



HOUSE OF COMMONS
CANADA

SUPPORTING THE FIVE

*Canada and the Central American
Peace Process*

**The First Report of the House of Commons
Special Committee
on the
Peace Process in Central America**


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HOUSE OF COMMONS
Bill No. 5
Wednesday, May 4, 1988
Wednesday, May 25, 1988
Wednesday, June 1, 1988
Tuesday, June 14, 1988
Wednesday, June 15, 1988
Wednesday, June 29, 1988
Chairman: Ron Jones

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
Projet de loi n° 5
Le mercredi 4 mai 1988
Le mercredi 25 mai 1988
Le mercredi 1^{er} juin 1988
Le mardi 14 juin 1988
Le mercredi 15 juin 1988
Le mercredi 29 juin 1988
Président: Ron Jones

SUPPORTING THE FIVE

Canada and the Central American Peace Process

Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Committee on the
Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Comité spécial sur le

Peace Process in
Central America

Processus de
pacification en
Amérique centrale

The First Report of the House of Commons Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America

REPORTING

Chairman of the Committee


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Chairman of the House

PROCES-VERBAUX

Président du Comité

July 5th 1988



Second Session
Thirty-fifth Parliament, 1988

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

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Président: L'hon. John Bosley, c.p.

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Research Advisor

Fiona Bladon
Administrative Assistant

Lucie S. Pilon
Secretary

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America has been in existence for only a few short months but those months have been intense to say the least. We would be remiss not to acknowledge the contributions made by many individuals to the workings of the Committee both here in Ottawa and abroad. These contributions made it possible to digest the volumes of information presented to the Committee members on this complex yet fascinating subject.

The support received by the Committee from its staff is indeed appreciated and has been effective in allowing the Committee to meet its objectives in so short a time. Richard Rumas, Clerk of the Committee, along with Administrative Assistant Fiona Bladon, and Secretary, Lucie S. Pilon, competently administered the work of the Committee and also successfully coordinated our trips to Central America and the United States.

Acknowledgements should also be extended to the knowledgeable and resourceful research team consisting of Robert Miller and Gregory Wirick of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade who each brought their own expertise to our deliberations and played an essential role in the drafting of this report.

The Committee is additionally indebted to many officials from External Affairs and the Department of National Defence: Stanley E. Gooch, Ambassador to Costa Rica, the staff of the Canadian Embassy in San José and the Chargé d'Affaires in Guatemala, Dilys Buckley-Jones, for organizing and completing the logistical details of the Committee's trip to Central America; Richard Gorham, Roving Ambassador to Central America and the Permanent Observer to the Organization of American States; John Graham, Director General of External Affairs' Caribbean and Central American Bureau and other staff members for their expertise and organizational support; and from the Department of National Defence, Colonel John Annand, Lt. Colonel Don Ethell, and Lt. Colonel Jerry Thompson for accompanying us in our travels and sharing with us their expertise in military verification and peacekeeping. We also received organizational support from Richard St. Martin of the Canadian Embassy in Washington and Gail Miller of the United Nations Mission in New York during our meetings with people in those two cities. We must also express our gratitude to Dorothy Schultzki from the Department of the Secretary of State Interpretation Services (Multilingual) who accompanied the Special Committee to Central America and did an expert job of interpreting not only Canada's two official languages but also Spanish.

The Special Committee must also acknowledge the contributions of the different organizations and individuals — members of the academic community, non-government organizations, and other interested groups and persons — who appeared before the Special Committee to share with us their observations.

Finally, we must express our gratitude to the Canadian public for making us aware of their support and concerns for the peace process in Central America.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

- ARENA** The National Republican Alliance in El Salvador. A right-wing party, founded in 1981 by ex-major Roberto D'Aubuisson.
- CIVS** The Spanish acronym for International Committee of Verification and Follow-up — created by the Esquipulas II agreement of August 1987 to analyze the progress of implementation of the agreement. It was composed of the Secretaries-General of the U.N. and the OAS, as well as by the foreign ministers of the five Central American countries, the Contadora Group and the Support Group. Following the single report of the Committee, the Central American Presidents decided at a meeting in January 1988 to dispense with the services of the Committee, while not formally disbanding it.
- Contadora** The diplomatic process initiated by four countries (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela — the Contadora Group) in 1983 to seek a regional peace settlement for Central America. See the chronology for further details.
- Contras** The armed resistance forces to the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.
- Esquipulas** A small town in Guatemala which has given its name to two events: Esquipulas I was the first meeting of Central American Presidents since the Nicaraguan revolution of 1979 and took place in May 1986; at Esquipulas II, the second meeting of the Presidents, on August 7, 1987, they signed a regional peace plan, "*Procedure for the Establishment of Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America*".
- Executive Commission** The five Central American foreign ministers set up as the body to continue monitoring implementation of Esquipulas II.
- FDR** *Frente Democrático Revolucionario*. The political wing of a political-military opposition coalition in El Salvador which has long been banned because of the guerilla activity of the FMLN (see below). Recently, two FDR leaders were allowed to return to El Salvador after years of exile. Most recently, the FDR announced its intention to participate in the 1989 presidential elections.
- FMLN** *Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional*. The military wing of the coalition described above. Its forces are currently estimated at 5 – 6,000.
- FSLN** *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*. The Spanish acronym for the Sandinista Front for National Liberation, which has governed Nicaragua since the revolution that toppled the Somoza dynasty in 1979.
- National Reconciliation Commissions** Created under the terms of the Esquipulas II Agreement to be set up in each of the five Central American countries to monitor the political elements of the Agreement.

OAS	Organization of American States
Sandinistas	See FSLN
Sapoa	Small town in Nicaragua where government (Sandinista) and rebel (Contra) forces agreed on March 24, 1988 to a 60-day ceasefire commencing April 1. Various provisions were involved including agreement to a series of follow-up negotiating sessions referred to under the general term, Sapoa, while not necessarily being held in that town.
UNDP	United Nations Development Program. The main implementing and coordinating agency in the United Nations system for development cooperation. Accordingly, it will coordinate any funds raised multilaterally from member countries of the U.N. for the Special Plan for Economic Cooperation in Central America that was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on May 12, 1988.
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

INTRODUCTION

The Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America has the honour to present its

The Committee has been established to study the peace process in Central America and to report to the House of Commons. It has held several public hearings in Ottawa and has received many suggestions from the public. The Committee has also held several meetings with representatives of the churches and other non-governmental organizations in Central America. In addition, it has met with the Ambassadors to Canada of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations, with the Ambassadors of the United States and Cuba, and with several officials of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

FIRST REPORT

In accordance with its Order of Reference dated Friday, January 29, 1988, the Committee has considered matters related to Canada's participation in the peace process in Central America and presents the following interim report.

INTRODUCTION

There are times when ideas have so much power that they become a reality.

*Dr. Oscar Arias Sanchez
President of Costa Rica*

On August 7, 1987 in Guatemala City, the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua signed the Esquipulas II Agreement, "a procedure for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America." Since that time, despite many obstacles, the peace process has continued to make precarious progress. The chance for peace clings to life.

The Esquipulas II Agreement rests on a triad of hope — peace, democracy and development. Its future lies primarily with Central Americans themselves, but it will also be influenced greatly by the understanding and support of the international community, particularly the United States. The Canadian people and their Government have expressed strong support for the Agreement and are seeking practical, effective means to respond to and reinforce the will to peace of Central Americans.

This Report represents a united, parliamentary effort to contribute to Canada's support for Esquipulas II. The Committee's Order of Reference empowers it to study the situation in Central America, to consult knowledgeable Canadians and others and "to make proposals with respect to the means by which Canada could play a constructive role in the peace process." The Committee, composed of five Members of Parliament representing the three national political parties in the House of Commons, has actively pursued its mandate over the past several months.

The Committee has held a series of briefings and public meetings in Ottawa with government officials, with scholars expert on Central America and with representatives of the Canadian churches and non-governmental organizations that have long histories of activity in and commitment to Central America. In addition, we met with the Ambassadors to Canada of the five Central American countries, with the Ambassadors of the United States and Cuba and with senior officials of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

From May 8 to 18 Committee members and staff visited the five Central American countries signatory to the Esquipulas II Agreement, where we met with Presidents and other senior government officials, with opposition political figures, with representatives of the churches, unions, business and human rights organizations and with Canadian officials and private Canadian citizens working for non-governmental organizations. Through field visits to refugee camps and Canadian aid projects, we had the opportunity to talk to individual Central Americans, to see for ourselves the often terrible consequences of conflict and to hear the hopes for peace. As a final element in this phase of our investigation, the Committee visited Washington and New York City on June 2nd and 3rd to meet with members of the United States Administration and Congress and with officials of the Organization of American States and the United Nations.

While it is our intention to continue the Committee's work through the present session of Parliament, we think it is essential to report now on our findings of the past several months. We believe there is a closing window of opportunity to strengthen the peace process. Accordingly, we offer a number of proposals for confidence- building measures that may help to revitalize and sustain the search for peace. In one way or another, all of our recommendations spring from the single conviction that has guided our work from the beginning and that was powerfully reinforced by our visit to Central America: namely that Canada should do everything in its power to support the Central American five in their own search for peace, in ways *they* deem useful. It is in that spirit of "Supporting the Five" that we present this Report.

PART I: THE ELEMENTS OF THE CONFLICT

Every violent act provokes a counter-reaction.

Jose Azcona
President of Honduras

By and large in Central America, the political centre has not held or ever coalesced. The resulting anarchy has led to a spiral of despair and destruction to which the events of recent years bear witness. It is appropriate to review these events in brief — the elements of the conflict — to demonstrate the background against which the five Central American countries seek peace despite all odds. Under these circumstances, it will be seen that the support of the international community for the five in their struggle is a moral imperative.

Multiple Conflicts

The region has been beset by multiple conflicts for many years. Factionalism and the power of the military have impeded the development of civil governments, and, indeed have made them impossible in some countries for long periods of time. Disputes between states have poisoned the atmosphere throughout Central America. Intertwined has been a geopolitical dimension: the intimate involvement of the superpowers, historically the United States and more recently the Soviet Union, has immensely complicated attempts at reconciliation.

In response to one of the oldest insurgencies in the Western hemisphere, the Guatemalan military undertook one of the harshest repressions in contemporary Latin American history. The results have been traumatizing for Guatemala which had no less than 120,000 orphans as a result of the internal conflict, according to the Guatemalan Supreme Court's last official tally in 1985. In El Salvador, the struggle between the army and the guerillas of the *Farabando Marti de Liberacion Nacional* (FMLN) pits "*los pobres contra los pobres*, the poor against the poor".¹ It is a chronic civil war that appears to be stalemated with little prospect of a quick solution. Finally, the bitter aftermath of revolution against a hated regime in Nicaragua has been internal insurrection supported by the United States. The reverberations of this conflict in particular have been felt in every country in the region with corresponding effects on their own domestic struggles. In short, internal conflicts have become inextricably linked to the intensification of conflict throughout Central America.

Honduras, for example, has been swept up in events in neighbouring Nicaragua. The United States-supported war against the Sandinistas has been based in Honduras and the resulting flow of Contras and Nicaraguan refugees has been a continual irritant in relations between the two countries. Honduras also feels menaced by the potential threat that a revolutionary neighbour poses. Although the military is the most powerful institution in Honduras, it has been unable to control the borders. In addition, U.S. military assistance to Honduras has grown enormously in the last few

years, creating a new dependency for an extremely vulnerable nation. Even Costa Rica, the sole democracy of longstanding, has been drawn inexorably into the conflict with its full share of refugees and exiles, as well as Contras who at one time used Costa Rica as a base in their war against the Sandinistas.

Militarization

Perhaps inevitably, there has been a degree of militarization which, while intended to increase security, paradoxically has done much to heighten fears and add to destabilization within the region. It has also had the effect in most countries of increasing the sway of a military elite whose power was already overweening. A few figures illustrate the problem. In 1978 military personnel in El Salvador totalled approximately 10,000, including para-military security forces. In 1987 the figure was 47,000, excluding the para-military which accounted for an additional 12,000 personnel. Guatemala's army numbered 14,270 in 1978; the most recent figure is 38,000. Nicaragua's armed forces of 77,000, including active-duty reserves and militia, is the largest in the region, and has grown from 14,000 (including para-military) in 1981 and from 11,000 in 1978 under the Somoza regime. Even Costa Rica's para-military security forces reached 9,500 in 1987, up from 5,000 in 1980.² In sum, military spending increased by 50% in real terms within the region between 1979 and 1983.³ This drain of resources for defence-related purposes has been extremely destructive for the region's already-depressed and always precarious economies.

