to apply throughout the lifetime of such chemicals.

In the case of those chemicals whose diversion would pose a high risk, the data describing production, consumption and end use will need to be verified by routine, random inspection. Data covering chemicals considered

to pose less of a risk, and which may be produced by industry in very large amounts, should be subject to some type of "spot-check" to remove substantive doubts that may arise about compliance with the Convention or to provide reassurance to the international community that the provisions of the Convention are being observed.

It is clear that it will be necessary to develop procedures for the inspection of plants in industry to verify the data which is submitted to the appropriate organ of the Consultative Committee. A significant contribution to the development of such procedures was made by the United Kingdom in its paper CD/575 of 6 March 1985. The relationship between the different types of verification and the requirements for an inspectorate to perform them were analysed in a paper submitted by the Netherlands delegation (CD/445 of 7 March 1984).

Whether the inspection is part of a routine, random process or is in the nature of a spot check is unlikely to alter the format of the inspection. The criteria for the inspection are that it should be effective, cost-effective and should protect commercial confidentiality.

The appropriate Australian Government agencies have for some time been in consultation with the Australian chemical industry with a view to drawing up an inspection procedure which would meet these criteria. An inspection procedure was developed which was later tested in a "trial inspection" of an Australian chemical facility.

This paper sets out the results of that trial inspection.

The inspection was in the nature of a rehearsal for the type of general inspection which will be required by the Convention in order to verify non-diversion of chemicals from peaceful uses to the manufacture of chemical weapons. Its purpose was to explore procedures for the successful implementation of such inspections and to identify any practical problems with the conduct of them. A basic concern throughout the trial inspection was to devise procedures which would minimize interference with the routine operation and commercial security of the inspected facility.

The facility selected for the trial inspection was of medium size by Australian standards. It employed about 100 persons and occupied a site covering a little over 2 hectares in a built-up suburban area. The facility inspected did not produce any "high risk" chemicals in terms of the proposed Convention - although the parent company handled several phosphorus compounds - and was chosen because it had the capability - though not, in this case, the requisite safety features - to produce some chemical weapons precursors. In this sense it was fairly representative of the type of facility which, because of its capability, could be used to manufacture chemicals used for the production of chemical weapons, or the chemical weapons themselves, with relatively little modification.

The objective of the trial inspection was not to "prove" that a régime of on-site inspections for the civil chemicals industry can be easily implemented. Rather, it was to examine whether it was possible to conduct an on-site inspection in a way that was acceptable to the operators of the facility, while still providing objective data sufficient to enable an

inspection team to make a reasonable judgement whether or not the facility was being used for the manufacture of chemical weapons. This objective was achieved.

It is hoped that the experience gained from this inspection will assist in devising procedures of sufficient generality to cover different circumstances in different countries.

The details of the trial inspection are presented below. Further analysis of the issues they raise will clearly be necessary. Other delegations might wish to conduct similar trials so that a better understanding may be reached both of the problems involved in the conduct of such inspections and of possible solutions. Further information on facilities involved in processes and production of particular commercial sensitivity would be especially useful in elaborating a global system for the inspection of selected chemical facilities.

The inspection format

The following outline of the stages of the inspection is suggested as a basis for further study of possible arrangements for the Convention's inspection régime:

1. Notice of inspection. The facility should be notified of the intention to inspect approximately 48 hours prior to arrival and advised of requirements for documentation relevant to the conduct of the inspection (see List A annexed).
2. (a) On arrival the team should make a tour of the facility either on foot or by bus (depending on the size of the facility) in order to identify its main subdivisions.

(b) Documentation relevant to the conduct of the inspection should be provided by the Management of the facility on the team's arrival. The team should be provided with office space in order to study this. A management representative and some clerical assistance should be available. The documentation should be used:
 - (i) to check for consistency with data already in hand from the National Verification Authority and
 - (ii) to plan an inspection of those sections of the facility known or likely to be making or using designated chemicals.
3. Inspectors would check items 1-5 of List A to establish which chemicals designated by the Convention are made or used by the Company. The trend towards computerization of company records could facilitate this process. Where chemicals are traded, but not made or used by the facility, this should be evident from item 5 of List A. Products which are listed by trade or proprietary names should be identified from the facility's "Product Handling and Safety Bulletin" or equivalent document. This document should also serve as a check on items 1-5, taking into account that it may cover products made in quantities less than the given threshold.

4. Inspectors would request information on production and use of designated chemicals. This information should include:

- quantity handled in previous 12 months (or other reporting period as appropriate)
- location in the facility where the chemicals were made or used
- end-products of use and quantity of end products
- buyers if sold as such and quantity sold.

5. After consultation with the Works Manager the Inspectors should decide on the areas to be inspected on day two. This inspection plan would develop with reference to the Site Plan of the facility, in conjunction with relevant operating manuals. It should be remembered that a multi-purpose facility might make or use designated chemicals intermittently.

6. The physical inspection would take place on day two. All locations handling designated chemicals should be inspected. In the process plant inspectors should note:

- the capacity of the facility for the specified annual production taking into account possible intermittent production
- the presence of safety equipment in excess of that expected from the declared use
- the presence of items of equipment listed in List B (annexed) which might indicate use of the facility for production of a non-declared product

7. Samples should be taken from quality control sampling points or other "safe" sampling points as deemed appropriate. The Operating Manual should provide information sufficient to cover all sampling. Three samples should be taken per sampling point and might be coded to preserve confidentiality (see below). One sample should be retained at the facility, one be retained by the Inspection Team, and one sent for analysis.

8. Inspectors should decide on the basis of all information available whether to inspect a part of the facility not indicated as involving designated chemicals. This option should be available since a clandestine production process might be hidden in another part of the facility.

9. Inspectors should examine all bulk storage areas including any small subsidiary areas. Samples should be taken on a random basis. Particular attention should be paid to re-labelled drums or drums located in areas with low accessibility.

10. Inspectors should check dispatch or shipping areas for consistency with items on List A.

11. In the case of large multi-purpose facilities inspectors might need further time to evaluate their findings and request additional information.

12. The final report on the facility would be made following the analysis of samples by appropriate laboratories.

13. The facility itself would be notified of the completion and results of the inspection.

Problems arising because of the size of very large facilities may to some extent be offset by their use of single-purpose processes which could not readily be changed to the production of designated chemicals.

Protection of information confidential to the chemical facility

The guidelines should be such as to protect confidential information obtained during an inspection. It will be necessary to develop detailed procedures to ensure that facilities inspected will not be commercially disadvantaged by the inspection process. Thus all information obtained by technical inspectors should be protected. In particular, documents such as operating manuals should not be removed from the plant, or copied. Reporting to the Consultative Committee should be in general terms, and should not reveal names of plants inspected or analytical details of samples taken. The Consultative Committee would only scrutinize detailed reports on a need-to-know basis.

It is recognized that certain products or certain parts of facilities to be inspected might require a higher level of confidentiality than this. An organization might request that part of its operation be treated as commercial-secret. A special procedure could then be adopted to ensure that identification of the nature of the product with the name of the producer and the associated commercial arrangement would be available only to designated senior officers of the Technical Inspectorate. In such cases the inspectors would encode samples taken. The analyst would examine a coded sample of unknown origin. The analyst should be given details of the general class of the compound and any special handling procedures required. Complete information identifying the chemical, the facility and the country of origin would only be available to a small, senior group of technical inspectors.

If the samples taken from a facility are found to be consistent with their labelling and of no military significance the facility would be declared clear, its management advised, and no further action would be taken by the Technical Secretariat at that time. If any of the samples were to be identified as containing chemicals listed in the appropriate annexes to the Convention, then the Inspector's report and the results of the analysis should be reviewed by a senior member of the Technical Secretariat. Should there be any doubt as to the possibility of diversion further details should be sought from the facility, or from the country of origin in order to resolve any ambiguity. A second inspection might be required.

Plans and strategies to ensure commercial confidentiality and also to ensure compliance with the Convention should be developed by the Technical Secretariat under the general direction of the Consultative Committee. The inspection format suggested here represents only one possibility.

Conclusion

It will be difficult to guarantee fully that there will be no illicit production of designated chemicals through a process of materials accountancy alone. For example, the diversion of a few per cent of an industrial country's annual production of designated chemical, could result in a militarily significant quantity of a chemical agent or key precursor.

A system of materials accountancy and routine, random inspections of chemical plants will, however, provide a strong deterrent to both the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals or their key precursors and to the diversion of "other lethal" chemicals for use in chemical weapons.

ANNEX

LIST A

LIST OF INFORMATION/DOCUMENTS REQUIRED ON THE
FIRST DAY OF THE INSPECTION

Material to be provided by the chemical facility.

1. List of all chemicals produced by the facility in the last 12 months in quantities greater than one tonne.
2. List of chemicals purchased by the facility in the last 12 months in quantities greater than one tonne.
3. List of end users/buyers of chemicals in the last 12 months in quantities greater than one tonne.
4. List of chemicals not covered in 1-3 above but which are held in stocks in quantities greater than 10 tonnes.
5. List of all chemicals traded in quantities greater than one tonne, i.e. bought and resold but not processed.
6. Safety manuals, including Product Handling and Safety Bulletins or equivalent documentation.
7. Operating manuals for particular processes.
8. Basic flow sheet for the facility.
9. Map showing plant lay-out.

ANNEX

LIST B

CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT WHICH MIGHT BE USED TO
PRODUCE DESIGNATED CHEMICALS

The possession of any of the following items individually is not suggestive of chemical weapons production. However, location of several items at one facility would indicate inspection may be necessary to verify that there are no CW activities at the facility.

1. Chemical process equipment (reactors, piping, distillation columns, etc.) constructed of Hastelloy or another alloy with a high nickel or tantalum content.
2. Chemical process equipment with linings suitable for use in a high corrosive environment (i.e. glass-, teflon-, or plastic-lined equipment).
3. Pumps or valves designed for use with hazardous chemicals (for example: double-seal, magnetic drive, or canned pumps, bellows or diaphragm valves).
4. Activated carbon filter units and scrubber units capable of handling large volumes of air from ventilation systems.
5. Equipment specially designed for fluorine, phosphorus, or sulphur analyses.
6. Inert gas generating units.
7. Double-walled piping.
8. Sensitive toxic detection and alarm systems.
9. Filling equipment for use with hazardous chemicals, including especially large glove boxes used to enclose filling machinery.
10. Incineration or scrubbing equipment for hazardous chemical waste treatment, such as Venturi scrubbers or Brinks mist eliminators.

LETTER DATED 6 JUNE 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE
MESSAGE DATED 30 MAY 1986 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE STATE
COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, TODOR ZHIVKOV
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

I have the honour, upon instruction from my Government,
to transmit, herewith, the text of the Message dated May 30th,
1986, from the President of the State Council of the People's
Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, to the Conference on
Disarmament.

I should be grateful if you would kindly make the
necessary arrangements to have this Message circulated as
an official document of the Conference on Disarmament
at the second part of its 1986 Session.

(Signed) KONSTANTIN TELLALOV

Ambassador,
Permanent Representative

I should like to single out, in particular, the major importance which my country attaches to its relationships with the Balkan States. We work actively to turn the Balkans into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons; we maintain our proposal to sign with all Balkan countries bilateral agreements which would include a Code of Good-neighbourly Relations; we have come out with the initiative for the

Balkan States to work out and sign a Treaty on Ecological Protection of the Balkan Peninsula and to adopt an appeal on this matter to all countries and nations of the European continent.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/700
16 June 1986

Extract

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/FRENCH/
RUSSIAN/SPANISH

LETTER DATED 12 JUNE 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON THE MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES, HELD IN BUDAPEST ON 10-11 JUNE 1986 AND THE APPEAL BY THE SAME STATES TO THE MEMBER STATES OF NATO AND TO ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Communiqué issued on the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, held in Budapest on 10-11 June 1986, as well as the Appeal by the same States to the member States of NATO and to all European countries for a programme of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

Upon instructions from my Government, acting on behalf of the participants of that Meeting, I hereby request that the aforementioned Communiqué and Appeal be circulated as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Dávid Meiszter
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

The destruction of types of mass-destruction weapons like chemical weapons and the liquidation of the industrial base for their production by the end of this century. Efforts should be persistently intensified to ensure the successful completion of negotiations at the Geneva Conference on the conclusion of a corresponding agreement. States should refrain from any action likely to impede the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The participants in the meeting take a firm stand against the further increase of arsenals of this type of mass-destruction weapons and their deployment in the territories of other countries and call on the NATO countries to refrain from the realization of plans for the production and deployment in Europe of binary weapons, a particularly dangerous type of chemical weapons.

CD/700
page 5

IV.

The Warsaw Treaty member States regard the strengthening of European security and co-operation a central task of their foreign policies. They take a stand for lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe, for reducing military capabilities on the continent, and for steady progress in making the territory of Europe completely free of nuclear and chemical weapons. The establishment of zones free from these weapons of mass destruction in the Balkans and in the central, Nordic and other regions of the continent would facilitate strengthened stability and confidence. The proposals recently put forward by the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as well as the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania and supported by the participants in the meeting are aimed at these goals.

CD/700
page 9

APPEAL

by the Warsaw Treaty member States to the member States of NATO and to all European countries for a programme of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe

The Warsaw Treaty member States, being aware of their responsibility to their respective peoples and to mankind for the peace of Europe and the world at large and seeking a radical change for the better in the current complicated international situation, are of the view that now, more than ever, there is a need for taking resolute action and concrete measures aimed at ending the arms race, proceeding to effective disarmament and averting the danger of war.

They support the programme proposed by the Soviet Union for the complete and comprehensive liquidation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century. They are convinced that the cessation of nuclear testing, the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the extension of the arms race to outer space, a ban on and the liquidation of chemical weapons and other disarmament measures would be conducive to bringing about a more secure world for the peoples of Europe and the entire globe.

The implementation of measures like the establishment of nuclear and chemical weapon-free zones on the European continent, gradual reduction in the military activity of the two military alliances, the establishment of co-operation among their member States on questions of arms reduction and disarmament would facilitate the strengthening of confidence, the creation of more favourable conditions for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

Continued

On page 10, following paragraph six, add the following:

The States agree that the largest step on the road to disarmament and a more peaceful world order is not to reduce their armed forces and military activities to levels outside the zone of reduction.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/700/Corr.1
20 June 1986


ENGLISH ONLY

LETTER DATED 12 JUNE 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC TRANSMITTING
THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON THE MEETING
OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WARSAW
TREATY MEMBER STATES, HELD IN BUDAPEST ON 10-11 JUNE 1986
AND THE APPEAL BY THE SAME STATES TO THE MEMBER STATES OF NATO
AND TO ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Corrigendum

On page 10, following paragraph six, add the following:

"The States signing the Agreement on the reduction
of armed forces and armaments would undertake not
to increase their land forces and tactical strike
air forces outside the zone of reduction."



LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY TRANSMITTING A RESEARCH
REPORT ENTITLED "VERIFICATION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION. PART V. SAMPLE HANDLING OF CHEMICAL
WARFARE AGENTS"

I have the honour to transmit to you a research report entitled
"Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention. Part V. Sample Handling of
Chemical Warfare Agents". This research report represents a further
contribution of the Government of Norway to the work of the Conference on
Disarmament in the field of chemical weapons.

I would appreciate if the report would be circulated as an official
CD document.

(Signed)

Martin Huslid
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Norway

1/ A limited distribution of this document in English only has been made
to the members of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are
available from the Permanent Mission of Norway at Geneva.



NORWAY

WORKING PAPER

Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention

Procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons

Introduction

As a contribution to the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a Chemical Weapons Convention, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated in 1981 a research programme on the sampling and identification of chemical warfare agents. The research programme is carried out by the Division for Environmental Toxicology of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment at Kjeller. Whereas the research programme during the first five years was limited to winter conditions, the results of research from 1985/86 concern verification of alleged use of chemical weapons on an all-year basis.

In order to provide a sound basis for the research programme, the experiments have been carried out under field conditions. This has been done in order to provide realistic data for developing verification procedures for a Chemical Weapons Convention.

As a result of the research undertaken during the period 1981-85, the following Working Papers have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament: CD/311 of 11 August 1982, CD/396 of 19 July 1983, CD/508 and CD/509 of 15 June 1984, CD/598 and CD/600 of 20 June 1985. Based on these documents Norway presented in document CD/601 of 20 June 1985 proposals for procedures for the fact-finding team when investigating alleged use of chemical weapons under winter conditions. Document CD/601 referred to the composition of the fact-finding team and procedures for collection and handling of samples, as well as essential equipment for the fact-finding team.

In this Working Paper Norway presents additional proposals concerning procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. These proposals include procedures for sample handling in the field on an all-year basis to be followed by the fact-finding team, which should be established on the basis of the Chemical Weapons Convention to investigate inter alia alleged

use. The main purpose of this work is to establish procedures for sample handling which do not require highly trained personnel and advanced equipment.

