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International Perspectives

Journal of the Department of External Affairs



 External Affairs Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

Symposium on Canadian-U.S. Relations

Transition to a Vietnam Settlement

Canada and Europe

Behind the Rhetoric in Uganda

International Perspectives

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International Perspectives is designed as a publication combining articles by officers of the Department of External Affairs and the editors with contributions from people who have no connection with the Department. These contributors from outside the Department are expressing their personal views on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions of interest to Canadians.

Published by authority of
the Honourable Mitchell Sharp,
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

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A special issue of *International Perspectives*, released in October 1972, contained a major study of Canada-U.S. relations by External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp. The article examined the integrating forces at work in North America and attempted to assess the impact of these forces on Canada.

In the face of the pull of continental forces, the article identified three options as being open to Canadians:

To try to maintain something like the present position with a minimum of policy change;

to move deliberately toward closer integration with the United States;

to pursue a comprehensive, long-term strategy to develop the Canadian economy and other aspects of Canada's national life.

The article considered the first option inadequate because it did not come fully to grips with the basic Canadian situation or with the underlying continental pull and hence involved a risk that Canada might find itself "drawn more closely into the U.S. orbit". The second option was also rejected because whatever the economic costs and benefits of closer integration with the United States — it was judged unlikely that it was politically tenable "in the present or any foreseeable climate of

Canadian public opinion".

Mr. Sharp's article concluded that, of the three options presented, the third represented the one best calculated to serve Canadian interests because it would, in time, lessen "the vulnerability of the Canadian economy" and, in the process, strengthen "our capacity to advance basic Canadian goals" and develop "a more confident sense of national identity".

International Perspectives has asked four analysts of Canadian-U.S. relations to comment on the study, which was prepared with the advice and assistance of Mr. Sharp's colleagues in the Government and External Affairs Department officials.

The commentaries are provided by Professor Dale G. Thomson, director of the Center of Canadian Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Washington; Professor Louis Balthazar of Laval University; Professor Harry G. Johnson of the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics; and Professor Abraham Rotstein of the University of Toronto. Although two of these scholars are conducting their principal research at present outside Canada, all four are Canadian-born. The views expressed in each of these commentaries are those of the author.



Dale C. Thomson



Louis Balthazar



Harry G. Johnson



Abraham Rotstein

Option Three: what price tag?...

By Dale C. Thomson

While the content of Mitchell Sharp's article deserves careful analysis, the very fact and the circumstances of its publication are also worth mentioning. Over the centuries, foreign policy in practically every country has been the exclusive preserve of a small élite group, and, after it became independent, Canada fell with amazing rapidity into this pattern. The Canadian public, including academics, accepted this state of affairs; until recently courses on Canadian foreign policy were a rarity in our universities.

In recent years, the connection between domestic and foreign affairs has become more evident, a fact recognized by the Government of Canada when it declared in its Foreign Policy Review, issued

in 1970, that foreign policy was "the extension abroad of national policies". The Foreign Policy Papers themselves constituted not merely the "severe reassessment" of Canada's external policies called for by Prime Minister Trudeau in the 1968 election campaign — they represented as well an attempt to establish a dialogue with Canadians in that area of public policy, and to ensure greater popular understanding and participation.

The principal shortcoming of the Foreign Policy Papers was the absence of a booklet on Canadian-United States relations. Responsible officials in the Department of External Affairs asserted that the subject was too vast and complex to be encompassed within a single paper, and

that, at any rate, it recurred frequently in the other booklets. The point was also made that there were dangers in committing the Government in advance through policy papers to specific approaches and objectives. These arguments had to be discounted in view of the Government's goal of broader participation in the foreign policy process, and particularly the importance of Canadian-United States relations in the daily life of every Canadian. Accordingly, the gaps in the Foreign Policy Papers were ordered to be filled.

The document itself was drafted by the officials concerned and prepared in its final form by the Minister with the benefit of the advice and assistance of his Cabinet colleagues and departmental officials. It did not, however, receive full, formal Cabinet approval before release and was issued as a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. This is regrettable since it cannot be considered a statement of Government policy and could be disowned by Mr. Sharp's successor in that portfolio. On the other hand, we know that it is a carefully-considered statement by the Minister and specialists within the Department.

Another aspect of the publication of this article deserves special mention. That the Government has issued a carefully considered statement on an important subject for public consideration is cause for satisfaction. More impressive still is the fact that it has invited uninhibited comment on it in an official publication. There can be few precedents in any country for such a situation, and it augurs well for the practice of democracy in the area of Canadian foreign policy. However, in order for the process to be successful, both sides — officialdom and outside analysts — must be as forthright as possible in presenting the facts and their viewpoints; otherwise the exercise could easily become a sham.

Limited objectives

The objectives of Mr. Sharp's article are disappointingly limited. It examines the nature of the Canadian-United States relation, and then outlines three possible "options" or policy orientations for Canada in the immediate future. Apparently in an attempt to avoid any suggestion of a policy commitment, or even an official view of particular issues, the language is cautious to the point of evasiveness. For instance, while "Option Three" evidently finds favour with the author or authors, that preference is never stated specifically. The article has much of the tone, and even the content, of a speculative intel-

lectual exercise, and, as such, makes rather a frustrating reading for persons accustomed to drawing firm conclusions from hard facts.

Another consequence of the abstract nature of the article is that it discusses neither specific policy issues nor possible strategies for dealing with them. And there is a dyadic relation that cannot be examined without entering into specifics: it is surely the Canadian-United States one. To this criticism the answer can be given that general policy orientation must first be established, and that specific policy positions and strategies will flow from them.

But how is one to choose among three options if one does not know their implications in practical terms, which are the real concern of Canadians? Canadian like Mr. Sharp and his advisers, may lean in principle towards Option Three which calls for greater independence towards the United States; but they want to know the price tag on that option. And serious students of Canadian-American diplomacy will want to know, before making their choice, precisely how each option is to be implemented, how Americans are likely to react, and how it is proposed to deal with that reaction. Clearly the choice of a general policy option cannot be dealt with satisfactorily in isolation from these and similar considerations.

"Special relationship"

What of the options that have been outlined? The first is essentially the *status quo* "with a minimum of policy adjustments". It is described as "dealing with each problem as it arises and seeking to maintain something of a 'special relationship'". It comes as something of a surprise that the Government of Pierre Trudeau, that great conceptualizer, apparently has been — nay, still is — guilty of such "special relationship" or, in fact, special treatment on occasion. Speeches made by Mr. Sharp and his predecessors in the External Affairs portfolio over the years created the impression that Canada had a more coherent policy toward the United States. And we were told that the expression "special relationship" had been dropped from the vocabulary of both American and Canadian officials.

Option Two calls for Canada to deliberately toward closer integration with the United States", and possibly toward political union. A serious choice? Certainly one that belongs in the gamut of possible scenarios, but not to be considered

Choice of option should not be treated in isolation from U.S. reaction

rather, Canadians generally reject it, and Americans would do the same if all its implications were explained to them. Then why include it, and not some other intellectual constructs, say, closing the border completely and liquidating American holdings in Canada? Possibly to present a range of options, and a straw man to contrast with Option Three, the preferred way ahead.

By underselling Option One, and setting up Option Two as a diversionary target, Option Three is made to appear more imaginative, intellectually valid, and patriotically Canadian. It calls on Canada "over time [and it "will take time", we are told] to lessen [and "there are limits", we are warned] . . . the impact of the United States and . . . to strengthen our capacity to advance basic Canadian goals and develop a more confident sense of national identity". But, we are tempted to ask, isn't that what Mr. Sharp and his colleagues have been about in recent years? How does this option differ from what they have been, and are still doing, according to Option One?

Economic tone

But let us assume that Option Three represents a completely new orientation, and assess it accordingly. The changes envisaged are essentially economic in nature. "The basic aim," we are told, "would be . . . to lessen the vulnerability of the Canadian economy to external factors, including, in particular, the impact of the United States." However, "there is no basic change envisaged in Canada's multilateral trade policy", and no "intention to distort our traditional trading patterns". Indeed, "the United States would almost certainly remain Canada's most important market and source of supply by a very large margin".

Then what steps does Mr. Sharp have in mind to disentangle the two economies? He mentions "the concept of countervailing factors", "relative shifts . . . over time", "the judicious use of Canadian sovereignty", "mutually-reinforcing use of various policy instruments", and "trade policy . . . harnessed to . . . an industrial-growth strategy and a policy to deal with aspects of foreign ownership". This is an interesting shopping list of possibilities, but until the vague phrases are translated into specific measures, their effectiveness cannot be evaluated.

Then there is the dilemma of reconciling the objectives of making the Canadian economy "more rational and more efficient", and reducing our trade with our most natural trading partners. Canada

and the United States have not become each other's best customers because of any conscious design but rather because that was the most "rational" and "efficient" relation for both. To turn our backs deliberately on the United States market and "recast the economy" to develop alternative outlets that have far less potential in the foreseeable future, particularly for the manufactured products that Canada wants to sell in greater quantities, makes little economic sense. It may well make a good deal of sense, however, on other grounds, such as the more irrational but equally legitimate desire to ensure a distinct national entity. In presenting Option Three to the Canadian people, Mr. Sharp would have been well advised to explain more forthrightly this fundamental choice, and the costs involved.

Cultural terrain

Mr. Sharp also ventures, somewhat cursorily, onto the terrain of American cultural influence in Canada. He paraphrases John Kenneth Galbraith, Canadian-born economist at Harvard University, to the effect that United States economic influences can be disregarded as long as Canada maintains a distinct culture. What Professor Galbraith actually said was that the battle for Canadian identity had to be fought more on the cultural than on the economic front. Mr. Sharp comments that "many Canadians would disagree with him", and one can only presume he shares that view. This impression is strengthened by two subsequent assertions: that Canadians do not feel as concerned about cultural as about economic domination; and that "the general directions of Canadian policy in the cultural sector have been set and they have been pursued with reasonable success. Perhaps we have already turned the corner".

Both statements raise serious questions. Where is the evidence that Canadians are less concerned about a lack of cultural distinctiveness? And, even if they are, does that mean that the problem is less real? Far from having "turned the corner", it could mean that we have gone so far past it that there is no turning back. It also seems optimistic to assume that the two "prescriptions" at present applied in the cultural sector — regulatory measures and direct support — will offset the asphyxiating effects on Canadian creativity of the massive flow from the South.

In preparing the article, Mr. Sharp and his advisers were evidently uneasily aware that the Americans were watching over their shoulders. It is interspersed with assurances that Option Three is not

Defining differences with Galbraith on the struggle for cultural identity

directed against the United States, and that the American threat is clearly inadvertent, not a malevolent design. American sources, including President Nixon, are invoked to justify the new orientation as a normal national aspiration. Distinctiveness from, but harmony with, the United States is the goal, the United States is assured, and no drastic change is contemplated in the bilateral relation. These reassuring statements are important, but once again they raise more questions than they answer. Like Canadians outside Mr. Sharp's immediate entourage, Americans are curious to know what this "deliberate, comprehensive and long-term strategy" implies in practical terms. What, in his view, is "the optimum range of interdependence" between the two countries that he is seeking?

Nixon policies

Option Three must also be assessed in the light of the present economic policies of the Nixon Administration. In this respect, at least, the United States has accepted the fact that Canada is a separate country and is determined to reduce the imbalance, currently running in Canada's favour, in payments between the two countries. Washington is nettled by the Canadian surpluses under the auto pact and the defence production sharing agreements, the lower Canadian tourist allowances and indirect Canadian subsidies to exports, as in the Michelin tire case. Americans argue that the Canadian industrial strategy, evoked by former Trade and Commerce Minister Jean-Luc Pepin, will further aggravate the balance-of-payments situation since more than 80 per cent of Canadian manufactured goods are sold in the American market. But the most important factor affecting the bal-

There is no intrinsic reason . . . why Canadian distinctness should in any way inhibit the continued existence of a fundamentally harmonious relationship between Canada and the United States.

. . . There will, of course, be issues such as Canada's policies on foreign ownership, and perhaps in relation to energy and other resources — and in many other areas —, where perceptions will differ. The same will almost certainly be true of United States policies as that country continues to grapple with secular and structural problems of economic adjustment. . . . In the main, however, we should expect both countries to manage change in a spirit of

ance of payments is the huge amount of Canadian borrowing on the United States money market.

Conceivably, a Canadian policy inspired by Option Three could reduce borrowing south of the border, limit government assistance to industries selling in American markets, cancel the defence production sharing agreements and the auto pact. Those steps would go far to meet Mr. Sharp's objectives of distinctness and harmony between the two countries. But would their consequences be acceptable to Canadians? In any measure, Canadians themselves are setting the limits on their independence from the United States by their desire to enjoy the benefits of an open-border relationship. There is a price tag on Option Three. Mr. Sharp wants to make it official policy; he should first explain how much it will cost; then Canadians can make up their minds about it, according to how much they are willing to pay.

Mr. Sharp has made a good beginning in enunciating a Canadian policy toward the United States. He, or his successor, should be encouraged to flesh out the intellectual skeleton he has presented. And he should certainly be encouraged to pursue the public debate that he has stimulated.

Dr. Thomson is professor of international relations and director of the Centre for Canadian Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of a number of books and articles on Canadian affairs and U.S.-Canadian relations. His most recent book (with Roger Swanson) is Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives.

harmony and without doing unnecessary damage to interests on the other side. Above all, it is in Canada's interest to work closely with a dynamic and outward-looking United States whose influence and the leverage it can bring into play will continue to be critical to the achievement of some of Canada's principal objectives in the international environment.

In the final analysis, harmony is not an extraneous factor in the Canadian-United States relationship. It has marked the relationship because it is based on a broad array of shared interests, perceptions and goals. . . . (Excerpts from "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future").

Achieving a stronger identity...

By Louis Balthazar

The publication of a special document on Canada-U.S. relations, signed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, must be greeted as an important step in the development of Canadian foreign policy. From now on, Canada's policies with regard to the United States may be something more than the reaction of the moment; indeed, one may hope that they will be part of a general, well-defined policy. At the very least, we shall now have an instrument enabling us to judge these policies in terms of specific objectives and a serious evaluation of the situation.

This recent document is an "in-depth" study whose content shows marked progress over the 1970 review, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*. All aspects of the Canada-U.S. problem are described in their full complexity and correctly situated in the context of the international system. The options open to Canada are analyzed closely and realistically, as are the reasons for the choice proposed. One can undoubtedly find shortcomings in various chapters. In this paper, however, I shall merely deplore a certain brevity with regard to the assumption underlying the basic objective and to the means of achieving that objective.

The Canadian identity

It is clear that reduction of the vulnerability of the Canadian economy is justified only by the desire of Canadians to constitute a distinct society "because they want to do the things they consider important and do them in their own way" (*International Perspectives*, Autumn 1972, P. 20).

The true postulate of Canadian foreign policy towards the United States is not, therefore, one of economic growth, which could, after all, be achieved at the cost of greater integration with the American economy. Rather, it is above all "to strengthen our capacity to advance basic Canadian goals and develop a more confident sense of national identity" (P. 17). The document returns to this point on several occasions:

"The pursuit of a distinctive identity runs through the process of Canadian nation-building" (P. 13). "(The real ques-

tion . . .) is whether interdependence with a big, powerful, dynamic country like the United States is not bound, beyond a certain level of tolerance, to impose an unmanageable strain on the concept of a separate Canadian identity . . ." (P. 13).

"In essence, distinctness should be implicit in any relationship between two sovereign countries such as Canada and the United States. The very fact that it has to be singled out as an objective of foreign policy says something about the Canada-U.S. relationship" (P. 20).

It is quite true that in most relations between sovereign countries, this question of separate identities is self-evident. Why is this not so in the case of the Canada-U.S. relation? On several occasions, the document mentions the "affinities" between the two countries. In the case of American cultural influence, for example, "Canadians generally find it more difficult to focus on it than on the U.S. impact on the Canadian economy, perhaps because the many affinities between Canadians and Americans tend to make any concept of a threat unreal" (Pp. 19-20).

Is this not the crux of all Canadian policy with respect to the United States? The question is, to what extent do Canadians constitute a population distinct from the American population? Undoubtedly, other quite separate nations also face the problem of the economic and cultural influence of the United States. Undoubtedly, Canada's geographical location is a factor that aggravates the problem. But is this question of identity as acute in Mexico as it is in Canada?

Ambivalence toward U.S.

Here it is absolutely essential to consider first English-speaking and then French-speaking Canadians, a matter the document wished to avoid as much as possible. This ambivalence toward the United States lies at the very heart of the history of English Canada. The tragedy of the Loyalists is that they were forced to define themselves as British while at heart remaining Americans. It has been shown that the American Revolution divided a homogeneous people in two and that fidelity to the myth of the British Crown has

'Is this question of identity as acute in Mexico as it is in Canada?'

been largely a defence mechanism on the part of those who were forced to go North against their will. The "British of North America" have long refused to find an identity of their own. Today, English-speaking Canadians are quite detached from Britain, but their latent Americanism has perhaps not altogether disappeared. It is true that the majority of English-speaking Canadians are not descendants of the Loyalists. But have not many of them become so by adoption? Have not many others arrived in Canada because they wished to become Americans?

Today this desire to be Canadians, to act together as a people with an identity separate from that of the United States, is growing stronger. But it is a desire that lacks roots and it is difficult to see how far it can go.

The case of French-Canadians is much simpler. Their culture very early diverged sharply from that of modern France and, though they have always been subject to the American pull, their language and way of life give them a separate identity. Thus they do not react in the same way to the impact of the American economy on Canadian enterprises. According to the document, "they tend not to draw a very sharp distinction between the impact of economic control of local enterprise, whether exercised from the United States or from elsewhere in Canada" (P. 16). Nevertheless, one hopes that French-Canadians will prefer to be a minority in Canada rather than in North America and will be responsive to Canada's efforts to expand the French culture. The situation is perhaps not quite so simple.

Indeed, if it is true that foreign policy must reflect certain aspects of domestic policy, it is the whole problem of Canadian unity, if not that of two cultures (or two nations!), which must be faced when defining Canada-U.S. relations. The document occasionally mentions the need to co-ordinate federal and provincial policies toward the United States. This is not sufficient. Americans themselves have already given us to understand that the uncertainty about Canada's future is not without harmful effects on Canadian foreign policy. Why should we not face up to it? The problem of economic and cultural penetration by the United States must necessarily be considered by Ottawa in conjunction with provincial governments, in particular with the government of Quebec, which, rightly or wrongly, tends to consider Canadian economic nationalism as wholly an Ontario phenomenon.

The Canadian identity cannot be defined without considering the presence in

Canada of two distinct societies, whose sometimes view problems differently. A trait that distinguishes Canada from the United States is perhaps precisely this duality, not to use the discarded expression "biculturalism". In any event, the consolidation of the Canadian economy acquire meaning only if it respects the postulate of a Canadian identity understood in all its complexity.

Means of achieving independence

The Department of External Affairs defines Canadian foreign policy toward the United States as "a comprehensive . . . strategy to . . . strengthen the Canadian economy", thus essentially in economic terms. It is, of course, in this field that the most urgent problems are. Though these problems are well defined in the document, there is less certainty as to how they may be solved. It is understandable that an account of this kind deal with the formulation of precise policies. Nevertheless, the study is so detailed in its evaluation of the problems that one might have hoped for at least an attempt at solving problems such as the submission of subsidiaries of American companies to essentially American directives on export monopolies and so on. Nor is any mention made of contracts awarded by the United States to Canadian companies. Such contracts, devoid of any protectionist character, are undoubtedly profitable for some sectors of the Canadian economy, contributing to technological progress; however, they link Canada uncomfortably to American military policies, notably in Vietnam.

Defence policies

With regard to defence policies, we are given to understand in the descriptive part of the document that Canada's strategic dependence on the United States has lessened considerably as a result of technological advances and improved Soviet-American relations. Nothing is said, however, of the renewal of NORAD agreements scheduled for 1973. Nor are we told whether Canadians will be able to make the Americans accept any major diversification of their defence policy, from cold war activities to peacekeeping goals.

Finally, Canadian independence is not only evident on the economic, cultural and military levels. If it is complete, without, of course, renouncing the need for interdependence, it must affect major policies. Canada has already learned to keep its distance from the United States when required to do so in national interests, as, for example,

Ottawa must deal with U.S. penetration in conjunction with the provinces

Whatever the case, it is comforting to think that Canada's foreign policy is becoming more vigorous and freeing itself from some of the constraints of former years. If only Canadians can achieve a stronger identity, one can hope that they will find the best means of maintaining their independence.

Louis Balthazar is Professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Laval University, and head of that department. He is also director of the Section of Comparative Foreign Policy of the Quebec International Relations Centre and co-ordinator of a research program on various aspects of Canada-United States relations.

The advantages of integration...

by Harry G. Johnson

Mitchell Sharp's carefully modulated and handsomely reasonable essay entitled *Canada-S. Relations: Options For The Future* embodies one of the characteristics I have come to consider most distinctively Canadian. This is the unquestioning assumption that, if enough eminent Canadians express enough "concern" about something, and keep up the clamour long enough to get their "concern" widely publicized, there must be a real problem requiring government policy action, regardless of whether the concern is backed up by solid evidence and analysis, or merely reflects an inferiority complex or an inability to obtain under free competition the amount of property, academic or literary repute, or whatever, that the "concerned" citizen considers his due as an eminent Canadian.

On the economic side, the argument for policies to establish Canadian control over the Canadian economy was launched by the Gordon report, *Canada's Economic Prospects*, whose recommendations were clearly oriented toward the financial interests of Toronto, and carried on by the Watkins report. On the cultural side, apart from the long-standing pressure from Canadian broadcasters and magazine-writers for protection for the sale of inferior Canadian imitations of American products, there has recently been a cam-

paign by Canadian academics (largely located in Ontario) to insist that Canadian students should be educated by Canadians no more accomplished than themselves. It takes a great deal of literary skill to merge these self-interested pleas into a national desire for national distinctiveness. It also takes a great deal of optimism to believe that the distinctiveness acquirable by the policies recommended by such interest groups, however rationalized by reference to Canadian concerns, will be something that Canadians will be able to take pride in rather than apologize for to foreigners.

The trouble with the concept of "national distinctiveness" is that, individually, you only know whether you have it or not when you get involved in serious discussion of important general problems with nationals of other countries, and discover that you either can or cannot see angles to a problem that the others do not see, or judge the issues and arrive at answers more fairly than they. Collectively, you only know you have it when either privately or by government policy you have arrived at solutions to common human problems better than those other nations have arrived at. (Of course, one can arrive at far worse decisions, and so be distinctively backward in civilization, but this is not the theme of Mitchell Sharp's paper.) Distinctiveness in either

context is something quite different from bull-headed insistence on "my nation, right or wrong".

In either case, it is not safe to allow its presence to be determined, and the means of achieving it, if deemed absent, to be determined, by the judgment of a national élite whose main concern is to establish themselves in the same position in their national society as they think other national élites enjoy in theirs.

Canadian character

I firmly believe that there is a distinctive Canadian national character; and it is compounded of three elements, all deriving from Canada's position as the northern small neighbour of the United States. The first, and to me completely unattractive, side, is the inferiority complex in relation to the United States and the endemic anti-Americanism that permeate Canadian opinion at all levels. This is a legacy of the American Revolution (which they now call politely the War of Independence), the resulting influx into Ontario of United Empire Loyalists; and the fact that our British immigrants have long memories of that war and the contempt of an aristocratic society for a democratic one. This aspect is in contradiction to the second, and, I believe, very valuable, characteristic: that Canada has never had the "melting-pot" tradition, and it remains open to immigration on a relatively significant scale, whereas the United States does not. This means that Canada is a microcosm of what the world will have to become in due course — a place where people of different origins have to learn to live with each other in peace and mutual respect, and in which the function of government is to satisfy common needs that people cannot satisfy by themselves, not to marshal them into the service of grandiose military or international political or economic objectives that they do not want but that their political leaders do.

The third characteristic is that, precisely because it is a small country but one that understands the United States and the realities of international power politics, Canada has to believe in and defend the international rule of law as the only defence available to small countries against the derogations from that rule by large countries. The inferiority complex and anti-Americanism I deplore, as demeaning to what Canadians are or could become; I also suspect that, for many Canadians, they are an excuse for delivering less to Canadian society than their original talents justified. The "live-and-let-live" principle and the faith in the rule of inter-

national law put Canadians ahead of the rest of the world in global civilization; and it would be a tragedy indeed if the atavistic ambition of some Canadian mindful of the glories of past European empires from which their forebears emigrated, and envious of the present position of the United States as a far more powerful heir to the European imperial concept should succeed in coercing Canada's citizens back into conformity with an obsolete conception of the nation state. Because Canada is a country mixed out of French colonialism, British imperialism and unbrainwashed *émigrés* from imperialistic European nation states, the idea of turning Canada into a European American type of nation state must obviously appeal emotionally to many Canadians; but it is not the way to preserve and foster Canadian distinctiveness in any genuinely significant sense.

Distinguishing the options

Mitchell Sharp's paper is couched in fashionable American terms of "options". They are not really options, in the sense of genuinely available alternatives for choice, at least as Mr. Sharp presents them; the whole argument leads up to the conclusion that Option Three, "the long-term strategy, etc.", is the only one available. I would myself distinguish between so-called options in quite different terms. Option Three is what Canada would do if it had a highly centralized and powerful national government that was attempting to reach an optimal compromise between the aspirations of certain members of the national élite for domination over the nation state of the conventional and obsolete kind, and the objective circumstances of the nature of the Canadian economy and the rules of the international competitive game. (These rules favour explicit protection of domestic industries but permit implicit protection *via* fiscal policy, science policy, and so forth.)

Option Two, deliberate closer integration with the United States, is what Canada should do in its own economic interests. Mitchell Sharp admits this, then introduces a number of plausible but completely unwarranted propositions the effect that a free-trade area must be turned into a customs union and then into a political union, which would be unacceptable to Canadians. It is both surprising and appalling that the excellence of members of the Canadian External Affairs Department — whose quality is admired by every other foreign affairs department I know — should be enlisted in the support of the travesty of the facts of

'Canada a microcosm of what the world will have to become in due course'

history of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) offered in Mr. Sharp's paper. Even the slightest knowledge of the history of EFTA would show that what such an association discovers is that tariffs are not the only obstacle to trade, and that fair free-trade competition requires attention to the other barriers and Canada's own experience with Commonwealth preferences (not quite the same thing as a free-trade area, but the same in economic principle) shows no tendency whatever for the members of the system to move "toward a full customs and economic union as a matter of internal logic".

It is also instructive to compare Mitchell Sharp's arguments on this score, which stress the alleged political disadvantage of Canada-U.S. economic integration as an overwhelming offset to the economic advantage, with the British arguments for joining the European Economic Community, which stress the political advantages in terms of international power as an overwhelming offset to the absolutely certain economic disadvantage.

If Canadians wish to be independent of the United States, the best way to do it is to secure the maximum possible participation in American affluence and dynamism. Although for dynamism the Japanese, Germans and Italians have the Americans beat by miles — another instance of Canadians accepting American mythology without question) and to spend the resulting profits their own way; and the richer Canadians are, the less likely they are to want to let an American majority decide how to spend their money for them.

Canada's course

The first option — proceed more or less along present policy lines — is not what Canada could or should do, but what in fact it will do. Canadian policy towards the United States, ever since the start of Mitchell Sharp's "Phase Three", has been a mixture of truculence reined in by opportunism as soon as it began to hurt any important short-run economic Canadian interests. If Canadians really wanted "distinctiveness" to the extent of being willing to pay a price for it, they should welcome any American policy that treated Canada just like any other country outside the United States, instead of always rushing to Washington to ask for exemption under the rubric of the "special relationship". But since the Canadian government always does the latter, and since the Canadian electorate is smart enough to save itself from centralized coercion either by insisting on provincial rights or by voting federally so as to make

a coalition government necessary, short-run opportunism (Option One) and not long-run national policy determination (either Option Two or Option Three) is the best that we can expect of Canadian policy towards the United States — and it may be the best of the options offered by Mitchell Sharp.

In conclusion, some comments should be made on two themes that run through Mitchell Sharp's essay: "the continental pull" and "Canadian vulnerability". The "continental pull", in economic terms, is simply the dawning recognition that a former daughter colony of a now aged and declining mother country will gain by transferring its interest from supporting mother to courting with a young, virile and rich young man. In cultural terms, it represents a recognition that very rich people can teach comfortably rich people how to spend their money wisely better than poor people can. The United States is the mentor for the whole world in the exploration and dissemination of styles of living for an affluent mass (not class) society; it is only Canadian parochialism that prevents Canadians from noticing that what is regarded in Canada as "Americanization" is accepted in other countries both east and west of the "iron curtain", albeit reluctantly, as the modernization and democratization of society. The complaint about the "continental pull", from another point of view, represents the unwillingness of the archaic British élite of Canadian society to be dragged kicking and screaming into the modern world.

"Canadian vulnerability" is another ambiguous phrase. Economically, it refers to the fact that, because of the high degree of interdependence between the Canadian and U.S. economies, the effects of either U.S. depression or inflation on U.S. balance-of-payments policy actions can have a potentially large impact on the Canadian economy. But these effects can be largely offset by Canadian use of a floating exchange-rate against the U.S. dollar — a policy instrument that the options paper nowhere mentions, though it is crucial to the whole management of Canada-U.S. relations — by adroit use of Canadian fiscal and monetary policy, and by the automatic adaptive flexibility of the Canadian economy. One suspects that Mr. Sharp's view of the seriousness of Canadian vulnerability is based on the stridency of the immediate complaints of Canadian business about changes in U.S. policy, not on *ex post facto* analysis of how much real resource cost these changes imposed on the Canadian economy. Cultur-

Can make use of fiscal, monetary policies to offset 'vulnerability' to U.S. actions

ally, "Canadian vulnerability" refers to the easy and cheap availability of American communications media to the vast majority of Canadian citizens. The assumption is that availability ensures conviction and perversion — an assumption that is the key issue in the current controversy about pornography, and one in which Canadian intellectuals tend to take a dramatically opposite position in that context to the one they adopt regarding "Americanization". In my judgment, people prefer to read, listen to, and watch what is best tailored to their taste, but to use the results as a sort of echo-sounding procedure that enables them to determine where they really stand. There is no reason to think that the easy and cheap availability does more to "Americanize" Canadians than it does to remind them of why they are happy not to be Americans — especially as the American cultural media are free to express reasoned (and even unreasoned) dissent from official

American policy. In fact, one could argue that Canadian exposure to reasoned American opposition to official American policy is, in large part, responsible for the surge of Canadian interest in Canada's "distinctiveness" since the escalation of the war in Vietnam.

One postscript on a positive note: a sense of Canadian identity would be greatly strengthened if more young Canadians from the Hamilton-Ottawa-Montreal triangular industrial centre of Canada were assisted and/or obliged to spend a year or two of working life in one of the other regions of Canada.

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Shedding innocence and dogma

By Abraham Rotstein

In a liberal society, the parentage of documents, no less than of persons, deserves to be set aside in a consideration of their intrinsic merits. Invidious voices would remind us that within the same period of the election campaign we were offered 80 acres of redeveloped waterfront in Toronto and the makings of an independent foreign policy. The disclaimers that either policy had anything to do with the federal election were delivered with an unblinking sincerity that commanded the highest awards for dramatic performance. Gift horses are to be welcomed, however, and dental scrutinies only to be done later. More than one good public policy has been the child of political expediency.

The Department of External Affairs continues to produce the most elegant prose in Ottawa — writing with lucidity, moderation and a logic that is as compelling as it is comprehensive. But it is the substance of the document that stands out, elevating the Department from keepers of the quieter arts of protocol to spokesmen for a new mood. Indeed, a new generation of civil servants

is articulating fundamentally reoriented ideas on behalf of the entire nation. It almost ventures the suggestion that we have become educators extraordinary, an old guard congenitally fearful of confronting the dimensions of the Canadian dilemma.

To think of *Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future* solely as a document in foreign policy, however, would miss the point. In regard to policy toward the United States, the distinctions between foreign and domestic preoccupations have long since blurred. Indeed, once the *Foreign Policy Review* of 1970 had been defined, quite rightly, the national interest as the touchstone of foreign policy, one could have foreseen some such document as the logical outcome. At the core of the national interest must be national independence — a categorical imperative for policy-makers, who must necessarily look first to the survival of the state. Thus we have the following question: "The fundamental question for Canada is whether and to what extent interdependence with the United States

repairs the reality of Canada's independence." Although the statement as a whole is unexceptionable as a declaration — even this late date — of independence, it may be judged more critically by those who have long since passed from the credo to the issues of timing and strategy.

Questionable assumption
On these grounds the chief assumption of the U.S.-Canada options paper that is questionable is that "no policy option is likely to be tenable in any context other than that of a harmonious relationship between Canada and the United States".

The qualifications follow immediately: the Canadian-American relationship may become more complex" and on both sides "perceptions will differ". Potential — indeed actual — sources of conflict touching on vital national interests on both sides come immediately to mind and the likelihood of harmonious solution is, at the least, an open question. With a seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate in Canada hovering between 6 and 7 per cent, the various techniques used and contemplated by the Nixon Administration that impinge on our employment level are not easily a matter for harmonious resolution. The Canadian-American Committee has now pinpointed this question as the crucial source of tension between the two countries over the next few years. The DISC legislation (Domestic International Sales Corporation) now effectively in operation is organized in an aura of confidentiality that makes it almost impossible to gauge its effects on this country, even if we suspect that we are not substantially damaged. The pending Burke-Hartke Bill is another matter and carries the weight of the American trade union movement behind it.

Various estimates of potential loss of employment in Canada if this legislation could be passed provide cause for grave concern. If one adds to this the related employment issues of the auto pact, the Mackenzie Valley pipeline (offering no more than 400 permanent jobs) and other possible trade restrictions that may flow from the continuing American balance-of-payments crisis, then "harmonious" relations are by no means clearly in the cards.

Various strategies that derive from forward planning for such eventualities will be mandatory and, it is to be hoped, these will not be inhibited by wishful assumptions about the future tenor of Canadian-American relations.

What is clearly exposed is the self-imposed Canadian vulnerability, which emanates from our previous (and existing) *laissez-faire* policies toward foreign investment. We must now clearly recognize that the multinational corporation is not a one-way street for creating employment but provides a channel into the heart of the Canadian economy for *reducing* employment if the more stringent American measures materialize.

The political and administrative control over these "multinational" corporations by the American Government remains intact, and they continue to serve as an available instrument of U.S. economic policy abroad.

The prospects are not all Cassandra-like by any means, however! The most positive sign is the growing awareness of the central question of independence among Canadian policy-makers, not only in External Affairs but in the Science Council and, occasionally, in other quarters, such as the Secretary of State's Department.

The acclamation for this statement, however, will not be universal. I suspect that the old guard among academic economists may be the last to reorient their thinking. Invocations will, no doubt, continue to the classical trinity of free trade, free capital markets and the supposedly greater prosperity that results for Canadian workers — should they have a job. On this latter point of solicitude for the worker, these sources have yet to accommodate themselves to minimum wage legislation.

If we can ever shed this colonial combination of innocence and dogma, and discover the present network of power and administrative relations posed by the presence of multinational corporations in our midst, we shall be well on the way to the end of that era future historians may subtitle "From Colony to Hibernation".

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Multinational firms continue to serve as an instrument of American policy

The problems of transition to a settlement in Vietnam

By Mark Gayn

The transition from war to peace is never simple. In South Vietnam it has been (how can one best put it?) most unusual.

The United States undertook an airlift second only to that which saved West Berlin a generation earlier. In one 48-hour period in November, some 60 giant U.S. transports brought in 1,400 tons of military matériel. U.S. Air Force emissaries went searching the hangars of friendly nations, from Iran to South Korea, for planes that could be transferred hastily to the government in Saigon. In a few instances, for fear that the ceasefire might occur too soon, war supplies were formally transferred to the South Vietnamese Government while they were still waiting to be put aboard ships in U.S. ports. Through this device no one could, on some future day, accuse the Americans of having breached the draft agreement under which no military hardware could be transferred once the truce was arranged.

It was also a rare day at Saigon's vast Ton Son Nhut airport when arriving planes did not bring in yet another group of uncommunicative American civilians. In mid-November, 5,000 of them were already in South Vietnam, and another 5,000 were being hired under secret contracts to serve as "civilian advisers" to the government in Saigon. One heard also of American companies come to do good, but with no publicity: the Lear Siegler, Inc., whose men will be servicing the F-105s; the Norman Harwell Associates of Texas, which will be helping with the maintenance of what has already been billed as the world's third-largest air force.



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Many of the planes delivered to South Vietnam would have to be mothballed, for it is not likely that there would be half enough pilots to fly them.

But let no one jump to the conclusion that the United States, in its pursuit of peace, has been any less sincere to North Vietnam. The latter, too, has been moving arms south. And it has been insisting adamantly on keeping its troops there — obviously to give protection to the Viet Cong and its political activities spreading across South Vietnam's countryside for tomorrow's tests of strength.

This accumulation of weapons suggested that both Washington and Hanoi expected the conflict to continue. But it would be a different kind of struggle. In 1965-72, it had been a miniature war, much like the conflict in Spain in the thirties. The arrangement that was painfully hammered out in late 1972 made it clear that the three major powers involved in the struggle — China, the Soviet Union and the United States — were not going to let the war continue. The new arrangements would end direct intervention. The new arrangements would a continued civil war, or at least a protracted struggle with a great deal of military involvement. But it would no longer be a uniformed Americans die in this uncontrolled land, and it would no longer be the relations among the Big Three.

Détente as goal

This change has been the product of a major historic development. About a year ago all three major powers involved in Vietnam began to re-examine their international and national priorities. And each, for its own compelling reasons, decided that the war in Vietnam no longer served its interests. That the old-fashioned cold war was unrewarding, and that what each country desired was a world-wide détente. The coincidence of interest, unprecedented in the past quarter of a century, has made the dominant political fact of our time.

It is useful to recall why each of the three became initially enmeshed in Vietnam. The United States entered the

1965 because it was determined to check the spread of Communism wherever it could, and it saw Hanoi as Peking's tool in achieving mastery of Southeast Asia.

China became involved in the conflict not because Hanoi was its tool but because Peking could no more allow the Americans to establish a military foothold on the Vietnamese side of its borders than it could allow this in Korea in 1950. The Chinese involvement in the war was costly in weaponry supplied and in rice, in the 40,000-50,000 men who helped to sustain communications in North Vietnam, and in industrial equipment. Half a century ago, on a visit to a huge machine-building plant in Shansi Province, I saw scores of crates with machinery destined for North Vietnam. Such crates, I have no doubt, could have been found in the warehouses of many other Chinese factories in those years.

The Soviet Union entered the conflict for a variety of reasons. It could not allow its Communist ally to be crushed by the Americans. It became increasingly pleased to see the United States mired in a war that was straining its economy and, even more, rending its social fabric. It wanted to test its weapons (it did in Spain 30 years earlier). And, as important as any of these, it wished to prevent China's dominance in this corner of Asia.

But, by late 1969, all three decided independently that it was time for relative disengagement in Vietnam, for other interests were far more important.

Soviets as rivals

China became convinced that the "American Century" in Asia, which began with the conquest of Japan in 1945, had just run its course. Now the United States no longer seemed to be the prime power in the mid-Sixties, while the Soviets were increasingly seen as the principal rivals. It therefore seemed advisable to establish contacts with Washington — if only to prevent the creation of a Washington-Moscow axis.

The Soviet Union came to desire a détente because, like the United States, it had been finding the costs of the cold war, providing guns and economic aid to ungrateful recipients, prohibitive. Moscow wanted a breathing spell in the cold war to be able to attend to its vast needs at home. Its agriculture needs huge investments, which are not easily available. Its industry is enormous, but inefficient. It needs modern management and technical know-how and large



UPI Photo

North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's chief foreign policy adviser, exchange greetings after initialling a Vietnam ceasefire agreement in Paris. The ceasefire became effective on January 27. The pact provides for release within 60 days of all U.S. prisoners of war and in the same period the 23,000 U.S. troops remaining in South Vietnam are to be withdrawn.

foreign credits. To meet all these needs, the men in Moscow obviously decided it was necessary to seek a world-wide détente.

President Richard Nixon, aided by Dr. Henry Kissinger, also proceeded early in 1969 to re-examine U.S. domestic and foreign priorities. The result was a new blueprint, of which withdrawal from Vietnam was an essential part. But, in deciding on a pull-out, the President was still determined to retain a major voice for the United States in East and Southeast Asia. This goal he then proceeded to follow, with skill and patience. The result was spectacular. For 1971-72 saw the beginning of an essential dialogue between the Americans and the Chinese after a lapse in which the only voice heard in the United States was the shrill and negative voice of the China Lobby. Where in 1969 the Americans feared the end of their role in Asia, in 1972 they saw themselves playing an influential role.

In the late spring of 1972, President Nixon tested the attitudes of the two Communist giants by clamping a blockade on the North Vietnamese ports and subjecting the country to devastating air

U.S. determined to retain key voice in Southeast Asia despite planned Vietnam withdrawal

attack. If ever there was a moment to come to the aid of an ideological ally, this was it. But the Russians and the Chinese contented themselves with some unkind oratory. (And the Chinese were quick to note that, when the bodies of Soviet sailors killed in U.S. raids on Haiphong were returned to the Soviet Union, not a word was published in the Soviet press, so as not to mar President Nixon's visit there.) The President now knew that both Peking and Moscow had given top priority to a *détente* with the United States — and had downgraded Vietnam.

The coincidence of interest was solidly confirmed.

Impact on allies

This realignment of priorities by the Big Three had an electrifying impact on their

former wards and allies. During the of the cold war, North Korea as South Korea, Thailand no less the Philippines or even Japan, patterned policies, words and deeds on those powerful patrons. I was in Tokyo Dr. Kissinger's first visit to Peking July 1971, and I remember the Japanese officials. They were caught awares by this first "Nixon shock" they heard themselves still speaking language of the cold war at a point the Americans were already using the tongue of *détente*. Japanese diplomat spoke of the need to "discover Dr. Kissingers", while some of the tionalist press wrote bleakly of "Saigon betrayal". It was not until 1972 new Premier, Kakuei Tanaka,

Weighing a new peacekeeping role

External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp has set out the Canadian Government's position on the role Canada is being asked to undertake in Vietnam as a member of the proposed four-nation supervisory commission which would become operative in the wake of a negotiated ceasefire.

As of the end of December, the Government had taken no final decision on whether to join such a commission. The Secretary of State for External Affairs said Canada could not do so until the ceasefire negotiations had been completed and full information on the proposed arrangements is available.

In statements and interviews on November 21 and 25 and December 3, Mr. Sharp made it clear that the Canadian Government wished to have assurances on certain points before arriving at a decision. Among the points raised by Mr. Sharp were these:

That the proposed supervisory commission would be acceptable to all the parties concerned — that is, the North Vietnamese, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the Government of South Vietnam and the United States — and that the protocol governing the operations of the commission would be accepted by all four parties;

that there would be a continuing political authority to receive reports from the commission members;

that the procedure for reporting by the commission would be workable;

that the commission would have the necessary freedom of movement to carry out investigations in all parts of South Vietnam;

that there will be arrangements for a member's withdrawal from the commission.

While ceasefire negotiations were under way, the Canadian Government did announce, on November 2, that it would be prepared to place at the disposal of the new international commission the services of the Canadian delegation to the existing International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam for an initial period. It was Canada's hope, Mr. Sharp said, that this would meet the need until the international conference, provided in the proposed ceasefire agreement, enabled Canada as well as the other parties concerned to determine what, if any, future role Canada could play.

What has been suggested is a proposed arrangement to be embodied in a protocol signed by the parties to an agreement that would become operative in advance of an international conference and continue after it. Canada sought clarification from the governments involved about the structure of the proposed new observer commission, the role it would be expected to play in Vietnam, its size and terms of reference. Canada's representative in Hanoi was instructed to explore these questions with North Vietnamese authorities and Canada's Ambassador in Washington

the historic visit to Peking, was able finally to readjust Japan's own policy to the new realities.

But nowhere has the new alignment had such a traumatic impact as in North Vietnam. For, suddenly, Hanoi discovered in 1971 that its interests and those of its two great Communist allies no longer coincided. It protested. Its leading journals published angry editorials. Its leaders spoke of continuing the conflict — if necessary with no outside help. But Hanoi knew that it no longer held a strong hand. It has been argued that the last Communist offensive in South Vietnam, launched in March 1972, was a major gamble to destroy the government in Saigon (or at least gain a good bargaining position in the talks ahead) before it was too late.

One may never know. But it can be surmised that the new attitudes in Peking and Moscow played a decisive role in Hanoi's decision to come to terms with the Americans — these new attitudes as well as the immense damage done by the U.S. bombing, the weariness of the people, the blockade of the ports, and the battle losses in the South. The bombs did not weaken the will of the leaders in Hanoi. Nor did they halt the flow of men and supplies from the North to the South. But one need only listen to the domestic broadcasts of Radio Hanoi to know that the country has been bombed half a century back.

The bitter experience of 1972 is likely to shape Hanoi's course in the future. It now knows exactly how far its two great allies will — or will not — go in supporting

he was in close touch with U.S. authorities. On November 20, Mr. Sharp discussed these matters with U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers in New York, and he held further conversations with Mr. Rogers during sessions of the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting in Brussels on December 7 and 8. Until the ceasefire negotiations were concluded, it was not possible to know the terms of reference, operating conditions, size, responsibilities, financing and facilities that the new commission would have.

Mr. Sharp emphasized in his statement of December 3 on the role being contemplated for the new commission that there was no question of maintaining peace through the use of arms. If it were decided to provide Canadian military personnel for the commission, they would not be a military formation but specially-selected individuals who had the required expertise to observe and report on implementation of the ceasefire agreement. They would be part of mixed observer groups drawn from each of the four participating nations — Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland.

Elaborating on the points on which Canada sought clarification, Mr. Sharp said during a press conference on November 21 that it would not be possible to have a successful supervisory force unless you have some international authority to which to report; you cannot have a successful one that doesn't have clear rules for reporting, because

these are the kinds of ambiguities that have interfered with the successful operations of these kinds of commissions in the past . . .”.

In an interview on the CTV television network on November 25, Mr. Sharp said Canada would insist that the protocol establishing the conditions under which the commission would work be signed by all four belligerents.

He said Canada's purpose for participation in any new supervisory machinery despite the conspicuous lack of success of the old ICC would be to help bring the war to an end. "It's the only condition under which we would participate. We have no other interest . . .". Mr. Sharp said in the interview it would be unrealistic to think that the conflict in Vietnam would be over at the time a ceasefire was signed and a supervisory commission appointed. But membership in a supervisory commission should be considered very seriously if there was a chance that a mutually representative group of observers might reduce the scale of violence significantly and permit some sort of political settlement.

Mr. Sharp said on both November 21 and 25 that the cost of participation in a supervisory commission would be very substantial — in the tens of millions of dollars. But to contribute to world peace by stopping the bloodshed in Vietnam would — in the view of the Government and the Canadian people — be worth such a price, he declared.

it. It does not want the two to fight their bitter feud in Indochina. And it has its own dreams for the region that do not include any political role for either Peking or Moscow.

This should explain why Hanoi so readily agreed to allow the United States to help rebuild the devastated North. Normally it would have looked only to its Soviet and Chinese friends to do this. But it now sees in the U.S. presence a way to offset the pressures of its two giant friends. No one would have expected Hanoi to be a Chinese or a Soviet principality. But the U.S. involvement in Vietnam's tomorrows is almost a guarantee of Hanoi's fierce and continued independence.

Dr. Kissinger, who plays the political game with the dash and brilliance that Bobby Fischer displays at chess, has obviously made very careful calculations. The North Vietnam of the Seventies will not be easy to live with. Its influence will spread wide, and will inevitably clash with the U.S. interests in the region. But this will be more than offset by the continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam — now not only in the South but in the North as well.

What are the prospects? At the time of the writing (December 1), they seem to hold little hope of genuine peace soon. The conflict between the two irreconcilable enemies, the Communists and the rightists, will go on. Both sides will continue to receive aid from their friends, though on the sly and on a reduced scale.

Each of South Vietnam's 10,000 hamlets is likely to become a battlefield, at times political, at other times military. The control of each hamlet will even depend on the time of day, for the reinforced network of Communist cadres will prevail in the night, even as Saigon's officials will govern in daylight. Saigon has been preparing for the conflict of to-

morrow by giving nearly absolute to its military administrators, by oning all possible opponents, by the people to commit themselves the display of flags and through pledges.

One should not underestimate gon's staying power. Its administrators may be corrupt and heavy-handed, but there is a substantial layer of South Vietnamese society which has a personal stake in resisting the Communists. It includes the Catholics and minor religious sects; the tens of thousands of small shopkeepers and Mekong Delta peasants who have given a patch of land and mean to it; the huge bureaucracy, which wishes to preserve its income and prerogatives a good part of the army.

War-tested network

But this old-fashioned alliance may be better against the Communists than the large but fragile coalition put together by Chiang Kai-shek a quarter of a century ago. The Communists in Vietnam have a war-tested network of organizers, administrators, agitators, tax-collectors. They will offer the incorruptible government, strong control for social welfare (one of the first things the Communists have been doing in entering a hamlet has been to offer medical service, however rudimentary), and nationalist dreams of reunification and peace. The appeal of all this to the minds of the young, the disenchanting and dispossessed also should not be underestimated.

Thus the signing of a cease fire agreement is not likely to bring peace to the ravaged land. And, when the Observance Force of the proposed supervisory mission is brought into being, it will

Negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam on the terms of a ceasefire agreement were broken off on December 13 after nine days of meetings. U.S. presidential adviser Henry Kissinger subsequently said the negotiations had failed to reach what President Nixon regarded as "a just and fair" agreement to end the Vietnam war. Mr. Kissinger said the North Vietnamese Government must accept the largest share of blame for the failure to reach an accord. Hanoi denied it was to blame for the delay and maintained the breakdown was due to an American effort to reopen issues that went to the

heart of the agreement.

On December 19, President Nixon authorized resumption of U.S. bombing raids throughout North Vietnam.

On December 30, the White House announced a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam above the 20th Parallel and said that Mr. Kissinger would resume negotiations for a Vietnam settlement with Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's chief negotiator, in Paris on January 1. On January 23, President Nixon announced a ceasefire agreement had been negotiated and would become effective on January 27.

Hanoi now sees in U.S. presence a way to offset the twin pressures of its giant friends

hands full trying to check on breaches
the truce in every village in the country.
here will be no ceasefire line to watch,
cept in the North and the West. The
ncipal problem will be to detect the
lations within South Vietnam, where
e divisions will run not along any clearly-
fined geographical lines but along pol-

itical alignments, and will depend on the
hour of the day or night.

But the perils and problems of to-
morrow should not diminish the merits of
the agreement between Hanoi and Wash-
ington. For it will reduce what has been
a major international conflict to the scale
of a local civil war.

Next: a two-stage blueprint of an aid program for Vietnam

Of the four different types of political
outcome considered — a negotiated settle-
ment, continued Vietnamization, co-existence
between North and South, and two
or a unified) Communist Vietnams, the
st and third would appear conducive to
the use of multilateral assistance agencies
recovery and development programs.
The second would make extensive multi-
lateralization impossible. There would be
a technical reason why the multilateral
agencies could not function in co-opera-
tion with Communist governments in
Vietnam; but, on the basis of experience
and far, the political difficulties on both
sides of the ideological curtain would
probably inhibit such a development.

*study of possibilities for an inter-
national organizational role in the postwar
recovery and development of North
and South Vietnam was commissioned by
the U.S. State Department. The report
on a possible aid program for Vietnam was
prepared by Dr. Andrew W. Cordier,
senior dean of the School of International
Affairs, Columbia University, and former
senior United Nations official, and
Miss Ruth B. Russell, research associate
of the school. Completed in the spring
of 1972, it examined possible political out-
comes and alternative aid programs.
The study is one of a series designed to
supplement the State Department's
own capabilities and to provide indepen-
dent expert views to departmental
officers and analysts. Its publication does
not indicate endorsement by the State
Department nor should its contents be
construed as reflecting the official position
of the U.S. Government. The accom-
panying excerpts represent a summary of
the study's conclusions.*

There are two basically different
types of assistance programs that might
be applied through multilateral agencies
when conditions permit:

(1) A massive "crash program" type,
expected to be carried out by large-scale
funding and special institutional arrange-
ments such as an "UNRRA for Vietnam",
a "multilateral Marshall Plan," or some
ad hoc consortium or consultative group
on the pattern of the one formed for
Indonesia. This approach essentially seeks
to achieve "reconstruction" within a re-
latively short period of time.

(2) A mixed type of program based
on a longer-term view of the situation
that breaks the problem down into shorter-
term relief and rehabilitation aspects and
longer-term development issues, with ap-
propriate modalities for each.

War-damage fund

We would favour combining a short-term,
autonomous, international war-damage
fund under United Nations administra-
tion with an incremental effort to bring
the former Indochina countries into the
mainstream of expanded, regular, inter-
national economic development programs
in Southeast Asia as soon as possible.

We visualize the specialized war-
damage fund (limited in time and in
scope to relief, rehabilitation and repair
of rather closely defined war damage to
persons and property) as based on the
institutional model of the Fund of the
United Nations for the Development of
West Irian (FUNDWI) and using some
of the techniques of UNRRA (UN Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration), and
the effort to normalize development assis-
tance for the Indochina countries as
using the wide variety of existing inter-

national agencies in larger programs of their regular type and as part of the expanded programs of the Second Development Decade throughout Southeast Asia.

We would hope that the United States would support the latter approach through increased contributions to appropriate existing agencies and through willingness to finance generously an autonomous war-damage fund that would also be supported by other governments.

This multi-institutional and incremental approach appears more likely than a crash program to attract the necessary support of other contributors, to fit the capacities of the multilateral agencies and to suit better the limits and needs of the countries themselves, for the following reasons:

(1) Crash program proposals appear to envisage the problem in terms that parallel the post-Second World War situation in Europe and Japan. The economic recovery of post-hostilities Indochina, however, will not be a question of reconstructing the shattered cities and the industrial infrastructure of previously developed economies but rather one of helping underdeveloped countries to restore economies that have been seriously distorted, where not destroyed, by years of warfare, and to promote the process of modernization that (except in North Vietnam) had hardly begun before the war.

(2) This multiple approach, which we see as requiring that smaller doses of multilateral aid be channelled through coordinated country-development programs and projects within a Southeast Asian regional framework, would leave each government free to select the combination of bilateral and multilateral projects best fitted to its national needs and its form of economic and political organization. The Lower Mekong Basin project provides one useful model for this type of rather loose, multilateral co-ordination of bilateral aid.

(3) The massive program approach on the other hand — whether intended to be carried out by existing agencies or through the creation of a new institution for an independent program — could only be implemented by directly or indirectly distorting the broader programs of the regular agencies (because of limited total human and material resources) in order especially to favour the Indochina area. This would arouse the antagonism of other developing peoples, particularly in the same region, who have equally legitimate claim to the aid resources of the international community.

(4) The more gradual approach would better adapt to the area's limited

capacity to absorb developmental inputs. It would also greatly diminish the need for bringing in large numbers of foreign experts to carry out the numerous individual projects that would make up any massive recovery and development program because of the lack, by definition, of implementation skills in developing countries. Such an influx under a crash program would give it a "neo-colonial" appearance locally.

(5) The multi-institutional approach would also facilitate the co-operation of both Communist and non-Communist governments, as both donor and recipient participants — after the pattern of the Development Program (UNDP) — in contrast to the overwhelmingly "Western" pattern of large-scale programs heretofore. It would, in addition, assist in developing co-operative relations among Indochinese recipients that have been opponents in current war and have considerable historical enmity to overcome if the area is to have any hope of a more peaceful future.

(6) Finally, as a purely practical consideration, the dispersed, incremental approach would reduce the scale of short-run effort necessary to mobilize and equate international resources — which is not noted for broad generosity toward developing countries, and in particular among industrialized states generally reluctant to commit a larger proportion of their national incomes even to the Second Development Decade, let alone to multilateral aid for a few small countries in Southeast Asia. . . .

. . . There are two purely American factors that, especially in view of the prominent role the United States continues to play in multilateral programs, must have negative effects. One is our propensity for the large-scale, crash program approach. This seems to have a natural appeal to many Americans: in line with such experiences as that of the Marshall Plan in Europe; it is not beyond the capacity of the United States to finance, on its own if it so desires; it accords with the American penchant for grand engineering projects and for getting things done in a hurry. And, in the case of Vietnam, it would, in addition, in some ways help to restore the consciences of those who feel that the United States must do something to restore the war damage that American actions have caused. But if the preceding analysis of this report is correct, the crash program approach is the least likely to be successful, especially in terms of the particular proposals being advocated — to persuade other governments to give the necessary

*Mekong Basin
plan provides
model for
co-ordination of
bilateral aid*

contributions.

The second American factor is the increasing reluctance of the Congress — probably an accurate reflection of public attitudes in this case — to appropriate foreign assistance funds for economic purposes . . . which is part of a wide demand for reform of foreign aid policy generally. . . .

. . . If political conditions are favourable, we would consider the multilateral, but “non-crash”, approach . . . to be the most effective method by which to draw forth supporting contributions from other governments and the most rational

basis on which to advocate increased multilateral aid within the United States. . . .

This approach also would promise the most effective results to the Indochina countries on the receiving end in terms of achieving their own objectives of modernization and economic development.

(Note: *The spread of hostilities to the Khmer Republic (Cambodia) and Laos makes it artificial to consider the problem in terms of North and South Vietnam only. For purposes of this study, however, the fates of the first two may be considered as dependent on the nature of the outcome in Vietnam. . . .*)

Pattern for a special war damage fund

A special fund for repair of war damage and rehabilitation of war casualties would include the usual components of humanitarian assistance programs (such as medical aid; food and clothing; materials for the reconstruction of destroyed housing and community buildings such as hospitals; seeds and tools for agriculture); the most necessary repair of damaged bridges, roads, power and communication installations; and longer-term projects directly necessitated by war damage, such as restoration to productivity of land put out of use by bombing or defoliation — or, if restoration is impossible (as of a destroyed forest area), the development of a new resource equivalent for the country concerned.

Most of the undertakings to be covered by such a fund should be capable of being completed within a limited period — say, three to five years. Because the destructiveness of the conflict has varied from region to region, and because considerable repair and reconstruction has been accomplished even while the war continued, a more precise estimate of requirements in this field cannot be made.

It can be assumed that President Nixon's proposed assistance for “reconstruction” would cover this sort of mainly short-term need; . . . and it can probably also be taken to refer to at least some longer-term types of development projects as well, since “reconstruction” is often (but ambiguously) used in that sense. In any event, the \$7 billion for Indochina as a whole, referred to by the President, could no doubt be used to meet

a wide variety of such needs and to begin the development process as well.

It may be that the Administration is considering giving this “reconstruction” assistance on a bilateral basis; but we would consider an international basis preferable for a number of reasons, including the belligerent status of the United States in the situation and the contentiousness of its concurrent aid policies during the conflict. There have been a number of different patterns of international organization that could provide possible models for an Indochina war-damage fund, beginning with UNRRA after the Second World War.

. . . That organization, established by a special conference of World War II allies, was the first operational United Nations agency; but it was a completely independent institution, in view of its timing. A similar organization set up now would probably be linked to the permanent United Nations “family,” which did not exist in 1943. . . .

The United States, being in a position to contribute most of the financing to UNRRA during and at the end of World War II, dominated the organization from the beginning, which was a natural result of circumstances of the time. Today, however, it would seem better to adapt elements from other United Nations precedents to the institutional requirements for a war-damage repair agency to operate in the Indochina countries.

(*Excerpt from the Cordier-Russell report on postwar aid prospects in Indochina.*)

Pursuing the realistic goal of closer Canada-EEC links

By Jeremy Kinsman

Despite recent editorials, there is little indication that Canadians have the intuition that what the Europeans are doing and what we are doing and what the Americans are doing may involve considerably closer ties between Canada and Europe. Yet most Canadian observers accept the need for Canada to diversify external economic relations, and Europe is the most obvious candidate as an object of diversification. The entry of Britain into the European Economic Community should enhance both the realism and the popularity of efforts in this direction.

Except sporadically, Canadians haven't tended since the last war to think about Europe as a serious partner in Canadian development. Of course, we saw a role for Canada in the reconstruction of Western Europe after the war, in subsequent security arrangements and in the concept of an Atlantic Community. This idea, popular with the United States "Eastern Establishment", assumed a transatlantic community of view, which, if it had really existed in the extraordinary conditions of 1950, was certainly a vain illusion by 1960. Someone said that the Atlantic Community would have made a lot of sense to Henry James. It certainly made very little to President de Gaulle, who saw in the European Economic Community the possibility for Europe to define itself at a distance from the United States. His veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market in 1963 (Harold MacMillan was an Atlantic Community enthusiast) took most of the life out of the idea. The war in Vietnam and its multiple effect on both Europeans and the United States pretty well finished it off.

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Canadians flirted with the notion of the Atlantic Community as well, but almost exclusively English-speaking, in a sort of way. This was perhaps a natural product of the war experience when the alliance was for all practical purposes between ourselves, the British and the Americans. All the original EEC countries were defeated and occupied at various stages of the war. The "Anglo-Saxons" won, and we saw it; the rest, in one way or another, appeared to have lost. In the Fifties the Atlantic Community idea was an extension of the alliance. It became, moreover, an envelope in which we could somehow avoid paying the consequences of decisions that were continentalist. An Atlantic Community was about the right place to look for some Canadian complexes — a home arena for our ardent internationalism, where there would be enough support from the United States, without our having to fear we were being smothered, and not the will of the British to oblige us to feel intimidated.

Little interest in Europe

There was little apparent interest in Europe *per se*. Many Canadians, royalists abandoned at the time of the British application to join the EEC, a few argued that EEC enlargement would assist closer Canada-European relations largely because these relations were seen to hold any particular potential importance. We had already enjoyed an extraordinary influence in the postwar period and in the 1950s and it must have been difficult to foresee that we should develop closer ties with Europe — not anybody else for that matter — as a function of fundamental self-interest. At the same time, some argued the merits of the EEC as a counterweight, for most the main issue about the EEC was the question of access to the Common Market for Canada's exports.

Some argued a bit for the French content in closer Canada-Europe relations, as a sort of added bonus

nobody really cared. Any perception in English-speaking Canada of the need for a European counterweight to the United States was largely cultural. For Quebecois the threat on that score was somewhat closer to home. Jean Lesage and Daniel Johnson recognized Quebec's counterweight and soon parlayed Franco-Quebec relations into political gain within Quebec and *vis-à-vis* Ottawa. Europe then appeared briefly in vogue as "national identity" became a national cause. Even the terminally Anglophone began to recite the credo of two founding nations. President de Gaulle, however, soured that in 1967 and English Canadians have seldom felt as wounded.

Canadian attentions were, in any case, elsewhere. In government, it was maintained that Canada and the United States shouldn't disagree in public. Canadian businessmen were hypnotized by the challenge of cracking Canada's biggest and most affluent and richest market. The universities were "into" the newly independent Africa, Asia, and elsewhere and probably tried to ignore increasingly obvious demerits at home. The Canadian vocation of the Sixties appeared in the universities elsewhere to be essentially anti-European. Europe appeared selfish, *fade* probably corrupt. As a Canadian public interest, Europe simply vanished.

Before there could be any realism in our view of Europe or appreciation that there was considerable potential in Canada-EEC relations, we should need a more realistic collection of views of ourselves. We should first need the assurance that we constituted something identifiable and distinct before we could begin to take seriously an external dimension of our satisfactorily representative of our interests.

Inevitably, of course, there would have to be a reappraisal of the Canada-European relation as part of this, but only as a dimension of a reappraisal of ourselves.

Distinct from U.S.

1967 champagne has turned pretty sour but the sobriety that followed the centennial celebrations has encouraged a somewhat more realistic view of the complexity of the Canadian group. There is now an increasing and generalized appreciation of the EEC, as a very heterogeneous group of people, we are socially developing in a somewhat different way from our U.S. neighbours. Generally, we are evolving in a more decentralized and a deliberately tolerant way.

Our methods of development are increasingly our own, chosen to fit our cir-

cumstances. Of course, this had — until the last war anyway — always been the case. Politically, hard times and our own geography have given us third- and fourth-party movements that have persisted, instead of being absorbed into the old parties. Left-right distinctions are facile, but we all heard Canadians last autumn say that George McGovern's proposals were already pretty old hat in Lilac — or Kelowna, la Beauce, or even Rosedale.

Canadians are exploring how we can exercise, through our governments and our economic and other activities, the where-withal necessary to assure the conditions and qualities we variously wish. Most other peoples are doing the same. The difference in quality in our experience is that for Canada as a whole this had first to be done against the very pervasive American fact.

There is still consternation that the distinctiveness of the Canadian group is not always taken into account by policy-makers or taxi-drivers in foreign capitals but the travellers among us can attest to much less confusion abroad on the point in recent years, variously attributable to de Gaulle's visit, Prime Minister Trudeau's image and the tragedy of October 1970. We are generally surer of ourselves, in the sense that we are clearer about who we are and the degree to which we are different from our neighbours.

The longer-range and more substantial phase will be the process of structuring Canada to enable us to develop and achieve what we variously need. Probably, the most important dimension is economic. As External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp wrote in an article in this magazine entitled *Canada/U.S. Relations: Options for the Future*, "in the face of the inherent pull of continental forces" the only option

Distinctiveness of Canadians seems clearer in recent years

Canada has decided to appoint a full-time ambassador to the European Communities in recognition of the growing political and economic importance of the European Common Market to Canada. External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp announced on December 21 that James Langley has been named Canadian Ambassador to the European Communities. Mr. Langley, Canadian Ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg, had also been accredited as Ambassador to the Communities. Canada will now accredit a separate ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg. The European Communities include the enlarged European Economic Community, the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Coal and Steel Community.

The Europeans are trying to forge common industrial and technological policies and action on an internal basis. Cooperation between EEC and Canadian interests could be excluded were it not for the attractive state of the Canadian technological art in certain areas and existing institutional and other links between Canada and the enlarged EEC. Moreover, common action in the EEC in this area is thus far only token.

Why should Europeans bother with Canada? There are, of course, obvious European material interests in the potential of Canadian development. The alternative to the success of Canada's third option could be a North American economic bloc dominated by the U.S. economy that would, among other things, reduce the possibilities of EEC access to Canadian industrial materials and energy resources under conditions of increasing scarcity.

The inability of Canada to represent a point of view independent of the U.S. and the EEC would also need to be seen as a loss from the European angle, one that could aggravate any confrontation between the United States and Europe.

Year of Europe'

The possibility of such a confrontation needs to be taken seriously; "1973 will be the year of Europe" Henry Kissinger has said. On such fundamental questions as international trade and monetary reform, and on bilateral and other economic issues, there is misunderstanding about respective motives and intentions, and often basic disagreement on essentials. On many of these issues, Canadian views have tended to be closer to those of Europeans than of Americans.

Recently, there has been a tendency to place Canada in the U.S. "natural orbit" in a tri-polar trading world based in the areas of natural influence of Japan, the EEC, and the United States. This may be a natural assumption on the part of people attracted to such simplistic notions of "spheres of influence," but would run counter to the whole postwar history of attempts to liberalize world trade and emphasize the interdependence of the trading system. More important to Canadians, this just doesn't make any sense in terms of our attempts to diversify, nor does it make much sense in terms of our industrial development. Continental geography can be deceptive; Canadian industrial raw materials and energy potential in the Arctic might well have more convenient and "cleaner" access by sea to either Europe or Japan than overland to the United States.

The Europeans are increasingly aware of the independence of Canadian interests as the specific mention of Canada in the communiqué of the summit meeting of European leaders in October illustrates. In order to ensure the harmonious development of world trade, the European Community affirmed that it should "maintain a constructive dialogue with the U.S.A., Japan and Canada and the other industrialized Community partners in an outward-looking spirit and using the most appropriate forms".

From Canada's point of view, this "recognition" has not been achieved easily. While it was becoming clear from the different tack Canadians were taking in many areas of foreign policy (NATO, China, the U.S.S.R.), it was not until the distinctiveness of Canadian concerns emerged most vividly in the aftermath of the August 1971 U.S. trade measures and when we "stood our ground" last December at the Washington meeting of the Group of 10 that the Europeans appeared to drop the assumption that their approach for the U.S. would more or less do for Canada as well.

The unequivocal congratulations Prime Minister Trudeau conveyed to Prime Minister Heath on the occasion in January 1972 of the British signature of the Treaty of Rome strengthened the EEC's view in our favour. We had reacted favourably to Britain's entering the Community for a few simple reasons: First, we considered it was Britain's decision to make and it appeared to be the right one for the British; second, we had anticipated that this could strengthen Canada's long-term relation with the Community; third, since Britain was going into the EEC in any case, we should try to be as constructive as possible about what was inevitable.

Impact on Canada

The EEC appreciated that an easier alternative would be for us to limit ourselves to continued complaint about the impact of enlargement on Canada. About half our exports of \$1.5 billion to Britain will, at the end of the transitional period in 1978, receive less favourable access. We saw, however, that continued complaint would not change the terms of access in any significant way and recognized that, in any case, the potential of Canada-EEC relations could more than compensate for any short-term losses in the British market. (A good analysis of the possible trade impact of British entry is that of Roy Matthews in the October 1972 issue of *Behind the Headlines*, published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.) While

Europeans dropped assumption that approach for U.S. would fit Canada

we intended to explain fully the damage to Canada on a Canada-Community basis with regard to particularly sensitive products as cases arose, and on a multilateral basis in the GATT negotiations on the effects of enlargement, we considered these to be fundamentally exercises in short-term adjustment. The more important issue was whether Canada could strengthen its economic relations with the enlarged EEC in the years to come.

On instructions from Mr. Sharp, our ambassadors in the capitals of the enlarged Community made simultaneous presentations to the governments concerned just before their foreign ministers met in March to map out the approach the autumn summit meeting should take with regard to the Community's relations with third countries. Canada's representatives had little difficulty in convincing Europeans of the distinctiveness of its interests. We nonetheless realized that the EEC preoccupation with the short-term consolidation of the Community tended to inhibit the Europeans' ability to focus on longer-range relations with Canada. These, after all, could not in fairness be considered to be a top EEC priority in the light of our own apparent detachment from the EEC over the years.

Agreement explored

In June, the Canadian Government sent off to the EEC a mission of senior officials from Industry, Trade and Commerce, External Affairs, and Finance. Their purpose was to propose informally to the Europeans a novel idea — that Canada and the EEC explore whether a comprehensive agreement (on the most-favoured-nation principle) on trade and economic questions could assist the development of Canada-EEC relations.

This kind of broad bilateral agreement between industrialized partners whose focus would be longer-range doesn't have any recent model. Trade relations between such countries are governed by the GATT. However, many of the issues we had in mind where the Community and Canada had a common interest (e.g. understandings on multinational corporations, or trade problems resulting from consumer legislation) might not be dealt with effectively in a multinational forum for some time. Indeed, co-operation between Canada and the Community — which would certainly not be against the interests of any third country — might assist eventual multilateral progress by providing helpful precedent and momentum.

We imparted a certain amount of urgency to the discussion by reminding the

Europeans that some of Canada's preferential trade arrangements with Britain which would soon be terminated, might usefully be discussed between Canada and the Community. For example, Canada would like assurance that no third country would be granted access to the Canadian market more favourable than that provided to Britain. Another subject of obvious interest to Britain's Community partners would be Canada's disposition of preferential access by Britain to the Canadian market, which we were under no GATT or other obligation to terminate in accordance with a particular timetable.

Generally, however, the Canadian mission discussed in an exploratory way issues of Canada-EEC development in the longer term, recognizing that for many of these there was not yet a national policy in Canada or a Community policy in Europe. Moreover, there are federal, provincial and Community-member jurisdictional issues potentially involved that can make concrete discussion difficult. We clearly needed a framework for discussion and development which would take into account the emergence of a common policy in the EEC but would reflect our need to continue to strengthen relations with individual member states. As Mr. Sharp later pointed out: "The Canadian objective was to reinforce bilateral relations with the member countries of the Community through creating an appropriate framework linking Canada and the EEC as such".

No quick results

We recognized, of course, that such an agreement would not be something we were going to work out together quickly. Because of the novel character of a comprehensive economic agreement between industrialized countries directed toward the middle term of their relations perhaps years of negotiations would be required. What we needed to do was identify the substance of our relations then try to establish what would be necessary for their development.

We set out in a lengthy working document some of the elements we could merit discussion between Canada and the EEC. Apart from the question of negotiating a bilateral MFN agreement with the Community itself, the paper covered a wide range of topics, including the liberalization of agreements relating to goods in transit, the question of state-purchase policies, countervail, coastal shipping port subsidies, concessional financial

No recent model for broad pact with Community

long-term prospects for trade in energy
raw materials, copyright, consumer
protection, protection of the environment,
standards and quality control, the industrial
application of science and technology
and others.

In November, Canadian officials discussed some of these in Ottawa with representatives of the EEC Commission. These discussions with the Commission will continue probably in early spring.

In the meantime, officials are in close touch with the member states through formal channels in capitals and the convocation of such bilateral mechanisms as the Canada-U.K. Continuing Committee and the Canada/France Comité économique; ministers are continuing the consultations with their European colleagues which Mr. Sharp and Jean-Luc Pepin, then Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, has initiated with several working trips to European capitals since 1970. Mr. Sharp conferred in Brussels with Ralf Dahrenhorst, EEC Commissioner for Foreign Relations, in December, and Mr. Trudeau reviewed some aspects of Canada-EEC relations during his talks with Britain's Prime Minister Edward Heath in London.

None of the consultations and developments on the government level will be able to provide the substance necessary, however, for more worthwhile relations with the EEC without real public interest in Canada and, in particular, on the part of Canadian industrialists.

natural objective

Diversification of our external economic relations is not a novel idea; we tried it years ago with Britain. The success of that effort, however, needed a much more buoyant market than Britain could provide. Moreover the effort was directed toward Britain for reasons more sentimental than real. The enlarged EEC is a much more promising possibility, particularly because closer Canada-EEC relations would now be sought in a spirit which demonstrates greater conviction that this is a natural, and not synthetic defensive, thing to do.

This is not to say that Japan, the S.S.R., China, Latin America, Australia-

Our first task is to ensure that the European community develops internally.

We must also ensure that the community plays a full part in a number of international negotiations but, more than that, must make Europe a force in the world

New Zealand and other areas should not also be the objects of greater Canadian attention — as, indeed, they have been in recent years. It is more to acknowledge that, in terms of the development of Canadian industrial structures, closer economic ties with the enlarged EEC make predominant good sense since this is our second-largest market by far and birth-place of millions of Canadians.

The suggestion that this is somehow anti-American is nonsense. A "special relationship" has been declared to be over for some time, most notably at the time of the Nixon Administration's August 1971 trade measures. We are still very good friends, in many ways uniquely so. However, the United States is bargaining hard with trade partners on bilateral issues and in preparation for the next round of multilateral trade negotiations, and expects others to bargain hard as well, including ourselves. Canada's bargaining only makes sense if it is accompanied by efforts to reduce what all of us recognize as Canada's economic vulnerability.

Diversification does not mean a transfer of any of our economic activity from North America elsewhere. It can be more aptly seen as the development elsewhere of additional and strengthened ties.

It isn't going to be easy to convince industrial interests in both Canada and the Community that closer co-operation is in their particular interests, since in some cases, of course, it won't be. Many possibilities can, however, be explored and realized. For example, constructive developments in this sense are emerging from industrial introductions and mutual exposure gained through the science and technology agreements Canada has recently signed with Belgium and West Germany. This kind of government working device is essential since it engages the interests of the two parties directly and visibly. The technique, however, can only be expanded and made to work on the necessary scale if there is a mutual understanding on the part of the public involved of the broader issues engaged, and it is on this level of "education" that constructive developments are most urgently needed.

imbued with the spirit of peace and with the openness and spirit of justice which our world needs so much. (*EEC Commission president François-Xavier Ortoli of France, January 6, 1973*)

*Seeking closer ties
with EEC seen
as good sense,
not anti-American*

The road to greater security within a divided continent

By Robert W. Reford

It is ironic that so many of the issues that have made Europe potentially insecure should be well on the way to settlement at a time when a European security conference seems almost certain to take place. An agreement on Berlin has been negotiated. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has ratified agreements with the Soviet Union and Poland, accepting in the latter case Poland's Western frontiers as being on the Oder-Neisse Line. German reunification has been recognized as a dream for a more distant future rather than something that can be achieved tomorrow; and West Germany has been talking to the other half, the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

East Germany is increasingly accepted as something that exists, and formal recognition by Western nations is in prospect. With the signing by the two Germans in December of a treaty on basic relations between them as the climax to a series of negotiation sessions, both are being recognized and it seems certain that both will be admitted to the United Nations in 1973.

The two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have agreed to some limitation on the development of

strategic weapons. Although this does not affect Europe directly, it does provide a climate for negotiation, especially for a mutual and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons (MBFR) on the continent.

These political issues, however, are only one side of the coin. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) is expected to deal with a wide range of issues, including economic questions, cultural and scientific exchanges and co-operation in many areas such as control of the environment. In fact, too, progress has not depended on the conference. Trade between Eastern Europe and the rest of the world has been expanding. Economic co-operation is growing, even to the extent of multinational companies building plants in the European Union itself. Cultural groups are making changing visits, and there has been an increasing flow of scientific information. There are even signs of a loosening of restrictions on personal movement. Both sides have agreed both in greater tourist travel and in granting of exit visas to a small but an important number of Soviet Jews.

In these circumstances, it is tempting to ask whether a European security conference is really necessary. If so, is it happening without the panoply of summit meetings, should one be held at all? It may turn out to be little more than a propaganda exercise, generating a "Helsinki" as illusory as the "Geneva" after the summit conference of 1954 or the "Spirit of Camp David" after Nikita Khrushchov's talks with Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959? What will 34 nations be able to accomplish if they are down together that they could not do bilaterally or in smaller groups?

Definition of security

Part of the answer to these questions is in posing another: What is security depends far more on a psychological feeling than on accepted boundaries, automatic recognition, arms or the well-being of them, or economic prosperity.

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ilitary terms, is the strongest power in the Middle East, but it does not feel secure. By contrast, Switzerland, whose armed forces are negligible by modern standards, has felt secure for centuries. The United States is today as secure as a nation can be, thanks to the second-strike capability of its strategic nuclear deterrent. It is legitimate to ask whether the average American citizen feels secure in light of the turmoil of his own society. Security, then, is relative.

Looking back over the last 25 years, one could say that, on the whole, Europe has been secure. It has seen no major military confrontation and there has not been a serious confrontation between the two superpowers since the building of the Berlin Wall. Yet the very existence of the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact is the source of a feeling of insecurity. Despite repeated disclaimers, the Soviet Union and its allies have not believed that the United States was not preparing an attack. The presence of overseas bases, the placement of nuclear weapons on European soil, the constant alert of the Strategic Air Command and the war in Vietnam have been perceived as a threat. The West could point to the suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 and Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in mid-1968, as well as Soviet support for what are called wars of national liberation and the constant willingness to intervene into any power vacuum, as evidence of the Kremlin's ultimate intention to rule the world.

Both sides have perceived a threat in the actions of the other. They would refer to what the other says but what it does not say. As a result, neither has felt secure in its knowledge that it could ride out a nuclear attack and wreak unacceptable destruction on the other. If the Big Powers do not feel secure, how can the smaller countries of Europe feel so? They are, of course, glad that the United States and the Soviet Union are finally talking to each other and apparently making a serious effort to bridge the chasm that has opened between them. However, this process has its own pitfalls.

The other European nations are at present worried that their big brothers will not take care of the future of the continent between themselves without consulting their allies — let alone the neutrals. An imposed security arrangement of this kind would be unacceptable, and most European nations feel that a conference would help them feel more secure. In this sense, the psychological effect of the SCE is likely to be quite different from the euphoria created by the summit meetings of the 1950s.

It could be argued that Europe is the most stable continent in the world. Apart from Czechoslovakia (admittedly a notable exception), it has not been the scene of a serious international crisis since the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. The same cannot be said for Africa, Asia or Latin America. They have all witnessed wars and *coups d'état* that have posed threats to international peace and security. However, Europe remains the only continent where the United States and the Soviet Union confront each other directly. The other crisis points, such as the Middle East, Vietnam and Southern Africa, are either of immediate concern to one superpower and not to the other or they involve a confrontation through friends and allies. There are those who believe that, because of this relative stability in Europe, it is best to leave things as they are. It has been said that the best guarantee of security would be two tanks facing each other at Checkpoint Charlie, with Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev at the controls. According to this thesis, any change is likely to upset the balance and be destabilizing.

Nuclear arms deployed

Yet Europe is potentially more explosive than any other continent. Nuclear weapons are deployed there in large numbers. The United States and the Soviet Union feel their national interests are directly at stake, and a crisis will always contain the seeds of nuclear war. Anything that can be done to lower tensions, reduce the possibility of crisis and solve the issues that have created this set of conditions should surely be worth the effort.

The idea of a European security conference is not new. It can be traced in one form or another back to the abortive meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the immediate postwar years. It surfaced again in the mid-1950s, especially with the so-called Rapacki Plan, which prompted the debate about disengagement and nuclear-free zones in Central Europe.

Over the years, proposals have emanated from both East and West but, when one side was interested, the other would visualize a potential trap and shy away. It might be said that each would be most anxious for a conference when it was having trouble at home or with its allies because such a situation would create a need to affirm the status quo. Usually, the other side would then be in a relatively stable situation and would not be as interested. Thus, the stars have not been in conjunction and the time was never propitious for both sides.

Europe remains only continent where U.S., U.S.S.R. confront directly

Now this is much less true. President Nixon has been to Moscow and Peking seeking to make a reality of his vision of an era of negotiation. Europe itself is changing. West Germany's *Ostpolitik* has unfrozen its relations with the socialist countries. The European Economic Community is enlarging its membership. In short, the climate has never been more favourable for a settlement of the issues that have divided Europe since 1945.

Traced to 1966

The current initiative for a European security conference can be traced to 1966. In March of that year, Mr. Brezhnev reported to the Twenty-third Congress of the Soviet Communist Party that the Central Committee proposed:

"To enter into negotiations on matters of European security. To discuss the existing proposals of the socialist and other states of Europe concerning a military *détente* and the reduction of armaments in Europe and the development of peaceful, mutually-advantageous ties among all European states. To convene an appropriate international conference for this purpose. To continue to seek ways for solving one of the cardinal tasks of European security — the peaceful settlement of the German question with a view to eliminating completely the vestiges of the Second World War in Europe on the basis of recognition of the now existing European frontiers, including those of the two German states."

Of course, Mr. Brezhnev was motivated by national self-interest. That is natural for a political leader. He wanted to get U.S. troops out of Europe and to bring about the disbandment of NATO, two traditional objectives of Soviet foreign policy. He may also have been anxious to secure his European flank in case of serious trouble with China.

This Soviet proposal was carried a step further at a meeting of the political consultative committee of the Warsaw Pact powers held in Bucharest in July 1966. The declaration issued at its conclusion listed a number of steps considered necessary to establish peace and security in Europe and it said:

"Convocation of a general European conference to discuss questions of ensuring security in Europe and organizing general European co-operation would be of great positive importance. The agreement reached at the conference would be expressed, for example, in the form of a general European declaration on co-operation for the maintenance and strengthening of European security. Such a declaration could

provide for an undertaking by the signatories to be guided in their relations by interests of peace, to settle disputes peaceful means only, to hold consultations and exchange information on questions of mutual interest and to contribute to all-round development of economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations. The declaration should be open to all interested states to join."

The next development was a meeting of leading Communist Party officials at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in 1967. It was attended by representatives of the Communist parties of some West European countries, but neither Romania nor Yugoslavia was represented. The declaration listed a number of requirements for security in Europe, among them:

Recognition of the inviolability of existing frontiers, particularly the Oder-Neisse Line and the borders between the two Germanies;

recognition of the existence of sovereign and equal German states;

exclusion of any opportunity for the FRG to gain access to nuclear arms;

liquidation of artificially-created barriers in economic relations;

conclusion of a treaty renouncing the use of force or threat of force in the relations between European states;

agreements or partial solutions in the sphere of disarmament.

Harmel study

Meanwhile, the North Atlantic alliance had decided to undertake an exercise in self-examination. In December 1967, Pierre Harmel, Belgium's Foreign Minister, had been asked to study the tasks of the alliance and the procedures for fulfilling them. His report, endorsed by the NATO Council's ministerial meeting in December 1967, said: "The ultimate political purpose of the alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful settlement in Europe, accompanied by appropriate security guarantees."

This study had been undertaken because of a need within NATO. It was no sense a direct reaction to the proposal of the Warsaw Pact powers for a European security conference, although it obviously had an effect in weighing NATO's response to those proposals. It could be said the Harmel study recognized the change in the function of alliances that had been defined by Zbigniew Brzezinski as follows: "In the past, they served to wage war in our age, they deter war; tomorrow, they must shift collectively to the promotion of peace."

There were two obvious gaps in

Climate never more favourable for settlement of divisive issues

Soviet proposal carried further at mid-'66 session of Warsaw Pact

Warsaw Pact proposals. One was Berlin. If the borders between the two Germanies were to be treated as inviolable, the same should apply to Berlin. But this was not mentioned. The second gap involved disarmament. The Bucharest declaration, no doubt at the insistence of the host government, had mentioned liquidation of foreign bases, the withdrawal of "all forces from foreign territories", the reduction of German forces, the establishment of nuclear-free zones and an end to flights by planes carrying nuclear weapons. However, the Karlovy Vary statement - to which Romania was not a party - backed away by saying simply that all proposals "deserve thorough examination".

The NATO ministers decided at their meeting in Reykjavik in June 1968 to explore arms control and issued a declaration on mutual force reductions. This was the first specific proposal for what has since become known as Mutual and Balanced Reduction of Forces (MBFR).

A third point requiring clarification was which countries would participate. The position of the United States and Canada - NATO's two non-European members - had been left ambiguous and statements from Moscow and other capitals in Eastern Europe frequently used the phrase "an all-European conference". Neither of the two North American countries could accept this and, in the ultimate understanding about a conference, it was agreed that they should take part.

In October 1969, the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact powers met in Prague, proposed two central questions for the agenda of an all-European conference and published draft declarations as a basis for implementing the objectives outlined in their proposals. The proposed agenda items were:

Ensuring of European security and renunciation of the use of force or threat of its use in the mutual relations among states in Europe;

expansion of trade, economic, scientific and technical relations on the principle of equal rights aimed at the development of political co-operation among European states.

In June 1970, the same ministers, after a meeting in Budapest, reiterated these proposals with two changes. They added cultural relations to the subjects added in the second item and suggested a third item:

The creation at the all-European conference of a body to deal with questions of security and co-operation in Europe.

Although the phrase, "all-European conference" was still used, it was explicitly

stated that the United States and Canada would take part.

Two sets of issues

There are two groups of issues involved in European security. One reflects the end of the Second World War and is keyed to the future of Germany. It includes territorial questions such as Poland's Western frontier along the Oder-Neisse Line and the status of the two Germanies and Berlin. It is these that the Soviet Union and its allies are anxious to see settled. The second group of issues stems from the cold war period. They include establishment of the two military alliances, the issue of nuclear weapons, freedom of movement throughout the continent and the Brezhnev Doctrine. It is these areas in which the Western powers want to see changes.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, to find that different countries have different motives for wanting a European security conference. They are more positive and pronounced for the nations of Eastern Europe. For example, the Soviet Union would like to see the withdrawal of U.S. troops; the GDR hopes for recognition; and Poland wants a settlement of its Western frontiers. The Western countries, put in the position of reacting to a proposal, have been more cautious and less certain of what they would like to achieve. Initially, they laid stress on MBFR, although France was strongly opposed and Britain lukewarm. When the Soviet Union indicated an interest in pursuing this line, it became apparent that NATO had not decided on how best to proceed.

Remembering the fruitless meetings of foreign ministers in the immediate post-war period, the West has shied away from what it feels would be meaningless results or propaganda accomplishments. Proposals for non-aggression treaties or agreements on the renunciation of the use of force are regarded as having little value. Yet this is not true for the East. Romania, for example, sets considerable store by these, believing they would be an answer to the Brezhnev Doctrine and prevent another Czechoslovakia.

Advantages for West

As time passed, certain positive advantages began to appear for the West. The United States, faced with growing pressure in Congress for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe, may find in CSCE and MBFR a convenient way of accomplishing this. Canada, too, might then withdraw its troops, a step some members of the Government would appear to favour

West shies away from results that would rank as meaningless

at a time when domestic problems have priority. As for the FRG, it will be able to continue its *Ostpolitik* in a new framework. France, which does not take part in NATO's military side, would find itself perhaps less an odd man out and a new power alignment in Europe might strengthen its position as one of the continent's nuclear powers.

In fact, there has been a good deal of speculation about the development of a European defence community that might follow the enlargement of the EEC. If the pressures for a U.S. withdrawal increase, especially if its European allies become convinced that this will happen, the formulation of a European defence policy will also become more likely. There would be formidable obstacles to overcome, but the possibility cannot be totally discounted. A trend in this direction could lead to a split between the United States and Europe, which in turn would open the door for the Soviet Union to create mischief by emphasizing such a division.

Bloc talks opposed

The neutrals, of course, are opposed to bloc-to-bloc negotiations. A settlement of European security reached between the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers would not take into account the views of such key countries as Yugoslavia and Sweden. In addition, Austria, Ireland, Finland, Spain and Switzerland do not belong to either alliance, but they are as involved in the future shape of Europe. France, for quite different reasons, is equally opposed to negotiations between the blocs. At the same time, some issues such as MBFR can only be settled by smaller groupings of states.

In another field, it may be simpler for relations between the European Economic Community and COMECON, the Eastern bloc economic grouping, to be worked out by direct talks between them. At still another level, the nuclear balance is a subject that can only really be settled by a second round of the SALT talks between the super-powers, currently under way. Thus it will be seen that there will have to be a series of parallel but closely-linked negotiations between different groups of nations about the different problems which confront Europe.

Since 1966, European security and the proposed conference have been a dominant theme of every meeting of the Warsaw Pact powers. The basic theme was set six years ago and, although there has been a gradual development to meet objections from the West (e.g., agreement to U.S. and Canadian participation, acceptance of

MBFR), the objectives have remained essentially the same. The important thing is that the Western powers and the neutrals of Europe have agreed that a conference should be held.

Helsinki sessions

A certain measure of agreement emerged. Preliminary talks leading to a European conference began in Helsinki in the latter part of November and a separate exploratory meeting on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction was arranged early in 1973.

Representatives of 34 countries participated in the multilateral preparatory talks in Helsinki and those countries make up the list of participants for the full conference. They include the members of the Warsaw Pact, the NATO members, plus Albania, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Lichtenstein, Malta, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Vatican and Yugoslavia. (At the moment, Albania decided to boycott Helsinki sessions.)

It has also been accepted that a conference must be preceded by thorough preparation. In a sense, this has been progress for the past six years. The alliances have been co-ordinating their own approach and there have been countless meetings on a bilateral basis between statesmen of nations likely to be involved. France was anxious that the conference should begin with a session of foreign ministers, who would meet briefly to set up a series of groups or commissions, each would be charged with preparing detailed proposals for the ministers to consider at a second meeting about a year later. However, this approach did not find favour among the other NATO members. At the foreign ministers met in Bonn last

Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to the conference process. One, advocated by the Soviet Union and its allies, is agreement in advance on a set of declarations the CSCE could endorse. These would concern such things as renunciation of force and expansion in trade, economic, scientific and technical relations. Drafts for these were made as long ago as October 1969 by the Warsaw Pact's foreign ministers after their meeting in Prague. The argument has been advanced that the best way to proceed gradually, beginning with matters on which there is really no disagreement. It is admitted that this may seem redundant. Renunciation of force, for example, was accepted in the UN Nations Charter. However, according to this school of thought, there is no

Nuclear balance can be settled only by another round of SALT

why it should not be reaffirmed. Agreement to do so would create a climate of cooperation that would extend into other, more controversial areas.

The Western powers have felt that this is not good enough. They are chary of pieces of paper that might prove to be meaningless. They have become weary of the idea of meetings for what they consider to be propaganda purposes. The younger generation, particularly, feels this sort of exercise is no longer sufficient, and its disillusionment with what it calls the establishment will be the greater if CSCE accomplishes nothing more concrete than statements of principle. Thus the West has pressed to know in more precise terms what will be on the agenda, to know how the items will be developed and to define the advance possible areas of agreement. As the communiqué issued after the NATO ministerial meeting in Bonn put it:

“... the aim of Allied Governments in the multilateral preparatory talks would be to ensure that their proposals were fully considered at a conference and to establish that enough common ground existed among the participants to warrant reasonable expectations that a conference could produce satisfactory results.”

In other words, the West has sought careful preparation and a good deal of preliminary spade-work before a conference is convened. The Western powers want an understanding not only of what specific topics will be discussed but of the chances of agreement on them. It may well be that some are best left out of the CSCE format. Construction of pipelines or power-lines could be negotiated directly by those wishing to use them.

MBFR complexity

MBFR is one issue that required a separate forum because only members of the two alliances were directly involved. This is an extraordinarily complex issue. There is a general agreement that mutual and balanced force reduction is desirable and that it should be achieved in such a way that none of the nations of Europe emerge feeling any less secure than they do today. At their meeting in Bonn in May 1970, the NATO foreign ministers set criteria for Brezhnev is understood to have found generally acceptable. These criteria were:

(a) Mutual force reductions should be compatible with the vital security interests of the alliance and should not operate to the military disadvantage of either side, having regard for differences arising from geographical and other considerations.

- (b) Reductions should be on the basis of reciprocity and phased and balanced as to their scope and timing.
- (c) Reductions should include stationed and indigenous forces and their weapons systems in the area concerned.
- (d) There must be adequate verification and controls to ensure the observance of agreements on mutual and balanced force reduction.

These criteria are much easier to formulate than they will be to implement. The *Strategic Survey 1971*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, put the problem this way:

“SALT, by comparison, is much simpler, having to deal with a small number of discrete and well-understood weapon systems, in discussions which are bilateral. In MBFR, there is a host of weapons systems and forces and the possibility of a multitude of parties. SALT became possible because the Soviet Union had reached effective parity and could discuss equal reductions, whereas equal reductions in Europe, starting from a basis of inequality, are unbalancing by nature and unpredictable in their effect.”

Unilateral U.S. cuts

One of the difficulties that can never be overlooked is the need to abstain from unilateral force reductions, especially by the United States. The Nixon Administration has resisted attempts to reduce U.S. forces in Europe and the Mansfield amendment aimed at such reductions was defeated in Congress this year. However, some such proposal may win the support of Congress, and that in turn could jeopardize MBFR. If the United States were to reduce its forces unilaterally, why should the U.S.S.R. follow suit? Another consequence, as has been noted, might be the development of a European defence community and a subsequent split between Europe and North America. The end result would not affect the security of Eastern Europe, but it might weaken that of the West.

It is now generally accepted that a single conference will accomplish little and that there will have to be either a series of meetings, linked by working groups dealing with specific subjects, or some form of continuing machinery to examine problems of European security and cooperation. This accounts for the Warsaw Pact's proposal for creation of a “body to deal with questions of security and cooperation in Europe”. It is interesting to recall that a proposal for a European Se-

If U.S. to cut forces unilaterally 'why should U.S.S.R. follow suit?'

Committee on arms has substantial list of agreements to its credit

curity Commission was put forward in a study published in 1969 by the United Nations Association of the United States. Henry Kissinger, currently a key foreign policy adviser to President Nixon, was a member of the policy panel that studied this subject.

How such a body might operate is an open question, but a possible parallel might be the group that has been meeting in Geneva to consider disarmament questions. In its present form, this group dates back to 1961, when 18 nations were invited to participate. It became known as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, although, in fact, France has never taken part in its work. In 1969, eight more nations were added to the group and its name changed to the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament (CCD).

In the past decade, this committee has considered almost every proposal for disarmament and arms control and it has a substantial list of agreements to its credit. The committee has been in almost continuous session and the exchange of views and concerns has resulted in areas of disagreement being identified and, in many cases, narrowed. The ability of all participants to introduce subjects of their choosing has meant that nothing could be swept under the rug.

Forum for fears

This provides an interesting example for a body dealing with European security. It might be too much to expect the Soviet Union to have brought before such a body its concern about the Prague uprising of 1968. But other nations could have voiced their fears about possible Soviet reaction to it. In theory at least, there would have

The disintegration of global bipolarity and the rise of non-security issues open new opportunities and provide greater incentives for countries to cultivate a wider and more diverse range of international friends than was possible previously. In the heyday of the cold-war coalitions, each superpower, while competing for allies around the globe, made firm distinctions between its coalition partners and members of the enemy camp. Rarely would lesser members of either alliance deal bilaterally with members of the opposing alliance unless the exchanges were stage-managed by the alliance leader. Even for transactions within the camp, when important political or economic issues were being negotiated, the super-power was usually heavily involved and bilateral or multilateral dealings

been no need for armed intervention no need for the subsequent formulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

There would have to be several changes in makeup for a European security body, as compared to the Geneva disarmament committees. The original nation committee worked on the basis of co-chairmanship by the United States and the Soviet Union. That would probably be impossible for a European body. Similarly, the disarmament committee reports are sent year to the UN General Assembly. It is not clear to whom any European commission would report — if, indeed, it would report to anyone other than the governments represented on it.

Although the official subjects of the CSCE as given in the title are security and co-operation, its purpose has also been described as to create an atmosphere of co-operation in security. In other words, one of the aims is to break down the barriers that have divided Europe since the end of the Second World War. No one, even the countries of Eastern Europe, realistically expects NATO and the Warsaw Pact to disappear overnight. The alliances are recognized as stabilizing influences today and in present circumstances they provide a feeling of security that should lead to co-operation.

In the long run, however, it may be possible to visualize a European security system without alliances. This presupposes that the European countries will not threaten one another within the continent. A security system of any kind is designed to meet a potential threat. At present, NATO members are threatened by Warsaw Pact countries and vice versa.

among a subset of members were discouraged.

... More and more, divergences in world view or differences in social systems are insufficient causes to bar cordial relations among countries. Economic interdependence, technological co-operation and scientific and cultural exchanges are considered legitimate among virtually all possible combinations of countries; and, increasingly, organizations and forums for these purposes are using functional rather than ideological criteria for participation. . . .

(Excerpt from "The Changing Presence of Power" by Seyom Brown, Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, Washington, in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973)

When the walls come down and an atmosphere of co-operation is strengthened, a continental security system may follow. Possible models might be other regional organizations, especially the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization for African Unity (OAU). OAS members do not feel threatened by an outsider, but they have joined together to make certain that, should such a threat arise, it will be met through co-operation. There are considerable disparities between OAS members in their systems of government, economic development, military power and economic strength. But they do feel a common interest in defending their continent against an intruder. The OAU sometimes gives the impression of being far from united. However, its members have agreed that Africa's problems should

be settled by Africans, and this approach has been accepted by the United Nations.

Perhaps the most important achievement of a European security conference might be psychological. If it can lead to an acceptance of Europe as a single entity rather than a divided continent, it will have made a great step toward establishing security. This is important for technical and economic co-operation, for such things as the exchange of energy and control of pollution. More important, perhaps, will be the free movement of people. If security depends primarily on how people feel, it is surely essential that they meet each other and discover that the person they had previously thought of as a devil incarnate is, in fact, another human being like themselves.

Canada and European security

Canada has perceived the proposed Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as part of a broad negotiating process between East and West. In Canada's view, the conference would be neither the culmination of that process nor an end in itself. Rather, it would be the opening of a new phase in negotiations aimed at dealing with, and ultimately resolving, the underlying causes of division and tension in Europe.

From the outset, Canada has emphasized "proper preparation" as a requirement for such a conference — hence its emphasis on the need for a discussion of substantive issues at the 34-nation multilateral preparatory talks under way in Helsinki since late November. Canada has felt that the Helsinki talks should explore areas of common ground to permit a realistic judgment on the prospects for success at a full-dress conference before a final decision on convening the conference was made.


As External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp put it at a press conference during the North Atlantic Council ministerial sessions in Brussels in December, the Helsinki talks should come to grips with the issues — to determine whether the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners are interested in something more than "blessing the status quo" in Europe.

In its opening general statement at the Helsinki talks, Canada said none of the participants would be content with a

conference that had only superficial results: "A conference which did no more than agree on high-sounding but empty forms of words would create a dangerous illusion of progress. This is why the Canadian Government is of the view that the conference should make concrete . . . contributions to security and co-operation; . . . it should try to agree on specific steps — however modest they may be in the first instance — to improve the situation . . .".

How does Canada qualify as a participant in such talks? There are a number of elements that have given Canada entrée to what was originally characterized as an "all-European" conference. Canada has been deeply involved in two world wars that inflamed the European continent. Canadian and European security are seen as interdependent. Canada has a direct stake in European security through maintenance of Canadian forces there as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's military complement. Canada's traditions and cultures are in large part of European origin. It has firm historic and economic ties with Europe. Moreover, co-operation with European countries is an essential part of current Canadian policy of diversifying the country's external relations. A European security conference could affect not only the shape of Europe but the shape and tenor of transatlantic relations as well.

On the basis of NATO and Warsaw Pact stated positions and the first phase of



Representatives of 34 nations gathered in Helsinki for multilateral preparatory talks aimed at paving the way for the proposed Conference on European Security and Co-operation. Canada was among the

countries at the six-sided conference table for the Helsinki talks which began on November 22. The talks were recessed in mid-December and resumed in January.

UPI photo

the discussions at Helsinki, the agenda for a European security conference would fit into two general categories — questions of security and those embraced under the heading of co-operation.

On security, the most important item will be a proposed declaration on the guiding principles governing relations between states. Representatives of the Warsaw Pact powers have urged that this should take the form of a renunciation of the use of force or threat of force and a declaration of respect for and inviolability of present European borders.

Canada, along with some of the other Western powers, has agreed that the principle that frontiers should not be changed by force is one which should gain universal acceptance. But, as Canada said in Helsinki, the participants should avoid phrases which give the impression "that the conference is taking on the responsibility of a peace conference by establishing permanent frontiers in Europe or recognizing them in international law". The conference, in other words, should not attempt to do the work of a peace conference.

The European security conference is also expected to deal with so-called "confidence-building" measures — certain military aspects of security that may be considered outside the framework of the

separate exploratory talks on mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) among a smaller group of nations. In Canada's view, these might include advance notification of military movements and observation of manoeuvres. They could help enhance stability on the continent. Most European members of NATO would also like to include on the agenda a declaration of MBFR principles on force levels.

Another aspect of security might encompass specific proposals for disputes-settlement machinery emanating from some of the non-bloc powers. Among these is the Swiss proposal for settlement of European disputes by a combination of mediation and arbitration.

Elements of co-operation

Canada's approach to the other main agenda heading — co-operation — is that this is just as important a part of the proposed conference as security.

Co-operation is an umbrella-like item covering such areas as economic and trade relationships, efforts to preserve and improve the environment, exchanges in the fields of science and technology, cultural relations and the freer movement of people, ideas and information.

East-West economic co-operation — in the context of a European security con-

ference — involves the general relationship between the Western countries with their market economies and the more centralized, state-controlled economies of the Eastern European countries. It involves the role and membership in economic institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund and the Economic Commission for Europe. It might also include attempts by the enlarged European Economic Community and the Eastern European countries to evolve special arrangements.

Canada is sensitive to possibilities of trade negotiations between blocs which could result in discriminatory arrangements adversely affecting export opportunities for third countries such as Canada. In its statement at Helsinki, Canada suggested, for example, that "whatever new forms of economic co-operation are developed among countries at the conference should be outward-looking in their orientation and would be of a kind which would also benefit the developing states. In this context, we believe that the principles to be applied should include those underlying the GATT, Bretton Woods and related agreements — namely non-discrimination, uniform standards, common regulations, stability of markets and modification by consultations". In other words, Canada, in this forum as in others, will put the emphasis on a multilateral approach toward trade liberalization.

In the field of cultural relations, a European conference could use the present network of bilateral agreements as a starting-point for improved communications between East and West. Canada favours more imaginative approaches in terms of cultural exchanges — an attempt to go beyond the traditional fields of literature, music, fine arts and theatre to encompass study of national ways of life and such subjects as sociology, urbanism, health and social welfare.

Freer movement of people

On the question of freer movement of people, ideas and information, Canada has underlined this issue as an important item on the conference agenda — and Mr. Sharp drew special attention to it in his remarks to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on December 7. In a press briefing later on the same day, the Secretary of State for External Affairs said Canada considered freer movement of people, information and ideas one of the major objectives of the West: "If we don't achieve something in this direction — including the basic freedom of families to reunite — then the

conference will have failed to achieve one of the most desirable goals." The North Atlantic Council communiqué issued on December 8 said the alliance attached particular importance to freer movement of people, ideas and information as an objective and elaborated on this in a specific reference to the conference. The NAC said the conference should "bring about closer, more open and freer relationships between all people in Europe" and "stimulate a wider flow of information and ideas".

Apart from subject areas for the proposed conference, there have been questions of organization: the form any conference should take and what — if any — permanent machinery should be established to carry on the work of the conference.

Canada has given its support to the so-called three-stage pattern of organization for a conference, a plan initially put forward by France. This would involve:

A formal opening session of foreign ministers, which would delegate subject areas to a number of commissions and sub-commissions of officials;

sessions of these commissions over a period to work out an agreed position on agenda items;

a final-stage conference of ministers to confirm the work of the commissions.

Some countries, including the U.S.S.R., would like the final meeting to be at the heads-of-government level.

Mandates as guide

Participants in the Helsinki talks are considering whether "mandates" should be given to each of the commissions. These would be lists of subjects which would be examined by the commission and would serve as a guide to the production of draft resolutions or declarations for the final ministerial session.

Canada approved this format, asserting at Helsinki that the participants should try to provide mandates "which would, in effect, be an elaboration of the agenda items, setting out in a general and, if possible, non-controversial way the various points the proposed commissions would consider at the conference. These points would then be debated, amended, accepted or rejected in the commissions or by the conference itself". Canada suggested that, in drawing up these mandates, it would become evident whether sufficient areas of common ground could be found to ensure success at the conference.

There have been proposals from Soviet-bloc countries for creation of permanent arrangements or a permanent body on

Mandates designed to determine common ground for conference

European security and co-operation to function in the wake of the conference — a sort of extension of the conference process. In its general statement at Helsinki, the Soviet Union envisaged discussion of the question of “setting up an appropriate body capable of being a bridge between the first and subsequent conferences” — a body that would be consultative in nature. Canada, along with some of the other Western nations, has had reservations about such a body. Canada has indicated it will consider such a proposal in the light of whether it promises any positive, long-term gains for all participants. Canada would want to be able to play a full part in such a permanent body and to avoid conflict or overlapping with existing bodies.

At this press conference in Brussels in December, Mr. Sharp went beyond

these immediate concerns about form and organization and maintained that was not enough for a conference to work toward a statement forgoing the use of force. The nations involved must try to remove the basic conditions of division in Europe.

Joseph Luns, NATO Secretary-General, foresaw a period of unprecedented diplomatic activity, and expressed confidence that the Helsinki talks would lead to a full-scale conference. This same measure of optimism pervaded both the Helsinki talks and the Brussels sessions of the North Atlantic Council. *Détente* is now linked with defence in a world that has spun, as C. L. Sulzberger says, “into a curiously intricate era of multipolarity”

MURRAY GOLDBLATT

Could a conference lead to ‘peace fever’?

In approaching the problem of a security conference and of the multilateral preparations that will precede it, we should be both clear-headed and enthusiastic. Our enthusiasm was voiced in the Bonn ministerial communiqué. . . . Our clear-headedness manifests itself in the constant improvement of the Alliance’s defence posture. . . . This clear-headedness is especially necessary because the other side’s military capabilities are sharply increasing and its forces are no longer confined to specific areas but are deployed world-wide. . . .

Over and above the diverse hopes that have been placed on it, what else can the Conference on European Security be expected to produce? First, it may lead to a peace fever. It seems difficult for 30 to 35 nations of Europe and North America to make solemn declarations regarding their peaceful intentions in Europe without this having side-effects on their relationships elsewhere. . . .

Secondly, for West and East, a Conference of European Security entails a wager *vis-à-vis* the future: the East is banking on the juridical ratification of the *status quo*, commonly referred to as normalization, which would mean that, once the existence of an entity had been recognized, it could never again be called into question; for the West, the wager consists of assuming that the best way to achieve

freedom at some future date is to accept the present situation. . . . Thus, the security conference may further *détente* by enabling it to produce new fruits. . . .

Apart from the advantages, the conference may justly give rise to some misgivings. It could be used as a lever to dismember a still-fragile Western Europe; it could be a means of separating a vulnerable Europe from America; above all, it could lead to the belief that words can take the place of actions and that peaceful declarations are tantamount to peace itself.

Without doubt it is here that the greatest danger lies. The West is everlastingly tempted to take its desires for realities, whereas the realities should constantly temper its desires. If the West wishes to exploit the success its defence efforts have achieved for more than 20 years, then it must ensure that force can not disrupt the negotiations; thus, the balance of forces continues to be a prerequisite for these negotiations.

While we should enter the negotiations actively and in good faith. . . , we must never forget that our objective lies not in the negotiations themselves but in the results they produce. . . . (From speech at Aix-la-Chapelle by Andre de Staerck, Belgian Permanent Representative to NATO, during seminar organized by the Atlantic Treaty Association)

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London Daily Express, UPI Photos

Behind the rhetoric in Uganda —the expulsion of the Asians

At the beginning of August 1972, General Idi Amin Dada of Uganda ordered all non-citizen Asians to leave the country within 90 days unless they were given special permission to remain. During the next three months, 45,000 Asians were forced to find new homes abroad, including 5,000 who have settled in Canada. General Amin has been acclaimed by some as the saviour of Uganda and decried by others as a black racist. However, any examination and explanation of his action should ignore the rhetoric about the man and concentrate on a review of the history and socio-economic role of the Asian community in Uganda and in East Africa as a whole.

The Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama encountered merchants from Arabia and the Indian subcontinent trading in spices, skins, ivory, gold and slaves in all the major towns along the East African coast during his voyages of discovery at the end of the fifteenth century. It was not until almost four hundred years later, however, when the British colonial administration recruited labourers from the subcontinent to help in the construction of

the East African Railway from the port of Mombasa to Kampala, that settlers arrived from Asia in any numbers. An estimated 32,000 reached East Africa during that period and more than 7,000 of them remained there. As a result of continuing immigration, the number of Asians totalled more than 350,000 by the early 1960s or slightly more than 1 per cent of a total population of 30 million. They included approximately 150,000 in Kenya and 100,000 each in Tanzania and in Uganda.

Under British colonial rule, Asians could not own farm land (except in Tanganyika) and most of the early arrivals found positions in commerce, the skilled trades and the middle ranks of the civil service. Later generations turned to manufacturing and the professions. They quickly emerged as the East African middle class. In the ranks of the British colonial administration and the large British companies, they occupied the middle ground between senior British officials on the one hand and African clerks on the other. Colonial society was rigidly structured. Each racial group lived in its own residential area, with its own schools and clubs. The Africans understandably resented the privileged position occupied by the Asians and, as a prosperous minority that remained aloof and exclusive, they were the

Of the 45,000 Ugandan Asians forced to find new homes abroad, about 5,000 were granted entry to Canada. Pictured (left) is a group of refugees from Uganda trudging toward processing point in London. A young Asian mother and child (centre) wait in Montreal airport for accommodation arrangements to be completed and Bryce Mackasey (right), then Immigration Minister, welcomes a group of Ugandan children among the first party of Asians to arrive in Montreal.

This article was prepared in the African Affairs Division of the Department of External Affairs.

object of increasing envy, suspicion and dislike.

Post-independence regulations

When Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda gained their independence during the early 1960s, Asians who could prove that they and at least one of their parents had been born in East Africa were automatically eligible for local citizenship. Those who did not so qualify were given the opportunity to apply for citizenship. But this meant surrendering their British nationality and most Asians were reluctant to commit themselves completely to the new nations. A minority applied for local citizenship, others left, but the majority remained, with British passports.

The newly-independent governments soon came under popular pressure to end the Asian domination of commerce and their preferred position in the civil service. Each government has pursued its own path to this end.

In Kenya thousands of expatriate and Asian civil servants were replaced by native Kenyans. With the aim of "Kenyanizing" commerce and industry, the Government passed in 1967 an immigration and a trade-licensing act that required non-citizens to apply for work permits in order to hold or obtain jobs. Commercial operations by non-citizens were restricted to certain parts of the country and certain categories of goods. Although the Government formulated these controls on the basis of citizenship rather than race, it was the Asian community that was primarily affected. When 15,000 Asians left Kenya early in 1968, they received international attention. The Kenyan Government was concerned about the decline in local business confidence as a result of the exodus and the unfavourable effect that it might have on foreign investment and tourism. It sought to reassure the Asian community by freely issuing work permits to skilled Asians and postponing the implementation of the trade-licensing act. Since then, President Kenyatta has sought to maintain a balance between the conflicting demands of the economy and of popular opinion, which demands accelerated Africanization policies.

Legislation affecting non-citizens was also introduced in Tanzania. There, however, nationalization played an important part in official policy. A few Asian agricultural estates and commercial holdings were nationalized in 1967, together with several foreign-owned concerns. The Government also assumed direct control of the major part of the import-export trade and the wholesale-trade areas traditionally

dominated by Asians. In 1971, it imposed strict exchange controls to halt the outflow of capital and nationalized all rental property valued at more than £5,000 (\$14,000). As in the case of Kenya, the new measures avoided any direct reference to race, it was the Asians who were affected, in virtue of the fact that they were the country's property-owning class. Some 20,000 Asians left the country as a result of the measures and the Asian population fell to 50,000. For the most part, those who remained possessed much-needed skills that were in short supply.

Entrenched in Uganda


It was in Uganda that the Asians were most strongly entrenched. It had been recognized as early as the mid-1930s that unless the colonial administration intervened, Asian talent and money would permit them to extend their control over the economy, while native Ugandans remained primary producers in the agricultural sector. Accordingly, in 1938 non-African traders were confined to existing areas of activity. By the mid-1940s, African groups mounted a campaign demanding participation in the cotton-ginning and coffee-processing industries, which were then almost exclusively controlled by Asians. When riots broke out in 1948 and again in 1952, many rural Asian traders moved into urban centres and, in the spring of 1952, African leaders organized a boycott of Asian shops in Kampala and some shops were bombed.

In spite of this, Asian traders continued to dominate the commercial sector. They were not only more experienced, but they could draw on sources of credit readily available to Africans. Because of this, the small, service-type industries well were almost exclusively operated by Asians who ran the garages, bakeries and furniture factories and the profitable timber, oil and maize mills. This situation continued after independence in 1962, in part as a result of Government policies which concentrated on the development of larger enterprises through the state-owned Uganda Development Corporation.

Although their predominance in commerce and industry was a continuing source of popular grievance, there was little official pressure on the Asians until 1970, when the Government passed licensing and immigration legislation similar to that which had been introduced in Kenya. President Milton Obote also announced that the Government intended to place responsibility for imports and exports and the domestic wholesale trade in the hands of public corporations and that it would

Pressure to end Asian domination in civil service and commerce

Kenyatta seeking to maintain delicate balance between economy, popular opinion



Montreal Star—Canada Wide

Two of the Ugandan Asian children who arrived in Montreal clutch their Canadian souvenirs as they relax before getting word of settlement plans from authorities.

acquire a 60 percent interest in all banks and insurance companies and in the more important manufacturing, mining and transportation companies, most of which were owned by Asians. Several thousand of them decided to leave. They were allowed to take a portion of their capital with them and to withdraw the balance over a period of six years. "Ugandanization" was to be completed gradually by 1977.

The immediate result of President Obote's program for increased governmental participation in the economy was to weaken overseas investor confidence and to compound Uganda's economic problems. Between 1967 and 1969, the country's gross domestic product had risen in real terms at an annual rate of 5 per cent. During these years, Uganda had enjoyed a healthy annual balance-of-payments surplus of approximately \$10 million, based primarily on exports of high-quality coffee and cotton. However, a slump in world prices for these commodities, combined with the initiation of large, capital-intensive prestige projects, had an adverse impact on the country's economic performance and the growth-rate slowed to less than two per cent in 1970.

Amin's seizure of power

The seizure of power by the military Government of General Amin in January 1971 was generally welcomed by the Asian community. The new Government consider-

ably narrowed the scope of the nationalization program by limiting the number of companies to be affected and reducing the Government's shareholding to a minority interest. Steps were also taken to maintain existing foreign-exchange reserves and to reverse the outflow of private capital.

At the same time, however, the new regime greatly increased Government expenditure. Much of this was devoted to the military sector. Three-fourths of the Government's development fund and one-third of the current budget were allocated to defence spending, which reached \$20 million in 1971. By February 1972, the Bank of Uganda reported that its foreign-exchange reserves had fallen by 85 per cent during the previous year — to less than enough for two weeks' imports — and that the total trade account had accumulated a \$30-million deficit during that time. Inflation had become a serious problem and lower world prices for coffee and cotton had resulted in a reduction in agricultural output and an increase in unemployment. By mid-1972, Uganda faced an economic crisis.

President Amin, had, by this time, publicly branded the Asian community as economic saboteurs and had criticized them for their failure to integrate. On the other hand, he had also cancelled outstanding citizenship applications from 12,000 Asians. Pressure against the community continued and, by August 1972, when Amin issued his expulsion order for all non-citizen Asians, the Asian population had fallen to less than 50,000.

During the next three months, some 45,000 Asians left Uganda. In addition to the 25,000 who settled in Britain and the 5,000 who came to Canada, approximately 6,000 went to India and the rest to a number of countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also arranged for 4,000 stateless Asians still in the country when the deadline expired to be transported to temporary camps in Europe. Each departing Asian family was allowed to take 1,000 shillings (approximately \$140) out of the country. They were forbidden to sell privately or transfer any property left in Uganda. The 2,000 Asians who remained in Uganda were ordered to leave the towns and settle in the rural areas.

General Amin's action was widely criticized on both humanitarian and economic grounds. Apart from the more obvious humanitarian considerations, it was pointed out that the removal of the country's commercial class would create a vacuum that native Ugandans lacked the experience and the financial resources to

Vacuum anticipated if country's commercial class ousted by regime

fill easily or quickly and that it would undermine confidence in the regime at a time when the Ugandan economy was in need of foreign capital and expertise.

Economic repercussions

In fact, the continuing campaign of Africanization has had serious repercussions in Uganda's economy. The departure of the Asian community has produced an acute shortage of skilled manpower. Trade has declined and the supply and distribution systems have been disrupted. In Kampala and the main towns, the majority of the shops and small businesses have closed. Unemployment has increased. Tourism has disappeared as an important source of foreign exchange. Foreign investment has declined drastically. Meanwhile, military expenditures continue to absorb a high percentage of resources. But although the decision was questionable in economic terms, at least for the short run, it was undoubtedly popular with most Africans in Uganda.

World reaction to the expulsion order was swift and, in the main, condemnatory, particularly when it became clear that President Amin would not extend his November 8 deadline and when he announced that thousands of Asians who held Ugandan citizenship would be included as well. It was, however, difficult for African leaders to comment. Africanization policies of various types had been initiated in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as in most newly-independent countries on the continent, with the encouragement and support of their black African populations and while there may have been disagreement with Amin's methods, there was considerable popular sympathy for his aims in those countries where the control of a significant portion of its national economy remained in non-national or non-African hands. But the racist overtones of General Amin's actions also embarrassed many Africans.

World's reaction mainly critical but comment difficult for African leaders

President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania gave voice to this embarrassment in a speech on August 21, when he referred to the human problem created when thousands of people were suddenly forced to leave their homes. He also placed the problem in an African context when he added: "Sometimes we in Africa adopt the attitude that we have suffered so long it will be good for other people to suffer and see what it is like". "But", he continued, "all African countries are liable to be asked questions about what the governments or regimes of other free African states are doing".

Canada's response

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau on August 24 described the expulsion order as "one which we deplore and regret" and announced that Canada would admit a number of Asians forced out of Uganda on an emergency basis. A special team of Canadian officials was sent to Kampala to accelerate the processing of applications and commercial aircraft were chartered to bring the successful applicants to Canada. The operation was completed on November 8. Visas were issued to more than 6,000 persons and, by December 1, almost 5,000 had arrived in Canada. For the most part they were successful professional people, entrepreneurs and businessmen and, on December 5, Manpower and Immigration Minister Robert Andras announced that nearly half the Asians who had registered for employment had found positions.

President Amin has made it clear that the expulsion of non-citizen Asians was only the first campaign in a larger "economic war" aimed at placing all economic activity in the hands of black Africans. In line with this approach, he announced in November that British tea plantations in Western Uganda would be nationalized. Although British investment in Uganda is considerably less than that of the Asians before their expulsion, it occupies an im-

Idi Amin revels in peasant oratory and barrack-room philosophy. His tribal background and military career gave him a thorough training in both. Essentially, he is a product of African village politics and colonial parade-ground pugnacity. . . .

He is a man of immense energy and no little physical courage. Despite his accumulation of enemies, he scorns personal security, preferring to drive around the streets in an open jeep. He puts in an

average 14-hour day and travels several thousand miles each week to talk to the people. Popularity with the ordinary people means much to Amin. He has the peasant's contempt for the pretentiousness of other social orders. . . . (Excerpts from study of Amin by Christopher Munnion of Britain's Daily Telegraph, in the New York Times Magazine, November 12, 1972. Munnion was expelled from Uganda in September, and is now based in Salisbury, Rhodesia.)

portant place in the Ugandan economy, British banks, in particular, have traditionally played a key part in such areas as crop financing.

In December, President Amin confirmed that all tea estates belonging to non-Ugandans would be taken over and he announced that a number of other foreign-owned companies, most of them British-owned, would be nationalized by the Ugandan Government. New terms govern-

ing employment of British aid personnel were also announced.

The actions taken by the Ugandan leader underlined the significance of President Amin's allusion to a second phase in the campaign to give black Africans control of all economic activity. "The second phase," he has stated, "will be for black Ugandans to buy all shops, factories, cotton gins and businesses owned by Europeans and Asians, whether they like it or not."

Amin: an African experiment laced with 'bludgeon diplomacy'

By Philip Short

The last few months in Uganda have been dominated by two events: the expulsion of non-citizen Asians and the unsuccessful guerrilla invasion from Tanzania. In the one, about 45,000 people were uprooted from their homes and made to travel half-way around the world. In the other, at least 400 Ugandans — both guerrillas and Government troops — were killed.

Whether there was ever any direct causal relation between the two, as Ugandan President Idi Amin alleges, is doubtful. But there was at least one point of contact — the Ugandan army. To an even greater extent than in most African states, it is from the armed forces in Uganda that the Government derives its political power.

When President Amin announced at the beginning of August that he had had a dream in which God had told him to act against the Asians, all Uganda's top army and air force officers were visiting Moscow as part of a military delegation. On their return, he told them: "Now we are no longer quarreling among ourselves. Instead, we are all fighting the economic war."

A month earlier, there had been a mysterious incident in which a leading army officer from the Lugbara tribe in President Amin's home district of West Nile had been abducted and killed. Some sections of the army believed that the killing had been ordered at the highest level, and there were rumours of unauthorized troop movements. Briefly, the regime seemed threatened and President Amin cut short a visit to North Africa to fly back and sort the trouble out. But 36 hours later he felt confident enough to leave again on an extended tour of the Middle East.

Troops remained loyal

It may be that in August the President again feared a resurgence of this kind of unrest, although in fact there was little to suggest it was likely. And, in the event, when the invasion from Tanzania took place six weeks later and disaffected elements in the Ugandan army had their best opportunity to rebel, the troops remained totally loyal. Indeed, from President Amin's standpoint, the most significant aspect of the invasion was the complete absence of any answering internal unrest when the guerrillas struck.

Once the guerrillas had moved, a second link with the Asian exodus was established. President Amin claimed that Britain had been supporting the 1,000-strong guerrilla force sent in by Uganda's ex-President Milton Obote from Tanzania and had even been planning a simulta-

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Strained relations with U.K. led to Uganda fears of British move

neous invasion by British paratroops with a view to restoring former president Obote to power. The deal, President Amin asserted, was that when Obote had been reinstated, he would rescind the order expelling the Asians. It was a shrewd propaganda tactic. The expulsion program had the support of the vast majority of Ugandans. By making it appear that the guerrillas were on the side of the Asians, President Amin effectively alienated popular sympathies from the guerrillas.

Nor was the allegation of British involvement quite as nonsensical in the Ugandan context as it might have been elsewhere. Relations with Britain, strained throughout most of the year, plummeted with the expulsion decision. Only five days before the guerrilla attack, President Amin ordered a British military training mission out of Uganda, declaring that the officers serving on it were to take command of a British invasion force he said was about to attack. This idea apparently stemmed from articles in the British popular press, demanding that the Royal Air Force be made ready to evacuate British nationals if the need arose.

When the real invasion came, it was seen in the light of these earlier allegations, and Anglo-Uganda relations hit rock-bottom. Although President Amin was wrong in thinking Britain was preparing to overthrow his regime, he was right in believing that the British Government would by that stage have been delighted if someone else had done it for them.