This growth in Central American military expenditures has been accompanied by a burgeoning of military assistance from abroad. United States military assistance to El Salvador, for example, jumped to U.S. \$82 million in 1982 and U.S. \$128 million in 1985.⁴ Assistance to Honduras grew from less than U.S. \$4 million in 1980, to U.S. \$81 million in 1986, though it dropped to U.S. \$41 million in 1988.⁵ But the United States has not been alone. Soviet, Eastern bloc and Cuban military aid to Nicaragua grew rapidly between 1983 and 1986. The Sandinista counter-insurgency effort owes its success to the mobility and firepower provided by the Eastern bloc.⁶ The levels of assistance have been reduced since then but remain a concern.⁷

The Costs of Conflict

Apart from the pervasive fear, the consequences of these multiple conflicts are appalling. Casualties are a commonplace, both deaths and injuries. In a speech toward the end of 1987, President Ortega said that there had been 45,714 casualties in Nicaragua since 1979, out of a total population of 2.7 million. In El Salvador, the number of deaths had reached 61,000 out of a population of 5.6 million and the use of land mines by both sides had produced a small army of people missing limbs.⁸ As Professor Hal Klepak observed of that country, "It is a mistake to consider this a war of low intensity ... in terms of what Central America has lived in its sad past, this is a high level of fighting.⁹ We witnessed a small part of the physical cost in a visit to a rehabilitation centre in Nicaragua. There, where people of all ages hobbled on crutches or painfully relearned simple tasks through physiotherapy, the misery was palpable. These stories are all too common throughout Central America.

We also saw the consequences of this time of troubles with visits to two refugees camps, one in El Salvador and the other in Honduras. Although attempts to create a sense of community have met with some limited success, the predominant impression was of desperation. These people's lives are suspended in a kind of no man's land. Deprived of their homes and livelihood, they too are casualties,

obliged to wait, sometimes for years, in the hope that by some quirk of fate they can leave the camps and piece together their shattered lives. As the Deputy Regional Representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) told the Committee in Costa Rica, refugee camps are not a solution; they are part of the problem. Unfortunately, they are also essential in the present context and overwhelmed by the numbers involved. Jean Christie of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation quoted British Refugee Council figures which estimated a total of 750,000 refugees throughout Central America.¹⁰

They are joined by an estimated 1.5 million people who are displaced within their own countries.¹¹ Canadians can readily grasp the scope of this displacement since the region's total population of 25 million matches that of Canada. They are a significant factor in the runaway urbanization which is placing incredible strain on the meagre resources of Central America's large cities, particularly San Salvador and Managua. They also add to the economic dislocation that plagues the region.

Central America's economic distress, however, cannot be attributed solely to the hostilities. The downturn in exports of traditional goods after 1980 would have created a depression regardless of the strife. Moreover, poverty is scarcely new to the region. As Gabriel Siri of the Economic Commission for Latin America has observed, with the exception of Costa Rica more than half of the region's population produces very little, earns and consumes little, and invests not at all. Yet he insists that "the presence of this large body of indigent people is at the root of the current social and political upheaval ... and constitutes the main obstacle to a sustainable peace."¹² In the case of Nicaragua, the effects of the U.S. economic embargo have also been quite severe and have posed further serious obstacles to that country's development.

This same consciousness of the inequities tormenting Central American society is one of the principal motivations behind *Esquipulas II*. In the face of the multiple conflicts which are rooted in social and economic deprivation, the initiative of the five Central American presidents is a start in the slow struggle to redeem the past; a calculated response to the disintegration that years of conflict have wrought. Its implementation promises to provide that space for which all the parties and interests we heard from in Central America seem to yearn. "Give us space" was their refrain, space in which to master our own destiny. It is an evocative appeal, which this Committee supports. Against the fatalism of the past, *Esquipulas II* proposes new hope, founded on new self-assertion.

PART II: GIVING PEACE A CHANCE

Esquipulas II is the second Act of Independence for Central America.

José Napoleon Duarte
President of El Salvador

Introduction

The space for Esquipulas II had to be created — the space to trust each other and to talk to each other. The problem was political and it was at the political level that a means had to be found to break the impasse. That process required patient and painstaking diplomacy. It was this role that the Contadora Group assumed and it is important to trace the uphill struggle from Contadora to Esquipulas to appreciate how considerable the labours have been.

From Contadora to Esquipulas

At the beginning of 1983, the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela met on the Isla de Contadora off the coast of Panama and formed themselves into the Group that has since been known as Contadora. In a declaration issued on May 13, 1983, they stated that the purpose of the Group was to fulfill for Central America “a diplomatic function aimed at seeking, through a political route, the solution of the conflicts and counting, in order to accomplish this, on the collaboration of the involved parties.”

Following their initial meeting, Contadora undertook a series of joint meetings with foreign ministers of the five Central American states. This was the first political engagement among the five since the Nicaraguan revolution. It brought in its wake a host of diplomatic exchanges — the endless talk that is a necessary means to mutual understanding. In addition, according to the Mexican academic Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, one of the main elements of Contadora was to shift the attention of the principal actors from the internal situations of states to the regional situation. Another important feature was that Contadora cast the conflict in terms of the Central American region and not as an east-west confrontation. Finally, Contadora quite deliberately excluded the United States. The assumption was that each one of the countries was acting in its own national interest.

To attain these objectives, Contadora devised a very complex set of diplomatic and legal proceedings and rules of engagement. In this way, they managed to create a negotiating environment which permitted everyone to sit at the table and discuss matters in general terms. When foreign bases were discussed, for example, no one was singled out, no blame was assigned. Instead, the energies of the various parties were devoted to working out principles and achieving a consensus about these principles.

One of the seminal documents in this regard was a 21-Point *Document of Objectives* which was adopted at a joint meeting of Contadora and Central American foreign ministers on September 9, 1983.

The central points included the following:

- 1) to put an end to situations of conflict in the area;
- 2) to stop the arms race;
- 3) to end [the presence of] foreign military bases or other types of foreign military interference;
- 4) to eliminate the traffic in arms;
- 5) to give free access to fair and regular elections based on the full observance of citizens' rights;
- 6) to respect and ensure the exercise of human, political, civil, economic, social, religious and cultural rights; and
- 7) the establishment of the machinery necessary to formalise and develop the objectives contained in this document, and to bring about the establishment of appropriate verification and monitoring systems.

The development of that machinery and systems became the responsibility of the Contadora States to negotiate with the parties in conflict.

Hence too began the interest and involvement of Canada in the Contadora process. On September 27, just two weeks after the *Document of Objectives* was announced, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs told the UN General Assembly that Canada supported the Contadora proposals "to stop the process of militarization and to verify and monitor the progressive withdrawal of all foreign military personnel from the region." In November, at the request of the Mexican Foreign Minister, Canadian officials provided a detailed briefing on Canada's peacekeeping experience during the 5th Canada-Mexico Joint Ministerial Committee sessions.

In January 1984, the Contadora and Central American foreign ministers, following up their 21 objectives, adopted another key document entitled, *Principles for Implementation of the Commitments Undertaken in the Document of Objectives*. In June, the first formal draft of an *Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America* was presented to the Central American states and Canada was officially requested to comment on the security and control aspects of the draft. These suggestions, which included basic criteria for the establishment of a Control and Verification Commission, were submitted to Contadora officials on August 23 prior to the presentation of a second draft *Contadora Act* on September 7.

What characterized all of these initial documents (the 21 Objectives, the Implementing Principles and the draft Acts) was the blending of both short and long-term objectives. Contadora had greater ambitions than simply arranging a peace treaty for a specific conflict. The immediate necessity of a truce was to be followed by a disarmament effort and then, most significant of all, by a major economic, political and social development enterprise aimed at resolving the fundamental causes of conflict in Central America. In this respect too, Contadora is a precursor of the Esquipulas process which also emphasizes the interrelatedness of the region's problems.

On September 21, 1984, Nicaragua indicated its willingness to sign the second draft *Contadora Act*. But although Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica had initially expressed their support for the draft, they now raised various objections. On October 20, they presented a counter-proposal, the *Act of Tegucigalpa*, which turned out to be unacceptable to Nicaragua. Canada was again asked to comment on the documents, as it would be several more times before the issuing of another revised draft Act by Contadora in September 1985, which incorporated many of the Canadian suggestions relating to verification and control mechanisms. Unfortunately, because of the latest draft's failure to prohibit U.S. military activity in the region, Nicaragua once more objected.

Thereafter, Contadora continued to make efforts to break the stalemate, but by then its influence had begun to wane and other initiatives were needed. Nonetheless, the Contadora process made lasting contributions to the search for peace. It re-established diplomatic connections among Central Americans. There were meetings almost every month, for a period of three to four years, involving all of the Central American countries, both ministers and officials. Military personnel were also involved and these discussions, for example between the Nicaraguan and Honduran armies, were another significant breakthrough. The time came, however, when the Central Americans had to look to themselves. As great as their suspicions had been of each other, neither were they entirely comfortable with their Contadora interlocutors; in the view of a Mexican observer, despite the desire of Contadora "to be part of the solution ... they were actually part of the problem."

Thus, when for the first time the five Central American Presidents met as a group in May of 1986 in Esquipulas, Guatemala, they once again failed to agree on the Contadora draft. The creation of the Central American Parliament, however, was broached for the first time. In the ensuing months before the second meeting of Presidents in Esquipulas the following year, there was a plethora of diplomatic manoeuvring, not all of it constructive. The mutual resentments and frictions that had festered over time could not be swept aside in a day.

The Esquipulas II Agreement

The Agreement signed by the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua on August 7, 1987 is entitled *A Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America*. The title reflects the understanding that peace is not a single event, achieved once and for all, but an ongoing process that conforms to certain principles, spells out specific commitments and establishes mechanisms for ensuring compliance. The elements of the agreement are as follows: (*The full text of the Esquipulas II Agreement appears as Appendix A to this Report*).

Political

Esquipulas II contains some twenty-two specific commitments in five broad categories — political, security, refugees, development, and verification and follow-up. The political element begins with the need for national reconciliation and dialogue, for, as President Arias explained to the Committee, the entire Agreement rests on the belief that "dialogue is the only way ahead for Central America". Toward the objective of encouraging national dialogue, "where deep divisions have occurred within the society" the Agreement provides that decrees of amnesty will be issued by governments while, simultaneously, irregular armies must free all persons held in their custody. At the same time, the five Central American governments commit themselves "to achieve an effective ceasefire within the constitutional framework."

The commitment to dialogue and reconciliation having been launched in this way, the Agreement then spells out what its architects saw as the essential requirement for sustaining reconciliation — democratization.

The Governments undertake to promote an authentic democratic process that is pluralistic and participatory, which entails the promotion of social justice and respect for human rights, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and the right of every nation to choose, freely and without outside interference of any kind, its own economic, political and social system.

It is worth quoting the Agreement's definition of the democratic process in order to highlight its several elements: authentic, pluralist democracy; social justice and human rights; and sovereignty, territorial integrity and the right of national self-determination. This section of the Agreement goes on to say that "in order to ensure good faith" in the development of democracy, it shall be understood that there will be complete freedom for television, radio and the press; political groups will have full enjoyment of the right to proselytize and full access to the media; and, where states of emergency or martial law are in force, they will be lifted.

The Agreement then provides that "the conditions pertaining to every democracy having been created", free elections will be held. Significantly, it first provides for elections to the Central American Parliament, the creation of which was proposed by the Esquipulas Declaration of May 1986 and the coming into force of which is the subject of a separate treaty. The Parliament is described as the Central American States' "joint expression of their desire for reconciliation and lasting peace for their peoples" and it is provided that elections should be held within the first semester (up to six months) of 1988 with international observers to verify that they have been governed by "strict" standards. In its final passage on democratization, the Agreement specifies that after elections to the Central American Parliament, equally free and democratic municipal, Congressional and Presidential elections will be held in each country, with international observers and in accordance with the present constitutions. No timetable is set down for these elections.

To verify these political elements of the Agreement — amnesty, ceasefire, democratization and free elections, as well as "unrestricted respect for civil and political rights" — it is provided that a National Reconciliation Commission be established in each country. The Commissions are to consist of delegates chosen by the Executive Branch of national governments, churches and opposition political parties, as well as "an eminent citizen belonging to neither the Government nor the government party."

