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
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**WORLD POPULATION GROWTH AND MOVEMENT:
TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY**

by Michael Shenstone

*Consultant to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and
to Citizenship and Immigration Canada*

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


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ISBN: 0-662-25933-5. Government of Canada Catalogue number: E2-170\1997E.

Copies of this paper can be obtained through the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's "Infocentre", tel. 1-800-276-8376 or (613) 944-4000, fax (613) 996-9709, quoting the code SP80A.

June 30, 1997



INTRODUCTION

The mid-nineties have seen more attention than ever before focussed on the two great "people" issues of our time: the growing number of the earth's inhabitants, and their growing flow, voluntary or involuntary, from place to place and country to country. Neither of these two phenomena can be fully understood without the other. Yet there is still incomplete public awareness of their interlinked causes and effects and their close interrelationships with other pressing issues of policy. Government officials, including Canada's, unfortunately tend to treat the two separately from one another, as do academics, and there is persisting irresolution on dealing with them systematically and coherently, despite commitments made. We are not yet well prepared for what the coming century may have in store for us.

The purpose of this paper is threefold:

- to present what the author sees as basic facts and future possibilities of the situation;
- to discuss key implications of these facts, and reactions to them by international organisations, governments and publics, including Canada;
- and to recommend courses of action by Canada for the future.

Inevitably, the paper contains rash generalisations, personal speculations and over-simplifications which expert readers will readily discern. It is a broad survey cutting across specific domains, intended to stimulate thinking by policy-makers, specialists and the concerned public on what needs to be done. While the emphasis is on Canadian policies, much of what is said here is relevant elsewhere as well.

Frequent references are made in the text to happenings over the past five years. This is because a lot has happened, and also because the paper is in a sense a sequel to the author's *World Population Growth and Population Movements: Policy Implications for Canada*, completed in early 1992 and published as Policy Planning Staff Paper No. 92/7 by what was then External Affairs and International Trade Canada.

The paper has wide sources, oral and written, official and non-official, in Canada and abroad; they are not identified except for a few textual quotations. Many of those consulted may recognise some of their own thoughts, ruthlessly plagiarised and perhaps unwittingly distorted. The author owes heartfelt thanks—and apologies—to the numerous people who generously helped him. There is no bibliography, the convenient excuse being that so much of the information relayed below was provided "not for attribution".

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



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SUMMARY

Trends in population change and movement are alarmingly clear in general but unpredictable in detail. They will increasingly impinge on Canadian interests.

World population, now at 5.8 billion, will continue its rapid growth. Although the rate of increase and of fertility has begun to taper off slowly, thanks in part to past international efforts, the total will very probably reach 10 or 11 billion late in the coming century.

Developing countries are still growing much faster than developed ones, but with wide variations among them that must be closely followed. Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the Middle East, has the highest rates; the lowest are in Japan and Europe, where actual declines are imminent or have begun. Further urbanisation of the developing world and the youth of its expanding population will have serious political and migration consequences. Women as individuals, so often deprived of all choice, bear the heaviest burden, in terms of sickness and mortality.

Movements of people, forced or otherwise, are becoming larger and more complex, in the fluid, turbulent post-Cold War situation. Factors include population growth, gross inequalities within and between countries, economic change and globalization, environmental degradation, ethnic conflict, better communications. If there are now slightly fewer recognised "refugees", this is largely because of stricter Western controls on asylum; instead there are many more "illegals" or "irregulars" as they are called. The huge numbers of "internally displaced" in developing countries and places like Bosnia are a particularly distressed and vulnerable category.

The complexity of causes and effects of population change is increasingly realised. Rapid growth, racing ahead of development, is actually reducing GDP per capita in much of Africa; more generally it has a corrosive effect on institutions, can overwhelm governments struggling with the challenges of development, and holds back desperately needed improvements in women's status and quality of life. Reproductive health measures thus contribute indirectly but substantially to Canada's priority of alleviating poverty and meeting basic needs.

Population growth will further increase malnutrition and also environmental stresses. Combined with—and often intensifying—a deterioration of socio-economic conditions, it can trigger mass migration, which in turn can impose severe strains on poorer receiving countries.

The 1994 Cairo ICPD, central to current international population policy, placed major emphasis on the relatively new concepts of reproductive health and rights, addressed for the first time sensitive issues such as female genital mutilation, made numerous references to ways of empowering women (thus paving the way for the Beijing conference), reached broad agreement on key migration and refugee issues, and gave specific estimates of the resources needed to achieve reproductive health (including family planning) for all by 2015. Canada and other donors accepted these as a commitment, reiterating it later in the OECD. Over opposition, subsequent major UN conferences, particularly Beijing, reaffirmed ICPD language.

The UNFPA is providing good international leadership on population, including ICPD follow-up. The World Bank and regional banks have a spotty record; the IPPF, as the leading NGO, works effectively but has suffered financially (including a large cut by Canada). Various discussion bodies and commissions have various track records. A new South-South cooperative organisation on population may be useful. However the broader picture is mixed: APEC summits have commissioned studies including population along with other questions, but recent G-7/G-8, Francophone, Commonwealth and environmental summits attended by Canada have said little or nothing on population or migration in their pronouncements on global issues.

Some progress is being made. The use of modern contraceptives is spreading, even if unevenly (e.g. very little in Francophone Africa), but 100-120 m. women still have an unmet need for access to family planning. Other issues needing attention include finding a proper balance of effort, enhancing quality of service, stimulating more research, and promoting human rights and non-coercion. But prospects are not good for donor contributions adequate to keep up the momentum and to achieve their 2015 commitment.

Trends in thinking about migration issues include a new emphasis on "human" security, more discussion (though little more action) on getting at migration's "root causes", more attention to "control" (often with undesirable implications), and difficult controversies about the application of concepts such as "temporary protection" and "family reunification". However support for an international migration regime or major conference is minimal. The possibility of eventual pressures for freer world movement of labour (alongside capital and goods) is rarely touched on.

The UNHCR continues to deserve its preeminence among organisations relevant to forced migration, despite criticisms that can be made. Others such as the DHA and the UN human rights bodies have been less effective. With sovereignty a shibboleth for so many countries, next to nothing is done for the internally displaced. The IOM has some policy potential for general migration issues; developed country bodies such as the IGC and OECD have continuing usefulness; so also does Canada's current and proposed bilateral cooperation with the EU and with the USA, although its immediate benefits to Canada should not be overestimated; and the new Puebla group for North and Central America is off to a good start.

Here are some highlights of recommendations for Canada made in the paper:

- there is a need for clearer and more comprehensive policy statements. A detailed CIDA policy document on population and development should be prepared very soon to provide a firm basis for specific programming on population by all CIDA's branches. A document on Canada's international migration strategy is required, in order to bring together, update and refine the elements now scattered across various CIC statements, and incidentally make up for the lack of migration policy themes in the government's 1995 foreign policy statement. With population growth and movement so related, each document should contain elements of common analysis.
- in population, Canada should promptly restore assistance from its present all-time low of \$28 m. to the \$45 m. level of '90-1, and then move up substantially towards our \$140 m. ICPD/OECD commitment. Our IPPF contribution should be restored, and more emphasis should be placed on Africa, particularly Francophone Africa. Reproductive health including family

planning should be stressed, but with balanced attention to other factors bearing on population. More population expertise should be provided throughout CIDA. The IDRC should be urged to restore its abandoned population research. Canada should encourage South-South cooperation, and more World Bank and regional bank lending for population after it has put its own house in order.

— in migration, Canada should look carefully at the policy implications for us of “root causes”, including the complexities of population/migration/development relationships. Equitable measures are required to restore the IRB’s credibility and avoid it becoming a source of anti-immigrant intolerance. Its advocacy of speedier removals should be supported. Much of current immigration policy seems on sound lines, but new restrictions on undocumented asylum claimants should be rescinded, and the heavy tax on immigrant landings reduced. Funds should be provided to maintain refugee selection from camps overseas.

— internationally, we should persevere with efforts to conclude a Memo of Agreement with the USA and foster more cooperation with the EU, without counting too much on major results soon from either, and should push ahead and expand the new Puebla process. Continuous careful assessments of the numerous international organisations active in the field are warranted, so that we can encourage and help guide the most effective, but we must avoid a resource-driven temptation to over-prioritise among them, or to go in too exclusively for either regional or fully multilateral approaches. An international strategy is a necessity for us and cannot come cheap.

— human rights should continue to have prominence in both population and migration policies: Canada should look at ways to integrate reproductive rights more clearly into human rights as a whole, consider adopting the IPPF’s charter of reproductive rights, clarify its position on the “Rights of Migrant Workers Convention” and improve the capacity of the UN human rights bodies to foster the rights of refugees and the internally displaced.

— as part of Canada’s new Pacific emphasis, we should advocate more serious discussion of population and migration issues at APEC, and press for Japan to be invited to join the IGC.

— we should do more to see that such issues, along with other global concerns, receive attention at G-7/G-8 summits, Commonwealth and Francophone gatherings, and other major meetings.

— within Ottawa, much more frequent and sustained senior-level interdepartmental dialogue on these questions is required, particularly between CIC, CIDA and DFAIT, including—on globalization issues—the latter’s foreign trade component.

— briefings, general foreign policy statements and reporting from posts should regularly feature population change and movement as basic and closely related phenomena needing to be taken into account in Canadian policy everywhere.

— Canadian NGOs as well as academics should be encouraged to play enhanced roles in both fields, taking into account also the development aspects.

— and in sum, much more should be done by all concerned inside and outside government to highlight and discuss the fundamental long-term factors affecting and affected by population and migration, so that they receive our consistent long-term attention and help us cope with what the coming century may have in store for us.



ABBREVIATIONS

APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
CIC	Citizenship & Immigration Canada
CIS	Conference of Independent States (of the ex-Soviet Union)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
cp	Contraceptive prevalence
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (of Canada)
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (of the United Nations)
EC	European Commission
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (of the United Nations)
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the United Nations)
World Bank	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
IGC	Inter-Governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia
ILO	International Labour Organisation (of the United Nations)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Federation
IRB	Immigration and Refugee Board (of Canada)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PPFC	Planned Parenthood Federation of Canada
TFR	Total Fertility Rate
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)
UNCPD	United Nations Commission on Population and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

WFP	World Food Programme (of the United Nations)
WHO	World Health Organisation (of the United Nations)
WTO	World Trade Organisation

PART I — Basic Facts and Projections

A: How Many People?

Global Trends

The brute figures are awesome, but with a glimmer of improvement. There are now about 5.8 billion people in the world, some 400 million (or 13 Canadas) more than there were five years ago. The annual increase is now thought to be approximately 1.48%, or 81 million, having peaked at 87 million in 1987, an all-time record.¹ Some lowered revisions in estimated rates of population growth and of total fertility (TFR)² have recently been made. These are mainly due to: a) faster than expected downward fertility trends (a world average TFR of 3.4 in 1991 is now perhaps 3.0), most markedly in China with its heavy statistical weight, but also in South-central Asia and in the still towering rates of sub-Saharan Africa; b) lower birthrates and life expectancy in the European ex-USSR and much of Eastern Europe; c) higher estimated mortality in countries affected by wars (such as Rwanda, Liberia, Iraq) or the spread of AIDS; and d) better census and fertility data in a number of African countries, for example Nigeria, still much the largest.

The future is a mixture of uncertainties and certainties. High among the uncertainties is whether there will be a slackening of the systematic population policies of past decades, now yielding real results. But among the virtual certainties is that even if overall fertility continues a gradual decline, actual world population will go on growing at nearly its present numerical rate for several more years, mostly because of the high proportion of young people already alive in developing countries. After that, the growth rate will taper off only gradually. This phenomenon, which the experts call "population momentum", will probably account for almost two-thirds of future growth. In the entirely implausible event that TFR were to fall to the 2.1 replacement level tomorrow, which it will not, world population would still increase to 6.9 billion by 2050. It will in any case hit 6 billion by 1999 or 2000.

Predictions get vaguer, the further from the present one gets, and one is rightly warned that each depends on an array of assumptions. For the future world population, the UN puts out a preferred "medium variant" with "high" and "low" variants on either side:

	<u>2015</u>	<u>2050</u>
High	7.55 billion	11.1 billion
Medium	7.28 billion	9.36 billion
Low	7.01 billion	7.7 billion

The medium variant is based, among other things, on a projected continuation of efforts in population and related fields, which would still leave population increasing by 44 million a year in 2050. Otherwise, higher figures are deemed more likely.

Obviously, expansion of world population must eventually come to a halt—our pressure on the environment, if nothing else, will see to that—but no agreement exists on when, or at what level. Some have predicted a virtual doubling to 11.5 billion by 2100. The UN posits 10.35 billion by 2100, 10.66 billion by 2150, and stabilisation just after 2200 at 10.73 billion. A new estimate by the reputable International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Vienna suggests a peak of 10.6 billion about 2080, dropping to 10.35 billion by 2100 (the same figure as on the UN's rising curve), and continuing to shrink slowly thereafter. All caution that their figures are very speculative, but it is clear that a huge increase still lies ahead.

Regional and Country Trends

The stark contrast between developed and developing countries remains. The latter, where 80% of the world's population lives, are increasing annually by 1.77%, and their TFR averages 3.3 or 3.4. Without China, these figures would be still higher, perhaps as much as 2.2 % and 4.0. On the other hand, the developed countries are growing by a negligible 0.4%, and their TFR, at 1.68, is well below replacement level. This does not yet mean an actual decline, but by 2050 all of Europe and Japan will be dropping. The developed-developing gap in growth rates has profound significance for the world's political and economic future.

Differences within regions and countries are equally important. Foreign policy and migration specialists in Canada and elsewhere pay insufficient attention to the relevant figures—of which a sample follows—although they are vital for understanding of long-term political and economic trends.

Africa still has by far the highest increase rate (2.8%) and TFR (5.7). Although there are now indications that these figures are beginning to fall, particularly in urban areas, the increase exceeds GDP growth, so per capita GDP is decreasing, i.e. poverty is actually rising in the continent as a whole. There is a clear distinction between Sub-Saharan Africa (2.9% and a breathtaking 6.1) and Northern Africa (2.4% and 4.3), with the latter watched specially closely by Europe because of deemed migration pressure. Nigeria, mistakenly thought to be 122 million in 1991, is now estimated at 115 million, but is still the Africa colossus, with a 3% growth rate and a 6.45 TFR, virtually unchanged for 20 years; by 2050 it will be the fifth largest in the

world, and at 339 million will be closing in on the USA of the time. It is no accident that Rwanda and Burundi, at 6.2 and 6.6 have TFRs above even the Sub-Saharan average, and some of the highest population densities per arable land, though there are others undisturbed at present which have even higher TFRs, such as Niger, an astounding 7.4. 17 countries have TFRs more than 6, and less than 10% modern contraceptive use, but there are now fertility declines faster than expected in Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya. The 63 million Egyptians, whose political and economic stability is so important in Middle East politics but who are counted by the UN in Africa, will be 97 million by 2025 unless they can quickly bring their fertility down further from 3.6.

The Middle East is still next, at 2.4% and 4.4. Those who are concerned with the Palestine-Israel question should note that the Gaza Strip unhappily holds the world record, 5% and 8.8, with the West Bank not very far behind at 4% and 4.3. Israel, in contrast, is 1.5% and 2.9. If present rates hold, the population of the occupied territories combined will by 2025 be 7.2 million to Israel's 8 million, with obvious implications for the peace process.³ Other high rates are Yemen (with the second highest TFR in the world), Iraq, Syria, and then Saudi Arabia, which does not see population growth as a problem despite the menace to its long-term stability from its many newly-educated unemployed. As many as 1/3 of its total 18 million may be expatriates. Populous Iran, often counted in South Asia but more important politically here, is 2.9% and a high 5.1, but these have fallen from 1991 and may be starting to fall further under new government-inspired efforts, declared officially to be consonant with Islam.

South Asia, averaging 2.1% and 3.8, has 950 million-strong India, now down to 1.9% and 3.4 from 2.11% and 3.9 five years ago, but its population may still hit 1,384 million by 2025. With little or no population effort, Pakistan's high rates have hardly budged, but Bangladesh is down from 2.4% and 4.9 five years ago to 2% and 3.4—a remarkable tribute to the success of Canadian and other assistance in this field.

Latin America and the Caribbean is at 1.9% and 3.1, with wide regional variations ranging from Paraguay (2.8% and 4.5), to Barbados (0.5% and 1.6), with Cuba close to the latter. Our NAFTA partner Mexico, at 2.2% and 3.1, has dropped, but its population of 94 million could be 142 million by 2025. The economic implications bear close attention by Canada. The other Latin American behemoth, Brazil, is growing a little more slowly, at 1.7% and 2.8. Chronically troubled Haiti is at 2.3% and a high 4.8, the contrast between the two figures probably reflecting its appallingly high infant mortality.

Southeast Asia (1.9% and 3.3) shows continuing population policy success in massive Indonesia and populous Thailand, but only the beginnings in Vietnam, and still high TFRs in backward Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos, as well as populous, Catholic Philippines, with its seventy millions growing at 2.3% and due to double in thirty years.

Enormous China, with its 1,217 million people, has come down to 1.1% and 1.8 (the latter figurer being lower than that for the USA!) despite earlier predictions that decreases might

be stalling. Instead of a formerly forecast 1,600 million by 2025, it is now predicted to reach just short of 1,500 million.

Then comes North America, at 0.6% (not counting immigration), and for the USA a TFR of 2.0, up from less than 1.8 in 1975. With a TFR of 1.64 (down from 1.76 in 1989), Canada's 1995 growth rate was 1.34% including net immigration. Within that Ontario was 1.63% and Quebec 0.75%, partly because a much higher proportion of migrants go to or end up in Ontario. Fertility rates in the two large provinces are similar (1.65 and 1.58 respectively). Newfoundland has the lowest TFR (1.25) and is the only province in population decline.

Japan lies just below, at 0.2% and 1.4, with a preoccupation in some circles there that its population may drop from 125 million now to 55 million by 2100. A precipitous drop in TFR in Japan came soon after World War II, without our baby boom, so a population decline will show up shortly.

The European Union countries are almost all close to 0.1% growth, with the important exception of Germany, now in actual -0.1% decline, and with most TFRs well below replacement level, at an average of 1.5. Catholic Spain and Italy, along with Hong Kong, have the world record for the lowest TFRs, at just over 1.2; the Lutheran Nordic countries, and Catholic Ireland, have the highest European rates (around 1.8). A would-be EU member, Turkey, normally counted in Asia, has seen its rates fall sharply, but at 1.6% and 2.7 they are still far above the EU average, reflecting that country's different social pattern from the European norm, and probably posing a further political obstacle to its European ambitions.