Gradually the "Ugandization" program, which underlay the enforced Asian exodus, expanded to take in other areas in which Europeans, particularly Britons, were playing a role, until the ultimate object became to give Uganda not merely a distinct Ugandan image but a distinct black image.

Diversion from problems

Considerations of army morale and unity were not the only factors responsible for President Amin's order for the ousting of the Asians. There was also a need to revive the enthusiasm of the civilian population and divert attention from development projects halted for lack of funds — problems, the Government maintained, that were the result of profligacy by Obote's predecessor regime. And finally, of course, there was President Amin's dream; it may well be that, in the final analysis, the factor which actually precipitated the expulsions was no more rational than that. But although all this may explain the timing of the expulsion decision, it does not explain

why the Asians were chosen as the target or why so drastic a step as a mass expulsion was decided on. For that, there is quite a different set of reasons.

President Amin gave the Government's view of the failings of the Asian community at a conference with the leaders a year ago. It was an immense, long indictment and toward the end of his two-hour speech he informed his audience: "We could have gone on the whole afternoon and probably the whole night counting the various malpractices which are common among the Asian community... but, as it is not my intention to accuse but rather to remedy an unsatisfactory situation, I consider the examples I have given sufficient."

He had begun with the failure of Asian doctors and engineers, trained at Government expense, to remain in Government service; he moved on to what he described as the Asians' refusal "to integrate with the Africans of this country" warning that, if the Asian community continued to live in isolation from the African majority, "the situation which would be built up could easily lead to serious racial disharmony"; and, finally, President Amin dealt with the numerous commercial malpractices for which he held Asians to blame — bribery, currency frauds, counterfeiting, black-marketeering, profiteering, exploitation, hoarding, smuggling and maintaining a near-monopoly of the commercial sector.

Elements of truth

This was the unemotional side of President Amin's case — and it has to be conceded that there was a certain amount of truth in it. While many Asians were as honest and straightforward in their commercial dealings as the next man, there were a disproportionate number who did send money out of the country illegally, who regularly overcharged for price-controlled goods and who smuggled out essential commodities to neighbouring countries, where they fetched higher prices. In fairness, it must be added that overcharging was and still is even more prevalent among African traders.

President Amin's other principal complaint, that the Asians elected to retain the social and cultural barriers they had raised around their community, was also true. Moreover, unlike Europeans, they did not have white skins as an excuse. Yet, for all that, race relations in Uganda were better than in most parts of Africa, and there was no sign of the racial disharmony of which President Amin spoke being imminent. However, racial considerations did play a significant part in the other, emo-

ional, half of the Ugandan leader's case.

Shortly before the conference with Asian leaders, President Amin told a group of Scandinavian journalists: "Asians keep themselves in their community, which makes people have this feeling against them. Even I myself, if I began to be associated with Asians, would be rejected within a minute, let me tell you. This feeling — it is there with Ugandans. Europeans are cleaner than Asians . . . and actually I would be very happy if there were more Europeans here than Asians."

In the past year, President Amin's ideas have changed, and now that there are more Europeans in Uganda than Asians, it affords him no great pleasure. The emotional rejection of the Asians — "making Kampala look like Bombay or Calcutta" — remains, but this is complemented by a positive desire "to make all Uganda's towns completely black".

'Bludgeon diplomacy'

If the Asians were the obvious target in recent months — and a target, moreover, that was consonant with the idea, universally accepted among developing countries, of achieving national control over the economy as well as the body politic —, the measures taken against them were a striking demonstration of the policy of "bludgeon diplomacy" that President Amin has made his own.

Although the Ugandan President can, when necessary, be shrewd enough in managing the internal power balances that preserve his regime, his management of foreign affairs is devoid of subtlety. Frequently the accepted norms of diplomacy are trampled into the ground. It can be argued that the greatest failure of many Western states, and in particular Britain, in dealing with President Amin is their inability to come to terms with his approach to international problems. All too often, off-the-cuff remarks that had been better ignored are studied, analyzed and carefully replied to — leading to new and avoidable disputes. To a lesser extent, this is probably true of many other African leaders.

Where the traditional approach to foreign policy problems involves a gradual extrication from one position and a shift to another, President Amin favours what can be characterized as the "Gordian Knot" technique. The problem is not unravelled but cut, and the result is sometimes a wild policy swing.

In the late fall of 1971, President Amin was in the midst of a series of border skirmishes with Tanzania. Such support as he had in the rest of Black Africa came

from moderate states, many of which were inclined toward a policy of dialogue with South Africa. To strengthen this support, or perhaps one should say to cement ties between Uganda and these potential allies, President Amin announced his willingness to send a fact-finding mission to South Africa. Two months later, with the border skirmishes at an end, and an apparent possibility of normalizing relations with Tanzania, he offered Uganda as a base for training an all-African army to invade the white south.

In March 1972, after becoming convinced that his close relations with Israel were an impediment to his aspirations as a progressive African leader, and irritated by Israeli demands that his Government pay its bills, President Amin expelled his erstwhile allies and proceeded to forge strong ties with the Arab states.

In the case of the Asians, all the factors likely to influence President Amin militated against half-measures, and this, on top of his innate preference for clearcut answers to problems, ensured that no other solution but a mass expulsion would be considered. While President Nimeiry of the Sudan succeeded in dissuading him from expelling Ugandan citizen Asians, on the grounds that such action could not be defended against accusations of racialism, this was only a temporary concession. Two and a half months later, it was announced that Ugandan citizen Asians who did stay on would be forcibly resettled among African peasant communities in the bush as a means of "creating unity and harmony among all Ugandans, regardless of their colour". The result was, as intended, that all but the most fatalistic of the Uganda citizen Asians left.

The one real concession to economic considerations President Amin made was to exempt temporarily — for up to three years — more than a thousand Asian technicians and professionals whose skills Uganda needed. For the rest, he was quite genuinely convinced that Ugandan Africans could take over without any enduring economic ill-effects.

The guerrilla invasion was a considerable success for President Amin's regime. For everyone else it was a disaster. Through the previous 18 months, the Ugandan leader had periodically declared that Uganda was about to be invaded by Tanzania-based guerrilla supporters of ex-President Obote. After a while these claims lost credibility, and Black African sympathy was firmly with Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere. But after September 17, when Radio Uganda interrupted its programs to announce that 1,000 "Tan-

Only concession to fix exemption for thousand Asian technicians

*Tanzania leader
open to charges
of violating
Charter of OAU*

zaniaan troops" had crossed the border and were advancing on the southern Uganda towns of Mbarara and Masaka, the situation was dramatically reversed. Not only was President Amin shown to have been right all along in his insistence that guerrillas were training in Tanzania, but it later became clear that the invasion had been launched with the full knowledge and approval of the Tanzanian Government. Had the invasion succeeded, there would doubtless have been no recriminations. But its ignominious defeat left President Nyerere open to charges of violating the Organization of African Unity charter. That the invaders were "guerrilla troops from Tanzania" rather than "Tanzanian troops", as the Ugandan leader had first claimed, was of little consequence.

As events turned out, there was no direct conflict between the two countries apart from two Ugandan bombing raids on the northern Tanzanian towns of Bukoba and Mwanza, and the fighting with the guerrillas inside Uganda was over within a week. Nonetheless the situation, buoyed by President Amin's claims of an international conspiracy involving Britain, India and Zambia as well as Tanzania, was potentially explosive, and both Nzo Ekanhaki, the OAU Secretary-General, and several African leaders attempted mediation. But neither Ekanhaki himself nor such leaders as Sekou Touré of Guinea and Tolbert could bring off a settlement. The Sudan's Nimeiry and Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko were ruled out.

Mogadishu agreement

In the end, it was Somalia's President Mohamed Siad Barre who succeeded in bringing the two sides together. The resultant Mogadishu peace agreement was something of a surprise in that it permitted ex-President Obote and his supporters to remain in Tanzania — and the accord did not require President Nyerere to recognize the Amin regime. It seemed as though the Ugandans, even though they were negotiating from a position of strength, had conceded a great deal and obtained little in return.

What appears to have happened is that they signed the agreement on the understanding that, after a suitable period of face-saving, the remaining differences would be smoothed away. It became clear soon after the signing that this was not going to take place and that the Mogadishu agreement would not be the "final solution" it had been made out to be.

The limited agreement that was reached has been implemented, but the

other, more fundamental, differences remain as intractable as ever. Overt tensions are much reduced, but there is little prospect of any further normalization of relations.

Amin's credibility

Like the invasion from Tanzania, the expulsion of the Asians did much to restore President Amin's credibility. He had said he would do it, and he did it, despite what was, under the circumstances, ill-advised obstruction by Britain. Whether the expulsion program was approved outside Uganda is another question and the answer seems to be that it was not. Where credibility is concerned, approval is not the main consideration.

With the guerrilla episode over and the Asians out, President Amin's time has been devoted equally to the problems of transferring vacated Asian businesses to black Africans — non-black Ugandans are ineligible to take them over — and to extending the policy of "giving Uganda a black face" to other fields. Unsurprisingly the British community in Uganda is a prime target. Another is the thousand or more European missionaries who are viewed as a potential source of subversion. Doubtless there will be more.

The economy, meanwhile, is showing no signs of collapse, although there is massive urban unemployment and the expected shortages of consumer goods are beginning to occur. What the eventual economic repercussions of the Asian exodus will turn out to be is too early to say but the probability is that, in view of the small size of the commercial and industrial sectors in what is a predominantly agricultural country, they will be much less marked than is generally expected. The real difficulties will be social and political — the consequences of unemployment, the shortages of essential goods, inflation and above all, the absence of any ideological framework to continuing, wayward change.

It is this last factor that has prevented the expulsion program having significant political repercussions in other Black African states. Neither Kenya nor Tanzania shows much inclination to follow Uganda's lead — and only a change of regime in either of those countries or the demonstrable success of the Ugandan experiment is likely to change that situation. For the present, the main external effects of the expulsion of the Asians, and of the wider policy of "indigenization" of which it is part, will be on the economic strength of the East African Community and on Uganda's bilateral political and economic relations with the Western world.

*Pact with Nyerere
was implemented
but basic issues
remain unresolved*

Canada's initiatives to combat the latest scourge of the skies

By Lorne S. Clark

Canada's credentials on the anti-hijacking front are as good as those of any country, and better than most. Domestically, Canada was the first nation to provide specifically in its criminal code that offences on board its flag aircraft, wherever they might be (over the high seas or within the territorial jurisdiction of another state), could be prosecuted in its courts, as could offences committed on any non-Canadian aircraft in flight if the flight terminated in Canada. This was effected by statute in 1959. Internationally, the Canadian delegation to the 1963 Tokyo Air Law Conference was active in ensuring the inclusion of provisions dealing with "unlawful seizure of aircraft" (hijacking) in the landmark Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) at that time.

Since then, as the frequency and ferocity of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation have grown steadily, Canada has been in the forefront of those members of the international community committed to combating the new scourge of the skies. To this end, Canadian delegations have put specific proposals before ICAO, co-sponsored United Nations resolutions, taken part in a number of multilateral and bilateral negotiations and enacted additional comprehensive criminal legislation, the most recent in June 1972. But perhaps the most far-reaching Canadian initiative has been in the field of international enforcement measures against states providing sanctuary to hijackers and perpetrators of terrorist attacks against civil aircraft.

Before turning to an examination of these recent efforts, it might be worth while to review the current state of international air law as it relates to unlawful interference with aviation. The three key legal instruments are the 1963 Convention in Tokyo, the 1970 Convention in The Hague and the 1971 Montreal Convention, the first two of which are in force (the Montreal

Convention will probably come into force early this year); Canada is a party to all three. Basically, these instruments, all of which were elaborated by and adopted under the aegis of ICAO, provide that every contracting state should take the steps necessary to ensure that specific offences in the field of unlawful interference are covered by and can be prosecuted under its national criminal law, that domestic jurisdiction is extended to deal with particular cases, and that offenders are either extradited or made liable to prosecution.

Although these air-law treaties are significant elements in the international community's endeavours to construct a viable framework for preventing and deterring illegal acts on or against aircraft, they do not contain any enforcement provisions. States parties do, of course, agree to be bound by their terms; however, failure or refusal to implement international legal obligations reflected therein, while contrary to international law, involves no express penalty.

Additional convention

Canadian authorities, therefore, have taken the view that a way to complete the legal framework to promote the safety and security of civil aviation is to develop an additional convention that would create an effective system for ensuring respect for and compliance with the international air-law principles reflected in the previous treaties. To this end, following earlier

Mr. Clark is First Secretary at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, where he is responsible for legal matters and Congressional relations liaison. He has been a delegate to every international conference dealing with hijacking and related matters since the first session of the ICAO Unlawful Seizures Subcommittee. He was a member of the Canadian delegation that went to Havana early in 1971 to initiate negotiations for a Canada-Cuba hijacking agreement.



Wide World Photo

Injured passengers of a Southern Airways DC-9 jetliner, hijacked and flown to Cuba, are moved by ambulance attendants and nurses after they arrived in Miami on a plane that returned them from Havana.

The passengers and crew of the hijacked plane were subjected to a 46-hour ordeal ending when their bullet-riddled plane made a belly landing in foam at Havana's Jose Marti Airport on November 11.

initiatives — relating to both bilateral and multilateral approaches to enforcement — at the June 1970 seventeenth (extraordinary) ICAO Assembly, the ICAO Council meetings in September of that year, and the eighteenth session of the ICAO Legal Committee held in London in October 1970, Canada and the United States cooperated in a joint effort to have a 16-nation Special ICAO Legal Subcommittee convened in Montreal in April 1971. At this session they tabled a draft convention on the safety and security of aviation, designed to be linked to and augment the three earlier international instruments. The specific machinery envisaged in the new draft for ensuring compliance with the pertinent international legal obligations included a procedure for the suspension of air services to and from offending states under certain delineated circumstances.

Given the importance of the international juridical issues involved in, and the possible far-reaching consequences of, creating multilateral machinery for suspending international air navigation with states found to be in default of particular obligations, it is understandable that the subcommittee meeting spent much of its time

debating fundamental principles. In the event, the lengthy and detailed deliberations resulted in a near consensus that states did have a legal duty — based on newly-developed customary international law — not to detain the passengers and crews of hijacked aircraft. There was also agreement that states should not provide any form of encouragement, assistance or protection to hijackers and other perpetrators of serious unlawful acts against civil aviation.

However, many delegations could not agree that this responsibility (not to encourage, assist or protect) went so far as to constitute an obligation to either extradite or prosecute offenders. This and basic questions relating to the functioning of international consultative or decision-making machinery were the most intractable issues on which the subcommittee found it could not come to specific acceptable conclusions. Accordingly, it was recommended that a second session be convened at a future date to continue the work on a draft enforcement convention (although several representatives indicated that they did not foresee any possibility of securing a consensus on the most dif-

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difficult matters and therefore could not support another meeting).

With the passage of a few tranquil months during which no major air-transport incidents took place, the eighteenth ICAO Assembly, held in Vienna in June 1971, decided, over strongly-voiced Canadian objections, to place the subject of an enforcement convention on the Legal Committee's inactive list for the time being, and there the matter stood for an entire year.

Pressure from pilots

Then, mainly as a result of efforts on the part of the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA),

which had instigated a 24-hour strike to call attention to the need for renewed international anti-hijacking action, the enforcement convention question was taken up by ICAO once again in June 1972. Addressing the Aviation Organization's Council in Montreal on that occasion, the Canadian representative declared:

"It is absolutely essential that the responsible international community create an international legal regime, and the climate of awareness to underlie it, whereby resort to acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation will not be tolerated whatever the proffered justification. . . . The major air-service states must be prepared to take concerted action if the inter-



UPI-Wide World Photos



Margit Sommer

Ambulance stands ready as Frankfurt policemen surround skyjacked Air Canada DC-8 passenger jet with skyjacker and Air Canada stewardess hostage, Margit Sommer, aboard at Frankfurt Airport. The skyjacker, identified as a West German, entered the plane on November 25 after passengers had disembarked for

security check and demanded that a Czech student held in another hijacking be turned over to him and the three flown to Prague. The attempt was blocked when police shot the skyjacker as he attempted to pick up a radio at the door of the plane. Miss Sommer escaped uninjured.

national legal obligations contained in the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions are not respected. . . . Concerted action should be taken by the most important air-service states acting jointly according to a mutually agreed procedure to be contained in an international convention which should be worked out under the auspices of ICAO."

After lengthy debate on the issue, the Council, on June 19, adopted a resolution co-sponsored by Canada and the United States, which, *inter alia*, directed the legal committee to convene immediately a special subcommittee to "work on the preparation of an international convention to establish appropriate multilateral procedures within the ICAO framework for determining whether there is a need for joint action in (certain) cases". The joint action machinery envisaged was to include a system for the suspension of air services to and from offending states.

The new Special Subcommittee, as finally organized, had almost the same membership — and the same chairman was elected — as the April 1971 body. It also had the benefit of the report of the earlier subcommittee, including several enforcement-convention draft articles. These had been elaborated by a working group at the Montreal meeting of the ICAO Legal Subcommittee.

Fifteen ICAO member states sent voting delegations to the new session, which took place in Washington in September 1972. Official observers from one other member state and from the United Nations and three other international organizations also attended. As befitted the role of original proposers of the initiative that led to the Washington meeting, the Canadian and U.S. delegations were among the most active members of the subcommittee.

In his opening statement on September 4, the Canadian chief representative said:

"We are here on this Labour Day because of an American and Canadian proposal accepted by the ICAO Council in June deploring the continuing frequency of acts of unlawful interference, which cause serious safety problems, endanger lives and undermine confidence in international air transport. One needs only to reflect on the facts that, before 1956, aerial hijacking of commercial aircraft was virtually unknown, that the world-wide incident rate for this crime is now approximately once every four and a half days, and that, besides the hundreds of deaths and casualties attributable to hijacking and sabotage, some 13,000 passengers and

crews have had their lives placed in danger to realize why the Canadian Government, among others, considers it is absolutely essential that the responsible international community create an (effective and generally acceptable) international legal regime (to deal with) unlawful interference with civil aviation."

Issues more tractable

Once the conference was under way, became clear that several of the difficult and seemingly insoluble issues with which the April 1971 subcommittee had struggled now appeared much more tractable. In particular, a fairly general consensus developed on the type of default-determination machinery that should be established under any eventual draft convention. To deal with this question, a working group (which included Canadian representatives) was set up by the subcommittee to review the original Canada-U.S. proposal and submissions from other delegations; to consider the scope of the proposed new instrument; to examine the procedures to be applicable during the "fact-finding" stage of determining whether an accused state was indeed in default of relevant international obligations; and to look into possible formulae for linking the provisions of the convention to ICAO. Toward the end of the session, the working group reported a wide measure of agreement on these various matters and the subcommittee requested the working group's chairman to prepare the text of specific draft articles based on the subordinate body's report. This was done, and the report of the subcommittee has these draft articles annexed to it.

While the working group was concentrating on the fact-finding or default-determination machinery, the subcommittee itself spent a great deal of time discussing the "joint-action" stage, i.e. the system contemplated for international co-ordination and co-operation to secure the implementation of states' obligations in the sphere of air law. Building on the model envisaged in the 1971 Canada-U.S. draft, and taking into account the discussions held in the first subcommittee and the results of informal consultations with various ICAO member states, as well as the debate then under way, a new revised draft article on "joint action" was elaborated and tabled by the delegations of Canada, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States. Introducing the proposal on behalf of the co-sponsors on September 13, the Canadian representative underlined the importance Canada attached to providing for effective international ma-

15 ICAO states
sent delegations
to new session
in Washington

chainery in the convention and emphasized that the subcommittee should make every possible effort to ensure that a draft article reflecting the detailed discussion that had taken place was transmitted to the parent Legal Committee together with the articles on default-determination emanating from the working group's deliberations.

Results in Washington

By the end of the Washington Conference on September 15, significant results had been achieved, especially in comparison with the inconclusive outcome of the April 1971 session. These can perhaps best be summarized as follows: (1) The elements of a reasonably nearly complete draft enforcement convention are contained in the subcommittee report and its annexes. These include what Canada considers to be the two essential aspects: (a) machinery for the impartial determination as to whether a particular state is in default of its international legal obligations relating to unlawful interference; and (b) provision for a systematic means of deciding on joint action measures "to preserve and promote the safety and security of civil aviation including collective suspension of international air navigation" to and from offending states. (2) The subcommittee, with only one dissenting vote, expressed the view that its work had progressed so far that a second session was not required and the subject of drafting an enforcement convention was "ripe for study by the Legal Committee". (The Legal Committee -- on which all 125 member states have the right of representation -- is the ICAO organ that completes a draft international convention before it is submitted to a diplomatic conference for formal adoption

and opening for signature and ratification.)

In accordance with normal procedure, the ICAO Council considered the report and recommendations of the Special Subcommittee on November 1, 1972. Accepting the subcommittee's view that "the Legal Committee be convened . . . as soon as possible", and endorsing a U.S. proposal that, in the light of the importance and urgency of the subject matter, provision be made for the holding of a diplomatic conference at an early date, the Council decided that (1) the Legal Committee should hold a special session in January 1973 and (2) the dates of August 21 to September 11 should be earmarked for a diplomatic conference.

It thus seems clear that the possibility of completing the four-sided international air-law structure to prevent and deter acts of unlawful interference and to preserve and promote aviation security is at hand. The 1963 Tokyo Convention laid the foundation for international legal rules regarding the restoration of control of a hijacked aircraft to the pilot and the release of the passengers and crew and return of the cargo. The 1970 Convention in The Hague reflected the newly-emerging principle that hijackers must be either extradited or made liable to prosecution. The 1971 Montreal Convention mirrored the extension of this extradition or prosecution obligation to perpetrators of armed attacks, sabotage and other unlawful acts against civil aircraft. The embryonic new enforcement convention should, if its eventual final form bears much resemblance to what emerged from the Washington meeting, establish an effective means for ensuring that these various obligations are respected and implemented by states.

Foresee completion of a four-sided legal structure for promoting aviation security

... The international community still has no answer to the dilemma of deciding at what point local violence has such wide and obvious international implications that it can no longer be accepted as a purely domestic matter. We struggled with this problem last year in the crisis in Bangladesh. And, even where violence is plainly international from the outset, our means of dealing with it are often pitifully weak. . . .

Terrorism takes many forms. It is called forth by a wide range of complex situations. The rights and wrongs of these situations are bitterly contested. It is simple realism to recognize all this. But the problem cannot be ignored because it is difficult; there must be no truce with terror.

Some acts of terror are the work of deluded and demented criminals; others, of frustrated and desperate men willing to sacrifice their own lives and the lives of innocent people for what they regard as a noble cause. When we agree that the cause is noble, we are tempted to condone the terror. But are we wise to do so? The act we condone today may be the one we regret tomorrow when it is turned against us. For terrorism in the end affects everyone; it is an attack on civilization at large. Violence breeds violence, murder answers murder, and order dissolves in chaos. (Excerpt from address to UN General Assembly by External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp, September 28, 1972)

Fashioning new rules to meet the challenge of the charters

By Kenneth Romain

After long and arduous debate in a series of international meetings lasting over many months, agreement was reached in principle late last year on a new concept of international air-charter travel that promises to bring about a revolution in airline marketing methods.

In the first moves in this direction, the United States, Britain and Canada announced new regulations that marked the end of the so-called "affinity rule", which required that a charter traveller be a member of a club or association.

In the face of the increasing growth of charter travel and the increasing public desire for low-cost fares, the affinity rule had become largely discredited because it was so easily breached. It had become unenforceable, unmanageable, and unworkable. It was open to such widespread and blatant abuse by shady charter organizers that it often worked hardship not only on those who were aware they had knowingly broken regulations but even more on the unwary and the innocent.

This change in policy will open a new round in the battle between the scheduled carriers and the non-scheduled, or charter, carriers, but the new regulations, it is hoped, will drive the so-called "bucket-shop" organizer from the scene and place the marketing of the new charters in the hands of more responsible individuals.

The new regulations, known as Advance Booking Charters, or as Travel Group Charters in the United States, go into effect this year on the highly-travelled North Atlantic route. The regulations have also received the endorsement of the West European governments that participated in the discussions through the European Civil Aviation Conference, a body representative of the aviation agencies of these countries.

Advance booking

Broadly speaking, the new ABC conception means that anyone can qualify for low-fare charters by making a booking 90

days in advance and paying a non-refundable deposit of 25 per cent of the fare. Although the regulations will open charters to a far wider market, the establishment of the advance-booking feature will still offer protection to the scheduled services of the scheduled carriers. The advance feature is intended to insure that there is as little diversion as possible of the regular users of scheduled operations, such as business travellers, to the lower cost charters. The businessman and those who fly for family or personal reasons require more flexibility than is provided by a system involving a commitment three months in advance of a flight.

The new regulations also give official distinction to business and pleasure or holiday travel rather than emphasizing scheduled or non-scheduled service, as in the past. The advance-booking feature serves to maintain the difference. The business traveller is usually on an expense account and his air fare is paid by other than himself, or at least is tax-deductible. The vacation traveller — whether alone or with his family — usually pays his own fare and, in return for a substantial discount, he can be expected to book several months in advance of his planned departure date.

The government action was not prompted by any overwhelming consumer pressure for low fares but by growing reports of passengers stranded at overseas airports and the arbitrary cancellation of holiday flights when it was discovered that affinity regulations had been broken. In addition, there was the scandalous behaviour of some unscrupulous organizers.

Kenneth Romain, former foreign editor of The Globe and Mail, served for three years as head of the paper's British Columbia bureau. Mr. Romain has maintained a special interest in transportation problems and has returned to Toronto offices of The Globe, where he will serve as the specialist in transportation questions for the newspaper's Report on Business.

who reaped profits at the expense of the travelling public.

The affinity rule had become a farce. The regulations were so bent that the law had become "a ass". Change was long overdue.

Flights to double

Although governments had the authority to enforce the affinity regulations, it would have required an army of officials to police them properly and adequately. In addition, charter traffic growth is not expected to level off. In fact, international travel and both scheduled and charter flights are expected to more than double between 1970 and 1975. Because of the increasing affluence of both North American and European workers, there is a growing trend toward the two-vacation family, which in turn is leading to the expansion of off-season travel.

Although each government is now prepared to say it led the way in initiating change, there is no question that the Canadian Government, through the Canadian Transport Commission and the international section of its Air Transport Committee, played a major role in formulating the new policy. Recognition of this role was the holding of two of the international meetings on the policy changes in Ottawa in the past year.

In aviation parlance, airlines primarily engaged in charter services are referred to as non-scheduled, supplementals or "non-skeds", as opposed to the scheduled carriers, which provide point-to-point individually-ticketed service on fixed routes and fixed schedules.

The international scheduled carriers have long recognized the "non-skeds" as a threat to their operations and in 1953, through the International Air Transport Association, they devised the affinity rule, known as Resolution 045, to control charters and protect their own scheduled traffic by placing restrictions on charter flights. The resolution was adopted by governments and embodied in their aviation legislation.

The gist of the resolution was that charter-worthy groups must have been formed for at least two years for purposes other than organizing charter flights and must have a membership of not more than 50,000 persons, and that all participants in a charter must have been members of the chartering group for at least six months.

In the early days it was an effective instrument. But with increasing affluence and the introduction of the jet aircraft and its lower operating costs, charter air-

lines and charter travel experienced a major leap forward, beginning about 1963. Organizers mushroomed along with the charter airlines. Each began fighting the others to operate cheaper trips, opening the way for the cut-price and shady organizer to obtain charter customers.

Operating behind a screen of dummy and bogus club organizations, these organizers, often with the tacit approval of an airline or airlines looking for business, booked their own charters. They also contracted to sell the unsold or unfilled seats of legitimate charters that wound up short of the total number of members needed to fill an aircraft. The most common form of abuse was the backdating of membership cards to meet the six-month membership requirement.

The organizers also advertised so openly that many never realized they were breaking the rules and often were genuinely astonished, and in turn apprehensive, when they were told they were not legally entitled to fly.

Because of the laxness of enforcement, the organizer operated with impunity and increasing refinement and sophistication. Government officials complained of the lack of enforcement staff and explained they were so busy examining the flood of charter applications they did not have the time or the manpower to check on whether the clubs were legitimate operations.

Last year saw the introduction of another wrinkle in the charter game with the issuance of one-way tickets and a voucher redeemable overseas for the return charter flight home. Many unwary travellers last summer found the vouchers to be worthless pieces of paper — their overseas contacts had disappeared or had declared bankruptcy.

Legislation limited

The Canadian Government, as well as other governments, was never able to control this so-called middleman; charter legislation only covered club organizations and the airlines. Although the British Government intends in its new regulations to license the charter organizer, the Canadian Government cannot do so because such licensing comes under provincial jurisdiction.

However, the new regulations do introduce a direct "contract" conception to charter travel, in which the individual can contract directly with the airline. Full details of all the arrangements, itineraries, flight dates and passenger-lists must be filed by the airline with the proper government body well in advance of depart-

*Contacts vanished,
unwary travellers
found vouchers
to be worthless*

*Organizer or line
able to sell
standby list
of substitutions*

ture. Any airline or organizer breaking the rules would risk losing its eligibility to make such applications for charters.

All new regulatory proposals are broadly the same, with minor variances that will not prevent their adoption. These include the 90-day advance booking, a minimum stay, a minimum of 40 persons to a group, the advance 25 percent deposit, and full fare paid in advance of departure. Although the group must fly together, members can return on different airlines. All fares paid in advance are held in escrow in a bank until the trip is completed.

The organizer or airline will also be able to sell a standby list of names of persons who can substitute for these passengers on the original application-list who are unable to make the trip because of illness or for other reasons. Control of the lists — to prevent last-minute “ringers” — will be exercised through a requirement for submission of the passport number of each person taking part in the flight. Inclusion of passport numbers should curb abuse, because abuse could mean that a breach of passport regulations was involved.

Through these new regulations, governments hope to eliminate the abuses of the past. As the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board said in announcing its new rules: “There is an irresistible and understandable public demand for low-cost transportation, much of it on charter services. The demand up to now all too often has been met by flouting existing charter rules. The new rules will enable consumer needs to be satisfied in a lawful manner.”

Although abolishing the affinity groups, the new rules do make provision for club charters — as in the past — for special purposes or special events. The legitimate club-charter organizer will not be restricted in serving his club’s travel plans or pursuits.

New spectrum of traffic

As for the scheduled carriers, they have always been reluctant to accept charter services. They have argued that the affinity-rule provisions were necessary if they were to avoid a diversion of their regular traffic. The growth of the charter movement had brought many warnings from the International Air Transport Association of the danger of siphoning off scheduled traffic and the effect it could have on scheduled service.

However, charter operators have always shot back that their activity has generated a whole new spectrum of traffic with their low fares, which would never

have been developed under the IATA lines’ higher-fare structure. And air-traffic growth statistics appear to bear them out. Although charter traffic has seen spectacular growth, the scheduled-airlines’ traffic has also grown, if not at the same rate of increase. The activities of the charter operators have also forced the airlines to lower their fares through promotion rates to meet the charter competition. And to grab a share of the market, many scheduled carriers have formed their own charter subsidiaries which operate outside the IATA framework. In addition, the non-scheduled carriers have been a significant regulatory instrument of governments, which has enabled governments on many occasions to control IATA activities.

It is easy to see that the charter operators can operate more economically than the scheduled carriers as they do not have the high overhead costs required for scheduled service and need to fly only when their aircraft are full. The scheduled airline must fly whether the plane is full, half full, or nearly empty.

Challenge to charters

However, the scheduled carriers have no intention of letting this charter market go to “non-sked” operators by default of lack of competition. They are preparing to mount their own campaign to enter the market with more and more aircraft allocated to charter operations, which means that low fares will continue to be available.

Some of these airlines are seeking to introduce a new part-charter system that will enable them to block off seats on regularly scheduled flights for charter organizers to sell at below scheduled fares. But some countries see this move as working against their state-owned airlines, especially those countries that do not generate or receive large numbers of charter travellers. Before part-charters can be introduced, the unanimous approval of all IATA carriers will be required. There is also controversy over the number of seats that should be blocked off.

But whether part-charters are approved or not, the scheduled carriers see the new regulations as an opportunity to move into the market and are ready to fight the charter operators on their own ground.

Airline capacity can now be related to demand, and in recent years the demand has been for low-cost charter travel while the sale of individual tickets on scheduled services has been well below the capacity available.

The U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board

acknowledged, in introducing the new regulations, that there would probably be some diversion of traffic from the scheduled services to the charter groups but suggested that airlines could overcome this by reserving seats or aircraft to handle the charter groups and still be able to maintain a reasonable level of scheduled service.

The U.S. board said it realized the new rules might result in the reduction by route carriers of some scheduled flights in particular markets and the allocation of some aircraft to charter traffic. However,

the board, as well as the agencies of other governments participating in the new program, said it had no objection to an adjustment of the ratio by route carriers between scheduled and charter service so long as the total service was responsive to the public demand for both scheduled and charter operations.

This opens the way for a whole new marketing conception by both scheduled and non-scheduled carriers, which will bring with it a whole new look in the marketing of airline travel.

Prelude to Commonwealth Conference

The 31 Commonwealth governments have accepted an invitation from Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to hold a Heads of Government Meeting in Ottawa this year. Wholehearted support for such a meeting in Canada in 1973 was voiced at sessions in Ottawa of senior Commonwealth officials in October, 1972. Subsequently, there was agreement on August 2-10 as the date for the next Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting.

According to Arnold Smith, Commonwealth Secretary-General, the meeting of senior officials in Ottawa dealt with comparative techniques of government and prepared recommendations to governments on procedures designed to make the Prime Ministers' meetings increasingly effective.

At their meeting in Singapore in 1971, Heads of Government had endorsed a study of ways and means of restoring greater intimacy and informality to their meetings. The new recommendations were aimed at reducing formality, increasing flexibility and creating an atmosphere conducive to frank discussion.

The senior Commonwealth officials in their study of various techniques of government in member countries formulated proposals on the basis of which the Heads of Government might consider this subject. The topic was first raised by Mr. Trudeau at the Commonwealth conference in Singapore when he drew attention to the value of exchanging ideas and experience in comparing methods of government.

The Commonwealth officials — many of whom were Cabinet secretaries — held discussions themselves on the running of the office which supports the policy-making apparatus and compared notes on such aspects as the most appropriate relationship between the public service and the

government, implementing of cabinet decisions effectively and improvement of communications between government and people. They also exchanged views on the role of the Cabinet office in co-ordinating submissions to Cabinet, in presenting and outlining the various options available to the executive, and in monitoring the implementation of government policies. The meeting of officials proposed that the Commonwealth Secretariat should prepare a study of the problems facing governments in forward financial planning and control.

In an interview at the conclusion of the Ottawa sessions, Secretary-General Smith was asked whether there was any point in "deluding ourselves" into thinking that the Commonwealth is a good thing in these changing times.

"I think there's more point in recognizing that it's potentially a very important instrument. Canada . . . is more concerned about continental pull than ever. I think Canada invented the Commonwealth because we didn't want to be in bed alone with a much richer and more powerful neighbour. We want a balance. . . ."

The Commonwealth Secretary-General said it would be "very shortsighted on the part of humanity to let the Commonwealth cease to be in existence until we get one world society with the instruments and attitudes of one society. . . . The tendency may be to move toward continental blocs, toward disenchantment between people of different races. But if we let that happen, we're stupid, and it could be very dangerous for our children. The world is getting more interdependent and we need more dialogue and more understanding between the rich and developing countries, between Europeans and Asians and North Americans and Africans. . . ."

John Watkins: An appreciation

"The director of the Art Museum in Tashkent, an Uzbek woman of about 35 and herself a painter, made a tour of the collection with us, but called on the curator of the West European part to help with the explanations. She was a Russian woman, well over 50, with an ugly troll-like face and dyed hair of an improbable reddish hue, but she was extremely well versed in her subject, spoke concisely and well and had a good sense of humour. She made sure that we did not miss seeing a French nineteenth century painting of a husband who had suddenly returned home and caught his wife with her lover. I said that it reminded me of a French cartoon in which the husband was pointing a gun at the lover and the wife was screaming: "Don't shoot the father of your children!" This delighted her hugely and she kept chuckling over it for the rest of the tour. The dignified director, whose sense of humour was less robust, smiled slightly."

This incident took place during a trip to Central Asia by John Watkins in the autumn of 1954. He was then Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union and made an extensive tour of

the republics of Central Asia, which lie in an area bounded by the Caspian Sea on the west, Iran and Afghanistan on the south, China on the east and Siberia on the north. In the past, the role of this area was that of a land bridge conveying countless caravans and armies into the Near East. In the late fourteenth century, it was the centre of the empire of Tamerlane.

John Watkins was born in 1902. As a student, he had specialized in Norse literature and North European affairs generally. He held a Ph.D. from Cornell University and worked for many years with the American Scandinavian Foundation in New York. He taught in the University of Manitoba for two years before joining the Department of External Affairs in 1946. He was first posted to the Canadian Embassy in Moscow during the late 1940s, and returned there as Ambassador in the mid-Fifties. He was an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs between 1956 and 1958, when he was appointed Ambassador to Denmark. He died in Montreal in 1964.

From the beginning of his stay in Moscow, he was an avid traveller. His

Mirror for Soviet life-style

Tashkent

John Watkins explored the views of students on a trip to storied Tashkent in September of 1954:

The flight to Tashkent took a little over 11 hours. In the Hotel Tashkent, I was given a large two-room suite on the second floor, furnished with a grand piano, a large black leather divan, an imposing desk, a table and several chairs, potted ferns, a three-foot-high porcelain vase with a picture of Venus and Cupid, and a large bronze statue of St. George and the Dragon. After dinner in the hotel restaurant, I went for a walk.

Not far from the hotel was a typical Soviet Park of Rest and Culture for which there was an admission charge of 50 *kopecks*. It had the standard equipment — open-air theatres and movies, a paved

dancing square, places for open-air concerts, shooting booths, outdoor restaurants, a basketball court, billiard rooms, chess rooms.

I soon got into conversation with some students from the Railway Institute who were climbing over the high iron fence in preference to paying the entrance fee. They thought at first that I must be a delegate to the Medical Conference, but when they heard that I was a diplomat from Canada they seemed to be even more eager to talk. They had all had two years of either English or German but had not absorbed much more than we do at home in the same length of time and had, of course, had no practice in speaking. They had completed the standard ten-year course and were now in the first year of the Railway Institute. When I asked them they would like a glass of beer or lemonade,

narratives often include humorous anecdotes about the troubles of travel in the Soviet Union at that time. They are also rich in information about the lifestyle of the Soviet peoples, and frequently provide sharp insights into their outlook and ambitions.

The excerpts from some of his more notable travelogues have also been compiled to illustrate his own outlook on life. Everyone who had the good fortune to know John Watkins had the warmest affection for him. He was interested in everyone he met and was the kindest, most generous friend anyone could have. He was a man of formidable erudition, widely read in many fields and many languages. He was a linguist of genius and used his gift to acquire a deep insight into the literature, history and life of many countries. He was also a talented musician and a serious student of music.

The Scandinavian languages and peoples were his first love, but Russian, acquired relatively late in life, was a close second. Within a few months of his first arrival in Moscow in 1948, he was passably fluent in Russian and before the end of his first posting there in

1951 he had acquired and read an immense library of Russian literature and had advanced in the spoken language to the point where he could converse easily and naturally with anyone he met. And no one (in those cold war days) met more people. Leaders in government and the arts, academics and writers, and all kinds of people encountered on his wide travels — all responded to his friendly, witty, curiosity and added to his vast store of knowledge and anecdote about the country and the life of its people.

With all his learning, he was down to earth and unassuming, still close in many ways to his Ontario farm origins. He loved to shock Russians by calling himself a *kulak* — the thrifty, independent peasant farmer of pre-revolutionary Russia.

Whether *kulak* or musician or linguist or scholar or diplomat, he was a person of rare worth whose memory is always fresh to his friends in many lands.



ade, they said that they would prefer just to talk and spread out a newspaper on a bench. They asked many questions about Canada, the United States and Europe, but obviously regarded the prospect of ever seeing anything outside the Soviet Union as very remote. Two girls of about the same age on a nearby bench joined in the conversation, and one of them showed that she could speak and understand French quite well. None of them seemed in the least uneasy about talking to a foreigner and paid no attention to a militiaman who gave us, it seemed to me, a rather searching look as he sauntered by.

The students asked if they could walk back to the hotel with me and persuaded me to go on a little farther and see the new Opera House, called after the great Uzbek poet Navai. It had been built by Japanese prisoners of war, they said, and they had done a very fine job. In the centre of a spacious square in front of the theatre was a large fountain lighted from below in constantly changing colours, of which they

were particularly proud. They then walked back again to the hotel and reluctantly said goodbye, asking me to take their friendliest greetings to Canada when I returned.

As a sample of students from a trade-school, they made a good impression. They had no ambition to go on for higher education and seemed satisfied that the course they had chosen would give them an interesting occupation and a good living. Two of them were Russian and one Uzbek, but all had been born in Tashkent and spoke both languages. None of them was bookish but all were fond of reading and had seen many operas, ballets and plays. All were convinced that ordinary people like themselves everywhere in the world wanted peace and were optimistic that war could be avoided. . . .

By the time we got back to the hotel, I had noticed that the famous Uzbek folk dancer and singer Tamara Khanum, whom I had heard when she had visited Norway with a Soviet cultural delegation in 1953,

was giving a concert that evening in the theatre on the same street as the hotel, and said that I would like to go. My guide said that she was an old friend of his and that he would like to accompany me.

We had seats in the front row. Tamara Khanum was in good form and gave an exacting program of folk songs and dances from many countries — Chinese, Korean, Indian, Spanish, Hungarian, Finnish, Russian, Norwegian and, of course, Uzbek — and sang all the songs in the original languages. When we went back stage to speak to her in the intermission, I said that I was probably the only person in the audience that night who understood her Norwegian, which was excellent. She had performed in Oslo and several other cities and had thoroughly enjoyed her Norwegian tour, but Trondheim seemed to have made the strongest appeal. She presented me with three beautiful roses and insisted that I sit down. She had to stay on her feet and keep moving a little during the intermission, she said, or her muscles would stiffen. Her dressing-room was just a small curtained-off space at the side of the stage and her dresses, shoes and jewellery were arranged for speedy changes. Her dresser, an elderly woman who accompanies her everywhere, must be a model of efficiency, for the speed with which she makes a complete change of costume is one of the most astonishing features of her programs. . . .

Stalinabad

During the same trip, John Watkins visited Stalinabad. The following discussion with a group of students took place at the university:

Instead of bas-reliefs along the upper part of the front of the school building, they had a row of busts of famous poets, including the tenth-century Persian poet Firdausi, whom the Tadjiks consider their own, because the language is the same, the Uzbek Navai, and the Ukrainian Shevchenko. If I had been from Palermo, Ontario [a statue of the poet Shevchenko donated by the Soviet Union stands in the village of Palermo], I should no doubt have recognized Shevchenko's face immediately but, as I was trying to remember, one of a group of students, who had been looking at me with frank curiosity, got up the courage to come over and speak. He understood that I was from Canada, he began politely. I was — but how did he know? He and his friends had heard me talking to the director and they were wondering if I would not like to see the university. If I would, they would be happy to show me around. I accepted

Row of busts of famous poets including Shevchenko

with pleasure.

The student who spoke first was an Uzbek named Ahmed. As we walked along he introduced his friends. I have forgotten their names, but there were a Tadjik, a Pamir, a Russian, a Ukrainian and a Jew in the group, and they were specializing in various fields. The Uzbek remarked on the many nationalities in the group and said that this was typical not only of the university but of the city. The university, like all the other large buildings in Stalinabad, was only a few years old but it was already overcrowded. . . .

It was getting dark and the lights were on in the building. There was nothing very remarkable about the interior, which was plain, solid and practical, with little effort at ornamentation.

In one of the classrooms of the Department of Marxism-Leninism, a lecture was going on. Some of the group who had come with me had disappeared but other students had joined us and were asking all sorts of questions in such loud voices that I was afraid that we might disturb the class and moved on.

Atlantic Pact

Didn't Canada belong to the aggressive Atlantic Pact, one aggressive young man wanted to know. It was a defensive not an aggressive alliance, I replied. Defensive against what, they wanted to know. Against any country that might be strong enough to attack, I replied. Then it must be against the Soviet Union, they deduced not illogically. But surely it must be obvious that the Soviet Union stood for peace and had no intention of attacking any other country. I said that since the *coup* in Czechoslovakia in which a Communist minority had taken over the government, many other European countries were afraid of their own Communist parties attempting something similar and they did not want Communist revolutions any more than they wanted war.

It was at about this point that I became afraid that the professor of Marxism-Leninism might think he had opposition outside his door and suggested that we might be disturbing the class. The other students left, but Ahmed, the Uzbek, had still so many questions to ask that he walked the streets with me for a couple of hours. He was very young, only 18, and in his first year in economics. Often he spoke so rapidly that I had to slow him down and he jumped from one subject to another so quickly that it is hard to give much idea of his conversation. He was tall and thin with a round brown face, large dark eyes and unruly black hair. He was plainly but

well dressed in a dark turtle-neck sweater and suede sports jacket. Although he had been born in Stalinabad, his parents were both Uzbek and he was, he said, of almost pure Arab blood. His people were evidently well enough off that he had never had much to do but study, and no matter how excited he got about the subject under discussion he was always extremely polite.

Ahmed's ambition had always been to enter the diplomatic service and he had thought of going directly into the diplomatic training-school in Moscow — if he could get in. The competition was very keen. Then he had decided that it would be better to take a degree in economics first, so that if he did not succeed in getting into the diplomatic service, or if he got in and found that he did not like travelling and living abroad as much as he had expected, he would have his economic training to fall back on. In any case, he planned to go to Moscow for postgraduate studies when he had finished the five-year course in Stalinabad. He was determined that he would not marry before 26 or 28, no matter how strong the family pressure might be.

At 16, he had been madly in love with a beautiful Tadjik girl, who had turned the heads of many of his contemporaries; she had also been in love with him and not, I gathered, stand-offish. But she had wanted to get married and he had not, so he had broken it off and she was now happily married to somebody else, thank goodness. The families had given him a bad time of it for a while, and his own parents were now looking for another suitable match. It was considered very bad in that part of the country not to raise a family as soon as possible, but he wanted to finish his studies first.

Communism as religion

Could people read the works of Marx and Lenin in Canada, he wanted to know. They could if they wanted to, I told him. Was Marx studied in the universities? Yes, you could hardly give a course in nineteenth-century political and economic thought without Marx, I replied. But I cannot understand how they can let the students read Marx if they are afraid of Communism, he exclaimed. I said that that was part of what we called our liberal tradition — that people read what they liked and made up their own minds about it. Did they teach Marx in the primary and secondary schools? No, they did not; if a man were a Catholic or a Presbyterian, he taught his children Catholicism or Presbyterianism from the age of three or so. That was a question of religion, and it

seemed to me that in the Soviet Union Communism was a kind of religion, which people taught their children to believe in from their earliest years. A religion, he exclaimed. But in a religion there is always God. Well, you have what you think is the one and only truth and that is your substitute for God, I replied. This idea was obviously novel and disturbing and he was not prepared to counter it.

As we walked around the large fountain in front of the Opera, on one side of which was my hotel, he suddenly asked if I knew many people in this city. . . . I did not know anybody, I said, but of course the people in the hotel knew who I was. He talked about other things for awhile and then abruptly inquired where my bodyguard was. I told him that I had none and was travelling quite alone; I could not imagine that anybody wanted to murder me. But Comrade Vishinsky had had a bodyguard when he had visited Stalinabad. But he was Vishinsky, I replied, and the Foreign Minister. Well, don't you suppose Mr. Dulles has a bodyguard when he travels, he asked. He probably had, I said, but he was a very important man. Ahmed thought ambassadors were important people too and would all have bodyguards, but I assured him that none of the ambassadors I knew in Moscow had any. I hope I did not disillusion him with the profession.

Like all intelligent young Soviet citizens, Ahmed was avid for outside contacts and thrilled at the mere idea of travelling abroad. He asked innumerable questions about Canada and when I showed him pictures from the farm, he thought the countryside looked very beautiful. Maybe he would come and visit me on my farm in Canada some day, he said daringly. I assured him that he would be most welcome. Wouldn't he be arrested because he came from the Soviet Union? Not if he came on a proper visa, I said. The Soviet Embassy had a large staff in Ottawa and Soviet artists and doctors had visited Canada recently and had told me that they had received a cordial welcome. The old brick farm-house struck him as very large and he said he supposed I must be some kind of aristocrat. On the contrary, I said, I was a peasant or at most a *kulak*. He looked around, as if to make sure that nobody had heard, and laughed.

American jazz

Ahmed just loved American jazz, he said, and all the students listened to it on the radio. I admitted that I was not a fan. But it was so wonderful to dance to, he said: the rhythms simply made your blood boil. (In general, I imagine, the boiling-point of

*Ahmed puzzled —
unlike Vishinsky,
ambassador moved
without bodyguard*

Central Asian blood is low.) It seems clear from this that American musical programs, perhaps from German stations, are not difficult to hear in Central Asia and are not jammed. There was no point in asking Ahmed about news broadcasts, as he knew no English. He had had two years of German and planned to go on with it and also to begin English. On the whole, the students in Central Asia were behind the Russian average in Western European languages, perhaps because they had had to spend so much time on Russian. Most of them seemed to have had two years in English, French, or German and to have learned about as much as our high-school students do in the same length of time.

Had I ever heard Paul Robeson sing, Ahmed wanted to know. I had heard him several times and had also seen him act the role of Othello. Ahmed had not known that he was an actor but he was a marvellous singer and even sang in Russian. He had sung several times in the Soviet Union but according to the papers he was not allowed now to leave the United States. Ahmed had read, too, that the Americans had recently suppressed the Communist Party; he supposed it would go underground. Was there a Communist Party in Canada? Were there Communist newspapers in Canada? What was the Government? The Communist parties in Canada, Britain and Scandinavia might be very small, but he knew that they were not so small in France and Italy. How did people live in Canada and in Western Europe? Was there any unemployment? What was a Canadian farm like? Was agriculture highly mechanized? Did we grow much cotton? What kind of grains and fruits had we? When I pointed out that it seemed odd to us that there should only be one political party in the Soviet Union, he gave the stock answer that the Communist Party represented the interests of the workers and peasants and that covered the whole population.

Ahmed thought it very interesting that the different nationalities in the university should have such different temperaments. The Uzbeks were very free and easy; an Uzbek spoke to a child just as he would to a grownup person. The Tadjiiks were more reserved, and the Pamirs were taciturn and sarcastic. The Pamir I had met in the group was a good example. He was an excellent student, worked very hard and took good marks, but was not very sociable, spoke little, and when he did speak was uncomfortably sharp. The Russian in the group (a dark dapper young man with a Charlie Chaplin moustache) was superficial and even silly.

Why had he wanted to lead the conversation on to the subject of sports? Just that he could boast that the Russian team had beaten the Canadians in hockey. This was quite out of place, Ahmed thought, and positively embarrassing. But the Russians were like that.

It was getting late when Ahmed reluctantly said good-bye and got on his trolley.

Crimea

John's last trip, before being posted to Ottawa in 1955, was to the Crimea with the company of two Russian friends, Alexandr, an adviser to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and Ivan, a poet. They decided to take the trip by car:

After we had been on the road a couple of hours the next day, the engine began sputtering and my driver decided that the gas he had got in Oryol had not been of high enough quality and that it would be better to add some from one of the cans in the back. Also the accelerator pedal had come off and needed to be screwed on again. We decided to have lunch under a tree by the roadside sitting on the rich carpet of grass, clover and wild flowers of many kinds. The driver soon discovered that, in the rush of getting ready (he had just returned from leave), he had forgotten to bring either a screw-driver or a piece of hose. So he began to "vote", as he expressed it, and waved his hand in the air at every car and truck that passed. Most of the drivers paid no attention and the two or three who stopped could not help. Finally a shiny new green *Pobyeda* with sheer, pale-green curtains pulled up. An exceptionally tall, slender, smartly-dressed young lady got out, and the driver announced in jubilant tones that at last he had found a "good soul" who was willing to help him.

With the young lady was a tall, fair, athletic-looking young man who could have been a Swede but, since both were talking with the driver, we decided that they must be Russians and walked over to satisfy our curiosity. Ivan brought out his best line, for which he is renowned and teased among his friends, and it worked so well that the young lady accepted an invitation to have a cup of coffee with us. The young man rather rudely and sourly declined, saying that he drank only milk and refused to come and join us under the tree even when his cousin, as he said she was, called him. The young lady had light brown curly hair cut fairly short, large deep-blue eyes with long dark lashes, a fair, clear complexion, and a pleasant somewhat arch smile with a row of even

*Questions flowed
— about Robeson,
about agriculture,
about
unemployment*

white teeth — and whether they were all her own or not, there was no sign of stainless steel. The young man's smile, however, when he finally relaxed enough to show it, was disfigured by two large stainless-steel teeth.

Ivan was bursting with curiosity but the young lady, although flirtatious enough and expert in the exercise of her azure orbs, was chary of information about herself. It had to be extracted bit by bit. She said that her name was Tatiana Nikolayevna, but refused to divulge her surname. When Ivan asked if she was on the stage, she admitted that she occasionally appeared in vaudeville but would not say what she did. The young man's name was Aleksei. He could not drive himself and was nervous of his cousin's driving. She was such a *likhach* (daredevil). She had hurt her back in a fall from a motorcycle and still had to have massage treatments. (Aleksei had finally condescended to join the group but had haughtily refused any of our refreshments.) She adored motorcycles, she said, and it finally emerged that she had at one time ridden a motorcycle in the circus.

Tatiana and Aleksei were driving to Yalta for a holiday and like us were planning to spend that night at a hotel in Kharkov. Since they had so kindly helped us out, I asked if they would not have dinner with us at the Intourist Hotel. Aleksei made various objections, but Tatiana overruled them and accepted.

Kharkov changed

Kharkov was a sad sight when I first saw it in 1950. It had changed hands several times during the war and been bombed by both sides and, although many new buildings had been constructed, there were still whole streets of empty shells. It looks infinitely more cheerful now. There has been a tremendous amount of reconstruction, including, of course, many grandiose official and institutional buildings. Streets have been widened and much space formerly built on has been used for squares and gardens and the banks of the rivers have been or are being turned into parks. The population was given as 833,000 in 1939 and is probably well over a million now.

As we were having breakfast in the dining-room the next morning, our highway acquaintances walked in and sat down at a table. Ivan was up like a shot and invited them to join us. They had had a slight automobile accident since we had last seen them. A truck had suddenly come out on to the highway from a side-road and Tatiana had jammed on the

brakes so hard that the car had almost turned over. Aleksei had been sitting in the back seat studying his French grammar and did not know what had hit him. Both had bad bruises and cuts on arms and legs and were feeling the shock. The *Pobyeda* was in a Kharkov garage for minor repairs. If Tatiana had been a second later in braking, they would probably both have been killed. . . .

Tatiana's spirits had been much restored by a good Kharkov steak for breakfast, and it had been agreed that we should have a picnic lunch somewhere along the road and that they should be our guests for dinner at Zelyonny Gai in the evening. Ivan and I stopped for a dip in the Oryel (not related to the word Oryol) River. Ivan pointed to the prevalence of bathing suits at the various swimming holes in the region as a sign of advancing culture.

Like sea of grain

As we finished, the green car pulled up beside ours and we agreed to lunch at the first shade-trees we found. Large trees were scarce in this region. There was nothing but the steppes, like a sea of grain, for miles and we had to drive almost 100 kilometers before we found a small grove on the edge of a little village consisting entirely of small whitewashed, thatch-roofed cottages. Ivan persuaded the housewife in the nearest cottage to boil some water for us so that we could use our Nescafé. Although the cottage was small and had a rather tumbledown look from the outside, Ivan said that it was clean and tidy inside. At first the woman had feared that it would take some time to get the water boiled because she had let the fire go out, but Ivan spotted a primus stove in a corner and they used that. Aleksei bought a jar of buttermilk from an old man who lived alone in another cottage. His cow was tethered on the roadside in front of the house and his little mongrel dog was keeping watch. As in all these little villages, there were chickens and geese wandering along the side of the road. All the men and girls were away at work on the *kolkhoz* haying or harvesting.

At lunch Ivan was able to add a little more to his stock of information about Tatiana. She was 34 and had been married and divorced some years ago. She had since remarried — that was to say, they had not yet registered their marriage but lived together as man and wife. They had had a quarrel before she left. Her husband had not wanted her to go to Yalta and had agreed only on condition that her cousin go along to keep her out of mischief. She and Ivan found that they had several

*All of the men
and girls away
haying, harvesting
on the kolkhoz*

mutual acquaintances in Moscow, among them one of the leading ballerinas of the Stanislavsky Theatre, Natasha Konius. Ivan was a little concerned about this, as Miss Konius was quite well informed on some of his flirtations with the Stanislavsky ballerinas. Tatiana was still indisposed to talk about her theatrical activities, but Aleksei told us that she had played the leading role in the film *Aviators* some years ago.

We had dinner in a pleasant open-air restaurant at Zelyonny Gai. It was the kind of clear, silent moonlight night one reads of in Gogol and after dinner Ivan and Tatiana wandered off to a secluded arbour in the garden. My role was clearly indicated and as I walked Tatiana's watchdog around the property I found out a little more about Aleksei.

He was 28 and a graduate of Moscow University in law. On graduating he had entered the Ministry of Education and was now an assistant to the Minister. He had also graduated from a linguistic institute in French, which he spoke fairly fluently and was eager to practice, and had taught himself German. He had never attempted English. Both his parents were university graduates and so was Tatiana's father, but I gathered that he had made what the family considered a misalliance and that Tatiana's mother had had more looks than brains or education. Aleksei was well read in Russian literature. (So, for that matter, was Tatiana; she knew a great deal of poetry by heart and recited almost professionally several poems by her favourite poet Yessenin.) He had also read widely in French literature (Anatole France was one of his favourite authors) and could quote Schiller and Heine quite creditably in German. Except for Shakespeare, Sheridan, Wilde, and Shaw, who are constantly played in the Moscow theatres, he did not seem to know much about English literature. Nor did he know any modern French authors except Romain Rolland, Barbusse, Aragon, Sartre and others approved by the régime.

Travel curb

Aleksei would give a great deal to be able to travel in Western Europe but was pessimistic about his prospects. It was not a matter of money. He could well afford it. But the only way to get out was on a delegation of some kind — artistic, sports, scientific, and he did not qualify. Although he was fairly careful in what he said, it was plain that he was critical of many things about the régime and was not even remotely interested in Marx and company. (Later, in Yalta, at a book kiosk where he

had asked the young lady in charge what new books she had, he handed her back a recently-published volume of a new edition of Lenin's works with such a disgusted expression that she quickly restored it to its place on the shelf in some degree of embarrassment, as if she had committed a breach of etiquette.)

Aleksei said that, although he received quite a good salary in the Ministry, he could easily make three or four times as much by taking a job as manager of a store or in the administrative office of a factory; indeed, he had had many tempting offers of jobs of this kind but for social reasons it would be quite impossible for him to accept. His family and friends would be simply horrified. I expressed surprise at such a snobbish outlook in a socialist state. It was the rankest snobbery, he admitted, and it was a great impediment to progress. People with more education, background, and taste were badly needed in all sorts of enterprises — in the clothing and furniture business, for instance, in the hotel and restaurant business, in printing and publishing, etc. Many of the people holding down highly-paid jobs in these fields were pretty crude and ignorant and the results were apparent in the bad taste of textiles, clothing, furniture, wallpaper, etc.

Facing disapproval

I said that, in his place, I would feel like defying the social conventions, taking a better-paid if less refined job, and trying to make a useful contribution where it seemed to be so badly needed. His parents would not understand, he said, and he would not be able to face the disapproval of his friends. I mentioned that, in Canadian and American universities, students did all kinds of jobs to put themselves through, even to waiting on table in restaurants. In Europe there was more prejudice. Even the Scandinavian students, who were pretty democratic on the whole, were shocked when some of their number had worked in the restaurant of International House in New York. That kind of work would be out of the question for a student here, he said, although many of them made extra money by doing translation or surveying or acting as supernumeraries in theatres.

Years ago, I said, there had been a strong prejudice against young people of good family going on the stage and there were probably still many conservative, puritanical people in Canada who would not wish their daughters to become actresses. In this country, Aleksei said, actors, opera singers and ballet dancers ranked very

'It was the kind of clear night one reads of in Gogol'

high socially. Their bohemianism was overlooked or forgiven, as it would certainly not be in other circles. Many of them had had matrimonial troubles and had been divorced several times. Others were known to drink too much or even to be confirmed drunkards; but this did not affect their popularity in the least. Tarasova, for instance, had had four or five husbands and, although she was now too old for the parts she was playing, her admiring public remained loyal. Nobody could understand why Ulanova had divorced Zavadsky to marry her present insignificant and rather stupid husband but after all that was her own affair. A good many others just moved about from one partner to another without bothering about the formalities of marriage and divorce. These things were known and talked about but an artist was still an artist.

Sports devotee

From time to time Aleksei paused to wonder where his cousin and Ivan had got to but he could usually be deflected from the search by a question about himself. He had gone in for sports in a big way when he was younger and still kept himself fit by gymnastics and swimming. As a result he was never ill and rarely caught cold. He went a great deal to the ballet, opera, theatre and concerts and many of his friends were theatre people. He considered himself something of an authority on the ballet and was quite dogmatic on the subject. Plisetskaya, he said, was the most brilliant dancer in Moscow. I agreed but thought that, as an artist, Ulanova was in a class by herself. This he would admit, but she had never been as brilliant technically as Semyonova, Lepishinskaya or Plisetskaya. . . .

Ivan and I went down to Gorki Park (in Moscow) last night to see our highway acquaintance, Tatiana, do her motorcycle act. In a circular wooden building about 30 feet in diameter and 20 feet deep, she and the boss of the act, Grisha Levetin, a Jew of about 50 who formerly owned it but now works for the state, rode motorcycles at high speed up the wall. In the last act Grisha drove a small car and Tatiana her motorcycle. We stood with a

crowd of about 100 around a railing at the top. The admission price was three roubles. The whole structure moved when the motorcycles whizzed around and this did not make the act any less exciting for the crowd. Tatiana said that the give in the wall was necessary; it was a kind of "amortization".

Women's lib

After the act, we went to see a play at the little theatre in the park and met Tatiana at 11:00 p.m. to go to Ivan's apartment for coffee. He had no hesitation in asking her how much she earned. About 1,000 roubles a day, she said. Last Sunday she had made 1,500 but had done the act 42 times and was completely exhausted. Last night there had been only three performances but it was quite enough for she had had a headache even before she started and the air-pressure always made it worse. They did not put on the act until about 100 spectators had assembled. She was supposed to work only every other day.

Part of the time Tatiana has whirled around with her hands in the air. The man had done this too and had also ridden standing up and driven his motorcycle up and down the wall as well as around it. Tatiana said that she could do all those tricks and more too but they would not let her because he was a man and had to appear the more daring of the two. Ivan remarked that apparently she and Grisha did not hit it off too well. They were always fighting, she said. He had a bad character — was a really difficult type.

This little manifestation of Women's Lib in the Soviet Union in 1955 is perhaps as good a place as any at which to bring this narrative to a close.

The appreciation of Ambassador Watkins and the selection of excerpts from his reports were handled by Marshall Crowe, president of the Canada Development Corporation, and Arthur E. Blanchette, head of the Historical Division of the Department of External Affairs. Mr. Crowe, a former External Affairs officer who served in Moscow on two occasions, was deputy secretary to the Cabinet responsible for Cabinet operations before assuming his CDC post.

Book review

Mike Pearson: normality 'raised to a higher power'

By D. V. LePan

The first volume of Mr. Pearson's memoirs is another in the long list of services he has rendered to this country. Our literature is not rich in political autobiographies or, indeed, in good autobiographies of any kind. This volume of autobiography is lively, well written, well organized and full of interest. It should have a great success.

For the most part, the Mike Pearson who appears in these pages is the Mike Pearson who has long been known to his friends and admirers here and abroad and who increasingly, if belatedly, has come to be valued and honoured by Canadians generally. The figure who emerges is one of great energy, great intelligence, great patience, great skill as a negotiator, and great warmth as a human being. There are no mysteries. Or, if there is any mystery, it is simply the mystery of how there can be no mysteries.

You feel yourself in the presence of normality (which is so rare as to be itself a kind of mystery), but of normality raised to a higher power. You sense the

Professor LePan, a special assistant to Mr. Pearson for more than a year during 1950 and 1951, is currently University Professor at Massey College, University of Toronto, after six years as Principal of University College there. Professor LePan has had extensive experience in the Department of External Affairs, first on the staff of the Canadian High Commissioner in London and later in various posts, including that of Minister Counsellor at the Canadian Embassy in Washington and during 1958-59 as Assistant Undersecretary of State for External Affairs. Professor LePan served as secretary and director of research of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, 1955-58.

Note: Professor LePan's review of the first volume of the Pearson memoirs was prepared several weeks before Mr. Pearson's death.

presence of a perfectly-adjusted nervous system and of the highest kind of intelligence to go with such perfect nerves. Those things are matchless passports for achievement. And there is achievement in plenty throughout these pages.

If there is anything new in the portrait that emerges, it lies perhaps in the subject's justifiable and proper pride in what he has achieved. Recounting his translation in 1946 from the Embassy in Washington to become the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson remarks that "at the age of forty-eight, I had reached the summit of the Canadian diplomatic service. I do not think it immodest to observe that I had done this without outside influence and without financial resources, apart from my salary. I had done it by hard work and long hours; by making it evident that I was available for whatever was to be done; by welcoming every opportunity for new and more responsible duties; and by accumulating all the experience possible in all the varied aspects of my profession." That is true and deserves to be said. But it adds something to our knowledge to hear it from Mr. Pearson. One other thing that comes out perhaps more clearly than ever before is his instinct for being in the right place at the right time. To have joined the Department of External Affairs in 1928, when it was just beginning to grow, to have served in London from 1935 to 1941, to have gone to Washington a few months after Pearl Harbour, to have been prominently on the scene in Ottawa when Mr. St. Laurent was succeeding Mr. King as Prime Minister, was to show a marvellous sense of timing. The results were fortunate both for Mr. Pearson's career and for Canada.

The picture we are given of the Department is also generally familiar from other records. But here again there are some new disclosures. As would be expected, Mr. Pearson is generous in his praise of his peers and colleagues, particularly of Norman Robertson and of Hum

Wrong. He praises Norman Robertson for "the tremendous burden" he "had carried so ably and unselfishly during the long years of war as Mr. King's principal adviser" and he describes him earlier as being "as modest and kindly as he was erudite and wise". But he does not conceal that administration was not Norman Robertson's forte. Nor does he conceal that he had hoped to be appointed Undersecretary in succession to O. D. Skelton in 1941 and was disappointed when Norman Robertson was appointed instead. There are many references to his close friendship with Hume Wrong, who is praised at one point as being his "superior in intellect". But he quickly adds that he was less able "to get along with people" and later discloses that there were "problems of incompatibility" between Leighton McCarthy as the Minister in Washington and Hume Wrong as his second-in-command which led to Mr. Pearson's replacing him here in the spring of 1942.

Such honesty is a principal mark of the book. He is honest about his colleagues, honest about his superiors, honest about himself. He speaks highly of Vincent Massey's services as High Commissioner in London. But he does not fail to note his lack of ease with Canadian businessmen or his almost continuously deteriorating relations with Mr. King.

Picture of Mackenzie King

His picture of Mackenzie King is of particular interest. Although Mr. Pearson was so well and so favourably known to Mr. King that by September 1947 the then Prime Minister was already thinking of him as his ultimate successor, he reveals that, for his own part, he never felt that he knew Mr. King — and he implies that that feeling was almost universal. He confesses to irritation over the way Mr. King would instruct his representatives in London or Washington to make vigorous protests to the British or United States Governments and then undercut them with shows of bland friendliness in personal exchanges with whoever happened to be in power in London or Washington at the time. He also notes how open he was to personal flattery. And he tells the damaging story of Mr. King, after a night of heavy bombing in London in 1940 when Westminster Hall had been hit, sending a "Secret and Most Immediate" telegram to Canada House asking that stones from the bombed building be shipped to Canada to be placed among his ruins at Kingsmere. Mr. Pearson's summary of his long-time chief is chilling. After speaking of his efforts, when he was serving shortly after-

ward in Ottawa, to understand the Prime Minister's subtleties and apparent hesitations, he continues: "This understanding was not made easier by his enigmatic and contradictory personality, with that combination of charming friendliness and self-centered calculation, of kindness and ruthlessness, of political vision and personal pettiness which so many who worked for him found disconcerting." The picture given of Mr. King in these pages by someone who was in a position to know deserves to be taken into account in any attempt at a final assessment.

Mr. Pearson is also honest about himself. His autobiography opens with a description, done with great care and charm, of his family background, which was godfearing, hard-working and very happy, as he describes it. But he makes no secret of the fact that it had little intellectual or artistic stimulus, and that he read Henty much more than Shakespeare while he was growing up. Nor does he conceal the fact that, until he went to university and for some time after that, he thought about the world largely in terms of the British Empire, and that Canadian nationalism hardly touched him. His education in nationalism and internationalism — he tells us later in the book that he sees them as two sides of the same coin — began in the First World War and proceeded by leaps and bounds, back in Toronto at Victoria College, at Oxford, as a professor of history at the University of Toronto, in Ottawa, at international conferences, in London and Washington. But he does not claim that his foresight was always perfect. In reading his chapter "The Drift to War", it comes as somewhat of a shock to find him saying that the clouds on the horizon early in 1937 did not "seem particularly ominous to me" and that even then he was "not yet fully aware of the menacing implications of Nazi policies". On reflection, it is perhaps even more of a shock to realize that that chapter is written without once mentioning the Spanish Civil War, which threw such a lurid light on the policies of the dictators. But such lapses are rare. Ample amends are made later by his prescience in outlining what the consequences would be of a failure to control the development of atomic energy. His account of the discussions of this problem in Washington in November 1945 on board the yacht *Sequoia* between Mr. Truman, Mr. Attlee and Mr. King — bizarre triumvirs! — forms one of the high points of the book.

At this point, Mr. Pearson is largely relying on a memorandum drawn up by Canadian officials in preparation for the

*Picture of King
deserves weighing
in any attempt
at final assessment*

*Prescience in citing
results of failure
to control growth
of atomic energy*

discussions between heads of government. At other points, he relies largely on his diary entries. The existence of these sources could readily be surmised by historians, and no doubt they will all become available in due course. But there is one body of source material that Mr. Pearson uses whose existence could hardly have been guessed at. It is an apparently extended and systematic correspondence, of informal and only quasi-official kind, which was carried on between Mr. Pearson and Dr. Skelton, the then Undersecretary, during the years from 1935 to 1941, while Mr. Pearson was posted in London. It would be interesting to know how extensive the correspondence was, how long it lasted, and whether it will ultimately be published along with the official correspondence that was being carried on simultaneously between Canada House and External Affairs. On superficial examination of the excerpts in this book, it would seem to have contained much of the most important political reporting from Canada House during that critical period.

To repeat, this is a book that is ad-

mirably arranged and admirably written. It is a pleasure to read. Wherever I have been able to check it against other sources, it would seem to be impeccable. Perhaps a slight illustration will be sufficient. In his chapter on the First World War, Mr. Pearson recalls that, when he was an officer cadet in Oxford after returning from Macedonia, his platoon officer was Robert Graves. Turning to that very different autobiography *Goodbye to All That*, I find Robert Graves' writing in the Epilogue provided for the 1957 edition that "the chievious young Corporal Mike Pearson whom I recommended for a commission from the Oxford Cadet Battalion in 1917 has become Mr. Lester Pearson, Canada's most famous citizen". However that may be, let us hope that — as certainly one of Canada's most famous citizens (but so is Mike!) — he will be able to give us in the two further volumes he has projected, covering the period when he acquired the fame that Robert Graves refers to.

MIKE: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 1 (University of Toronto Press, 1972)

Lester Bowles Pearson

Lester B. Pearson, for nearly a decade principal architect of Canadian foreign policy and later Prime Minister for five eventful years, died at his Ottawa home on December 27. He was 75.

Mr. Pearson was for 20 years a diplomat and foreign policy administrator, rising to the position of Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1946. In 1948, at the invitation of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, he entered the political field as Secretary of State for External Affairs. In his nine years in this post, Mr. Pearson became a leading international figure and his achievement at the United Nations in helping to resolve the Suez crisis of 1956 won him the Nobel Peace Prize a year later.

After the defeat of the St. Laurent Government in 1957, Mr. Pearson was chosen Liberal Party leader and in 1963 he became Prime Minister. When he stepped down from this office in 1968, he did not slip into quiet retirement. He accepted the chairmanship of the World Bank Commission on International Aid and Development and in 1970 he was selected as first chairman of the Ottawa-based International Development Research Centre.



Retrospective views of Mr. Pearson's career will appear in the next issue of *International Perspectives*.

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March/April 1973

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Timetable for European Union — a matching of goals to reality

By Tim Creery

To anyone who learned grade-school history in the old way, by dates, the development of the European Economic Community is history as it should be: scheduled history, history to timetable, 1957 and all that. On March 25, 1957, the representatives of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed in Rome the treaty instituting the EEC. On January 1, 1958, the EEC came into existence with a whole series of deadlines for realizing zero tariffs internally, a common external tariff and a common agricultural policy.

From the beginning, the European Community has kept itself under the pressure of deadlines — and met most of the essential ones, unlike the bleary-eyed morning newspaper correspondents who have waited out the marathon ministerial sessions in Brussels and Luxembourg.

Along with the necessary timetables and deadlines went a rather mechanistic approach to "building Europe", as the process is commonly called. This approach was associated with the first, and long-time, president of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein of West Germany. The approach posited that the mechanics of creating the Common Market and a common agricultural policy would force upon member countries the necessary development of stronger central political institutions in the Community. Before the *faits accomplis*, the national governments would come to recognize and approve the necessity of central decision-making, democratic control by a directly-elected parliament and assumption of ever-broadening powers at the centre to harmonize and promote the growth of the whole structure so that its potential benefits could be fully realized.

The assumption was that the will of the people for a united Europe was already there. All that statesmen and politicians needed to do was follow the dictates of the wonderful mechanical toy which the technocrats had so cleverly constructed for them in Brussels.

The assumption was wrong. It was especially wrong for French President Charles de Gaulle, often for reasons not shared by other EEC members. But in the end it was pretty generally recognized that other countries hid behind France. They too could not have accepted the kind of automated growth of community sovereignty at the expense of national sovereignty preached by the Brussels enthusiasts in the early years.

This was the main lesson of the expansion of The Six to The Nine. Leadership to build a united European Community must come from the peoples, and their leaders and representatives, who will have to cede autonomy to the central power. The member states, in the words of the first summit conference of The Nine in October 1972, constitute the *élément moteur* (driving force) of the Community.

The lesson may seem elementary to a Canadian familiar with the Confederation process. But it has only developed as a major theme of European oratory in recent times. The national politicians and Europhiles are turning back to the people — consumers, workers, farmers, voters. They realize that new European promises are necessary beyond those which have appealed to the producers, company directors, bankers, real-estate promoters, technocrats, economists, diplomats, statesmen.

The next few years will offer a decisive test of just how far the member nations and their leaders — the *élément*

Mr. Creery has served as Paris-based correspondent of Southam News Services for nearly five years, covering key EEC and NATO developments. In January, he completed his European tour of duty and accepted appointment as editorial page editor of the Montreal Gazette. Before taking the Paris post, Mr. Creery served as Southam News Services correspondent in Quebec City, Ottawa and Washington. The views expressed are those of the author.



Summit session at The Hague produced break in log-jam created in Gaullist years

moteur — are willing to follow up the oratory by making the Community itself a driving force in the true political sense.

There has already been progress in the first three post-de Gaulle years. The Community's self-proclaimed turning-point away from the log-jam of the later Gaullist years came with the summit conference at The Hague in December 1969. With President Georges Pompidou of France taking a constructive view toward enlargement and political development of the Community, the 1969 summit approved negotiations with the four applicant countries — Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. It also approved immediate negotiation within The Six to install another important mechanism, a measure of taxing and spending power for the EEC's Brussels executive. Thus, by 1975, a key year in the new timetable soon to be discussed, agricultural levies and 1 per cent of the value-added sales tax (VAT) will go directly to Brussels to finance primarily the agricultural support program. Under the mechanistic approach, this would produce a cry of "taxation without representation" and hasten the day of central government responsible to the people's representatives. The 1969 summit meeting also produced good intentions in a number of other fields, notably the project for eventual economic and monetary union.

But everyone realized that real progress in further integration schemes must await the outcome of the negotiations with the applicants. These were completed with Britain by mid-1971 and with the other three later that year. Through 1972, the EEC was thinking and acting more and more as though Britain and the others were already members. So, when the leaders of the soon-to-be-enlarged, nine-nation Community — Norway had dropped by the wayside because of a negative referendum vote — met at the October 1972 summit, they were ready to consider the broad lines along which the Community should progress.

More ambitious timetable

This second summit of the "New Europe" was an exercise in correlating a number of specific projects already approved, and of trying to breathe some political life, uplift and dynamism into them. One after another, the national leaders testified that Europe must not be simply a community of traders, that it must serve the social needs of its people and assure them their collective place in a world of super-powers. A more ambitious timetable of programmed history was drawn up.

The old deadline magic stretched ahead from creation of the European Monetary Co-operation Fund by April 1973 to the constitution of the whole nine-nation entity into something to be called European Union by 1980. The same target-date was adopted for the completion of Economic and Monetary Union, loosely described as the ensemble of measures and policies necessary for a common European currency.

In their decade of dates, The Nine would follow up the April 1973 monetary fund with reports on the development of short-term support by September 30 and on progressive pooling of reserves by December 31 of this year. The point of no-return for monetary collaboration, the so-called Phase II, would begin January 1 next year. By this time, the regional development fund sought by the British would be in place, together with its own financing mechanism from Community funds.

Moving from central economic and monetary questions, the summit called for a report on industrial, scientific and technological co-operation, including recommendations and a timetable for implementation, by January 1, 1974. This project involves the breaking down of tax and fiscal barriers to the establishment of Community-chartered European firms operating easily across national borders. It involves, too, an effort to overcome the fragmentation, marginal character and frequent failures in nuclear-research co-operation in Euratom and space co-operation in the now-fused ELDO (European Launcher Development Organization) and ESRO (European Space Research Organization — i.e. satellites).

A broad social action program, including plans for consumer protection and worker participation in management of enterprises, is also to be prepared by next January 1. An action program on environmental policy is to be ready by July 31.

Despite the huge projected growth in responsibilities and activities of EEC institutions, the provisions for political growth to accommodate it were the weakest part of the summit document. Among the new members, Britain especially was unwilling to commit itself to the ceding of sovereignty, though holding out promise of later developments in this direction. For the moment, Prime Minister Heath faces an Opposition leader, Harold Wilson, and a majority of Labor MPs who won't even sit in the present consultative European parliament, which convened most recently in Strasbourg in January.

Among the original members, France



UPI photo

French President Georges Pompidou (centre) presides at opening session of summit meeting of nine European Economic Community nations in Paris. Flanking Mr. Pompidou at the October 1972 meeting are French Premier Pierre Messmer (left) and French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann (right).

At Mr. Schumann's left is French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and at extreme left of picture, with earphone cord on his shoulder, is Jack Lynch, then Prime Minister of Ireland, one of the three new nations being admitted to the Common Market grouping.

showed traditional reluctance either to cede decision-making power to Brussels or to have the European parliament directly elected, as envisaged (though not made obligatory) in the Rome Treaty. The Dutch, Italians, Germans and Belgians, in descending order of urgency, were left pressing the case for democratization and strengthening Community institutions.

But the summit did produce a general declaration: "The member states reaffirm their determination to base the development of their Community on democracy, freedom of opinion, the free movement of people and of ideas, and participation by their peoples through their freely-elected representatives."

Progress on the issue central to any federal structure — distribution of powers between the centre and the parts — is to go forward on the basis of a report due from the EEC's Executive Commission by May 1. The summit session "invited" member states to decide finally on the distribution of competence and responsibilities by January 1, when monetary union enters its decisive phase. Steps are also to be taken to associate the consultative parliament more closely with the work of the Community.

Between summits, the top body of the EEC — a kind of cabinet dependent on

national capitals for decision-making authority — is the Council of Ministers. The Council consists at its highest level of the foreign ministers of The Nine. The European Commission, which de Gaulle disliked hearing described as the "executive" commission, is a kind of sub-cabinet of full-time commissioners with departmental responsibilities such as foreign relations, social policy, industrial policy.

Draft constitution

By 1975, all of these "institutions of the Community" — Council of Ministers, commission, parliament, economic and social committee — are to produce a report on "transforming, before the end of the present decade, and with the fullest respect for the treaties already signed, the whole complex of the relations of member states into a European Union . . .". This, in fact, amounts to a call for a draft constitution. It is to be submitted to another summit conference. Then, again according to timetable, there would be five years to implement the new arrangements by stages. Meanwhile the transition period for the three countries that entered in 1973 would have been completed by the end of 1977.

Commenting afterward on the summit, Sicco Mansholt, former president of

Timetable calls for constitution of European Union drafted by 1975

the European Commission, said it could "signify much or it could signify little". Raymond Aron wrote in *Le Figaro*: "With or without Britain, united Europe no longer looks like a Grand Design; a work of governments and functionaries, it belongs to reality, but a distant and prosaic reality in the eyes of the ordinary man."

Disillusioned comments like these come from men who are measuring the Community's progress, not against long stretches of history in warring Europe, but against current world power patterns and challenges. Verbiage, timetables, plans and plans for plans are set against realities.

As a world power, the Community's impact has been minimal. At the prospective European Conference on Security and Co-operation, it will be present only through its member countries. At the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, a few of its members will be present along with the United States and Canada. In defence, the Community has no policy other than that of the Atlantic alliance, with which France has often been in disagreement. France belongs neither to the Eurogroup with NATO nor to NATO's integrated military structure. The limitations on Community international policy because of dependence on



UPI photo

West German Chancellor Willy Brandt leaves session of EEC summit meeting in Paris International Conference Centre with his Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel.

the United States for nuclear defence is painfully obvious.

The inability of the members of the Community to form their own "European pillar" of NATO, pooling French and British nuclear strength, may eventually be overcome, but not in time to affect the current realignment of power in the world.

Greater trade impact

In the major Nixon round of trade negotiations this year, the Community will pack a more solid and united punch. But with the subjects of negotiation moving into the non-tariff field and the field of trade-offs between trade liberalization and reform of the international monetary system, the formulation of united European policy becomes more difficult.

Just as federations like Canada or the United States have difficulty co-ordinating policy on non-tariff questions because of provincial and state jurisdictions, so Europe has even greater problems because of strong national jurisdictions. In the monetary field, the Community is caught between the goal of European monetary union and the continuing ambition of each member nation to get the world system best suited to its national interests.

Thus, in the so-called "era of negotiations" dominated by the super-powers, the Community has extremely limited chances of getting in on the ground-floor. An obvious rejoinder might be: who wants another super-power?

The reply of the champions of Europe would be that the Community is desirably and inextricably tied by economics, technological and industrial similarity, and general culture, to the United States. The question is basically whether this should be a subordinate relationship or a relationship of equality — one in which Europe has as much autonomy as its Atlantic partner and is therefore able to act from time to time as a counterweight. There was quiet fury in the breasts of many Europeans that so many of their leaders failed to speak out with one voice against President Nixon's Christmas-time saturation bombing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. There is also constant concern that the United States is simply vaulting over Western Europe in arranging its new relationship with the U.S.S.R. and forgetting about Western Europe altogether in resuming relations with the other giant, the People's Republic of China.

The major international negotiations starting this year are bound to make the membership of the Community acutely conscious of their organization's limited effectiveness on the world scene. The effect

may be to toughen the resolve of The Nine to produce meaningful results from the numerous forums in which the summit conference called on them to hammer out joint economic, monetary, industrial, technological, scientific, social and organizational policies by the beginning of next year.

Entry of Britain, Ireland and Denmark at the turn of the year produced a fresh sense of interest and hopefulness in the Community, which can perhaps be sustained through the haggling to come. The British have accepted the fact that the Community is, in the words of Britain's chief negotiator, a tortoise rather than a hare. The slow but steady practical approach suits the British style. At the same time, Prime Minister Heath has made clear enough his own hopes that the tortoise will move along a bit.

There is a fair chance that European Union will "signify much", in the words of Mr. Mansholt, that the EEC's programmed history will be imprinted in the history books with an importance matching the oratorical flourishes of its progenitors. But the next turning-point — the all-important political one — cannot come until 1975, according to the summit timetable. On the basis of the record to date, it could well come later—and it might never come at all.



UPI photo

Sicc Mansholt, then president of the European Common Market Commission, (left) and Commission member Wilhelm Haferkamp of Germany attend EEC session. Mr. Mansholt said the group's target should be a "real European government possessing the necessary powers and answerable to a European parliament freely elected by universal suffrage".

What EEC entry may mean for Britain's foreign policy

By Robert Boardman

Inevitably, *The Times* put the matter in a nutshell in an editorial two weeks before Britain formally became a member of the European Economic Community: "All human institutions change. We have left the British Empire far behind. It is one with the Holy Roman Empire." Clearly the move was a historic one. Yet Britain became an actor on the European stage to the raucous accompaniment of yawns, boos and even violent squabbling from the public audience. The Government's cultural Fanfare for Europe, organized to mark the event, failed to arouse even a fraction of the excitement that had greeted the British Museum's Tutankhamen exhibition.

Nevertheless, closer ties with the six older EEC partners and the other two new entrants, Denmark and Ireland, are likely to have far-reaching implications for Brit-

ain's role in international politics. And the effects might be even greater for foreign than for domestic policies because of the traditional insulation of diplomacy from

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public debate. It is significant that the two issues on which the House of Commons took a strong stand critical of the Government prior to entry were Prime Minister Edward Heath's proposed immigration regulations and the presence on British roads of European 40-ton "juggernaut" trucks. Both were issues that went to the grass-roots of British politics in a way that the more distant questions of foreign policy rarely do.

The repercussions of entry touch on the full range of current British diplomacy. Britain's EEC membership raises important questions about the role of the Commonwealth in a changing world, the future evolution of the Western alliance, the contribution of individual allies to Western defence, changes in the international monetary and trading system, and problems of aid and trade with Third World countries. On an expanding list of foreign policy issues, British officials will be taking their cue from European colleagues.

Third World and Commonwealth

It was the Commonwealth link that many in Britain saw as the crux of the Common Market debate. The problem is that the two organizations — Commonwealth and EEC — are very different. Far more is involved than a shift of emphasis by Britain between two international groupings of which it is a member. As a multicultural and decentralized group of nations with many diverse, and often conflicting, interests, the Commonwealth remains a unique body. Because of the links many members had with countries outside the Commonwealth, it has avoided the inward-looking and exclusive air that often pervades the EEC's deliberations. Is Britain entering a small and cosy rich man's club, intent only on promoting the prosperity of its members?

Common Market membership will have considerable impact on British policies toward poorer Commonwealth and other Third World nations. Under Protocol 22 of the accession treaty, developing Commonwealth countries were given the option of joining existing EEC arrangements, governed largely by the Yaoundé Convention, or else of concluding a different form of association or trading agreement with the Community. The Convention is essentially that under which France's former African colonies are linked to the EEC. It provides access to aid channelled through the European Development Fund. The problem is that, for some African countries, Commonwealth as well as *francophone*, it also smacks of neo-colonialism.

It has been claimed that Britain's own

generalized trade-preference scheme is more liberal than that operated by EEC countries. But, on the other hand, British aid policies before entry came under heavy criticism. The Government is a long way short of the United Nations target for official aid of 0.70 per cent of gross national product, or even of the French Government's achievement of 0.68 per cent. Indeed, over the last ten years British official development assistance has declined from 0.53 per cent to 0.39 per cent of GNP. Common Market membership may possibly tip the British figure in an upward direction, but this is far from certain.

Even inside the EEC the British Government will have its own economic difficulties to iron out. On the trading front, it has been estimated that about a quarter of the Asian Commonwealth nations' exports to Britain, which currently amount to about \$600 million, will come under higher tariff regulations. The links between economics and politics are never far apart in diplomacy. Britain's recent dispute with Uganda might be the forerunner of even greater difficulties ahead in the mid-70s.

Ruled out by Community

The most noticeable impact on the Commonwealth of Britain's joining the EEC will be in concentrating British attention in a more restricted area of the world. The outcome of the renegotiations of the Yaoundé Convention, due to begin in August 1973, is uncertain. But already a number of Commonwealth countries have been ruled out as not associable with the EEC under the Community's rules. The "associables", poorer Commonwealth countries eligible for official links with Brussels, number 20, and these are spread out geographically through Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The EEC, however, has traditionally had a special interest in Africa and the Mediterranean. Britain's relations with Malta and Cyprus now fall under the Common Market's Mediterranean policy. The Asian and the "old" Commonwealth in general fall outside these areas of concentration.

It is too simple to say, as did John Armstrong, Australia's High Commissioner elect to London in December 1972, that the Commonwealth is breaking up. But it is certainly changing. Canberra's new Labour Government may in the near future be making symbolic moves toward a new national anthem and flag, or even toward becoming a republic. The fact that British negotiators were unable to extract from The Six special concessions for Australia or Canada before entry was no longer, by 1972, regarded in Whitehall as a crucial

'Is Britain entering a small and cosy rich man's club?'

obstacle to British membership. Even New Zealand has only five years of guaranteed access to EEC markets for its butter and cheese exports. The number of important issues that need to be discussed in high-level Commonwealth exchanges will almost certainly decline. Yet, on the other hand, links with a smaller number of Commonwealth countries may be strengthened rather than diminished as a result of British participation in the EEC.

Washington link

If the Empire is long dead, the "special relationship" between London and Washington is a much more recent corpse. As recently as 1963, the ties binding the two Atlantic allies, particularly on military and strategic questions, were used by French President Charles de Gaulle as the justification for vetoing Britain's first application to join the EEC.

British membership in EEC has not altered the connection so much as the growing complexity of United States foreign interests. The days are long past when British prime ministers could fly to Washington and expect — and to some extent receive — special consideration as the valued second-in-command power in NATO. Decision-making in Washington may now be so complex that no one country or internal group could affect its course on a sustained basis. Increasingly, during the 1960s, American officials thought of "Western Europe" as an entity. Outside of full participation in the Community, it is doubtful whether Britain alone could now exercise much of a pull on Washington.

Formal membership in the EEC at least clarifies this situation. The older ties may give Britain a special position. On some questions, particularly relating to defence, British officials have acted as the representatives in Washington of several West European states. But on most matters Britain will be simply one of a group of European nations. It is felt in London that this will enhance British influence in the Atlantic region. After all, talks between Washington and Brussels now take on much more the appearance of exchanges between economic giants. Common Market countries, indeed, account for about one-quarter of all world trade, as against the United States' one-sixth.

The first trials of the new relationship will not be long in coming. The second Nixon Administration has made it clear that 1973 is to be the year of Europe. American grievances with the EEC have been gathering momentum at least since the late 1960s. Washington's concern over increases in American imports and obsta-

cles to exports was spelled out in 1971 in the influential report of the Williams Commission. Shortly afterward, President Nixon inaugurated the Administration's new approach to international economic questions by suspending dollar-gold convertibility and instituting the import surcharge. American officials have already raised the question of the EEC's special links with certain African and Mediterranean countries. The significance for Washington, then, of British entry into the EEC is that even larger slices of the world's markets will be sucked away from American exporters and into closer ties with Brussels. It remains to be seen how Britain inside the EEC will react to American pressures in trade talks during the mid-70s.

Erosion of independence

British foreign policy since 1945 has been marked by a continual erosion of the Government's capacity for independent action in world affairs. Dependence on the American link was made clear by the late 1940s, after United States financial assistance to Britain and the establishment of NATO. Eden's venture into Suez in 1956 may be recorded by future historians as the last occasion on which a British Government could take unilateral action on an issue regarded by it as vital to the national security, just as George II is remembered as the last British monarch to lead his troops into battle.

It is thus a gross oversimplification to say that Britain in 1973 has signed away its power of independent foreign policy initiative. The constraints on British foreign policy officials were powerful ones before entry into the Community. Accession to the Treaty of Rome is one step in a very much longer historical process. As Andrew Shonfield argued in the first of the BBC Reith Lectures in November 1972, the countries of Western Europe are less and less in charge of their individual national destinies.

Progress is, in fact, already being made toward greater harmony among the foreign policies of EEC members. British officials, even before January 1, 1973, were taking an active role in promoting these developments. At the end of 1972, the permanent representatives of The Nine in the UN General Assembly attempted for the first time to establish an accepted point of view on draft resolutions dealing with the situation in the Middle East. Earlier, the foreign ministers of The Nine met for a two-day conference in The Hague to discuss such questions as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the forthcoming European Security Conference and the two Germanies.

Even larger slices of world markets will gravitate into closer ties with Brussels



Canada Wide photo

Britain's Prime Minister Edward Heath signs the historic agreement providing for British entry into the European Economic Community. With Mr. Heath for the

ceremony in Brussels are Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home (left) and Geoffrey Rippon, Britain's chief Common Market negotiator.

Britain has argued that this trend should be encouraged, and that the scope of foreign policy questions on which The Nine are in broad agreement should be extended. As a first step in this direction, the heads of the political departments of foreign ministries are meeting in the Davignon Committee, which is expected to present its report in June 1973.

Obstacles to EEC harmony

There are substantial obstacles in the way. Taking Western Europe as a whole, Britain has disputes with Iceland over fishing rights, and with Spain over the status of Gibraltar; relations with Ireland are marred by the Ulster conflict; the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, has been outspokenly critical of Finland's defence expenditures; and there is little common ground between the British and the Swedish Governments' stands over U.S. policies in Vietnam.

Similar disagreements could be expected in further major attempts to harmonize the foreign policies of EEC members. And the record of The Six seems to be that progress toward economic union is quite compatible with a degree of independent initiative by members on foreign policy issues. Rather, merging of British policy in

a West European foreign policy may come about more indirectly.

The Treaty of Rome makes deep inroads into many areas of official policy. But co-operation on such issues as the movement of labour or capital, changes in tax systems or banking is bound to eat more and more into areas formerly regarded as falling strictly within the jurisdiction of foreign policy officials. Indeed, it has become the conventional wisdom of British foreign policy that diplomats, while retaining generalist skills, should also possess specialized knowledge in relation to trading and commercial matters. It could be argued that expansion of British exports has been the major foreign policy goal of all recent British Governments.

Labour Party's position

The impact on British foreign policy of EEC membership will also depend on how opinion in Britain reacts to the costs and benefits of the link. The Labour Party, and a small but vocal minority of the Conservative Party — including notably Enoch Powell — are committed to the notion of "renegotiation" of the terms of British entry. What this means is never quite clear. Usually the term is a symbol for the expression of resentment and indignation

Record indicates progress toward economic union compatible with independent stance on foreign policy

at the Government's pro-European line. It quickly wins nods of approval from those — including probably the “silent majority” — who protest at rising prices even before the full effects of membership are felt; or who fear cheap foreign labour taking British jobs and undermining the bargaining power of the trade unions; or, who, like the smaller shopkeepers and businessmen, are alarmed at the administrative complexities and other effects of the new Value Added Tax introduced from April 1973; or who simply object that the British people have lost the power to govern their own affairs, and sold their sovereign birthright for a dubious mess of long-term economic pottage.

Renegotiation can mean two things: staying inside the EEC and trying to improve Britain's lot by working through its institutions; or else withdrawing completely from the organization and starting again in a fresh series of talks with Brussels. Harold Wilson, in setting as his main Opposition priority the maintenance of Labour Party unity, has managed to hint that either might be a valid option for a future Labour Government. The leader of the pro-Market forces in the party, former Chancellor of the Exchequer and Deputy Leader Roy Jenkins, spent 1972 in a spirit of splendid isolation from the party's wildly careering anti-European bandwagon. In the process, he won approval from other European socialist parties and was awarded both the Charlemagne Prize of the city of Aachen in April and the Robert Schuman prize for services to European unity at Bonn University in November.

Wrangling between the two sides of the Labour Party came to a head over the issue of the party's representation in the European Parliament. On December 13, the Parliamentary Labour Party finally decided against sending representatives for at least one year. The move was described by Mr. Wilson as the “last dying kick in our internal argument”. But there were other signs that shifts in the party's position were in the offing. It is notoriously prone to fratricidal conflict when in opposition. And during this year, the approach of another general election, probably in 1974, is bound to turn members' thoughts more to vote-catching than to inner doctrinal purity, especially with Labour candidates faring badly in three by-elections

toward the end of 1972. This will still mean an element of anti-Europeanism. The position could be maintained, however, without the “extremism” at influential levels of the party's organization to which Lord George-Brown has referred recently.

The way the Labour Party resolves its debate on Europe during 1973 is important. Its absence from the European Parliament will be felt even though that body is not regarded as a powerful democratic check on the EEC Commission's operations. And should a Labour Government be formed in the next election out of a groundswell of public reaction against inflation and Brussels decisions, commitments made now could have a decisive effect on British policy. Actual withdrawal, however, does not seem to be a realistic option.

Britain as a European nation

In a very real sense, Britain was already a European power before entry into the EEC. The withdrawal east of Suez has been accomplished, and the Government's chief area of foreign policy interest lies in the European and Atlantic region. From now on, however, decisions on relations with Commonwealth countries, especially poorer Third World members, and with the United States, will increasingly be taken by Britain in conjunction with its Common Market partners. And if current moves towards harmonization of the foreign policies of EEC members continue, it may eventually prove difficult to identify unequivocally just what British foreign policy is.

This is even more the case when the impact of the larger corporations is considered. *The Economist* has argued that Europe in the future will be run in the main bread-and-butter sectors by a few multinational firms or by the joint subsidiaries of national giants. Two EEC companies, the Belgian Gevaert and the West German Agfa, are finally nearing completion of a merger planned since 1964. This is the first amalgamation of its kind since the establishment of the EEC, but it is unlikely to be the last. With Britain in the EEC, officials in London will still have an important residue of traditional diplomatic business to attend to. The variety and complexity of the new tasks they face, however, will call for an additional dimension to the traditional diplomatic skills.

*Labour victory
could alter
British approach*

*Even before entry,
Britain already
a European power*

Bangladesh: a troubled state coming to terms with itself

By Elliot Tepper

Bangladesh has survived its first year. On balance, the newest state has done reasonably well. The unpropitious circumstances surrounding its emergence have been partially offset by the international sympathy that Bangladesh inspired, by an international climate which worked to its favour, and by the skills and capacity of the Bangladeshi themselves. The sympathy and circumstances seem likely to endure for some time yet, but it is up to the people of Bangladesh to move quickly to secure its permanence before external factors alter and sympathy wanes.

New states appear so regularly that their legitimacy, or *raison d'être*, are no longer questioned. The right of self-determination is so well ingrained that successful aspirants for independence are given nearly automatic recognition and treated with the symbolic and other accoutrements that accompany sovereignty. Bangladesh, however, is a special case. It is the first major state to be produced recently, not from the break-up of colonialism but from the breaking-up of a post-colonial state (Singapore may be in this category as well, but not Biafra). Moreover, its existence as part of the former Pakistan was itself anomalous, depending solely on the unusual ground of religious affinity, and separated from West Pakistan by culture, ethnic character and 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Now it is free, and officially secular, socialist, nationalist and democratic.



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Despite the suddenness of its emergence and the unusual basis for its appearance earlier as East Pakistan, there are strong historical and cultural antecedents for a separate, sovereign East Bengal. The territory occupied today by Bangladesh has historically been linked only partially to the political and cultural basin of North India. All of Bengal can be viewed as a delta, an outlet for the region's great river system. East Bengal was the last part of the delta to be cleared and settled, a perpetual frontier area in medieval times. The reconquest of Buddhism by Hinduism, as in West Bengal, was never thorough in the Eastern region of the delta, which became a Moslem bastion instead.

Opted for Pakistan

When Britain tried to partition Bengal early in this century, opposition by Bengali Hindus was so strong that the British had to change their stand and rescind the partition. But much of the Moslem leadership took a different view. The Moslem League was founded in Dacca as a response to the anti-partition struggle and, when the British eventually departed, East Bengal voted overwhelmingly to opt out of India, and for the new Moslem state of Pakistan. Now that, too, has failed to be adequate. When given an opportunity, Moslem Bengal has repeatedly chosen to be different and to be free.

Economically, East Bengal was a hinterland of Calcutta. Bangladesh inherits a formidable set of constraints. It is one of the most rural, the most densely populated and the poorest regions of the globe. Nearly 90 per cent of the population is engaged in agricultural pursuits. The population to a square mile approximates Canada's population to one hundred miles squared. The *per capita* income, by some estimates, ranks the world's eighth-largest state just above tiny Upper Volta and Burundi. All of this is an area cut off from its former trade lines (to Calcutta, then West Pakistan), visited regularly by floods, cyclones and droughts, and em-

broiled in a vicious and destructive civil war.

Sheikh Mujib returned to Dacca on January 10, 1972, released from prison by Pakistan's President Bhutto (who deserves high praise for this particular act of statesmanship). The return of the Bangabandhu, Friend of Bengal and father of the nation, marks the real beginning of Bangladesh's first year of independence. He has provided the shaping force for the initial moments of the new state. That force has been moderate and evolutionary in tone, distinctively Bangladeshi in style.

The first year was given over to a drive for continuity and institutionalization. Sheikh Mujib and his party, the Awami League, draw heavily on middle-class values, and votes, for support. Their impulse was not for a cultural, proletarian or any other kind of revolution but for a return to normalcy and some semblance of stability. Accordingly, many of the regime's initial steps were designed to restore the routine operations of government. Apart from minor Cabinet reshuffling, and requisite adaptation to changed circumstances, the new state is truly the linear successor to both British India and Pakistan. The events of 1972 recreate the opportunities lost since 1947.

The Government moved quickly. One of the Sheikh's first actions on his return was to reject the title of President conferred by his associates in favour of Prime Minister. He then set in motion the machinery that led to the framing of a constitution and an open election, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of procrastination and degeneration that beset the erstwhile Pakistan during its formative years. Simultaneously, the Government established a powerful Planning Commission and nationalized much of the industrial sector (by necessity as much as predilection, as the West Pakistani industrialists were gone), thus guaranteeing that "the commanding heights of the economy" would come under Government guidance or actual control. Banks, schools, factories and the Government itself resumed operation within a month of the Sheikh's return.

Commonwealth link

Legitimacy was pursued internationally as well as domestically. Bangladesh joined the Commonwealth, and will be represented in Ottawa this August when the prime ministers meet. Recognition has been granted by at least 88 countries, including the United States, which supported the Pakistan Government during the war. Recognition has not yet been accorded by Pakistan, China and several



Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

UPI photo

Moslem states in Africa. China used its first veto in the United Nations Security Council to prevent the admission of Bangladesh. However, even this hostile action was accompanied by expressions of friendship for the people of Bangladesh. Subsequently, Bangladesh was invited to join UNESCO, and has been granted observer status at the United Nations. No one, at home or abroad, seriously questions the right of Bangladesh to exist.

More threatening are the brute needs of rehabilitation and development. The history of Bangladesh, outlined briefly above, has resulted in monumental neglect of what is now Bangladesh, and monumental destruction by nature and man as the immediate precursor to liberation. A United Nations estimate of damages and replacement costs indicated that it would take two years and \$2 billion to restore the economy of Bangladesh. A dominant concern of the Government has been to procure and utilize the necessary local and foreign resources.

Apparently the basic costs are being met — multilateral, bilateral and private aid commitments through January 1973 total well over \$1 billion. Canadian aid commitments are very sizable, approaching in total \$76 million, and Canada is the third-largest bilateral-aid donor (behind India and the United States). More important, Canada has provided badly-needed food grains and transportation repair and support facilities. Since Canada is more capable of sustained support than India, Bangladesh's greatest benefactor in the first year, the Canadian response is likely to become increasingly important in the years ahead. It is clear that Bang-

The 'brute needs' of rehabilitation and development

ladesh will need to sustain aid flows at the present level for at least one more year.

Apparently basic needs are being met as well. Ten million refugees have been returned from India and resettled. Immediate, if temporary, housing substitutes are being found to replace the estimated 2,000,000 homes destroyed during the fighting. Bridges are up again, including the majestic Hardinge over the Padma river; trains are moving; the port of Chittagong is back to near full pre-war capacity. Jute exports, the country's major hard-currency earner, are nearly back to the pre-war level also.

Mujib's style

Although preoccupied with pressing reconstruction needs, the Government has attended to integrative and developmental considerations. Sheikh Mujib's open political style and socialist patriotic rhetoric have given a human and Bengali quality to his Government that was badly needed during the early months. The costs in efficiency have to be balanced against the gains in other kinds of institutionalization. The one-year development plan produced by his Government, an impressive achievement under the circumstances, also shows concern for post-reconstruction needs. It is marked by a candour and a recognition of agricultural and employment priorities that are a refreshing change from pre-liberation documents.

The question that still lingers is whether moderate reformism and Mujib's charisma are adequate for the tasks facing the country. Indeed, given the magnitude of the constraints and paucity of natural resources, the question may be more fundamental: Is sovereign statehood possible for a region with so many inherent disadvantages (and big neighbours)? Bangladesh is a test of the limits of statehood, of the flexibility and vitality of nation states, as much as a test of democratic reformism as a development model.

The immediate task is to continue to move on all fronts at once, maintaining the pursuit of consolidation, while shifting priorities, and funds, increasingly to development needs. The ability to pursue multiple goals simultaneously will be the key to the success of the regime at this time.

Food-deficit area

Consolidation priorities still rest on essentials: food, infrastructure, stability. Bangladesh is a natural rice-bowl, but in recent times has been a food-deficit area. Famine was a predictable by-product of the destruction caused by the cyclone and tidal wave that overwhelmed the lower

districts, floods that inundated Northern Bengal, and the civil war. Famine was averted by a massive international rescue operation, spearheaded by India. However, the fall monsoon then failed, and both India and Bangladesh once again faced food shortages at a time when only Canada and the United States felt free to respond to calls for further food aid. Neither nature nor international politics are dependable, so long-range safeguards for Bangladesh are needed. For the time being, food stocks should be sufficient to avert famine (and major electoral difficulties for the Awami League).

Infrastructural damage must obviously be repaired further if more than bare-minimum achievements are expected. The cotton and paper industries, for example, remain hobbled by lack of distribution capacity and spare parts. All sectors of the economy will be out of phase as long as physical bottlenecks intervene. Formation of a domestic airline has already helped in this regard; and the natural bounty and river-communication paths of Sonar (Golden) Bangla counter an otherwise hopeless situation. The rapid recovery of the jute industry is a testimonial to the ingenuity and capacity of the delta's farmers.

Problem of stability

Stability is more of a problem, for it rests on much less tangible, and malleable, factors. Political violence is a way of life in the area, accentuated by elections, such as the one being waged as these words are written. Usually, civil violence subsides when elections are completed, and Bangladesh ought to benefit from this local cultural pattern. But weapons are everywhere now, and the causes of violence are numerous. In an economy of scarcity, there is no lack of instigation for a resort to unauthorized use of arms. Sheikh Mujib has taken measures to curb such incidents, including personal forays into the countryside, where thousands of weapons were laid at his feet. He recently responded to rural fears by dispersing newly-formed para-military forces to all parts of the state.

Both consolidation and development measures are needed to reduce the underlying civil malaise. Corruption and high prices are both encouraged by food shortage and administrative limitations. Continued consolidation, including a sense of political legitimacy, will ease this kind of pressure. However, development priorities should move quickly to the forefront, not only for long-term needs but also to alleviate the multiple ills that threaten sta-

*Will reformism,
Mujib's charisma
prove adequate
for tasks ahead?*

bility and lead to dangerous over-reliance on the charismatic appeal of Sheikh Mujib.

Development priorities can be discussed in terms of bottlenecks. As emphasis shifts, so too will the nature of potential problems which are likely to be encountered.

A central problem will be administrative capacity. As the need for increased production and employment become pressing, the question of plan implementation becomes more crucial and shifts attention to the administrative structure of Bangladesh. This is a broader question than "absorptive capacity," the ability of a host Government to use foreign aid effectively. Assuming that Sheikh Mujib, or his successor, juggles overtly political issues and relief measures satisfactorily, then the Government will want to get on with the job of economic growth and social justice. For both these primary goals, the Government will have to pay attention to the rural sector. And it is in the rural sector, particularly at the lower levels, that governmental abilities have been most circumscribed. Bangladesh today cannot afford the price of having been historically a neglected rural hinterland.

Reform of rural apparatus

Fortunately, there is room for some optimism in this area. The Government has already announced several very important measures relating to reform of the rural governmental apparatus. In principle, it has been decided to expand the number of rural districts, and correspondingly reduce the territorial dimensions. Such a step would greatly increase the coverage of existing governmental services, both routine and developmental. Local government is to be reorganized, and has already been given a constitutional guarantee of ample authority. Co-operative and other development activities are to be restructured throughout Bangladesh on the very promising model demonstrated at the Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development at Comilla. In tandem with the land and tax reforms already announced, these steps would be quite valuable. What is essential is that the Government and others now provide sustained attention and funding to the peasantry of Bangladesh. The modalities for doing so require much more thought and support than have been available in the past.

Turning to the urban sector, the problem will obviously be managerial. As the Annual Plan points out, the industrial sector provides a bare fraction of the country's gross national product and employment, but what it does produce is impor-

tant to the politically-effective urban population. Even though agriculture is really the country's best "growth industry," the industrial component is vital, particularly as the changing nature of Bangladesh puts increasing strain on new urban groups and the old middle class. For historical, and perhaps cultural, reasons, the talent of the area for large-scale entrepreneurial tasks has come from Hindus based in West Bengal and, subsequently, Urdu-speaking Moslems based in West Pakistan. Neither group is currently welcomed in Bangladesh, and the country is left with the problem, and opportunity, of running virtually all of its existing industries. (Government sources estimate that "85 per cent of the assets in the modern industrial sector are now owned by the people of Bangladesh".)

While the Government is still encouraging private enterprise, at the small and intermediate levels, large-scale industry, including new industry created by private foreign investment, will retain 51 per cent Government interest. This particular bottleneck may turn out to be a non-problem, or a problem more generally bound up with other urban matters such as labour policy and middle-class consumption patterns. It is too early to evaluate the success or failure of the nationalization policy. It is not impossible that both managerial and entrepreneurial skills will emerge in satisfactory quantity.

One other type of problem ought to be mentioned as well. Bangladesh is extraordinarily reliant on external aid. Its relations with other states thus bear continual scrutiny. So far, its own policy of friendship toward all has been quite successfully pursued, aided by the general disposition of the major powers, and not unduly hindered by the limited opposition of the few remaining unfriendly states. Much of this is a matter of luck and the skill of the state's leaders. Both are likely to be maintained for the present.

Relations with India

In particular, Bangladesh must pay close attention to its evolving relations with India. Bangladesh is an enclave in Indian territory, tied by traditional economic and emotional links to India's flanks. India plays an ambivalent role for the people and Government of Bangladesh. This was recognized by an Indian military officer who fought in Bangladesh: "For ten days we will be treated as liberators. On the eleventh day we become occupiers."

Much to the credit of both parties, the two states have been very "correct"

Changing nature of nation puts increasing strain on new urban groups

with one another. It is essential that this sophisticated approach be maintained. Bangladesh cannot exist in peace, or with a hope of prosperity, without India's good will and co-operation. India cannot hope for a co-operative, friendly and stable Bangladesh unless it continues to respect the new state's sovereignty and fundamental desire for simple dignity.

Bangladesh today is neither an Indian satellite nor an "international basket

case". It remains a troubled, turbulent state, which is undergoing a metamorphosis. The prospects of political turmoil are high, as a variety of forces and newly powerful groups strive for influence under the framework of a parliamentary democracy. Bangladesh is a fascinating experiment. So far it has earned the right to be treated generously as it comes to terms with its own problems and with itself.

Bangladesh notebook

By Jean Pelletier

Dacca has grown in a disorganized way. It is a city with no clearly-defined limits, with each neighbourhood unrelated to the others and development taking place according to promises made by municipal officials. North of Dacca is the site of the uncompleted new capital of Bangladesh — a huge complex of red-brick circles and triangles that looks like a partly-built set for some Hollywood extravaganza. I was expecting a shattered city, but this is not the case; the evidence of war is to be found, not in broken buildings but in the men earning 5 takas (75 cents) a day splitting bricks with hammers to make concrete, the students having trouble adapting to the possession of a measure of political power, and the women who fill the streets, some of them begging.

The people of Dacca make a living any way they can. The economy is based on the production of matches, Indian cotton and cigarettes, and even the repairing of

ball-point pens. Suppliers of lumber and corrugated iron are getting rich: it takes at least 12 bamboo poles and eight sheets of corrugated iron to build a house, and that comes to a minimum of \$60. Many live in homes consisting of concrete sewer sections or aluminum frames and sheets of plastic or tar-paper.

Dacca's lifeblood is power — political debate and the great rallies organized by the Awami League and the Communist Party. There is always a demonstration under way somewhere, with handbills being passed out and slogans broadcast over loudspeakers perched on the roofs of carriages dating from colonial times.

It is a city of small businessmen and civil servants who share authority and direct the fortunes of the country, not according to ideology but according to prices and share values. Many houses in Dacca have an unfinished look, as if one storey were missing. This enables the well-to-do to reduce their property taxes on the pretext that they are investing in construction.

The importance of the cities in the life of Bangladesh is more or less limited to the political sphere because the basic structure of the country consists of the 65,000 villages in which 94 per cent of the people live. Thus Dacca does not represent an economic norm — it is just a symbol of a way of life and a prosperity that the northern peasant or the delta fisherman would envy. Dacca has the university, the hospital, the power and the security that big-city anonymity confers on its inhabitants.

The Mukhti Bahini . . .

Bangladesh is a country of water and rice-paddies; by and large, it would be easier to travel by boat than by car if the British colonial authorities had shown more ima-



Jean Pelletier, director of overseas operations for the Canadian University Service Overseas, provides his on-the-spot impressions of Bangladesh in the year after it emerged from the Indo-Pakistan conflict as a new state. Mr. Pelletier made two trips to Bangladesh in 1972, first between April and July to evaluate the possibilities of launching a CUSO program there and again in October-November to complete arrangements for the program. Mr. Pelletier was a CUSO volunteer in Ghana in 1969-71 and then a project officer in Eastern Nigeria on a reconstruction program sponsored jointly by CUSO and the Canadian International Development Agency. The views expressed in his Bangladesh notebook are those of Mr. Pelletier.

ination instead of building more and more roads at staggering cost. The typical village is an island for six months a year, and the result is a very tight-knit community with a strong attachment to its ancient values and traditions. Some Bangladesh politicians view the Mukhti Bahini phenomenon as a very serious threat, because these young men succeeded in taking over a good many villages during the war with West Pakistan. The most important aspect of the phenomenon is the fact that the following they built up does not reflect the traditional political pattern: it is founded not on campaign promises but on wartime comradeship.

Mukhti Bahini (or freedom fighter) has become a somewhat debased term, because in the aftermath of victory the movement acquired a large number of self-styled recruits. But, regardless of its numbers and the validity of some of its membership, the honour and prestige it has acquired have profound political implications with which all parties must come to terms.

Technological revolution and the peasantry...

According to Dr. Akhtar Hamid Khan, founder of the Comilla Rural Academy, the population of a Bengali village is made up of three quite distinct groups. First, the more prosperous farmers, who enjoy a higher standard of living and a more balanced diet than the others. On average, they own a minimum of 7.5 acres of land per family. Next are the farmers of average means, about 60 to 65 per cent of the total, who generally own less than 7.5 acres. The impoverished remainder of about 25 per cent own one acre or less.

In economic terms, these isolated communities have no chance of overcoming the obstacles of hunger and unemployment and, in the absence of a technological and administrative revolution, this situation will continue. The technological revolution has already begun. Of the 19.6 million acres of arable land in Bangladesh, 96 per cent are producing at least two harvests a year. The only way to increase the output of rice is to increase the number of harvests from two to three a year. The third crop is harvested in winter, from December to March, and its success is entirely dependent on irrigation and on more productive varieties of rice. Thus the technological revolution is based on the farmer's adoption of new techniques. Striking successes have been achieved at Comilla, at Chittagong and south of Barisal, where a massive organizational effort was made by determined men, both Bengalis and foreigners.

This brings us to the subject of the administrative revolution. With the new regime installed, there was a rash of talk about such things as adult education, birth control and agrarian redistribution; the Rural Academy at Comilla suddenly became a prime training centre. The Ministry of Rural Development encouraged the establishment of agricultural co-operatives; the theory was that these would be accepted and taken over by the villages, thus reducing their dependence and assisting in their progress. In practice, this has not yet happened. Too many farmers borrowed money and then had bad harvests, leaving themselves hopelessly in debt. Too many companies were formed with little or no popular participation. The cyclone and the war made these establishments even less effective because people felt that their existence depended on government investment, rather than the other way round. In a village newly rebuilt by a voluntary agency, a farmer told me: "The co-operatives are for you foreigners."

The Bangladesh farmer...

The typical farmer in the Ramghati region on the Bay of Bengal, south of Dacca, does not own the land he farms. One-fifth of all the arable land in Bangladesh is worked by peasants who do not own it. They invest their tools and labour, but receive only half the proceeds, the other half going to the owner. Thus the "typical" delta farmer is deprived from the outset, and in 1973 the memories of the cyclone and of nine months of war are still fresh, so he believes everything the Government tells him or nothing, depending on whether he is of an optimistic or fatalistic turn of mind.

He is living in the most fertile, albeit the most dangerous, region of the country. The Government has established a system of "cluster villages" with brick-built cyclone-proof homes protected from tidal waves by ten-foot earth dikes. The peasants agree to live in them because the Government gives them a feeling of security they cannot find elsewhere. But this does not mean they are in favour of the idea. At Bishawgram, a village built with funds collected by employees of the World Bank (the name means "world village"), the farmers told me: "We live here because the Government is going to help us by giving us cattle and land." The fishermen cherished similar hopes. They belong to the co-operatives, of course, but the latter were set up too quickly, without public understanding of their function. The managerial staff are too immersed in accounting and administrative problems to be receptive to

'Cluster villages with brick homes protected from tidal waves by earth dikes'



UPI photo

Ankle-deep in grain, Bengali workers and children unload a mini-bulker at the port of Khulna City. The ship brought the food to the Pusur River port from Chittagong. The shipment was part of a United

Nations relief and rehabilitation program in Bangladesh. UN and voluntary organizations have contributed \$89-million worth of material and financial aid to Bangladesh in less than a year.

better ideas. Of course, you meet people like the local organizer who was full of hope on his return from Japan and could talk of only one thing — not the wonders of Japanese agriculture, but the role of women. He was so taken with the idea that one week after his return he enrolled his wife in high school. “The main problem in Bangladesh,” he informed me, “is that women do not take part in the working life of the country.”

The voluntary agencies . . .

Bangladesh has become a happy hunting-ground for relief agencies. The West has given birth to an almost infinite variety of agencies to minister to the various needs of the Third World. Some have come to adopt children, some to build orphanages, some to see that international adoption laws are complied with — and still others to preach birth control.

The population factor has upset all the experts' calculations. Although in theory the country has an adequate supply of grain, the distribution system is so deficient in practice that famine still affects many areas.

In the beginning, many agencies attributed the shortcomings of the system to the consequences of the Indo-Pakistan war. Now they talk of corruption and pour scorn on the local authorities to ease their

own consciences. The coming months will see the departure of a number of agencies that feel their job is done.

Since the war ended, Bengali officials have had to learn how to get along with these strange individuals who come and go with such holy zeal and confidence in the rightness of what they are doing. The best reaction was that of the Minister of Finance, who justified his Government's acceptance of American aid in the following terms: “We look upon American aid to Bangladesh as war reparations.”

The “have” countries had a sudden attack of conscience about the Third World, and Bangladesh in particular. They had had a similar reaction toward Nigeria at the end of the civil war and Vietnam will doubtless be welcoming the same crowd of agency directors and assorted “experts”. It is easy to criticize and downgrade the work of these organizations, as many itinerant journalists have done, but the fact is that they contributed about \$89-million worth of material and financial aid to Bangladesh in less than a year when no assistance had yet been forthcoming from foreign governments.

The attitude of these agencies nevertheless creates pessimism among the Bengalis. With so much talk of thousands of women raped, children orphaned and people starving, they start to wonder whether

the only way to arouse any response in Europe or America is to dwell on rape and bloodshed. A student at the University of Dacca asked me whether Canadians would be interested in Bangladesh if he spoke to them about progress instead of disaster.

Mujib and the villagers . . .

A. H. of the Comilla Rural Academy spoke with me one afternoon in June; the day before, Sheik Mujib had held a huge rally to commemorate the Six-Point Declaration and A. H. was telling me how Mujib had no sense of history. "In March 1971," he said, "Mujib should have declared independence at the beginning of the month when the whole country was pressing him to do so instead of waiting until three weeks later, when any uprising on our part had become impossible."

On June 7, Mujib made the choice between right and left, opting for the more or less corrupt parliamentary tactics of the Awami League rather than the socialists, whose ability varied from one faction to another but who were at least more honest. The June 7 speech drew the entire population of Dacca, all the revolutionaries in the country and the students of the five universities, who poured in by train and truck. But it was a disappointment because Sheikh Mujib suddenly stood revealed as an indecisive man, placing his reliance on the *status quo*, believing in dreams fuelled by the inflow of relief from all over the world instead of declaring that he would himself take over the running of the country in order to eliminate corruption and rebuild the economy.

A. H. felt that this speech made the prospects for future stability even slimmer, because the villagers, the people of Dacca and the "have-nots" of the country in general, lost a little more faith in the first genuine spokesman they had ever had. In his view, institutional change is engendered in the villages, not in the large cities

or in the universities. "The basis for change is the third rice harvest in the winter. It has changed the rhythm of life for the peasants, particularly their working habits. It means that the Government must pay attention to the villages; they must be given more autonomy in the decision-making process."

All the senior officials are landowners and they also wield political power through their traditional hold over the impoverished peasants. In the circumstances, therefore, a clash between the two classes is inevitable, and the technological transformation intended to increase agricultural production is bound to stand the country on its ear

Villages must be accorded more autonomy in decision-making

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League won an overwhelming victory on March 7 in Bangladesh's first parliamentary elections since it emerged as an independent state after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict. The Awami League won 290 of the 300 seats at stake, according to final but unofficial returns. The opposition was fragmented among 14 parties, of which only three put forward a substantial number of candidates.

It seems that, when they think of Bangladesh, people automatically assume that it is a place where change is non-existent, if not impossible. We readily equate traditionalism with fatalism and we speak of the growing threat of a population explosion. In this connection, A. H. told me the story of tea-drinking in Bengal — tea being by far the most popular drink. It was introduced by British planters a mere 35 years ago. They went about it the right way, sending salesmen armed with kettles from market-place to market-place, offering tea to all. "Now everyone drinks tea in Bangladesh. Yet some doubt whether revolution is possible."

Khushwant Singh, novelist and editor of *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, described an interview with Sheikh Mujib in *The New York Times Magazine*, January 21, 1973. The Bangladesh leader was asked about the nation's achievements in its first year.

"Achievements? Four big achievements," he explodes in heavily Bengali-accented English. He puts up four fingers of his left hand and speaks as if he were addressing a public meeting. "First, I have resettled 10 million refugees who had fled to India," he says, pulling down one finger with his right hand. "Second, I have re-

stored law and order in my country." He drops another finger. "Third, I have restored communications. . . ." The third finger comes down. "Four, I have given my country a new constitution." All four fingers are down. He waves his right hand like a magician after a successful sleight-of-hand. . . . Naive, unsophisticated and egocentric; but also shrewd down to earth and a dynamo of energy. Whatever one's opinion of him as a person, it is clear to everyone that the only person who can hold Bangladesh together and lead it to prosperity or disaster is Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. No one else really counts.

The UN's 27th session in review

By Murray Goldblatt

It is standard practice to explain the limitations of the United Nations by noting that, in a world of sovereign national states, the UN is bound to reflect the weaknesses of the international society that produced it. As External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp put it in his speech to the UN General Assembly last fall, "time and again, national egotism seems to be the ruling principle" of society. Despite this troubling fact of international life, the record of the twenty-seventh United Nations General Assembly showed that the world organization continues to record modest achievements.

Canada set out its priorities early in the session in the speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs on September 28, 1972. The Assembly, he said, should concentrate on measures to prevent terrorism, to consolidate the UN's first advance in the environmental field, to secure administrative and budgetary reform, to protect human rights in Africa and elsewhere and to develop international law, especially the law of the sea and the law governing air piracy.

The UN's record was mixed, but there was progress toward certain of these objectives. The recommendations of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment emerged almost unscathed after vigorous debate. (See separate review of decisions on environmental questions). Most uncertainties about holding the Third Law of the Sea Conference were cleared away and a time-table set for a preparatory meeting and for the conference itself. Work programs in the field of outer space were made more precise and general support sustained for expansion of international law in these areas. The budgetary issue was dealt with by adoption of a resolution limiting assessment of the highest contributor to 25 per cent of the regular budget. No progress was made, however, on other financial issues — notably the UN's chronic deficit.