Security

A second essential element of the Esquipulas II Agreement relates to security and disarmament commitments. The importance of these provisions will be immediately apparent from our description in Part I of this Report of the multiplicity and multilayered nature of the conflicts in Central America. As conveyed in the preamble to the Agreement, these provisions express the commitment to "struggle for peace and eliminate war."

Strictly speaking, the call for ceasefire which the Agreement groups with its political provisions may also be seen as an immediate and important security provision. The second of the security provisions commits the five signatory governments to

request Governments of the region and Governments from outside the region which are providing either overt or covert military, logistical, financial or propaganda support, in the form of men,

weapons, munitions and equipment, to irregular forces or insurrectionist movements to terminate such aid; this is vital if a stable and lasting peace is to be attained in the region.

Specifically exempted from this provision is aid for the purpose of repatriation, relocation or reinstallation of irregular forces in normal life. The Agreement goes on to request that such forces abstain from receiving military aid and then describes these provisions as being in accord with other agreements to eliminate the arms traffic within Central America and from outside the region.

Another important security provision, bearing particularly on the continuing tensions between Honduras and Nicaragua arising from the operations of the Contras, calls for restrictions on the use of national territory to attack other states. It commits the five countries to "constrain" the use of their territory and otherwise not lend or allow logistical and military aid to persons, organizations or groups intending to destabilize Central American governments.

The last of the security provisions highlights the continuity between Contadora and Esquipulas II. It commits the five governments of Central America, with the Contadora countries serving as mediators, to proceed with negotiations on matters set down in the Contadora Accord of September 1983. That Accord contains some of the same elements set forth in Esquipulas II but includes several other security proposals as well, such as agreements to forbid establishment of foreign military bases or other forms of foreign military assistance; and to reduce, and eventually eliminate, the presence of foreign military advisors and other forms of foreign military and security actions¹³. While the inclusion of the reference to Contadora in the Esquipulas II Agreement does not constitute a commitment to these proposals, it does suggest the longer term hopes and thinking that lie behind the Agreement.

Refugees and Displaced Persons

Members of the Committee saw for themselves one of the most visible and tragic by-products of Central American conflict in the form of large refugee camps that have sprung up throughout the region. The Esquipulas II Agreement declares the urgency of providing refugees and other displaced people with protection and humanitarian assistance and facilitating their voluntary repatriation or resettlement. Governments further commit themselves to seek additional international assistance through bilateral and multilateral arrangements as well as through the UNHCR.

Peace and Development

Whereas the section of the Agreement on refugees may be said to address the consequences of conflict, the section on development addresses the root causes which are to be found in poverty and economic inequality. The Preamble to the Agreement declares firmly that "peace and development are inseparable" and the Agreement itself states that "the strengthening of democracy entails creating a system of economic and social well-being and justice." To reach these goals, the Central American governments "shall jointly seek special economic assistance from the international community."

International Verification and Follow-Up

The extreme political polarization within most countries of Central America and the deep suspicions between some countries make it imperative to have credible mechanisms for monitoring compliance with the Esquipulas II Agreement. Miguel D'Escoto, Foreign Minister of Nicaragua,

remarked to the Committee that "in the history of Central America there have been many agreements, but this is the first one with built-in verification and consequences for non-compliance. That is the newness of the agreement".

We have earlier described one mechanism specified for monitoring the political elements of the Agreement, namely the National Reconciliation Committees to be established in each country. In addition, the Agreement provides for the creation of an International Committee of Verification and Follow-Up, to be composed of the Secretaries-General, or their representatives, of the Organization of American States and the United Nations, as well as by the Foreign Ministers of the five Central American countries, the Contadora Group and the Support Group.¹⁴

In order to facilitate the work of the International Committee of Verification and Follow-up, the Agreement pledges the five Central American governments to render all necessary facilities for its work, as well as the work of the National Reconciliation Committees. In addition, all nations "interested in promoting the cause of freedom, democracy and peace in Central America" are invited to adhere to these declarations. The logic of this arrangement was described to the Committee by President Duarte who remarked that "Esquipulas II is like an inner ring of five Central American countries. The outer ring is everyone else."

The final section of the Agreement provides a timetable for implementation of many of its provisions: within 15 days of signing, an Executive Commission of the Central American Foreign Ministers is to commence the work of planning and organizing the Agreement's procedure for peace; after 90 days the political and security provisions are to be put into force "simultaneously and be made public"; after 120 days the International Committee will analyze the progress of implementation and after 150 days the five Presidents will meet to receive the Committee's Report and take "relevant decisions".

Implementation: The Precarious Life of the Peace Process

In the mandate given by the House of Commons, we were asked to "note and analyse the compliance or non-compliance of the five countries to the specific provisions of the Esquipulas II Agreement." With five major elements in the Agreement, twenty-two specific commitments and five signatory countries, the possibility for losing sight of the forest for the trees would seem to be unlimited. A complete analysis, to be accurate and fair, would also presume a depth of understanding of Central America that the members of the Committee do not claim to possess. On the other hand, we had an excellent opportunity during our ten-day trip to the five countries to hear Central Americans' own assessment of the peace process. In the end it is these assessments more than any other that will determine the prospects for peace.

Throughout our meetings we heard it said that Esquipulas II remains a great source of hope for Central America. We were often struck by the ability of those we met to detail the many obstacles to peace and yet proclaim themselves optimistic. President Duarte remarked that the Agreement remains "as valid today as the day it was signed". When asked to justify their hopes, many replied that Esquipulas changed the mood of Central America by getting people to talk to each other. The Sapoa negotiations between the Government of Nicaragua and the Contras was often cited as the most tangible benefit to date of this new mood.

It must be said, however, that the hopes for Esquipulas II were tempered by more than a little pessimism about its overall progress and prospects. We were told repeatedly that by the spring of

1988 the political will for a comprehensive regional peace process had significantly diminished, although not disappeared. It was said that the momentum of Esquipulas II had been lost. We were warned by several Central American Presidents that there was a deadline for the recovery of momentum — the remaining one to two years in office of the five Presidents who signed the Agreement. As President Arias explained, “we are more committed to the Agreement than anyone else will be.”

The evidence of lost momentum is to be found in the tense, halting and uncertain course of the negotiations since the signing of the Agreement. The deadlines set for compliance have not generally been met although this seemed a matter of greater concern to outside observers than to Central Americans. Julio Martini, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guatemala, argued that as much time as necessary should be taken to overcome the difficult problems that remain. Father Xabier Gorostiaga of Nicaragua passionately asserted the right of Central Americans to define their own political space and time.

The point should be emphasized that Esquipulas II is not a treaty; it is a procedure among the five to establish “firm and lasting peace.” Its timetables are not for outsiders to enforce, nor is it necessarily a failure if its own timetables are not met. The approach to timetables is illustrated by the ratification of the treaty for the Central American Parliament, a matter of great interest to the Committee. The Agreement specified that elections to the Parliament should be held within the first six months of this year but, at the time of writing, the treaty is still to be ratified by Costa Rica and El Salvador. The Vice-President of Guatemala, Roberto Carpio Nicolle, a leading supporter of the Parliament, expressed the hope that elections would be held in the fall of 1988, but the Committee’s impression is that the process of ratification in Costa Rica, involving a constitutional amendment, may be rather slow.

The report of the International Committee of Verification and Follow-up was the most traumatic event to date in the implementation of Esquipulas II. The Committee was to analyze the progress of implementation and report to the five Presidents who were to take “relevant decisions.” As it happens, the relevant decision taken by the Presidents following discussion of the Report in January was to dispense with the services of the Committee, though not formally disbanding it. The Report, particularly the passages on human rights, provoked “a terrible, terrible fight,” to quote a senior Central American official. Some Presidents felt, rightly or wrongly, that the “outer ring” of Esquipulas II had become too judgemental and intrusive and it was agreed, unanimously but with varying degrees of conviction, that the Committee had outlived its usefulness.

This decision left a considerable hole in the arrangements for verification of the Agreement, a hole that was only partially and tentatively filled on April 7 when the Executive Commission (the five Foreign Ministers) issued a statement reaffirming the role of the National Reconciliation Committees in verifying the political elements of the Agreement. The statement also went on to say,

With regard to security commitments, the Executive Commission shall request, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the assistance of specialized personnel of the Governments of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain, which have indicated a desire to cooperate in the Central American peace process in setting up verification control and follow-up machinery.¹⁵

The statement further provided that “once that request has been formalized”, the Auxiliary Group would get on with its work. However, no request has been sent and so Esquipulas verification remains in limbo.

National Dialogue and Reconciliation

It was made clear to us during the course of our trip that the procedural difficulties of Esquipulas II are symptoms of deeper political problems. In only two of the countries, Nicaragua and Honduras, were the National Reconciliation Commissions described as having been active and, in the case of Honduras, the Commission was seen as having considerable moral authority but doubtful influence. At the same time, we noted some encouraging signs of political forces striving for dialogue.

In the case of Guatemala, little or no dialogue has occurred between the Government and the armed opposition. The Government's position is that the insurgency has ceased to be an important military or political force and all that remains is for the remnants to lay down their arms and to become part of the political process, with their safety guaranteed by an amnesty decree. Other observers saw Guatemala slipping back into the highly polarized and repressive conditions of the early 1980s, with both the armed insurgency and the extreme right growing in strength. During the course of its brief visit, the Committee heard evidence that human rights violations were once more on the rise. At the same time, we were told of President Vinicio Cerezo's persistent efforts to maintain the democratic option and of his courage in supporting Esquipulas II. We met with opposition political figures who spoke of re-entering the democratic arena with "fear and trembling" but who persisted nonetheless.

The situation in El Salvador is more clearly ominous for the peace process. During the past six months, the Christian Democrats have been severely weakened by a series of events: their resounding defeat in municipal elections by the right wing ARENA party, the subsequent infighting and split in the Christian Democrats and the recent news of President Duarte's grave illness. In meetings with government officials and representatives of both the *Frente Democratico Revolucionario* (FDR) and the FMLN we saw little hope for a constructive dialogue. We were told by knowledgeable observers that both sides in El Salvador's chronic civil war continue to believe in their eventual military victory. On the other hand, representatives of the FDR, the political party in alliance with the FMLN, told us that they were giving serious consideration to joining the electoral process for the 1989 Presidential elections; since our visit we have learned this decision has been taken. The Reverend Ignacio Ellacuria, Rector of the *Universidad Centro Americana de El Salvador*, welcomed this possibility as providing a democratic alternative to the extreme right and, at the same time, signalling the left's realization "that a pure revolutionary model cannot exist in the region." In the hope of dampening growing polarization, the Catholic Church, seized by the crisis of the political system, is organizing a national debate involving all sectors of society in the hope of dampening growing polarization.

Honduras has not had the history of conflict nor the high levels of human rights violations associated with El Salvador and Guatemala. Nonetheless, during our visit, we were told of numerous killings, arrests and disappearances as the result of 'abuse of authority'. Hondurans are preoccupied, however, with their country's dangerous role as the principal staging base for the U.S.-supported counter-revolutionary war against the Sandinistas, a role that has aroused some resentment of the United States. Hondurans fear both the Nicaraguan army and the Contras, who, whether the Sapoá talks succeed or fail, may remain on Honduran soil. A lesser fear, though very real, is of the play of forces on the border with El Salvador between the armed forces of that country and the FMLN. The Commander-in-Chief of the Honduran Armed Forces, General Regalado, conveyed the national sense of vulnerability when he remarked "we do not have control over our borders."

Honduras has much to gain from Esquipulas II but also little room for manoeuvre. It has made concrete and useful proposals for verification but the dialogue with Nicaragua, which Esquipulas initially did much to encourage, has been marred by mutual suspicion that now blocks progress of the Agreement. Prior to Esquipulas II, Nicaragua had initiated a case against Honduras in the World Court complaining of that country serving as a base for the Contras. Honduras in turn has objected that such an action is contrary to the spirit of Esquipulas II, which provides for settlement of disputes by the five. Officials of the Honduran Foreign Ministry informed us that until the case is withdrawn, the negotiations on verification would not proceed and the overall prospects for Esquipulas II "would be seriously affected." At the most recent meeting of the Central American Foreign Ministers, on June 21-22 in Tegucigalpa, progress was once again stalled by failure to resolve this issue.