Most of Eastern Europe, including Russia and Ukraine, but excepting Poland, is slated for early population decline, with TFRs averaging 1.4 and falling life expectancy. Russian officials have said that they expect a 7% drop in population in the period 1995-2000. These trends reflect the severe economic and social problems that have followed the fall of the Curtain. Will there be a turnaround if the political or the economic situation stabilises?

Trends within Populations

World urbanisation is continuing to rise, particularly in developing countries. 34% of their population lived in cities five years ago; now the figure is 38%, and by 2015 it will be over 50%. This means that before long, urban dwellers will be in the majority in all regions.

As with total populations, however, there are wide differences within regions. For example, in Asia Bhutan is 6% urban, and Singapore 100%. Although the annual rate of urbanisation has been decreasing, the gross numbers rise: 59 million more people will inhabit cities this year than last, and 93 million more annually by 2025. The process is particularly fast in Africa. Cities are growing both from natural increase and from rural migration—the latter because of lack of local opportunities, often fuelled by rural over-population, but sometimes

without this. In a few places the rural population is actually dropping because of out-migration. In Africa, rural-to-rural migration is probably even larger than rural-to-urban.

The biggest cities are continuing to swell, and developing countries are rising in the urban league tables. By 2015, there will be ten "mega-cities", all over a staggering 18 million. One developed country city, Tokyo, will still lead the list, as it does today; the other monsters, in order, will be: Bombay, Lagos, São Paulo, Dhaka, Karachi, Mexico City, Shanghai, New York and Calcutta. New York will have dropped from 4th to 9th place, and Los Angeles, 7th today, will no longer be in the running. But it has been pointed out that the fastest-growing cities of all "are not the giant metropolises but anonymous secondary cities", where social, health and environmental problems are often even worse, and "without the national attention and international attention that go to the more visible megacities"⁴.

Urbanisation is important for policy planners of all disciplines, because rapidly growing cities foster economic and social modernisation, and at the same time can be sinks of poverty and pollution. When combined with economic problems and "declining state capacity", to use the apt phrase of a Canadian academic, they can be a principal source of political instability. **And they can be the source of massive migration abroad.**

Political turbulence is not always to be blamed on cities: Rwanda is only 6.1% urban, and Burundi 8%. The main problem, however, has been well stated: developing countries are "urbanising faster than they are industrialising. Cities are attracting people ahead of their economic capacity to provide jobs, homes, water, sanitation and other basic services. This is the road to urban squalor, with social tensions, crime, and other basic problems to follow."⁵

Ethnic and cultural differences within populations are reflected in some differing growth rates, with significant social, political or other consequences. Among examples on our continent are the high birth rates in Canadian and US indigenous populations, compared with national averages,⁶ and the different growth rates in Canada as between Ontario and Quebec, already mentioned (with the political implications hardly needing elaboration).

Further afield, in South Africa the white population reproduces much like those of developed countries, and the majority African population much like other Africans, so racial ratios are changing. Albanian-origin citizens of Serbia have much higher rates than "Serbian" Serbs, adding to the explosive potential there. It has been remarked that reproducing groups within a country are those that have something in common, such as ethnic communities, and not the nation-state; they are "elements in each other's reality", and react to one another in demographic as in other respects. The Israel-Palestinian nexus, although not formally within one country, is an intimidating example.

Age structure merits particular attention because in most developing countries the high proportion of young people, approaching or already at reproductive age, guarantees further rapid population increase in the years just ahead. It also severely strains employment prospects, with grave economic, political and migratory implications.

An OECD study puts the situation starkly:

"for the foreseeable future, close to 90% of the people entering the world's labour market will have been born in a developing country. For example, by the year 2015, sub-Saharan Africa alone will add annually to the world's labour force more than *three times* as many new workers and work seekers as the OECD countries, Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union combined."⁷

There may also be distortions in aspects of the age problem. A number of countries refuse even to recognise (and gather statistics on) unmarried teen-age pregnancies, which can be numerous especially among the most disadvantaged (as also in Canada). The true picture of population growth—as well as of the extent of human distress—may thereby be underestimated.

Developed countries including Canada of course have an increasing proportion of old people in their population, and their future economic burden is well advertised. A current IIASA study suggests that by 2050 the over-60's in developed countries will rise by 16% and the under-15's will be down by 10%. But due to rising life expectancy, many developing countries also now have a larger number of the aged than formerly; their over-60's will rise by a further 10% by 2050. Could this, combined with a weakening of the extended family, put additional social strain on them in future?

Importance of the Individual

We must not forget that the array of demographic statistics above on rates of population growth and fertility tells only half the story. Equally important is what is missing here: a picture of the appalling situation of hundreds of millions of *individuals*, particularly women, in developing countries—victims of persistent discrimination or violence, at risk of dying as a result of pregnancy, vulnerable to AIDS and the like, their quality of life, well-being and improvement of rights held back, their desire to limit or space their child-bearing frustrated by lack of availability or information on the means to do so safely and effectively. What will count is the voluntary choices that they one by one will be enabled to make about their own future.

Here are some grim numbers. There are 585,000 deaths annually from pregnancy or childbirth, 99% in developing countries. Of these, 70,000 die from unsafe abortions, out of the 20,000,000 such abortions done annually, according to the WHO's estimates. **"Every minute of every day, at least one woman dies from causes related to pregnancy, childbirth and abortion."**⁸

Over one in five married women in developing countries—something like 120 to 150 million people—would like to space or limit their pregnancies, but lack contraceptive means—the so-called "unmet need".⁹ This is despite the fact that use of modern contraceptives in these countries has risen from 53% in 1991 to 57% in 1995 (the figure is 71% in the industrialised world), and that only two countries (the Holy See and Saudi Arabia) officially deny access to contraception, even though many do little or nothing to promote it. In the developing countries

40% of contraceptive prevalence (hereafter cp) is due to sterilisation, mostly female; 12% from the pill, and many from IUDs.

A later section of this paper gives more detailed information (on page 28 and following) on the gradual progress being made in extending the use of modern contraceptives to *married* women, although as pointed out earlier, statistics on and help for *adolescents* and *the unmarried* are lacking in a number of countries. Sadly, their death and illness rates due to pregnancy are often higher. The impact of AIDS must also be reckoned with: information on it appears on page 15.

All those concerned with population and migration must keep constantly in mind the necessary balance between concern for the collectivity and concern for the individual.

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Notes to Section A

1. These are UN figures. The Population Reference Bureau of Washington, DC still has the annual increase as 86 million.
2. The "Total Fertility Rate" (TFR) is the average number of children born to a woman in her reproductive lifetime at the current rate. A TFR of 2.1 maintained over many years would theoretically lead to a stable population.
3. The figures for Israel exclude immigration, which in some years can be quite substantial (nearly 500,000 over the period 1990-4). The TFR for its 14% Muslim community is 4.7. Immigration to this community and to the occupied territories is of course virtually nil.
4. Pp. 54-55 of The Exploding Cities of the Developing World, article in *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 1996.
5. P. 28 of *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*, 1995. The Report also comments extensively on the problems of population growth.
6. The indigenous population of Saskatchewan could be in a majority by 2020.
7. J. Edward Taylor, ed., *Development Strategy, Employment and Migration: Insights from Models*, p. 9. OECD Development Centre, Paris, 1996.

8. Text accompanying *1997 World Population Data Sheet*, published by the Population Reference Bureau, Washington, DC

9. According to UNFPA, the range of unmet need by married couples is from 14% in Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, to more than 35% in Bolivia, Ghana, Kenya and Togo.

B: Who's Going Where?

Problems of Description

We are accustomed to speak of "migration", but a more appropriate term to describe the general phenomenon that concerns governments and publics is the "movement" of people. This is because it is more and more evident that *temporary* stays in other countries or regions are of the same level of importance as *permanent* ones. For example there are various kinds of "guest worker" labourers who work for limited—but often quite long—periods of time, legally or illegally, outside their own countries; "suitcase vendors" moving highly informally in and out of former Soviet-bloc countries; sadly exploited prostitutes; domestic servants; asylum seekers; business people on short-term assignments; and more.

Moreover, despite a plethora of academic and governmental studies, there is a great deal that we do not know about population movement. The UN itself has recently commented on the lack of reliable data in this field, although understandably skipping over the fact that figures are manipulated up or down by some member states for political reasons (census figures are often manipulated too). Countries of emigration very frequently report less people leaving than destination countries report arriving; sometimes, as in Canada, this is because we have no firm statistics on permanent departures, and in other cases emigration figures are downplayed for prestige reasons. Also, the populations concerned fluctuate from month to month or year to year.

One should beware of the references that are very often made, even in UN documents, to the 100 or (now) 120 million "migrants" or "migrant stock", as somehow demonstrating the scale of present-day migration. These tell us almost nothing about current rates, because they refer to people who came decades ago as well as recent arrivals. Such figures are however of some use in assessing the scale of problems of integration. In fact the total world migrant stock as a percentage of world population is about the same now as it was in 1965 (2.3%), although the stock in developed countries has risen from 3.1% to 4.5% over that period.

It is more generally realised now than it was a few years ago that the sorting of people on the move into clearly defined, distinct categories (refugees vs. others; or political vs. economic; or voluntary vs. involuntary; or temporary vs. permanent) is partly artificial, because most people have at least some mixture of motives in leaving their homes, and the pressures and circumstances differ in almost every country and every individual case. Nevertheless a degree of arbitrary categorisation is necessary for analysis and for orderly handling of migratory movement.

The Numbers

Within the "South"

It remains the case, as it was five or ten years ago, that the major movements of people are within the developing world rather than from there to the developed world, though it is the latter movement that gets more international (read, Western-dominated) media attention, in Canada as elsewhere. There are huge numbers (and the world's highest rate in growth of foreign-born population) in Africa, very many being forcibly displaced, notably from or within the Great Lakes countries, Sudan and Liberia; others desperately seek better circumstances, for instance the 150,000 Mozambicans who are reported to be turned back annually at the South African frontier. Experts expect still more migration within (as well as from) Africa in coming years.

The past few years have seen large flows from the developing parts of the ex-USSR (mainly Russians and others returning to their original homelands), as well as movements of more skilled people westward to the Czech Republic, Poland, and others, and of course a dramatic rise in the number of displaced in ex-Yugoslavia, where the tale is not yet told. Since 1989 some nine million people have been forced to move within the former USSR as a result of armed conflicts, political and ethnic tensions and environmental disasters.

Fast development in much of East Asia has been accompanied—and probably fostered—by large numbers of low-skilled workers moving temporarily or semi-permanently (two to five years) to more prosperous countries, which become largely dependent on them. Malaysia, for example, has now become an immigration as well as emigration country, with two million out of a 8-9 million work force from outside (largely from Indonesia, and largely illegal). Indonesia has a formal policy of labour export, but at the same time skilled and semi-skilled workers are brought in, mainly from investing countries. Similarly, Thailand shelters perhaps a million illegal foreign labourers, while 400,000 Thais work abroad, perhaps 26% illegally. South Korea is also involuntarily becoming an immigration country for unskilled labour, most of it illegal; so is Taiwan, whose average GDP growth (7%) has for some time far exceeded its population growth (1%).

In the Middle East, the aftermath of the Gulf War means far fewer Yemenis and Palestinians are working in Arab oil-rich countries, but they have been replaced by non-Arabs from Asia, mainly low-skilled and low-waged. Many of these are illegal and liable to sudden and inhumane expulsion (reportedly 160,000 from the United Arab Emirates in late 1996). But the enormous wage differentials (8 times or more) encourage ever more people to try their luck. Cutbacks of Palestinians allowed to work in Israel have even led to the temporary import of (non-Jewish) Bulgarians . . .

To the "North"

Migrants to developed countries are very roughly estimated at 3 to 3½ million, including 100,000 to 300,000 refugees (depending on the definition)—a proportion of migrants in relation to population that has changed little since 1970, according to the World Bank World Development Report 1995. These figures mean that the ratio of refugees to other migrants lies somewhere between 1:10 and 1:30 (a little higher than 1:10 in Canada), though the public has the impression of much more. Of the total, about two million come to the four "official" immigration countries of North America and Australasia. Most of the rest come to Europe, although statistics there are unsatisfactory since the majority of countries are politically reluctant to admit that immigrants are arriving permanently. Spain is a recent addition to the unofficial tally of European "countries of immigration". Japan may now have something like 300,000 illegals, mostly from Asian countries. Many of the most menial, "dirty" jobs in Japan are now held by non-nationals.

The Specially Underprivileged and Privileged

The last few years have seen large and increasing numbers of "illegal" or "irregular" or "undocumented" migrants (tact or the lack of it more or less governs one's choice of term) in both North and South, and there is little evidence that the increase is tapering off. Almost by definition their numbers are not known, but it is generally accepted that many of them now come or remain as such in developed countries because they believe they would not be accepted—genuinely or otherwise—as refugees. For a time ending in the early '90s refugee status was understandably seen as a choice path to these countries, but new restrictions in the last few years have curtailed this.

The illegals have few or no rights in many countries, and are often shamefully exploited. Access to local health, educational and other facilities varies widely; as an example, recent US proposals to deny schooling to the huge numbers of Mexican illegals in California etc. were only narrowly defeated. Illegals, numbering 600,000 in Texas alone according to the US authorities, are welcomed by many employers because they are cheap and diligent, and have minimal or no rights which would raise their cost. The same happens in many other countries.

If illegals are the specially under-privileged, a contrasting, specially privileged new category is formed by the small numbers of highly qualified professionals and business people who move fairly freely, and not necessarily permanently, with the currents of world economic globalization, under individual country policies or wider arrangements (NAFTA, WTO etc.). For example, the US Immigration Act of 1990 allows 80,000 "high-level professionals" to enter outside normal quotas, avowedly to boost US competitiveness, and the story has it that Congressional moves to curtail foreign students applying for permanent residence were curtailed when Bill Gates of Microsoft pointed out how many of his experts were drawn from them.

Canada's policies are less explicit (unless one counts the special privileges for entry by people bringing large amounts of job-creating capital), but foreign students studying in Canada in disciplines in high demand such as computer programming are welcome to apply as immigrants (without enquiry as to whether their home government financed them), and temporary admissions for such occupations are sometimes now also facilitated. Many of the 5,000 new Nortel jobs in the Ottawa area will have to be filled from abroad, for (temporary?) lack of Canadians qualified for them.

People in Flight

There are probably still more people in the misery of flight in the world than there were five years ago. Numbers have declined in one internationally recognised category, but are on the rise, and likely to continue to do so, in others where distress is as great or greater.

There are now about 15 million official "refugees" under the Geneva Convention and similar arrangements, down from 17 million in 1992. In parallel, asylum applications to Europe and North America were probably 400,000 in 1996, whereas in 1992 they had been 825,000. The drop in applications is not because of any marked change in those needing protection, as events in many areas of conflict testify, but mainly if not almost solely because of stricter controls by receiving countries on granting asylum. On average, over half the refugees are women, who are of course particularly vulnerable, but ratios in different countries vary widely, from 15% to 83%. Women and children together may make up a world average of 80% of refugees.

Beyond Convention refugees and specially acknowledged long-term categories like the Palestinians (who are demographically on the increase as indicated by the world-record TFR figures mentioned earlier), there are perhaps upwards of 20 million people who are, in the UN phrase, "in refugee-like situations"¹—probably a considerable increase over the last few years. Most of these would qualify as actual refugees under the broader definitions proposed (but predictably not accepted by developed countries) in the Latin American "Cartagena Declaration" or the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) Convention. These definitions in essence would cover people fleeing from generalised violence or war, without necessarily having an *individual* "well-founded fear of being persecuted ..." as stipulated under the Geneva Convention. Many of the Somalis, Rwandans, Kurds, Bosnians and others who have crowded our television screens in recent years fit into this large but vague category of suffering people. As with official refugees, the status of most of them is in theory temporary, pending restoration of acceptable conditions in their home countries, even if in practice many of them are at least semi-permanently abroad. Those who have found shelter in developed countries usually have a much higher standard of living than at home (even if often deplorably low by our standards), and are thus much less likely to repatriate willingly. Between developing countries, voluntary or semi-voluntary return is much more frequent.

Another, even larger category is that of the "internally displaced", whose fate has been described as "the issue of the decade". These have risen from 20 to perhaps 26 million or more—4 million in the Sudan alone, for example—although statistics on them are particularly uncertain. There is no internationally agreed definition of them: the UN's working definition says they are "...those who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who are within the territory of their own country." This definition has been criticised as at once too broad (because it includes victims of natural disaster where human rights violations and persecution are not also involved) and too narrow (because of the quantitative and time qualifiers in the definition); it "essentially should help identify persons who should be of concern to the international community because they are basically in refugee-like situations within their own countries, and their own governments are unwilling or unable to protect them".²

If one is right in surmising that world dislocation and disorder will increase further in coming decades, the numbers of those in flight, under whatever category, can only rise. **Canada** and the rest of the international community must prepare for this sad eventuality.

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Notes to Section B

1. The UN General Assembly has authorized the UNHCR to act on behalf of these, defined as "refugees who were in a situation 'analogous' to that of convention refugees because they were victims of man-made events over which they had no control" (quoted on p. 272 of *Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration and US Policy*, Michael S. Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner, eds., 1995). This book is one of the best recent surveys of migration and refugee issues.

2. Pp. 21-22 of article "Protecting the Internally Displaced" by Roberta Cohen in *World Refugee Survey 1996*, US Committee for Refugees.

PART II — Implications and Actions

A: Population Growth

A Mixture of Causes

The proximate *cause* of rapid population growth remains as it was, the incomplete "demographic transition" in most developing countries, whereby this century's dramatic decrease in infant and general mortality almost everywhere—with some unhappy exceptions—is not yet accompanied by a corresponding decrease in TFR to replacement level over a sustained period. But this by itself explains nothing.