Progress on environmental and legal questions was not matched in the political

and security fields, where the picture was much more blurred. The Korean question was deferred for another year. The Assembly handled the issue of the admission of Bangladesh by a consensus resolution. The German question was treated gingerly in order not to upset negotiations among the parties. The debate on the Middle East produced another resolution condemnatory of Israel, but there were no specific initiatives designed to foster a Middle East settlement.

Terrorism focus altered

On the question of terrorism — an issue with sensitive political overtones — the Assembly altered the primary focus from measures designed to deal with terrorism to adoption of a resolution creating a committee to explore the problem and its causes.

The UN as such remained outside the arena in which a ceasefire agreement in the Vietnam war was negotiated. But the UN Secretary-General was invited to attend the post-ceasefire international conference on Vietnam, and there are firm prospects for UN involvement in programs of relief and aid for Indochina.

Undoubtedly the two most explosive issues at the twenty-seventh Assembly session were the question of international terrorism and the U.S.-fostered drive to alter the budgetary assessment formula so that no member would pay more than 25 per cent of the regular UN budget.

Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim initiated the effort to bring the subject of international terrorism before the Assembly. His initiative came in the wake of a series of aerial hijackings, the slaying of 26 persons in Tel Aviv airport in May of last year, the subsequent deaths of 11 members of the Israeli team at the Olympic Games in Munich after a raid by Palestinian terrorists, and the mailing of letter-bombs to individuals in a number of states.

Arab nations led the opposition to inscription of the terrorist item on the UN agenda but, after a series of debates in the

No progress made in solving problem of chronic deficit

steering committee and in plenary, it was placed on the agenda and dealt with in the Assembly's Sixth (Legal) Committee.

In this committee, the United States introduced a resolution calling for the convening of an international conference early in 1973 to draw up a convention against acts of terrorism. A second resolution, introduced by a group of countries including Canada, Britain, Italy and Japan, proposed that the UN International Law Commission be given the task of drafting a convention that would be considered by an international conference to be called at the earliest practical date. Both of these resolutions condemned acts of international terrorism.

Neither of these approaches won majority support among member states and neither was put to a vote. Instead, the Arab states, the Soviet-bloc countries and most of the African states threw their support behind a resolution sponsored by Algeria and a number of other countries characterized as non-aligned.


Committee authorized

This resolution authorized establishment of a 35-member Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism to consider proposals for an effective solution to the problem and to examine the underlying causes that give rise to such acts of violence. The

resolution expressed deep concern over "increasing acts of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms". The resolution reaffirmed the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and "other forms of alien domination", upheld the "legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements", and expressed opposition to the "continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien regimes in denying their peoples their legitimate right to self-determination and independence...".

As can be seen from the phraseology of this resolution, the Arab states and their supporters regarded the question as essentially a political issue. They were concerned about a more specific resolution dealing with measures to combat terrorism as somehow being used to infringe on the rights of political militants in the Middle East and liberation movements in Africa. They believed a stronger resolution could be exploited for political ends. Spokesmen opposed to the Algerian resolution regretted the failure to recommend forceful measures against terrorism and indicated that its passage would be a clear signal that the UN had chosen to take minimal action on the problem.

Arab countries regarded question of terrorism as political issue



UPI photo

George Bush, U.S. Ambassador to the UN (left), confers with Britain's Sir Colin Crowe and France's Louis de Guiringaud (right) during a recess of the General Assembly session. Discussion focused on

Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim's proposal for UN consideration of measures against terrorism. The subject was placed on the UN agenda despite opposition from some Arab and African states.

The Algerian resolution was approved in the Assembly's Sixth Committee by a vote of 76 to 34, with 16 abstentions. Canada joined Australia, Britain, Italy, Japan, the United States and 28 others in opposing the resolution. France and Norway were among those that abstained. The Assembly, by a similar vote (76-35-17), adopted the resolution.

Canada's position

Canada's basic position on the subject of international terrorism was outlined in a statement to the Sixth Committee on November 16 by David Miller, director of the Legal Operations Division of the External Affairs Department. Mr. Miller conceded that, although it would be useful to study the causes of international terrorism and essential to do everything possible to eliminate those causes, "it is not necessary to await the results of any such study before acting co-operatively to take effective measures against international terrorism...".

Canada set out a five-point program it felt the Assembly should accomplish at the session. This included condemnation of all acts of international terrorism; strengthening of the global network for collection and dissemination of information about terrorists; reaffirmation and, where necessary, strengthening of existing international instruments governing such crimes as piracy, trafficking in narcotics, aerial hijacking and sabotage and acts against internationally-protected persons; and rapid development of such additional legal instruments as were deemed desirable to deal with the international elements involved in acts of terrorism, concentrating on the need to protect the innocent.

Mr. Miller said Canada felt it was necessary to augment existing international law through a new instrument on terrorism, having the broadest possible coverage and application in cases of violent attack with international characteristics or effects and directed against innocent persons wherever they might be and regardless of the motives or objectives involved. Such a convention should provide for punishment of these crimes by severe penalties and call for extradition or prosecution by the competent authorities of the state in which the perpetrators of the terrorist act were found.

In view of this general position, Canada opposed the Algerian resolution creating a committee to probe the causes of acts of terrorism. Explaining Canada's vote, Dr. Saul Rae, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN, said the resolution was unsatisfactory on several

grounds. It failed to condemn acts of international terrorism; it spoke of the right of self-determination, which was not at issue, and its language might be interpreted as going beyond the principles and concepts embodied in the UN Charter; the resolution made no clear distinction between the political and legal aspects of the problem.

"The relationship between criminal or terrorist acts and the underlying causes from which those acts spring is easily recognizable," he said. "Both aspects demand urgent attention and action. However, in our respective national jurisdictions, are there any of our governments which refrain from taking measures on the one problem — violence — while other problems are outstanding?... In the international field, as in the national field, measures to prevent such acts (individual acts of violence and crime) must go hand in hand with efforts to remove underlying conditions which breed violence."

UN observers feel that, although the resolution adopted by the Assembly contains no specific course of action aimed at developing measures against international terrorism, it does not preclude discussion of such measures during deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee. In fact, advocates of specific measures agree that maximum use should be made of the new committee for this purpose.

Financial squeeze

In the administrative and budgetary area, the UN's twenty-seventh session made no basic advances toward resolving the organization's financial squeeze. The Committee of 15, the Special Committee on the Financial Situation of the United Nations authorized a year earlier, failed to make any real headway. It completed its mandate and left further steps to the Secretary-General.

Key factors in the UN's financial problem are the cumulative effects of the failure of such powers as the U.S.S.R. and France to help finance past peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East and the arrears in regular contributions to the UN budget, a situation that affects the organization's cash position. Payments of contributions are to be made by mid-February under UN regulations, but in practice many members, including some of the largest, pay on an instalment basis throughout the year. A number of countries did respond to the Secretary-General's plea for earlier payment and made sufficient change in the pattern to avoid a liquidity crisis in May and June of last year.

Canada maintained it was unnecessary to await results of any study

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UPI photo

Members of the General Assembly's Legal Committee view the tally after a key vote of 76 to 34 with 16 abstentions for a resolution authorizing committee study of the problem of international terrorism

and its causes. A proposal, backed by Canada and a number of other Western states, for action on a full-scale convention to combat acts of terrorism failed to win majority support.

The Assembly last fall approved a budgetary appropriation for 1973 of \$225.9 million, as compared to a 1972 figure of \$213.1 million. This new level represented an increase of 6 per cent, but it was once more a reduced rate of increase when compared with the increases in the previous two years. The new budget includes staff costs and related expenses of \$126.2 million and equipment and supplies of \$18.6 million.

As indicated earlier, most attention in the Fifth Committee, which deals with budgetary matters, was focused on the U.S. push for a reduction in the budgetary ceiling to 25 per cent for the maximum contributor on the UN scale of assessments.

U.S. attitude

There has been growing disenchantment in the United States with the world organization, and this feeling has reinforced elements in Congress who have favoured a reduction in the U.S. share of the UN budget. It should be recalled that the President's Commission on the United Nations in its final report in 1971 recommended that, as part of a redistribution of responsibilities, the United States should seek "over a period of years to reduce its

current contribution of 31.52 per cent to the assessed budget of the organization so that eventually its share will not exceed 25 per cent". The commission suggested that each reduction in the U.S. share of the regular budget should be matched by at least a corresponding increase in U.S. contributions to one or more of the voluntary budgets or funds in the UN system.

The history of UN budgetary assessments has shown a gradual reduction in the share of the maximum contributor. In 1946, the scale of contributions set by the General Assembly provided for a U.S. assessment of 39.89 per cent of the regular budget, whereas, if the contribution had been based on relative capacity to pay, it would have stood at nearly 50 per cent at that time. In 1948, the General Assembly decided that in normal times no member should pay more than one-third of the total assessment, and in 1952 agreement was reached whereby, as of January 1954, this provision for a 33½ per cent ceiling became effective. In 1957, the ceiling was lowered in principle to 30 per cent, and the U.S. contribution has steadily declined since that time, to the current (1973) level of 31.52 per cent.

The U.S. move for a reduction in its

Assembly decided that no member should pay more than one-third of total assessment

rate of assessment to 25 per cent produced one of the most acrimonious debates of the session, both in the Fifth Committee and in plenary.

The United States argued that the U.S. draft resolution represented no shift in U.S. policy and no diminution of interest in or support for the UN. The principle of a 25 percent ceiling had remained as a long-range goal from the outset of the organization, adjusted to immediate economic circumstances resulting from the Second World War. The U.S. representative noted that since 1957, when the last change was made, 50 new members had joined the organization and it had become timely to take the final step toward a 25 percent ceiling.

The U.S. representative recalled that U.S. support for the UN had been increasing steadily. By the end of 1971, contributions of the United States to the UN system had amounted to more than \$4.2 billion — almost \$3 billion of it in voluntary contributions, or almost twice the total of all the regular budgets voted by the organization since its inception. The United States was not seeking achievement of a 25 percent ceiling rate of assessment for financial or economic reasons but for reasons of institutional principle.

Early in the debate in the Fifth Committee, Canada endorsed the U.S. position on this question and worked to gain support for it. Speaking for Canada, Dr. Rae noted that the 25 percent ceiling had been considered in 1946 as the appropriate level for the largest contributor. Canada felt that, if the Assembly approved the draft resolution, no further reduction in the level of the ceiling should be sought. Adoption of the proposed ceiling, he said, would ensure the continued viability of the UN in today's world. Dr. Rae singled out the section of the draft resolution providing that the percentage contribution of member states should not in any case be increased as a consequence of a reduction of the ceiling — this, he stressed, was an important factor in determining Canada's support.

Soviet opposition

The Soviet Union led the opposition to the move, arguing it was counter to the basic principle of apportioning contributions of member states on the basis of relative ability to pay. This was the only objective and impartial, and therefore only correct, principle, the Soviet spokesman said. On this basis, the current U.S. contribution would amount to 38.4 per cent, not 31.5. Now the United States wanted to make the injustice worse, demanding new

advantages for itself; in terms of money for 1973, this would amount to \$13 million of the UN budget or \$25 million in terms of relative ability to pay. The U.S. proposal was even less justified, the U.S.S.R. maintained, in the light of facts showing that the United States derived tremendous financial advantage from the location of UN headquarters in New York. If a more just foundation for assessment of contributions were desired, the present ceiling should not be reduced but rather eliminated so that all members, including the United States "above all", would pay contributions in strict conformity with the principle and criterion of relative ability to pay.

The U.S.S.R. and other delegations drew attention to benefits some of the most developed countries including Canada would derive from application of the per capita ceiling principle if the American proposal were adopted. This principle provides that no member state should contribute on a per capita basis more than the largest contributor. Canada and Denmark, however, indicated they would be prepared to consider foregoing these benefits if the American proposal were approved.

The resolution providing for reduction of the ceiling to 25 per cent was ruled to involve an issue requiring a two-thirds majority in plenary for adoption. In the Fifth Committee, it was approved by a vote of 67 to 30, with 32 abstaining, and in plenary the vote was 81 in favour to 27 against, with 22 abstentions — a margin that met the two-thirds majority requirement.

The resolution said specifically that, as a matter of principle, the maximum contribution by any one member to ordinary expenses of the UN should not exceed 25 per cent of the total. In preparing scales of assessment for future years, the UN's Committee on Contributions was instructed to implement this principle "as soon as practicable" and to utilize for this purpose, to the extent necessary: (i) the percentage contributions of any newly-admitted member states immediately upon their admission; (ii) the normal triennial increase in the percentage contributions of members resulting from increases in their national incomes. But the percentage contributions of member states should not in any case — either in the UN or its Specialized Agencies — be increased as a consequence of the resolution.

The Assembly adopted another resolution revising downward the minimum assessment for UN members. The present floor of 0.04 per cent was established in 1946, and 69 of the 132 member states are

No further cut in ceiling level should be sought, Canada suggested

currently assessed at that minimum level. The new minimum of 0.02 per cent was approved in the Fifth Committee by a vote of 105 in favour (including Canada) to seven opposed, with 17 abstentions; in plenary, the resolution was approved by a vote of 111 to zero, with 20 abstaining.

Using these resolutions, other guidelines established by the General Assembly and national income data, the UN's Committee on Contributions will draw up a revised scale of assessments for the years 1974-75-76 and submit this to the General Assembly for approval next fall. The new scale with the revised ceiling and floor could thus take effect for the 1974 budgetary assessments. (Canada's current percentage assessment is 3.08 per cent.)

Middle East debate

In the political field, the UN debates clearly mirror the antagonisms that lie close to the surface, but results rarely match the heat of the discussion. In the Middle East debate at the twenty-seventh session, for example, discussion was keyed to a resolution dealing with Israel's actions in occupied Arab territories. Israel was accused of making changes in the physical character and demographic composition of these territories — of "creating new facts". The Middle East resolution was based in its original form on an Egyptian draft that was subsequently modified to garner broader support. The original draft called on members to "refrain from providing Israel with assistance which aims at enabling it to sustain its occupation of Arab territories".

As amended and eventually adopted by the Assembly, the resolution declared that changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories "in contravention of the Geneva Conventions are null and void". It called on Israel to rescind such measures and to "desist from all policies and practices affecting the physical character or demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories". The resolution urged all states "not to recognize any such changes and measures carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories" and invited them "to avoid actions, *including actions in the field of aid*, that could constitute recognition of that occupation". (Author's italics).

The resolution adopted by the Assembly deplored the non-compliance by Israel with the General Assembly resolution adopted by the twenty-sixth Assembly, which, in particular, called on Israel to respond favourably to the peace initiative of the special representative (Gunnar Jarring) of the Secretary-General to the

Middle East. It declared that acquisition of territories by force was inadmissible and urged withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. It recognized that respect for the rights of Palestinians was an "indispensable element" in establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 86 to seven, with 30 member states, including Canada and the United States, abstaining. In explanation of its abstention, Canada said it regretted that the Middle East debate did not lead to a resolution that "brought the parties to the dispute closer to agreement". The Canadian delegation was unable to accept the retention in the resolution of certain references that could be interpreted as derogating from the "balance of integrity" of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967. Canada continued to believe that this Security Council resolution constituted the best available basis for negotiations aimed at a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

In the opinion of UN observers, the modified Middle East resolution did not specifically provide for sanctions against Israel, although that may have been the intent of the original draft. However, it still held implications that Canada and others could not support. The key clause urging states to avoid "actions, including actions in the field of aid", that could constitute recognition of Israeli occupation of Arab territories was considered vague and capable of a number of interpretations; it could, for example, be construed to be directed against credits to Israel or straight purchases, as well as development aid.

Status of Bangladesh

In treating the question of Bangladesh, the Assembly was faced with a situation in which the new state's entry into the world organization had been vetoed by China in the Security Council in August. India, the Soviet Union and other supporters of Bangladesh wanted the Assembly to direct the Security Council to admit Bangladesh. China, Pakistan and others wanted no action taken until such time as the issues between India and Pakistan had been resolved in accordance with an earlier Security Council resolution. The final result was a compromise.

Canada joined 21 other nations in supporting a Yugoslav resolution expressing the desire that Bangladesh be admitted to UN membership at an early date. A second resolution, backed by Algeria, Argentina and a number of Arab and

Respect for rights of Palestinians regarded as vital in Mid-East peace

African states, urged the parties to make all possible efforts to reach a fair settlement of issues still pending and called for return of prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and the relevant provisions of Security Council Resolution 307(1971).

After extensive consultations, the Assembly, through its president, agreed that the two draft resolutions would be adopted together without debate and without a vote. The president said this procedure would give expression to the consensus of the Assembly. "It is . . . essential to view this simultaneous adoption of these two draft resolutions as constituting an interdependence between these two viewpoints. A peaceful solution on the subcontinent should be promoted; in this context, the Simla Agreement (between India and Pakistan) is to be welcomed. . . ."

Peacekeeping mandate

Peacekeeping guidelines have continued to preoccupy the General Assembly, although the International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam — essentially an observer mission and an outgrowth of the Vietnam ceasefire agreement — is *not* functioning under UN auspices. UN bodies have long struggled with the question of reaching agreement on the constitutional and practical procedures governing UN peacekeeping operations. Since 1965, this task has been entrusted to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations — the Committee of 33 — and its subsidiary groups. Modest progress was achieved between 1968 and 1971 in defining models of peacekeeping operations involving troop contingents and observer missions — and some aspects of their functioning. But agreement eluded member states on such basic questions as establishment, direction and control of the mission involving the respective responsibilities of the Security Council and the Secretary-General, the role of the Secretary-General and the Security Council's Military Staff Committee in the day-to-day control of peacekeeping operations, and the method of financing peacekeeping operations.

Although the United States and the Soviet Union have modified earlier approaches, the United States still envisages actual control and direction of a peacekeeping operation in the hands of the Secretary-General, with a consultative body serving in an advisory capacity, while the Soviet scheme casts the Security Council, with a subsidiary committee, in the role of executive body and the Secretary-General in a consultative or advisory role.

Two resolutions on Bangladesh adopted together without a vote



Wide World photo

Huang Hua, Chinese Ambassador to the UN, voiced China's objections to a recommendation that the General Assembly call on the Security Council to admit Bangladesh. China had vetoed the new state's entry into the world organization during Security Council sessions in August.

At the Assembly's twenty-seventh session, the report of the Committee of 33 and its enlarged 13-member Working Group, including Canada, indicated that it had not been possible to register further progress in achieving agreed guidelines on UN peacekeeping operations. But in December the Assembly again renewed the committee's mandate. The resolution adopted urged the Committee of 33 to intensify its work and recommended that its Working Group should submit reports at intervals to facilitate agreement on questions of substance.

Proposal by Canada

Canada, which has submitted proposals on UN peacekeeping at earlier points in the committee's life, made a new approach last fall in an Assembly document referred to the Committee of 33. The Canadian proposal sought to make use of the Security Council's Military Staff Committee in dealing with the question of command and control of peacekeeping operations. Under the UN Charter, the Military Staff Committee is composed of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the states contributing to the mission being invited to participate in meetings on that operation. In the Working Group and the Committee of 33, Canada explained that it had not tried to bridge the gap between the positions that were furthest apart but to make use of an alternative mechanism

already in existence. Canada emphasized that its proposal was provisional and negotiable — designed to stimulate creating rethinking by members of the Working Group and the committee. The proposal was confined to operations identified as Model 1 or Model 2 — that is, those authorized by the Security Council involving either military observers or contingents.

The essence of the Canadian proposal was that the Security Council, while retaining general direction and control of an operation, should use the Military Staff Committee as its executive agent. The Military Staff Committee in turn would be supported by an International Headquarters Staff set up by the Secretary-General and reporting through him. Under normal operational conditions, the Headquarters Staff would be the channel of communications between UN headquarters and the commander in the field.

Under the Canadian proposal, the International Headquarters Staff to be established under the Secretary-General would assume responsibility for detailed planning and for day-to-day conduct of authorized missions or operations. But the Military Staff Committee, making use of proposals developed by the Headquarters Staff, might advise the Security Council on the terms of the mandate, number of observers or size of force required and the necessary agreements with the host country and contributing countries. The Security Council, if it approved, could authorize the Secretary-General to conclude such agreements with the respective governments. The Military Staff Committee might also maintain under periodic review the operations of any observer mission or peacekeeping operation to ensure that these were in accord with the mandate authorized by the Security Council.

The Canadian delegation conceded that the machinery in the proposal might be considered cumbersome. But Canada formulated it with the idea that a certain loss of mechanical efficiency was a justifiable price to pay for political acceptability. The Canadian proposal has not been endorsed by either the United States or the U.S.S.R., but it is one of the areas to be explored when the Working Group resumes its deliberations this year.

Arms control measures

In the field of disarmament and arms control, the twenty-seventh General Assembly in effect marked time. The nuclear-testing powers gave no indication they intended to respond to the call for restraints proposed in a resolution adopted by the Assembly a year earlier. That resolution,

put forward by Canada and 15 other states, had urged the nuclear superpowers to adopt measures of restraint to cut back the size and number of underground tests pending achievement of a full test ban.

During fresh consideration of the issue this time, the Assembly adopted a cluster of three resolutions. One six-part resolution, sponsored by Canada and 14 other countries, called on all governments conducting underground nuclear tests — particularly the parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 — immediately to undertake unilateral and negotiated measures that would suspend or reduce such testing pending early entry into force of a ban on all nuclear-weapons tests in all environments. The resolution requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to give first priority to a treaty banning underground nuclear tests, taking full account of expert views and technical developments bearing on verification of such a treaty. All governments were urged to seek a halt to all nuclear-weapons testing and to try to achieve at the earliest possible date a comprehensive test ban and to obtain universal adherence to such a ban.

In addition to this broad resolution, the Assembly approved a resolution, submitted by Australia and New Zealand, stressing the urgency of bringing to a halt all atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific or anywhere else in the world and urged states that had not yet done so to adhere to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and meanwhile to refrain from testing in environments covered by that treaty. This resolution was considered to be directed particularly at France, which has conducted a series of atmospheric tests in the South Pacific.

A companion resolution, spearheaded by Mexico, urged nuclear-weapons states to halt all tests no later than August 5, 1973 — the tenth anniversary of the Partial Test Ban Treaty — either through a permanent agreement or through unilateral or agreed moratoriums.

In 1971, the twenty-sixth Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons and on their means of delivery — a convention worked out in negotiations of the CCD in Geneva. A large number of states have adhered to this convention, but it is not yet in effect. At the same session, the Assembly heard a report on efforts to seek agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. During the past year, the CCD devoted further

Move designed to press France over test series in South Pacific

attention to this issue, but did not find it possible to arrive at an agreed draft convention on chemical weapons. The twenty-seventh Assembly merely instructed the CCD to continue work aimed at early agreement on measures for prohibition of chemical weapons.

Disarmament conference

On general disarmament, the proposal for a World Disarmament Conference drew most attention. This idea had been discussed in the early 1960s, and in 1971 the U.S.S.R. took the initiative in pressing for such a conference. The Assembly agreed to seek the views of UN members on the idea and, at last fall's session, the Soviet Union renewed the proposal — with the support of most of the non-aligned states. After discussion in the First Committee, where opposition was led by China and the United States, the committee, and later the Assembly, endorsed a resolution authorizing creation of a special 35-member committee on the World Disarmament Conference. The committee, to be designated by the Assembly president, is to examine views and suggestions of governments on convening such a conference and to present a report to the General Assembly this fall. Canada was among the states nominated for this committee, but the group's final composition had not been decided as of mid-February.

Canada took the position that such a committee might perform a worthwhile function but that it would be essential for the nuclear powers to be represented on it. So far as the conference itself was concerned, W. H. Barton, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the CCD, told the First Committee earlier that Canada would be prepared to support a World Disarmament Conference if there was good reason to believe it would make a positive contribution to the achievement of agreements on arms limitation. Any such session would have to have the support of a preponderance of world states, and in particular of the five nuclear powers. In addition, Canada suggested, any decision to proceed should be made only if there was reasonable assurance that it would not delay or adversely affect specific disarmament negotiations being held elsewhere.

Law of the Sea Conference

In the field of international law, perhaps the most important decision involved Assembly action to set in motion the machinery for convening the Third Law of the Sea Conference. Member states approved a resolution providing for an organizational

session in New York in November and December of this year. The second session — a full-fledged eight-week conference — will be convened in Santiago in April and May 1974, with subsequent sessions in Vienna if deemed necessary by the conference.

J. A. Beesley, Legal Adviser to the External Affairs Department, noted in a statement to the First Committee on November 30, 1972, that the UN had embarked on a major restructuring of the law of the sea — not a mere codification exercise, as was largely the case in 1958. The task would be more complex, but there were developing trends that provided a blueprint for future structure of the law of the sea. There was a general willingness of states to reconsider their rights and obligations as they were affected by both new and traditional uses of the seas. Only developments in the law of outer space and of the environment came close to ranking in importance with this trend. For the first time in 300 years, Mr. Beesley said, large numbers of flag states, on the one hand, and coastal states, on the other, were prepared to accept limitations on their pre-existing rights — and to accept corresponding duties.

In other action at the twenty-seventh session, member states adopted twin resolutions authorizing study of seabed resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. One resolution, fostered by a group of landlocked states, called for a comparative study of the extent and economic significance of the resources to be found in the international area that would result from each of the proposals for limits of national jurisdiction presented to the Seabed Committee (Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction). A companion resolution, put forward by Peru and supported by Canada and other coastal states, was prompted by concern among coastal states that the first resolution would be too narrow in scope. The second resolution called for a comparative study of the potential economic significance for coastal states — in terms of resources — of each of the proposals before the Seabed Committee. Both studies are to be submitted to the midsummer session of that committee.

On outer space, the Soviet Union pressed for immediate consideration of a convention restricting direct television broadcasting *via* satellite. This proposal was controversial because of its highly restrictive approach and sensitive underlying issues of freedom of information and national sovereignty. Canada, the United States and others noted that such broad-

Need participation of nuclear powers for conference on disarmament, Canada maintains

casting would not be feasible or economical in the near future. They felt it should not be put in a straitjacket at such an early stage of development.

Canada co-sponsored a number of amendments to the Soviet proposal, and these were adopted by a narrow margin. Canada then voted for the amended resolution, but the United States remained opposed. The resolution finally adopted by the Assembly declared that it was considered necessary to elaborate principles governing the use by states of artificial earth-satellites for direct television broadcasting, with a view to concluding an international agreement or agreements. The Assembly referred the matter to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for the drafting of such principles as soon as possible.

The Assembly endorsed the general report of the Outer Space Committee and noted that progress had been made on a draft treaty relating to the moon and a draft convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. The Outer Space Committee's legal subcommittee was urged to pursue work on both documents as a matter of priority.

In other legal areas, a Canadian proposal put forward a year earlier was embodied this time in a resolution inviting the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to conduct a study of the legal problems presented by multinational corporations and the implications for international trade law. This will be carried out in conjunction with a separate and more general study of multinational enterprises to be carried out by a panel of experts commissioned by the UN's Economic and Social Council.

Another proposal for a study as to how greater use might be made of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague was deferred to the next Assembly session. Canada and a number of other states had sponsored a resolution calling for a review of the ICJ's role by a special committee that would report in 1974. But the resolution was not put to a vote.

At the 1971 Assembly session, the UN's International Law Commission was requested to prepare a draft convention on the protection and security of diplomats in missions accredited to the UN. The ILC did produce a set of draft articles on protection of diplomats. Canada favoured a procedure whereby comments from member governments would be received and reviewed by the Law Commission in time to permit convening of a diplomatic conference in the fall of 1973 to draw up a convention on the subject. But the major-

ity supported a resolution giving the task of formulating a convention to the Assembly's Sixth Committee at the next session after receipt of comments on the draft articles prepared by the ILC.

Sequel to UNCTAD

In the economic field, the UN Assembly, by an overwhelming 121 to zero vote (five abstaining), approved an omnibus resolution urging follow-up action to the UN Conference on Trade and Development in Santiago earlier in the year. The Assembly urged implementation of the UNCTAD resolutions and efforts to reach agreement on important issues left unresolved by the Santiago sessions.

The UN Assembly welcomed UNCTAD resolutions on multilateral trade negotiations and the international monetary situation. It reaffirmed that the developing countries should participate fully in all stages of multilateral trade talks and in the decision-making process of the international monetary system and its reform — notably through their participation in the International Monetary Fund's Committee of 20 and forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations.

The Assembly took note of the conclusion of UNCTAD's Trade and Development Board in October 1972, whereby the board agreed that one of the basic aims of negotiations should be the expansion and diversification of exports of developing countries in line with their trade and development needs. Every effort should be made in negotiations to ensure that they resulted in significant benefits to the developing nations.

The Assembly resolution invited the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to make adequate arrangements to ensure that all developing countries — whether parties to GATT or not — were given the opportunity to participate fully in negotiations at all stages.

Negotiations should aim to secure additional benefits for the international trade of developing countries in order to achieve substantial increases in their foreign-exchange earnings, diversification of exports and acceleration of the rate of growth in their trade. UNCTAD members were invited to ensure that these basic aims were achieved and to pursue their efforts to include other basic objectives, such as further improvement of conditions of access to industrialized countries' markets and the solution of problems posed by pricing policy for the exports of developing countries.

The Assembly drew the attention of

Assembly urged bid for agreement on issues left unresolved by Santiago sessions

the Trade and Development Board to the need for substantial improvement by the mid-Seventies in the terms of international trade in primary products on which the great majority of developing countries still depend heavily for their export earnings.

Trade guidelines

Canada endorsed this omnibus resolution, which was put forward by a large bloc of less-developed nations in the UN. But Canada abstained, with the United States, Britain, France and 16 other states, on a second, more specific, resolution dealing with multilateral trade negotiations. This resolution, originated by Chile and co-sponsored by eight other states, set out guidelines for parties to GATT at trade negotiations scheduled for later this year. Under this resolution, adopted by the Second Committee and later by the Assembly, all parties to GATT were invited to give priority attention to the economic development needs of the developing countries during the preparatory work, as well as in all stages of the multilateral negotiations. The Assembly also recommended that the decisions and measures the parties to GATT adopted in favour of the developing countries should be applicable to all of them and that, in whatever action they took in favour of the least-developed states, they should ensure that the interests of other developing nations were in no way prejudiced.

Under other provisions, the Assembly would invite the preparatory committee for the negotiations to study ways of economic and financial compensation for any losses incurred by the less-developed states as a result of the negotiations. Parties to GATT were urged to provide the developing countries with additional benefits. All concessions that might be exchanged by developed countries among themselves should automatically be extended to all developing countries, while

concessions granted by the developed countries to developing states would need to be extended to other developing countries. In negotiations among developing nations, tariff and other concessions that they might negotiate among themselves should not be extended to the developed nations.

At its twenty-sixth session, the Assembly decided to expand the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN agency charged with co-ordinating the broad range of economic and social activities under the General Assembly's authority. The enlargement from 27 to 54 nations was approved by the Assembly, but requires an amendment to the Charter to be implemented. Canada and a number of other states have ratified this amendment but enlargement of the Council will take place only after ratification by two-thirds of UN members, including the five permanent Security Council members. Meanwhile, ECOSOC's three sessional committees were expanded in accordance with the amendment's intent and Canada was re-elected to these committees. Canada hopes to become a member of ECOSOC when the Charter amendment becomes effective.

In the field of economic assistance Canada pledged \$19.8 million as its contribution to the UN Development Program — an increase of \$1.8 million over the previous year — and made another special pledge of \$500,000, to be devoted to aiding the least developed among the developing nations. The UNDP is responsible for most of the organization's technical assistance and pre-investment activities, as well as the newly-founded UN Volunteers Program.

Charter review delayed

Apart from its broad range of other concerns, the General Assembly has been faced with proposals for restructuring the UN itself and devising new voting proce-

The international community often seems incapable of preventing war, powerless in the face of acts of terrorism, apathetic at the spectacle of starvation and misery, and irresponsible in its willingness to risk permanent damage to the environment. We seek to explain this by observing that, in a world of sovereign nation states, the United Nations is bound to reflect the weaknesses of the international society that produced it. Time and again, national egotism seems to be the ruling principle of that society.

This is at the root of the world's

deep anxiety. For the better part of this century, we have known nationalism has imperfections. Yet mankind is not about to do away with sovereign states . . . It is unrealistic to plan for an international order in which the system based upon sovereign national units has been replaced. Instead, it is more hopeful and more sensible to work to transform the existing system, encouraging it when necessary to produce the antidote to its own poisons. (*External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp at the UN General Assembly, September 28, 1972*).

Parties to GATT invited to give priority to needs of less-developed

chres in the Assembly and Security Council. There have been repeated suggestions that the UN Charter be reviewed with the goal of making the organization more effective. Acting on a resolution adopted by the twenty-fifth Assembly, the Secretary-General called on member states to submit proposals for Charter review. But, at the Assembly's session last fall, a resolution was adopted that, in effect, postponed consideration of such a review for another two years.

The resolution noted that fewer than one-quarter of the member states had replied to the Secretary-General's inquiry and no general trend of opinion could be deduced from these replies. The resolution called on countries that had not already done so to submit before July 1, 1974, their

views on the desirability of a Charter review and their proposals. The Secretary-General would then submit a report on the question to the twenty-ninth Assembly (1974) for further consideration.

Canada did submit a reply to the Secretary-General last year and took the general position that the UN could be made more effective and more dynamic without rewriting the Charter. When the question was again under discussion at last fall's Assembly, Canada described the Charter as a "remarkably flexible and responsive document" and "a positive vehicle for action in the world community". The effectiveness of the UN, in short, does not depend so much upon changing its basic structure as upon the political will of its members.

The UN's concern for human rights as mirrored in resolutions on Africa

The United Nations General Assembly, at its twenty-seventh session, reinforced its concern with the question of human rights in Africa through the adoption of a series of resolutions dealing with territories under Portuguese administration, the status of Rhodesia under the regime of Ian Smith, the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa and the future of Namibia. The Assembly's Fourth Committee took the decision early in the session to seat representatives of the national liberation movement as observers of its deliberations.

On the Portuguese territories of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique, the Assembly voted 98 to six, with eight abstentions, for a resolution reaffirming the right of the peoples of these and other territories under Portuguese administration to self-determination and independence. It described the national liberation movements as "the authentic representatives of the true aspirations of the peoples of these territories" and declared it imperative that negotiations should be initiated at an early date between the Portuguese Government and the national liberation movements with a view to granting these peoples independence. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were urged to withdraw any assistance to Portugal which

enabled it to prosecute colonial wars in these territories, and all states were urged to end any activities which helped to exploit the territories under Portuguese control.

Canada supported the resolution after voicing reservations about sections which implied support for violent solutions. The Canadian representative emphasized that Canada had complied strictly with Security Council resolutions on arms sales to Portugal but that it continued to oppose attempts to interfere with trade in peaceful goods with Portugal and its territories. He indicated that Canada had voted for the resolution primarily because of the initiative calling for negotiations between the Portuguese Government and the people of the respective territories — a course which conformed with Canada's view that the dispute should be settled by peaceful means through negotiation between the parties.

Pressure on Britain

On Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the Assembly, by a vote of 111 to four, with nine abstentions, adopted a resolution reaffirming the principle that there should be no independence before majority rule. The resolution called on Britain not to transfer or accord to the Smith regime, under any circumstances, any of the powers or attri-



UPI photo

UN Secretary-General Waldheim and Guinea's Jeanne Martin Cisse confer during meeting of Security Council last November. The Council was considering a draft resolution dealing with a call for talks between Portugal and its African territories. A similar resolution was adopted by the Assembly.

butes of sovereignty. Britain, as the administering power, was urged to convene a national constitutional conference designed to work out a settlement. It was called on to bring about conditions necessary to enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, including unconditional release of all political prisoners, repeal of all repressive discriminatory legislation and removal of all restrictions on political activity.

A second resolution, adopted by a vote of 93 to eight, with 23 abstentions, deplored the failure of Britain to put an end to the "illegal, racist, minority regime" and pressed it to take all effective measures to achieve this purpose. It called for strict compliance with sanctions already imposed by the Security Council and urged widening the scope of sanctions and consideration of sanctions against Portugal and South Africa, which were condemned for collaborating with the Smith regime.

Although Canada supported the general objectives of the sponsors of the resolutions, it abstained on both because it was concerned that neither would help to create conditions necessary for a solution to the problem. Canada believed it was "illusory" to request Britain to undertake measures which British representatives in the Security Council and in the Fourth Committee stressed they were clearly unable to implement. Canada was also opposed to the extension of sanctions against Portugal and South Africa.

On South Africa, the Assembly adopted a cluster of resolutions assailing South Africa's *apartheid* policies. South Africa was called on to end all forms of physical and mental torture of opponents of *apartheid* through detention or imprisonment, and the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid was urged to promote a campaign to end such repression. The Assembly renewed its appeal to all states to support the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, which provides assistance to victims of repressive legislation. A program of work was drawn up for the Special Committee on Apartheid authorizing it to hold consultations with representatives of the liberation movements recognized by the Organization for African Unity to ensure greater moral and material aid to "the national movement of the oppressed people of South Africa". Another resolution urged intensification of the program of information on *apartheid*.

A further omnibus resolution, adopted by a vote of 100 to four, with 21 abstentions, demanded that the South African Government repeal all repressive laws used to persecute persons opposed to *apartheid*. The resolution called on all governments to implement fully the arms embargo against South Africa and reaffirmed a conviction that economic and other sanctions constituted one of the essential means of achieving a peaceful solution to the situation in South Africa. The resolution affirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa to eradicate *apartheid* and racial discrimination "by all available means" and to attain majority rule based on universal suffrage. It appealed to governments to provide greater assistance to the African nationalist movement. The resolution urged discontinuance of all military, economic and political collaboration with South Africa and a boycott of South Africa on sport, cultural and other activities. It also requested the Specialized Agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to discontinue all collaboration with the Government of South Africa.

Canada supported all the resolutions except the resolution on the program of work of the Special Committee and the omnibus resolution. The Canadian representative explained that Canada remained opposed to: (1) violent solutions to the problem; (2) interference with trade in peaceful goods; and (3) undermining of the principle of universality in UN membership by excluding South Africa from the Specialized Agencies.

On Namibia (South West Africa), by a vote of 112 to two, with 15 abstentions,

Failure of Britain to put an end to 'illegal' regime was deplored

the Assembly deplored the continued "illegal occupation" of the territory by South Africa in defiance of earlier resolutions. It reaffirmed the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence and called on the Government of South Africa to withdraw immediately from the territory. Acting on a proposal from Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, the Assembly appointed Agha Abdul Hamid as Acting United Nations Commissioner for Namibia until December 31, 1973. The Assembly also enlarged the United Nations Council for Namibia to a total of 18 states and suggested that the Council should represent Namibia in international organizations and conferences and assume responsibility for programs of assistance to the territory.

The Assembly also invited the Security Council to take effective measures to secure withdrawal by South Africa of its administration from Namibia. Earlier in December, the Security Council met to

consider the report of M. A. Escher, the Secretary-General's personal envoy to Namibia. The Secretary-General had been invited by the Security Council, at its Addis Ababa meeting on February 4, 1972, "to initiate contact with all parties concerned . . . so as to enable the people of Namibia . . . to exercise their right to self-determination and independence . . .". Mr. Escher was sent to Namibia and South Africa to continue the discussions which Mr. Waldheim himself had initiated with a view to achieving a negotiated compromise solution to the problem with South Africa's leaders. After hearing various arguments on the contents of the Escher report, the Security Council adopted a resolution inviting the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to ensure that the people of Namibia exercised their right to self-determination and independence and directing him to report on implementation of this resolution no later than April 30 of this year.

Building on Stockholm's base

By J. R. Morden

Governments participating in the historic United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in June 1972 committed themselves to keeping the state of the environment under constant surveillance and creating an organization to co-ordinate a global drive to meet the threats to that environment. (*International Perspectives*, September-October 1972). Approval of the decisions and recommendations of the Stockholm conference had, however, to await consideration by the UN General Assembly. This consideration of the Stockholm conference report took place during the Assembly's twenty-seventh session, which concluded in December.

Interest in the conference was high at the General Assembly. Apart from their intrinsic importance, environmental questions have rapidly acquired considerable political sex appeal. Delegates were aware that their actions would render final judgment on four years of work that had just culminated in a conference already being described as an outstanding success.

There was also an element of suspense. What would be the attitude of the

Soviet Union and those of its friends which had boycotted Stockholm because the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) had not been offered equal status with the Federal Republic of Germany? Would the many compromise decisions reached at Stockholm, particularly on questions touching on development, survive in the harsher atmosphere of the Assembly's Economic Committee? Where would the new UN secretariat unit be located?

The answers to these and other questions were largely happy ones. The Soviet Union and others that did not attend the Stockholm sessions were content to disassociate themselves formally from Assembly action on the Stockholm recommendations. Moreover, by presenting a full regional slate of candidates for the Environment Governing Council, they clearly indicated their intention to participate in future UN environmental activities. Most

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important, perhaps, for ultimate success was the general readiness of developed and developing countries alike to cooperate in achieving a harmonious and positive result.

The significance of this willingness to work together can only be fully appreciated in the light of the troubled atmosphere that often surrounds development discussions. It is even more remarkable considering that, only four years ago, many developing countries saw the Stockholm meeting as a pollution-control conference, more likely to make recommendations designed to stifle their industrialization prospects than to be of any benefit to them. The efforts of Maurice Strong, Stockholm's Secretary-General and former head of Canada's aid program, to explain the wider implications of human environment problems did much to contribute to this change in the attitude of developing countries.

Confrontation came closest over the site of the new environmental secretariat unit. For reasons of cost and more efficient co-ordination, developed countries preferred one of the UN headquarters (New York or Geneva) or a city where a UN presence already existed and at least some services could be shared (Canada, for example, would have preferred Geneva).

Developing countries, on the other hand, argued that the time was ripe for the political gesture of establishing a major UN unit outside Western Europe or North America. Uniting in support of Nairobi, they outvoted the developed countries in committee. Later, having weighted the desirability of a continuing interest in, and support for, environmental activities by developing countries as well as the need to give maximum impetus to this launching of UN involvement in the environment, developed countries joined in unanimous support for Nairobi in the final plenary vote.

The Assembly approved 11 resolutions on environmental questions, ranging from the delineation of a link between environment and development to the establishment of an annual prize for outstanding contributions to the human environment. Two resolutions were of fundamental importance — one that formally put into effect the Stockholm Declaration of Principles and 108-point Action Program adopted at Stockholm and, equally important, one that established new UN machinery for environmental activities.

UN machinery

The UN machinery is made up of a secretariat unit (under the direction of Mau-

rice Strong) and its governing body, as well as a voluntary fund for additional financing of environmental programs. The fund has a five-year target of \$100 million. Eventual adoption of these resolutions, essentially unchanged, was greeted with much satisfaction — and some considerable relief.

Two further matters, plus election of the new UN Governing Council for the Environment, were also focal points of Canadian attention at the Assembly. Canada was elected to the 58-member Governing Council. A resolution initiated by Canada sought approval for the holding of the Stockholm-recommended Conference-Exposition on Human Settlements and Canada's offer to act as its host in Vancouver.

Problems relating to human settlements had been a major subject of discussion at Stockholm and there was widespread support for such a conference. Originally scheduled for 1975, it now appears that, for administrative reasons, it will be held in the late spring of 1976. Detailed planning is under way and the first meeting of the UN Environmental Governing Council later this year will have before it a report outlining the scope and objectives of the Conference-Exposition.

Duty to consult

A considerably more controversial and difficult question involved the legal principle on the duty of a state to consult its neighbours should it be planning to implement a project that could have environmental consequences for them. This principle had originally been intended for inclusion in the Stockholm Declaration but differences between Argentina and Brazil — stemming from a specific problem between them — prevented agreement at the time. They had been able to resolve their problem before the Assembly dealt with the Stockholm Report, and many countries, particularly in Latin America, pleased at the outcome, were quick to lend their support to an Argentine-Brazilian resolution on the duty to consult which reflected that agreement.

Although Canada and others shared the general satisfaction, they were concerned that the resultant resolution would derogate seriously from the very important Principles 21 and 22 enunciated in the Stockholm Declaration. These dealt with the responsibility of states not to damage the environment of other states by their activities and with the development of international law governing liability and compensation should such damage occur. Negotiations yielded a textual im-

Strong's efforts aided in change of attitudes on development

Developed nations lost in voting on location of UN unit

improvement in the Argentine-Brazilian resolution, consensus that it could not in any way affect Principles 21 and 22 and a blanket disclaimer — in a separate Mexican-sponsored resolution — that any resolution adopted at the Assembly would affect those principles. It was a satisfactory result from Canada's point of view.

During the discussions on the envi-

ronment, the representative of Kenya, referring to the gap in understanding between developed and developing countries, said that the nations must "get into each other's perspective so that we can see things in harmony". If this has not yet been achieved, United Nations actions on environmental questions in 1972 have made a substantial beginning.

The basis for a new planetary politics

The very existence of nation states, arranged in a hierarchy of political, economic and military power, each jealously guarding its position in that hierarchy, each struggling to consolidate and improve its position, is in absolute conflict with global environmental control and abatement systems. The problem is exacerbated by the enormous maldistribution of power — economic, political, technological and exploitive — among the nations of the world. Global environmental control without a radical redistribution of power and resources is unacceptable to the have-not nations since they view this control as an attempt to freeze fundamental inequalities....

The politics of pollution transcends the politics of partisanship, inter-personal, intergroup or international. The threat of planetary pollution, with its capacity to destroy all species, should offer a new basis for human co-operation and a new unifying principle, creating the possibility of a global morality and a new planetary politics. The combined threat of the hunger crisis, the nuclear hazard, the ecological crisis and the maldistribution problem transcends all power struggles. There can be no territorial, no political, no psychological victor in any existing or potential human conflict — not in Vietnam, not in Pakistan, not in the Middle East, nowhere! For victor and loser together will perish, if not with a bang then a whimper in a world which can no longer sustain life.

This is not idle imagination, science fiction or the alarmist propaganda of proponents of blind action or disarming dismay. It is the objective judgment of the majority of independent scientists. The world stands in mortal peril. It is only a matter of time, and tomorrow, if not today, may be too late to reverse the course toward global disaster. To provide a time-

table for this disaster is difficult, but it is not unreasonable to expect a serious collapse of our environment if we do not act soon. Survival demands action and the politics of survival demand that this global action originate with the United Nations.... (Excerpts from *What Happened at Stockholm* by Professor F. H. Knelman of Sir George Williams University, Montreal, in *International Journal*, Winter 1972-3).

... The ecologist and the Moralpolitiker look to the long-term goal, believing that enlightened self-interest must bring all men to work for their objective common interests. The political realist, by contrast, observes how politicians generally orient themselves to short-term aims and put the immediate needs of their regime or country above those of humanity when the two seem to conflict. If the ecologist points to an ideal, the political realist asks: how do we get there? what are the incentives that will make politicians subordinate their parochial, immediate concerns to those of humanity?

Are these divergencies irreconcilable? Will it take ecological disaster to compel politicians to take a long-term approach to eco-politics? There is at least a chance that the growing concern for ecological values in virtually all developed nations will help to transcend ideological differences between Communist and non-Communist or between the Westerner and the Oriental. There is less evidence or reason to believe that a similar bond will soon overcome the divergent outlooks of industrial (or agricultural) haves and have-nots. Nevertheless, it has long been recognized that a common external threat can have a cohesive and mellowing impact on conflicting factions.... (Excerpt from *Ecology and International Relations* by Professor Walter C. Clemens Jr. of Boston University in *International Journal*, Winter 1972-73).

Japan and China: the roots of a new era in East Asia

By D. Gordon Longmuir

The signature of a joint communiqué in Peking on September 29, 1972, by the Prime Ministers of China and Japan brought a formal end to more than four decades of abnormal relations between two major Asian powers with strong historical and cultural ties. Some observers have gone so far as to date the period of "hostility" from the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, during which Japan took control of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores and replaced China as the "suzerain" of Korea.

With the end of the Second World War, Japan was forced to surrender its territories outside the home islands and to accept the verdict of Potsdam that Taiwan must revert to China. But the Communist revolution which created the People's Republic of China in 1949 was to provide a dilemma for Japan upon the resumption of its sovereignty two years later. Chiang Kai-shek, purporting to speak for all China from his retreat in Taiwan, offered Japan very favourable peace terms, including the waiving of reparations payments. In 1950, the Korean War broke out, with the P.R.C. supporting North Korea and Japan acting as a "rear" area for United Nations forces. Moreover, in 1951, the United States and Japan signed a mutual security treaty, which, by implication, was directed against the threat of military action from the Soviet Union and the P.R.C. The peace treaty between Japan and Chiang's Nationalist Government in Taipei was, therefore, virtually a foregone conclusion. This treaty, signed in 1952 and ratified the following year, was to be seen as one of the most important impediments to the normalization of relations between Tokyo and Peking.

Successive conservative Japanese Gov-

ernments, while looking wistfully at the mainland, concluded that there was little choice, in political, economic and strategic terms, but to continue diplomatic relations with the "Republic of China". This official attitude did not, however, prevent the establishment of trade relations, semi-official agreements on fisheries questions and such other contacts as could be made short of diplomatic recognition of Peking

The 1964 'lobby'

As early as 1964, there was a significant "China lobby" in Japan in favour of at least a "two-China" policy. The French decision to establish relations with Peking was viewed with some alarm by the Government, but also sparked a strong campaign in the press and among the opposition political parties for normalization of relations between Japan and the P.R.C. The Great Cultural Revolution put off any initiatives Japan might have had in mind at that time but, in 1969 and 1970, Japan followed with great interest the Canadian and Italian negotiations with Peking, and began seriously to examine the possible implications of normalization. Japanese officials considered, and most outside observers agreed, that because of its special relationship with Taiwan, the "price" of establishing relations with Peking would go beyond the "take-note" formula adopted by Canada. Article 2 of the Canada-China communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations reads as follows: "The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Canadian Government *takes note* [editor's italics] of this position of the Chinese Government."

The value of Japan's trade with the P.R.C. had grown to almost equal that of its trade with Taiwan. Japan had become China's biggest trading partner, in fact, and only about 10 per cent of this bilateral trade took place under their so-called "Memorandum Trade Agreements". A large number of Japanese businessmen, journalists and politicians began to visit

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Peking. Among the politicians were senior and powerful members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, including former foreign ministers Aichiro Fujiyama and Takeo Miki. Early in 1971, it became evident that a majority of both houses of the National Diet were in favour of the establishment of diplomatic relations with "mainland China". A typical newspaper poll found that a large majority of the Japanese people favoured recognition of Peking; un-
nerving, however, was the additional information that a similarly large majority was against severing ties with Taipei.

In December 1969, President Nixon and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato had remarked, in a joint communiqué after their meeting in Washington, upon the mutual interests of Japan and the United States in ensuring the security of Taiwan and Korea. It should be recalled that this statement was made in the context of an agreement by the United States that the Ryukyu Islands would be returned to Japanese rule as early as 1972, and implied no security commitment by Japan. Nonetheless, it was seized upon by the Japanese press and by opposition politicians as implying the acceptance of a wider role for Japan in the military security of the area. Peking, as the occasion arose, professed to be vitally concerned at the "revival of Japanese militarism" and darkly hinted at evidence that Japan was planning to acquire nuclear weapons. The Sato-Nixon communiqué was subsequently soft-pedalled and the references to Taiwan and Korea had been virtually explained out of existence by early 1972.

Impetus of 'Nixon shocks'

The "Nixon shocks" of July and August 1971 gave strong impetus to a review of Japan's foreign policy options, particularly in East Asia. But before the implications of the American decision to seek a *détente* with China had been fully understood, a major decision faced the Japanese Government with respect to China: the question of the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

Japan had studied a number of possible courses of action. A popular option was to seat the People's Republic of China in the Security Council, but retain a seat for Taiwan in the General Assembly — the so-called "Byelorussia" solution. As usual, of course, it was immediately evident that neither Peking nor Taipei could accept either a "two-China" or a "one-China, one-Taiwan" formula. For a time, it was expected that, although Japan might vote for the traditional "important question" resolution, and against the "Albanian"



UPI photo

Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka waves to a crowd of well-wishers as he leaves Tokyo airport for historic meeting in Peking with Premier Chou En-lai last September. The meeting marked a formal end to more than four decades of hostility between the two major Asian powers and produced an agreement on immediate establishment of diplomatic relations.

resolution calling for the restoration of the rights of the People's Republic of China, it would not take part in any particular initiative to maintain Taiwan's seat, or to find a "two-China" solution. Prime Minister Sato's decision came as a surprise to most observers. Apparently against the judgment of some of his senior advisers, he decided to co-sponsor a procedural resolution proposed by the United States which, if passed, would have postponed a decision on the China seating question for a further year. The defeat of this resolution, and the passage of the Albanian resolution, was a blow to Sato's prestige, and an apparent setback for Sino-Japanese relations.

Early in 1972, the Prime Minister's office sent a message to Peking to the effect that Japan would welcome the opening of talks aimed at the normalization of relations between Japan and China. Although this message was elaborately ignored, a large number of Japanese visitors to Peking reported that China was not averse to negotiations — but would not enter into talks while Prime Minister Sato was in office. It had been widely rumoured that

With defeat of delaying move, Sato's prestige suffered blow

Sato would retire before the end of 1971 or, at the latest, very early in 1972. The formal agreement for the reversion of Okinawa having been signed, Sato had fulfilled one of his most important objectives — bringing about what he described as the “end of the postwar period”. It soon became clear that the Prime Minister intended to stay on until after the actual reversion of the Ryukyus in May 1972. A factor in Sato's decision might well have been his perception that he would, if he stepped down earlier, be seen to be yielding to Chinese pressure.

In any case, the retirement of Eisaku Sato in July, and the election of Kakuei Tanaka as his successor, opened the way for rapid progress toward the negotiation of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The Chinese had laid down three main conditions for normalization: Recognition of Peking as the legal Government of all of China, acceptance of the fact that Taiwan was an integral part of the People's Republic of China, and the abrogation of the “illegal” peace treaty between Japan and the Nationalists on Taiwan. As early as February, the Sato Government was prepared to accept the first condition, and to “fully understand” the second. There was, however, a natural reluctance to abrogate a peace treaty signed with an authority which Japan had heretofore recognized as the Government of China, and which had been in force for almost 20 years.

In spite of this inconclusive response, China let it be known very shortly after the assumption of power by Prime Minister Tanaka that it would welcome early negotiations for normalization. Chou En-lai subsequently issued a formal invitation to Prime Minister Tanaka and, on September 25, the Prime Minister, with Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira and a small army of advisers and journalists, embarked on his historic voyage to Peking.

Tanaka's pledge

Tanaka, for his part, had declared that his first foreign policy task was to restore the historical ties between China and Japan. It was clear that China was interested in an early agreement with Japan but, as late as August 1972, it had appeared that full diplomatic relations might have to await several months of detailed negotiations. The September 29 communiqué came, therefore, as something of a surprise. The communiqué contained in its preamble a specific affirmation that the state of war between Japan and China was ended, while the operative section announced the termination of the “abnormal state of affairs

which has hitherto existed . . .”. The question of a formal peace treaty thus became somewhat academic, although there was agreement on the future conclusion of a “treaty of peace and friendship”.

The tricky question of the status of Taiwan was covered by the statement that “the Government of Japan fully understands and respects [the] stand of the Government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation”. (Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation [or “ultimatum”] reads as follows: “The terms of the Cairo declaration [returning Taiwan to China] shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we shall determine”.) The problem of the peace treaty with Taiwan was not mentioned in the communiqué, but Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, in a press conference following the signing, referred to the fact that the treaty no longer had any *raison d'être* and was therefore terminated. Perhaps the most surprising development of all was the fact that the communiqué made provision for the *immediate* establishment of diplomatic relations (i.e., as from September 29, 1972), and the exchange of ambassadors “as speedily as possible”.

As had been generally foreseen, China demanded no war reparations but, in the preamble to the communiqué, the Japanese side pronounced itself “keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damage in the past to the Chinese people through war and *deeply reproaches itself . . .*” [editor's italics].

With the establishment of diplomatic relations, a number of difficult problems remain to be solved. It is likely that China has accepted Japan's assurances that the U.S.A./Japan mutual security treaty is entirely defensive in nature, and that the P.R.C. sees no threat from Japan. The Chinese leaders are probably also convinced that Japan does not intend, in the near future, to attain a nuclear capacity, or to use its defence forces outside the home islands to fill the “vacuum” left by the United States' military withdrawal. On the other hand, there is no question that China and Japan are potential, if not actual, rivals for influence in Southeast Asia. Depending on the rate of China's economic growth, on the one hand, and Japan's use of its political influence, on the other, the small countries of Asia may be placed in a very difficult position in years to come.

A large factor in the future security of East Asia is the triangular relationship

China indicated it would welcome early negotiations for normalization

between China, Japan and the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. has only begun to exert its influence as an Asian power and its dispute with China will not make its task any easier. It has been argued that one of China's major reasons for establishing diplomatic relations with Japan was to dilute the influence of the Soviet Union on that country.

Japan and China have their own "border" dispute to solve in a small chain of possibly oil-rich islands lying between Okinawa and Taiwan. The Senkaku (Tiao Yu-tai) Islands are claimed not only by Tokyo and Peking but also, naturally enough, by Taipei. As an interesting parallel development, the Chinese Government has backed Japan in its demands for the return of certain of its "northern territories" (the island of Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu and Kunashiri) annexed by the Soviet Union in 1945.

Embassies were exchanged between Tokyo and Peking early in January 1973 and ambassadors were to be named shortly thereafter. In the meantime, groups of officials have travelled in each direction, laying the groundwork for agreements on trade, navigation, civil aviation, fisheries

and other bilateral matters.

Despite dire predictions to the contrary, Japan's relations with Taiwan in the economic and cultural fields are continuing in the absence of diplomatic relations. Non-official offices are being established which resemble closely the "Memorandum Trade" offices that existed in Japan and the P.R.C. before diplomatic relations were established. The Chinese do not appear to have raised any objection to the maintenance of these limited ties.

China and Japan have stressed in the re-establishment of their relations their common heritage and culture and have pledged co-operation in seeking a new era of peace and stability in East Asia. Concrete advantages to either, in economic or commercial terms, are unlikely to be overwhelming in the immediate future. In line with its doctrine of self-reliance, China will probably not accept economic assistance from Japan; even export credits are suspect. But the fact that these two great Asian nations have, for the first time in 80 years, established a relationship based on mutual respect for one another's "sovereignty and territorial integrity" is an historic accomplishment.

Japan retaining economic links with Taiwan through offices

A symbol of Japan's international diplomacy...

It must be recognized that, above all, the *rapprochement* between East Asia's two most powerful countries — at odds with each other for close to a century — constitutes a major stride toward the stabilization of East Asian politics and hence toward greater national security for Japan. Tension had existed between Japan and China almost continuously since 1886 ... and it had been a constant obstacle to the construction of lasting peace and stability in East Asia. It would obviously be wrong to say that the understandings reached in Peking have removed that tension overnight, but they at least represent a significant first step toward dissolving the miasma of nonconfidence and distrust that has enveloped relations between the two governments and toward setting their relations on a new and more fruitful course that could turn the tide of history in Asia.

Another gain for Japan is that the normalization of relations with the PRC represents a significant accomplishment of Japan's own new international diploma-

cy. ... Since the nation's defeat in World War II, Tokyo governments had generally adhered to a low-posture, passive role in international affairs. However, as Japan gradually rebuilt its economy to become the world's third-ranking industrial power, such a role became incongruous, and there has been a steadily growing desire among Japanese to see their government assume a more positive and independent role commensurate with the nation's rising international position. The move to restore relations with China is a response to this desire, and it marks an important initial advance toward a more active participation by Japan in the affairs of Asia.

Of direct benefit to both Japan and China will be the stabilization of economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries. ... (from *Japan and China, A New Stage?* by Shinkichi Eto, professor of International Relations at the University of Tokyo, Problems of Communism, November-December, 1972).

Population planning: the puzzle a crowded planet must solve

By Frederick Nossal

As mankind gropes towards the beginning of a global community, the most urgent problem facing planners is that of population. Each year, the danger of another world war seems to be receding. Instead, men face the possibility of an overcrowded planet with an undernourished population. Some rather pessimistic economists and sociologists see a bitterly divided world, with the rich nations trying to fend off hungry impoverished millions being driven out of Asia and Africa by famine.

Most population experts are adopting a far more realistic attitude. At present, they are preparing for a major conference on demographic problems. The United Nations has designated 1974 as World Population Year. Demographic trends will be examined closely at the international talks. Antonio Carrillo Flores, former Foreign Minister of Mexico, has been appointed secretary-general of the conference.

There is wide agreement that a future global community, if and when humanity attains that distant goal, will have to find a means of stabilizing the population inhabiting the planet. Already the developed nations, and the countries of Europe in particular, have managed to keep populations under control. Europe's annual growth rate last decade, for instance, was

only 0.9 per cent as against 2.5 per cent in Asia and 2.9 per cent in Latin America. The figure for the United States and Canada was 1.4 per cent.

Among the international organizations that have been taking a hard look at population projections in recent years are various United Nations agencies. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) all have been highly active. Last year, the World Bank published a working paper on population planning which discussed growth rates and the economic effects of reducing the size of families in poor countries. The paper also describes the World Bank's efforts in assisting member nations in population planning.

Many facts about the population explosion already are well known. Yet it is always startling to learn just how rapidly the world is filling up with people. About the time of Christ, there lived on earth little more than 200 million people, and it took 1,800 years for the global population to reach one billion. In the pre-industrial era, disease, famine, wars and rebellions kept numbers down. Between 1348 and 1350 alone, bubonic plague (known as the Black Death) killed about a quarter of Europe's population in just two years.

Twentieth century leap

The industrial and agricultural revolutions brought a decline in mortality rates, and it took mankind only about 125 years to produce another billion. The third billion was added in three decades. Between 1950 and 1975, humanity will produce its fourth billion. If the present trend continues, the global population will leap by one billion every eight years by the end of the century.

The concept is difficult to grasp. From his early beginnings, it took man 20,000 to 25,000 centuries before 2 million people walked the earth. And



Mr. Nossal, a staff member of the World Bank's Public Affairs Department, has served as a foreign correspondent in Asia, first for The Globe and Mail and later for the Toronto Telegram. In 1959, he established The Globe and Mail's bureau in Peking, becoming the first Western newspaperman permitted to reside in the Chinese capital since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949. He has travelled widely in China and covered developments in India, Pakistan, Malaysia and South Vietnam. Author of Dateline Peking, Mr. Nossal has lectured at Canadian and U.S. universities on China and problems of poverty and population in Asia. He is currently based in Washington for the World Bank.

ZZ] within three decades, 200 million persons will be added every 18 months, unless population growth-rates are reduced. The World Bank study examines population projections — showing first what is likely to happen under optimistic assumptions and secondly if changes in global attitudes toward family planning come very slowly.

Under the first projection, the world population would reach about 8.4 billion by the year 2075, and would then level off. But if population control efforts remain as modest as they are at present, humanity would quadruple from today's level of 3.8 billion. The global population would continue mushrooming until it stabilized at about 15.3 billion in the year 2125.

"It is becoming increasingly difficult to raise living standards and maintain even the present quality of life in the face of these huge annual increases in population," says the World Bank in assessing the present situation. "This is especially

true in the developing countries, where two-thirds of the world's population live, and where five-sixths of the 1970-80 increase will occur."

According to experts, the historical demographic transition evolves through three stages. The first is high fertility and high mortality. Then follows high fertility and low mortality. (Most developing countries have reached this stage now). Finally, low fertility and low mortality lead to a more stable population pattern.

Projections are important, of course, but the needs of the present day are more urgent. Each day, on every continent — but particularly in Asia and Africa — thousands die of hunger. The immediate remedy is to ship more grain. But clearly this is no long-range solution. The World Bank believes that many governments can be assisted if it helps them to collect, organize and analyze facts about population growth.

The movement of people is another



James Pickerell for World Bank

Women wait for family planning advice at a clinic in the Victoria Jubilee Hospital in Kingston, Jamaica. The World Bank is assisting the Jamaican Government's

national family planning program to help slow down the growth of its population. Part of the funds will help finance expansion at the hospital.

vital area of study. It is now known, for instance, that urban populations in developing countries are increasing at an astounding rate of about 5 per cent annually, or doubling within 15 years.

Family planning projects

The World Bank Group supports family-planning operations only in countries where governments either invite experts to assist, or at least where officials do not object to such activities. Commitments have been rising rapidly since the first World Bank population project got under way in Jamaica in 1970. By 1971, the original \$2-million commitment had quadrupled to \$8-million. Last year, the Bank committed another \$29-million, and the figure for the current fiscal year is \$30-million. Between 1972 and 1976, according to present plans, the World Bank Group will be engaged in about 20 lending operations in 19 countries. Commitments for these population projects will total \$150-million.

So far, the Bank and its affiliate, the International Development Association (IDA), have helped finance population projects in Jamaica, Tunisia, Trinidad and Tobago, Indonesia, India and Malaysia. Population missions have also been sent to Colombia, Egypt, and Mauritius. Operations are being expanded with the stress on fact-finding and institution building.

Governments wishing to develop a meaningful population planning program must concentrate their activities in the fields of education, information and organization. Facilities such as training-schools for nurses, midwives and family-planning workers, urban and rural clinics, maternity homes and administrative offices must be built. The already burdened budgets in poorer lands must allow for vehicles and furniture. But often the greatest need is not finance. Developing countries must get more technical assistance — the vital expertise that will help governments first to study and analyze their population problems and then to act accordingly.

It is obvious that not enough is being done to reduce the global birth-rate. India's population, which will pass the estimated figure of 570,000,000 some time this year, is growing at the rate of 2.25 per cent annually. This means that 12,000,000 persons (or almost the equivalent of an entire Australia) are added to the population each year. Only about 11 per cent of the 100-odd million Indian couples in the reproductive ages of 15 to 44 are said to be protected by contraceptive methods.

And only about 20,000,000 women in

18 countries that have adopted population programs — a mere 10 per cent of the married women of reproductive age in those nations — have accepted contraceptive devices or methods during the past five years. Admittedly, these are vague estimates at best (for even in modern urban societies people resent intrusion into their private lives), but they are indications of the monumental problem of global overcrowding.

Fund shortage

The difficulties population planners around the world face include lack of interest and insufficient funds. Family-planning programs are still very low on the list of priorities in most nations. Expenditures have been modest in relation to budgets, and average about 1 per cent. India spends about 1.6 per cent of its national budget on family planning. The figure for Indonesia, on the other hand, is only 0.1 per cent.

In some countries, like Pakistan and the Republic of China (Taiwan), foreign aid given specifically for population control almost equals expenditures by national family-planning programs. In 1968-69, for instance, Taiwan's national budget was \$823-million, of which only \$600,000 was allocated for family planning. Foreign aid supplied another \$500,000. Pakistani expenditures in that year were far higher. Of a national budget of \$997-million, more than \$19-million went on family planning, plus an additional \$15-million provided by foreign assistance.

Ideally, the poorer countries today should be spending more than \$2.6-billion annually on population-control programs. The United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) estimates that, to mount reasonably full programs, developing countries would have to spend at least 65 cents (U.S.) *per capita* per year. This figure rises to \$1 per head if other costs such as family-planning education and evaluation of different systems are included.

What with inflation, and with populations in the poorer countries expected to rise between 4.5 billion and 5.25 billion by the end of this century, the eventual expenditures on sound and effective family-planning programs could become astronomical.

On the basis of \$1 *per capita* annually, population control would represent about 5 per cent of present-day national budgets. It is a much lower figure than most governments are prepared to spend on education (15 to 30 per cent), and far less than they put into national security.

Bank commitments for projects in 19 countries reach \$150-million

In its latest study on population planning, the World Bank bemoans the fact that even the most committed governments with the most successful programs are spending less than half the *per capita* amounts the UN suggests as an ideal. "It is clear that population programs require important shifts in government priorities, which will frequently require fairly significant changes in budget allocations," says the World Bank. "Successful programs require substantial increases in both national and international inputs — public and private."

The U.S. Population Council found that, in 1968, India was spending less than eight cents (U.S.) *per capita* on family planning. The figure for Jamaica, an island with a population of 2,000,000, was 37 cents *per capita*. And the total for Indonesia in 1970 was a mere four cents.

India's drive

Among the poorer nations, it was India that spearheaded the drive to stem the human flood. Less than five years after gaining its independence in 1947, India embarked seriously on population planning. Most other nations which adopted either their own programs, or at least population policies, were about a decade behind the Indians.

Even China, the most populous of the world's nations, did not adopt an active family-planning program until 1962. Before being persuaded that too great a population could negate any gains his revolution might have achieved, Mao Tse-tung used to say that the vast Chinese population was the nation's most precious asset. And back in 1959 and 1960, when I was writing about China from Peking, citizens as well as officials told me quietly they felt that the Government had no right to interfere in their private lives. Today, this situation has altered dramatically, and the Chinese have pulled ahead of India in regard to family planning.

China's population grew by about two per cent in the decade from 1960 to 1970, and Peking lately has been using its highly impressive propaganda machinery to get the message about family planning to its more than 800,000,000 people. (The World Bank estimates that China's 1970 population was 836,000,000). Peking pushes late marriage, the advantages of having only one or two children, the pill and other contraceptives. The population-control methods being promoted by China are the direct result of too rapid growth and the inability of the Chinese to build up sufficient food stocks in case of natural

disaster or some other calamity such as a major war.

Farmers around the world used to have large families so that children could be employed as cheap labour to help grow food. And this is true to this day in many countries. It is one of the reasons why family planning is often political dynamite. In other instances, religion has prevented politicians from pushing urgently needed programs.

Commitment vital

Experts from the World Bank and other international agencies realize that government commitment to population planning is vital before any project can begin. The Bank has said that some of its 122 member countries have not yet recognized that a population problem exists. When assistance is not sought, the Bank's experts can try to educate and persuade, but they cannot hope to develop projects.

The monumental nature of the population problem is now reaching even into remote villages. And certainly the leadership in an increasing number of nations is aware that it is vital to cut across tradition and religion so that mushrooming populations do not lead to a drastic decrease in global living standards.

The rise in population-planning activities at the public and official levels during the past 12 years has been dramatic. In 1960, only two of the world's poor and populous countries — India and Pakistan — had government policies designed to slow population growth. By 1971, according to figures presented in October 1971, at the Fourth Annual Population Conference of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 26 countries had begun official programs or had at least announced population policies. In these nations live more than two-thirds of the population of developing countries. Another 24 countries, with 12 per cent of the developing world's people, support private family-planning programs. In the intervening 11 years, more than 700,000,000 people had been added to the global population.

Of the poorer nations with populations of 50,000,000 and more, only Brazil gives no official government support to the concept of family planning. With an annual growth-rate of almost 3 per cent, Brazil's population has already passed 100,000,000.

Countries that do have population programs establish certain targets, and try to reduce the existing crude birth-rate over a period of five to ten years. Or they

*Official programs
were launched
by 24 nations
in 12-year span*

may try to recruit a specific number of "accepters" — the term for men and women who accept contraceptives, abortion, sterilization and other methods to prevent the birth of unwanted children.

Racist label invalid

From a Western viewpoint, the matter of advising poorer countries on population planning is extremely delicate. Are the white and wealthy nations afraid of being inundated by the coloured majority? Can North Americans and Europeans be accused of racism because they are helping to curb the populations of Asia, Africa and Latin America? The answer is no. These are not valid arguments because those who must suffer the results of global overcrowding are not the affluent whites but the impoverished non-white majority.

The as-yet-unanswered question is

just how effective population programs in developing countries have been. The poorer countries, for instance, are far from the goals achieved by the United States, which last year reported that fertility had dropped for the first time below the replacement level of 2.1 children per family, which amounts to zero population growth. The 1972 growth in the United States was only a little more than half of the average growth during the 1960s.

On a global scale, however, the situation is very different. The World Bank estimates that, given very optimistic assumptions, about 882,000,000 births could be omitted in the world in the three decades between 1970 and 2000 — 837,000,000 of them in developing countries. So much depends on the political will of many governments.

During the Second Asian Population

The Canadian Government contributes in a number of ways to the support of international programs for family planning and population research.

In terms of direct assistance, Canada pledged \$2-million to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities as part of its multilateral development-aid program for 1972-73. In addition, Canada made a grant of \$1-million for the 1972-73 program of the International Planned Parenthood Federation, a private body which sponsors family planning projects.

The Canadian International Development Agency, Canada's foreign aid arm, is providing assistance to a number of voluntary organizations which conduct family planning projects abroad. CIDA has provided aid for 15 of these including projects sponsored by OXFAM, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Peace and Development, the Family Planning Federation of Canada and World Literacy of Canada.

Apart from these efforts, the International Development Research Centre has been playing an increasing role in fostering family planning research projects and programs. The IDRC was established by Parliament in 1970 to apply and adapt scientific, technical and other knowledge in the interests of the economic and social advancement of the world's developing regions.

Assistance from IDRC's Population and Health Division includes: a grant of \$150,000 to El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico City, to enable a group of Latin American social science institutions to undertake long-term multidisciplinary

research in population policy; a grant of \$252,000 to the Government of Mali to enable the Malian Association for the Protection and Promotion of the Family to undertake a two-year research and demonstration program in Bamako as part of a pilot family planning program; \$180,000 to the World Health Organization to provide financial and technical support for WHO's program of expanded research in human reproduction and fertility control and an additional \$52,000 to help WHO undertake site visits and convene consultant meetings.

Another grant of \$149,000 has been made to Centro Latinoamericano de Demografia, Santiago, Chile, to enable it to conduct research training seminars on the analysis of rural fertility surveys carried out in Latin American countries in the 1960s; \$100,000 to help the newly founded International Committee for Applied Research in Population in pursuing research leads; \$92,000 to enable the Federation of Family Planning Associations of Malaysia carry out a detailed study of cases of early termination of pregnancy; and a grant of \$99,500 to the National Institute of Statistics in the Republic of Zaire for a demographic survey of three major cities — Kinshasa, Matadi and Bukavu — in a country facing rapid urban population growth.

The IDRC has also made a \$69,000 grant for study of fertility decline in Barbados and is providing assistance for projects in Thailand, Korea, the Philippines, Colombia, Egypt and the Dominican Republic.

Conference, held in Tokyo last November, social scientists and demographers admitted once again the explosive nature of the subject. Rafael M. Salas, executive director of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, said then that his organization could provide family-planning assistance only upon request because of the political and moral issues involved. He admitted that Asian approaches to the population question were still in their early stages.

In the Philippines, for instance, the present population of 40,000,000 is growing at the rate of 3.4 per cent annually. By the end of the century, 100,000,000 Filipinos could inhabit the islands. Thailand's population of 38,000,000 is expected to double by 1990.

Information and research

One obvious answer to the population crisis is to spend more money on information and education, health and social services, and research into cheap, simple contraceptives. Some economists argue that poor countries should devote their resources not to increasing industrial output, but to slowing population growth. This method could be perhaps a hundred times more effective in raising per capita incomes in many of the poorer countries, according to some experts.

Today, more countries are devoting increasing amounts toward population-planning programs. Much of the money is raised by the developing nations themselves. But outside assistance is of great importance.

The fact that total development aid for population programs rose from \$2.8 million a year in 1960 to \$225 million in 1971 is the clearest possible proof that the poorer countries want this kind of help. World Bank studies have found that bilateral, multilateral and private organizations provide a wide range of technical assistance. Medical, paramedical, educational and administrative personnel from abroad often are directly involved in family-planning services. Experts help with social, technical, psychological and demographic studies to determine the kind of program acceptable to the population.

Canada is one of the countries that have bilateral population programs — but it is more than a decade behind that of Sweden, which began its family-planning program with a single project in Ceylon in 1958. The Canadian Government started helping population programs in developing countries after legislation specifically designed to discourage the use of contraceptives was repealed in 1969.



James Pickerell for World Bank

Guidance counsellors attend family planning training session in Kingston, Jamaica. The counsellors are being provided information on family planning techniques which they will use in courses throughout Jamaica.

In December 1970, Ottawa announced its first official support for family planning activities abroad. Canada's aid includes funding the work of international organizations (such as expanded medical research by the UN Fund for Population Activities) and direct assistance in several priority countries. Grants have been made to Barbados and Colombia and to the World Health Organization for contraceptive research.

U.S. budget largest

The United States has the largest budget for family planning, and most of it is channelled through the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). From \$4-million spent on the population problem in 1966, the U.S. figure has multiplied more than 25 times to well over \$100-million in 1972. The United States has supported bilateral programs in 33 countries according to the World Bank, and has helped finance activities in many others through private, public and international organizations. Other nations involved in bilateral family-planning programs include Britain, Norway, Japan, Denmark, the Netherlands and West Germany.

Is it right for the nations of the world to become involved in each other's population problems? Population growth

U.S. allocations for aiding nations in family planning soar since 1966

around the globe is truly a planetary affair, and therefore each nation at least has the right to express its own views, and to act accordingly — in co-operation with other countries. Population planning on the broadest possible scale is in the world interest. And it is becoming generally recognized that national rights are becoming blurred in an increasingly inter-dependent world.

Perhaps the most puzzling question to emerge from various demographic studies is this: Does mankind already suffer from over-population, or is global poverty merely the result of an unfair sharing of resources? The answer has to be twofold: The staggering growth of population clearly shows the development process in many of the poorer countries. What is more, slow population growth in richer countries and fast population growth in poorer lands will tend to perpetuate the present gap between the haves and the have-nots.

In the final analysis, however, each nation must decide for itself how population-planning programs should be tackled. The latest World Bank study concedes that population research is usually best

pursued by domestic institutions which can draw upon well-informed local workers.

The time has not yet arrived when governments can control the size of individual families by legislation. Nor can one nation tell another how to conduct its population program. Most experts believe that the harshness of global realities, rather than official tyranny, will persuade people that only through population planning can the global majority attain the goals most men seek. And these are not merely economic aims. They involve the quality of life around the world — the many non-material, intangible aspects of day-to-day living that make up such a large part of human existence. Once it can be proved without doubt that men can attain a fuller life by limiting their own numbers, population-planning experts around the world will have little trouble in implementing their programs. But time is needed. For although the prophets of doom complain that time is running out, there are no instant answers to population-planning problems. They must be handled with much wisdom, understanding and co-operation — in both the developed and the developing nations.

In final analysis each country must decide how to tackle population growth

Many governments in Asia simply cannot take the pervasive steps needed to curb population growth and hope to remain in power.

Progress is an especially relative term in population control. All Asian governments claim it. One monumental achievement, at least, is that all Asian governments now recognize that population growth is a problem, and all have family-planning policies and programs, some of them strong and some token. Only eight years ago, Sukarno, then president of Indonesia, said: "In my country, the more the better."

For most poor Asian people, this is still the view. The reasons for it reflect the complexity of development programs. The security in old age for the parents of the baby born in India is just one element.

Without real development and its guarantees for security, children are the best guarantee people have that they will be provided for in their old age.

Without adequate nutrition and health care, education only reinforces the idea that each couple must have several children in order to insure that enough will survive.

Without sexual equality — notably lacking in Asia, where men have far more

chance of economic success — each couple must keep producing until it has enough sons.

However many children a family has, progress in development can raise false hopes for security. Industrial growth and the Green Revolution in agricultural output have expanded national incomes at a rate of more than 6 per cent a year. That is more than double the yearly rate of Asian population increase, which is 2.7 per cent. However, the new wealth has been concentrated in relatively few hands....

... Urbanization has become a nightmare in poor Asian countries. Villagers stream by the hundreds into Seoul, Manila, Bangkok, Jakarta, Dacca, Calcutta and Bombay, to mention just a few cities overburdened by warren-like slums that compounded their inability to provide sanitation, order and other essentials.

Pockets of opulence symbolize progress and some people see urbanization as a sign of it. However, many development experts consider urbanization in poor nations as distressing evidence of the breakdown in traditional rural life, largely as a result of population growth. (*Excerpts from New York Times series on life in Southern Asia by James P. Sterba, March 19, 1973*).

Canada's role in Vietnam

In response to a formal invitation from the four parties to the Vietnam ceasefire agreement signed in Paris on January 27, the Canadian Government announced its decision to participate with Poland, Hungary and Indonesia in the new four-power international supervisory organization envisaged by the agreement and its protocols.

External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp indicated in a statement to the House of Commons on January 24 that Canada would be prepared to serve for an initial period of 60 days on the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS). In a further statement, on January 27, confirming Canada's commitment to serve on the new body, the Secretary of State for External Affairs said Canada had made it clear that its participation beyond the 60-day period would be "dependent on the extent to which the conditions for full acceptance of membership by Canada . . . are fulfilled during the period of initial participation".

In a review of those conditions made during a Commons debate on January 5, Mr. Sharp had emphasized that the first and "ultimate" condition was that "the provisions for the operation of the new organization, when taken as a whole, should be workable and offer real prospects of being effective". Canada had also stipulated that the four belligerents — the United States, The Republic of Vietnam, North Vietnam and the Viet Cong — should be bound by the agreement. In addition, Canada sought assurances that there would be a "continuing political authority" that would assume responsibility for the settlement as a whole and to which the commission, or any of its members, would have access through reports or consultations. Canada also insisted that the new commission should have freedom of movement and observation within the demilitarized zone and in South Vietnam "necessary to achieve a proper exercise of its functions." (See also *International Perspectives*, January-February 1973).

Functions of the International Com-



*Ambassador Michel Gauvin,
head of Canada's ICCS delegation*

mission of Control and Supervision are to control and supervise implementation of key provisions of the Vietnam ceasefire agreement (Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam).

Gauvin heads delegation

Mr. Sharp announced that the Canadian delegation participating in the new commission would be headed by Michel Gauvin, Canadian ambassador to Greece. Mr. Gauvin served as an adviser to the old International Control Commission in Indochina and as Canadian chargé d'affaires in the Congo during the period of United Nations peacekeeping operations in that country.

The first group of Canadian military and civilian personnel to serve with the ICCS arrived in Saigon on January 29 and the second group on February 12 — making up the full complement of the planned 290-member Canadian contingent under Major-General Duncan McAlpine of Montreal. The first ICCS observer teams were deployed in the seven regional

centres listed in the ceasefire agreement on February 5 and by early March other commission teams had been deployed in most of the remaining places designated in the protocol concerning the supervisory commission.

In debate on the Vietnam situation in the Commons on February 1, the external affairs minister said that the initial 60-day period of membership on the ICCS would enable Canada to see whether the contracting parties were determined to make the ceasefire agreement work and whether a continuing political authority was provided.

"If we conclude that Canada's conditions are adequately met and that Canada's continued participation would be effective, we may decide to accept full continued membership — with or without reservations. If we conclude that Canada's conditions are inadequately met or that we are likely to be drawn again into an exercise in futility and frustration, as the previous commission had become, we shall decide to withdraw."

But Mr. Sharp emphasized that in the initial period Canada would concentrate on making the commission work. The minister reaffirmed that neither the Canadian delegation nor the ICCS as a whole was a force to keep the peace. Its task was to observe and report upon the performance of those whose responsibility it was to keep the peace.

Inadequacies of agreement

The Secretary of State for External Affairs described as inadequate and unpromising some aspects of the international observer arrangements, as set out in the ceasefire agreement and accompanying protocols. Deficiencies cited by Mr. Sharp included these:

— Absence of a provision for a continuing political authority, a deficiency which might be repaired by the international conference on Vietnam scheduled for Paris beginning February 26.

— The obligation of unanimity in the commission's decisions and reports; effects of this rule of unanimity were qualified by a provision for reporting by individual commission members if unanimity could not be achieved, but such statements would have no status as commission reports.

— A provision that the new commission and each of its teams must act as a single body comprising representatives of all four members. This made action by one, two or three national delegations impossible. "This," Mr. Sharp told the

House, could turn out to be "an invitation to paralysis".

— A provision that each of the four commission members should pay not only salary and allowances of their personnel but a fixed percentage of the general commission budget as well.

— A provision that the commission should supervise and control entry into South Vietnam of military personnel and all military equipment — a task which was "clearly beyond the means of an international commission of this size, or indeed, of any likely size".

Mr. Sharp said Canada would make the commission and its activities and proceedings as open and public as possible. Canada would consider itself free to communicate its views and the difference between those views and those of other delegations to whatever person or organization it saw fit or to the public and press.

International conference

At the 12-nation International Conference on Vietnam held in Paris between February 26 and March 2, Canada made a strong effort to rectify some of the inadequacies cited by Mr. Sharp and, in particular, to press for creation or designation of a continuing political authority to which commission members would report. Without such a body, Mr. Sharp said in a statement made in advance of the conference, he did not believe the task in Vietnam could be carried out effectively.

At the conference itself, the external affairs minister reminded the delegates in a statement to the opening session on February 26 that Canada had consistently stated it would serve on the supervisory commission only if among other things the conference produced "some more broadly-based international authority" which would accept responsibility for evaluating and, if necessary, acting upon reports from the commission or its members.

Ideally, he said, the UN Security Council should be the body responsible for receiving reports from the ICCS or its members and determining what, if any, action is required. But Canada acknowledged that this solution was not practicable at present and some acceptable substitute must be found.

Mr. Sharp proposed that the membership of the international conference itself should constitute the "continuing political authority" to which members of the supervisory commission should report. He suggested, as well, that the UN Secretary-General, invited to the conference by the parties to the ceasefire agreement, would provide "the most appro-

60-day period set to permit assessment of ceasefire pact

No provision in agreement for continuing political authority



Canadian Press photo

Major Barry Dixon of Beloeil, Quebec (second from left), makes tour of inspection as part of ICCS team investigating shelling in Tri Ton, South Vietnam. Most

of the supervisory commission's teams had been deployed by early March in field positions listed in the Vietnam ceasefire agreement and protocols.

appropriate and effective channel for receiving and transmitting the views of the international commission". If this mechanism were adopted, the Secretary-General should in Canada's view also be vested with the task of reconvening the conference when requested to do so.

the Four-Party Joint Military Commission had not operated effectively — both of which factors had "seriously impaired" the supervisory commission's ability to meet its obligations.

Canadian formula

The Canadian proposal circulated at the Paris conference contained a formula for reconvening the conference on any one of four conditions:

Mr. Sharp said the Canadian Government was well aware of the problems that a vacancy in the ICCS could create and would do whatever it could to avoid that situation arising. But Canada "should not be asked to watch in silence a resumption of hostilities nor to accept direct responsibility for all the consequences that could ensue if we felt duty-bound to report to the world that the agreement had been seriously breached".

(a) On receipt of a request from the ICCS;

The external affairs minister served notice that, if Canada did decide to terminate its membership on the supervisory commission, it would inform all interested parties that, at the end of the 60-day period on March 30, Canada would cease to be a member of the ICCS. But Canada would be willing in these circumstances to remain in place and act as a member until April 30 or such earlier date as a new member could be agreed upon by the signatories to the ceasefire agreement.

(b) On receipt of a request from the Four-Party Joint Military Commission made up of the four belligerents or the Two-Party Joint Military Commission (the South Vietnamese parties);

(c) On receipt of a formal request from five of the members of the conference, excluding the UN Secretary-General;

(d) After determining, at the request of any member of the conference, that a two-thirds majority of the members, excluding the Secretary-General, considered that there was cause to reconvene the conference.

Mr. Sharp noted in his statement to the conference on February 26 that reports he had received from the head of the delegation to the ICCS had made two points clearly: the ceasefire had not been effective throughout South Vietnam and

Mr. Sharp stressed that it would be a bitter disappointment to have to terminate Canada's participation. But he was satisfied that "no Canadian would wish to see our representatives placed in the position of having to choose between suppressing relevant information or accepting

Canada should not 'be asked to watch in silence a resumption of hostilities'

full and direct national responsibility for the possible consequences of transmitting it under the existing arrangements. Even less would the Canadian people wish to see our delegation stand idly by, as Canadian delegations in Indochina have had to do in the past, while agreements they are supposed to supervise are disregarded."

In a second statement to the plenary session of the conference on March 1, Mr. Sharp said that Canada was prepared to sign the nine-part declaration worked out at the Paris sessions. He emphasized, however, that Canada would have to assess the arrangements set out in the declaration for an international reporting mechanism in determining the extent to which Canada's conditions for continued participation in the commission had been fulfilled.

Paris delegation

The declaration of the Paris conference (Act of the International Conference on Vietnam) was signed on March 2 by Canada and the 11 other parties attending the sessions: the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Britain, France, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (Viet Cong), as Canada's three fellow members on the supervisory commission — Hungary, Poland and Indonesia.

The parties to the declaration expressed their approval and support of the Vietnam ceasefire agreement signed in Paris on January 27 by the four belligerents and urged that this agreement and its protocols be strictly respected and scrupulously implemented.

But on the question of a continuing political authority to which commission members report and the international reporting mechanism itself, the pertinent provisions of the Paris declaration fell short of the objectives sought by Canada.

Reporting on the conference to the Commons on March 5, Mr. Sharp conceded it was clear that few participants were prepared to support the type of independent international reporting mechanism such as Canada had suggested — and some of the conference participants were, in fact, strongly opposed to the whole concept. "What finally emerged... was the most that could be obtained," he said. Under the arrangements endorsed by the Paris conference, "the reports and views of the international (supervisory) commission will at least be transmitted outside the closed circuit of the belliger-

ents to the conference participants, and the conference itself can be recalled..."

The external affairs minister told the Commons he made it clear to the conference Canada's disappointment that it could not agree on a more effective arrangement and he questioned whether the mechanism went far enough and whether it could work.

Mechanism for ICCS reports

The mechanism cited by Mr. Sharp is contained in Articles 6 and 7 of the Paris declaration. These provide that the commission's reports, and any differing views of individual members, transmitted to the four parties to the ceasefire agreement or to the two South Vietnamese parties, should, in turn, be transmitted by those parties — either individually or jointly — to all of those who signed final Paris conference document and to the UN Secretary-General. The Paris declaration also provides that, in the event of a violation of the ceasefire agreement or protocols which threatens the peace in Vietnam, the four parties to the ceasefire agreement will consult all those who signed the final document of the international conference in order to determine what remedial measures should be taken. Finally, it provides for reconvening the international conference, either at the joint request of the United States and North Vietnam on behalf of the signatories to the ceasefire agreement or at the request of six or more of the parties to the Paris declaration.

Mr. Sharp, in his statement to the Commons of March 5, said Canada had signed the Paris declaration because of its spirit and good will; it welcomed peace in Vietnam and called for the participants to do nothing to jeopardize that peace. Failure to sign could have been open to misinterpretation and would have meant pronouncing final judgment on the machinery provided for international reporting of ceasefire violations. Canada would have to examine the political authority and reporting arrangements established to determine whether they have "a reasonable prospect of operating effectively". Canada would also have to relate these arrangements to the effectiveness of the ICCS on the ground. There had been "disturbing developments" in Vietnam which compelled the Canadian Government to question whether the ICCS would be allowed to function in a way that would justify Canada's continued participation.

Mr. Sharp pointed out that the peace in Vietnam depended upon the parties to the peace agreement itself. The ICCS could help by investigation and observa-

Assess mechanism for reporting against conditions urged by Canada

Paris declaration fell short of objectives Ottawa sought



Canadian Press Wirephoto

Captain Luc Caron of Montreal, member of the Canadian contingent serving in Vietnam, surveys the effects of war on Quang-Tri, most of which was levelled

during the hostilities. The ICCS set up a camp at Quang-Tri to supervise prisoner-of-war exchanges.

tion and reporting, but it could not keep the peace. "The commission is not an essential element. It can be of help only if the parties — and that means all of them — wish to see the commission function."

In further comments to the Commons Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on March 6, the minister said it was "at least marginally possible" that the machinery evolved at the Paris conference could meet Canada's conditions concerning a continuing political authority and that it would work.

Double task

Mr. Sharp said the Government had a double task. One aspect was to do everything possible to make the ICCS work. The other task was to determine whether the arrangements for a continuing political authority which had been provided were adequate to meet the conditions Canada had laid down. "Our freedom to opt out remains unaffected" by Canada's signature of the Paris declaration.

Mr. Sharp told the committee Canada was making a sincere effort to be of use in helping to bring the war in Vietnam to an end. "As long as we believe we can be useful, we will stay. If we conclude that our presence is not useful, we shall withdraw. This would not necessarily mean that the peace agreement was a failure. It would mean only that the concept of an

ICCS contained in that agreement was not one which fulfilled our well known requirements"

In response to questions from committee members, the external affairs minister said the ICCS was experiencing difficulty in carrying out investigations of suspected ceasefire violations because of procedural obstacles and by other delaying actions by some members of the supervisory commission. In addition, the ICCS had encountered difficulties in getting some of the former belligerent powers to allow access to areas for investigation.

The minister said he planned an on-the-spot examination of the Vietnam ceasefire situation before recommending to his cabinet colleagues a final decision on Canada's continued participation in the supervisory commission.

The minister and other members of the Canadian party left for Indochina on March 13. The tour included visits to Saigon and ICCS field positions, discussions with South Vietnamese leaders and with Mr. Gauvin and other members of the Canadian delegation to the ICCS, a stopoff in Vientiane, Laos, and discussions with North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi before returning to Ottawa on March 19.

Indochina tour set by minister before decision by government on participation

Murray Goldblatt

Pearson in retrospect

The perils of the larger world . . .

By Richard O'Hagan

He served the entire world as few men of his generation served it . . . he kept plugging away at his life's work, building an international community, almost to the end.

One journalist wrote this of L. B. Pearson. And of the many tributes paid him after death — by newspapers and statesmen and friends — I suspect Mr. Pearson would have liked it as well as any. Certainly he would have appreciated its lack of pomposity, but most of all would he have valued the plain acknowledgment of his own primary commitment in life. For, however substantial were his accomplishments in domestic terms, however successfully he addressed himself to what he perceived to be the urgent latter-day task of reconciliation and nation-building at home, the perils of the larger world — with its ideological fears and its ancient hatreds, its injustices and its hunger — were seldom far from his mind. Indeed, once wholly free of public office, he was not long in turning his full attention again to these long-standing preoccupations.

He knew well, and said frequently, that the legitimate aspirations and grievances of states and peoples were as nothing if selfishness and overweening pride were finally to plunge us all into nuclear catastrophe. (One need only read the first volume of *Mike*, his autobiography, to comprehend his abhorrence of war and to recognize the beginnings of his lifelong devotion to the easing of tensions and prevention of conflict.) Seldom did he make a speech, no matter how informal or what the occasion, in which he failed to allude to this paramount concern. Sometimes he would elaborate, feelingly and at length. The response he elicited varied according to his audience, but his orator-

Richard O'Hagan is minister-counsellor in charge of information and cultural affairs at the Canadian Embassy in Washington. For six years (1961-66), he was on Mr. Pearson's staff as special assistant and press secretary.

ical style, in spite of a certain fervour that showed when discussing this subject in particular, was always something of a handicap. How often Mr. Pearson must have wished he were a more arresting speaker!

There was virtually no time during his political career, unless it was in the golden glow of the centennial year, when it was not acceptable, and at times fashionable, to speak of him in the most complimentary terms as a diplomat or internationalist while lamenting that his grasp of affairs did not extend equally to the home front. "What a pity Mr. Pearson is not at the United Nations," went the familiar refrain. "He is not meant for politics."

Questioned on UN role

Early in 1961, shortly after joining his staff, I accompanied Mr. Pearson on a trip to Vancouver. Toward the end of the customary news conference, he was asked if he would accept the Secretary-Generalship of the United Nations if it were offered to him. In reply, he began by saying the job was already competently filled (by Dag Hammarskjöld). That apart, he said he was not likely to receive such an invitation in any event, recalling his unacceptability to the Soviet Union when his candidacy had been advanced before. However, he went on, it was the kind of call to service he would regard as his over-riding responsibility to accept — "as any man would!" Even as his answer came out — hypothetical, conditional, intrinsically unexceptionable, I had no difficulty whatever anticipating the news reports: "Pearson Would Go to UN". They would not be profound in their implications but they would be distinctly unhelpful to one already having some difficulty building a constituency of confidence. I understood what he was saying — as I think the reporters did — but would the casual consumer? Might he not be seen as discontented with what he was doing, as lacking singularity of purpose,

'Lifelong devotion to the easing of tensions and prevention of conflict'



Mr. Pearson is seen with President Lyndon B. Johnson during the Canadian Prime Minister's visit to the LBJ ranch in Texas in January 1965. Mr. Johnson returned the visit in May 1967, during Canada's centennial celebrations.

or even preaching for a call?

Although, as I would discover, Mr. Pearson was the easiest and most considerate of men to serve, our relationship was then just beginning. I diffidently put my question to him nonetheless. Did he think it wise, I asked, to give such apparent weight to another job, no matter how important — the more so when he was responding to a hypothetical proposition? The news conference over, we were alone in a hotel corridor as I escorted him to the row of elevators. His hands in his trousers pockets, Mr. Pearson showed no sign of irritation or impatience, or for that matter amusement. He gave me a quick sideways glance that could have encapsulated a mixture of interesting thoughts on politics, the press, and callow aides, thanked me for bringing the matter to his attention, and stepped into the waiting elevator.

Many months later, before he became Prime Minister, I would hear Mr. Pearson speak again of the Secretary-Generalship — this time privately. We were in his office, several of us. How the subject came up is unclear in my memory and



IDRC photo

Lester B. Pearson, first Chairman of the Board of Governors of the International Development Research Centre, was in India in March 1972 for a meeting of the IDRC's Board. He is pictured during discussions in New Delhi with India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Mr. Pearson, who headed a commission on international

development before assuming the IDRC post, saw the IDRC as an important link in making available to developing countries part of the growing capacity of industrialized countries for scientific and technical research. Mr. Pearson died at his Ottawa home on December 27, 1972, at the age of 75.

probably unimportant. He was on his feet, in front of his desk, now more sure of himself as a political leader, discussing what might have been. "I thought, and still think," he said, "that to be Secretary-General (of the UN) is the most important job any man could do, for it offers opportunities to serve that are greater than any other." Then he broke into a grin and added "But I *have* a job!"

Before long, that job would lead him to the Prime Minister's office with all its burdens and satisfactions. He would pay an early visit to New York to address the General Assembly, whose presiding officer he himself had been a decade earlier. It was, of course, a different UN, reflecting a changed and changing world.

He continued personally and through the Government to give it unflagging support "as man's best hope", even though the UN's prestige was in decline. He was not able, however, to give it his direct, personal attention. Other pressing claims were being made on his time and remarkable energies. Inevitably, some of these would be international in character. Indeed, in his first weeks as head of government he would travel to London to see Harold Macmillan, and to Hyannis to see John F. Kennedy. Then it was Paris and

Charles de Gaulle. Spotted throughout were the meetings of Commonwealth prime ministers, and the visits exchanged with the President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson. But, increasingly, national events and priorities took clear and often dramatic precedence.

No sooner, though, had he retired from office and politics than he was back on the international front heading, at the request of Robert McNamara of the World Bank, a study commission on the global dimensions of aid for underdeveloped nations. In fact, my last memory of Mr. Pearson in a public role was as he delivered his report to the annual meeting of the IBRD in Washington in October 1969. His voice, I thought, was weaker than when I had last heard it but the quick step, the youthful smile and the shining determination that man must do better by his brother were all still there.

After that he wrote, which he loved, and taught a little, which he loved too. And in 1970, still fully engaged and apparently as vital as ever, he became Chairman of the Board of Governors of the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa. It was almost an epitaph in itself.

One of the great negotiators . . .

By C. S. A. Ritchie

"A working diplomat" — that was a familiar expression of Mike's. It was also a description of the man himself throughout his years in the foreign service. Others have written eloquently of his achievements as a political leader and a world statesman. I knew him first as a fellow foreign service officer.

He was a very hard, fast worker. He was rapid in draftsmanship, not much concerned with fine points of style, writing a serviceable, expressive English in memorandum and despatch. He wasted no time in getting to the point he wished to make and was not given to the "on the one hand and then on the other hand" approach. He was not tolerant of slipshod work in others. Unlike Hume Wrong, who took endless trouble in correcting the memoranda of his juniors and from whom they learned so much, Mike did not bother with criticizing

the detail of a botched or immature job. One learned from him in another way — by what he brushed aside.

He was remarkably fertile and ingenious in finding a formula for the conciliation of opposing interests. This and his powers of persuasion made him one of the great negotiators of his time. At international conferences or in departmental committees, when deadlock developed, one would see him writing on the pad lying before him on the table. On the spot, he would produce a form of proposal that circumvented the deadlock and pushed towards constructive action. He was, in fact, a man of action — a reflective man of action. For all his earnestness of purpose, he enjoyed the game of international politics and moved with the quick footwork of an athlete. He could stimulate his team. It was fun working for him, but arduous fun.

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United Nations photo

Mr. Pearson (centre) takes his seat at the United Nations Security Council table for the first time in January 1948. At left is George Ignatieff, then adviser to the Canadian delegation, and at right, S. A. Freijfeld, then the delegation's information

officer. Mr. Pearson served as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1946 to 1948 before assuming the post of Secretary of State for External Affairs at the invitation of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent.

His humour enlivened everything. It was a brand of humour very individual to the man. It combined a refreshing sense of the ridiculous, a strong dash of self-depreciation and a keen edge of ridicule. He loved teasing. His teasing was friendly and good-natured, never malicious, but very near the bone. Sometimes, rather than complain of inefficiency or pretension in others, he would puncture them with the oblique weapon of a joke. It seldom missed its mark.

He had a curious trait in dealing with proposals put to him. If he received a suggestion with the words "That is interesting", you knew (or came to know) that he had little interest in it. If, on the other hand, he said "Oh gosh, that would never work" or "What do you think would be the result of that?", one knew that his interest was aroused and he would go on turning the proposal around until he had extracted something positive from it that he could use. Thus some of those who took his first, affable politeness for positive acceptance were doomed to disappointment.

He was not in favour of confrontations, personal or political, when these could be avoided. This did not mean that he was easily deflected by resistance from the policies in which he believed. Indeed he was persistent. If he encountered a stone wall, he found a way around it. If he met with lack of comprehension as to his purpose from one source or person, he turned to another.

His first love

He was an outstandingly successful Canadian representative abroad. When I served with him in London during the war years, I was always impressed with the variety of his friends and contacts, the extent of the information that seemed to flow in to him. He got along effortlessly with all kinds of people. Oxford had left its mark on him. He could speak the political and social language of London but always with a Canadian accent.

I think, however, that his first love was not service abroad but work in the Department of External Affairs with all its

'If he encountered a stone wall, he found a way around it'

daily strains and crises.

The Department in which he started his career is, of course, a thing of the past. In the cavernous, Gothic gloom of the East Block was assembled a small group of men — some of them, such as Mike himself, Hume Wrong, Norman Robertson, Loring Christie and others, men of exceptional ability by any standards. Among them existed a *camaraderie* in which rank played little part. Organization and administration were rudimentary, sometimes chaotic. Pay was small even by the standards of those days — \$1,800 a year for a third secretary. We were directly responsible to the Prime Minister under the aegis of the modest but redoubtable Dr. Skelton. Here were Mike's beginnings as "a working diplomat", and he never forgot them.

Later, of course, he presided over the large and complex organization of the modern Department of External Affairs, and to the end he kept his lively interest in

the Department that he loved and whose new home — the new External Affairs headquarters building on Ottawa's Sussex Drive — will bear his name.

Charles Ritchie spent 38 years in the External Affairs Department before his retirement last year and at many points in his own career he was in close contact with Mr. Pearson. Mr. Ritchie served as Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1950-52 and then as Deputy Under-Secretary. Subsequently, he served, among other appointments, as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador to the United States, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations and Permanent Representative to NATO, before assuming the post of High Commissioner in London in 1967, where he served until last year. Mr. Ritchie is currently special adviser to the Privy Council Office.

The things that are Caesar's: the essential Heeney Memoirs

By J. W. Pickersgill

This article is not a review of Arnold Heeney's *Memoirs*, which I believe should be read by every officer of the Canadian foreign service and all serious students of Canadian public administration. The book is a straightforward, consecutive account of the background, education and the subsequent career of one of the most distinguished public servants of a generation when the Canadian public service was admired throughout the world.

During the decade we both served Mackenzie King, Arnold Heeney and I worked together very closely, though, despite our similar backgrounds, I never met him until he became head of the Prime Minister's Office in the fall of 1938.

The first time I heard of Arnold Heeney was 16 years earlier in the fall of 1922. During my freshman year, the *Manitoban* (the university paper) appeared one week with Heeney's picture on the front page and the report that he had

just been chosen as the Manitoba Rhodes Scholar who was to go to Oxford in 1923.

I read the early chapters with nostalgia, because his early experiences were so much like my own. Though born in the East, we were both authentic products of the Manitoba of the First World War and the early Twenties. At the university, we had been taught by many of the same teachers. It was in Manitoba that we both began to learn and to love the French language when that was not a common experience. We were successively at Oxford, that greatest of all schools of English Canadian nationalism. Reared in Tory families, we had gradually evolved into Liberals. Our interest in public affairs was nurtured by similar meetings, like the Liberal Summer School at Port Hope, which Arnold and his wife attended in 1933. In the Thirties, the Port Hope meeting and the annual meetings of the learned societies brought young Canadians to-

gether from every part of the country and helped a succession of young men and women to see Canada whole. For 12 years in Montreal as a student and a lawyer, Arnold Heeney had the advantage of viewing French Canada at close range. By the time he entered the public service, few Canadians could have been less parochial.

Entry into PM's Office

Heeney did not choose the public service as a career. He has recounted the unusual, almost accidental circumstances which brought him to the Prime Minister's notice, outlined the tough bargain he made with Mackenzie King and recalled how hard it was to get his terms met. In his *Memoirs*, he reports on his first visit to the Prime Minister's suite in the East Block and recalls that he took over my office and my secretary. That is true. I had preceded him in the Prime Minister's Office by about ten months. From Heeney's first day as Principal Secretary to Mackenzie King until his appointment as the first Secretary to the Cabinet, I was his closest collaborator and we worked together, as I recall it, in unbroken harmony.

Shortly after he became Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister in 1938, Heeney asked Norman Robertson, his friend of Oxford days, about the prospects of succeeding in establishing a Cabinet secretariat. Because Robertson had had a brief tour in the Prime Minister's office in 1937, Heeney asked him for a "frank opinion of the feasibility of my performing a useful role in relation to cabinet business. Was there a real job to be done? If so, would I be given the chance to do it, to establish something on a permanent basis? . . . Never one to give a snap judgment, he heaved one of the great sighs which became his trademark. He felt bound to say that he was sceptical. There was certainly a job to be done, but the real question was whether the conditions could be created which would allow anyone to do it. This would depend almost wholly on the Prime Minister. For example, Robertson continued, would King be willing to accommodate himself to what I regarded as the essential professional, apolitical character of the position? Perhaps, but it would go against his grain, and I should recognize this kind of difficulty from the start. It would not be easy, but he hoped I would persist and give it a good try. In the process I would have an interesting if often frustrating time. Norman's counsel was sobering; but my daily experience was soon to prove it wise."

Because, in August 1939, Heeney made it clear his duties were professional

and were not to be confused with Mackenzie King's role as a party leader, he was able to lay the foundation for a non-partisan Cabinet secretariat. His sense of order and passion for tidiness were exactly what was needed at the centre of the administration. The imperative demands of war created a climate in which Mackenzie King's administrative anarchy could scarcely survive. I know no one else who could, and would, have persisted in establishing the minimum of administrative discipline without which effective wartime government would have been impossible.

Arnold Heeney's greatest achievement, in my opinion, was the creation of a Cabinet secretariat. It is hard now to believe any government could operate without one, though the Government of Canada did for nearly three quarters of a century.

Arnold Heeney was not a humble person and he expected, and received, the respect to which his successive positions entitled him, but his *Memoirs* reveal a refreshingly modest man, with no exaggerated view of his intellect or his influence. He did not have an original mind nor was he a "hot-gospeller", but he had great gifts of organization, genuine capacity to get the best out of those who worked with him, and he was good at everything he undertook. What has struck me most about his *Memoirs* is the utter honesty of his narrative, the sense of proportion about events, and the fairness of his judgments of men.

The frustrations and disappointments he encountered in working with and for Mackenzie King for a decade might well have been reflected in occasional bitter-

Mr. Pickersgill, who played a key role in the St. Laurent and Pearson Governments, was a close associate of Arnold Heeney in the early years of Mr. Heeney's public service career. Mr. Pickersgill, a history lecturer at the University of Manitoba, came to Ottawa in the fall of 1937 and joined the staff of Prime Minister Mackenzie King. He served until Mr. King's retirement in 1948, then stayed on with his successor, Louis St. Laurent. Mr. Pickersgill became Secretary to the Cabinet in 1952 and was appointed to the Cabinet as Secretary of State a year later. He subsequently served as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and in 1963 when the Pearson Government took office, he again became Secretary of State and later Minister of Transport. He was appointed first president of the Canadian Transport Commission in 1967 and retired from that post in August 1972. Mr. Pickersgill is currently working on a book dealing with the St. Laurent period.

No 'hot-gospeller' but he possessed great gifts of organization

ness. On the contrary he is always fair and often penetrating. For instance, at Page 55, he dispels the legend that Mackenzie King was anti-British and at Page 71, by recording a simple fact, he destroys the myth that Mackenzie King accepted, in 1944, a resignation Ralston had written two years earlier. In the final paragraph of the chapter entitled "Secretary to the Cabinet" he wrote:

"After more than a quarter of a century I can assert with some confidence that the cabinet secretariat, based firmly in the ancient Privy Council Office, has achieved a permanent and accepted place in the machinery of Canadian government. That this is so is due in part to each of the prime ministers who, since 1940, has presided in the Privy Council chamber. But most of all, it is due to William Lyon Mackenzie King who, while he may have had little interest in the administrative process, had a sure and subtle instinct for the business of government."

In referring to the long memorial address at Mackenzie King's funeral, Heeney gave his final judgment:

"It seemed to me ironic and sad that in expressing his admiration for the deceased, the pastor, in addition to acceptable expressions of respect, felt called upon to predict 'that as the years pass the figure of Mackenzie King will grow in stature and increase in greatness until he enters into his true and rightful place in the affection and gratitude of the Canadian public.' As I reflected upon my own experience with King, I certainly felt respect and gratitude, but I doubted that many felt affection for that great but strange man."

Role as Under-Secretary

After Heeney left the Cabinet Office to become Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, my official relations with him were less close. But I would not quarrel with his judgment that his main achievement in External Affairs was to give some administrative order to a department where the previous Under-Secretaries had had, at best, a marginal interest in administration. In the field of External policy, I would guess he was a wise moderator in a company where brilliance was sometimes more valued than moderation.

Of his work at NATO, I knew little, though his narrative gives the impression of high competence. The *Memoirs* confirm my judgment that he was as able and effective as any of our ambassadors to the United States, including Pearson. Like

many another Canadian, Heeney learned at Oxford that Englishmen are merely human and only life-size, but, more than most Canadians, he learned quickly at Washington that all Americans are not an inferior breed with either vulgar ways or sinister intentions or both, but that they are often abler and more civilized than Canadians. He liked and usually admired the Americans he worked with, and they clearly liked him. He avoided, too, the almost instinctive Canadian bias in favour of Democrats. There is no doubt that Mr. Diefenbaker made a wise choice in sending Heeney to Washington for a second term and that, during that period of strain, he performed better than any other available Canadian could have done.

One of the great values of the *Memoirs* to historians is the insight they give into the character of the public men he knew so well. Louis St. Laurent, C. D. Howe, Brooke Claxton, D. C. Abbott, Walter Harris, and later John Diefenbaker, Howard Green and Donald Fleming, are all viewed fairly and with discernment. The same is true of Eisenhower, Nixon, Dulles, John Kennedy and Dean Rusk.

Heeney was obviously saddened by the superficial and damning criticism of his last contribution to Canadian-American relations, the report he made in collaboration with Livingston Merchant. The effect of a single phrase taken out of the context of a report filled with wisdom and commonsense revealed how easy it is to discredit conscientious work and how widespread is the Canadian inferiority complex about the United States which Heeney certainly did not share. That report should be required reading for all Canadian diplomats and politicians.

Heeney's *Memoirs of a Public Servant* will probably never be a popular book because it requires too much background but, now that the *Memoirs* are available, they are indispensable to an understanding of the evolution of Canadian government during a quarter of a century. The book portrays a fine human being who did not stop with rendering unto Caesar. I echo John Holmes, who says in his foreword: "His intellectual and moral integrity, the granite in him, radiated confidence."

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'A wise moderator
in a company
where brilliance
was sometimes
more valued
than moderation'

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No. 73/1 Canada Views Vietnam Peace Prospects. A statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, in the House of Commons, January 5, 1973.

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No. 1 (January 4, 1973) Memorial Service for the Former President of the United States of America.

No. 2 (January 11, 1973) Opening of Consulate General in Atlanta, Georgia.

No. 3 (January 12, 1973) Visit to Ottawa of Sweden's Foreign Minister.

No. 5 (January 15, 1973) International Cocoa Agreement.

No. 6 (January 16, 1973) Statement on January 16, 1973, by Mr. E. A. Côté, Canadian Representative to the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, Helsinki, regarding the proposed Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

- No. 7 (January 24, 1973) Nomination of the Canadian Representative to the Commission on the Status of Women.
- No. 8 (January 26, 1973) Canadian Delegation to the Commonwealth Meeting of Ministers Concerned with Youth Matters in Lusaka, Zambia.
- No. 9 (January 26, 1973) Renewal of Canada-Venezuela Commercial *Modus Vivendi*.
- No. 10 (January 27, 1973) Canadian Participation in an International Commission in Vietnam.
- No. 11 (January 30, 1973) MBFR Exploratory Talks.
- No. 12 (January 31, 1973) Yugoslav Claims.
- No. 13 (February 2, 1973) Canada-Cuba Hijacking Negotiations.
- No. 14 (February 7, 1973) Canada and Vietnam.
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 In force provisionally August 20, 1971.
 In force definitively February 12, 1973.

June 1973

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U.S. policy in Southeast Asia: the built-in gambles of the '70s

By Robert A. Scalapino

For almost every statement that can be made with respect to Southeast Asia, a plausible counter-statement can be advanced, rendering the task of the analyst both frustrating and incredibly difficult. The war in Indochina is coming to an end — or is it? The major powers, each for its own reasons, want a conclusion to military strife in this region, and a political settlement based upon neutralization and the principles of peaceful coexistence — or do they? The native capacity of the Southeast Asian governments to survive seems better than at any time since the colonial era ended, warranting cautious optimism — or does it?

Under such circumstances, it may be wiser to focus upon the basic issues posed rather than to search for the course of events that will govern the future. In any case, however, central trends must be exposed and critical choices identified. Let us commence with the United States. Nearly three decades after the Second World War, the United States has undertaken a significant alteration of its foreign policies, not merely in Asia but elsewhere as well. The basic movement is that from idealism, unilateralism and extensive, highly visible commitments toward realism, multilateralism and a foreign presence both lower in profile and more selective.

This trend, as much the product of success as of failure, was inevitable at some point. In 1945, there was only one true super-power. Europe and Asia were exhausted by the most destructive war in human history. The tasks of rehabilitation and building an international order were certain to fall heavily upon the wealthiest, most advanced, least damaged nation in the world — the United States. Nor were the issues soon to confront us trivial — from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece and West Berlin to Korea and Japan. Stalin and Stalinism existed. They were not invented by American "Cold Warriors", despite the claims of certain "revisionists".

A quarter of a century later, the

United States could legitimately assert that many of its broadest objectives had been attained. Nuclear war had been averted. A basic political-military equilibrium had been achieved in Europe, and seemed possible in Asia. Meanwhile, West Europe and Japan, once ravaged by war, had re-emerged with extraordinary economic strength and a new climate of political freedom. At the same time, the Sino-Soviet alliance, which had once appeared likely to dominate the Eurasian continent, lay in tatters, and both of the major Communist states had altered their foreign policies dramatically as a result.

Mistakes were unquestionably made, some of them grave. On balance, however, American foreign policies in the period immediately after the Second World War were logical and generally successful responses to the set of international circumstances then existing. By the same token, the 1970s present the world — and the United States — with a set of circumstances radically different in certain respects. Correspondingly, new policies are warranted.

In Southeast Asia, how are the new policies being expressed? The Nixon Doctrine is clearly designed to put a high premium upon each government with which the United States is aligned bearing the primary responsibility for its own defence and development. Toward small allies, the first question is to be: "What

Professor Scalapino, member of the University of California's Political Science Department since 1949, has written widely on Asian policy and U.S. Asian policy. Recent works include a study of American-Japanese relations and a two-volume analysis of Communism in Korea. Dr. Scalapino, who also serves as editor of Asian Survey, has visited Asia frequently; during 1972, he spent a month in China and three months in South and Southeast Asia. The views expressed are those of Professor Scalapino.



are you doing for yourself?" Toward large allies, an additional, more startling, question has been added: "What are you doing for us?"

The shrewd observer may well note that neither of these questions, and especially the former, has been absent from policy considerations in the past. Indeed, the issue of *quid pro quo* policies has been the subject of deep and frustrating internal debate in American policy circles throughout recent decades. Nevertheless, the Nixon Administration has sought to spell out clear guidelines for American aid — and in advance. Truly internal disturbances will be wholly the responsibility of the government concerned. Even in the event of external aggression, the heaviest burden must be borne by the state immediately involved, assuming that the conflict is a non-nuclear one. A nuclear umbrella over allies will be maintained to prevent any direct or full involvement by other nuclear powers. Moreover, in the event that treaty obligations are called into operation in connection with a conventional war, American advisers may be available, together with American air and sea power. American ground forces, however, will not fight on the continent of Asia again (or elsewhere?) if the present principles hold.

In theory, as opposed to practice, these military policies are not new. Long ago, the United States took note of the manner in which the Russians (in the case of both Korea and Vietnam) and the Chinese (in the latter case) allocated their military resources, even in contests appearing to involve them deeply. After Korea, indeed, both political and military leaders in the United States repeatedly asserted that American ground forces would never again be committed to the mainland of Asia (quite possibly misleading the Vietnamese Communists — just as, earlier, the Korean Communists had been misled when Korea was apparently omitted from the U.S. defence perimeter). The Communist charge that U.S. policy was dedicated to "forcing Asians to fight Asians" long predated the Nixon Doctrine.

Mid-Pacific basis

If not entirely new, however, current American security policies with respect to the Pacific-Asian area carry a more compelling tone, partly because of the domestic and international scene from which they issue. Increasingly, the United States will rest its primary security forces on its mid-Pacific bases, relying for close-in presence upon mobile sea and air forces. Fixed bases in populous areas of Asia will gradually be

given up because of their political costs. A few such bases, however, will be retained for the near future, both because they relate to ongoing, unsettled issues and because they bolster American credibility in this transitional era. Even when certain bases are relinquished, it is likely that arrangements will be made with the host country to keep them on a readiness basis in case of need.

Security pattern

Such security policies suggest important political corollaries. Without abandoning its bilateral ties, the United States has commenced to explore the possibilities of collective security, not on the older patterns of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization but collective security resting, in the final analysis, upon agreements among the major Pacific-Asian powers. At one level, the United States is seeking to reassure its Asian allies that it will maintain its treaty commitments, albeit with the proviso that those allies engage in the fullest possible measure of self-reliance. On another level, however, the United States hopes to reach certain agreements, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, with the big states of the region that will, in effect, underwrite the security of the region as a whole or, at a minimum, strictly contain violence.

What issues are at stake in this respect? Quite clearly, there are two: first, the full range of weapons limitation and control issues; second, the related question of how to make peaceful co-existence operational. It is one thing to pledge that one will respect the right of other societies to live under different socio-political systems; it is another thing to pursue policies rigorously adhering to that pledge. Perhaps a final, more positive, issue will be given equal attention — namely, that of economic co-operation in the fashion of the Mekong River Project, co-operation cutting across ideological/political lines.

None of these key issues will be easily resolved. For example, the People's Republic of China has thus far made it emphatically clear that it is not interested in nuclear-weapon controls until it has what it considers to be a credible nuclear deterrent. Nor are some of the knotty problems related to peaceful co-existence currently susceptible of solution. Consequently, the present disposition of the United States is to negotiate through strength, and to maintain, with some modifications, the older alliance system while the experimentation with a new approach to international relations in the Pacific-Asian region is conducted.

Even in case of external aggression, heaviest burden to be borne by state involved



UPI photo

One of the last groups of U.S. troops to withdraw from South Vietnam under the terms of the ceasefire agreement is seen boarding a plane at Tansonnhut Airport on March 27. At right, North Vietnamese

and Viet Cong officers snap pictures during the withdrawal procedure. The 23,000 U.S. troops still in South Vietnam were withdrawn in the 60 days after signature of the ceasefire pact.

This dual course — and some of the risks involved in it — can be illustrated by recent developments with respect to Indochina. Present American policies there are based upon three gambles. The first is that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China — each for its own reasons — are prepared to aid in bringing the war to a close and to foster a compromise political solution permitting non-Communist elements to survive. The efficacy of major power diplomacy in Asia may well get its supreme test here.

A logical case can be made out for this gamble. The Soviet Union, preoccupied with the China problem, overcommitted in global terms, and extremely hopeful of further *détente* in Europe, might desire an end to the drain represented by the "hot war" in Indochina — and an end that would not represent an open invitation for Chinese dominance of Southeast Asia. The Russians have shown a remarkable interest in seeking accommodation with the non-Communist governments of the region (with the exception of South Vietnam), and their policies in Cambodia are graphic evidence of the disinclination to go along with Peking-

oriented regimes. The refusal to accord Prince Sihanouk recognition cannot be read in any other fashion.

China, on the other hand, sees Soviet activities in Southeast Asia as a part of Russian encirclement policies, and is determined to thwart them. It is for this reason that Peking's attitude toward an American presence in the region appears to have changed significantly. For the present, at least, Chinese leaders regard the Soviet problem as paramount, not merely — perhaps not even primarily — because of a presumed military threat but also because of the potentially explosive penetration of the Russian issue into Chinese domestic politics, particularly in this transitional era.

Nor is it clear that the Chinese are altogether happy with Hanoi and its policies. As the Vietnam war reached its climactic stages, North Vietnamese leaders pursued military tactics more Soviet than Maoist, perhaps partly because of the heavy degree of their dependence upon Soviet hardware. More importantly, Peking is well aware of the anti-Chinese element in Vietnamese political life, Communist and non-Communist alike, and the

Chinese leaders see Soviet problem as paramount, fear encirclement

degree to which Hanoi has sought to play Peking and Moscow off against each other. Does China really want Hanoi to dominate the whole of Indochina, with the implications which this might have for other parts of continental Southeast Asia? Peking's policies in Laos and Cambodia, as well as in Thailand, cast considerable doubt on this. Clearly, the People's Republic has its own interests in this region, and while they are not necessarily compatible with the interests of the non-Communist governments and peoples of the area, neither are they necessarily in alignment with Hanoi's plans.

On critical issues, Communist powers have maintained more solid front than non-Communists

If there is a logical case to be made out for playing to Soviet and Chinese "moderation," however, the evidence is far from conclusive. Neither China nor the Soviet Union wants to fall under the label "traitor to the international revolutionary cause", and in this sense their competition over issues like Vietnam can be conducive to loyalty rather than moderation. On critical public issues thus far, the Communist powers have maintained a more solid front than the non-Communists, and some of those issues have been exceedingly important.

Peking's policy

Nor are the basic policies of the major Communist states with respect to Southeast Asia clearly conducive to the type of settlement envisaged in Washington. High Chinese leaders have privately expressed the view that "in principle, we favour the neutralization of Southeast Asia — but it is very difficult to apply such a principle concretely". Meanwhile, Peking continues to pursue a threefold diplomatic policy involving various "mixes" of state-to-state, people-to-people and comrade-to-comrade relations. There are real strengths in such a policy, since it enables a high degree of flexibility, but it is also a policy worrisome to China's small neighbours and falling considerably short of the requirements of peaceful co-existence. By maintaining clandestine radio stations within its borders purporting to be the "voice of the free Burmese (Thai, Malayan) peoples", by sheltering key Communist leaders from the region in China, and by providing some training and equipment to dissident forces, Peking maintains a leverage to influence the policies of concerned governments.

Does it ultimately intend to play a greater role in Southeast Asia, insisting upon regimes "friendly" and allied, rather than merely "neutral?" No certain answer can be given to this question at present, but China's present leaders have on oc-

casions firmly asserted that China has special interest" in Asia and intends to play a special role.

Similarly, the Soviet Union may be less accommodating than is called for in the script. In a certain sense, Moscow's deep concern over China makes it host to in greater measure to Hanoi. Unquestionably, Russian leaders have advised the North Vietnamese at some points to take courses of action immediately compatible with the politics of negotiation rather than with those of heightened violence. But should these be viewed in a strategic or tactical light? Does Moscow have any intention of trying to moderate Hanoi's desire to dominate Indochina? Given its current antipathy to Peking, does an ascendant, aligned North Vietnam not have some merit? Until such questions can be answered with greater certainty, and weighed against the factors conducive to Soviet "moderation" in Southeast Asia, reliance upon Soviet policy remains a gamble.