Costa Rica is another case entirely, where strong democratic institutions have enabled the country to avoid the political polarization and conflict endemic to much of Central America. Nonetheless, inspired by the fear that the region's mounting troubles would engulf his own country, President Arias committed himself to launching a dialogue among the five countries and was the main architect of Esquipulas II. During our visit to Costa Rica we were told that the country remains overwhelmingly supportive of the peace process, but, at the same time, the President faces political pressures to devote less time to regional peace and more time to domestic affairs. Despite these pressures, President Arias continues to provide his good offices to facilitate dialogue.

Sapoa

The peace process has yielded one substantial prize so far — the Sapoa negotiations between the Nicaraguan resistance and the Government of Nicaragua. While some elements of these negotiations go well beyond the provisions of Esquipulas II, they are a practical application of the Agreement's logic and spirit at a focal point of Central American conflict. Many Central Americans remarked that Sapoa, named for the small Nicaraguan town where the talks began, was the least expected area of progress but also the most promising for strengthening Esquipulas II as a whole.

The Sapoa talks are, of course, only an agreement to negotiate during a 60-day ceasefire that is now being extended on an ad hoc basis. Their success, as we were reminded repeatedly during our trip to Central America, is far from certain. Both sides have compelling reasons for bringing the war to an end but both sides are also driven by hatred and fear of the other. The principal demand of the Contras is for guarantees of democratization that they believe the Sandinistas will not willingly provide. They suspect that Sapoa is a delaying tactic to resupply the Sandinista army and wear down the Contra forces. The Sandinistas believe that the Contras are manoeuvring to obtain a resumption of U.S. lethal aid and that their talk of democratization is only a pretext for their real agenda — destruction of the revolution. As President Ortega remarked to us, "The only thing that will satisfy these people is for us to leave."

At the time of writing, the talks appear to have broken down after entering a more productive stage. There are some who believe the talks are over, but we hope this is not the case. The resistance had shortened its long list of demands for constitutional change, the most important of which is the separation of the Sandinista party from identification with the institutions of the state and army. According to information received by the Committee, the Government of Nicaragua had accepted most of the short list of Contra demands and was negotiating seriously on this matter of constitutional linkages between party, army and state. At this stage it is impossible to predict the

outcome of Sapoa, but it is clear that if the talks are to succeed, both sides must make major concessions. The Contras must accept that in free and fair elections, the Sandinistas may win and continue to govern Nicaragua. The Sandinistas must accept real curbs on their power and respect the fundamental rights of opposition parties. In this connection, we were struck by the words of President Arias.

When the five presidents met in June 1986, I told President Ortega "the difference between you and the rest of us is that we are prepared to become leaders of the opposition and you are not." He agreed. Since that time, Ortega has changed. This is the first time a Marxist ruler has been committed to democratization. He should be given the chance.

In viewing Sapoa as something of a linchpin for regional peace, the Committee does not mean to imply that there is one Esquipulas for Nicaragua and another, less stringent, for the rest of Central America. President Duarte stressed the point that Esquipulas *is* the five when he remarked that he had rejected the first draft of the peace plan because "it was written against Nicaragua by the four of us and I would not do anything without Nicaragua there." At the same time, the Committee was told on more than one occasion that Sapoa, if successful, may be the most promising route towards the wider Esquipulas, by lessening tensions between Nicaragua and Honduras and, of enormous importance, opening the door to improved relations between Nicaragua and the United States. In that connection, a few commentators felt that Sapoa would permit discussion of the U.S. concern, well-founded or not, of Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran guerrillas. It is such geopolitical elements in the peace process that may finally determine the potential of Esquipulas for transforming the Central American scene.

Geopolitics and Esquipulas

The Esquipulas II Agreement bears only five signatures but other, powerful geopolitical interests weigh heavily in its implementation. This is nothing new in Central American history. Since the sixteenth century the isthmus has been a focal point of great power ambitions and rivalries. During the past century the United States has repeatedly intervened in Central America, militarily and diplomatically, and since World War II the region has served as a battleground in the Cold War.

"We need space" was an expression used repeatedly by those we met in the region, meaning room to exercise their own judgement and devise their own solutions. Our impression is that the Agreement has succeeded in marginally expanding the region's political space. We encountered a widespread perception in Central America that the United States Administration is opposed to Esquipulas and has used its enormous influence with some countries in the region, specifically Honduras and El Salvador, to impede implementation. A meeting with officials of the United States Embassy in Honduras revealed sharp criticism of the Agreement. Ambassador Everett Briggs quoted President Reagan as saying the Esquipulas plan was "fatally flawed" because the requirement for simultaneous implementation of commitments was impractical and there were no enforcement teeth. These were only secondary concerns, however, compared to the fundamental objection to the plan, namely its "equation of four democratically elected governments in Central America with a Marxist government." In other words, the basic premise of Esquipulas — of the five coming together and thereby legitimizing each other — seems not to have been grasped by, or may be opposed by, the U.S. Administration.

There is evidence, however, that Washington is re-examining its options. It should be noted that one of the essential preconditions for the Sapoa talks was the narrow vote by the U.S. Congress

against further lethal aid to the Contras. That vote was directly in line with the spirit of Esquipulas and the letter of Section 5 of the Agreement, calling upon "extraregional Governments" to end military assistance to irregular forces or rebels. It represented a bet by Congress on the chance for peace in Nicaragua. During our visit to Washington, we had the opportunity to discuss these matters with both Democrats and Republicans in the House of Representatives. We were particularly encouraged by Speaker Wright's assessment that both sides in the Sapoa talks exhibit a "seriousness of purpose and desire for peace." It was his view that nothing short of the "greatest provocation" by the Sandinistas would cause Congress to resume lethal aid to the Contras, though he did worry that some elements in the Administration would try to trump up a charge that the Sandinistas had broken the truce or otherwise failed to cooperate in the peace process. He and his colleagues reflected on long term changes that were needed in U.S. policy and the Speaker remarked: "We must get it through our heads that we don't have any God-given right to decide who should win their elections."

During the course of the Committee's meeting with Chris Arcos, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, we also formed an impression of evolving U.S. policy. Mr. Arcos stressed that the Contras must get some satisfaction on democratization but acknowledged that "a lot of progress has been made." He described the United States as not opposed to Esquipulas but as having legitimate concerns about its effectiveness. In discussing U.S. concerns about Soviet military assistance to Nicaragua and possible Soviet military presence in the region, Mr. Arcos acknowledged these issues were on the agenda for the Reagan-Gorbachev summit but that the United States would "find it hard" to accept the Soviet proposal of balanced and phased reductions in military assistance by both superpowers. Nonetheless, the United States "wants a rational level of the arms race in Central America", by which we understood him to mean something less than at present.

As for the Soviet Union, a number of expert witnesses who came before the Committee agreed that it too was reconsidering its policies in Central America, as part of a much broader reshaping of relations with the Third World. They explained that a combination of factors, including a strong economic interest in improved east-west relations and disillusionment with their ability to control events in the Third World, has led the Soviets to approach regional conflict with greater flexibility and pragmatism. In the case of Central America, the earlier Soviet policy of "cautiously" attempting to irritate and distract the United States in its own sphere of influence, appears to have given way to fears of economically burdensome Nicaraguan dependency and a corresponding desire to see conflicts resolved. A senior official of the Soviet Embassy in Canada told the Committee that his country had no intention of establishing military bases in the region and that, as part of greater Soviet interest in and support for multilateral cooperation, the Soviet Union very much wanted Esquipulas II to succeed. Reflecting on these new policies, Professor Neil MacFarlane, author of *Superpower Rivalry and Soviet Policy in the Caribbean Basin*, concluded his statement to the Committee with the following words:

Soviet policy in the Third World is entering a period of pragmatic and reasonably non-confrontational realism. In the region, this is reflected in a willingness to search for a diplomatic settlement, allowing the U.S.S.R. to reduce its commitment to Nicaragua gracefully. At least in this respect, then, prospects for peace in the region have improved. Whether those in the region and other interested parties can capitalize on this particular changing circumstance depends, it seems to me, on the extent to which the subsequent American administration also proves capable of realism in dealing with what are, in current circumstances, largely myths about Soviet-sponsored revolutionary instability.¹⁶

PART III: SUSTAINING PEACE

One point unites us and that is our economic problems. It was our economic problems that allowed us to speak to each other.

Daniel Ortega
President of Nicaragua

It will be evident from our account of Esquipulas II and its implementation that peace will not spring to life fully formed. The negotiations will be long and hard. At the same time, we have noted elements of progress and a commitment to peace by the Central American five that compel all of us to confront a major challenge: what can we do to help sustain the peace process?

Time and again Central Americans told us that international support was vital in reinforcing their own will to peace. The interest and assistance of a wide spectrum of the international community would strengthen their independence through diversification of economic, diplomatic and cultural ties. People and governments from around the world could witness and verify compliance with the commitments made in Esquipulas II. And, perhaps most important of all, Central America needs practical and effective international economic assistance to help tackle the problems of mass poverty and economic vulnerability. In short, the role of the international community is to support the efforts of Central Americans themselves to construct their triad of hope — peace, democracy and development.

Peace

Esquipulas II provides a framework within which to address the multiple conflicts in Central America and the mechanisms, however incomplete, for advancing the peace process. It is not for the international community to propose alternative agendas or to push the five into creating additional mechanisms. Nonetheless, the Committee's trip to Central America revealed specific ways in which outside players could be helpful.

Dim as the prospects may seem, every effort should be made to encourage dialogue between the Government and armed opposition in El Salvador. We believe that a negotiated ceasefire is essential in El Salvador and, for this to happen, both sides will have to step back from current positions. The FMLN continues to make proposals for a ceasefire that go well beyond the provisions of Esquipulas II, as indeed the Sapoa negotiations have done. It is proposed that guerrilla forces be maintained in the field and integrated with the regular armed forces; and that a government of national unity, embracing both the present government and opposition political forces, be formed to prepare the way for free and fair elections. The Government of El Salvador has rejected these proposals as completely unacceptable. According to President Arias, the Salvadoran government and the United States "still think they can win the war and they are wrong." It is our hope that the possibility of ceasefire will be actively pursued in El Salvador and in Washington.

The Sapoa negotiations are the other item of immediate concern for the international community. To encourage them we strongly urge that the United States Congress maintain the cutoff of military assistance to the Contras. We share President Arias' assessment that, so far as democratic development in Nicaragua is concerned, the Contras "have been the excuse not to comply, not the pressure to comply." The corollary of that proposition, also emphasized by President Arias, is that the international community must "put a lot of pressure" on the Nicaraguan government to abide by its commitments to democratization, commitments made following the revolution and repeated in Esquipulas II and in the Sapoa talks. Failure on either side to bargain in good faith would be a betrayal of Esquipulas and plant the seeds of immediate trouble.

In addition to these internal conflicts, there are dangerous cross-border and intra-regional tensions in Central America, particularly in the relations between Nicaragua and Honduras. In March of this year, there were charges and counter-charges of Nicaraguan and Honduran forces crossing into each other's territories, followed by the dispatch of U.S. combat troops to Honduras. This incident illustrates just how vital it is to have credible international monitoring of borders as part of the peace process.

Apart from encouraging the peace process, the international community has a long-term role to play in the verification of Esquipulas II. We have earlier described the current stalemate on verification and will later discuss its modalities and Canada's role. With the exception of President Duarte, all government officials we met in Central America, civilian and military, recognized the crucial importance of verification as a confidence-building instrument. Moreover, there was general agreement that verification, to be effective and credible, must have a strong, expert international component. Canada, along with West Germany and Spain, has been provisionally chosen by the five countries to assist in the design of verification systems.

Democratization

The role of the international community in helping to verify Esquipulas II has two quite distinct aspects, military and political. While it was generally acknowledged by Central Americans that the latter would prove even more difficult to verify than the former, they also insisted it was equally important. Father Xabier Gorostiaga of Nicaragua remarked that the best way to measure the Sandinista commitment to peace and democracy is to check them. "If they fail they will lose your support. Nicaragua needs international verification."

In essence, the political formula of Esquipulas II is peace through democratization. It therefore becomes important for the international community to understand what is meant by the term and how, fairly and credibly, its achievement may be verified. The Agreement is absolutely clear that democratization entails the promotion of an authentic, pluralist and democratic process, but it also specifies, that the process "entails" the promotion of social justice, respect for human rights and national sovereignty, "without outside interference of any kind." In short, according to Esquipulas II, institutional democracy is a vital and necessary but not a sufficient condition of democratization, which also requires other guarantees. It also makes quite clear that a country's choice of economic, social or political system is no justification for foreign intervention.