Largely through major world conferences and the extensive preparations for them over the past five years, there is now greatly increased understanding by policy-makers and the interested public of what researchers and other experts have known for some time. This is that **population growth, and one of its principal practical expressions, the degree of effective modern contraceptive prevalence (hereafter "cp"), is intimately linked in complicated but important ways to other major world issues, notably: poverty; underdevelopment; the health of mothers and children; the status, education and rights of women; environmental degradation; urban growth; and food supply.**

It is now more clearly seen that all of these factors react with one another, and thus that measures to deal with them are also mutually reinforcing. Nevertheless the balance between them varies sharply from society to society, as well as with the eye of the beholder. Totally dispassionate observers are few. Moreover the links between factors are often ambiguous or delayed in their effect. It has been pointed out, for instance, that the remarkable fall in TFR in Bangladesh has occurred without much economic progress or closing of the gender gap. In contrast, TFR has dropped little in the Philippines, where female school enrollment is higher than male, or in Arab countries, where female education (but not female emancipation) has progressed quite swiftly. There is also the oft-cited example of South Indian states where women's status is relatively advanced, and fertility has fallen, although great poverty persists on a scale comparable to high-fertility North India. Migration too affects population, as well as the converse. The UN says that 45% of current developed-country population growth is due to migration (a third in North America, but 88% in Europe). In contrast it has lowered growth in developing countries only by an average 3% (ranging from 1% in Africa to 7% in Latin America).

The population-development link is particularly difficult to analyse, unless a very long time-frame is envisaged. A subtle piece of recent research shows that

"initially, fertility is unresponsive to development, resulting in delays in the onset of transition. Once a few countries in a macro-region enter the transition, other countries follow sooner than expected. As time goes by, the onset of transition occurs at ever lower levels of development. ...Once innovative fertility behaviour has been adopted by a group of individuals within a community, by a community within a country, or by a few countries within a region, social interaction can become a powerful force that accelerates the pace of transition...and stimulates its onset elsewhere."¹

AIDS is now seen to have a significant demographic impact. According to UNAIDS, 22.6 million people are infected with HIV/AIDS, and 6.4 million have died. 90% of the sufferers are in developing countries, and 42% are women. Five Sub-African countries (Botswana, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have more than 10% infection. During the period 1985-2015 the epidemic may cause 19.6 million additional deaths in Africa, and life expectancy is being lowered by six years. The epidemic is now spreading fast in Asia, where the number of additional deaths will be 6.6 million in 2005-2015; India is especially hit. Overall fertility will be little affected, according to a 1994 US Bureau of the Census study, since HIV takes so long to develop into AIDS and since most AIDS mortality occurs after the average age of child-bearing. Still, in the most affected African countries the annual population growth rate by 2010 (the supposed peak year of the epidemic) may be 1% or less, compared with an AIDS-less rate of over 2%. In Thailand, where fertility is already below replacement, AIDS may contribute to earlier than foreseen population decline. Increasing regional population movement, in both Africa and Asia, is of course a major factor in the spread of AIDS. The itinerant truck drivers and soldiers up and down Eastern Africa are an oft-cited case in point.

A Mixture of Effects

The *effects* of rapid population growth in developing countries are the same as five years ago, only more so. A vicious circle is to be seen, for, in the words of Canada's most distinguished demographer, Nathan Keyfitz, "population growth can prevent the development that would slow population growth". Schools, infrastructure, health facilities, savings, investment, simply cannot keep up with the surging numbers, particularly in the poorest countries. This drastically curtails the policy options available to them. The example of Africa's falling per capita GDP has already been cited. A 1997 US government report to Congress put it succinctly this way:

"Rapid population growth undermines economic and social development in poor countries, outpaces investment in human capacity and infrastructure, damages the health of women and children, contributes to environmental degradation, and impedes improvements in the status of women."

As events in the last few years in Africa have vividly shown, rapid population growth, working with other factors:

- has a **corrosive effect on political and social institutions** and thus can be a large contributor to internal conflict and to massive human rights violations;
- can **overwhelm governments**, which cannot keep up with the rising demands on the developmental, educational and social services they are supposed to provide.
- adds to the **difficulty of improving the status and quality of life of women**, by imposing further heavy personal burdens on them as individuals, as well as by impeding development and handicapping education—thus constituting yet another vicious circle, since a low status of women is in turn one of the causes of rapid population growth.

Family planning and other reproductive health measures thus constitute an indirect but key contribution to the alleviation of poverty and the meeting of basic needs, the key goal of Canadian and most other aid efforts.

The experts tell us that **Malthusian mass starvation in the coming century remains improbable**, despite the four or more billion additional mouths there will be to feed, but that there will be still **more malnutrition**—already 43% in sub-Saharan Africa and 22% in South Asia. The main problems in raising agricultural production for the growing world population will be, as they are now, water and capital needs. A recent IIASA study indicates that in coping globally with increasing population, lack of arable land will not be a limiting factor in many areas provided that there are environmentally-friendly advances in technology, but that there may be severe problems in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Central America. One could add the Great Lakes region of Africa.

It is newly appreciated that in the most densely populated countries there will be a harsh choice between costly measures to increase yields, and costly imports of food. In consequence, and particularly if less internal subsidy by the USA and the European Union raises international cereal prices, we may see higher food costs overall, and more demands from the poorest, fastest-growing countries for emergency food aid. One hopes that **Canada**, as a leading grain exporter, is already doing research on the long-term effects of population increase on likely demand for this commodity.

The severe effects of growing population on the environment were unfortunately given no prominence in the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio, nor in **Canada's** efforts there, nor at the recently concluded Earth Summit in New York. Nevertheless more of the informed public seems to have become aware of the importance of this aspect. The salient points were and are that:

developed, high-consumption countries with low population growth damage the environment at least as much as developing, low-consumption countries, though largely in different ways;²

but "hundreds of millions of poor people are forced, all over the world, to over-use their habitats in order to survive", a problem exacerbated by growing numbers;³

hasty development efforts to cope with rising population may rely on undesirable measures (soft coal, mining of the water table, and the like) which add to local and global environmental problems;

the degradation and depletion of renewable resources under the pressure of population can bring social conflict, widen gaps, and undermine the ability of societies to develop.

An irony is that increasing incomes in the developing world will increase consumption. There will be many more cars, for example. Meat consumption may rise and thus place more pressure on scarce land to feed the cattle, as well as further increasing grain prices, even though in some cases the result of a little more prosperity may be more knowledgeable, less degrading land use. But in general the environment, not food itself, would be the ultimate limiting factor on world population.

As discussed in section B of Part II of this paper, population growth contributes indirectly but heavily to the more immediate causes of migration in many (though not all) areas of the world. "Of course, rapid population growth by itself does not necessarily translate into migration, but when it is combined with deteriorating socio-economic conditions, the trigger for migration is set in motion."⁴

Few if any countries any longer openly equate total population with national strength. Yet as population ratios shift further over the long term, there will be fresh strains on the international political system. An example is the unwillingness of Canada and many other countries to subscribe to the argument that India, for example, should have a permanent Security Council seat, though it is already 3½ times as populous as the next largest country, the USA, and will be nearly 4½ times by 2050, as well as outnumbering China. Only Japan and Germany are currently being seriously considered. Canada's criteria as stated last year are "the contribution of members to the broader purposes of the UN Charter, and also the need for equitable geographic representation", but cynics might say that behind this is the scale of assessed contributions, i.e. relative Japanese and German wealth. Others might point to India's nuclear policies, and the unwillingness of Muslim countries to support it while its feud with Pakistan goes on, as the real reasons for its exclusion. But how long can this incongruity last?

The International Community

The Cairo Conference

The central event in population policy over the past five years was the September 1994 "International Conference on Population and Development" (ICPD) in Cairo and in particular the "Programme of Action" approved by the conference.⁵ Though there are differing views on the

meaning to be given to the Programme's conclusions and on its implementation, a look at the ICPD is a good way to survey the overall situation.

A summary pamphlet put out by the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Bank and the World Health Organisation (WHO) characterizes the outcome aptly: "governments . . . committed themselves to a programme of action which places reproductive health and rights at the center of the population and development agenda". This constituted the main innovation of the ICPD. The concepts of reproductive health and reproductive rights had previously been virtually unknown to anyone except specialists, but are now part of standard discourse in the population field, even if the rather cumbersome agreed definitions are not often cited.⁶

The main argument about these concepts at the conference concerned their implications for abortion; family planning itself was not widely contentious. (Amidst tough negotiations on this aspect, there was even one lighter moment)⁷. Two other newly prominent concepts, which were largely the focus of this dispute, were "safe motherhood" and "unsafe abortion", the latter being recognised for the first time as a major public health issue. The conference agreed that in all cases (i.e. even where abortion is illegal) women should have access to services to manage unsafe abortion complications, although abortion is not to be promoted as a method of family planning. It is the main method, safely, in Japan (where the pill is still banned), and largely unsafely, in the ex-USSR.

The legal framework and the specific application of reproductive rights as affirmed by the ICPD and other recent conferences are comprehensively and thoughtfully analysed in the UNFPA's *The State of World Population 1997*.⁸ As follow-up the document develops on pages 54-56 the valid point that "action is especially needed in two areas: first, to establish the broad human rights which enable sexual and reproductive rights, and create the conditions for their exercise; and second, to put in place information and services that meet the full range of requirements for sexual and reproductive health. Greater attention has to be paid to broader human rights issues, especially those that promote gender equality and the empowerment of women ..."

Among other notable features of the conference:

- It openly addressed sensitive issues such as infanticide, rape, incest, sexual harassment, and sexuality (previous conferences had not even used the word "sexual"), and vigorously denounced female genital mutilation, formerly—but no more—called more delicately "female circumcision". Two million girls a year, mainly in Africa, are subjected to this deeply rooted but appalling practice, which most African governments claim they are now moving against. Some UN agencies had been working against it even before the ICPD; the UNHCR had been doing so among Somali refugees from 1993.
- It tackled for the first time the sexual and reproductive health needs and rights of adolescents, based on a realisation that a billion teenagers in the world create new reproductive and fertility dilemmas. This topic proved and remains very contentious,

particularly for Islamic and some other governments, because of the implication that sex can occur before and outside marriage. Canada played a special role in helping to reach compromise wording.

- It contained numerous, systematic and explicit references to **various means for the "empowerment of women", placing them in a population context**. It thus prepared the way for the decisions of the 1995 Beijing conference on women
- It reflected relatively new **developmental concepts** such as "sustainable development" and "good governance", and by stressing population's relevance for the environment, somewhat compensated for UNCED's feebleness on this score. However the importance of population growth reduction for development was little discussed in Cairo, and was not greatly emphasized—even though present—in its concluding document, compared to some of the other issues already mentioned.
- For the first time at a UN population conference, and after some argument, there was extensive **NGO participation** (including in the case of Canada and some others, participation to good effect in the official delegation)—a healthy development, well reflected in the final document.
- There was **more thorough and relatively more innovative agreed treatment of migration and refugee issues**, including the internally displaced, than previously. Unfortunately this aspect of the ICPD (discussed separately on page 39), in several ways as useful as other parts of the document, has received comparatively little attention from policy-makers and experts.
- Also for the first time at a UN population conference, the document included **specific estimates of the resources needed annually in order to achieve access for all to reproductive health, including family planning, by 2015**, (and not, significantly, to achieve demographic goals, as previously), plus other amounts for the prevention of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, and for basic research, data and policy analysis. About two thirds of the resources required would come from the developing countries concerned (with less from the least developed), and one third from donor, i.e. developed, countries. The important part of the following table, put together from various parts of the ICPD document, is the right-hand column; the figures in it were accepted by the participants including the prospective donor countries, Canada among them.

Year	<u>Estimated Annual Resource Needs for Developing and "Transition"⁹ Countries</u>				<u>Donor Contributions</u>	
	Fam. planning	Other reprod. health	AIDS etc.	Research etc.	TOTAL	TOTAL
	(in billions of US dollars at 1993 prices)					
2000	10.2	5.0	1.3	0.5	\$17.0	\$5.7
2005	11.5	5.4	1.4	0.2	\$18.5	\$6.1
2010	12.6	5.7	1.5	0.7	\$20.5	\$6.8
2015	13.8	6.1	1.5	0.3	\$21.7	\$7.2

This basic outcome of the ICPD was encapsulated in a major OECD report of May 1996 formally approved by Canadian and other ministers, that:

"the death rate for infants and children under the age of five should be reduced in each developing country by two-thirds the 1990 level by 2015; the rate of maternal mortality should be reduced by three-fourths during the same period";

"access should be made available through the primary health-care system to reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate ages, including safe and reliable family planning methods, as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015."

Interpretation of some of the ICPD's results is nevertheless not easy, and poses some major problems for would-be population aid-givers. It has been pointed out that the Cairo document is long on references to the well-being of women and children, and short on statements implying any imperative to reduce high population growth. Yes, say many, but

- the shift to emphasizing individual need is no more than an acknowledgement that the solution will come not from governments but from individuals;
- people are most likely to be receptive to family planning when their specific reproductive health needs are addressed;
- demographic and development objectives will not be reached without taking account of the primary importance of the situation of women and girls, and their reproductive health needs;
- in many countries the "unmet need" for family planning services, featured in the document, is high enough that substituting it for demographic targets would actually help achieve demographic goals.

Others argue (and still others deny, sometimes within the same organisation) that an over-strong emphasis on reproductive health has drawn attention away from the *developmental* importance of dealing with rapid population growth, and that there is a risk of scarce funds being drawn off from family planning into more general health tasks (for example, is fighting malaria a better way of reducing mortality than promoting reproductive health?), or into other aspects of women's welfare, empowerment and status, all more appropriately financed from other sources.

A choice is also seen between providing either contraceptive services for a larger number of people, or broad reproductive health services for less people, with the same amount of money. The argument runs thus: "family planning receives just 1 to 2 percent of the total flow of foreign aid. Urgently needed improvement in the comprehensive health status of women can and should be financed from the 98 percent that is not earmarked for family planning."

It has even been said that Cairo was an uneasy peace concordat between feminists and demographers, which has since dissipated. According to one view, the developing countries have bought into the reproductive health approach, but not into the notion that concern for individuals should preclude demographic and developmental concerns, although in Cairo they were restrained by "political correctness" from insisting on this point. One forthright expression of this outlook, after pointing out the surprisingly big declines in TFR in coercive or semi-coercive Asian countries, goes as follows: "oddly, the implied lessons in the Cairo Programme of Action do not much follow from any Asian experience—odd, because Asia contributes most of what experience exists on generating fertility decline. The evils of patriarchy and the virtues of reproductive rights are not self-evident in the Asian fertility experience. . . . The intellectual origins of Cairo lie elsewhere—in the traditions fostered by the Western enlightenment, which now flourish, at least on a rhetorical plane, in the greenhouse atmosphere of UN conferences."¹⁰

However this may be, developing countries, or at any rate their governing élites, clearly focus more directly on the developmental implications of rapid population growth than do many Western observers. The argument crops up elsewhere as well. One leading *developed*-country aid agency, the author was told, is divided almost openly into camps: the "numbers people" vs the "reproductive health people." There are also uncertainties about the implications of reproductive rights—how these may mesh with responsibilities in the same domain, as well as the role of religious organisations.

The author's own view is that indeed, the two sides—the family planning and reproductive health side, and the demographic, developmental side—must be kept in balance. Just as the latter used to be over-emphasized at the expense of the former, so there has recently been too much exclusive attention to the former, to the extent that even the word "population" is starting to be shunned in some circles. We need to come back to the middle.

Post-Cairo Conferences

The four major UN conferences which were held in the two years following the ICPD picked up and reaffirmed some of its key themes, thanks in no small measure to efforts by Canada, although the same cannot be said of the non-UN summits (G-7, Commonwealth and Francophonie) or our efforts there.

- The March 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen included in its over-long final document brief mentions of the challenge posed by continued growth in the world's population and the need for access to reproductive health care for all by 2015 as recommended by the ICPD, and four pages on refugees, displaced persons, asylum-seekers and documented and undocumented migrants (including migrant workers), repeating the main content of the "migration" Chapter X of the ICPD. The summit's recommendations were so diverse and numerous that most of their impact has been lost.
- The September 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing preserved the full sense of the ICPD texts on reproductive health and rights (thanks in no small measure to Canadian negotiators), despite strong Vatican and other attempts against them. It also recognized sexual violence and gender-related persecution as grounds for considering women as refugee claimants, thus according with Canadian policy.
- The June 1996 Conference on Human Settlements ("Habitat II") in Istanbul, at which Canada took the lead in raising population issues, also reaffirmed ICPD language on reproductive health and rights and family planning, urged governments to "fully integrate demographic concerns into sustainable human settlements policies", and referred to issues of excessive population concentration and rural-urban migration. It has however been criticised as not developing the numerous connections between demographic processes and urban issues.
- The November 1996 World Food Summit in Rome made brief references to population incorporating ICPD and Beijing language: the "need to fully integrate population concerns into development" and to promote access to reproductive health services; the fact that rural underdevelopment is "reflected in high population growth and out-migration, both internally and to other countries"; and the need for increased food production to occur within the framework of "...early stabilization of the world population."
- The G-7 Summit of 1995 in Halifax under Prime Minister Chrétien's chairmanship, continuing the practice of occasional brief sherpa-drafted communiqué references to population and migration without any actual heed being paid by leaders, referred to the need for (unspecified) new approaches "to deal with emerging global challenges such as ...unsustainable population growth, mass displacement of victims of conflict and involuntary migration across borders". Neither the 1996 G-7 Summit in Lyon nor the 1997 G-7/G-8 Summit in Denver had such references in its text, nor did the 1995 Commonwealth or Francophonie summits, in all of which Canada has a major voice.
- The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit of 1995 in Osaka declared that its region's "fast-expanding population and rapid economic growth are forecast to sharply increase the demand for food and energy and the pressures on the environment" and said that "these inter-related, wide-ranging issues" would be put on its long-term agenda. In 1996 it agreed "to push for further progress on these important issues", without specifying

how, but a study of them for APEC leaders is under way in the Economic Committee, currently chaired by Canada. The question of migration—particularly delicate in the APEC area—is not included in the study, although the Committee's *1996 APEC Economic Outlook* report describes its effects on member countries in largely positive terms.

Programme Activity by International Bodies

The UN Population Fund or UNFPA (this abbreviation of its long-abandoned earlier title being still in use) is more than ever the key player on population. In practice it has the international leadership role on the subject held before Reagan's reign by the USA. Despite bold pronouncements, Clinton has been unable to resume this role in practice because of Congressional obstacles to US policy. The UNFPA's able and now long-serving Executive Director, Nafis Sadik, in effect masterminded the ICPD and remains a strong presence. According to its new Mission Statement, its basic objectives are: universal access for all to sexual and reproductive health, including family planning, by 2015 (the ICPD goal, to which it plans to devote 70% of its budget); capacity-building in population programming; promoting awareness of population and development issues; and advocacy for resources and political will. It aids more countries in population than any other multilateral or bilateral donor, although the programs of the USA and the World Bank still are larger. It is deemed especially successful as a global advocate.