A second gamble now appears more hazardous — namely, the gamble that, by means of a stick-and-carrot policy, North Vietnam can be caused to accept, for the immediate future at least, an Indochinese "solution" that offers the Communists some hopes and opportunities but is decidedly short of the victory for which they (as well as others) have sacrificed so much. There is a certain irony in recent American policies toward North Vietnam. The United States seems to have taken a leaf from the Chinese book. Historically, China managed the "barbarians" on its borders by offering them tribute in exchange for good behaviour, and threatening to bash them over the head if they became unruly. Nor has Chinese policy changed greatly, as Peking's three-tiered diplomacy illustrates. Now it is Washington that is seeking to learn from the old masters: aid if you behave, dire consequences if you escalate the war.

Will it work? President Nixon's first task was to establish his credibility with respect to both alternatives, and at one point this appeared to have been accomplished despite Congressional (and public) foot-dragging. Certainly North Vietnamese leaders should have learned the hard way that Mr. Nixon is prepared to take resolute action when he feels that agreements or understandings are being violated. Perhaps they have also learned something else. In impersonal terms, current U.S. policies pursue minimal and maximal goals — the minimal being a withdrawal from Vietnam with American credibility in the world maintained, the maximal the preser-

Peking continues threefold policy with high degree of flexibility

ation of a non-Communist South Vietnam. But, in personal terms, President Nixon himself is both devoted and committed to the second alternative; he will not abandon it lightly.

Hanoi's objectives

Nevertheless, Hanoi has its own deep commitments and objectives. In the final analysis, these represent nothing less than dominance over Indochina: ultimate Vietnamese unification under the Communist aegis, and the governance of Cambodia and Laos by surrogates. Even if U.S. policies succeed in blunting an immediate, overt military drive (and this is far from clear, especially with respect to vulnerable areas such as Cambodia), can more intricate but nonetheless inexorably mounting pressures be thwarted and contained? Will North Vietnam, having paid so dearly for its efforts to control Indochina by force, now see compelling advantages in concentrating upon internal development, much of it funded from abroad, and accept the type of political conditions with which the Germans and/or the Koreans have lived for many years?

At present, the prospects cannot be considered good, and evidence of continued Communist use of force has even caused the Nixon Administration to set aside temporarily its proposed program for reconstruction aid to North Vietnam, although negotiations on this matter continue. Certainly, at this point, one cannot rule out the possibility that Hanoi is still determined to push for a military decision, particularly in areas where military prospects seem good.

The second gamble ultimately meshes with a third — the capacity of non-Communist regimes in this area to survive, given the reduced and changed nature of the American commitment, on the one hand, and the uncertain attitudes and policies of the Communist states, large and small, on the other. Unquestionably, the Nixon Doctrine has created apprehensions among the small non-Communist states and contributed to important political decisions. Such states as South Korea and Thailand have tightened political controls, preparing for a protracted contest with Communist neighbours in which much greater self-sufficiency will be required. The problems faced by quasi-open societies when locked in competition with wholly mobilized, authoritarian societies are formidable. The extensive American presence of the past permitted a greater experimentation with political openness than was born out of the natural traditions and evolution of certain societies, on the one



UPI photo

U.S. military policemen roll up the American flag for the last time at Long Binh Airfield in South Vietnam as the airfield is officially turned over to the South Vietnamese Army.

hand, or the nature of the threat faced, on the other. Now, an adjustment is being made — painful to those who had hoped for steady democratic advances.

In the final analysis, however, the viability of non-Communist regimes will depend upon factors much broader in scope than civil liberties. This is not the place to discuss such matters in detail, but it is obvious that the performance of mixed economies interacting with the advanced world, the capacity of regimes and leaders to legitimize themselves by interweaving "traditional" and "modern" appeals, and the ability of governments to balance successfully centralist (nationalist) claims against regional and ethnic diversities of interest and need will all affect the internal strength or weakness of the still-new Southeast Asian states. The policies of the major powers can certainly influence the outcome of most of these challenges, but it is doubtful whether they can fully determine them. It is unfortunately true, moreover, that the capacity of external influences to affect results negatively is generally greater than the capacity to affect them positively.

The gambles currently being undertaken could have been avoided, to be sure, had the path of isolationism been chosen. Senator George McGovern's policies, for example, would have made it unnecessary to be concerned about Soviet or Chinese moderation in this area since we would have withdrawn as quickly as physical circumstances would have permitted. Nor

Viability of regimes in Southeast Asia keyed to factors much broader than civil liberties

would the United States need to have worried about restraints on North Vietnam. It would have been difficult, moreover, under such circumstances, to manifest any credible concern over the fate of non-Communist states in Southeast Asia or elsewhere.

Greater risks

But would not such policies have promoted other, far greater risks? Why should the United States assume under such circumstances that the People's Republic of China, or for that matter the Soviet Union, would have any commitment to serious negotiations? China has shown a remarkable interest in a new policy toward the United States precisely because it is powerful and is committed to the Pacific-Asian area, now and for the foreseeable future. The burden of proof rests upon those who believe that peace can best be maintained by destroying U.S. credibility with both friend and foe, and retreating into "Fortress America".

As noted at the outset, the future — even the immediate future — remains unpredictable. Serious defeats for the non-Communist cause in Southeast Asia are clearly possible. It is also conceivable that the major powers of the Pacific-Asian region will fail in efforts to attain agreement on the crucial issues outlined earlier. Then we shall be forced to continue living with crises.

The *rapprochement* between China and the United States in many ways is the most fundamental and most hopeful development in the world political system since 1949. It is desirable to stress the fact that the catalyst for the shift in Chinese policy was China's perception of a Soviet threat, both from Siberia and from Southeast Asia.

I emphasize the point not to disparage the diplomacy of my own government, which I consider to have been skilful and effective, but to bring out the essential nature of this immensely significant event.

China did not respond to the inducement of American offers, put forward regularly for many years and pressed insistently during the last six. It did respond, however, to the fear of a Soviet attack. The shift occurred because the Chinese had finally reached the conclusion that the mobilization of some 50 Soviet divisions in Siberia, coupled with the growing Soviet presence in Southeast Asia, constituted a

If the courses outlined here remain gambles, however, they are nonetheless legitimate, given the alternatives available and the nature of contemporary international politics. In many respects, Southeast Asia remains a test of the great issues of our time. Can peaceful co-existence work, especially among small states? If we can make "big wars" too costly to contemplate, can we also find alternatives to "small wars?" Is there promise in the movement from exclusive alliances toward collective security *via* major-power diplomacy? Are there viable alternatives to the authoritarian path for emerging societies dedicated to nation-building and economic development?

It is possible to raise these questions with some hope of progress, albeit with no certainty of the outcome, because, in spite of unprecedented abuse, internal as well as external, the United States stood firm in Southeast Asia during recent years. Consider the situation as the 1960s got under way. "Liberation wars" were still regarded as the wave of the future, a relatively promising method of meshing civil conflict with international assistance, to the benefit of the Communist cause. Meanwhile, the situation throughout Southeast Asia was ominous in the extreme. Not only was Indochina collapsing against a background of rising Communist assault, Indonesia and the People's Republic of China, in close alliance, were posing additional chal-

danger to the regime and to Chinese national autonomy despite their own formidable nuclear capability. The Soviet menace, they perceived, is backed by huge military budgets and a political will in the imperial mood. To such a danger at this point there was only one possible response for the Chinese — association with the United States.

The United States has wisely made it clear that, while the hope of deterring a Soviet attack on China is the heart of the new relation between China and the United States, that relation is not an alliance against the Soviet Union. The goal of American policy is to achieve equally correct relations with both China and the Soviet Union.... (Eugene V. Rostow, Professor of Law at Yale University, President of the Atlantic Treaty Association and former U.S. Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, speaking to the Europe-America Conference in Amsterdam, March 26-23, 1973).

allenges. Confrontation with Malaysia represented another "hot war". Violence was also the order of the day along the Sino-Indian frontier to the west. The issues, moreover, spilled out far beyond South and Southeast Asia. An effort was under way, led by Indonesia's Sukarno and supported by Mao Tse-tung, to wreck the United Nations and establish a rival organization, one that would make its central appeal to the "non-West," with overt racist overtones.

Thus, the issue was never just Vietnam, or even just Southeast Asia. Not all of the events since 1960 favourable to a more rational, balanced approach to Pacific-Asian problems can be ascribed to the continued substantial presence of the

United States in East Asia — but some of the crucial ones can, a fact so galling to our "anti-Vietnamites" and isolationists that they will go to any length to deny it. The fact remains that, in seeking peace, we are just as dependent at this stage upon a basic political-military equilibrium in Asia as has been the case in Europe. The United States, moreover, remains vital to such an equilibrium, as even the major Communist states are now prepared to admit. Indeed, perhaps the supreme irony of this era is that, increasingly, both Peking and Moscow have come to accept as vital a role for the United States in the Pacific-Asian region which some Americans consider a relic of the Cold War.

Implications of ceasefire pact for North Vietnamese strategy

By Sheldon W. Simon

Within days after the Vietnam ceasefire agreement was initialled so hopefully in Paris on January 23, it became painfully apparent that any cessation of hostilities in Vietnam itself still awaited the unfolding of further developments in the South. Indeed, none of the antagonists (Hanoi, Washington, Saigon, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam) expected the Paris accord to alter the intensity of the struggle for control of South Vietnam in any substantial way. Each agreed to the Paris statement either because it was believed to weaken one's opponent more than one's ally (the Vietnamese Communist position) or because it was a concession required by the senior partner of the junior partner in order to maintain the former's support for the continuation of the struggle (Washington's relationship to Saigon). The purpose of this article is to explore the implications of the Paris ceasefire agreement for North Vietnam's strategy in Indochina and its future relations with the major powers, as well as other Asian states bound to be affected by any dramatic change in the political organization of Indochina.

For North Vietnamese leaders, the purpose of the Paris negotiations was to provide the United States with essentially

the same opportunity provided for France in the 1954 Geneva Conference: a reasonably dignified exit from Indochina. Subsequently, it was presumed, first South Vietnam and then Laos and Cambodia would come under the effective control of Hanoi — not necessarily through outright military occupation but rather through the installation of governments controlled by the local Communist forces, whose back-

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AP wirephoto

North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh (left) arrives at Orly Airport in Paris for the formal signing of the Vietnam ceasefire agreement in

January. He is greeted by Le Duc Tho, chief North Vietnam negotiator, and a crowd of supporters.

ground, support and directives had always come from the Viet Minh. In effect, Hanoi's objectives remained constant since the early 1950s — to accede to the former French position in Indochina.

Key issues in Paris

From Hanoi's viewpoint, the following were key issues in the Paris negotiations:

(1) The maintenance of a substantial number of North Vietnamese forces (VAP) south of the 17th Parallel — one of the major goals of the Spring 1972 North Vietnamese offensive. With some 145,000 regular troops south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), North Vietnam has, in effect, extended its borders well below the 17th Parallel and has established contiguous logistics for future military activities in support of its southern agent, the PRGSV (Viet Cong).

(2) Insuring that no effective international supervisory force could hamper or publicly embarrass Vietnamese Communist military operations designed to expand "liberated areas" in the South. Hence, Hanoi's original desire for only some 250 supervisory personnel against an American figure of more than 5,000. The compromise number, 1,160, remains small enough to render detection of supplies and troop movement through the DMZ, the Laotian panhandle and Eastern Cambodia unlikely. Despite the apparent concession by Hanoi not to use the Laotian and Cambodian infiltration routes, it is important

to note that the United States was unable to obtain an Indochina-wide ceasefire, thus leaving these important supply-routes under the indefinite control of North Vietnam.

(3) Finally, Hanoi required language in the accord which could be interpreted to mean *non-recognition* of the legitimacy of a separate South Vietnam, despite the fact that both Saigon and the PRG would be explicitly recognized as political contenders for the South's future. Thus, the 17th Parallel was deemed a provisional line of demarcation for purposes of South Vietnamese self-determination.

Concession on coalition

By contrast, the North Vietnamese have made at least one important concession in the Paris agreement: withdrawal of the demand that a coalition government be created in Saigon prior to a ceasefire. North Vietnam's previous insistence on this point was a product of its bitter disillusionment over the breakdown of the 1954 Geneva agreement, as a result of which Hanoi lost at the negotiating table what it believed it had gained on the battlefield: recognition as the only legitimate government in the whole of Vietnam. Since that time, Hanoi has been loath to consider any political agreement which was not preceded by a clearcut military victory. The DRV's symbiotic set between military and diplomatic developments may well have accounted for the lengthy impasse in Paris from 1968. It began to dissolve only as North Viet-

Aimed at small supervisory force to make detection of troops, supplies more unlikely

name leaders perceived the growing great-power *rapprochement* which emerged in late 1971 and was confirmed in the absence of any significant response from either Moscow or Peking to the heavy U.S. bombing and mining of the Hanoi-Hai-phong area in the wake of the North Vietnamese spring 1972 offensive.

The purpose of the North Vietnamese attack was to salvage the fortunes of the NLF prior to a negotiated settlement. The NLF's position in the South Vietnamese countryside had been on the wane since the failure of the 1968 Tet offensive. The combination of growing Communist terrorism and Saigon's land-to-the-tiller program between 1969 and 1972 had led to a decline in the popularity of the NLF as an alternative to the Saigon regime. North Vietnam's offensive served to reverse this trend by drawing the Saigon army away from village security duties and once more opening up the northern, western, and Mekong Delta areas of South Vietnam to the re-establishment of Viet Cong cells. The late January 1973 ceasefire-in-place, then, temporarily solidified these areas for the Viet Cong but, at the same time, doomed the accord's workability.

Access denied

With the political future of South Vietnam undetermined, both sides moved to challenge adjacent areas under the adversary's control, while the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) was denied effective access to those parts of South Vietnam under military contention. Although Canada won a small point at the enlarged February 1973 Paris conference on the future of South Vietnam in its insistence that the conference itself be designated an ongoing institution for purposes of receiving supervisory commission reports, the victory was somewhat Pyrrhic, in that the commission has been unable as of mid-April to investigate most of the violations alleged by either Saigon or the PRG. Saigon, meanwhile, stymied the operations of the proposed "council of reconciliation" set out by the Paris agreement in order to avoid having to co-operate politically with the Viet Cong. Since the Paris agreement set no timetable for the operations of the council or the subsequent elections, Saigon was given an effective veto over its operations by refusing to name representatives to the body.

With the political situations in the South stalemated by the spring of this year, Hanoi's options focused on whether and how to enhance the Communist military position. Because the ARVN (South

Vietnamese) forces consisted of a very well equipped regular army of some 600,000 plus a reasonably well armed (but not well led) militia of another 500,000, with excellent logistical pipelines to the U.S. bases in Thailand and the Pacific, North Vietnamese leaders may well fear that time is working against Communist consolidation in the South unless new military pressures are exerted against those areas under Saigon control. Fourteen of North Vietnam's 15 combat divisions are deployed against South Vietnam — eight around the DMZ and six scattered throughout the South or in border areas of Laos and Cambodia. Cautioning against a precipitate reinvolvement of North Vietnamese regulars, however, is the lesson of President Nixon's pre-Christmas saturation bombing of the North, which was designed to demonstrate to Hanoi how much devastation U.S. air power could wreak on its territory even after the withdrawal of American ground forces.

Hanoi faces a dilemma of timing: if it waits too long to reassert its efforts in the South, Saigon may be able to thwart them, for total Viet Cong strength is estimated at only 100,000 men — half guerrillas and half *cadres*. If, on the other hand, the DRV reopens hostilities before a general mentality of total disengagement has pervaded the U.S. leadership, then it risks renewed devastation from air-bases in Thailand and the Pacific.

There is little reason to suppose that Hanoi is willing to abnegate its unification plans. In a speech to the DRV National Assembly on February 22 and in an interview broadcast over Japanese television on March 5, North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong reasserted the unity of Vietnam, stating before the North Vietnamese representatives: "The entire Vietnamese nation is resolved to pursue, with a new mettle, the hard and infallibly victorious struggle for completing the national and democratic revolution in South Vietnam and proceeding to the peaceful reunification of our beloved fatherland." In short, the primary task for Hanoi remains the fulfillment of a Communist victory in the South, after which "peaceful reunification" becomes a matter of course.

Strategy in Laos, Cambodia

Hanoi's primary concern with reunification probably determines its strategy toward Laos and Cambodia as well. Insisting publicly that the conflicts in both countries are exclusively fought by their own "national liberation movements", North Vietnam refused to discuss the situation at the Paris conference or acknowledge its sub-

Hanoi faces timing dilemma in exerting new pressures in the South

stantial military presence in both countries. The Laotian ceasefire agreement, concluded in late February, in effect confirms North Vietnamese control over the Laotian contiguous border areas necessary to resupply VPA forces in South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The Cambodian situation is more complex, largely because the insurgents are not uniformly North Vietnamese allies but rather a combination of Cambodian Communists (Khmer Rouge), Sihanouk supporters — who viewed the home-grown Communists as bitter enemies and foreign agents in the not-too-distant past — and those who are simply disenchanted with the corruption and inefficiency of the Lon Nol Government in Phnom Penh. Minimally, North Vietnam has insisted on its continued occupation of much of Eastern Cambodia — particularly the Parrot's Beak region — which has served to supply its forces in Western South Vietnam and the Mekong Delta region.

The remainder of Cambodia is being left increasingly to the Khmer insurgents, who can rely on the North Vietnamese for supplies and training but who appear to be undertaking more of the actual fighting for themselves. The insurgents' primary problem is their mutual mistrust — the Sihanoukists fearful that the Khmer Rouge will sell out Cambodia to the North Vietnamese. There is, in fact, barely disguised tension between Sihanouk's government-in-exile in Peking and the North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge. On more than one occasion, the Prince has expressed his apprehension over being displaced by his erstwhile allies after Cambodia's "liberation". And reports from the "liberated zone" inside Cambodia point out that Sihanouk is barely mentioned by North Vietnamese or Khmer Rouge *cadres* in their village indoctrination sessions. The Prince's trump card remains the hope that China can convince North Vietnam that an independent left-leaning Cambodia (in effect, the *status quo ante*) is preferable to an openly North Vietnamese satellite.

Task of rebuilding

In addition to the unfulfilled goal of reunification, North Vietnam is confronted by the massive task of rebuilding much of the small modern sector of its economy, as well as such infrastructure as roads, dams, railway lines and bridges. The country's vast needs, however, also provide its leaders with some political leverage for retaining the DRV's independence *vis-à-vis* outside powers by eliciting multiple aid programs. If President Nixon can persuade the U.S. Congress, a multi-billion-dollar rehabilita-



UPI photo

Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's chief foreign adviser, conferred with North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi in mid-February on relationships between Washington and Hanoi in the wake of the ceasefire accord. Mr. Kissinger is pictured with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong.

tion program for Indochina may be in the offing. This could well dwarf contributions from Hanoi's two major allies, Moscow and Peking, which can ill afford to transfer the kind of industrial equipment to Vietnam of which they are in such great need themselves.

Relations with Moscow and Peking, then, may cool somewhat when and if the Indochina war winds down. Support for the Vietnamese Communist cause has been an economic burden for both Communist major powers. And each possesses different foreign policy priorities, which have been obstructed in the course of the protracted Indochina conflict. For China, the diminution of hostilities removes the major obstacles (leaving Taiwan aside) to normalizing relations with the United States. And, indeed, less than one month after the ceasefire, the two countries agreed in Peking to establish "liaison offices" in each other's capital — providing the functional equivalent of regular diplomatic relations.

Peking's desire for closer U.S. ties is no mere diplomatic nuance but an important component in its attempt to break out of what it sees to be a new Soviet encirclement policy enunciated in the August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and promulgated through numerous Soviet appeals in the last two years for a system of "Asian collective security". An end to the Vietnam war,

Cambodian situation more complex with insurgents split by mistrust

Country's needs provides leaders with leverage for retaining DRV independence

then, would provide two opportunities for the PRC: new ties with the United States tacitly designed to discourage Soviet military adventurism and the termination of China's grudging co-operation with the U.S.S.R. through the course of the war for the transit of Soviet supplies to Hanoi. This anomalous situation had required that China actually help the Soviet Union maintain its influence in North Vietnam.

For the U.S.S.R., too, the winding-down of the war permits a reorientation of energies on a variety of fronts, including domestic purposes, such European affairs as the forthcoming continent-wide security conference, and bilateral strategic disarmament talks with the United States. This Soviet reorientation, however, is tempered by its protracted dispute with China, currently tying down about 45 Russian divisions along its lengthy China border and its growing commitment to a naval and economic presence throughout Asia as part of the U.S.S.R.'s new globalism. Indeed, the contraction of Soviet aid to North Vietnam could lead to its reallocation to other parts of Asia such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, where the Russians are attempting to establish a presence in the wake of an American withdrawal from the region.

Finally, we come to the non-Communist Southeast Asian states and Japan. For them, change in Indochina is fraught with both peril and opportunity. The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines — fear a North Vietnamese dominated Indochina. In their February 1973 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the ASEAN foreign ministers called for the creation of an all-Southeast Asia conference to discuss the future of the region (and presumably to constrain North Vietnamese ambitions). They further urged that ASEAN be involved as an organization in the reconstruction of Indochina and went on record supporting the *status quo* in Laos and Cambodia, that is, their continued existence as non-Communist states.

Earlier, Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kwan Yew, with characteristic candour, had advised the United States to maintain its bases on mainland Southeast Asia to insure that the Nixon Doctrine would indeed serve to deter external support for insurgent movements. And, early in March 1973, Deputy Thai Foreign Minister, Chartchai Chunchawan, announced that his Government was requesting the

Change in Indochina fraught with both peril, opportunity for ASEAN members

Our involvement in Indochina was based on a mistaken judgment about just what the role of the United States should be in local conflicts in general. A review of the past decades shows . . . that the odds are generally quite high that military intervention by the United States is often not necessary to prevent a country from losing its autonomy and the interventions often have counter-productive results.

At one time or another, Congressmen, commentators and analysts of foreign affairs openly declared that this or that country was about to be lost to Communism. This was stated about Ghana under Nkrumah, Egypt following the Aswan Dam deal with the U.S.S.R., Syria under countless leftist generals, Guinea under Sekou Touré, Indonesia under Sukarno, Brazil under Goulart and many other countries. However, we refrained from military intervention and the countries 'righted' themselves.

In some instances, we decided to step in. We landed Marines in Lebanon in 1958 and sent paratroopers to the

Dominican Republic in 1965. But now it is widely agreed that at least two of our interventions were based on faulty information and miscalculations of the risks involved in staying out. Most experts now agree that those nations would have remained as free as they are now even if we had stayed away.

At other times and in other countries, U.S. intervention did little to stop an ongoing process — or, worse, helped to escalate the involvement of others. The Communist intervention in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam is immeasurably greater than when the United States first entered the picture.

Of course there are exceptions. One thing is beyond reasonable doubt: we use military power too often too quickly, at tremendous cost, often with results which are neither in line with our goals nor in the welfare of any one involved or affected. . . . (Excerpts from testimony by Dr. Amital Etzioni, Director of Centre for Policy Research, Columbia University, before Congressional Subcommittee on National Security Policy, May 31, 1972).

continuance of American air force units in Thailand: "Until North Vietnamese forces leave Laos and Cambodia and other ceasefire agreements are carried out . . . We don't lose any national honour, as charged by some persons, by allowing the U.S. Air Force to remain stationed here for regional stability and our own security in these uncertain times."

Indeed, the prospect of a North Vietnamese controlled Indochina could well elicit Thai moves for even closer bonds with both the United States and China. The U.S. presumably would assist counter-insurgent programs in Thailand's North and Northeast against dissidents aided by

the Viet Minh, and Peking, too, may oppose the spread of North Vietnamese influence on mainland Southeast Asia.

As for Japan, the Tanaka Government has expressed interest in developing a bilateral aid program for Vietnam after a cessation of hostilities. Tokyo has also hinted at the likelihood of establishing diplomatic relations with Hanoi sometime in 1973. These developments can only be welcomed by the DRV as one major source of outside aid in what may become a new North Vietnamese balancing act of economic diplomacy following two decades of military dominance in North Vietnamese foreign policy.

Vietnam: a further trial period

Two months after the signing of the Vietnam ceasefire agreement, Canada's involvement in the international peace supervisory commission in Vietnam was extended beyond its initial trial period.

In a statement to the House of Commons on March 27, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp announced that Canada was prepared to serve a further two months on the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) in Vietnam. But the Secretary of State for External Affairs emphasized that, unless in that 60-day period there had been "some substantial improvement" in the situation or "distinct progress . . . toward a political settlement", Canada would withdraw from the commission — giving a further 30-day grace period for the parties to the ceasefire agreement to find a successor. "This means," Mr. Sharp told the House, "that unless there is a substantial improvement in the situation or some signs of an imminent political agreement, Canada will cease to participate in the ICCS by June 30, 1973."

With the signing of the ceasefire agreement on January 27, Canada had agreed to serve on the four-power ICCS for an initial, 60-day trial period. Mr. Sharp made it clear that participation beyond that period would be dependent on Canada's assessment of how its conditions for full acceptance of commission membership had been fulfilled (*International Perspectives*, January-February, March-April 1973). In effect, Mr. Sharp in his statement of March 27 indicated that the Cana-

dian Government had approved a further trial period — until the end of May — before making a final decision on whether to remain on the ICCS or withdraw from it.

The external affairs minister described the dilemma confronting the Government in arriving at this decision. All Canadians, he said, desired to serve the cause of peace in Indochina as long as there was the slightest hope of a peaceful solution to the Vietnam problem. On the other hand, the Government was equally resolved that "Canadians should not take part in a charade in which they will be required to supervise not a ceasefire but continuing and possibly escalating hostilities".

Six-day tour

The minister made his March 27 statement to the House little more than a week after returning from a six-day tour of Indochina. The tour included a stop-off in Tokyo and visits to Saigon and ICCS field positions, to Vientiane in Laos and to Hanoi. In Tokyo, the minister conferred with the Japanese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. In Saigon, Mr. Sharp reviewed the situation with Michel Gauvin, head of Canada's ICCS delegation, and other officials of the delegation. He held discussions with leaders of the South Vietnamese Government and with spokesmen for the Provincial Revolutionary Government of Vietnam (Viet Cong); in Vientiane with Laotian Government leaders and senior officials of the Pathet Lao movement; and, finally, in Hanoi with North Vietnamese leaders.



CP wirephoto

External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp joins Ambassador Michel Gauvin, head of Canada's delegation to the ICCS, for a stroll through the garden of the Ambassador's residence in Saigon. Mr. Sharp held discussions with Mr. Gauvin and others in Saigon as part of a six-day Indo-China tour in mid-March.

Reporting on the trip, Mr. Sharp told the House it was a common impression of those on the tour that the ICCS was, in fact, "not performing the tasks assigned to it under the ceasefire agreement". But this situation governing the ICCS existed in spite of the best efforts of the Canadian delegation to make the commission work. He said it was generally accepted that, "had it not been for the energy and ingenuity of the Canadian delegation, even the setting-up of the various bodies required by the (ceasefire) agreement would not have taken place as soon as it did".

Despite the shortcomings of the ICCS in carrying out its assigned tasks, the minister said, a number of other governments felt the commission had a role to play beyond its function in supervising provisions of the ceasefire agreement and investigating alleged violations of that agreement. Not everyone shared Canada's conception of truce observation and supervision.

Mr. Sharp said Canada was told there was a "totally different but equally vital role" that bore no relation to Canada's previous experience in Vietnam and was nowhere hinted at in the text of the agreement and its protocols. This was to provide "an international presence as an indication of the continued involvement of the world community in the Vietnam situation". According to this argument, the Minister

said, "although the ICCS may not be necessary for the purposes of carrying out the agreement, its absence would be taken as an indication that the agreement lacked world support and consequently our withdrawal could become a further destabilizing psychological factor in a situation already very unstable".

The External Affairs Minister said he was not convinced that the ICCS did play such a part in the thinking of the Vietnamese and he did not believe Canadians could be expected to play such a part over any protracted period.

More time needed

He said it was no part of the responsibility of Canada as a member of the ICCS to judge the relative merits of the positions taken by the two Vietnamese parties to the agreement. "But it is now clear — as it was not two months ago — that all the Vietnamese parties will need a little time to demonstrate the feasibility of their solutions: not to bring them about, just to demonstrate feasibility. Once confidence has been established and if there has been some movement toward a political solution on either side's terms, the peace will no longer be as fragile as it is and the mere presence of an international commission will no longer be regarded as a vital part of the picture or as necessary to contribute to a solution. On the other hand, if neither side's view of a political solution is making any headway, we can look forward to a resumption of fullscale hostilities regardless of any observer or supervisory body.

"It is out of consideration of this new element and of the possibly far-reaching consequences of opting out now, for which we would have to accept some responsibility, that the Government has decided not to exercise its option to withdraw after 60 days, even though it could justify doing so on the basis of the reasonable application of its announced criteria. On the other hand, our experience, both past and present, does not justify moving into acceptance of open-ended or unconditional participation.

"Consequently, the Government proposes to inform the parties to the agreement that Canada would be prepared to serve on the same basis as it does now for a further period of about 60 days — that is until May 31 —, after which, unless there has been some substantial improvement or distinct progress has been made toward a political settlement, it will withdraw, giving a further 30-day grace period for the parties to find a successor."

Mr. Sharp noted that talks were under way between the two South Vietnamese

'Our experience does not justify open-ended or unconditional participation'

parties in an effort to reach an accord on internal matters, including the holding of elections. The agreement calls for an election to form a new national government, and the ICCS protocol assigns an undefined observer role to the commission in such an election. Even if Canada were to withdraw from the commission, Mr. Sharp said, it would be prepared to undertake at a later date a supervisory role in an election, provided it was held under the provisions of the ceasefire agreement.

The Minister pledged that Canada would continue to maintain the "objective and open approach" that had characterized its participation in the ICCS and would try to see that the commission fulfilled "not only the psychological part that has been superimposed on it but also the duties as laid down in the agreement. We will not take part in a charade nor will we tacitly condone inaction when we believe action is required".

An ambassador's view of the ICCS limits

Ambassador Michel Gauvin, head of Canada's delegation to the International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam, assessed the role of the ICCS and its record in a speech to a service club in Saigon on April 9. The following are excerpts from his remarks, in which he defined the limits of such a commission:

The conclusions that the Canadian delegation and the Canadian Government have drawn from our experience so far is that the ICCS is not performing adequately the tasks assigned to it under the ceasefire agreement.

The view has been expressed by some observers that this really doesn't matter — that the importance of the commission lies in its symbolic and psychological value, that by its very presence the ICCS manifests the concern of the international community in the restoration of peace in Vietnam. In the minds of some who hold this opinion, there is a corollary argument: that the ICCS should not concern itself with investigations, but should use its influence and prestige to bring the parties to the conflict closer to a resolution of the basic political issues that divide them.

These views give rise to a number of questions. First of all, can the International Commission be expected to play such a role given its composition? Can a body composed of Canadians, Hungarians, Indonesians and Poles be expected to conceive of solutions that the parties themselves cannot devise? More important, would the Vietnamese parties tolerate attempts by the ICCS to interject its opinions in an area of vital concern to them? Would the commission not fall into the trap of appearing as a body to take sides in a dispute between the parties?

The differences dividing the parties in South Vietnam are . . . very difficult and

very deep-rooted. We believe that only the parties can resolve these differences. The International Commission can on occasion offer assistance, but should not seek to direct the course of events in South Vietnam or seek to influence the outcome.

Decision for South Vietnamese

The future of South Vietnam is for the people of South Vietnam to decide. The sovereignty of South Vietnam is something which the (ceasefire) agreement calls on us to respect. It is the people of South Vietnam who will suffer if hostilities continue and it is they who will benefit if peace is finally restored. True peace can only be restored on the basis of accommodation and reconciliation between the two sides. No third way conceived and presented by an International Commission of outsiders can result in a true and stable peace.

The International Commission must, in my view, concentrate on the role which has been assigned to it. This role is one of "blowing the whistle" on those who violate the Paris agreement and its protocols. The chief means the commission possesses in this respect is its power to investigate.

The Paris agreement (Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam), with all its imperfections, is the only document we have that has been accepted by all parties to this dispute and it is therefore the document that must govern the commission's actions as well as the parties' actions. All parties have stated that, if the Paris agreement is strictly implemented, a lasting peace can be restored in Vietnam.

Clearly at this juncture each party has its own interpretation of the Paris agreement and of what the end result should be if the Paris agreement is strictly

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UPI photo

Major-General Duncan McAlpine, head of Canada's military contingent serving with the International Control Commission

in Vietnam, points to a map during press briefing. General McAlpine outlined deployment of regional ICCS teams.

adhered to. Nonetheless, the agreement has produced a way in which the dispute in Vietnam can be resolved by peaceful means. The commission's part in this process is a limited and specialized one, that of judging whether the process of ending the war and resolving the issues that surround the war, as laid out in the agreement, is followed — without the commission itself intervening in that process.

Too much expected

If I emphasize the role of the present commission, it is for one reason. There was a tendency during the life of the previous commission — the International Commission of Supervision and Control — for governments and influential opinion leaders in many countries to expect too much from that commission

An unrealistic view of what can be expected from the ICCS must be avoided this time around. We are here to perform a clearly defined function — a necessary and meaningful function, but one that has its limits. The parties to Vietnam's conflict, and only they, can close the deep and bitter divisions that have been both the cause and the effect of this long and bloody conflict.

Canada agreed to participate in the ICCS for an initial period of 60 days. We have decided to extend our participation for another period of time but, I must say, with grave doubts about the usefulness of our presence. What has given rise to our doubts is the rather dismal record of the ICCS so far in fulfilling its responsibilities objectively and impartially, as well as our scepticism that the ICCS can or should in fact perform the symbolic political function that some would thrust upon it.

But we are remaining in the hope that within a relatively brief period of time the parties to the conflict will move toward a political settlement that will make our presence unnecessary.

While we remain, we will continue to press the International Commission to act in accordance with its responsibilities. We will not condone inaction, we will not ignore the duties we have accepted by remaining as a member, we will not relax our efforts to identify violations of the agreement when they occur in the hope that, by identifying violations and those who commit them, other violations will be deterred and that the process of restoring peace in Vietnam will be carried forward

Commonwealth: can it combat the world's divisive trends?

By Arnold Smith

In August this year Canada, which has played no small part in the evolution of the modern Commonwealth, will be host for the first time to a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

It will be a notable meeting on a number of counts. It will be the first time that Britain has attended a Commonwealth heads of government meeting as a member of the European Economic Community. Further, the meeting takes place at a time when many member countries are being called upon to make far-reaching readjustments in their trading patterns, particularly in their relations with the expanded EEC. The meeting will also be conscious that, in the world at large, there are worrying indications that the advantages of transregional co-operation could be overshadowed by the dangers of inward-looking, isolationist attitudes and rivalry between regions and continents.

As far as the conference itself is concerned, Ottawa is likely to see the introduction of new procedures designed to make heads of government meetings increasingly fruitful, and to encourage informality and spontaneity in the discussions.

The Ottawa meeting, to take place from August 2 to 10, is the nineteenth in a series that began in 1944. It is the third to be held outside Britain. The first de-

parture from the traditional London venue was the Heads of Government Meeting in Lagos in January 1966, which was also the first to be organized and serviced by the Commonwealth Secretariat. The second was the Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore in 1971.

The change from the practice of meeting in London reflects the diminishing Anglocentrism of the Commonwealth, and the concurrent growth of an interwoven network of relations based on an increasingly decentralized association of equal partners. It is also a reflection of the organic evolution of the Commonwealth, whose capacity for healthy mutation has been one of its chief strengths.

The Commonwealth proved its adaptive capacity as it progressed from the narrowness of an all-white club to the relevant interracial, multilateral Commonwealth of today. With the inclusion in its fold of India and Pakistan in 1947, it embraced a mere seven countries. It has since expanded almost fivefold. The Ottawa meeting will bring together 32 countries, with the Bahamas as the newest member.

Common commitment

The Commonwealth has no rules. It is governed not by a constitution but by a common commitment to certain principles and ideals. On various occasions, Commonwealth statesmen have spelt out some of these principles, and at their last summit in Singapore they endorsed a comprehensive Declaration of Principles. This declaration emphasizes the voluntary nature of the Commonwealth's membership and its multiracial character. It proclaims the Commonwealth commitment to human liberty, racial equality and justice, economic and social development, and to international peace and co-operation. In the declaration, the heads of Commonwealth governments express their faith that the Commonwealth can "expand human understanding and understanding among nations, assist in the elimination of dis-



Mr. Smith has served as Commonwealth Secretary-General since mid-1965. Before his appointment to the top post in the Commonwealth Secretariat, he held a number of senior positions in the External Affairs Department culminating in his service as Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1963 to 1965. Previously he served, among other posts, at the United Nations and in Brussels and London. He was Canadian Commissioner to the old International Control Commission for Cambodia in 1955 and subsequently served as Ambassador to Egypt and later as Ambassador to the Soviet Union.



UPI photo

During the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore in January 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau makes his way through a crowd of delegates and newsmen as he leaves a special session. The Commonwealth has no rules, as Arnold Smith points out in the accompanying article. It is governed not by a constitution but by a common commitment to certain principles and ideals. At the summit meeting in Singapore, Commonwealth statesmen endorsed a comprehensive Declaration of Principles. It proclaims the Commonwealth commitment to human liberty, racial equality and justice, economic and social development and to international peace and co-operation. In the declaration, the Commonwealth heads of government expressed their faith that the Commonwealth could expand human understanding and understanding among nations, "assist in the elimination of discrimination based on differences of race, colour or creed, maintain and strengthen personal liberty, contribute to the enrichment of life for all and provide a powerful influence for peace".

Declaration of Principles at Singapore in 1971

crimination based on differences of race, colour or creed, maintain and strengthen personal liberty, contribute to the enrichment of life for all, and provide a powerful influence for peace".

The forthcoming Heads of Government Meeting follows the Commonwealth consultations in Ottawa last year at which senior officials discussed techniques of government and procedures for such meetings. This meeting was inspired by Prime Minister Trudeau, who, in Singapore, had referred to the challenging tasks of government in the present age, and the complexity of problems which governments faced in their relations with party, legislature, bureaucracy and public. He thought that, with the similarities in institutions and processes among Commonwealth governments, it would be useful for them to share ideas and experiences in the methods of government appropriate to present-day conditions.

Commonwealth leaders welcomed this suggestion. They also agreed that it was time to examine the way heads of government meetings were conducted. These meetings have changed in style as a larger, more heterogeneous membership evolved

from the cosier gatherings of earlier years. The August meeting will have before it the report by senior officials on techniques of government and on ways of making the heads of government meetings more informal and effective.

It is customary for Commonwealth heads of government to undertake a wide-ranging review of world developments. This is a valued part of Commonwealth consultation, and enables Commonwealth leaders to exchange views on current issues, and to gain from each other's experiences and insights. Since the heads of government met in Singapore, there have been international readjustments of a basic nature, and changes the impact of which has still to be fully assessed or felt. Apart from major political developments, there has been the undermining of world currency stability and the prospect of painful adjustments in trading patterns. These developments provide the backdrop to the August meeting.

It does not require much prescience to anticipate that Commonwealth leaders will take note of the changed relations between the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and discuss the situations in the

world's troubled areas, such as Indochina, the Middle East and Southern Africa. Among economic issues, they are likely to give their attention to the continuing monetary disequilibrium and to trends in world trade, particularly as they affect developing nations, their export prices and their capacity to earn foreign exchange. Development problems and policies will also be of interest, including the question of debt service which troubles many developing countries.

EEC enlargement

One change in the external environment that will concern Commonwealth leaders will be the recent enlargement of the European Economic Community. As European integration progresses, the policies the Community adopts not only toward the developing Commonwealth countries, which comprise a substantial segment of the Third World, but towards the rest of the world community in general become questions of importance.

Among the immediate implications for the Commonwealth are the loss of preferences in the British market. This will have a varying impact on different members of the Commonwealth. There is naturally special concern with the consequences for the developing Commonwealth, though the more advanced members also have their own adjustments to make.

The changes in prospect should, however, be viewed against the relative changes in intra-Commonwealth trade that have already occurred as Commonwealth countries have developed their economies and diversified their trade. It should also be noted that Commonwealth preferences, largely established in response to the high American Smoot-Hawley protectionist measures in the early years of the 1930s depression, have been of diminishing importance with the wider acceptance of generalized preferences schemes by the more advanced nations.

Commonwealth countries have no doubt gained from export advantages in Commonwealth markets, but it would be unwise to assume that the loss of preferences in the British market must mean the end of the relationship. As the Commonwealth is far more than a relic of Empire, it is surely more than privileged access to markets.

An enlarged European Community, however, raises issues which go beyond the impact on Commonwealth trade. There is the basic character of the relationship which Europe seeks to establish with the developing world: does it serve to perpetuate certain forms of relationship tradi-

tionally associated with the colonial era? It is no secret that some aspects of the Yaoundé type of association, originally designed mainly to link former French colonies to the Community, have caused concern in many Commonwealth countries in Africa and the Caribbean.

What worries many of the developing countries of the Commonwealth is the possibility that arrangements entered into with the EEC could mean limitation of their freedom of trade, not only with other developing countries in the Third World but with the developed countries as well. They are also concerned about the implications for their continued access to other aid resources of any arrangements that involve discrimination in favour of the European Community as against other parts of the world. Understandably, therefore, they have tended to view the prospect of special association in their future relationship to Europe with a certain amount of caution.

The extent to which these concerns can be met will depend on the willingness of the members of the European Community to adopt non-exclusive trade policies towards the rest of the world, and to avoid using aid as a lever to seek special commercial privileges. The leaders of Europe have, in fact, pledged themselves to take an outward-looking approach to the Community's role in international affairs. So far as the relationship between the developing members of the Commonwealth and the EEC is concerned, a number of hopeful signs have begun to appear. The indications are that at least some of those responsible for the determination of Community policies have recognized that looser and more liberal arrangements than those contemplated in the past are likely to prove of the greatest benefit to all, developing and developed alike.

While technology has bridged distance and brought the peoples of the world together, the prospect of disruption and division remains. To the danger of fission along lines of race and colour is added the risk of division between the hungry and the well-fed. One line of cleavage is superimposed on the other, deepening tensions between a complacent, white North and a frustrated, dark South. Despite Development Decades and UNCTAD assemblies, with their fanfare and rhetoric, the rich-poor gap is widening, and there is growing disenchantment in the Third World.

Trend to regionalism

The increasing north-south polarization is not the only potentially divisive trend in the world. Recent years have manifested a

Implications include loss of preferences in British market

stronger trend towards regionalism. Regional groupings can provide a basis for useful and practical co-operation and closer relationships among countries facing common problems. In some circumstances, however, there may be a tendency for them to develop an undue degree of exclusiveness, and this, if not recognized and checked by the countries themselves, can develop into isolationism and dangerous splits with other countries or groupings. To counter any such tendencies with a broader vision is an important task of our times.

The Commonwealth is one of the very few viable instruments the world has to meet these dangers. It is a voluntary association that bridges the divides of race, colour and religion, that brings together developed and developing, and reaches into all the continents. Its members comprise a fourth of humanity. Tensions have tested it, and it is the stronger for committing itself unreservedly to racial equality. Newly-woven strands are constantly strengthening the mesh of multilateral links which join its governments, institutions and peoples. Its composition is an antidote to regional exclusiveness or continental chauvinism. Commonwealth co-operation promotes cohesion, dulling the edge of racial passion and softening economic embitterment. The Commonwealth is the suppler for not being monolithic, for being flexibly non-exclusive, bringing its members together in consultation and co-operation while they enjoy freedom of association and action, within and without the Commonwealth.

While the heterogeneity of the Commonwealth enhances its value as a unifying force, certain shared traditions and institutions facilitate co-operation among its members. Besides English, which is widely used in all parts of the Commonwealth, similar political, legal, medical and educational systems have helped to keep the Commonwealth together.

It is now established practice for Commonwealth finance ministers to consult together before the annual World Bank and IMF meetings. Health ministers have similar meetings before the sessions of the World Health Assembly. Education and youth ministers who met in Lusaka this year to discuss the aspirations and problems of youth decided in favour of co-operative action and launched a Commonwealth Youth Program aimed at helping young people to become increasingly active participants in building their societies. This is likely to be one of the principal Commonwealth initiatives of this period, with far-reaching constructive potential. Earlier in the year, there was a Common-

wealth Law Conference in London. The fifth Commonwealth Education Conference will be held in Jamaica next year.

Commonwealth broadcasters meet regularly. So do telecommunications officials. The catalogue of Commonwealth-wide professional consultation is ever-widening, aided greatly by the Commonwealth Foundation. Set up in 1966, it promotes exchanges and helps to establish and strengthen links in professional fields.

Increase in aid flow


Practical assistance is a predominant aspect of Commonwealth relations. The economically-advanced members are major supporters of the development efforts of the others, but the developing members are also playing their part. Commonwealth donors are among the leaders in improving the terms of development aid, and have fulfilled the terms set by the OECD in 1969. The larger part, between 75 and 90 per cent, of their bilateral aid goes to Commonwealth developing states. Intra-Commonwealth aid is expanding, and net aid flows rose 12 per cent in 1971.

Commonwealth countries also provide assistance through multilateral channels like the UN agencies and through purely Commonwealth instruments. Among the latter comes the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, formally set up in 1971. Canada has an intimate link with this fund, providing both its first managing director and the largest share of its resources. All Commonwealth countries contribute, with Canada providing 40 per cent and Britain 30 per cent of its funds on a multiplier basis, increasing in proportion as other contributions rise.

The Commonwealth Fund, for which £ 1-million was pledged in its second year, has established itself quickly as an important source of technical assistance. Under it, the Secretariat is able to provide experts and advisers, to finance training within developing countries and to give special assistance in fields such as export-market development. The number, nature and geographical coverage of projects has grown rapidly. One of the notable features of this program is that it is designed to tap, to the maximum practicable extent, the resources of expertise and training available in developing Commonwealth countries that can be used to the benefit of other developing Commonwealth countries.

It is clear that the growth of Commonwealth consultation among ministers, officials and professionals and the intensification of functional co-operation has been greatly facilitated by the availability of

*Fund established
as key source
of technical aid*



UPI telephoto

Heads of government and officials from 31 Commonwealth nations are shown at the opening session of the Commonwealth

conference held in Singapore in January 1971.

central machinery in the form of the Secretariat, responsible to all the member governments collectively. The Secretariat's role has grown in response to increasing demands for its services from the Commonwealth.

Established by Commonwealth heads of government as "a visible symbol of the spirit of co-operation which animates the Commonwealth", the Secretariat fosters co-operation in a widening spectrum of fields which currently include international affairs, finance, trade, commodities, health, education, youth affairs, law and information. Through the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, it provides technical assistance for economic and social development. It organizes meetings and the pooling of knowledge and experience. It provides expert advice. It is increasingly able to respond quickly and flexibly to the felt needs of member governments. Its regular service of information covers both Commonwealth affairs, as well as international developments, and trends in aid, trade and commodity markets.

It would be disingenuous to suggest that the Commonwealth story is one of unqualified progress, that it has experienced no problems or setbacks, that its face does not sport the occasional wart. There have at times been sharp differences of view among Commonwealth members on a number of issues. It could hardly be otherwise in an association of 32 independent sovereign states drawn from all parts of the world, with each having its own

special interests to protect or advance. It is the differences that make the headlines. What do not get all the publicity they deserve are the innumerable practical ways in which the Commonwealth serves the interests of its members, politically as well as functionally.

Wider consultation

The postwar period has seen not only the expansion of Commonwealth membership but steady growth in Commonwealth activity. The scope for arithmetical enlargement, at least in the conventional sense, will soon be exhausted, but not the opportunities for deriving mutual benefit from wider consultation and greater co-operation. These provide the functional sinew which strengthens Commonwealth links and makes the association more meaningful.

The heads of government meetings provide the occasion both for taking stock of progress achieved and for planning for the future. The Ottawa meeting may be the stage for new initiatives and for developing earlier ideas. One area where discussions have already pointed to opportunities for useful activity is in consultations among senior administrators. These officials face complex problems in administration as well as in co-ordination and communication. Particularly in the developing nations, they are called upon not only to administer but also to promote economic development and social cohesion. Such officials could benefit from regular exchanges of views and experience, and the

Differences get the headlines; practical benefits often overshadowed

chance to refine their skills. The creation of machinery to provide such opportunities, perhaps in the form of a centre for advanced studies in administration for high-level officials, would be a useful innovation.

Expansion of exports

Another sphere in which there is room for rewarding initiatives is in assisting Commonwealth countries to expand their exports. Foreign-exchange earnings are crucially important to development efforts, and export promotion therefore rates high priority among Commonwealth governments.

A modest beginning in Commonwealth activity in this field has been made through the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, which provides technical assistance in export-market development. Most of the developing Commonwealth countries would welcome an extension of these efforts into the area of export credit. Even when prices are competitive, the inability to offer credit terms owing to national foreign-exchange constraints can seriously inhibit a country's attempts to increase exports. Institutional arrangements to help Commonwealth countries overcome this difficulty seem to be a feasible avenue for extending practical co-operation.

These are but two directions in which there appear to be prospects for advantageous new activity. Others will, I think, be explored in Ottawa. There are many ways in which the Commonwealth can increase its usefulness and extend the horizons of co-operation.

All members of the Commonwealth have contributed to its development, its character and its unique style. The Canadian role in shaping the new Commonwealth has been significant, and at times crucial. The decision of Canadian leaders a century ago to retain a transoceanic link with Britain to counterbalance possible pressures from within their own continent can now clearly be seen to have been a foundation-stone for the modern Commonwealth. This link with Britain, which re-fashioned the old umbilical tie into a new two-way relationship devoid of any subordination, was a creative innovation.

At a later stage, Canada was to play an equally decisive role when it asserted its claims to an independent presence at international conferences, rejecting legalistic arguments for the diplomatic unity of the British Empire. Again, in the period leading up to the Second World War, Canada resisted the idea of an Imperial Cabinet, which Mackenzie King feared would imply Whitehall dominance. In

fighting for equality and democracy within the Commonwealth, Canada was paving the way for Asian and African nations to take their place in the new Commonwealth. Had Canada failed to reject the dominance of Downing Street over the Dominions, Asian and African nations are unlikely to have opted to stay within the Commonwealth after independence.

A few years later, Canada played its part in facilitating India's continuing membership as a republic. This was a critical stage in the Commonwealth's constitutional chemistry, which transformed the role of the Queen from presiding over a dwindling Empire to being the titular head of a vigorous Commonwealth. This was another of those innovations that might have appeared startlingly improbable a few years earlier but are now seen as sensible and mature developments.

The Canadian approach to practical internationalism that made possible its creative participation in the Commonwealth has more recently led Canada and another Commonwealth country, Mauritius, to become founder members of the Agence pour Co-operation Technique et Culturelle, a sort of secretariat for La Francophonie, set up to promote cultural and technical co-operation among French-speaking countries. Like the Commonwealth, La Francophonie is a transregional association straddling the racial and economic divisions of mankind, and the Commonwealth Secretariat has been happy to establish cordial and very useful working links with the Secretariat of the new organization. It is my hope that we shall develop in due course some co-operative programs, to help promote co-operation among French-speaking and English-speaking neighbours in Africa and the South Pacific.

Canada is itself a plural society, not immune to the challenges and problems that in Asia and Africa are usually called intercommunal and intertribal. This has not only enriched Canada's cultural and domestic life, it has helped Canadian leaders to understand the difficulties of other countries which are heterogeneous, and to contribute constructively to multi-racial associations like the Commonwealth and now La Francophonie. The Canadian commitment to multiracialism proved particularly useful when the Commonwealth faced a crisis over South Africa, and later in discussions on Rhodesia. The Canadian attitude on these somewhat tricky issues undoubtedly helped in saving the Commonwealth from divisions which could have been fatal.

These contributions to the Common-

*Canada's part
in facilitating
India's adherence
as a republic*

wealth have helped to mould its structure and form its ideology. Canada has also taken a leading share in the functional co-operation that has been an increasingly important feature of Commonwealth relations in their modern phase and translates into action the idea of sharing and participation implied in the term Commonwealth. Canadian contributions to the development efforts of less well-endowed Commonwealth partners are well-known and widely-appreciated. So are its pioneering efforts to improve the terms of aid to developing countries. Poverty and misery continue to test our humanity; the still widening gaps between the affluent and the economically "less developed" parts of our planet test our political common sense.

I trust that Canadians, in co-operation with other members of the Commonwealth will respond to these challenges with imaginative generosity and political wisdom.

In the postwar period, the Commonwealth has grown in membership, widened in its relationships and matured in understanding. In a world where divisions of race and income pose potent dangers and where regionalism issues its siren calls, its relevance stands enhanced. It is neither a substitute for nor a rival to the United Nations, but it is a particularly useful instrument for supplementing the work of the UN and other international organizations in furthering global understanding and co-operation, and in promoting social justice and human dignity.

Canada and the Commonwealth —assuming a leadership role

By Richard H. Leach

At first sight, the topic may seem trite and long since fully explored. Certainly the literature on Canadian foreign policy has titles aplenty, such as Vincent Massey's *Canadians and their Commonwealth* (1961), and official statements by the Department of External Affairs deal regularly with Canadian involvement in Commonwealth affairs. It is thus possible to trace Canada's founding role in the Commonwealth and its continuing participation in it to the present time with little difficulty. One can quickly come to see why Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau could say in his Empire Club speech in Toronto on September 29, 1972, that "the Commonwealth has long been one of the pillars of Canadian foreign policy".

Today Canada's commitment to the Commonwealth is simply taken for

granted, although the Government's most recent definitive statement on foreign policy, *Foreign Policy for Canadians* (1970), dealt with the Commonwealth only casually. The foreign policy review mentioned it in passing in the first general volume and in the volume on Europe, and went into detail — and very little at that — only in the volume on the Pacific. The separate Commonwealth Division disappeared and in 1971 the responsibility for relations with individual members of the Commonwealth was transferred to four regional bureaus created as part of a major departmental reorganization. At the same time, a Commonwealth Institutions Division was set up in a newly-created Bureau of Co-ordination, one of six functional bureaus.

To the extent that there is a current flurry of governmental attention to the Commonwealth, it is owing to the forthcoming Conference of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Ottawa in August of this year. But this pre-conference flurry serves to underline the fact that Canada's position within the Commonwealth has been changing rapidly — and this in several respects.

In recent years, Canada has moved from automatic and ritualistic support of the Commonwealth to active leadership in

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Whether the Canadian people have moved in attitude along with their Government is harder to demonstrate.

Conciliator at Singapore

But it is not hard to demonstrate that the Trudeau Government has moved Canada to new prominence in Commonwealth activities and that Mr. Trudeau himself has emerged as a pre-eminent Commonwealth leader. It was the Prime Minister who stepped in as conciliator with the black members of the Commonwealth to save the day at the Singapore Heads of Government Meeting in 1971; it was Mr. Trudeau who provided the compromise over the issue of Britain's proposed arms sales to South Africa that made the Singapore Declaration finally acceptable to Britain and Australia as well as to the black members of the Commonwealth. This made a harmonious outcome possible. And this came about not by luck or default but because Mr. Trudeau had worked hard ahead of time to pave the way. He had sent Ivan Head, his special assistant, to Africa, before Singapore to persuade the reluctant African leaders to come to Singapore in the first place, and he used every opportunity at Singapore itself to make his advance preparations pay off. Both before and after the Singapore meeting, the Prime Minister has visited a number of Commonwealth countries personally and sent members of his Government to visit others. In Mr. Trudeau's own words: "Of the many initiatives which we have undertaken since 1968, none give me more pride than those which were Commonwealth-oriented."

As a result of his personal efforts, and in appreciation of the efforts of many of his associates, leaders of the developing Commonwealth countries have come increasingly to look to Canada for this advice and help they need. Indeed, in the Caribbean Commonwealth, in such key African countries as Nigeria, Zambia, and Tanzania, and in Malaysia and Singapore, Canada is recognized as the leading Commonwealth Force in many areas of activity.


Moreover, Canada has stepped up its financial support of the Commonwealth. When at Singapore the heads of government agreed to establish on a multilateral basis the ongoing Commonwealth Program for Technical Co-operation, Canada at once announced that it would contribute the lesser of 40 per cent of the total or \$350,000 in each of the first three years of the program's operation. In addition, Canada has pledged to contribute 14.75 per cent of the total budget of the Commonwealth Foundation, (£350,000) for each

year through 1976. When to these figures are added Canada's share (19.55 per cent) of the annual costs of the Commonwealth Secretariat — in 1972-73, \$148,846; of the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux — 1972-73, \$463,000; of the Commonwealth Committee on Mineral Processing — 1972-73; \$1,000; of the Commonwealth Forestry Institute — 1972-73, \$8,000; of the Commonwealth Institute — 1972-73, \$7,800; of the Commonwealth Legal Advisory Service — 1972-73, \$8,000; of the tenth Commonwealth Mining and Metallurgical Conference — \$50,000; of the Canadian Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association — 1972-73, \$27,500 — and Canada's share of the expenses of the association's operation in London — 1972-73, \$33,000, and of the Commonwealth Scientific Conference Geological Liaison Office — 1972-73, \$5,000 — the total is impressive. And these figures, of course, do not include Canada's commitments under the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan or the substantial amounts of aid given to developing countries in the Commonwealth.

Colombo Plan aid

Indeed, as the new multiracial Commonwealth has developed over the last decade or so, Canada has met each stage of development with an appropriate form of aid to the emerging countries. Canada early joined in the Colombo Plan, and in volume it is still the largest of the bilateral programs Canada maintains. From food aid and technical assistance, the focus of the Asian aid program has shifted to commodity loans and other forms of balance-of-payment support. India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaysia have been the major recipients under the program, though Singapore has had some assistance. In Commonwealth Africa, the emphasis of the Canadian aid program was on technical and educational assistance when it was first established in the early 1960s; subsequently it shifted to support of capital projects. Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana have been the chief beneficiaries of the Canadian aid program, with Sierra Leone, Mauritius and Malawi as minor recipients. And, in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Canada began a modest program in 1958 and has steadily expanded it since then. The program there concentrates on assistance in transportation, water supply, agricultural development and education. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados have all had a good deal of Canadian aid from the beginning, and recently the program has been expanded considerably by a long-

Focus was shifted in Asian program from food aid, technical assistance



Information Canada Photo

The External Affairs Department set up a special Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Task Force to prepare for the Commonwealth conference taking place in Ottawa from August 2 to 10. This marks the first time that Canada has been host to a Commonwealth heads of government meeting. Pictured conferring on plans for the conference are

members of the task force (left to right): Ms. Judy McCann, administrative secretary; Lt.-Col. H. L. Graves, Department of National Defence co-ordinator; B. V. Johnstone, External Affairs, administration officer; V. G. Chapman of the Prime Minister's Office, deputy director; and Peter Roberts, External Affairs, director of the task force.

term development scheme for the Leeward and Windward Islands, technical and capital assistance for Belize and the establishment of an agricultural development fund and general assistance for the University of the West Indies. Though these programs do not constitute all Canada's aid to developing countries, they do represent a sizeable proportion of it. In 1972-73, the total amount in dollars was close to \$200-million.

Thus the Commonwealth provides Canada with an international position it might not otherwise have. Canadians are a felt presence in much of the developing world, and in the councils of the developed nations as well, as a result of Canada's extensive Commonwealth engagements. Obviously, cynics might argue, Canada saw a good chance for self-promotion, an opportunity to provide a counterbalance to domination by the United States, and grabbed it. To be sure, it costs something, but it is a small cost to pay for elevation into a seat of world power, where Canada is regarded more warmly than its southern neighbour.

National motivations are hard to assess, and there may well be some of this in Canada's decision to develop its position in the Commonwealth. But there is

evidence too that Canada did not push itself to Commonwealth eminence as much as have it thrust upon it. Britain began to give notice in the 1950s that it was relinquishing its pre-eminent position in Commonwealth affairs, and the United Kingdom shortly followed word by deed. Had the Secretariat not been established when it was in 1965, to take over the machinery of the Commonwealth from England, the Commonwealth might well have fallen apart. Australia had opposed the conception of a secretariat, and most of the other old Commonwealth nations were in no position to assume a leadership role. It was thus probably no coincidence that a Canadian, Arnold Smith, was chosen as Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. His selection made it natural for Canada to take an increasing interest in the Commonwealth. Canada might not have moved as quickly, however, had there not been the appeal of unanswered need from the developing Commonwealth. There is surely an intimate connection between the generally-recognized Canadian commitment to assisting less fortunate countries and the void in Commonwealth leadership. The two forces happened to intersect at about the same time. Prime Minister Lester Pearson appreciated the situation and

Canada thrust into prominence with diminution of U.K. position

gave his support to an increasing thrust of Canadian activity in the Commonwealth. But it remained for Prime Minister Trudeau to bring it into blossom.

Trudeau's 'conversion'

It has been remarked by a number of his critics that Mr. Trudeau was not very Commonwealth-minded at first. Certainly, some of his early comments about it seem to support that conclusion. But once fully into office and made cognizant both of national pro-Commonwealth feeling on the one hand and of the needs of the Commonwealth in a changing world on the other — and probably of the personal and national prestige the opportunity promised too — Mr. Trudeau adjusted his sights. The record of Canada's increasingly prominent role in Commonwealth affairs since then has already been described.

But Mr. Trudeau's "conversion" led to more than a more active and directive role for Canada in Commonwealth activities. It led also to a re-examination of the use of the forum function of the Commonwealth and a suggestion for its redirection, — an approach that will be tested in August at the Heads of Government Meeting. It has long been accepted by its members that "consultation is the lifeblood of the Commonwealth association". Thus not only the prime ministers have long been meeting in conference but a host of other Commonwealth officials in a wide variety of fields as well. Much more attention has been paid to the prime ministers' meetings over the years than to the meetings of ministers and officials, usually because the prime ministers have ordinarily used the occasion of their meeting to apply their collective thoughts to whatever happened to be the current crisis of the day.

As the nature of the Commonwealth changed, and a steadily larger number of divergent views began to be represented at the meetings, more often than not the meetings failed to yield productive results. The Singapore session of heads of government in 1971 nearly saw the Commonwealth come apart at the seams. As already noted, it was largely through Prime Minister Trudeau's efforts that this did not happen. And it may well be that the occasion will not arise again in the future, also because of a Trudeau input.

It seemed to Mr. Trudeau that Singapore was the natural result of viewing the Commonwealth's forum function in the wrong perspective. Inasmuch as the Commonwealth tie itself no longer had much political content and increasingly less economic content, it was obviously inappropriate to use it as a forum for the

consideration of political or economic questions. For what, then? For co-operation in devising methods for the better government and greater coherence of all the nations involved in the Commonwealth. In other words, the consultative role of the Commonwealth should be shifted from one directed to mediation (the "helpful fixer") to one focusing on promotion of "techniques of improving . . . the parliamentary democratic system" (the apt descriptive phrases of Thomas Hockin in his recent *The Canadian Condominium: Domestic Issues and External Policy*). As Prime Minister Trudeau himself put it recently, the important thing is to focus Commonwealth discussions "not essentially on the clashes that happen today and tomorrow, but on things which are useful in the medium and long term . . . on the importance of exchanging information on the techniques of government . . . [on] planning in a cabinet and parliamentary form of government . . . [on the] use . . . of committee systems, [on] . . . budgeting techniques", on how to "set the priorities . . . [on] getting legislative timetable[s] set up", on how to "ensure the co-operation of the opposition parties". (Press conference. London, December 4, 1972).

Thus it was at Mr. Trudeau's suggestion at Singapore that the Commonwealth Secretariat subsequently organized a conference of cabinet secretaries or permanent heads of prime ministerial or presidential departments in member countries to explore the dimensions of a comparative study of techniques of government to meet the challenge of self-government in a technological age. At Canadian invitation, such a meeting was held in Ottawa from October 16 to 19, 1972. Most Commonwealth member countries were represented at the meeting. Mr. Trudeau himself attended the sessions in the middle of the federal election campaign. The officials present "compared notes . . . on the most appropriate relationship between the public service and the government, implementing cabinet decisions effectively, and improving communications between the government and the people" (Commonwealth Secretariat press release, Ottawa, October 19, 1972). Moreover, again in consequence of a direction from the Singapore meeting, the officials agreed on the procedures to be followed at future Heads of Government Meetings so as to restore greater intimacy and informality to those meetings and to direct them toward long-range questions. Canada also took the initiative in securing the next Heads of Government Meeting for Ottawa in August 1973.

In a short space of time, thus, Canada

*Commonwealth
seen inappropriate
as a forum
for political,
economic issues*

*Relations changing
but British ties
still remain
of central concern*

has begun to redirect the attention of the highest unit of the functioning Commonwealth away from discussion of each member nation's internal policies toward the consideration of basic governmental techniques and methods, the mastery of which alone will secure democratic government in the member countries. In this way especially, the Commonwealth can contribute greatly "to the adjustments required by the accession to independence of its members from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean", always areas of particular concern to Canada (External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp, House of Commons, December 1, 1971). Time is, of course, necessary to judge how well the Commonwealth stays on this track. Finally, a word needs to be said about Canada's changing relationships with individual members of the Commonwealth. Canada's relation to Britain remains its central concern with the Commonwealth. Although with Britain's entry into the European Common Market that relationship will no doubt undergo change, the fact that there is close liaison between the prime ministers, as well as through the Canada-U.K. Continuing Committee, and the fact that Britain remains an important supplier of imports to Canada, virtually guarantees the continuation of the basic harmony that has long marked the many contacts between the two countries. "For our part," the Canadian High Commissioner in London said last year, "we will continue to cherish and foster the direct relationship with Britain. At the same time we will be trying to deepen the links with the other members of the EEC and the Community as a whole. In all this, Canadians will count on Britain's co-operation and support."

Expanding contacts

If there is nothing surprising in Canada's determination to continue to be close to Britain, it is surprising how greatly Canada has expanded its contacts with other members of the Commonwealth in recent years. Today, indeed, there are only a few new and small members of the Commonwealth with which Canada is not tied directly in one way or another. Canada has a long history of interest in the Caribbean, and particularly in the Caribbean Commonwealth but, since 1966, when a Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada Conference was held in Ottawa, Canada has sharpened that interest and begun to take the initiative in developing a continuing dialogue with the several Commonwealth Caribbean countries, on the one hand, and in offering an increasing range of specific aids, on the other. In a way, the Caribbean Common-

*Long history
of interest
in the Caribbean*

wealth provides the model Canada is seeking to follow in its relations with other parts of the developing Commonwealth.

That model is being followed in Canada's developing relations with the newly independent Commonwealth African countries. Perhaps because of a felt need to balance its attention to *francophon* Africa, but even more likely as a product of its deep commitment to bridging the gap between the rich and poor nations of the postwar world, Canada has come to play an important role in African development. The Canadian presence is felt especially in West Africa. *Foreign Policy for Canadians* made specific reference to Canada's interest in Southern Africa, and the recent establishment of a Canadian mission, headed by a high commissioner, in Lusaka, Zambia, is concrete evidence of that interest.

Pacific faces

Finally, Canada is turning to the Pacific Commonwealth in ways it never has before. The facts that Canada has a Pacific as well as an Atlantic face and that the power balance has shifted dramatically in that area have caused it to seek contacts and relationships with Commonwealth Pacific nations beyond the merely fraternal links it long had enjoyed with the older of those nations. Thus Canada is now "in constant bilateral contact with Australia and New Zealand, formerly seen principally as [merely] fellow-members of the Commonwealth", about a wide range of matters of mutual national interest (Address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Vancouver, January 17, 1972).

So short a summary does not do justice to Canada's continuing interest in India and its immediate response to the needs of Bangladesh, or to its contacts with other Commonwealth nations. It may suffice, however, to show Canada in a new light in a great many developing bilateral Commonwealth relations.

Such concentration on Canada and the Commonwealth may seem to suggest that promotion of the Commonwealth has become Canada's chief concern in the international arena. That, of course, is not so. The desire to move ahead in Commonwealth relations does not occupy nearly the same priority in Canadian thinking as Canadian-American relations, or as developing links with Japan, or even, just at present, Latin America. But this is not to say that the Commonwealth is Canada's Cinderella, kept in the chimney-corner and sadly neglected. Canada has a conscious Commonwealth policy and pursues it

steadily. It is all the more remarkable that Canada does so in view of the heavy demands on its time and attention imposed by concern over such major questions as Canadian-U.S. relations, negotiations with the enlarged European Economic Community and international trade problems.

Despite Canada's long involvement in Commonwealth affairs and its more recent assumption of Commonwealth leadership, there remains a continuing need in Canada to maintain and increase the information available to Canadians about the Commonwealth. If the Cumberland Lodge group felt there was a lack of knowledge in Canada about Britain, how much greater the communications gap must be with regard to the newer and more remote Commonwealth members! (*Britain and Canada: A Colloquy*. A report of discussions held at Cumberland Lodge, England, September 3-5, 1971.) The Information Division of the Department of External Affairs is evidently cognizant of the problem and is attempting to fill the void. But it cannot do the job alone.

Perhaps a Canadian equivalent of the Commonwealth Institute in London is needed. Even more, some kind of regular attention to Commonwealth matters in the

press is required. By and large, Commonwealth reporters do not exist in Canada. What does appear in the press is most often crisis-related. This not only serves to distort the opinion of the average Canadian about the Commonwealth, but may indeed contribute to negative feeling toward it. The full development of the Information Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat may be a partial answer. In any event, if the Canadian people are to stay with their Government as the Government develops its new Commonwealth approach, they need not only to become more aware of Canada's Commonwealth partners but also of the vital role Canada is coming to play in the maturing of many of them.

When the heads of Commonwealth governments meet for the first time on Canadian soil in August, they will be the guests of what seems to have become the new *primus inter pares* among them. At this point in time, it seems likely that Canada will occupy that status for quite a while. The evidence suggests that Canada's new Commonwealth stance is not merely a Trudeau frill but a development arising out of Canada's own best interests. As such, it deserves both support and applause.

Find reporting crisis-related, distorting opinion on Commonwealth

Setting the Commonwealth pattern

The Ottawa conference could set the Commonwealth pattern for a long time to come. It will be held, incidentally, for the first time in the country which a century ago became the first territory in the British Empire to achieve self-government from Britain by mutual agreement. It will be the third conference held outside Britain and the first to be hosted by a member of, for want of a better phrase, the Old Commonwealth overseas.... Most significantly of all, perhaps, the conference is being held after British entry into the European Economic Community....

... The conference meets at a good time, for it will follow a period in which all the public focus has been on Europe, and when the relationship of the Commonwealth *vis-à-vis* Europe may begin to be seen in a less emotional perspective.

The conference will publicly demonstrate that, despite Britain's EEC membership, the Commonwealth is still there. The case that the EEC and the Commonwealth are not alternatives, but are quite different types of international organization, each

with its own job to do, may take some years to prove; yet Ottawa should go some way toward supporting it....

The topic that is sure to dominate this conference is the one in which the British Prime Minister is so intensely interested; the new Europe of The Nine and its impact on the rest of the world. Every Commonwealth country is anxious about its relationship with this new economic giant and is looking to Britain for help in the long negotiations upon which each must embark this year and upon which will depend, in some cases, its whole economic future — perhaps for decades to come....

Now that Britain is in the Common Market, her Commonwealth connections can only enhance the British voice at Brussels and assist Mr. Heath's hopes of a more outward-looking Community. Furthermore, Britain needs to prove to the Commonwealth that its arguments about British entry strengthening and not weakening the association were not empty and facile phrases.... (Derek Ingram, *The Round Table*, April 1973).

Labour's Whitlam fashioning a new posture for Australia

By Alan Fitzgerald

On the day Edward Gough Whitlam was sworn in as Prime Minister and leader of the first Australian Labour Government in 23 years, he said he wanted an Australia "which would enjoy a growing standing as a distinctive, tolerant, co-operative and well regarded nation, not only in the Asian and Pacific regions but in the world at large".

One of the first acts of the new administration was to reverse Australia's pattern of voting in the United Nations General Assembly: where Australia had abstained or voted against resolutions concerning Southern Africa, the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, *apartheid* and self-determination, it now voted affirmatively. Mr. Whitlam was using the UN to demonstrate his Government's break with past attitudes and to proclaim its readiness to adopt a new, more independent posture.

The withdrawal of the remaining Australian servicemen from Vietnam, the announcement of an end of military aid to Cambodia and Vietnam and the recognition of the People's Republic of China soon followed.

These actions were accompanied by criticism in private and public of President Nixon's Christmas bombing of Hanoi. To be independent meant having a voice of one's own.

For Australians in general it was the beginning of a new experience. They had elected to power a Government not only committed to social change but that would evolve a new image for Australia.

As Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Whitlam saw the na-

tion's foreign policy being built on a "wise, proper and prudent balance between commitment and power".

The emphasis would be on regional co-operation and no longer on military alliance. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was dismissed as "moribund" in its present form. The Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), because of the continued membership of Taiwan, was seen as anachronistic.

The four commitments in Australian foreign policy were to: (a) national security; (b) securing of a united, friendly and independent Papua New Guinea; (c) achievement of closer relations with Australia's nearest and largest neighbour, Indonesia; and (d) promotion of the peace and prosperity of the neighbouring region.

The ultimate commitment, according to Mr. Whitlam, is to preserve stable and peaceful relations between the great powers. The idea of Australia attempting diplomatic initiatives as a middle power can only be seen to be daring in the context of the country's immediate past history. For the previous 23 years, the public theme of Australia's relations with the world was one of loyalty to what Sir Robert Menzies called "our great and powerful friends", that is, to the policies promoted by the United States and, to an ever lesser extent, Britain.

This loyalty had sent Menzies to Cairo at the time of Suez and Australian conscripts to Vietnam during the days Prime Minister Harold Holt declared us to be going "all the way with L.B.J.". What Whitlam does now must be compared with what his predecessors were prepared to do in the Fifties and Sixties.

Since the Government changed on December 2, 1972, Australia has established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam and East Germany and is responding to approaches from North Korea.

The visit of the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia presented Australia with an opportunity to establish closer contact with the non-aligned nations. The Yugo-



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slav delegation suggested it would promote Australian attendance, with observer status, at the September meeting of the non-aligned nations in Algiers.

At the time of writing no decision has been made, but Australian representation would be in accord with the Government's desire for closer relations with the Afro-Asian bloc.

The Whitlam determination to steer Australian foreign policy in new directions is based on the belief that time and a reduction in tension between the major powers allow the opportunity to proceed.

No conflict of interest

Australia has no conflict of interest with any of its neighbours, and optimistic predictions of ten years or more suggest that none is foreseeable.

Asia, therefore, is not a front-line, a place where enemies have to be fought and contained before they reach national soil, as was the case with the Japanese in the Second World War, the Communists in Korea and Vietnam and, behind them, the shadow of China in the years since, or even the Sukarno regime at the time of Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia.

Mr. Whitlam wants the Australian people to shed the old fears and animosities which he claims have encumbered the national spirit for generations and dominated, for domestic partisan purposes, the foreign policy of the nation.

Traditionally, in all Australian general elections since 1949, the Labour Party was held to be "weak" on foreign policy, untrustworthy with Australia's security, anti-American and "soft" on Communism.

Paradoxically, President Nixon's visit to Peking (rather than Mr. Whitlam's which preceded it) and the enunciation of the Guam Doctrine had their impact on Australian domestic politics, to the advantage of the Labour Party. If Australia's great and powerful friend could come to terms with the "Red Bogeymen", perhaps Labour could be trusted. Labour was elected to office because its social policy, geared to the contemporary needs of the nation, could not be rejected on the basis of doubts about its foreign policies.

In February, Mr. Whitlam visited Indonesia. The Prime Minister's visit was not so much an initiative as a continuation of Australia's interest in maintaining good relations with its near neighbour. Liberal Prime Ministers Holt, Gorton and McMahon had all been to Djakarta before him with aid and friendly overtures.

Mr. Whitlam affirmed his Government's support for the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) proposal



UPI photo

Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam looks over the text of a statement during a nationally-televised press conference after he led Australia's Labour Party to victory in last December's general election.

The Labour Party returned to power after 23 years out of office.

for a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia. Australia is not a member of ASEAN, and Mr. Whitlam, dissatisfied with Australian membership in SEATO and ASPAC, floated the idea of a new, wider regional organization, which would include Australia, New Zealand, China and Japan. The idea was to complement ASEAN and not replace it with the new body, which would be without ideological overtones and would help free the Asian-Pacific area from great-power rivalries. The Indonesians did not warm to the proposal but recognized its potential value in the long term. Later, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister (Tun Dr. Ismail) was to react similarly.

This was seen as a rebuff to Mr. Whitlam, although he explained it by claiming that his proposals were preliminary and exploratory. There arises the possibility of two complementary regional

organizations — one for Asia (dominated by Indonesia but excluding Australia) and another for the Pacific (excluding Indonesia, but in which Australia would play a paramount part).

For the present, Australia is a party to the Five-Power Defence Arrangements among Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, New Zealand and Australia. Although Australia will withdraw its battalion from Singapore at the end of 1973 in accordance with Labour policy opposing the stationing of troops overseas, it will honour its commitment to ANZUS to stabilize the region. This means Australia will maintain some logistic support troops in Singapore to facilitate joint training exercises, and its small naval contingent and two squadrons of *Mirages* in Malaysia. The five-power commitment will endure as an interim measure pending neutralization of the region.

Mr. Whitlam would like to see a much lower profile emerge for SEATO if Australia is to continue to play any part in it. He would like to see it become a vehicle for co-operation and technical and cultural exchange rather than continue as a military pact owing its existence to fear of China and the sound of falling dominoes.

Similarly, ASPAC is held to be another Cold War anachronism. Australia, New Zealand and Japan have recognized China (and Malaysia is moving towards recognition), yet Taiwan remains a member. The existence of ASPAC in its present form can only add support to the proposal for some more wide-ranging association of Asian and Pacific nations.

Commonwealth role

Britain's entry into the Common Market, its preoccupation with European affairs and its diminishing world role have served to underline the weaker links between Australia and what used to be called "the mother country".

However, the Australian Government still attaches a measure of importance to the Commonwealth. It provides a framework for co-operation and contacts at all levels with African, Caribbean, Pacific and Asian countries.

It sees the Commonwealth as presenting opportunities for promotion of peace and social and economic advancement in a multiracial group of more intimate nature than the UN.

Although it is a basic objective of the Whitlam Government to foster close and continuing co-operation with the United States, ready realization of that objective may prove difficult. The problem arises from within the Labour Party itself. On the left of the party, both within the trade

union and parliamentary wings, there are elements emotionally and intellectually opposed to the Nixon Administration. Outbursts of what Washington would term "anti-Americanism" are likely to occur from time to time and yet not be significant in terms of policy formation.

A Labour Government looks to a more mature and less adulatory relationship with the United States; Mr. Nixon was given an illustration of what that meant in practice when he received a strong personal note from Mr. Whitlam critical of his decision to bomb Hanoi in December. There was also a verbal tongue-lashing of American Vietnam policy by three Cabinet Ministers, on which Mr. Whitlam, as Foreign Minister, did not comment.

Recognition of China

The Australian Government has since recognized China and North Vietnam, and may soon recognize North Korea. These actions would not have been taken at this time by the previous conservative administration of Mr. McMahon, which gave the appearance of being willing to follow Washington's lead.

Under the previous Australian Government, ANZUS (the defence treaty linking Australia, the United States and New Zealand) was invoked domestically with the fervour of love of mother, country or God. Mr. Whitlam would change ANZUS from a military treaty into one which was an instrument "for peace and justice and political, social and economic advancement in the Pacific area".

He regards ANZUS as no more than the legal embodiment of common interests but is wary of placing too much reliance upon ANZUS as a sole objective of foreign policy because this would, in fact, place Australian foreign policy in suspension.

The ending of American intervention in Indochina is seen by Mr. Whitlam as removing the one serious difference between the two governments. However, the existence of a number of secret American bases in Australia and Mr. Whitlam's refusal to disclose "American secrets" has produced some tension within the Labour Party, dedicated as it is to a policy of open government.

Mr. Whitlam has headed off his critics by agreeing to renegotiate the terms on which U.S. bases operate, blaming the previous Liberal-Country Party Government for not insisting on joint control.

At the March meeting of the general assembly of the Victoria State branch of the Labour Party, Mr. Whitlam declared that his Government would not yield to

Whitlam seeks lower profile for SEATO

pressure from within the party to break the American alliance, withdraw from ANZUS or divulge information about American defence bases that would render their operation useless. On this occasion, Mr. Whitlam carried the day. His foray into the state assembly was seen as a move to forestall possible trouble over the bases at the July federal conference of the Labour Party.

Mr. Whitlam, as head of the Government, is still subject, as are other parliamentary members of the party, to decisions on policy made at annual conferences of the Labour Party held every two years. The conference is made up of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, the Leader and Deputy Leader in the Senate, 42 delegates from the six state branches, one delegate each from the federal territories and one representative of the Young Labour Movement.

What happens at a federal conference is determined by which faction produces "the numbers" to have its policy adopted. In refusing to disclose information about the Pine Gap and Nurrungar defence installations, Mr. Whitlam has successfully evaded the spirit of the last federal conference in 1971, which called for their general purposes to be revealed.

Keyed to 1971 policy

In anticipation of an embarrassing policy decision arising from this year's conference, Mr. Whitlam has put forward the novel suggestion that his Government was elected on the 1971 policy and should not be bound by new policies until it has sought a new mandate from the people at the next election. In other words, any policies arising from the July conference would go on the shelf until an election. Mr. Whitlam's interpretation, while politically expedient, rests on the assumption that what a conference can do to a parliamentary party in opposition is different from what it can do to a party in power.

Unresolved at the time of writing is a decision by the Whitlam Government on whether the United States will be allowed to establish an Omega navigational base in Australia. In an attempt to defuse the "foreign bases" aspect of the decision, Mr. Whitlam asked his Minister for Transport to make a submission on the question to the Cabinet. Yet, in opposition, the Labour Party had claimed that Omega could be used by missile-carrying U.S. submarines and was primarily of defence significance.

The democratic nature of the Australian Labour Party, the fact that it embraces left and right, and the influence the party can bring to bear on the Govern-

ment may make Washington long for a return to the good old days when it dealt with an essentially pragmatic conservative administration not given to agonizing about its ideology.

The Crown

It is inevitable, with the nationalistic stance of the new administration, that the continued role of the monarchy in Australia will be questioned.

Republicanism is not a political issue in Australia. Attitudes to the Crown are more likely to be shaped by one's age or ethnic origin. Young people, naturalized Australians of non-British origin, and even third or fourth-generation Australians of Irish origin, see the Crown as an anachronism. Mr. Whitlam's allegedly republican actions must be seen more as a response to reality than as an attempt to shape public opinion.

On achieving office, Mr. Whitlam became the first Australian Prime Minister to decline to become a member of the Privy Council. He sponsored a competition to find a new national anthem to replace *God Save the Queen*, and abolished the practice of the Federal Government recommending citizens for imperial honours. There will be more Australian knights created this year, as three of the six state governments (all non-Labour) will continue, twice yearly, to forward a list to Buckingham Palace for inclusion in the Queen's Birthday and New Year's Honours Lists.

Australian passports will no longer carry the words "British subject" and immigrants presenting themselves for naturalization will no longer have to swear allegiance to the Queen but rather to uphold the Australian Constitution (of which the monarchy is an integral part), but these simple administrative actions have aroused no passions.

True, Sir Robert Menzies, the former Australian Prime Minister, addressed, by means of a tape-recording, a meeting of the Australia-Britain Society, urging them to uphold the British connection, but Sir Robert's personal affection for the monarchy and his "British-to-the-boot-heels" declaration were never as deeply felt by the nation as a whole during his long period in office.

A recent public-opinion poll showed 54 per cent of those questioned favouring retention of the monarchy, but the majority in favour of the institution has declined steadily over the years the poll has been taken. Significantly, a majority of those in the age group 16 to 24 favours the introduction of a republic.

Alter passports, naturalization procedure for immigrants

*Charisma alone
is not enough
but Whitlam
carrying the day
for the present*

It was to this youthful majority that the Governor-General, Sir Paul Hasluck, addressed himself in reading the Government's program at the opening of the first session of the twenty-eighth Parliament in February.

He spoke of the manifest desire of large sections of the Australian community, particularly the youthful majority, for a more tolerant, more open, more humane, more equal, yet more diverse society. The address foreshadowed the introduction of legislation lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 years.

A great deal of legislation will be put through the Parliament this year to fulfill Labour's election promises. Many of the measures will be accepted by Labour's enemies as well as its friends as long overdue. The young, especially, feel Australia is moving at last, and that in itself is an achievement.

Undoubtedly it is Mr. Whitlam who has brought Labour out of the wilderness, delivered it from 23 sterile years in opposition. At 56, Mr. Whitlam is a big man, 6 feet 4 inches tall, who, physically as well as intellectually, dominates the Parliament.

A succession of earnest plodders and indolent playboys in the job of Australian Prime Minister and a state-rights constitution which has shackled many would-be reformers... had left Australians unprepared for the dazzling first hundred days of Labour....

In the first few days... Gough Whitlam recognized China, North Vietnam and East Germany, ended Australian military participation in South Vietnam, abolished conscription and freed draft-dodgers, announced a new deal for aborigines, tore up the New Year Honours List and said there would be no more honours while Labour ruled, abolished the racially offensive "white Australia policy", barred racially-selected South African sporting teams from visiting or passing through Australia....

... To many people in Australia this looked like a left-wing variation of the Gaullist style of thunderbolt decision from high places which the French call Jupiterism....

Australia was prepared for Whitlam's announcement of a 35-hour week and \$84 minimum wage.... But a complete change in Australia's stance in the world and a major and apparently sincere redefinition of the whole purpose of the nation seemed at first far beyond Mr. Whitlam's mandate....

Articulate and cultured though he is an element of malice has often given a cutting edge to his wit, particularly when directed at less able men. His apparent arrogance has been largely dissipated by the euphoria of power enjoyed at last once under pressure, it could reassert itself, and not only to his national cost.

Like all men with a sense of their own destiny, and with a desire to shape events to their personal vision, Mr. Whitlam is not without critics in his own Government. The Labour Party, by tradition working class, blue collar and egalitarian, is suspicious of "Great Men" who display their talent ostentatiously. In this regard, Mr. Whitlam is cast in the mould of a Menzies but, unfortunately for him, leading the wrong kind of party. Unlike the Liberal Party, which Mr. Menzies fashioned in his own image to win victory in 1949, and for his successors to hold office until 1972, the Labour Party has its own system of checks against its leader assuming too much personal initiative in policy formation. Charisma alone is not enough. But for the present Mr. Whitlam is making the running and carrying all before him.

Mr. Whitlam looked to many people in Australia like a saloon-bar radical who was trying to set the world to rights without regard to harsh political realities.

In my view, however, he has a very exact idea of the way his own country works and of the difficulties he is going to face in getting his program through.

Australians have never been able to make up their minds whether their country is a helpless European orphan marooned among land-hungry Asians, or an advanced outpost of Western civilization called on to support Britain or the United States in making the world safe for democracy.

In truth, Mr. Whitlam says, Australia is neither. "Our actual situation is this: we are far and away the richest nation in the neighbourhood. We have a gross national product equal to that of all the countries between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea (that is, from Bangladesh to Vietnam). Those countries have twenty times our population. We are an island continent with one of the most formidable natural defences in the world. We have no serious conflict of interest with any of our neighbours, and there are no foreseeable conflicts likely to arise well beyond this decade." (Excerpts from study of Mr. Whitlam by Murray Sayle of *The Sunday Times* of London, reprinted in *The Globe and Mail*, April 3, 1973).

Scanning the 'troubled waters' of Canadian-American relations

By R. M. Fowler

The traditional way to reduce turbulence at sea is to pour oil on the troubled waters. That remedy, however, was developed before present concerns about pollution and it may no longer be acceptable. In any case, the waters of Canadian-American relations are undoubtedly troubled today, and there is little indication that Canadian oil can, or will, do much to quiet them.

Canadian resources of oil and gas are undoubtedly important and are, in Canadian terms, substantial. Canada is unique among Western industrial nations in having the capacity to supply all its energy needs from domestic resources—including, in particular, oil and gas. It is true that new discoveries in the conventional producing areas of Western Canada have, in recent years, been disappointing, resulting in a declining index for known reserves. However, exploration in the frontier areas has resulted in major discoveries of gas, though not yet of oil, in the Mackenzie Delta and the High Arctic. These discoveries are greatly in excess of Canada's needs in the foreseeable future, and they can probably only be exploited if directed mainly to the U.S. market. Thus, access to the American market is most important if Canada is to develop its full potential.

Today, available supplies from conventional reserves in Western Canada can do little to meet the energy needs of the United States. They are important in certain areas in the mid-West, but Canadian needs are growing and U.S. energy requirements are growing in even greater volume. Current Canadian exports of oil amount to little more than one year's growth in U.S. demand.

From this, it follows that oil and gas policy should not loom so large as a cause of friction between Canada and the United States. Its immediate importance is grossly exaggerated on both sides of the border. Americans should not think that Canada is sitting on rich, available supplies which,

if we did not take a "dog-in-the-manger" attitude, would keep their buses running and their home-fires burning. Equally, Canadians should not suppose that their available supplies of oil and gas give them a powerful bargaining counter in trade discussions with the United States.

In the short run, Canada can do little more to ease the American "energy crisis". The only conceivable way to meet American requirements in the next few years is for the United States to increase oil imports, largely from unstable areas such as the Middle East, to levels hitherto considered to be imprudent. Perhaps as much as 50 per cent of U.S. oil requirements will have to be imported by the end of the present decade.

Long-term picture

Over the longer term, the picture is quite different. Demands in both the United States and Canada will continue to rise, but not necessarily at past and present rates as consumption patterns adapt to the fact that energy will no longer be abundant and cheap. At new cost-price relations, new and less vulnerable energy sources can be developed to meet rising demands in both the United States and Canada. We

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have vast, proven energy reserves in the tar-sands and there are heavy oil and shale deposits, as well as nuclear energy. Currently-known and potentially greater reserves in the frontier areas of the Arctic, and probably off the East Coast, can become available when the economic equation justifies their use.

All these solutions take a long time — perhaps ten to 15 years — and require determined programs by both Canada and the United States, which by their very nature are interrelated and interdependent. We are not going to have a “continental energy policy”, except in the sense that two national policies must add up to some kind of policy for North America. What we need is a “friendly energy policy” where each side, in developing its own programs, recognizes the other's problems and limitations.

In the short term, a more relaxed and flexible Canadian policy might, in a minor way, ease some American difficulties, at no great risk or cost to Canada. However, it is the longer-term development of new energy sources that is more important and, in this undertaking, Canada, while pursuing an independent energy policy, must know about and take account of what Americans are doing. So used, oil could help to reduce some of the turbulences on the troubled waters of Canadian-American relations.

Focus on economic relations

External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp's essay last October entitled *Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future* deals more generally with the troubled waters between the two countries. It is mainly concerned with economic relations, although it deals also with cultural relations. On the latter, it seems to conclude that the Canadian public is not anything like as concerned about American cultural influences as about economic relations. Anyway, the study seems to assume that the essential choices to preserve Canada's cultural identity have been made and that a continuation of regulation and public support of cultural activity in Canada is working satisfactorily. As an old broadcasting hand, I should be inclined to doubt these conclusions, but shall not debate them as I am not sure that much more can be done, or would be acceptable, on the cultural front.

On the economic front, the External Affairs study is a useful and well-written commentary on Canadian-American relations. But I, at least, found it a curiously unsatisfactory and inconclusive document. It starts by setting out clearly the various

historical stages in the relationship and touches on most of the new domestic and international factors that now influence it. Then it tails off into a discussion of three so-called options for Canadian economic policy towards the United States — which, when you examine them, are not really distinct options at all.

The second option — that Canada should move deliberately toward closer integration with the United States — is really put up as a straw man to be quickly knocked down. The argument is that closer economic integration would quickly lead to a free-trade area, which would soon become a customs union, and probably move on to a political union. This reasoning has been sharply questioned by Dr. Harry Johnson in a subsequent commentary (*International Perspectives*, January-February 1973). He argues that Mitchell Sharp's use of the European Free Trade Association experience to support the thesis that a free-trade area must move “toward a full customs and economic union as a matter of internal logic” is factually wrong. Professor Johnson argues that this is the option Canada should choose in its own best economic interests and that the best way for Canada to be truly independent of the United States is to secure the maximum possible participation in American affluence and dynamism and spend the resulting profits in our own way. However, Mr. Sharp suggests — probably rightly — that this option is not politically tenable in the present or any foreseeable climate of Canadian public opinion. And Harry Johnson concludes that we shall not adopt a deliberate policy of closer economic integration with the United States. So, the two come to the same result on this one.

Options One and Three appear to be different, but are really almost indistinguishable. The first option is described as “more or less to maintain the present relationship with a minimum of policy adjustments”. However, it is carefully explained that this is not an option meaning no change, as there are many things to be done. Option Three is the one that the minister seems to favour, although he does not say so specifically. It is to “pursue a comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy — and in the process to reduce present Canadian vulnerability”. Then the paper lists a number of things Canada should do under this option — for example:

- (a) “to recast the economy in such a way as to make it more rational and more efficient as a basis for Canadian trade abroad;”

Study assumes essential choices to preserve cultural identity have been made

- (b) "deliberately to broaden the spectrum of markets in which Canadians can and will compete;"
- (c) "encourage the specialization and rationalization of production and the emergence of strong Canadian-controlled firms;"
- (d) have close co-operation of government, business and labour in implementing industrial strategy.

There does not seem to be a single action suggested under Option Three that we should not be taking under Option One. If we take these actions in our own immediate best interests, what is the point in dressing them up as a deliberate attempt to make Canada less vulnerable to the United States? It may not seem to matter *whether* we strengthen the Canadian economy by actions that result in our becoming less vulnerable to the United States *or* set out to become less dependent on the United States and find ourselves compelled to adopt an industrial strategy to strengthen our economy. But I think it does matter how we put the argument and explain the motivation for the policies we adopt.

If we say, as Option Three does, that we are deliberately taking steps to make ourselves less dependent on the United States, we set up resentments among Americans that are totally unnecessary and unproductive. Instead, we make our actions more acceptable to Americans (if not to some Canadians) if we say simply: "We are going to adopt some new economic policies as part of a comprehensive industrial strategy. We are doing so for necessary domestic reasons, which as an independent nation we are fully entitled to do. In the process, if we are successful, we are likely to become stronger and less vulnerable to the United States, but that is a result rather than a cause." I think Option Three is strictly for Canadian consumption as a gesture to the nationalistic fringes of opinion in this country and it could do considerable damage to Canadian-American relations.

Negative tone

More fundamentally, the tone of this essay is essentially negative and defensive. It is full of references indicating a preoccupation with "vulnerability" to U.S. influences, the need of "counterweights" to dependence on the United States, the emphasis on "threats" to Canada in the relationship. Vulnerable to what? There is no clear answer to that question. If Canada is to live in the world — as it must — it is going to be "vulnerable" in a sense to the influences of other countries. To what other country would you rather be vulner-

able? Would you choose Britain? But then think for a moment of Britain's decision to enter the European Economic Community, which was a necessary and proper action in its own interest but showed little regard for the effect on Canada? Would you choose France after recent examples of French policy and its tendency to meddle in internal Canadian issues? By contrast with these two obvious alternatives, the record of the United States in the past decade shows numerous instances where Canada's interests have been regarded or adjustments made in American policies to accommodate them to Canada's needs.

The concern about vulnerability to American influences comes down to the old fear that we may have too many of our eggs in one basket. That old adage ignores the fact that you may be better to have your more valuable eggs in one strong basket than scatter them around in a number of fragile and insubstantial containers. Of course, if you conclude that your main basket is coming apart at the seams, you may have to transfer your eggs elsewhere, but I should question that the American basket has really become less reliable than other available baskets.

Trade alternatives

There are some positive issues of policy to which we should be giving attention in our economic relations with the United States and other countries and which received little attention in the External Affairs study last fall. For one thing, it seems to rely heavily on the traditional approach to trade negotiations, and on the GATT principle of multilateral, non-discriminatory deals and the most-favoured-nation principle. This is clearly the preferred approach for Canada, but there is no discussion of any possible alternatives.

Should we not be examining whether the multilateral MFN approach to a new trade deal is any longer valid or possible in the light of changes in world trading patterns that have occurred? Looking around the world, we see Russia and its satellites in a tight, managed trading system that is growing in economic strength and may soon enter world trade in a major way. Japan is creating a trading empire in Asia with special ties to Southeast Asia and also increasingly in South America. In Europe, there are not only the enlarged membership in the Community but special preferential trading arrangements with the Nordic countries and with Mediterranean and African countries. Even in the United States, there are indications that American policy may include special arrangements for particular products or with

'You may be better to have your more valuable eggs in one strong basket'

particular countries that are not applicable on a multilateral basis. In this kind of existing trading world, what chance has the MFN principle to win effective results for Canada? If, regrettably, it has little chance of success, what approach do we put in its place in forthcoming negotiations?

Understanding U.S. problems

Looking directly to the United States, it would do us no harm if we made greater efforts to understand American economic problems. The forces favourable to continuing liberal trading policies seem, at the moment, to be growing in strength and there is a good chance that they will successfully beat down the protectionist pressures of American labour and the Burke-Hartke primitives. A general American retreat into economic isolationism seems unlikely, but this is not to say that underlying economic forces will not compel modifications of a generally liberal trading stance by the United States that could have some extremely uncomfortable effects on Canada.

The Americans do have a serious balance-of-payments problem and are likely to have one for a long time to come. They may learn how to live with it and it would be eased if they could obtain better access for manufactured goods and agricultural products in the coming trade negotiations. However, the American economy will need increasing quantities of natural resources — particularly energy. It is unlikely that higher levels of traditional exports will fully keep pace with these rising U.S. import demands. They may be forced to adopt some protective measures to conserve exchange for these vital and growing import needs. If these are made on a multilateral basis generally applicable to all America's trading partners, the effect on Canada could be disastrous, even though we are not a major cause of American economic problems. If they are to be directed towards the main sources of American difficulties — particularly Japan and, to a lesser extent, the European Community —, then Canada will have to be prepared to accept and negotiate special trading arrangements with the United States, whatever Canadian nationalists may think about such moves toward greater economic integration. I wonder how clearly we know what we want and should try to negotiate.

The essence of a good foreign economic policy is constant re-examination of its assumptions in the light of new and changed conditions. We may well prefer to stay with familiar policies that have served us well under earlier and different

circumstances. But therein lies the danger. We need positive, and probably new, policies to meet today's conditions, possibly including bilateral trading and monetary arrangements with the United States.

Purely as an illustration of the kind of positive policy we should be exploring, I pick one concerning monetary relations between Canada and the United States. It is no more than a tentative idea, which has not been worked out in detail and may well have many holes in it.

We have today a floating exchange-rate, and many people feel strongly that we should continue it indefinitely as the most suitable arrangement in Canada's best interests. Certainly it is a most desirable position for us to be in at the moment. But we may not be able to hold to the floating rate for all time. When the international monetary system settles down, we may have to re-establish a fixed rate if we are to continue as a member in good standing in the club, or we might want to go to a fixed rate under changed conditions in our own best interests.

Canada, among major trading nations, has a mixed trade, dependent both on traditional exports of manufactured goods and agricultural products and on exports of natural resources, for which there is a growing demand in the United States and other countries. We are neither like some Middle East states dependent entirely on natural resources nor a completely industrialized country like Japan with few natural resources. We want and need to expand both traditional exports and natural-resource exports to promote economic growth and full employment. But unfortunately these two objectives work against each other through the exchange-rate. If we expand our natural-resource exports to meet rising American and other foreign demands, it will put upward pressures on the floating exchange-rate. So also will any large imports of capital to develop our natural resources. This higher level for the Canadian dollar will make expansion of manufactured-goods exports more difficult, and may even destroy some of our traditional exporting industries.

There is a good argument that we need a fixed exchange-rate for our trade in manufactured goods and either a floating rate or some special monetary arrangement applicable to the supply of increasing quantities of natural resources to the United States. These are exports of Canadian capital assets and we should get back capital in return for them.

The dilemma is that, if we continue with a floating rate, increased natural-

Forces favouring liberal policies considered capable of beating back the protectionists

Canada will have to be prepared to negotiate special trading arrangements

resource activity may push up the Canadian dollar and seriously damage the competitive position of our manufacturing industries. On the other hand, under a new fixed rate set at a tolerable level for the traditional exporters, new demands for natural resources may increase our reserves, and we cannot accept a rule that we must automatically revalue.

Bilateral arrangements

In these special circumstances of our trading relationship with the United States, should we not devise a special technique for dealing with the bilateral monetary arrangements between Canada and the United States? Is there not a way to maintain the exchange relationship at an appropriate level for traditional exports and use surplus reserves from increased natural-resource exports to obtain capital assets in return? I should make it clear that this is not a suggestion for a two-tier exchange-rate but rather that, under a fixed rate, reserve increases caused by an increase in traditional trade might be distinguished from an increase caused by new demands for natural resources. In the former case, we could accept international rules for exchange-rate adjustment; in the latter, we could use the returns from a sale of national capital resources as we might choose. Oddly enough, this could be used to achieve one of the main objectives of the nationalists; we could use these excess reserves to repatriate foreign holdings in Canadian companies and reduce foreign control of our industries.

If we are to develop new policies and then negotiate them successfully with Washington, there is finally the question of style. George Kennan, one of the ablest of American diplomats, put the point very

well some 20 years ago, when he said:

"One must never underestimate the importance in this life of the manner in which a thing is done. It is surprising how grace, assurance, dignity and good manners make actions and policies acceptable — and *vice versa*. It is therefore well to think of the conduct of foreign affairs as a problem of style even more than of purpose."

This wise advice is particularly applicable to Canadian-American relations. Because we speak the same language and know each other so well, we tend in periods of pressure to treat each other cavalierly and brusquely. In private life, a tense man will often treat his next-door neighbour and his close friends with less elegance and consideration than he treats a stranger. There is much tension today in Ottawa and Washington — much confusion and uncertainty as to where each of us is going. Perhaps because of this, the style in which our relations have been conducted — on both sides — has been less than distinguished in recent months and years.

Options for the Future has, as its basic premise, that Canada must live in harmony with, but distinct from, the United States. It seems to assume that we do have generally harmonious relations but are in jeopardy in maintaining our distinctness from the United States. It is arguable that both assumptions are wrong. There is little doubt about the distinctness of Canada in the eyes of most people, including Americans, although not all Canadians. But relations today are not really harmonious; they are filled with suspicion and resentment. Unless we can recapture a sense of mutual regard and understanding, the solution of economic problems between Canada and the United States will be difficult or impossible.

Need to recapture a sense of mutual regard and understanding

... The Secretary of State for External Affairs seems to plump for an economic option characterized as a "deliberate, comprehensive and long-range strategy" aimed at achieving a "balanced and efficient economy". Yes, but then? Well, "fiscal policy, monetary policy, the tariff, the rules of competition, government procurement, foreign investment regulations, science policy may all have to be brought to bear . . .".

... What these words appear to say is that elected and appointed officials, together with the career civil service, can make accurate, far-seeing and large-sized judgments about matters that are inherently particular, obscure, complex and,

finally, unpredictable. I am sceptical . . .

Canada does have another economic alternative, within limits anyway. It is to pursue with all possible vigour the extension and strengthening of the multilateral system. Of course, Canada — not alone — is now vulnerable to the vagaries of United States policy-making. There is no way wholly to eliminate this vulnerability. But it can be reduced by better and tighter international rules applicable to the United States along with everybody else . . . (Philip H. Trezise, *The Brookings Institution*, in *Behind the Headlines*, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, February 1973).

Examining the face of power after the French elections

By André Fontaine

The French elections of last March 4 and 11 were awaited with more than usual interest. From abroad there was speculation whether they might not lead to a change in the policy of independence introduced by Charles de Gaulle and continued in the main by his successor, Georges Pompidou, despite obvious differences in style. Even in France the election campaign almost monopolized attention for months on end. But, although on previous occasions there had been no question as to the Gaullists achieving a majority, the possibility of a Government defeat in 1973 was not unthinkable. It was the first time that the National Assembly had been renewed since President de Gaulle's departure. It was thus also the first time that elections had been held with Mr. Pompidou in power. It was also the first time that leftist formations—Communists, socialists and radicals of the Left—had managed to agree not only to standing down in each other's favour but also to fighting on a joint platform.

Throughout the campaign, opinion polls had revealed that the majority was losing ground, while the Left was gaining in popularity. In those polls, the majority had never obtained more than 40 per cent, while the Left had never had less than 45 per cent. But only a stranger to the French electoral system would have believed that such figures were enough to ensure victory for the Left. François Mitterand, Socialist Party first secretary, made no mistake when he stated a few days before the first ballot that, in order to win, the coalition forces supporting the joint program would have to obtain at least 49 per cent of the vote.

Two-round constituency ballot

The system by which members of the National Assembly are elected is a two-round uninominal ballot—undoubtedly the only one in the world. France is divided into 490 constituencies, each of which elects a deputy; if a candidate obtains an absolute majority of the vote on the first

ballot, he is elected; if not, a runoff election is held a week later, the winning candidate being the one who heads the poll, no matter how many votes he may actually have polled. It is generally said that the first round shows the electorate's choices; the second is a process of elimination. Needless to say, between the two rounds all sorts of bargaining and manoeuvring take place to ensure that particular candidates who have done well on the first poll obtain the votes of those who stand down.

Great disparities

This system is wide open to criticism and is, indeed, heavily criticized. It would be less vulnerable if the constituencies were of equal size. Disparities are now so great that in the second constituency of the Hautes Alpes there are 25,749 registered voters as against 116,424 in the third constituency of Essonne, in the greater Parisian area; this amounts to saying that, politically, one resident of the Hautes Alpes is worth four in Essonne. Although there are some examples to the contrary, the present setup works to the advantage of the rural areas, which are by nature more conservative and more inclined at present to vote for the Government, which, thanks to the European Common Market, managed to improve the farmers' standard of living by 11 per cent in 1972 alone.

Many attempts have been made to redraw constituency boundaries, but the Government has always resisted them strenuously. Between 1968 and 1973, the only change made was the creation of three additional constituencies in the Department of the Rhône (Lyons), which had until then been grossly underrepresented. In his speech presenting his second Government to the National Assembly after the elections, Premier Pierre Messmer hinted at other minor reforms. But it is perfectly clear that no sweeping changes will be made in the electoral map. The Fifth Republic intends to see that Parliament ensures representation for geo-

Coalition forces needed poll total of 49 per cent in order to win

graphical areas as well as for individuals. Thus the least densely-populated department is assured of at least two deputies.

There is even less chance that the electoral law itself will be revised. The latter was adopted immediately after General de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, by a Government in which all parties except the Communists were represented. Since the Liberation, France had had a proportional representation system which, in view of the size of the two extreme formations, Gaullists and Communists, had been largely responsible for the instability of the Fourth Republic. A man such as Mendès France, for example, had never stopped fighting for a return to the constituency ballot which had been the rule prior to 1939.

The constituency ballot was inevitably to lead to what has been called bipolarization. Indeed, the only hope of removing the Government from power is to unite all opposition forces, including the Communists. Since a sizable portion of the electorate is still frightened by the idea of the Communists taking power, the Government is able to stand firm. "If we don't do anything stupid, we'll be there till the year 2000," declared Alain Peyrefitte, one of the key majority leaders.

Communist party stagnation

The Communists contested seats in all constituencies on March 4 but obtained only 21.29 per cent of the vote. Of course they did not fail to proclaim the results a success, since, in the previous elections of June 1968, they had obtained only 20.02 per cent, and the higher turnout at the polls gave them this modest percentage increase, or some 600,000 more votes. But, on closer examination, one observes that the party came within 0.02 per cent of the number of votes obtained by its candidate, Jacques Duclos, in the first round of voting in the 1969 presidential election. Despite the fact that there were 1,400,000 more registered voters than in the 1967 legislative elections, it polled 13,000 fewer votes than in 1967, when it received 22.51 per cent of the vote.

Since it is generally agreed that the 1968 elections were exceptional, taking place as they did at a time of reaction or backlash in the aftermath of the May upheavals, the French Communist Party (PCF) must conclude that it is stagnating and even losing ground. The days of the Liberation are long past, when it could call itself the "first party of France" and obtain as much as 28.6 per cent of the vote.

This change is not difficult to explain. Twenty-five years ago, the Communist

Party took advantage of the major role it had played in the Resistance and the prestige enjoyed by the Soviet Union for crushing Nazism. The extreme poverty of a country emerging shattered from war naturally attracted to the party of the disinherited the sympathies of a large section of the population.

Today, memory of the Resistance has dimmed, and it is significant that neither the leader of the Government nor of the Communist Party was a member of the Resistance — yet no one is really shocked by this. The prestige of the U.S.S.R. has been considerably tarnished by Khrushchov's revelations about Stalin's crimes, by the Prague coup and by the Soviet break with China. Most Frenchmen now see the U.S.S.R. as a great totalitarian power following the dictates of a pragmatic and sometimes cynical policy.

Finally, living conditions in France have undergone considerable change. In the days when France cut a figure as a world power and reigned over a vast empire, its economy functioned in what was almost a closed circuit, sheltered by narrow protectionism. Today, forced back within the boundaries of the hexagon, it has rediscovered the ideology of growth, expansion and the conquest of (foreign?) markets. Though paying the price of inflation, like everyone else, France is among the countries with the highest gross national product growth-rate in Europe, and is beginning to grow used to Hermann Kahn's idea that, in the not-too-distant future, it could very well exceed the industrial production level of Britain, and even of West Germany.

Respect through power

There can be no doubt that the goal of growth is the main objective of this new Saint Simonian, Georges Pompidou. Though a Gaullist in the sense that he is by no means an unbeliever in disinterested government, he feels that, in our tough and egotistic world, the only way to bring things off is by commanding respect — and,

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*Neither leader
was a member
of the Resistance*





President Georges Pompidou (left) casts his ballot during French elections. President Pompidou's governing Gaullists beat back a challenge from Socialist-Communist alliance to retain control of

in order to be respected, one must be powerful. Hence the accumulation both of so much military power — with its force of dissuasion — and industrial power, which has been maintained and even strengthened under his Government.

But though this power is swelling the Bank of France's gold and currency reserves and is providing the Government with statistics of which it can be proud, the fact remains that France's wealth is unequally distributed and that too many French citizens feel that they are getting only the crumbs from the feast their hard labour provides for the "haves", who insolently flaunt it. Though France holds the world record for the number of secondary residences per citizen, it is also the holder of a far less illustrious record — namely, for the greatest disparity between incomes. In 1970, 2,100 taxpayers declared more than 400,000 francs a year of taxable net income, or 41,700 francs a month, while, for the same period, social security recipients drew only 242 francs, or 172 times less. The housing problem is a permanent cause for scandal, not only because those most underprivileged, particularly immigrant workers, are forced to live cheek by jowl in



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the National Assembly. The Socialist Party, led by Francois Mitterand (right), improved its position, but fell well short of the gains it had hoped to make.

shanty towns, but because certain "promoters" have managed to accumulate incredible fortunes, thanks to the housing shortage and the clever sidestepping of building restrictions.

Unpleasant atmosphere

These injustices and scandals — though there are many others, particularly with regard to the overdue social services such as hospitals and telephones, and the lack of opportunities for young graduates — have produced an unpleasant atmosphere surrounding the present regime. It is also a victim of the spiritual crisis in whose grip France, like other Western countries, finds itself; all the traditional ideas of family, society, education, the army or the church are under fire. In the eyes of a great many young people, anyone in authority is immediately suspect. Moreover, it is the very goals of industrial society that are being questioned by every individual, beset as he is by traffic jams, pollution and increasing tension.

During the election campaign, the Government was unable to speak in terms, or define objectives, that would have aroused enthusiasm. Having got off to a

ate start in defining its so-called Provins program, in which one finds echoes of certain themes of the Left's "joint program" — for example, on minimum wages, the lowering of the retirement age, and social services — the Premier then made no further reference to it. Not until after the elections did he state, in his first speech to the National Assembly, that he had decided to implement the program. In the main, the Government limited itself to depicting in the blackest possible terms the fate which awaited the French people in the event of a victory by left-wing forces in which the Communist party played a major role.

The socialist revival

As it turned out, this argument did indeed have some effect for, despite the general dissatisfaction, the Communist Party—as already noted—was unable to improve on its 1969 performance. This, combined with the advantages of the electoral law, enabled the majority to win on the second ballot. But it was not enough to deter a large number of French voters from casting their ballots in favour of a Socialist Party — despite its alliance with the Communists — that was in total disarray when taken over four years ago by François Mitterand, a former minister in the Fourth Republic who has never for one moment slackened in his opposition to the Fifth. While the Socialists' 1969 presidential election candidate, Mr. Defferre, Mayor of Marseilles, had obtained only some 5 per cent of the vote, in spite of the departure of Mr. Mendès France, on March 4 the Socialist Party obtained 19.16 per cent of the vote, as opposed to 16.53 per cent in 1968.

Nevertheless, one should not overestimate the significance of this relative success. After all, in 1967 the Socialists did poll 18.96 per cent of the vote, while this March they failed to achieve their more or less avowed intention of doing better than the Communists so as to be in a position to veto any of the latter's more excessive claims, should a coalition government be formed. The question remains as to whether, in the final analysis, some voters were frightened away from the socialists because they were too closely linked with the Communist Party or because of some sections of the joint program; those on nationalization or the financing of their stated social policy, as well as national defence, were, to put it mildly, lacking in precision.

Under these circumstances, did not the general discontent perhaps benefit the country's third political group, the opposition centrists, the "reformists" of Messrs

Jean Lecanuet and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, partisans of a resolutely European foreign policy and of a domestic policy of extensive decentralization? One indeed wonders. But, although the reformists regained some of the territory lost in 1968, when their percentage of the vote fell to 10.34 per cent, they were far from matching the results of the 1969 presidential election, when Alain Poher, President of the Senate, carried their colours. While Mr. Poher polled 23.3 per cent of the vote on the first ballot and 17.85 on the second, the reformists this time won only 12.56 per cent — not even up to their 1967 standing (12.64). Between the two rounds, Mr. Lecanuet was reduced to negotiating with Mr. Messmer on a number of reciprocal withdrawal agreements; this was the only way for him to obtain — narrowly at that — the 30 seats he needed to form a parliamentary group. However, he was at the same time playing the game of the outgoing majority; thanks to the support of a great number of its voters, it won more than half the seats in the Assembly and was thus enabled to dispense with Mr. Lecanuet's support.

Premier Messmer did indeed offer Mr. Lecanuet a portfolio, but on the condition . . . that he make no conditions. This was, of course, unacceptable, and thus, after an arduous campaign lasting months, the majority remained the majority (with 274 out of 490 seats, as opposed to 354 out of 487 in the previous Parliament), although its percentage of the vote fell to 35.54 per cent as against 43.65 (a record figure) in 1968 and 37.73 in 1967. The change is, nevertheless, a marked one. In 1968, the Union pour la Défense de la République (UDR) had an absolute majority. Now, with only 24 per cent of the vote and 183 deputies, it finds itself forced to share power with the other allied groups: the independents of Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (7.01 per cent and 55 deputies) and the "government centrists" of Jacques Duhamel (3.81 per cent of the vote and 30 deputies).

Debré's departure

This result has not altogether displeased the President of the Republic, who has never particularly appreciated the UDR's tendency to consider itself the sole guardian of General de Gaulle's heritage, since he considers himself the only person designated by the constitution to define and direct France's policy. Thus one of his first decisions immediately following the elections was to remove from office Michel Debré who, as Minister not only of National Defence but also "of State", had

UDR forced to share power with centrists and independents

become a sort of self-appointed permanent watchdog over all Government affairs. His departure is all the more significant in that it coincides with the entry into the Cabinet of Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's principal lieutenant, Prince Poniatowski, the smiling colossus who had never ceased to attack the UDR in general and Mr. Debré in particular.

Mr. Debré is not the only figure to have left the Cabinet. Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann, defeated at the polls by a slim majority, has also been forced to abandon the Quai d'Orsay. Mr. Pompidou has taken the opportunity to replace him with his closest collaborator, Michel Jobert, something of a dark horse, who, as secretary-general at the Elysée, played a major role in planning foreign policy.

In spite of these personality changes, one need not expect any major changes in French diplomatic policy, which will continue, much as it has been, to be the responsibility of the head of state. France will not rejoin NATO. It will not support Israel in its conflict with the Arab world, as the reformists and some centrist ministers would like. It will continue to place its hope in a Europe freed of blocs. But it will undoubtedly cease to strip its language and actions of anything that might be deliberately offensive to its American allies. And one will hear even less than ever of support for Quebec separatism.

Cabinet switches do not signify any major change in foreign policy

Will the changes in domestic policy be more noticeable? The new Messmer Government has come to power at a time of increasing demonstrations by high-school and university students against the ending of draft deferments, and when there are signs of a new wave of social unrest.

It is to be feared that the Premier's promise to reduce income disparities will manage to displease the middle classes rather than rally the workers and the intelligentsia to his cause. The firmness of the words of a man whose sincerity and courage are unquestionable cannot, however, make us forget his almost tragic inability to define objectives and to speak in language which might put an end to the national grumbling.

"We must recognize that lack of daring and imagination is our worst enemy," Mr. Messmer himself has said. Daring and imagination were indeed General de Gaulle's cardinal virtues. No one, either from the Left or the majority, has yet taken up where he left off, and it is for this reason that the ideas of the small "unified Socialist Party", in favour of self-management, and those of the leftists are making far more progress, especially in the unions, the Church, the university and even the magistracy, than examination of their very modest results at the polls might lead one to believe.

The lesson for Mr. Pompidou...

... Now that Mr. Pompidou's followers have been returned with a new, if diminished, majority in the National Assembly, he may actually manage to persuade himself that the election results are a mandate for inaction. If he thinks that, he will be as mistaken as those who held that the French were ready to accept the Communists as a party of government. The Gaullists and their allies will have to take stock of the fact that they polled barely more than 150,000 votes more than the parties of the Left and that they have slipped back by more than a million votes and 100 deputies since the last parliamentary elections in 1968. The true-blue Gaullist Union of Democrats for the Republic can no longer run parliament all by itself. It will have to lean more heavily on the Independent Republicans led by Mr. Giscard d'Estaing.

If Mr. Pompidou is willing to draw the lesson of March 11, it is that a majority of the French people has rejected radical change, and above all the entry into government of the Communist Party, but has

also voted in favour of a more active, more reform-minded and cleaner ministry than it has had lately. Mr. Lecanuet, the Reformist leader, got it right when he said that the French people want neither immobility nor adventurism....

... There are lessons for the Left as well in the election results, and they apply to other countries besides France. These elections showed that the Communist Party is still a sizeable albatross around the neck of any social democratic movement in France that hopes to capture power through an alliance of the Left. The Socialists are no doubt consoling themselves with the thought that they scored better at the polls than at any time since the Second World War and doubled their number of deputies compared with 1968 despite their alliance with the Communists. But there is still a deep-seated fear of the Communist Party among the middle sectors of the electorate — precisely the people who must be won over by whoever is going to capture an outright majority.... (*The Economist*, March 17, 1973).

A recognition of East Germany as a stable factor in Europe

By Jean Edward Smith

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was created in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany in 1949, largely in response to the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the Western zones, which, in turn, was a response to Soviet encroachment in Central Europe, the collapse of a non-Communist Government in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade. Midwived by the Soviet Union, and closely allied with the forces of the Warsaw Pact, the GDR has existed for 24 years — all but ignored by the democratic nations of Western Europe and North America. The reasons for this neglect of East Germany are part historical, part ideological, and in very large part, a reflection of global *Realpolitik*.

From 1949 until 1961, both East and West vigorously endorsed the idea of German unity. Whether such support reflected more than patently meritorious lip service is open to conjecture, but the fact was that the idea of German unity and the separate existence of two German states were mutually exclusive. Add to that the fact of the Cold War, which had divided not only Germany but Europe and much of the world as well, and the reasons for diplomatic non-recognition of the GDR become painfully apparent. West Germany (our side) was pictured as the vehicle by which the "West" would unify Germany and restore liberal democracy, free enterprise and the Christian Church to the German lands beyond the Elbe. East Germany (their side) was the illegitimate child of Russian occupation, whose birth was better left unrecorded, the quicker to fade into oblivion.

This doctrine was elevated to the status of a formal treaty obligation in the London and Paris accords of 1954 (signed for Canada by Lester Pearson), whereby the Western powers, in return for West German rearmament and accession to NATO, agreed to "consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled

to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs". (*Final Act of the Nine-Power London Conference*, October 3, 1954, and *Paris Protocol to North Atlantic Treaty on Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany*, October 23, 1954.)

But the doctrine that the FRG was the sole repository of German legitimacy came to grief, ironically, at the moment of its greatest success, August 13, 1961 — with the construction of the Berlin Wall and the concomitant recognition of the economic and political bankruptcy of the East German regime. From 1949 until 1961, the German Democratic Republic was the pale and sickly stepchild of Soviet Communism. Its Government was unloved, its social and political system unaccepted, and its economy creaked along, a poor relation to the dynamism of the Federal Republic. An unbiased observer could very well imagine the GDR a temporary expedient, and in such a context the epithet "so-called" — the prefix by which Western ministries always addressed it — was doubtless deserved.

Berlin Wall

By 1961 every indication pointed to the growing instability in East Germany, and it was to arrest that instability that the Berlin Wall was constructed and, indeed, was accepted by the Western powers. For, by 1961, Dullesian ideas of roll-back and liberation no longer appeared viable in the West, and the pressing concern of the

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Kennedy Administration (whether one likes it or not, the United States has dominated Western policy on Germany since the early days of the occupation) was to prevent the Third World War rather than flirt at its brink.

In this sense, the Berlin Wall provided eloquent testimony to Communism's failure. The refugee exodus from East Berlin was draining the GDR's most productive elements, and popular unrest clearly was on the upswing. The increasing labour shortage alone posed grave dangers to the economy, to say nothing of the growing popular disaffection which followed in its train.

The position of the GDR was precarious, and the continued hemorrhaging through its open border threatened its very existence. The danger of an isolated incident in Berlin setting off the German tinder-box and possibly kindling a global conflagration caused all concerned — East and West alike — to recognize that only by closing the border, in effect, by sealing Germany's division, could such a danger be overcome.

But if it is true that the Wall originally offered testimony to the failure of the GDR, it is also true that it inaugurated one of Europe's most far-reaching economic miracles — and paved the way for an equally profound shift in popular attitudes. Since 1961, the pace of life has quickened in East Germany. The stark night-and-day contrast with life in the affluent West no longer appalls. Industries hum busily, the Government enjoys growing respect, and, on the international front, the shock and revulsion which greeted the Berlin Wall has been slowly dissipated.

Status quo legitimized

The Berlin accords of 1971, and the recent state treaty between East and West Germany (due to be ratified in June), in effect recognize the fact of Germany's continual division and legitimize the status quo. They tacitly acknowledge that a united Germany is in no one's interest (least of all the Germans'), and, in effect, prepare the way for a European peace settlement, now almost 30 years overdue. The outlines of that settlement have become increasingly clear. Unlike Versailles, which left Germany united, neutralized and outcast, the gradual evolution of the new German settlement envisages two German states: one Communist, one democratic — each linked intimately with its ideological partners. Crowning the apex of this settlement sits Berlin — a symbolic token of Allied victory over Nazism epitomized in its continuing four-power occu-

pation: a hostage, as it were, to continued good behaviour.

The separate existence of the German Democratic Republic, which the Western powers reluctantly accepted in the Berlin border closure of 1961, has been an integral part of this peace settlement, and the floodgates to diplomatic recognition have now opened. Britain and France have already announced their decisions to exchange ambassadors with the GDR, and presumably Canada and the United States will follow suit — a move which by any reasonable standard is long overdue.

As for the German Democratic Republic itself, Western perceptions have been out of date. Our failure to grant diplomatic recognition — as in the case of China — blocked normal channels of communication, and whatever information we received was filtered through the hostile lens of the Cold War, often at its coldest. The academic community likewise neglects East Germany. There is no scholar exchange program, and studies of comparative politics, so far as Germany is considered, concentrate on the Federal Republic. Even those scholars dealing with problems of Communism, including the nations of Eastern Europe, generally exclude the GDR from their purview.

Ulbricht misjudged

To the extent the German Democratic Republic is considered, it remains a curious Marxist aberration — a relic of Soviet expansion described alternately as Moscow's most docile satellite or the last Stalinist state in Eastern Europe. But the model of Stalinism most frequently associated with the German Democratic Republic has never had significant validity. Stalinism, among other things, implies extreme police terror and capricious one-man rule. But police terror — as it was once known under Stalin — has been largely absent in the GDR, and Walter Ulbricht, the woefully underrated Communist who led East Germany until 1971, was never the personification of evil his enemies in the West made him out to be. Unlike Stalin's, Ulbricht's thirst for personal power never broke out into murderous vendettas. Indeed, there is no more serious indictment of the contemporary study of the two German states than the shabby treatment given to Walter Ulbricht, for, of all the Communist heads of state, only Ulbricht had to contend with a divided nation — and his portion of that nation was scarcely the larger, the richer, or the more productive.