Esquipulas II is also quite deliberate in its use of the term democratization, meaning striving towards democracy. With the exception of Costa Rica, none of the states in the region have well-developed or stable democratic systems. The question is whether they are making progress towards democracy and, of equal importance, securing the protection of human rights. In Guatemala and El

Salvador human rights violations, though beginning to rise once more, are still below the levels of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Is this progress or simply the result of so many having been killed before? In our judgement it is progress when the gains have some protection against arbitrary reversal. In El Salvador Father Ellacuria judged there were such signs of progress: "By this time under normal conditions and with the stalemate in the National Assembly, El Salvador would have suffered a coup." In Guatemala, it was estimated that the Government of President Vinicio Cerezo had 20 percent of the power compared with 80 percent in the hands of the military. Still, that 20 percent did not exist five years ago.

In making these judgements it is essential that the same standard be applied to all countries in the region. We reject the tendency of some to apply relative standards of democratization to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras while applying absolute standards of democracy to Nicaragua. It is a matter of concern to us that the opposition in that country is seriously constrained by the overwhelming power of the Sandinistas. This seems very similar, however, to the constraints imposed by the military on opposition forces and civilian governments in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. And when one judges democratization by such human rights indicators as death squads, illegal killings by security forces and disappearances, the Nicaraguan record in the 1980s has been better than that of some of its Central American neighbours. If the concept of democratization is to be more than a rhetorical weapon, progress towards democratization in all the countries of Central America must be evaluated fairly and comprehensively within the framework of Esquipulas II.

We are equally concerned that democratization be the ally of peace and not promoted in such a way as to destroy the prospects for peace. The international community should encourage and offer to assist the five in complying with the democratization provisions of Esquipulas II, such as by helping to develop human rights and democratic institutions. Support for the Central American Parliament is one of the most promising ways of doing so.

The dream of one parliament for the region is an old one, going back to 1823 when the United Provinces of Central America won their independence from Spain. There followed years of war and foreign interventions that destroyed the fragile union and reduced the region to a collection of small, highly vulnerable, countries. Central America has been described by one historian as "a nation divided."¹⁷ The Central American Parliament is not intended to replace the national legislatures but to serve as a forum for representatives from all five countries. It is not seen as being a powerful decision-making body, and we heard many Central Americans say it was a matter of secondary importance. In our judgement, its significance would lie in the Parliament becoming the first institutional embodiment of Esquipulas II. In addition to the occasional meetings of Presidents and Foreign Ministers that today constitute the Esquipulas II process, the Parliament will afford a regular opportunity for legislators from all five countries to talk to each other. As well, elections to the Parliament could serve as an example of the high standards that should apply to all elections throughout the region. A compelling vision of the Parliament was presented to us by the Vice-President of Guatemala, Roberto Carpio Nicolle, who saw it as having an important role to play in democratization. "The Parliament will serve as a guide to how much freedom people will enjoy in their individual countries."

Development

The root causes of conflict in the region are mass poverty and recurrent cycles of economic collapse. In 1988 the per capita income in the region had plummeted to levels below those in the

1960s. The prices of the region's major export commodities — coffee, cotton, bananas, sugar and beef — have declined over the past seven years by 41%, 31%, 7%, 83% and 12% respectively.¹⁸ The devastating impact of Central America's international economic vulnerability compounds the fundamental weakness of their economies, namely extreme inequalities that condemn the majority of Central Americans to lives of the utmost precariousness and misery.

To take only one measure of inequality, but one that is deeply significant for primarily agrarian societies, the distribution of land ownership is highly skewed. Inequality explains why even high rates of economic growth, which Central America experienced in the 1960s and into the early 1970s, do so little to alleviate the poverty of most Central Americans. In the words of a study by the Economic Commission for Latin America "the fruits of the long period of economic expansion were distributed in a flagrantly inequitable manner."¹⁹ In fact, there is considerable evidence that the process of modernization has sometimes worsened the lot of the poorest people, forcing them downwards from poverty into destitution. For this reason Esquipulas II proclaimed that "the strengthening of democracy entails creating a system of economic and social well-being and justice." This may well prove to be the most difficult part of the Agreement to implement.

As economic conditions have given rise to violence, so violence has reinforced worsening economic conditions. It has distorted national budgets, created enormous dependency on outside economic assistance, sapped the economic life of Central America and made it impossible for hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of Central Americans to pursue their livelihoods. For that reason, peace and development are seen as complementary in the Esquipulas framework; for that reason too, international economic assistance can be of vital importance to the peace process.

President Ortega remarked that "Esquipulas II depends for its survival on political will, and the only way in which that can be strengthened is with heavy international assistance tied to the peace process." President Arias made a somewhat different point when he said "perhaps the main thing is for the western democracies to offer an economic carrot. 'We will help you economically if you comply with the Accord.'" As we interpret the two statements, President Ortega sees international assistance as a vital stimulus to the peace process and President Arias sees the peace process as a requirement for international economic assistance. But what is striking to us about the statements is that, by different routes, they come to the same conclusion — peace and economic development throughout Central America are inextricably linked. In turn, this means that programs of international economic assistance and the peace process should move forward in tandem and reinforce one another at every step along the way.

It is our judgement that in launching Esquipulas II, the five Central American countries have taken a first giant step toward peace. The international community must now encourage further progress by providing significant amounts of additional economic assistance to the region as a whole, on an urgent basis. Central Americans must be given every reason to believe that by laying down arms they will have greater opportunity to take up productive lives. We stress the urgency of international assistance because the next one to two years will be critical for sustaining the momentum of peace.

We have been encouraged by the appearance of several international study groups on a special aid program for Central America, but it is imperative that study now be converted into practical help. On May 12, the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted a resolution identifying international economic assistance to Central America as a priority and stressing the urgent need to provide financial resources on concessional and favourable terms, "in addition to

those they are already receiving from the international community.”²⁰ The Committee was informed, however, that the resolution does nothing by itself to guarantee additional assistance. As far as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is concerned, any increase must come out of a worldwide allocation of some \$ 700 U.S. million in new resources this year. These matters were to be discussed at a June meeting of the Governing Council of the UNDP which will be an early moment of truth for the international community’s support of Esquipulas II.

Central Americans stress the importance of diversifying their international economic relations and diminishing dependence on two countries, the Soviet Union in the case of Nicaragua and the United States in the case of Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador. The Committee was told that diminished dependency would also be welcomed by the superpowers. Nonetheless, the United States’ participation in a special plan will be important to its success and, in any case, U.S. policies will continue to have an enormous impact on the economic fortunes of the region. In this connection we believe there are two steps that the United States could take in the spirit of Esquipulas II, and to encourage the Sapoa negotiations in particular; end its economic embargo against Nicaragua and, similarly, abandon its policy of opposing loans to Nicaragua by the international financial institutions. These would be welcome signs that the United States is fully committed to sustaining the peace process. In the same spirit of international cooperation that should be part of Esquipulas II, we would welcome and encourage Soviet participation in a multilateral effort to support region-wide economic recovery and development in Central America.

Canada

During a recent meeting in Washington, the Committee was confronted by the accusation that Canada is more observer than participant in Central America or, to use the critic’s words, “the past was have been Exhibitors and exhibitor.” We reject the charge then and we do now.

It is true that prior to 1980, Canada saw Central America as marginal to its foreign policy interests but that view has changed significantly in the decade of the two year period 1980-1987. Canadian development assistance to the region, both governmental and non-governmental, more than tripled to a total of \$1.5 billion, by the participation of some 1,000 Canadian voluntary organizations with working in the two countries. CANAD has also been a significant contributor to the care of refugees, particularly as a result of a crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Between 1978 and 1981, Canada accepted 1,000 refugees from El Salvador. Under special programs for refugees and economic development of refugees, a further 2,000 Salvadoran were granted refugee status in Canada. In 1982, 20,000 Central American refugees were granted refugee status during the past five years. There have also been special efforts to aid in the resettlement of political prisoners who found danger upon release, and support of NGO, development and humanitarian efforts in the Central American refugee camps.

All of these activities require a high level of technical skills and are being carried out by the staff of Canadian Embassies, consulates, professional organizations and branches of the Government regularly across the region and in the subject countries. These are also areas of Canadian relations with the Third World in which Canada has a long and successful and substantial record.

Increasing Canadian government has also been notably increased with efforts to sustain underlying principles of Central American policy, namely that political and economic development are inseparable and national autonomy, social justice and democracy are essential to regional development.

PART IV: CANADA'S ROLE — SUPPORTING THE FIVE

Canada should try to be as objective as possible in Central America and see to it that agreements are to the benefit of everyone ... if they are not, problems will be left unsolved for the future.

*Roberto Carpio Nicolle
Vice-President of Guatemala*

It is so important to find little things that can keep things rolling, we should be looking in every nook and cranny for areas in which we can contribute.

*The Right Honourable
Joe Clark
Secretary of State for
External Affairs,
Canada*

During a recent meeting in Washington, the Committee was confronted by the accusation that Canada is more observer than participant in Central America or, to use the critic's words, "in the past you have been kibbitzers and gadflies." We rejected the charge then and we do now.

It is true that prior to 1980, Canada saw Central America as marginal to its foreign policy interests but that view has changed significantly in this decade. In the five year period 1982-1987, Canadian development assistance to the region, both governmental and non-governmental, more than tripled to a level of \$167.5 million. By last year, some sixty-two Canadian voluntary organizations were working in the five countries. Canada has also made significant contributions in the area of refugee resettlement as a result of conflicts in the Central American region. Between 1982 and 1987, Canada admitted 15,877 refugees under its annual refugee plan. The majority of these refugees (11,251) originated in El Salvador. Under special programs for relatives and immediate dependants of refugees, a further 4,444 civilians were granted refugee status in Canada. In total 20,935 Central Americans were granted refugee status during the past five years. There have also been special efforts to aid in the resettlement of political prisoners who faced danger when released, and support for NGO, development and humanitarian efforts in the Central American refugee camps themselves.

All of this activity directly reflects a high level of sustained public interest in Central America on the part of Canadians. Parliamentarians, parliamentary committees and Ministers of the Government regularly receive more mail on this subject than on virtually any other aspect of Canadian relations with the Third World. In short, Central America is now solidly and substantially on Canada's foreign policy agenda.

Successive Canadian governments have also been notably consistent with respect to certain underlying principles of Central American policy, namely that conflict in the region is rooted in local economic and political problems not in geopolitics and, therefore, that peace requires development

and democracy above all; that negotiations, not further violence, are the only acceptable way to address these conflicts; and that a regional peace process of by and for the five countries of Central America should be welcomed and supported by the international community. Canada's commitment to the peace process has been more than rhetorical. Canadian governments gave strong diplomatic and expert support, including military and security advice, to the Contadora Accord. Successive Secretaries of State for External Affairs have made visits to the region. From the beginning of Esquipulas II, our country has been consistently and strongly supportive of the five, a fact they have recognized in provisionally naming Canada as one of three countries to assist in designing verification systems. On March 24, the House of Commons adopted a unanimous resolution commending the Sapoa negotiations.

During our visit to the region, Central Americans expressed their appreciation for Canada's support of development and the peace process. Repeatedly, we heard phrases like "we trust Canada" and "you try to be fair and objective" and "you have been a friend". At the same time, we acknowledge the plain fact that Canada *does* remain a minor player in Central America when compared with the superpowers. The United States' assistance to Honduras alone, to take only one example, is several times larger than Canadian assistance to all five countries of the region. Perhaps it is just because Canada is not a huge and overwhelming partner that it appeals to Central Americans. We can be helpful without being threatening.

An essential objective of Esquipulas II is to expand the political space open to the small, vulnerable countries of Central America by their talking to each other and cooperating among themselves. It is equally important to expand the international space open to them by diversifying their economic, political and security relations and diminishing their dependency on any one country. In this way, Central Americans may be helped to escape the traps set for them by powerful geopolitical forces. Canada has an important role to play in helping to mobilize the international community — in particular, multilateral institutions and a wide range of middle powers — behind peace, democracy and development in Central America. It should be a central aim of Canadian policy to help forge the "outer ring" of Esquipulas in support of the inner five.

