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THE RELATION OF DEFENCE POLICY TO FOREIGN POLICY

Excerpts from an address by Prime Minister Trudeau to a Dinner of the Alberta Liberal Association, Calgary, April 12, 1969.

... Our decisions of last week in the area of foreign policy, in the area of our defence policy and the announcement we made about NATO... are very important and very far-reaching. They are far-reaching in terms of time and in terms of space. In terms of time because, when you make a decision to reorient your foreign policy, it will last for quite a while. Our last reorientation lasted, I suppose, a generation. It is important in terms of space, too. In Canada, the foreign policy we shall embark upon will concern every Canadian, rich or poor, Easterner or Westerner. It will concern our allies in all parts of the world, our friends, those who believe in the same principles as we do.

Our foreign policy, the one we are defining for Canada, is also very important for another reason. Our defence budget as you know is one-sixth of the total budget. That's a lot of money - \$1,800 million for defence. And it's a lot of money especially when you realize that it's accompanied by a great deal of uncertainty on the part of Canadians. There is a tendency in the past few years, when more money is needed for housing or more money is needed for anti-pollution schemes or more money is needed for social welfare legislation, for every form of expenditure in Canada (a project here, a research grant there), on the part of individuals, on the part of institutions and on the part of provincial governments, to say to the Federal Government "Spend less on defence, you'll have more for this other worthwhile project" -- whether it be education or health or housing or urban growth. There is a tendency on the part of all Canadians to say "Take it away from defence, you will have more money for the worthwhile things" -- implying, I suppose (and this comes, as I say, from many institutions, and even from provincial governments), that the money we spend on defence is not well spent.

Now this may be so, and if it is so, it is important that we correct it. It is important that we realize that the sixth of our national budget which is spent on defence is not an expenditure which is accepted as justifiable by a significant proportion of the Canadian people -- and even the military themselves. I cut out a clipping on April 8, a Canadian Press story, saying that at least 40 per cent of the graduates of the Canada's military colleges leave the armed forces at their first opportunity -- 40 per cent of all those who are being trained at the taxpayers' expense to become the élite, the cadre, of our armed

forces, leave before they can serve in the armed forces. This means that even in the military themselves there is an implication that our foreign policy and the defence policy that flows from it is not one which convinces them that their career, the military career, is a good one.

Well, what should we do about it? Are we spending too much money or are we spending too little? This is the kind of question we have been asking ourselves in Ottawa, this is the kind of question that during the election, last spring, I said that we should deal with in this Government. And we are doing it now. Our first decision we announced last week, and I want to explain to you the significance of it.

These decisions in the area of foreign policy are extremely important then for these reasons, and they are important also because of the objectives. What we want to do with this \$1,800 million is to defend Canadian sovereignty and to contribute towards world peace. Why else would Canadians want to spend money on defence? We don't want to go to war with anybody. These are the aims then of our foreign policy, to serve our national interests, and when I say national interests I am not thinking in any egotistical sense of just what's happening to Canadians. It's in our national interest to reduce the tensions in the world, tensions which spring from the two-thirds of the world's population who go to bed hungry every night, the two-thirds of the world's population who are poor whereas the other third is rich, and the tensions which spring from this great ideological struggle between the East and the West. This is the aim of our foreign policy; it is to serve our national interest and to express our national identity abroad so that other countries know us. They know what we stand for, they know what our interests are and what our values are, in the economic sphere, in the cultural sphere, in the social sphere, in the ideological sphere. This is what our foreign policy is all about.

And this is what we have been examining in the past several months in Ottawa. And some people think it is taking too long. But it will take longer, because you only re-examine your foreign policy once in a generation. You can't switch every year, you can't switch after every election.