This Working Paper is based on the results of the research undertaken in 1985/86, and the research report is circulated as a separate document (CD/702).

Research results

The studies of different methods to be used by the fact-finding team for handling samples of aqueous solutions started in 1983/84. The objective was to establish procedures for concentration of the chemical warfare agent samples and to minimize decomposition of chemical agents during transportation to the laboratory. The field experiments showed that the possibility for positive verification to a large extent was dependent on sample handling.

The research in 1985/86 has therefore been concentrated on elaborating practical analytical field procedures which require a minimum of equipment for the fact-finding team, prevent breakdown of any agent present in the samples and enable adequate chemical analysis.

Chemical warfare agents in an aqueous solution can be isolated and concentrated by extraction with an organic solvent. This method (the method of organic solvent extraction) extracts almost completely all known chemical warfare agents from aqueous solutions. By using this procedure the chemical warfare agents are well preserved and do not show any decomposition. This method requires glass-ware and may not be applicable under all field conditions. It also requires solvents of very high purity to avoid interfering impurities. This may finally generate a problem in transportation of the samples for a fact-finding team.

Alternative methods have therefore been evaluated. During 1985/86 the research was concentrated on improving the method of adsorption to porous polymer (the method of porous polymer adsorption). The experiments proved Amberlite XAD-2 (a commercial product) to be the most promising adsorption material. All experiments were carried out with standard columns having an inner diameter of 10 mm. This method was comparable in efficiency to the method of organic solvent extraction.

Another polymer column (Sep-Pak C-18 column) which is small and has a construction which facilitates its use in the field, was also found to be excellent in isolating chemical warfare agents. Both XAD-2 and C-18 are commercially available materials which are often used in sample preparation and clean-up procedures for water analysis. The methods were therefore tested on samples from clean and dirty snow and also on muddy water samples. The methods have further been tested on water extracts from soil, sand and vegetation as well as in field experiments under winter conditions.

All field experiments for adsorption were carried out with 50-100 ml of an aqueous solution of chemical warfare agents. The aqueous solution was passed through the columns at a high rate (within 2 minutes) by applying an external air pressure on the column using a small gas bomb with air.

The amount of XAD-2 in the columns was a critical factor when the perfusion speed was increased. In particular, nerve agents were poorly

adsorbed when the amount of XAD-2 was too small. When the amount of XAD-2 was 2 grams the adsorbed amount of agent was more than 50 per cent. Two grams of XAD-2 was therefore chosen as standard. The adsorption to the C-18 column was independent upon the rate of perfusion. The cartridge is ideal for field experiments and has also the advantage that impure samples both from snow and water are purified during this adsorption and desorption.

It is important that agents are stable during the storage on the columns. The effect of degradation of the agents was studied by leaving the columns for 1, 2 and 7 days at 5°C. The results showed only small variations in the recovery, indicating low rate of breakdown of the chemical warfare agents in the columns. No special precaution is therefore necessary during transportation of the column-material. The samples may be stored or transported over a much longer time period than one week.

Several experiments were carried out to determine the optimum conditions for desorption of agents from the XAD-2 column in the laboratory. Volume of eluant and the time of contact for the eluant on the column were studied in order to find the optimal condition to desorb the agent from the column. Rapid rate of desorption had to be compensated by larger volume of eluant. Thus desorption with 10 ml chloroform showed that the eluted amount of agent was more than doubled after 5 minutes instead of 2 minutes of contact and almost four times larger after 10 minutes of contact. On the other hand, the desorption from the C-18 column was independent on time of contact.

Field exercises of the procedure for sampling and handling of snow samples showed that both methods using polymers (XAD-2 and C-18) gave high recoveries for the agents involved in the experiments.

The exercises with water extracts from soil, sand and vegetation samples and with impure water showed that the C-18 cartridge was efficient in handling these samples too. The chemical warfare agents were also identified from XAD-2 desorption but in lower amounts than from C-18 cartridge.

Conclusions


The ultimate objective of the Norwegian research programme is to develop comprehensive procedures for selection, handling, transportation and analysis of samples collected in the field, on which the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons can be based.

This Working Paper has focused on sample handling and the development of methods of transportation of samples from the field to laboratories selected by the Consultative Committee for unambiguous analysis. It is important that the samples from the field are not degraded or contaminated during this process. It should also be borne in mind that it might often be necessary with a clean-up procedure and further efforts to concentrate the samples in the field both to reduce volume and prevent further degradation. For example samples from soil and vegetation may easily be submitted to bacterial growth and degradation. Samples from water and snow may require a large reduction in sample volume before transportation. The need and type of equipment that a fact-finding team will need for sample handling have been identified.

On the basis of field experiments and research the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has developed procedures for two different methods of sample handling. These methods have been used successfully with samples from snow, muddy water and aqueous extracts of soil, sand and vegetation. These methods, which are of general use on an all-year basis, can be used by the fact-finding team in the field for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. The two methods can supplement each other and require only simple equipment.

The method of organic solvent extraction necessitates that glass-ware and organic solvents must be brought into the field by the fact-finding team. This method, which is simple to perform, gives a high recovery of all known chemical warfare agents and can easily be applied under field conditions.

An alternative method is based on the adsorption of chemical warfare agents to columns containing porous polymers (the method of porous polymer adsorption). This method is slightly less efficient than the extraction with the organic solvent. The columns are, however, easy to use and to transport and have also excellent storage properties. In addition, the amount of field equipment necessary for the fact-finding team is reduced to a minimum when using this method.



NORWAY

WORKING PAPER

VERIFICATION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Evaluation of methods for identification of arsenic
containing chemical warfare agents

INTRODUCTION

As a contribution to the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a Chemical Weapons Convention, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated in 1981 a research programme on the sampling and identification of chemical warfare agents. The research programme is carried out by the Division for Environmental Toxicology of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment at Kjeller. The programme involves a study of the different steps of a procedure for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This Working Paper focuses on the final step of this procedure, namely the analytical methods for identification of the chemical warfare agents. Whereas much research has been carried out on the analysis of super-toxic nerve agents, little research has been undertaken on the arsenic containing chemical warfare agents. Exposure to these agents provides symptoms ranging from rapid skin damage to severe irritation of the sensory organs. The latter symptoms include severe irritation to the nose, throat and eyes and the symptoms are described as intense sneezing, cough, headache, shortness of breath, nausea etc. It is evident that many of these symptoms also may occur from natural causes particularly during a stressful wartime situation. Arsenic containing chemical warfare agents are therefore often mentioned in connection with alleged use of chemical weapons.

The arsenic containing compounds which are often looked upon as potential threats are lewisite (L), adamsite (DM), clark I (DA) and clark II (DC) (Annex 1). These compounds were first synthesized at the end of World War I and were produced in quantities of 10-30,000 tons between the two world wars. The arsenic containing compounds may be divided in two groups according to their chemical structure. Lewisite is an alifatic compound while adamsite, clark I and clark II are aromatic compounds. Lewisite is volatile and may be analysed by gas chromatography - mass spectrometry. Adamsite, clark I and clark II are less volatile than lewisite and are therefore difficult to identify by gas chromatography. Adamsite, in particular, has an extreme low volatility. Experiments with the aromatic arsenic compounds were carried out to develop methods for identification by use of high performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) with electrochemical detection.

RESEARCH RESULTS

The aromatic arsenic containing compounds adamsite, clark I and clark II were dissolved in methanol and injected onto a high performance liquid chromatography-column (Annex 2). The analysis was performed both with an electrochemical detector and with an ultra-violet detector. Clark I and clark II are both reported to be readily hydrolysed in an aqueous solution to give diphenylarsenoxid. It is therefore impossible to distinguish between these two compounds by high performance liquid chromatography. In annex 3 (Figure 1) the ultraviolet spectrum of all the three agents are illustrated. These spectra show that all three agents have absorbance maxima at 280 nanometers. Detection by an ultraviolet-detector was therefore performed at this wavelength.

The voltammograms of adamsite, clark I and clark II are recorded by an electrochemical detector following injection of samples containing 1 mikrogram/milliliter at different detector potentials. The voltammograms are shown in annex 3 (Figure 2) and these voltammograms show that in the analysis of adamsite maximum current are obtained at a potential of 1.10 volt while clark I and clark II have their maximum current at 1.25 volt. In analysis of unknown samples the potential should be 1.25 volt to give the highest possible sensitivity for all the arsenic containing chemical warfare agents. This may, however, be modified in connection with possible interference according to the type of sample to be analysed.

Identification of adamsite and clark I and clark II is based on the relative retention times of the compounds together with their electrochemical properties. The chromatograms of both electrochemical and ultraviolet detection are shown in annex 3 (Figure 3). Standard curves for qualitative analysis of the compounds were obtained by analysing samples with known amounts of the different compounds. The detection limits for adamsite, clark I and clark II are approximately 100 picograms for both detectors.


The high performance liquid chromatography-method with electrochemical detection is tested in the analysis of snow samples contaminated with chemical warfare agents. These experiments showed that analyses could be carried out with no preliminary concentration steps with samples containing 100 parts per billion of adamsite. The results of the field experiments showed further that adamsite is highly stable under winter conditions and that it was easily detected even after 4 weeks exposure to the prevailing weather conditions.

Relatively few chemical compounds are oxidized at potentials as low as 1.25 volt. Interference with other compounds in the sample is therefore not likely. On the other hand an ultraviolet-detector will detect all compounds with an absorbance at 280 nanometers and therefore interference may occur in analysis of impure samples. The electrochemical detector is therefore considered more specific in identification of chemical compounds than an ultraviolet-detector.


CONCLUSIONS

The Norwegian research programme has sought to identify the different steps of a procedure for the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This Working Paper has focused on the final step in this procedure, namely the method for unambiguous identification of arsenic containing chemicals. This is


an important group of chemical weapons comprising lewisite, adamsite, clark I and clark II. Exposure to these agents gives symptoms like skin damage and strong sensory irritation which may be confused with symptoms caused by a stressful war situation. The arsenic containing agents may be identified by the use of high performance liquid chromatography with electrochemical or ultraviolet detection. The electrochemical detection is particularly selective since relatively few chemical compounds are oxidized at potentials as low as 1.25 volt. Interference with other compounds in the sample is therefore not likely. On the other hand an ultraviolet-detector will detect all compounds with an absorbance at 280 nanometers and, therefore, interference may occur in analysis of impure samples. The electrochemical detector is, therefore, considered more specific in identification than an ultraviolet-detector. In verification of alleged use of chemical warfare agents high performance liquid chromatography with electrochemical detection is thus recommended as a method for identification of aromatic arsenic containing compounds.



CLASS I
(DIPHENYLARSINE CHLORIDE)



CLASS II
(DIPHENYLARSINE CYANIDE)




LEWISITE
(CHLOROBIS(2-DIPHENYLARSINO)ETHYLENE)

Annex 1

Chemical structures of arsenic containing compounds


ADAMSITE

(PHENARSAZIN CHLORIDE)




CLARK I

(DIPHENYLARSIN CHLORIDE)




CLARK II

(DIPHENYLARSIN CYANIDE)



LEWISITE

(CHLOROVINYLSARSINDICHLORIDE)



Annex 2

Operating conditions for high performance liquid chromatography
with electrochemical detection

PUMP SYSTEM: Consta Metric III, LDC/MILTON ROY

INJECTOR: Rheodyne model 7125, 20 μ l injection loop

COLUMN: Supelcosil RP-18 25 cm x 4.6 mm

DETECTORS: Spectro monitor III, LDC/MILTON ROY
ESA Coulochem model 5100 A

INTEGRATOR: CI - 10B, LDC/MILTON ROY

MOBILE PHASE: Acetonitrile - 0.1 N Sodium acetate buffer (7:3)

FLOW-RATE: 1.0 ml/min

TEMPERATURE: 20.0°C

POTENTIAL: 1.25 Volt

Figure 1. The ultraviolet spectra of adamsite (DM), class I (DA) and

class II (DC). Notice that all compounds have an absorbance maximum at 285 nm.




Figure 2. The voltammograms of adamsite, class I and class II. The curves

are derived from the decrease in absorbance of the oxidation potential. Adamsite has a maximum at 1.18 volt and class I and class II at 1.25 volt.

Annex 3

Ultraviolet spectra, analytical results




Figure 1. The ultraviolet spectra of adamsite (DM), clark I (DA) and clark II (DC). Notice that all compounds have an absorbance maximum at 280 nm.




Figure 2. The voltammograms of adamsite, clark I and clark II. The curves are derived from the stepwise increase of the oxidation potential. Adamsite has a maximum at 1.10 volt and clark I and clark II at 1.25 volt.




Figure 3. High performance liquid chromatograms of adamsite, clark I and clark II with a) electrochemical detection and b) ultraviolet detection. Retention time for adamsite is 3.14 minutes. Clark I and clark II give the same peak due to their oxidation to diphenylarsinoxid localized at retention time 3.71 minutes. Injected amount of adamsite is 2 ng and 30 ng of clark I and clark II in both chromatograms. Notice that the sensitivity of adamsite is about five times higher then of clark I and clark II in electrochemical detection and thirty times higher in ultraviolet detection.

Introduction

In a Convention banning chemical weapons both routine inspection and challenge inspection will find a place. As a challenge inspection is a politically loaded instrument with relatively serious implications it is desirable that the system of verification is based as much as possible on routine inspection. It is, however, sometimes suggested that a system of routine inspection for verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the civil industry would be impracticable as it would require too many inspectors and would have to be so intrusive as to seriously endanger the functioning of the chemical industry involved. In an earlier document (CD/445) we came to the conclusion that, on the assumption that 550 plants worldwide would be subject to routine random on-site inspection, an inspectorate consisting of 50 inspectors and 90 supporting staff would be sufficient. We hope that the Workshop has contributed to a better understanding of possibilities to perform routine inspection in a way that is effective from a point of view of verification and not hampering the civil chemical industry in an unacceptable manner.

Purpose

The purpose of the Workshop was twofold. Its first purpose was to show CD delegates responsible for the negotiations of a future convention what a modern chemical multi-purpose plant looks like and how the authorities of the central and local governments in the Netherlands exercise their control functions. In the second place an experimental inspection was carried out to test in practice some verification procedures.

It should be stressed that the scope of the Workshop was limited. During the experimental inspection the emphasis was on the verification of phosphorus containing chemical compounds and especially on chemicals containing the P-methyl or P-ethyl bond. Therefore important supertoxic lethal chemicals like mustard gas and the nerve agent tabun fell to a large extent outside the scope of the experimental inspection. Another limitation was the fact that the experimental inspection was only limited to a qualitative assessment of the production of the plant (which means that we tried to find a simple answer to the question whether or not the plant was producing chemicals prohibited under a CW Convention), leaving the problems of a quantitative assessment for the greater part aside (which means that we did not attempt to answer the question whether or not past or present stocks of chemicals were fully utilized for purposes not prohibited under a CW Convention). Still another limitation was the fact that the subject of the inspection was a multi-purpose plant using a batch type process.

Programme

The Workshop organized by the Netherlands Government was attended by participants representing 45 nations. The programme consisted of three main parts:

- a general introduction on questions relating to the verification of non-production

- an introduction and report on an experimental inspection
- a visit to the civil chemical plant where the experimental inspection had taken place.

The Australian Government kindly agreed to present a report on a trial inspection of an Australian chemical facility at the Workshop. Several of the introductions that were given during the Workshop have been distributed in a more comprehensive form to the delegations participating in the Workshop. The following documents are or will be published as documents of the Conference on Disarmament:

- Report on a trial inspection of an Australian chemical facility (CD/698).
- Scenario for an experimental inspection (CD/CW/WP.141).
- Observations on the scenario for an experimental inspection (CD/CW/WP.142).
- An approach to the verification of non-production substances, subject to monitoring in a CW Convention (CD/CW/WP.133).
- Existing arrangements for monitoring the civil chemical industry in the Netherlands (CD/CW/WP.143).
- Verification of phosphorus - containing nerve agents in waste water (CD/CW/WP.144).

Preliminary conclusions

The experimental inspection was in fact a process that took more than half a year and involved experts from the Prins Maurits Laboratory of the Central Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) in Rijswijk, the company where the experimental inspection took place, the Central Environmental Protection Department of the Rhine Estuary Region as well as from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The results of these brainstorming sessions have been recorded in the scenario for an experimental inspection. This scenario has led to a number of observations and suggestions which are recorded in separate documents (CD/CW/WP.141 and CD/CW/WP.142).

Apart from these more or less detailed observations and suggestions, the Netherlands would like to present a few tentative conclusions of a more general nature. These observations do not necessarily reflect the final position of the Netherlands Government, but may serve as a contribution to the negotiations on an adequate system of verification of non-production.