With Esquipulas II we are entering a new phase in our relations with Central America, a period of greater risks, commitments and possible benefits. Verification of the military commitments might lead one day to Canadian lives being at risk; verification of the political commitments will certainly entail the risk of giving offence. From time to time, greater Canadian involvement may also generate friction in our relations with the United States. The need for an "Economic Esquipulas" has a bottom line for Canada too — more fiscally painful official development assistance. And there is another point about commitments: we cannot adequately do any of the above without more Canadians on the ground.

So there are greater risks and commitments, but where are the greater benefits? They are, to be sure, more prospective than the costs but we think they are no less real. They are the benefits which come from helping to turn situations of human misery into situations of hope, and those are the most practical benefits of all. Central America is today not only a drain on the lives of many of its people, it is also a drain on the world. It draws trouble of many kinds. With Esquipulas II, Central Americans declared their determination to fight the trouble and to run the risks of doing so. Canada should join them in the struggle for peace and bear a portion of the risks.

Before turning to specific areas of Canadian support, we should make clear that it was not our mandate to conduct, nor have we conducted, a comprehensive review of Canada's policies and

programs in Central America. Our attention has been focused on ways in which Canada can be helpful to Esquipulas II. In the first instance that involves Canada's role in helping to design and possibly participating in verification systems for ceasefire management. Beyond that we discuss ways in which Canada can strengthen the peace process through human rights and democratic development programs, by economic assistance and by the strengthening of our diplomatic representation in the region. All of this is intended to be practically helpful to the peace process.

Verification

As the Contadora process makes clear, Canada has often been consulted about potential arrangements for verification and control of the security situation in Central America. We have been approached because of longstanding interest and international experience in peacekeeping. As a result of this experience, Canada has developed a body of knowledge about what constitutes effective peacekeeping operations.

On April 7, 1988, the Foreign Ministers of the Central American five requested the assistance of an auxiliary technical group, composed of specialized personnel from Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain, in designing verification, control and follow-up machinery with regard to security commitments under Esquipulas II. This request remains informal since the Foreign Ministers decided that it would require subsequent confirmation, which has yet to be given. Canada, Germany and Spain have all indicated their willingness to assist, but obviously cannot proceed until the request is formally received. Our Committee supports the Government in its willingness to participate in the auxiliary technical group if and when such request is confirmed by the Esquipulas II Executive Commission. In the interim it is imperative that Canada prepare as carefully as possible an effective policy framework within which it could participate.

In general, there are three alternative verification regimes once a ceasefire is in place. A *Peace-restoring force* is one involving fairly large-scale military operations which could include, if necessary, the use of force, such as that employed by the United Nations in Korea. Canada, however, is unlikely ever to be involved in a peace-restoring force again and there was no suggestion during our investigation of any such operation in Central America. A *Peacekeeping force*, normally interposed between two factions, is partly comprised of combat elements, but is usually lightly armed and under orders to use its weapons only in self-defence under precise and stipulated conditions. Finally, an *observer force* is unarmed and generally refers to teams or individuals employed on observation, inspections and verification patrols or other supervisory duties.

The essence of both the peacekeeping and observer roles is to act as a neutral third party, but in other respects there are fundamental differences between these two roles. The peacekeeping role entails a greater degree of intervention and obviously a greater risk if, for example, it involves the disarming of combatants. We have the impression that there remains considerable uncertainty as to which type of mission may be requested by Central Americans. During a meeting with Honduran Foreign Ministry officials, the Committee discovered that Hondurans expect any such mission to include the power of disarming combatants and controlling cross-border movements. These roles go well beyond the normal function of an observer force, and illustrate the importance of Canada determining the requirements as precisely as possible.

Military verification of any kind will not be easy in Central America. The region comprises extremely rough terrain with extensive mountains and jungle. In areas where roads exist, they are

often poor and easily washed away during the rainy season. The border between Honduras and Nicaragua, which is likely to be a sensitive area, is very mountainous with virtually no population. According to General Regalado, the Commander-in-Chief of the Honduran Armed Forces, there are no specific crossing points along the border, just jungle, and although Nicaragua is starting to build roads, access for the Hondurans is limited to horseback.

The Sapoa negotiations illustrate just how complex and difficult it is to define the peacekeeper's role at the outset. That agreement calls for the creation of seven zones within Nicaragua — two of them bordering Honduras and one Costa Rica — in which, in due course, all of the Contras would gather. In dispute is whether the number of Contras in each zone should be subject to verification, something the Contra leaders have thus far resisted. Verification would also encompass supervision and observation of the movement of host country and insurgent troops back to defined lines or ceasefire zones, the supply of humanitarian aid to insurgent forces, the exchange or passage of prisoners of war, the presence of outside military advisors, and the monitoring and even control of international borders.

In the view of National Defence officials who briefed the Committee, any successful verification activity must operate under a clearly defined mandate issued by a responsible body. This body should preferably be international — for example, the United Nations, the Organization of American States or a similarly recognized authority. As Nicaragua's Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto observed, parties to the conflict cannot also be their own judges. A credible international authority would receive reports and have adequate powers to supervise the mandate of the mission which should provide for freedom of movement and activities. The force itself should be self-sufficient, capable of supporting itself operationally, administratively and logistically for the duration of its mission. It would require permanent mobile units and its own secure communications. Given the difficulty of the terrain, mobility will necessitate a range of transportation from helicopters, to four-wheel drive vehicles, to watercraft in some areas, to horseback and even foot.

There are a host of additional questions that would also need to be delineated, but the Committee wishes to lay out its own views of Canadian policy should certain events occur. If and when, following the design work of a formalized auxiliary technical group, a verification force of some kind is created and Canada is requested by the five to participate in the force, then Canada should favourably consider such a request. We should also favourably consider participating in an arrangement that pertained to only some or even one of the five countries, provided that none of the five formally opposed our participation.

Canada should strongly urge the involvement of a larger rather than a smaller number of states in any possible international verification force. The participation of three states in any such venture would be a bare minimum; several more would be preferable. A larger number would increase the capabilities of an international force by ensuring a greater pool of resources, whether personnel, equipment or financial. It would increase the political legitimacy of the force and diminish the risks involved and the associated political costs should the situation prove untenable and withdrawal become necessary. In any case, Canada should encourage broad multilateral initiatives in Central America. It may be that in security matters especially, the region has suffered the consequences of excessive reliance on a few outside countries. Beyond immediate verification, the introduction of military forces from other members of the international community could assist in opening up Central America's security relations by bringing entirely different perspectives to the region's security concerns.

The risks of involvement in Central America are considerable, but the risks of non-involvement, of turning a blind eye to a genuine appeal from the five, would be a failure of responsibility and of self-interest on Canada's part. While Canada is not "preaching for a call", as the Secretary of State for External Affairs made clear in his appearance before the Committee, neither should we shirk a reasonable request. Although the east-west dimension to this crisis has been overdrawn with unfortunate consequences, it cannot be ignored. Given the region's strategic importance, geopolitical arguments are inevitable; what Canada wishes to avoid is geopolitical confrontation in which the concerns of the region become secondary. Esquipulas II, by reviving a regional consciousness, is an effort to disengage Central America from the stratagems of the superpowers. They are seeking alternatives. As the Vice-President of Guatemala told us, "Canada can help us in convincing the United States that it must take the five countries more seriously." The dependency of the past must be replaced by a mutual recognition of interdependency — both in the context of Central America and in terms of the changing circumstances of world politics. As a middle power entirely aware of our own dependence on external forces and links, Canada should support Central America's new vision.

Human Rights and Democratic Development

The verification of Esquipulas II has a political as well as a military aspect, the political having to do with dialogue, democratization and human rights. The National Reconciliation Commissions were established by the Agreement as the primary instrument for this broad verification, although we have found that with one or two exceptions they have not been terribly active or effective. It is our hope that the Commissions can play a more prominent role in the peace process. Canada should contribute to their greater effectiveness and convey to the governments of the region our willingness to provide assistance if and when asked to do so.

The National Reconciliation Commissions are intended to both assess and, more importantly, promote compliance with the political commitments of Esquipulas II. Similarly Canada should also do more than just sit in judgement on the human rights and democratic development records of the five. We should, positively and constructively, help to develop those conditions and institutions which in the long run are the only guarantee of human rights. As we were reminded by representatives of the Canadian Council of Churches, the primary causes of human rights violations are the multiple conflicts and economic crises in the region, both of which can and should be addressed within the framework of Esquipulas II. In addition, there is a basic need for assistance in strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law.

The Canadian Government's plan to establish an International Institute for Human Rights and Democratic Development makes this a very opportune time for such initiatives. The proposal for the Institute originated with a unanimous recommendation of the all-party Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations. In its June 1986 final report, *Independence and Internationalism*, the Committee argued:

Through co-operative programs of financial support, exchange, research and technical assistance, Canada should contribute to the long-term development of political, civil and cultural rights as it now contributes to long-term economic and social development through the aid program. By helping to build representative political and other institutions and strengthen processes that serve, directly or indirectly to protect human rights, Canada can add an element of protection to the carrots and sticks of traditional human rights policy.

With these objectives in mind, the Government has now drafted legislation to create the Institute but, at the time of writing, it has yet to be introduced in Parliament. In light of the vital importance of democratization and human rights in the Esquipulas peace process, we recommend that the legislation be introduced expeditiously and we would strongly support its passage in this session of Parliament. Furthermore, when established, we would urge the Institute's Board of Directors to establish an *Esquipulas Program*, designed within the framework of Esquipulas II to provide practical assistance for human rights and democratic development in all five countries. Particular attention should be paid to the development of women's rights.

A key aspect of the Esquipulas II Agreement is that free, fair and honest elections should be held in all five countries of the region. Central Americans told us repeatedly that Canada could help by sending electoral observers and reporting objectively on the process. Canada has done just that for several Salvadoran elections but the Government declined to send official observers to the 1984 Nicaraguan elections. We think it is important to develop a regionally consistent policy on election observing and to expand the Canadian capacity to make well-informed judgements. Short visits to inspect and observe voting may not provide sufficient understanding of the circumstances surrounding election day. Over the years guidelines have been developed for international election observing.²¹ Canada should be in the forefront of efforts to develop these standards further and to promote international cooperation in their application. Where possible the Canadian government should seek to participate in international observer teams that enhance the credibility of these missions.

Canada's approach to election observing in Central America should be closely identified with and supportive of the democratization provisions of Esquipulas II. We should seek every opportunity to help develop the region's own mechanisms and standards for the conduct of free and fair elections. For reasons we have stated earlier, we recommend that as a matter of priority Canada should support the establishment of the Central American Parliament. The ratification process is being led by the Vice-Presidents of the five countries whose efforts we commend and encourage. When the Central American Parliament is established, the Canadian Parliament should create a Canada-Central America Parliamentary Association to build ties with legislators throughout the region. In addition, the Committee recommends that the Canadian Parliament establish a President Arias Fund, in honour of the architect of Esquipulas II, to provide technical and other assistance to the Central American Parliament and to the five national legislatures. This fund should be managed in close cooperation with the proposed Esquipulas Program of the International Institute for Human Rights and Democratic Development.

Apart from this regional approach, which should be the centrepiece of Canada's support for democratization, we think there are many opportunities for Canada to support constructive work in the five countries. In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, representatives of human rights organizations told us of serious failings in their judicial systems. These may spring, in part, from fundamental problems which Canada has neither the means nor the right to address, but we suspect they also spring from an accumulation of weaknesses, such as lack of trained personnel, about which we might do something. Such help should be in response to and in cooperation with the Governments of the Five. In addition, Canada should respond to requests for badly needed assistance in strengthening public administration in Central America.

There is no more immediate and lasting danger to democratization and human rights in Central America than from the excessive power of military, para-military and police forces in some countries of the region. A number of people we met during the course of our trip urged Canada to provide

assistance in this area. Edmondo Mulet, a Member of the Guatemalan Congress, remarked that both public administration and police forces in his country would benefit from outside assistance in training. He pointed out that Spain, Venezuela, Mexico and Germany were already providing such help but went on to say that "Canadian assistance as well would be very valuable." We agree, although at the same time we are highly conscious of the risks and sensitivity associated with such assistance. Accordingly, we recommend that the Department of External Affairs, in consultation with the Department of National Defence and the R.C.M.P., study the feasibility of providing such assistance and make recommendations for appropriate Canadian activities. The study should be carried out following close consultation with the civilian authorities in the Esquipulas countries.