Two interesting new developments in UNFPA's activities are: its modest start-up in Eastern Europe and the CIS area, where family planning facilities are poor and abortion rates high; and a recent agreement with the UNHCR to work among refugees, using funds from relevant country programs; it now assists refugees in a dozen or more countries.

UNFPA's total expenditures, voluntarily funded, were US \$300 million in 1996, up from \$221 million in 1991, but contributions to it, which rose substantially after the ICPD apart from Canada and the USA, seem to levelled off in 1996 and possibly 1997.

Criticisms that are made of it include that it spreads itself too thin among and within countries; that it should do more to develop its own expertise and rely less on other UN agencies; that while it should continue advocacy for women's empowerment, it should set clear boundaries between this and the financing of large-scale, broader women's programs better left to others; and that it should do more with local NGOs. As a UN body, it suffers the constraint of having to work with—or at least with the tacit assent of—the government concerned. All in all, it is one of the more effective UN organisations.

The World Bank is a major player, but also a question-mark. It regrettably abolished its separate "population adviser" position some time ago, and its new President says little publicly on the importance of population. In 1996 it raised to \$600 million its lending for population and reproductive health (with which it includes AIDS and safe motherhood) as part of a larger commitment to the broad population, health and nutrition sector. However separate statistics for

family planning and other core population activities are not provided (why? one wonders), and a UN report of February 1997 cites evidence that less Bank resources may be flowing to family planning activities than before. Depending on local personalities, the World Bank cooperates fairly well with UNFPA, which manages some of its projects, and increasing efforts are being made to avoid duplication in the relatively few countries where the World Bank has population programs.

The Regional Development Banks have a spotty record. The Asian Development Bank has had a clear population lending policy since 1993, and has modestly raised the proportion of population projects within its health lending; by 1994 it had seven loans with principal or large population components. The Inter-American Development Bank also has a population policy, and does much lending for health, but has apparently used little of it for family planning, conceivably because of some Latin American governments' religious sensitivities. The African Development Bank, beset as it has been with internal difficulties, does not seem to have been active in the population sector, so important in Africa, although it is reported to be interested in some kind of involvement. In all of these banks, including the World Bank, **Canada**, like other donors, has a voice, but does not appear to use it to encourage population lending. It should do so, as was also suggested five years ago.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) is the lead UN organisation on reproductive health, and has recently increased the visibility of this subject within its overall activities. It has good people working on it, particularly on the "reproductive technologies" side, but little activity in the field, and limited funds from its regular budget. Most of its projects are financed by extra-budgetary means, including from the UNFPA. **Canada** (CIDA) makes a modest contribution (\$400,000) to the WHO's reproductive technologies program, after briefly dropping it some years ago. The Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO), which also serves as WHO's regional office for the Americas, says it does some reproductive health work, under a "family health" rubric, but seems to want to keep this inconspicuous (possibly for political reasons connected with the attitude of some Latin American governments) as it makes no mention of it whatever in its public relations material. Canada is one of the 38 dues-paying members, but is not known to have discussed population-relevant issues with PAHO.

In contrast with the past, UNICEF now gives good verbal support to the importance of reproductive health and family planning, as for example in its 1996 *Progress of Nations* report. Some thirty UNICEF programs abroad have a reproductive health element (and some of these include family planning in countries where contrary political pressure is absent) but the record in the field is still a little uneven, as (reportedly) is the extent of cooperation with UNFPA. The ILO, the FAO, the WFP, UNESCO, UNHCS and UNAIDS¹¹ all have smallish programmes bearing on population, mostly (except for UNAIDS) financed largely by UNFPA.

The International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) remains the major and still very effective international NGO active in the population field. Its usefulness, like that of other NGOs, derives in part from the fact that unlike governmental bodies, it can tackle issues that politicians

often find too sensitive or difficult, such as the provision of sex education, the training of doctors in family planning techniques, or the distribution of contraceptives to people in remote areas. Its affiliates are also devoting attention to refugees' reproductive health.

The IPPF's finances peaked at \$125 million in 1995 (no thanks to **Canada**, which that very year ill-advisedly cut out its large (C\$8 million) and long-standing contribution—a contribution only now being partially restored). In 1996 its income dropped by 18%, and may drop by another 6% this year, although the largest donor, Japan, will maintain its US \$21 million contribution. Its valuable role in co-ordinating and promoting activities by its member associations seems at risk.

A useful "Charter on Sexual and Reproductive Rights" agreed in 1995 by the IPPF's member Family Planning Associations in some 140 countries (including the **Planned Parenthood Federation of Canada (PPFC)**) went beyond the rights established at the ICPD and Beijing by asserting rights: to privacy (for women to make autonomous reproductive choices); to freedom of thought (from the restrictive interpretation of religious texts etc. as tools to curtail freedom of thought on sexual and reproductive health etc.); and to choose whether or not to marry and found and plan a family. The IPPF's 1996 conference called on governments and parliamentarians to support international and national instruments regarding these rights. The PPFC has recommended that the **Canadian government** "would be well advised to study and adopt these simple human rights measures". This could and should be done.

Other NGOs with population programmes are mainly US-based, although the prestigious Population Council, which leads the way in much population research, receives assistance from **Canada** and other countries. Talented **Canadians** now serve as its President and one of its Vice-Presidents. Big US foundations such as Rockefeller do much to support population activities, and their funds for the purpose have been rising (to a possible 1997 total of US \$110 million, i.e. four times the Canadian government's assistance for population) as US government aid has fallen. Apart from the PPFC, few Canadian NGOs are active in population abroad, whereas many dozens are involved in development activities or refugee relief.

Advisory and Discussion Bodies

The United Nations Commission on Population and Development (UNCPD)¹² meets briefly once a year and reports to ECOSOC. Its secretary was somewhat fanciful in telling it at its February 1997 meeting that "since its founding in 1946, this Commission has been the primary international forum for developing consensus on population actions among nations of the world". It has been officially charged with overseeing the follow-up to the ICPD. Under competent **Canadian** chairmanship at its first post-ICPD meeting, it agreed on a 5-year plan, whereby one major theme was to be taken up each year: reproductive health and rights in 1996, migration and development in 1997, health and mortality in 1998, population growth, structure and distribution, including sustainable development, in 1999, followed by a 5-year review of the ICPD. So far,

little new ground has been broken, and this year at least, attendance by experts from capitals was minimal (Canada and a few others excepted), leaving the field rather too open for secretariat ideas alone.

The UN Population Division helped run the ICPD, and turns out authoritative statistics, but it is slimly and unevenly staffed, conservative in approach, not very responsive to member governments' views, and not well equipped to provide leadership on substance.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), representing developed countries, helps intermittently to raise the profile of population issues through its inter-governmental Development Assistance Committee, as well as its secretariat's Development Cooperation Division and research-oriented Development Centre. The important agreed undertaking on population made at the OECD's May 1996 meeting has already been cited.

A new ten-country South-South organisation, Partners in Population and Development, has recently been set up with Rockefeller, UNFPA and World Bank help. It is to be based in Bangladesh and headed by an Egyptian, to share knowledge between developing countries on population and to develop proposals for funding (by developed countries) of collaborative efforts. Indonesia, for example, has approached some Sahel countries to offer advice. Canada has been considering the provision of assistance; it should do so.

In late 1996 the Independent Commission on Population and Quality of Life published its long-delayed 400-page report, entitled *Caring for the Future*. This body, originated by the Rockefeller Foundation on the model of the Brundtland Commission, was headed by an ex-Prime Minister of Portugal and consisted of 18 eminent men and women from various countries, including a distinguished Canadian, Monique Bégin. Canada and six other governments (but not the USA) and a number of international organisations and foundations helped to finance it in high hopes. After extensive regional public hearings and expert testimony, it provided 34 pages of wide-ranging, idealistic recommendations, not only on reproductive health and rights and family planning, but also demilitarisation, trade access for developing countries, credit for micro-firms, new educational technologies, and dozens of other topics—even broader in scope than the World Summit for Social Development. Its proposals were so radical, went so far beyond population, came so long after the ICPD (which Rockefeller had hoped would follow it), and were so poorly publicised (an activity for which its President did not care), that it is unfortunately unlikely to be heeded by governments or opinion-makers.

Donor Contributions

The prospects are not good. Developing countries and "countries in transition", who agreed to be responsible for two thirds of population expenditure under the ICPD's Programme of Action, spent about \$7.5 billion on population in 1995, and may perhaps reach the target of \$11.3 billion in 2000, as their share of the projected \$17 billion. **In contrast, the developed world is very unlikely to meet its \$5.7 billion share, as starkly shown by a recent UNFPA report.**¹³

After Cairo, assistance from donor countries rose by 26% in 1994 and another 20% in 1995 to about US \$1.27 billion, with loans and grants from multilateral and private institutions bringing the total to perhaps \$2 billion. Part of this increase, however, was due to including broader reproductive health categories, and in some cases assistance for AIDS prevention, in the statistics. Little or no further increase is foreseen for 1996. The USA is still the largest donor, but its population assistance, \$581 million in 1995, was cut by the Republican Congress to \$350 m., and was preserved in 1997 only on a heavily conditional basis. Japan has cut its yen contribution slightly, and increases by other countries, lately including Germany and a new player, the EU, may not be sufficient to maintain the earlier momentum. **Canada disgraced itself during the period of others' increases by cutting its own population assistance from an earlier C\$45 million to \$30 million and last year to \$28 million.**¹⁴

Here are the current league tables for developed-country population assistance in millions of US dollars, as calculated by the UNFPA, and using the broad ICPD definition:

<u>Country</u>	<u>1995 Assistance</u>	<u>2000 ICPD Target</u>
Australia	27	70
Austria	3	41
Belgium	2	57
Canada	37	146
Denmark	50	90
Finland	22	20
France	13	475
Germany	135	414
Ireland	1	8
Italy	4	93
Japan	94	856
Luxembourg	1	4
Netherlands	89	184
New Zealand	1	7
Norway	47	70
Spain	1	74
Sweden	45	113
Switzerland	17	59
United Kingdom	98	193
United States	583	583
TOTAL	\$1,268	\$3,570

The US\$37 million figure for **Canada** given above, unlike the C\$30 million figure cited in the preceding paragraph, includes some C\$17 million for AIDS and a small amount for safe motherhood, being based on the wider ICPD definition rather than the former, narrower DAC definition which we have used for some time. At 25.3% of our target, we are proportionately behind nine other countries. The United States contribution was sharply reduced by Congress in 1996, as noted above, but still is ahead of ours in per capita terms. The UNFPA also points out that reaching the necessary \$5,700 million in 2000 would require, in addition, \$2,100 million from development banks, multilateral organisations and private institutions.

Results of Efforts

Much has already been accomplished, despite these many problems. **Efforts over past decades, even though slackened somewhat since 1989, are now yielding cumulative results, unevenly, to be sure, but clearly.** Developments in modern cp and reproductive health illustrate great variety. Regional differences are however narrowing, even though those countries with the lowest cp, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, have improved least on availability of facilities. They have nevertheless improved more than others on their policy positions. Does the latter herald the former? One would like to think so.

Here is a sampling of cp developments in selected countries.

In Asia, where cp averages 79% in East Asia and 43% in the remainder:

- In China, cp may now be 80%, the highest in the entire world, largely due to the avowed coercion of its one-child policy, even though this is less stringently applied in rural areas. As an unhappy consequence, the uneven sex ratio of infants, at 131 for males and 100 for females, implies that a high proportion of girls are being aborted, fatally neglected, or just plain killed.
- India's cp is now 37%. The heavy reliance on female sterilisation is dropping, and the government has adopted a World Bank Population Council recommendation shifting policy away from collective targets towards individual reproductive health measures, although implementation will be difficult. There are still elements of coercion, as in the draft laws reported this year penalising seekers or occupants of state jobs who marry too young or have more than two children. India's birth rate halted its decline in 1993-94. Will this continue?
- The cp in Bangladesh, where Canada's bilateral assistance has been largely concentrated for years, has risen to a creditable 38%, parallelling the remarkable continuing drop in fertility. But donor funds are decreasing, and not being replaced by the government. Some sense a levelling-off of progress, and a need for a new approach.

- Indonesia's cp is 52%, and it is believed by some to be on the way to replacement fertility—important because of the country's huge population. The cp rate has been attained through semi-coercive methods, as is much else (notably in agriculture) in this "guided democracy".
- Thailand, where cp is now 72%, is hailed as a great success story for population policies, although here too there have in the past been coercive pressures, at any rate on the village level.
- Iran's cp of 45% has been attained with (fairly recent) government encouragement. The Iranians played a very helpful role at the ICPD, except, predictably, with regard to adolescents and unmarried women.

In Africa the average cp is only 15%, lowest in the least developed and much higher in the more advanced countries of North and Southern Africa:

- Sub-Saharan Francophone African countries have particularly low cp (Burundi 1%, Congo-Kinshasa 2%, Benin 1%, Sénégal 5%, Mauritania 1%, Côte d'Ivoire 4%) though certain populous non-Francophone countries are also very low (for example Ethiopia 3%, Nigeria 4%).
- In Tanzania, the TFR has actually risen, to 6.3 in 1995, and the cp is 10%.
- In Zimbabwe, the preferred method is moving from the pill to sterilisation, which is interesting as demonstrating the dangers of generalisation; India, for example, is moving in the opposite direction.
- A legacy of apartheid in South Africa, where the regime sought to limit the black birth rate, is that population is not officially viewed as a problem by the new government, and policy is not defined in terms of fertility. But cp is 48%.
- In Egypt, views differ as to whether progress is plateauing. Cp there is 45%.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, "despite the religious patterns of most of the population", as a senior observer has put it, cp has risen to 49% and fertility in a number of countries is falling rapidly. This has mostly occurred without government intervention, but with some NGO (including Canadian) help. Yet there are stark exceptions:

- In Haïti, Guatemala and Bolivia, cp is 14%, 27% and 18% respectively.
- In contrast, cp now averages 65-75% in Costa Rica (Guatemala's immediate neighbour), as well as Brazil, Colombia, Cuba and Puerto Rico.
- The cp figure is 45% in Mexico, achieved to some extent, one reads, by elements of what we might consider semi-coercion. For example, government officials are said to have condoned the insertion of IUDs or sterilisation in some hospitals without consultation.

USAID has no bilateral agreement on population with Mexico, supposedly because of Vatican pressure.

In Eastern Europe, cp is not far below the Western European level, but facilities are poor in several countries. In the ex-USSR, where our knowledge of family planning rates is very sketchy, facilities are probably considerably worse, and cp appears low, perhaps as low as 13%. Abortion is said to be responsible for 13% of maternal deaths in Eastern Europe and 23% in the ex-USSR.

Issues for the Future

Not Meeting Financial Targets

What will happen if the ICPD financial target of \$17 billion is not met? The UNFPA report cited in Note No. 13 of this section gives what it aptly calls "grim figures". It was well received by most donors (except one or two European laggards) at the recent Executive Board meeting, and is to be further refined for next autumn's UNGA. According to the report, the annual shortfall by 2000 could range between \$2.1 and \$3.8 billion (the latter only if developing countries also fail to meet the target). The resultant underfunding of family planning services would mean:

- 96-175 m. fewer couples using modern contraception, and perhaps an additional 43-78 m. others not using any method, for lack of services;
- possibly 122-200 m. additional unintended or unwanted pregnancies between 1995 and 2000;
- 43-88 m. more abortions;
- 65,000-117,000 more deaths from maternal mortality;
- an additional 5.2-9.3 m. needless deaths of children;
- further grave (but still unquantified) reproductive health consequences, including the extra millions affected by deaths and illnesses from AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases.

These are awful statistics for those who fix budgets and ODA programs to have on their consciences. How many of them will care?

Other Issues

In addition to this key question, Canadians and others concerned with population in governments and NGOs will need to focus on issues such as the following as the next century approaches:

- With limited resources everywhere, the balance of effort as between family planning, other aspects of reproductive health, general health, other women's issues, and non-health aspects of population, such as censuses, will have to be continually watched, but country by country rather than across the board.

- Now that half of the world population has access to safe, effective family planning, experts point out that there is an additional need to question and centre attention on its quality, as repeatedly emphasized at the ICPD.
- Who to serve? Most programs now focus on married women with several children, in their middle reproductive years. Much more heed should be paid to younger (and often unmarried) women including adolescents, and to older women, often marginalised by their societies and more prone to ailments such as cancer; and although male responsibility is rightly mentioned in the ICPD document, little action is taken on it. Often men are reluctant to approach female-staffed family planning clinics about a wife's health, or to seek condoms and the like.
- Although the ICPD urged more research on contraceptives, little is being done, and what there is, concentrates on modifying existing hormone-based methods, rather than new technology. Most big pharmaceuticals are getting out of the field, partly under pressure of systematic attack by "product liability" lawyers on vulnerable companies—an issue highlighted in a recent report by a panel of the Institute of Medicine. There is also no progress on male methods.
- Ways should be found to integrate sexual and reproductive rights more fully into the human rights treaty monitoring process, so as to hold governments legally accountable for neglecting or violating those rights, as suggested in *The State of World Population 1997* document already cited. Here is a useful role for Canada, with our emphasis on human rights.
- Population policy in individual developing countries, as five years ago, so just as much now, needs to be linked with the main development strategy of the country, rather than being quarantined off in often weak ministries of health; and despite the important "balance of effort" issue already referred to, family planning should not be dealt with organisationally separate from general health—a major continuing problem in Bangladesh, for example, where Canada's largest bilateral population effort is located.
- Much reliance should be placed on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the field, such as the IPPF and its local affiliates, as already mentioned, but there should also not be neglect of very small informal groups of women, no doubt unskilled in the modern technique of project writing, but effective nevertheless.
- The fully voluntary, individual-based approach to family planning, as opposed to various forms and degrees of coercion, appears to be the best in the long run, but how is one to deal with major countries like China which take the view that their economic problems due to population growth are on such a scale that governmental pressure is justified? The answer is probably to proceed with practical cooperation according to one's own strictly non-coercive standards, and maintain general dialogue on the merits of the approach.