1. The chemical industry is accustomed to inspections

Not only the results of the SIPRI-Pugwash symposium organized in Stockholm in October 1985, but even more clearly the preparations for the

Workshop have led us to the conclusion that the perspectives for co-operation with the chemical industry in finding adequate ways and means of verifying non-production of chemical weapons, appear to be favourable. In the Netherlands, part of this willingness is due to the fact that the chemical industry is already used to a rather intrusive system of inspection. From that point of view one inspection more should not make a great difference. However it is recognized that a satisfactory solution must be found for the protection of sensitive information, in particular on production data and on the destination of sales.

An important difference between the existing systems of national inspection and the proposed verification of non-production is that the second form of inspection is at an international level. So far the experience with international inspections is rather limited (IAEA is a favourable exception). However, what seems to be possible at the national level - where competing chemical and pharmaceutical industries are controlled by the same inspectors - should in our view be feasible internationally, provided adequate safeguards for the protection of sensitive information are devised. We attach importance to the participation or association of both chemical and legal experts in the negotiations to establish a régime that is both acceptable to the industry and effective from a viewpoint of verification.

2. Familiarization visits are essential

In the past we, like many other delegations, assumed that a routine inspection could start with a visit to the office of the plant manager to get acquainted with the lay-out and other properties of the plant to be inspected. During the experimental inspection we found that this would take too much time to make routine inspection effective. We believe therefore that as soon as a CW convention comes into force, inspectors should start familiarizing themselves with the plants that will be subject to routine random on-site inspection. The information that is already available in different branches of the Government of a party for purposes of national inspections can probably be used for the purpose of these familiarization visits.

3. No single scenario for all routine inspections

In order to make routine random on-site inspections not more intrusive than is strictly necessary, but nevertheless effective, the peculiarities of a plant to be inspected (like size, capabilities, current stocks, etc.) will have to be taken into account. None the less it is possible to draw up a checklist of points that can be relevant and to develop verification techniques that can be used as building blocks of an actual inspection. To work out an effective inspection procedure in every single case will be the responsibility of the inspection team. Much will therefore depend on the skill and knowledge of the inspectors.

4. Waste water analysis can help but not always to the same degree

In the experimental inspection extensive use was made of a method for the detection of small quantities of fingerprint chemicals in waste.

Reports on this method have been published as documents CD/306 and CD/307. The latest state of the art was reported at the Workshop and will be made available as a Working Paper of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The method described proved to be a great help but did not provide simple answers to all questions during the experimental inspection. The starting material and the raw final product of the production process that was the subject of the experimental inspection contained very small amounts of phosphorus methyl compounds. This was demonstrated by analysing the waste of the plant. However outside the premises of the industrial complex the presence of these impurities could not be established. It would be interesting to investigate whether by the same method P-methyl traces can be detected outside a plant that is producing P-methyl compounds. We were not able to do this, since a plant of that kind does not exist in the Netherlands.

Other countries might wish to develop this and other methods further.

5. Highly qualified inspectors are needed

In order to be able to recognize which parts of a plant are relevant for chemical weapon production, the inspectors will have to be very highly qualified, both in the field of the chemistry relevant to chemical weapon production and in the field of chemical engineering in general. As was pointed out in the Netherlands document CD/445, the number of inspectors necessary for an adequate system of routine random on-site inspection does not have to be large (less than 50), but they will have to be highly qualified and paid accordingly.

6. Non-production verification is possible at acceptable costs

The experience obtained by the experimental inspection has strengthened our view that also in other production plants an adequate system of verification can be elaborated. Although as yet insufficient data are available, we venture to believe that this can be realized at reasonable costs. Although a system of routine random on-site inspection will not make an effective challenge inspection system superfluous, it will diminish the need to resort to challenge inspections.

Follow-up

The Netherlands hopes that other delegations will take into consideration the suggestions made by the Netherlands at the Workshop. There is no denying that a lot of work still has to be done to develop efficient methods for non-production verification. We could, perhaps, focus on general rules and guidelines which on the one hand ensure an effective system of inspection and on the other hand would take into account legitimate concerns of the chemical industry on the protection of intellectual property. Technical methods also remain to be elaborated but the convention does not have to wait for finalization of the work in this. Details can be worked out in separate verification manuals, to be attached to the final Convention. In our view it should be possible to establish the general principles and the basic provisions of a régime for verification of non-production within a reasonable timeframe.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/711^{1/}
CD/CW/WP.145
9 July 1986


Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 JULY 1986 FROM THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A DOCUMENT
ENTITLED "CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL PROGRAM" PREPARED BY
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MD.

I have the honour to transmit to you a text entitled "Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program" that recently has been made public. I would be grateful if you would take the measures necessary to have this text circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and as a CD/CW working paper.

(Signed) Donald Lowitz
U.S. Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

1/ A limited distribution of this document in English only has been made to the members of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the United States Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva.



JAPAN

SOME QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. As the CD moves into more detailed examination of the various provisions of a Chemical Weapons Convention, the ad hoc Committee and its Working Groups have arrived at the stage of discussing such practical measures as the "number of random inspections" or "significant quantities below which control and verification could be exempted". There are also many other quantitative parameters that are being taken up.

2. It is important to realize that

(a) these figures may differ between the various chemical facilities and as for different chemical agents, but at the same time, that

(b) they are governed by the same mathematical principles and thus quantitative consistency should be maintained, while

(c) these figures, when accumulated, will determine the resource requirements for the inspectorate and the technical secretariat.

3. Japan has pointed to the importance of such technical consistencies, as well as the need to identify the governing mathematical principles in its plenary statement of 3 April 1986. It is also extremely important that the international régime of verification and control be defined within a reasonable scale, so as not to exceed the practically available resources both in personnel and financial terms. A great deal will depend on the number of chemical agents and facilities to be subject to the different régimes of verification and control, as well as the required amount of paper work including reports and records, as these may be shared between international and national régimes of control if such a dual system were to be adopted.

4. There is a great deal of information that can be derived from the IAEA safeguards experience, in that it is also a verification régime based on material accountancy. The analogy ceases there, however, because the number of chemical elements involved is maximum of three (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in the case of nuclear safeguards, while a CW convention will have to deal with a very large number of complex chemical compounds. (The amount of material and the number of facilities involved may be orders of magnitude different in the case of a CW convention). This speaks all the more for the need of clear and consistent logic in the quantitative handling of the various aspects of CW control.

II. STATISTICAL SAMPLING AND CW TREATY VERIFICATION

Where continuous monitoring is impractical, one may attain the best results through a statistical sampling technique. Such statistical samples are composed of systematic and random components. For example, visits every other day is systematic in that one can predict when. (Systematic components are sometimes referred to as "bias" in mathematics). The random component is unpredictable save their total number, and can be defined, for example, on the basis of computer-generated random numbers.

Destruction of stocks

1. Verification of the initial inventory (declared store) is done by
 - (a) counting the number of containers or shells, and
 - (b) establishing the average content of such containers or shells by means of
 - chemical analysis (representative samples) and
 - weight measurement.

Since not all containers or shells can be examined, "random sampling" leading most likely to a "normal distribution" curve should be employed to determine the chemical contents and weight.

2. Verification of no unauthorized removal from the inventory - periodic inventory takings (involving random sampling again) or continuous monitoring of the perimeter (containment) - is a necessary element.

So are the quantitative verification of authorized removals from the inventory to the destruction facility and the establishment of a running inventory at the destruction facility.

3. Material balance at the destruction facility will be established through
 - feed measurement: weight, chemical composition, etc.,
 - waste (product) measurement: weight, flow rate, pressure, temperature and content.

For any given time (day), the material balance of the feed and output have to match. Otherwise diversion may have taken place, meaning some CW may remain while reported as having been destroyed.

This verification can be done either by constant on-site observation or random verification of samples (which the destruction facility will need to take for its own operational control). In view of the fact that STLCs with very low threshold quantities will be handled daily, daily presence of inspectors will probably be required.

If there are means of using tamper-proof continuous automatic monitoring devices, there is a possibility of reducing some human presence. (See papers CD/271, CD/619 etc.).

Production facilities

4. Production facilities for protective purposes

For a dedicated facility of limited annual output, something analogous to the quality control system of the plant operation should give sufficient confidence regarding the quality of the substance and the amount of production. (The normal technique is random sampling).

However, when dealing with an integral part of a large chemical complex, the process of confirming the quality and production volume will be more difficult, with a larger number of sampling points, and possible computer simulations which may or may not be a part of the plant's operational routine.

5. Non-production or "no diversion" from permitted activities

Large-scale production lines require a large number of sampling points and very sophisticated instruments to assure the representativeness of samples. To follow all such activities will require very large resources (qualified inspectors, independent measuring instruments etc.). It makes more sense to rely on the plant's own record and report system, and to have access to the plant for a limited period (but on the dates the inspectorate can decide on their own, based on random sampling either of operating days or among the necessarily many production plants).

6. Random sampling allows one to have knowledge about the whole, from a surprisingly small number of (random) samples. An example is a few hundred people polled over the telephone to give good and reliable indication of nation-wide public opinion, if the subjects are carefully chosen with sufficient stratification and randomness. Such statistics should be accompanied by "confidence" statements, so that one comes to the conclusion that "with 20 visits to the plant during a year, there is 95 per cent confidence that production of no more than X kgs of a prohibited substance could have taken place".

The number of visits and the level of confidence can be determined according to the level of toxicity or the threshold volume of military significance. If very large volumes and low toxicity are involved, verification statistics can be handled very easily. In the case of low priority items, it is possible and in fact will be more efficient to forget the statistics and limit verification to occasional "spot check visits" for the sake of a deterrence effect.

Challenge inspection

7. When such statistical verification produces an anomaly which requires additional inspection to clarify the situation, the Technical Secretariat could recommend ad hoc inspections. This is one form of "challenge inspection" which, in principle, may not be refused.

When there is suspicion of undeclared and unreported activities outside the coverage of routine (statistical) inspection, challenge on such cases has to be handled in a very different manner, and according to more politically oriented criteria.

III. THRESHOLD LEVEL FOR DATA REPORTING

A militarily significant quantity

1. For a chemical agent to be considered within the context of a CW convention, it will be necessary to assign a minimum quantity below which the agent will have no military significance. This is a practical consideration necessary in order to avoid undue complication.

(a) If the agent in question is a chemical weapon as defined in the Convention, this quantity (Q) will theoretically be determined by considering the probable mode of its deployment as well as the specific scenarios for its use. Considerable elements of human judgement will enter into the process of the determination of Q for different categories of chemical weapons.

(b) If the chemical in question is unrelated to any known CW, Q in this case will be infinity.

(c) If the chemical is used on a large scale in civilian industry, but may be converted into a CW, then Q for this substance will be determined by taking into account such factors representing the time and means required for conversion, and the required work at the facility.

In any event, Q is an amount (kgs or tons) linked to the individual chemical agent.

Threshold level

2. For the effective implementation of a CW convention, there will be a need to set threshold levels for verification and control. For example, some agreed threshold level will have to be established for the verification of declared CW stocks or for its destruction, in order to establish a confidence level for statistical sampling or of setting allowable margins of error in measurement.

By definition, and for practical purposes, this threshold level (L) will need to be expressed in terms of individual facilities and for a given period of time. In other words, while Q was so many kgs or tons as a more or less time independent quantity, L will be stated in units such as kgs/week per facility. This means conversion of the notion from a "maximum allowable" in absolute terms, to one of control parameters in a system.

Something other than pure scientific logic is usually required in the process of deriving L from Q and here again good common sense and judgement by those very knowledgeable about the subject will be required.

3. The relationship between Q and L may be stated as follows:

(a) Q is an amount below which there is no need to worry about the chemical in question. If sub-Q amounts of a chemical are being stored or produced, they are for all intents and purposes not a factor to reckon with as far as the CW Convention is concerned.

(b) Q itself cannot be taken as L when there is more than one production facility. If there are N number of sub-Q facilities which are all exempted

from controls, the total exemption NxQ will obviously exceed Q , and thus will have military significance. This means that some fraction of Q will be an appropriate level as the threshold quantity. Q should be defined either as a "national limit" or "facility limit" as the case may be. Similarly, if statistical uncertainty and measurement error were to accumulate over many years, they will eventually exceed Q no matter how often inspections take place. This is another reason for defining the threshold level in relation with the time factor.

(c) In this connection, adopting one year as the time factor seems to be a practical suggestion based on the assumption that continuing clandestine production in N number of facilities for one full year would be a very cumbersome and unrewarding operation. If some facilities are to be visited by inspectors once a year for a check of the production records, one year may be justified on such grounds.

(d) However, one should be very careful before adopting a certain parameter which would determine necessary inspection resources. The quantitative aspect of verification and control has to be approached with utmost caution, otherwise one may end up with a logically consistent but inoperable scheme.

4. There are a number of considerations which have to enter into the determination of L , especially in the case of non-CW chemicals.

(a) If the main concern is the production capacity, then rather than X tons/year, it is better to use X kgs/day, which, with an appropriate plant load factor, becomes X tons produced during a year's time. This conversion from annual production capacity to production levels makes the work of day-to-day control much easier.

(b) As explained above, L is likely to be some fraction of Q . Though below L , the chemical is as good as non-existent for the purpose of the CW convention, excessive activities involving a large number of just sub- L productions or storages should be regarded with some suspicion. There will be a need to go beyond data reporting and occasional spot check visits. The mechanism of challenge inspection can be applied to such "legally consistent but substantively clandestine activities".

(c) On the other hand, the nature of the chemical industry is such that it is conceivable that there will be plants whose annual throughputs would be tens of hundreds of times L . In these cases, accumulation of normal measurement errors can easily exceed L tons/year. In such a case, reporting of the total output as well as some technical indication of the level of quality control may be all that is feasible as a means to establish confidence to assure the absence of unauthorized activities.

5. In all the cases hitherto discussed, the threshold level for data reporting is derived with a considerable amount of judgement factors. It is natural that within such judgements should be included those such as:

proprietary considerations of industrial production data,

restriction on access of inspectors in the plant premises, if only from a safety point of view,

available resources at the international (national) control organ(s) for handling reports and for the dispatch of qualified inspectors.

6. It may be worth noting that the problems of setting a threshold level of control, of reporting and recording have been extensively dealt with in regard to nuclear materials control within the IAEA safeguards. Although figures such as 25 kgs for enriched uranium and 8 kgs for plutonium, have been used as a practical solution, representing one explosive device each, and somehow a standard was established to exercise control on the basis of a unit of such "significant quantity" per facility per year as a working hypothesis in most cases, a completely consistent justification for these practices may need further elaboration.

IV. CONSISTENCY OF MEASUREMENT IN CW DECLARATION AND ELIMINATION

1. Chemical weapons (CW) to be destroyed will initially be identified by "declarations". These declarations will specify:

the location,

physical state of the CW (whether in shells or containers, whether liquid, vapor under given temperature and pressure, etc.),

the amount (weight, volume and number of containers, etc.), and

chemical composition and known impurity.

Even if it were to take some time for the CW stocks to be gathered at sites suitable for declaration, such process should be carried out in as short a time period as is possible, so that the starting point for CW elimination may be quickly established.

2. The declared stock will need to be verified, and for this purpose, measurement of weight (per individual shell or container, as the case may be) may either be done for the total number of units individually or through statistical sampling. Analysis of chemical composition is, by definition, on a sampling basis. The theory of statistical sampling will determine, based on an assumed distribution of variances, the relationship between the number of random samples and the level of confidence. Measurement errors for weighing and analysis will have to be clearly established so that it will be possible to have a good grasp of the extent of accuracy with which the stock is verified.

3. The schedule of destruction for CW stocks will specify:

the location of destruction facility,

the method of destruction (incineration, chemical decomposition, etc.), and

daily (hourly, weekly) rate of such destruction, as well as the annual schedule of operation.

This means that at the declared location, removals of CWs other than scheduled (for destruction, protective purposes, etc.) will be unauthorized acts and will come under strict control. This could be verified by either periodic re-establishment of inventory, or through continuous surveillance of the perimeter to confirm that no unauthorized removals have been made.

It is important to realize that verification at this stage (either re-establishment of inventory or measurement of CWs being removed) has to be on the level of accuracy and confidence compatible and consistent with the level originally employed to verify the initial declaration.

4. Throughout the destruction process, verification would very likely involve establishment of a material balance either on a comprehensive basis for the batch or with emphasis on some predominant chemical element. If the process involved is incineration of CWs contained in a shell, measurement of material (in weight) and the subsequent analysis of discharged waste may be either on a continuous basis or according to some statistical sampling.