More recently, the open hostility of the Cold War has yielded to a more insidious assault — an attempt to smother the

Refugee exodus from East Berlin represented drain, popular unrest on the upswing

national, indeed the international legal, status of the GDR under a suffocating "special relation" with Bonn. This constitutes, in effect, a denial of international sovereignty.

A strange element of this new policy, often unstated but always at the root of futuristic scenarios, is the discredited academic theory of convergence: the idea that Communist and non-Communist states are becoming more alike; or in this case, that the two Germanies, despite obvious political differences, will become more similar as affluence and prosperity erode the doctrinal underpinnings of the GDR.

Briefly stated, the argument for convergence presupposes that industrialization imposes inexorable uniformities in skill, technique and organization; that it simultaneously spawns a multiplicity of interest groups competing for rewards and services; that it engenders material affluence — supposedly corrosive of political discipline and ideological orthodoxy; and that, by increasing cultural and international contact, by breaking down the barriers to exchange, these trends can be accelerated. (Note Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: U.S.A./U.S.S.R.*, Viking Press, 1963). In this sense, convergence becomes a euphemism for snuffing out the separate existence of the GDR — a euphemism with which Canadians currently wrestling with the pernicious aspects of foreign ownership are only too familiar.

But the case of the GDR is unlike Canada's, whose increasing convergence with the United States is a fact of everyday life. In the first place, Canada and the United States share a common political creed and a common social philosophy. The two German states do not. West German affluence derives from a more or less privatized economy, more or less devoid of political ideology. In the GDR it is just the opposite. The present affluence enjoyed by the average East German can be traced directly to the policy of the state. Economic abundance, the rationalization of production, agricultural reforms, individual initiative, have been embraced by the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and supported by it.

In West Germany, political liberty preceded material abundance, not vice versa. Affluence might change the nature of that liberty, but it could not bring it about. In the GDR, the fact is that material abundance stems from the Berlin Wall — an act of state (perhaps of statesmanship) that has permanently sealed Germany's division.

The fact is that economic reform is

part and parcel of the GDR, and the cold reality of that fact is that technological change, modern industrial management, and the techniques of economic analysis are as adaptable to a highly-developed Communist economy as to a capitalist one. Indeed, as GDR affluence increases, the periodic production crises and strains to which the economy was repeatedly subjected during the late 1940s and 1950s becomes a thing of the past, further reducing the arduous demands made by the state on its citizens.

Stability ignored

On a more abstract level, the idea that Communism cannot survive the affluence of modern industrialization is a curious conceit reserved to what John Kenneth Galbraith recently described as the "sub-Imperial" style of the United States; and perhaps, by extension on this issue only, to the Federal Republic. It is an idea akin to classical arguments that democracy could survive only in a poor, egalitarian, rural environment, and ignores the evidence available — especially in the GDR — that Communism and economic modernity are scarcely incompatible.

It ignores in the first instance the hard-won stability of the German Democratic Republic — a stability won at great cost over many years and of which the people of the GDR are justly proud. Exploited first from the East, then by the West, the GDR limped along until 1961 unable to establish its national *bona fides*. Since then it has enjoyed not only a significant economic resurgence but has navigated a difficult change of leadership — from Ulbricht to Erich Honecker — without so much as a ripple of discontent — a vital test of the legitimacy of any one-party regime. Ignored, too, is for example, the fact that Marxism is scarcely an alien philosophy in Germany. Marx and Engels were nothing if not German, and the entire logical structure of Marxist thought rests on the imposing edifice of nineteenth century German philosophy — especially the works of Hegel and Feuerbach.

In many respects, if there was a Marxist movement in the late nineteenth century, it was German. The cities of Eisenach and Gotha — located in the GDR — gave birth to modern socialism. And, with the exception of Lenin, most early interpreters of Marx were German. It was in Germany alone in the Europe of 1912 that the Marxists constituted the largest single party in the Parliament; and the split of the party following the voting of war credits to the Kaiser in 1914 was a traumatic experience from which German

*Regime navigated
difficult change
of leadership
to Honecker*

Marxism never recovered. This split is embodied in many respects in the two German states that now exist. But it scarcely reinforces the idea that Marxism is an alien philosophy in Germany, or that the GDR is a departure from the normal pattern of German development. For the Left Marxists — under Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg — were almost as significant in the International as Lenin and Trotsky. The abortive Spartacist uprising in Berlin in 1919 provided East German Marxism with its own martyrs — as did the Hitler period. And these are authentic German heroes.

Aside from the German heritage of the GDR, consider the question of popular support and national consciousness. As the past decade in most Western democracies has made abundantly clear, it is probably true that most governments are not so much supported as they are tolerated. The same is as true for East Germany as it is for France, for Belgium, for Canada or the United States. If citizens have abdicated from political concerns in the GDR — a not uncommon German trait — it is because their basic needs are satisfied and not the reverse.

Longing for unity eroded

The 12 years of enforced solitude since the Berlin Wall has also had its effect. If anything has been eroded in the GDR during this period, it is the residual longing for German unity on Western terms. Even that longing, to the extent that it existed before 1961, is easily exaggerated, for although it is true that almost three million people fled East Germany, another 17 million remained — attesting at least a minimal commitment to the regime.

More important, the past 12 years have seen 12 school classes grow to maturity — classes whose commitment to the GDR is scarcely a matter of conjecture. The revived East German economy provides immediate opportunities for employment and advancement, plus a stimulating sense of pride toward East and West alike. Social equality, educational opportunity and a pervasive system of care and benefits have led to an increasing adaptation between the citizen and the state.

Two additional factors in the East German *milieu* which militate to the regime's advantage are the Lutheran tradition of Prussia and the so-called administrative state — the *Rechtsstaat* of Bis-

marck and the Emperor. Lutheranism, almost by definition, is an inward experience. Accommodation to government — whatever that government — is a fundamental trait. The Church got along with Ulbricht's predecessor; now it gets along with the SED. And on its part, the Government reciprocates. The population is not deluged with atheist propaganda; the Church does not raise its voice against the state.

The tradition of the administrative state likewise functions on the GDR's behalf. Government is institutionalized; coercion is bureaucratic. The citizen obeys, but he does so freely. The tradition is as old as Prussia itself, and the SED is the beneficiary.

GDR's longevity

Another important factor is the longevity of the GDR. Neither Weimar nor Hitler endured so long, and the ramifications are extremely far-reaching. Djilas, for example, wrote of a "New Class" in Yugoslavia in 1956. But what do 17 additional years mean in the creation of new élites — élites who owe much to the GDR?

Domestic stability reflects more than ideological agreement or charismatic leadership. The more important questions relate to the degree of integration of the entire social fabric. In East Germany, a new social order has been established, and the Government has been the locomotive of that change. The clock cannot be set back. By whatever test has been set against it, the GDR has shown time and again an exceptional capacity to endure.

The time is now ripe for international recognition of the GDR, for by recognizing East Germany we put our seal of approval on the peace that has endured in Europe since 1945. At times, that peace has been an uneasy one. But the very stresses and strains to which it has been subjected have produced a viable, pragmatic compromise between East and West. Germany, as always, remains the pivot of European destiny, and a stable yet divided Germany has proven itself to be the most enduring formula for providing peace in Europe and, indeed, in the world. By recognizing the German Democratic Republic we are associating ourselves with its formula: a formula which, while perhaps satisfactory to no one, is less unsatisfactory to everyone than any other formula which could be developed.

Revived economy means opportunity for employment, helps to create sense of pride

The Sudan: a bid to balance between Arab, African worlds

By Nathalie Barton

Sudan is the lynchpin of Arab Africa and black Africa. It is also undergoing fundamental changes both internally and as regards its external relations. The resolution in March 1972 of the conflict between the Southern Anyanya rebels and the Khartoum authorities opened the way for a new type of Sudanese involvement in Africa. The first anniversary of the signature of the Addis Ababa Agreement provides an appropriate occasion for reviewing the situation.

The kidnapping in Khartoum on March 1, 1973, by Black September commandos of five diplomats, and the subsequent killing of three of them (a Belgian and two Americans), drew the world's attention once more to a little-known country — the Sudan. This vast country, the largest in Africa, with a population estimated at 16 million, is a microcosm of the continent's tensions, according to one Sudanese leader; it is the meeting place of black and Arab Africa.

Black September struck at a time when the President, General Gaafar Nimeiry, was welcoming a distinguished visitor to Khartoum, Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie. The "Father of African Unity" had been invited to take part in the celebrations in Juba, capital of the new Southern Region, marking the first anniversary of peace in the Sudan. On February 27, 1972, the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement brought an end to 17 years of war between the Moslem North, the seat of economic and political power, and the non-Moslem South striving for independence and an end to Arab influence.

This war, which cost at least \$30-million a year, caused a million deaths and forced 400,000 Sudanese to take refuge in neighbouring countries. Whether the aim of the Fedayin was to take advantage of the crowd of foreign visitors in Khartoum, possibly to get at the Emperor himself, or to force President Nimeiry, an enthusiastic defender of the Palestinian cause, back into the Middle East conflict after his

"turn to the South", is difficult to tell. The fact remains that the President set off for Juba as planned that day, leaving his Minister of the Interior, General Baghir, to carry on protracted negotiations by telephone with the terrorists while Khartoum suffocated under a sand-storm. This gives some indication of the importance which is placed on the success of this difficult peace.

The future of the Southern peoples is the key question facing the Khartoum Government. The British administration, from 1899 to 1956, excluded the South from the economic development of the country, while ethnic, cultural and religious cleavages deepened. The South rebelled in 1955. One after another, the regimes which have held power in Khartoum since independence have tried vainly to achieve a military or political solution to the conflict.

Nimeiry's stake

President Nimeiry has staked the future of his regime on the success of the Addis Ababa Agreement. At present he is more popular in the South than in the North. "In the South," according to Major-General Joseph Lagu, former leader of the Anyanya rebels, "Nimeiry is a real hero. It was he who secured peace." The Southern leaders recognize that Nimeiry is the best ally of the regional government in Juba despite his extremely brutal record of suppression while he served in the South from 1958 to 1960.

Nathalie Barton, member of the staff of the Third World Press Agency in Montreal, reported on the activities of the Southern Sudan insurgents in 1971 in what has been described as Africa's "forgotten war." She has now returned from spending a month in both northern and southern parts of the country at the invitation of the Sudanese Ministry of Information to gain an impression of the situation since the end of hostilities. The views expressed are those of Miss Barton.





Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiry (left) shakes hands with Major-General Joseph Lagu, former leader of the Anyanya rebels, at a decoration ceremony. The ceremony marked the first anniversary of

the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement that brought an end to 17 years of war between the Sudanese Government and the dissident forces of the South.

The son of a provincial policeman and a great admirer of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, Nimeiry, since taking power in May 1969 at the head of the Free Officers' Movement, has confronted a series of crises: in 1970, the failure of nationalization efforts; in 1971, a pro-Communist attempted *coup d'état* and (provisional) breaking of relations with the Soviet Union; in 1972, tension with his Egyptian and Libyan partners. After four years in office, and having increased his stature as head of state, President Nimeiry still considers himself an enthusiastic socialist revolutionary who has chosen a "Sudanese way" marked by pragmatism. "African unity is a dream. For it to become real we must begin building it at the regional level. Our achievement will be an example for the rest of Africa to the extent that we are able to do this". This remark by Dr. Mansour Khaled, Minister of Foreign Affairs and a close colleague of the President's, is indicative of the regime's pragmatic approach.

For anyone who was familiar with the Sudan at the height of the war, the present agreement is astonishing. At that time,

Khartoum considered the Southern separatists — approximately 20,000 guerrillas organized since 1970 in a Liberation Front — as bandits, while the black population looked on the Northern Arabs, who are descendants of slave traders, with hatred. At present, General Nimeiry is a genial symbol of the country's unity, willingly travelling to the most remote regions; although popular emotions are sometimes cleverly orchestrated by means of songs and slogans, they are nevertheless genuine.

Contacts between Northern officials and their Southern counterparts are openly friendly; a regional minister introduced to foreign journalists by his Northern counterpart as a "former Anyanya leader" scarcely betrayed a trace of nervousness! There is a constant debate between Northern and Southern deputies. (There are 207 in the Constituent Assembly, of whom 50 are Southerners.) A number of clauses in the draft constitution — the first to be adopted in Sudanese history — that were discussed in the Assembly during sessions broadcast live by radio aroused strong opposition among deputies. Nonetheless, President Nimeiry, the military leader of

a single party (the Sudanese Socialist Union), has won the confidence of a large number of Sudanese by imposing his own personal style on the administration of the country. Direct, often impulsive and quick to acknowledge mistakes, Nimeiry is a flexible man who nevertheless pursued the "Communist hunt" in 1971 ruthlessly and does not appear to be sparing of the Black September Fedayin.

Army dismissals

Credit for achieving a negotiated settlement of the rebellion in the South belongs to the President, although the danger is not yet past. The 1972 agreement created hostility in some political circles in the North, where it is perceived as a threat to national unity, to the Arab character of the country or to economic progress. President Nimeiry's opponents, whom he has forced underground or into exile, still represent a considerable opposition force. However, their freedom of action within the key sector of the army has been reduced by a vigorous policy of dismissals.

These opponents, ranging from Moslem conservatives to Marxist Arabs, are fiercely hostile to the *rapprochement* with black Africa which the South advocates, and seek to strengthen the links with the Arab world. Among the opposition groups, the coalition of the Moslem Brotherhood, a clandestine group of the extreme right, and the Ansar and Khatmia sects represents the most likely alternative to the regime. However, a *rapprochement* between President Nimeiry, who is himself Ansar, and these conservative Moslem groups now seems possible. Sadiq el Mahdi, former leader of the OUMMA Party ("nation" in Arabic), who was forced into exile in 1970 during the governmental crackdown on the Ansar, has recently returned to the country and is living in Port Sudan. President Nimeiry has also allowed Hussein Sharif Al-Hindi, former Nationalist Unionist Party leader, to return to Khartoum. These career politicians, whose mere presence in the country constitutes a guarantee for Nimeiry, would certainly not hesitate to take the opportunity of reasserting their influence. In any case, Khartoum was noncommittal for a long time on the question of the Sudan's entry into the Federation of Arab Republics before announcing that such a move was being postponed indefinitely, reflecting the need to placate this opposition sector.

Moreover the South's autonomy in linguistic and economic matters, to mention only the most disputed areas, is, in fact, very small, which must reassure Northern opinion. In fact it is on economic

questions that Southern leaders express the most concern. Foreign aid and major development and export contracts are all under the jurisdiction of the Central Government; the Addis Ababa Agreement does not provide for a certain fixed percentage of the national development budget being earmarked for the South; emergency aid funds promised by Khartoum are frequently blocked as a result of administrative confusion. According to several Southern leaders, this is a manoeuvre by officials who are hostile to the President and wish to sabotage the agreement on which he has staked his personal prestige. A worried official said that at the beginning of 1973 less than half of the \$675-million released by Khartoum to cover the first six months of peace reached their destination. With its economy paralyzed and its infrastructure destroyed, the South will be dependent on the central power of the North for a long time to come. More and more voices are raised in criticism of this situation of autonomy without economic self-sufficiency. "It amounts to subsidizing a future independence movement," they object.

Economic problems

The South's economic take-off problems are, of course, immense. It is very difficult to mobilize the population in a region covering 350,000 square miles in which only two towns have short sections of paved road, where air-freight transportation has been extremely unreliable since the end of the United Nations airlift, and where both the press and radio communications are still in the planning stage. (The UN airlift, which operated between July and December 1971, brought food, medicine and construction materials to the Sudan under a program organized by the UN High Commission for Refugees.) Discontent is beginning to make itself felt at the meagre results of the first year's administration.

Almost half the refugees have returned from camps in Zaire, Uganda, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic, and many of them are disappointed at the precarious living conditions which greet them. Reality has not lived up to the promises made by officials touring the camps immediately after the signing of the agreement. Because of the desperate shortage of money, the Commission for Assistance and Rehabilitation is going to ask neighbouring governments to limit the number of departures from the camps in the next few months. Almost a million people took refuge in the bush during the war. They flood into the towns, then return to their native villages with a few tools

South to depend on central power of the North for a long time

Almost a million took refuge in the bush during the war

and clothes and enough food for two or three days.

Hospitals and dispensaries that were either burned or bombed are laboriously repaired. But it is the situation of the schools which gives rise to the strongest criticism. The more solidly constructed school buildings were commandeered by the occupation forces during the war. And some of them have not yet been evacuated. Thus, for example, five schools within the Bussere garrison are being used to house soldiers — this time Anyanya recruits who have been integrated into the ranks of the national army. Students returned from exile where they continued their studies have staged violent demonstrations in an effort to obtain accommodation, equipment and teachers. The "free schools", the rudimentary shelters that sprang up in the bush during the war under the auspices of the Anyanyas, where hundreds of children learned to read and write without paper, pencils or books, have been integrated into the system by the new government. The teachers, who are guerrilla veterans, now receive salaries and teach up to 300 children a school. Shortages are as serious as in wartime. As one of them remarked: "The only difference is that now we don't have to flee further and further into the forest to escape the bombs."

Linguistic maze

The language problem has become acute in this atmosphere of improvisation. Teachers who have returned after more than ten years of exile in English-speaking countries are incapable of teaching Arabic, the Sudan's official language, while students who have been studying in Ethiopia or Zaire demand courses in Amharic or French.

The Addis Ababa Agreement, says that, although Arabic remains the official language, English should become the "principal language" of the Southern Region. But the negotiators scarcely discussed the implementation of this controversial passage. Thus contradictory opinions are expressed on the future of English, which was the language traditionally taught in the missions and which remains a specific feature of life in the South, depending on political leanings. According to some, English should disappear in a country where the Sudanese Socialist Union is trying to promote homogeneity; according to others, English, on the contrary, should gain in importance in the South as the language of official communications and teaching. Luigi Adwok, the Minister of Education, advocates Arabization over a period of years, with English being taught as a second language. This is

a policy of assimilation which some of his colleagues do not hesitate to criticize. On the other hand, there are no specific directives to guarantee the survival of the numerous, deep-rooted local languages.

While the civilian population expresses its impatience at the slow pace of reconstruction, the military authorities maintain a tone of calm optimism. Major-General Lagu, the Anyanya leader, is still a major figure. In his eyes, the future role of the combatants was the key issue in settling the conflict. "I had to be sure that the 6,000 men who were to make up the armed forces and the bulk of the police were Anyanya." Nine thousand guerrillas were recruited by the army and the police in the Southern Region and 11,000 others were given civilian assignments.

General Lagu, the Southern spokesman on whom President Nimeiry relies most, is quite similar to him in temperament: ideology comes after concrete achievement; thus, he declared after Addis Ababa: "I was anxious above all that the South should have power and be able to develop in its own way. The terminology — federation, autonomy or whatever — did not matter to me." However, his popularity among the Anyanyas has declined. They were only consulted after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, and many regarded it as a surrender. In fact General Lagu was reluctant to sign until the last minute. He proposed more than 40 amendments to the draft agreement in an attempt to increase the South's executive power; the Central Government's representatives only accepted three of these. General Lagu, who was subject to strong external pressures, finally signed. On their return from Addis Ababa, the Southern representatives were nearly shot in General Lagu's headquarters by angry Anyanyas. They got away with their lives thanks only to his intervention. The Anyanyas remain nonetheless a coherent political force capable of intervening in the event that the regional government — most of whose members were proposed by General Lagu — does not live up to their expectations.


Foreign policy

As early as 1971, there was a change in foreign policy orientation in preparation for the new equilibrium between pro-Arab and pro-African tendencies in the Sudan. Dr. Mansour Khaled, a distinguished diplomat, is responsible for the new, pragmatic foreign policy. "Today," he states, "fanatics and puritans are out of date in the field of international relations"; this is an allusion, of course, to Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, whose crusade for Arab unity

Students press to obtain more teachers, accommodation and equipment

SUDAN

0 500 Miles



has sometimes embarrassed the Sudanese Government.

Since the cooling of relations with the Soviet Union as a result of the abortive *coup d'état* in 1971, the predominant tendency has been to diversify aid agreements. Exchanges with China, an important contributor, have been developed. Chinese technicians build roads and participate in agricultural projects; mobile medical teams have been very successful in the South. In 1972, Khartoum resumed relations with the United States; these had been broken off after the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War in 1967. The Americans have contributed about \$50-million in emergency aid. West Germany provides hospital equipment and tractors, while Canada, which does not have diplomatic relations with the Sudan, finances a variety of aid projects (health and various types of equipment) for a total of about \$179,000 — not including the \$500,000 for the Sudanese Red Cross.

Economic relations with Britain have improved since the publication of a reassuring investment code and agreement in principle on compensation for British

companies that had been nationalized. Most of the investment which the Sudan so desperately needs is provided by Western countries. While the Gulf countries have enormous potential, they are unable to supply the necessary technical assistance and the quarrel with Libya has dried up a major source. Dr. Mansour Khaled, imperious and smiling, disputes the charge of having “turned to the right”. “Right and left are no longer meaningful terms. If China or Vietnam can enter into dialogue with the United States and if the Soviet Union can develop its commercial relations with the West to the extent that it is doing at present, I think it would be somewhat of an exaggeration to accuse the Sudan of turning to the right. But, if we analyze the sources of the aid which we have received since 1971, 70 per cent of it comes from countries which could not be called conservative.”

Sudan's dual role

At the same time, a diplomatic effort has been staged in black Africa. President Nimeiry has paid official visits to Somalia,

*Western nations
supplying most
of investment*

Ethiopia and Tanzania and has welcomed the heads of state of these countries, as well as Presidents Amin and Mobutu, to Khartoum. The African orientation has been developed because of pressure from the Southern leadership, whose opposition was also responsible for finally blocking Sudan's membership in the Federation of Arab Republics.

Some observers believe that President Nimeiry's increasing tendency to co-operate with the old parties will inevitably lead to a return of the right to power. An alliance of the Moslem parties under Sadiq el Mahdi would eventually cut out Nimeiry without necessarily involving armed resistance, in order to create the basis of an Islamic state. The links with the Arab world would then take precedence once more. According to this theory, a small group of Southern ministers known for having participated in previous Northern civilian governments would doubtless be invited to take part. The "normalization" which this would bring about in the South — renewed takeover by the Southern Command and the police, linguistic standardization, the return of Arab officials and traders — would probably lead the Anyanyas to take up arms again. If General Lagu were either neutralized in Khartoum or unable to regain the confidence of his

men, and did not lead the movement, other Southern officers whose hostility to the Addis Ababa Agreement is well known would be in a position to do so.

The early months of euphoria having now passed, Southern leaders admit: "If the North deceives us, we shall have no alternative but to declare independence. The Anyanyas are holding on to their arms just in case...". In this context, the politicization of black ethnic groups in the North who have been converted to Islam takes on a new significance. For President Nimeiry, who is vulnerable in the North, the support of the South is an indispensable asset but one he cannot take for granted. From now on, the President and his close collaborators represent the only political force which unconditionally supports national unity.

Conscious of the dual role it is called upon to play, the Sudan can contribute equally well to the development of the Arab world and to that of black Africa. But it is only possible for it to maintain an equilibrium between these two poles because of its internal tensions. Whether President Nimeiry will succeed in satisfying both extremes or the Sudan will finally swing either to the Arab or black African side remains an open question.

Some observers see return of the right through alliance of Moslem parties

NORAD agreement extended for two years

Canada and the United States have agreed to extend the North American Air Defence Command agreement for a further two years, Defence Minister James Richardson announced in the House of Commons on April 17. The NORAD agreement was originally signed on May 12, 1958, for a period of ten years. On March 30, 1968, the agreement was renewed with some additional provisions for a further five years. The two countries agreed on a further extension beginning May 12, 1973.

Mr. Richardson noted that the United States Government had been actively engaged in the development of modernized air-defence systems. Canada had been kept fully informed of the progress being made and had actively co-operated in some aspects of the work being done.

But the defence minister said that, although development of the new systems was at an advanced stage, "it has not reached the point at which the two governments are able to decide upon the extent to which the systems for air

defence of North America should, at this time, be changed and improved. As further time is required before decisions can be reached by either country, it has been determined that the best course of action to meet the requirements of both countries is to extend the present NORAD agreement for a further period...".

Mr. Richardson pointed out that the Government's decision to renew the NORAD agreement was consistent with the recommendations contained in the majority report tabled by the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

The minister said two major objectives of Canadian defence policy were to protect Canadian sovereignty and, in co-operation with the United States, to make an effective contribution to the defence of North America. These objectives were being achieved in part through Canada's participation in NORAD. (See also "NORAD: Choices for Canada", *International Perspectives*, November/December 1972.)

The development of relations between Canada and Mexico

By G. A. Calkin

The establishment of relations between Canada and Mexico formed part of a general expansion of Canadian representation in Latin America during the turbulent years of the Second World War. The action was based not only on a desire for development of inter-American trade but also on the conviction that a closer understanding between hemispheric neighbours was necessary to the solution of common problems during the war.

Diplomatic relations were established and resident diplomatic missions exchanged in 1944 with the appointment of Francisco del Rio y Canedo as Mexican Ambassador to Canada and W. F. A. Turgeon as Canadian Ambassador to Mexico. In 1947, a trade agreement came into force between Canada and Mexico, providing for each country to give the other most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment. In the decade that followed, relations with Mexico were cordial but retained a low profile, as both nations were preoccupied with events elsewhere.


In 1959, a new phase of the relationship opened when Mexico's President Adolfo Lopez Mateos paid a state visit to Canada, which was returned the following year by the then Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. This high-level recognition of mutual interest was followed by the gradual development of closer relations.

In 1968, another new impulse was given to the relationship during the visit of a Canadian ministerial mission to Mexico. This resulted in creation of a joint Mexico-Canada committee at the ministerial level in order to provide a continuing forum for periodic consultations on a growing number of political, economic, commercial and cultural matters of interest to both nations. The ministerial committee met for the first time in October 1971 in Ottawa. The ministers identified a wide range of specific initiatives and new opportunities for bilateral co-operation in trade promotion, scientific and technological co-operation, cultural and youth exchanges, tourism and

consular matters. The Canadian ministers confirmed that, in the process of deepening and strengthening relations with Latin American countries, Canada's relationship with Mexico was of key significance. At the close of the ministerial committee meeting, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp, on behalf of the Government, renewed the invitation to President Luis Echeverria to visit Canada. The invitation had been extended in December 1970 by Gérard Pelletier, then Secretary of State, when he represented Canada at President Echeverria's inauguration.

In the period after the first ministerial committee meeting, Canadian-Mexican relations began to acquire a more fully articulated character. The Canadian Government Travel Bureau (CGTB) has representatives in Mexico City, as do the Bank of Montreal, the Bank of Nova Scotia and the Toronto Dominion Bank. There are several Canadian companies established in Mexico, many in partnership with local enterprises (e.g. Polymer, Alcan, Noranda, Massey Ferguson, among others). A Canadian Library Centre was opened in Mexico City in December 1971 to provide a public source of Canadian reference and reading material. The government of Ontario opened a trade and industrial development office in Mexico City this year and the Canadian Executive Service Overseas (CESO) also maintains an office in the Mexican capital. CP Air, Aeroméxico and other airlines increased their daily flights between the two countries in order to serve the rapidly-increasing tourist traffic (some 110,000 Canadians visited Mexico in 1972). Canadian export financing through the Export Development Corporation (EDC) reached higher levels in Mexico than in any other world market.

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Canadian Press photo

Mexican President Luis Echeverria conferred with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, External Affairs Minister Sharp and other members of the Canadian Cabinet during the Mexican leader's visit to Ottawa in March. Later he

addressed the Canadian Parliament. Pictured from left: Mexican Foreign Minister Emelio Rabasa, Mr. Echeverria, Mr. Trudeau, Mr. Sharp and Finance Minister John Turner.

In the area of trade, Mexican-Canadian relations have also expanded in recent years. Except during 1971, Canadian exports rose each year, to reach a record level of \$99.1 million in 1972, compared to only \$54.6 million in 1968, making Mexico the second-largest market in Latin America for Canadian products (Venezuela is first). During this period, the makeup of Canadian exports varied significantly. Growth items include pure-bred cattle, skin-milk powder, motor-vehicle parts and accessories, power boilers and production machinery, while newsprint and wood pulp have maintained their traditional position of importance (e.g. Canada currently supplies 50 per cent of Mexican newsprint imports.)

Purchases from Mexico have shown a slight yearly increase over the past five years, reaching a record level of \$64.1-million in 1969. Since then, imports have averaged \$50-million, the decrease being largely influenced by reduced raw-cotton imports as a result of continuing lower output. Major imports include agricultural products, such as tomatoes, coffee, raw cotton, sisal, strawberries, melons, cucumbers and peanuts, and more fully manufactured goods, such as baler twine, handbags, cowboy boots and toys.

The Canada-Mexico Bilateral Businessmen's Committee, which first met in Mexico in 1970, is in the private sector but works in close co-operation with interested

government officials of both countries. Its second meeting took place in Toronto in 1971, and the third in Cuernavaca, Mexico, on May 28 and 29 this year. In May 1972, the Canadian Government organized a trade seminar in Toronto in order to assist the Mexican Government and Mexican businessmen in promoting exports to Canada. This seminar again emphasized the substantially complementary nature of the Canadian and Mexican economies and the close affinity that exists between Canadian industrial capacity in specialized sectors and Mexican requirements.

International sphere

In the international sphere, Canada and Mexico have worked together or consulted on many matters, particularly on the law of the sea and environmental problems. Mexico has been promoting the notion of the "patrimonial sea", which is close to the position favoured by Canada — the establishment of limited forms of jurisdiction for limited purposes, as opposed to the advancement of claims to the territorial sea in offshore areas. On December 29, 1972, Canada became one of the first nations to sign the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea in Mexico City, and took part in the First National Congress on Environmental Problems, held in the Mexican capital from January 14 to 19, 1973.

Purchases reached a record level of \$64.1 million during 1969

Mexico, like Canada, is an active member of the Geneva Disarmament Conference and both delegations enjoy a mutually-useful working relation on many arms-control issues. The two countries have worked together in Geneva and at the United Nations to achieve progress on an underground nuclear-weapons test ban; Canada has consistently supported the Mexican-sponsored Treaty of Tlatelolco, which proclaims a nuclear-free area in Latin America, as well as its Protocol in the UN General Assembly, which provides for nuclear-weapon states to commit themselves to respect the non-nuclear status of the region. Canada and Mexico have expressed similar views and have co-operated on a number of other matters at the General Assembly, in UN Specialized Agencies, in institutions of the Organization of American States and in other international institutions and meetings.

In 1971, Canada joined the Mexico-U.S. conferences to discuss mutual co-operation in the control of illicit traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs in North America. After the first technical meeting in Washington in October 1971, a meeting at the ministerial level was held in Mexico City in the spring of 1972. A further Tripartite Narcotics Control Conference, at deputy minister level, was held in Ottawa on January 15 and 16, of this year.

"People-to-people" exchanges have increased in recent years. In addition to the contacts engendered by the Canada-Mexico Businessmen's Committee and the Canadian Association for Latin America (CALA), there have been Canadian participation in film festivals and cultural exhibits and a Canada Book Week. The Secretary of State's ongoing "Contact Canada" program was implemented with Mexico in June 1972 when ten young Mexicans arrived in Canada for a three-week period and in August 1972 when the same number of Canadians visited Mexico for the same length of time. The Canada-World Youth Program, an exchange of young people from each country, began in January of this year, when 34 Canadian participants arrived in Mexico. A similar number of Mexican young people will visit Canada later in the year. In addition, the number of students from each country studying in the other is increasing from year to year.

By the end of 1972, Mexican-Canadian relations were becoming increasingly diverse and complex. The initiatives that had been identified at the first Canada-Mexico ministerial committee meeting were in the process of being implemented. Canadian representation in Mexico had

increased in order better to fulfill our growing commitments and responsibilities, and the increasing contacts between Mexicans and Canadians were helping to develop a better mutual awareness.

Echeverria visit

It was in the context of Canada and Mexico as North American neighbours sharing an interest in broadening, deepening and diversifying their relations, that the March 29 to April 2, 1973, visit of President Echeverria to Canada proved particularly timely. The President and members of his party held in-depth discussions in Ottawa with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Mr. Sharp and other members of the Cabinet and officials on March 30. The same day the Mexican President addressed a joint session of both Houses of Parliament, in the course of which he put forward the views of the Government of Mexico on issues involving the interests of both countries. The President also visited Toronto and Montreal. His program included visits to the Ontario Hydro nuclear-power station at Pickering, Ontario, and the Habitat 67 housing development in Montreal.

In reviewing the changing international situation, the President and the Prime Minister examined recent developments in Indochina, arms-control and disarmament negotiations, the law of the sea, the United Nations, the general preference scheme (GPS), international monetary reform, the proposed Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the changing Latin American scene.

Bilateral initiatives

During the exchange of views on Mexican-Canadian bilateral relations, several fresh initiatives were examined:

(1) In noting the increasing volume of trade between Canada and Mexico and the existing potential for a further substantial expansion in two-way trade, both governments expressed their determination to stimulate and promote this growth.

(2) Both sides agreed to take further specific steps to stimulate direct investment and the transfer of technology between Canada and Mexico.

(3) Measures are being taken to clarify differences in trade statistics between Mexico and Canada. Note was taken of opportunities for co-operation through the use of Canadian technology and expertise in complementary agricultural and industrial sectors such as transportation, steel production, forestry, pulp and paper and seaports. Both sides noted with satisfaction the exchange of missions intended to foster more trade and investment in such areas of mutual benefit.

Trip included visits to Toronto and Montreal, address to session of Parliament

Pact provides for exchanges of technicians and specialists

(4) It was recalled that, on the basis of agreement reached by Mexican and Canadian ministers at their last meeting, consultations had been going on concerning export-quality certificates for fresh and processed fruit and vegetables, designed to create conditions in which a greater proportion of this trade could flow direct between the two countries. These consultations are being actively pursued.

(5) The two governments decided to initiate discussions looking towards the conclusion of an agreement between the two countries for the avoidance of double taxation.

(6) An invitation was extended to the Government of Mexico to send a delegation of officials to Canada to foster a better understanding of, and to exchange views on, the mineral policies of the two countries.

(7) Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa and Canada's External Affairs Minister Sharp signed a memorandum of understanding providing for exchanges of young technicians and specialists as a means of broadening scientific and technological relations between Canada and Mexico. This program will begin in a few months time. In their discussions, the President and the Prime Minister emphasized the desirability of stimulating and expanding other youth-exchange programs between Canada and Mexico. An exchange of notes to this effect was also signed by the foreign ministers.

(8) Both governments affirmed their wish to expand reciprocally existing cultural and scientific programs and activities. They also noted with satisfaction that discussions had been held between the two governments looking to the development of methods of direct communication (including satellite communication) between Mexico and Canada.

(9) It was the view of both governments that they should jointly study the

contribution that nuclear technology could make to meeting the increasing demands for power, as well as the peaceful application of nuclear science in the fields of medicine, agriculture and industry.

(10) President Echeverria and Prime Minister Trudeau emphasized the common concern of the two countries regarding the serious problem of environmental pollution. They stressed their common interest in harmonizing industrial growth with the conservation of the environment and took note of the close co-operation and common approach of the two countries in the development of international co-operative measures for the protection of the environment. The President and the Prime Minister agreed to further this co-operation through exchanges of experts and information.

(11) Both sides welcomed the progress of the tripartite talks on the control of narcotics in which Mexico, Canada and the United States are participating.

(12) The hope was expressed that the rapidly-growing exchanges of tourists and visitors between the two countries would contribute to a better understanding by Mexicans and Canadians of each other's national heritage and way of life. The two foreign ministers signed an exchange of notes constituting a consular understanding between Mexico and Canada to facilitate increased travel by tourists, visitors and businessmen between the two countries.

At the close of the visit, the Mexican ministers extended an invitation to Canadian ministers to hold the next meeting of the Canada-Mexico Ministerial Committee in Mexico before the end of this year. It is hoped that, at that time, the several initiatives taken during Mr. Echeverria's visit will be reviewed, progress assessed and measures taken to ensure the further continuing development of Canadian-Mexican relations.

... For years, Canada and Mexico have had similar attitudes on some of the most important questions of our time. Both our countries are concerned, for instance, about finding formulas to harmonize industrial growth with the conservation of the human environment and natural resources.

Air, water and land pollution becomes a new source of servitude when it is the result of relations with more industrialized countries. Ecological aggressions which cause serious damage to life, health and the economy are an additional load for less

developed nations to bear.

Economic sovereignty is one of the expressions of political sovereignty. This is why we affirm the unalienable right of all countries to defend and exploit their basic resources. Therefore we fight for the establishment of a regime of international protection of the environment through regional and international agreements that take into account the legitimate right of states...

(From an address to the Canadian Parliament on March 30 by Mexican President Luis Echeverria).

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No. 73/3 Conference on European Security and Co-operation: Canadian Expectations. A statement by the Canadian Ambassador to Finland, Mr. E. A. Côté, at the Multilateral Talks Preparatory to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, December 1, 1972.

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Ottawa April 2, 1973.
In force April 2, 1973.

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Canada and the Government

of Mexico concerning an exchange program of young specialists and technicians.

Ottawa April 2, 1973.

In force April 2, 1973.

U.S.S.R.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the U.S.S.R. amending and extending the agreement on fisheries co-operation between the two countries signed January 22, 1971.

Ottawa February 15, 1973.

In force February 19, 1973.

U.S.A.

Agreement between Canada and the United States of America for promotion of safety on the Great Lakes by means of radio 1973.
Ottawa February 26, 1973.

Venezuela

Exchange of Notes between Canada and Venezuela constituting a renewal of the Commercial *Modus Vivendi* between the two countries dated October 11, 1950, as amended and renewed on September 30, 1966.

Caracas January 22, 1973.

With effect from October 11, 1972.

Multilateral

International Convention for Safe Containers, 1972.

Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.

Signed by Canada February 13, 1973.

Act of the International Conference on Vietnam.

Done at Paris March 2, 1973.

Signed by Canada March 2, 1973.

In force March 2, 1973.

International Cocoa Agreement.

Done at New York November 15, 1972.

Signed by Canada January 12, 1973.

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited March 23, 1973.

Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and Protocols thereto.
Done at Paris January 27, 1973.

Canadian notes, accepting as Third State obligations of Protocols, addressed to Parties to the Agreement signed at Ottawa January 27, 1973.

In force for Canada January 27, 1973.

Canadian notes further extending participation in the ICCS signed at Ottawa March 28, 1973.

Commonwealth Telecommunications Organization Financial Agreement.

Done at London March 30, 1973.

Signed by Canada March 30, 1973.

Commonwealth Telecommunications Organization Terminating Agreement.

Done at London March 30, 1973.

Signed by Canada March 30, 1973.

Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth Telecommunication Organization March 1966.

*Amendments accepted by Canada by letter dated March 27, 1973.

*Prepared and agreed to by the 1972 Conference.

July/August 1973

International Perspectives

A Journal of the Department of External Affairs



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Changing World Power Relationships

Focus on Cambodia and Laos

Energy Policies in a Global Context

An Altered Role for India

International Perspectives

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International Perspectives is designed as a publication combining articles by officers of the Department of External Affairs and the editors with contributions from people who have no connection with the Department. These contributors from outside the Department are expressing their personal views on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions of interest to Canadians.

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Representatives of 26 universities and institutions with programs of international relations met in Ottawa on May 17 and 18 with officers of the Department of External Affairs for an exchange of views. External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp presided at the opening dinner and dealt with comments and criticisms of his paper on Canada-U.S. relations published in a special issue of *International Perspectives* last October.

The key theme of the conference between the nearly 50 academic and senior departmental officers was changing world power relationships and their impact on various regions.

At the opening session of the colloquium, James E. Hyndman, then chairman of the department's Policy Analysis Group, presented and commented briefly on a few ideas concerning the nature and possible implications of the changes taking place in the international system. These views, which were summarized in a paper circulated at the meeting, reflected some very preliminary thinking developed in the Policy Analysis Group in the context of a study in progress. They were intended mainly to stimulate discussion. In the first article which follows, Professor André Donneur picks up and expands upon this analysis. As usual in this publication, he is writing in a personal capacity.

Professor Donneur has been associated with the Policy Analysis Group

of the department since September 1972 and has contributed to the various studies of the group since then, including, in particular, the study on the international system. He has only recently left the group to resume his teaching and research in international relations and foreign policy at the Montreal campus of the University of Quebec, where he is associate professor in the Political Science Department.

In addition to the survey presented by Mr. Hyndman, the participants heard papers and examined the subject as it related to U.S. foreign policy and its impact on Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Canada.

Published with Professor Donneur's paper in this issue of *International Perspectives* are the assessment by John Halstead, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, of the impact for Canada and the opportunities for action in view of changing world power relationships. There are two commentaries on the nature of the conference itself, by Gordon Hawkins, executive director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University, and François Bouvier of the Department of Political Science at the Montreal campus of the University of Quebec, and a review of the work of the Department's Academic Relations Service in promoting more effective means of consultation between the academic community and the Department of External Affairs.

The new international order

By André Donneur

It is quite apparent that the international order, as it has operated since the end of the Second World War, has undergone such major changes in recent years that political leaders and specialists in international relations unanimously admit that the system in its present form has seen its day and is giving way to a very different international order. There is also fairly general agreement that we are now going through a transitional period — and a fairly rapid one at that — and the characteristics of the newly-emerging order cannot be

predicted precisely and definitely. Despite the difficulties inherent in making predictions in such a complex field, various possibilities seem to exist, and the one that will actually take shape in the future undoubtedly depends as much on the interpretations and decisions of political leaders as on the conditioning imposed by factors of change that are largely beyond their control.

The problem that arises is to ascertain what are the various possible and plausible structures of the international order that

might result from current changes, which one seems the most probable, and what the consequences would be for a middle power such as Canada.

Naturally, there are various ways of approaching this far-reaching question. In this article the procedure will be first to try to determine the key features of the postwar bipolar structure of the international order and the main factors that seem to be acting, or have acted, to change it. We shall then outline several models that might develop in the next few years, after which we shall discuss the plausibility of each of the models by examining in turn the position, problems and goals of the main powers or groups, and by analyzing the trends and major problems that can be observed today in international relations and in strategic, political and economic fields in particular.

The bipolar system

It is somewhat arbitrary to speak of a single system applying to the entire period from the end of the Second World War to the present; the situation has been changing constantly, and cold-war historians, for example, differentiate between various periods during this quarter-century of history. The fact remains, nevertheless, that the influence of and rivalry between the two "super-powers" have been apparent since the end of the war. Two blocs, or groups of allies and "client states," were established very quickly. A third group of countries on the fringe of this conflict — the developing countries — emerged and rapidly increased in number with decolonization. Despite the desire of most of them to remain neutral in the cold war and to force attention to their development problems, these countries found themselves implicated in the more general confrontation of the first two groups, and some were able to take advantage of it to obtain increased economic and military aid.

The two blocs and their open opposition were, however, the basic aspects of the system. Strategically and militarily, peace depended on a relative balance between nuclear and conventional weapons acting as a deterrent. At first the superiority of the U.S.S.R. and its allies in conventional forces in Europe was offset by American superiority in nuclear weapons. Even during the period when America's nuclear superiority went unchallenged, the Western countries considered it essential to lessen Soviet superiority in conventional weapons in Europe, through European rearmament and a close alliance — NATO — which also meant large numbers of conventional American (and Canadian) forces

in Europe. In addition to their contribution, such forces guaranteed American intervention in case of Soviet aggression (direct or indirect). As the gap in nuclear capability between the Soviet Union and the United States narrowed, and as — with the advent of ICBMs — they became increasingly capable of destroying one another, the foundations of the balance of deterrent power shifted. An intensive nuclear-arms race marked the change towards nuclear equality between the two super-powers, which resulted in a balance based on terror, since each was capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the other, even if it was the victim of a massive surprise attack. Each had a sufficiently large and invulnerable counter-attack capability.

These changes were accompanied by new tensions and problems within the blocs. Both super-powers had concluded that it was in their interests to avoid proliferation. Problems such as the credibility of America's nuclear deterrent and the sharing of responsibilities were to aggravate relations within NATO and give encouragement in France and Britain to the advocates of national nuclear forces. Certain persons, including, naturally, Charles de Gaulle, and also Konrad Adenauer, were obsessed by the fear of a Russian-American agreement to maintain the status quo, over the heads of Europeans. Gaullism made its appearance, and France withdrew from NATO's integrated forces. The Soviet Union's refusal to provide China with the necessary know-how to produce nuclear arms was a significant cause of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Sino-Soviet break

The system was bipolar in that it was dominated by the United States in the Western bloc and by the Soviet Union in the Communist bloc. In the West, American military and economic superiority went unchallenged, and its leadership was obvious and quite widely accepted. The Soviet position in the Communist camp was even stronger, although China had always remained substantially independent of Moscow. The Sino-Soviet break and the Gaullist challenge to the United States in the early Sixties marked the beginning of the disintegration of the bipolar system.

The system was centred on Europe, where the boundary lines were clearly drawn and, in practice, observed. In Asia, the situation was much less clear, and American efforts to establish a similar network of alliances proved of limited effectiveness. They did not take sufficiently realistic account of a unified China that

U.S.S.R. and allies held superiority in conventional arms; this offset by U.S. lead in nuclear weapons

was in the process of modernization. All of Asia was in ferment. Where was the line to be drawn?

Already the Middle East and Indochina were showing that, despite nuclear deterrents, local and limited wars were possible. Africa and Eastern Asia were in the arena of East-West confrontation but the two super-powers tacitly agreed to limit the risks. Latin America, except for Cuba, was an American preserve.

East-West economic exchanges were very limited; the developing countries were not a significant factor. The economic system was basically Western, and involved mainly Western countries, Japan and a few Latin American countries. The United States was the unchallenged leader of this economic order.

Key characteristics

In summary, the main characteristics of the "bipolar" international system were:

(1) The dominance of the two super-powers, the only real world powers, actively engaged in both Asia and Europe, competing in the Third World, the only great nuclear powers.

(2) Open opposition between the two blocs they headed in a dispute in which ideology played a large role.

(3) The relative stability in deterrent power in the nuclear age between the two large powers, and the increasingly marked recognition that war could not be a rational instrument of policy — "the impossible war". Natural consequence: the possibility of small wars outside Europe and outside well-defined areas.

(4) Greater concern over strategic, military and political matters than over international and economic social problems and the domestic problems of the main countries.

(5) The marked division into three groups of countries in economic matters. The economic system was mainly Western and unipolar, and served the interests of the developed countries. American leadership was accepted and necessary.

(6) The importance of the Third World patently came into play in the context of the cold war. Economic interaction between the Third World and Western countries was limited. However, in certain areas such as petroleum, raw materials and certain basic manufactured goods, it was substantial.

(7) The need for interdependence in matters of international co-operation and regulation in economic, technical and social fields (for example, communications, health, agriculture, maritime law, tourism, immigration) gradually became apparent,

but was of little importance compared with strategic and political questions.

Factors altering the system

The main factors in the erosion and transformation of the system seem to be:

(1) The effects of nuclear equality and of the balance of terror on the policies of the two super-powers. They are far less dependent on their allies and on the control of territories and bases abroad for maintaining this balance. It is obviously in their common interest to maintain stable deterrent forces and to minimize their escalating cost. The risks in upsetting that stability are first and foremost those of nuclear proliferation. As a result, there is a widening area of common interest in stabilizing and normalizing their relations. However, such trends facilitate and encourage polycentralism within the two blocs and the disengagement of the Third World. They also put the emphasis on the importance of regional balances in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, and on the usefulness of highly mobile nuclear and conventional forces (air transport, fleet, submarines).

(2) The shift in the American and Russian focus of interest to Asia.

(3) The Sino-Soviet break and the emergence of China as a big power in Asia, and a possible super-power, with the development of its nuclear capability and the impact of its example, its ideology and its ancient civilization.

(4) The emergence of the European Community and Japan as big economic powers, capable of competing with the United States.

(5) The growing importance of economic problems in the development of foreign policies, which are tending to replace security problems. The partial removal of barriers between the economies of the three groups (Western, Communist and developing countries). The U.S.S.R., in particular, is playing a larger role in the economic system. China is looming on the horizon, far behind a middle power like Canada.

(6) The domestic problems of the big powers (shortage of raw materials, access to new technologies, environment) are becoming increasingly pressing and affect their foreign policy.

(7) The need for international co-operation and regulation in many economic, technical and social fields is becoming much greater (maritime law, marine resources, pollution, communications, science and technology).

(8) Lastly, mention should be made of major changes in American, Soviet and

Emphasis put on regional balances in Europe, Asia and Middle East

Chinese policies; confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the United States and China are becoming fewer than those between the U.S.S.R. and China. In the case of the United States, fairly dramatic changes, symbolized by President Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow, reflect a fundamental re-evaluation of the international system and of the role of the United States (the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine).

More complex structure

However desirable and appropriate, such a re-evaluation by the United States, and undoubtedly also by the U.S.S.R. and China, will necessarily have a profound effect on the evolution of the system. We should also note that the factors of change in the international system are making the structure more complex. Whereas, in the postwar period, the strategic configuration alone shaped the international system, at the present time, and in the near future, both economic problems and those stemming from the search for resources and from concern for the environment will tend to establish configurations other than strategic ones. Lastly, the strategic configuration itself has become more complicated.

The cold war — with its two clearly-defined poles, had accustomed us to a general evaluation of the world's strategic balance. Today — and this applies to the future that concerns us — Asia and Europe merit separate examination. In Europe, the two poles of Washington and Moscow remain the major determining factors in the strategic configuration, since Western Europe does not have an adequate military force to resist the Soviet Union. In Asia, China is developing a deterrent force to protect itself against the U.S.S.R., which in turn is acting as India's protector against China; the United States is protecting Japan, which is still relatively weak militarily, against China and the U.S.S.R.

It is time to try to define more precisely what structure the international order is now assuming and will have, let us say, around 1980. Several possibilities can be envisaged, and we shall present four possible models of the international order of the future.

First of all, we can minimize the importance of the new big powers and assume that the international order will continue to focus on the two super-powers. At most, we shall concede that China, Japan and the countries of the European Economic Community have and will have a tendency to play a greater role than during the cold war. We shall speak of modified or flexible bipolarism in which the United States and

the U.S.S.R. will continue, however, to have the ultimate power of decision, in this case their thermonuclear capability. Through direct agreements such as those resulting from the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), the two super-powers will continue to strengthen the status quo. After Europe, within which the territorial status quo, practically speaking, is accepted, the two super-powers will endeavour to eliminate the frictions they may have, especially in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, together they will prevent any other state from changing the existing international order. We have, therefore, a *flexible bipolar model*.

In contrast to this model, we can envisage a multipolar configuration of the system. China, Japan and the European Community would tend to join the United States and the U.S.S.R. as big powers in the system. As in the nineteenth century situation in continental Europe, a subtle balancing act among several big powers would bring a resurgence of diplomatic activity. Alliances to suit the occasion between two or three of these powers on limited questions and specific objectives would make it possible to make the others adopt a particular solution to a problem. On some other question, alliances would be entered into with other partners. The main characteristic of this *multipolar model* would be its fluidity, but it would be very stable if we compare it with the examples of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Adding China

The third model puts the emphasis on the tripolarism of the international order. Without denying that bipolarism is disappearing, in this case we limit the emergence of new powers to China alone. In this model, the nuclear deterrent capability is the decisive criterion. If China is able to acquire, and does acquire, a significant nuclear strike force that can be combined with large military manpower, the European Community and Japan find themselves in a different situation. The British and French strike forces are not up to scratch and are not about to be integrated; the Community's small territorial area would, in any event, limit the deterrent power of a combined force. Japan, for internal reasons (constitution, strong opposition from public opinion) and external reasons (predictable reaction of China and numerous countries in Southeast Asia and Oceania), cannot consider the creation of a strike force; furthermore, it is too small a country for such a force to be effective. The *tripolar model*, therefore, assumes

Visits by Nixon
were symbol
of re-evaluation
of U.S. role

that the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China will be the three poles in the international system and that their relations will be decisive by about 1980.

It is possible to picture a fourth model of the system, which takes into consideration the development of new poles (China, Japan, the European Community), and also takes into account the *military* superiority of the United States and the U.S.S.R. Though China is attempting to narrow the gap in military power, it cannot hope to equal the super-powers by 1980. Japan and Western Europe will continue to depend on the United States for at least nuclear military protection. Such protection is imperative for strategic balance in both Asia and Europe. However, in *commercial* and *monetary* matters, the significant poles will be the United States, the European Community and Japan, with the still relative emergence of the U.S.S.R. and with China still out of the race.

A third "operational" field — that of resources, the environment, communications and technology — will shape a third configuration. In fact, these various phenomena call for a new type of relations based mainly on co-operation, although they also harbour certain conflict situations. Where resources are concerned, the United States, the European Community and Japan, which provide the demand, will have to take into account not only the U.S.S.R. but also certain middle and small powers that hold the key raw materials such as petroleum. The Soviet Union's and China's technological and grain requirements will make them seek agreements with other big powers. All sorts of problems related to the environment, the tapping of resources in international territories (the seabed) and communications imply some degree of co-operation among states, both big and small.

Finally, multinational corporations and other transnational agencies will play a growing role. Will development problems evolve within this third configuration, or will they have an independent role? For the time being, it seems that, where the fourth model is concerned, they will be linked to resource problems because the big powers will be directly involved in such problems. This model, which consists of three separate configurations, will be called, for discussion's sake, a *three-dimensional complex model* (containing both bipolar and multipolar features).

Reality in 1980

The problem that arises and that our analysis should solve is to ascertain which model will best reflect reality about 1980.

On the basis of both President Nixon's statements and messages on the state of the world, and Henry Kissinger's writings, it does seem that the United States sees the world centred around five large power centres or poles: the United States, the U.S.S.R., China, Europe and Japan. However, there has been some change in the American evaluation of the role that the five centres should play. In an interview in *Time* magazine (January 1972), President Nixon cited the example of the nineteenth century harmony in Europe, while Henry Kissinger, when proposing a new Atlantic Charter, stated that Europe and Japan had only regional interests. Was this not implicit recognition of the fact that only the United States, the Soviet Union and China belonged to the world-wide international system in which the United States alone could be the spokesman of the Western alliance?

The fact remains that, for the United States, international order and peace would in future rest mainly on the policies of these five centres and on a subtle world-wide and regional balancing act. The United States role and influence should be exercised more discreetly, and indirectly; the bulk of the defence responsibility in each region should be assumed by the countries in that region. The United States speaks of moderation and self-discipline by the big powers, and of functional co-operation among them. Originally designed for Asia, this American doctrine is much more ambiguous as it applies to Europe and in its repercussions on Western countries. The overriding United States concerns seem to be to reduce the cost and demands of its international military and economic commitments, to straighten out its balance of payments and its economic situation and to begin solving its domestic problems.

Washington sees erosion

Seen from Washington, the developments of the past ten to 15 years seem like a major and dangerous erosion of its international position and of its internal cohesion and balance. The trend must be checked, and the United States reinstated in a position of lasting leadership, although undoubtedly less dominant than in the past. Seen from Moscow, such developments undoubtedly seem much less decisive. The consolidation of the Soviet position and the extension of Soviet influence have progressed greatly. Domestic problems are more controllable. Its main concerns are no doubt focused on China, and on maintaining the Soviet position in the East European bloc. Are they to ac-

Soviet concerns focus on China and maintaining of Soviet position in Eastern Europe

cept and adapt to multipolarism, or are they to consolidate the European status quo to the best of their ability, while perpetuating bipolarism as much as possible? Does the United States really want multipolarism, or does it mainly want to conserve its strength by taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet schism, and to restore American leadership?

Europe as contender

Do China, Japan and Europe really have the capacity to function as comparable poles in the near future? Many feel that the Europe of the enlarged Community is the only serious contender for a role comparable to that of the U.S.S.R. and the United States, on the basis of its wealth, its technology, its culture, its geography, its diplomatic talent and its ties with Eastern Europe and Africa. The whole question is whether it will be politically capable of pursuing a coherent policy, in view of the unwieldiness and undeveloped character of its decision-making process. Japan would be too dependent economically, since it must rely on outside sources for energy and raw materials, too suspect in Asia because of its aggression in the Second World War, and temperamentally unfitted because of its introversive culture. As for China, it simply would not have developed sufficiently, or have the necessary economic power, its main asset being the diplomatic potential derived from its usefulness as an example and model for poor countries.

Moreover, can we limit our examination to these five centres? Should not a whole series of other countries that are important in certain fields and/or regions be taken into account?

It seems obvious, therefore, that multipolarism gives rise to objections that are too serious for it to reflect the situation in 1980. However, the bipolar model does not take into account the economic strength acquired by Japan and Western Europe, or the development of Chinese military strength. The tripolar model does reflect China's strengthened position, but it cannot encompass the economic upsurge of Japan and Western Europe, which is a reality that cannot be ignored. It is out of the question that Europe and Japan will be satisfied to play a secondary role to the United States in a tripolar system. In any event, it is far from certain that the trade and monetary problems of Europe, Japan and the United States will be smoothed out quickly; they are more a source of conflict than of harmony.

In point of fact, the major shortcoming of the bipolar and tripolar models is

that they are based on an analysis of the world in which the strategic aspect continues to dominate completely. Although this aspect admittedly determined the structure of the postwar international order, this is no longer the case today. Economic relations, which in the postwar period reflected the United States' absolute domination, have become much more complex with Europe's resurgence and Japan's economic rise. The multipolar model takes this new economic balance into account, but tries to combine it in a structure in which the strategic aspect continues to dominate. Furthermore, this model completely disregards the fields of resources, the environment, communications and technology, which are playing a greater role today and cannot be ignored.

This leaves us with the three-dimensional complex model, which, as its name indicates, is the only one capable of embracing the complexity of the emerging international order. It corresponds well to the evaluations of both military and economic strength and takes into account the disparities between these two dimensions. Its third dimension takes into consideration the many ties that are being established between countries in the form of technical, scientific and cultural co-operation. It takes into account international problems stemming from the exploitation of the seabed, the protection of the environment, space law and so on. In this type of question, the big powers are not the only ones that count, and the middle and small powers have something to say. Similarly — and especially when we contemplate the problems raised by the search for sources of energy and raw materials in general — we find that the small powers have even formed groups such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and play a major role in the international order. Other non-governmental agencies, such as multinational corporations, will also have an opportunity to exert their influence. Three aspects thus call for three configurations within the international order.

One may seriously wonder about the advisability of adding a fourth configuration to this model, one that would be based on the problem of underdevelopment. We discarded the idea. It seems to us that, if underdevelopment plays a role in the international order, it will do so as a side-effect of the resource problem. Some underdeveloped countries may have to cash in on vital resources — we have petroleum in mind — to finance an accelerated development plan. The question of development, by itself, is no longer playing the major

Tripolar model cannot embrace economic upsurge of Japan and Western Europe

role that it may have had in the late Fifties and early Sixties, when the two super-powers were vying for the attentions of underdeveloped countries. Today, in large part as a result of both economic and political setbacks but also because of the emphasis on domestic problems and because of their *rapprochement*, the two super-powers are no longer engaged in a serious contest over aid. The European Community has traditional privileged and contractual ties with Africa that will not be seriously challenged by the other big powers. Nor should a limited Japanese policy of aid to Southeast Asia prompt objections from the other big powers. Finally, China will not have the resources to pursue a spectacular policy of aid that would give rise to conflicts with the other big powers. Thus the problem of underdevelopment, important as it will remain in itself, will not be acute enough to warrant a fourth configuration of relations between states.

What will be the role of middle powers, particularly Canada, in this new international order? In terms of a flexible bipolar model, Canada's policy should not be so very different from the one it has followed since the war; the alliances originating at the two main poles would still be the determining factors. Canadian influence would continue to be based on the multiplicity of its relations within NATO, the Commonwealth, the French-speaking community and the United Nations. A tripolar model would lead to similar conduct since, in the Western bloc, the alignment with Washington would continue to be the most important. In a multipolar model, it might be feared that the United States would be inclined to regard all North America or the Americas as being part of its reserved strategic area. With the United States' withdrawal into "Fortress America", Canada would have to cope with American pressures that might limit our freedom of action.

However, in terms of the three-dimensional complex model that we consider most likely, the five main poles will not be able to dominate and control developments by themselves. Consequently, the middle powers such as Canada, Brazil and India, pressure groups such as OPEC, or non-governmental agencies such as multinational corporations will play an important role. The only danger that may seriously threaten Canada in such a model would be very keen economic rivalry between the United States, Western Europe and Japan degenerating into a trade war that would lessen Canada's freedom of action.

In the more likely hypothesis that the multilateral trade and monetary system will be retained, it seems that Canada should be able to follow a policy of diversified relations. It already seems obvious that the development of Canada's relations with the Soviet Union, China and Japan is considerably increasing its capacity to act and to exert an influence on the international scene. Whereas, in the postwar period, Canadian influence was based on the multiplicity of its relations within NATO, the Commonwealth and the United Nations, in a three-dimensional complex model Canada's influence would be based on a multiplicity of contacts throughout the world, with the emphasis mainly on bilateral relations.

Middle powers, pressure groups such as OPEC, multinational firms designed to play important role

A professor at the Montreal campus of the University of Quebec, Dr. Donneur is the author of Histoire des Partis socialistes pour l'action internationale and has contributed to two collective works, Fédéralisme et Nations and Multilingual Political Systems; Problems and Solutions. He has published a number of articles dealing with Canadian foreign policy, the international system, security and co-operation in Europe and international socialism.

Implications for Canada

By John Halstead

John Halstead, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, discussed the implications for Canada of changing world power relationships at the final session of the Meeting of Consultation between academics and department officials. Mr.

Halstead reviewed some of the more important factors or elements of change in the world system and said he would try to assess both the opportunities and the dangers they might have posed for Canada. He said he would concentrate on those

aspects he felt were particularly pertinent to Canada's position and neglect those with a more general impact. The following is the balance of his paper:

The first change is the movement away from a bipolar structure, dominated by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and largely conditioned by the ideological confrontation between them, to a more fluid multipolar structure, increasingly open to dialogue and negotiation based on state interests rather than ideology. With respect to East-West relations, this change offers some obvious advantages to a country like Canada in its relations with the Communist countries. It allows us more room for manoeuvre, more chance to pursue our distinctive interests and more opportunity to contribute to international intercourse and co-operation, without being accused (or at least suspected) of ideological impurity.

There are, of course, a number of examples already of movement in that direction: our relations with Cuba; our recognition of the People's Republic of China and our support for its seating in the United Nations; our *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union; and our early support for the proposal for a conference on security and co-operation in Europe. In these cases, we have followed lines different from those of the United States, not for the sake of being different but because our perception of what was desirable and feasible was not the same as that of the U.S. Not only am I sure our perceptions have been realistic in these cases, but I believe we may in the process have made it easier for others, with other responsibilities, to move in the right direction.

When we come to the implications for relations between the United States and its allies, the picture becomes a great deal more complicated for Canada. First, there is the question of the effect on Canada of the shift in relative power and influence from the United States to the European Community and Japan. Is this likely to create a more balanced and stable situation in the non-Communist world, or, on the contrary, a more unstable situation of greater rivalry? This, of course, is what Henry Kissinger's recent "Year-of-Europe" speech is all about, and much will depend on whether the search for co-operative solutions to the security and economic problems facing the United States and its major allies is successful. It is certainly in Canada's interest that the co-operative approach should triumph over rivalry and competition and Canada should do what it can to contribute to that end.

This does not necessarily mean sup-

porting the United States in all matters against the European Community and Japan, in spite of the fact that a good many Canadians believe that the maintenance of predominant U.S. leadership is essential to Canada's well-being. Indeed, I think the new situation offers us enhanced opportunities for diversifying our relations and reducing our vulnerability to policy changes of any single outside power. This implies seeking partners on a pragmatic basis where our interests converge with or complement those of other like-minded countries. It is true that, in the short term, the enlargement and development of the European Community pose serious problems of trade adjustment for Canada, but in the longer term the growth of European prosperity and cohesion seems likely to offer us greater chances of trading and co-operating with the Community, provided, of course, the general trend toward liberalization can be maintained. Similarly, the degree of political integration in the European Community that is probable in the foreseeable future is unlikely to cause us insurmountable problems, provided the larger framework of the Atlantic alliance is maintained and strengthened, if possible, by a new consensus on common objectives.

Harder to be heard

One of the dangers, however, is that the emergence of the European Community and of Japan as economic great powers able to compete with the United States may tend to favour the development of a triangular power structure in the non-Communist world, where it will be harder for Canada to fit in or make its voice heard. There are indications that some Americans may be thinking in such terms. In his speech, Mr. Kissinger did mention Canada, once, and Washington has assured us that the Americans want our contribution to the developing search for "shared principles" of co-operation. There is likely to be a strong temptation, however, for the three main non-Communist centres of economic power to negotiate the most important questions among themselves.

Another danger is, of course, that co-operation among the United States, the European Community and Japan may falter in the face of increasing competition among them and give way to a trend toward ever-larger regional groupings hardening into protectionist blocs. This could happen if the U.S. Government fails to get the necessary authority from Congress or other key partners are unwilling to participate in a meaningful way in the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations. Or it could happen if the negotiations them-

Canada given
more room
to manoeuvre

selves fail, particularly if the present precarious monetary stability is lost and the basis for further trade liberalization is destroyed in the process. If protectionist tendencies were in this way to become stronger than those favouring liberalization, Canada would probably find its openings in other markets, particularly in Europe, increasingly cut off and would be forced more and more into a North American continental bloc.

Reduction of war risk

The second change I should like to look at is the decreasing probability of war among the super-powers with the establishment of nuclear parity between them and the growing limitations on the use of military force in their relations. While this does not necessarily mean a reduction of the risk of conventional wars in relations among non-great powers (and indeed the reverse can be argued), it certainly does mean a reduction of the risk of any war involving Canada, since the only conceivable military threat to us is from a conflict between the nuclear super-powers. Canadian security is, therefore, enhanced under the new circumstances.

At the same time, there is likely to be a general shift in emphasis in international relations (at least among the developed countries) from military factors to others, such as economic, technological and ecological. In these fields, described as "functional", Canada, with its relatively large and sparsely-populated territory, its rich resources, particularly its energy resources, and its advanced economy, is in many ways at a comparative advantage. It should, therefore, be possible for Canada to play a relatively more influential role in a world where security considerations, though still central, will no longer dominate the day-to-day business of international affairs. Signs of this can already be seen in the increasingly important place Canada occupies in such areas as technical and development aid to the Third World, protection of the human environment, national resource management and so on.

On the other hand, we have to take note of an important question mark: do we have the economic independence necessary to take the decisions that count, and the means to carry them out? Are we able to shape our trade and monetary policies in an optimum way for Canadian interests, or is the room for manoeuvre left to decision-makers in Canada so small that Canadian interests may go by default or be left to others to defend? This sort of question is likely to become of growing importance as global supplies of natural resources, and

particularly energy sources, become scarcer.

The third element of change I want to mention, closely related to the second, is the increasing requirement for international co-operation and regulation, particularly in the "functional" fields, in order to compensate for the proliferation of smaller national states and their inability to cope with the new problems emerging on a global scale. It seems to me that it is very much in Canada's interest to promote such international efforts and that they, in turn, are likely to give Canada enlarged scope for influencing the international environment in favour of the sort of interdependent world most congenial to Canadian interests. One such field of endeavour where we have been particularly active is the Law of the Sea. Whether we can also make any distinctive contribution to a solution of the problem of dealing more effectively with non-national power elements (e.g., multinational enterprises, civic disobedience groups, terrorist organizations) I do not know, but it is certainly as much in Canada's interests, and perhaps more than in those of any other country, to try.

What I ought now to try to do is to make some sort of synthesis out of the various considerations which go into these positive and negative implications for Canada. It is obviously not easy, the more so because the balance of considerations is likely to vary according to future international events, particularly in the trade and monetary fields, many of them no doubt unpredictable. More important in my view, however, is the fact that the balance will also depend in large part on what we ourselves do.

'Accentuate the positive'

What we *should* do, of course, is, in the words of the popular song, to "accentuate the positive" and "eliminate the negative" — follow policies designed to reinforce the positive trends and forestall, counteract or counterbalance the negative trends. How? Well, some of the possibilities on the positive side are: diversifying Canada's external relations and reducing Canada's vulnerability in accordance with the "third option" while maintaining our harmonious relationship with the United States; developing more substantial relations in all fields and building a continuing dialogue with the European Community and Japan; encouraging and contributing to the process of *détente* both in our bilateral relations with the Communist countries and multilaterally in such forums as those dealing with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and Mutual

Diversification and reduction of vulnerability to U.S. in line with 'third option'

and Balanced Force Reductions; promoting international co-operation and regulation in the United Nations and other organizations, particularly in tackling the new global problems of an economic, technological and environmental nature. On the negative side, we can take defensive action ourselves and can warn our friends and partners of the dangers of regionalism and protectionism for stability and security.

Domestic policies

Is this enough? I do not think it is. The policies I have been talking about are essentially foreign policies and I believe the outcome will, in the last analysis, depend more on domestic than on foreign policies. Can we take the measures necessary to support a "long-term strategy" along the lines of the "third option"? Does our federal system or our geopolitical situation allow us to? Do we want to?

These questions in turn raise others which are often debated, implicitly or explicitly, by Canadians. One is whether the emphasis on Canadian independence is an anomaly in our increasingly interdependent world, in a world where closer

international co-operation is not only desirable but increasingly essential. The other question is whether Canadian integration with the United States is inevitable and in step with the times. It may be tempting in this connection to draw an analogy between North America and Western Europe, where the countries of the European Community are integrating their economies and merging their sovereignties in a search for greater unity. Without trying to supply answers to these questions, I should like to close by pointing to two important distinctions. The first is that interdependence among a number of countries of differing but broadly comparable power is one thing, whereas an exclusive interdependence between two countries of vastly disparate power is quite another. The second is that there is no real parallel in cultural, economic or political terms between the group of countries making up the European Community, on the one hand, and Canada and the United States, on the other; perhaps a closer parallel would be between the countries of the European Community and the provinces of Canada!

Domestic policies more than foreign described as key to the outcome

Encounter with the diplomats

By Gordon Hawkins

If the Capulets and Montagues had begun to speak of each other simply as misguided and uninformed, there would have been consternation in the piazzas of Verona. Some quarters in Canada would receive with the same incredulity the news that relations between the diplomats and the academics have been improving in the last few years. But the truth will out. And the extent of the academic relations program of the Department of External Affairs is testimony to it. Not that this is so across the board. There is still some fear that, in the encounter, one will land as readily on a snake as on a ladder.

It is, nevertheless, a fact that the professors are propelling their craft more deftly among the bureaux of the directors-general and, as the department itself is engaged in its final move to its new headquarters on Sussex Drive, this important relationship (dyadic, as we say in the trade) has taken on a larger dimension.

It is at once more positive, more complicated and more in need of continuous scrutiny.

At least two interconnecting problems of form and substance seem to emerge from the most recent Meeting of Consultation between the two professions which took place in Ottawa in mid-May.

The first problem concerns the subject of consultation and its treatment.

Non-state power

At an early point in the Ottawa discussions, there was a casually brilliant piece of advocacy for regarding states as actors

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Undersecretary of State for External Affairs A. E. Ritchie (left) and Gordon Hawkins, executive director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University, are seen at the opening dinner of the two-day Meeting of Consultation with academics.

that need to defend themselves against non-state power as much as against each other. This statement was exemplified in ways which brought into clear focus not only the proposition itself but the question of what these meetings might be about.

The paper on changing world-power relationships by the Department's Policy Analysis Group floated the thesis that a valuable model for understanding the structure of the emerging international system was one that had three dimensions — a strategic, a commercial-monetary, and a functional dimension — and it went on to discuss its value in delineating the multiple ties among states. The non-state critique was, of course, a challenge to this approach.

The point concerning us here is less the value of the model and more the implications the ensuing argument carried for future diplomatic-academic encounters.

The argument that state-centric decision-making models underplay the significance of non-governmental actors drew our attention to the limitations of the substantive agenda for the meeting and the unfortunate absence of the members of related disciplines. There is inevitably a problem of numbers, but it was clear, for example, that a more rewarding discussion would have turned around a particular international issue and the patterns of interaction that the actors, state and non-state, are forming around that issue. Satellite-communication and law-of-the-sea issues come readily to mind. And such issues would naturally involve international law-

yers and resource and environmental specialists.

It could be argued that a Meeting of Consultation — to be what it should be — would have to be a grappling exercise in interdepartmental and interdisciplinary discussion. Needless to say, this is a daunting prospect. It is a game neither side has played well on its own ground. But is this not the forum for testing it out?

A project of this order would, of course, be a terrible burden, politically and administratively, on an already hard-worked and modest Academic Relations Service (and critics might then point out to us its unfortunate acronym). But, if we are going to make serious advances in Canada's diplomatic-academic relationship, would this not be the board to play on? There would still be the problem of snakes and ladders. However, it would make models of three dimensions rather more operatively real if a wider range of players were casting their dice together.

The second problem emerging from these meetings relates to academic performance and has two visible aspects. The first is that, as both communities are large, a sifting of possible participants has to be made by the Academic Relations Service. Relying, as it must, on those contacts within the universities with whom it can maintain an effective and continuing connection, it tends naturally to rely for its support on individuals with position, prestige and experience. The younger academic is not likely to be there unless he has a very special intellectual claim or is required to help out with regional representation.

Atlantic emphasis

The other noticeable bias built into this process is that, for very explicable reasons, the specializations of these senior professors, in so far as they have area interests, tend to be disproportionately East and West European and North American in character. They are largely Atlantic persons.

When a paper prepared by the Department's Policy Analysis Group on changing world-power relationships was considered in relation to Asia and the Pacific, the academic input to the discussion was low. While Asian scholarship is modest enough in Canada, it is better than it seemed on this occasion. Our Asian and Pacific scholars tend to be historically-minded or younger or disengaged from the institutional relationships on which External Affairs must rely and thus very under-represented. Little of this is the fault of the Department; some of it lies with the

Academic input on Asia, Pacific less than when meeting focused on Atlantic area

discipline in Canada. It does mean, however, that criticism is much more keenly attuned to appreciation of Canada's Atlantic affairs and, while this may reflect past and even current reality, it limits the speculation that an adequate representation of other areas would encourage.

There is a third aspect of the Ottawa consultation that could not be characterized as a problem, but it merits some attention.

Functionalism to the fore

Through much of the substantive discussion at this gathering, functionalism seemed to be on the verge of reinstatement as an important element in Canadian foreign policy. Canada's proudly creative, not to say assertive, role in law-of-the-sea negotiations was cited as the principal among a number of examples of the way in which Canadian functionalism, which reaches back to Mackenzie King for its credentials, seems to be assuming a larger contemporary aspect. Was this, one wondered, a new reality or a prayer for the reincarnation of middle powermanship?

Was it a hankering for the helpful fixer role in a fresher guise? Was it a leap for freedom over the wall of maximum security in North America?

Certainly, if one looked, as we were bidden to do, at the options in Canada-U.S. relations, it could be made to appear that the Gulf of Maine dispute, for example, looked at in functional terms, was a dispute between equals. It exists outside the alliance relationship. It is not significantly related to economic independence. Here Canada is an equal of the United States in the sense that Iceland is functionally equal to Britain. And, in the law-of-the-sea area generally, Canada has clearly been the functional equal of the great powers.

If the sources of the comments on Canadian functionalism were correctly recorded, it was the academics and the parapedagogues who were trying this one out. If there was anything here at all, it would certainly support the case for raising the encounter between these two old professions to a more sophisticated level.

A consensus was too easy

By François Bouvier

"If the intellectual is to deepen national policy, he faces a delicate task. He must steer between the Scylla of letting the bureaucracy prescribe what is relevant or useful and the Charybdis of defining these criteria too abstractly." (Henry Kissinger — "The policy-maker and the intellectual", The Reporter, March 5, 1959)

It is not every day that the opportunity presents itself for consultation between theoreticians and practitioners of the political art — that is, between those who analyze international relations and foreign policy from a comprehensive, long-term point of view and those whose job consists in seeking to direct the course of events on a day-to-day basis and to define and apply a political will. As a result, the initiative taken by the Academic Relations Service of the Department of External Affairs in organizing a "conference" with professors last May 17 and 18 in Ottawa was a welcome one.

This initiative is unquestionably in keeping with the objectives of the Aca-

ademic Relations Service, which are "to increase understanding and co-operation between the department and the university" and "to promote the participation of specialists at the university and elsewhere in the long-term analysis and development of Canadian foreign policy".

Gap not so wide

First of all, it should be noted that the frequently-mentioned gap separating practitioners and theoreticians — that is, between diplomats of the Department and analysts in the academic sector — is not as wide as one might think. In spite of differ-

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ing points of view, in many cases the approach to problems is the same. If the identity of most participants had not been known beforehand, it would not always have been easy for an observer to tell which paper was presented by a professor and which by a diplomat.

This may be explained by the preference that appeared to manifest itself on both sides, with perhaps a few exceptions, for a relatively pragmatic approach to the questions discussed, one that was oriented toward factual analysis and empirical reasoning. To be sure, it is difficult to deny that all attempts to analyze international relations in more systematic terms and to use a deliberately theoretical approach that does not eschew the use of quantitative measures when necessary do not appear, at least up to the present time, to have yielded immediately operational results of any consequence. There is a need, however — and this consideration is one that analysts in the academic sector are more aware of — to attempt to go beyond mere approximations so as to arrive at evaluations that are more rigorous from a methodological point of view and better integrated into a comprehensive perception of the interrelation of the various phenomena.

For this to happen, a clear confrontation of the two sides is desirable, rather than a dissipation of differences such as was the case at the last meeting; the diplomats' point of view, being the result of day-to-day practical experience of international affairs, may offer a stimulating challenge to the academics' efforts at systemization and at constructing theoretical systems whose correspondence with reality remains to be verified. Conversely, the diplomats present can profit from more general presentations and analyses by the professors, which are also less fragmentary than the analyses the former are accustomed to dealing with and which use indicators that sometimes shed a new light on the real world. In short, the main stumbling-block this type of conference must avoid is not so much conflict between participants as a too-easily-arrived-at consensus.

The preference for a concrete approach to problems was demonstrated early in the conference by the manner in which the working paper prepared by the Departmental Policy Analysis Group on *the evolution of the international system* was received. The paper, which opted for a three-dimensional model chosen from several possible alternatives — *strategic* (dominated by the United States and the U.S.S.R.), *commercial-monetary* (trian-

gular: United States, Europe, Japan) and "*functional*" (resources, environment, technology, etc. . . .) — and which "has the advantage of doing justice to the increasing complexity of the structure of the international system", was nevertheless relegated to second place in favour of a less formal discussion of the actual balance of forces. This tendency became more and more pronounced as the debate went on, especially with regard to the evolution of the international system in its relations with Asia and Europe.

The transitional nature of the present period and the fact that a new balance of forces is taking shape at the top level of the international system were duly noted. Of special interest was the evaluation of the power of the United States and its relative importance in the international arena; the decisive character of this factor, particularly for Canadian foreign policy, reappeared and was considered from this point of view.

At the same time, several participants pointed out that the political *détente* at the top levels would result in a shift toward "functional" aspects: commercial and monetary questions, the energy crisis, conflict within national associations, etc. . . . One of the peculiarities of these areas is that they require very specialized knowledge and therefore lend themselves much less to a general view of the problems than a more properly "political" diplomacy.

Canadian foreign policy

During the meeting, the professors listened and asked questions as much as they made comments. Reflecting, perhaps, the natural attraction felt by intellectuals for concrete action, the latter group asked to be briefed on the manner in which Canadian foreign policy was formulated, the analyses on which it was based and the goals aimed at. The discussion following the speech by External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp on Canada's relations with the United States demonstrated that professors retain their critical faculty when discussing official ideas or proposals. There is a fear, for example, that the "*third option*" defended by Mr. Sharp, according to which it is possible to affirm Canadian independence while at the same time maintaining good relations with the United States, is in reality merely a new political statement that boils down to the continuation of former practices.

One also observes among university professors a certain desire to see Canada's foreign policy stand out in much greater relief and commit itself to more radical or dynamic options. This desire feeds a sort

*Desire to see
Canada's policy
committed
to more radical,
dynamic options*

Canada's stress on 'functional' means shift away from spectacular or secret diplomacy

of frustration that no doubt, in the view of public servants, refuses to take sufficiently into account how difficult it is to "radicalize" a foreign policy the co-ordinates of which are so narrowly defined at the outset. The only topic capable of giving rise to anything like emotional debate in these last few years is Canada's economic and political independence from the United States. It would appear, however, that the paper produced by the Department of External Affairs on this subject has neither met with unanimously favourable reactions nor succeeded in polarizing public opinion.

This feeling of frustration may last for some time; to the degree to which a consensus is established that the vocation of a power like Canada should become operative above all at the "functional" area level, to that degree it will be necessary to abandon all "superpower", secret or spectacular diplomacy and to assume tasks that are less sensational for public opinion and whose profitability is observable only from a long-term point of view.

Long-term impact

Such is also the case in this type of meeting; its impact may be measured only on a long-term basis. The immediate implications are more difficult to foresee, except, perhaps, for the mutual understanding and the development of respect for each other

that were created; in any case, the results were most certainly positive, for public servants had the opportunity to explain to an attentive and articulate audience their views on international affairs — and hence on the foundation of the department's policy. This brings us to the question of whether the meeting could be called a "conference". Without necessarily patting themselves on the back consciously, public servants quite naturally have a tendency to present an analysis of the situation in harmony with the policy they are applying or advocating.

Because they are less encumbered by external fetters on action, political analysts in the academic world may remove themselves one step further than public servants from the phenomena they are observing. The result is that they are able to interpret the facts in the light of less traditional and more critical models. Given the different perspectives of the two sides, it is normal and even desirable for a clash to occur. On the whole, it is essential that the meeting not turn out to be one in which the professors are expected to make policies that have already been adopted more or less intellectually respectable. If this is not to happen, confrontation must be an option open to the participants, however harsh it may be.

Dialogue with Academe

The Academic Relations Service of the External Affairs Department is engaged in fostering dialogue between two worlds. Since its inception in 1967, the division has attempted to encourage closer communication between those who teach and conduct research in the field of international relations and those who serve as official advisers and implement government decisions in the same field.

In practice, this means promoting a two-way exchange of ideas between government and the academic community. In some instances, this has involved sending the practitioners of foreign policy into the academic world; in others, the academics have made their expertise available to the department.

One form of exchange has been the introduction of foreign service visitors — senior departmental officers seconded to Canadian universities. Under this pro-

gram, the officers are freed from departmental duties for a full academic year — a sort of sabbatical in reverse — and join a university faculty or department. They devote their time to reading, research, teaching, writing, holding seminars and consultations in the realm of international relations under arrangements worked out with the host university. For the first three years, two foreign service visitors were named annually, but in 1972-73 the number was increased to three — one each at the University of Montreal, York University and the University of British Columbia. Three more are being appointed for the year 1973-74 and it is planned in future to augment this number gradually.

The departmental speakers' program represents another form of liaison between government and the academic community. Foreign service officers are made available to address university audiences and other

interested groups, attend conferences on foreign policy and participate in international affairs seminars. Since September 1971, more than 125 officers have accepted invitations to visit universities and other centres of learning.

In addition, members of the Academic Relations Service, as well as other members of the department, maintain contact with institutions and academics interested in international affairs. Successive heads of the Academic Relations Service have made a series of liaison tours to establish rapport with certain universities and centres as well as to stimulate exchanges with the department.

Invitation to Ottawa

To encourage academics to give those in government some benefit from their analysis of foreign policy problems, the department invites professors to Ottawa to give talks and direct joint seminars. Topics range from current foreign policy issues to aspects of international relations theory. There have been discussions under such headings as Foreign Affairs and Parliament, Predicting Foreign Policy Trends, Our Clumsy Approach to Development, Changing Patterns of Policy-making. The department is anxious to broaden the areas of review to include such fields as the environment, international economics, technology and energy.

The department is also considering introduction under certain conditions of a type of seminar that would offer academics an opportunity to spend a week or two working within a departmental division. This would allow exposure in depth to the work of the department through briefings, permit attendance at meetings and provide access to current policy documents, despatches and files.

On a longer-term basis, this idea has already been implemented. The department has provided for employment of academics for specified periods in Ottawa and abroad. In the 1972-73 academic year, for example, the department retained the services of a political scientist from the Montreal campus of the University of Quebec for a special assignment in its Policy Analysis Group. A law professor has similarly been attached to the Bureau of Legal Affairs. A specialist in East Asian affairs, Professor William Saywell of the University of Toronto, joined the Canadian Embassy in Peking for the year 1972-73 and another Sinologist, Dr. Brian Evans of the University of Alberta, will succeed him in the coming year as resident academic in Peking. Other professors in various disciplines may eventually be in-



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vited to stay for suitable periods of time at headquarters in Ottawa or at overseas missions. A possible formula would see the exchange of an External Affairs officer with a professor or graduate student for a year at a given university.

Historical series

Historians and research assistants are being employed on contract in the department's Historical Division, where they are helping to edit the *Documents on Canadian External Relations* series. Other divisions have also awarded research contracts for preparation of special studies. One recent contract involved an examination of Soviet policy toward the proposed Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; another dealt with the operations of multinational firms and their relationship to Canadian foreign policy.

The department has participated in the organization of seminars and conferences in Ottawa and elsewhere in Canada. On three occasions — in 1970, 1971 and again in mid-May of this year — Meetings of Consultation were held in Ottawa at which academics joined senior officers of the department in a discussion of foreign policy themes and academic relations. This year's meeting dealt with changing world power relationships and their impact on

Divisions award research contracts for preparation of special studies



Louis Balthazar, director of the Department of Political Science at Laval University.

Asia, Europe and Canada. In 1969 and 1970, four seminars on various aspects of Canadian foreign policy were arranged with the co-operation of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs at a time when the Government's White Paper, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, was being drafted.

The Academic Relations Service has at times provided assistance in organization of meetings and conferences held by universities and international affairs centres. This took the form of co-operation in

... The extent to which President Nixon, whose past record as an anti-Communist cold warrior is well known, is inwardly committed to the new realism on which many of his administration's policies seem to be based may be one of the most important questions for the future of those policies.

For example, if things go badly for the American-supported, non-Communist regimes in Southeast Asia, will he be able to avoid being drawn in once more in the way that his predecessors were? And if anti-Communism ceases to work as an automatic, irrational stimulus to intervention, will considerations of prestige take its place?

In the historical tradition, the spirit of anti-Communism is akin to that of the crusades or the wars of religion, but the concept of national "honour" has an equally baneful history. What if the "peace with

preparation of programs and supply of departmental participants as well as help in defraying some of the administrative expenses incurred by the universities and professors involved. Examples of such cooperative ventures include the symposium on the international legal aspects of pollution, in Vancouver in 1970; the seminar on European monetary unification and the dollar zone, in Ottawa in the same year; a working group that gathered in Ottawa in 1971 to discuss the possible reform of the International Court of Justice; an inter-university seminar on Canada-U.S. relations, in Ottawa in 1972; another meeting called by the CIIA in the same year to examine the state of Canadian studies and research on Canada-U.S. relations; and a seminar on the North American Air Defence Command agreement at the University of Victoria in March of this year.

Apart from all of these programs, the department is reviewing the question of possible grants to universities and international studies centres to assist advanced research in the field of international relations. There has been specific action in this area in response to a recommendation in the Pacific sector paper of *Foreign Policy for Canadians* that facilities for Asian and Pacific studies at Canadian universities should be strengthened. The Government approved a special \$400,000 matching grant toward creation of a Centre for Asian Studies in Vancouver. But a general grant program of providing subsidies to institutions for research in international relations has not yet become possible.

honour" that has been proclaimed breaks down? Will "honour" require a resumption of American military involvement for the indefinite future? This is certainly one of the negative factors that could spoil the developing prospects for détente in the area.

In any case, the extent of American involvement in East Asia seems certain to remain high... the evolution of America, the economic and political imperatives which determine its attitudes from within, are therefore at least as important for the future of East Asian international affairs as the internal evolution of the East Asian countries themselves. . . . (Excerpt from paper entitled *Changing World Relationships in Asia and the Pacific* delivered at mid-May conference with academics by Dr. E. G. Pulleyblank of the University of British Columbia).

A formula for resolution of the impasse in Cambodia

By Robert Garry

Cambodia is a small country, with a total area scarcely larger than that of the New England States. However, its geographic location and its network of waterways, highways and railways combine to make its position an extremely strategic one, and this explains the decision of the United States to include Cambodia in its military system during operations in May 1970.

In its May 30, 1967, issue, the American magazine *Look* published a map of the Far East entitled "Our New Western Frontier". On the map was a line running from the Aleutian Islands through La Perouse Strait, between Sakhalin and Hokkaido, then around the Japanese archipelago and up through Korea along the 38th Parallel, passing just off the Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan. It then followed the 17th Parallel to the centre of Vietnam, traced the border between Laos and South Vietnam, separated South Vietnam from Cambodia and finally met the border between Thailand and Cambodia by passing through the Gulf of Siam; it then circled around Thailand and Malaysia. Along this entire line, which circled around China from Upper Burma to the Bering Sea, there was but one break: Cambodia. As a result of the invasion on May 1, 1970, the line was connected.

From then on there was no break in communication lines through Cambodia, from Thailand to South Vietnam and from the shores of the Gulf of Siam to central Cambodia and Laos. Unfortunately for American strategy, the Cambodian and Vietnamese revolutionaries have severed these communication lines, making the American intervention virtually ineffectual.

Cambodia is a pivot point in the military systems of the two opposing sides. It has become a stake neither side wants to give up; this accounts not only for Cambodia's key position but also for its tragic destiny. In order to understand the meaning and scope of the struggle taking place there, it should be remembered that present-day Cambodia is but a tiny remnant of the Great Khmer Empire, which in the thirteenth century occupied a large

part of South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand, as well as its present territory. We should also remember that the empire was carved up by the neighbouring Thais and Vietnamese — less-civilized people perhaps but more numerous and more powerful — who would have destroyed Cambodia as an independent country if it had not been for the intervention of France in 1863. Since that time, there has been strong hostility between the Cambodians and both the Vietnamese and the Thais. We can, therefore, appreciate the vital necessity for Cambodia to escape from the encroachments of its neighbours by ensuring that it has protection from one of the great powers. Nothing has filled the vacuum created when the French left Cambodia. This explains Prince Norodom Sihanouk's frantic efforts to gain international recognition for Cambodia's borders, to maintain its precarious position of nonalignment and to have this neutrality guaranteed by the world's major powers.

Problem of remaining neutral

In 1953, Cambodia broke its ties with France and became independent — and immediately became the object of the calculating attentions of the major world powers. The United States, eager to include Cambodia in its military plan of surrounding China, offered military and economic assistance. For India, there was a spiritual link with Cambodia — it was a tiny remnant of "Farther India", which, in the high Middle Ages, was a vast empire,

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*Sihanouk sought
Nehru's guidance
in early years
of independence*

loosely knit politically but spiritually homogeneous, stretching to the China Sea. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru volunteered to act as Prince Sihanouk's tutor; and it was to him that the Prince went, in the early years of Cambodian independence, to seek inspiration and guidance in the principles of peaceful co-existence of this "Pancha Sila", which were so dear to the Indian Prime Minister.

Of the other powers, only Japan proposed to provide economic and technical assistance to Cambodia; the Soviet Union and China were not yet present, since they did not have official relations with Cambodia at the time; France had very modest ambitions — it was only concerned with protecting its economic interests and maintaining its cultural position.

Cambodia and the United States

In its efforts to secure Cambodian support for its anti-Communist policies, the United States demanded that Prince Sihanouk state his position regarding the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), but he did not yield to this American pressure and refused to make any commitment. John Foster Dulles was dispatched to Phnom Penh in February 1955, but returned home empty-handed. A few months later, Prince Sihanouk took part in the Bandung Conference and there met with the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, who won him over and promised to support Cambodia's position of neutrality at all times. Yet, soon after his return to Phnom Penh, Sihanouk, under pressure from some politicians and military officials, consented, on May 16, 1955, to sign an agreement under which the United States promised to supply direct military and economic assistance to Cambodia.

The tactless, impolite, arrogant attitude of the American diplomats of the time soon pushed Prince Sihanouk back toward China. He made a visit there in 1956. On April 21, 1956, the third national Cambodian congress approved the policy of neutrality and peaceful co-existence and the refusal to participate in SEATO or accept its protection. Establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and the socialist countries was endorsed.

Until 1958, however, Cambodia maintained excellent relations with the "free" world. The United States had a large, well-staffed embassy in Phnom Penh, an office in charge of economic assistance, a U.S. Information Service office and a branch of the Asia Foundation. This privileged situation was jeopardized by the U.S. insistence that it be allowed to set up military and naval bases on Cambodian territory.

Moreover, its refusal to intervene to halt raids on Cambodian territory by its South Vietnamese allies and its support of attempts at subversion in Cambodia led Prince Sihanouk to oppose the United States. In 1963, he denounced the agreement of May 16, 1955, and asked that American military, technical and cultural aid be terminated. On March 11, 1964, a mass anti-American demonstration swept through Phnom Penh. The demonstrators attacked the American and British embassies and sacked the U.S.I.S. offices. On May 3, 1965, diplomatic relations between Cambodia and the United States were broken off.

Despite his repeated attacks against American policy, Sihanouk wanted to remain neutral and to arrive at some sort of arrangement with the United States. Following Jacqueline Kennedy's visit in 1967 (which Prince Sihanouk used to his political advantage) and the hearty welcome given to Ambassador Chester Bowles, diplomatic relations were restored on June 11, 1969, in spite of the almost daily attacks by American planes on Cambodian border villages. At this time the United States recognized Cambodia's existing borders. The anti-imperialism of 1965 was over. Thus protected on the right, Prince Sihanouk plunged into a violent campaign against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese establishments and infiltration in Cambodian territory. This abrupt change in the Prince's policy is explained by his fear of American withdrawal, which would have left Cambodia alone against one of its mortal enemies. He set up a pro-American Government which he thought would not hesitate to swing Cambodia over to the American camp if Communist subversion were to develop. Yet his deepest inclinations and his political instinct, which rarely failed him, caused him to lean towards a policy of nonalignment — the only policy which could ensure peace and independence for his country.

On March 18, 1970, Prince Sihanouk was deposed by the Cambodian National Assembly while he was on a trip to Moscow. On May 1, American and South Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia on the pretext of capturing the North Vietnamese command-post, destroying their hiding-places and eliminating the arms caches they had created. The plan misfired — we shall see later what happened and what was learned as a result.

Relations with China

China and Cambodia have always been on friendly terms. The Chinese settled in the Khmer Empire as early as the Angkorian

period, and we have but to read the memoirs of Tcheou-Ta-Kouan, the ambassador of the Yuan dynasty, to realize what a high opinion he had of this country. Despite Prince Sihanouk's anti-Communist statements just after Cambodia gained independence, China thought of the Cambodian head of state as a sincere nationalist whom it should help by discreetly encouraging him to protect his country's territorial integrity and political independence. The first contact he had with China at the Geneva Conference in 1954 made a favourable impression on him which remained until the Cultural Revolution and even afterward.

At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Chou En-lai greatly impressed Prince Sihanouk by his attitude of moderation and his broad outlook. Prince Sihanouk accordingly made a visit to Peking in 1956 and was well received. At the time Chou En-lai stated that China would never become involved in Cambodia's domestic affairs; he repeated this statement a few months later, during his visit to Phnom Penh. It was not until July 24, 1958, however, that the Cambodian Government established official diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The Laotian crisis and the development of the Vietnamese situation led to a strengthening of the ties between Cambodia and China. In May 1960, Chou En-lai went back to Phnom Penh and promised China's assistance if Cambodia were threatened. Six months later Prince Sihanouk signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with China. Sihanouk's many other trips to Peking and frequent visits by Chinese leaders to Phnom Penh advanced Sino-Cambodian friendship still further. From that time on, Chinese policy was limited to a scrupulous respect for Cambodian neutrality, avoiding an official alliance which would have violated this principle. Successive agreements provided Cambodia with substantial economic and technical assistance, to which was added considerable aid in the form of military supplies, beginning in 1964. The loans provided by China were interest-free and long-term, and did not involve any obligation whatever.

General Lon Nol's accession to a position of power in 1966, the repercussions of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Samlaut peasant revolt (which Sihanouk felt was instigated by the Red Guards) brought about a sudden change in Cambodian policy. Prince Sihanouk deported some prominent Chinese figures, closed schools, banned Chinese newspapers, disbanded the Sino-Khmer Association and threatened to recall his am-



AP wirephoto

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, deposed in 1970 as leader of Cambodia, is pictured on one of his trips in northwest China.

bassador. Chou En-lai had to intervene personally to avoid a complete break. It does not seem, however, that Sihanouk was at that time completely at ease about his country's fate once the Indochinese conflict was settled. Although relations between China and Cambodia were considerably improved, Sihanouk's verbal attacks against Sino-Vietnamese Communism did not stop: these "Maoists" were ruthlessly pursued and imprisoned. Sihanouk's main aim was to provoke the Chinese in order to obtain an anti-Communist label that he could use in dealing with the United States and its allies. The Chinese would not let themselves be manoeuvred in this way and remained even-tempered until Sihanouk was deposed.

Cambodia and the Soviet Union

Relations between Cambodia and the Soviet Union have always been reserved, although officially friendly. There seems always to have been a certain amount of mutual incompatibility and misunderstanding between the two nations. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has continued to support Cambodian neutrality (this suited its policy) and supplied Cambodia with considerable military, economic and cultural assistance — though with little enthusiasm, it should be noted.

The Soviet Union applied pressure to Cambodia to sign the Moscow treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, but to no avail. After a period of coolness

Despite reserve, Soviet continued to back policy of neutrality for Cambodia

in relations, marked by what was regarded as an insult to Sihanouk during the celebrations for the forty-eighth anniversary of the October Revolution, there followed a notable improvement in relations between the two countries. The Soviet Union was content to use discreet, unofficial means to express its reaction to Cambodian repression of leftist forces and to attacks against the provisional revolutionary government. For his part, Sihanouk made no comment when the U.S.S.R. invaded Czechoslovakia. In April 1969, however, a Cambodian mission sent to Moscow to seek military supplies and a long-term loan received a rather cool reception. Soviet leaders were extremely reluctant to provide arms and ammunition they suspected would be used against their allies. It is very likely that they did not trust Sihanouk — in fact, they have always maintained an attitude of extreme caution towards him.

The coup of 1970

This is not the place to analyze the basic reasons behind the deposition of Prince Sihanouk on March 18, 1970, at a time when he had gone to request the Russians and Chinese to intervene to halt the raids by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese on Cambodian territory. The reasons are linked with internal politics, rivalries between political figures, the deterioration of the social climate and the precarious economic situation. Obsessed by his desire to keep Cambodia out of the Indochinese conflict, Sihanouk was not able to devote himself to solving the country's domestic problems — however serious and pressing they may have been. For him, the maintenance of Cambodian neutrality was a priority, but it was an extremely difficult task, at which he was remarkably successful for 16 years. To achieve this, he had to rely successively on China, the United States and occasionally the Soviet Union; yet the sides were not evenly matched and, when Cambodian policy went counter to U.S. interests, the latter did not hesitate to make use of their superiority and force Cambodia to be a part of their military strategy.

It is difficult to understand the reasons behind the American intervention. There is no doubt that the special services had been striving to oust Sihanouk for some time, and it is likely that they played a major role in his deposition. The fact remains, however, that this was a strategic error, because the North Vietnamese Communist Party was never overcome, and its hiding-places and arms caches were only partially destroyed. The present military



UPI photo

General Lon Nol, head of the Cambodian Government which seized power from Prince Sihanouk, is pictured on a military tour.

situation confirms that this was an error. It was also a grave political blunder, particularly in view of the fact that South Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodian territory. A tract distributed in Phnom Penh justifiably pointed out that the Lon Nol regime left the entire country open to South Vietnam on the pretext of evacuating a few Viet Cong bases on the border.

On March 19, 1970, Prince Sihanouk arrived in Peking and was welcomed by the Chinese. The day before, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin had told him that he had been deposed by the Khmer National Assembly. On the invitation of the Chinese, Prince Sihanouk decided to remain in Peking and set up a government-in-exile to form the legal opposition to the Lon Nol regime.

He later said that by so doing, he was simply imitating General Charles de Gaulle, who had gone to London after the French defeat. Like de Gaulle, he made a "June 18" appeal to his people. On March 21, he had a political statement distributed in which he affirmed that he would not attempt to regain the power he had lost or "to retain the now contemptible title of head of state". He added that the people and youth of his country could count on

Coup occurred while Sihanouk solicited aid to halt raids on his territory

him to do his utmost to help them set up this new, untainted power, in which he himself would not be involved at all. It should be noted that, since making this statement on the day after his deposition, Prince Sihanouk has not wavered in his stand — he is resolved, or resigned, never to resume his position as Cambodian head of state and to leave the responsibility of governing to the progressive forces of his country.

Five-point statement

On March 23, the Prince issued a five-point statement which was to serve as the basis of the fight against the Lon Nol regime:

- dissolution of the Lon Nol Government and of the Parliament, both of which had betrayed their oath and violated the constitution of the Kingdom;
- appeal to all Khmers and others living in Cambodia to refuse to recognize legislation enacted by the new regime;
- formation of a Gouvernement royal d'union national khmère (Grunk) (Royal Government of the Khmer National Union) and of an assembly representing all levels of Khmer society;
- formation of an army to fight for liberation;
- formation of a Front uni national khmère (Funk) (Khmer National United Front) for all Khmers devoted to the principles of independence, democracy, neutrality and progress, and prepared to fight against imperialism and neo-colonialism.

The government-in-exile includes many notable figures under the direction of the universally-respected Samdech Penn Nouth. Some live in Peking; others, members of the Cambodian leftist movement, are with the Maquis in northern Cambodia and were recently visited by Prince Sihanouk. When the film taken at that time was shown, the three leftist deputies who disappeared from Phnom Penh in 1967, and who were rumoured to have been executed by Sihanouk's police, were seen to be very much alive, leading the people's liberation army.

There is no doubt that the regime of General Lon Nol was set up by the personal enemies of Prince Sihanouk in the *coup d'état* on March 18, 1970. The young people and intellectuals were revolting much more against Prince Sihanouk's personal power and the rampant corruption existing in the country than against the Prince's political party. Discontent with the new Government soon arose, and despite cabinet shuffles, miniature internal *coups d'état* and proclamations of martial law and of states of emergency, the Lon Nol

Government is becoming more and more isolated and has lost all popular support. It is only because of massive assistance from the United States that the Government remains in power. Students and intellectuals are fleeing the capital to join the resistance movement; corruption, disorder and political chaos are more in evidence every day. Demonstrations by teachers and students are frequent, not only in Phnom Penh but also in provincial centres still occupied by armed Government forces, and the repression of such demonstrations is becoming increasingly violent.

Lon Nol is able to hold the country only because of the army and the police. However, the army is no longer reliable: the soldiers are demoralized, unpaid and underfed; they have no political conviction and are not inclined to defend a regime for which they have only contempt. A few weeks ago, 500 Cambodian soldiers who had not eaten for three days and had not been paid for two months left their posts, went to Phnom Penh and fired their guns in the streets, demanding their due. This mutiny is not an isolated incident; it reveals low morale and negligible zeal for defending the country's institutions. The Lon Nol regime prides itself on having an army of 200,000, but 100,000 of these are probably imaginary, appearing only on the pay lists. It is, therefore, not surprising that 85 per cent of the country is not controlled by the Government. Actually, the Government has authority only in the capital, with its population of over 2,000,000 (mostly refugees), and in a few towns in the interior that are accessible by plane only and are in effect, besieged towns.

Economic situation

The economic situation is catastrophic — rising prices and the resulting evils, corruption and the black market, are more common than ever. Supplies are becoming scarce and essentials have been rationed. The population is interested in one thing only — to have peace restored in their country, regardless of who is at the head of the Government. Two American senators who went to Cambodia on a fact-finding mission stated that the people would not object to Sihanouk's return to Phnom Penh. They have not forgotten that, despite their pain and suffering and the many compromises he was obliged to make, Prince Sihanouk had succeeded in maintaining peace in Cambodia. The people are grateful to him for this; they still trust him, and they are counting on his return, which would signal the end of hostilities.

It would be a serious error to think that the government-in-exile in Peking

More isolated from populace, Lon Nol regime stays in power with U.S. help

UPI photo

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UPI radiophoto

A Cambodian Government soldier helps a wounded comrade move toward the rear during operation along highway from Cambodia's seaport, Kampong Som, to embattled Phnom Penh.

consists only of Prince Sihanouk and those who supported him after the *coup d'état* in 1970. Despite the intellectual and political character of these people, some of whom are of the highest calibre (such as Samdech Penn Nouth, the President of the Grunk, whom Jean Lacouture admiringly called "The Constable"), one cannot overlook the former deputies of the left, who are living in the bushland of northern Cambodia. They have formed a liberation army of 50,000 well-trained and well-equipped men, who, if it were not for the presence of American forces would have made short work of General Lon Nol's army. The "Red Khmer" triumvirate of Khieu-Samphan, Hou-Youn and Hu-Nim is the intelligent, capable nucleus of a popular party that seems ideally suited to forming and leading a future government.

During Sihanouk's six-week "long march" to Cambodia, from mid-February to the end of March, a compromise was negotiated and a coalition government formed with the leaders of the Cambodian left. Prince Sihanouk contributes the "legitimacy" of his Royal Government of the Khmer National Union and his prestige and popularity among the country's peasant masses; for their part, the leaders of the left bring to the intellectuals and young people of Cambodia the hope for an honest and honourable regime the leaders of the March 1970 *coup d'état* were not able to provide.

Once a progressive regime is set up in

Phnom Penh, it appears certain the Prince Sihanouk will be nothing more than a figurehead; he will have no power and will speak only on behalf of the left coalition, which will thereafter be responsible for governing Cambodia. He will no longer have the ultimate power to make decisions at the bargaining table; this will belong to the leftist leaders. Such would appear to be the results of the six weeks Prince Sihanouk just spent in Cambodia.

There seems to be no possibility of negotiations between the Phnom Penh regime and the government-in-exile. Prince Sihanouk will not hear of any contact with Lon Nol and his advisers; he reaffirmed this stand in Rabat on May 29 during his state visit. The coalition regime he has just created with the "Red Khmers" will negotiate with the United States only. For its part, the Lon Nol regime would be willing to negotiate with the leaders of the left because it knows that only they could transform the Red Khmers into a force capable of defeating the present regime without the assistance of the North Vietnamese. However, the Red Khmers are not prepared to negotiate with the Lon Nol regime because they see its desire to negotiate as a clumsy attempt to create a union in their group.

U.S. objectives

The United States would like to see a friendly government in Phnom Penh. This is why Washington is supporting the Lon Nol regime (until it finds a valid replacement) providing it with massive military and economic assistance and, to prevent it from collapsing, indulging in bombing raids more intensive than anything seen so far in the war in Indochina. The rest of the world is indifferent to or ignorant of the devastation; one cannot imagine the losses to civilians caused by the bombing of the shores of the Mekong, the Tonle Sap or the Bassac, which are the richest and most densely populated regions of the country. Since mid-March, Cambodia has suffered 240 bombings a day — 80 per cent of all American bombing raids hit this hapless country. The Americans do not realize that these bombings increase the number of refugees in the cities (600,000 more in the last few months in Phnom Penh) and push the victims into the opposition. Moreover, by promoting raids by South Vietnamese troops on Cambodian territory, they are reinforcing the ancient hostility between Cambodians and Vietnamese and making the return of peace in the peninsula even more difficult.

The Cambodian conflict is a civil war in which the United States is providing

Coalition formed with leaders of Cambodian left

direct military support to one side. Support for General Lon Nol's tottering regime, which might formerly have met with the approval of those sectors of the population that helped him obtain power, today arouses serious discontent, particularly in the army and among intellectuals and disillusioned students. The United States does not know what to do; it is well aware of the grave faults of the regime it is supporting, and has tried to persuade General Lon Nol to expand his Government to include some form of opposition, to establish communication with the underground forces in the North and to set up a government of national reconciliation which the United States could effectively support. However, there is no one among the "republicans" whom the population would approve and who has the prestige and stature required to lead the country and take charge of a government of national reconciliation. The leaders of the underground movement refuse to declare themselves on the matter, and it appears that a solution to this problem cannot be found as long as the decisions are made in Washington and the Americans are in Phnom Penh to enforce them.

Obviously the United States and its allies in Saigon cannot sit idly by and watch the establishment in Phnom Penh of a popular regime which might question the "Vietnamization" program begun in the South and even endanger President Thieu's South Vietnamese regime. On the other hand, the Indochinese revolutionaries cannot allow Cambodia to be transformed into an American base that would pose a threat to their positions throughout the Indochinese peninsula. The situation has thus reached an impasse, and no one can foresee how and when peace can be restored.

The Soviet attitude

Since Nikita Khrushchov, Soviet leaders have apparently had neither the means nor the imagination to block the action of rival powers in Southeast Asia. They are at a disadvantage because of their remoteness and the lack of interest they have shown until now in this part of the world, and have therefore tried to enlist the support of the Asian nations in a vast plan for collective security, conceived by Leonid Brezhnev. In this way, they expected to neutralize the major powers, particularly China, and at the same time exclude the United States. This plan did not arouse any enthusiasm; the Soviet Union took note of the fact, and gave tacit recognition to American supremacy in Southeast Asia. Now the U.S.S.R. would like to make an

agreement with the United States in order to limit Chinese influence. It has merely denounced the brutal American bombings in Indochina and issued an appeal to fight aggression but has not undertaken any positive action to substantiate its position.

Promoting third force

Opposition to China and marked coolness towards Sihanouk seem to be the key points of Soviet policy. After recalling its ambassador from Phnom Penh following the 1970 *coup d'état*, the Soviet Union has kept a chargé d'affaires with the Lon Nol regime and has continued to provide him with economic assistance. Soviet diplomacy is aimed at promoting the appearance of a third force that would support the U.S.S.R. and applying pressure to induce Lon Nol to allow the existence of a Communist party that could oppose the revolutionary leftist leaders of the Sihanouk Government. Despite the considerable efforts of a heavily-staffed embassy, which has been working on both approaches, this policy has not yet been successful.

Chinese diplomacy, on the other hand, seems to have worked remarkably well; it has not only supported Prince Sihanouk but has managed at the same time to promote a popular government with which it is on reasonably friendly terms. The Chinese are somewhat indifferent as to the form and name of the future government of Cambodia — they will judge it by its actions. What they want above all is to maintain a sort of status quo with a neutral, independent Cambodia that they could support and that would act as a check on the ventures of an overly-powerful Vietnam or Thailand.

There seems to be a slight possibility that the coalition regime set up by Prince Sihanouk and the Red Khmers could satisfy, to a certain extent, the interests of all parties involved. According to some reports, Washington would agree to the return of Prince Sihanouk to Cambodia if Lon Nol would leave on an extended holiday to the United States, provided Sihanouk's position is only symbolic and he has no real power. The Khmers could work everything out if they were left on their own.

In the statements he made in Rabat on May 29 of this year, Prince Sihanouk declared that his Government is ready to negotiate with the United States. He is suggesting that, in exchange for the surrender of the "traitors" in Phnom Penh, diplomatic relations be restored immediately and there be a peace in which neither side is considered the victor. He added that the future policy of Cambodia

U.S.S.R. provided economic aid, general policy less successful than Chinese

U.S. might agree to return of Sihanouk if position only symbolic

would be based on nonalignment, positive neutralism and active neutrality.

There are signs that definitely point toward *détente*. On the one hand, a well-known Cambodian figure, Mr. Son-Sann, former minister in the Sihanouk Government and former director of the Bank of Cambodia, who went to France at the time of the *coup* in 1970, has just returned to Phnom Penh. One of the first things he did when he returned was to issue an appeal for national reconciliation. He could well be the intermediary for whom everyone has been waiting to begin negotiations between the United States and Prince Sihanouk. In addition (and the significance of this move should not be underrated), the Phnom Penh Government has just released the entire royal family, particularly Prince Sihanouk's sons and daughters and the two eldest sons of Samdech Penn-Nouth, who were imprisoned the day after

the unsuccessful attempt against Lon Nol by Flight-Lieutenant So Potra (Prince Sihanouk's son-in-law) last March 17.

Whatever form the Cambodian Government assumes in the future, whoever its leaders are, Cambodian policy must be aimed at maintaining the country's independence and neutrality at all costs. Cambodia could then fit into an Indochinese unit whose neutrality would be guaranteed by the great powers. This would require that the Americans leave the country and halt all intervention in Cambodia's affairs.

The decision as to whether Cambodia will have peace or war is now in the hands of President Nixon. He can either continue to support a tottering regime that represents nothing and no one, and would result in the systematic destruction of Cambodia, or he can begin negotiations with Prince Sihanouk with a view to bringing about a ceasefire.

Laos still lives in the shadow of Indochina's larger conflict

By David Van Praagh

Prince Souvanna Phouma's drawing-room overlooking the Mekong River outside Vientiane is adorned with, among other things, a study kit of Mohandas K. Gandhi's works and the autographed photographs of three U.S. presidents: Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon.

Royal Laotian T-28 trainers carrying bombs and machine-guns sometimes fly several times daily on their missions over peaceful Buddhist temples and orange-robed monks who do not bother to look up.

In Luang Prabang, frequently cut off or nearly surrounded by Pathet Lao guerrillas supported by North Vietnamese

troops, a single soldier stands guard at the gate to King Savang Vatthana's palace.

These are all symbols — standing for the clinging of Laos to peace and, at the same time, the immersion in war of this ruggedly beautiful Buddhist kingdom and its more than two million people.


A phase of the Indochina war was over with the signing of the Vietnam ceasefire agreement on January 27, 1973, and the signing of an Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos on February 21. But it is by no means certain that war is finished in Indochina, or that Laos will not be embroiled in a wider military conflict increasingly centering on Thailand rather than Vietnam.

If a number of happy conditions coincide, there is just a chance that Laos will attain the kind of peaceful, neutral and even unified status that was envisaged in the 1962 Geneva Agreement on its future.

But geography, as well as several large and medium powers, conspired to upset this understanding and to drag Laos into a war far worse than its own civil



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AP Wirephoto

Prince Souvanna Phouma, oft-styled neutralist head of the Laotian Government, arrives in Paris for meeting with French leaders during 1972 tour. Souvanna is

described by Professor Van Praagh as a patient man working toward a government of national union, including neutralist, Communist and right-wing representatives.

conflict. The odds must be that this will happen again as the scene of confrontation shifts westward in Southeast Asia.

I asked a prominent Laotian not long ago from what foreign power the main threat to his country came. He reflected a moment, then replied: "From India and China, of course."

Between the giants

It was a detached, historic view, and a deliberately wry one. By sprawling across the part of Asia known as Indochina — between India and China — Laos falls between the two Asian giants whether the area is taken to mean the former French territories or to extend further afield.

The trouble is that Laotians can no longer afford to take a detached view of anything. The tragedy is that the kingdom of Lan Xang — the Million Elephants — may have lost whatever chance it had to develop a national identity of its own.

Foreign powers from near and far have destroyed the prospects for the people of Laos entering the twentieth century on anything like their own terms. Many of

these people live in primitive conditions and would have needed assistance in any case. What they did not need was the Vietnam war.

But the war is not the only factor preventing the ethnic Lao, who left South China in the thirteenth century, and their hill-tribe cousins from coming into their own as a distinct national and cultural entity. Geography is the underlying inhibition. The Laotian who took the broad "Asian" view of his country's plight was not entirely wrong.

If one spreads out a map and moves one's finger clockwise from the extreme north of Laos round its landlocked borders, one comes to China, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma.

India is not contiguous but it is present in Vientiane in the person of the chairman of the last ineffective Indochina truce commission extant. (Canada, with two representatives left, and Poland are also members of the International Control Commission. The commission originated with the 1954 Geneva accords, was revived in 1962, has not issued a report since 1966

and is looked to by Souvanna and some other Laotians to oversee the establishment of a new ceasefire and coalition government.)

Impact of U.S.

The United States is not contiguous either but there is no denying its profound impact on the land and people of Laos. A recently-published book by Fred Branfman, *Voices From The Plain of Jars*, presents eyewitness documentation of destruction of the society existing in the Plain of Jars in north central Laos by U.S. bombs. As many as 50,000 persons were completely uprooted.

Seen from almost any vantage-point, Laos is the linchpin of Southeast Asia. Its people have suffered civil war for almost as long as the Vietnamese. But this internal conflict among opposing political, and often family, factions has been used by outside powers with their own opposing interests.

North Vietnam has steadily increased the number of its troops in Laos, to as many as 70,000. Some of these troops, perhaps 20,000, fought alongside or "stiffened" Pathet Lao guerrillas or pro-Communist neutralist troops, or operated on their own in the Laotian civil war. But Hanoi's main and immediate objective in Laos has been to maintain the Ho Chi Minh Trail, or more properly trails, supplying anti-Government forces in South Vietnam and, to a limited extent, Cambodia.

South Vietnamese troops went into southern Laos in force in February 1971 in an unsuccessful attempt to cut these trails leading from the Mu Gia and other North Vietnamese mountain passes through dense jungles to areas of deployment and battle.

It is unlikely that the United States would have become so heavily involved in Laos after the 1962 Geneva Agreement, which President John F. Kennedy sought and Ambassador Averell Harriman helped negotiate, if it had not increasingly intervened in Vietnam. From 1964 to early 1973, nearly two million tons of U.S. bombs were dropped on Laos. The U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, employing various military and CIA agents and even two airlines, became the effective command-post for the Royal Laotian Government.

The United States not only organized Government forces, including irregular units mostly of Meo and other hill tribesmen and provided bombing cover for them, but also paid for use of Thai troops in Laos. Until recently it was believed that Thai mercenaries numbered 5,000 to 8,000, but

a former U.S. ambassador admitted to Senate committee recently that the actual number is between 15,000 and 20,000. This suggests that whole units of Thai infantry as well as artillery and possible air units may have been as involved in fighting in Laos as were the North Vietnamese units.

The extent of Soviet military aid to the Pathet Lao is uncertain, as compared to the period before the 1962 agreement when the Russians openly delivered arms. But it is significant that the Neo Lao Haksat, the political arm of the Pathet Lao, and more recently the Phak Pasason Patavat Lao (People's Revolutionary Party of Laos), have acknowledged close ties to the Soviet Communist party and the Laodong Party of North Vietnam.

China's interest in Laos is also obvious but more murky than that of other powers. Premier Souvanna and the Chinese leadership have long shown a certain sensitivity to each other, undoubtedly due in part to the Pathet Lao's link to Moscow. Souvanna has been reluctant to criticize the most tangible evidence of the Chinese presence — a road or roads being built by as many as 20,000 Chinese troops, protected by anti-aircraft guns, from Yunnan Province through northern Laos to the Mekong River just above the Thai border. Another Chinese-built road in this remote area points toward Burma.

These foreign manifestations may be more important to the future of Laos than the internal situation more or less ratified by the February 21 agreement. The terms of the agreement have yet to be fulfilled, but some progress has been made and the necessary Laotian goodwill seems to be far closer to the surface than the cooperation among Vietnamese needed if the Vietnam ceasefire agreement is ever going to work.

Pathet Lao control

Up to three-quarters of the 91,000 square miles of Laos is controlled by the Pathet Lao, nominally headed by Prince Souvannouvong, Souvanna's half-brother, and other Communist forces, with Government forces left mainly in possession of the Mekong Valley. The population of Laos has never been enumerated, but it is in the neighborhood of 2.5 million, divided roughly equally between ethnic Lao and hill tribes. About one-third of the population is in Communist territory, and some peasants have been resettled. About one-third more consists of refugees driven from their homes by fighting and bombing, and living on Government land. Military units on both sides have suffered heavy casual-

*More intervention
in Vietnam
meant increasing
U.S. role in Laos*

ties. The economy of the country remains backward and disrupted, and, in the Government sector, heavily dependent on U.S. aid.

Although the February 21 agreement acknowledges the existence of two zones in Laos, Souvanna, a patient man, is working toward a government of national union, including neutralist, Communist and right-wing representatives, and eventual creation of a single zone. The Pathet Lao want two distinct zones even with a national coalition regime, and so do the so-called rightists, including the influential Champassak family, which continues to hold parts of southern Laos. Souvanna is supported by the King, whose token guard indicates that he is accepted by all Laotian parties, and the United States, about which many Laotians have mixed feelings.

The United States has bombed in Laos since the February 21 agreement, and continues to bomb regularly in Cambodia, where it has proved more difficult to reach a separate ceasefire agreement. If the military and political struggle for South Vietnam continues, and if North Vietnamese troops continue to use parts of Laos and Cambodia to help wage this struggle (both probabilities), then at least the possibility remains that U.S. air power will continue to be deployed over Laos and Cambodia, and possibly Vietnam again, from bases in Thailand, to try and head off Communist gains in South Vietnam. If this happens, it is difficult to imagine political and military conciliation on the ground in Laos or in any other country in Indochina.

Even, or perhaps especially, without continued U.S. intervention, North Vietnam's leaders might well decide to extend their sway over all Laos after, or even before, a change to their advantage in Saigon.

Apart from what happens in Vietnam or Cambodia, the Pathet Lao might well try to extend its control to Vientiane or other cities, or right-wing generals might determine on a *coup* against Souvanna as a last attempt to save their positions.

Any of these eventualities would undercut the slim chances for a peaceful Laotian settlement of the country's divisions by all concerned parties. So would extension of their interests in Laos by either or both of two other neighbours — Thailand and China.

There are many natural links between Thailand and Laos, and the military rulers in Bangkok could not easily tolerate an unfriendly presence directly on the northern banks of the Mekong. Ethnic Lao and most Thais come from the same racial

stock and their languages are similar. The royal families of Laos and Thailand are related. Although it is unlikely that Thailand would mount a major military operation outside its borders without U.S. encouragement and support, a crossing of the Mekong by Thai troops as more than clandestine mercenaries is conceivable.

Thailand's vulnerability

Thailand's vulnerability is increased by Communist-led insurgent movements in the north and northeast, and China's road-building activities in Laos. The road from Yunnan to Pak Beng, on the Mekong in Laotian territory, points directly at the Nan Valley cutting deep into the centre of Thailand. Thai insurgents, who still operate in relatively small groups but control many villages in border areas, come, at least nominally, under the Thai Patriotic Front, with an office and a radio in China. The prospects of military struggle in Thailand increasing in scope and intensity may be enhanced by use of eight bases on Thai soil by the U.S. Air Force. If Thailand does become the new battleground of Southeast Asia, Laos can no more escape than it can from the Vietnam war.

But it is also possible to envisage a set of circumstances, relating more to Thailand and China and a new U.S. role in the region than to the old warring factions in the Vietnam war, which in effect could underwrite a new settlement in Laos and make it stick far better than the 1962 agreement on a tripartite neutral Laos did.

At the time of President Richard Nixon's visit to China in February 1972, there was some indication that the leaders in Peking were willing to help guarantee neutral coalition governments in Laos and Cambodia, outside Hanoi's orbit, if the United States let matters run their course in South Vietnam. By an arrangement of this kind, Washington and Bangkok would be assured of buffers against further threats to Thai territory and U.S. air bases. Mr. Nixon chose not to let matters run their course in Indochina and the position of the U.S.-supported governments in Vientiane and Phnom Penh particularly continued to deteriorate while U.S. bombing went on, both before and after the ceasefire agreements in January and February.

The U.S. Congress has been emboldened by the Watergate revelations to move to force Mr. Nixon to stop bombing in Indochina. While it might take another administration in Washington to help bring about a true peace with honour in Southeast Asia, a change in U.S. policy is certainly conceivable. Also conceivable is

Thai insurgents control villages in border areas

co-operation by China and the Soviet Union, for different reasons, to damp down the old wars and prevent new ones. In short, it is perhaps truer than ever that joint action by the major powers is necessary to restrain lesser powers, and thus save Laos, and perhaps much more in a besieged part of the world.

Withdrawal from Vietnam

Canada will withdraw its peace-supervisory contingent from Vietnam by July 31, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp announced in the House of Commons on May 29. The decision to withdraw from the four-power International Commission of Control and Supervision was based on the conclusion that the Canadian conception of the functioning of the international commission as an impartial, fact-finding body had not been accepted.

With the signing of the Vietnam ceasefire agreement on January 27, Canada had agreed to serve on the ICCS for an initial 60-day trial period. On March 27, Mr. Sharp announced that Canada's participation would be extended until May 31, but he added that the Government would decide before that date whether to remain or to withdraw. The minister said at that time that, unless there had been a substantial improvement in the situation or some signs of an imminent political agreement between the two South Vietnamese parties, the Canadian contingent would be withdrawn by June 30 — thus providing a further 30-day grace period for the parties to the ceasefire agreement to find a successor.

In his statement of March 27, Mr. Sharp said the ICCS had not been able to perform the tasks assigned to it under the ceasefire agreement and, in his statement of May 29, he said there had been no significant change in the situation. (See also *International Perspectives*, March-April, May-June 1973).