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Notes to Section A

1. Pp. 665 and 669 of Social Interactions and Contemporary Fertility Transitions, article by John Bongaarts and Susan Cotts Watkins in *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 22, No. 4, December 1996.
2. For example, the USA has 19.11 metric tons of CO₂ emissions annually per capita, and Canada 14.36 tons. Chad emits .04 tons.
3. Pp. 29-30, *Caring for the Future: Report of the Independent Commission on Population and Quality of Life*, Oxford University Press, 1996.
4. P. 2, *Emigration Dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Economic, Demographic, Political and Ecological Conditions and Policy Implications*, discussion paper by Professor Aderanti Adepoju, Director, African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, Sénégal, for IOM/UNFPA seminar "Managing International Migration in Developing Countries", Geneva, April 1997. Professor Adepoju's statement is of course valid beyond Africa as well.
5. The English text of the Programme is in UN document A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 ENG (*Report of the International Conference on Population and Development*), pp. 1-115 (a typed version), and document ST/ESA/SER.A/149 ENG (*Population and development, vol. 1: Programme of action adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 5-13 September 1994* (New York: United Nations, 1995 — a more legible, typeset version). The French text is in A/CONF.171/13 FRA.
6. The ICPD reaffirmed a slightly amended WHO definition of the terms in question as follows: "Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and purposes. (It) therefore implies that people are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are the right of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which are not against the law, and the right of access to appropriate health-care services that will enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth and provide couples with the best chance of having a healthy infant...
Bearing in mind the above definition, reproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in national laws, international human rights documents and other

consensus documents. These rights rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health. It also includes their right to make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and violence, as expressed in human rights documents." (¶7.2 and 7.3 of ICPD *Programme of Action*, repeated verbatim in ¶94 and 95 of the Beijing conference's *Platform for Action*.)

7. The *Earth Negotiations Bulletin*, published daily during the negotiations under the auspices of the International Institute for Sustainable Development, of Winnipeg, reporting on 13 September on the adoption by the Main Committee of Chapter XIII *ad referendum*, stated "The Holy See said that it could not join the agreement on sub-paragraph 13.14(c), which calls for 'expanded condom distribution.' Zimbabwe said that it could not endorse this sub-paragraph either, since expanded condom distribution seemed to call for the distribution of expanded—and therefore used—condoms. After the Chair regained his composure, he suggested an alternative: 'expanded distribution of condoms.'"

8. Much of the analysis in the UNFPA document is based on the pathfinding work of Professor Rebecca Cook of the University of Toronto.

9. "Countries in transition" is UN jargon for countries of the former Soviet bloc.

10. P. 22, *Governance of Fertility Transition: Regularity and Duress*, by Geoffrey McNicoll. Research Division Working Papers 1996 No. 85, The Population Council.

11. For the full titles of the organisations listed here, see the Abbreviations section of this document.

12. The currently fashionable "and Development" was added to its title after the ICPD. Canada rejoined this body after a long absence, in 1993.

13. The report in question is UN document DP/FPA/1997/CRP.1 of 5 May 1997: *United Nations Population Fund: Meeting the Goals of the ICPD: Consequences of Resource Shortfalls up to the Year 2000*. Also relevant is document E/CN.9/1997/6: *Flows of Financial Resources in International Assistance for Population*, Report of the Secretary-General to the thirtieth session (24-28 Feb. 1997) of the Commission on Population and Development.

14. Canadian population assistance is discussed in more detail below, from page 54.

B: Migration and Refugees

Basic Factors

The major change in the past five years affecting migratory movements has been the much more complicated and fluid international environment following the end of the Cold War. Refugee flows have become more complex and unpredictable; trends of economic globalization and also regionalisation have developed further; different kinds of national and international action, not all of them for the best, are more frequent.

More change lies ahead. **There is every indication that in the coming quarter-century at least, world migration pressures will increase further.** An underlying factor in most areas¹ will be the **population growth** that is already inevitable, interacting with other phenomena, notably:

- instability verging on chaos in many areas;
- ethnic conflict, now increasingly aimed at actual population displacement;
- continuing economic and labour market change;
- more rural-to-city movement and urban growth;
- intensifying environmental degradation;²
- enormous persisting inequalities within and between countries;
- and rising levels of education and improved communications which increase awareness of the existence of better places to live, particularly in the developed world.

No one migratory movement has the same balance of factors, but the immense and tragic flows in the Great Lakes Region of Africa provide a vivid example of most of them. There are also feedback loops: large-scale movement of people can cause conflicts in *receiving* regions, with adverse economic effects and fresh strains on resources already made scarce by a growing local population. Theories of migration proliferate. A 1995 report prepared for the World Bank³ lists five major ones applicable mainly to "voluntary" migrants, but there are more. The valid point is made that they are not necessarily contradictory or mutually exclusive.

There has been much discussion recently about the balance between "push" (or supply) of migrants in sending countries, and "pull" (or demand) from receiving countries. It is cogently pointed out that the push/pull model is not a helpful way of analysing migration, since it is the perceived *relative* gap (economically, politically, environmentally etc.) between conditions at home and at the destination that induces people to move, so push and pull are not independent of one another.

This is certainly true, but the push/pull metaphor is nevertheless a useful tool for policy purposes, i.e. when considering changes that are occurring, or should occur, on one side of the equation or the other. In this context, the view is rightly gaining currency that more heed should be paid to the phenomenon of demand, or pull. In developed countries, despite high unemployment, there is a continuing demand—which governments mostly facilitate—for small numbers of highly-skilled people, and also, as the service sector expands, a demand—which some governments tacitly permit—for very low-skilled people to do jobs that the native-born no longer want to do. Sometimes this latter type is encouraged and organised on a temporary basis, as an alternative to illegal but probably long-term arrivals; circumlocutions are often used, such as “apprentices” in Germany, or “trainees” in Japan. But those in the middle, the great majority, are much less sought after, and make up the bigger battalions of those who are seeking to move. Countries and enterprises are increasingly looking for alternatives to the import of workers by building factories abroad, modernising their own facilities so as to need less labour, or mobilising underutilised groups in their own societies, such as women, and older persons.

Meanwhile supply, or push, rises almost inexorably. It is now much more generally recognised than it was five years ago that in the shorter term at least, the development process, together with the aid, foreign investment and trade which promote it, actually *stimulates* emigration, by spreading knowledge of the outside world and destabilising local social and economic structures. Although in Canada this phenomenon does not seem to have been studied jointly by CIDA and CIC, as recommended by the author five years ago, it has become a commonplace at international gatherings and in think-tanks. For example, the lengthy paper prepared by the UN secretariat for this year’s UNCPD meeting⁴ recognised explicitly that NAFTA “may result in higher migration pressures in Mexico over the short to medium term because of the dislocation of labour in small-scale agriculture”. The migration effects of NAFTA, however, are probably wider than just the agricultural sector.

The term “migration hump” has gained currency to depict migration rising sharply with the onset of vigorous development, and then dropping off as development matures and the gap with other countries narrows. There are however no good estimates of how long this may take in any specific country—in most cases, longer than one might think at first, probably.

Besides population growth and the demographic pressure of youth on employment mentioned earlier (leaving, for example, 40% of Bangladesh’s labour force unemployed or underemployed), women’s rise in status, later marriage and entry into the workforce also pushes up the labour supply in developing countries, and this trend will continue. More literacy and higher levels of education of both sexes will add to the pool of individuals prepared to move, and with the resources to do so. It is no accident that the asylum claimants who manage to get to Canada, the USA and Europe on their own are mostly an élite minority by the standards of their own countries, with the masses left behind helplessly in the camps. According to a press report, the Algerian authorities have admitted that more than 400,000

people, mostly from the best-educated strata, have fled the country since the Islamic rebellion began in 1992.

As before, the *continuation* of migration has somewhat different causes (with at least three theories to explain it, according to the previously cited paper for the World Bank) than its *initiation*, although the gap which prospective migrants see between conditions for them "here" and conditions "there" is always a dominant factor. The existence of networks—a natural and in many respects desirable phenomenon—perpetuates and increases both legal and illegal flows. Family ties may be even more important in flows to countries such as Canada now that so much migration is from parts of the world where extended-family loyalty is strong. Economic and political relations between individual states have an important effect on what experts oddly term the "trajectory" (i.e. destination) of migration, through labour recruitment or penetration by transnationals. Negative factors are sometimes operative too. For example, since the Gulf war Arabian peninsula countries seem more comfortable with temporary workers from non-Arab and even non-Islamic areas, as being less likely to spread sedition.

In one sense world migration is now really an enormous, diverse *business*, involving not only governments (note Canada's tell-tale slogan of "managed" migration, and our hunt for rich investor-migrants), but also middlemen, travel agents, smugglers, traffickers, legions of immigration lawyers and consultants, and bankers too. Forgery of documents has become a lucrative art. The \$71 billion annual remittances from migrants (dwarfing all foreign aid) are another business aspect. Labour export becomes an explicit or (more often) implicit policy objective for a number of countries, although sometimes conflicting with another objective, that of protecting the rights of their nationals abroad.

Indonesia, for example, has set a 1.25 million target of labour export for the period 1994-99, although the remittances these exported people will bring in will still be much less than the total paid to skilled foreign workers imported *into* Indonesia. 10,000-30,000 North Koreans are encouraged or forced to work in the Vladivostok area of Russia; their government pockets all their pay beyond subsistence. Even aspects of control are being privatised, in the sense that airlines, for fear of penalties, now take on direct responsibility to ensure that undocumented people or asylum claimants do not get on to their flights to countries like Canada. The burgeoning syndicates which get people into countries for a price are a ghastly new service industry—ghastly for governments, and for the many vulnerable people who are exploited, but let's face it, still worth it for the even larger numbers of individuals who are enabled to enter the countries of their choice. The migration "business" is bound to get bigger; will there be any way to impose any kind of rules and regulations on it?

International reactions

Amidst the confusing plethora of organisations, forums and conferences on migration—seemingly as numerous as ever, or perhaps more so—some interesting trends in discussion may be discerned:

There are the beginnings of a welcome humility. The UN secretariat's paper for this year's UNCPD, for example, admits that there is an "absence of a coherent theory to explain international migration" and that there is "very weak understanding of the complex interrelationships between migration and development".

Broader terminology is being used, reflecting more awareness of this complexity. The UNHCR now talks much more of the problem of the "forced displacement of population", covering not only refugees but others displaced externally or internally. New, wider definitions of security (reflected partially in the titles of US and Canadian foreign ministry bodies dealing with migration along with other subjects) are in use, getting away from an exclusively military meaning to become "human security", or sometimes in Canadian government parlance (and bringing in another newly fashionable word) "sustainable human security", including migration, population growth, environmental degradation, social issues, human rights, and occasionally even culture.⁵ Not that this is entirely a blessing: some have pointed out that the association of migration with security, however defined, feeds fears that migrants as a category are a security problem.

There is now a good deal more talk, and to some extent more subtle analysis, of migration's "root causes". The phrase recurs constantly in official documents, although there is little sign of governmental willingness to tackle such causes. Development agencies (including CIDA), perhaps because they are faced with so many other demands on dwindling resources, have been hesitant to discuss the migration and development theme in depth with migration ministries. **This should be remedied, in Canada at least.**

In many governments, including a growing number of developing countries (and Canada too), there has been much more emphasis on control of migratory movements. This reflects increasing and sometimes exaggerated public concern at the rising totals of illegals (totals which themselves are due in part to recent stricter controls on asylum seekers). Although few if any officials would consciously admit to the proposition, control is seen as easier, swifter and much cheaper than getting at "root causes". Practically every organisation concerned with migration now sponsors conferences or agenda items on "trafficking" in and "smuggling of" migrants, activities which in the past few years have become increasingly controlled by crime syndicates. An irony in the basic situation is that in today's free-market world, man is supposed to pursue his economic self-interest, but if he decides opportunities for him are better in another country, there is suddenly no free market; yet that same free market is making a control-oriented policy more difficult to implement.

Yet despite the control emphasis and a lot of tough talk by governments, there has been no great change in the reluctance of most developed countries (including Canada) to face the adverse publicity of large-scale forcible removals of rejected asylum claimants or illegals. Another factor is the extent of protection built into the legal system in most Western countries, making appeals and hence delay common, and timely removals very unlikely. Only 20-25% of those rejected in Western Europe actually go home; the rest stay on one pretext or another, or simply disappear. Things are much the same in Canada.

More theoretical attention is being paid to the integration of migrants, but in most countries there has been little advance in practice, and wide differences persist. Canada's policies in this domain are generally good.

New or newly prominent concepts without recognised international definitions have come to the forefront in the last few years:

"the right to stay", or its softer version in the ICPD text "the option to remain in one's own country", which is useful as a means of highlighting problems that urgently need fixing in order to induce people to remain, such as economic imbalances, infringements of human (including minority) rights, international or internal conflicts, food insecurity, or lack of good governance, although the term has been criticised as double-edged and too easily perverted into measures limiting the right of asylum;

"temporary protection", widely current (although not applicable in Canada) as an alternative to asylum, but interpreted quite differently (sometimes even under a different name) in various countries. It is for example the basis on which large numbers of Bosnians are in Western Europe, left without permanent rights against "non-refoulement". This leaves the German government theoretically free to pursue its policy (firm in principle, but not yet in practice) of dislodging them, and other states are equally free to seek to prevent them merely moving to nearby countries, as many naturally try to do. UNHCR officials rightly emphasize that there is a need for a clear international definition of the nature, duration and cessation of the rights of those under temporary protection. The preferable solution, probably, would be to for them to be examined individually under the provisions of the Convention, or given full Convention refugee rights. Canada is however in a poor position to advocate this, protected as we are by the Atlantic from the mass arrival of such persons;⁶

"family reunification", not at all a new concept, but one which has been receiving increasing emphasis, including proposals at and since the ICPD by some developing countries of emigration to have it recognised as a "right". Canada and other recognised immigration countries do not concede such a "right", although observing it largely in practice, except for pending asylum claimants and temporary arrivals. EU countries are more cautious in practice also.

In the fashionable "globalization" and "regionalisation" contexts (for example NAFTA, the setting up of the WTO, and recent agreements in principle for free trade in the early decades of the coming century in the APEC area and the Western Hemisphere), the proposals and actual reductions in barriers to the movement of goods and capital made in recent years have not been accompanied by any serious discussions, even looking to the far future, about reductions in barriers to the movement of labour across regions or between blocs. Here, for example, is the Denver Summit's definition: "globalization encompasses the expansion of cross-border flows of ideas and information, goods and services, technology and capital"; not a word about actual *people*. Africa, curiously, is an exception: some of its sub-regional organisations have been taking initiatives to facilitate labour mobility.⁷ A different kind of exception consists of the provisions for limited movement of business and professional élites, already mentioned.

A small symptom of the compartmentalisation of thinking on the topic is that the special autumn 1996 issue of Canada's esteemed *International Journal* entirely devoted to globalization has no mention whatever of this issue. In its May 10 issue, the *Economist*, speaking of Central Americans' resentment of US protectionism and new US legislation on immigrants, remarked that "their argument is crude but true: be nice to our goods, and so boost our economies—or law or no law, you will find our job-seekers coming instead". But the basic problem is not on the political agendas of any developed country, including Canada, at present.⁸ Will it not be a coming issue for the next century?

Because of almost universal ICPD participation, the ICPD's Chapter X on migration and refugees should receive more attention than it has as an internationally agreed summary of the state of affairs in the field in 1994. Two cautiously phrased but useful pages on the internally displaced in Chapter IX may also be noted.

While not startlingly innovative, Chapter X is more "liberal" than might have been expected on refugees and migrants in general,⁹ and contains new emphases (some remarked on above), such as "root causes", the "stay option", the desirability of fostering remittances because of the impact on the country of origin, the usefulness of short-term migration to facilitate technology transfer, and the protection of refugee women and children. A little more novel are references to migration pressures due to climate change, the right of receiving countries to regulate access, trafficking in women and children, the treatment of asylum claim rejectees, and sudden mass arrivals of displaced persons (to be accorded "at least temporary protection and treatment in accordance with internationally recognized standards..."). States are "invited to consider ratifying the International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families". Few countries, even in the developing world, have done so. Nor is Canada among them. (Officials point out to enquirers that migrant workers already enjoy more protection in Canada than the Convention would give them, and also that some of its provisions would be legally inapplicable here. Nevertheless, because of the continuing controversy, the subject should at least be re-examined and the position publicly clarified). A last-minute dispute

in Cairo about the right to family reunion, not accepted by developed countries as already mentioned, at least served to raise the media profile of this chapter.

It has become evident that there is no generalised desire to complement the existing international "refugee regime", as enshrined in the Geneva Convention and related national policies, with an international "migration regime". Apart from the fact that there is no move to create a non-refugee UN migration equivalent of the UNHCR, a proof is the lack of sustained support, even among many developing countries, for a proposed "International Migration and Development Conference" mooted at the ICPD by a few countries.

As pale substitutes, an inconclusive and lacklustre one-week session of the UNCPD on migration and development was held in February 1997 (discussed further on page 43), and a "technical symposium" on the same subject will take place next year, involving individual experts selected by the UN Population Division rather than governmental representatives. The idea of a conference has been strongly opposed by most developed countries, led by the USA, although Canada has taken a more nuanced position. In addition to general "conference fatigue" after the six large world "theme" meetings held since 1992, it has been judged, rightly in the author's view, that the time is not ripe for a productive major conference on migration. It has been noted that the international community is still at the beginning of the discussion, that it took many years to prepare the ground for other big, successful conferences (the Social Development summit being neither long prepared nor successful), and that there does not yet exist on migration what has been termed a "critical mass of knowledge, political interests and understanding"—which did exist, for example, for the main themes of the ICPD.

Activity by International Organisations

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) remains by far the largest and most influential organisation in the field. From 1994 the UNHCR's budget has exceeded that of the UNDP, and at US\$1.4 billion, it is twice what it was in 1989. The role of the organisation is changing and broadening, as implicitly recognised in its key "Strategy Towards 2000" paper and "State of the World's Refugees 1995" report. The decline in the number of Convention refugees and therefore the task of their protection in countries of asylum has been more than compensated by the increase in other categories of people under its care, and new activity within countries of origin instead of only outside them—whence its new emphasis on "forced displacement of people", referred to earlier, and a new phrase, "humanitarian space" (applied for example in Bosnia). It is now responsible for some 26 million people, including 6-8 million of the internally displaced, millions of returned refugees, and some 3.5 million others outside their own countries who are deemed "of concern" to the UNHCR. The High Commissioner has made it clear that it is the Agency rather than outsiders that will choose which displaced persons it will deal with, on condition that a principal organ of the UN must make the request, the host country must agree, a humanitarian need must exist, and displaced persons must

be mixed with or have been or might become international refugees. Much room is left for creative interpretation.