Since the level of accuracy in measurement at the destruction stage will reflect the "state of art", it is likely that the level of measurement accuracy and thus the confidence required at earlier stages (stock and removal verification) may not meaningfully exceed this level. It will be useful to consider the problem of such consistency by creating some representative numerical model from initial declaration through the various stages of destruction.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Chemical Weapons Convention: Verification and
Compliance - The Challenge Element

1. CD/431 of February 1984 set out the view of the United Kingdom that the Chemical Weapons Convention will require both a routine and an exceptional verification mechanism. At the routine level there will need, in addition to data exchange, to be mandatory international on-site inspection to ensure:

- (i) (a) regular verification of declared stocks and
- (b) continuous on-site inspection of their destruction;
- (ii) verification of the destruction of chemical weapon manufacturing and filling facilities;
- (iii) verification of the single small-scale facility that will be permitted to produce super-toxic chemicals for research for defensive purposes;
- (iv) verification of the non-production of chemical weapons within the civil chemical industry.

2. As a result of these routine verification measures, States party to a Convention should have confidence that sites and facilities declared under the Convention were not being used for purposes prohibited by it. These arrangements should, in normal circumstances, assure all States that others were complying with the obligations assumed under the Convention.

3. None the less, it is still possible that the actions of one State may give rise to concern on the part of others which cannot be resolved by routine inspection measures. In those circumstances, it should be open to States party to seek to resolve matters by bilateral or multilateral co-operation. To some extent, a consensus on the sort of arrangements that might apply has already begun to develop within the Conference on Disarmament, and has been reflected in CD/636. It is not the purpose of this paper to detract anything from the useful work already achieved in that area. However, the United Kingdom believes that, in addition to such bilateral or multilateral co-operation measures, it is essential that the verification arrangements should contain a régime providing for inspection on challenge. This will act as a verification mechanism of last resort, an extraordinary measure which would be required only in special cases and would apply independently of any consultation or routine inspection procedures.

4. Although challenge inspection might be required in the event that a breach of the Convention were suspected, its main function would be to prevent such breaches occurring in the first place. States party would be strongly discouraged from considering acts in breach of the Convention because of the likelihood that the breach might be discovered by means of a challenge inspection. They would also have to take into account the likely reaction of other States party were they to attempt to conceal breaches by refusing a challenge inspection. It follows from this that a right in the Convention to request an inspection on challenge might never have to be invoked.

5. A strict challenge verification régime would also give universal reassurance. If any State party were unjustly suspected of a breach, and there were no routine way to resolve the issue, the use of adequate challenge inspection machinery, which would by definition command a high degree of international confidence, would enable the continued compliance of that State to be clearly demonstrated to all other States.

6. Many delegations have put forward their own views in this area. In addition to CD/431, particularly comprehensive proposals have been set out in CD/500 and CD/664. Valuable discussion has also taken place, and is continuing, in Working Group C. But there continue to be substantive differences between the views of various delegations. Accordingly, the United Kingdom now proposes an alternative approach which it believes will help to eliminate these differences. This paper sets out detailed proposals by the United Kingdom on a possible text for the challenge inspection elements of Article IX of the Treaty. The key proposals are amplified in the following paragraphs.

Basic obligation

7. Should any party request clarification or resolution of any matter causing doubts about compliance, each State party receiving such a request should be obliged to demonstrate to other States party, and especially the requesting party, that it remains in full compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The United Kingdom believes this point to be of fundamental importance, and that it must underpin any arrangements that are negotiated. The need for such a demonstration is self-evident, and serves the interests of all parties. Were one not to do so, other States party to that agreement would not be confident that the acceptance by them of limitations on their sovereign rights was necessarily in their own interests.

Fact-finding

8. A request under Article IX would be a serious matter. At that point, we would expect a requesting State party might well wish to engage the attention and assistance of other States party to the Convention. One way of proceeding therefore would be for that State to put its request to the Executive Council, stating as precisely as possible its doubts or concerns and the action it would wish the Executive Council to take. Any subsequent action by the Executive Council would have a high degree of international authority. A possible procedure, consistent with other United Kingdom proposals for Article IX, has been included in this paper.

Challenge inspection

9. However, it has already been recognized that in addition to any arrangements for fact-finding conducted along the lines of para. 8 above, a verification mechanism of last resort will be required. In an extreme case, and bearing in mind the obligation to provide satisfaction of compliance, the United Kingdom believes it is necessary that each State party should have the right directly to request an inspection of another party. The request would be made to the Technical Secretariat who would then notify the Executive Council and the State to be inspected.

Conduct of an inspection

10. An inspection should be carried out impartially by members of the Technical Secretariat. They would be required to reach the location or facility as rapidly as possible, and not later than 72 hours from the issue of a challenge. It would then be expected that any State receiving a request for an inspection would allow the inspection team to carry out a comprehensive investigation in order to determine the facts of the case.

11. However, it must be recognized that a State receiving a challenge may have legitimate security interests at stake. In the earlier United Kingdom paper, CD/431, we recognized that in some very exceptional circumstances, which must be avoided if at all possible, a very limited right of refusal of inspection might form part of a challenge inspection régime. Such a right would be very restricted, and would not detract from or weaken the fundamental obligation, set out in paragraph 7 above, to demonstrate compliance. In such exceptional circumstances a State would have the right to propose alternative measures which would provide sufficient information so that the matter under consideration could be resolved. If these alternative measures did not enable this to be done, further alternative measures would need to be provided by the requested State until there was sufficient information to enable a conclusion to be reached. The time-limit for this process would be a maximum of seven days. During that time the requested State would be obliged to take sufficient steps to enable its compliance to be demonstrated.

Consequences

12. After an inspection, the requesting State would inform the Executive Council whether it was satisfied that the requested State was in compliance. If it remained unsatisfied, the Executive Council would need to consider what further steps needed to be taken. The obligation upon the requested State to demonstrate its compliance would remain.

13. All delegations share the hope expressed by President Reagan and Secretary-General Gorbachev on 22 November 1985 that efforts to conclude a comprehensive and verifiable ban on all chemical weapons should be accelerated. The United Kingdom believes these proposals will enable the current negotiations on such a ban to reach a successful conclusion.

ARTICLE IX

General provisions

1. Each State Party to the Convention may, in accordance with paragraphs 4-14 of this Article, request clarification and resolution of any matter which may cause doubts about compliance with this Convention or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous.
2. Each State Party shall be obliged, in the event of receiving such a request, to provide satisfaction (including arrangements for access, as necessary) as early as possible and no later than 10 days, to the requesting State Party that it has been and is at the present time in full compliance with its obligations under this Convention.
3. Nothing in this Article affects the right of any two or more States Party to this Convention to arrange by mutual consent for inspections or any other procedures among themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the rights and obligations of any State Party under other provisions of this Convention.

[Fact-finding]

4. Each State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to assist in clarifying any situation which may be ambiguous or which gives rise to doubts about compliance with the Convention.
5. Any such request shall be submitted to the Technical Secretariat and shall specify as precisely as possible the doubts or concerns, the reasons for the doubts or concerns and the action that the Executive Council is requested to take.
6. The Executive Council shall meet within two days of receipt of such a request to consider what action to take. It may in particular decide, by a simple majority of members present and voting, to:
 - (a) forward a request to another State Party for clarification of any matter giving rise to concern; or
 - (b) forward a request to any State Party for an on-site inspection by a team from the Technical Secretariat.
7. Any request for clarification shall be answered by the requested State within seven days. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly forward this reply to the Executive Council and the requesting State, together with any relevant information or data in its possession; or which may be supplied by any other State Party to the Convention.
8. Unless decided otherwise by a majority of the Executive Council, present and voting, any request for an on-site inspection shall be handled in accordance with the detailed procedures governing the organization and conduct of inspections at Annex [].]

Challenge inspection

9. Each State Party shall have the right at any time to request an inspection in the territory of any other State Party if it considers that, in the exceptional circumstances of the case, such a measure is necessary in order to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts that the other State Party is duly complying with its obligations under Articles [] of this Convention.

10. In submitting such a request, the requesting State shall specify as precisely as possible the locations or facilities to be inspected, together with the issues relating to compliance with the Convention on which reassurance is required. Any request for an inspection under this paragraph shall be submitted to the Technical Secretariat which shall notify the Executive Council forthwith.

11. On receipt of a request under paragraph 9, the Technical Secretariat shall immediately notify the State Party to be inspected of the terms of the request and shall indicate at the same time the arrangements for the arrival of the inspection team in the territory of the requested State. In accordance with the detailed procedures governing the organization and conduct of inspections, set out at Annex [], the requested State shall facilitate the immediate arrival of the inspection team at the location or facility to be inspected, and the inspection team's access to any part of the location or facility without restriction. In the exceptional event that it deems comprehensive access to be unfeasible, the requested State shall propose alternative arrangements which will satisfy the requesting State that the former is in compliance with its obligations. In the event that these are not satisfactory, the requested State's obligations, as set out in paragraph 2 above, will continue to apply.

Further action

12. The requesting State shall promptly indicate whether it is satisfied, as a result of fact-finding or challenge inspection, that the requested State is in full compliance with its obligations. The Executive Council will then meet to consider all evidence available to it, including any clarification from the requested State, the report of the inspection team and the views of the requesting State.

13. If the requesting State is not satisfied that the requested State is in compliance with its obligations, the Executive Council shall take such measures as it may collectively decide. Measures may include the withdrawal of rights and privileges from that party under the Convention.

14. Such measures shall be without prejudice to the right of the other States Party to take unilateral action up to and including withdrawal from the Convention, if a State Party decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Convention have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

Text of Annex is as follows:

DETAILED PROCEDURES FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION

I. Areas to be subject to inspection

1. An on-site inspection may be requested of any location or facility under the jurisdiction of another State party. No location or facility shall be excluded by virtue of being subject to systematic international on-site inspection pursuant to Articles [] of this Convention.

II. Composition of inspection team

2. An inspection requested under Article IX shall be carried out by inspectors designated from among the full-time inspectors of the Technical Secretariat. Each inspection team shall consist of five inspectors. The requesting and the requested States shall each have the right to nominate an observer to accompany the inspection team.

III. Access to site

3. The Technical Secretariat shall inform the requested State of the place and time of arrival of the inspection team within the jurisdiction of the requested State. The inspection team shall arrive within the jurisdiction of the requested State as soon as possible but not later than [48 hours] after receipt of the request.

4. The requested State shall ensure that the inspection team and its equipment reach the location or facility under inspection as soon as possible, and not later than [24 hours] after arrival within the jurisdiction of the requested State.

IV. Conduct of inspection

5. On arrival at the location or facility the inspection team shall be permitted to secure the site, monitor the movement of equipment in and out of the facility and shall be provided with comprehensive access in order to conduct such investigation as may be necessary to enable a determination to be made whether the requested State is in compliance with its obligations under the Convention.

6. In the exceptional event that comprehensive access is not deemed to be feasible the following procedures shall apply:

(a) the requested State shall propose alternative on-site inspection measures to enable its obligations under paragraph 2 of Article IX to be demonstrated, and to enable the team to make a report of its findings.

(b) if the inspection team does not judge that the alternative proposals would provide sufficient information to resolve the matter which gave rise to the request for an on-site inspection, the team shall so inform the requested State which shall then be required to propose further alternative inspection measures. At the same time, the inspection team shall immediately inform the Executive Council of the alternative proposals and that a further request has been made,

(c) the inspection team may continue to request further alternative inspection measures, until it is satisfied that the matter can be resolved. The inspection team shall inform the Executive Council of steps taken by the requested State in order to demonstrate its compliance with its obligations under the Convention.

7. The inspection team shall conduct its inspection in the least intrusive manner to accomplish its purpose.

V. Completion of inspection

8. [Seven days] after arrival of the team on site, or earlier should the inspection have been completed to their satisfaction, the inspection team shall leave the location or facility under inspection and then promptly provide a written report to each member of the Executive Council, the requesting State and the requested State. Each inspector shall have the right to have his own views included in the report, which shall contain both the substance of the findings and the steps taken by the requested party to demonstrate its compliance.

9. Nothing in the above paragraph shall detract from the right of members of the Executive Council, the requested State and the requesting State to submit their own views on the findings of the inspection.

LETTER DATED 25 JULY 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF FINLAND TRANSMITTING A DOCUMENT ENTITLED
"AIR MONITORING AS A MEANS FOR VERIFICATION OF CHEMICAL
DISARMAMENT; C.3 FIELD TESTS, PART II"1/

I have the honour to transmit to you a document entitled
"Air Monitoring as a Means for Verification of Chemical Disarmament;
C.3 Field Tests, Part II". This report represents a further contribution
by Finland to the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of
chemical weapons.

I would appreciate it if the report were to be circulated
as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Olli Mennander
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Finland

1/ A limited distribution of this document in English only has been
made to the members of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies
are available from the Permanent Mission of Finland at Geneva.

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons
to the Conference on Disarmament

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 337th plenary meeting on 6 February 1986, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the following decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons (CD/654):

"The Conference on Disarmament, keeping in mind that the negotiation of a Convention should proceed with a view to its final elaboration at the earliest possible date, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolutions 39/65 C and 40/92 B, and in discharging its responsibility to conduct as a priority task the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to ensure the preparation of the convention, decides to re-establish, in accordance with its rules of procedure, for the duration of its 1986 session, the Ad Hoc Committee to continue the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as future initiatives with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible. This agreement, if possible, or a Report on the progress of the negotiations, should be recorded in the report which this Ad Hoc Committee will submit to the Conference at the end of the second part of its 1986 session."

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. In accordance with the decision mentioned above (CD/654), Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was appointed Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs, continued to serve as Secretary of the Committee, assisted by Mr. Michael Cassandra, Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs.

3. The Ad Hoc Committee held 14 meetings from 19 February to 20 August 1986. The Ad Hoc Committee benefited from the inclusion in delegations of national experts. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations.

4. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.

5. During the 1986 session, the following official documents dealing with chemical weapons were presented to the Conference on Disarmament:

- CD/643, dated 27 September 1985, submitted by the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Letter dated 25 September 1985 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the German Democratic Republic transmitting the Joint Text of the Letters sent by Mr. Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, and Mr. Lubomir Strougal, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, to Mr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 13 September 1985'
- CD/644, dated 21 October 1985, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled 'Letter dated 16 October 1985 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany transmitting the Identical Replies of Mr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic'
- CD/646, dated 11 December 1986, submitted by the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Letter dated 11 December 1985 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representatives of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic transmitting replies to the letters of Mr. Helmut Kohl of 27 September 1985'
- CD/648, dated 10 January 1986, submitted by the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania, entitled 'Letter dated 10 January 1986 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Socialist Republic of Romania transmitting the Declaration Appeal by Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Todor Zhivkov, President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, concerning the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.128)
- CD/651, dated 31 January 1986, entitled 'Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 13-31 January 1986'

- CD/654, dated 7 February 1986, entitled 'Decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons'
- CD/664, dated 13 February 1986, submitted by Pakistan, entitled 'Fact-finding under the future chemical weapons convention'
- CD/664/Corr.1, dated 20 February 1986, submitted by Pakistan, entitled 'Fact-finding under the future chemical weapons convention'
- CD/667, dated 14 February 1986, submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Letter dated 14 February 1986 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the United States of America transmitting the text of a document entitled "Joint Statement" issued by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 21 November 1985'
- CD/668, dated 14 February 1986, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Letter dated 14 February 1986 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting the text of a document entitled "Joint Soviet/United States Statement" issued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on 21 November 1985'
- CD/675, dated 7 March 1986, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled 'Letter dated 7 February 1986 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany transmitting notes of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in response to the replies of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic concerning talks on the problem of chemical weapons'
- CD/677, dated 12 March 1986, submitted by Canada, entitled 'Letter dated 11 March 1986 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting a Handbook for the Investigations of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons'
- CD/679, dated 13 March 1986, submitted by Canada, entitled 'Identification of Chemical Substances'
- CD/685, dated 3 April 1986, submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Amendment to CD/500, Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.132)
- CD/689, dated 11 April 1986, submitted by Canada, entitled 'Letter dated 10 April 1986 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting a Compendium of all Chemical Weapons documentation of the Conference during the period 1983-1985'