The Secretary of State for External Affairs tabled with his statement a White Paper reviewing Canada's participation in the ICCS up to the end of March 1973.

The following are portions of Mr. Sharp's statement to the House on May 29:

... The House will recall the efforts that the Government made to establish conditions which would help to improve the prospects for the successful function-

This possible scenario may not be very convincing when compared to others affecting Laos. But as a British diplomat said a year ago when the Royal Government was being pushed almost up against the Mekong: "Poor Laos. It didn't deserve this goddamn war." Still less could Laos survive another war.

ing of the International Commission of Control and Supervision provided for in the Paris agreement on Vietnam....

Freedom of access

What we sought to ensure was that the new international commission would be an impartial, fact-finding body, supported by the parties to the peace agreement, with sufficient freedom of access to enable it to ascertain the facts about any alleged breach of the agreement and reporting quickly not only to the parties to the agreement but also to the international community as a whole. While we did not achieve all our purposes, I think it is fair to say that we helped to effect some improvements, at least in form.

What we could not ensure, and what the ICCS could not ensure, was peace in Vietnam. That depends on the parties to the peace agreement and not on the ICCS. Nor can Canada alone ensure that the ICCS fulfills its function of peace observing and reporting as provided for in the peace agreement. That, too, depends on the parties to the agreement and on the other member delegations of the commission.

Notwithstanding our hesitations and doubts, we accepted membership for a trial period of 60 days. At the end of that first 60 days, our hesitations and doubts had been reinforced, but we were urged by many countries to show patience. So we agreed to another two-month period, which is now coming to an end. By and large, there has been no significant change in the situation that would alter the view we formed at the end of the first 60 days, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of the Canadian contingent to support the functioning of the international commission.

Let me repeat that our attitude results from Canadian experience in the old ICSC and the Canadian concept of the functioning of a peace-observer body. We

ICCS unable to handle tasks assigned to it under agreement

are not criticizing the peace agreement. We welcomed that agreement, we regard it as a good agreement that provides a sound and honourable a basis for peace as was negotiable. If the parties will set themselves to applying it, as we hope they may yet do, it can bring lasting peace to Vietnam. We hope that the efforts of Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Le Duc Tho to achieve a stricter observance of the agreement will be crowned with success.

Canadian concept

We have come to the conclusion, however, that the Canadian concept of the functioning of the international commission has not been accepted and that it would be in the interest of all concerned if we were now to withdraw. Nor do we believe that Canadian withdrawal would have any significant effect upon the prospects for peace in Vietnam. That depends upon the parties to the peace agreement and not upon the ICCS. It is only if the parties are cooperating in a strict observance of the agreement and are willing to use the ICCS as a means of reinforcing the agreement that the commission can perform its function with any hope of success.

Throughout our tenure on the ICCS we have sought above all else to be objective. We have represented none of the contending parties. We have been as insistent in calling for and participating in investigations of alleged violations by the United States and the Republic of Vietnam as we have with regard to alleged violations by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the other South Vietnamese party. If the RVN or the United States has been at fault, we have said so. If the other parties were to blame for ceasefire violations, we also have said so. I assure the House that we have no need to listen mutely now or later to any charges that we have acted partially; we can be proud of our objectivity in the commission and of our attempts to see this impartiality as an integral part of commission activities.

I said in my statement to the House on March 27 that Canada would be prepared to return to Vietnam to participate in the international supervision of an elec-

tion clearly held under the terms of the Paris agreement and therefore with the concurrence and participation of the two South Vietnamese parties. It went without saying that our participation would not be necessary if a replacement were found for Canada on the ICCS. I am not convinced that there is much chance that an election will take place as provided for in the agreement but, if it should (and we would want to examine it carefully to make sure it was this kind of election), and if no replacement has been found for Canada, we would consider sympathetically a request to return temporarily to the ICCS for this purpose, in the light of the circumstances then prevailing and our assessment of the chances for effective supervision.

Deadline postponed

The peace agreement itself anticipates the replacement of the named members of the ICCS — Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland — or any of them. I have also said that we would be prepared to remain on the commission until June 30 so that a replacement could be found. We have since learned that the discussions which took place recently between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Le Duc Tho will be resumed in June. We want to give those discussions every chance of success and we would certainly wish to do nothing that would complicate them by introducing what might seem to be too short a deadline for agreeing on a replacement for Canada on the commission.

In recognition of that possible difficulty, we are prepared, if the parties to the agreement so wish, to stay for a period beyond June 30 but not later than July 31. Canada's decision to withdraw is firm and definite, but the additional flexibility should give the parties adequate time to find a replacement for the Canadian delegation. Should a successor be named and be ready to take its place before July 31, we would of course be prepared to hand over our responsibilities at any mutually convenient earlier time. We shall, of course, continue to function as we have been doing during the remaining period of our stay on the commission

Would consider temporary return to participate in supervision of an election

The pressing need for Canada to define its energy policies

A new dimension to global politics

By David Crane

The world's vast energy requirements are adding a new and urgent dimension to global politics. The pattern that is emerging is not only one that threatens to disrupt world money markets and upset the international economy. It may bring on energy recessions in the major industrial states. But worse still, because shortages mean instability, peace itself could be threatened if the oil nations on the Persian Gulf become the targets of takeovers and *Realpolitik* conspiracies.

Canada is in a unique position among the Western industrial powers. It is self-sufficient in energy. And, more than that, it is a net exporter. Its potential energy resources are immense, and discoveries to date represent only a small fraction of what could be developed.

For energy-rich Canada, one of the crucial questions of the 1970s is to decide the pace at which it wants to develop those resources. Finding them will not be automatic. This requires huge investments, and could have a disruptive effect on the rest of the country.

Yet the potential energy crisis of the United States will create new pressures on Canada to develop those energy resources as quickly as possible.

American feelings about Canada can hardly remain sanguine if U.S. energy

shortages are causing serious problems while Canadians hold off developing their resources. Most Americans simply assume that, if they need energy and Canada has a supply, then it will be made available.

And it is probably true that Canada itself could suffer if the United States were ever driven into an energy recession, since Canadian output and employment are likely to continue to depend on American prosperity.

Search for compromise

Obviously, the search in the Seventies will be for a middle ground that provides some kind of compromise between the Canadian desires for balanced economic development, improved benefits from its resources and greater control over its economy and the American desires for secure and diversified sources of energy. But the search for that compromise will not be easy, and political and economic relations could suffer in the process.

The critical role of energy diplomacy is already apparent in world politics. The United States, Europe and Japan will need top-level negotiations to avoid a "beggar-my-neighbour" competition for scarce energy resources and to establish a better bargaining position with the oil-rich countries of the world's most powerful cartel, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development are grappling with problems of security of supply in the event of severe shortages. Officials at the International Monetary Fund are deeply concerned about the tens of billions of dollars the Middle East states will accumulate from oil sales and the impact this will have on world monetary conditions. And, at the World Bank, there is fear that the competition by the industrial powers for energy will lead to energy shortages or too costly supplies for the less-developed countries.

For the energy-rich countries, ranging from Canada to the Middle East, there is



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a growing sense of economic power and a feeling that energy resources will provide them with an important political voice in world affairs, or at least, in the case of Canada, put this country on a little more equal footing with the United States.

The importance of resources in foreign policy was stressed recently by the Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam. In a foreign policy statement, he told the Australian House of Representatives: "Now that the procurement of resources is becoming a vital national interest for the industrialized countries short of mineral resources, any domestic legislation we make is bound to affect our relations with these countries. It is becoming apparent that we can no longer regard resources legislation in purely domestic terms, but that implications for our foreign relations need increasingly to be taken into account in the planning of government action."

While he was talking of Australia's own mineral resources, much the same point could be made on the relevance of domestic Canadian energy policies and legislation to Canada's relations with the United States. Canadian conditions for energy development or pricing will inevitably cause some reaction in Washington in particular and among Americans in general.

Americans have come to look on Canada as a reliable source of supply for energy, although they are also becoming increasingly familiar with more nationalistic attitudes to energy development.

For much of the past 15 years, Canada has actively encouraged the United States to look north for oil and gas and has encouraged the U.S. oil industry to search for hydrocarbons in this country. Much of Canada's diplomatic effort in Washington over the past decade was designed to increase energy sales. Now Canada is changing its stance, and this is bound to have political repercussions, and perhaps economic ones as well.

One reason is the U.S. perception of energy resources in Canada. Many Americans talk of U.S. energy shortages and North American energy resources. Congressional leaders have been advocates of an all-embracing energy deal with Canada. And one former White House energy adviser said recently: "It doesn't make sense for Canada, with spare energy, not to sell it to the United States, which needs it."

From the viewpoint of the U.S. oil industry, Canadian frontier energy resources have been explored by U.S. oil companies as part of a global strategy to develop a variety of sources of supply for the United States.

Speaking about impending U.S. en-

Donald Macdonald, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, on June 28 tabled in the House of Commons a two-volume study of Canadian energy policy issues.

The study expects that Canada will continue to export oil, gas and electricity to the United States, but indicates that Canada will not play a major role in helping the United States solve its emerging energy crisis.

The study suggests that Canada should review its tax and royalty policies to make sure that Canadians benefit from the increasing value of its energy resources and indicates that Canada should probably adopt a cautious approach in opening up its frontier resources.

Consultation with the provincial governments is now under way. Just as the Borden Royal Commission on Energy led to the energy policies that Canada followed through the 1960s and early 1970s, the new federal study on energy issues is expected to set the stage for Canada's energy policies for the remainder of the 1970s and into the 1980s.

ergy shortages early this year, T. D. Barrow, senior vice-president of Exxon Corporation, said that "recognizing this problem almost ten years ago. Exxon has embarked on an expanding world exploration program".

While he acknowledged this was only a partial solution, Barrow went on to point out that "we have concentrated on the offshore basins and the remote Arctic areas of the world where the possibility for giant oil reserves still exists". Not surprisingly, Exxon's Canadian affiliate, Imperial Oil Ltd., is a major permit-holder in the Mackenzie Delta and the Atlantic Provinces offshore exploration program. The Exxon executive also noted Alberta's rich heavy oil and tar-sand deposits, in which his company is also a participant.

Continental needs

From the viewpoint of U.S. oil companies in Canada, which control much of the exploration and development, these resources are being sought out and exploited to meet continental rather than purely Canadian needs. This has been encouraged by official Canadian policy up to now.

Under the national oil policy Canada actively sought entry for its oil into U.S. markets, arguing, in recent years, that additional oil exports would mean the chance for new natural gas exports. While U.S. policies have cut off the U.S. market for uranium supplies, Canada has cam-

paigned energetically but unsuccessfully to crack the U.S. embargo. And over the past 15 years Canada sold more electricity to the United States, reversing a near-50-year opposition after export commitments in the First World War caused shortages in Canada.

In 1963, when Prime Minister Lester Pearson visited President John Kennedy at Hyannis Port in 1963, the two leaders agreed to study continental or common energy and mineral development policies. The communiqué issued at the end of that meeting said, in part: "President Kennedy and Prime Minister Pearson reaffirmed the desire of the two governments to cooperate in a rational use of the continent's resources: oil, gas, electricity, strategic materials and minerals."

The Heeney-Merchant Report in 1965 urged that the two countries consider joint energy planning, the authors noting that "we have been impressed by the prospects of mutual benefit which might be realized in closer co-operation and co-ordination between our two countries in the production and distribution of energy".

Several years later, in 1969, when Prime Minister Trudeau visited President Nixon in Washington, the two leaders spoke of common energy policies and the President subsequently order the State Department to pursue a continental energy arrangement with Canada.

Viewpoint changed

But what was a Canadian goal in the early Sixties was politically anathema by the early Seventies. By the time the United States had swung to the Canadian view, Canada had realized that the view of the Sixties was probably not appropriate for the Seventies or the Eighties.

The last time the two countries appeared to review the prospects for joint energy development was in 1970, at the Canada-U.S. Ministerial Meeting held in Ottawa. The communiqué said the two countries agreed that "discussions should be continued to work out mutually acceptable arrangements, consistent with the responsibilities of the regulatory bodies concerned for an increasing trade in crude oil, petroleum products and other fuels between the United States and Canada".

In testimony before the Joint Economic Committee in Washington last year, James Akins, director of the Office of Fuels and Energy in the State Department, referred to a meeting with Canadian officials that took place in September 1970. "We did initially talk to the Canadians about a broad energy agreement incorporating all forms of energy," Mr. Akins told

the Committee. "They were not willing to do that, however, and we subsequently said that we would talk about any forms of energy that they wish — about atomic energy, about oil, or gas."

This is the view of the United States up to the present. U.S. officials say they are ready to talk about any particular energy commodity, one at a time, and appear to have given up, for the time being at least, any idea of an energy package agreement. But U.S. Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz recently told the House Ways and Means Committee that the United States would like to increase its imports of Canadian energy supplies just as Canada wants to increase its exports of manufactured goods, implying that bilateral negotiations might still hold some promise.

In the past year, the United States has been concerned over what some Americans view as a frivolous Canadian offer of a Mackenzie Valley corridor to carry Alaska oil to the United States, the failure of the two countries to negotiate an arrangement for security of supply in case oil imports into Eastern Canada from Venezuela and the Middle East should be cut off, Canadian efforts to develop major refining and super-port facilities on the Atlantic coast to process foreign oil for U.S. markets, and the freeze on the level of oil and gas exports from Canada.

But future issues will be different. They will centre primarily on frontier oil and gas and, somewhat later, on uranium and nuclear power. And they will be concerned mainly with accelerating the pace of Canadian oil and gas development. The projects around which this development will centre will not come to fruition before the 1970s or the early 1980s.

Even if Canada wanted to, there is, in fact, very little new energy it can supply to the United States for the remainder of this decade because Western resources have reached their peak level of development. Exports of oil and gas will continue at about existing levels, and oil exports could even fall off somewhat towards the end of the 1970s. The next decade, though, could be very different.

Canada's oil reserves, potentially very rich when frontier oil and the tar-sand reserves of Alberta are included, are limited for the remainder of this decade. Earlier this year, the Federal Government put oil exports under controls since U.S. demands for oil were threatening to leave Canadian refiners in short supply. At the end of last year, Canada's oil reserves were lower than a year earlier, the third successive year of decline.

Canadian goal of early Sixties became anathema by early Seventies

According to the Canadian Petroleum Association, proven reserves were eight billion barrels and probable reserves about ten billion barrels at the end of last year. With production expected to be about 700 million barrels this year, Canadian reserves are clearly limited. Some 13 billion barrels have been found so far. According to the National Energy Board, "these 13 billion barrels are considered by many knowledgeable observers to be about 60 to 70 per cent of the ultimate crude reserves to be found and developed in this region outside of the frontier areas".

In the NEB's view, the 13 billion barrels of reserves, with another five billion in crude oil, condensates and pentanes-plus that can be added to reserves in the future, will give Canada access to about 18 billion barrels of oil up to 1985.

What this means, the NEB has indicated, is that Canadian oil exports to the United States could be approaching zero in the early 1980s unless big tar-sand plants are built, which would cost about \$650-million at today's prices, or unless oil is found in the Mackenzie Delta and a pipeline is built down the Mackenzie Valley to carry that oil.

Below U.S. expectations

Thus oil exports to the United States are likely to fall well below U.S. expectations set out in the National Petroleum Council's study *U.S. Energy Outlook*, published in December last year. It projected 1975 oil imports from Canada at 2.3 million barrels a day, compared to the NEB estimate of 1.3 million barrels a day. And while the NEB expects exports to the United States to fall off in the late Seventies, the National Petroleum Council expects them to increase to 3.7 million barrels a day by 1980 and 4.7 million barrels a day by 1985.

The Canadian Petroleum Association has estimated Canada's total potential oil reserves at 121 billion barrels, including 45 billion barrels in Western Canada and the Mackenzie Delta, 43.5 billion barrels in the Arctic islands and 24.8 billion barrels in the Atlantic offshore region.

In a more conservative study, the Canadian Society of Petroleum Geologists has estimated Canada's total potential oil reserves at 85 billion barrels, including 20 billion barrels in Western Canada, eight billion barrels in the Mackenzie Delta-Beaufort Sea, 22.5 billion barrels in the Arctic islands and 22 billion barrels in the Atlantic offshore region. But even these figures are challenged by some geologists as too high.

Neither set of figures includes the

heavy-oil pools in Alberta, which are estimated to contain another 20 billion barrels of oil, or the tar-sands in Alberta, which are estimated to contain somewhere between 85 and 175 billion barrels of crude-oil equivalent.

Canada's natural gas reserves are also limited at present. Last year, for the first time, Canada produced more gas than was found, with the result that for the first time proven reserves fell. According to the Canadian Petroleum Association, Canada had 53 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves and probable reserves of 60.5 TCF at the end of last year. A member of the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board has calculated that a price increase of 10 cents a thousand cubic feet of gas would yield an extra 10 TCF of gas in the province, but this view is disputed by the NEB.

About 16 TCF of Canada's remaining gas reserves are committed to U.S. exports, the rest being reserved for Canadian use. This year Canada will produce about 2.4 TCF of gas, with 1 TCF going to the United States and 1.4 TCF being consumed in Canada. Two years ago the NEB called a halt to new gas-export contracts, concluding that Canada no longer had an exportable surplus of natural gas. "The danger here is obvious to all," the NEB said. "An over-commitment to export markets, which appear at this time to be almost insatiable, could deprive the rapidly-expanding Canadian markets of access to Canadian gas."

The U.S. Department of the Interior, however, is optimistic about the growth in gas imports from Canada. A projection of U.S. energy needs and supplies to the year 2000, published by the department last year, said pipeline imports of gas coming almost entirely from Canada could supply 19.3 per cent of U.S. gas needs in 2000 compared to about 4 per cent in 1971. It projected imports of 2 TCF in 1975, 3 TCF in 1980, 4.1 TCF in 1985 and 7.4 TCF in 2000. The National Petroleum Council, however, projected gas imports from Canada at 1 TCF in 1975, 1.6 TCF in 1980 and 2.7 TCF in 1985.

Gas reserves

Canada's potential gas reserves are estimated to be substantial. The Canadian Petroleum Association calculates total potential reserves at 724.8 TCF, with 270 TCF in the Western provinces and Mackenzie Delta region, 260.7 TCF in the Arctic islands and 149.9 TCF in the Atlantic offshore region. The Canadian Society of Petroleum Geologists says there are 577 TCF of gas in Canada's potential

For first time proven reserves of natural gas fell last year

total reserves, with 124 TCF in the Western provinces, 64 TCF in the Mackenzie Delta region, 203 TCF in the Arctic islands and 132 TCF in the Atlantic offshore region.

It is Canada's potential oil and gas reserves that the United States will want to see developed in the 1980s. U.S. Interior Secretary Rogers Morton, testifying before the Joint Economic Committee last summer, explained that moving Alaska oil down the Pacific Coast and Alaska gas through Canada fitted in with a longer-term U.S. view of oil and gas development. "I think we do have a 15-year policy. And the solution as governed by that policy would be to develop the Alaskan oil now — the Alaskan system now. [Then] get the cold gas pipeline in as soon as you can; get it financed, and then by that time you would have a better idea of what the Canadian oil discoveries and reserves are in the Arctic islands in the Canadian Arctic — and develop another pipeline system that would serve that area," Mr. Morton explained.

The pressure-points

These will be the main pressure-points where the United States may want to see development proceed faster than Canada does:

- A Mackenzie Delta gas pipeline, which is estimated to cost \$5-billion. This would deliver four billion cubic feet of gas a day, half from the Mackenzie Delta and half from Alaska, to U.S. markets, with perhaps a small amount to be used in Canada in the early years of the pipeline. The pipeline consortium argues that Canada will need some Mackenzie Delta gas by the time the pipeline would reach its full capacity in 1980 and argues that, with 50 percent U.S. gas, this will make the pipeline cheaper for Canada. Canada's bargaining power depends on whether Canada needs some of that gas by 1980 and whether or not a competing project to move Alaska gas in liquified form by tanker down the U.S. West Coast, as proposed by El Paso, is a viable alternative.
- A Mackenzie Delta oil pipeline to move Canadian oil from the Mackenzie Delta-Beaufort Sea region into U.S. markets initially and then to Canadian markets as well. The NEB has estimated that such a pipeline could be built by about 1980, delivering 293,000 barrels a day at first, with gradual enlargement to 526,000 barrels a day by 1985.
- Extensive development of the Alberta tar-sands and heavy-oil reserves nearby at Cold Lake. But these plants to extract the oil may create serious environmental prob-

lems in the future, and the Alberta government may want to pace their development more slowly so that Alberta industry can get the maximum participation in engineering and construction. Up to 175 billion barrels of oil, or far more than Canada's estimated total potential reserves, are thought to lie in the tar-sands — An Arctic islands gas pipeline, down either the west or east side of Hudson Bay from the Arctic islands, could carry natural gas into central and eastern U.S. markets. The gas is largely controlled by Panarctic Oils Ltd., which is 45 percent owned by the Federal Government. The company estimates 10 TCF of gas has already been found and that threshold reserves to justify a pipeline could be proved-up this year.

— An Arctic islands oil pipeline. Oil is expected to be found in the Eastern Arctic islands. If it is, there will be pressure to move it by tanker down to the U.S. East Coast and perhaps to make it available for European markets as well.

— An Atlantic Coast gas pipeline from the Sable Island region, where some gas has already been found, to the Boston area. There could be a conflict, too, if Montreal also wanted that gas but Boston was willing to pay more for it.

— Atlantic Coast oil-loading terminal, tapping possible oil-pools in the region and moving the oil by tanker to U.S. markets.

Although all these projects together would not solve U.S. energy problems, they would all help reduce dependence on politically unstable sources such as North Africa and the Middle East, while U.S. monetary authorities believe it would be easier for Canadians to buy imports with the oil and gas revenues generated than it would for the Middle East states.

Such a massive development of Canada's energy resources could create serious economic distortions in this country, ranging from a continuing resources boom that would cause serious inflation problems and attract capital away from perhaps more important investments to a combination of huge resource exports and major capital imports to develop them, pushing up the value of the exchange-rate of the Canadian dollar and putting Canadian manufacturing industry at a disadvantage.

But U.S. pressure, expressed directly and through the corporations that are currently very busy searching for those energy resources, will be hard to resist, especially if it is accompanied by offers of trade and other concessions that would be useful to Canada.

Energy resources last year earned

Morton set out 15-year policy keyed to use of Alaskan line

Canada a surplus in energy trade with the United States that was greater than Canada's entire \$1.1-billion trade surplus with the United States. In fact, Canada's energy-trade surplus with the United States has grown progressively from just over \$300-million in 1968 to well over \$1-billion last year. And, in the first quarter of this year alone, it was over \$500-million. Some economists argue that a massive build-up in Canada's foreign exchange reserves due to energy sales over the next ten to 15 years will give Canada the U.S. dollars to buy back U.S. investment in this country.

The impact of the U.S. energy crisis will make itself felt in many ways in Canada in the next 15 years. Along with pressures to speed up the development of Canadian resources, there could be a problem for Ontario Hydro of continuing to obtain all the coal for its thermal stations that it imports from the United States, and there will be proposals to divert Canadian waters into the Western States so that major coal-gasification plants will be able to get the water they need if the United States is to be able to use its huge coal resources in the way it plans.

Obviously, Canada will need clear energy policies of its own before it can talk to the United States. What pricing policies shall we follow? Will tax policies change?

... In the long run, the only satisfactory position for the United States (and to a lesser extent for its main allies) must be the development of alternative energy resources. . . .

Suggestions a few years ago for a vast program of development of new energy sources received no support in Congress or from the public. Yet, had the United States a few years ago been willing to accept the realities which became evident in 1967 or even in 1970, it might have started sooner on the development of western hemisphere hydrocarbons and domestic energy sources. . . .

On the diplomatic front, we have for years discussed an agreement with Canada which will permit free entry of Canadian oil into the United States. This has lost much meaning by now, for Canada is currently sending us all her surplus oil and has imposed export controls. But we may still reach agreement. We have also discussed a treaty with Venezuela. . . .

Within the United States itself, a wide sweep of actions can be taken to increase

Will processing or trade concessions be demanded? How will projects be scheduled? Will there be new requirements on Canadian ownership? Will there be new methods to capture resource rents? And how will Canada's own interests be defined?

If and when Canada is able to determine its energy policies, then it will make sense for Canada to explain them to the United States, see how they can be applied in a way that will help the United States meet its energy crisis, and agree on a pattern of development that both satisfies Canada's interests and gives the United States some view of what it can expect by way of available energy resources over the following decade.

It may be that Canada will want to develop its energy resources quite slowly. This will be difficult to explain to the United States, especially if its big urban centres are plagued by "brownouts" and its industry is hard-pressed to operate without interruption owing to energy shortages.

But what would be even worse for both countries would be for Canada to delay the definition of its energy policies and to ignore the U.S. plight. Probably nothing could be better calculated to turn American opinion against Canada than a complete disregard for U.S. problems.

domestic energy production and to use energy more efficiently. Finally, there is the question of controlling the rise in oil demand through reasonable conservation actions. . . .

No one action will solve our energy problem, much less the entire world's. But, taken together, these steps — collaboration with other nations, development of alternative energy sources and controlling our consumption reasonably — could allow us to reduce our imports significantly. . . . This must surely be our immediate goal.

To look simply at the world's oil reserves and conclude that they are sufficient to meet the world's needs can no longer be acceptable. . . . Whether we focus on today, or 1980, or 1985, it is abundantly clear that we must move on a variety of fronts if we are to avoid a situation which could lead to or even force us into highly dangerous action. . . . (Excerpts from "The Oil Crisis" by James E. Akins, director of the Office of Fuels and Energy, U.S. Department of State, in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1973).

The signs of pending trouble for Chile's Salvador Allende

By James Nelson Goodsell

Salvador Allende Gossens is committed to nudging Chile along the road to socialism. But, two and a half years into his six-year Presidency, he is face to face with his most critical test to date. Although his Unidad Popular coalition Government did better than almost anyone expected in early March legislative balloting, indicating he had the support of a growing minority of Chileans, there is no mistaking the signs of trouble on the horizon.

For one thing, the Chilean economy is faltering because of inflation, serious shortages of consumer goods that may call for rationing, lagging agricultural and industrial production and dwindling foreign reserves. The winter months just ahead will probably further aggravate the economic difficulties.

On the political front, a stiffening non-Marxist opposition movement has already frustrated Dr. Allende on a number of his plans to move Chile toward socialism. This Opposition, centred on the powerful Christian Democratic Party and its leader, former President Eduardo Frei Montalva, is going to do what it can to frustrate the Allende program even more.

And, as if this were not enough, Dr. Allende's coalition Government is splintered with deep divisions between his own radicalized Socialist Party and the more conservative Communist Party. These divisions can often be papered over in times

of critical need, but beneath the coalition's facade there remain the unresolved differences between the Socialists and the Communists over goals, tactics and a host of other issues.

Dr. Allende never expected that the road to socialism in Chile would be easy. Despite the euphoria of many of his followers who thought his election two and a half years ago would quickly usher in the economic and social changes they desired and Dr. Allende promised, the new President was always more realistic. He frequently counseled his followers to be patient. On more than one occasion during those first heady days in office, he said he would be satisfied if he could significantly nudge Chile along the road to socialism during his six years in office. He has been saying the same thing again in recent months. He seems prepared for the long pull of political and legislative skirmishing he has already encountered and knows he will continue to face as he tries to carry out the Unidad Popular platform.

Basic restructuring

That document calls for a basic restructuring of Chile's economic and social order along Marxist lines, although it clearly calls for a retention of some traditional forms of private enterprise under government supervision. It is plainly a reflection of Dr. Allende's own views of how Chile ought to order its economic and social life. Moreover, it has an appeal to many Chileans other than Socialists and Communists. After all, Chile is a nation with a strong "sock-the-rich" attitude, based in some measure on an egalitarian view of things and also on a tradition of independent thought that springs, at least in part, from the country's relative isolation along the South Pacific coast. The Christian Democrats, for example, are reformist and lean left of centre. On many issues, they can easily go along with Dr. Allende and, indeed, have supported a variety of his programs. But they draw the line at the extent to which the Allende Government



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seeks to bring socialism to Chile. Moreover, they make clear that they oppose the Government on many issues because of the economic problems facing Chile.

Looking back over Dr. Allende's two and a half years, it is easy to see that he and his Unidad Popular Government already have done much to alter basically the Chilean economic and social structure. Much of this change took place in the Government's first year in office, a year that was something of a honeymoon in view of the difficulties encountered since. The copper industry, the biggest foreign-exchange earner in Chile, accounting for 70 per cent of exports, was nationalized in July 1971, a step that few Chileans would reject. A conservative businessman, for example, talking about the nationalization of the copper properties that had been in the hands of foreigners for decades, shed no tears for the one-time United States owners. "After all, the copper is ours," he stated flatly — a view that must be shared by the overwhelming majority of Chile's nine million people. The Christian Democrats started the process of nationalization back in 1966, when their "Chileanization" of the copper mines got under way with the Government buying into U.S.-owned properties and getting "a piece of the action". While Chileanization was supposed to last 20 to 25 years, almost everyone in Santiago, except for the U.S. copper people, expected Dr. Allende, or whoever won the 1970 election, to culminate the process of nationalization sooner.

There was controversy, to be sure, over other Allende measures — the amalgamation of the banking system into a state-directed arrangement, the gradual takeover of some 91 basic Chilean and foreign-owned companies, and the Government's takeover of food-distribution systems, to name a few. But, during Dr. Allende's first year in office, much of this effort proceeded without too many stumbling blocs. Rather than nationalize the banks through legislation, as had been the case with copper, Dr. Allende simply began purchasing shares in the privately-owned banks until his government had won control of the facilities. Now, some 96 per cent of all banking is in Government hands with all this that this means for credit, control of accounts and the like. Many of the old names of Chilean banking have been kept, but one significant name-change is worth noting — the Banco de A. Edwards, the facility once in the hands of the Edwards family, publishers of *El Mercurio*, the conservative-leaning Santiago daily, now carries a new name.

In the countryside, under the leadership of Jacques Chonchol, a one-time Christian Democrat, the Allende Government moved with considerable swiftness to implement the agrarian reform laws already on the books, laws that Mr. Chonchol helped push through Congress when he was in the previous Government under former President Frei. Mr. Chonchol split with the Christian Democrats over the Frei-inspired program of implementing land reform slowly in order not to disrupt the economy too severely. He wanted to move quickly to implement the law and, under Dr. Allende, he had his chance. In the Allende Government's first year, more land was taken from private hands and put under Government control than the Christian Democrats had in all their six years in office. Late last year, Mr. Chonchol was talking of finishing the break-up of large private landholding within months. But he is now out of the Government and land-reform efforts have slowed considerably. Mr. Chonchol was replaced in one of several recent Cabinet shuffles aimed at cooling the growing antagonisms within the Government, and also the stiffening attitudes of the Opposition. The whole Chonchol approach was much criticized by Chileans in and out of the Government.

Drop in production

Dr. Allende apparently realized that the Chonchol-dictated speed in agrarian reform could prove an Achilles' heel of the Government. The agrarian reform speed-up, coupled with illegal land seizures by landless peasants and a tendency on the part of many private farmers to sow smaller crop acreages, has caused a significantly sharp drop in agricultural production throughout the nation. The Communist Party, the more conservative element in the Unidad Popular governing coalition, recently gave the previous Christian Democratic Government a pat on the back, perhaps unintentionally, in a statement which called for the "slower approach to land reform used previously". Still, Mr. Chonchol's successors in the agrarian reform bureaucracy are hard-pressed on the issue. A rising tide of clamour from landless peasants in the countryside continues to press for a complete end to large landholdings. It is spurred by the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a group of young, radicalized Chileans who are a thorn in Dr. Allende's side. On a whole host of issues, but with particular emphasis on land reform, the MIR argues that Dr. Allende's Government is going too slowly.

Dr. Allende is thus pressured by those

Chile's regime moved swiftly to implement agrarian reform



UPI photo

Chile's President Salvador Allende gestures during an address in the UN General Assembly in December 1972. At that time he accused U.S. corporations of fermenting Chilean civil war and instituting boycotts against Chilean exports.

who want him to slow down the change in landholdings and those who want him to speed it up. He is also pressured by history. Although Chile does, in fact, have adequate land to support its population with native-grown produce and livestock, it has long been a food-importer. Try as he might, former President Frei, Dr. Allende's immediate predecessor, was never able to get Chile off the hook of food imports. Dr. Allende, because of the rural turmoil, has even had to increase these imports — from about \$150 million when he took over to more than \$400 million at present. The current prospects are just as frightening. Food production is off significantly in some parts of Chile; for example, in the rich Cautin wheat and cattle area 400 miles south of Santiago, many areas harvested 40 percent less wheat than in 1972, which was also a poor year for wheat harvests.

The food shortages are severe and are probably going to get worse, with rationing a likely prospect. The Opposition, for its part, is making the shortages appear even worse than they are. The considerable propaganda machines of the Opposition miss few opportunities to report shortages. Newspaper accounts, complete with pictures, show empty food-stores and long lines of Chileans waiting for limited quantities of various items.

At the same time, the Allende Government claims that part of the problem of shortages has to do with a redistribu-

tion of available foodstuffs. Dr. Allende's own propaganda machines point daily to the improved living standards that the Unidad Popular coalition claims for the 40 per cent of Chile's population that is classified as poor.

There is no question that the poorer classes benefited considerably from Dr. Allende's program during its first year. Unemployment, which had for long stalked these classes, fell sharply after Dr. Allende came to power and adopted programs aimed at finding work for the unemployed and underemployed. There was also more spending power in the hands of the poorer classes. In that first year, Dr. Allende was not only riding the usual crest of popularity of new presidents but also accomplishing a great deal that seemed to have immediate benefit for the lower-income families. Moreover, the Opposition forces were in disarray. They had been surprised at Dr. Allende's victory, which, though it was a narrow one (about one percentage point — some 36,000 votes) over his nearest rival, gave him the Presidency and the distinction of being the first elected Marxist leader in the Western hemisphere.

Opponents coalesced

But the first year ended and the problems began to mount, and with the problems came demands from his supporters that he move more quickly along the road to socialism, while his opponents began to coalesce and find that they did, indeed, have considerable strength. After all, they represented more than half the population and held a commanding majority in both houses of Congress. If they did not have the two-thirds majority that, in theory, would give them the strength to impeach Dr. Allende, they did have enough votes to frustrate many of his plans. They began impeachment proceedings against three successive Ministers of the Interior and, on a number of key votes in 1972 and early 1973, were able to defeat Government proposals on the economy and on the nation's social structure.

The honeymoon of 1971 was clearly over and political polarization was developing. Chile has long been a nation that takes its politics seriously, but in gentlemanly fashion. Last year marked a turning-point. Legislators who once forgot their differences and enjoyed afternoon tea together were less inclined to fraternize with their opponents. Abusive language was frequently heard on the floor of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Newspapers and radio stations joined in and hardly a day went by that some po-

Opposition bid to make food shortages appear worse

political figure in the Government, Dr. Allende included, or in the Opposition was not attacked by the press. The tempers were rising and the passions becoming increasingly heated. In October, a nationwide strike mushroomed into an explosive situation that prompted Dr. Allende to warn that Chile was "on the verge of civil war". Government supporters and Opposition supporters clashed in the streets of Santiago. The smell of tear-gas hung over the capital for days in October and November. As the days wore on, the Opposition mounted a furious campaign against the Government, met by an equally furious and angry counterattack spearheaded particularly by the Socialists, Dr. Allende's political co-religionists.

With conditions at the point where Dr. Allende's forecast of civil war seemed plausible, the Government suddenly called on the military to enter the Cabinet and assume three top posts, including the Ministry of the Interior, which, in Chile, as in many Latin American lands, has responsibility for the maintenance of domestic order and is in charge of the *carabineros*, the crack national police force which has long been a pride of Chile.

The military presence in the Cabinet and Chile's long tradition of finding a way out of difficult situations without loss of face to either side combined to calm tempers and restore a semblance of normalcy to life in Chile. The strike was settled. Stores reopened, factories began working again and the Christmas holidays were looked forward to with some anticipation. But there was also a feeling that things would never be quite the same again, that the battle-lines were being drawn between the Allende coalition and the increasingly vocal Opposition. The first test of this new sense of confrontation was to be the March legislative election, the usual mid-term vote that confronts all Chilean Presidents within a year or so of taking office.

Half the seats in the 50-seat Senate and all 150 seats in the Chamber of Deputies were at stake. Soon after the first of the year, the focus of attention in Chile was clearly on the elections. Observers in Chile who had witnessed other elections in the past said that never before in Chilean history had an election been so bitterly contested. In the immediate week before the election, there was a good deal of hope among the Opposition that it might somehow manage to win a two-thirds majority in both houses and therefore have a veto power over Dr. Allende's programs. By all accounts, the Opposition was expected to keep its margin in both houses.

When the votes were counted, it did

nearly that — losing two seats in the Senate and six in the Chamber of Deputies, a loss that did not seriously alter the balance-of-power. But it was obviously a moral victory for Dr. Allende, in terms of the few extra seats that he picked up, and also because his 36 percent margin of the vote in his own presidential election in 1970 had gone to 43 per cent for his coalition's candidates in the March 4 balloting. In a way, it was an election that both sides could claim to have won. In this, it was very Chilean.

Polarization intensified

But, in the long run, the vote probably intensifies the polarization of politics in Chile. Indeed, the results suggest that there are only four important political parties in Chile today — the Socialists and the Communists on the Government side and the Christian Democrats and their more conservative allies, the Nationals, on the Opposition side. Minor parties attached to either side were swept away in the voting. More important, the polarization means that Chile is now in a situation of two rival camps locked in what both sides feel is a death struggle. That may sound dramatic, but the conception was suggested to this observer by key leaders in both camps in the immediate aftermath of the voting. "We are struggling at the precipice," a Christian Democrat said. "One of us will go over, and that will end it." Just hours later, a Communist Party chieftain said: "What we have in Chile is a classic struggle between two foes — and one has to be killed."

Salvador Allende may well be accurate in his forecast of civil war; indeed, the ingredients are there. The whole business must be rather distasteful to Dr. Allende, a man who continues to talk with sincerity about ideological pluralism. He commented during a press conference in March that "there is room for many different political concepts". He may feel that way, but his supporters and his opponents are more and more taking another course. His own Socialist Party is pulling him faster along the road to socialism. "Now is the time to strike," commented Carlos Altamirano, the Secretary-General of the Party, in a conversation with party officials about party tactics. The more conservative Communist Party notwithstanding, the coalition Government is being tugged toward a more radical stand.

The Christian Democratic Party, around which the Opposition is centred and which is still Chile's largest single party, has taken increasingly tough stands against the Government. Moving quickly

Vote intensified situation where two rival camps appear locked 'in death struggle'

after the election, former President Frei, who had just won back his old Senate seat from Santiago Province with the largest single vote of any candidate, issued a stinging indictment on the Allende Government for its economic policies, which, Mr. Frei said, had brought Chile to the point of economic crisis. He cited a list of problems and called on Dr. Allende to mend his economic ways or face the stiffening wrath of the Opposition and the full force of Opposition votes in the legislature.

Military ousted

Chile's immediate future is very much in doubt. Dr. Allende has removed the military men from the Cabinet, apparently at the insistence of the more radical elements in his own party. The economy continues to deteriorate, with inflation mounting and likely to match last year's world record of 163 per cent. Shortages, real and partly imagined, continue to haunt the Government, with more substance to the reports today than a year ago. Although Dr. Allende's coalition did fairly well among the lower classes in the March balloting, there is already evidence that grumbling among the workers is growing. Labour disputes, spotlighted by

strikes of copper miners, who are regarded as the *élite* of Chilean workers, are mushrooming round the country.

Whether there is a way out of the dilemma is unclear. The answer may come from Dr. Allende himself and former President Frei, who probably is the one single figure in the Opposition to command national respect. Indeed, Mr. Frei may well be the victor in the 1976 Presidential election when under the constitution he can seek another term. Some sort of accommodation between these two men could bring about an end to the developing political confrontation, and accommodation may be in the interests of both. After all, Dr. Allende has three more years to serve, and he needs some semblance of political peace if his remaining time in office is to be more than desultory in-fighting that would profit neither the forces seeking socialization of the economy nor, for that matter, those who want something less than state control of the economy.

But such an accommodation does not appear in the immediate offing. Rather, Chile is on the edge of an abyss and no one can be sure whether it will fall over and drag both the Government and Opposition over with it.


Reorientation for Argentina with the return of Peronism

By James Neilson

On March 12, Argentinians learned, to their considerable surprise, that their next President would be Dr. Héctor J. Campora, a Peronist who had spent most of the time since Juan Domingo Peron was overthrown by the army in 1955 as a political pariah. Campora's four-year term began on May 25, making the return to power of a movement which had been systematically ex-

cluded from political life for 17 years; in that span, the armed forces either ruled directly or permitted elections without Peronist participation. These elections were invariably won by the Union Civica Radical, the reformist and fiercely nationalist party which dominated Argentine political life in the Twenties and Thirties.

Since 1966, the army had ruled without the paraphernalia of democracy, but by 1971 its morale had been cracked by wave after wave of popular unrest. President Alejandro Agustin Lanusse, a shrewd cavalry general who had removed his two predecessors, decided to hold elections again, this time with the Peronists contesting them. Peron himself, however, was barred from running. Lanusse thought the Radicals would win. He was wrong. The Peronist-dominated Justicialist Liberation



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UPI photo

President-elect Hector Campora (left) embraces Juan Peron as they meet in Rome shortly after the Peronist movement was returned to power in national elections held in March. Campora, personal choice of Peron to head the Peronist-

dominated Justicialist Liberation Front, took office on May 25, but indicated subsequently that he would step down, call new elections and support a presidential state headed by former leader Peron himself.

Front got more than 49 per cent of the votes and was in a good position to get a big majority in the scheduled run-off. After a day of tense waiting, a chagrined Lanusse announced that Campora would be Argentina's next President.

The Peronists inherited a patchily-developed country still struggling to make the difficult transition from a farm economy to a modern industrial society. Since the Great Depression, when the need to industrialize became evident, no administration has been able to rule for long with the consent of both the armed forces and the civilian population. The Peronist administrations that ruled from 1946 to 1955 came nearest to success, but Peron's cavalier disregard for civil rights, his hostility towards the Roman Catholic Church, the free-wheeling corruption of his régime and a series of ferocious economic crises, turned senior military officers against him.

Shift to left

Now the Peronists are back. Peron, a somewhat mellowed 77, is at their head, and Campora takes his orders from him. Since 1955 the Peronists have shifted to the left. Traces of their fascist origin still remain, however, and Peron is a *caudillo*

in the old-fashioned mould, pragmatic and arbitrary, who depends on his personal appeal rather than his ideas. Argentina too has changed, with industry no longer an aspiration but a fact.

The March 11 elections, which gave the Peronists comfortable majorities in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies as well as the Presidency, were perhaps the freest ever held in Argentina. The results were very revealing and showed Argentina to be a very different country from the one the armed forces thought they were ruling. The Radicals, their great hope, had withered away and had to be content with a humiliating 21 per cent of the vote. Yet they are, if anything, even more suspicious of private enterprise and foreign investment than the Peronists. The third-placed candidate, Francisco Manrique, who polled 15 per cent, offers a more genuine, moderately conservative, alternative to the Government. But his electoral alliance is already coming apart at the seams. The quasi-official military candidate, Brigadier Ezequiel Martinez, who began his campaign while serving in Lanusse's Government, received a paltry 2.7 per cent of the votes cast — evidence, if any were needed, that the military régime was very unpop-

Peronists kept ideology vague, built broad electoral alliance

ular indeed and utterly unrepresentative.

The Argentine people clearly voted for change, but it was not clear what kind of change they wanted. In an effort to lure as many groups as possible into the fold, the Peronists kept their always murky ideology as vague as possible. Their electoral alliance stretched from the Maoist Left to the pre-conciliar Catholic Right. The only element binding them all together, apart from their acceptance of Peron, is a burning nationalism. But as internationalism is a dead cause in Argentina today, even that is shared by the Opposition. The movement's centre of gravity is at present near the moderate Right, but the Left, represented by the turbulent Peronist Youth, is noisily pressing for "national socialism" and "national revolution". At the beginning of May, the Youth leader almost sparked a *coup* by calling for the creation of "people's militias". He was immediately sacked.

The main political divide is now likely to lie between the Peronist Left, which wants Argentina to become a bastion of Marxist Socialism comparable to Cuba, and the moderates. The moderates have made themselves the standard-bearers of the new Argentine consensus, which demands a moderate redistribution of available wealth, selective state intervention in the economy and a critical but not rabidly hostile attitude towards the United States. Their point of view is supported by the trade unions and the Church, and is very similar to the standpoints of the Radicals and other smaller groupings who together represent about 30 per cent of the electorate. Even Manrique agrees with most of their policies, although he has a populist suspicion of the state.

Despite their election victory, the Peronists are far from holding absolute power. They have little to fear from the divided Opposition, but are fully aware that the armed forces can oust them overnight. The armed forces have mapped out clear limits which the Peronists can overstep only at their peril. The service chiefs insist that they have their hands free to continue the war against the murderously active urban guerrillas, now the biggest single danger confronting Campora's Government. The army will also resist any Government attempt to tamper with its command structure. It will, moreover, do its best to see that any "revolution" remains largely rhetorical, and this will help Campora resist what he sees as hot-headed pressure from his Left. A great deal will depend on Peron's success in assuaging the fears of the generals without losing the support of his followers. A great deal will

also depend upon Peron's continued good health. Campora, a totally uncharismatic dentist, was chosen for his obsequiousness toward Peron, not his qualities as a leader.

The armed forces, their pride stung by the election results, have nevertheless left the Campora Government considerable room to manoeuvre both at home and abroad. Campora hopes to keep the Left appeased by his recognition of Cuba, North Vietnam and North Korea for a few months while he is feeling his way. Conservative fears have already been allayed by the strong links between the Peronists and business circles, who, in fact, feared a Radical victory most of all, and contributed handsomely to the Peronist campaign fund.

There is no reason to doubt the Peronists' sincere concern for social justice, which promises to be their main preoccupation. A rough and ready egalitarianism, which has not prevented the rise of a number of Peronist millionaires, has characterized the movement since its beginnings as a South American variant of European fascism. Past Peronist administrations did a great deal to integrate millions of impoverished peasants and city workers into the national mainstream. As Peronism draws most of its support from the working class, common sense dictates that it do something to satisfy working-class aspirations. Nevertheless, social justice is unlikely to be pursued as systematically as it would be in a socialist state.

Foreign policy

Peronist foreign policy is rather less straightforward. Like most people, Peron has warm feelings toward some countries and dislikes others, and the way the Campora administration is sorting out the foreign sheep from the goats owes more to emotion than a cold-blooded appraisal of the country's interests.

The Peronists like to think of Argentina as a country in the front line of the battle against imperialism and a potential leader of the Third World. The fact that Argentina has as much in common with the developed world as the Third World does not disturb them. If the first Peronist administration is anything to go by, there is likely to be a wide gap between foreign policy statements intended for home consumption and the actual measures taken to further Argentine interests in the world. In the late Forties and early Fifties, Peron made great play with his "third position", neither capitalist nor Communist. His speeches were larded with hostile references to the United States. But on the

whole, and especially toward the end of his rule, he proved a reasonably docile member of the Western community.

While Peronist foreign policy is bound to fall short of the perfervid anti-U.S. dreams of some of the rank and file, it does imply a fairly drastic reorientation of Argentina in Latin America and the world. Its chief characteristics are friendship for Europe, cautious hostility towards the United States — at present the biggest foreign investor, with a stake of about a billion dollars in Argentina — and verbal solidarity with “progressive” Third World countries. In Latin America, the Peronists have left no doubt that they regard Brazil, currently riding a spectacular economic boom, as a dangerous rival, a “sub-imperialist” nation being groomed by the United States for a role as a continental gendarme. This contradicts the Peronist desire to help forge Latin American unity and has already caused many headaches in Brasilia, which is engaged in a tug-of-war with Argentina for influence in Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, all within the traditional Argentine sphere of influence.

Cold war with Brazil

There is no lack of specific issues dividing the two countries. The most urgent concerns the gigantic Itaipu Dam, which will be part of the largest hydroelectric complex in the world. It is being built on Brazil-Paraguay border about 100 miles from Argentina, but will use the waters of the Parana River, which flows through some of Argentina's richest industrial and farming areas before reaching the River Plate estuary. In theory Brazil will be able to pollute vast areas of Argentina by spewing industrial waste into the river, or flood thousands of square miles by opening the dam. The danger of slow pollution of cattle areas is very real and the process has begun. This could harm Argentina's vital meat trade. Brazil has shown little willingness to discuss this with Argentina. The two countries have, in consequence, been fighting a running battle about it in international bodies. Since the Peronist election victory, voices both in Brazil and Argentina have gone as far as to prophesy that it will lead to a shooting war.

This cold war with Brazil, the latest stage in a struggle for Latin American leadership which has been going on since Spaniard and Portuguese first came into contact in what is now Uruguay, is encouraging Argentina to seek close ties with Chile and Peru. The Peronists, moreover, have shown an enthusiastic determination to join these two nations in the popular

sport of singeing Uncle Sam's beard. Argentina's military government enjoyed fairly good relations with Washington, although the army's feelings were hurt when President Nixon announced his new economic policy in mid-1971. Argentina has a large trade deficit with the United States, and the move affected Argentina's highly successful efforts to export manufactured goods.

Argentine-U.S. relations have usually been prickly. Since winning independence in 1816, Argentines have liked to think their country is, potentially at least, a rival of the “colossus of the North”. For many decades Argentina led the Latin American attack on U.S. pretensions in the hemisphere. Now Peron is looking forward to resuming this role, and contacts aimed at leading to an anti-U.S. Latin American alliance have already been made with Cuba, Panama and Ecuador, as well as Chile and Peru.

Argentina could hardly have chosen a better time. The absence of any long-range U.S. policy towards Latin America has irritated even governments which would like to be friends with Washington. The breakdown of the old bipolar world system with the rise of the European Common Market, Japan, and China, has left neutralist-minded countries with a wide variety of options.

Closer to Europe

The Peronists hope to move Argentina closer to Europe, thus resurrecting another traditional policy, and desperately hope an avalanche of European investment will speed industrial expansion. This hope has distressed the party's extremist wing, which would like to see Argentina go it alone, and has exposed the Peronist leadership to the Radical charge that they intend merely to exchange one form of “dependence” for another. The Peronists have also sent out feelers to Japan, China and, far more cautiously, the Soviet Union. This does not depart too much from the policies of former president Lanusse, whose Government recognized Peking in 1972, but the Peronists are pursuing them with far greater energy.

Argentina's overtures to the Common Market have been directed mainly to Italy. Most Argentines have some Italian blood in their veins as a result of massive immigration at the beginning of this century. Commercial ties are already strong, with Fiat the biggest single investor in the country. Peronist envoys were warmly received in Rome soon after the election results became known. But Italy's influence in the EEC has declined sharply

Feelers sent to Japan, China and Soviet Union; policy pursued with more vigour

thanks to domestic unrest and industrial turmoil, and despite several months' hard work the Peronists have yet to persuade a single large European investor to put money into Argentina. Instead, European businessmen, like their counterparts elsewhere, are waiting to see if the Peronists can keep the peace and ensure stability. The series of political assassinations that preceded Campora's inauguration, and the ever-present danger of a new *coup* which could lead to civil war, have not encouraged them to risk their money.

One possible difficulty in the way of a Brussels-Buenos Aires trade axis is Argentina's long-standing claim to the Falkland Islands, which have been in British hands since 1832. Nearly all Argentines see this as a clear case of imperialism. Britain would be willing enough to relinquish the islands were it not for the fervent desire of their 2,000 inhabitants to remain British. The two countries are engaged in long and complicated talks on the issue, and in the last two years communications between the islands and the mainland have been greatly improved. The idea behind this is to let the islanders get to know Argentina and eventually, it is hoped, agree to a transfer of sovereignty. The Peronists' instincts tell them to make their claim as stridently as possible, but they do not want to become involved in a heated row with a powerful member of the Common Market.

The next step to power...

President Hector Campora submitted his resignation to Argentina's Congress in mid-July to prepare the way for actual assumption of power by former leader Juan Peron. The resignation of Mr. Campora, a Peron protégé, recalls the March election campaign slogan of Mr. Campora: "Campora to government, Peron in power." New presidential elections are required to accomplish the changeover.

In a speech explaining his resignation, Mr. Campora told the Congress and people: "I have always had very clear in my conscience the conviction that my election was for no other reason than to restore to General Peron the mandate that was taken from him unjustly."

In a broadcast to the nation made after the Campora statement, Mr. Peron commented: "At this station in my life, I cannot have any other aspirations but to be useful to my fatherland to the point which the fatherland demands it..."

Writing in the *New York Times* (July 15, 1973), Jonathan Kandell observed that, as a political philosophy, Peronism

The Peronists see the Falklands issue as being one of a chain of territorial disputes pitting Latin America against the Anglo-Saxon powers. On every one, their support for the Latin American position is absolute. These disputed areas — British Honduras, a large chunk of Guyana, the Panama Canal Zone (and, to stretch a point, Gibraltar) — offer ample scope to nationalists determined to present Latin America as the victim of imperialist depredations. They can draw on the great store of resentment built up since the feud between Britain and Spain, inherited by their successor states, began.

Another time-bomb is Argentina's claim to exclusive fishing rights over an area up to 200 sea-miles from its coast. British and West German trawlers, being gradually driven from their fishing grounds off Iceland, are eyeing the possibilities offered by the South Atlantic, which is already being heavily fished by Soviet fleets. The Peronists, like the military juntas ruling Peru and Ecuador, will do their best to meet intruders with force and are buying the necessary gunboats.

This could rapidly lead to another conflict between national interest and nationalist emotion. The Peronists have yet to work out a balance between these two often contradictory factors. They will have to reach a compromise, and this compromise will determine Argentina's relations with the rest of the world.

had always been ill-defined, drawing on both Fascist and leftist ideologies and organization techniques. "This ideological vagueness," Mr. Kandell says, "has permitted Mr. Peron to broaden his following. Young leftists, moderates and right-wing nationalists have joined the working class that Peronism won over three decades ago."

"While the Peronists were out of power, the differences in their ranks were largely submerged in their common opposition to a succession of military or military-backed governments. But, with their return to power, conflicts between right- and left-wing factions have resurfaced."

Mr. Kandell suggests that, during the time Mr. Peron has been back in Argentina, he has tried to forge a new coalition of conservative Peronists, the armed forces and the Radical Civic Union, the middle-of-the-road party headed by Ricardo Balbin, a former Peron rival. "The government that emerges from the current vacuum may very well reflect this new political alignment," Mr. Kandell says.

Assessing India's altered role amid changing Asian realities

By Ashok Kapur

India's military victory in the 1971 war with Pakistan established its dominant position in subcontinental security policy and this in turn paved the way for a serious dialogue between India and the United States and a "mini-dialogue" between India and China. The breakup of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh secured for India a reliable ally in India's northeast and the alteration in the subcontinent's geopolitical setting sharply reduced China's capacity and will to pursue Naxalite-type subversion. In fact, the suppression of the Naxalite rebellion by the Indian Army and a credible campaign of political pacification by the Indian Government had started to deflate the impact of Mao's thought on the Indian Maoists before the 1971 conflict. Vague hints from China to India to "normalize" relations had started to appear in embassy parties in New Delhi and Cairo before the 1971 conflict polarized India-U.S. and India-China relations.

Nevertheless, it took a war in 1971 to alter the entire setting and the choices of the great powers involved in that part of the world. Consequently, with the unavailability of this region for Chinese diplomacy, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's interest in subcontinental politics was reduced to protecting China's position in West Pakistan, which remains a vital logistical flank of Chinese Sinkiang.

The war had another major side effect. It enabled Indira Gandhi's Government to strike a blow against the concept of superpower-directed management of regional conflict. While the Indian rhetoric appeared to be even-handed, the context of the Soviet Union's mediation in Tashkent suggested that Moscow was India's principal target. This became evident from repeated declarations by the Indian Prime Minister that India was grateful to Moscow for "great moral support" and nothing else. Secondly, and more explicitly, Mrs. Gandhi made it quite clear in her statement of December 31, 1971, that India would not tolerate a Tashkent-style set-

tlement and that the problem was one of normalization of Indo-Pakistan relations on a bilateral basis. The Simla Agreement provided a fundamentally novel approach compared to earlier efforts at United Nations or superpower-directed mediation of Kashmir. The revised approach on the Indian side was to focus on the use of force as a guarantee of peace and bilateral diplomacy as the method to consolidate the peace.

Great-power responses

During the 1971 crisis, the responses of the great powers to India's revisionist behaviour varied. American and Chinese calculations underestimated India's will to strike a blow for subcontinental self-help and overestimated Pakistan's ability to contain an Indian military threat. Even though India's military potential was well known, the expectation in American and Chinese thinking was that there would be time to engage in crisis-management, to bring the issue to the diplomatic table and defuse it. While American and Chinese intelligence in New Delhi and Dacca had a clear picture of the calculations and pressures which underlined Indian contingency planning after March 1971, only the Soviet Union seemed to be fully in the picture.

In the earliest stage of the crisis, India took the opportunity to test the Soviet reaction on the possibility of Indian military intervention, and the responses were

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diverse. The Soviet military personnel asked Indians about "what they were waiting for", but on balance the Soviet counselled restraint and projected a clear preference for a political solution. It was only in June-July 1971, when Delhi became full of speculation about the likelihood of war in the fall, that Moscow revived its interest in an Indo-Soviet treaty. This is not the place to discuss the treaty of mid-1971 in detail but it will suffice to note that the treaty discussions had been shelved for almost two years and the initiative to revive them came from Moscow. Although the treaty elevated India's international position, it was also a vehicle for exercising Soviet restraint on India.

The internal dynamics between India and the Soviet Union during the Bangladesh crisis are worth examining because they bring out two points about decision-making. First, after the Indo-Soviet treaty was signed in August 1971 and India got the benefit of the uncertainty which the treaty created *vis-à-vis* China, the Soviet Union found that it did not have much leverage on a determined decision-maker such as Mrs. Gandhi. Having discovered this, the U.S.S.R. quickly sought to support the winning side and to utilize its highly-visible support to enhance the Soviet image in India and Bangladesh. Whether or not Moscow obtained a diplomatic payoff from India in return for its support is not certain. Indian recognition of North Vietnam and East Germany can be seen as either a payoff or a natural evolution of Indian foreign relations. But one can be certain that in the inner sanctums of Indian decision-making the sensitivity to superpower management of regional conflict increased. Secondly, even though Moscow seemed to have quickly discovered the limits of its influence with Mrs. Gandhi, American statements during 1971-72 — as, for instance, in President Nixon's annual foreign policy messages and Secretary of State William Rogers' annual report — insisted on the need for Soviet restraint in South Asia. American rhetoric on South Asia appeared in the framework of its preoccupation with the Middle East crisis, but, since Indo-Soviet relations were not in the same category as Soviet-Egyptian relations, Indians wondered if Soviet restraint or activity would really have made much difference and whether the real source of restraint was India rather than the U.S.S.R. Fortunately, in the 1973 U.S. presidential message and the 1973 report of Secretary Rogers, the new orientation is to deal with India as a factor for stability in the area.

The natural context for an appraisal

of the likely direction of Indian foreign policy in the 1970s is not the relationship between India, Pakistan and China — as the multi-coloured *Foreign Policy for Canadians* series insists. Rather it centres on the interplay between the India-U.S., India-U.S.S.R. and the India-China pairs, with Pakistan and Burma as flanks in the Indian foreign policy system — as points of manoeuvre rather than as determinants of power. Obviously, Pakistan is not in quite the same category as Burma. Pakistan's President Bhutto has a flair, backed by experience, for manipulating diplomatic alignments. Furthermore, because of America's interest in the evolution of Iran's military and diplomatic position in the northwestern Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, Pakistan is still essential to American strategy in the region. Nevertheless, the point can be made that, as a consequence of the changed realities in the subcontinent, Pakistan lacks the capacity to contain India militarily or politically; and in view of the emerging problems and priorities in the northwestern Indian Ocean and in Pakistan's internal politics, the emerging direction of Indian and American behaviour is to harmonize, to coordinate interests, rather than to highlight the negative aspects, as was done in the past. Thus the recent American decision to restore the flow of non-lethal American equipment to Pakistan and India is no repetition of an old story — that is, if the currently-held premises in American policy do not change.

Second element

The second element in the Indian context is less well understood, but is nevertheless vital. The Indo-Soviet relationship has peaked from an Indian perspective and its economic and security dimensions seem to have reached optimum levels. This assessment emphasizes the negative elements in the relationship, and on balance it appears that, even though the existing Indo-Soviet arrangements in the political, military and commercial spheres are stable constants in the Indian policy mechanism, India may find it useful to phase out, or revise, some of the existing arrangements if other more attractive external sources of help become available.

For example, there are inequities in the Indo-Soviet economic arrangements and the rate of exchange between the rupee and the rouble requires re-examination and renegotiation. On the foreign policy side, one must note that India's pro-Moscow strategy from its earliest conception has been built on the premise of Sino-Soviet hostility. Even though Indians — officials

U.S.S.R. sought to utilize aid to enhance Soviet image in India, Bangladesh

and scholars alike — have made much of the China problem during the early 1960s, the changing nuances in India's China debate deserve emphasis. The anti-China rationale has been the basis for developing a modern conventional military deterrent and for developing India's Soviet policy. But as there is now a stable adversary military relationship "in being" between India and China in the Himalayas and as China's capacity to alter the Asian balance of power by force is problematic, the fear of a Chinese military threat has lessened in Indian perceptions.

Similarly, in India's domestic nuclear debates, the immediate danger of a Chinese military threat seems less. During the 1965-68 debate in Geneva, Indian Ambassador V. C. Trivedi took care to emphasize that India nuclear option related to questions such as International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation treaty safeguards, which went beyond the principle and practice of bilateral Indo-Canadian and Indo-U.S. safeguards; that China was a potential threat which required an Indian nuclear option; that India needed to be free to conduct "peaceful" underground nuclear explosions if security and technological needs dictated such actions; that nuclear proliferation was a "consequence" of the superpower arms race; that nuclear weapons were not frozen assets and that, even if they were militarily useless, they had a political value.

Consequently, India's nuclear policy has not only centred on China's potential threat but it has also related fundamentally to the framework of India's relationship with the super-powers. In other words, as India's problem with China has become less central to India's concerns in the 1970s and India's problem with the super-powers has become more visible, one must take note of a reorientation in India's strategic behaviour. China's nuclear and military behaviour *vis-à-vis* India in the next few years may influence the pattern and the rate of change of India's nuclear programs, but an equally important determinant will be the nature of India's bargaining problems with the super-powers.

Indo-U.S. dialogue

In this general strategic context, the starting-point of the Indo-U.S. dialogue is not really the Nixon Doctrine. India has been formally outside the American defence perimeter except during 1962-64. Marginally, the Nixon Doctrine may appear to be a basis for the current dialogue but this is misleading because the points of departure are more salient than the points of co-

ordination. For instance, the first principle of the Nixon Doctrine emphasized a continuation of American treaty commitment to its allies. Since the deliveries of American equipment to India after 1962 did not match the promises, the context of the military-supply relationship during 1964-72 was one of unreliability rather than trust on the Indian side.

President Nixon's second principle related to the promise of a nuclear shield to countries whose survival was essential to American security. Since India failed to obtain joint assurances from the super-powers and since the American assurance in NPT was routed through the UN Security Council, where China's veto could hardly help India, the second principle of the Nixon Doctrine was also irrelevant for India. Only the third¹ principle — namely, the promise of economic and military transfers to India against other types of aggression — applies to the present Indo-U.S. dialogue. However, one is talking here not essentially about foreign aid but about a package of economic-political issues and to a lesser extent of security issues.

The specific bilateral focus in Indo-U.S. relations since the 1940s should be noted to develop a sense of the mood and the direction of the evolving framework of the relationship in the 1970s. Several points are obvious. First, no American President (including Franklin D. Roosevelt), no Secretary of State and no Assistant Secretary dealing with South Asia has developed a viable policy focus on India, and usually the State Department has been sucked into Congressional and Pentagon politics. Many American Ambassadors in New Delhi, including Chester Bowles, Ellsworth Bunker, Sherman Cooper and John Kenneth Galbraith, cared about India, cared about their jobs and tried to understand India as an important phenomenon in Asia. But this thesis was rejected by Washington and the general orientation — or rather disorientation — in America's India policy was compounded with the anti-Communist crusade of American politics.

Secondly, while the rhetoric emphasized the need for peace and democratic values, there was no natural coalescence between the two democracies and the personality clashes between two globalists — Dean Acheson and Jawaharlal Nehru — and two overpowering personalities — Krishna Menon and John Foster Dulles — highlighted the negative, irritating and arrogant aspects of the relationship between two proud nations. Thirdly, the links between the political, the strategic and the economic aspects of the relationship re-

*Disorientation
in U.S. policy
compounded
by crusade
of anti-Communism*

mained for the most part tenuous and contradictory. On the American side, the need to contain the effectiveness of Indian non-alignment in particular, and non-alignment as a third alternative in the bipolar system in general, induced America to utilize Pakistan as a diplomatic and military instrument to keep India off balance; this approach was constant in American thinking from Presidents Eisenhower to Kennedy and Nixon.

Strategic aspect vague

But, to help India on the economic front and in deference to India's non-alignment posture, the Eisenhower regime and its successors separated the political and economic aspects of the relationship. The strategic aspect was vague in American thinking and the picture of an economic race between the Indian and the Chinese developmental models was portrayed and matched with the talking-point that, politically, India was, or could be, a counter-balance to China. The former argument was more saleable, but the latter was also used by some American ambassadors in their dialogue with Washington, even if they did not necessarily believe it themselves. The approach was one of "ad-hoc-ism" and crisis-management rather than a pragmatic analysis of common interests and a pre-crisis dialogue.

President Nixon's 1972 annual foreign policy message signalled the need for a serious dialogue and, with the posting of Ambassador Daniel Moynihan to New Delhi, the American mood is to emphasize the need for "purposefulness in our discussion of issues that interest us both", while the Indian mood is to emphasize that the two countries "have no basic conflict of interests". Ambassador Moynihan is not as close to President Nixon as John Kenneth Galbraith was to President Kennedy and, although he is new to the Indian scene, he has already accelerated the dialogue by adopting a package approach to bilateral relations. The new emphasis is on trade rather than aid and the revised focus includes an exploration of the opportunity for greater private American investments in India's industrialization plans. Admittedly there are pitfalls in adopting this approach; it is easier to sell foreign aid on humanitarian and security grounds than it is to sell a trade package in which foreign imports may hurt American domestic interests.

In the new approach, security and political angles are naturally given less visibility but the ban on the flow of non-lethal American military assistance for items such as communications technology

and equipment has been lifted. However the security aspect is likely to remain a key and for the time being the State Department is likely to argue against transfer of lethal equipment such as military aircraft for India's aircraft carrier.

Another item of interest on the agenda includes the possibility of improving Indo-U.S. academic relations. Over the years the Indian Government has been concerned with the flabby state of the arts in South Asian studies in American and Canadian universities and such a concern has produced constraints on the flow of North American scholars into India. However, in due course it seems probable that, as the bureaucratic reactions on both sides are worked out and the sense of frustration of the scholarly community grows, the Indian Government may find it useful to seek permanent intergovernmental or inter-university arrangements of the type India has with some European states.

Evolving rivalries

The framework of the dialogue is still evolving and the agenda items are just beginning to take shape. Hence it is best to conclude this piece on a tentative note. One key point in the strategic environment which has emerged is that India and America both need to be attentive to the evolving rivalries in the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean and the potentialities of Soviet behaviour in that part of the world. At present the Soviet interest is to stabilize the region east of Iran, and neither the Soviet nor the United States would seem to gain by destabilizing the Indian Ocean. However, a Chinese ICBM test in the direction of the Indian Ocean and Chinese show-the-flag submarine missions into the Indian Ocean could alter the current level of naval activities in the region. The second general element is that America now views India as a regional partner and the Asian balance is seen not as a neat black box of four Asian powers but rather as a combination of several balances — that is, the Central Asian balance, the Northeast Asian balance, the South Asian and Indian Ocean balance. With the revised approach, the style of behaviour at present is that India makes a move and the United States responds rather than *vice versa*.

But it is on the economic front that the two countries will be able to provide a tangible expression of their mutual interests. In a speech to the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce in Bombay on April 6, 1973, Ambassador Moynihan outlined the possibility of doubling India's share of the American import market and the Indian response was promising. There is

*U.S. separated
political and
economic aspects
of relationship*

clearly a common interest in both countries to revitalize and expand the system of economic interdependencies and the difficulties which arise are likely to relate to European and Congressional attitudes

primarily. Unless the "Spirit of '76" evaporates with Watergate and all, one can look forward to a limited but fruitful dialogue based on pragmatism rather than sentimentalism.

Canada-India relations

India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi paid an official visit to Canada from June 17 to 24. She conferred with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in Ottawa on issues of international and bilateral interest. In addition, the two prime ministers participated in a meeting of their senior officials chaired by Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp. The Indian Prime Minister addressed a joint session of both Houses of Parliament. During her eight days in Canada, Mrs. Gandhi also visited Toronto, Niagara-on-the-Lake, Montreal, Calgary, Banff, Vancouver and Victoria.

The communiqué issued at the close of the visit noted that the two prime ministers felt that, after a quarter-century of friendly and co-operative relations between India and Canada, it was now desirable to "initiate a review and renewal of bilateral relations between the two countries in economic, cultural, scientific, technical and commercial exchanges. In this context, it was decided that senior

officials of the two governments should meet later in the year for detailed discussions, including possibilities for joint economic ventures".

The communiqué said the world food situation had been assessed and that India's achievements in increasing its food production were appreciated. It was agreed that early consideration would be given to further co-operation by India and Canada in India's efforts toward self-reliance through the supply of food grains, edible oils and fertilizers, including potash.

Prime Minister Gandhi conveyed to Mr. Trudeau India's appreciation for Canadian assistance in India's economic development. The Canadian Prime Minister expressed admiration for India's efforts to tackle basic national problems, and reaffirmed Canada's continuing interest in Indian development.

International issues

Among the international issues reviewed by the two prime ministers were recent developments in Indochina, the Middle East, Africa and Europe, as well as preparations for the Conference of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Ottawa and the Non-Aligned Nations Conference in September.

The Indian Prime Minister explained the latest developments on the Indian sub-continent, identifying the joint Indo-Bangladesh Declaration of April 17, 1973, as a "sincere initiative to resolve humanitarian problems" resulting from the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1971, designed to promote durable peace and co-operation in the area. The two prime ministers agreed that a durable settlement of outstanding problems should be achieved through negotiations among the countries of the sub-continent. They expressed the hope that Bangladesh would soon be enabled to take its rightful place in the United Nations and other international organizations, and welcomed the membership of Bangladesh in the Commonwealth.

According to the communiqué, tribute was paid to the active and constructive



Canadian Press photo

India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi replies to a question at a press conference during Ottawa phase of her visit to Canada in June of this year.

Indian leadership among the developing countries in organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) "in promoting change in the world economic order, to bridge the gap between industrially developed and developing countries, to increase the transfer of technology, improve the terms of trade, increase the flow of financial resources and generally accelerate the pace of development in the developing countries".

Both sides noted the significance for future world prosperity of the successful outcome of the forthcoming round of tariff negotiations in the GATT and discussions on the reform of the international monetary system.

The prime ministers agreed that India and Canada should work closely together on such international questions of common interest as the law of the sea and the improvement of the environment.

Resolve for self-reliance

The following are excerpts from Prime Minister Gandhi's address to the joint session of both Houses of Parliament on June 19:

... A nation can achieve economic or political liberation only through its own endeavour and sacrifice. Our development is based primarily on our own savings and labour. But the problem of poverty is a world-wide one, demanding international action. We have welcomed and received co-operation from other nations for our developmental plans. I should like to express the gratitude of our people for Canada's help. It was concrete and imaginative, and without expectation of political advantage.

Not all countries have been so understanding. Their attempts to derive some political leverage have, not unnaturally, led to impatience with aid on the part of many developing nations. Donors are also becoming aid-weary.

The Indian people are resolved to achieve self-reliance. This does not mean diminution of economic give-and-take, but that economic relations between one nation and another should be on the basis of equality. We shall continue to look for technological assistance to bridge the gaps in the structure of our basic industries and our know-how of the new technologies. Our efforts could be more effective if the advanced countries adopted more enlightened trade policies. When it comes to trade, many of the strongest nations behave as though they need protection from the weak. A new outlook which will not

condemn developing nations to permanent disadvantage is essential.

Canada and India provide examples of how countries with differing backgrounds can work together for common goals. In many parts of the world, we have cooperated on international issues such as colonialism and racial discrimination and on major economic problems such as international trade and commerce. In Korea, our two countries played a major role in defusing an extremely dangerous situation. We have participated together in peace-keeping missions in many risky situations and areas — for example, Gaza and Indochina.

A country's foreign policy is dictated by its historical conditioning and its assessment of national interests. In keeping with our tradition of non-violence and our belief that mankind is one family, we have subscribed to the concept of peaceful co-existence. The world is large enough to hold countries with different civilizations and political ideologies. Anyhow, we cannot choose our neighbours or move to another planet. So we are glad that the powerful have ceased to mock us for our naiveté and have moved away from the doctrinal rigidities of postwar bipolarity. We welcome the *détente* in Europe and are glad that China has at last been given its legitimate place in the United Nations.

Role of smaller powers

But can we be certain that the new and more realistic relations between the great powers do, in fact, indicate a more stable world order? Or are they yet another attempt to reinforce the old concept of balance of power? High-level exchanges and discussions between great powers are good, but we hope that they will not lead to decisions which affect other nations, big or small, without full consideration of their legitimate interests. We must be vigilant against big-power arrangements for the creation of new spheres of influence. In our own area and with our neighbours, we favour a bilateral approach for resolving issues.

We should, and do, welcome the relaxation of tensions, but we think that the only non-proliferation of nuclear arms which is compatible with real peace is total disarmament. Such disarmament calls for far greater courage and conviction than is now in evidence. We cannot ignore the acceleration of military preparations. The arming of small nations by big powers, which was once in pursuit of cold-war compulsions, continues in the name of maintaining regional balances. It is a fallacy to believe that the induction of arms

Suggests efforts more effective 'if advanced countries adopted more enlightened trade policies'

from outside could promote stability, for this invariably encourages those militaristic elements who have little use for democratic and peaceful solutions. This is why we protest against continued arms aid to countries in our neighbourhood and regard it with grave concern.

The only safeguard against big-power

hegemony is for the smaller nations to stand together and help one another on as wide a scale as possible. Countries like Canada and India, which have no territorial ambitions, no economic empires to protect and no ideologies to export, can take a less self-regarding and more far-seeing view of international affairs....

The mission to Kuibyshev

By R. M. Macdonnell

If you are the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa, how do you go about setting up a diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union during a world war? To begin with, how do you get there? There were no ready answers to be plucked from files in the small department that existed in 1942 when the Governments of Canada and the U.S.S.R. decided to exchange diplomatic missions. The advice and help of friendly nations, supplemented by an ability to improvise, saw us through.

It made sense to establish direct diplomatic links with a major power that had come into the war against Hitler. The trick was to find the people and get them to the place where they were to do business.

The people were found in some likely and some unlikely spots. To head the mission as Minister (there were still legations in those far-off days), the Government appointed L. Dana Wilgress. After a career in the Trade Commissioner Service, he had become Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, one of the senior public officials in Ottawa. He was also a Russian-speaker of long standing, dating from the time he was Canada's first Trade Commissioner in Omsk before the First World War. The author was second-in-command, the only member of the team with experience in External Affairs, having served for the past eight years in Washington. Then there were two third secretaries. One was J. A. McCordick, now our distinguished Ambassador to Poland (all heads of mission, including the author, are by definition distinguished). He was another Russian-speaker and was on loan from the Canadian Army to the British, serving as a liaison officer with Soviet forces in Northern Iran. After release from the Army, he joined External Affairs. The other third

secretary was Arnold C. Smith, now Commonwealth Secretary-General, who was working for the British Embassy in Cairo in the field of public information and who joined the team on its way through Cairo to Kuibyshev. The armed forces contributed Brigadier Hercule Lefebvre, military attaché, and Major George Okulich, assistant military attaché, who acquired his Russian the easy way — he was born in Czarist Russia.

Selecting route

Once it was known who was going, a route had to be selected. To arrive in war-torn Europe after crossing the North Atlantic would leave still unsolved the problem of how you might hope to get through, over, or around the war. Crossing the Pacific

Ronald M. Macdonnell, Canada's High Commissioner to Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), submitted this retrospective piece about his experiences in wartime Russia shortly before his death of a heart attack in Colombo on May 19. A member of the External Affairs Department since 1934, Mr. Macdonnell worked in Ottawa and Washington before serving on the staff of Canada's first diplomatic mission to the U.S.S.R. In 1947, he opened the Canadian legation in Czechoslovakia. He twice served as Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and later as Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. From 1959 to 1964 he held the post of Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal. Before his Colombo posting in 1970, he was Ambassador to Indonesia and subsequently High Commissioner to New Zealand.

presented the risk of interception by the Japanese Navy and interment for the duration. It was decided to use the South Atlantic.

When the Canadian pilgrims left Ottawa, they began by heading due south. The U.S. Army Air Corps had nobly agreed to take them as far as Cairo, with Miami the take-off point. South and ever south we went, finding it hard to believe that this was really the way to the Volga; through Trinidad, British Guiana and Brazil, till we reached Ascension Island in the middle of the South Atlantic. Then it was north again to Accra in West Africa (the capital then of the Gold Coast, now of Ghana) and on through Kano, Fort Lamy and Khartoum to Cairo. The last legs of the journey went through Palestine and Iraq to Tehran, whence the Soviet air force flew us to Kuibyshev *via* Astrakhan.

When you shift from one extreme of climate to another you face clothing problems, especially if your baggage is limited to 44 pounds. Our party left Ottawa in the first days of a very cold January and was soon crossing the equator, first southbound and then northbound. The weighing of baggage by the military air transport people was governed by the helpful assumption that only bags and other containers would be put on the scales, while anything worn on or draped over the person was considered to be part of the individual's weight. Thus a winter coat could be worn or carried, its pockets stuffed with socks, while various sweaters and windbreakers, as well as galoshes, could be carried. It caused vast amusement to the citizens of hot places like Accra to see Canadians descending from aeroplanes with enough winter clothing on or about their persons to equip them for a Prairie winter. The point was that we were indeed heading for a Prairie winter.

Moscow was not our destination but Kuibyshev, a city on the Volga known earlier as Samara. When German forces came unpleasantly close to Moscow, it was decided to evacuate the capital of government departments, educational institutions and other important bodies. The chief evacuation centres were cities on the Volga, well to the east of Moscow, including Gorky, Saratov and Kuibyshev. It was the distinction of the latter to receive the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic missions. A further distinction was the arrival of opera and ballet companies from the Bolshoi Theatre, providing frequent opportunities for the *corps diplomatique* to watch the *corps de ballet*.

Kuibyshev has a climate similar to that of the Canadian Prairies, with dry

heat in the summer and dry cold in the winter. We should be arriving before winter had ended, so there was nothing for it but to accept cheerfully the amusement we created in Khartoum and Cairo and to lug our winter coats and galoshes with us. We were glad of them when we reached Kuibyshev in mid-March, with winter still in full swing.

Population doubled

There was a sense of achievement in getting our little band safely to Kuibyshev despite the periodic delays and separations associated with wartime travel. Then came the business of creating a working mission in a city that had probably doubled its population through evacuations from Moscow. Fortunately the Soviet Government had assigned us a house. It had been a malaria hospital, and the patients were moved elsewhere. Indeed, for the next six months the occasional visitor from the countryside would call to visit a patient, not having learnt that the hospital was no longer at our address. The building was large enough to provide office and living accommodation for our all-male staff, now including an RCAF non-commissioned officer, who had joined us in Cairo, to do typing and clerical work, later replaced by a petty officer from the Navy.

But for two of us travel was not yet over. There was still a journey to be made to Moscow for the presentation of credentials. A number of highly-placed officials never took part in the evacuation and remained in Moscow. Stalin was one of these and another was Kalinin, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, one of whose duties was to receive the credentials of heads of diplomatic missions. Dana Wilgress had therefore to go to Moscow. It is normal practice for a head of mission to be accompanied at the ceremony by the diplomatic officers of his staff but, in view of the limitations on travel imposed by wartime conditions, we were informed that only one officer could go with the Minister to Moscow, and I was it.

Train travel in the Soviet Union was infrequently permitted and usually took a long time to accomplish. It was not simply a matter of finding out when the trains would run (difficult enough in itself) and buying a ticket. Because of the gap between supply and demand, a permit issued by the police was required, and these were granted sparingly. Armed with our permits and tickets, the two of us headed west.

According to pre-war timetables, the journey from Kuibyshev to Moscow required 36 hours. During the war it would take between 72 and 96. An ancient sleeper

*Kuibyshev got
corps de ballet
as well as
corps diplomatique*

once belonging to the International Company of Bed-Wagons was hitched to the rear of a non-priority train and a few favoured passengers allowed to occupy this first-class accommodation. There was plenty of room, for the broad gauge of the Soviet railway system adds appreciably to the width of the cars. In other respects the facilities were austere. A samovar was kept going at one end of the corridor to provide tea, but otherwise the passenger took along his own rations. We embarked with a couple of wooden boxes containing bread and canned butter, cans of meat and fish, and even the materials for exotic hot dishes such as beef stew and pork-and-beans. The heating was done on an army contrivance known as a tommy-cooker, fuelled by the gelatinous substance known in Western Canada (and sometimes drunk there after being strained through a cloth) by the name of canned heat. This was fine when it worked. The trouble was a tendency to set fire to the compartment when the lurching of the train upset the tommy-cooker. Nevertheless we managed well enough.

72-hour trip

The journey to Moscow, on a mainly one-track line, took 72 hours. Behind us lay the industrial region of the Urals sending munitions and equipment to the front, then not far west of Moscow. This meant that our unimportant train must pull into sidings to allow the munitions to overtake and go through. Moreover there was a further need to get off the main line to allow hospital trains from the front to carry wounded to safety well behind the lines. I clocked one wait in a siding at eight hours. We tried to forecast our time of arrival in Moscow, after collecting data on stops and starts during the first day, by calculating our average speed so far and applying it to the distance still to be travelled as shown by the kilometre-boards on the telegraph poles. For a while our estimate of a mid-morning arrival in Moscow, a convenient time, remained firm.

But the omission of one important factor led me into grievous error. I had not allowed for the fact that, 100 miles or so from Moscow, the line to the front continued to the west and we veered right and north. There was little high-priority traffic on this line and our average speed increased markedly. Thus, instead of arriving about 10 a.m. as I had supposed, we turned up around 2 a.m. The Chief of Protocol was there to greet the Minister in a bleak and frosty railroad yard, for our car was at the end of a long train that seemed to stretch for miles beyond the station platform.

With credentials presented, the Minister was now legitimized and another time-consuming train trip took us back to Kuibyshev to get our work organized. The question was, how long would we be there? The city was very much a temporary diplomatic capital, with the evacuees and new arrivals anxious to move to Moscow and the original inhabitants clearly wishing they would go. One thing that stands out in memory is the scorn with which officials at the Peoples' Commissariat for Foreign Affairs regarded Kuibyshev. Most were Muscovites, either by birth or adoption, and they vastly preferred their metropolitan capital to the provincialities of an overcrowded tank town on the Volga. By the summer of 1943, most senior officials had wangled a transfer to Moscow. One vice-commissar (out of several) was left in Kuibyshev, presumably to confer an air of respectability, but the Commissar (Molotov), the other vice-commissars and, by this time, most heads of division were enjoying the satisfactions of the capital. There were few officials for diplomatic missions to do business with and the Commissariat's office in Kuibyshev was little more than a post office, sending communications to Moscow and passing out replies if they ever came. No wonder the diplomatic corps suffered a sense of collective frustration. Yet the Soviet authorities were determined to keep us in Kuibyshev until all possible threat of a German attack on Moscow had passed. A second evacuation was too embarrassing to contemplate.

The length of our stay in Kuibyshev thus depended on the military situation. Throughout the summer of 1943 the Red Army rolled the Germans further and further west. It was clear, at least to armchair strategists, that Moscow was no longer threatened and that diplomatic missions could safely return there. Every mission seized every possible occasion to point this out to the Soviet authorities. They remained non-committal until August, when it was announced that we could go.

Final move

By this time we had, after complex negotiations, secured accommodation in Moscow — the Embassy is still doing business at this site — and were more than ready for a final move to a more stable life. The move, by rail, was made under conditions very different from those described earlier.

This was an important symbolic occasion, the return of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic missions from exile, and the authorities saw that it was done with style

Shift to Moscow symbolic occasion, done with style and punctuality

and, above all, punctuality. They announced that five special trains would be made available during a fortnight and left it to the missions to work out the order of their going. It happened that the Canadian Legation was on the first train and we were among the witnesses of an extremely efficient operation. To begin with the train started punctually at the announced time. In so doing it left behind several foreigners who considered themselves experienced and well-informed, and took a late departure for granted. Next, we took precedence over other traffic and went bounding along according to prewar schedules, with only a few stops. Those stops provided us with

the eerie sight of normally crowded railroad stations in major centres which had been cleared of everyone but the work force. Platforms, waiting-rooms and even the approaches to the stations had been emptied, and only railroad workers and large numbers of police were to be seen. This apparently was done with our greater safety in mind. Finally the train reached the Moscow station at the precise scheduled minute, though to do this it had to slow down and barely inch its way over the last few kilometres.

Now in mid-August, seven and a half months after leaving Ottawa, the mission could start putting down roots.

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- No. 33 (March 15, 1973) Foreign Investment Insurance Agreement with Indonesia.
- No. 34 (March 20, 1973) Appointment of Mr. Louis Rasminsky as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the International Development Research Centre.
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September/October 1973

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Ambiguities in America's vision of a brave new Atlantic world

By Charles Pentland

America's Year of Europe has, it seems, begun life inauspiciously — misnamed by its parents, anxiously regarded by their friends, its birth announcement obscured by other events. The Year of Europe is misnamed since it is directed less at a region of the globe than at a set of problems — fundamentally economic — in whose resolution the United States wants the support not just of Western Europe but of an Atlantic system expanded to embrace Japan. The anxieties of these countries, in turn, arise from recent evidence of America's will and capacity to deal as briskly with its friends as it deals warmly with erstwhile foes.

The official announcement — Dr. Henry Kissinger's speech to the Associated Press in New York on April 23 — was in large part a condensed reiteration of well-known American positions on the desirable form of future relations between the United States, Western Europe, Canada and Japan. Both the style of argument and the reaction it provoked, however, pointed to some troublesome ambiguities in America's vision of the brave new Atlantic world. Dr. Kissinger was most specific in discussing problems and conflicts between America and its friends, and vaguest when dealing with common goals and interests. To many this suggested the difficulty of a "fresh act of creation" to make the Atlantic world a dynamic force in "building a new structure of peace" when the foremost Atlantic nation had only just begun — rightly or wrongly — to make major demands that would clearly exacerbate Atlantic tensions. A spirit of rebirth, after all, sits uneasily with a spirit of reckoning.

What kind of life, then, is the Year of Europe likely to have, as a renewal project for the Atlantic Community and as a new phase of American foreign policy? Any attempt at such a judgment should logically begin with an examination of the main points in Dr. Kissinger's speech.

The basis of Dr. Kissinger's argument is the now familiar Nixonian synopsis of the evolution of the international system,

especially since 1969 — an evolution which has rendered obsolete many of the founding assumptions and institutions of the Atlantic relationship. Some changes were virtually unforeseen, such as the energy situation. Others represent the success of initially uncertain enterprises, such as the economic revival and unification of Western Europe. Still others are the consequence of a long-term American diplomatic strategy: the *rapprochement* with China and the relaxation of East-West tensions. All point to the same current need: a change in the principles on which the Atlantic relationship, "the cornerstone of all postwar foreign policy", is constructed and in the modalities through which it is conducted.

Focus of grievances

The economic, military and diplomatic problems of the Atlantic world, Dr. Kissinger suggests, are in no small measure caused by our insistence on conducting our affairs as if all these dramatic changes of context had not occurred. America's economic grievances focus specifically on the European Community's agricultural and preferential trade policies and, more generally, on the reluctance of its major trading partners to reduce their chronic surpluses and help alleviate America's balance-of-payments problems. Europe's grievances, as Dr. Kissinger presents them, concern American investment, pro-

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*Allies concerned
at possibility
of reduction
in commitment
from America*

tectionism and growing hostility to European integration.

In matters of *defence*, American complaints centre on Western Europe's unwillingness to take seriously the domestic pressure in the United States for unilateral troop withdrawals and to hasten, therefore, to carry its "fair share of the burden". Nor have America's allies been willing to work out the implications of Soviet-American nuclear parity and East-West *détente* for future defence needs and for the doctrine of flexible response. The fears of the allies, on the other hand, concern a possible reduction in the visibility and credibility of America's commitment to their defence, either through troop reductions or, more serious, through a new, flexible posture of superpower crisis-management with the Soviet Union.

American *diplomatic* complaints, finally, concern the obsessive regionalism of Europeans and their tendency to criticize and distrust the United States rather than support it in pursuing its necessarily global interests and responsibilities. Europeans fear, Dr. Kissinger says, not being consulted by the superpowers over issues directly concerning them, and thus being sacrificed on the altar of superpower accommodation.

All these problems combine to have unhappy effects on the institutions of the Western world. Economically and diplomatically, Europe has become a regional power with regional interests and institutions, while America "must act as part of, and be responsible for, a wider international trade and monetary system". At the same time, Europe is determined to be "Atlantic" when it comes to defence, at the very time when changed strategic conditions may have undermined some of the rationale for "unity and integration". Similar inconsistencies exist with respect to Japan and presumably Canada, so that, in organizational terms, the whole system is out of phase and unharmonious. In Dr. Kissinger's view, the national, regional and global perspectives need reconciling.

Appeal to common ideals

The proposed solution to these problems combines, in the best tradition of alliance politics, an impassioned appeal to common ideals and a firm statement of national intentions. In the first place, there is an appeal to Europe, Canada and Japan to create a "new Atlantic Charter" so that "a unity forged by a common perception of danger can draw new purpose from shared positive aspirations". Rapidly, however, we move from the philosophical plane to the political. The President's approach to ne-

gotiations, says Dr. Kissinger, "will be dealt with Atlantic problems comprehensively". "The political, military and economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked by reality, not by our choice or for tactical purpose of trading one off against the other," he states. "The solutions will not be worthy of the opportunity if left to technicians. They must be addressed at the highest level."

From one perspective, then, the Year of Europe is to be an overdue exercise in the clarification and redefinition of assumptions and goals fundamental to the Western world's diplomatic relationships. The proposed Charter, as the concrete embodiment of these reworked ideas, is evidently intended to revitalize the Atlantic system internally and to concert and strengthen it in its external dealings on security, trade, aid and energy. This is the practical political meaning of a "joint effort of creativity . . . to build a new structure of international relations for the decade ahead".

From another perspective, the Year of Europe is less about common philosophical principles than about the ground-rules of bargaining between America and its associates. Dr. Kissinger puts forward America's goals — (a) a "balanced" world trading order, (b) a "rational defence posture, at safest minimum size and cost with burdens equitably shared" and (c) a set of broad common diplomatic objectives and a practice of consultation that permit maximum tactical flexibility — in terms of which none of its partners could seriously object, while at the same time presenting *their* views as if they were incompatible with such goals. The comprehensive, high level bargaining approach, too, clearly embodies the rules of play by which the United States expects to do best out of the autumn's round of negotiations. To assert that the economic, military and diplomatic issues are linked by reality, not by choice or tactics, is, of course, true only because America's determination to link them has itself become part of Atlantic reality. The decline in the determining role of American intentions in the Atlantic system is an important theme of the Kissinger thesis. Ironically, the fate of the "linking" idea during the coming negotiations will be a test of that thesis.

Initial reaction to the Kissinger speech has been, at best, friendly and cautiously interested. Few Europeans have echoed the instant eulogies of some American commentators who drew rather strained comparisons with the Marshall Plan. Many have expressed scepticism or suspicion.

Not surprisingly, the relatively enthu-



UPI photo

Henry Kissinger

gional preoccupations. But he also suggested the basis for a statement of common Atlantic principles, and in fact, whatever their views on linkage, The Nine have been working toward a Community position on defence issues as well as trade.

Dr. Kissinger's inclusion of Japan in his new Atlantic world has drawn wide comment, much of it uncomprehending. The Japanese themselves seem more concerned about growing competition among petroleum consumers and about possible Euro-American collusion against Japanese exports. The notion of Western Europe as a single entity has not made much headway in Japan, and the political and psychological barriers to negotiating with such a Europe and the United States would be great, even leaving aside the intolerable linkage of trade and defence. It is not even clear that the Japanese are very grateful for being offered a new Atlantic identity.

As a persistently Atlantic country, Canada has welcomed many of Dr. Kissinger's ideas, though not without some wry amusement that the United States has at last discovered NATO's Article 2. As to the proper approach to negotiations, Canada seems to be in agreement with the Europeans, noting pointedly the wide variety of existing organizations in which military, trade and monetary matters might separately be settled. Of greater concern perhaps is the growth of a new "triangle" imagery in which Canada is seen by Americans, Europeans and Japanese alike as part of the North American corner. In the coming negotiations Canada will be faced with its oldest problem in a new context — how to lay credible claim to independent status.

The Year of Europe, then, has had a mixed reception among the countries whose positive response is vital to its success. The literal notion of a new Atlantic Charter

Growth of image of 'triangle' with Canada seen as part of North America

seems already to have sunk from sight, its only trace being the NATO ministerial agreement in June to create a study group of the permanent representatives to re-examine over the summer the alliance's strategic principles and objectives. But even if no Charter is forthcoming, the exercise of pondering and debating the philosophical foundations of the Western world's relations may prove of some value. It is unlikely — even in the presence of some of the less savoury Western European regimes — to confound the skill of Atlantic diplomats at constructing communiqués. More positively, a firm, reasonably concise statement could usefully sustain domestic backing for the American presence in Europe and make clearer to the Russians what can and cannot be expected from *détente* and duopoly.

Greater difficulties surround the proposed linkage of negotiations on trade, money and defence. Resistance to this idea seems to be running high throughout Dr. Kissinger's Atlantic world. But what will the strength of this resistance be in the face of American political will? Can America's partners call its bluff and reject the linkage idea as global blackmail, a callous trade of prosperity for protection? Will they simply ignore it and stall? Or will they quietly begin to accept some degree of linkage as negotiations commence?

Bargaining purposes

In the end, the first two responses are unlikely to prevail, although both will be adopted early on for bargaining purposes. Outright rejection of the linkage between defence and trade would be hollow posturing, since the European alternatives to the American guarantee are not credible in the short or medium term. Europe must, can and will pay some sort of economic price for America's troops and strategic arsenal — no matter what the uncertainties that surround their use. That price will be reduced, but not removed, by America's own need, as a superpower, for a presence in Europe and by the continuing fact that, as Dr. Kissinger put it, America's values, goals and basic interests are "most closely identified with those of Europe".

Nor can America's partners close their eyes to the comprehensive approach and hope that somehow they will still be able, when the time comes, to bargain issue by issue. Too many deadlines arrive at about

the same time, in areas where Europe's need of solutions is as great as America's. In such circumstances, it becomes difficult to effect a tactical separation of issues.

The linkage of defence, trade and money is likely, therefore, to loom large over the Atlantic world, even if, as probable, dealings on such issues take place at different times and in different situations. Its decisiveness in the outcome depends not so much on whether the other governments accept it as a principle but on whether political and economic conditions will permit America to turn it to concrete advantage.

Within the United States, an aroused and unpredictable Congress will undoubtedly renew pressure for troop withdrawals and may delay or emasculate the President's Trade Reform Act. Watergate has already damaged the President internationally and may yet produce a paralyzing constitutional crisis. Although a President struggling with Congress can sometimes paradoxically, have unusual leverage in international bargaining, some of these developments could, by upsetting the timing of negotiations or removing strong cards from the American hand, effectively reduce the linkages between issues.

Internationally, there are other volatile conditions. A continuing depreciation of the dollar will only add force to the European argument that monetary settlement must be reached separately from, and prior to, any trade agreement. Moreover, if America is to retain advantage and initiative *vis-à-vis* Europe, and devote full attention to the negotiations, the previously arranged pieces of the "new structure of international relations" must stay in place — particularly the rather rickety Indochinese settlement.

The essential ambiguity of the Year of Europe lies in its combination of purposes: to lay the philosophical and political groundwork for a new Atlantic relationship in the context of an emergent global architecture; and to establish the terms in which America can resolve its economic problems, frankly and necessarily at the expense of its friends. The first enterprise, handled with customary dexterity, may prove of more value than is currently acknowledged. The second, however, is what really counts for Dr. Kissinger's new Atlantic world, and its future is most uncertain.

Europe must pay some price for U.S. presence even if it is to be reduced

European security: a review of conference's first stage

By David Karsgaard

"The conference that opens today is without precedent in the history of our continent. This is no meeting of the victors of a war; nor is it the meeting of the great powers. Our conference is the common endeavour of all concerned governments, on the basis of mutual respect and equality, to reach solutions on vital questions concerning all of us."

With these words, President Urho Kekkonen of Finland on July 3 welcomed delegates in Finlandia Hall to the inaugural session of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. It was indeed a historic moment; for the first time the foreign ministers of all but one of the states of Europe had assembled in company with those from Canada and the United States. Their meeting was the result of almost seven months of preparatory negotiations conducted by ambassadors in Helsinki, and their major task was to approve the product of those negotiations — the *Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations* — and thus set the scene for the second stage of the conference.

The *Final Recommendations* is a 27-page document which lists the four agenda items (Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Co-operation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment, Co-operation in Humanitarian and other Fields and Followup to the Conference). The document includes the detailed mandates or terms of reference for the committees dealing with each item. The document also prescribes the rules of procedure as well as the organizational and financial arrangements for the conference.

Each minister in his statement on his country's general approach to the conference expressed satisfaction with the *Final Recommendations* and confidence that it constituted a balanced basis for the substantive and detailed work of the conference's second stage. Many of them emphasized interest in a particular issue by tabling explanatory notes and draft declarations. Canada's Secretary of State for

External Affairs Mitchell Sharp tabled a submission listing specific points in the area of freer movement on which Canada wishes to see progress made.

Malta's proposal

While all this was accomplished smoothly and undramatically a peripheral issue very nearly spoiled both the atmosphere and the success of the first stage. The Maltese requested that Algeria and Tunisia be allowed to present their views to the conference, but they then refused to consider an Israeli request for a similar hearing. Countries soon adopted hard positions as the divisive themes of the Arab-Israeli conflict began to be sounded in the corridors and in the conference room. Canada and several other participants stood firmly for non-discrimination in the treatment of all non-participating Mediterranean states, and in the end the Maltese proposal fell for want of consensus on any course of action. It is almost certain, however, that the question will return to haunt the second stage of the conference.

Aside from the heat engendered by this episode, the general tone of the first stage was positive and cordial. The ministerial statements were non-polemical and constructive. Understandably, they were designed as much or more for domestic consumption as they were for the conference audience. It is therefore not surprising that most of the positions taken closely resembled the positions previously staked out at the beginning of the preparatory talks in November 1972. Cracks which had been papered over during preparation of the agenda reappeared and even widened as delegations prepared for tactical manoeuvring at the second stage. Eastern representatives tended to describe the conference as the culmination of a long process, as an end in itself. Western

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Eastern bloc
sees top task
as blessing
of status quo

speakers saw it as an encouraging step in the right direction, as an earnest of things to come. Obviously the gulf which separates East and West at this conference is still very real and still very wide.

When they addressed themselves to the items on the agenda, the Eastern Europeans invariably stressed the overriding importance of the first item, which deals with questions of security. In their view, the supreme task of the conference is to adopt a declaration on principles guiding relations between states, the effect of which would be to bless the *status quo*, territorial and political, to exclude all forms of change, peaceful or not, and to confirm the right of each government to restrict the movement of its people in the name of non-interference. It follows that any co-operation in a Europe thus permanently divided would be between two mutually hostile ideological blocs, and would be highly controlled.

The non-Communist theme, on the other hand, was that real security is based on the trust which is the fruit of contact and co-operation. Psychological as well as physical barriers should not be strengthened but progressively removed. The British Foreign Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, noted with approval President Kekkonen's statement that security is gained not by erecting fences but by opening gates.

Western speakers thus emphasized the importance of the agenda item Co-operation in Humanitarian and other Fields, drawing particular attention to the area of the freer movement of people, ideas and information. A number of speakers, including External Affairs Minister Sharp, pointed out the need for moving from words to deeds, for agreeing on practical measures designed to expand human contacts.

Canada's submission

The submission Mr. Sharp tabled listed five specific points for consideration during the second stage:

- liberalization of exit procedures;
- permission for family reunification, regular family contacts and marriage between nationals of different states;
- liberalization of restrictions on the validity of passports;
- elimination of closed zones;
- assurance of access to diplomatic, consular or other officially sponsored foreign establishments.

Progress in this area, Mr Sharp declared, is "the touchstone of the success of the conference".

Although most speakers did little

more than tip their hats in the direction of increased economic co-operation, the East also seemed to be seeking changes in the Western trading system. The West rejoined that the *quid pro quo* for any such change would have to be greater access to Eastern markets and greater freedom of movement for Western businessmen. It was pointed out, however, that no one is quite sure how in practice economic co-operation can be established between market and planned economies.

Neutral and nonaligned states have played a positive role during the preparatory talks, and during the first stage they again served as a reminder that the conference is not exclusively a confrontation between two military alliances but a meeting of states on a basis of equality. They tended to stress the item on the peaceful settlement of disputes, originally a Swiss initiative, and pronounced themselves generally in favour of some body continuing the work of the conference in its wake. The East did not press as hard as expected for the creation of permanent machinery, but it will no doubt do so as the second stage proceeds.

Second stage

All of this served to set the scene for the second stage of the conference. Its purpose, as defined in the communiqué produced by the ministers in Helsinki, is to "pursue the study of the questions on the agenda and ... to propose drafts of declarations, recommendations, resolutions or any other final documents on the basis of the proposals submitted during the first stage..."

The conference's second stage began in Geneva on August 29 with a meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee, a body composed of heads of delegation responsible for organizing the work of this phase and submitting its results to the third stage. It is also charged with considering "such measures as may be required to give effect to the decisions of the conference". Three committees, each responsible for one of the agenda items, began their work on September 18 under the direction of the Co-ordinating Committee. They in turn have each set up a number of subcommittees which deal with the specific points of each agenda item. As was the case for both the preparatory talks and the first stage, all decisions are taken by consensus.

In his statement at the first stage, the Secretary of State for External Affairs observed that there were three lessons about negotiation by consensus learned at the preparatory talks which would be of value in the later stages of the conference. The first lesson was that negotiations must

serious, detailed, and carried out in a spirit of accommodation rather than confrontation. The goodwill demonstrated in Helsinki does augur well for the negotiations in Geneva.

The second lesson was that "there can be no artificial time limits or other constraints". Sufficient time should be taken to achieve the best possible results. The gulf which still exists between East and West, the length and detail of the agenda, and the structure of the second stage are all factors which indicate a period of negotiation extending perhaps into the spring of 1974.

The Warsaw Pact countries, nevertheless, have repeatedly stated their desire that the third stage of the conference (to be held at either foreign minister or head-of-state level in Helsinki) be convened before the end of this year. One thing does appear certain in this haze of conflicting expectations: a short second stage would inevitably result in agreement at the minimum level, a situation which would satisfy the East but leave the West without

meeting its objectives for the conference.

The third lesson Mr. Sharp cited was that the negotiations of the conference could not be isolated from other multi-lateral negotiations such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) or from bilateral agreements such as those reached by Nixon and Brezhnev. In particular, progress in negotiations on mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe will have a favourable effect on progress in the conference.

It was recognized by most of the speakers at the first stage that ultimately the success of the conference and its place in history would be judged on the results achieved in Geneva. For Canada the key to its success is the extent to which the participants decide to establish security on a basis of true co-operation. Declarations of the principles which guide relations between states will be sterile without the nourishment of increased contacts between people and the trust which is the fruit of such nourishment.

Dealing with the U.S.S.R. during a split-level détente

By Franklyn Griffiths

The split-level *détente* that currently exists between East and West is likely to be with us for some time to come, as both sides continue to display antagonism on certain issues while developing forms of co-operation on others. We should be seeking to add new structures on the collaborative level, to a point where it becomes possible to spend only little time and energy in the more primitive wing of the relationship. So far as Western governments are interested in influencing the Soviets in this direction at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), they might well begin with a differentiated conception of current Soviet intentions.

Rather than suggesting that either antagonism or an interest in collaboration is uppermost in Soviet behaviour, it is desirable to recognize that Moscow, like the principal Western powers, is pursuing mutually incompatible ends in Europe. Two tendencies can be identified in Soviet

conduct. There is an activist trend based upon an assessment in which the West — particularly the United States — is seen as a declining force in world affairs as a result of changes in the strategic military balance, sharpening economic and political divisions within NATO, and a growing disenchantment with the military and political ob-

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*May persuade
Western powers
to exchange
increased security
for economic links*

jectives of postwar foreign policy, especially in Western Europe. Limited *détente*, increased economic co-operation within Europe, and further growth in Soviet military capabilities are favoured as means of enhancing Soviet power and obtaining favourable political changes within Western Europe, while avoiding the destabilizing effects of more intimate co-existence in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.

A trend toward greater collaboration with the West, on the other hand, arises in part from balance-of-power considerations, according to which offensive Soviet behaviour in Europe serves to isolate Moscow by driving the United States and its allies into increased co-operation with China. More important, however, is the perception that the Western powers may be persuaded to trade increased security for prolonged economic co-operation, which may be employed to improve the Soviet system's performance to such an extent that it unquestionably becomes a model for social development the world over. From this perspective, the CSCE should not be employed in an illusory quest for unilateral advantage that serves to retard the internal economic and political development of the Soviet Union. Rather, Moscow should be prepared to make concessions in an effort to reinforce the position of those in the West who favour a stabilization of relations, thereby creating a situation in which Soviet energies may progressively be directed to internal tasks.

Activist trend uppermost

When the Warsaw Treaty Organization resurrected the proposal of a CSCE in 1966, the activist trend was clearly uppermost: the United States and Canada were not to be invited, and the call for a conference was accompanied by divisive and propagandist appeals for the rapid dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. By the end of 1969, however, armed clashes had occurred along the Sino-Soviet border, the possibility of a Chinese-American *rapprochement* directed against the U.S.S.R. had arisen, and the rate of economic growth in the Soviet Union had proved increasingly disappointing.

In this situation, the collaborative trend began to surface in official Soviet actions, as the United States and Canada were invited to take part in the proposed meeting, and Warsaw Pact appeals placed increased emphasis on East-West economic and technological co-operation. An activist preference for divisive conciliation could be discerned in these outward changes of policy. And yet, in the Moscow treaty of 1970 with West Germany and the four-

power Berlin agreement the following year the Kremlin reduced its ability to make demands on the Berlin and German issues for offensive political purposes. At the same time, the Twenty-fourth Party Congress of 1971 marked a reorientation of economic policy to accord greater priority for better living standards and the technological re-orientation of Soviet industry. These developments consonant with an appreciation of the collaborative trend were capped by the Soviet-American summit of May 1972 and the series of arms-control, economic and technical agreements that Moscow reached with its principal Western adversary at that time. When the multilateral preparatory meetings for the CSCE began in Helsinki last November, it could be suggested that collaboration and activism were approaching a position of parity in the determination of Soviet conduct in Europe.

At the Helsinki talks, Moscow made certain concessions. Initially it advocated a very brief negotiation that would produce a general statement of agenda items, but it soon yielded to Western demands for thorough preparation. In so doing, it lessened its opportunity to make propaganda at the CSCE, and opened the door wider for those in the Soviet Union who regarded the conference as an opportunity for detailed and businesslike negotiation with the West on practical matters of common interest. The CSCE was thus becoming a different affair from the one proposed in 1966, but the Soviets remained committed to a mutually satisfactory outcome. Accordingly, on the question of expanded freedom of movement of persons and ideas between East and West, Moscow bowed to NATO insistence on the importance of this item, and eventually agreed to remove some of the qualifying language that directly protected the Soviet Union from co-operation in this area. Here and on other matters, the final recommendations that issued from Helsinki in June of this year marked a convergence of views that would have been unthinkable in 1968.

Brezhnev-Nixon summit

Before the foreign ministers met to launch the CSCE in July, the second Brezhnev-Nixon summit occurred. A confidence-building exercise, it represented a further move in the direction of a collaborative emphasis in Soviet policy toward the West. Additional arms-control and technical agreements were reached, but of primary significance was the mutual undertaking to avoid nuclear war. It is difficult to believe that Washington would have accepted this measure, which throws new doubt on

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UPI photo

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko (left), accompanied by Finnish Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen, is greeted on

his arrival in Helsinki for the first phase of the European Security Conference.

the American commitment to the defence of Western Europe, without first being convinced Moscow would refrain from an active exploitation of internal differences within NATO. The same applies to the revised American estimate of NATO-Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, which sees them as already being roughly in balance, and to Washington's acceptance of Soviet preferences in referring to negotiations for mutual as opposed to mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe (the latter suggesting the Soviets have considerably more to yield than the West). Hard bargaining nevertheless occurred, and reportedly it was only at the last moment that Brezhnev agreed to move ahead with European force reductions before the conclusion of the CSCE.

By comparison with the preparatory talks, the foreign ministers' meeting — the conference's formal first stage — marked a step backward, as the statesmen addressed themselves to their domestic audiences and sought tactical negotiating advantage by reverting to positions initially presented the previous November. The West, which had economic co-operation to offer, said little about economics and technology, and instead emphasized the need for freer move-

ment of persons and ideas as a prerequisite for authentic security and co-operation in Europe. The East, desiring an expansion of economic relations and being reluctant to lower its defences against political and ideological penetration, laid stress on the peace issue and economic measures. The Soviets proffered a disappointing draft declaration on European security, which was largely a reformulation of the final recommendations of the Helsinki preliminaries. They also differed with the West on the question of the European territorial status quo; where the West was unwilling to eliminate the possibility of peaceful change of frontiers by negotiation, as in the case of German reunification, the East argued for permanent boundaries that could not be altered by any means. In sum, Moscow was willing to endorse only very closely controlled co-operation between two antagonistic social systems in a perpetually divided Europe. Conceivably this posture was taken in part for purposes of negotiation, for under the consensus procedure of the CSCE each party tends to begin with maximal demands if it is to obtain an optimal decision. Nevertheless, the stated Soviet position in the opening phase of the conference represented a

West unwilling to eliminate the possibility of peaceful change of frontiers by negotiations

diminution of the collaborative trend that had previously become more evident in Soviet actions.

What may be expected from Moscow at the second stage of detailed negotiations, which will have begun in mid-September, and at the third and final stage, which may be held at the heads-of-state level sometime next summer? Since the West is pressing for greater freedom of movement, and this not merely as a negotiating tactic aimed at securing trade-offs on other issues, the political situation within the U.S.S.R. will be of primary importance.

Soviet fears

Brezhnev has personally become heavily committed to the conference, and requires a successful outcome if his position is not to be damaged. Before April of this year, internal criticism of Kremlin policy toward the West suggested that influential institutions and groupings feared the CSCE would erode political and military preparedness, open the way to impermissible ideological compromises, facilitate subversion in the U.S.S.R., allow the penetration of Western capital into the Soviet economic system, and convert the Soviet Union into a hewer of wood and drawer of water for the West as a result of the export of unprocessed raw materials. Then a series of important Politburo changes were announced at the end of April, which brought the military, internal security apparatus and Foreign Ministry directly into the highest decision-making councils. Though the officials concerned may be personally beholden to Brezhnev, the institutions they represent are conservative ones, and may be expected to resist rapid moves toward increased co-operation with the West. Indeed, the promotion of Andropov, head of the security forces and something of an "old China hand", may be a signal to Peking that Moscow has gone far enough in the West and is now somewhat more interested in repairing relations to the East.

In any event, Stage I of the CSCE was reported as a success to the Soviet people, and in mid-July Brezhnev echoed Khrushchov in speaking of "the high aspiration to ensure that the sky over the earth be forever clear, that guns be silent forever, that rockets be used only for peaceful purposes". At the same time, internal ideological controls were tightened, and the Soviet press continued to insist on the need for relentless struggle against alien bourgeois ideology. Similarly, while the Party received briefings on current foreign policy developments, the Soviet

people were not told of the vigour which the West had made the case for freedom of movement. Nor were they informed that many in the West advocated freedom of movement not for disruptive purposes but as a means of improving mutual confidence. Lack of public preparation in the area suggested either that there was serious intention of relaxing the barriers to East-West co-operation or that the requisite decisions had yet to be taken. In either case, Brezhnev now appears to be operating on a tighter rein. Though he strains forward in suggesting that the success of Moscow's peace offensive requires new assessments and new targets for Soviet diplomacy, his freedom of manoeuvre will depend substantially upon Western readiness to reach reasonable agreements that effectively undercut his internal opposition.

If the foregoing is correct, it is an illusion to expect the CSCE to produce a marked increase in the movement of persons and ideas, a consequent increase in international trust, or an early relaxation of Soviet policy toward its own and the East European populations. To press ahead with proposals for freedom of movement is a matter of paramount importance that may pay off politically in Western countries that have ethnic minorities whose homelands lie within the Soviet bloc. But it also plays into the hands of those in the U.S.S.R. who argue the West is seeking to undermine the socialist camp, and who advocate the exploitation of East-West negotiations for unilateral Soviet gain. The same applies to the argument that the West should speak out against the Kremlin's oppression of its national minorities and its denial of civil rights. Official condemnations from the West could only harden Soviet attitudes, accomplishing little for the Jews, Ukrainians, Esthonians and others whose position Western governments should seek to improve.

A modification of prevailing policy priorities and influence patterns within the U.S.S.R. is certainly necessary for a more productive East-West relationship. The same is true for Western societies. But to seek a stunning defeat for the Soviet internal security apparatus, the military Stalinists and neo-Stalinists on the freedom-of-movement issue is illusory. Instead it is more practicable to accept the basic structure of power and policy as it currently is in the Soviet Union, and within this framework to negotiate specific East-West measures that gradually improve the situation for the reunification of families, the performance of the journalist's profession, the dissemination of information and viewpoints originating in different social

First stage of conference reported success to Soviet people

systems, and so on. Even here we may expect a display of the Soviet bureaucracy's capacity to frustrate East-West exchanges.

Nevertheless, it is by cautiously inserting the wedge of ideological co-existence that a growing tolerance of diverging trends and interests may be encouraged within the Soviet Union. Similarly, it is by proceeding with restraint in this area that the West may bolster the influence of those in the Soviet bloc whose attitudes are less inimical to Western societies and their own populations as well.

Economic realm

If the issue of freedom of movement deserves reduced emphasis in Western negotiating behaviour at the CSCE, it is in the realm of economic and technological co-operation that the most can be done to moderate Soviet foreign and internal policies. Subordinate to this are questions of European security whose resolution may help to create a climate of increased trust within which economic co-operation should more readily occur. In the final recommendations of the Helsinki preliminaries and its draft declaration at the foreign ministers' conference, Moscow has undertaken to consider basic principles or rules of the road for political-military behaviour in Europe, and has also accepted the utility of confidence-building measures such as the exchange of observers at certain military manoeuvres. A thorough implementation of these proposals would further stabilize the situation in Europe. But the East-West confrontation is already to a considerable degree a stable one. The major effect of security innovations at the CSCE would, therefore, be to promote a reassessment of existing armaments efforts and a reordering of investment priorities to the detriment of defence. Whether such a re-orientation occurs primarily in the West or also in the Soviet bloc will depend on the extent of the Western commitment to economic and technological collaboration.

If Western political support for such co-operation proves lukewarm, the consequences will be unfortunate in two respects. Credits, trade, investment, and technology will enhance Soviet economic, and hence military, power without going so far as to produce offsetting internal constraints on Soviet foreign policy, which could revert to demands at a later and more opportune date. And they would provide Moscow with external substitutes for the reform of its economic and hence political systems. On the other hand, extensive co-operation coupled with tension-reducing political measures could lend

assistance to those in the Soviet Union who have been seeking to reduce their defence effort and reallocate investment funds in the direction of the consumer, agriculture, public services and a modernization of industry.

By moving to create an increasingly dense web of interdependence between the economies of East and West, interests in political-military stability would be broadened on both sides, as officials sought to reduce the influence of political, and hence unpredictable, elements in the performance of functions upon which more and more depended. In the presence of a prolonged relaxation of East-West tensions and steadily growing co-operation, the Soviet economy and policy could not long be insulated from the reformist pressures that exist in the country. The outlook for a relaxation of central controls would be improved, and with it the prospects for increased freedom that accompany a decentralized economy relying on material incentives to stimulate individual economic activity.

Fostering co-operation

Over the long term, which is a necessary perspective in evaluating the CSCE, more can be done to further a moderation of Soviet policies by employing economic collaboration to fasten them into a posture of increasing co-operation than would be the case if the West pursued policies of economic denial or piecemeal relations. Either way, Soviet military power will gain. But in the presence of substantially broader economic interaction and measured progress toward freedom of movement between East and West, the rate of gain in Soviet military capabilities could be reduced and counterbalanced by internal political changes. In any case, increases in military power cannot be translated directly into increased political power. Ultimately, it is by lending assistance to those forces in the Soviet Union who would like to see their system an indisputable success that the Soviet sense of inferiority will be reduced, and with it the Soviet propensity to compensate by seeking global power and suppressing internal dissidents. Unfortunately, Western governments are likely to extend themselves in this direction only if Soviet actions provide less equivocal support to the arguments of those who favour increased restraint and collaboration *vis-à-vis* the U.S.S.R. in Europe.

The CSCE is taking place under the slogan of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Everyone claims to abide by this principle. But the governments of East and West are all, to a greater

Soviet policy and economy could not be long insulated from pressures for reform

or lesser degree, involved in an effort to influence the politics of foreign and internal policy in opposing states. In fact, the CSCE is not so much an East-West negotiation as an extraordinarily complex transnational interaction. Highly informal coalitions that cut across frontiers and ideological dividing lines are vying to determine the balance between collaboration and continued antagonism in the future relations among states with different social systems. The evolution of East-West affairs

favours the growth of co-operative tendencies. But, in the short term, much will depend upon increased mutual awareness among the diverse national constituencies that favour reconciliation and are at present very largely ignorant of one another's activities. Increased freedom of movement will obviously make a contribution here. So also will Western efforts even now to provide support for collaborative and reformist trends within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

MBFR: the long-awaited test of the superpowers' good faith

By Albert Legault

For several years journalists, commentators, diplomats and observers of the international scene have been discussing the MBFR negotiations, and they are still doing so. If they did not, they could not keep abreast of the subject. It is not that the problems are unusually complex but rather that, like anybody else, politicians are apt to change their minds.

In fact, serious interest in the reduction of forces in Europe dates from the publication of the *Harmel Report* in 1967. It was, indeed, considered in 1957, at the time of the Rapacki Plan, but the latter — the plan, not the minister — was quickly shelved because of the icy reception it was given in the West. In 1968, following the *Harmel Report*, the NATO countries officially put forward the idea of mutual balanced force reductions in Europe. (See *International Perspectives*, March-April 1972). The Warsaw Pact countries, for their part, maintained their long-standing proposal for a conference on European security. After some tough negotiating and the conclusion of several East-West agreements tending towards greater co-operation between the two Europes — in particular the German-Soviet and German-Polish treaties, the Quadripartite Agreement on

Berlin, the agreement between the two Germanies and the SALT agreement of May 1972 — it was finally decided that both East and West would get the conferences they had been advocating for years.

Relationship between the two conferences

Accordingly, the first phase of the multilateral discussions on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Helsinki in November 1972. After a meeting of the NATO Council in Bonn in May 1972, the West had insisted that the MBFR exploratory discussions should begin "before or concurrently with the opening of preparatory discussion" on the CSCE. In September 1972, following Henry Kissinger's visit to Moscow, the Russians finally acceded to the Western request; preliminary discussions on the MBFR might begin in Vienna, rather than Geneva, in January 1973.

For most of 1972 it was uncertain whether there would be two conferences, or only one at which questions of force reduction and co-operation would be discussed concurrently. The Soviets, after talking first of a single conference and then of two, finally fell in with the Western view. There would be two conferences — the CSCE and the MBFR. This approach was fully justified in view of the complexity of the subject. It should, however, be noted that security questions will be dealt with in general terms at the CSCE. (At the preliminary talks on the CSCE, the "basket" system proposed by Switzerland was

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instrumental in settling the difficult question of the agenda. Security matters will be dealt with under Basket No. 1). Moreover, it is possible that this conference will result in permanent organizations responsible for supervising the implementation of agreements that may come out of the MBFR talks.

The "preparatory consultations relating to Central Europe" (this was the name given to this first preparatory conference) began in January 1973 and were completed in June 1973. October 30, 1973, saw the official opening of the conference "on mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe". As can be seen, the titles change frequently, though the same subject matter is involved. Let us take a closer look at the salient points of the MBFR negotiations.

Opposition to title

At the opening of the preparatory consultations in Vienna, the Eastern countries registered definite opposition to the official conference title proposed by the West. They were prepared to discuss mutual force reduction on a reciprocal basis but objected to the term "balanced reduction". This referred to the Western insistence on the principle of a balance of forces. Some of the factors in this area are easily evaluated, and others are difficult to appraise. Geography, for example, is one such factor. Thus, for their manoeuvres and operations the Warsaw Pact countries have a depth of field that gives them a considerable advantage, since they can obtain fresh supplies of heavy equipment by means of a logistic supply system stretching without interruption from East Berlin to Moscow, if not from East Berlin to Vladivostok. The West therefore insisted on the principle of balanced reductions, to offset the advantages conferred on the countries of the East by an accident of nature.

While they were denied a formal victory, the point was carried, nevertheless, in a substantive sense, inasmuch as the final statement published after the Nixon-Brezhnev meeting in Washington in June 1973 referred to "strict observance of the principle of undiminished security of any of the parties". The principle of asymmetrical reductions was a second formula advanced by the West, to prevent troop reductions further aggravating the unacceptable situation resulting from the limited depth of field available to the NATO countries, especially since the withdrawal of France from the military side of the Atlantic alliance. In these circumstances, asymmetry might involve either

numbers in a given weapons category or reductions in different weapons categories in proportions which would also be different.

All these variations raise the difficult problem of military equivalence, which clearly illustrates the complexity of the debate. In any case, with a little goodwill on both sides, negotiations should be possible, especially since the principle that none of the parties should derive an advantage from troop reductions has now been firmly established. It is still too early to know whether certain formulas for reductions will be approved. Certainly, the general impression that emerges is that no formula will be rejected in advance, though there may be opposition concerning form and the use of certain terms.

The question of the geographic area within which troop reductions might be made was also the object of a consensus. In spite of the intentions expressed by some countries in connection with the CSCE of extending the discussions on European security, if not to the whole of Europe at least to the Mediterranean basin, the countries taking part in preparatory consultations on the MBFR decided to limit the geographic scope of the reductions to Central Europe. In the West, this zone includes the territory of the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), and, in the East, Poland, the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In other words, this zone, with Hungary and the Western countries except for the F.R.G., corresponds to that proposed by the Poles in 1957 for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Europe.

Objection over Hungary

When the preparatory consultations opened, the socialist countries indicated their objection to this approach. The U.S.S.R., for example, wholly rejected the idea of a limit on the number of troops it had stationed in Hungary; in fact, their number has increased since the preparatory consultations commenced. However, it should be noted that the military command for the southern flank of the Warsaw Pact is located in Hungary, while the Central European command is in East Berlin.

In fact, the distinction is of some importance, as the military command for the southern flank of the Warsaw Pact might easily mobilize units for service in the Central European sector. In any case, the West could not wear down Soviet resistance. It was necessary, therefore, to fall

Principle set that none of the parties should derive an advantage from troop cuts

*Dispute dealt
with the role
of Hungary
at the conference*

back on a compromise formula by which it was agreed that Hungary, though it would not have the status of a full member, would participate in the work of the conference as an observer.

The participating countries were extremely reluctant to comment on progress at the conference. Two conclusions can be drawn, however, concerning the participation of Hungary. The Netherlands delegate, for example, accurately reflected the Western point of view at the conference when he stated that the observer status conferred on Hungary should not prejudice participation by that country "in future negotiations, decisions or measures agreed on". The Hungarian representative, on the other hand, did all he could to allay Western fears that troops withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, Poland or East Germany would merely be shifted to Hungarian territory.

The selection of countries participating in the preparatory consultations undoubtedly constituted the main point of disagreement. When Mr. Kissinger made his visit to Moscow in the fall of 1972, the United States indicated its preference for the establishment of as narrow a forum as possible. It was thus hoped that only the Western countries directly involved — that is, the countries of Central Europe, and those maintaining troops in that area, namely the U.S.S.R., the United States, Canada, Britain, the three Benelux countries, and France if it so desired — would take part in these meetings.