While donor governments have rhetorically resisted much of this UNHCR "mission creep" in principle they have encouraged it *ad hoc* in individual circumstances. The UNHCR recognises that international attention does not necessarily go to all neediest situations equally. Perhaps inevitably, there is a lack of coherence in the international response. There can be resort to some or all of safe havens, human rights monitors, and mixed military and humanitarian intervention, as in Bosnia, to control conflict and by implication to protect the local inhabitants. The UNHCR is involved at least partially in much of this. Canadian and other NGOs have recently been criticising its management for supposedly de-emphasising the protection aspect of its basic mandate and concentrating too exclusively on its humanitarian assistance responsibilities, but it is hard to see how it could do more on protection in areas of crisis such as the Great Lakes or Bosnia as long as member states are not prepared to back it up with force.

Thanks partly to a CIDA management study, the UNHCR has been seeking to increase its policy analysis and understanding of the external environment. Thought is rightly being given within and outside the UNHCR to the problems associated with the return of forcibly transferred populations; to its new role in humanitarian action, looking at its neutrality and impartiality and at unintended consequences of its actions; and the limits of what it can and should do in complex repatriation and reintegration programs in the light of the expectations, realistic or otherwise, from other actors. Despite internal weaknesses and the difficulty of affecting the actions of such a powerful organisation from outside, it merits the strong support Canada continues to give it. In 1996-7 CIDA provided some \$25 million to the UNHCR, much of it for special projects in the African Great Lakes region, but also including \$12 million core funding, out of a total of \$73.8 million for humanitarian assistance.

The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), now in existence some 5 to 6 years, (and set up in part on Canadian initiative) has had mixed reviews. It is useful in coordinating funding appeals to donors by UN agencies, but does not set priorities among them—nor would agencies like the UNHCR permit this. Donors thus pick and choose according to their own preconceptions, with the result that relief and refugee situations in some countries (Angola is a current example¹⁰) are underfunded, whereas others (Guatemala) have been relatively overfunded. Some argue that donors have not made clear what they expect of it, and also that its attempts at coordination (a word smilingly accepted but secretly dreaded by most operational agencies) are insufficiently conceptual. It has been commended for its role in Chechnia and Daghestan, but much less so in Rwanda. It chairs an Interagency Task Force on the Internally Displaced, but has done little to provide leadership and coordination on this knotty problem. The Task Force is currently inactive.

Because most refugees and many internally displaced are by definition victims of human rights violations, it would be logical to expect the Geneva-based UN Human Rights High Commissioner and Centre to be a close partner of the UNHCR, also in Geneva, but hopes five

years ago for a cooperative relationship between the two have not been realised. The UN human rights machinery has been relatively ineffective in some areas, and there was much internal feuding between the recently resigned Commissioner and the head of the Centre, fuelled by countries glad to see inaction on human rights. Accordingly it has been poorly funded. The vastly more powerful UNHCR does not seem to take it seriously, although some human rights monitoring is done in the context of the UNHCR's humanitarian activities. Canada has concentrated on the restructuring of the Centre, looking to the future. Perhaps we should now try again to enhance its role, now that a capable new High Commissioner has been appointed.

The intergovernmental UN Commission on Human Rights, despite weaknesses in its secretariat, receives good, hard-hitting reports from its Rapporteurs (including Canadians), and in the migration field has had for some years annual items on "Human Rights and Mass Exoduses" and on "Internally Displaced Persons." The first was originated and is still strongly promoted by Canada. Our annual resolution on Human Rights and Mass Exoduses is intended to serve the purpose of focusing attention on the need to address the human rights of refugees (and not merely their right to asylum), and to give the UNHCR a voice on the subject, as well as facilitating cooperation with the UN's human rights machinery. The UNHCR has encouraged us from the start.

Since 1993 Canada has tried to focus the resolution particularly on early warning (now called "Humanitarian Early Warning") of problems under this heading, and has tried to insist that such warnings be heeded—mindful that there were UN warnings of the Rwanda disaster three years before it happened. This has not been easy. Sovereignty has reared its ugly head. Many developing countries, including some refugee producers, perceive early warning as opening the door wide for (Northern-inspired) interference in their internal affairs. At this year's Commission, India made an only partly successful (because last-minute) move to orient the resolution entirely away from early warning through six pages of amendments dealing with sensitive issues like "temporary protection" and their view of "root causes" of refugee flows, such as "structural adjustment" policies and the failure to fulfil the "right to development"—worth discussion, presumably, but not in this Commission. The Indians may be more successful at the UNGA's 3rd Committee and next year's Commission session, so we may have to find other ways of promoting early warning. Indeed it is open to question whether our concentration on this particular aspect is worth the effort expended on it. The resolution itself is inordinately long even by UN standards, and seemingly little heeded by other organisations, governments, and the UN at large.

Sovereignty is predictably also a problem regarding the Internally Displaced. The 1996 report to the Commission by the Secretary General's Special Representative for the Internally Displaced, Francis Deng, cogently pointed out:

- the inadequacy and non-implementation of a legal framework for protection and assistance to them;
- the absence of political will to create a new organisation to help them or get an existing one to do it;

- the need for better collaboration, including improved integration of the internally displaced into the work of humanitarian and development agencies;
- the requirement for special attention to displaced women and children, who form the great majority;
- and the need for more country visits and dialogue with governments concerned, several of which have refused to receive him.

By implication, his suggestions also support the need to augment the pitifully small resources given to the Special Representative. All of this is true. Despite Deng's prodding, lip service and little else is what these unfortunate people get, apart from the humanitarian aid given by UNHCR to certain categories of them, as explained above. It is anyone's guess what will happen to the "Guiding Principles" for the internally displaced which Deng will submit next year—probably not much.

Canada has made some efforts to obtain more resources for Deng (whose mandate is up for renewal next year), but could and should do more to highlight the whole subject of the internally displaced. For example the Canadian ministerial statement to this year's Commission meeting made no mention of this agenda item at all, while singling out several others. We should place much more emphasis on it forthwith.

The UN Commission on Population and Development (UNCPD), already mentioned on pages 25 and 40, had at least a temporary role on migration in 1997 because of the decision to give it a follow-up role for the ICPD. Its secretariat turned out a useful comprehensive paper on migration and development (see note 4 on page 51). However its February meeting was attended by migration policy experts from only four countries including Canada, most of the rest being demographers, as is traditional for this body. It approved a resolution drafted by Canada on the desirability of regional, interregional, subregional and bilateral discussions of migration (meaning not a truly international conference), greater coordination among UN and other agencies, and an examination of linkages between migration and development. But the Commission, like the UN Population Division which provides its secretariat, is unlikely to be able to provide much leadership on the subject, and its members do not seem anxious for it to do so. A "Technical Symposium" on migration which it is to sponsor next year will involve invited experts alongside UN officials, but not government representatives; its influence will therefore probably be limited.

The UN Economic Commission for Europe has a tiny migration and population unit, and publishes a useful periodic survey of regional trends. It has recently turned its attention to Eastern European migration issues. Not long ago it tried to induce other UN regional commissions to do migration work, but this was discouraged by Canada among others. (This year, however, the Puebla Group (see below) has invited the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, together with the IOM, to carry out a regional study on development and migration links). The more general question of the role of regional commissions in migration might be reconsidered by Canada and others. Their former role in population matters has largely been taken over by UNFPA, although they do report on the topic to the UNCPD.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), a non-UN intergovernmental body, has 59 member states (including Canada only recently, though we have used its services for many years), and 42 observer states. It has been predominantly an operational agency providing transportation, language and other services for migrants against reimbursement by governments such as the USA and Canada. It has won general commendation for this work, despite some criticism that it needs to be more in the field, and that it needs certain management and budgetary reforms. It is heavily in deficit, and 23 members are in arrears—not an indication of broad support.

The IOM also has a growing policy role, as the only international organisation able to look at *all* aspects of migration (the UNHCR, of course, being confined to refugees and the like). Here it has had pluses and minuses. It has held useful conferences on various topics, usually with other organisations like the UNHCR or UNFPA, but with occasional overlap with other gatherings on similar subjects. It has the same problem that the OECD has (see below) in getting the attention of policy-makers for the conclusions reached at such conferences. It has provided competent technical support for the nascent "Puebla Group" (see below, page 50), to which the UNHCR was originally not invited. Its over-ambitious "IOM Strategic Planning Towards the Twenty-First Century" paper talks of being "well positioned to play the key catalytic role" in dealing with migration pressures, "addressing root causes of irregular migration", being "the reference point for information" on migration, "promot(ing) economic and social development through . . . migration programmes", as well as "to be a forum for, and provide leadership in, the international debate on migration". Canada has rightly sounded a cautionary note, saying that any such activity should be linked to existing programs, and that the IOM should "be sure it has sufficient depth of experience and personnel". But its policy role does have potential, and merits nurturing.

The Inter-Governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia, more often known as the "Informal Consultations" or simply the "IGC", has fourteen members and a tiny secretariat and budget (US\$70,000 from each, plus occasional *ad hoc* contributions). It continues to give good value as the only place where developed countries on their own, beyond but including most key EU members, can discuss current migration concerns. This is important for Canada because of inward-turning tendencies in EU policy. Originally set up to talk about asylum issues, and still with links to the UNHCR as well as the IOM, the IGC now focuses more on control and enforcement issues, as all its members are doing. Canadian and other NGOs concerned with refugees therefore view it with some suspicion. It is currently working on trafficking, involuntary return (Bosnia again), unaccompanied minors, family reunification and burden-sharing (of refugees etc.), with a view to discussion at its periodic "high-level" meetings of member states, the most recent of which was in May 1997. It produces excellent statistics not available elsewhere on asylum procedures, illegals (about which states are notoriously unwilling to share information) and other matters. Attempts by its able former "Coordinator" to stimulate serious discussion of "root causes",

including development, were met with polite apathy, and the related "structured country assessment" approach pushed by Canada in 1992 was gradually dropped.

The rotating chair of the IGC is currently held by the USA. Unspecified higher-level political disagreements by France outside the IGC context led to French withdrawal from the IGC last year, but with French officials saying they did not wish their departure to be "contagious." Will France return when the USA's turn is over? Some tentative Japanese enquiries about membership, prompted apparently by fears of a massive North Korean influx if the situation there collapsed, have not been followed up on either side. An argument advanced by some officials against Japanese membership is that Japan is so exclusionary about foreigners that its membership would reinforce undesirable tendencies among other members. This author believes however that membership would be an effective way of exposing Japanese officials to broader, more tolerant approaches, and that Canada, anxious as we are to pursue dialogue with our partner Japan on all topics of mutual interest, should take the initiative to invite Japan to join. The USA would probably support such an idea. We should also drop our Pavlovian resistance to any growth in the IGC's very modest budget; the slogan of zero nominal growth may be appropriate to large organisations, but not to minuscule ones like the IGC where we stand to profit more than most other members.

The Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) has an intergovernmental "Working Party" (OECD jargon for "committee") on migration, of which a senior Canadian official was recently elected chair for a 5-year period, and a tiny "Migration Unit" in the part of the secretariat concerned with social and labour affairs. Both are mainly concerned with non-refugee migration, especially into member countries. Also relevant are the OECD's Development Co-operation Division (which has an uneasy relationship with the Unit because of the division's scepticism about the positive relationship of aid to migration reduction), and its Development Centre, an in-house think-tank which is doing useful work on linkages between various topics including migration.

The Working Party and the Unit are handicapped by the very low priority accorded to migration by the OECD as a whole, including its ministerial meetings. Nevertheless general and regional conferences are held on useful migration subjects, notably a large 1993 conference in Madrid on migration and development, co-sponsored (and co-financed) by Canada, and a co-ordinated series of regional meetings on "migration, free trade and regional integration" for Eastern and Western Europe, Asia, the Mediterranean (both shores) and North America (the latter to take place this October in Mexico). These are supposedly to be crowned in 1998 by a general, intergovernmental conference to pull together the regional results. Given the dichotomy of approach between migration and trade policy ministries in most OECD countries including Canada, one wonders what this conference can achieve.

One problem with these OECD endeavours is that its conferences and workshops (which sometimes overlap uncomfortably with similar meetings by other organisations) consist largely of presentations of academic papers—many, it is true, of high quality—with government representa-

tives playing little part, and without any attempt to reach conclusions binding on participants. Attendance by governments is spotty, and not necessarily by officials actually involved in policy. The proceedings, rich in wisdom though they may be, tend to be known only to those who were there, with little apparent diffusion to others. They thus have a largely educative value for the attendees alone, and little discernible effect on policy. Canada should continue to support the OECD effort, but without necessarily committing major resources to it.

NATO held a seminar in Warsaw last year on the "Economic Aspects of the Impact of Migration and Refugees on State Security", which like OECD conferences was an academic-official mixture, without agreed conclusions. A Canadian representative attended. It was probably useful education for a number of CIS representatives lacking information on practical border control issues. For the Poles, its main point was probably as a way to add to their NATO relationship generally, with an eye on their membership application. There seems little reason to repeat it, but for some odd reason NATO has been persuaded to co-sponsor, with the Greek Ministry of the Aegean, a 3-day conference in September 1997 on "non-military aspects of security in Southern Europe: migration, employment and labour market", which sounds remarkably like the OECD conference on the Mediterranean mentioned above. One meets duplication at every turn in this field.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), pushed by the USA and Canada to get into the field through the holding of a seminar in 1992, did little more on the subject till May of last year, when it (and the UNHCR and IOM) organised a large CIS conference on population displacement issues. Most of the countries of the area signed the Geneva Convention in the early '90s, but some, like Russia, have taken few steps to implement the decision. The 87 attendees, including Canada, agreed on a Plan of Action, which may stimulate further progress. The OSCE should probably be encouraged (perhaps by Canada among others) to do more in the migration field, since it is already so extensively involved in migrant-producing European areas of tension, notably ex-Yugoslavia.

Canada has had observer status at the 40-member Council of Europe since last year, and participates in Ministerial and other meetings on migration and related topics. A focus of Council activity is the protection of human rights and provision of assistance to Eastern and Central European countries—also a priority for Canada. We have some potential to exert influence in this small multilateral forum, and have for example introduced into its deliberations our concept of "managing migration flows" (for which see page 63 below).

The Budapest Group, initiated in 1993, is likewise concerned to regulate and manage migration movements from and through Eastern and Central Europe. It is the main regional forum for increasing cooperation on all aspects of irregular/illegal migration from this area. As such, it is in Canada's interest to follow its work.

The European Union (EU)

Developments in the EU merit special attention, because so much of what they do bears on Canadian policy. The Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in November 1993, put "Justice and Home Affairs", including asylum, border crossing and immigration policy, plus various law-enforcement issues, as part of the EU's "Third Pillar", i.e. subject to inter-governmental agreement, but with a Commission right of "co-initiative". Over the past five years there has been what some have called an "odour of harmonisation", but a number of political instruments are not really followed, and there are many exceptions. In practice, things have not changed very much, despite new bodies such as clearing houses for information, and various suggestions for new Conventions. The majority of effort has been in the control field, where there has been a degree of national convergence in instituting unilateral measures that members have been reluctant to adopt collectively. EU officials have worked frenetically, but have little energy left for cooperation with distant and minor outsiders like Canada.

Very little has yet been transferred from the (intergovernmental) European Council to the (common) European Commission, and rivalry between the two huge bureaucracies is clear to see. The Commission is aiming at common criteria for admission of foreigners to EU territory, but not yet a common policy on immigration, for instance a universal right to a working permit. The June 1997 Amsterdam Summit has agreed on a new treaty (still to be finalised) which apparently tends towards a "pillar 1-bis", with uneasily shared Council-Commission jurisdiction on much of the present Third Pillar. Britain and Ireland, and for different reasons Denmark, have strongly insisted on their exclusion from common border control arrangements.

Factors affecting policy on migration within the EU include: continuing or increased antipathy towards foreigners, as headlines from Europe constantly remind us; renewed nationalism; economic recession and the large costs of assisting the transition of former Soviet-bloc countries; and the feared mass-migration implications of the uncertain Balkan and Russian situations. France has particular concerns about Algerians, who already number three million in the country. It is not clear how far the new Socialist government will carry out its hints of readiness to alleviate restrictive policies on their residence and citizenship. According to the Quebec government, the French authorities have recently been encouraging Quebec to accept Algerian immigrants, who are applying in increasing numbers.

Even federal-minded Germany has gone on its own, with its expulsion threat of the 350,000 Bosnians—a threat so far much more demonstrative than wholesale, but accompanied by efforts, including German-financed EU help for resettlement using international NGOs, to induce the return home of people many of whom no longer have homes to return to. The EU countries speak of "temporary protection" for Bosnians etc., but have no common definition. (See the discussion of this issue on page 38). They combat illegal immigration, but admit the difficulty of removals.

A major Commission "Communication on Immigration and Asylum Policies" in February 1994 made an effort to discuss root causes, as part of "reducing migration pressure", and made an interesting attempt to link immigration with foreign and even population policy by speaking

of measures such as "human rights, ...humanitarian assistance, security policy, demographic policies, trade, development and cooperation policies." As there would be only long-term results, and huge costs, there was little follow-up. One measure recommended in the Communication was the reaching of a common refugee definition, which has recently been approved by the Council. It does not include gender persecution, and EU officials privately criticise Canada for now doing so (because it puts them in a poor light?). The EU definition gives members the option of refusing refugee status for victims of non-state persecution, a provision insisted on by France so as to exclude Algerians fleeing domestic Islamic terrorism. The UNHCR has rightly said in public that it is in "fundamental disagreement" with this aspect of the EU definition.

The EU's 1990 Dublin Convention, determining responsibility for dealing with asylum applications, is still not in force, ratifications having been long delayed; its rules of procedure, i.e. its interpretation, will require unanimity. Five years ago Canada hoped that it could obtain a parallel agreement with the EU, but (as is now privately admitted) no-one in the EU was interested, although they did not want to give an outright "no" to friendly Canada. Now the EU priorities for parallel accords with non-members are Norway and Iceland, followed by the Eastern European countries being prepared for eventual entry, and Switzerland.