This brings us to a final matter of utmost importance for Canadian policy, namely how to strike the right balance between Canada's international human rights policies and our support for Esquipulas II. Canadian policy, as reflected in the recent aid strategy *Sharing our Future*, is that where continuous gross and persistent violations of human rights occur, bilateral or government-to-government development assistance should be reduced or terminated. Many Canadian NGOs and church groups opposed the resumption of bilateral assistance to El Salvador in 1984 and Guatemala in 1987. While acknowledging that human rights violations in both countries are substantially lower than in the early 1980s, an Executive Member of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation testified that the citizens of these countries are still often terrorized, imprisoned and not infrequently, killed when they attempt to exercise their democratic rights to organize and press for reforms. On the other hand, the Canadian Government decided to resume bilateral assistance to both countries because it wished to encourage the democratization that has been accompanied by lower levels of human rights violations and, in the case of Guatemala, because it wished to send a strong signal of support for President Cerezo who has been one of the main forces behind Esquipulas II. These differences in view between the Canadian non-governmental community and the Government remain largely unresolved.

In the Committee's view, there is no easy way of eliminating this policy dilemma. The best that can be done is to manage the tensions between Canadian human rights policy and the vital objective of supporting the Esquipulas peace process. If patterns of continuous, gross and persistent violations of human rights reappear in countries of the region, Canada should reduce or terminate government-to-government assistance. In present circumstances, while remaining vigilant in monitoring human rights, the focus of Canadian policy should be to encourage and assist the five countries in their own process of implementing the democratization and human rights commitments of Esquipulas II.

Economic and Humanitarian Assistance

When Committee members asked President Arias how Canada could help the peace process, he responded "there are many ways you can help, including helping us to build 80,000 houses for our people." He went on to suggest that the western democracies should offer an "economic carrot" to the region as a whole. The point was acknowledged by Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, when he remarked to the Committee:

If there is going to be a serious commitment to the beginning of the process to bring peace, there has to be a serious commitment to the next phase, which is to encourage economic development in the region.

Canada has substantially increased its economic assistance to Central America in the 1980s and, with the recent decision to re-establish a bilateral program in Guatemala, now has (or is about

to have) government-to-government assistance programs in all five of the Esquipulas countries. In the five year period 1982-87, Canada disbursed more than \$105 million in bilateral aid, including bilateral food aid and Mission Administered Funds.²² A variety of other channels, such as matching funds for NGOs, the Business Cooperation Program and the International Development Research Centre, brought total Canadian aid for the period up to \$167.5 million. That assistance was disbursed to the five countries of the region as follows: Costa Rica, \$44.3 million; El Salvador, \$10.6 million (with the addition of an \$8 million line of credit that began disbursement in 1986); Guatemala received no bilateral assistance in the period but a total of \$13 million through other channels; Honduras \$43.7 million; and Nicaragua \$40.9 million.²³ In addition to country-specific programs, Canada has a Regional Program that provides assistance to such organizations as the Central American Confederation of Universities (CSUCA), the Centre for Research and Development in Tropical Agriculture (CATIE) and the Central American Institute for Nutrition (INCAP). Finally, Canada also supports international organizations, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that do vital work in Central America, as elsewhere in the world.

It is not our purpose to review Canada's aid program in the region, only small parts of which we saw during our visit to Central America. Instead we wish to share our findings and recommendations in light of the peace process. From that perspective, the first priority is for Canada to participate actively in development of the Special Fund for Central America and to make an early and substantial pledge to it. It is impossible to say what amount of money will be raised, but Canada should not wait for other countries to show their hands. We recommend that \$100 million be designated as a special *Esquipulas Fund* for a five year period. This, in addition to existing planned expenditures, would very substantially increase Canadian assistance to Central America over the next five years. Apart from demonstrating its own commitment, Canada should provide political leadership and active diplomacy in the international community to bring the Special Fund to life. We believe that only with such leadership by Canada and other like-minded countries will the declarations of good intentions be converted into a program of effective and timely assistance.

In preparing for the Special Fund, Canada should conduct a thorough review of its resources for contributing to a coordinated international effort. Two objectives should lie at the heart of Canadian programs: strengthening regional institutions and addressing the problem of poverty. On the matter of regionalism, Esquipulas II will begin to realize its potential only if it leads to the building, or in some cases the rebuilding, of a regional economy. Gabriel Siri has observed:

One of the most painful casualties of the economic recession has been the Central American Common Market. Trade between the countries, which in the past constituted the driving force behind the industrial sector, has plummeted to the levels of the early 1960s (less than one-third of the values recorded during the peak period of 1979-1980).²⁴

Siri goes on to write that "today, more than ever, there is a need to reactivate the integration process in order to take advantage of the stimulus that a broader internal market can provide and the possibility of entering jointly into negotiations with the rest of the world." Canada should support reformation of the Common Market, as and when the opportunity arises, and otherwise encourage the integration process in any way possible. We should, for example, join the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) or, short of that, extend it lines of credit and other forms of assistance.

A second basic objective of Canadian support for an Economic Esquipulas should be that of improving the lives and enhancing the productivity of the poorest Central Americans. This

corresponds to the first principle of Canada's new ODA charter as set out in the aid strategy *Sharing our Future*: "The primary purpose of Canadian official development assistance is to help the poorest countries and people in the world."²⁵ In providing support for regional institutions, Canada should identify and give highest priority to those that specialize in health care, education and training for the poor. The vital role of women in these areas of development should be recognized and supported. In addition, Canada should shape its bilateral development assistance programs in light of the commitment that Central American governments themselves make to improving the lot of their poorest people. We heard from Canadian NGOs that the Government of Nicaragua, in particular, is strongly committed to basic health care and literacy programs. Accordingly, we recommend that in developing a poverty-focussed aid program in Central America, Canada recognize and support the strong commitment of Nicaragua to these same objectives.

While the countries of Central America remain primarily rural, during our visit we were told of the exploding urbanization in the region and we saw the extreme poverty in some of its cities. We visited a *barrio* in Managua with a population of 3,000 people which had three taps as the only sources of potable water. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), with the support of CIDA, has established a program of international assistance for the Third World. We commend this effort and urge the Federation to develop a special program of assistance for Central America. Further we would urge that twinning arrangements, involving both exchanges and technical assistance, be established between Canadian municipalities and their counterparts in Central America.

Finally, we would emphasize the importance of Canada seeking and responding to any opportunities to provide assistance to refugees under Esquipulas II. During the course of our visit to Central America we were made aware of the tremendous problems associated with the displacement of people as the result of conflict. We were also informed that in some instances refugees are returning to their countries of origin: these include Guatemalan refugees in Mexico; Salvadoran refugees in Honduras; and the Miskito Indians of Nicaragua, who fled to Honduras and are now returning to their homes in large numbers. During the course of a conversation with President Ortega, he indicated both the desperate need of these people and that Canadian assistance would be welcome. We recommend that the government ensure there are contingency funds available to respond quickly and flexibly to the needs of refugees as they attempt to return to their home countries.

At the same time, the Committee wishes to express its deep concern about reports that some refugees are being pressured into returning to their countries despite grave dangers and unsuitable conditions for resettlement. We have been informed of such pressures being put on Salvadoran refugees in Honduras, particularly in three camps—Colomoncagua, San Antonio and Mesa Grande. We recommend that Canada strongly support the efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other organizations to protect refugees in these and other camps. We call upon all governments to respect the rights of refugees and to comply with the Declaration of Esquipulas II that:

The Central American Governments undertake to attend, as a matter of urgency, to the flows of refugees and displaced persons caused by the crisis in the region, providing them with protection and assistance, particularly in the areas of health, education, work and safety, and to facilitate their repatriation, resettlement or relocation provided that this is voluntary and carried out on an individual basis.

Diplomatic Representation

Canadian diplomatic representation in Central America is too light on the ground. Despite their knowledge and ability, our diplomats are extremely hardpressed to meet all of the varied demands made of them. To undertake the additional responsibilities associated with Canada's support of the peace process is clearly beyond existing capabilities.

The Committee believes that it is necessary to enhance diplomatic representation in the region in order to underline and facilitate Canada's support for the peace process and for the larger process of democratization and development. We are aware that the Department of External Affairs is currently operating under rather stringent spending restraints. What we propose will require some additional expenditure of public funds, but primarily a redeployment of resources within the region. We wish to ensure that the Canadian presence is being used to maximum effectiveness and, at the same time, is sending a clear signal of our support for the region as a whole.

Currently, Canada has an Ambassador in San José, Costa Rica, who is also accredited to Panama to the south, and to Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras to the north: five countries in all. The Ambassador is assisted by a staff of 18 Canadians (or Canada-based staff), all but one of whom reside in San José. In addition, he can draw on support from a variety of locally-engaged staff. The single Canadian outside of Costa Rica is an aid officer based in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. In Guatemala, which falls within the ambit of the Canadian Ambassador in Mexico, we have an office of 7 Canada-based staff headed by a chargé d'affaires. For the purposes of this report, we shall concern ourselves solely with the Canada-based staff in the region.

In the Committee's view, the ideal solution would be to have embassies in each of the five countries. There is simply too much work for a single ambassador and the work will increase given the requirement for political verification that is an essential part of Esquipulas II. We believe that there is an urgent need to have a political officer for each of the Esquipulas countries. As a minimum solution to the problem of Canadian under-representation in the region, the Committee strongly recommends introducing a chargé d'affaires in Nicaragua who would report to our Ambassador in Costa Rica, and restoring Guatemala to full ambassadorial status. We would also recommend that the Government appoint chargés d'affaires in El Salvador and Honduras, both to report to the Ambassador in Guatemala. These recommendations may require a small increase in the total Canada-based staff in Central America and some redeployment of resources from Costa Rica. The value of official Canadian 'eyes and ears' in all of the countries would be indispensable. It would improve our effectiveness at a crucial time and allow for a better distribution of limited resources. Our credibility would be enhanced at relatively small cost to the public purse.

The embassy in San José would remain the largest in the region with special responsibility for all existing and incipient regional institutions. The latter mandate would include the Central American Common Market, the Central American Parliament and the Canadian aid office for the region which is already being planned for San José. By giving special prominence to regional institutions, once again Canada would be clearly demonstrating its support for the regional peace process and for all efforts of regional integration, regarding such initiatives as concomitant with the integrity and self-determination of each of the five countries.

The Committee also sees merit in the newly-created position of ambassador-at-large or "roving ambassador" for Latin America. We see potential for this ambassador to be given special responsibility for the vital role of coordinating Canadian efforts to mobilize multilateral support for

Esquipulas II and the Central American peace process within the various international agencies concerned. Thus, we see this ambassador playing the roles at once of catalyst and interlocutor, conceivably arranging meetings to discuss Canadian policies and strategies involving all the Canadian executives directors of the international financial institutions (the World Bank, IMF and IDB), as well as our representatives to the United Nations and its relevant agencies. In short, the roving Ambassador should use his or her good offices to help link the inner and outer rings of Central America in practical and flexible ways.

Central America. There have of course been differences among the five members of the Esquipulas II or that have been in progress for a period of the past several months has shown in many respects together with the fact that this Report and all of its recommendations were adopted unanimously. The "majority" very strongly that support of the Central American peace process. The Report was adopted by the House of Commons and, indeed, the vast majority of members of the

The themes running throughout our Report are clear, and we believe that the five countries should support the five in their own efforts to bring a lasting peace through negotiation and development. Our country should do everything in its power to encourage dialogue, alliance and between the countries of Central America and, in particular, to let their efforts in the region take solutions to their problems. We believe that Canada has a special leadership role to play in seeking to mobilize international support for the peace process. In this way, we can see the threat and that special status of Esquipulas II.

Finally, we appeal to the Five. You have initiated a process that can have enormous significance for your own countries as well as for the world-wide search for peace. We wish you well and ask that you persevere in face of the great difficulties that lie ahead. We commend your efforts and pledge our support.

PART V: IN CONCLUSION

Among the most satisfying aspects of our work to date has been the discovery of a bedrock of shared conviction about the peace process in Central America. There have, of course, been differences among the five members of the Committee on this or that issue but, in general, the experience of the past several months has served to bring us closer together in our thinking. We wish to stress here that this Report and all of its recommendations were adopted unanimously. This suggests very strongly that support of the Central American peace process can and should unite all parties in the House of Commons and, indeed, the vast majority of concerned Canadians.