- CD/697, dated 20 May 1986, submitted by Belgium, entitled 'Order of Elimination of chemical weapon stocks and method for comparing these stocks: Elements of a possible solution' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.135)
- CD/697/Corr.1, dated 10 June 1986, submitted by Belgium, entitled 'Order of Elimination of chemical weapon stocks and method of comparing these stocks: Elements of a possible solution' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.135/Corr.1 - Arabic and English only)
- CD/698, dated 4 June 1986, submitted by Australia, entitled 'Verification of non-production of chemical weapons and their precursors by the civilian chemical industry: Trial inspection of an Australian chemical facility' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.140)
- CD/702, dated 16 June 1986, submitted by Norway, entitled 'Letter dated 16 June 1986 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Norway transmitting a Research Report entitled "Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention. Part V. Sample Handling of Chemical Warfare Agents"'
- CD/703, dated 16 June 1986, submitted by Norway, entitled 'Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention. Procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons'
- CD/704, dated 16 June 1986, submitted by Norway, entitled 'Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention. Evaluation of methods for identification of arsene containing chemical warfare agents'
- CD/706, dated 20 June 1986, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons. Report on the Workshop on the verification of a chemical weapons ban, held in the Netherlands from the 4th to the 6th June 1986'
- CD/711, dated 9 July, submitted by the United States, entitled 'Letter dated 9 July 1986 from the United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a document entitled "Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program" prepared by Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.145)
- CD/713, dated 14 July, submitted by Japan, entitled 'Some Quantitative Aspects of a Chemical Weapons Convention' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.146)
- CD/715, dated 15 July 1986, submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, entitled 'Chemical Weapons Convention: Verification and Compliance - The Challenge Element'
- CD/719, dated 25 July 1986, submitted by Finland, entitled 'Letter dated 25 July 1986 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Finland transmitting a document entitled "Air Monitoring as a means of verification of Chemical Disarmament, C.3 Field Tests, Part II"'

6. In addition, the following Working Papers were presented to the Ad Hoc Committee:

- CD/CW/WP.128, dated 10 January 1986, submitted by the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania, entitled 'Letter dated 10 January 1986 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Socialist Republic of Romania transmitting the Declaration Appeal by Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Tidor Zhivkov, President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, concerning the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans' (also issued as CD/648)
- CD/CW/WP.129, dated 17 February 1986, submitted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, entitled 'Outline for the Organization of Work during the 1986 Session'
- CD/CW/WP.129/Rev.1, dated 19 February 1986, submitted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, entitled 'Outline for the Organization of Work during the 1986 Session'
- CD/CW/WP.130, dated 10 March 1986, submitted by China, entitled 'Working Paper on Calculation of Elimination of Quantity'
- CD/CW/WP.131, dated 24 March 1986, submitted by Australia, entitled 'Régimes to Ensure Non-Diversion of Super-Toxic Lethal Chemicals: Possible Approaches'
- CD/CW/WP.132, dated 3 April 1986, submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Amendment to CD/500, Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' (also issued as CD/685)
- CD/CW/WP.133, dated 11 April 1986, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'An approach to the verification of non-production - substances subject to monitoring in a CW convention'
- CD/CW/WP.134, dated 9 April 1986, submitted by Yugoslavia
- CD/CW/WP.135, dated 20 May 1986, submitted by Belgium, entitled 'Order of Elimination of chemical weapons stocks and method for comparing these stocks: Elements of a possible solution' (also issued as CD/697)
- CD/CW/WP.135/Corr.1, dated 10 June 1986, submitted by Belgium, entitled 'Order of Elimination of chemical weapons stocks and method of comparing these stocks: Elements of a possible solution' (also issued as CD/697/Corr.1 - Arabic and English only)
- CD/CW/WP.136, dated 18 April 1986, submitted by the German Democratic Republic and Poland, entitled 'Working Paper on Article IX'
- CD/CW/WP.137, dated 18 April 1986, entitled 'Report of the Chairman of Working Group C'

- CD/CW/WP.138, dated 21 April 1986, entitled 'Report of the Chairman of Working Group A'
- CD/CW/WP.139, dated 23 April 1986, entitled 'Report of the Chairman of Working Group B'
- CD/CW/WP.140, dated 4 June 1986, submitted by Australia, entitled 'Verification of non-production of chemical weapons and their precursors by the civilian chemical industry: Trial inspection of an Australian Chemical Facility' (also issued as CD/698)
- CD/CW/WP.141, dated 10 June 1986, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Verification of non-production of Chemical Weapons: Scenario for an experimental inspection'
- CD/CW/WP.142, dated 13 June 1986, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Verification of non-production of Chemical Weapons: Observations on the scenario for an experimental inspection as laid down in CD/CW/WP.141'
- CD/CW/WP.143, dated 1 July 1986, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Verification of non-production of chemical weapons: Existing arrangements for monitoring the civil chemical industry in the Netherlands'
- CD/CW/WP.144, dated 24 June 1986, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Verification of phosphorus - containing nerve agents in waste water'
- CD/CW/WP.145, dated 9 July 1986, submitted by the United States, entitled 'Letter dated 9 July 1986 from the United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a document entitled "Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program" prepared by Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD' (also issued as CD/711)
- CD/CW/WP.146, dated 14 July 1986, submitted by Japan, entitled 'Some Quantitative Aspects of a Chemical Weapons Convention' (also issued as CD/713)
- CD/CW/WP.147, dated 25 July 1986, submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Movement of Chemical Weapons Stocks'
- CD/CW/WP.148, dated 29 July 1986, submitted by Cuba, entitled 'Definition of the term "capacity"'
- CD/CW/WP.149, dated 1 August 1986, entitled 'Report of Working Group C'
- CD/CW/WP.150, dated 6 August 1986, entitled 'Report of Working Group A'
- CD/CW/WP.151, dated 6 August 1986, entitled 'Report of Working Group B'
- CD/CW/WP.152, dated 14 August 1986, entitled 'Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament'

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1986 SESSION

7. In accordance with its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee continued the negotiation and further elaboration of the Convention, utilizing Appendices I and II of CD/636, CD/651 (Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 13-31 January 1986) as well as other new proposals presented by delegations. To this effect, it retained the basic structure that was established by the Committee in 1985, and accepted the Chairman's proposal to set up three Working Groups which dealt with specific aspects of the Convention as follows:

(a) Working Group A: Article II (Definitions and Criteria) and Article VI (Permitted Activities)

(Chairman: Mr. Richard Rowe, Australia)

(b) Working Group B: Article III (Declarations), Article IV (Elimination of Chemical Weapons) and Article V (Measures on Chemical Weapons Production Facilities)

(Chairman: Mr. Petar Poptchev, Bulgaria)

(c) Working Group C: Article I (General Provisions on Scope), Article VII (National Implementation Measures), Article VIII (Consultative Committee) and Article IX (Consultation, Co-operation and Fact-Finding). Working Group C was also responsible for the question of herbicides and it was understood that the question of investigation of allegations of use would be dealt with in this Group.

(Chairman: Mr. Noegroho Wisnoemoerti, Indonesia)

The Working Groups concentrated their efforts on the consideration of those specific topics with a view to finding generally acceptable formulations for inclusion in the Convention.

8. In accordance with the outline for the organization of work during the 1986 session (CD/CW/WP.129/Rev.1) and on the basis of the results achieved in the Working Groups as well as on proposals put forward by the Chairman as a result of his consultations, Appendix I of CD/636 has been revised to reflect the present stage of the negotiations.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9. The Appendix to this Report reflects the present stage of negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention, however the draft texts contained therein do not bind any delegation.

10. The Ad Hoc Committee recommends to the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) that the Appendix to this Report be used for further negotiation and drafting of the Convention;

(b) that the reports of the Working Groups, as contained in documents CD/CW/WP.149, CD/CW/WP.150 and CD/CW/WP.151, together with other relevant present and future documents of the Conference also be utilized in the further elaboration of the Convention;

(c) that the Ad Hoc Committee resume its work under the Chairmanship of Ambassador R.I.T. Cromartie (United Kingdom) and under its present mandate for a session of limited duration during the period 12-30 January 1987; that the work cover issues under Articles III, IV, V, VI and IX, and parts of Article II relevant to Articles V and VI; furthermore, that consultations be undertaken on these issues by the Chairman in the meantime in preparation for the resumed session; that for that purpose open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee be held between 24 November and 17 December 1986 including when necessary meetings with full services, and that the Committee present to the Conference on Disarmament a report on its work during the inter-sessional period;

(d) that the Ad Hoc Committee be re-established at the outset of the 1987 session with its 1986 mandate and that Ambassador R. Ekéus (Sweden) be appointed as its Chairman.

1/2

Preliminary structure of a Convention on chemical weapons

... of the Convention on chemical weapons ...

... of the Convention on chemical weapons ...

... of the Convention on chemical weapons ...

APPENDIX

This Appendix is based on Appendix I contained in CD/636 and includes new material produced so far in the 1986 session of the Committee in respect of Articles IV, V, VI, VIII, IX and Annex IV to Article IV.

... of the Convention on chemical weapons ...

Preliminary structure of a Convention on chemical weapons */

Preamble

- I. General provisions on scope
 - II. Definitions and Criteria
 - III. Declarations
 - IV. Chemical weapons
 - V. Chemical weapons production facilities
 - VI. Activities not prohibited by the Convention
 - VII. National implementation measures
 - VIII. Consultative Committee
 - IX. Consultations, co-operation and fact finding
 - X. Assistance
 - XI. Economic and technological development
 - XII. Relation to other international agreements
 - XIII. Amendments
 - XIV. Duration, withdrawal
 - XV. Signature, ratification, entry into force
 - XVI. Languages
- Annexes and other documents

*/ Discussions are still continuing on where different issues like verification measures are to be placed under this structure.

preamble */

The States Parties to this Convention

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

Recognizing that the Convention reaffirms principles and objectives of and obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

Bearing in mind the objective contained in Article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,

Determined for the sake of all mankind, to completely exclude the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of June 1925,

Considering that the achievements in the field of chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind,

Convinced that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and their destruction, represents a necessary step towards the achievement of these common objectives.

Have agreed as follows:

*/ Some delegations consider that the texts contained in the Preamble require further consideration.

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS ON SCOPE

1. Each State Party undertakes not to:

- develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone.

2. Each State Party undertakes not to:

- assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in activities prohibited to Parties under this Convention.

3. Each State Party undertakes not to use chemical weapons. */ **/

4. [Each State Party undertakes not to [conduct other activities in preparation for use of chemical weapons] [engage in any military preparations for use of chemical weapons].]

5. Each State Party undertakes to [destroy] [destroy or divert for permitted purposes] chemical weapons which are in its possession or under its [jurisdiction or] control ***/

6. Each State Party undertakes to [destroy] [destroy or dismantle] chemical weapons production facilities which are in its possession or under its [jurisdiction or] control. ****/

*/ It is understood that this provision is closely linked to the definition of chemical weapons in another part of the Convention, the final formulation of which is yet to be agreed upon. It is also understood that this provision does not apply to the use of toxic chemicals and their precursors for permitted purposes still to be defined and to be provided for in the Convention. This provision is also closely linked to a provision in the Convention to be agreed upon relating to reservations.

**/ The question of herbicides is subject to ongoing consultations. The Chairman of these open-ended consultations has suggested the following formulation for a provision on herbicides: "Each State Party undertakes not to use herbicides as a method of warfare, such a prohibition should not preclude any other use of herbicides".

***/ An alternative formulation and placement of this undertaking is given under "Chemical weapons".

****/ An alternative formulation and placement of this undertaking is given under "Chemical weapons production facilities".

II. DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA

For the purposes of this Convention:

1.*/ The term "chemical weapons" shall apply to the following, together or separately: **/

- (i) toxic chemicals, including super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, other harmful chemicals and their precursors, including key precursors [and key components of binary and/or multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons], ***/ except such chemicals intended for permitted purposes as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes, ****/
- (ii) munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals, as referred to above, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices,

*/ The definitions of chemical weapons are presented on the understanding that problems related to irritants used for law enforcement and riot control, and also to chemicals intended to enhance the effect of the use of chemical weapons if their inclusion in the Convention is agreed could be handled outside the definitions of chemical weapons if this will result in a more clear and understandable definition. Preliminary suggestions to solve these problems are given below and consultations on them will be continued.

**/ One delegation expressed its reservation on the present formulation of the definition of chemical weapons and on the terminology used in (i) that failed to reflect the general purpose criterion.

***/ Some delegations consider that further deliberation is required in order to clarify at a later stage of the negotiations the implications of this definition for other parts of the Convention. This applies to other relevant parts of the Appendix. Other delegations consider that key component of binary and/or multicomponent chemical system for chemical weapons means: a component which poses a special risk to the objectives of the Convention as it can be an integral part in a chemical weapons munition or device and can form toxic chemicals at the moment of their employment and possesses the following characteristics: (a) reacts (interacts) rapidly with other component(s) of binary and/or multicomponent chemical system during the munition's flight to the target and gives a high yield of final toxic chemical, (b) plays an important role in determining the toxic properties of the final product, (c) may not be used, or be used only in minimal quantities, for permitted purposes, (d) possesses the stability necessary for long-term storage.

****/ One delegation suggests that the term "permitted purposes" should be substituted, where it occurs throughout the Convention, with the term "purposes not prohibited by the Convention".

(iii) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices;

- [The term "chemical weapons" shall not apply to those chemicals which are not super-toxic lethal, or other lethal chemicals and which are approved by the Consultative Committee for use by a Party for domestic law enforcement and domestic riot control purposes.]

- [States Parties agree not to [develop, produce, stockpile or] utilize for chemical weapons chemicals intended to enhance the effect of the use of such weapons.]

[2. "Toxic chemicals" means:

chemicals [however or wherever they are produced], [whether produced in plants, munitions or elsewhere] [regardless of the method and pattern of production] whose toxic properties can be utilized to cause death or temporary or permanent harm, to man or animals involving:]

[2. "Toxic chemicals" means:

any chemical, regardless of its origin or method of production which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to man or animals

Toxic chemicals are divided into the following categories:]

(a) "super-toxic lethal chemicals", which have a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by an agreed method */ set forth in ...

(b) "other lethal chemicals", which have a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) and less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by an agreed method set forth in ...

[(c) "other harmful chemicals", being any [toxic] chemicals not covered by (a) or (b) above, [including toxic chemicals which normally cause temporary incapacitation rather than death] [at similar doses to those at which super-toxic lethal chemicals cause death].]

[and "other harmful chemicals" has a median lethal dose which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation).]

*/ It was noted that after such measurements had actually been performed, the figures mentioned in this and the following section might be subject to slight changes in order to cover sulphur mustard gas under the first category.

3. [Permitted purposes] [Purposes not prohibited by the Convention]

[Non-hostile purposes] means:

(a) industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, domestic law enforcement purposes, and military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons.

(b) protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against chemical weapons; */

4. "Precursor" means:

a chemical reagent which takes part in the production of a toxic chemical.

(a) "Key Precursor" means:

a precursor which poses a significant risk to the objectives of the Convention by virtue of its importance in the production of a toxic chemical.

It may possess [possesses] the following characteristics:

(i) It may play [plays] an important role in determining the toxic properties of a [toxic chemicals prohibited by the Convention] [super-toxic lethal chemical].

(ii) It may be used in one of the chemical reactions at the final stage of formation of the [toxic chemicals prohibited by the Convention] [super-toxic lethal chemical].

[(iii) it may [is] not be used, or [is] used only in minimal quantities, for permitted purposes.] **/

Key precursors are listed in ...

For the purpose of the relevant provisions in a Chemical Weapons Convention key precursors should be listed and subject to revisions according to [characteristics] [guidelines].

Chemicals which are not key precursors but are deemed to pose a [threat] [particular risk] with regard to a Chemical Weapons Convention should be included in a list.

*/ The suggestion that such permitted protective purposes should relate only to "an adversary's use of" chemical weapons was removed pending a decision on whether in the Convention the question of prohibiting other military preparations for use of chemical weapons than those mentioned under scope should be dealt with.

**/ One delegation considers that this particular characteristic has primary importance and should be placed first.

[(b) Key component of binary and/or multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons means:]

[a key precursor which forms a toxic chemical in the binary or multicomponent weapons munition or device and which has the following additional characteristics (to be elaborated):]

5. "Chemical weapons production facility" means:

- Chemical weapons production facility means [any building or equipment designed, constructed or used [in any degree] for the production of chemical weapons] or for filling chemical weapons.
- Chemical weapons production facility means [any building or any equipment which in any degree was designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946, for:
 - (a) the production for chemical weapons of any toxic chemical, except for those listed in (schedule B), or the production for chemical weapons of any key precursors,] or
 - (b) the filling of chemical weapons.

III. DECLARATIONS */

Declarations of chemical weapons 1/ and plans for their elimination 2/ 3/

1. Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee, not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, declarations stating

(a) whether it possesses or does not possess any chemical weapons on its territory or elsewhere under its jurisdiction or control,

(b) whether it has on its territory any chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else,

(c) whether it has transferred control of chemical weapons since ... or has received such weapons since that date. 4/

2. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee, not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, declarations stating the aggregate quantity and detailed composition of its chemical weapons.

3. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee not later than ... months 5/ after the Convention's entry into force for it, general plans for the elimination of its chemical weapons based on the Principles for the Order of Elimination laid down in Annex IV.

4. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee declarations stating the locations and detailed inventories of their chemical weapons stocks as well as detailed plans for

*/ This session's work on Articles IV and V necessitates the reorganization and redrafting of Article III, which will be undertaken at a later stage.