We promised during the last election to re-examine our foreign policy, because the data, because the objective situation, have changed, because the Canadian requirements have changed over the past generation. We're beginning to realize now that we're not a one-ocean country, not an Atlantic country, not even a two-ocean country, an Atlantic and a Pacific. We're a three-ocean country. We're beginning to realize that this Pacific seaboard is more important to Canadians than we realized in the past. We're beginning to realize that countries like Japan, like China, like Australia, and those on the Pacific coast of South America, are as important partners for Canadians as the nations across the Atlantic. And we're beginning to realize that in the Arctic Canadian interests are very great and that there are not only ice and barren lands up there but that there is oil and there are minerals and there is untold wealth.

And we're beginning to realize, too, in the cultural sphere that la francophonie is important and that part of our national identity is having a bilingual country, and that if it is important that we remain in the British Commonwealth of nations it is important also that we express our identity in the French-speaking countries, those that form la francophonie.

And we are realizing too that the strategic factors making for peace or threatening war have changed immensely in a generation, and that the existence of ICBMs which are pre-targeted on all the major European and North American cities and which can spell immediate destruction if they are ever unleashed is a new factor. And that there is a very delicate balance, a balance of deterrent forces, between the two poles of military strength on this planet of today, and this is a new factor.

And we realize that all these factors are "inputs" in our foreign policy, and that we can't go on as we did in the past with the same foreign policy. Before the Second World War, it is said, we practically had no foreign policy, we were too small a country in terms of population and in wealth, and our foreign policy wasn't very different from that of the United States or of the United Kingdom, providing they had the same foreign policy, and when their interests diverged or were divergent, well, we tacked onto one or onto the other. So before the Second World War we didn't have a very distinct foreign policy.

After the Second world War, we were faced with a Europe which was divided into two power blocs, hostile, a Europe which had been impoverished and destroyed by war, and we realized that the tensions in Europe could be the most destructive ones for a lasting peace. And it's at that time that Canada, along with other countries, realizing the principal threat to peace was Soviet aggression, helped set up NATO as an answer to that possibility of aggression. And it's at that time that NATO was developed as a very important policy for peace in the world because Europe at that time, a Europe which had been destroyed, I repeat, by the war, had to be strengthened and had to be fortified against the danger of aggression. And as a result of that, NATO became practically all of our foreign policy. Until then, our foreign policy was that of the United States or of the United Kingdom. But since '49 our foreign policy has taken on a new dimension. That was the dimension of NATO, a dimension wherein we could talk to other countries in Europe which had more or less the same values as us but which had the same interest in stopping any possibility of Soviet aggression.

Twenty years later, today, Europe has been rebuilt. The gross national product of the NATO countries in Europe is over \$500 billion. The population, 300 million people. Canada's contribution to this Europe, important though it has been and important though it remains, is marginal -- 20 million people against 300 million. Our defence policy, which flowed from this foreign policy of NATO, now was more to impress our friends than frighten our enemies. Our contribution in Europe which was brought in the early years after the Second World War was very important then; it is marginal now in terms of strict military strength -- one mechanized division against perhaps 80 or 55, depending how you count them. This is our contribution. It is important; I am not trying to belittle it. But we have to remain free to decide our own foreign policy. And when we are told that we shouldn't be taking a free ride to peace in the world, when we are told that if we withdraw from NATO even in any degree this will lead other countries to withdraw from NATO, I don't admit this. I don't admit that Europeans or even Americans won't follow their own wisdom, that they don't have their own foreign policy. And I don't admit that our friends and allies will be guided in their decisions and determined in their actions by what Canadians do, and, if they think we are doing the wrong thing, that they will imitate us just because we have done it. I don't believe this. I believe that each country must have its own foreign policy. And in our case, where our contribution to Europe, I repeat, is marginal, but where we still believe that NATO is an important force in the world, we are entitled, we have a right, to ask questions about our participation in NATO.

In 1949, when we set up NATO, I think it was true that we could not wait for political settlements in order to meet the security issue, because the security issue was the number-one issue. But 20 years later I should be inclined to say that we can't wait until all the problems of security have been settled before we tackle the political issues of peace in the world. And it so happened that NATO after 20 years in our opinion had developed too much into a military alliance and not enough into a political alliance, not enough into an alliance which is interested not only in keeping the balance of deterrence of tactical power in Europe but into an alliance which is interested in arms control and de-escalation.