The Dublin Convention's intended companion piece, the draft External Borders Convention, supposedly ready for signature by 1992, is still in limbo, ostensibly only because the United Kingdom and Spain cannot agree on border controls for Gibraltar, but also because of lack of enthusiasm by others. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, about the free circulation of foreigners (but not their right to work) within the member states, has been shakily in effect since 1995, with only the United Kingdom and Ireland totally and resolutely outside. It has however had teething troubles and delays in ratification or implementation. The French, notably, periodically suspend its application to ward off Algerian terrorists coming from supposedly more lax EU states. Italy, Austria and Greece are scheduled to be admitted to the Schengen Group in October, if they can do more to curb illegal migration.

Transatlantic cooperation involving the EU's Third Pillar takes the form of a certain amount of cooperation on drugs and terrorism, notably in the G-7 and G-8 context, but less on migration. A bulky USA-EU Action Plan, including many provisions for cooperation on migration, crime and the like, was concluded last year. It was followed in December 1996 by a more compact Canada-EU Action Plan, after the lifting of a year-long Spanish veto of it arising from their resentment of our turbot policy. Among much else, it has a cautiously phrased section on "Migration and Asylum", promising cooperation "on all issues related to the international movement of people". It lists some of these, like joint exploration of measures on illegal migration (including smuggling and trafficking of women and children), exchanging information "on asylum trends and on initiatives in the area of asylum system reform" as well as "asylum claims of unaccompanied children", and "work(ing) towards the development of appropriate multilateral and bilateral co-operation for the management of migration and asylum movements".

This all seems rather vague, but arrangements are already in train for a joint seminar on information technology relevant to border control (where Canada has much to offer), and for meetings on integration, the reception of asylum seekers, and trafficking in women, all by default open to the USA as well. It is not clear whether there will also be efforts at closer coordination on Eastern Europe, where EU officials concerned do not seem aware of what Canada is doing.

USA Policy

According to a US official last year, the USA had a backlog of 400,000 asylum claims, but new applications were down by almost two-thirds because of changes in regulations and a 150-day delay in work authorisations; subsequent legislation curtailing welfare benefits for non-citizens worked in the same direction. The USA has a real claim acceptance rate of about 33%, if successful appeals are taken into account, and a minimum of 300,000 illegal migrants per year. Migration is said to be taken more seriously by the Clinton Administration than previous regimes as a foreign policy and security concern.

Mexico is of course the major focus for US policy outside the refugee sphere, and likely to remain so, because of Mexico's continuing population growth, its economic gap with the neighbouring USA, and large employment opportunities unofficially offered by many Americans.

The USA is now more favourable than it was to regional and sub-regional cooperation on migration, to some extent because it is so strongly opposed to a general international conference (see page 40). Officials in Washington see new issues in the field as including: how to end "temporary protection"; the management of mass migration, with the unhappy US experiences with Haiti and Cuba not to be emulated; alien smuggling; the relationship between environmental degradation and mass movements; and the familiar "root causes". As in Canada, however, US aid experts display little interest in the issue of migration and development.

Some claim that the USA is coming to see itself in the same boat as countries like Germany or Canada, or at any rate that the USA and Canada are one region for migration. Yet responsibility-sharing seems to have no short-term importance for them, and their political appointees inevitably have little in the way of a longer-term agenda. This may partly explain why the proposed USA-Canada "Memorandum of Agreement"¹¹ to curb asylum shopping, for which negotiations started in 1991, has still not been concluded. The negotiations have been dogged throughout by a predictable "what's in it for us" attitude among US officials, since claimants preferring the USA to Canada would be far more numerous than the converse despite our more generous welfare and medical provisions for them. (Already some 60% of our claimants enter Canada via the USA, presumably drawn by our higher acceptance rate). It is estimated that only one-third of prospective claimants would be eligible, because of so many exceptions and long-stay provisions in each country; moreover, to placate Congress only 150 cases from Canada would be accepted in the first year by the USA, with a subsequent increase to 500. Is either figure large enough to make the agreement significant?

North American Cooperation

1996 saw the initiation of the intergovernmental Regional Consultation Group on Migration, or Puebla Group (after the site of its first meeting, in Mexico), comprising Canada, the USA, Mexico and the seven Central American countries, with observers from various UN bodies (initially not including the UNHCR until Canada strongly insisted), the IGC and the IOM. It has so far held two sessions at senior official level, and Canada is to host the 1998 meeting. We and Panama have overcome earlier opposition by several others to the presence of Caribbean and South American countries—with some of which our own migration problems are considerably greater than with the present members. Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic are now to be invited as observers. There is as yet no permanent staff (nor was there during the OSCE's early years, for that matter); the IOM provides technical assistance at meetings.

The returns are not yet in on this group, but it has already approved priority issues for discussion, and a modest "Plan of Action", on human rights of migrants, trafficking, development and migration links (see page 43 above), migratory policies including fraudulent documents, technical cooperation on procedures and training, and cooperation for the return of irregular migrants from outside the region. While direct benefits to Canada will remain minimal until membership is expanded further, Canadian participation fits in with Canada's desire for closer relations with countries of the area, and seems to be welcomed by them. We should be able to continue avoiding direct involvement in Mexican-USA migration issues.¹² We should use our 1998 chairing role to expand the Group's activities and potential membership, and as this proceeds, we should not exclude the eventual possibility of a small permanent staff (on the model of the IGC) in order to give the Group some institutional memory and continuity. We might also talk the group up within the OAS, with a view to a possible later relationship with it. If all this costs a little more in money and personnel, so be it; there is no free lunch.

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Notes to Section B

1. Exceptions to the role of population in migration include much movement within the developing world from one high-fertility country to another, notably in Africa, and from Eastern to Western Europe, from one low-fertility country to another.
2. The term "environmental refugees", current in the 1980s, has had a short shelf life, since it is now more clearly seen that population movements attributable mainly to environmental degradation, while potentially large, do not have the characteristic of rapid refugee-type flight (except in the case of natural disasters such as eruptions or floods), but are usually gradual and operate through more direct causes. An example is that desertification contributes to poverty which in turn makes people seek better conditions for survival elsewhere.

3. *International Migration: Implications for the World Bank*, by Sharon Stanton Russell (World Bank HCO Working Paper HCOWP54).
4. *World Population Monitoring, 1997: Issues of international migration and development: selected aspects* (UN document ESA/P/WP.132, 20 December 1996).
5. The expression "sustainable human security" occurs in speeches by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and in the Liberal Party's "Red Book II", which proposes to "promote sustainable human security in its broadest sense."
6. For a useful and comprehensive statement of the UNHCR view of "temporary protection", see Mrs. Ogata's statement of May 6, 1997 to the IGC.
7. See p. 6 of paper by Professor Adepoju, cited in Note #4 of Part II, Section A.
8. For instance, Canada among others is delaying to the maximum extent concessions to developing countries under the Uruguay Round on textiles, clothing and footwear, although many of these countries are sources of migration pressure caused partly by lack of employment in export industries at home.
9. This was largely due to efforts by EU members (a little surprisingly) and Canada (not surprisingly) at the 1993 European Population Conference, a preparatory event for the ICPD.
10. A June 6 1997 UNHCR press release said that a US\$38 million appeal for Angola in February had so far yielded only \$4.6 million in promised contributions.
11. Its full title is "Agreement on Cooperation in Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries".
12. The trilateral talks between the USA, Canada, and Mexico initiated in 1991 seem to have lapsed, being succeeded in practice by Puebla, as well as by continued high-level USA-Mexican dialogue, notably on the treatment of Mexican legal and illegal migrants in the USA.

PART III — Canadian Policies

Throughout Part II of this paper, brief comments are interspersed on Canadian policies, or the lack thereof, under the various headings. The present Part III provides a more elaborate view of these policies as a whole, and offers suggestions on how they should be modified to take account of what the next century may confront us with. For convenience, our population and migration policies are discussed separately, even though one must keep constantly in mind that the two topics are intimately linked in all sorts of ways, and are likely to become more so in coming decades.

A: Population

Policy Documents

The lack of clear Canadian Government statements of policy concerning population assistance, which was so evident five years ago, has since been partly remedied. There are three relevant policy documents, all publicly available and proffered to every enquirer:

(a) The Government's statement of February 1995 entitled *Canada in the World* refers to "overpopulation" and to "population growth" among potential security problems, and says that in Africa Canadian policy will, among other things, focus on "addressing ...factors such as environmental degradation, population growth and poverty..." It states six program priorities for Canada's official development assistance (ODA), of which three obviously bear on population policy issues:

- i) "Basic human needs: to support efforts to provide primary health care, basic education, family planning, nutrition, water and sanitation and shelter. . . . Canada will commit 25% of its ODA to basic human needs as a means of enhancing its focus on addressing the security of the individual." (The "family planning" sub-category has been further defined by CIDA's Executive Committee of senior officials as "family planning and reproductive health", comprising family planning services, basic reproductive health services, sexually transmitted diseases/HIV/AIDS, and capacity development, including for example the collection and analysis of demographic data);
- ii) "Women in development;"

iii) "Human rights, democracy and good governance."

(b) *CIDA's Statement on Population and Sustainable Development* of August 1994 (i.e. on the eve of the ICPD) lists its objectives as:

- promoting a better understanding of the impact of population dynamics on sustainable development;
- addressing pressures of population on it;
- providing comprehensive client-oriented reproductive health care centred on high quality family planning services;
- and emphasizing health, education and income generation for women in order to foster population levels consistent with sustainable development.

It then briefly gives some salient points (prongs?) of the "multi-pronged approach" used by CIDA to achieve these objectives.¹ It ends however by warning in extra-large type that programming and resource allocation decisions on population assistance "will be made through CIDA's corporate planning exercise"—in effect leaving it up to CIDA's separate, quasi-independent branches to determine how much and what to do, with no firm guidance from the top on an overall approach. Its sparse two pages are entirely inadequate as a basis for systematic programming.

(c) *CIDA's Strategy for Health* of November 1996 spells out the "major health challenges in developing countries" including (in addition to other topics): women's health; the status of women; illiteracy and limited education, particularly of girls and women; rapid population growth and rural-urban migration. It points out that population growth means a falling GDP per capita in many of the poorest countries and that without addressing the high unmet need for family planning, it will be very difficult to address poverty reduction as well as prevention and control of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. "Top priority," says the document, "is accorded to strengthening national health systems and to improving women's health and reproductive health." This latter "strategic objective" would include sub-categories such as safe motherhood, women's health programming, quality family planning services, and information, education and communication on reproductive health. The OECD ministerial statement of May 1996 on reproductive health and family planning (quoted on page 20 above) is highlighted in the document as a commitment shared in by Canada. It is interesting that NGO comments on the original draft led to a strengthening of population aspects of the *Strategy*. So far, however, CIDA has done little to implement it in specific programming—a fact already noticed by other countries.

These governmental statements are sensible and satisfactory as far as they go. However as a matter of priority a policy document on population and development should be prepared which is much more comprehensive and detailed than the 392 words of the "sustainable development" paper. It should be circulated for NGO and other public comment and issued at an early date.²

The process of developing and securing approval of such a document would serve two purposes. First, within CIDA it would foster discussion and broaden understanding throughout

CIDA about the importance and nature of the population/development interrelationship, and thus permit more and better population programming.. Many officials are still ill-at-ease or sceptical about the subject—rather more so, it would seem, than in other leading aid agencies—despite the stated priority given to it by CIDA's top leadership. Qualified professional experts on population in the organisation are scarcely more numerous than they were five years ago, when the present author remarked on the problem, and efforts are only now in train to remedy the situation.

Second, beyond CIDA, the preparation and issuance of a policy document would clarify and stimulate debate on Canada's role in population in the political milieu, and among the interested public and Canadian NGOs concerned with development. Despite high-quality participation of individual members in the Cairo and Beijing conferences, there has been minimal Parliamentary interest until moves this spring to form an all-party "Parliamentary Association on Population and Development". Also, despite general goodwill in the NGO community there has hitherto been little direct focus or involvement by Canadian NGOs apart from Planned Parenthood. Efforts (involving the author, among others) are under way to remedy this situation through the creation of a small new organisation tentatively titled *Action Canada for Population and Development* (ACPD), whose purpose would be to promote and support the ICPD Programme of Action and stimulate discussion and research about population and related issues (including migration).


Population Funding and Programming

Canadian population assistance in the last few years has suffered not only from the lack of a comprehensive policy document, but also from:

- the increased demands made on our shrinking ODA by structural adjustment's consequences, post-Cold War political instability, regional conflicts, mass refugee movements, and new environmental tasks such as climate change;
- insufficient qualified population personnel in CIDA, as pointed out above;
- the distractions of prolonged CIDA reorganisations, now, one hopes, concluded at last;
- and repeated ministerial changes.

In 1990-91 our population assistance, as defined by DAC criteria, was \$45.4 million (1.5% of our ODA at that time; the author recommended an increase to 2%). It was cut brutally by 30% over the three following years, but from 1993-4 through 1995-6, thanks to valiant efforts by a few officials within CIDA, it was held at about \$30 million while the overall CIDA budget was falling. In 1996-7, disbursements fell to a ten-year low, \$28.13 million. With other OECD countries increasing their population assistance in response to the ICPD, we are now left as only about No. 10 in population assistance expenditures per capita, and No. 10 in moving towards the ICPD target we accepted in Cairo and at the OECD—not a creditable record for a country that likes to depict itself as so earnestly committed to meeting the Third World's priority needs. We are below the USA level even after the Gingrich Congress has done its worst.

The following graph shows this dramatic divergence between the general upward trend of donor country disbursements for population assistance and the sharp downward trend of Canadian disbursements. (Note that assistance by all countries is given according to ICPD criteria, as pointed out in connection with the table of individual contributions on page 27, whereas assistance is given according to DAC criteria. But the stark contrast remains.)



To meet the commitments accepted by Canada, our assistance would have to rise to about C\$140 million (DAC criteria) or US\$146 million (ICPD criteria) annually by 2000, as already pointed out on page 27. There is no prospect, unfortunately, that these figures will be even remotely approached. However the level of assistance should be promptly restored to that of 1990-91, and further substantial increments of \$10 or \$15 million should be made in each of the next two or three years.

Highlights of population disbursement in 1996-7 included:

- * \$9.47 million for the UNFPA (down from \$11.6 million in 1994-95);
- * \$4.5 million for the IPPF, via the UNFPA (formerly \$8 million, cut in 1995 almost to nothing by a former minister for unexplained reasons, and partially restored a year later);

* for Asia, \$6.42 million plus \$4.5 million commodity assistance to continue the long-running and largely successful program, with other donors, in Bangladesh;

* for Africa and the Middle East, \$2.45 million, for modest activities in Eritrea, Tanzania, Egypt and Southern Africa (none in Francophone countries);

* for the Americas, nil (in 1995-6 there had been a small (\$475 thousand) programme in Haïti; our total aid programme there is some \$47 million).

The *balance* of effort—as distinct from its *level*—seems about right, with important exceptions:

(a) it would be desirable to restore the original level of our IPPF contribution because of the high quality of its grass-roots work and its usefulness in guiding and coordinating the work of Canadian and other family planning NGOs working abroad;

(b) we should place much more emphasis on Africa, where the population problem is greatest, and where *Canada in the World* says we will be addressing population growth as one of three principal themes (see above);

(c) A special effort should be made in Francophone Africa, since:

—population issues are particularly acute in most of these countries (see pages 3 and 29);

—it is a key area of foreign policy interest and aid concentration for Canada (we helped Rwanda and Burundi generously for years, but spent not a cent on population there);

— other Francophone developed countries, notably France, have negligible population assistance programs, leaving Canada as the only serious potential partner in the field, apart from USAID.

In addition, the points made in an earlier section of this paper on “Issues for the Future” (see page 30) merit attention by CIDA experts.

It is important that CIDA should do more, and soon, to ensure the presence of senior population experts in its various branches. Otherwise programming will be ineffective.

Other Population Activity

The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) still has a clock in its front hall showing the relentless rise of world population minute by minute, but it dropped most of its population research programming in the early 1990s. For a time it continued (in the face of criticism from some women’s groups) a small project aiding contraceptive vaccine research in India, but this is now finished, and its overall health sector has been contracted.³ One might hope that a prestigious organisation such as the Centre would be involved at least minimally in population as a key, if complex, element in development. It is strongly suggested that the IDRC’s new leadership take another look at the possibility of finding a suitable research niche on population which the Centre could fill, perhaps drawing on some of the research

priorities identified by the ICPD and also consulting Canadian demographers and relevant Canadian NGOs.

Canada's foreign policy needs to take consistent account of the long-term implications of population change as a basic theme underlying more immediate trends, and it needs to do more to increase international awareness of and attention to the issues involved. Warning signs of future trouble must be posted, and heeded. These points are, in the immortal phrase, "déjà vu all over again". It is recommended that:

(a) briefings and assessments of individual countries and areas by DFAIT and other departments, including CIDA and CIC, should as a matter of routine include, prominently, an indication of the implications—political, economic and social—of probable future population and migration trends. This is not now regularly done. Orientation sessions for new Canadian heads of mission should stress the importance of heeding and reporting on such trends.

(b) references to the importance of population and migration factors should be regularly included in Canadian ministerial statements on foreign policy and development issues, at the UN and other significant international gatherings, as well as in Canada. This too is rarely done.

(c) Canada should work to secure appropriate mentions of population and migration questions in the communiqués of G-7, Commonwealth, Francophonie, APEC and other multilateral summits, and should try to ensure that leaders at such meetings actually discuss these topics occasionally. This has rarely happened, despite what one might think from reading the fine prose of the communiqués.

(d) beyond UN fora whose main concern is population and/or migration, such as the UNCPD, the UNFPA Executive Board, and the UNHCR Executive Committee, Canadian delegations should also take opportunities to bring up the relevance of these issues in UN committees and organisations dealing with women's issues, with human rights, with development, with the environment, and so forth. The idea is to provide constant reminders of the complex interrelationships of all these questions, to discourage them from being treated too exclusively as separate subjects of interest and effort.

There is much to be done in Canada as well. There is a need to encourage greater collective Canadian NGO, academic and think-tank activity (in research, promotion and public education) on international population and development issues and related fields, including international migration (on which an unhappy adversarial relationship seems to exist between at least some officials and some NGOs). General progress is currently being made, but still more is needed, in order to provide the intellectual background of support (and/or criticism, where warranted) for government policies. The issues are too important for the long-term future of Canada and the world to be left either to government or to non-government alone. Govern-

ment departments and private institutions alike should regard this cross-nurturing as a priority.