1/ In accordance with agreed definitions.

2/ In accordance with the provisions in Article IV.

3/ The question of old unknown weapons or stocks which have been left by others without the knowledge of the State Party is not addressed in this Article. It is understood that this question will be dealt with at a later stage of the negotiations at which time the placement in the Convention of the relevant provisions will also be decided.

4/ The view was expressed that past transfers should not be included in the Convention.

5/ Three and six months have been proposed.

their elimination. These declarations and plans shall be submitted not later than three months before the commencement of each elimination period 1/ specified in the Principles for the Order of Elimination in Annex IV, and shall encompass all stocks to be eliminated during the next coming such period.

5. States Parties shall consult among themselves and through the Consultative Committee, as soon as possible after the declarations made in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, with the view to co-ordinating their plans.

6. The declarations and plans under Article III, paragraphs 1 through 4, shall be made in accordance with Annex III.

7. Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee annual progress reports on the implementation of the plans for the elimination of chemical weapons and a notification of the completion of the elimination within 30 days thereafter.

8. Annex III and Annex IV constitute integral parts of the Convention.

Declarations of chemicals which could be used for chemical weapons purposes but which are intended for permitted purposes 2/

Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities

(To be elaborated)

Verification of declarations

(To be elaborated)

1/ Some delegations held the view that overall declarations should be made within 30 days after the Convention's entry into force for a State Party.

2/ In accordance with the organization of work (WP.98) these provisions are to be elaborated in the context of Article VI taking into account inter alia some harmful chemicals, to be elaborated.

ANNEX III

I. DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A. Possession or non-possession

1. Possession of chemical weapons on own territory.

Yes

No

2. Possession, jurisdiction or control over chemical weapons elsewhere.

Yes

No

If yes, information about location(s), expressed by name(s) of State(s).

B. Existence on the territory of any chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else

Yes

No

If yes, information about ownership, expressed by name(s) of State(s).

C. Past transfers 1/

If there has been transfer of control of chemical weapons since, or reception of such weapons since that date, the following information shall be provided. To be elaborated.

D. Aggregate quantity and detailed composition of chemical weapons

1. Chemicals

1.1 Toxic chemicals 2/

In cases involving mixtures of two or more toxic chemicals all such components should be specified as well as the percentage of the mixtures.

1/ The view was expressed that past transfers should not be included in the Convention.

2/ In accordance with agreed definition.

1.1.1 Super-toxic lethal chemicals 1/

Scientific chemical name/ 2/ Structural formula 3/ and Toxicity (of pure substance)	Bulk			Filled in munition Quantity (metric tons)	Total quantity (metric tons)
	Purity 4/ %	Quantity (metric tons)	Number and size of containers		
Chemical A					
Chemical B					
etc.					

1.1.2 Other lethal chemicals 1/

Scientific chemical name/ 2/ Structural formula 3/ and Toxicity (of pure substance)	Bulk			Filled in munition Quantity (metric tons)	Total quantity (metric tons)
	Purity 4/ %	Quantity (metric tons)	Number and size of containers		

1.1.3 Other harmful chemicals 5/

Scientific chemical name/ 2/ Structural formula 3/ and Toxicity (of pure substance) if applicable	Bulk			Filled in munition Quantity (metric tons)	Total quantity (metric tons)
	Purity 4/ %	Quantity (metric tons)	Number and size of containers		

1/ In accordance with agreed definition.

2/ In accordance with the IUPAC (International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry) Nomenclature.

3/ Different views exist whether it is necessary to state both the scientific chemical name and the structural formula in order for the declarations to be unambiguous.

4/ Three different approaches were taken by delegations: 1) Initial purity, 2) Purity of the compound as stored with an approximation of some 10 per cent. 3) That declaration of purity was not necessary.

5/ In accordance with agreed definition, but pending such a definition it is unclear which chemicals to declare in this table.

1.2 1/

Scientific chemical name/ <u>2/</u> Structural formula <u>3/</u>	Quantity (metric tons)	Number and size of containers
<u>Key precursors for unitary systems 4/</u>		

Scientific chemical name/ <u>2/</u> Structural formula <u>3/</u>	Bulk		Filled in munition/ submunition (metric tons)	Total quantity (metric tons)
	Quantity (metric tons)	Number and size of containers		
<u>[Key components] [Key precursors] for multi-component systems 4/5/6/</u>				

1/ The view was expressed that these two tables were not necessary and the key precursors and key components could be declared under points 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 as applicable.

2/ In accordance with the IUPAC (International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry) Nomenclature.

3/ Different views exist whether it is necessary to state both the scientific chemical name and the structural formula in order for the declarations to be unambiguous.

4/ To be declared separately for super-toxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals.

5/ Identified in accordance with approaches to be worked out in the context of Article II.

6/ Some delegations suggested that multicomponent chemical weapons should not be declared as a special category in a separate table.

1.3 Precursors 1/ in bulk 2/

Scientific chemical name/ <u>3/</u> Structural formula <u>4/</u>	Quantity (metric tons)	Number and size of containers
<u>Precursors for unitary systems</u> <u>Components for multicomponent systems 5/</u>		

1/ Identified in accordance with approaches to be worked out in the context of Article II.

2/ Some delegations did not consider this table necessary.

3/ In accordance with the IUPAC (International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry) Nomenclature.

4/ Different views exist whether it is necessary to state both the scientific chemical name and the structural formula in order for the declarations to be unambiguous.

5/ Some delegations suggested that multicomponent chemical weapons should not be declared as a special category in a separate table.

Munitions

Name	Calibre (if applicable)	Quantity of unfilled munition/submunition (number of pieces) <u>1/</u>	Filled munition/submunition	
			Quantity (number of pieces)	Chemical fill (in kg per piece of munition/submunition)
<u>Artillery chemical type</u> Examples: Shell Atrtridge Rocket warhead	155 mm	22,000	13,000	2.82 kg of chemical x
	120 mm	500 warhead bodies	8,000	1.12 kg of chemical y
		1,500 submunitions	1,000 warheads	50 kg of chemical z (50 x 1 kg submunitions)
<u>Artillery chemical type</u> Examples: Shell for ... name of final active product)	155 mm	100 shell bodies	500 (completed shells, components stored separately)	3 kg chemical A + B
		200 cannisters A 300 cannisters B	100 cannisters A 150 cannisters B	2 kg chemical A 1 kg chemical C

Other devices

Name	Quantity of unfilled devices (number of pieces)	Filled devices	
		Quantity (number of pieces)	Chemical fill (in kg/piece)
Example: spraytanks)			

1/ Some delegations did not consider this column necessary.

4. Equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and other devices under points D:2 and 3. (Example: single purpose rocket launchers).

5. Chemicals specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and other devices under points D:2 and 3. (Example: thickeners). 1/

E. Locations and detailed inventories of chemical weapons stocks to be declared before the commencement of each elimination period 2/

For each stock the following shall be declared:

1. Location

Geographical location expressed by ...

2. Detailed inventory

Composition and quantities of the chemical weapons shall be declared in accordance with paragraph D of this Annex.

II. PLANS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A. General plans

The following chemical weapons shall be eliminated during Elimination Period I: 2/ 3/

The following chemical weapons shall be eliminated during Elimination Period II: 2/ 3/

etc.

1/ Different views exist concerning, if or to what extent such chemicals should be declared. Furthermore, it appears that this question will have to be decided in the light of the final definition of chemical weapons.

2/ Some delegations held the view that overall declarations should be made within 30 days after the Convention's entry into force for a State Party.

3/ Chemical weapons shall be described and amounts indicated in a manner identical to that of the declarations.

B. Detailed plans

They shall include:

- schedules indicating detailed timeframes, quantities and types of chemical weapons to be destroyed or diverted to permitted purposes 1/ in accordance with the Principles for the Elimination laid down in Annex IV,
- location of facilities to be used for destruction or diversion 1/ and information confirming that the facilities can consume the quantities to be eliminated within the elimination period,
- methods to be used for the destruction or diversion, 1/ as well as the end products,
- plans for verification of the destruction and diversion 1/ processes based on the Principles and Methods for the Verification of the Elimination of Chemical Weapons laid down in Annex IV.

1/ One delegation stated that it was unconvinced that diversion was either a practical or economical method for elimination. It may be prepared, however, to review its position in the event a practical system for diversion can be devised, preserving the requirement for effective verification.

IV. CHEMICAL WEAPONS 1/

1. The provisions of this article shall apply to any and all chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control 2/ of a State Party, regardless of location, including those on the territory of another State.

2. Each State Party, within 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, shall submit a declaration which:

(a) specifies the [precise location,] aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of any chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control;

(b) reports any chemical weapons on its territory under the jurisdiction or control of others, including a State not Party to this Convention; */

(c) specifies any transfer or receipt by the State Party of any chemical weapons since [...] or any transfer of control by that State Party of such weapons; and

(d) provides its general plan for destruction [or diversion] of its chemical weapons.

3. [Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under para. 2 of this Article has been submitted, provide access to its chemical weapons for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection. Thereafter, each State Party shall ensure, through access to its chemical weapons for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification and through on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, that the chemical weapons are not removed except to a destruction facility.]

4. Each State Party shall submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons not later than ... months before each destruction [diversion] period begins. The detailed plans shall encompass all stocks to be eliminated during the next coming period, and shall include the precise location and the detailed composition of the chemical weapons which are subject to destruction during that period.

*/ A question was raised as to the applicability of this sub-paragraph.

1/ It is anticipated that a reorganization of Article III will occur and may include identification of material currently in Article/Annex III for possible inclusion into Articles/Annexes IV and V.

2/ It is agreed that the concept of "jurisdiction or control" requires additional discussion and elaboration.

5. Each State Party shall:

(a) destroy [or divert] all chemical weapons pursuant to the Order specified in Annex IV, beginning not later than ... months and finishing not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force for it;

(b) provide information annually regarding the implementation of its plans for destruction [or diversion] of chemical weapons; and

(c) certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction [or diversion] process has been completed, that all chemical weapons have been destroyed [or diverted].

6. Each State Party shall provide access to any chemical weapons destruction facilities and the facilities' storage for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of destruction through the continuous */ presence of inspectors and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, in accordance with Annex IV 1/.

7. Any chemical weapons discovered by a State Party after the initial declaration of chemical weapons shall be reported, secured and destroyed, as provided in Annex IV. 2/

8. All locations where chemical weapons are [stored or] destroyed shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Annex IV 1/.

9. Any State Party which has on its territory chemical weapons which are under the control of a State that is not a Party to this Convention shall ensure that such weapons are removed from its territory not later than ... months after the date on which the Convention entered into force for it.

10. The declaration, plans and information submitted by each State Party under this article shall be made in accordance with Annex ... and Annex ...

*/ The precise wording to express this concept satisfactorily in some of the languages requires further elaboration.

1/ The provisions of Annex IV, which address verification, require further elaboration.

2/ In view of the complex situations these chemical weapons involve, this issue needs to be further discussed and resolved.

ANNEX IV

I.1/ Principles, methods and organization of the elimination of chemical weapons

A. Destruction of chemical weapons

1. Destruction of chemical weapons means a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons, and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and other devices unusable as such.

Elimination through destruction shall apply to all chemical weapons except those which may be diverted (to be elaborated).

2. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons shall determine how they shall be destroyed, except that the following procedures may not be used: dumping in any body of water, land burial or open-pit burning.

3. The destruction of chemical weapons shall take place at a specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facility(ies). [The facility(ies) shall be government property.]

4. The chemical weapons destruction facility shall be constructed and operated in a manner to ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons, and that the destruction process can be verified under the provisions of this Convention.

B. Diversion of Chemical Weapons

Diversion of chemical weapons means a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way into end products that may only be used for purposes other than those related to chemical weapons. [Diversion also includes taking super-toxic lethal chemicals from the chemical weapons stocks for use for permitted purposes in quantities up to 1 metric tonne in accordance with Article VI.] 2/

Elimination through diversion may apply to (to be elaborated).

II. Principles and Order of Elimination

1. The elaboration of the Order of Elimination shall build on the undiminished security for all States during the entire elimination stage;

1/ For some delegations, the question of the applicability of this Annex to obsolete chemical weapons (ordinances) retrieved from the combat zones of World War I will have to be resolved later.

2/ One delegation stated that it was unconvinced that diversion was either a practical or economic method for elimination. It may be prepared, however, to review its position in the event a practical system for diversion can be devised, preserving the requirement for effective verification.

confidence building in the early part of the elimination stage, gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons stocks and applicability irrespective of the actual composition of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the elimination of the chemical weapons.² The elimination of chemical weapons stocks shall start for all States Parties possessing chemical weapons simultaneously. The whole elimination stage shall be divided into nine annual periods.

3. Each State Party shall eliminate not less than one-ninth of its stockpile [in measure of stockpile equivalent and/or equivalent mustard weight] during each elimination period. ^{1/} ^{2/} However, a State Party is not precluded from eliminating its stocks at a faster pace. Each State Party shall determine its detailed plans for each elimination period, as specified in part III of this Annex and shall report annually on the implementation of each elimination period. ^{3/}

4. Order of Elimination (to be elaborated). ^{4/}

III. Plans for elimination of chemical weapons

A. General Plans for elimination of chemical weapons

1. General Plan for destruction of chemical weapons

The general plan for destruction of chemical weapons, submitted pursuant to article ... shall specify:

(a) a general schedule for destruction, giving types and quantities of chemical weapons to be destroyed in each period;

(b) for each existing or planned CW destruction facility:

- ["name" and address]

- [location]

^{1/} It is considered necessary to elaborate a method for comparing different categories of chemical weapons stocks. The comparison of lethal and harmful chemicals remains unresolved and is subject to further consideration.

^{2/} Some delegations expressed the view that the question of the regulation of the elimination of stockpiles needs further and full discussion.

^{3/} It has been recognized that the elimination of chemical weapons stocks and the elimination of relevant production facilities should be considered together.

^{4/} Some delegations feel that it would be appropriate to introduce the idea of security stockpile levels to meet the security concerns of countries with small stockpiles of chemical weapons.

- chemical weapons intended to be destroyed
- method of destruction
- capacity
- expected period of operation
- [products of the destruction process]

[2. General Plans for diversion of chemical weapons (to be elaborated)]

B. Detailed Plans for Elimination of chemical weapons

1. Detailed Plans for Destruction of Chemicals Weapons

These plans shall be submitted to the Consultative Committee in accordance with Article ... and shall specify:

(a) the number of chemical weapons destruction facilities and a detailed schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons at each of these facilities;

(b) the aggregate quantity of each individual type of chemical weapons plans to be destroyed at each facility;

(c) data about each facility:

- name, postal address, geographical location;
- method of destruction;
- end-products;
- layout plan of the facility;
- technological scheme;
- operation manuals;
- method of storage and volume of the Facility's storage, estimated by types and quantities of chemical weapons;
- types and quantities of chemical weapons kept at the storage during each elimination period;
- the system of verification;
- safety measures in force at the facility;
- living and working conditions for the international inspectors.

[2. Detailed Plans for Diversion of chemical weapons (to be elaborated)]

IV. Principles and Methods for the Verification of the Elimination of Chemical Weapons

A. Destruction of Chemical Weapons

1. The aim of verification of destruction of chemical weapons stocks shall be:
 - to confirm the identity and quantity of the chemical weapons stocks to be destroyed, and
 - to confirm that these stocks for all practical purposes have been destroyed.
2. After a review of the detailed plans provided in Section III above, the Technical Secretariat, if the need arises, will enter into consultation with the State Party concerned in order to ensure the facility is designed to assure destruction, to allow advanced planning on how verification measures may be applied and that the application of verification measures is consistent with proper facility operation, and to ensure that the facility operation allows appropriate verification.
3. Each State Party should execute a detailed agreement with the Technical Secretariat covering detailed inspection procedures for each facility subject to inspection. (This concept remains to be further elaborated).
4. The inspectors will be granted access to the chemical weapons destruction facility [...] prior to commencement of the active destruction phase, to carry out the engineering review of the facility, to include the facility's construction and layout, the equipment and instruments for measuring and controlling the destruction process, and the checking and testing of the accuracy of the verification equipment.
5. The inspectors will be granted access to conduct their activities at the facility and the facility storage during the entire active phase of destruction. They will conduct their activities in the presence and with the co-operation of representatives of the facility's management and the National Authority if they wish to be present.
6. The inspectors may monitor by either physical observation or devices:
 - (a) the facility storage and the chemical weapons present;
 - (b) the movement of chemical weapons from the storage to the facility;
 - (c) the process of destruction (assuring that no chemical weapons are diverted);
 - (d) the material balance (to be elaborated further), and
 - (e) the accuracy and calibration of the instruments.
7. To the extent consistent with verification needs, verification procedures should make use of information from routine facility operations.