And I am afraid, in the situation which we had reached, NATO had in reality determined all of our defence policy. We had no defence policy, so to speak, except that of NATO. And our defence policy had determined all of our foreign policy. And we had no foreign policy of any importance except that which flowed from NATO. And this is a false perspective for any country. It is a false perspective to have a military alliance determine your foreign policy. It should be your foreign policy which determines your military policy.

So all we have done (and it is pretty important), last week in Ottawa, was to stand the pyramid on its base. It was standing on its head. We have decided to review our foreign policy and to have a defence policy flow from that, and from the defence policy to decide which alliances we want to belong to, and how our defences should be deployed. And that is why we gave a series of four priorities. In our statement last week, we said that the first priority for Canadians was not NATO, important though it is, and we have said that we wanted to remain aligned in NATO with those countries who believe in deterring the Soviet aggression in Europe. But this is not our first priority. Our first priority is the protection of Canadian sovereignty, in all the dimensions that it means.

And I don't accept the criticism of those who say this is a return to isolationism, or this is a return to the "fortress America" conception. This is not our purpose and this is not our aim.

What we are doing in our foreign policy, and what we are doing in our defence policy, we shall do by discussing with our allies, and we shall explain to them that our contribution is in order to promote the values which they are promoting in NATO -- values of freedom and of liberty. And this is what we are aiming for first.

But it is false to talk of isolationism when you think of Canada, which is territorially one of the largest countries in the world, second in terms of its land space, and which has a very small population in terms of the middle and great powers. It is absurd to say that this is isolationism because we are not on all the fronts of the world, political and military, fighting with other people. You can't talk of isolationism of Canadians because, with the small manpower we have, with the economic means we have, we say we want to use the first part of it in terms of our own sovereignty, the second part of it in terms of the defence of our territory and of the continent, and the third part of it in defence of other alliances such as NATO, such as peacekeeping operations which we will embark upon and we have embarked upon through the United Nations. We need our armed forces in order to perform these roles, but in degrees determined by our foreign policy. We don't want a military alliance or a defence policy to pre-empt all our choices.

That is why we decided last week to announce what I call Phase One of our defence policy, saying that we were not neutralists and we were not pacifists, that we believed in aligning ourselves with countries who wanted to protect the same kind of values as we in the world but we wanted to do this by leaving also our military options open to these four priorities. And that is why we shall not say, until our foreign policy has been determined and presented to Parliament and presented to the country, in a final way, what forces we shall put into NATO and what forces we shall draw out of NATO. It is our foreign policy which must come first, and not the defence policy and not the military alliance.

That is why last week, because of the dead-lines, because there was a meeting of the foreign ministers of NATO countries in Washington, we had to then state our general position. And we did. We stated we were remaining in NATO but we would not be pressed into making decisions now about our contributions to NATO, which I repeat we shall only make after our foreign policy has been determined overall. This is going apace. We have made several announcements. We have talked about recognizing Peking; we have talked about our policy in South America; we have even talked about the Vatican, to the scandal of a lot of people. We have talked of a lot of areas where we are reassessing our foreign policy. But until this policy has been presented, I repeat, to the Canadian people, we shall not close our options and say that all of our military strength will be oriented towards NATO.

We have a right to ask questions of our allies. If they want to keep us on these terms we shall be very happy because, our friends in NATO, we want to keep them. We want to continue "dialoguing" with them in the political sense. We want to keep these channels of communication open. We want to keep friends in Europe. But we don't want their military policy to determine our foreign policy. That's why we shall ask questions. It's right now, I believe, that we ask questions of ourselves about NATO and we ask questions of our allies about NATO.