In their note of January 18, 1973, however, the Soviets proposed enlarging the conference to include all states wishing to take part. It was therefore necessary once again to fall back on a compromise formula; selection of the participating countries would be decided at the time of the preparatory discussions, and the Western countries noted that only countries with a "significant influence" were qualified to take part in the preparatory discussions.

Full participants

In this situation, agreement was finally reached on selection of full participants. Four countries — the United States, Canada, the F.R.G. and the Netherlands — would represent NATO, while the Warsaw Pact would be represented by the U.S.S.R., Poland, the G.D.R. and Czechoslovakia. The status of observer countries was settled by two countries from the West representing each flank: Norway and Denmark alternatively for the northern flank, and Italy, Greece or Turkey for the southern flank. Finally, Bulgaria, Hungary and

Romania would have the same observer status. It is ironic that, after claiming the status of full participant, Romania ended by abandoning this in face of Western opposition, while Hungary, for which the full participant status was advocated, wound up in Romania's shoes by default.

The preparatory consultations in fact concluded in June 1973 without an agenda being finally agreed on. This matter was still in dispute. Nevertheless, the final statement set out the title that will be given to the conference when it opens officially in October 1973. The discussions will cover, as we noted earlier, "mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe."

Scope widened

For anyone who has followed the progress of events closely, this title is significant. In the first place, it had been questionable whether the reductions would involve only armed forces. The fact that the discussion is now to cover reduction of forces and armaments seems to indicate that it has been decided to widen the scope to include weapons systems. In this regard it is probable, contrary to what was formerly believed, that weapons systems of the traditional or tactical nuclear type might be subjected to various limiting formulas. Secondly, even as Western chancelleries were considering the problem of preparation for the CSCE, there was discussion of measures which might be advisable in order to create a genuine climate of confidence in Europe. Among such measures may be mentioned prior notification of military manoeuvres, a ban on manoeuvres along national frontiers, an exchange of observers and the establishment of control and supervision posts. These technical considerations are now definitely among the priorities set by the Vienna negotiators, and they account for the expression "associated measures in Central Europe".

A discussion of these measures would go beyond the scope of this article. It may be mentioned, however, that the principle of prior notification of manoeuvres should be accepted without too much difficulty, given that, as a general rule, nations are not loath to extol in advance the merits of military exercises they are planning. Acceptance of the second principle will depend on political and technical military considerations. For example, are there other areas with terrain for manoeuvres resembling or comparable to that found in the frontier areas? Or will states be willing to give up the psychological advantages they derive in periods of crisis from manoeuvres carried out along the frontier? Nor

should the exchange of observers create insuperable difficulties. In this respect, everything will hinge on the degree of latitude governments are willing to allow the observers. The formula is not in itself revolutionary; many countries have in the past invited foreign military attachés to witness the finely-synchronized movements of their armed forces. In fact, if there is a point over which the negotiations might break down, it is the establishment of control and supervision posts.

Last June the two superpowers asserted that a SALT II agreement should be possible in 1974. Does this mean that an agreement on MBFR is also probable in the short term? That would overstate the case, as all observers now recognize that the problems are infinitely more complex than anyone had imagined only a short time ago. It is clear that the Russians and Americans favour an agreement in this area, for different reasons. If it is true that political considerations take precedence over military factors, then it might reasonably be expected that partial or limited accords on MBFR would be concluded in the years ahead.

In the first place, there are enormous political constraints. There are two main theses concerning Soviet aims. Some commentators argue that the U.S.S.R. has not changed since 1945, that it still preserves its hold over the countries of Central Europe and seeks the departure of the Americans from Europe and division of the NATO allies. Others, however, feel that the U.S.S.R. suffers from a considerable technological gap, that it needs Western capital for further development, and that it is seeking to guard its rear against China, which looms in the background. It is probable that the truth lies somewhere between these two views, and that the U.S.S.R. has decided to make a deal with the West but without jeopardizing its interests within the socialist camp.

The United States, for its part, would be quite happy, as, moreover, would many other NATO countries, to be able to reduce the numbers of its troops in Europe, provided, of course, that this could be achieved in an orderly manner and in a context of mutual reductions between East and West. Furthermore, public opinion is no longer as willing to accept as true what is fed to it, while the United States can no longer see why it should continue to shoulder indefinitely the cost of Western defence, when co-operation might be a means of finally eliminating all vestiges of the cold war.

For the two superpowers, therefore, MBFR is the long-awaited means of testing their good faith and their political will

to enter upon a new phase of peaceful international relations. It undoubtedly is to be expected that many pressure groups will create opposition to troop reductions, in the East as well as the West, but this is part and parcel of a positive strategy of not putting all one's cards on the table.

Furthermore, troop reductions could not be dramatic or incompatible with European security. The military forces are composed differently; the NATO countries are clearly inferior in some areas, and just as clearly superior in others. Simple formulas such as a mutual reduction of 10 per cent might receive approval from both blocs, provided no unforeseen events occur to deal a fatal blow to the climate of reconciliation that has been emerging in Europe for some years. In addition, the arms programs under consideration — greater mobility of troops and technical improvements permitting a more flexible, accurate and diversified disposition of tactical nuclear weapons — might produce a qualitative offset to the relative numerical weakness of the West.

Finally, Europe is in the process of establishing itself. This does not mean, of course, that it should be left to its own devices — we all remember the story of Little Red Riding Hood. However, it would not be a bad idea in certain quarters to consider giving it a little more leeway. In this situation the United States, if the Russians see it as to their advantage, might withdraw a significant portion of its troops from Europe (several writers have gone as far as to suggest reductions of 30 to 40 per cent), provided, of course, that the timetable for withdrawal is clearly established and that Europe shoulders its responsibilities and assumes a greater share of the cost of military expenditure in Europe.

It would be misleading to end here without striking a different note. The most penetrating argument that can be brought against MBFR is not so much the general uncertainty that would result from a partial American withdrawal 3,000 miles from the shores of Europe but rather governmental uneasiness about growing indifference on the part of youth and the general public to arms programs. In fact, it is probable that troop reductions would contribute to the further demobilization of public opinion, which has been made to serve as a useful ally under cold war conditions. Specifically, if there is so much talk of troop reductions today, perhaps it is because there is no longer any real interest in the cold war, and societies are facing a new threat, against which so far no cure has been found, perhaps because the diagnosis has still to be made.

*Timetable
for withdrawal
seen essential,
with Europe
sharing greater
burden of cost*

The case for a new approach in Canada-EEC relations

By Maurice Torrelli and Kimon Valaskakis

Canada's reaction to Britain's entry into the European Economic Community reveals the basic ambiguity of the Canadian attitude towards the latter; on the one hand, Europe represents the colonial past, the "Land of Sin" as Jefferson put it, whereas, on the other hand, the EEC, which is the largest trade bloc in a world in which an economy of conglomerates is becoming the rule rather than the exception, is acting more and more as a powerful attractive force. Futurologists à la Herman Kahn speak of the vitality of certain "winning" groups such as Europe or Japan, and of the decline of certain "losing" groups, such as the United States or the U.S.S.R., whose aging administrative structures are beginning to constitute a threat to economic growth.

As far as its relationship with these large conglomerates is concerned, Canada, a country that certainly would never have been invented by an economist, is more or less associated with each of them, but the process of becoming a satellite, although it is at a very advanced stage, is not yet complete. This process may be stopped provided Canada adopts a policy consistent with the objectives of national inde-

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pendence and a general increase in prosperity set forth in 1970. In other words Canada needs a policy of diversification that would make it possible to control the domination of its economy resulting directly from the very magnitude of its relations with the United States and to find the new markets the structure of its economy requires.

Up to the present, however, Canada, unlike the United States, has not taken Europe seriously; nevertheless, three factors militate in favour of a change of attitude. On the one hand, the end of the war in Vietnam seems for the moment to have checked the observed shift in the economic axis of the developed world from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Japan exerts a considerable attractive force, but Europe remains clearly the principal economic partner of the United States. On the other hand, Britain's entry into the Common Market puts Canada in a situation similar to that which prevailed after 1846, when Britain abandoned Imperial mercantile protectionism in favour of a system of free exchange, thereby rendering European markets accessible. Because it eliminated the tariff-free importation of Canadian wheat into Britain, the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 was considered in certain Canadian quarters to be a "betrayal" and forced Canada to re-evaluate its general orientation. This re-evaluation led first of all to the conclusion, in the 1850s, of the Reciprocity Treaty between Canada and the United States, which set up a sort of common market between the two countries for a whole range of products, and then, after the failure of the treaty, to Confederation in 1867. Confederation was the expression of Canada's will for a legal definition of its independence and led to a policy of economic nationalism and to the construction of Canadian transcontinental railways. Canada had decided to find its own identity without either Europe or the United States.

Today, with Britain's entry into the EEC, Canada feels somewhat as though it

were the victim of a second British "betrayal"; the end of modern-day preferential treatment by Britain will certainly create difficulties for certain Canadian industries that will be in an unfavourable competitive position on the British market in comparison with the other EEC member states. Canada can opt for a *rapprochement* with the United States, as it did in 1846, or once again revert to economic nationalism.

There is, however, a third solution; it consists in creating closer ties with Europe, the legal terms of which are yet to be defined but whose economic justification may be stated precisely: the third factor that makes Europe particularly interesting for Canada is the complementary nature of the two economies.

The notion of "complementarity" is, to be sure, a difficult one to grasp in the theory of international exchange. Some people like to interpret it from a purely trade point of view; according to them, two economies are complementary if the amount of their mutual trade is higher than the amount of trade with other partners. If we were to use this criterion, however, we should have to conclude that Canada's economy is less and less complementary to that of Europe since the amount of trade done with the United States is much greater than that done with Europe and is continuing to increase. This criterion would appear to us, however, to be too narrow and to express only one aspect of the idea of complementarity. By pursuing a commercial policy that promotes trade between present business partners only, one is really maintaining the status quo. Complementarity may be understood in a more sophisticated way — as the complementarity of the factors of production.

Factors of production

By using intuitive reasoning, or by doing an in-depth econometric study, one arrives at the conclusion that Europe is rich in capital and in labour and poor in natural resources, whereas Canada is in the opposite situation. We have a tendency to disregard the complementarity of the factors of production in the analysis of international trade, for the latter is traditionally distinguished from domestic trade by the immobility of the factors of production. This immobility was a reality at the time of Adam Smith and Ricardo, but it is no longer the case today. Thanks to the great international transatlantic migrations of labour during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and to the internationalization of capital and production engineering, almost all the factors of production

are now mobile. The multinational firm has crossed over all political boundaries and is present everywhere.

The argument that the distance between the two continents is too great is even less convincing today than it was in the seventeenth century, for, even at that time, Canada's economy depended on the existence of a transatlantic trade network; furs, cod and wheat crossed the Atlantic in an easterly direction, whereas manufactured goods, capital and immigrants made up the return cargo. Nowadays, in the era of the "jumbo" jet, the Atlantic is, as an advertisement for an airline put it, just a narrow river that may be crossed as often as one likes. Canadian cities are becoming more and more accessible to Europe; Montreal and Toronto, for example, will soon have integrated airport complexes (Mirabel and Pickering) that will include industrial parks stressing the air-transport aspect of international trade. Plans are being laid for the setting-up of foreign companies — which could quite easily be European — in these industrial parks. Thus commercial ties abroad would be strengthened and European capital would supplement American capital or perhaps even act as a counterbalance to it.

Re-evaluation and reorientation

The main economic argument in favour of a re-evaluation and a reorientation of Canada's policy towards Europe is that important complementarities are taking shape that need clarification, not only from a trade point of view but also, and especially, at the level of the factors of production. This aspect has been overlooked in the relevant technical literature and is not stressed in the recent article by Jeremy Kinsman (*International Perspectives*, January/February 1973), perhaps because it is, after all, rather obvious. Nevertheless, we should like to give two specific cases in point.

It is becoming more and more apparent that the Europeans will succeed in unifying their monetary system. One of the consequences of this will be the lowering of the "reserves/extra-Common Market imports" ratio which, in 1968, stood at approximately 62 per cent for the EEC and 42 per cent for the United States, thus creating excess reserves of several billion dollars. Problem: How could the surplus dollars be brought back into the United States without having a deleterious effect on the parties involved and producing new crises detrimental to the stability of the international monetary system? Professor Vély Leroy, head of the Department of Economics at the Montreal campus of the

*More apparent
that Europeans
will succeed
in unifying
monetary system*

University of Quebec, has suggested that the solution should, first of all, lead to a definite improvement in the balance of payments on current account of the United States and/or in its official reserves, provided there is assignment of tangible property and, in the second place, make it possible for certain specific sectors of the European economies (labour, manufacturing, finance) to become integrated with similar sectors of one of the economies in the "dollar zone". One such example would be the integration of labour markets through the emigration of European labour. That presupposes, of course, that the host country has considerable potential for development and a highly-evolved industrial structure and financial organization.

On a short-term basis, it is evident that no country except Canada fulfills these conditions. If either Europe or Canada were to take the initiative of injecting American dollars into the Canadian economy for investment purposes, this would help prevent an "excess supply" of dollars from accumulating and would also provide Canada with a more diversified source of supply of various kinds of capital. By thus creating what is tantamount to a third bloc, which might include other countries (Australia, New Zealand...), the Canadian solution would spare the international monetary system the uncertainties of a bilateralism between the United States and the EEC which has been a source of instability and has acted as a restraint on the growth of world trade and the free movement of capital.

The mining industry is one of the few Canadian industries that have enabled certain Canadian companies to become multinational corporations. According to F. F. Todd, president of the Canadian Mining Association, this industry is experiencing a non-systematic growth and too often its products are exported in an unfinished state. At the same time, the Europeans became aware, after the completion of the "Memorandum Concerning the Overall Objectives of the Iron and Steel Industry of the Common Market for the Years 1975/1980", published by the European Communities Commission, that the supply of ore being imported from Canada, Brazil, Venezuela, West Africa and Sweden was insufficient. This was due, in large part, to competition by the Japanese. The memorandum notes: "Canadian mines, which operate mainly for export purposes, supply American factories almost exclusively. Considerable work on expanding capacity has been undertaken in the region of Labrador and Quebec. These projects take into account the supply needs created as a

result of recent contracts signed with Japan. They also constitute a response to a certain increase in export opportunities to Western Europe". As a result, the Commission suggests the adoption by Europeans of a long-term mining investment policy. It would appear to us that this is an additional example of complementarity, which is of more long-term importance than the short-term grumbling about Canadian pulp and paper or wheat.

Finding an equilibrium

In spite of what we have said, however, this complementarity must, just like the terms and conditions of European investment, be negotiated on a world-wide level, so as to avoid domination or quasi-colonial exploitation. The orientation of Canada's policy in the direction of Europe could then form an integral part of a general plan for the diversification not only of trade but also of the sources of investment and labour. Diversification does not, however, necessarily mean a split with the United States; without systematically turning away from the United States, Canada could, by creating closer ties with Europe, realize its vocation as a pivot point or counterbalance to these two giants of Western civilization, thereby ensuring its "separate identity", as External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp would put it.

It should, in addition, be emphasized how dangerous the attitude can be of those Canadian businessmen who look exclusively to the United States; the ninth report of the Economic Council of Canada sets forth certain possible alternatives in the evaluation of the future performance of the Canadian economy. This performance depends, to a large degree, on the behaviour of our neighbour to the South: the rate of increase in its gross domestic product and its propensity to buy our exported goods and to invest in our industries are critical factors which, in their turn, determine Canada's gross national product and its level of employment. The measures taken by the Americans in 1971 should constitute a serious warning of the dangers inherent in our increasing over-dependence on the United States.

We are in agreement with the Government's conclusion that a real interest must be aroused on the part of the Canadian public, and, more specifically, on the part of our manufacturers; it is essential to add, however, that it is the Government's responsibility to arouse this interest and to go even further by opting for a policy that, if it is favourable to Canada, will meet with the subsequent full approval of manufacturers and public opinion. That is a

*Dearth in supply
due largely
to competition
from the Japanese*

risk the responsibility for which lies wholly with the Government.

The Government's uncertainty

Unfortunately, the Federal Government does not appear to have made a choice, and this uncertainty manifests itself in two ways. On the one hand, it would appear that the main goal of any future negotiation with Europe would necessarily have to be limited essentially to trade concessions, since no one has ever seriously asked the following questions: (1) As part of a ten-year plan, to what degree does an ECC strengthened by Britain's entry constitute a serious alternative to the United States on the economic, political and cultural levels? (2) Are there enough present or potential complementarities enabling Canada to begin to free itself from the American hold on our economy? (3) To what degree should Canada's relations with the EEC — the scale of which could extend from simple trade arrangements to a quasi-economic union — be deepened, keeping in mind Canadian objectives in the economic, political and cultural areas, and also institutional constraints (Treaty of Rome, agreements at present in force binding Canada . . .) that arise because of European objectives and priorities and that may be incompatible with those of Canada?

To be sure, if Canada were to orient itself toward closer co-operation with Europe in the economic area, the political "special relationship" Canada enjoys would probably have to be re-examined. If, on the other hand, Canada fails to build up its economic relations with Europe, it will have to suffer the political consequences of being absorbed slowly but surely by the United States; not choosing between an orientation that would bring Canada closer to Europe and one that would unite the Canadian economy to that of the United States is tantamount to implicitly assenting to the latter alternative. Perhaps Europe is not Canada's last chance, but we shall not have many more of them, especially as the time is propitious to in-depth negotiations.

Nevertheless, the Canadian Government appears to be in no hurry to enter into negotiations with the EEC, and its contacts have been limited to a few "exploratory" visits; in addition, Mr. Sharp's approach, which consists in strengthening Canada's bilateral relations with the member states of the Community, "thereby creating a framework conducive to good relations between Canada and the EEC as a whole", is open to criticism.

In the first place, the time is favourable

to the opening of negotiations for different reasons. After Britain's entry into the Common Market, the Europeans promised to take into consideration the possible repercussions of British membership on the Canadian economy. Whereas the Federal Government always had the impression that Brussels was neglecting it, for the first time the final communiqué of the summit conference in Paris mentioned Canada as a possible partner. The approach of the Nixon negotiations will probably compel Canada to define a position that is uniquely its own, so as not to be treated once again as a mere satellite of the United States. In addition, an examination of the external relations of the EEC shows that, most of the time, it is the country outside the EEC that must take the initiative in requesting negotiations, for the Europeans are mainly preoccupied by internal problems; only when they have received a specific request do they usually define their position regarding foreign nations.

In the second place, a bilateral approach unnecessarily delays the commencement of negotiations, while not offering any particular advantages; the member states favourable to negotiations with Canada are already convinced, whereas those that might be more hesitant cannot be induced to change their minds in this fashion. Once again, a study of the external relations of the EEC clearly indicates that it is at the level of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities that disagreements are resolved, so as to arrive at an overall compromise and a common position.

Permanent negotiating platform

Finally, if Canada were to orient itself in the direction of an in-depth and long-term re-evaluation of its relations with Europe, it would probably be advisable to establish a permanent negotiating platform. We have already mentioned the necessity of creating institutional ties with Europe. There is good reason for this, for, when one considers this prospect, one must take into consideration the evolutionary nature of the conception of complementarity and of the Europeans' efforts to define their common policies; in order that these two realities might develop harmoniously, a permanent contact is necessary. The Europeans are conscious of this need and all their special relations have this institutional element to a greater or lesser degree. They have set up, for example, a joint advisory board for certain trade agreements, a Council of Association invested with decision-making power in association agreements. In addition, it should be

Nixon approach will compel Canada to define stand to avoid being treated as a satellite

brought to the attention of those who are upset by the word "association", in that they see in it a break with the United States, that this system is an open-ended one, in the sense that its content may vary from simple trade agreements to a quasi-economic union, with the advantage, however, that an official and permanent means of negotiation is set up.

In the absence of a complete cost-benefit analysis of Canada's relations with

Europe, these remarks can only hint at where new solutions may lie for Canada. It is to be hoped, however, that examination of these possibilities will not be systematically precluded because of any psychological inhibition on our part; one might even go so far as to hope that the United States would facilitate a sudden awareness on the part of Canada by adopting new measures such as those it put into effect in 1971.

Defining the European Community...

It is comparatively easy to define what Europe is *not* going to be like. First, it is hard to imagine that the (European) Community will want to become a superpower in the sense in which this term is currently used: a power with global aspirations toward imposing a certain kind of order. Certainly, it will have worldwide interests, and must resist any attempt to be relegated to a minor regional league. But I do not envisage European gunboats patrolling the Straits of Malacca, or EEC paratroopers supporting wobbly regimes in faraway countries against rebellious populations....

Second, although the echoes of past glories still reverberate faintly in some quarters, the peoples of the Community at large will feel no temptation to resume a colonial role. Europe, whatever its special interests and links with certain neighbouring areas, will not be a vehicle for the continuation of colonialism by collective action.... Europe cannot remain a closed bloc.... It must remain open to partnership with everyone: with North America as well as Eastern Europe, with Asian groupings as well as Latin American countries....

Third, the Europe of 1980 will not simply be a Switzerland cast on a larger scale. To be sure, it is inevitably going to be a community of producers and traders, manufacturing, selling and buying. Yet for its own self-preservation it must actively participate in the web of international organizations from which Switzerland keeps largely aloof....

But if Europe is not going to be imperialist, colonialist or helveticized, then what is it going to be like?

First, the European Community has to see to it that it cannot be pushed around by anyone. It must safeguard its existence, its prosperity and its growth potential. On the one hand, the EEC states must

prevent *Finlandization* — being swallowed up politically, if not militarily, by the Soviet Union, with only a semblance of autonomy left to them. On the other hand, they have to ward off what might be called *Canadianization* — being pressed into economic subservience to the United States, their autonomy and freedom of choice threatened by dollar diplomacy. Finally, the EEC must resist unfettered activities on the part of U.S.-dominated multinational companies.

Second... the Community must establish itself as a totally new type of entity — neither parochial nor imperial, neither unassuming nor overbearing — a building-block for a broader and more complex international order, a "new intermediary between the national states and the world system," to quote Andrew Shonfield.... Europe can serve as a model of how to achieve unity despite diversity. It is bound to be a force for openness and liberalism. And it can demonstrate, especially to the Third World, what Ralf Dahrendorf has termed "co-operation without dependence".

Third, Europe has a moral role to play, and should unabashedly do so. This may strike some as censorious, as in its time did American moralizing. But as Peregrine Worsthorne pointed out in the *London Sunday Telegraph*, it is important that someone act as the conscience of humanity: "The World would be a much poorer place if there were no area which could be relied upon to preach a plausible sermon with some semblance of conviction from a posture of sufficient authority." America, Russia, China, the Third World, Worsthorne suggested, could not fulfill this role. Europe could.... (Excerpts from *The Community is Working* by Theo Sommer, editor-in-chief of Hamburg's *Die Zeit*, in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1973)

International peacekeeping: does it have any future?

By John Gellner

Canada's withdrawal from the International Commission of Control and Supervision — physically completed on July 31 last — will probably be shown to have had little, if any, impact on developments in the continuing Indochina conflict. More important was the symbolic significance of that move. The country which had taken part in more post Second World War peace-preservation efforts than any other, and had been a prime mover in the organization and execution of international operations of that kind, had given up. It had done so after giving it a try for a mere six months instead of the more typical spans of Canadian perseverance when it came to peacekeeping — nine years (Cyprus), ten and a half years (Gaza/Sinai), 19 years (the old ICC in Indochina), 24 years (Kashmir and peace observation in the Middle East). Contrary to previous practice, which was to carry on for whatever it might be worth even after it was concluded that nothing of substance could be achieved, this time such sober appreciation of the situation was accompanied by the decision to stop further attempts at doing the patently impossible.

This may be overstating the case, but one is tempted to say that the Canadian withdrawal from the ICCS marks the end of a noble experiment in international co-operation, that of on-the-spot, peaceful, third-party intervention for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of a conflict, or of cementing it if it was already concluded.

In fact, the current ICCS case was merely a somewhat dramatic demonstration of a change in attitude toward which Canada — and other formerly every-ready peacekeepers, such as the Scandinavians — had been edging for some time. It started, at first imperceptibly, but then, under the impact of events, ever more patently, in the aftermath of the biggest and most expensive international peacekeeping enterprise, the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) of 1960-1964. (This is not counting Korea, which was a UN peace-enforcement or, if you

will, aggression-punishing operation in name but not in substance.)

Some aspects of the conduct of ONUC in the Congo were certainly open to criticism. It was an unusually vast enterprise — it would have been quite unnecessarily big had it stayed within the conceptual limits of active peacekeeping (peaceful third-party intervention to police a settlement arrived at without interference from the peacekeepers by the parties directly concerned). Some 93,000 men from 35 countries served at one time or another with ONUC, though actual troop strength at any particular stage did not exceed 20,000. The cost was about \$411 million. Partly because of the composition of the force (82.4 per cent of it came from 19 Afro-Asian countries, some of which at least had very definite ideas of what the future of the Congo should be and thus could not be entirely objective in a multifaceted internal conflict), partly because of what may have been excessive idealism and zeal on the part of leading UN representatives on the spot, ONUC went beyond the legitimate purpose of a peacekeeping operation. A side was taken; that it was the one most likely to serve the interests of the country is beside the point. There was fighting, not all of it purely in defence of life and limb of the peacekeepers. Casualties were sustained and, worse, comparatively heavy casualties were inflicted.

Lacking a doctrine

In sum, there was every reason to sit down after the operation was over, determine where ONUC went astray and why, and then "firm-up" the rules of international peacekeeping. After all, like the other UN peacekeeping operations, ONUC too was

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put on an *ad hoc* basis. A doctrine was lacking — even anything like a fairly comprehensive set of rules of engagement. Just because of the mistakes that were made on that occasion, ONUC should have provided an impetus toward the laying of a doctrinal basis for future peacekeeping operations.

It was not to be. The Soviet Union, whose political aims in the Congo had been thwarted partly as a consequence of the UN intervention, adroitly used not only its own power but also the uneasiness felt by many UN members after ONUC to put an end to active peacekeeping by the United Nations. It did so by engineering, at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly (1964/65), a showdown over the application of Article 19 of the Charter (which states that a member "shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of arrears equals or exceeds the amount of contributions due from it for the preceding two full years").

What was in fact put in question was the legitimacy of peacekeeping operations approved by the General Assembly in the absence of big-power consensus in the Security Council. The challenging of Article 19 of the Charter was merely a tactical device by which the Soviets forced the UN membership to make the choice between abandoning peacekeeping under the aegis of the General Assembly and continuing with it at the risk of, at worst, breaking up the world body and, at the least, seeing it paralyzed as it was at the nineteenth Assembly.

That the eventual compromise (worked out by the Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and approved — by consensus, since there was still no voting in the Assembly — on August 31, 1965) referred only to the operations of UNEF (the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza/Sinai) and ONUC was unimportant. It was the inevitable consequences that mattered. To put it in the simplest terms, the General Assembly had been effectively pushed out of the peacekeeping business in which it had engaged actively, and for the previous nine years not without success, since Canada's Lester B. Pearson had sold the idea of it to a sceptical and at first un-receptive eleventh General Assembly, and the modalities had been worked out under the pressure of the Suez crisis in one hectic night (November 5-6, 1956) by the UN staff directed by that great Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. The United Nations has in fact mounted no peacekeeping operation of any consequence subsequent to the compromise of August 31, 1965, though, Heaven knows, there was plenty of opportunity and, in some cases,

an urgent — indeed, a desperate — need for some such action.

Chances for observer missions

In examining what chances there are for a revival of active peacekeeping, it is as well to simplify one's task and to exclude from any consideration that which under present circumstances appears to be inconceivable: further policing actions of the sort undertaken by UNEF and ONUC, and the still-continuing operations of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Those the current United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations — the so-called Committee of 33, which has been sitting since 1965 — has classed as Model 2. Military-observer or supervisory missions are Model 1. They are perhaps still in the realm of the possible (or, at any rate, could become possible again, given certain conditions) and thus worth considering.

Any future Model 1 operation would be initiated by the Security Council. There can be no doubt on that point; the Soviet Union had its way in 1965, and this is final. Disagreement centres on the questions of who is to direct an action approved by the Security Council, and how. Without going into the fine points in the respective positions, the United States wants the Secretary-General to guide operations on the basis of the directives issued and the terms of reference set by the Security Council. He could be supported by a consultative committee composed in the main of representatives of the countries engaged in the observer mission. Thus the preponderant power of the permanent members of the Security Council, manifested by the right of veto, would come into play prior to the decision to mount an operation but not afterwards, at least not overtly and not formally. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, wants the big-power-dominated Security Council involved throughout, directly, and as a rule also through an operational committee that would, in fact, exercise command and on which unanimity among the five permanent members would again be necessary. The Secretary-General and his agents would generally be entrusted only with day-to-day administrative-logistic tasks.

Clearly, it is the U.S. scheme that is the sensible one; the Soviet plan would, except in very special circumstances, surely be quite unworkable in practice. Every one of the 11 UN peacekeeping operations we have had so far was under the general direction of the Secretary-General, who usually delegated a portion of his authority to a representative on the spot. There has

General Assembly pushed out of peacekeeping since compromise of August 1965



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been criticism of the way things were handled, for instance, as previously mentioned, in the case of ONUC, or of the winding up of UNEF. The basic mode of operation, however, could not be called in question, and the jobs were done. One shudders to think what would have happened if current decision-making had been in the hands of a committee, on which at least five members would in each case have had to agree on the next course of action. After all, even with the Secretary-General as the director of operations, some vital decisions could not be made quickly enough — witness the fact that, for example, parts of UNEF were, in the end, still caught up in the whirlpool of the Middle East war of 1967.

No sign of compromise

Although in its latest memorandum on the subject (March 22, 1972) Moscow has, except for some very minor modifications, maintained its position concerning the direction of any future UN observer missions, the opinion has been voiced that, with the current U.S.-Soviet *rapprochement*, a compromise formula might be found that would reconcile the opposing standpoints in this matter also.

There have, in fact, been no indications of anything like this happening. The disagreement is fundamental. It reflects differences in the very conception of the institution of the United Nations.

In any case, even if a West-East accord on the operational aspects of Model 1 peacekeeping could be hammered out, there would still be another obstacle to overcome, one that has newly arisen with the entry into the United Nations of the People's Republic of China. It might have been foreseen. That Peking has shown itself indifferent toward, if not hostile to, peacekeeping by the United Nations

should certainly have caused no surprise. As has been contended for years while the question of the PRC's qualification for membership in the United Nations was under dispute, Peking has never been prepared to accept the no-war principle embedded in the Charter. It still is not. "We support just wars," the Chinese representative said bluntly in a programmatic speech, on October 3, 1972, "and oppose unjust wars." This should not be taken as mere rhetoric. Rather, it would be prudent not to count on Chinese co-operation in the field of peacekeeping — a co-operation that would be essential, since China is a permanent member of the Security Council — and not to rely on it too heavily even if, in some particular case, it should be forthcoming.

There are other obstacles with which the Committee of 33, and its working groups, have tried to contend, but even these cursory references to the main roadblocks should make it plain enough that even Model 1 peacekeeping is not now in the cards, let alone Model 2 peacekeeping.

It has been said that "UN peacekeeping is dead". This may be too pessimistic an outlook. In human affairs, there can be no absolute assessments. Still, it would perhaps be fair to say that paralysis has set in for UN peacekeeping and that, to save it, a heroic cure would have to be found. Even the staunchest supporters of international peacekeeping are at present sceptical about the availability of such a cure. They include Canada, as anybody will sense who reads, for instance, the pertinent section of the foreign policy review of 1970, or the 1971 White Paper on Defence. The latter, in particular, reflects a completely different evaluation of the possibilities of peacekeeping from that expressed in the preceding White Paper, issued in the spring of 1964, before the

Canada withdrew its 290-member contingent from the International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam at the end of July. Pictured (left) are some members of the supervisory force arriving in Vancouver. Warrant Officer R. A. Saunders (right) and his family are seen in emotional reunion at the Ottawa airport.

Soviet move in the United Nations that resulted in the compromise of mid-1965.

Sponsorship by others

There remains active peacekeeping sponsored and directed by other bodies than the United Nations. The ICC, creature of the Geneva accord of 1954, and the ICCS, established under the Paris agreement of January 1973, are examples. The Organization of American States (OAS) has conducted operations of that kind with a modicum of success in the latter stages of the Dominican Republic crisis (1965/66) and in the Honduras-San Salvador dispute (1969). The Organization of African Unity (OAU) seems to be moving toward developing machinery for this sort of intervention. What are involved here are regional interests best attended to by regional forces — if they can be brought into play, and with sufficient leverage to achieve their purpose.

For the regular peacekeepers of the post Second World War period, those countries that provided the patient, steadfast troopers in the blue berets and the earnest staff officers riding in the white-painted jeeps, there is clearly little room left for action. Because they are still willing — though not as unconditionally as some of them were before 1965 — they maintain at least a standby capability. This is how one can categorize such effort as is made by Canada, which keeps a force of battalion size in readiness for possible future peacekeeping duties, or the operation by the four Scandinavian countries of the Nordic Centre for the co-ordination of training

... There could be further international demands for Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations — especially in regional conflicts. The Government is determined that this special brand of Canadian expertise will not be dispersed or wasted on ill-conceived operations, but employed judiciously where the peacekeeping operation and the Canadian contribution to it seem likely to improve the chances for lasting settlement

... It has been a continuing objective of Canadian foreign policy to work toward strengthening the authority of the United Nations, particularly the capacity of the UN to act as a peacekeeping agency for the control of conflict and the mediation of disputes

The foreseeable prospects are not great that the UN will be asked to undertake major operations involving peacekeeping forces on a scale comparable to the UN Emergency Force in the Middle

and the development of techniques and procedures for international peacekeeping. Under the same rubric — that of keeping open an option that may be available at some point of time — come the occasional governmental statements on the subject, as a rule concerned nowadays with hypothetical rather than actual situations.

For the rest, it will be a matter of seizing what opportunities there are for strictly-delineated interventions in furtherance of anything that is likely to prevent armed conflict. An example of that kind of peace preservation mission was given by External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp in the Commons on March 27 this year, and again on May 29, when he said that, even after withdrawal from the ICCS, Canada might be prepared to return to Vietnam "to participate in the international supervision of an election clearly held under the terms of the Paris agreement . . .". This would be a case of Model 1 peacekeeping, not under the auspices of the United Nations and narrowly limited both in scope and in duration.

Men of goodwill may find it unfortunate that the premier peacekeeper, Canada, once so unsparing of effort and money when it came to expending them for that purpose, now does not seem to be willing to go further than that. There has been a change, no doubt about it — a change that was probably inevitable, considering how things have gone for international, and in particular for United Nations, peacekeeping. One can only hope that the process is not irreversible.

East or the UN operations in the Congo, and most certainly not without great-power agreement in the Security Council

The demands which are made on the UN are more likely to take the form of requests for the establishment of military observer missions for specific and limited purposes. It follows that the types of request to be made of Canada over the next five to ten years will most probably take the form of helping to man UN observer missions.

Canada's exceptional knowledge and experience will be of value irrespective of the form of future peacekeeping operations and, consistent with our basic interest in maintaining peace and security, Canada should continue to take an active part, based on that experience, in negotiations at the United Nations on the peacekeeping role of the organization (Excerpts from *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, June 1970)

Regional interests best attended to by regional forces such as OAS, OAU

Commonwealth notebook

By Clyde Sanger

So, what happened in Canada in the early days of August? Let's look at the Page One headline of Canada's National Newspaper, day by day:

"Bacon prices jump again, up 30 cents on weekend" (Tuesday, August 8);

"Supermarkets reducing existing stock prices" (August 9);

"\$62 beef: export, buyer demands drive prices up and up" (August 10);

"Beef across the border shows profit both ways" (August 11);

"Cabinet meets Monday to act on food prices" (August 12).

A story that touched every Canadian family pocket and stomach. But there was another story which a persistent reader could dig out of the inside pages. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, after all, mentioned the Cabinet meeting on food prices as an aside during a news conference to sum up on the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting that had just ended. So here are some personal jottings about the 32 presidents, prime ministers and their deputies, and also about the advisers and the journalists and the lobbyists, who made up the nineteenth Commonwealth conference — and turned it into perhaps the most remarkable party ever to be staged in Ottawa or Canada.

One writes mostly about people rather than issues. Partly this is because we are all gossips, and the nine-day meeting produced a harvest of ripe anecdotes. But mainly it is because the conference was a very personal encounter between leaders, especially under the new rules that restricted each delegation's representation at any session to three people. The greatest issues were being discussed: nuclear strategy, superpower diplomacy, racism, poverty, the control of foreign investors, the techniques of good government. But leaders made their points, and won respect, not because they had big battalions back home but through their personality and quick wit, their realism and sincerity and occasional theatricalness.

Everyone knew of the different strengths of Edward Heath and Julius Nyerere, and these were shown again. But new reputations were made — Michael

Manley of Jamaica, Norman Kirk of New Zealand. At the close, Pierre Trudeau said the heads of government had "encouraged one another to face facts" and, for the first time, had followed up speeches of candour with constructive suggestions. He might have added that Manley and Kirk had led the way in this new course.

Lee Kwan Yew, saying that Singapore could never hope to be a Shangri-la, went on to prick plenty of bubbles: "I have to face reality, otherwise I must perish". Even those who differed from him on most subjects respected his intellect and his experience. Personality counted again.

Look at it the other way. The countries whose top leaders didn't come—India, Trinidad and Tobago, Zambia, for example — played only minor roles in the fast-moving discussions. There just wasn't time to clear the policy implications of an intervention or new thought with Delhi or Lusaka, so their foreign ministers said only predictable things. A pity that Indira Gandhi and Eric Williams and Kenneth Kaunda were not there with their wisdom. Next time they should be.

Ironies in greetings

Opening day, with Trudeau greeting each leader at the prettied-up entrance to the old railway station, had its share of little ironies. Heath arrived in a Cadillac with a Quebec licence-plate (so, more appropriately, did Mauritius) . . . some ex-Uganda Asians found themselves waving their protest banners ("Disarm Amin" and "Arrêt Amin!") at Grace Ibingira, the gentle artistic Ambassador at the United Nations, who had himself spent five years in detention . . . Mainza Chona, Zambia's Vice-President, burst from his car with a hearty bilingual greeting — "Ça va?" Was

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his cheeriness the way of overcoming awkwardness about the Victoria Falls shootings? One wondered, as the photographers clicked frantically.


Almost reluctantly, one starts with Edward Heath. Reluctantly, because he is not very likeable and he certainly wasn't being a stimulating visitor, sparkling with new ideas. Rather, he was powerful in a negative sense. The Duke of Edinburgh might tell the Canadian Club that the Commonwealth no longer resembled a wheel with the spokes connecting through Britain as the hub but was more like an airline route-map with lots of individual links between countries. Nevertheless, the new structure was still fragile and Heath could have damaged it with an angry fist or simple neglect.

He almost didn't come. The invitation cards to a British reception were made out in the name of "the Leader of the British Delegation" in case Heath didn't show. The first few days were touch-and-go; and the New Zealand pressure for a declaration against all nuclear tests threatened to isolate Heath as much as in 1971 at Singapore over the issue of arms sales to South Africa. Trudeau and Arnold Smith, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, helped save the situation, and kept Britain from isolation, on this and later issues (multinational corporations, southern Africa). By the weekend at Mont Tremblant, Heath had warmed up and on the following Thursday, his last day before flying back to the Fastnet sailing race, he said: "This conference has been good value . . . By listening to each other, we influence each other and this is later on reflected in the policies which are followed by individual governments. So it has been a very well organized conference. It has been well worthwhile, and I have thoroughly enjoyed it."

Next conference, one hopes, the airline-route framework of the Commonwealth will be stronger and the others won't have to pay particular regard to British sensitivities. The change in Heath's attitude wasn't all wrought by softer words from African and other leaders, though. An eavesdropper at a reception on August 1, the eve of the conference, might have witnessed the remarkable sight and sound of Heath being assailed by a determined white-haired woman and accepting her lecture meekly:

"I'm sick and tired of your bloody boat. You've got to concentrate on this conference, and be positive about it. It isn't good for Britain if you don't!"

"Now, now, Betty, don't get upset. I understand how you feel . . ."



CP wirephoto

Jamaica's Prime Minister Michael Manley. New concepts of pricing seen as goal

Of course he did, for he'd known Betty Owen, an indomitable Kentish woman, since he was a young backbencher and she has never hidden her feelings, least of all now as Vice-President of the Royal Commonwealth Society. What was important was that Heath went back from the reception, lifted some phrases from the Secretary-General's report and slipped them into his own speech that Friday. He came across like a man enthusiastic for the Commonwealth as an organism (Nyerere's word, in fact) that spans the regional blocs of the world; and this positive approach in turn helped persuade the others to be gentle with Britain over its move into the European Economic Community, and set a more reasonable tone for the whole conference. Betty Owen and her bluntness deserve at least a footnote in the history of the Commonwealth.

Counter-conference

There were other lobbyists or more official advisers who made their mark. There were the 200 or so supporters of the People's Forum, who sweated it out for three days at a "counter-conference" in an unventilated auditorium in Ottawa University, pressing the cause of the liberation movements of southern Africa. There were Number Twos, like Simon Nxumalo of Swaziland, who worked their skilful touch on leaders' speeches; one of the striking statistics I will remember from the conference is that, if Britain's defence budget were cut by only one-thousandth and the equivalent amount were remitted to Swaziland, it would double that country's total budget revenue.

*After first days,
Heath warmed up,
found conference
'good value'*

Perhaps the most effective of these quiet advisers was David McDowall, head of the UN division in New Zealand's Foreign Office. He knows all the Commonwealth ropes from having worked as a special assistant to Arnold Smith, and he put his expert knowledge behind the unabashed idealism of Prime Minister Kirk to make a remarkable team. Everyone wrote about New Zealand's initiative on the nuclear-testing issue (and some about Kirk's horrifying calculation that 400 tests have been carried out in the last ten years since the partial test-ban treaty was signed). Less was written than might have been about Kirk's pushing for the Commonwealth Secretariat to organize studies on trade and investment matters to help the poorer countries, or about the skilful way in which he (with Gough Whitlam of Australia and Trudeau) made Britain take seriously the scheme for an eventual "Commonwealth presence" in Rhodesia, while at the same time arguing Nyerere out of phrases about "freedom fighters" that would have prevented any agreement with Britain on the importance of giving humanitarian assistance to indigenous people struggling for self-determination in southern Africa.

Whitlam, while tangling with Lee and Heath over multinational corporations, commended himself to African leaders. The strengthening of links between these two white premiers in Asia and the African heads of government is a major result of the Ottawa conference.

Jamaica's Manley

The newcomer who may have made the biggest contribution, though, was Michael Manley of Jamaica. He was impressive from the moment on the first morning when he stepped out of his car in a high-collared Chinese-style blue uniform, symbolic (one presumed) of frugality and dedication. His big moment came the next Wednesday, when he lifted discussion above individual grievances about trade inequities and complaints about tied aid and argued for systematic work to be done through the Secretariat on new conceptions of pricing that might end the deterioration of trade terms, which, more than almost anything, has caused the gap between rich and poor nations to widen.

Trudeau echoed Manley's words in his closing statement: "We have insufficient understanding of how to control the mechanisms which permit manufactured goods to be priced according to cost, but which force commodities to be priced according to the market." And the final communiqué picked up the need to "increase the export

earnings of developing countries from primary products, especially agricultural products, as prices of industrial goods continue to rise; and to study methods to introduce a realistic relationship between the prices of the two categories of goods".

How much can be done, and whether the Commonwealth can pioneer new schemes of trading relationships for the world at large, is a moot point. But Manley made it clear he was a man of action at the highest level.

Other impressions

So many other impressions, both important and trivial, remain of the conference:

— the contrast in style between different national briefings: at the Canadian briefings, ebullient optimism from Ivan Head; at the British briefings, great emphasis on who was dining with Heath or Alec Douglas-Home (the Ugandans never made it to either table, after Idi Amin's ferocious speech *in absentia*); at Australian briefings, an astringent air of irreverence ("for once X spoke on something he knows about...")

— the charm of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh and the wit of Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, which were used to the fullest effect, the first at a breakfast meeting to persuade Canadian voluntary agencies to redouble their efforts for Bangladesh, the second at a news conference to avoid undue praise of Heath. Invited to say that Heath was a changed man with improved ideas on southern Africa, Nyerere resorted to a Swahili proverb: "Mgema akisifiwa, tembo hulia maji" ("Don't praise the brewer, he'll put water in the beer!")

— the freshfaced boyishness of General Yakubu Gowon, unaged from having steered Nigeria through a civil war and its aftermath. Sometimes he was disconcerting, as when he questioned the usefulness of pressing for the release of the Zimbabwean leaders Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole ("won't they just start quarrelling again?"). Sometimes simply funny, as when he stared at his earphone and exclaimed: "Now it's started speaking French!"

— the jargon that grows up like weeds. Question at a British briefing: "Did Mr. Heath see Mr. Mintoff this morning?" Answer: "No, he didn't have any bilaterals today."

— the *machismo* of the principal side-show on opening day, the presentation of new colours to the 3rd Royal Canadian Regiment by the Duke of Edinburgh. Both Prince Philip and the colonel, Dan Spry, were so brisk and upright, and the battal-

*Manley clearly
man of action
at highest level*



Canada Wide

Nigeria's General Yakubu Gowon steered nation through civil war

ion wheeling in six guards across the lawns of Parliament Hill so ordered and smart, that inevitably one made the contrast with the politicians across the road, out of step and at odds with one another. No wonder why many new countries, in their impatience to move quickly, have gone under military rule.

Nyerere's hour

A greater impression will be carried by all who heard Julius Nyerere speak for a spellbinding hour on southern Africa. Accounts tell how every chair was turned his way and not a shuffle nor a sound was heard as he spoke. His denunciation of General Amin ("racism is racism, whoever practices it") prepared the way for his appeal to Heath to "tell your ally, Portugal" to end its colonial wars, quit Africa and leave Mozambique and Angola to find freedom. His speech paved the way for the first direct words of strong criticism of Portugal by all Commonwealth leaders in their communique, a significant step.

Alongside each new issue, Trudeau

The style of the Ottawa conference and what has emerged about its content have finally dispelled any notion about a Commonwealth heads of government conference as a forum for exercising power.

When it was a question of blocking British recognition of a minority regime in Rhodesia or of deterring Britain from selling arms to South Africa, past meetings did have some leverage, or at least appeared to.

and Arnold Smith. kept a nimble pace. Plenty of stories emerged of Trudeau's skilled chairmanship, including how he gently deflated Dom Mintoff of Malta on foreign investment and trade ("What have you got to sell? Geography, that's all."). The organization was near-perfect, even if the computer servicing the media centre was better at recording the time messages were received down to the nearest second than at churning out party invitations on time. Every visitor I met seemed to be leaving full of praise for Canadian efficiency and friendliness. The messenger girls in orange skirts were a great hit, and nobody seemed to mind that bicycles were being hired at an exorbitant \$4.00 a day, whereas you can get them for 25 cents in Katmandu.

But what does it all finally add up to? Where, as Julius Nyerere asked, do we go from here? Arnold Smith, at the meeting's close, claimed success in these terms:

"The past nine days in Ottawa have significantly lessened the dangers that we might be embarking on a period when the continents and races of this world would gradually drift apart. [They] have increased understanding, confidence and a determination to work together by the leaders of a very significant group of countries of many races and regions, and this determination to co-operate in trying to find solutions and in trying to nudge humanity towards the goal of one world is of course what the Commonwealth is about."

That was Friday evening. Prime Minister Trudeau had little time to taste success. On Monday, as *The Globe and Mail* reminded him in their Page One headline the next day, he would be chairing something else: a special Cabinet meeting on food prices.

A commentary on some of the major questions discussed at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Ottawa, by Professor P. D. Pillay of Dalhousie University, will be published in the November-December issue of International Perspectives.

All that is gone now and the meeting's only function is to bring men who all have a common element in their history together for discussions and an exchange of ideas

Unlike arms sales or rebellions, the exchange of ideas is a very difficult subject to monitor, evaluate and communicate to anybody beyond the select circle doing the exchanging (Hugh Winsor in *The Globe and Mail*, August 10, 1973)

Organization of African Unity: prospects for the second decade

By Timothy M. Shaw

The Organization of African Unity was founded on 25 May 1963; its tenth anniversary is an appropriate occasion to review its progress and to evaluate the prospects for its second decade. The 32 founding member states met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to overcome the divisions then existing among the Casablanca, Monrovia and Brazzaville groups. The OAU Charter is a product of this compromise; it reflects the idea of a loose association of states advanced by the "unity-as-alliance" groupings, rather than the more ambitious supranational and federal proposals made by the "unity-as-movement" Casablanca faction, particularly by the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana.

This new international organization is an institutional expression of Pan-Africanism, of the notion that "We are all Africans". Its members agree to co-ordinate their policies "to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; and to promote international co-operation". Its present membership of 41 states makes it the largest regional organization; this number will increase as decolonization proceeds.

The OAU has an orthodox but rather loose structure: an Assembly of Heads of State, which meets annually, a Council of Ministers, which meets biannually, and a Secretariat. The latter has had two Secretaries-General - Diallo Telli (Guinea, 1964-1972) and now Nzo Ekeangaki (Cameroon). A President of the Assembly is elected annually; recently his role has expanded to include the representation of the Organization in its diplomatic initiatives, a function previously left to the Secretary-General. Major Gowan currently holds this position, reflecting Nigeria's reunification and emergence as a major African power. Whenever the OAU meets away from its headquarters in Addis Ababa, the role is assumed by the head of

the host country; in 1972, King Hassan of Morocco was elected President during the Rabat conference. The OAU system also includes a set of specialized commissions and the OAU Liberation Committee, with its unique significance and status.

Modes of unity

The major achievement of the OAU in its first decade is its survival. It has begun to transform Pan-African rhetoric into concrete unity, but as its authority depends on its members its role is based on the power and commitment of national *élites*. The co-existence of "radical" and "moderate" regimes has produced a distinctive texture in the African international system. Their common interests focus on national development, sovereignty and the liberation of Southern Africa. Advance towards supranationalism is unlikely until ideological differences are narrowed.

However, the two blocs, with their changeable compositions, have devised a division of labour between themselves. Over the last ten years, the conservative group has concentrated on inter-African mediation and Eur-African ties, while the militants have put their energies into the OAU Liberation Committee and links with the Third World. This functional compatibility was recognized at the founding conference, where the moderate Monrovia and Brazzaville states secured the signing of the OAU Charter while the Casablanca faction was able to get a radical resolution on decolonization passed. Factional conflict between these fluid groups has pro-

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Canada Wide Feature Service photo

Zaire's President Joseph Mobutu (left), President Leopold Senghor of Senegal (centre) and President Julius Nyerere of

Tanzania at sessions of the Tenth anniversary conference of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa.

duced a fluctuating pattern of dominance and issues in the last decade.

Any evaluation of the OAU's performance should consider both African and comparative criteria of success. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania has commented with other African leaders on the disappointing achievements of the OAU: "Without unity — and by that I mean frank and unashamed political unity — the peoples of Africa have no future except as weak and perpetual victims of imperialism and exploitation". The Organization has been most successful in resolving low-level, border or verbal conflicts, but ineffective in ending civil wars because of its observance of the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs; its "peace-breaking" strategy in Southern Africa offers the prospect of several liberated states within the next decade.

The OAU has regained its *élan*. The optimistic "spirit of Addis Ababa" has been succeeded, after an uncertain interim period of coups, civil wars, Rhodesia's UDI and the "dialogue" debate, by the "spirit of Rabat". Its members have been subject to bitter learning experiences and now have more modest and realizable goals; the Organization's pre-eminence is assured. The under-development of Africa in an increasingly unequal world has forced it into a position of greater continental self-reliance in its liberation and development strategies. Yet, in an era of global *détente*, the confrontation across the Zambezi prevents Africa from acquiring a peripheral status. However, rather than continuing to offer mediation between cold war blocs, the non-aligned OAU is now more concerned with improving linkages with affluent smaller powers such as Canada, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Romania.

The OAU is the most visible symbol of Africa's quest for identity, non-alignment

and autonomy. Its members now respond to the theme "try OAU first" rather than continuing their reliance on extra-African mediation and resources. Regional African customary law enhances the Organization's authority and is a step towards a continental definition of development: unity and autonomy against "neocolonialism" and continued dependence on affluent states. The forum provided by the OAU system encourages an alternative set of relationships to inherited reliance on the former colonial power.

Interaction within the OAU has started to erode ideological distinctions and to advance "African Socialism" as a continental ideology. Racial sovereignty and continental jurisdiction are tenuous because of Africa's continuing dependence on unequal economic ties with the rich world. Moreover, it still seeks extracontinental support in the Southern Africa confrontation.

Africa's autonomy is most nearly complete in those areas in which its members' interests are compatible. The conservative character of the OAU and its Charter is indicated by its membership's acceptance of colonial boundaries and the principles of non-interference and territorial integrity. The principle of *uti possidetis* freezes the inherited status quo and is consistent with African nationalism rather than with the recognition of ethnic distinctiveness or the advocacy of continental unification.

The OAU has protected, not eroded, state sovereignty. In its early years, its debates were characterized by a battle between "radicals" and "moderates" over paths to unity; they advocated, respectively, "instant" continental unification and regional integration. Nkrumah's proposition of rapid Pan-African federation has been superseded in theory and practice by regional co-operation based on limited

Africa forced into position of self-reliance on strategies of development and liberation

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economic and functional goals; but some of his ideas, such as an All-African Army, were revived at the recent anniversary session. Although some attempts at regional integration have been short-lived, several groupings have persisted and may become centres of organic African unity — notably the East African Community (EAC), Conseil de l'Entente, L'Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) and Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM). These regional groupings have achieved more supranational authority than the OAU and claim compatibility with the continental grouping.

Mediation to protect sovereignty

The OAU serves its membership by acting as an intermediary in their disputes and by insulating these from extra-African interference. It reacts to a collective interest in the territorial status quo and order by creating *ad hoc* commissions on border disputes and civil wars. Its first attempt to mediate was over the Algeria-Morocco border, one cause of the failure to create the OAU before 1963; after protracted negotiations, this border was finally demarcated in May 1972. It has clarified its position on national irredentism and secession through support of the status quo in the cases of alleged interference in West Africa by Nkrumah's Ghana, the Somalia-Kenya border conflict and the Nigerian civil war respectively. In independent Africa, it advances order rather than justice, whereas in Southern Africa its goal is respect for human rights.

The OAU has no coercive resources. It relies on the services and prestige of disinterested and distinguished African statesmen. Its mediation is informal and advisory, and it has not engaged in peace-keeping operations. The resolution of disputes tends to be protracted; some are never solved. For instance, the Somalia-Ethiopia dispute was revived at the 1973 conference; another "good offices committee" of eight heads of state under General Gowon was struck to normalize relations. So the triangular border conflict between Somali irredentism and Kenya and Ethiopia also passed its tenth anniversary in 1973. However, in an international subsystem characterized by relatively low military power and in the absence of a supranational authority, the emerging hortatory and deliberative African mediatory style is both appropriate and effective. The forum of the OAU is similar at the interstate level to Nyerere's depiction of traditional democratic practices among African elders: "They talk till they agree". At the

recent OAU meeting, Presidents Nyerere and Idi Amin were formally reconciled through the efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie.

The experience of the OAU in mediation led to a mission in 1971 to the Middle East in an attempt to find a basis for discussion between Israel and Egypt. Its failure and Libya's offensive against the established diplomatic links between African states and Israel led to a more radical resolution in 1973, which threatened collective or individual measures against Israel and demanded "unconditional Israeli withdrawal from all occupied African and Arab territories". The 1973 political declaration indicates the OAU's preoccupation with "liberation" in Northern and Southern Africa.

The OAU's commitment to majority rule throughout the continent is expressed through political and economic support for its Liberation Committee based in Dar-es-Salaam. In 1965, it also set up an African Defence Organization to enhance Africa's security and provide conventional troops from independent African states to supplement the guerillas in Southern Africa. However, although leaders like General Amin occasionally call in public for its revival, it remains a moribund institution. The Liberation Committee mediates between competing guerrilla factions, solicits African and other aid for them, and provides diplomatic and public relations services. It does not recognize all African liberation movements, and distributes resources to the more unified and active parties, which involves it in global disputes between major states.

The liberation of Southern Africa unites the OAU membership. However, South Africa's outward-looking foreign policy has tried to exploit the frustrations of support for a protracted guerrilla war and the development problems associated with the decline of international assistance. Its advocacy of "dialogue" in exchange for neutrality in the confrontation momentarily shook this unity. In 1971 the OAU was divided over Africa's reaction, with Presidents Banda and Houphouet-Boigny of Malawi and the Ivory Coast providing the core of the dialogue faction. They challenged the strategy of the Lusaka Manifesto, which had been approved by the OAU in 1969: "We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to violence against human dignity which is now being perpetuated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible . . . we would urge our brothers in the resis-

Mediation failure in the Middle East led to more radical stance

tance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change".

The OAU approach, based on this manifesto, was reaffirmed at the 1972 Rabat meeting following victories by the freedom fighters and political changes which reversed the pro-dialogue policies of Ghana, Madagascar and Lesotho. The resilience of the OAU in the face of this seductive South African initiative is noteworthy, although it has not tightened its undemanding membership criteria. And the lack of authority of the Organization was revealed in December 1965, when only a quarter of the membership broke diplomatic ties with Britain over its failure to end Rhodesia's UDI.

Economic development

Besides promoting liberation and mediation, the OAU hopes to advance peace by improving the rate of Africa's economic development. It acts as a forum and as an interest group in aggregating and presenting members' demands to non-African economic institutions like the EEC and UNCTAD. Before British membership in EEC, more than half its members were associate states; in future all but five African states will have some formal relationship with Europe and there is a possibility of a general OAU-EEC relationship. The OAU and the ECA hope that French-speaking states of OCAM and the English-speaking members of the Commonwealth will present a common position to Brussels. They will demand more favourable terms than those contained in the present Yaoundé Convention and Arusha Agreement.

The OAU's Scientific, Technical and Research Commission absorbed the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa, which had been established by the imperial powers as decolonization approached. It organizes applied research bureaux, committees and funds from its Nigerian headquarters.

The OAU supports a variety of African events, such as the Pan-African Cultural Festival in Algiers (1969), the All-Africa Trade Fair in Nairobi (1972) and this year's All-Africa Games in Lagos.

For Africans, the OAU has equal authority to the UN. It was designed to be compatible and co-operative with the system of UN institutions. The division of labour between them is expressed in legal and working relationships: local disputes should be settled through the appropriate regional organization before reference to the UN Security Council. Over the Congo and Rhodesia crises, the UN invited the OAU to take complementary action.

The OAU membership holds a significant bloc of votes in the UN system and can use the General Assembly to achieve attention and legitimacy for African causes. The first meeting of the Security Council ever held outside New York, in Addis Ababa in 1972, symbolized the close OAU-UN relationship over confrontation in Southern Africa. The attention of the UN has also been drawn to two other continental conditions: Africa contains more "least-developed" and land-locked states than any other region.

All OAU members belong to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Under the creative leadership of Robert K. A. Gardiner (Ghana), it has stimulated the growth of intra-African trade, plus economic research and training. The OAU and ECA agreed to co-operate in an accord signed in December 1965; the OAU views its Economic and Social Commission as the economic policy-making body and the ECA as a technical institution. In addition to a regular program of case and country reports and statistical collections, the ECA is encouraging the development of four regional groupings in Africa. It has established the African Development Bank and Fund to promote the identification of, and investment in, capital projects. It is also co-ordinating the finance and construction of the Trans-Africa Highway from Mombasa, Kenya, to Lagos, Nigeria.

The OAU complements the UN in the role of intermediary; Africa's poverty makes it dependent on extra-African sources of capital. All OAU members seek assistance from UNDP, IBRD and other UN agencies. UNHCR and African states co-operate in the provision of sanctuaries and services for refugees on the continent.

The OAU system has limited and specialized functions compared with those of the UN. Its specific membership and goals have enabled it to become a relatively versatile and flexible organization. However, its failure to reduce Africa's Balkanization in its first decade may be an opportunity lost forever. The degree of equality among its members is declining, and within the next few years Africa will probably be characterized by the emergence of a few middle powers such as Nigeria, Zaire and Egypt, which will be influential both within, and for, the continent. Clearly, the liberation of Southern Africa, continental mediation and economic development will continue to be its primary concerns. The integration of liberated areas into the continental international system will be a preoccupation after the successful promotion of political change in Southern Africa.

Only a quarter of membership broke ties with Britain over Rhodesia

Echeverria's view of Mexico in the post cold war world

By Miguel S. Wionczek

On the eve of President Luis Echeverria's departure last March for a state visit to Canada, Britain, Belgium, France, the Soviet Union and China, the London *Economist*, a journal not at all given to overstatement, declared that the head of the Mexican Government "is trying to modernize Mexico, no less", adding that in the process he "has at least awakened Mexico to the existence of countries other than the United States".

The remarks of the *Economist* should not be taken to mean that during the 150 years of its independent history Mexico had lived in a state of total dependence on the United States and total isolation from the rest of the world. If the U.S. looms very large, indeed, in Mexican history, it is just because Mexico, and Canada, as Mr. Echeverria stated while in Ottawa, are the only two countries that share the border with the largest world power. Historically speaking, the President of Mexico has reawakened rather than awakened Mexico to the existence of Canada, Western Europe, the U.S.S.R. and China.

At different times, from the colonial epoch to the emergence of U.S. hegemony in the western hemisphere at the end of the nineteenth century, Mexico has had all sorts of relations—some happier than others—with the non-U.S. world. Thus, for example, its commercial and cultural relations with the Chinese "Celestial Empire" were particularly intense in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, because of New Spain's role as a bridge and intermediary between the Iberian Peninsula and the Far East. Moreover, believe it or not, the first settlers of California were Russian fur traders and members of New Spain's religious orders who co-existed peacefully, in what is today the San Francisco area, until the 1830s. At some point before the cession of the Oregon Territory to the United States in 1843, Mexico even shared the border with British America. To the chagrin of the United States, Britain and not the U.S. was the first foreign power to sign, in 1826, a trade and friendship treaty

with the newly-independent Mexico. Finally, France had two military confrontations with Mexico in the nineteenth century—the first, in 1838, known as a "pastry war", the second, and much more serious, remembered as Maximilian's imperial adventure of 1861-1867, which interrupted for a while the process of Mexico's modernization, started in the previous decade by a full-blooded Indian from Oaxaca, Benito Juárez.

These brief historical recollections are not meant to display scholarly pedantry but rather to point out that, over its long history, starting, obviously, with the Spanish conquest, Mexico has been exposed to the outside world. The isolationist attitude adopted after the 1910 Revolution represented the conscious reaction to all the misfortunes that befell the country after it achieved its independence in 1821. While this impressive list of misfortunes was of both domestic and international origin, it should not be forgotten that between 1821 and 1867, the year in which the Juárez Republic was finally restored, Mexico was the unhappy scene of the struggle for the Spanish succession in Latin America between the U.S., Britain and France.

Foreign invasion

The country suffered several dozen larger or smaller foreign invasions or punitive expeditions, which originated both with its northern neighbour and in Europe. Not only had Mexico lost about half its territory, including Texas and California, to the United States in 1848, but it was the victim of all kinds of economic and political blackmail by the major world powers

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throughout the nineteenth century. In this connection there is a curious similarity between the Mexican and the Chinese experiences with "foreign devils". Consequently, one should not be surprised if both countries found it convenient for a time to adopt a policy of withdrawal into themselves, accompanied by intense nationalism.

Mexico's geopolitical position and wealth in national resources made such a policy particularly difficult. Before the 1910 Revolution, the second-best attitude had to be adopted; during the 30-odd years of the conservative régime of Porfirio Díaz (1878-1910), Mexico attempted with varying degrees of success to play off foreign interests, mainly the U.S. and Britain, against each other. But the peaceful demise of the British power in the western hemisphere — except in Canada — between the end of the nineteenth century and the First World War did not leave Mexico with much room for manoeuvre. Consequently, the Mexican post-revolutionary foreign policy had become strictly one-dimensional and defensive. Its purpose was to neutralize and disarm strong pressures arising in the U.S. in the inter-war period in favour of direct intervention in Mexico on behalf of foreign economic, and particularly oil, interests, affected by the nationalistic legal ideas contained in the 1917 Constitution and in the subsequent natural resources legislation. It has never been forgotten in Mexico that, as late as 1923, the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico during the Revolution, Henry Wilson Lane, had publicly been calling for the partition of Mexico and the establishment in Northern Mexico of a "buffer state" friendly to the United States.

Mexican-U.S. relations

Although, as the result of the very careful handling of its political and economic relations with the United States, even the major conflict that arose from the Mexican petroleum expropriation of 1938 did not reach the point of open confrontation, it is perhaps only fair to stress that Mexican-U.S. relations between 1910 and 1940 were far from good. Their considerable improvement after 1940 was due to three major factors: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's personal sensitivity to the "Mexican problem", the importance of Mexico to the Allied camp during the Second World War and the country's strategic position in the recent period of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding the fact that Mexico has been receiving special treatment from Washington, very few Mexicans would



Luis Echeverría

CP photo

agree that since the last war Mexico has been getting a square deal from the United States. Because of the urgent need to present a united hemispheric position *vis-à-vis* the Soviet bloc, the United States found it necessary to tolerate such Mexican "aberrations" as the almost religious insistence upon the principle of non-intervention (born of Mexico's own unhappy experience), the refusal of Mexico's signature to the military treaty with the United States, the continuation of diplomatic relations with Cuba after its expulsion from the OAS. But on the economic front Mexico was much less successful in Washington than on the political one.

In spite of its broad access to multi-lateral public sources of capital such as the World Bank and, after 1960, the Inter-American Development Bank (currently presided over by a former Mexican Minister of Finance), Mexico's economic and financial relations with the United States in the past two decades developed largely along traditional lines: large Mexican deficits arising from "free" non-preferential trade with its powerful neighbour offset by proceeds from U.S. tourism and exports of

U.S. direct private capital to Mexico. By the late 1960s it became clear to Mexicans that the exchange of political gains accruing to Mexico for economic gains accruing to the United States was a mixed blessing for the lesser partner.

The growing economic, commercial, financial and technological dependence upon the United States not only seemed very costly and self-perpetuating but was creating obstacles to domestic social modernization, sacrificed in the postwar period in the name of rapid quantitative growth. Moreover, by 1970, the year in which Mr. Echeverria assumed leadership of the Mexican Government, the unilateral relationship with the United States had proved an anachronism. While all other U.S. allies and major clients were rapidly adjusting themselves — commercially and otherwise — to the conditions of the new multipolar, post cold war world, Mexico, a major Latin American power, had continued to follow political and economic rules established for the western hemisphere by U.S. fiat in the Forties and Fifties.

Aim of visit

Considering the historical background and the most recent circumstances, Mexico's foreign political and economic policy, as reflected in President Echeverria's visits, undertaken in the past two years, to Japan, the United Nations General Assembly, UNCTAD, Canada, the enlarged European Economic Community, the U.S.S.R. and China, does not seem to be as difficult to explain as many foreign observers may think. Neither does it aim exclusively at such short-term gains as the expansion of external trade and the diversification of foreign capital and technology sources.

Mr. Echeverria's numerous domestic speeches and pronouncements during state visits abroad bear witness to his conviction that, while the era of ideological, military, political and economic bipolarity is over, the major unresolved global problem is not mutual adjustment among the world's four industrial centres of power — the United States, Western Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union — but the future of the relations between the advanced countries, whatever their ideology may be, and the so-called Third World, of which Mexico is still a part in spite of its relative economic advancement. Assuming that no madman will blow up the planet with easily available nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, the overmastering issue is not that of East-West accommodation but of North-South relations that would take account of the fact that for any citizen of the high-income

North there are at least three human beings in the low-income Asian, African and Latin American continents. The idea in itself is not novel; what is novel is that it is being espoused by the leader of a middle-size developing country that has been rather successful in terms of past political stability and economic development performance.

Alleged romanticism

During his 1973 world trip, Mr. Echeverria has been exposed on various occasions to direct or veiled criticisms — especially in the Western press — for his alleged romanticism and ingenuousness in dealing with big international political and economic issues. Only those willing to subscribe to one of two alternative global viewpoints — that either no big controversial international issues exist or that they have been solved in the past two decades — have the right to call Mr. Echeverria romantic or naive.

But, faced with the wasteful nuclear race between Washington and Moscow, the deep crisis of the international monetary system, the biggest world-wide inflationary wave in the history, the unsolved problems of social adjustment in advanced industrial and post-industrial societies, the decline and fall of traditional ideologies, and the multiplication of the Bangladesh sort of hunger and misery situations in the Third World, one must be really very confused or thick-skinned to proclaim that the world is doing all right. Not only has our planet not been doing too well since 1914, or for more than half the present century, but the degree of rationality in international relations has been declining on a global scale even more since 1939. The lack of common sense and farsightedness seems to be the rule rather than the exception, not only in the postwar relations among great powers but also, and perhaps to an even larger degree, in the relations between each of them and the rest of the world. In brief, the large powers seem largely to live on the planet as it looked several decades ago and not as it is in final quarter of the twentieth century.

It is quite easy to offer any number of examples of such antiquated behaviour of the major powers. Example Number One: With all the megatons of nuclear power and the perfect means of their trans-continental delivery, the United States and Soviet Union cling to their traditional military bases on foreign territories. Guantanamo in Cuba and underground fortifications in the Panama Canal Zone bring as much love and popularity to the United States in its "own camp" as Russian tanks

Finds behaviour of major powers to be antiquated; cling to bases on foreign soil

in Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union in the socialist bloc. Example Number Two: Who could have imagined just a decade ago that, while visiting Moscow, one would hear almost constantly indirect complaints about the "Yellow Peril" and that, upon arrival in Peking several days later, one would be invited on a tour of underground shelters built as protection against the Soviet atomic danger? It is not poor-taste science fiction — it is the reality witnessed by the writer of these lines in Moscow and Peking in April 1973.

What action is feasible for purpose of making world more viable?

In situations such as those just described, what is important is not, as some seem to believe, whether or not the present Mexican President wants to follow in the footsteps of Nehru or Tito as a leader of the Third World but rather what kind of multilateral international action is feasible for the purpose of making the world more viable in the future than in the past 50 years. To be realistic (and not romantic), such action must address itself to the central issues of the political and economic relations between about 100 intensely nationalist poor nation states of all sizes and the few very conservative and self-seeking rich centres of world power. Would anyone exclude the Soviet Union from this small club, as being progressive and magnanimous because of its ideological origin, so different from that of the capitalist powers?

Revision of patterns

Middle and small states, whether rich or poor, see diminishing reason for the perpetuation of patterns of North-South relations in force in the bipolar world period of 1945-1970. Thus, the agenda for the revision of these patterns can be drawn up easily. It would include perhaps, as the key issues: the cancellation of the rights — mostly self-appropriated by the major power centres — to use the territories of the remaining states in the dangerous planet-wide nuclear game; the establishment of some code of economic behaviour for all nation states — a code that would do away with many practices inherited both from the imperialist century (1850-1950), and the last two decades of neo-colonialism, and the orderly incorporation into the world economy of new resources discovered or "created" by the present-day scientific and technological revolution. Being of world-wide nature, neither of these three major issues lends itself to bilateral dealings and negotiations, nor can it be left to concerted or unilateral decisions of the major powers.

Although, in one way or another, the presence of these issues has been acknowl-

edged lately by different parts of the United Nations, the only international decision-making system — however weak and imperfect —, little progress has been made towards their solution because of the prolonged absence of China from the UN and the difficulties of organizing the common front among members of the Third World. Fortunately, China has finally been incorporated into the United Nations system and the prospects for Third World cooperation seem to be improving lately in spite of the serious, albeit localized, clashes in each of the three underdeveloped continents. With political and economic neo-colonialism dying out and the nature of the conflicts with the great powers changing — except in the case of U.S.R.R.-China relations — room for international action by the developing world is increasing. Furthermore, on many specific political and economic issues, Third World countries are receiving the support, previously absent, of the richer small countries whose interests do not necessarily coincide fully with those of some major capitalist or socialist powers.

Building positive coalitions

The espousal of a thesis that a major stumbling-block to the peaceful reorganization of international relations is represented by the conflicting interests of the great powers rather than by the divisions among the rest of the world should not be equated with the acceptance of an operational formula calling for "outvoting the few by the many" at international gatherings. Small and middle-size countries can hardly use their own national interests as an argument against the presence of nationalism and special interests in the strong rich nations. Adopting such a position might amount to romanticism, naiveté or even perversion. Perhaps the best way of solving world-wide problems might be, instead of attempting to outvote the powerful minorities, to build gradually positive coalitions on specific issues against particularly hard-headed major powers or special interests responsible for such hard-headed positions. This seems to be the strategy adopted by President Echeverria with respect to three major international issues mentioned earlier: the denuclearization of the Third World, and particularly of Latin America; the elaboration of an international charter of economic rights and duties of the states; and the orderly world-wide use of large sea and ocean riches.

The Tlatelolco Treaty, which withdrew Latin America — directly and indirectly — from the nuclear race, was negotiated at the United Nations between 1966

and 1970 largely on Mexico's initiative. The treaty will be of very limited value, however, unless ratified by all members of the nuclear club. Before Mr. Echeverria's 1973 world trip, the score on this issue was as follows: two for the treaty — the United States and Britain; two against — France and the U.S.S.R.; and one undecided — China. As a consequence of the Mexican President's voyage, France and China promised to adhere to the Tlatelolco Treaty, leaving the Soviet Union alone. The long-run political cost to the U.S.S.R. of continuing — for complicated and somehow obscure technical and legal reasons — as the only nuclear opponent of Latin American denuclearization may, however, become so high as to force that country to abandon its present position. Independently of their origin, atomic arms used as a peace guarantee are far from popular in any part of the world.

UNCTAD proposals

The proposal for the elaboration of an international charter of economic rights and duties of member states was tabled for discussion by Mr. Echeverria at the Third UNCTAD in Santiago, Chile, in April 1972. Some principles proposed in Santiago for eventual incorporation in such an international legal instrument included free disposal by the owner nations of their natural resources, the right of each country to choose its economic system without outside interference, the subordination of foreign capital to domestic legislation, the liberalization of aid conditions, the prohibition of political interference with the host countries by transnational corporations, the elimination of restrictive business practices in international commodity and technology trade.

The arguments behind the Mexican proposals run as follows: Over a long period, especially in the advanced countries, national regulatory legislation has been established to defend society against economic and other abuses of powerful special interest groups. Moreover, such a body of domestic laws, aimed at putting the public welfare ahead of private privilege, is subject to constant change and improvement in the light of new developments. In many cases, wilful transgression of regulatory laws calls for penal sanctions. Tax evasion, monopolistic practices, and the production of goods hazardous to health represent on the national level examples of very serious law violations. Domestic legislation stops, however, at national borders. Except in very specific fields such as trade in narcotics, no international legislation exists as yet that would

eliminate the strange situation in which what is illegal domestically continues to be perfectly legal in international relations.

With the slowly-growing body of international *political* law, the problem of building up international *economic* legislation appears very urgent, particularly in the light of the pre-established inequality of the subjects of such law — the nation states. The additional urgency arises from the recent appearance on the horizon, both in advanced and in poor countries, of transnational corporations, productive units that are larger than many national states and act globally. Economic conflicts among unequal states and economic conflicts between weak states and strong transnational corporations may lead to the increase of the already serious conflicts in the world of nationalism, finite resources and unlimited wants. Conflicts arising from the lack of international legislation under conditions of the inequality of partners cannot be lessened by a general declaration of intent with respect to "world economic peace and order", something similar to the UN Charter of Human Rights. The new instrument would operate only if it took the form of a set of specific rules of economic conduct that would offer a sort of preferential treatment to weaker and poorer nations to offset the economic, financial, commercial and technological power of the advanced ones.

Attitude of major powers

Mr. Echeverria's proposal was unanimously endorsed by the UNCTAD, which received a mandate to submit a draft charter to the UN General Assembly at an early date. A special 40-country working group started drafting the document in Geneva last February. Early in the preliminary game, a curious situation arose. While the majority of the weak and poor UN members supported the Mexican initiative by taking the position that the proposed charter should go beyond mere codification of existing norms of international law and should contribute to the progressive development of such law by creating new rules responding to the present and future needs of the international community, the major world powers, and some of the rich small countries, found many ways to show their lack of interest in the whole exercise.

The United States found especially attractive the argument that the charter as proposed might represent a serious infringement of the sovereign rights of states, presumably the rich, powerful ones. Most Western European countries showed their strong preference for a charter of the

UNCTAD endorsed Echeverria plan but larger powers discovered ways to demonstrate lack of interest

Declaration of Human Rights type; Japan opted for silence; Switzerland was unable to find any official willing to participate in the working group; while the Soviet Union once again took convenient shelter in the argument that being a socialist country it shared no responsibility for the sorry mess of the neo-colonial exploiter-exploited relations between the rich and poor countries of the "capitalist segment of the world economy". While China intimated that no self-respecting country should fall into the trap constituted by the conspiracy between the two "super-powers", the European socialist bloc offered as a solution to world economic ills a draft document containing main principles formulated in general terms affirming the rights of states to choose freely the way of socio-economic development and to participate on an equal basis in the international division of labor "in the interests of economic progress and the well-being of all people".

In retrospect, however, the February 1973 meeting in Geneva on the subject of a charter of economic rights and duties proved more successful than expected. The numerical majority of less-developed countries in UNCTAD received the support of such socialist mavericks as Romania and such capitalist heretics in West Europe as France and the Scandinavian countries. The fact that some members of the Commonwealth were not particularly helpful suggests the interference of distance between Canberra or Ottawa, on the one hand, and Geneva, on the other, with the foreign-service communications systems in these capitals. Some major and middle powers, however, started having second thoughts in the later stages of the debate on the catalogue of issues to be included in the future charter.

No outright rejection

Here again Mr. Echeverria's world trip of last spring proved of considerable help. First, no government of the countries visited by him, starting with Canada and ending with China, found it politically possible to reject the charter proposal outright; second, Canada, the Soviet Union and China offered much more explicit support for the Santiago proposal than on earlier occasions. The United States, Britain, Japan and West Germany continue to represent the centre of the opposition, but anyone knowing the current line of thought of Willy Brandt and Kakuei Tanaka should not despair with respect to possible changes of view on the charter both in Bonn and Tokyo. It is obvious that a detailed draft of a charter on economic rights and duties of the states will not be

ready either this year or in 1974. But by 1975 it may become a distinct possibility.

The issue of the international sea legislation inscribed on the UN agenda since the mid-Fifties becomes broader and more important every year. What started less than 20 years ago as a revision of the old conception of freedom of seas beyond the traditional limit of three miles from the coast now covers such novel problems as the control of pollution of large high-seas territories, previously out of reach of unilateral or international jurisdiction, the extension of territorial-sea zones for the purpose of their domestic exploitation up to 200 miles off the coast and, finally, the future exploitation of natural resources available under the high seas and on the ocean beds. All these issues would not have arisen without the fantastic speed of technological progress in natural resources exploration and exploitation. The uneven distribution of this technological progress and its concentration in the few advanced countries creates a distinct danger for the resources of many poor and even not-so-poor coastal or island states, as suggested by the French-Brazilian "shrimp conflict" of several years ago and the present "cod-war" between Iceland and Britain. The problem is becoming particularly urgent in the light of the world-wide shortages of animal proteins and the low-protein diet in the developing countries that, for technological and economic reasons, are unable to exploit their protein-rich fishery resources.

For some time, Mexico has been very active in United Nations bodies engaged in the search for international solutions of the sea and its resources problems. With the rest of Latin America, Mexico takes the position that the fishery wealth of the high seas up to 200 miles off the coast should be left for exploitation by adjacent countries. Moreover, Mexican experts are for the establishment of some international legislation calling for the just and orderly use of the primary resources of the high seas and ocean bed, which may be larger than those known in the dry parts of the planet's surface and may become subject to exploitation before the end of the century.

Opinion canvassed

President Echeverria used his 1973 trip to canvass opinions on all these subjects, which will be discussed at the important UN-sponsored International Conference on Maritime Law in 1974. Once again, a similarity of views was discovered between Mexico, Canada, some smaller West European countries and China. On many issues, the Soviet position follows closely that of the United States and Japan, the countries

*U.S., Britain,
West Germany
and Japan
serve as centre
of opposition*

with the largest fishing fleets in the world. The Canadian policy on fishing closing lines and prevention of contamination in Arctic waters elicited particularly sympathetic reaction from the Mexicans.

This brief account of international political and economic issues of direct interest to Mexico's President hardly suggests romantic and emotional attitudes. Quite the contrary — all the issues are in the longer run vital to the development and welfare of those poorer countries of the world that, first, are not interested in or willing to enter the world armament race, secondly, have the strongest doubts about

the viability of the imperial or neo-colonialist North-South economic relations in the post cold war nationalist world and, thirdly, are worrying about the waste of natural resources by some high-income countries in the face of pressing economic needs of the Third World. The fact that these issues have never been completely absent in the Canadian thinking about the future of our planet and its nation states offers a hopeful avenue for the bilateral and multilateral search for solutions for problems that in Mr. Echeverria's view will be with us for some time to come.

A national authoritarian Brazil seeks status of a great power

By Antonio Freire

The Brazilian "revolution" has just celebrated its ninth birthday. It was originally interpreted as a victory over the leftist parliamentarianism of the Joao Goulart Government, but is seen today as the straightest route to the most amazing economic boom on the South American continent.

Before 1964, the Brazilian Government had tried to kindle popular nationalism, using the dreams of economic and political independence from the United States and of international liberalism. This idea was given concrete form on the national level through the strengthening of labour unions and the formation of new citizens' groups. The life of these mechanisms of citizen participation was as eventful as it was short. In foreign policy, the spirit of independence manifested itself in attitudes which seemed open provocation to the great power to the north: defence of the principle of non-intervention in Cuba, support of China's admission to the United Nations, establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba and the U.S.S.R., and solidarity with the underdeveloped countries.

The Goulart Government had thus aroused the displeasure of the ruling classes within the country and of international liberalism outside. Popular nationalism was not in keeping with North American economic policy; international capitalism was opposed to strict control of

foreign investment. The nationalistic measures taken during the time of Joao Goulart, such as restriction of the transfer of profits and nationalization of many basic industries, gave rise to a wave of distrust of Brazil in the United States. The situation was soon considered chaotic, and a U.S. Senate subcommittee recommended that all economic aid to Brazil be suspended. In Brazil, in the meantime, inflation exceeded 80 per cent in 1963, and was expected to be more than 110 per cent by the end of 1964.

This was a propitious time for bringing in the spectre of Communism. The Americans with interests in Brazil saw Communist infiltration everywhere: in the Government, Congress, justice, education, the Catholic Church, the media, the army, the unions, the rural associations and the social movements in the cities. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon reported to Washington that the number of Communists in Brazil was certainly not very large, but that their

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influence was much greater than one might think. He said that the main areas of infiltration and influence were the labour unions, and that even the Government was affected. He also said that the Communists had penetrated the student movement.

Coup against Goulart

Action was taken without further delay; credit to the federal government was cut off and the credits to the state governments representing the opposition were increased. In March 1964, the Goulart Government was overthrown by a military *coup d'état*, supported by the Brazilian bourgeoisie and international capital.

In the United States, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs said shortly afterward: "In January 1964, when we occupied our post, we were convinced that Communism was rapidly undermining President Goulart's Government. Even before that time, however, we were already applying a policy of providing aid for the governments of certain states in Brazil. We did not provide any funds to improve the balance of payments or the budget, and we did not take any measures to help the Central Government of Brazil.... Now that Mr. Goulart has been deposed, if the Brazilian Government undertakes... the type of development program we would like to see... we would be prepared to consider granting considerably increased funds."

The early years of the "revolution" were devoted to establishing a climate of preferential alliance with the United States. It was necessary first to reassure American investors that they would be able to repatriate their profits by removing the previous Government's restrictions on foreign capital; in 1965, an agreement gave special guarantees to North American investments in Brazil, and large foreign companies were given a preferential share of the credit at extremely low interest-rates. According to President Castelo Branco, Brazil was opting for a policy of free enterprise and for controlled entry of foreign capital.

A formula of interdependence in military, political, economic and cultural matters replaced the policy of national independence. This involved above all—according to the Minister Vasco Leitaó da Cunha—"guaranteeing the security of the continent against subversion and oppression from outside and inside and re-establishing relations at all levels with the United States of America, our great neighbour and friend to the north". Such an attitude could only please the United States, since a firm and lasting alliance with Brazil was a reliable

guarantee that the continent would remain "free". The breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Cuba in May 1964 and Brazil's participation in the inter-American peace-keeping force which invaded Santo Domingo in April 1965 were the most important manifestations of this new policy.

The newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo* pointed out in an editorial that, after the revolution of 1964, responsibility for the defence of Western democracy no longer fell on the United States; Brazil would henceforth be the "indisputable leader of the cause of democracy and liberty in Latin America".

Instead of Brizola's and Goulart's popular and hazardous nationalism, the Brazil of the "revolution" has opted for the already-tested formula of liberal imperialism: development dependent on foreign capital as the basis of the system, incorporated into the political strategy of the great power to the north. The country has kept the initiative to seek a sub-territory under its own hegemony on the periphery of the system. It is possible that this new nationalism, which is more like growing political pride, will come into conflict with the interests of international liberalism, if one day Brazil's claims seem unreasonable.

Current power structure

The power is shared by international enterprise, the associated national capital and the control mechanisms established by the state. The revolutionary Government has established its power gradually, by institutional acts giving it increasingly broader jurisdiction. With its last Institutional Act (Number 5, 1970), the Government subdued the last sectors which limited its freedom: Congress, the press, the political parties, the unions, the state governments, the employers' associations, the religious organizations, regional interests and the associations of students and intellectuals.

The Government has emerged more powerful, not only internally but also in relation to international capital, since it has asserted itself as the sole leader and legislator. Not only has it turned the course of events to its own advantage but it is increasingly imposing its will in the area of production and export planning.

The army—where the "revolution" was born—is becoming increasingly identified with the Government. It is army support that maintains the Government in power. Institutional Act No. 5, wrote Fernando Cardoso, a researcher for CEBRAP (Brazilian planning centre), has practically made the President into a dictator, supported by the armed forces. The middle

'Guaranteeing the security of the continent against subversion and oppression'

class has given itself over entirely to the state, abdicating its power of decision and control. Since political stability is one of the necessary conditions for the success of liberal imperialism, the national and international middle class unconditionally supports the military government. An awkward position, certainly, but a necessary one.

With such a guarantee of continuation, any power struggle becomes short-lived; all those who might like to rule are no match for the existing machine. Certain groups on the periphery of the Government and the army — police and judiciary organizations and conservatives of the Catholic Church devoted to the defence of the sacred traditions (tradition, family and property) — form a noisy but ineffectual extreme right within the existing structures.

Since 1964, in the various phases of extending its power, the revolutionary Government has been trying to accelerate the accumulation of capital for the benefit of large national and international companies, and has seen to it that the dominated classes are incapable of changing the operation of the regime. Political power is exercised by the representatives whom the privileged groups manage to keep in the key positions; the proportions vary, depending on the political struggles of the moment.

The Government enjoys relative autonomy, and will continue to enjoy it as long as the army remains the only force capable of guaranteeing the stability and continuation of the regime. A belief — which is now a conviction — in the existence of a close relationship between economic development and authoritarianism has become widespread.

National authoritarianism

Because of its size and its population of 100 million, Brazil is naturally subject to the ambition of becoming a great power. Its wealth of already known resources hints at further, untold riches. Brazil has the geographical requirements for becoming a world power.

Political success depends on power in Brazil. *National authoritarianism*, as Carlos Estevan Martins, a researcher at the São Paulo Brazilian Planning Centre, calls it, has become a force in Brazil in the last several years. It has manifested itself internally in two general principles: concentration of power among the élite and restriction of political pluralism. The immediate consequence of these two principles is the subjection of the lower classes. (Basically, there is only one lower class, just as there is only one dominant class.)

This subjection takes the form of a series of now standard measures.

If the prime cost of industrialized products is very low, the greatest possible profit margin is guaranteed. This is why the real level of Brazilian minimum wage rates was lower in 1968 than in 1964. Of the Brazilian workers receiving the minimum wage, 67.5 per cent were working in industry, the sector of the national economy which enjoyed the greatest increase in profits. A study of the standard of living of the working class in São Paulo (a city of 8 million inhabitants), carried out by the Inter-Union Department of Socio-Economic Statistics and Studies in 1969, revealed that the real minimum wage of heads of household had decreased by 39.3 per cent between 1958 and 1969! Although the number of workers in a family doubled (to an average of two persons in 1969), the family income decreased by 10 per cent.

With such mechanisms, the Government can force suppliers of foreign capital to do their share as well, by redefining their objectives. It is in Brazil's interest to ensure that foreign capital manufactures more in Brazil for export to already established international markets. In such circumstances, it is very advantageous for foreign capital to come to Brazil and produce there. Thanks to internal stability, the gross national product in Brazil, which was \$38 billion in 1970, will be \$50 billion in 1973, or around \$500 *per capita*.

Control of inflation

The greatest economic victory of the new regime has been the control of inflation, which was reduced to around 12 per cent in 1973. The figures for the Brazilian "miracle", often exaggerated, are nevertheless astounding: increases of 70 per cent in the highway system and 60 per cent in electrical power and petroleum production. In round figures, the annual rate of economic growth is 11 per cent, the rate of population growth is 2.9 per cent, and the rate of the increase in *per capita* income is 6.8 per cent.

If the crucial problem of distribution is ignored, the economic growth in Brazil can reasonably be called a miracle. When we look at Brazilian "participation", however, we see an entirely different picture. Of the 100 largest foreign companies in Brazil, thirty-seven are American, twelve German, eight Argentinian, four Swedish, four Luxembourgian, four Italian, four English, four French, three Canadian, three Dutch, three Belgian, two Swiss, two Danish, one Norwegian, one Finnish, one from Liechtenstein, one Japanese and six jointly owned. American investments oc-

Force supplies of foreign capital to do their share by redefining their objectives

Brazil looking more and more for markets outside of inter-American system

copy an unobtrusive enough position in the economy as a whole for Brazil to think of going beyond the inter-American system.

Brazil is, therefore, looking increasingly for markets outside the inter-American system, especially in the European Common Market, the countries in the European Free Trade Association, those in the Latin American Free Trade Association, the socialist countries in Europe, Japan and, recently, China and India. This constitutes a considerable effort to escape the North American hegemony and to avoid the dangers any country faces when it has only one purchaser for its products. Since 1970 (the January-October period), Brazilian exports to the European Common Market countries (28.47 per cent of the total Brazilian exports) have exceeded sales to the United States (26.60 per cent). The other principal destinations for Brazilian exports are the European free trade countries (11.74 per cent), the Latin American countries (10.43 per cent), Eastern Europe (5.84 per cent) and Japan (4.43 per cent). Canada imports 1.30 per cent of Brazilian exports. The total exports for 1972 were \$4 billion.

Territorial waters

Brazil asserted itself politically by extending the limits of its territorial waters to 200 miles. Similar decisions had given rise to still unresolved disputes between the United States and both Ecuador and Peru. The great powers, the only nations technologically equipped to exploit the ocean depths, do not look favourably upon this extension of national territory, especially since they know that there is a considerable quantity of energy reserves in the continental shelves. Despite this diplomatic restraint, Brazil's decision was respected as if the country had already been admitted to the ranks of the great powers.

In foreign policy, Brazil has recently taken positions that are often far from those of the United States. In the matter of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, Brazil supported Portugal against the United States and most of the European countries. Brazil saw this as an opportunity of exercising its empire, as if the Portuguese colonies were also Brazilian colonies.

The *rapprochement* with Japan is another new effect of American influence. While exports to the United States have decreased in six years from 33 to 26 per cent, exports to Japan have increased from 2 to 5 per cent. Concurrently, Japanese investments to Brazil have grown considerably. A Japanese fair was held recently

in São Paulo's Anhembi Park, with 317 stands and 275 exhibitors. Even before the fair opened, the Japanese had sold \$50-million worth of merchandise. A minimum of \$120 million in Japanese expenditure in infrastructures alone is forecast for 1973. The Japanese currently find Brazil a favourable place for investing a constantly increasing portion of their surplus of more than \$20 billion.

Brazil's intentions regarding the other countries in Latin America are becoming increasingly clear; it has almost a third of the population in the southern part of the continent, and is therefore preparing to play the role of keeper of the peace, as Argentina wanted to do at the time of the first "justicialist" government. Hegemony seems to have been established at the economic level, thanks to the existence of abundant cheap labour, a necessary condition for any economic "miracle", as the former Cabinet minister Roberto Campos pointed out recently. The weakness of the labour unions is contributing to the stability of these conditions of progress.

What remains to be done

These figures and this ideological ambition must not, however, be allowed to obscure an even more important reality. Despite surprising progress and an annual economic growth rate of around 11 per cent, the balance of payments shows a deficit of \$300 million for 1972 and the foreign debt is \$10 billion.

Many dreams have turned into less attractive realities. Five years ago, it was expected that Brazil would be self-sufficient in petroleum by 1975. Now, in 1973, Brazil hopes to maintain the rate of national petroleum production at 170,000 barrels a day. Domestic production provides only 27 per cent of internal consumption needs; the rest still has to be imported. The largely unknown Amazon region had been the object of high hopes, particularly for petroleum, but apparently it is still not certain whether the petroleum discovered there can be exploited profitably.

Independence from the United States in the sphere of exports has certainly been achieved in absolute figures, if one considers the other countries as a group, as we have here. However, real autonomy in foreign trade, for a country in the process of industrial development, depends on its trade in industrial products. The United States buys more than 50 per cent of Brazil's industrial products: 65.7 per cent of its wood, 52.4 per cent of its coffee, 51.4 per cent of its beef, 56.8 per cent of its rolled iron, 68.9 per cent of its molasses and 89.1 per cent of its shoes. The second-

largest purchaser of its industrial products is the European Common Market, but it is far behind the United States.

It is not in the United States' interest to check the upsurge of Brazilian authoritarianism, mainly since this would violate its own principles. A much more effective approach is to confine itself to watching the trend closely, since it is essential to pretend that such a valuable ally is setting its own ground rules. The famous and indiscreet American journalist Jack Anderson revealed that the Pentagon, concerned about the direction Brazil was moving in, commissioned in 1972 a study by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, in conjunction with the University of Philadelphia Science Centre, on the topic "Should the United States help Brazil become a world power, and if so, how?". According to the researchers' answers to the Brazilian journalist Lucas Mendes, the study concluded that, with or without American assistance, Brazil was more likely than any other Latin American country to become a world power within ten years, and the researchers recommended that the American Government assist Brazil in its development.

Champion of underdeveloped

Brazil has publicly championed the underdeveloped countries, saying that their conflict is not between East and West, but between North and South. This explains why Brazil insisted at the United Nations that the Charter be modified to create fair and equitable conditions for the operation of international trade, rather than see the great powers constantly resist the claims of the developing countries. Brazil is, therefore, preparing to receive expressions of sympathy from countries which have increasing reservations about Americanism. This position is of interest to the United States, in that it would thus be able to free itself safely from its "responsibilities" in the southern part of the continent. Brazil could play the same role in South America as West Germany plays in Europe and Japan plays in Pacific Asia.

In another manifestation of its "great power" status, Brazil wishes from now on to negotiate international economic issues directly with the American Government, rather than with the "lobbies" operating within the American system. One thing which Brazil seems unwilling to accept is the international division of labour formulated in the Rockefeller report of 1969, by

virtue of which the underdeveloped countries would supply the international capitalist system with cheap labour and raw materials while the wealthy countries would provide capital and technology for production destined for the wealthy countries and the privileged minorities in the poor countries. This is certainly the aspect which is most worrying to the multinational corporations.

This anxiety is relieved by the fact that Brazil is still a "friend" in the south, which will not "drop" the stronger nation. Last April, when the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Miguel Angel de la Flor Valle, convinced the other South American countries of the need for completely revamping the Organization of American States and moving its headquarters away from Washington, Brazil was opposed to the idea.

Since 1964, the history of Brazil has unfolded without any popular participation. The slogans stuck on car windows, the sides of buses and on the front pages of the newspapers – "There is no stopping Brazil", "Love your Brazil or leave it" and "Onward, Brazil" – leave the man in the street sceptical. And yet certain mechanisms of participation already exist, like so many prophecies of hope. Every firm must now make social insurance contributions of 40 per cent of the wages the workers receive; this is the highest rate of employer participation in South America. The 19 million students (14 million in primary schools, 4,300,000 in high schools and 700,000 in universities) represent an unprecedented opportunity for popular participation in Brazil's history. The municipalities have to devote 20 per cent of their budgets to elementary teaching for children and adults.

The Government is aware of this need for popular participation and has chosen the slow process of education as a means of achieving it. In official statements, education and culture are the Government's two basic concerns, but it wants to have the only say in counselling young people and adults in their intellectual decisions.

The Government of the Revolution is here to stay. Any political change seems impossible at the moment except within the present framework, since public opinion is not consulted for any decisions. Brazil will probably make further gestures of independence and assert its hegemony in the near future, trying out its newly-claimed status as a great power.

Political change seems impossible at the moment except within present framework

O. D. Skelton: the scholar who set a future pattern

By Norman Hillmer

O. D. Skelton was one of the most important – and powerful – Canadians of this century. He first achieved prominence as a professor at Queen's University and the controversial author of an endless stream of strongly nationalist books and articles that established him as the leading Liberal intellectual of his day. Then, in 1925, he became Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, a post he held until his death in 1941. He was the founder of the modern Department of External Affairs. As adviser and administrator, Skelton assumed a position of authority perhaps unparalleled by that of any other civil servant in Canadian history.

Skelton's impact was very great, and yet few Canadians will have heard his name. The Winnipeg journalist Grant Dexter wrote shortly after Skelton's death: "Perhaps no biography of Dr. Skelton will ever be written. It would be difficult to tell the story of his life. The makers of Canada stride through history, giant figures, towering high above the people whose lives they moulded. Dr. Skelton was their peer. At innumerable points he touched the life of this country Yet in the full record his name will seldom appear. He did the essential work: others took the spotlight and will get the credit. There is nothing unfair in this – so at least Dr. Skelton would argue. He did his job: they did theirs."

Certainly Skelton does not seem the stuff out of which twentieth century heroes are made. Contemporaries remember his appearance as drab and austere, with thick

glasses, shaggy eyebrows and colourless unruly hair. Few knew him or thought they could know him. His considerable warmth and dry wit were reserved for a small circle of friends. To others, as to the young Lester Pearson, Skelton was simply "somewhat shy, even distant".

Skelton had no instinct for public relations. "For society in the formal sense, for precedence and place," Dexter recalled, "he did not care a straw." The story – perhaps apocryphal – is told that in 1933, when Skelton was expected to arrive in London to become the chairman of a Commonwealth economic committee, a suitable welcome was arranged. High-ranking officials assembled at Waterloo Station to meet the boat-train from Geneva, gathering around the entrance to the first-class compartments. They waited, but the Canadian was nowhere to be found. Finally, when the notables were turning to leave, a rumpled figure appeared a long way down the platform. Apparently, to the horror of his British counterparts, Skelton was a man who travelled third class and carried his own luggage.

Skelton is now, even so, finding his way into the history books. His influence, his achievements and his shortcomings are emerging from the research that is being done into Canadian foreign and defence policy in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, there are historians who are going overboard in the other direction, with the suggestion that Skelton ran things himself, without the help of mere prime ministers.

Prime ministers, of course, have their uses. Professor Stacey has pointed out that Skelton's reputation and advancement are associated with the names of two long-reigning Liberal premiers, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Mackenzie King. Skelton was the official biographer of Laurier and it was Mackenzie King who brought him into government. And as Stacey says, both Skelton and King were devoted admirers of Laurier the man, his political views and his policies.

Skelton won his job in External by



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convincing King that he had learned Laurier's nationalist lessons well. He certainly had the "knowledge and the right point of view," King wrote in his diary after hearing Skelton address a Canadian Club audience in Ottawa on Canada and foreign policy early in 1922. His address "would make an excellent foundation for Canadian policy on External Affairs, and Skelton himself would make an excellent man for that department".

Mackenzie King had just become Prime Minister. He knew little of foreign affairs, but he knew what he liked and he could see that Skelton shared with him a desire, after ten years of Conservative rule, to return to the policies of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. King and Skelton believed, like Laurier, that Canadians should not seek influence and prestige in the world through external commitments and alliances, as the Conservatives had done. Instead, the emphasis in external affairs must be on things domestic — national unity and national development.

British connection

Skelton acknowledged that the most important fact of Canada's existence was its position within the British Empire. He knew that the British connection could unite Canadians, as it had done in 1914, but he believed that it was more likely to divide them and divert them from their goal of nation-building on the North American continent. Laurier had resisted the designs of the powerful minority at home and in London who had sought to involve Canada in imperial adventures and foreign wars; Mackenzie King must do the same. Only in this way could moderate men, French and English alike, be kept together under a single Canadian roof.

Both King and Skelton were, in the beginning at least, almost childishly naive about the complications and complexities of foreign policy. After all, the latter asked, what were most foreign affairs but ordinary "line-fence disputes" with one's closest neighbours? Skelton, however, had a much clearer framework of assumptions and convictions about Canada's role in the world than King and he could provide intellectual justification for these views. The prime minister came to rely on the academic for precisely that reason.

In the days after his Canadian Club speech, Skelton became more and more associated with, and committed to, Mackenzie King. He served as King's chief of staff at the Imperial Conference of 1923 and in a number of other advisory capacities. But he still hesitated to cut his ties with the university and come to Ottawa on

a full-time basis.

In 1924, when Sir Joseph Pope was in his last year as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Skelton entered External as a counsellor on a year's leave of absence from Queen's. He half expected to return to Kingston, where he had enjoyed the privacy and detachment of university life. But Skelton also had ambition and a sense of mission about seeing his ideas put into practice. After much agonizing, he accepted King's offer to become Pope's successor, closing the door, as Dexter said, "on a life that, to him, was infinitely desirable".

Skelton wanted to return to the policies of Laurier, but he wanted more than that. As early as 1904, he spoke in terms of a positive ideal, "the ideal I've always cherished, Canadian independence". He believed that Canada would only be truly free when it assumed full responsibility for the conduct of its foreign affairs and when it had the capacity, at home and abroad, to reach an independent verdict about circumstances in the world outside. He sought, therefore, a strong and active Department of External Affairs as both the agency and expression of Canada's developing nationhood.

External's original role

External had been established under Laurier in 1909, primarily as a post office to facilitate the handling of Canada's increasing external affairs business. In 1925 it still spent the bulk of its time as a clearing-house, transmitting external affairs correspondence to and from the government department primarily concerned or dealing with routine matters on its own. Individuals within the department, notably Loring Christie, had made an important contribution to the creation of Canadian external policy over the years, but the department itself had been largely ignored in this regard. The administrative staff in 1925, Skelton included, totalled three. External's brief was uncertain, its organization virtually non-existent.

Skelton set out to change all that, and in so doing he laid down the pattern for the future. After a careful study of the organization and procedures of other countries, the new Under-Secretary of State decided to model the department on the "career" example of the British Foreign Office, with the foreign service officer at the centre of development and decision-making. He initiated an orderly recruitment program, bringing men of the calibre of Hume Wrong, Norman Robertson and Lester Pearson into the East Block, and tirelessly advocated the extension of Cana-

dian diplomatic representation abroad.

Skelton's background and biases, and his hopes for the future, were reflected in the membership of the new Department of External Affairs. This is made clear in Professor Gilles Lalonde's *The Department of External Affairs and Biculturalism*, the most helpful source of information on External's early organization and personnel. Professor Lalonde has pointed out that Skelton "took an active part in the recruitment of foreign service officers by competitive examination. Not only did he prepare the written papers himself, he also presided in person over the boards for the oral tests, in order to ensure the maintenance of certain standards, and especially to remove immediately the elements that he judged undesirable."

University world

Skelton wanted his "young men" — as they inevitably came to be called — to be well-educated generalists, capable of performing in widely-differing assignments at short notice. His examinations favoured university degrees and postgraduate training in the law, history, political science and economics. Lester Pearson, for example, was brought in by examination from the staff of the history department of the University of Toronto. Skelton brought in a sizeable number of officers by Order in Council, a method he used not to make political appointments but in order to reinforce the strong ties with the university world that were developing out of the examination system.

Skelton thus surrounded himself with his own kind. More than a third of his recruits were professionals from the sphere of education. A large number had postgraduate degrees. Amazingly, Professor Lalonde calculates that of the small group of 71 officers brought into External from 1922 to 1944, about 25 per cent of those speaking English and 36 per cent of the *francophones* had doctorates. Contrary to widespread belief, virtually none of Skelton's personnel were Queen's men.

Skelton was not fluent in French and bilingualism was not a requirement for entry into the department. It is interesting to note, however, that External was more representative of the French and English elements in the Canadian population under him than at any other time in the department's history until quite recently. Nor did Skelton use the Order in Council to achieve this balance. Almost all of his French-speaking officers entered External by examination.

Skelton wanted the department to be independent and professional, but he fell

short of his objective. In those years, the Prime Minister was also Secretary of State for External Affairs. External was attached to the Prime Minister's East Block office, and the roles played by the two groups inevitably became confused. Under Mackenzie King and R. B. Bennett this meant, as Robert Bothwell has remarked, the subordination of even the most ordinary diplomatic routine to prime ministerial conceptions of political principle and expediency.

Under such conditions, the exigencies of politics and finance took precedence in all matters. Skelton found it difficult to build a staff sufficient to his needs. Even worse, the Prime Minister's Office called on External for assistants in various non-department projects. It was also impossible to persuade the politically-cautious and doctrinally-unconvinced King and Bennett of the need for a reasonable number of missions abroad if Canada was to call itself a free nation. And so, at the beginning of 1939, Canada still had only three legations — in Washington, Tokyo and Paris. Elsewhere, the Government continued to rely on the services of the British Foreign Office.

Chief adviser

When Mackenzie King was Prime Minister, Skelton served not only as Under-Secretary for External Affairs but also as a chief adviser to King on all matters — the Deputy Prime Minister, one insider called him. He was not, therefore, the disinterested head of a government department, concerned only that his recruiting of an intelligent and articulate band of external affairs officers would encourage lively debate and diversity of viewpoint within the department. He did want his officers to express their ideas frankly. But he also had political axes to grind and these, together with his tenaciously-held attitudes on all foreign policy matters, ensured that he would not pass on to his superior anything which did not reinforce his own opinions. There was, in fact, little place in Skelton's External for contrary views.

The frankly political nature of Skelton's position jeopardized the future of External in 1930, when the Conservatives under Bennett took power. There was, of course, strong party feeling against Skelton personally, but there were also a number of Conservatives who disliked the whole idea of an activist Department of External Affairs, which they thought a Liberal institution implying disloyalty to the British connection and, in addition costing too much of the taxpayers' money.

For his part, Skelton was dismayed at

Bennett's victory. He lamented that he had not accepted the principalship of Queen's University which had been offered to him the year before. He nevertheless decided to stay on under the Conservatives. He would not quit; he would have to be fired.

Bennett did not share in the desire to abolish External, but he was determined to replace Skelton. The new Prime Minister was too busy to take any action in the first few weeks, however, and when he did get the time, he found Skelton's knowledge and assistance so valuable that he decided to wait just a little bit longer. Weeks became months. Bennett soon discovered Skelton's indispensability: his talent for acting loyally and efficiently; his ability to expose the difficulties of any argument; and his willingness to marshal evidence to meet the needs of the day.

During the five years of Conservative rule, Skelton cut his ties with Mackenzie King. Still, he was relieved to see King return to office in 1935. The storm clouds were already darkening over Europe and Skelton's concern was that Canadians would be stampeded by "imperialist and war feeling" into a war fought to protect British interests. King shared with his chief adviser a profound suspicion of the centralizing tendencies of the London Government, a resentment at the way in which attempts were made to commit Canadians to British policies without consultation, and a determination to keep aloof for as long as possible from the complications of European power politics.

Skelton and King were not anti-British, though they feared and distrusted the English politician with his effortless superiority, his arrogance and his insidious charm. They admired and drew much from the intellectual traditions of Great Britain. They believed that, in the main, the British Empire stood for freedom, justice and toleration.

They also thought, however, that the real threat to Canada's developing independence came from Great Britain and from Europe generally, not from the United States. In the 1930s this was not an uncommon view. It was the British Empire that would get into a European war and it was the jingoes and imperialists at home and in Great Britain who would demand Canadian involvement in such a conflict immediately and without reservation, whatever the circumstances and whatever the consequences for the country's fragile national unity.

Skelton's reaction was to ask what all the shouting was about. "De we owe anything to Europe?" he had once written.

"Canada lies side by side for three thousand miles with a neighbour fifteen times as powerful. . . . She knows that not a country on the Continent of Europe would lift its little finger to help if the United States were to attack her. Her security lies in her own reasonableness, the decency of her neighbour, and the steady development of friendly intercourse, common standards of conduct and common points of view. Why not let Europe do likewise?"

Answering call of duty

King's reaction was similar, but it differed in one crucial respect. The Prime Minister had always been convinced, as he told the Imperial Conference of 1923, that "if a great and clear call of duty came, Canada will respond, whether or not the United States responds, as she did in 1914". This was a personal decision (like many Anglo-Saxons, he too felt the call of the blood) but there were also political considerations. Just as King believed that it was important for the sake of national unity to make no commitments before any world crisis, so he thought it necessary, in order to keep the country together, to go to Britain's side in 1939. When the crunch came, Skelton's arguments in favour of non-involvement were brushed aside.

It was King, not Skelton, who formulated policy. The Prime Minister knew that Skelton was "the best of counsellors and guides". They were friends as well as colleagues. And yet King felt the importance of remaining his own man. He preferred Skelton's long and detailed memoranda to personal contact with a superior intellect whom he feared might dominate or smother him. "The more one sees of the academic mind," King wrote in his diary in 1938, "the more one feels how necessary it is that it should be supplemented or balanced by wide political outlook or experience. . . ." Confident of his own instincts in this regard, the Prime Minister made the final decisions, big and small.

Overworked and feeling old for his years, Skelton soldiered on into the war. He died early in 1941 at the age of 62. He had had a number of careers — professor, author, bureaucrat. As a writer and teacher, he had always reserved his greatest admiration for liberal men of action, men like Gladstone, Woodrow Wilson and Laurier, who had not been afraid to get into the rough and tumble of public life or to compromise in order to get the job done. Now, in his last career he, too, had been a man of action. Doubtless he would have treasured Dexter's tribute the most: Skelton was a scholar who made history.

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No. 70 (July 26, 1973) Exchange of letters by Canada and New Zealand maintaining preferential trade between the two countries.

No. 71 (July 27, 1973) Statement by the Canadian delegation at the eightieth session of the International Commission of Control and Supervision, Saigon.

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Parley minus the spectacular, Commonwealth proves a plus

By P. D. Pillay

JAN 15 1974

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All 32 Commonwealth countries were represented at the nineteenth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Ottawa in August. Five were represented by their presidents or heads of state, 18 by their prime ministers, three by their vice-presidents and six by senior ministers. The conference organizers had taken great pains to ensure the comfort of both delegates and the media. While they were not able to do much about Ottawa's heat, humidity and torrential downpours, they spared no effort to provide a partly informal atmosphere. This task was made easier because no burning issues confronted the heads of government or their representatives.

The apparent absence of issues troubled the media. Despite their genuine satisfaction with their working facilities in the Connaught Building, they began to ask themselves what they were covering at the conference. Old Commonwealth hands, especially from Britain, were not dismayed by the seeming lack of hard news. Their direct links with most senior Commonwealth leaders enabled them to meet editorial deadlines. Unlike the Singapore Conference of 1971, when Britain's plans to sell arms to South Africa had been widely criticized in the weeks preceding the opening, this conference experienced on its eve no comparable crisis. The Canadian Government headed off potentially explosive situations by arranging for extensive official consultation on the agenda. At Singapore, the huge conference hall, with its extra-large conference table and massive floral display in the centre, often prevented leaders from seeing their colleagues across the table. Its mini-UN style of long set-piece addresses, often released to the press beforehand, did nothing to encourage frankness. At the press conferences, leaders showed the strain under which they were discussing agenda items.

In Ottawa, the arrangements made for a more informal and intimate gathering. Prime Minister Trudeau is to be thanked for the new style. After the first meeting

in the tastefully yet simply appointed main conference hall, the heads of government moved into the Sussex Room, where each was accompanied by two officials. Most of the executive or working sessions were held there. As chairman, Canada's Prime Minister introduced each agenda item and invited one or two leaders to lead the discussion. (An exception was made in the case of the Uganda presentation, of which more later.)

Free to intervene

The results were most satisfying; after the introductory statement, leaders were free to intervene, to correct their colleagues, to elaborate on an argument, or to pin someone down. This gave rise to a controlled free discussion, which Mr. Trudeau believed would be more beneficial than long, often boring and predictable set pieces. Sometimes, as the final communique so carefully says, discussions were "lively" or "lively and useful", which was, perhaps, the best way of saying that some leaders displayed temper or that provocative remarks were made during the give and take.

The traditional line-up between the old and new Commonwealth members also went by the board. At previous conferences, Britain had been able to rely on some support (much stronger when Robert Menzies was Australia's Prime Minister) in the face of hostile Afro-Asian questions, especially those connected with Britain's relations with the white minority governments in Southern Africa. On occasions, British officials were heard to hark back to the days when a Commonwealth confer-

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Richard Vroom photo

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau presides at the formal opening session of Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Ottawa. The meeting was held from August 2 to 10.

ence took place in the Prime Minister's residence at 10 Downing Street. In a cosy and intimate atmosphere, the old white "club" of Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa surveyed Commonwealth and imperial affairs. As the brown and black members of the Commonwealth made their presence felt and racial issues began to dominate the agenda of Commonwealth conferences, the air of privacy disappeared. With it went much of Britain's enthusiasm for the Commonwealth. Canada left the club in 1960, when Mr. Diefenbaker helped to make things so untenable for South Africa that it withdrew from the Commonwealth. Mr. Trudeau, too, has sought to be identified with issues instead of regional or racial groupings. Until the Singapore meeting, Australia and New Zealand could be relied on to make reassuring speeches in support of Britain. One significant feature of the Ottawa conference is that the New Zealand and Australian Prime Ministers broke up the club.

Independent stance

Even before the conference began, and influenced no doubt by the changing power relations in the Asia-Pacific region and Britain's entry into the European Eco-

omic Community, the leaders from "down under" took an independent stance on Commonwealth matters. Up to now the affairs of Asian and Pacific members of the Commonwealth have always been relegated to the background, and African affairs have commanded attention. At Singapore the arms-sale issue generated so much discussion that little time was left for talks about "Indian Ocean matters", as one delegate put it. Even when the Indian Ocean was mentioned, it was in the context of South Africa's strategic position *vis-à-vis* Western Europe's oil-routes from the Gulf states. In Ottawa, New Zealand Prime Minister, Norman Kirk, was determined to press Pacific concerns strongly. With the backing of Australia and Fiji, he asked for a declaration reaffirming the principle of the 1963 nuclear test-ban treaty aimed at showing Commonwealth displeasure over the impending French nuclear tests in the Pacific. This caught the attention of the media at once.

Britain's opposition to any statement which made specific reference to France (its partner in the European Economic Community) showed how a new factor influenced its foreign policy. Prime Minister Edward Heath made it abundantly clear that Britain would not go beyond supporting a general statement. Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore advocated a private approach to the French so as not to upset the Gaullists with a display of public pressure. For the first two days, Pacific affairs were given a thorough airing. Even at Secretary-General Arnold Smith's reception for the media, the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers, both six footers, received most attention. Both leaders stressed the Asian context of their countries. Both were trying to come to terms with the problems of poverty in Asia. The *détente* among the superpowers had forced them to redefine their security strategy. At the same time, they were loosening traditional ties with Britain, gradually nudging their electorates to abandon their almost exclusive identification with Western Europe. Although this sounded like political opportunism, both men represented a new Australasian approach to the Asian subcontinent. Their case for a declaration against nuclear testing gained wide support, and the test-ban resolution New Zealand introduced was accepted after a compromise was worked out, *viz* a reaffirmation of the test-ban treaty without mention of France.

Opening discussion on world and Commonwealth trends, the Nigerian leader General Yakubu Gowon, appealed for a more visible Commonwealth, one that was

... to be working at the practical level with associations, institutes and other organizations devoted to fostering the exchange of persons and ideas within the Commonwealth. He touched on the Commonwealth's greatest weakness without elaborating on it. For too long now the Commonwealth has appeared to do nothing else but sustain numerous organizations in the name of functional co-operation.

Race relations

Outside the conference centre, the delegates confronted questions on the thorny problem of race relations. In the past, white racism was the first object to come under renewed attack. In Ottawa, queries about black racism in Uganda met with a muted response from those leaders who gave interviews. The conference opened amidst speculation on the travel plans of Uganda's President Amin. His telegram to the Queen asking for a British aircraft, plus a bodyguard of Scots Guards, was politely but firmly turned down by Britain. In fact, his request was so timed that it is difficult to escape the conclusion that he had no intention of coming to the conference and was merely looking for a face-saving formula. After all, having ousted Uganda's former President, Milton Obote, when he was at the Singapore conference, Amin may very well have decided that he had

established an unfortunate precedent. Yet he sought to influence affairs from afar.

Over the weekend, while heads of government and ministers were having a rest at Mont Tremblant, secure from public view, the telephone-line between Kampala and Ottawa was busy. Paul Etiang, Uganda's acting Foreign Minister, was instructed to read into the conference record a long statement prepared for General Amin's use. It contained a stinging attack on Britain's colonial policy in Uganda, accused it of pursuing racist policies and argued that Asian holders of British passports living in Uganda had threatened to extinguish the economic life of the country. Despite the official stance of most African delegations, Amin's views on Britain's attitude towards white-ruled Southern Africa are widely shared by Africans. In his own inimitable way, he expressed many of their unspoken thoughts. But Amin could not escape the general feeling of distaste everyone felt towards him over the manner of his expulsion of Asians. No matter how earnestly Etiang tried to reassure the delegates of Uganda's determination to pay compensation, it was clear that some were sceptical of Uganda's intentions. The media even questioned its ability to make cash payments. When Etiang admitted that the matter was in the hands of a committee of "substantive ministers", of which he was not a member, he showed



Richard Vroom photo

Four Commonwealth leaders are seen during one of the sessions. Seated from left: Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak; Chief Leabua Jonathan, Lesotho's

Prime Minister; Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley; and Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister of Guyana.

how little authority he carried. The conference quickly passed on to other African issues.

African leaders inhibited

The Asian expulsion from Uganda inhibited African leaders when they came to discuss race relations. General Gowon tried to explain away Amin's actions as a "military solution" to an economic problem. Other Commonwealth leaders, whatever their private views, took the position that Amin's actions had jeopardized race relations in several countries. In Fiji, where the Indians constitute roughly half the population, Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamiseva Mara found that Uganda's actions had added to his difficulties in fashioning a multiracial society. Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere, elder statesman of Africa, disagreed with Gowon; Amin had engaged in racialism, and the reactions of Africans amounted to cynicism, he said. He noted that "racialism was racialism no matter where it was practised". India's Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, expressed his country's dissatisfaction with the Ugandan case at a press conference, and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew declared: "If Amin had come he would have completely ruined the conference."

The Ugandan case is far more important for the Commonwealth than just a chronology of General Amin's peculiar style of diplomacy. It placed the African members in a less advantageous position when it came to dealing with Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia. The tone of moral indignation has gone from the speeches of African and Caribbean leaders. When the delegates reviewed events in Southern Africa, they found the report of the Sanctions Committee a depressing document, for it included references to sanctions-busting by some "friends of Africa". Although temperatures rose and frustration set in, it became clear that Britain had no intention of doing anything new in order to produce a settlement in Rhodesia. Since the Pearce Commission had reported against terms agreed upon between Britain and the rebel regime in Rhodesia, no progress had been made. Short of a direct military solution, the option open to the Commonwealth lay in tightening sanctions to force Ian Smith to negotiate with Bishop Muzorewa, leader of the African National Council. Clearly, Britain was unwilling to do more than maintain sanctions and wear down the Ian Smith regime.

Several attempts were made to produce a dramatic initiative on the Rhodesia question. Prime Minister Errol Barrow of

Barbados proposed a Commonwealth presence in Rhodesia for ten years after black majority rule so that white minority interests could be protected. Although Canada offered to help with an examination of this idea, it gained no support and had only a pale reflection in the communique.

The suggestion has been interpreted as a desperate attempt by the African delegates to salvage something out of the conference, which, as predicted, produced no fireworks. To the chagrin of some members of delegations, things were going too smoothly. Pressure on the Africans came from another source. Various organizations sponsored a counter-conference at the University of Ottawa, at which representatives from black Rhodesian political organizations called for direct action against the Smith regime. Some members of delegations to the Commonwealth meeting addressed the counter-conference and showed how domestic political considerations and their own deep feelings over white-minority rule in Southern Africa combined resulted in a show of solidarity. It took a warning from Lee Kuan Yew to divert attention from Rhodesia to South Africa. Pointing to Rhodesia as the "tip of the iceberg", he commented on the emotion which was aroused when South African reactions had changed from rhetorical outbursts to considerations of practical ways of helping liberation movements. Most African leaders admit that hopes of an immediate solution are unrealistic and that a long drawn-out struggle lay ahead.

At his press conference, Britain's Edward Heath underlined the basic weakness of the situation. He did not see any African country going to war with South Africa in order to secure political rights for black Africans there and refused to lay down a time-table for the subjugation of the Rhodesian Government. Questioned about the use of force to topple Smith, he argued that on the one hand, the British Government was being urged to "talk" to the Russians and the Chinese and, on the other, it was being pressed to take up arms against Smith.

Prince Makhosini of Swaziland added another dimension when he set out the dilemma of small African states confronted by white power in Southern Africa. "... There are still people on this earth," he said, "with such a myopic conception of history that they are prepared to swim against the tide." Pointing out that his country was surrounded by those who had shown a supreme indifference to the "higher aims of mankind", he confessed that Swaziland's freedom was limited. Yet

Uganda expulsion made discussion of race relations more difficult



Rudi Haas photo

Heads of government were convinced that the Commonwealth association had once again demonstrated its vitality and flexibility. Pictured among the delegates leaving the airport is Tanzanian President

Julius Nyerere (right), with others in the background, including External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp, on hand to bid farewell to departing Commonwealth leaders.

this did not prevent him from declaring: "I would not like anyone to interpret my stand as that of a pacifist who is proposing that we should wait and allow history to follow its course." African countries had come to place no reliance on Western intervention to secure black majority rule in Southern Africa. The result was that discussions on Southern Africa were conducted in a relatively calm atmosphere.

Aid and development

The question of aid, development and the "brain drain" to developed parts of the Commonwealth continued to trouble members. Australia came in for criticism for doing little to help development in Asia. The brain drain of educated Singaporeans to Australia resulted in a depletion of Singapore's human resources which it could ill afford. Lee Kuan Yew criticized Australia's highly selective immigration policy, which was hardly an improvement upon the old "white Australia policy". Replying both in the executive session and through the medium of a press conference, Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam said that he was not prepared to play Singapore's game by deporting students who had completed their education and wanted to remain in Australia. Later Lee Kuan Yew accepted Whitlam's challenge to apply for extradition and did not seem to be worried about possible external criticism. Although it is difficult to be cer-

tain whether Singapore will actually take this step, the public dispute between Whitlam and Lee gave some indication of the difficult relations between the two countries. Lee is regarded as a "conservative", more closely allied to Britain on Commonwealth matters. His weekend trip to see Henry Kissinger in New York showed that his preoccupation with the political problems in Southeast Asia was very real.

The activities of the multinational corporations came in for close scrutiny, with the pool of experiences making for an informative session. Since the enemy was not located in any one Commonwealth country, members displayed a rare degree of unanimity (which Britain's exception already underlined). Canada had a great deal to say, living as it did next to the main stronghold of the multinationals. Since multinationals posed a serious threat to the direction of national economies in small countries, a call for some concerted action fell on receptive ears.

On trade and tariffs, the leaders dwelt on many of the problems facing the Commonwealth that had a "rich versus poor" ring to them. This part of the conference was productive in that everyone around the table understood the dilemma. With the next round of GATT talks on the horizon and Britain's entry into the EEC, the worries of the Caribbean nations, in particular, were repeatedly expressed. Al-

A rare degree of unanimity on the threat of multinationals

though the Commonwealth is an association of equals, the size and relative economic strength of each member is a factor that will have to be openly acknowledged in future. Members do not bring the same weight to bear upon round-table discussions if the disparities between them are vast. A comparison between India and Western Samoa shows how little meaning "equality" has in this context. The problems faced by Britain, Canada and Australia, for example, are markedly different from those faced by Jamaica, Mauritius and Fiji — all sugar producers.