8. If inspectors detect irregularities which may give rise to doubts they will report the irregularities to the representatives of the facility and the National Authority and request that the situation be resolved. Uncorrected irregularities will be reported to the Executive Council.

9. After the completion of each period of destruction the Technical Secretariat shall certify the declaration of the National Authority, reporting the completion of destruction of the designated quantity of chemical weapons.

[B. Diversion of chemical weapons (to be elaborated)]

V. [Verification of Declarations and Interim Monitoring of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles] */

*/ Some delegations believe it is necessary to elaborate principles and methods for verifying chemical weapons declarations and for monitoring chemical weapons stockpiles from the time of their declaration until their elimination.

V. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES 1/

1. The provisions of this article shall apply to any and all chemical weapons production facilities under the jurisdiction or control 2/ of a State Party, regardless of location. 3/

2. Each State Party with any chemical weapons production facility shall cease immediately all activity at each chemical weapons production facility except that required for closure.

3. No State Party shall construct any new facility or modify any existing facility for the purpose of chemical weapons production or for any other purpose prohibited by the Convention. 4/

4. Each State Party, within 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, shall submit a declaration which:

(a) specifies any chemical weapons production facilities under its jurisdiction or control, or on its territory under the control of others, 5/ including a State not party to this Convention, at any time since [1 January 1946] [at the time of entry into force of the Convention];

(b) specifies any transfer or any receipt by the State Party of any equipment for the production of chemical weapons [and documentation relevant to the production of chemical weapons] since [1.1.1946] or any transfer of control by that Party of such equipment [and documentation];

(c) specifies actions to be taken for closure of each chemical weapons production facility;

(d) outlines its general plan for destruction [or reconstruction for peaceful purposes] for each chemical weapons production facility, and

1/ It is anticipated that a reorganization of Article III will occur and may include identification of material currently in Article/Annex III for possible inclusion into Articles/Annexes IV and V.

2/ It is agreed that the concept of "jurisdiction or control" requires additional discussion and elaboration.

3/ It is understood that the above provisions also apply to any facility on the territory of another State [regardless of ownership and form of contract, on the basis of which they have been set up and functioned for the purposes of production of chemical weapons].

4/ Some delegations consider this paragraph redundant.

5/ Some delegations expressed doubts as to the applicability of this phrase.

(e) outlines its general plan for any temporary conversion of any chemical weapons production facility into a facility for destruction of chemical weapons.

5. Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration, under para. 4, has been submitted, provide access to each chemical weapons production facility for the purpose of [systematic] international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection.

6. Each State Party shall:

(a) close within three months after the Convention enters into force for it, each chemical weapons production facility in a manner that will render each facility inoperable, and

(b) provide access to each chemical weapons production facility, subsequent to closure, for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification through periodic on-site inspection and continuous [monitoring by] [use of] on-site instruments in order to ensure that the facility remains closed and is subsequently [dismantled and] destroyed, or [dismantled] [and reconstructed for peaceful purposes].

7. Each State Party shall submit detailed plans for [destruction] [elimination] of each facility not later than [3 months] before the [destruction] [elimination] [conversion] of the facility begins. 1/

8. Each State Party shall:

(a) [destroy] [eliminate] all chemical weapons production facilities pursuant to [the [order] [schedule] specified in] Annex ..., beginning not later than 12 months, and finishing not later than 10 years, after the Convention enters into force for it; 2/

(b) provide information annually regarding the implementation of its plans for the [destruction] [elimination] of its chemical weapons production facilities, and

(c) certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that its chemical weapons production facilities have been [destroyed] [eliminated].

1/ One delegation held the view that the detailed plans in question should be submitted by each State Party within twelve months of the entry into force of the Convention for it.

2/ Some delegations expressed the desire to see the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities at the earliest opportunity.

9. A chemical weapons production facility may be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons. Such a converted facility must be [destroyed] [eliminated] as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction of chemical weapons and, in any case, not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force for the State Party.

10. [Each State Party shall submit all chemical weapons production facilities] [All chemical weapons production facilities] shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification through on-site inspection and [monitoring with] [use of] on-site instruments in accordance with Annex ...

11. The declaration, plans and information submitted by each State Party under this article shall be made in accordance with Annex ... and Annex ...

ANNEX V

I. DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES 1/

A. Possession or non-possession 2/

1. Possession of chemical weapons production facilities on own territory.

Yes

No

2. Possession, jurisdiction or control over chemical weapons production facilities elsewhere.

Yes

No

If yes, information about location(s), expressed by name(s) of State(s).

B. Existence on the territory of any chemical weapons production facilities under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else

Yes

No

If yes, information about ownership, expressed by name(s) of States(s).

1/ Some delegations stressed that overall declarations should encompass not only production facilities with a production for chemical weapons purposes but also other facilities producing chemicals which can be used for chemical weapons purposes. It is understood that for the time being the paragraphs under the heading "Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities and plans for their elimination" refers only to production facilities with a production for chemical weapons purposes. A separate heading "Declarations of other facilities producing chemicals which can be used for chemical weapons purposes" has been inserted to indicate that the question of declaration of such facilities will need to be worked on.

2/ Some delegations held the view that all States Parties should declare their total production capacity. Other delegations felt that it was not necessary in this context to declare the total production capacity, and therefore that the entire paragraph was not necessary.

C. Past transfers 1/

If there has been transfer of equipment or technical documentation 2/ relevant for production of chemical weapons since ..., or reception of such equipment or documentation 2/ since that date, the following information shall be provided.

(To be elaborated.)

D. Initial declarations of chemical weapons production facilities

They shall contain the following information:

- (1) production, stating products by ...
- (2) capacity expressed as ... 3/
- (3)
- (4)

E. Declarations that all activities related to production of chemical weapons have ceased

F. Detailed declarations of chemical weapons production facilities

They shall contain the following information:

- (1) Geographical location expressed by ... 4/
- (2) Chemical names of products produced
- (3) Manufacturing/filling capacity for each substance expressed as ... 3/
- (4)
- (5)

1/ The view was expressed that past transfers should not be included in the Convention.

2/ The view was expressed that technical documentation should not be included.

3/ It was suggested that capacity be expressed as maximum hourly capacity.

4/ The view was expressed that declaration of location should be made in the context of declarations that production has ceased.

II. PLANS FOR THE CLOSURE, ELIMINATION AND CONVERSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

- A. Plans for closure 1/ of chemical weapons production facilities
- B. Plans for temporary conversion of chemical weapons production facilities into chemical weapons destruction facilities
- C. Plans for the elimination of chemical weapons production capacities
1. General plans
They shall include:
2. Detailed plans
They shall include:
- D. Plans for elimination of chemical weapons production facilities which have temporarily been converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities
- E. Plans for conversion of chemical weapons production facilities into facilities for production for permitted purposes 2/

III. DECLARATIONS OF OTHER FACILITIES PRODUCING CHEMICALS WHICH CAN BE USED FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES 3/

1/ Some delegations expressed the view that ceasing of production and closing of production facilities should be simultaneous. However, other delegations had doubts about the feasibility of this from the point of view of verification of the closure as well as from the point of view of possible temporary conversions of such facilities into facilities for destruction of chemical weapons.

2/ Some delegations held the view that conversion of chemical weapons production facilities into facilities for production for permitted purposes should not take place.

3/ Some delegations stressed that overall declarations should encompass not only production facilities with a production for chemical weapons purposes but also other facilities producing chemicals which can be used for chemical weapons purposes. It is understood that for the time being the paragraphs under the heading "Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities and plans for their elimination" refers only to production facilities with a production for chemical weapons purposes. A separate heading "Declarations of other facilities producing chemicals which can be used for chemical weapons purposes" has been inserted to indicate that the question of declaration of such facilities will need to be worked on.

IV. ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

A State Party shall decide for itself which methods, processes and techniques to use for the elimination of its chemical weapons production facility, if any, in accordance with the principles laid down in this Annex.

A. PRINCIPLES FOR THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

All chemical weapons production facilities shall be eliminated through destruction or dismantling. 1/ Chemical weapons production facilities may be temporarily converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities.

1. Destruction of chemical weapons production facilities

Destruction of chemical weapons production facilities means ...

Elimination through destruction shall apply to ...

2. Dismantling of chemical weapons production facilities

Dismantling of chemical weapons production facilities means ...

Elimination through dismantling may apply to ...

3. Elimination of chemical weapons production facilities temporarily converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities

4. Elimination of chemical weapons production facilities through conversion into facilities for production for permitted purposes 2/

B. PRINCIPLES FOR THE ORDER OF ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

(To be elaborated.)

C. PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF THE CLOSURE AND ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

The detailed arrangements for the actual verification of the elimination shall be worked out in collaboration between the State Party and the Consultative Committee (or its subsidiary organs, as appropriate) in accordance with the following principles:

1/ The view was expressed that pending the definition of chemical weapons production facilities, the possibility for other ways of elimination should be kept open.

2/ Some delegations held the view that conversion of chemical weapons production facilities into facilities for production for permitted purposes should not take place.

1. Principles and methods for the verification of closure of chemical weapons production facilities
(To be elaborated.)
2. Principles and methods for the verification of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities
(To be elaborated.)
3. Principles and methods for the verification of dismantling of chemical weapons production facilities
(To be elaborated.)
4. Principles and methods for the verification of elimination of chemical weapons production facilities which have temporarily been converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities
5. Principles and methods for the verification of elimination of chemical weapons production facilities through conversion into facilities for production for permitted purposes 1/

1/ Some delegations held the view that conversion of chemical weapons production facilities into facilities for production for permitted purposes should not take place.

VI. ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED BY THE CONVENTION 1/

1. Each State Party:

(a) has the right, subject to the provisions of this Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for purposes not prohibited by the Convention.

(b) shall ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are not developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or anywhere under its jurisdiction or control for purposes prohibited by the Convention.

2. Toxic Chemicals and Their Precursors:

(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors considered in Annexes 1, 2 and 3, which could be used for purposes prohibited by the Convention, as well as facilities which produce, process or consume these toxic chemicals or precursors, shall be subject to international monitoring as provided in those Annexes:

Annex VI.1: Super-Toxic Lethal Chemicals and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems].

Annex VI.2 List [A]: Key Precursors.

Annex VI.3 List [C]: Chemicals produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes.

(b) The Lists of chemicals contained in the Annexes may be revised as required (the basis and modalities for revision are to be developed).

3. Within 30 days of the entry into force for it, each State Party shall declare data on relevant chemicals and the facilities which produce them, in accordance with Annexes 1, 2 and 3.

4. Each State Party shall make an annual declaration regarding the relevant chemicals in accordance with Annexes 1, 2 and 3.

5. Each State Party undertakes to subject the chemicals and [facility] [facilities] under Annex 1 to the measures contained in that Annex.

6. Each State Party undertakes to subject the chemicals and facilities under Annex 2 to monitoring by data reporting and routine systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and use of on-site instruments as long as production and processing are not impaired.

1/ One delegation considers that the terminology used in this Article and its annexes should be consistent with the final definition of chemical weapons to be agreed upon.

7. Each State Party undertakes to subject the chemicals and facilities under Annex 3 to monitoring by data reporting.

8. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed in so far as possible to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities including the international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. 1/

9. In conducting verification activities, the (Consultative Committee) shall:

(a) avoid undue interference in the State Party's peaceful chemical activities;

(b) take every precaution to protect confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Convention; and

(c) require only the minimum amount of information and data necessary for the carrying out of its responsibilities under the Convention.

10. For the purpose of on-site verification, each State Party shall grant to the (Consultative Committee) access to facilities as required in Annexes 1, 2 and 3.

1/ The inclusion of this paragraph in this Article is to be considered further.

ANNEX 1

ARTICLE VI

Super-Toxic Lethal Chemicals and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems]

1. (a) The retention, production, acquisition and use of super-toxic lethal chemicals, and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems] for permitted purposes shall be strictly limited to those amounts which can be justified for such purposes.

(b) The production and use of all chemicals listed in Schedule [] shall be prohibited, except as required for research, medical or protective purposes.

(c) [Two alternatives for consideration]

(i) At no time shall the aggregate amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals, and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems] and key precursors possessed by a State Party for protective purposes exceed 1 metric tonne. The aggregate amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals acquired, withdrawn from chemical weapons stocks and produced for protective purposes shall not exceed 1 metric tonne per year, nor shall the annual amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals used for protective purposes exceed 1 metric tonne.

(ii) At no time shall the aggregate amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals, and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems] possessed by a State Party for permitted purposes exceed 1 metric tonne. The aggregate amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals acquired, withdrawn from chemical weapons stocks and produced for permitted purposes shall not exceed 1 metric tonne per year, nor shall the annual amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals used for permitted purposes exceed 1 metric tonne.

2. Single Small-Scale Facility

(a) Each State Party which produces super-toxic lethal chemicals, and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems] for [protective] [permitted] purposes shall carry out the production at a single specialized facility, the capacity of which shall be limited by measures to be determined. 1/

(b) The location and a detailed description of the facility shall be provided to the Consultative Committee no less than 30 days before operations commence.

1/ Some delegations consider that the production of key precursors for protective purposes should be carried out at a single small-scale facility.

(c) The facility shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments.

3. [Other Facilities] 1/

[To be developed.]

4. Transfers

[To be developed.]

5. Declarations

Declarations to be provided by a State Party in relation to Annex 1, under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article VI, shall include the following information: [To be developed.]

Schedule [] 2/

1/ Some delegations consider that the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes (other than protective) could be carried out at facilities other than the single small-scale facility. They consider that any facility producing or using a significant amount of these chemicals would be subject to strict monitoring, including data reporting and systematic international on-site inspection.

2/ The chemicals to be included in this Schedule are to be discussed. Some delegations consider that it is only necessary to list chemicals such as are in category I of CD/CW/WP.133. Other delegations consider that only in the context of elaborating a list of super-toxic lethal chemicals with no use as chemical weapons but which have practical application in pharmaceutical, medical and other civil purposes, could it be determined whether the division of super-toxic lethal chemicals into two categories could be acceptable and useful for the purposes of the Convention.

ANNEX 2

ARTICLE VI

KEY PRECURSOR CHEMICALS 1/

ANNUAL DECLARATION

The Annual Declaration to be provided by a State Party under Paragraph [] of Article VI shall include:

1. Aggregate data on each of the production, consumption, import and export of each of the key precursor chemicals listed in Schedule [].
2. The following information for each facility which produces, processes or consumes more than [] tonnes per annum of any of the key precursor chemicals listed in Schedule []: 2/

Key Precursor Chemical(s)

- (i) the chemical name, [trivial name used by the facility], structural formula, and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number.
- (ii) the total amount produced, consumed, imported and exported in the previous calendar year. 3/

Facility

- (i) the name of the facility and of the owner, company or enterprise operating the facility.
- (ii) the exact location of the facility. 4/
- (iii) whether the facility is dedicated to producing or processing the listed key precursor. 5/

1/ It is understood that there is an integral link between the list, the annual declaration and the verification measures for key precursor chemicals.

2/ The structure of this paragraph is provisional.

3/ Whether the total amount is to be expressed as an exact figure or within a range is to be discussed.

4/ It was suggested that "in a major enterprise" be added.

5/ This requirement needs to be considered further in connection with the question of "capacity".

- (iv) [the main orientation (purpose) of the facility]. 1/
- (v) the capacity (to be defined) of the facility. 2/
- (vi) which of the following activities are performed with regard to the key precursor chemicals:
 - (a) production
 - (b) processing with conversion into another chemical
 - (c) processing without chemical conversion
 - (d) other.
- (vii) whether listed key precursors are stored on-site in quantities greater than [] [tonnes]. 3/

Application of Chemical(s)

- (i) the purpose(s) for which the key precursor chemical(s) are produced, consumed or processed:
 - (a) conversion on-site (specify final product or product type)
 - (b) sale 4/ to other domestic industry (specify final product type)
 - (c) export of a key precursor (specify which country)
 - (d) other.

3. A State Party shall notify the International Authority of the name and location of any facility which intends, in the year following submission of the Annual Declaration, to produce, process or consume more than [] tonnes per annum of any of the chemicals listed in Schedule []. 5/

Verification

The facilities referred to in this Annex [shall] [may] be subject to systematic international on-site inspection on a routine basis (measures to be developed).

1/ It was suggested that this aspect could be incorporated in paragraph (vi).

2/ It was suggested that capability should also be considered in relation to capacity.

3/ The question of a threshold requires further consideration.

4/ It has been suggested that "sale" should be replaced by "transfer".

5/ The requirement contained in this provision is to be considered further.