Is an armoured brigade the right kind of contribution Canadians should make to Europe, could make to NATO? Is an armoured brigade, which can only be used in the plains of northern Germany, the right kind of contribution for Canadians to make? Is our squadron of CF-104s, which can be armed with conventional bombs or with nuclear bombs, the right kind of contribution? And what is the scenario for using nuclear arms in Europe, in our bombers, in our CF-104s? Do we want to participate in this way in an alliance without knowing in which way these so-called tactical weapons will be used? And has the scenario ever been explained to you, to the Canadian people, as to under what conditions our aircraft would fly nuclear weapons and unleash them on Europe? Will it only be as a second strike, will it only be as a deterrent? Are these 104s, are they soft targets? In the eyes of the Soviets, in the eyes of the Warsaw Pact countries, are they not entitled to ask themselves: "Well, what are these 104s flown by Canadians going to serve? Are they going to be first strike or second strike? Is it likely that they will be second strike? They are soft targets, they are on the ground, we know where the airfields are. Isn't it likely that they might be used to attack us first?" These are the questions that our enemies, the Soviets, are asking themselves, and these are the questions we are asking of our allies.

Our contribution in the naval area to our anti-submarine warfare -- is this the right contribution? Should we be having the kind of naval force which is prepared to destroy the Soviet nuclear-armed submarines, which are a deterrent for them as the Polaris is a deterrent for the United States? The United States

has Polaris submarines in the oceans and it will use them if it is attacked first, and if the American cities are destroyed the Americans know that they have their submarines as a second-strike capacity. And this strengthens the second-strike capacity of the United States. This is part of the balance of terror. This permits the Americans to say to the Soviets: "If you start first, we can still destroy you with our submarines." But the Soviets say the same thing: "If you Americans start first with your ICBMs, we can still destroy you with our submarines". The submarines are by nature, I suppose, in this capacity - they are second strike, they are deterrent. Is our policy right to be armed essentially against them?

These are the questions we want to ask of our allies, and we want to decide what our contribution in NATO will be. I am not promising any revolutionary changes. There may be some and they may not be very great. But I say that whatever our contribution will be in a military sense will flow from our foreign policy. And that is the purpose that our Government, your Government, is pursuing in Ottawa. It is an attempt to redefine our policies in all spheres. We have done it in the cultural, in the constitutional, in the trade spheres. We are doing it in the area of our foreign policy and of our defence policy....

... I wanted to talk to you about these things tonight because ... these things concern you, because these things are the problems which we are trying to solve, which we are trying to inquire into in Ottawa. And, as Canadians especially these are problems which will determine not only our future but the future perhaps of a great part of mankind. It is these problems, problems of East and West tensions, problems of North and South tensions, problems between the rich and the poor, problems which arise in our own country, problems of the protection of our sovereignty, problems of contribution to peace, to peace-keeping -- these are the problems we are asking ourselves to solve and these are the problems we want to discuss with the people of Canada. Because the solutions we will find will be important for every Canadian, not only the military.

I think the people who are in the armed forces have a right to know where we are going. And when I was reading this statistic a moment ago, about 40 per cent of those we trained to be officers leaving the armed forces, this is not because we made a decision last week. This is because, over the years, they feel that Canadians have no deep confidence, no deep belief, no deep respect even, for the kind of military role we are playing now. It is important that we re-define it, it is important that we believe in it. If we don't have a belief in it, we should tell the people who are devoting their lives in the armed service of the country: "There is no future for you. We are going to be a pacifist nation, or we are going to pull out of all alliances, or we are only going to need some forces in Canada in aid of the civil power". They have a right to know from us what their future is. Over the past several years, the armed forces have been losing very good men because they did not know where Canadians were going in their foreign policy. And I repeat what I said at the outset, they didn't know that because many taxpayers -- and I met some of them out tonight, though many were too young to be taxpayers -- but many people in our universities, many people in our financial circles, many people in our provincial governments, are saying we are spending too much on defence. Perhaps and perhaps not.

But we want to make sure, and this is the whole purpose of the review of our foreign policy; we want to make sure that whatever we do is understood by Canadians, whatever we do is justified in terms of the political decisions we have made, whatever we do is a result of honest men in government looking for the best ways in which they cannot only protect Canadian sovereignty but contribute to peace in the world.

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