Old patterns upset

Discussions on politics and economics were inseparable. The heads of government noted that *détente* between the United States, the Soviet Union and China had not improved regional security, especially in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Both the Soviet Union and Japan have upset the old patterns of world trade, especially in the commodities market — the former because of internal production shortages and the latter as a consequence of a rising domestic demand for imported consumer goods. The inherent instability of the international currencies market has affected international trade and tourism, one of the major sources of income for many developing Commonwealth countries. In sum, the leaders welcomed the relaxation of tension among the superpowers but repeatedly referred to the continuing troubles in parts of the world.

Reference was also frequently made to the widening gap between the rich and poor countries, a source of future difficulties. The thrust of the arguments advanced by the developing Commonwealth was that the existing favourable arrangements in the markets of developed Commonwealth countries, other than Britain, should be maintained if at all possible. Most of all, they wanted the appropriate international agencies to address themselves to questions of revised trading agreements as soon as possible. For example, it was argued that notions of reciprocity could not form the basis of enduring relations between developing countries and the EEC. Monetary issues, development assistance, private foreign investment, international transport and similar questions were all covered briefly. From the final communique a reader may well conclude that the heads of government could not have done justice to all topics in the brief time at their disposal. But the overview was useful in that it helped leaders to identify common problems.

*Most emphasized
need to revise
trade agreements
as soon as possible*

The Commonwealth showed itself at its best in the field of functional co-operation. The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation was lauded for the efficient way in which it dealt with calls for help. The scheme for establishing a Commonwealth Development Bank was sent to the finance ministers for consideration. The proposal for a Centre for Applied Studies in Government was referred to a group of senior officials, from whom a report is expected in 1974. The Secretary-General was instructed to implement the Commonwealth Youth Program now that funds were available, and the Commonwealth Foundation's budget was increased. On this positive note, the heads ended their deliberations and returned to their capitals.

Nature of the Commonwealth

People have trouble understanding the nature and purpose of the Commonwealth. It is not like the United Nations; it is neither a political alliance nor an economic trading block, and it has no rules and regulations. The Commonwealth "is a voluntary association of independent sovereign states, each responsible for its own policies, consulting and co-operating in the common interests of their people and in the promotion of international understanding and world peace". The Commonwealth is not only a matter of economic or technical aid, or of scholarships and fellowships, or of youth programs and travel schemes. It is an organism, it is based on human relations; its strength and frailty are reflections of our own strength and weakness.

In the relaxed informality and intimacy of the Sussex Room, Commonwealth leaders went a long way towards renewing or restoring friendly relations among themselves. The meetings were held in an atmosphere of understanding. Indeed, leaders took care not to provoke their colleagues, while maintaining a high degree of frankness in their exchanges. All this made the chairman's task relatively easy.

Those who looked for something spectacular were disappointed. Commonwealth conferences are not designed to entertain people; they are working sessions. It is difficult to assess how much goodwill flows from such contacts, but easy to imagine leaders subsequently communicating with one another on more cordial terms. In practical ways, this conference served the very useful function of proving the efficacy of conducting business under the new rules, which will be adopted for the next conference.

The opportunity for Pakistan in forging a new destiny

By E. L. Tepper.

Pakistan occupies an historical "shatter-belt", an unstable political zone frozen into stability by the British raj and held in place with difficulty by succeeding rulers of Pakistan. Indeed, even for the British, the northern frontiers of its South Asian empire were held as much by compromise and concession as persuasion and force. The land stretching from the Arabian Sea to the Hindu Kush is a buffer between cultural and political zones. Affinities stretch across its present borders into South Asia and into the Middle East. Without a strong inward focus of identity these diversities can be a threat to the integrity of the state. Pakistan is currently searching for that inward strength. If the present leadership fails in this task, Pakistan's neighbours may see the "buffer" as a vacuum, which is intolerable in politics as in nature.

Pakistan has always faced both East and West, drawing its history and societal forms from both directions. But its links to South Asia have been so firmly established that "the Middle East option" can only be exercised as an act of will, through conscious policy decision. With the loss of Bangladesh, that option has received increasing emphasis. In a sense, East Bengal was an anchor, tying the Western Moslem region to the subcontinent. Now it is free to float, to explore other possibilities. Pakistan's empty chair at the recent Ottawa meetings of the Commonwealth is one silent symbol of the determination to sever old links, as part of the process of readjusting to its new situation. There is not the slightest flicker of interest in Islamabad in rejoining the grouping that represents its subcontinental, colonial past. There is great interest in resolving disputes with India, in developing a relationship with Bangladesh, and presumably in countering Madam Gandhi's great success during her tour of Canada, which is a major aid donor to all three South Asian states. Even so, there was no sign of regret, or even nostalgia, at being absent from the hospitable Commonwealth forum. Officially, according to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,


that forum is "not useful". Diplomacy with South Asia apparently will be conducted bilaterally, as just one part of Pakistan's expanding horizons.

The Middle East option

Good relations with all countries and regions constitute Pakistan's goal now, as in the past. But special relations with the Middle East are a prominent feature of the post-Bangladesh era. The groundwork was already in place. Emphasis on common religious and ethnic bonds had been a feature of Pakistan's foreign policy for some time; rhetoric on Moslem brotherhood had taken an institutional form in the Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD), a low-key mutual co-operation scheme linking the contiguous Moslem states of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. The RCD just marked its ninth anniversary. Minor military assistance schemes exist as well, such as the training mission in Jordan that has come to public attention. Pakistani doctors and other professional personnel are found in large numbers throughout the region.

However, the crisis of old Pakistan's final years coincided with Iran's recent emergence as a self-perceived stabilizing element in its sphere of influence, which led to substantial material assistance to Pakistan during Yayha Khan's hour of need. Jordan, it is rumoured, also played a strategic role in assisting Pakistan. This has been followed by extraordinary statements of support and interest from the Shah of Iran and increasingly cordial personal relations between the Shah and Mr. Bhutto since he assumed power in Pakistan. That this is not a one-sided effort by

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Iran is shown by Pakistan's active involvement in the sensitive Persian Gulf area, centring on the development of a mutually beneficial relationship with Abu Dhabi, the wealthy and strategically-placed sheikdom in the former Trucial States. This too has been cemented by effective personal diplomacy between the leaders of the respective states. (For details, see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 22, 1973, Page 21). Pakistan and Kuwait are soon to begin a joint shipbuilding program. Indeed, it has been authoritatively stated that the Middle East and North Africa division is the busiest section of Pakistan's hard-worked foreign office.

Threats to stability


Part of the cost of Pakistan's reorientation process is the inability to keep apart problems of domestic and foreign origin. Indeed, the sundering of the former state was a signal to many that the remnant of Pakistan might be "up for grabs", that in the fluid postwar period almost any new combination was possible. The job of the Bhutto regime is to dispel such notions and to foreclose as many such possibilities as possible. The difficulty in doing so can be suggested by even a brief discussion of a few outstanding issues. Most stem from the historical shatterbelt nature of the state alluded to above, and the possible permutations or recombinations of Pak-

istan's territory that a fluid situation could permit.

Domestically, the 25-year history of Pakistan's independence period can be characterized as a steady process of consolidation of state power, measured by the erosion of regional territorial boundaries and identities and the emergence of a single "Pakistani" nationality and state. The process was marked politically by the formal creation, after a decade of independence, of a set of unitary institutions and the formal designation of East and West Pakistan. The attention of most outsiders was devoted to the attempted reconciliation of Bengal in this constitutional juggling, an effort that we now recognize as having failed. But for the erstwhile West Pakistan, it meant the attempted elimination, through integration, of a welter of political forms left over from the random accommodations and conquests of the British colonial period. Tribal, linguistic and topographical diversity, including such large former princely states as Kalat and Bahawalpur, were "regularized" by the removal of much of their historic autonomy through the creation of a single West Pakistan.

The lessons of Bengal's disaffection have led to a renewed compact within the residual Pakistan. Overriding Mr. Bhutto's preference for very strong centralization there is a balance struck between some

Bhutto regime aimed to dispel notion Pakistan might be 'up for grabs'



what autonomous provinces and a still strong centre in the federal constitution in effect since August 14, 1973 (the anniversary of Pakistan's independence in 1947). The haste with which this accord was sought by Mr. Bhutto is an indication of the pressing need to reach quickly an arrangement that can contain the diverse forces reopened by the breakdown of the former state. Bangladesh is a reminder of the earlier failure to reach such an accommodation.

Domestic dissension

Pakistan's amalgam of tribal groupings, traditional political entities and linguistic diversity provides ample scope for domestic dissension and foreign dabbling in troubled waters. Without adroitness in the use of central authority, including the judicious use *and* non-use of state power, the interests of dissolution could easily cohere. Baluchistan province, for example, emerged in time as an administrative unit through the merger of earlier entities, including autonomy-minded sheikhdoms of considerable power. It borders on Iran's Baluchistan province (leading Wali Khan, a major opposition politician in Pakistan, to suggest that the Arabian Sea ought to be called the Baluch Sea, as the two Baluchi areas have an extensive coastline). Politically, Baluchistan is a murky tinderbox with contending tribal-political leaders opposing each other, sometimes by force, and offering seemingly endless possibilities for alliances and re-alliances — within the province, between the province and centre, and perhaps between local factions and foreign powers. At the time of writing, there is no provincial cabinet, as no group can command a clear majority. Some say the Shah of Iran, through his friendship with Mr. Bhutto, will permit only a provincial government acceptable to him — that is, a cabinet that contains no party friendly with the Soviet Union or Iraq. The Shah, who is purchasing formidable military capacity, has made strong comments about the depth of his friendship for Pakistan. He has also said that, if Pakistan should start to dissolve, Iran would undertake "protective reaction" in neighbouring Baluchistan.

The Northwest Frontier Province offers a parallel situation. Like Baluchistan, it was won by parties in the 1970 election opposed to Mr. Bhutto's own political vehicle, the Pakistan People's Party. It, too, has a history of internal dissension and periodic indications of a desire to opt out of Pakistan. The rugged terrain is matched by an independent-minded pop-

ulation that has rarely been under the full control of any larger political unit, or quiescent for prolonged periods. The coup in neighbouring Afghanistan, therefore, could not have occurred at a worse time, or in a worse fashion, for Pakistani interests. It adds to an already volatile situation an external source of anxiety. Afghanistan's leaders have given recurrent support for the idea of a dismembered Pakistan, especially at moments when Pakistan seemed vulnerable. In 1947 and again during the 1950s, Afghanistan provided support for an independent Pathan area, a "Pakhtunistan". By Afghan reckoning, the new state would include all of the present Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan, well over half of Pakistan's present territory. That this would include many non-Pathans in Baluchistan, and would exclude the large tract of Pathan area in Afghanistan (reaching almost to Kabul), has not deterred Afghanistan.

Sardar Daud Khan, the man who overthrew the Afghan monarchy in July 1973, was formerly Prime Minister of Afghanistan and the main proponent of the Afghan policy toward "Pakhtunistan". His return to power was possible in part because of the popularity he gained from this policy in the Pathan areas of his country. The coup should probably be viewed as the normal method of transferring power in that mountain kingdom, a shift within royal factions. But Daud's political background, including a pro-Soviet foreign policy, his family's ancestral tradition as rulers of what is now northern Pakistan, and his bellicose pro-Pakhtun statements after the coup, add up to additional problems for Pakistan. So, too, did the instant recognition of the new regime by the Soviet Union and India, the first countries to extend such recognition.

International intrigue

One further example illuminates the complex mingling of domestic and international concerns. The threads of international intrigue cross Pakistan's borders in a complex mesh; some are fine and barely traceable, others as strong as docking cables. On February 9, 1973, the Government of Pakistan broke into the Embassy of Iraq and related buildings in Islamabad and seized a sizeable cache of small arms and ammunition. The material was Soviet in origin. This bizarre incident set in train a number of actions, and broad speculation. The Government blamed the main opposition party, Wali Khan's National Awami Party, and its coalition partner, and used the occasion to remove their governors in both Baluchistan and the

External source of anxiety keyed to attitude of Afghanistan

Domestic-foreign intrigue seen in incident of arms cache in Iraq Embassy

Another theory was that arms were meant for employment in a coup

NFP. Wali Khan denied involvement and provided a second hypothesis: he suggested, during an interview, that the whole incident was rigged by the Government as a way to attack the opposition. The Governor of the Punjab, a Government supporter, believed the arms were meant to be used in his province, against the state government. A Soviet source has suggested, as speculation only, that the arms were for transshipment to Iranian Baluchistan, in a clumsily-conceived thrust in Iraq's continuing feud with Iran. Another suggestion was that the arms were meant for use in a coup (by whom?) to be carried out against the National Assembly, across the street from the Iraqi Embassy.

There is no way to sort out the truth in this event, as there is plausible argument on behalf of any aspect of this implausible episode. What it demonstrates is that politics are rough in Pakistan, and that the stakes are high. The international lines that can be traced in this one event are indicative: a Soviet-Indian-Iraqi-Afghani lineup, all to be served by the Government viewpoint on the discovery (and reinforced by the recent disclosure of an Indian military training mission in Iraq); a Chinese-U.S.-Iranian-Pakistani lineup serving the opposition viewpoint.

Nor do the events so far discussed exhaust the list of major difficulties and incidents faced by Mr. Bhutto's Government in his tenure as President. The Sind province was shaken by a tribal rebellion, as part of the ongoing pattern of micro-intrigue, and by the explosive issue of language rights, the rock on which the first state of Pakistan began to founder in 1952. Death and injury occurred, with political repercussions as 1,000 opposition local party workers were arrested in July 1972. On the national scene, there was some form of military coup in the offing in March of this year, and a number of officers were arrested. This apparently was a "middle-officer" phenomenon rather than a tribal or ethnic affair (Punjabi colonels *versus* Pathan generals), as one unofficial account suggests that the men arrested were equally divided between Pathans and Punjabis. Still, the threat of military discontent, particularly Punjabi discontent, cannot be discounted. Tikka Khan's appointment as Commander-in-Chief can be viewed as an attempt to placate the foot soldiers and junior officers drawn from the Punjab, especially as many brethren sat captives in Indian jails. Tikka Khan is Pakistan's first Punjabi chief military official.

The Punjab is Mr. Bhutto's domestic

Achilles' heel. It is his political and military power bastion. A Sindhi, he came to prominence by forging a popular support base in neighbouring Punjab, by championing issues important to various segments of that province's society. Politicians from other provinces worry about Punjabi dominance (with 62 per cent of the population), leading to recurrent rumours of their efforts to outflank the Punjab — earlier, by dealing with East Bengal, and now, according to Government supporters, by dealing with Bangladesh, India and Afghanistan. The defection of able young Punjabis from the Government party to the opposition, as happened earlier this year, is probably a more realistic and serious threat. The Bangladesh recognition issue may give this group an opening, just as years ago Mr. Bhutto used the Tashkent Settlement so effectively among Punjabis against his mentor, Ayub Khan.

Some sources of strength

Pakistan's litany of woes, which includes labour unrest, inflation, and entrenched poverty, should not be viewed as a sign of the state's inevitable demise. Indeed, the mood of the country's leaders seems decidedly on the upbeat in the late summer of 1973. There are good reasons for their reasonably confident mood.

The economy is showing surprising strength, confounding expectations that the loss of Bangladesh would create havoc. Exports this past year surpassed the highest levels of united Pakistan. Domestic investors are apparently reassured about their future, foreign investors are becoming more assured, economic planning is proceeding. In part this is due to simple good fortune. Pakistan had bumper yields in commodities that suddenly were scarce on the world market: cotton, rice and wheat (perhaps the only good wheat crop in the Third World). As in an earlier period of adversity, just after partition, world market conditions worked to the country's benefit. With large dam projects coming "on line" (with Canadian assistance) and additional tubewell schemes being planned. Pakistan hopes to add even further to its large irrigated acreage, thus reducing dependence on the fickle rains that cost other countries so dearly in recent years. There are good prospects for additional resource discoveries as well, including oil. There are also efforts under way to enlarge the already sizeable component of light manufactured goods in the export profile.

Domestically, the Government seems in fairly firm control of events. The new constitutional pact, with its federal balance re-structed, is the latest chapter in the

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Canada Wide

Pakistan's Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (left) is greeted by President Nixon during Mr. Bhutto's visit to Washington about economic aid and assistance

for repatriating half a million military prisoners and civilian refugees from the 1971 war between India and Pakistan.

experiment in state consolidation; it will be some time before there are clear signs to indicate if the forces of centralization and decentralization have been joined in an optimal formula. In the interim, the commitment of all the primary political groups to parliamentary politics, even if gained reluctantly in notable instances, is a positive sign. The military may now be wary of plunging again into the political thicket; its tools have not served well either the integrity of the country or its own structure. The subcontinental heritage may be more appealing for the military at this juncture than the examples available in the Middle East.

Most important, the international constellation seems currently to be working in Pakistan's favour. There are abundant avenues for mischief if Pakistan weakens internally. But there are no states firmly committed to Pakistan's disappearance, and important states have a stake in Pakistan's stability. While the United States and China, for example, can probably restrain Afghanistan, there is no inherent reason why this should provoke the Soviet Union or Iraq. The powers prefer *détente*, if they can get it, and will pass up opportunities for global competition unless the opportunity is compelling. The lines of

dismemberment forces are possibilities, not probabilities, assuming a measure of domestic strength in Pakistan.

Stable buffer

Objectively, Iran and India have a mutual interest in a stable buffer between themselves and in stable border areas as well. Neither state needs additional territory or turmoil. Both states now perceive themselves as natural leaders of their respective regions; the "zones" meet in Pakistan. Given the potential international lineup of interests, setting the two on opposing sides, and their very real opposition during the Bangladesh crisis, there was an understandable period of tension following the Shah's statement of support for Bhutto's Pakistan and of his intentions regarding Baluchistan. It is to the credit of both states, and to everyone's advantage, that initiatives were taken to keep a fluid situation from hardening in a detrimental fashion. The Shah's reassuring July interview with a senior Indian journalist, and the subsequent quiet visit to Iran by India's Foreign Minister, has opened a positive new phase in their relations.

India and Pakistan similarly have a mutual interest in stability. Of course, they will not trust each fully for some time to

India and Iran see themselves as leaders of their zones

come, if ever. There is a real possibility that each country's "department of dirty tricks", so long in operation against the other, cannot resist the temptations that arise to probe the soft spots of each other's politics. However, it is time both countries accepted the fact that Pakistan's military is no longer a credible threat to India, and that Pakistan's stability is in the national interests of both countries; Pakistan's further dismemberment is in neither country's national interest.

There are opportunities as well as hazards in the fluid situation created in South Asia. Pakistan's chance to forge a new identity is paralleled by the regional opportunity to create a new balance of forces, conducive to enough stability to permit concentration on domestic development.

Fluid situations put a premium on political acumen. It is in this field that Mr. Bhutto excels. There has been serious failure by the subcontinent's leaders to grasp the positive opportunities, and all have played politics with thousands of hostages to a great game. However, the opportunities still exist. There are risks in the Middle East option; Pakistan could be drawn from a periphery to the centre of a whirlpool not of its making and not in its national interests. There are risks in the domestic games of tribal and regional balance. Mr. Bhutto has shown himself to be a master juggler, and has put on a dazzling display of political finesse. He must keep it up, however, to see that the clubs do not begin crashing down, bringing to an end Jinnah's dream of a Moslem homeland created from the fabric of Britain's patchwork Empire.

Indo-Pakistan agreement on prisoners

The Indo-Pakistani agreement of August 28, in which Bangladesh has concurred, attempted to separate the humanitarian aspects of the exchange of prisoners of war and populations from political considerations. It marks a fresh and impressive stride forward in the removal of tensions that have existed in the area since the 1971 war.

This latest hard-won agreement provides for the repatriation of all Pakistani POWs in India except for the 195 wanted for trial by Bangladesh; the simultaneous repatriation of all Bengalis in Pakistan (150-200,000 people) and all Pakistanis in Bangladesh; acceptance by Pakistan of a substantial number of non-Bengalis from Bangladesh, with an agreement to consider further migration later; the setting aside of trials for the 195 POWs until the three repatriation movements are complete and until the three countries "can discuss and settle the question". Finally, the agreement refers to possible international involvement to facilitate the repatriation agreement.

The agreement reflects concessions made by both Bangladesh and Pakistan. Pakistan has implicitly agreed to drop the counter-trials it threatened against 203 Bengalis and has agreed to accept

a substantial number of non-Bengalis who have opted for Pakistan. Bangladesh has permitted the transfer of the Pakistani POWs before its recognition by Pakistan. However, the agreement also contains a number of ambiguities and potential difficulties, such as the implementation of the principle of simultaneity of exchange and Bangladesh's desire to discuss issues with Pakistan only on the basis of "sovereign equality", which may hamstring the implementation of the agreement, as well as the early settlement of the larger issues involved.

The first movements of Pakistani prisoners of war and of nationals of Pakistan and Bangladesh have already taken place. The Canadian Government has made a preliminary contribution of \$50,000 through the International Committee of the Red Cross. The repatriation operation has been placed under the general co-ordination of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In response to an appeal made by the UN Secretary-General, a Canadian contribution to the repatriation and rehabilitation phases of the population transfers envisaged is being considered.

Mrs. Gandhi's standing at peak but India's grim facts remain

By Frank Moraes

Though partly derivative, Indira Gandhi's role as leader of India is individual and distinctive. Certainly she would not have been India's Prime Minister had she not been her father's daughter. But the Congress cabal then headed by its president, Kamaraj, who elected her to succeed Lal Bahadur Shastri following his sudden death in Tashkent in January 1966 miscalculated in thinking that she was a woman they could mastermind. Kamaraj believed that she was a pigeon he could manage by remote control. Actually he let loose a cat among the pigeons. It ended in the disruption of the old Congress.

"She is the only man among the old women of the Congress," I wrote as editor of *The Indian Express* shortly after Mrs. Gandhi's first election as Prime Minister. I cannot pretend to know her well. I think I first met her with her father in Bombay back in 1938, when Nehru briefly visited a cultural centre in which I was interested. She was then, as now, reserved and tentative. I have latterly come to know her slightly better, but only slightly.

Indira Gandhi can best be understood in relation to her background. In his earlier period, Nehru was a romantic who built a political dream world around him. Later he was a pragmatic, tentative realist in politics.

Mrs. Gandhi grew up against a revolutionary and rebellious background. She was born on 19 November 1917, the year of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, a child of what was to prove an earthshaking upsurge. China didn't matter then, but China was to matter later. A lonely child, Indira grew up in this environmental turnover, which must have left some scars in her memory. Additionally, there was the turmoil of Gandhian politics. Today she still goes it alone politically, perhaps the loneliest woman in India.

In a general sense, though many including myself disagree with her politically, I feel she has certain human qualities which transcend political yardsticks. She is sensitively aware of the human misery

in which India exists, the starving but now not so dumb millions who still look to Delhi for succour. *Delhi dur ast* (Delhi is far away).

To the villages

Travelling around India far more than any of her ministers has done, she is India in an extraordinary sense. She has taken Delhi to Indian villages. Her headaches began with her massive victory in the general election of 1971.

She had shown herself a clever tactician, artful in many ways, but she had now to deliver the goods, and her incapacity to think and plan in depth, particularly on economic issues, exposed her limitations as a strategist. India's crushing poverty would not yield to mere slogans. Unless increased productivity generated wealth, there was only poverty to distribute. To eliminate poverty demanded careful long-range planning, free from the incubus of "isms", and free also from the jungle of red tape, licences and controls in which the administration was bogged. The bureaucratic leviathan had inflated to monstrous proportions since independence.

A too massive parliamentary majority can, in fact, be an embarrassment, for the electorate endowed Mrs. Gandhi with their overwhelming vote primarily as an insurance against continuing instability at the centre, not as a mandate for extreme policies. The Indian sense of democracy,

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which has still to strike deep roots, prefers rule by an individual to rule by consensus. The father figure still looms large, as it does in China, expressing itself in the respect and reverence paid to the head of a Hindu joint family; and the emperor tradition lingers in the faith often reposed in a single, all-powerful leader.

Mrs. Gandhi's commitment to democracy will thus be put to a severe test and will be judged by the manner in which she exercises the vast authority vested in her. To her credit, the Prime Minister has so far resisted the temptation to move precipitately. If anything, she was more precipitate before the 1971 election, when her majority was small, than she is today. With greater political security, she also shows signs of more maturity. The convent girl has receded into the background and, while her thinking on some subjects still lacks depth and continues to be swayed by slogans, a new, confident personality speaks out of the barrel of power. She has her small, hand-picked band of trusted advisers. Some allege that her thinking is largely done for her by others, but I do not agree since, whoever gives the advice or whatever it is, hers is the ultimate decision.

Sure judgment

Mrs. Gandhi's strongest points as a political tactician are her sound instinct and her sure judgment. She can see more perceptively into the heart of a political or party matter than most of her colleagues, and even the most senior among them, men like Jagjivan Ram and Y. B. Chavan, have learned to defer to her opinions. Mrs. Gandhi will brock no rival, and before her authority ministers cower. Among them, including Chavan and Jagjivan Ram, subservience is possibly explained by the fact that, at one time or another, the Prime Minister has caught these veteran war-horses prancing on the wrong foot in the wrong pastures.

Mrs. Gandhi has the reputation of never forgetting. More ominously, she rarely forgives. She has shown a capacity for toppling restive colleagues as deftly as she has toppled a good few inconvenient state governments. Watching her in action today, surrounded by her courtier-ministers, all conscious that at any moment the axe may descend on their necks, one wonders whether a male liberation movement is not overdue in India, or in Asia. For, apart from Mrs. Gandhi, the only other two women prime ministers in the world are Mrs. Bandaranaike of Ceylon and Mrs. Golda Meir of Israel.

Between power and absolute power, as Acton pointed out, there is a distinction.

The overwhelming preponderance of the ruling party in Parliament has reduced public interest in that forum, as also public concern in the workings of democracy. Mrs. Gandhi has five clear years of absolute power before her, and the future of democracy and of India depends very largely on how she uses her overwhelming authority during this period.

Following the rout of the reactionaries in the 1971 election, the Prime Minister has lost her excuse for inaction. The eruption in Bangladesh, with the mammoth influx of refugees into India, served as a temporary excuse for delay. The lifting of the poor man's burden on which Mrs. Gandhi had won her elections cannot now be held up indefinitely. Mrs. Gandhi will have to begin delivering the goods within the next three years. At the end of the five years, she will be called to account.

In the hindsight of history, India's embroilment in war with Pakistan in December 1971, ending in Pakistan's dismemberment and defeat, gave Mrs. Gandhi a valuable breathing space. Her popularity in the country reached a new peak when she most needed it.

It wasn't only luck, for the way in which Mrs. Gandhi handled the Bangladesh crisis reveals a shrewd mixture of judgment, timing, calculation and guile. The tragedy of East Bengal, or Bangladesh as it is now known, reveals how tenuous a link religion is when the cumulative pressures of other influences are brought to bear. The tragedy of Pakistan was that in attempting to divide India it divided itself, over a 1,000 miles separating East Bengal from West Pakistan. Like the East Bengalis, the Punjabi, Pathan and Baluchi soldiers from West Pakistan were Moslems, but ethnically, linguistically and culturally they were different. The conception of a Pakistan based on a single religion has broken down under the stress of facts.

Second-class citizens

Since independence, West Pakistan had treated what is now known as Bangladesh as a poor relation, with the ruling Punjabi élite looking down on the Bengalis as second-class citizens. The fact that the East Bengalis constituted the majority of the two wings of Pakistan combined added to the irony of the situation. Usually a majority dominates the minorities; in old Pakistan it was the other way round. A minority sought to oppress and suppress the majority, for in West Pakistan resided 45 million people, while in East Pakistan were over 70 million.

I was in East Pakistan both during and after the fighting. West Pakistan was

With greater political security, she shows signs of more maturity

Her reputation was one of never forgetting, rarely forgiving

bent, especially after the December 1970 elections, when the polls resulted in a sweeping victory for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his party, the Awami League in East Bengal, on seeing that the balance of political and economic power should not shift to the east. The result was a head-on collision. East Bengal was subjected to a holocaust by the West which started the mammoth exodus of refugees into India.

"It wasn't an insurrection by the people. It was an attack on the people," a Bengali Moslem remarked to me in Agartala, near the frontiers of Bangladesh. I spent some days with the Bangladesh guerrillas, who were largely former members of the East Pakistan Rifles and the East Punjab Regiment. They called themselves the Mukhti Fanj, which might broadly be translated as "the Liberation Forces". Refugees were streaming into India, the vast majority Bengalis, though one also came across a few West Pakistanis fleeing from the vengeance of the Bengalis.

Mrs. Gandhi played her hand calmly and dexterously at this point. She refused to be hustled into war by the hawks on the Indian side. Instead, she insisted that the political rift between West Pakistan and East Bengal was no concern of India unless the influx of refugees into India assumed monstrous and unbearable proportions. The refugee problem concerned not only India but the civilized world, which could not escape its humanitarian responsibility. The exodus would not be abated unless the killing stopped. There would have been no refugees if there had been no attempt at genocide.

Mrs. Gandhi's plea fell on deaf ears. All she got from most world leaders on a foreign tour she undertook at this stage was sympathy and tea. The danger of the blaze in East Bengal igniting West Bengal also could not be ignored.

Repeated warning

As the influx of refugees from East Bengal into India mounted alarmingly, the Indian Prime Minister repeatedly warned the world that India could not remain a silent spectator to the growing menace posed by this problem. She once again appealed to the rulers of countries which had influence with Pakistan to stop the mass exodus.

By October 1971, the refugee influx was nearing the ten-million mark.

Actually, India's military involvement in Bangladesh was precipitated by Pakistan, which on December 3, 1971, descended with its bombers on nine Indian air-bases, largely in Kashmir and the West, in a pre-emptive air strike obviously modelled on the Israeli air attack on Egypt in June 1967. However, G H Q Delhi had anticipated the move and had taken the necessary precautions. When the Pakistanis came, they found their primary targets missing.

Mrs. Gandhi had now no alternative but to order the Indian armed forces to take the offensive in Bangladesh. The rest is history. Some 80,000 Pakistani troops under General Niazi surrendered. I was in Bangladesh shortly after the surrender and had some interesting conversations with our army commanders, officers and troops. There was still grisly evidence of the barbarities committed against the Bengalis, both Moslems and Hindus, not only by the Pakistani army but by some of the more extreme political fanatics. The fields around Dacca were strewn with many skeletons and a few ravaged corpses with dogs tearing and crows pecking at them. Some wells were heaped with grinning skulls. The stench was still strong.

At the end of the Bangladesh war, Mrs. Gandhi's popularity, influence and authority were at their peak. All the world loves a winner. But, once the euphoria had subsided, the Indian Prime Minister and people were left facing the grim facts of economic life. With a judiciary and bureaucracy weakened by frontal attacks, the props supporting good administration and the rule of law have begun to shake. The press, for the most part, still remains independent, refusing to bow before the Congress storm. But its influence, with the government-controlled radio and television in the ascendant, is not as pervasive and decisive as it once was.

Abroad, Mrs. Gandhi must thread her uneasy way between Russia and China. As long as the present alignments between the so-called superpowers and between China and Pakistan last, the Indian Prime Minister must move with caution and circumspection.

*No alternative
but to order
Indian forces
on the offensive*

*Requires caution
to thread way
between China
and Soviet Union*

The three background articles and commentaries on the Middle East were prepared before the major outbreak of fighting between the Arab states and Israel on October 6 and the subsequent adoption of resolutions by the United Nations Security Council in the week

of October 22-28. These resolutions provided for a ceasefire and the creation of a peacekeeping force to be sent to the area. A subsequent issue of *International Perspectives* will deal, in several articles, with the implications of the latest Arab-Israeli conflict.

Clash of nationalisms at root of the Arab-Israeli conflict

By Tareq Y. Ismael

The Arab-Israeli conflict has now dominated world headlines and threatened world peace for a generation. The regular occurrence of violence and war in the Middle East is regrettably familiar to us, and seems as normal a state of affairs as the cold war. Indeed, at times the situation in the Middle East has been more threatening. Of the six emergency special sessions of the United Nations called since the organization's founding, four have been convened owing to events in the Middle East, and the Arab-Israeli problem has been on the agenda of every regular session. But so many Middle East crises have occurred in the last 25 years that the nature of the conflict, its *raison d'être*, has become obscured by the emotion and suspense of each new phase of the drama. The news headlines, television coverage and magazine feature stories that dramatize each new crisis focus our attention on the issues of the moment and obscure the fundamental causes of the conflict from which each crisis arises. The following pages attempt to provide an overview of the conflict, its origin, escalation and present contours.

In essence, the Arab-Israeli conflict stems from the irreconcilable aims of

Zionism and Arab nationalism over the same land. Modern Zionism is a socio-political and nationalistic movement whose aim is the gathering of the Jews as a nation into Palestine. It developed as a Jewish response to antisemitism in Europe in the nineteenth century. The World Zionist Organization, founded in 1897, was dedicated to "create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law". Theodor Herzl, founder and first leader of the organization, attempted through diplomatic channels to get one of the major powers to sponsor a Jewish home in Palestine. Only the British were sympathetic, and in 1903 they offered what is now Uganda as a site for a Jewish home. But the World Zionist Organization rejected this offer. Owing to the religious and historic attachment of the Jews to Palestine, the Zionist organization was unalterably committed to establishing a Jewish national home in this area only.

Balfour Declaration

During this period, the World Zionist Organization established groups to facilitate Jewish immigration to Palestine and to purchase land in Palestine for the settlement of European Jews. Through British support, the Zionist organization was able to facilitate the immigration to Palestine of thousands of European Jews. And in 1917 Britain gave official approval in the Balfour Declaration to the establishment of a Jewish "homeland" in Palestine. But Zionist efforts to secure a homeland for Europe's Jews played a developing counterpoint to a growing nationalism that awakened among the Arabs aspirations diametrically opposed to those of the Zionists.



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Arab nationalism, considered as the belief in the national identity of the Arab people and the desire to see them brought into a single polity, has been described as the "principal movement through which the Arab peoples are seeking to reconstruct the foundations of their life, after centuries of suspended animation". It developed in the nineteenth century with the revival of Arab history, art and literature that awakened within the Arabs a sense of pride in their heritage and its uniqueness, and a desire to free themselves from foreign domination. The initial spark to the Arab "awakening" was provided by the steady influx of Western ideas, processes and techniques throughout the nineteenth century that was accompanied by an increase in Western intervention and imperialism in the area.

The Palestinians shared in this growing nationalist awareness. Palestine, historically a part of Syria, had a principally Arab population since 640 A.D.; language, history, national interests and geographic position bound Palestine's people with the rest of the Arab homeland. The national congresses of 1919 and 1920 passed resolutions expressing the nationalist aspiration that Palestine remain part of the Syrian entity and as such be unified with the greater Arab homeland.

Three forces

By the time of the First World War, then, there were three forces seeking aspirations in Palestine: the Zionists, who wished to establish a home there for European Jews; the Arabs, who constituted the indigenous population of Palestine as well as the surrounding regions, and identified Palestine as part of the Arab homeland; and the European powers, particularly the British, who sought to gain domination over Palestine and the surrounding areas for imperialist purposes. British and Zionist aspirations in Palestine were not necessarily incompatible. While the Zionists depended upon British support in the implementation of their goals in Palestine, the British, with typical imperialist chauvinism, viewed the settlement of an essentially European population in the midst of Arab culture as a progressive force. More important, however, they viewed the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine as a potentially important base for their imperialist operations in the Middle East. This identification of Zionist and imperialist goals has had a profound impact on the Middle East conflict, for both Zionism and European imperialism were antithetic to Arab nationalism and came to be regarded as accomplices in the ensuing struggle.

The British response to Arab nationalism was to enlist its aid in freeing the Middle East from Turkish domination during the First World War by promising the Arabs an independent state in the Arab lands of the Middle East. At the same time, however, Britain pressed forward with its imperial designs and in the secret Sykes-Picot agreement divided the Middle East into spheres of influence for the Allied Powers. In return for Zionist support during the war, Britain issued the Balfour Declaration. Palestine was "the most promised land."

When the Paris Peace Conference convened in 1919 to settle the issues of the First World War, Prince Faisal attended as the representative of a people who had made a significant contribution to the Allied war effort. Armed with Allied promises of Arab independence — the Husayn-McMahon correspondence promising the Arabs an independent homeland, Britain's Declaration to the Seven (a reaffirmation of Britain's pledge made to seven Arab leaders in Cairo in June 1918), President Wilson's Fourteen Points enunciating the principle of self-determination, and the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918 (again reaffirming Allied promises) — Faisal prepared to demand the fulfillment of those promises. However, in April 1920, the Allied Supreme Council met at San Remo and divided the Arab provinces into several mandates. The mandates as established were Syria and Lebanon under France and Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq under Britain. The Balfour Declaration was reaffirmed. And as a result of British duplicity, Arab nationalism came to regard all Western actions in the Middle East with suspicion and anxiety.

Jewish immigration increased

After the establishment of the British mandate in Palestine, Jewish immigration dramatically increased. While the period from 1883 to 1919 witnessed a total of approximately 121,000 European Jews immigrate to Palestine, during the mandate period from 1920 to 1948 approximately 430,000 Jews immigrated. (However, even in 1948 the Jews still constituted less than 45 per cent of the country's population). This massive immigration was facilitated by Britain's support of the Zionist program. Under the mandate, the Jewish community in Palestine established institutions of self-government and remained essentially autonomous from the Arab majority in every aspect of their social, political and economic life, thus exacerbating Palestinian fears "aroused by the strangeness, the manifest ability,

Britain's support of Zionist plan facilitated Jewish influx

and, above all, the aggressiveness of the Zionist colonists". (Millar Burrows, *Palestine is Our Business*, Westminster Press).

The Arab nationalist response to both British imperialist and Zionist aspirations in Palestine reacted to the growing waves of European Jewish immigration with hostility, for they regarded the European immigrants as agents of imperialism and identified the Zionist program as a plan for foreign usurpation of their homeland. After the establishment of the mandate, Palestinian Arab fears of Zionism in the face of growing Jewish immigration culminated in 1936 in a general strike that lasted six months, followed by a revolt against the mandatory government that lasted three years. As a result, in 1939 the British Government issued a White Paper in which it declared its intention to limit Jewish immigration and to grant Palestine its independence at the end of ten years. The Zionists reacted to the White Paper with a campaign of terrorism against the British. The British-Zionist alliance that had been so instrumental to the Zionist cause ruptured, and Britain found itself in the bull's-eye of both Zionist and Arab aims in Palestine.

The advent of the Second World War sharply curtailed Zionist activities aimed at independence. Hitler's persecution of European Jews caused the Zionist organization to concentrate its energy in support of the Allied war effort. But the Zionists also put considerable effort into the illegal immigration of European Jewish refugees from Hitler's persecutions. The Arabs, fearing the usurpation of their rights in Palestine by the swelling Jewish population, demonstrated and rioted against the Jewish communities and British occupation. In retaliation for British attempts to limit immigration, the Stern Gang, a band of Jewish terrorists, maintained a private war with the British. Thus, Palestine became an unbearable administrative and financial burden to the British and, at the war's end, Britain placed the Palestine problem before the United Nations.

Rally to Zionist cause

The revelation at the end of the war of the attempted extermination of European Jewry had two profound effects upon the Palestine problem. First, imbued with a deep-seated sense of guilt for Western civilization's age-old persecution of Jews that culminated in genocide, the Western world rallied to the support of Zionist aspirations. Western governments, particularly that of the United States, which had tacitly but passively supported Zionism, became staunch allies of the move-



Canada Wide photo

Egyptian soldiers stand beneath their flag on the Bar Lev Line, the defence works constructed by Israel on the east bank of the Suez Canal after the 1967 Middle East war. The Egyptians occupied much of this line three to ten miles from the canal during the early fighting in the conflict during October of this year.

ment and threw the weight of their international influence behind the Zionist cause. Thus, while the Zionist movement lost its British ally, this was quickly replaced by other, especially American, support.

The second effect was to imbue the Zionist movement with a pathological paranoia regarding the righteousness and necessity of the Zionist solution to the plight of the Jews. The very basis of Zionist philosophy is the perception of the world as a hostile, antisemitic environment. Thus, Herzl hypothesized that Jewish minorities would eventually be persecuted wherever they existed and advanced the plan of the ingathering of all Jews within their own nation, where they could be insulated against a threatening antisemitic world. Hitler's policy of genocide changed this fundamental assumption of Zionist philosophy into the cardinal principle of Zionism.

For the Zionists, the ingathering of the Jews and the creation of a Jewish state took on the aura of a sacred mission. The Zionist organization rejected all offers of resettling Europe's Jewish refugees in places other than Palestine and adopted

*In retaliation
Jewish terrorists
maintained
a private war
with the British*

any means by which to advance their cause, even the deliberate scuttling, with the consequent loss of 250 lives, of a ship filled with Jewish refugees detained in the harbour of Haifa for trying to enter Palestine illegally. According to an account of the episode published in the *Jewish Newsletter* (November 3, 1958), this was "a political demonstration against the British, carried out at the cost of 250 innocent Jews — men, women, and children". Thus, owing to the mass extermination of Europe's Jews, Zionism took on an aggressiveness, a sense of righteousness and a dedication to its cause symptomatic of ideological or religious fanaticism.

The Palestine issue went before the first sessions of the United Nations in 1946-47 and a special committee, UNSCOP, was instructed to study the problem. The special committee submitted to the General Assembly a majority report calling for a partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, and a minority plan supporting the formation of a federal government in Palestine.

Partition plan

The partition plan was energetically supported by the Zionists (as the achievement of the Zionist movement's goal of establishing a Jewish national state in Palestine), and by the United States, which brought its considerable influence in world affairs to bear on the matter. On the other hand, from the outset the plan was bitterly opposed by the Arab majority within Palestine and subsequently by the neighbouring Arab states.

In effect, then, the partition plan proposed a solution to the Palestine dilemma that was strongly opposed not only by the majority of the Palestinian population — i.e. the Arabs — but also by all the nations surrounding Palestine. However, the right to self-determination was never applied to Palestine. As early as 1919, Lord Balfour, author of the Balfour Declaration, wrote: "In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country.... The four great powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions." (*Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, 1st Series, Vol. IV.) And the General Assembly reaffirmed this principle by rejecting a resolution calling for a referendum to be held in Palestine and submission of the issue to the International Court of Justice.

After the General Assembly's acceptance of the partition plan late in 1947, the situation in Palestine completely deter-

iorated as civil war broke out between Arabs and Jews. The provisions of the plan became a dead letter when Israel declared its independence in May 1948 and open warfare broke out between the new state and its Arab neighbours.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1948 had several ramifications: first, Israel approximately doubled the size of the territory allotted to it in the partition plan; secondly, the Palestinian state the partition plan provided for the Palestinian Arab population never came into existence, as whatever territory of this proposed state was not seized by Israel during the war was awarded by the UN to the neighbouring state of Jordan; thirdly, Israel demonstrated its overwhelming military superiority over the combined power of the neighbouring Arab states.

Homeless Palestinians

By far the most dramatic and regrettable consequence of the 1948 war, however, was the expulsion from their homeland and the subsequent degradation of more than 1,000,000 Palestinian Arabs who became homeless, hapless refugees dependent upon world philanthropy for their survival. A Zionist terror campaign was largely responsible for the mass flight of the Palestinian Arabs. On April 9 1948, a small band of Zionist terrorists entered the Arab village of Deir Yassin and murdered its 250 occupants — mostly women and children. News of the massacre spread like wildfire to neighbouring villages and the Arabs fled in total panic. Although the Zionist organization condemned the Deir Yassin massacre, it never brought those responsible to justice. According to the editor of the *Jewish Observer*, Jon Kimche, "they [the terrorists] justified the massacre of Deir Yassin because it led up to the panic flight of the remaining Arabs in the 'Jewish State' and so lessened the Jewish casualties". (*Seven Fallen Pillars*. London; Secker and Warburg, 1953, P. 228.) Israel, on the other hand, maintains that the Palestinian Arabs were exhorted to leave by the Arab League, and thus left voluntarily. Israel has refused to abide by all UN resolutions demanding that the refugees be given the choice of returning to their homes or receiving compensation for lands and properties left behind.

Just as Hitler's genocide had a profound effect on Zionist attitudes, so the loss of Palestine and the plight of the Palestinian Arabs had an equally profound effect on Arab nationalism. The Zionist victory led many youthful nationalists to condemn Arab society as a whole and to attempt, within a decade of the Palestine

Israel doubled size of territory allotted to it after 1948 conflict



a Wide photo

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UPI photo

Egyptian troops sit atop tank guarding strongholds on east bank of Suez Canal during the first day of fighting between

Egypt and Israel in October. Israeli troops in later counterattacks held the Egyptian advance to a narrow strip along the canal.

war, nationalist upheavals in Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt that aimed at structural reform of Arab society as a whole with the destruction of feudal social structures, capitalist exploitation and the persistence of privileged classes.

In addition to this radicalization of Arab nationalism, the nationalist perception of a Zionist-imperialist threat became as paranoid as the Zionist perception of an antisemitic threat. This is the essential nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict: it derives from the clash of two nationalisms, each born of injustice, nurtured in violence and sustained by military conflict. Each views the other with a pathological fear that defines every act of the antagonist as aggressive and rationalizes its own acts as defensive.

It is through this perspective of the emotional and psychological environment of the Arab-Israeli conflict that the subsequent crises can best be understood. Both the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars were enmeshed in complicated issues far too involved to detail in this brief survey. The legal and moral aspects of such questions as who has what rights and obligations, who is right and who is wrong, and who

is aggressor and who is defender may be moot philosophic and historical points, but they do not explain the dynamics of the conflict. Each crisis has arisen from the perception of a threat — real or exaggerated — and the emission of a response. The response of one appears to the other as aggressive and threatening. Thus ensues an escalating spiral of acts that has culminated in two more wars since 1948 and is rapidly approaching a third.

Change in scope

While the basic nature of the conflict has remained a clash of nationalisms, the scope of the conflict has undergone considerable change. The most obvious has been the manifestation of the cold war in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States has been actively involved in the support of Zionism, and subsequently Israel, since the end of the Second World War. When first Egypt and then other Arab countries sought Soviet support during the Fifties to counterbalance America's support of Israel, big-power competition in the Middle East changed the scope of the Arab-Israeli conflict from regional to international. Throughout the Fifties and Sixties the

Each defines acts of antagonist as aggressive, rationalizes its own acts as defensive

danger of a big-power confrontation in the Middle East threatened world peace as both the United States and the Soviet Union bolstered the war machines of their protégés in the area and became entangled in the web of violence. However, following Israel's dramatic defeat of the Arabs in the 1967 war, Soviet support to the Arabs in their struggle with Israel has been gradually diminishing, with a consequent lessening of international tensions. On the other hand, America has continued to support unreservedly every Israeli policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967, including Israel's continued occupation of Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian territories that Israel seized in the war. And, so long as Israel remains so closely linked with an outside power, Arab nationalists will continue to perceive a Zionist-imperialist plot in the Middle East and to seek the support of outside powers as a counter-balance.

The addition of another million Palestinians to the ranks of refugees as a result of Israel's occupation of considerable stretches of Arab territory in the 1967 war changed the scope of human suffering too. Not only this, however. Out of the frustration of the 1967 defeat arose the Palestinian conviction that neither the Arab governments nor the world community were capable of restoring to the Palestinian people their usurped rights. In the fear that their fate — like that of the American Indians — would be consignment to oblivion, they have risen to challenge Zionism, traditional Arab governments and the world community as a whole. Their battle has the poignancy of a lost cause and the terror of desperation. Through guerrilla raids, hijacked planes and kidnapped hostages, they wage a new and terrifying kind of warfare that knows no limit to the war zone. In this way, they have internationalized the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the re-

spect that some of their exploits, launched from areas outside the Middle East, have become matters of international concern.

Key refugee problem

Israel's dedication to the Zionist ideal of ingathering world Jewry has been viewed by the Arabs as an expansionist program of usurpation of Arab lands to accommodate a foreign population in an exclusivist society. And indeed it may well be. In three wars, Israel has more than tripled its original size as provided by the UN partition plan, has refused to relinquish the lands thus gained by military conquest, and has refused to facilitate the return to their homes of the Palestinian Arab refugees. On the other hand, Arab nationalist dedication to the restoration of Palestine has been viewed by Israel as a threat to the survival of its society. And indeed it may well be.

Up to 1967, every Arab government refused to acknowledge the existence of Israel, and Arab nationalism is in principle dedicated to the restoration of Palestine. While both Zionism and Arab nationalism are to some extent victims of these evils, I tend to believe that the major emphasis of both is on the peace, prosperity and security of their respective peoples. However, so long as the Palestinian refugee problem remains unresolved in a just and equitable manner, the plight of the Palestinians will remain the central issue of Arab nationalism. And so long as the Palestinian Arabs remain in refugee camps, Israel will feel the insecurity of being surrounded by a hostile nationalism seeking justice and revenge for its people. In essence, then, I regard the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as depending on the solution of the Palestinian refugee problem. Whether this is possible or probable is for the antagonists, the world community and the future to decide.

Arab dedication to restoration of Palestine viewed by Israel as a threat to its survival

... The Arabs are haunted by their ghost too. It does not have the drama of the holocaust, but it is a ghost shared by the poor, underdeveloped two-thirds of the world's population. It is the ghost of humiliation and weakness.

Heirs to a proud civilization, contemporary Arabs are the sons and grandsons of those who lived under imperialism and colonialism. The last British troops evacuated Egypt, after 66 years, in 1956 — just a few months before they, the French and the Israelis invaded Egypt in the Suez

crisis. During the long British occupation, Egypt, already poor and backward, fell relatively further behind the rich nations. . . .

This sense of backwardness, humiliation and memory of distant grandeur is a poisonous political brew. We have watched its effects in Africa, Asia, Latin America and here at home. Few Arab governments are free of its effects. . . . (William R. Polk, professor of Middle East History, University of Chicago, Time-Post News Service, October 16, 1973).

Israel should be able to face the tests of the next 25 years

By Avraham Avi-hai

It is another irony of history that the Zionist settlers returning to Palestine — which they called “the Land of Israel” — were to a great extent inspired by the Messianic vision of eternal peace. Yet Israelis have had to fight and win three wars in order to convince themselves and others that the state they created is not ephemeral.

The 1956 war brought years of relative quiet to Israel's borders, though these remained unrecognized by its neighbours. Combined U.S.-U.S.S.R. pressure in 1956-57 forced Israel to withdraw from Suez and Gaza, while brilliant manipulation of Egyptian public opinion by the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser deprived Israel of recognition by the Egyptian public that Israel had indeed been the military victor. In the decade between the Sinai War and the Six-Day War of June 1967, it was the Syrian border, rather than that with Egypt, which was troublesome. Syrian threats and half-hearted attempts to divert the waters of the Jordan River in order to prevent Israel from completing its National Water Carrier Irrigation Project sparked several military incidents in the early Sixties, while Syrian funds and military and intelligence support launched the Fatah actions from 1965 onward that

played so important a role in setting the stage for 1967.


The Six-Day War cleared the way for a new situation in the Middle East. Paradoxically, while the United States and the Soviet Union had been moving slowly toward the limited *détente* that the June Brezhnev visit to Washington symbolizes, it was in the Middle East that the two superpowers found themselves close to confrontation. The late President Johnson's astute and determined use of the “hot-line” in early June 1967 made it clear to the Soviet leadership that an overcommitment to their Egyptian client would be met with steps so determined as to halt any active Soviet participation if this were indeed planned.

During the years since the 1967 war, a number of important changes have taken place in Israel's relations with its neighbours, as well as in the relations between area states and the great powers. When “the phone call” from President Nasser, making an appointment for peace-talks, never materialized, initial disappointment gave way to a double-edged Israeli policy. On the one hand, military force was used from time to time, as deemed necessary by the Israel decision-makers, to offset the Arab artillery advantage along the Suez line during the “War of Attrition” period (March 1969 - August 1971). Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's inept handling of the Russians and the U.S.S.R.'s receipt of Israeli signals that Israel would not back away from a direct confrontation with Soviet pilots and gunners, coupled with a change in line in Moscow due to fear of a Chinese-American anti-Russian axis, led to the withdrawal of Soviet “technicians” and troops from the U.A.R. in July 1972. Internal Soviet concerns also played their part in this withdrawal. The military balance, previously seen as favouring Israel, was now more and more perceived as such quite clearly by most Arab statesmen.

The hard line taken by the Israelis along their borders was matched, on the



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UPI photo

An Israeli Air Force Skyhawk fighter-bomber swoops in to deliver air support to advancing column of mechanized Israeli infantry moving to positions in Golan Heights on border with Syria. Israeli

troops recaptured Golan area during fighting in October and occupied a segment of Syrian territory beyond this zone in nearly three weeks of conflict before ceasefire.

other hand, by an enlightened paternalism within the occupied territories themselves. Effectively, the Arab "resistance" movements, called simply "terrorists" in Israel, have, therefore, not only been unable to stage any serious attacks within Israel or the occupied west bank in the past year or so but have been totally unsuccessful in building an organization on public support. The "open bridges" policy, which permits direct contact between the west bank and the east bank (Jordan), has muted the local Arabs' sense of loss, while massive aid and development-guidance has raised west bank incomes from 545 Israeli pounds in 1968 to 1,150 pounds in 1971. Thousands of summer visitors from Arab countries now come to the west bank and Israel, and with their firsthand reports offset Arab horror propaganda and the wishful thinking about Israel's imminent economic collapse.

In the Arab-Israel confrontation, Israel holds the military advantage over all the neighbouring Arab states — Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Jordan's King Hussein has openly called for negotiations with Israel, in itself a historic gesture. Lebanon and even Syria are relatively powerless and have been forced by limited

Israeli military intervention, or its possibility, to curb guerrilla attacks from their territories. But neutralizing the Arab states militarily has not led to peace negotiations.

The weakness of the political leadership in the countries of "confrontation" is compounded by a vigorous anti-Israel diplomatic and propaganda offensive spearheaded by the oil-rich Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and bankrolled by other geographically removed oil-producing sheikhdoms as well. The great-power stand-off, and the military impasse, have helped perpetuate a frozen situation in the Middle East. The energy crisis — real, imagined, or even co-sponsored by oil companies and oil-producers — coupled with the shaky world monetary situation, tends to encourage the Arab leadership to wait and hope for better times.

Two schools of thought

As a result, the hardening of Israeli public opinion seems to favour those who believe peace is a false and misleading goal, never to be attained. The underlying political debate in Israel today is between the two schools a Canadian political scientist has labelled "Ben Gurionists" and "Weizman-

Energy crisis encourages Arabs to wait, hope for better times

nists", after the first Prime Minister and first President of Israel.

According to Professor Michael Brecher of McGill University, the former believe in reconciliation through "superior strength", the latter in reconciliation through "rational search for moderate solutions". (*The Foreign Policy System of Israel*, 1972). The Ben Gurionists, the foremost of whom is Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, seem to be veering toward a closed belief system: "Peace is unattainable, let's get on with living." Yet the majority of the Labour Party's political-machine leadership tends toward a policy that would call for the return of highly-populated Arab territories in exchange for peace. The forthcoming national elections are expected to return Golda Meir to power with a coalition government, as has been the case for the past quarter-century. Given the frozen operational environment and the lack of change in the perceived positions of both Arabs and Israelis, there seems little possibility of any real change in the Middle East. This judgment, how-

Majority tend toward policy of returning highly-populated Arab territories if peace results

ever, must be hedged, particularly in the volatile Middle East, by asserting that it seems to be so "barring unforeseen or unforeseeable occurrences".

In spite of the hostile environment, and perhaps even some weakening in the American position (partly under the threat of the so-called energy crisis, as evidenced by the readiness to supply *Phantom* jets to Saudi Arabia), Israel has continued its startling economic progress. The state's Zionist purpose, to create a sizeable Jewish population, is pursued without pause, with the U.S.S.R. becoming, again paradoxically, the main reservoir of future immigrants to Israel. The Jewish population is today close to 2,750,000, as compared to 650,000 in 1948. And, in spite of an inflation as tough as any in the West today, *per capita* income is rapidly reaching that of the advanced Western European countries. And, most important, political stability has been matched by no loss of nerve or morale. With peace or without, Israel should be able to face the tests of its next 25 years with confidence.

... It would be inaccurate to make Israel and its foreign policy primarily responsible for the protracted war with its Arab neighbours. There can be no doubt, in this writer's judgment, that the absence of peace is overwhelmingly the result of Arab intransigence; more specifically, the refusal to recognize the legitimacy, legality and permanence of Israel. The relevant question in this context is whether Israeli policy contributed to an easing of that psychological block. The evidence points to a strongly negative reply. Israel as a nation passionately desires peace and accommodation and, even more, reconciliation and co-operation with its Arab neighbours. Yet those who make and enunciate Israeli foreign policy have not shown originality in moving beyond vague declarations of intent. ...

... Israel's leaders must cease repeating the clichés of the past 25 years. The predominant Israeli image of the conflict with the Arabs — with some notable dissenters like Eban and Sapir — runs something like this: "We alone want peace. The Arabs are unwilling to make peace, have always been unwilling to do so, and will never accept the state of Israel. ..."

The core challenge is to change that image to accord with reality. What is peace, the most widely-used operative word in the diplomacy of Israel? Peace is a relationship of mutually-accepted coexistence between two or more states. It may begin with hostile coexistence and then move

through stages to peaceful coexistence, to accommodation and to active co-operation. Most important, it is a dynamic political process, not a static legal condition.

An improvement in inter-state relations depends upon changes in behaviour, flowing from decision-makers' revised definitions of their situations, their interests and their goals. ...

A leap from 25 years of active conflict to peace cannot occur in one step. It is a process of accommodation through stages. Nor does peace require love, fondness, affection, friendship or even respect. Israel, like most nations, wants to be loved, but this is an illusory objective. Nations merely have to accept each other.

Hostile coexistence in the Near East core should be acceptable for a decade or more as a first step up the ladder to active co-operation. Thus the notion of withdrawing — at all — for a "real peace" seems to beg the issue, for a "real" peace cannot be created at the moment of withdrawal: the conditions for peace in a protracted conflict can be established only slowly — and painfully. Withdrawal, too, must take place in stages; their extent and timing will depend upon progress in accommodation, as perceived by Israel. The first stage would be limited in scope — but symbolic of intent. ... (Excerpts from "Israel's Foreign Policy", by Professor Michael Brecher of McGill University, reprinted in *International Journal*, Autumn 1973).

A Mideast profile: the cycle of terror and counterterror

By John B. Wolf

Militant Palestinians regard the conduct of an armed struggle against Israel as their only alternative to life and death in the refugee camps; they are convinced that violence and terror against Israelis everywhere are their sole alternative to disfranchisement. Regardless of past and possible future setbacks, warns Black September, Palestinians are committed to the conduct of a protracted campaign of international terrorism in spite of its threat to the very fabric of civilization itself. Black September is an organization of ultra-militant Palestinians who executed the Israeli athletes at Munich, murdered three western diplomats at Khartoum last March, hijacked a Japan Air Lines jumbo jet with 145 people aboard last July, and carried out a varied program of similar operations since they first gained international notoriety with the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tal at Cairo in November 1971.

The very refusal of militant Palestinians to accept their present national status as irreversible is the core of the Palestinian resistance psychology, which, in each stage of its unfolding into action, is influenced by existentialist philosophy. The emphasis that is placed by them on crisis, action and self-identity clearly establishes the relationship to existentialism. Consequently, their convictions and resolution have not been noticeably weakened by the terrible cost in lives already expended by their people to win back Palestine, the suicidal aspect of their international campaign of terror, or by the logic of Israel's overwhelming military superiority.

Psychology such as this is easily turned to violence by forced dependency and restrictions on individual movement. Consequently the almost \$1-billion in United Nations funds which has gone to refugee relief and works since 1949 to support the operations of the refugee camps has created a revolutionary situation, since the camps' confinement of a person's life-style breeds discontent. Also intensifying the spirit of revolt in the young

Palestinian is his awareness that both Israel and the Arab states refuse to resolve the refugee problem for reasons either pragmatic or ideological or both. Insisting that the absorption of the refugees into adjacent land would imply Arab approval of continued retention by Israel of refugee property and would indicate a tacit Arab recognition of Israel, the Arabs say that the refugee problem is the responsibility of the great powers that helped create the Jewish state. Israel, meanwhile, emphasizes that rehabilitation of the displaced Arabs could not occur while considerations of military security were still paramount and while Israel's economic and social development was paralyzed by mobilization.

Echoes of hatred

Consequently, hatred too echoes in the background of Palestinian-based terrorism, as nowhere more than in the past-oriented Arab world do people mourn their lost lands and glories while remaining so powerless to regain them. The young Palestinian author Fawaz Turki, in his book *The Disinherited*, exclaims:

"and so I hated. I hated the world and the order of reality around me. I hated being dispossessed of a nation and an identity. I hated not being a part of a culture. I hated being a hybrid, an outcast, a zero. A problem.... Give me a gun, man, and I will blow my own or somebody else's brains out...."

Turki's words resemble others written a

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Fedayeen raids followed by Sinai 1956 war, then period of low-intensity, sporadic clashes

century ago by Feodor Dostoyevsky in his classic *The Possessed*, a novel of nihilist terrorism in which the wanton killer was held to be "possessed by devils".

But against Israel the new generation knows that its people have known only defeat. In May 1948, when the British mandate in Palestine ended, the Arabs and Israelis were left to fight it out. The Arabs lost, and 700,000 Palestinians fled or were driven out. Between 1948 and 1955, a number of unofficial and unorganized encounters occurred between bands of Palestinians and the Israelis. These events evolved into a cycle of *fedayeen* (the name means "they who sacrifice themselves") raids and Israeli retaliation that led to the Sinai War of 1956, which the Arabs also lost. The years between 1956 and 1964 were marked by only sporadic and low-intensity clashes between Palestinians and Israelis. But in 1965 the *fedayeen* raids began to build in both numbers and intensity as a consequence of the formation of the Palestine liberation organizations, which included Fatah.

Guerrilla losses

Until the summer of 1967, these organizations executed about three raids a month against Israel, which resulted in a horrendous loss of manpower. Frequently guerrilla infiltrator teams of ten men left nine of their number dead inside Israel. In the Six-Day War in 1967, another Arab defeat, Israel occupied the west bank of the Jordan River, the Golan Heights of Syria and the Gaza Strip, causing another 300,000 Palestinians to become displaced persons and 600,000 more to come under Israeli control in the occupied territories.

As a consequence of the obvious Arab inability to prevail in a conventional war waged against Israel, the Palestinians themselves sought new leadership and new programs. Fatah expanded its ranks and tried to build a clandestine organization among the Arabs of the occupied west bank. Militarily, Fatah's objective was to bleed Israel during the course of a protracted struggle similar to the one waged by the Algerians against the French a decade earlier. But this kind of warfare caused more suffering, death and frustration to Palestinians than to Israelis and, consequently, Fatah has since all but ended any meaningful guerrilla war against Israel. Fatah is now painfully aware that desert terrain inhibits this sort of operation, especially when technology (principally helicopters and computerized infrastructural networks) gives Israel's counter-insurgent forces a focus, speed and mobility the guerrillas cannot match.

Furthermore, in September 1970, a Palestinian attempt to turn Jordan into a guerrilla-controlled state also ended in failure. King Hussein viewed their campaign as a "Viet Cong style" effort and directed his army to crack down on the guerrillas. His troops unleashed a campaign of reprisal whose carnage reportedly exceeded the devastation unleashed by the Mongols when they seized Baghdad in the thirteenth century. This suppression of the guerrilla movement in Jordan was responsible for the rise of Black September, whose name is intended to symbolize the wrath of the Palestinian people.

Defeated in Jordan, the Palestinians tried to exploit an understanding between themselves and the Lebanese Government, which sanctioned the maintenance of a limited number of guerrilla bases in southern Lebanon and offices in Beirut for their political intelligence and information units. But periodic Israeli raids, some lasting a day or more, destroy the bases shortly after their construction. Thus the likelihood is remote that a formidable guerrilla movement will ever be organized by the Palestinians in southern Lebanon, although they continue to try.

Once aware that their people were unable to prevail over the Israelis, when employing either the tactics of conventional warfare or those of the guerrilla, the new generation of Palestinians shifted to the tactics of terror. These tactics were defined by Leon Trotsky as measures which "kill individuals and intimidate thousands". Today the Israeli people themselves and its supporters everywhere are the targets of Palestinian vengeance. Black September's intention, when employing these tactics, is to intimidate the world community by raising the costs of maintaining the status quo, and thereby to force concessions. Consequently, most Palestinians regard Black September as an expression of their national liberation movement whose origin and operations are the natural outgrowth of a repressed people's struggle for independence, which has been marked by abysmal failure, and whose pleas for restitution are viewed by most other people as unrealistic.

Maoist notion

The ideology of this terrorist movement contains a curious mixture of the ideas not just of one theorist but of many. The Palestinians share, along with the Tupamaros, who have exploited Uruguay's chronic unrest for eight years, and others, the Marxist doctrine that the revolution will emerge after a period of "armed struggle" which is to include political kid-

nappings, bank robberies and assassinations. They have disregarded, however, the Marxist caution against embarking on the course of insurrection unless sufficient forces were mobilized to overcome a well-organized disciplined enemy. Instead, they adopted the Maoist notion that infiltration, conspiracy, agitation and terror could create and prolong a revolutionary situation. Also, the ideas of the Brazilian theoretician of urban guerrilla warfare, Carlos Marighella, have had a great impact on Black September and most other contemporary terrorist groups. In his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, Marighella remarks:

"Today, to be an assailant or a terrorist is a quality that ennobles any honourable man because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary engaged in armed struggle against shameful military dictatorship and its monstrosities."

Additional explanations are used by revolutionaries of the "New Left" to celebrate the tactics of terror employed by Black September as positive virtues. Violence, they say, promotes the "manhood" of oppressed peoples, and leads to freedom and unity. This notion, obviously, is gathered from the Algerian existentialists Albert Camus and Frantz Fanon. Fanon's book *The Wretched of the Earth*, a chronicle of his experiences and reflections during the Algerian uprising in the 1950s, envisaged a new alliance between revolutionaries and the *Lumpenproletariat* — the criminals and idlers of society. Fanon saw "all the hopeless dregs of humanity, all who turn in circles between suicide and madness", as marching "proudly in the great procession of the awakened nation".

This conception of Fanon's is now a reality as Black September has made common cause with groups representative of other people with real or supposed grievances that have been translated into a popular cause. Its Beirut offices are covered with posters of Che Guevara, American Black Panther leaders and members of the official wing of the Irish Republican Army. Furthermore, a recent article in *Action*, a publication of Arabic-English Newspapers, Incorporated, sees a certain similarity in the activities of the militant Oglala Sioux at Wounded Knee and Black September at Khartoum.

"In Munich and Khartoum, small groups of Palestinians, members of the militant Black September movement, took hostages, offering their release in return for the release of imprisoned Palestinians . . . In Wounded Knee, a small group of Oglala Sioux took hostages and offered to release them in return for, among other

things, official investigation into treaties made and broken by the United States Government."

"In short", exclaims *Action*, "the Oglala Sioux and the Palestinians have resorted to direct and violent action for precisely the same reason — nobody would listen." Driven by frustration born of decades of neglect and failure, Black September, having nothing to lose, is committed to the idea that violence is the only language the world understands.

Joint training

Actual evidence of an international exchange of ideas and pooling of weapons and information among terrorist groups emerged two years ago when information filtered into the press about American Weathermen, IRA members, terrorists from Turkey's Dev Genc group, and Tandanista guerrillas from Nicaragua, attending joint summer training sessions at Palestinian commando bases in Jordan. In May 1972, additional evidence came to light, when members of Japan's Red Army Group, in the interest of the Palestinians, took weapons out of suitcases and opened fire in Tel Aviv airport, killing 26 persons and wounding 80. Also, last July, the hijackers of a Japan Air Lines jumbo jet were identified as three Palestinians, a Japanese, and a blond Latin American woman about 30 years old who was killed accidentally when a grenade in her handbag exploded.

Black September, according to European and Israeli intelligence sources, consists of between 400 and 600 members. Sources in the United States, however, estimate the group's membership at from 100 to 200 young extremists, who are divided into four main operating units that are variously responsible for Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Americas. About a year ago, what little was known of their general organization indicated that their cellular structure was not patterned on the orthodox Communist system, in which each small cell has a leader responsible to a higher echelon. Today more information about Black September's organization is available. It is known, for example, that they operate in cells of from one to 40 members and that their average cell contains one leader and eight or nine subordinates. Also, it has been revealed that co-operation has been agreed upon in principle between the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Jordanian Communist Party in the framework of a "National Struggle Front", as Fatah is believed to be interested in making use of the Communist cells in Jordan

Black September was operating in four units responsible for Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Americas

and the Gaza Strip, having lost its own sabotage networks in these areas.

Operationally, each particular portion of a Black September cell is assigned a specific task and often the general objective of a particular operation is not revealed to anyone but the leader. The entire cell never meets and so the members cannot identify each other. Thus one team may throw a bomb into a restaurant to create a diversion. If they should be apprehended by the police and interrogated, they have no information to reveal of any effort by another team, taking advantage of the diversion, to kidnap a politically important person or to hijack an airliner.

Although its members are relatively few, Black September has blazed a trail of international terrorism which has not yet been followed by similar movements. In 1972 its members sabotaged a Dutch gas-pumping station, a Hamburg-based electronics factory that made components for sale in Israel and a field of oil tanks in Trieste, which were partly owned by American firms. During the same year, Black September murdered, in Bruhle, Germany, five Jordanian workers allegedly spying for Israel, hijacked a Belgian airliner, set off a blast aboard an Israeli airliner, executed the Israelis at Munich and seized the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok.

Their terror list for 1973 also involved world-wide operations. Among them was the attack on the Jewish Agency in Paris, which was seriously damaged by a bomb planted by Black September's "French Section", the attempted hijacking of an Italian ship in Famagusta, Cyprus, destruction of a steel company in Haifa, the murder of the western diplomats in Khartoum, the positioning of three explosive-rigged cars outside two Israeli banks and the El Al office in New York City, a bombing in Singapore, and the demolition of the ground floor of an apartment house in Nicosia, which was the residence of the Israeli Ambassador.

Also, last August they unleashed a murderous attack against passengers in the transit lounge of Athens airport, killing three people and injuring 55.

Link to Fatah

Until last March, however, there was no concrete evidence to clearly establish that Black September operations were planned, controlled and co-ordinated by Fatah. Thus it was difficult for intelligence analysts and operational planners to render a realistic assessment of the probable impact upon Black September of counter-measures executed against Fatah's more

vulnerable and visible infrastructure and installations. But in late March the Jordanian police arrested Muhammad Daoud, once chief of Fatah's central intelligence bureau in Amman. Daoud told his police interrogators that Black September was nothing but a name used by Fatah for its terrorist operations and supplied them with detailed information concerning the organizations leadership, operations and structure. The major thrust of Daoud's information was corroborated in early April by a news release published in *The Washington Post*, which mentioned that the United States Central Intelligence Agency had monitored radio communications between Black September operatives in Khartoum and Fatah leaders in Beirut prior to the killing of the Western diplomats.

Counter-terrorist policy

Although a relationship between Black September and Fatah has been alleged, Israel is still the only nation prepared to take on the terrorist organizations at gunpoint. Aware that the underlying maxim of all terrorist operations is that the psychological impact of terror in each case tends to lessen the opponent's ability to use force, Israel clearly perceives the terrorist as an instrument of modern warfare "who fights within the framework of his organization, without personal interest, for a cause he considers noble and for a respectable ideal, the same as the soldiers in the armies confronting him". Israel, therefore, seems to have adopted a counter-terrorist campaign which both tracks Black September throughout the world and retaliates against Fatah installations in the Middle East. To intimidate the terrorists, Israel tries to reverse the basic strategy of terror and use it against them, as evidenced by their position which indicates that a hostage is no protection for a terrorist. Acting in conformity with this position, Israeli soldiers stormed a hijacked Belgian airliner in Tel Aviv Airport in May 1972, killing two terrorists, and Premier Golda Meir urged the West German Government during the Munich episode to "take action for the liberation of the Israeli hostages and to employ force to this end."

It may be true, also, that Israeli security agents, once engaged in a world-wide hunt for convicted Nazi war criminals, are the people being used to track Black September. Israel officially denies any connection with such a program, although reports persist that Mossad, the Israeli secret service, is definitely involved. Nevertheless, last January, the Palestine Libera-

Action in Athens, Cyprus, slayings in Khartoum part of operations on '73 terror list

tion Organization's representative in Paris died as a consequence of wounds inflicted by a bomb that exploded in his apartment. In July, five persons were arrested for the murder of a Moroccan in Norway, two of whom admitted being members of an Israel counter-terror group trying to prevent Palestinian attacks on Israeli installations in Scandinavia. Also, other Palestinian resistance members were murdered this year in Rome and other European cities.

Beirut raid

Perhaps the most dramatic of recent Israeli counter-measures against the terrorists was undertaken against Fatah itself by Israeli raiders who landed on the Lebanese coast from rubber boats. It occurred on the night of April 9-10 in the cities of Beirut and Sidon, less than 12 hours after Arabs identifying themselves as belonging to "The Arab Youth Organization", a new and alternate name for Black September, had dynamited the home of the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus and tried to hijack an El Al airliner in Nicosia airport.

An Israeli military spokesman said that the raiders directed themselves against eight specific objectives, including the Beirut apartments of three Fatah leaders linked to Black September, who were killed. Major General David Elazer, the Israeli chief of staff, said that "the reason for the attack was the intensification of terrorist activity in Europe and other places during the last month" and also that "Lebanon and its capital is one of the few places in the world where terrorists of different nationalities are able to train their people, have their bases and commands and freedom to prepare their activity". "I believe," he continued "the only way to fight the terrorist operations is to combine offensive and defensive activity." Consequently, Israel's counter-terrorist activities must now be viewed not as isolated reactions to specific acts of terror but rather as a long-term policy of continuous warfare against the terrorist movement, independent of provocations. The immediate impact of this attack upon Fatah was a further reduction in the number of its veteran leaders, the indication of an obvious need for it to devote considerably more of its time and manpower to the organization and maintenance of security arrangements and the arrest of dozens of Arabs living in Israel and the occupied territories, whose names appeared on documents taken by the Israelis from one of the slain leader's apartments.

Also, the raid caused the Arab guerrillas to threaten once again to upset Lebanon's quasi-neutral foreign policy,

which maintains the tenuous balance among its religious sects. This policy of remaining aloof from the Arab-Israeli confrontation received its first severe jolt in December 1968, when Israeli commandos landed at Beirut International Airport and destroyed 13 commercial airliners in retaliation for an attack on an El Al airliner by Palestinians trained in Lebanon. This particular raid provoked a political crisis that lasted almost two years as it became a *cause célèbre* for the Palestinians, who unleashed a series of guerrilla raids against Israel from bases in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese army did little to curtail the guerilla operations because of a possible adverse impact upon Lebanon's stability regardless of which side prevailed. Therefore Israel has ever since been conducting land, air and sea operations against Palestinian encampments in Lebanon, and for two days in June 1970 occupied a portion of south Lebanon while its soldiers destroyed guerilla encampments and arms depots. Thus the Lebanese permit the Israelis to maintain order in their country and the guerrillas, rather than risk an Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, must accept this situation, although at times they might prefer to do otherwise.

Controversy at UN

Yet, regardless of the violence attributed to various terrorist organizations, the world community is hesitant to adopt plans and programs to combat them. At the United Nations, controversy exists concerning the prudence of creating an organization whose purpose would be to try to deprive people who suffer from genuine grievances of an important weapon by encouraging the international community to consolidate in defense of the status quo, which often rests on a denial of basic rights. Some UN members are also quick to mention that few nations are guiltless of having used terrorism when they thought it useful and give particular attention to the policy of official terrorism practiced by the governments of South Africa and Portugal, claiming that it exceeds anything that can be blamed on those who challenge their power. China, consequently, will not support an international convention that does not specifically deal with terrorism when practiced by governments, and rejects the American argument that existing international conventions provide an adequate code of conduct by which governments can be judged. China, however, does oppose what it considers adventurist acts of terrorism — hijacking and assassination.

Thus, last July, confronted with this impasse, the UN General Assembly voted

Raids unleashed from bases in south Lebanon; Israel conducted reprisal policy

to refer the whole question of international terrorism to a committee. The approved resolution also recognized the need to devise measures to prevent incidents of international terrorism and to conduct a study of its causes. It also condemned "the continuance of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial racist and alien regimes in denying people their legitimate right to self-determination and independence". One Arab delegate, commenting on the resolution, said, "after all, one man's terrorism is another man's patriotism".

It appears, therefore, that the international community must prepare itself to live with a cycle of terror and counter-terror. Actually, implementation by individual states of the Israeli plan designed to punish Black September in the Middle East and elsewhere is perhaps the only way to end the terror, as eventually such a program might so frustrate the terrorists that they turn inward on themselves and embark on a course of internecine warfare and eventual self-destruction.

Measuring impact of Palestinian resistance

The Palestinian resistance organizations, acting both within and outside the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization but outside the officially-accepted policies of the Arab states, pressed their claim to Palestine on as many fronts as necessary. On the Palestinian front, they mobilized their own constituency, recruiting their political and military fighters mostly from the "refugee" camps and younger elements drawn from the school system. On the Arab front, they recruited supporters from among the Arab people and obtained financial support for their guerrilla campaigns from most of the Arab states, especially those with oil resources. . . . In most Arab states, they established offices and were permitted access to the communications media to propagate their programs. On the Israeli front, they conducted guerrilla activities. . . .

Internationally, . . . they emphasized that the fundamental conflict in the Middle East is that between the Palestinians and Zionists. They indicated . . . that only Palestinians had the right, authority and competence to deal with their Israeli opponent in the Palestine conflict. . . . They explicitly indicated that all international efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict between the Arab states and Israel which do not take into account the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people would be resisted by the Palestinians. . . .

. . . Whatever fate may be in store for the Palestinian resistance, for the present we can note its accomplishments. While its absolute goal of the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of a democratic secular state for all Palestinians may be as remote today as it ever was, that explicit goal now commands the allegiance of all the Palestinian Arabs. . . .

. . . The military and guerrilla warfare of the Palestinian resistance has succeeded in undermining the monolithic position of the Israeli Government. . . . Not only Israeli fringe groups, but responsible members of the established Israeli order who fought valiantly for the emergence of Zionist Israel now acknowledge the Palestinian Arab presence in Palestine and the legitimacy of their grievance and are pressing the Israeli Government for a policy of greater flexibility toward the Palestinian aspiration for statehood.

Internationally, the resistance — despite some of its more extreme methods of operation, such as the aerial hijackings and kidnapping and assassination of diplomats and other "enemy" civilians, which have brought considerable opprobrium on the Palestinians as a whole — has succeeded in sensitizing the world to the long and painful experience of the Palestinians. . . .

. . . Palestinian assertiveness since 1967 has sensitized the Arab people to Israel's ambitions and power to a greater extent than before. Through its political structure, its militancy and its capacity for violence — individual and collective — the resistance has acted as an important brake on the attempts of the Arab states concerned to reach a compromise settlement with Israel. In other words, directly or indirectly, the resistance is perhaps one of the strongest factors limiting the options open to the Arab states. Only by *force majeure* against the Palestinians could the Arab states succeed in making a settlement with Israel that would leave the Palestinians on the sidelines. . . . (Excerpts from "The Palestinians since 1967", by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, professor of political science, Northwestern University, in *International Journal*, Autumn 1973).

Multinationals: the world's first citizens in worst sense

By Naomi Black

When we think about changes in the world's power relationship, we tend to think first about the decline of the United States and then about the rise of China. We are thinking of blocs and polarity, of alliances and counter-alliances. The image is essentially military, with power estimated in relation to a possible nuclear confrontation. The SALT talks and the European Security Conference then become crucial policy areas. For Canada, NATO force reductions have central significance because it is military force or potential that gives Canada power, if only power to make its voice heard in the councils of the great powers. Such a line of analysis is certainly common among both supporters and critics of the Government's position. This is the view of the world that sees Canada's contribution to peacekeeping, small as it is, to be the most important part of its international role.

Or there is an alternative to these basically military criteria — economic criteria. From the military empires, we shift to the economic empires, thought of as established in general by the economic power of governments and in particular by their use of the multinational corporations. Status now depends on trade and on the rate of industrial development. The relative decline of the United States is still centrally important, but it is the rise of Japan and of the European Community that represent the main changes in power. The image of hostile, would-be aggressive, but mutually-deterrent alliances is replaced by the image of economic octopuses, centred in, and tools of, the major industrial nations.

These two modes of analysis — military and economic — always tend to blur. The two bases of power tend to be associated. As Canadians are painfully aware, both military and economic power seem to concentrate in the United States. In the Soviet Union, the military state is also the national multinational enterprise *par excellence*. Japan's almost miraculous growth can be attributed to the unity of economic

and political structure, while the European Economic Community's military potential is seen as contingent on, and therefore an argument for, economic growth and integration.

Furthermore, the distinction between economic and military activities in international affairs is increasingly less clear. It seems unlikely that the American Government would resort to the use of force to get a pipeline through. Nevertheless, my students, to my surprise, rather expect it, and their expectation seems less implausible now we have seen the lengths to which both Iceland and Britain are prepared to go over access to the cod fisheries. Even Canada is prepared to use military instruments or bases of power for non-military purposes; almost never is it even suggested that Canadian merchantmen with concrete commercial reasons for plying our coastal waters might be better defenders of sovereignty than Canadian warships.

Today a more sophisticated analyst would combine the two approaches, arguing that what we have in 1973 is economic blocs, using mainly economic power backed by military sanctions. The important changes in world power relations derive, then, from the increasing limits on the effectiveness of the military sanctions, inhibited by fear of nuclear escalation. In addition, economic motivation is seen as superseding a narrower traditional drive for strategic advantage or conquest.

Some such view seems to underlie Canada's recent policy towards Europe. Canada's main interest is seen as economic. Canada remains part of the Western military bloc, but, within that grouping, it

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concentrates on reducing economic dependence on the United States by increasing its relations with Europe, including Eastern Europe. In this endeavour, the main instruments are economic, specifically the creation of multinational corporations. Alastair Gillespie, the Minister of Industry, Trade, and Commerce, seems to have such a model in mind when he urges us to establish our own multinational companies because they have been so beneficial to the United States: "They are important and they produce results."

Important assumptions

These views of world politics, with their differing emphases on military and economic power, share certain important assumptions. All three assume: (1) that the main actors in world politics are nation states; (2) that power is something positive, to achieve results with, a weapon or a tool; and (3) that power is controlled or directed by national governments. All this is most obvious in the first, military-bloc model. Armies are instruments of national policy, as are armament budgets. Similarly, Mr. Gillespie thinks of his Government as creating and using multinational corporations, as does the economic nationalist who warns against American MNEs as "an available instrument of U.S. economic policy abroad". (Abraham Rotstein, *International Perspectives*, January-February 1973).

Given such a notion of active, nationally-wielded power, some version of the economic-bloc model does indeed seem the most satisfactory as a description of our times. The most important change in world power relations would then be the shift in which national economic power takes over the active coercive role that military power can no longer handle in the Seventies.

Today, a nuclear power is powerful less because it can make its reactors into bombs than because, if it is developed enough to be nuclear, it is developed enough to put on the screws of oil sales or auto agreements. Under such circumstances, the major powers are seen as seeking to establish economic empires, in which they can coerce through economic power. Such seemingly innocuous arrangements as customs preclearance seem to be more significant weapons than guns or tanks, and a typical move of international power politics would be the American Government's use of the ITT to overthrow the Allende regime in Chile.

Yet these last examples suggest that the economic model also is defective. What happened — or did not happen — in Chile

is the reverse. The ITT apparently tried, but failed at that time, to get the Government to serve *its* interests. The U.S. Government did not create, does not wield, and can hardly be said to control its multinational corporations. Its international economic policy, as exemplified by the proposals soon to be considered by Congress, is essentially defensive. American commentators talk of multinational enterprises as "runaway businesses", and agonize about the negative balance of payments that results.

America's international economic policy is probably best understood as a response, often almost panicky, to an aggregate situation created in large part by a multitude of private firms acting in their own competitive interests. Typically unconcerned about any national interests were those multinationals whose frantic playing with the money markets bears a large share of the responsibility for the devaluation of the U.S. dollar (a devaluation neither they nor the Government seem to have wanted). And so far as it is possible to sort out the routes-preclearance quarrel between the airlines, it is a wrangle among a group of airlines, all showing their customary indifference to any imaginable version of national interests. To see any American airline companies as agents of American imperialism would be as inaccurate as seeing Air Canada as acting in support of any national policies that increase the ease of Canada's internal communications. Air Canada, as a Crown Corporation, might reasonably be expected to serve the national interests for which it was created; in practice, it shows the typical lack of concern of commercial enterprises for anything except their own narrowly-conceived profits.

Corporate power

What we have in the world today is not so much a new form or relationship of national power as new power that is not national at all, though it operates in the international realm. For nations, this means a new loss of power. An accurate reading of American (and other) foreign economic policy is as a desperate effort to get a measure of control over their corporate citizens. Andreas Papandreou calls the relationship between multinationals and home nations "symbiotic", but adds: "In this symbiotic relationship the multinationals have the upper hand." The nations help the multinationals, but they can only rarely use them, and almost never control them. Nuclear strategists suggest that mobility is a means of "hardening"

The major powers seen as seeking economic empires through which they can coerce

weapons systems; mobility or evasiveness is certainly the chief defence, and one of the chief characteristics of multinational enterprises. Living in a "host" country, Canadians worry about how multinationals can serve as channels of influence. The imperial sanction always turns out to be withdrawal of the branch plants. But we are wrong to assume that the branches will retract to the root. The multinationals will only reluctantly return to their country of origin, which is trying to regulate them. Instead, the multinationals will move their main activities to the new nations which need their skills so desperately and which lack the social and political solidarity and structure that make even an attempt at regulation possible.

Loyalty to Canada

The multinationals are, in fact, the first world citizens — in the worst sense of the words. And this will obviously be true, at least potentially, of the Canadian multinationals it is Government policy to create. There is certainly no reason to expect more loyalty to Canada from them than the U.S. gets from its business enterprises that move abroad.

There are other such "world citizens," better called "non-nationals". They share the characteristics of mobility, self-interestedness and lack of commitment to the regime of the national territory which they temporarily inhabit. The Palestinian guerrilla movements are the most obvious example, the international criminal and drug cartels another. We may also add the black liberation movements in Africa, the anti-regime authors of the Soviet Union, the anarchistic student movement, the international airlines (even if formally national), and perhaps some international civil servants — the cosmopolitan class of international culture managers. This is a very mixed bag indeed, and evaluations of them, even from narrowly national points of view, are bound to vary enormously. Nevertheless, they belong together because they share the characteristic that national governments are trying to establish control over them, on the whole without success. The governments do not seem to be able to co-operate successfully in such efforts. The result is a competitive attempt to confine the non-nationals to controllable areas of physical space.

The non-nationals depend on what the Marxists call the "law of uneven development". For heroin, as for liberation movements or for Solzhenitsyn, there are, among the many nation states, some which are willing to tolerate or even subsidize their activities. Even formal agreement on

co-operation for control is likely to be thwarted in an unevenly-developed world by the inability of the new or the very large states to police their own territory, combined with their unwillingness to admit any other nations' forces. Even, or perhaps particularly, the industrialized mass democracy finds it hard to combat groups so mobile, so motivated, so single-mindedly self-devoted (as the FLQ crisis should suggest). In the absence of the necessary but rare protective social cohesion, the nation state is driven back to its only advantage, the use of troops to attempt physical control of a limited area. The utility of this last resort, in turn, depends on the legitimacy of the national unit, which makes monopoly of force something different and more powerful than the terrorists' combination of speed and fanaticism.

Thus, the rise of the non-nationals has not really tended to produce international integration or even, to a marked degree, any increase in international co-operation. Transnational integration, in the academic sense, is often just the growth of the non-nationals. What the non-nationals have done is to drive the nations back on themselves. They amount to part of the explanation of the new growth of nationalism that so puzzles many observers. In the face of the impossibility of shared, positive action, the nation resorts to negative, preventive action within its own smaller territory. This territory is literally more controllable, by force of arms if necessary, or preferably by development of some sort of social solidarity. So that if we risk setting up our own "rip-off" machines, we can hope that our own new international capitalists may be easier to tie down. And, if the Russians join the International Copyright Union, they do so not to join in the fraternity of letters but to reduce the mobility of the works of their dissident Nobel laureates.

Sophisticated notion

The notion of world power "relationships" is a sophisticated one, seeing power as involving more than one party and concerning what goes on between them. It means something about influence, about who can do what to whom. Academic attempts to define power operationally take such a line. A attempts to produce on the part of B some action which would not otherwise have occurred. A's power over B is measured by the magnitude and unlikelihood of the resulting action. In this relationship, however, B also has power. Its power, in fact, is the inverse of A's, with B being thought of as being as weak as what

Mass democracy finds it hard to deal with groups that are so mobile, so motivated

it is made to do. B's power, on the other hand, is equivalent to the resistance it was able to offer to pressure.

Estimates of power tend to be based on the possession of characteristics that seem likely to produce results — bases of power. Calculating the likely results of trying to put pressure on others, we say that a powerful nation is one which has the characteristics likely to get it what it wants. A weak nation, then, is one likely not to get results, or, usually the same thing; likely to succumb to pressure. Terms like "middle power" come out of such estimates; a middle power is one that is moderately likely to be able either to exert or to resist pressure. (Which explains, of course, why a middle power may not be middling or median in terms of resources — it takes a lot to produce even a little internationally.)

Always cut and run

Non-nationals, then, can be very powerful against nations, partly because they can always cut and run. Their powers of resistance are enormous. From the point of view of the nations, their powers of compulsion are less against the non-nationals than they have ever been against one another. Indeed, the relationships among the nations have not changed significantly since the drastic change that was brought by nuclearization of international warfare. The range and nature of pressure devices has obviously changed, and so have the relative rankings of certain nations in certain sorts of scales of bases of power. But these are not changes in kind. They can be accommodated by adaptations of all the age-old ploys and tactics of international power management. What is new is the existence of the non-nationals, and the nature of the means required to control them.

The novel fact of world power today is the attempt to exert effective control over territory and thereby over the non-nationals. The crucial power is the ability, in a given area, to prevent certain sorts of thing from happening. And that ability depends upon something about conditions within the country rather than upon any of foreign policy. The guerrilla movements stayed in Jordan at first and then Lebanon because their hosts lacked the community basis for expelling them. Israel, the prime example of resistance, derives it precisely from such community.

I am not arguing here just the conventional line that foreign policy depends on national unity. This is, of course, quite true, but it is also true that conventional relations between nations tend to create national unity when it is needed. Chauvi-

nist nationalism has even been known to provoke international conflict as a means for internal unity. I am suggesting something new and less obviously visible — that there are, increasingly, new power groups that do not identify with or act for nations, and that play off nations against each other, not usually for war but rather for profit. And that foreign policy as such has very little impact upon such groups, since co-operation against them is not effective. The resulting policy concerns have to be mainly internal and deliberately aimed at national cohesion.

What is necessary to control the non-nationals is a policy of solidification or resistance. This is nationalistic, but not chauvinistic, for it is aimed not against other nations but against those who shelter behind national borders but feel no loyalty to anything there. An extreme example of this is the multinational firms subsidized by Portugal to carry on in Angola and Mozambique the colonialism it cannot afford but depends on. These are the extreme example of freelance capitalism, very like the mercenary soldiers employed to defend their enclaves. These multinationals, in the bitterest irony of all, speed the end of the Portuguese empire; lacking any commitment to Christianity or to Portuguese tradition, they will make deals with the rebels as soon as it becomes unmistakably profitable. But then the new government of Angola, like all their neighbours, will have in its turn to deal with the problems of relations with the non-nationals, in this case already deeply entrenched.

Making distinctions

We should, at this stage, indicate the necessity of making distinctions among these non-nationals. Beyond a certain point, it is clearly inappropriate to equate rebels and diamond companies in Angola, even though, from the point of view of either the present Portuguese or the future Angolan governments, they share the crucial qualities of mobility and self-devotion, and are controllable only in terms of territorial limitation and social solidarity. Any acceptable world image must, however, allow for situations where individuals have double or even triple loyalties; thus a painter in Toronto might feel ties with that city, to Canada as a whole, perhaps also to the international art community, and also to Israel. The world needs this and also mobility, cultural diffusion, and even stateless entities such as the international service organizations. What it needs also is the existence of territorial communities sufficiently strong that these multiple loyalties are able to be mutually support-

Power estimates are based on characteristics that are likely to get results

ing rather than the basis for power plays by the non-nationals. The goal has been called "polycentric nationalism", a notion of a world in which nations strive to coexist with each other and also to avoid being manipulated by those extra-national, non-national forces that are indifferent to the value of ranges of different styles and preferences.

There is, today, a lot of talk about the loss of national ability to provide a sort of military "hard shell" of invulnerability for a nation's citizenry against attack. This is seen as creating a corresponding decrease in the functional need for the unit of the nation state. Similarly, given the enlargement and increasing interdependence of economic units, the nation state seems to have lost its important function as a marketing and producing unit. The only new functions offered as substitutes are co-operative ones, not really national and, indeed, seen as valuable because perhaps only a way-station to the abolition of nations. Yet, as I have suggested, this co-operation, particularly in new functional

areas, has not made vast strides, and the expected mergers of the nations do not seem to be occurring. Instead we have the non-nationals, and we have as a result a new function for nations — that of becoming sufficiently cohesive human communities that they can tie down, control and regulate these stateless entities that have learned to aggrandize themselves among the unevennesses of the international system. Only some version of the nation state has the history, the shared experience, that can provide a framework for such a community, and the machinery for the legitimate use of coercion, forceful or otherwise.

Canada is much taken by the myth of American (or Soviet) imperialism. This myth has one valuable result: it mobilizes intellectuals, governments and, eventually, populations to resist what they think is attacking them. The risk is that, to defend themselves, they will copy what they think of as their enemies, and create more of the class of non-nationals who are indifferent to everything but themselves.

Attractions mingled with fear at advent of the multinationals

By Bernard Bonin

The two principal objectives of this article are, first, to outline a method of analyzing relations between multinational enterprises and governments that will be broad enough to apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to all countries and, secondly, to present a brief analysis of Bill C-132 based on this method.

There can be no question here of seeking to review the experience of any great number of countries. The idea is, rather, to provide a general notion of the type of question a country would be inclined to consider if it wished to derive maximum benefit from direct foreign investment or to minimize the disadvantages. This scheme of analysis offers the advantage of being extremely broad in scope, and a good many studies of the question made elsewhere in the world have, in some way or other, been inspired by it.

There are, indeed, areas of harmony and areas of tension between multinational firms and governments and this is why studies of multinational enterprise were not long in concentrating on relations between these two institutions. For, while Canada no doubt holds a unique position in the world when it comes to foreign presence, the number of multina-

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tional businesses is increasing throughout the world, at least in the industrialized parts of it, and a number of countries are interested in the questions we intend to analyze here.

The principal areas of harmony between multinational enterprises and governments are to be found in the realm of economic growth, for the task of ensuring economic growth has been entrusted by modern societies to their governments. Multinational enterprise, however, is making its own contribution to the pursuit of this objective by the activities in which it is engaged and because it represents a "conglomerate" of produce, technology, administrative talent, capital and access to foreign markets.

With regard to the formation of capital, it is often maintained that financing the development of some country is impossible because of insufficient savings. This argument has often been heard in Canada, so that a good many people think that the importance of the contribution made by foreign capital is such that Canada could not get along without it.

Actually, however, if you wish to set a value, from this point of view, on contributions made from abroad, you must be aware of the way in which foreign investments are financed. According to the document known as the Gray Report, for example, about three-quarters of all foreign investments in recent years have been financed either by reinvesting profits, by providing for write-offs or by borrowing on the Canadian market — and this, after all, amounts to using Canadian savings. Thus, if insufficient attention is paid to these distinctions, there is some danger that too high a value will be set on the contribution made by other countries.

Even though the extent to which a country depends on foreign savings is not as marked as is sometimes thought, such dependency is in no way prejudicial to the host country's ability to produce the other components of direct investment — namely, technology, administrative "know-how" and certainty of access to foreign markets — to the same degree. A country's access to foreign markets is most certain when development of its natural resources is concerned. As regards technological contributions, it is expected that the results of the considerable outlay of such countries as the United States, Germany, France and Britain for research and development will sooner or later be placed at the disposal of subsidiaries of companies located in those countries: it is also expected that new products will be introduced more rapidly in the host coun-

try than would be the case if local producers alone could be counted on. For these reasons, a great many countries have been more eager to welcome investments that involved some new "know-how". Even though it may sometimes be possible to obtain foreign technological knowledge in some way other than by direct investment on the part of the multinational enterprise, large American companies have shown a very marked preference for 100 percent ownership of their affiliates wherever possible, and some governments have perhaps come to the conclusion a little too readily that, in order to obtain technological benefits, they would have to agree to extensive participation by the parent company.

Regional development

A second area of harmony between the multinational enterprise and government has to do with regional development. It is well known that attempts have been made, especially in Europe and in Canada, to arrange for a geographic deconcentration of industry in an effort to do away with what are known as regional disparities. Sometimes we find that foreign enterprises, which are free from any sociological attachment to particular locations in the countries in which they are set up, have been more responsive than national businesses to tax incentives designed to encourage them to locate in certain regions. But we still have too few examples to enable us to attribute automatically the reduction in regional disparities to the presence of the foreign firm. There is no doubt that the same is true of disparities between countries.

It is also thought that the arrival of foreign firms will serve as a stimulus to home companies because of the increased competition the latter will have to face. Such reasoning, to put it simply, is as follows: foreign enterprises enjoy certain advantages — good financial standing, cheaper advertising, management by the main branch, technological knowledge. These advantages will result in lower costs and a tendency to a reduction in prices and an increase in sales. Home companies, as opposed to multinational ones, will thus be obliged to make the necessary adaptations and, if they want to be in a position to meet the increased competition, this should be an inducement to them to make a greater effort in the fields of research and increased productivity. In this connection, all that can be said at the moment is that, although it is possible to find a number of examples in the world of important innovations intro-

Country's access to foreign markets most certain in resource field

duced to a country's market by firms from abroad, it is still extremely difficult, nevertheless, to take any exact measure of the actual impact of foreign investment on competition within the country itself.

One final area of harmony between governments and the multinational firms lies in the balance of payments. Balance-of-payments considerations were quite important to the developed countries during the time of the dollar shortage, and still are for the developing countries. If short-term relief is sought for a balance-of-payments deficit, an effort will be made to attract foreign capital. But even there, while the short-term result will most probably be in favour of the host country, the picture is less clear when looked at from the medium- or long-term point of view.

Indeed, it does not suffice to analyze the position occupied by foreign firms in a country's exports if one wishes to measure the contribution made by foreign investment to that country's balance of payments. Factors other than the stimulus it offers to exports must also be taken into account — payments of fees abroad, profits repatriated by foreign shareholders, imports depending on the investment, and so on. It is not at all certain that all these factors will result, in the long run, in an improved balance-of-payments position for the host country. On the contrary, certain studies would appear to show that direct foreign investment will tend eventually to improve the balance of payments of the investing countries.

Administrative structure

Though the productive factors resulting from direct investment may make it possible to obtain a fair measure of coincidence between the interests of the host country and those of the multinational enterprise, the administrative structure of the multinational firm is, in itself, of such a nature as to cause tension between the two institutions. The degree of centralization of decision-making at the head office of the multinational enterprise varies from one company to another. Companies have shown a marked preference, however, for direct investment in a branch or subsidiary rather than for association with local firms in the form of licensing agreements or joint ventures. Since they are loath to accept outside interference in management, they also show a very strong preference for exclusive ownership of the subsidiary rather than for the admission of minority shareholders. It may be, however, that, even if such arrangements are

far from perfect from the point of view of efficiency, the host country will prefer to seek out licensing agreements or joint ventures with the idea of keeping its own businesses in existence and opening up for its own businessmen sectors where growth is assured. Often, too, the host country will want to see its own nationals holding shares in the subsidiary established within its boundaries because, rightly or wrongly, it thinks that such participation will better safeguard the national interest.

Since the prices used in transactions between the parent company and its branches do not always reflect market conditions and may thus serve to transfer profits or financial resources from one country to another, or to reduce competition, quite often without the host country's being aware of it, such transactions also create problems. Likewise it is possible that the multinational enterprise may have decided to centralize export orders in the parent company in order to realize better the firm's general objectives. What interests a government, on the other hand, is having the subsidiary within its territorial limits (thus providing employment for its nationals and bringing it in tax revenue) fill the order addressed to it. It may be greatly to the advantage of a multinational firm to have the parent company and its foreign subsidiaries obtain all their stock from common suppliers whenever possible, whereas the governments of the host countries would like to see local dealers supplying as much as possible. It may be to a corporation's advantage to centralize its research laboratories in the country in which the parent company is situated, while the country in which the subsidiaries have been established would like to have part of the research work carried out within its own boundaries, in the first place so that it will not become a mere parasite and, secondly, to avoid a "brain drain" that would cause it to lose the benefit of part of the resources it has invested in education. Many more examples could be given, but the foregoing will suffice to show that tension between multinational concerns and governments is practically inevitable.

Fear of domination

The attitude of a government to a foreign firm is very often ambivalent. The production factors sought and the profit to be derived by host countries often make them anxious to see a foreign firm set up on their soil. On the other hand, the fact that some of the important decisions will be made in another country gives the host country cause for apprehension.

Host country wants to see its nationals holding shares in the subsidiary

In the first place, it is afraid of industrial domination by multinational firms — especially American companies. Such misgivings are caused partly by the size of the multinational (American) enterprises and their subsidiaries, partly by their concentration in a few important sectors of industry, and partly by their aggressive behaviour. The acquisition of large companies by multinational enterprises and the announcement that the latter are to control large segments of the country's industry serve only to intensify the apprehension felt.

*Governments also
fear the effect
of technological
dependency*

Governments also fear the effect of technological dependency. Although the developed countries want the advanced technology that direct investment on the part of multinational enterprises will bring, they do not always like the time chosen for the transfer or the form it is to take; nor do they like the fact that the decision to diffuse technological knowledge will be made by the firm. What governments really fear is that there will be a gap between the industrialized countries as far as technological knowledge is concerned or else that the existing gap will not disappear.

Economic policies

Governments are also afraid of the effect the multinational character of some of the firms located in the country may have on their economic planning or, in more general terms, on the effectiveness of their economic policies. It is certain that, the more difficulty governments have in foreseeing the reactions of companies to economic plans or policies, the more arduous will the tasks entrusted to them become. The effects of the best of economic policies may well be nil if it is possible for companies concerned to avoid them.

Finally, fear has been expressed with regard to cultural penetration by so-called multinational firms, which are most often multinational only because they have establishments in several countries. Cultural penetration may take place in a number of ways (through the communication media, for example), and it is probable that the multinational firm may not be the most important vehicle for such penetration; it is certain, however, that American companies, for example, while bringing capital, technological "know-how", produce, and so on into a country, will also bring a typically American way of thinking and acting. And some people fear that American standards of living cannot be attained without simultaneous adoption of certain less-appreciated aspects of American life.

Although the reasons for apprehension mentioned briefly above are fairly general throughout the world, it might also be well to mention a few more specific reactions experienced in the developing countries. (J. N. Behrman, *International Business and Governments*, McGraw-Hill, 1971.) In such countries, as a matter of fact, most if not all the above-mentioned fears are felt, in addition to those described below, so that the resultant tension is so great that open hostility towards foreign enterprise is sometimes encountered.

Sometimes events are noted that might be interpreted as a refusal on the part of the American Government and its business concerns to let Latin American countries develop in their own independent and quasi-socialist fashion. Proof of this is found in frequent intervention by the American Government when negotiations concerning expropriations are going on between developing countries and certain firms.

This anxiety gives rise to two other fears:

(1) the fear that a country's national interests and objectives will not be taken into account in the management of subsidiaries (the fact that enterprises tend to insist on outright ownership of subsidiaries tends to accentuate this fear);

(2) the fear that the parent company will not leave a reasonable share of its investment profits in the host country. (As a matter of fact, where direct American investment in developing countries is concerned, in only one year during the period 1950-1965 did the outflow from the United States amount to more than the revenue brought in to the U.S. by American parent companies.)

Criticism has also been expressed regarding the disinclination of multinational businesses to hire nationals of host countries for top-level positions, the result being that the latter feel they are "second-class citizens" and develop an inferiority complex with regard to their status in their own country.

The fear of exploitation is further aroused by three other types of reaction. Marxist critics, to begin with, are convinced that American firms *have to* invest abroad to ensure survival. Then there are those who maintain that the foreign investor is more interested in those industries or projects that promise a quick return than he is in those that are most productive from the point of view of the host country. There is also the fact that the foreign investor looks for incentives from the host country before deciding to invest there. Finally, a fairly violent reaction is

found against the acquisition by foreign investors of companies already existing in the host country, often at "bargain prices".

'Excessive prices'

To proceed to a higher level, fear of exploitation is caused by the "excessive prices" the developing countries have to pay to obtain from other countries the technology they so urgently require. The same type of criticism is heard in the realm of finance: a foreign investor brings in his capital, his technological knowledge, his "management", in the hope of making worthwhile profits, and succeeds in persuading local investors to join him (more often by way of loans than by way of part-ownership), so that domestic capital finds itself under foreign control and is diverted, it is claimed, to less-productive goals. In this way the foreigner benefits by any increase in value of the shares while the local investor gets only the interest; the result is that most of the profits leave the country.

Finally, with a view to furthering their independence by strengthening their economies, the Latin Americans have thought of economic integration. A Mexican economist has interpreted this swing towards integration as a reaction to the frustration felt by Latin America in its process of development based on the capitalism of private enterprise. However, the existence of multinational business in the Latin America economy will give rise to another cause for resentment on the part of the host countries, for it is likely that broadening the market in those countries will very quickly be of great benefit to foreign enterprises.

Government policies

Government ambivalence with regard to foreign investment probably affords an explanation for the timidity shown almost all over the world by governmental policies in the matter. These various policies fall into three main classes: (1) the setting-up of a selection process for foreign investment or, in more general terms, the imposition of restrictions on foreign firms; (2) the taking of various steps to reinforce national industry; (3) the conclusion of international agreements. Canada's current Bill C-132 belongs to the first of these classes.

What the Canadian Government suggests is the setting-up of an agency to "screen" or select cases of acquisition of Canadian concerns by outsiders, as well as the establishment of new businesses by persons other than Canadians; an important exception is made, however, for the

expansion of foreign enterprises in sectors related to the businesses already being carried on by them in Canada. Thus, according to the basic philosophy underlying Canadian government policy, direct investment is neither necessarily good nor necessarily bad for a host country. It would therefore appear that Canadian policy conforms with the scheme of analysis described above, and it is certain that, under such conditions, each individual case should form the subject of serious consideration.

There can be no question of laying down broad general rules; since problems differ from one industry to another, even from one enterprise to another, our policy must be adapted to each industry. Then, unless it is to lose almost all its meaning, the investigation of the industry cannot be limited to what goes on within national boundaries. Since direct investment very often involves a sort of transposition of an oligopolistic struggle going on in several countries, the behaviour of the industry as a whole must be considered. In the light of the foregoing scheme of analysis, it will be understood that the cost-benefits analysis of the effects of direct investment will always remain incomplete because of the difficulty encountered in grasping all the implications of these effects. This is another reason why it is difficult to reach any clear-cut decisions in the matter. For all these reasons, we believe that the Government is doing the right thing in choosing the selective method. In spite of this, the Bill as it now reads, with no fundamental changes following discussion in the parliamentary committee concerned, is not without its weaknesses. (See the minutes, with appendixes, of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, First Session, Twenty-Ninth Parliament, 1973, as well as B. Bonin's article "Bill C-132 on Foreign Investment Review" in *L'Actualité Economique*, January-March 1973).

Weaknesses of screening measures

In the first place, let no one think that setting up an agency to review foreign investments in itself constitutes a policy. It is simply a policy instrument, and it will be necessary to go on from there. So far the Government has suggested a few criteria on which the foreign investment review will be based. For the time being these criteria are fairly general—even rather vague. No doubt they will become more concrete with experience. Other criteria have also been suggested that would constitute an improvement on present policy. There should be no cause for sur-

*Review agency
an instrument
of policy —
'will be necessary
to go on
from there'*

prise if the foreign investments analysis (as well as any other measures the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce has in mind for the future) were to lead to the conclusion that present policies should be modified or that a specific industrial "strategy" must be worked out if we want Canada to derive maximum benefit from the foreign enterprises in our midst.

It will not be an easy matter to enforce the terms of the bill once it becomes law. This point was stressed by a number of the organizations presenting briefs to the Standing Committee. It must be added that the screening agency's task will not be simplified if the time allowed the Government for coming to a decision is reduced from 90 days to 60. The result would be that the agency's staff would have to be increased, and this in no way constitutes a guarantee of success. Some of the provinces have not been overly enthusiastic regarding the bill, and doubts have even been expressed as to its legality under the Canadian constitution. It will not always be easy to decide what is an "unrelated" activity and the definition adopted will have little meaning in the case of modern "conglomerates". The exclusion of businesses already being carried on in Canada is warranted only for reasons of convenience and, since most of the increase in foreign ownership and control comes from such businesses, their

No easy matter to enforce terms of bill once it is law

exclusion will probably mean that the objectives of the bill will not be attained. The limits (total assets and sales) adopted for reviewing the acquisition of a Canadian business by a foreign enterprise are probably too high to prevent a goodly number of small but especially promising Canadian businesses from being purchased by foreign enterprises when they reach a decisive stage in their growth.

This list of weaknesses in the bill and difficulties that may be encountered in enforcing the act is far from complete. The work done by the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs gave rise to some 2,200 pages of testimony and discussion in which further examples may be found. Space does not permit us to make a detailed analysis of possible difficulties, which should not, however, prevent the Government from legislating on the matter. It is a complicated problem, but it is certainly not the only problem to present a high degree of complexity in contemporary society. If governments had to wait until every possible question had been cleared up before adopting legislation, very few laws would see the light of day. Under the circumstances, the most we can hope for is that the legislator will do the best work possible and keep a sufficiently open mind to amend the act if experience should show that it is not without its deficiencies.

... There are two fundamental requirements for a more satisfactory fit between multinational corporations (MNCs) and Latin America, at least until the day when there are international guides and controls which are needed

The first is for the MNC to know its own interests clearly and to have the capacity to arrange them in order of their priority. It then is necessary for the MNC to align its priority interests with the needs of the change process in the local (Latin American) country

The second, and related, requirement for perfecting the fit between MNCs and host countries is that the political order in the host country be sure of its interests and that it be able to speak with confidence and authority on behalf of those interests. For its confidence and authority to be reliable over time, it needs to be broadly acceptable and responsive to the change taking place within its jurisdiction. There are many formulas, democratic and otherwise, for the development of such a political order The friendliness of a political order is not as important as its

clarity of purpose and reliability

... The multinational corporation must be seen not primarily as property owned by a few in the rich world, to be conducted according to the principles of take what you can now and run.

Rather, the MNC must be cast as a world system which derives revenue according to its ability to serve world needs. The demand needs in the rich markets of the world are perhaps fairly clear. The needs and interests in the poor producing countries must be made just as clear. The MNC in this way becomes a link, perhaps primarily an interest-organizer, clarifier and server, its functions being political and social as well as economic. Where the political and social order is strong and clear, its task is simpler; where it is not, it must find ways of making it so. No short cuts for a quick buck will do; they will inevitably kill the goose (Excerpts from article by George C. Lodge, professor, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, as part of symposium on multinationals in less-developed countries, published in *Foreign Policy*, fall 1973).

What does the academic have to contribute to policymaking?

By Geoffrey Pearson

There are signs of change on both sides of the divide between political scientists interested in world politics and diplomats and politicians who practice the "art" of diplomacy. The gap has been widened over the last 25 years by problems of language. Before that, the policymakers could at least understand what the professors were saying, even if they disregarded it; now they can only with difficulty understand the language, to say nothing of the conclusions, of research. This is an ironic state of affairs, as a principal object of the new methods of analysis is to clarify meaning by finding and measuring comparable units of behaviour. Nor is the policymaking community blameless for the divide.

For too long officials have resisted the new approaches, partly because they are unfamiliar but also because diplomacy, of all the arts of government, is probably the one that most relies on traditional wisdom and intuition (it can hardly be claimed that the record justifies the tradition). Nevertheless, there are pressures for change. If the academics are unsure that a Kepler of the "science" of world politics lurks in the wings of history, the policymakers are more doubtful that the skills of a Metternich are enough to keep the ship of state on course.

There have always been and always will be "trouble-makers", persons outside government who hold strong views on what is right or wrong about the world and who urge policymakers to grasp this or that means of salvation. They argue, of course, that the real trouble is to be found in the minds of officials, or in the machinations of governments, or in the state system itself. This is not the issue here. Some academics hold these kinds of view, just as any citizen may do. Whether they do or not, however, many (not all) political scientists share the assumption that relations between the "actors" in world politics (individuals, corporations, churches, states, international organizations) are susceptible of systematic analysis capable of generating hypotheses that can, in turn,

explain international behaviour and provide a basis for prediction of the effects of such behaviour.

This view is by no means unchallenged in the community. Indeed, the literature of the "discipline" (again an ambiguous notion) is characterized by much argument about tradition *versus* science. But, on the whole, those who teach international relations in departments of political science (not in departments of history) in North America, and increasingly elsewhere, take pride in the concepts and methods of science. Their text-books dominate the undergraduate reading lists. Their journals explore the frontiers of research on "event-interaction", "international stratification" and "decision-making". Not all employ statistics and graphs, but most try to draw broad conclusions from data and to conceptualize the results. If there is little theory, strictly speaking, there is much speculation.

No agreement

Despite the relative dominance of new approaches in the study of international relations, there is no agreement about what to study or even how to study it. Let us take a hypothetical example of an action to be explained: the recent decision of the Canadian Government to recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China. If one were primarily interested in "systems" of world politics, one might concentrate on the processes that lead to transformation of the system from bipolarity to multipolarity and infer the Canadian action as a by-product of this change. If one were primarily interested in decision-

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making, one might emphasize changes in the domestic environment of Canada, including leadership. Students of organizations would concentrate on intra-government bargaining. Psychologists might point to changes in perception. Students of power and influence might prefer to explain it as a response to external pressures.

None of these approaches is necessarily wrong. What is striking about them is the lack of coherence. The historian, after considering the possibilities, will explain an action by a process of evaluation and judgment. The political scientist is likely to suggest that the explanation of particular cases is unsatisfactory if it does not apply to other, similar cases. He searches for more data and he invokes, if he can, a hypothesis to explain these data. But his problem is to define the class or category of action he is trying to explain. Is it, in this case, the recognition policy of Canadian Governments? Is it Canada-China relations? Is it "innovation" in the making of foreign policy? Moreover the data available will be inadequate to "prove" anything. At the most he can speculate about probabilities. The difficulty of the enterprise thus leads to partial explanation, to models of behaviour that may enlighten or may darken understanding. But scholars in the field are the first to admit that the road to explanatory theory will be long and difficult.

Paucity of findings

In addition to lack of coherence, the discipline of international relations suffers from a paucity of significant findings. For example, there has been much analysis of the decisions taken in the summer of 1914 by the major European powers. Most of the written evidence for these decisions is available. Scholars are mainly interested in showing that the decision-makers stumbled into war because they misunderstood the situation. This misunderstanding is illustrated by analysis of the messages they exchanged. But granted this be the case, what are we to learn from it? The idealists of 1918 said: "Abolish the states system". The scientists of today come close to saying: "Abolish the Kaiser". For they point out that decision-makers ought to slow down in times of crisis, beware of certain kinds of advice, and avoid commitment to small allies. Similar studies have been made of the Cuban missile crisis and, though the lessons drawn are worth attention, the circumstances were so extraordinary that most officials in most capitals are unlikely to be affected.

On the other hand, there has been

some excellent analysis of the way bureaucracies operate in times of crisis or tension and, though few specific lessons can be drawn, there are useful reminders that organizational processes may shape decisions as much as the wishes of leaders or peoples. Scholars studying perception (and sometimes it seems as though the psychologists have taken over the study of conflict) have salutary things to say about stereotypes, expectations, misleading historical analogies, and how to guard against them. To all of this one can say: "Fine, one does hope to act sensibly in crises and to organize the government in ways which promote 'multiple advocacy'; but the Kaiser did exist and may do so again."

Role of alliances

Again, attempts to link various attributes of the external or internal environment to a propensity to conflict have largely failed. Do alliances promote wars? Analysis suggests that sometimes they do and sometimes they don't. Is a five-power balance more stable than a two-power balance? It will depend on other things — e.g., the spread of nuclear weapons. Do statesmen consistently attempt to cover up internal conflict by picking fights with their neighbours? The evidence suggests the case is not proved. This kind of ambiguity of result does serve a negative purpose; folk wisdom about international relations is suspect. The researchers will add that the very activity of gathering information in precise, classified form is a pre-condition of success. They point to the indispensability of economic indicators to economic planning. If this is true for domestic policy, they say, is not international co-operation dependent on knowledge of how nations behave?

Granting the relevance of the question, the problem is first to collect and then to "operationalize" data, i.e. to organize them into a form that can be used to test hypotheses or assumptions. The methods of organization vary from comparison of common indicators such as GNP to simulating experience and observing the results. While there are obvious complexities in comparing data between countries and in getting at sources of data which governments won't reveal, and while the gaps are enormous (the Kaiser can't be interviewed), there seems no reason to assume that methods of political and social analysis which yield results in national terms won't also do so across nations.

The major danger, it seems to me, is that facility of measurement tends to dictate the research done and thus the results achieved. Research may not be

The historian explains an action by a process of evaluation and judgment

directed so much toward what is significant as toward what is definable. Nevertheless numbers can speak louder than words. The statement "India is a poor country" has no empirical meaning. But the statement "India contains over 25 per cent of the people of the world who earn less than X dollars a year" provides a basis for further research, not to speak of policy. It seems probable that, as research continues, more and more areas of world politics will lend themselves to this kind of empirical analysis. In any case, we should be wrong to judge the enterprise by the results so far achieved.

Debate by scholars

Some scholars have pointed to another supposed consequence of current methods of research — the neglect of policy issues and normative values. It may be true that this separation of fact and value is an important characteristic of natural science, but does the distinction apply to social science, and if so is it desirable to apply it? This is not the place to examine this debate, but it may be noted that, when scholars do plunge into debates over foreign policy, they do not usually emerge with academic reputations intact. There is a case to be made for the theorists and the inhabitants of the empirical jungle "doing their own thing". If the results are hardly noticeable to the policymaking world, this does not mean they will never be noticed or that the results do not have value. As for hidden assumptions about policy, the best the student can do presumably is to make his assumptions explicit and to leave to others the task of making judgments about the results.

This debate raises the question however, of whether and, if so, how academics and policymakers should co-operate on questions of foreign policy of mutual concern. Even assuming Lord Strang's dictum — "In diplomacy, as in morals, the particular case is not to be solved by the rigid application of a general rule" — what does the academic have to contribute to policymaking? Broadly speaking, he has knowledge, methods of analysis and independence of mind, in various proportions. There are, of course, people who claim to know all there is to know about a particular place or particular phenomenon. Expertise of this kind can be tapped by contract research or by seminars or simply by setting up research departments. But much of this knowledge is relatively remote from the concerns of a middle-power foreign office, and where answers are required they can often be provided from within the resources of the government.

The area or language scholar may have more to gain by co-operation of this kind, because it is often difficult for him to visit his area of interest without official support. There is a second category of expertise which relates to designing means for achieving particular ends, such as an aid project or the regulation of pollution. Domestic departments of government rely on this kind of research assistance all the time, and foreign offices are coming to do so more, although, in their case, the exercise of political judgment about the interaction with the external environment is usually more significant and difficult. Contract research may be the most practical way of utilizing this kind of knowledge. The third contribution — independence of mind — is more difficult to evaluate. It will depend in part on what political leaders need and what they expect from their permanent advisers. It will vary from country to country. The independence may, of course, be surrendered, but it need not be.

Over the longer term

In addition to wanting to know what is going on and how to do certain things, foreign offices may want to call on outside advice about what to do — not tomorrow but next year or over the longer term. Sometimes they need to know what they have done themselves. Information overload can affect not only day-to-day business but the finding out of what was done before. While it may be true that every diplomatic situation is *sui generis*, a knowledge of history, i.e. the files, will often help to spot similarities and to avoid mistakes. Research of this kind cannot usually be undertaken by "desk" officers.

Moreover, the political scientist may be able to identify regularities and to notice patterns to which the official is blind, partly because they are more explicitly suggested by methods of analysis which are familiar to the former and not the latter. As to the question "what to do?", the advantages of academic advice would seem to reside more in training than in judgment. Systematic analysis is not a preserve of the universities. But it is more likely to be found there than in government.

Deterrence theory may or may not be in the public interest (who is to decide?), but there is no doubt that it owes much of its influence on public policy to those American academics who elaborated models of bargaining in the 1950s. The balance of power may or may not be a useful way to think about war and peace, but there is no doubt that many governments do think this way and there is much to be said for

Foreign offices moving toward relying more on research aid in achieving particular ends

Political scientist may be able to notice patterns 'to which the official is blind'

analysing the attributes of such a balance and attempting to predict what factors lead to its breakdown. The analysis of concepts such as these is useful if only because they powerfully influence policy. Analysis may not change the policy. But it offers a rationale for change if that is needed.

Finally, there may be significant payoffs to be gained by speculation about the future. As Herman Kahn has said: "Policy planning requires some idea of what the world is going to be like when these policies come to fruition." (*Things to Come*, Macmillan, 1972) Political scientists do not claim to be able to predict political behaviour, but to bring to bear evidence which narrows the range of probabilities. Statesmen learn from history, sometimes to their misfortune. If history is accelerating as fast as some think, it may be wiser to look forward than back. It is noticeable that scholars write increasingly about "world politics" and "world society", emphasizing such phenomena as satellite communications, energy resources and international business and political élites, i.e. a transnational rather than a national focus. It is difficult for the reader to jump the gap between this world and the daily headlines which announce that Spain did this or Malaysia did that, but sometimes the two coincide, e.g. energy shortages. If the statesman cannot afford to make his decisions by betting on alternative futures, he should at least know what trends are more explicit than others.

American preconceptions

Even assuming, however, that international relations evolve towards world politics more quickly than we expect, states must continue to deal with more or less unusual situations. Canadian students of international politics are faced with reading lists which may be composed of books 90 percent American in origin, 5 percent British or European and 5 percent Canadian. American scholars have pioneered the new ways of looking at politics but, not surprisingly, their case material is largely American. Canadian scholars are just beginning to apply the new tools to Canadian foreign policy, i.e. systematic examination of external influences on our foreign policy, case studies of decision-making, the notion of integration as it applies to Canada-U.S. relations (economists have, of course, studied this relationship closely). But American preconceptions still tend to dom-

inate the content of courses. Hypotheses or prescriptions about the management of international conflict or crises are of concern to all peoples in a nuclear world but, inasmuch as Canadian experience, aside from peacekeeping, has little to offer to the conflict-data bank, it might make better sense for Canadian teachers and students to do more work on such themes as international resource regulation, the role of multinational corporations, the nature of economic development, the rights of minorities, and ideas of rank and role (Canada is not by any definition a small country except by the one we like to apply — comparison with the United States). One disadvantage of American texts on comparative politics is that Canada is rarely compared to any other country. Our own perceptions of Canada would benefit by such comparison if we could find the talent and time. This is not to argue for a parochial approach to the study of international politics but for shaping our approach to fit the material in which we have a special interest and, it is to be hoped, competence.

The Department of External Affairs, for its part, has taken steps in the last few years to encourage greater contact with the academic community, including the holding of seminars, the funding of short-term research and the employment of scholars for 9- to 12-month periods to work on current problems. Three or more officers of the Department each year attempt to grapple with foreign policy questions in the stimulating environment of universities. The Policy Analysis Group tries to keep abreast of techniques for planning and analysis.

Not long ago, a British civil servant, after study of these techniques, wrote a book in which he imagined a scene in the Foreign Office ten years hence, illustrating discussion of the latest Middle East crisis on the basis of a scale of probabilities keyed to the study of past behaviour. He called it a "calibration of the field of nations" (Nigel Forward, *The Field of Nations*, Macmillan, 1971) We shall probably not have international slide-rules in foreign offices for a good many years yet, but there seems little question that new ways of looking at world problems and new ways of thinking about the future are here to stay. If Kepler is not yet among us, Metternich must still learn to accommodate change.

There may be special payoffs 'to be gained by speculation about the future'

Canadian scholars just beginning to apply the new tools to foreign policy

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No. 73/19 *The Value of Bilateral Consultation and Cultural Relations*. An exchange of letters between His Excellency Walter Scheel, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, September 28, 1973.

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Ottawa August 1 and September 17, 1973.

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Entered into force August 9, 1973.

Signed by Canada September 4, 1973.

Protocol extending the Arrangements regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles from September 30, 1970, to September 30, 1973.

Done at Geneva June 15, 1970.

Canada's agreement to extension of this Agreement from October 1, 1973, to December 31, 1973, communicated to the Secretary-General of GATT September 21, 1973.

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