Within the government itself, more sustained high-level interdepartmental dialogue about basic issues and trends is needed between DFAIT, CIC and CIDA, in addition to the regular lower level liaison arrangements, which seem to function adequately. As pointed out in the next section, migration questions should equally be covered. Of course, senior dialogue should also regularly encompass organisations important to aspects of population like Status of Women Canada and Health Canada.

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Notes to Section A

1. Additional points of importance in this 1994 statement include mention of : "family planning based on free and informed choice, enabling individuals to exercise, in a safe and responsible manner, their reproductive rights"; "family planning programmes that build toward full reproductive health care..."; non-promotion of abortion as a family planning method, but recognition "that women require complete access to the full range of safe reproductive health care services"; promotion of "respect for human rights in the provision and development of contraceptive drugs and devices..."; and "continued support to population-related programming conducive to sustainable development, particularly the education of girls and women and other measures enabling women to exercise wider choices and have greater control over their lives."
2. Cynics might ask why Canada should have a population policy document about other countries when it has none of its own. The author declines to wade into the domestic political swamp of this issue.
3. The sector, entitled "Strategies and Policies for Healthy Societies", comprises only research in "measures to prevent disease at the household level, e.g., improved drinking water and impregnated bednets"; "the process of public policy making"; and "social reconstruction after civil war and social upheaval"—worthy topics all, of course, but still . . .

B: Migration and Refugees

Canada's "International Migration Strategy"

Over the past several years, through a careful process of seminars and public consultations as well as responses to the challenge of multilateral meetings, Canada has gradually formulated on paper, though not yet in any one place, a broader "International Migration Strategy" than we previously had, extending beyond refugee and asylum issues, even though these latter remain the most contentious and difficult. It would be desirable to update the Strategy and publish it all in a single document, relating its analysis to the proposed population and development document.

This section describes the three main elements of the Strategy, in quotations' and paraphrases scattered across various official statements. Comments and suggestions by the author follow each element.

(i) Strategy: Prevention of involuntary migration, by long-term approaches to root causes, that is by preventing situations that cause migration by those who would rather stay but are "forced by war, internal conflict, environmental disaster, human rights abuses, and so forth, or perceive themselves as being forced to move because of the impossibility of economic survival where they are" (a version of the ICPD's "option to remain in one's own country" discussed in Part II, page 38). There is a need to "explore links between migration flows and policies on development assistance, population growth, trade and investment, human rights and good governance, environmental degradation, and civil and international conflict"; however increases in aid are "not a panacea," resources are limited, and research is needed to see about "carefully targeted aid strategies." There is talk too of other "targeted strategies that are aimed at enhancing human security, including the enhancement of human rights and good governance." Sending and receiving countries have a "mutual responsibility" to address factors in forced or irregular migration. Better information is needed on the linkages between push and pull.

Comment: These are excellent formulations of the situation, but while Canada constantly brings up the "root causes" approach as outlined above, it does not actually do much about it, at any rate in a migration context. There is a need for a more systematic look at these "root causes" in their implications for Canada, based interdepartmentally and on focussed academic research. The "Metropolis" study in CIC deals with one aspect indirectly (integration of migrants in cities in receiving countries), although it might be desirable also to look at cities in sending countries, which receive migrants from the countryside and become jumping-off points for emigration. As of now, only developed countries are partners in the enterprise. Many other topics need equal attention; most of them are already listed in the extracts quoted above.

To pursue these issues effectively, **deficiencies in interdepartmental dialogue and liaison must be remedied.** Routine contacts between CIC and DFAIT on migration issues work adequately, though the DFAIT unit concerned is rather small and much preoccupied with other matters, so that it has little time for consideration of longer-term trends. Contacts are satisfactory between CIC and CIDA on specific matters such as cooperation with the UNHCR in places like Bosnia. But there does not seem to be systematic and high-level dialogue on broader topics between CIC and CIDA, as recommended five years ago. And there is no dialogue at all between CIC and those responsible for trade policy in DFAIT and the Department of Finance, with the result that the latter two are little sensitised to the basic contradictions or awkwardnesses between the growing free movement in goods and capital, and the continuing obstacles to the freer movement of most kinds of labour, as discussed in Part II (see page 38). The same dichotomy is evident among Canadian academics; migration and trade experts live in different worlds. There can be no question now of altering basic policies, but we should begin to look to the remoter future, and encourage others to do likewise.

(ii) Strategy: Protection "of those in need—refugees and those in refugee-like situations", by

"maintaining our refugee status determination system, working actively with the UNHCR to ensure humanitarian responses, and enhancing international cooperation for the protection of the rights of people who are forced to flee from their homes";
 encouraging resettlement to provide protection for those who cannot avail themselves of "voluntary repatriation or local integration";
 emphasising the needs of refugee women as a priority, and promoting our own gender-based persecution guidelines for refugees at the UNHCR, noting that such guidelines were recognised at the Beijing conference.

Comment: Canada's record in this field is a creditable one, despite the keen criticisms of some Canadian NGOs and academic specialists. The main problem concerns the rate of acceptance by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) of claims for refugee status. Of the 27,000 to 30,000 claims made in Canada each year, about 20% are withdrawn before a hearing, 30-35% are rejected, and the remaining 45-50% are accepted (or, on the stricter yes-or-no basis used internationally, 56% or more "Yes", to 44% or less "No"). **This rate is considerably higher than that of any other country, and has changed little since five years ago.** Among a number of reasons given to explain the high level positively are that:

- (a) an IRB panel, as a quasi-judicial body, must give the benefit of the doubt to claimants, as the UNHCR itself says it should, and accordingly does not need to "go to the outer limit of evidential proof";
- (b) in our system, if the two-person panel disagrees, the claim is accepted;
- (c) other countries are slower, unreasonably demanding of specific evidence of persecution from vulnerable claimants, or less sensitive to human rights considerations;

- (d) we have led the way with gender-based persecution criteria, hailed by the UNHCR, and only a few other countries have followed us; an example is that spousal abuse can be accepted by the IRB as amounting to persecution, although only where the state (such as certain Muslim ones) does not protect a wife, as in Bangladesh, Iran, or Gulf countries, or where it is unable to cope, as in some Caribbean countries. (Some 600 out of 1100 claims have been accepted on this basis);
- (e) all information furnished must be unclassified, and anyway there is often disinformation from governments to Canadian diplomats about how well they treat their citizens;
- (f) new IRB members, conscious of the "moral burden" they bear, tend to say "yes" during their first year, after which they become more familiar with the situation, but the average turnover is only 2½ years;
- (g) panels take independent decisions on individual cases, but efforts are made to reduce divergencies, whereby, for instance, certain similar cases are accepted 25% in Montreal and 2% in Vancouver;
- (h) members are now recommended by a more independent and impartial process. (After the 1993 election 50% were replaced by the new Minister all at once, largely from among declared refugee advocates.)

Most of these (and others not recorded here in defence of IRB practices) are sound points, but one wonders about the IRB chair's statement that "Canadians have developed the best refugee determination process in the world; ours is a process that mirrors the finest qualities of the Canadian character". Certainly it is the most generous and (some might say) the most naïve. Many well-known examples are cited of fraudulent or exaggerated claims pressed successfully by skilled immigration lawyers, systematic attempts to delay decisions so that potentially unsuccessful claimants can continue to avail themselves of Canadian social and medical facilities, ill-considered decisions by inexperienced members, and controversial decisions, such as those concerning Russians claiming persecution in Israel, and recently, a case concerning a minor calling into question British and US standards.

There are two adverse results of this situation:

Much the most important is the danger that the public, seeing so many obviously fraudulent or unreasonable claims being accepted for so long, may mistakenly turn against the whole idea of refugees and indeed of immigrants in general. Support for immigration in many sectors of public opinion is already fragile.

The second result is that we lose a degree of international respect for our policies as a whole. UNHCR officials have privately criticised our acceptance rate as too high, just as they have criticised Finland's (at 0.2%) as too low, no doubt because both, in their view, bring the Convention refugee system into disrepute. Other countries, mostly European, criticise our gender guidelines as too broad, as mentioned earlier, and also note that the lure of our high acceptance rate attracts potential claimants to potential jumpoff points in Europe such as Frankfurt, where we try to block them through airline access control measures. There is indeed some hypocrisy,

perhaps unavoidable, in our policy of vaunting our welcome to genuine refugees who manage to reach Canada while doing our level best through control measures overseas to prevent irregulars (who necessarily include most refugee claimants) from getting here.

The potential domestic result in particular, as described above, is of such significance that **early priority should be given to equitable measures to reform the operations of the IRB so that asylum claim decisions are still seen to be fair but without the present excess of cases accepted on dubious grounds.** Much rides on this. Not that reform is a simple task: criticism of any steps will be inevitable from the dedicated Canadian NGOs who work so hard on behalf of refugees, but there must be more general understanding that the present system poses risks for continued toleration within Canadian society. Well-organised opposition to reform will also be inevitable from the huge body of immigration consultants and lawyers who live from the system, many honestly, but some as exploiters of their clients. As said much earlier in this document, world migration is now in a sense an enormous, diverse business.

Other things can be done. The IRB's efforts to **speed up the decision period merit government support. The rate and inevitability of removals of rejected claimants should be increased,** as the IRB has advocated; in some cases this may mean tougher talk to countries which refuse to take their nationals back, perhaps through a concerted international approach. In parallel with IRB reforms, the government should reverse its decision, announced in January, to **postpone granting permanent residence—and thus the right to sponsor relatives—for an exaggerated period of five years for accepted asylum claimants who arrived without documentation (mostly Somalis and Afghans).** The purpose is described as to "discern the background and character of applicants for permanent residence" and prevent abuse of the system by "those who may choose to conceal their identity". An adequate IRB hearing should already have determined their bona fides (difficult if not impossible without identifying who they are); otherwise, why accept them? And even if their background and character are deficient, they will probably still be staying in Canada.

On the international front, we should **persevere with our long-standing attempts to secure a Memorandum of Agreement with the USA (see page 49), but not count much on it,** if and when concluded, to reduce the flow of claimants from there, because of the small numbers allowed under the draft agreement and the unlikelihood that the USA (unenthusiastic as it seems to be about any agreement) would want a much higher level in future years. Only dissipation of the worldwide impression that our claim system is a "soft touch" will reduce the flow. For reasons already explained, in the next few years we should **not count at all on an "asylum shopping" agreement with the EU parallel to their Dublin Convention.** The Canada-EU Action Plan provides vaguely that the parties should "work towards the development of appropriate multilateral and bilateral co-operation for the management of migration and asylum movements"; it is unclear how to do so. Nevertheless we should carry on with steps to broaden cooperation with the EU.

Recent regulatory changes to systematise humanitarian admissions of Convention refugees and people in "refugee-like situations" from abroad are an organisational improvement, but there will be no increase, but rather a decrease, in the numbers of deserving Convention refugees selected abroad from among those proposed to us by UNHCR or our own officials. (As mentioned earlier, most of these refugees in camps etc. are much more in need of help than the more well-to-do asylum claimants, genuine or otherwise, who make their own way to our ports of entry). As in recent years, Government funds are being provided this year only for about 7,300 people in all, but this number and the funds that go with it will now also have to include people from certain countries designated by Canada (currently Bosnia, Croatia and Iran) who do not meet the Convention definition, and are not necessarily living outside their own country, but who are "seriously and personally affected by civil war or armed conflict", plus certain Guatemalans and Salvadoreans who have suffered deprivation of civil rights and imprisonment because of political dissent. Private sponsorships can cover additional people in these categories plus others outside their own countries "suffering from massive violations of human rights" (no specific countries are designated). Such sponsorships will be encouraged by the recent changes, according to the CIC announcement, but are more and more difficult to obtain nowadays. **Government funds in this field should be promptly and substantially increased, so that the same number of Convention refugees abroad can be selected as previously, as well as equally deserving non-Convention cases as described above.** The humanitarian impact of such expenditure is vastly greater than what must perforce continue to be spent on claimants in Canada under our present system, as described in Part II, page 35.

At the same time Canada should do more to seek cooperation on protecting the rights of those who must flee. Among other things this means much more effort to strengthen the office and the functioning of the UN Special Representative for Internally Displaced Persons (see Part II, page 42 above), and more initiatives on behalf of this category of people generally. Efforts would also be worthwhile to make the human rights apparatus in Geneva more interested in refugee issues, and to secure more UNHCR teamwork with it as it improves, although these tasks are far easier said than done. We should rethink the way we promote resolutions on "human rights and mass exoduses" at the Human Rights Commission so that they have more clout (see page 41).

(iii) Strategy: "Managed migration", described as "fostering orderly migration regimes that facilitate and regulated movements of people in a predictable way", and as being largely beneficial although with growing security implications. The need to guard against national and international security threats must be balanced with "the importance of protecting the human rights of all migrants". The latter requires "collaboration and information sharing among all countries—sending, receiving and transit countries".

Within this theme, Canadian statements warn on the one hand that "an uncontrolled influx of poorly-skilled persons may result in an economically disadvantaged foreign underclass

which can contribute to the growth of intolerance and xenophobia" and that "uncontrolled mass movements within the developing world can contribute to socio-economic and political destabilisation and pose a huge financial burden", as well as a "significant financial burden on the developed world". Measures to be taken include steps against human trafficking, crime and terrorism, preventing illegal entry through visitor visas, interdiction overseas, and the exploration of "new avenues with other governments to establish cooperative arrangements for greater technological compatibility, harmonizing policies, exchanging information and sharing common risks".

On the other hand it is pointed out that "the positive impact of voluntary and regulated migration is clear...an outgrowth of economic development, and a catalyst for further development"; "foreign direct investment is linked to the intra-company mobility of managerial and expert talent; the growth of trade in services is connected to the mobility of people" (specialists); "and the movement of labour and skills" for example in the EU, NAFTA, and traditional immigration movements, "contributes positively to economic growth".

Comment: This paper is not the place to examine specific details of Canada's own immigration policy, but it is good that Canada is persevering in a respectable level of immigration despite unemployment. It is also good that recent changes narrowing the eligibility for family sponsorship to parents and unmarried children, while still preserving essential "family reunification"¹, are giving more room for independent skilled immigrants (plus their families), and that the criteria for choosing these are being made more flexible and less occupation-specific, since the majority of immigrants do not end up in the occupations or the places for which they were chosen. In the author's personal view, however, it is not good that our \$975 "right of landing fee" for accepted immigrants and refugees is being retained. **This head tax, as some Canadian NGOs term it, is unworthy of Canada and should be dropped to a nominal level.**

Internationally, it will be useful to "increase cooperation in such areas as immigrant integration", as provided in the Canada-EU Action Plan. Yet although we have things to teach them, our systems are so different that it is hard to see how this could be done. We should also continue with international control measures against illegal migration, smuggling and trafficking, but watch out for the risk of seeming to join European and Japanese "control freaks". We should also continue and expand measures to help former Soviet-bloc countries to set up good—and fair—border and asylum claim systems, to the extent they genuinely want help, and ensure that Canadian, EU and USA efforts complement one another—not a foregone conclusion on the EU side at least.

General Remarks

For an effective international strategy, personnel resources by all departments concerned must not be stinted and must be vigorously used. Unhappy examples of false

economies include the withdrawal in 1995 of a CIC representative at Canada's EU mission in Brussels just as Maastricht was coming into force (a decision only recently rescinded); and Canadian support for a meeting in Europe on crime, followed by RCMP unwillingness to send an expert. Praiseworthy efforts initiated a couple of years ago to encourage CIC personnel abroad to do more reporting and liaison work need follow-up, and Canadian posts, including those without CIC officers on their staff, should be encouraged to do more reporting and conduct more dialogue with host countries on migration issues (just as they should on population issues!).

Spare us more reorganisations in the CIC. Though none are apparently now contemplated, reorganisations over the past several years confused personnel, blurred lines of responsibility and thus slowed the pursuit of policy. So, likewise, did reorganisations in CIDA.

CIC and other departments must avoid the temptation, driven by "human resources" number-crunchers, to over-prioritise among international organisations, or to go in too much either for a regional or a full multilateral approach in migration and refugee matters. It remains as true as it was five, ten or more years ago that Canada, as a smallish country not in any one grouping must be active on all fronts in order to achieve its objectives. **An international strategy cannot be on the cheap; it is not a luxury for Canada, as it might be for some larger countries.** The comments made in Part II above on various organisations active on migration and Canada's role in them would imply, in the author's view, particular attention and effort devoted to: the UNHCR, the IGC, Canada-EU cooperation, and Puebla, and with a little more caution, to the IOM and the OECD; less so, but still with a watching brief at key meetings, to the Council of Europe, the Budapest Group; and NATO; exploration of further possibilities with the OSCE; and prompt attention and encouragement to anything that may emerge on migration and related subjects in the Asia-Pacific area, such as APEC.

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Notes to Section B

1. "Family class" immigrants (77,061) were 36.3% of the total "landed immigrants" in 1995 (212,270). In addition another 13.8% (29,282) were "assisted relatives", counted within the "independent" category.

PART IV — A Brief Conclusion


The coming decades will see many more people living in the world beyond Canada, and many more people anxious to get into other countries including Canada. These trends, alarmingly clear in general but unpredictable in detail, will increasingly impinge on Canadian interests—developmental, security, political, economic, social. The picture of the future is a complex one, with a tangle of interacting factors, and continuing change and turbulence. Poverty, conflict, and violations of human rights will be endemic over much of the globe.

Two kinds of reaction to this murky, uncertain situation must be avoided by governments and the public. One is that of relaxing our international effort and turning inward, either through complacency—fed by comforting headlines such as the recent UN-inspired “Canada is the best place in the world to live”—or through excessive concentration on the internal problems of our own making, such as national unity or budgetary shortfalls. The world will not let off so easily a country deeply dependent on international trade and prosperity, and with immigration as a basic element of national policy.

Also to be avoided is the risk of indecision and loss of focus, from a feeling that international problems, especially those involving the developing world, are too complicated, too numerous, too cross-linked, and rarely susceptible of progress. **In the field of population and migration in particular, as this paper has tried to indicate, some fairly simple policy actions are clearly desirable and urgent, and likely to be effective if resolutely pursued and sustained over a period, in the company of others.**

Alongside these steps, and of equal importance, **much more should be done by all leaders and departments concerned, and by NGOs, to highlight in internal and international discussions, and to discuss with the public, fundamental long-term factors affecting and affected by population and migration, such as development, human rights, the status of women, gaps between rich and poor countries, globalization, and the environment. Without much broader long-term attention to these issues, the lessons which the 21st century may have in store for us could well be harsh indeed.**

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