SCHEDULE [] */

Part I: Initial list of chemicals which satisfy all the three criteria 1/ for key precursors

1. Chemicals containing one P-methyl bond (mainly halides of anhydrides esters and salts)
2. N,N-Dimethylphosphoramidic dichloride
3. Diethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidate
4. Bis (2-hydroxyethyl) sulphide (thiodiglycol) 4/
5. Arsenic trichloride 5/
6. 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid and its esters
7. Quinuclidin-3-ol

Part II: Chemicals which do not meet all the three criteria 1/ for key precursors but possess features that would warrant their inclusion as an exception in List (A)

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

Types of chemicals to which the chemicals listed in col 1 belong

1. Chemicals containing one P-methyl, P-ethyl or P-propyl (normal or iso) bond
2. N,N-Dialkylphosphoramidic dihalides
3. Dialkyl N,N-dialkylphosphoramidates
- 4.
- 5.
6. Phenyl-, alkyl- or cyclo-alkyl-substituted glycolic acids
7. 3- or 4-hydroxypiperidine and their derivatives

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

Aggregated list of relevant chemicals (as a result of the discussions) to which régime [A] 2/ should be applied

Aggregated list of key precursors (as a result of the discussions) to which régime [A] 2/ should be applied 3/

1. Chemicals containing one P-Methyl, P-Ethyl or P-Propyl (normal or iso) bond (mainly halides of anhydrides, esters and salts).
2. N,N-Dialkylphosphoramidic

*/ This Schedule is subject to development and revision. Lists (A) and (B) and régime [A] as mentioned in this schedule refer to lists and régimes in CD/651.

Part III

A. Chemicals which according to the views of some delegations satisfy all three criteria 1/ and should be listed in Part I and which according to the views of other delegations do not satisfy all three criteria and may be listed in Part II.

1. N,N-Diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride 6/
1. N,N-disubstituted aminoethyl-2-halides
2. N,N-Diisopropylaminoethan-2-ol 6/
2. N,N-disubstituted aminoethan-2-ols
3. N,N-Diisopropylaminoethane-2-thiol 6/
3. N,N-disubstituted aminoethane-2-thiols

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

B.

3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-ol 7/

Alkyl, cycloalkyl alcohols etc.

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

1/ The general approach to the criteria is reflected in Article II. The formulations for the criteria are not definitive and are still evolving.

2/ To be elaborated.

3/ The chemical substances in the aggregated list have been placed there on a provisional basis.

It is necessary to consider further:

- (a) listing the entire family or only listing specific types of derivatives within the family
- (b) possible analogs
- (c) use in peaceful industries.

4/ It was pointed out that whether or not régime [A] should be applied to this chemical depends on the nature of régime [A].

5/ This chemical meets all three criteria for a key precursor. However, it is used for military purposes not related to chemical weapons (i.e., electronics). It is necessary to consider further whether régime [A] should be applied or not.

6/ It is necessary to consider further whether this compound meets all three criteria for key precursors and thus should be placed in Part I of List [A] or whether it should be included in Part II of List [A] as an exception.

7/ Views differ as to whether this compound:

- (a) meets all three criteria for key precursors
- (b) should be placed in Part II of List [A] as an exception, or should be placed in List [B] as an especially dangerous precursor.

ANNEX 3

ARTICLE VI

Chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes

1. ANNUAL DECLARATION

The Annual Declaration to be provided by a State Party under paragraph [] of Article VI shall include the following information for each of the chemicals listed in Schedule []:

- (i) the chemical name, [trivial name], structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number.
- (ii) the total amount produced, consumed, imported and exported in the previous calendar year.
- (iii) the final product or end use of the chemical in accordance with the following categories (to be developed);
- (iv) for each facility which produces, processes, consumes or transfers 1/ one of the chemicals listed in Schedule [] (on an industrial scale - to be defined).
 - (a) the name of the facility and of the owner, company or enterprise operating the facility.
 - (b) the location of the facility.
 - (c) the capacity (to be defined) of the facility.
 - (d) the approximate amount of production and consumption of the chemical in the previous year (ranges to be specified).

2. A State Party shall notify the [International Authority] of the name and location of any facility which intends, in the year following submission of the Annual Declaration, to produce, process or consume any of the chemicals listed in Schedule [] (on an industrial scale - to be defined). 2/

1/ The relevance of transfers in this connection is to be considered further.

2/ The requirement contained in this provision is to be considered further.

Schedule [] */

Phosphorus oxychloride	(10025-87-3)
Phosphorus trichloride	(7719-12-2)
Phosgene	(75-44-5)
Cyanogen chloride	(506-77-4)
Hydrogen cyanide	(74-90-8)
Trichloronitromethane (chloropicrin)	(76-06-2)
Di- and Trimethyl/Ethyl Esters of Phosphorus p(III) Acid:	
Trimethyl phosphite	(121-45-9)
Triethyl phosphite	(122-52-1)
Dimethyl phosphite	(868-85-9)
Diethyl phosphite	(762-04-9)
[Sulphur monochloride] <u>1/</u>	(19925-67-9)
[Sulphur dichloride] <u>2/</u>	(19545-99-0)

VERIFICATION

The verification régime for chemicals listed in Schedule [] will comprise both the provision of data by a State Party to the [International Authority] and the monitoring of that data by the [International Authority]. 3/

*/ List 'C' in CD/651 refers.

1/ and 2/ The question of whether or not these chemicals should be listed in Schedule [] is still to be resolved.

3/ One delegation considers that provision should be made for resort to an on-site "spot-check" inspection, if required, to verify information supplied by a State Party.

VII. NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

Each State Party to this Convention shall adopt any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to implement this Convention and, in particular, to prohibit and prevent anywhere under its jurisdiction or control any activity that a State Party to this Convention is prohibited from conducting by this Convention.

In order to implement these obligations, each State Party shall, according to its needs and specific conditions, designate or establish a national authority. */

Each State Party undertakes to inform the Consultative Committee concerning the national authority and other legislative and administrative measures taken to implement the Convention.

Each State Party undertakes to co-operate with the Consultative Committee in the exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Consultative Committee including data reporting, assistance for international on-site inspections, provided for in this Convention, and a response to all its requests for the provision of expertise, information and laboratory support.

National Technical Means **/

*/ It was suggested that guidelines for the functioning of the national authority for the implementation of the Convention be elaborated.

**/ It was suggested that no reference to National Technical Means is needed in a future Convention.

VIII. CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE */

A. Establishment of the Consultative Committee

1. There is hereby established the Consultative Committee.
2. The Consultative Committee shall be the principal organ of the Convention.
3. The first session of the Consultative Committee shall be convened by the Depository at [venue] not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention.

B. Composition, procedure and decision-making

1. The Consultative Committee shall be composed of all the States Parties to this Convention. Each State Party to this Convention shall have one representative in the Consultative Committee, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
2. The Consultative Committee shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as may be convened at the request of ... members of the Consultative Committee or of the Executive Council or as provided in Article IX of the Convention.
3. Sessions shall take place at the seat of the Consultative Committee unless it decides otherwise.
4. The Consultative Committee shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its Chairman and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new Chairman and other officers are elected at the next regular session.
5. A majority of the members of the Consultative Committee shall constitute a quorum.
6. Each member of the Consultative Committee shall have one vote.
- [[7. Decisions on questions of procedure, including decisions to convene special sessions of the Consultative Committee, shall be taken by a simple majority.
8. Decisions on questions of substance shall be taken by [a two-third majority] [consensus]. When the issue arises as to whether a question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as one of substance unless otherwise decided by the Consultative Committee by the majority required for decisions on questions of substance.]]
- [[7. All decisions shall be taken by a two-third majority.]]

*/ Some delegations suggested that the question of how the expenses of the Consultative Committee shall be met needs to be addressed within the Convention at an appropriate time.

C. Powers and functions

1. The Consultative Committee shall [oversee] [review] the implementation of the Convention, consider any questions or matters relevant to the Convention or relating to the powers and functions of any subsidiary organs [established by the Consultative Committee], foster consultation and co-operation among States Parties [for the advancement of chemical industry for peaceful purposes] and promote the verification of compliance with this Convention.

2. In carrying out its functions [referred to in paragraph 1], the Consultative Committee shall inter alia:

(a) co-operate with the appropriate national authorities of States Parties;

(b) facilitate consultations and co-operation among States Parties at their request;

(c) review scientific and technical developments which could affect the operation of this Convention;

(d) encourage international scientific and technical co-operation in the chemical field for peaceful purposes, [especially with the objective of promoting the advancement of chemical industry in the developing States as provided in Article XI,]

(e) carry out all activities relating to measures of verification; for this purpose, the Consultative Committee shall,

(i) specify procedures for systematic international on-site inspection;

(ii) oversee [and carry out] systematic international on-site inspection in accordance with Articles ...;

[(iii) consider and decide on requests to send a fact-finding mission in accordance with Article ...;]

(iv) carry out fact-finding activities in accordance with Article IX;

(f) establish and revise as necessary, procedures for exchange of information, for declarations and for technical matters related to the implementation of this Convention;

(g) receive, keep [and make available to States Parties] declarations, plans and notifications presented by States Parties in accordance with Articles ...;

(h) provide a forum for discussion of any questions raised relating to the objectives or the implementation of the Convention;

(i) elect the members of the Executive Council in accordance with Article ...;

[(j) elect ... (the head of the Secretariat) from among the candidates proposed by members of the Consultative Committee,]

[(k) appoint inspectors as the staff of the Inspectorate and the head of the Inspectorate,]

(l) establish, as appropriate, such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Convention,

(m) adopt the rules of procedure [of the Executive Council including the method of selecting its Chairman],

(n) consider and approve the proposed annual budget of the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs submitted by the Council,

(o) consider and approve the reports of the Executive Council,

(p) after the expiry of a period of ... years from the date of entry into force of this Convention, undertake a review of the operation of this Convention in accordance with Article ... */

3. The Consultative Committee shall establish an Executive Council [within 45 days after the entry into force of the Convention].

4. While the Consultative Committee is ultimately responsible for the functions provided for in paragraph 2, it shall delegate the actual implementation of those functions to the Executive Council in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

*/ Some delegations were of the view that provisions on review should be more appropriately included in another part of the Convention.

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL */

A. Composition, procedure and decision-making

1. The Executive Council shall consist of [15] States Parties to this Convention elected by the Consultative Committee. [In addition, those permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations which are parties to the Convention should be represented]. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one representative in the Council, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
2. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected on the basis of [an appropriate geographic and political balance.]
3. Election shall take place at regular sessions of the Consultative Committee. Each [elected] member of the Executive Council shall serve for [two] [three] years period, with [five] of the members elected each year.
4. The Executive Council shall function at the seat of the Consultative Committee.
- [5. A majority of the members of the Executive Council shall constitute a quorum.]
6. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote.
- [[7. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority.
8. Decisions on questions of substance shall be taken by [a two-third majority] [consensus]. When the issue arises as to whether a question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as one of substance unless otherwise decided by the Council by the majority required for decisions on questions of substance.]]
- [[7. All decisions shall be taken by a two-third majority.]]

*/ Some delegations believed that the question of placement within the Convention of some of the provisions relating to the functions of the subsidiary organs will have to be considered at a later stage.

B. Functions */

1. The Executive Council shall be responsible to the Consultative Committee and shall have delegated authority to discharge the functions of the Consultative Committee as provided in paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 (a) to 2 (h) of Section I Subsection C of this Article.

2. The Executive Council shall particularly:

(a) supervise and co-ordinate the activities of the subsidiary organs of the Consultative Committee in implementing the provisions of the Convention;

(b) ensure the effective implementation of, and compliance with, the Convention;

(c) propose to the Consultative Committee, as appropriate, the establishment of such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Convention;

(d) present reports to the Consultative Committee particularly about the exercise of the functions delegated to it;

(e) request the ... (head of the Secretariat) when appropriate and necessary, to convene a special meeting of the Consultative Committee;

[(f) propose to the Consultative Committee the establishment of appropriate mechanisms for directing and supervising the Inspectorate,]

[(g) propose to the Consultative Committee the appointment of inspectors as the staff of the Inspectorate and appoint among the inspectors the head of the Inspectorate,]

(h) obtain, keep, and disseminate information submitted by States Parties regarding matters pertaining to the Convention.

(i) receive requests for information and clarification regarding compliance with the Convention from States Parties, including requests for fact-finding.

[(j) decide and oversee specific actions to be taken regarding such requests.]

*/ Some delegations considered that the provisions on the functions of the Executive Council will require further specification in the light of such functions as may be conferred upon the Council in other parts of the Convention, particularly with regard to verification.

IX. CONSULTATIONS, CO-OPERATION AND FACT-FINDING

1. State Parties shall consult and co-operate, directly among themselves, or through the Consultative Committee or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the objectives or the implementation of the provisions of this Convention.

2. States Parties to the Convention shall make every possible effort to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultations among them, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. [A Party which receives a request from another Party for clarification of any matter which the requesting Party believes causes such doubts or concerns shall provide the requesting Party, within ... days of the request, with information sufficient to answer the doubts or concerns raised along with an explanation on how the information provided resolves the matter.] Nothing in this Convention affects the right of any two or more States Parties to this Convention to arrange by mutual consent for inspections or any other procedures among themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the rights and obligations of any State Party under other provisions of this Convention.

Procedure for requesting clarification

3. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to assist in clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to doubts about the compliance of another State Party with the Convention. The Executive Council shall provide appropriate information and data in its possession relevant to the situation which can dispel such doubts, whilst [taking every precaution in] protecting commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Convention.

4. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to doubts about its compliance with the Convention. In such a case, the following shall apply:

(a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the State Party concerned within [24 hours] of its receipt.

(b) The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council within [seven days] of the receipt of the request.

(c) The Executive Council shall forward the clarification to the requesting State Party within [24 hours] of its receipt.

(d) In the event that the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it may request the Executive Council to obtain from the requested State Party further clarification.

(e) For the purpose of obtaining further clarification requested under paragraph 2 (d), the Executive Council may set up a group of experts to examine all available information and data relevant to the situation causing the doubt. The group of experts shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council on its findings.

(f) Should the requesting State Party consider the clarification obtained under paragraphs 2 (d) and 2 (e) to be unsatisfactory, it may request a special meeting of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part in accordance with provisions in Article ... In such a special meeting, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to cope with the situation.

5. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to clarify any situation which has been considered ambiguous or has given rise to doubts about its compliance with the Convention. The Executive Council shall respond by providing such assistance as appropriate.

6. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties to this Convention about any request for clarification provided in this Article.

7. [If the doubts or concerns of a State Party about compliance have not been resolved within [two months] after the submission of the request for clarification to the Executive Council, or it believes its doubts warrant urgent consideration, without necessarily exercising its right to the challenge procedure, it may request a special session of the Consultative Committee in accordance with Article ... In such a special session, the Consultative Committee shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to cope with the situation.]

Procedure for requesting a fact-finding mission

The further contents of Article IX remain to be elaborated.*/ **/ ***/

*/ The text in Annex III of the Report of Working Group C contained in CD/CW/WP.149 dealing with procedures for challenge inspection in its present form in some instances has narrowed down differences. In the view of many delegations the text reflects the current stage of negotiations. It requires further substantive work. Other material on fact-finding and challenge inspection can be found in documents CD/294, CD/334, CD/416, CD/443, CD/500, CD/539, CD/664, CD/685, CD/715, CD/CW/WP.120 and CD/CW/WP.136.

**/ Many delegations felt that the text contained in Annex III of the Report of Working Group C, which is the product of intensive negotiations and consultations during the 1986 session, should have been duly included in the final report of the Ad Hoc Committee. They deeply regretted, therefore, that lack of consensus prevented the Committee from doing so and were of the view that such text should be the basis for future work on the crucial issue of challenge inspection.

***/ In the opinion of other delegations, differences between positions on challenge inspection are still great, and the current state of negotiations on this issue is reflected in the many proposals that have been put forth.

X. ASSISTANCE

XI. ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

XII. RELATION TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS */

Nothing in this Convention will be interpreted as in any way impairing the obligations assumed under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 and in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.

XIII. AMENDMENTS

XIV. DURATION, WITHDRAWAL */

...

The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

XV. SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE

XVI. LANGUAGES

Annexes and other documents

Preparatory Commission

*/ Some delegations consider that the texts contained above require further consideration.

25 August 1986

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

LETTER DATED 20 AUGUST 1986 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TRANSMITTING
THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CPSU, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, MADE ON SOVIET TELEVISION ON
18 AUGUST 1986

I attach the text of a statement made on Soviet television on 18 August
by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. Please arrange for this statement to be
distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. ISSRAELYAN

New proposals have been made relating to chemical weapons which, in our view, will make it possible, by the end of the year or during next year, to sign a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and elimination of stocks of such weapons, as well as the industrial base for their production.



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