The themes running throughout our Report are clear, and, we believe, compelling. Canada should support the five in their own efforts to build a lasting peace through democracy and development. Our country should do everything in its power to encourage dialogue within and between the countries of Central American and, in particular, assist their efforts to find region-wide solutions to their problems. We believe that Canada has a special leadership role to play in striving to mobilize international support for the peace process. In this way, we can be the truest and most useful allies of Esquipulas II.

Finally, we appeal to the Five. You have initiated a process that can have enormous significance for your own countries as well as for the world-wide search for peace. We wish you well and ask that you persevere in face of the great difficulties that lie ahead. We commend your efforts and pledge our support.

Among the most satisfying aspects of our work to date has been the discovery of a better shared conviction about the peace process in Central America. There have of course been differences among the five members of the Committee on this or that issue but in general the experience of the past several months has served to bring us closer together in our thinking. This suggests very strongly that support of the Central American peace process can and should unite all parties in the House of Commons and, indeed, the vast majority of concerned Canadians.

The themes running throughout our Report are clear, and, we believe, compelling. Canada should support the five in their own efforts to build a lasting peace through democracy and development. Our country should do everything in its power to encourage dialogue and solutions to their problems. We believe that Canada has a special leadership role to play in helping to mobilize international support for the peace process. In this way, we can be the friend and useful ally of Espinoza II.

Finally, we appeal to the five. You have initiated a process that can have enormous significance for your own countries as well as for the world-wide search for peace. We wish you well and ask that you persevere in face of the great difficulties that lie ahead. We commend your efforts and pledge our support.

FOOTNOTES

1. To use the words of Professor Hal Klepak of the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America*, Issue 4:16.
2. *The Military Balance*, (1978-9; 1980-1; 1981-2; 1987-8), International Institute of Strategic Studies.
3. *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook*, 1984, (Stockholm, SIPRI), p. 531.
4. Richard Millett, "The Central American Militaries", in *Armies and Policies in Latin America*, Lowenthal, Abraham F. and J. Samuel Fitch, (eds.), New York, 1986.
5. *Handbook on Honduras*, (American Embassy, Tegucigalpa, 1988) page 13.
6. S.N. MacFarlane, *Superpower Rivalry and Soviet Policy in the Caribbean Basin*, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Occasional Paper No. 1, pp. 39-40.
7. It is more difficult to come by reliable international figures on Soviet military assistance. According to US sources, however, Nicaragua received an estimated 850 tons of armaments from the Soviet bloc in 1980. This figure increased to 18,000 tons in 1985. Robert A. Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* (Princeton, 1987), p. 254.

The United States estimated a total of \$2 billion in Soviet military hardware to Nicaragua since the revolution (Linda Robinson, "Peace in Central America?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 66, no. 3, 1987-8, p. 607.)
8. *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 605-6.
9. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 4:16.
10. *Ibid.*, Issue 1:18.
11. *Ibid.*, Issue 1:19.
12. Gabriel Siri, Director Mexico Office, Economic Commission for Latin America, "External Cooperation Plans for the Rehabilitation of Central America", Paper presented at Conference on Peace and Development in Central America, Oxford England, April 9-10, 1988.
13. "Contadora 21-Point Peace Plan" included in Centre for International Peace, *U.S.-Nicaragua Talks: Going Through the Motions*, December 1983.
14. The Contadora Group consists of Panama, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico. The Support Group consists of Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Peru.
15. "Agreement of the 5th Meeting of the Esquipulas II Executive Commission, adopted at Guatemala City on April 7, 1988 as reprinted in United Nations General Assembly Document

A/42/948, S/19764. The Canadian Government has interpreted the original Spanish words here translated as "in setting up" as meaning more accurately "in designing".

16. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 3:19.
17. Ralph W. Woodward, Jr., *Central America: A Nation Divided*, Oxford University Press, 1976.
18. Gabriel Siri, "External Cooperation Plans for the Rehabilitation of Central America".
19. Submission by the Economic Commission on Latin America to the United States National Bipartisan Commission on Central America as cited in its *Report*, January 1984, p. 23.
20. United Nations, General Assembly, "Special Plan for Economic Cooperation for Central America", Document A/Res/42/231, May 20, 1988.
21. See the International Human Rights Law Group, *Guidelines for International Election Observing*, Washington, 1984.
22. Each Canadian Embassy has a Mission Administered Fund with an annual budget ranging up to several hundreds of thousands of dollars. This Fund is spent under the authority of the Ambassador, mainly on small, grass-roots projects.
23. CIDA, *Canadian Development Assistance Briefing Notes* (provided to the Special Committee).
24. Gabriel Siri, "External Cooperation Plans for the Rehabilitation of Central America", p. 2.
25. Canadian International Development Agency, *Sharing our Future*, Ottawa 1987, p. 23.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America recommends that:

General

1. Canada should do everything in its power to support the Central American five in their own search for peace, in ways they deem useful.
2. Canada play an important role in helping to mobilize the international community — in particular, multilateral institutions and a wide range of middle powers — in support of peace, democracy and development in Central America.

Verification

3. Canada, when formally requested by the Esquipulas II Executive Commission, should participate in an auxiliary technical group to design a verification and control mechanism to meet the security requirements of Esquipulas II.
4. If and when, following the design work of a formalized auxiliary technical group, a verification force of some kind is created and Canada is requested by the five to participate in the force, then Canada should favourably consider such a request. Canada should also favourably consider participating in an arrangement that pertained to only some or even one of the five countries, provided that none of the five formally opposed Canada's participation.
5. In response to requests from the Central American countries for Canadian advice on verification, the Government should urge that any mission operate under a clearly defined mandate and a credible international authority such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States. Further, Canada should strongly urge the involvement of a larger rather than a smaller number of states in any international verification force.

Human Rights and Democratic Development

6. Canada should contribute to the greater effectiveness of the National Reconciliation Committees and convey to the governments of the region our willingness to provide assistance if and when asked to do so.
7. Canada should do more than just sit in judgement on the human rights and democratic development records of the five. We should, positively and constructively, help to develop those conditions and institutions which, in the long run, are the only guarantee of human rights.

8. In light of the vital importance of democratization and human rights in the Esquipulas peace process, the Government should expeditiously introduce legislation to create the International Institute for Human Rights and Democratic Development and we strongly support its passage in this session of Parliament. Furthermore, when established, we would urge the Institute's Board of Directors to create an *Esquipulas Program* to provide practical assistance to all five countries. Particular attention should be paid to the development of women's rights.

9. Canada's approach to election observing in Central America should be closely identified with and supportive of the democratization provisions of Esquipulas II. We should seek every opportunity to help develop the region's own mechanisms and standards for the conduct of free and fair elections.

10. Canada, as a matter of priority, should support the establishment of a Central American Parliament and, when the Parliament is established, the Canadian Parliament should create a Canada-Central America Parliamentary Association to build ties with legislators throughout the region.

11. The Canadian Parliament should establish a *President Arias Fund* to provide technical and other assistance to the Central American Parliament and to the five national legislatures of Central America.

12. The Department of External Affairs, in consultation with the Department of National Defence and the R.C.M.P, should study the feasibility of Canada providing assistance in military and police force training to the five Central American countries and make recommendations to the Canadian Government for appropriate activities.

13. Canada should support democratization and human rights in the five countries by providing technical assistance and training for judicial systems and other elements of public administration.

14. In striving to strike the right balance between Canada's international human rights policies and support for the Central American peace process, the focus of Canadian policy should be to encourage and assist the five countries in their own process of implementing the democratization and human rights commitments of Esquipulas II. At the same time, Canada should remain vigilant in monitoring human rights and, if patterns of continuous, gross and persistent violations reappear in countries of the region, Canada should reduce or terminate government-to-government development assistance.

Economic and Humanitarian Assistance

15. In addition to existing planned expenditures, Canada should pledge \$100 million to a special *Esquipulas II Fund*, for a five year period, to assist in the economic development of Central America. Apart from demonstrating its own commitment, Canada should provide political leadership and active diplomacy in the international community in bringing a Special Fund for Central America to life.

16. Two objectives should lie at the heart of Canada's own participation in the Special Fund: strengthening regional institutions and addressing the problem of poverty.

17. In encouraging regional institutions, Canada should support reformation of the Central American Common Market and consider joining the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) or, short of that, extending its lines of credit and other forms of assistance.

18. In providing support for regional institutions, Canada should identify and give highest priority to those that specialize in health care, education and training for the poor. The vital role of women in these areas of development should be recognized and supported. In addition, Canada should shape its bilateral development assistance programs in light of the commitment that Central American governments themselves make to improving the lot of their poorest people. In developing a poverty-focussed aid program in Central America, Canada should recognize and support the strong commitment of Nicaragua to these same objectives.

19. To promote the development of Central American cities and thereby address the problem of growing urban poverty, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, in cooperation with CIDA, should develop a special program of assistance for Central America. Further, we would urge that twinning arrangements be established between Canadian municipalities and their counterparts in Central America.

20. As a result of the tremendous problems associated with displaced people, Canada should ensure that contingency funds are available to respond quickly and flexibly to the needs that arise from people returning to their homes.

21. Canada should strongly support the efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other organizations to protect refugees. We call upon all governments to respect the rights of refugees and, in particular, to comply with Esquipulas II which "declares the urgency of providing refugees and other displaced people with protection and humanitarian assistance and facilitating their voluntary repatriation or resettlement".

Diplomatic Representation

22. It is necessary to enhance diplomatic representation in the region in order to underline and support Canada's support for the peace process and for the larger process of democratization and development. In the Committee's view the ideal solution would be to have embassies in each of the five countries. As a minimum solution to the problem of Canadian under-representation, we recommend that a chargé d'affaires be posted to Nicaragua; the Government restore full ambassadorial status to Guatemala and that the Government consider posting chargés d'affaires in El Salvador and Honduras.

23. The embassy in San José, Costa Rica should remain the largest in the region with special responsibility for all existing and incipient regional institutions. Further, we recommend that the Ambassador-at-large for Latin America be given special responsibility for the vital role of coordinating Canadian efforts to mobilize multilateral support for Esquipulas II and the Central American peace process. We see this Ambassador playing the roles at once of catalyst and interlocutor.

18. In providing support for regional institutions, Canada should focus on the most pressing needs of those that specialize in health care, education and training for the poor. The vital role of women in the process of development should be recognized and supported. In addition, Canada should make its financial development assistance program available to the governments of Central America, which are the most in need of such support. In the area of health care, Canada should support the strong focused aid program in Central America. Canada should support the strong focused aid program in Central America.

19. To promote the development of Central America and thereby reduce the impact of growing urban poverty, the Government of Canada should continue its cooperation with the private sector. A special program of assistance for Central America, further, we would like to see developed. This program should be designed to support the private sector and to provide a strong focus on the most pressing needs of those that specialize in health care, education and training for the poor. The vital role of women in the process of development should be recognized and supported. In addition, Canada should make its financial development assistance program available to the governments of Central America, which are the most in need of such support. In the area of health care, Canada should support the strong focused aid program in Central America.

20. As a result of the tremendous problems associated with displaced people, Canada should ensure that our assistance is available to respond quickly and flexibly to the needs that arise. This program should be designed to support the private sector and to provide a strong focus on the most pressing needs of those that specialize in health care, education and training for the poor. The vital role of women in the process of development should be recognized and supported. In addition, Canada should make its financial development assistance program available to the governments of Central America, which are the most in need of such support. In the area of health care, Canada should support the strong focused aid program in Central America.

21. Canada should support the efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other organizations to provide relief. We will work with all governments to ensure the flow of relief and to provide support for the private sector. This program should be designed to support the private sector and to provide a strong focus on the most pressing needs of those that specialize in health care, education and training for the poor. The vital role of women in the process of development should be recognized and supported. In addition, Canada should make its financial development assistance program available to the governments of Central America, which are the most in need of such support. In the area of health care, Canada should support the strong focused aid program in Central America.

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23. It is necessary to enhance economic opportunities in the region in order to generate and support growth. Canada should support the private sector and to provide a strong focus on the most pressing needs of those that specialize in health care, education and training for the poor. The vital role of women in the process of development should be recognized and supported. In addition, Canada should make its financial development assistance program available to the governments of Central America, which are the most in need of such support. In the area of health care, Canada should support the strong focused aid program in Central America.

24. The emphasis in our aid to Central America should remain the largest in the region with special responsibility for all existing and incoming regional institutions. Further, we should support the Ambassador-at-Large for Latin America to give special responsibility for the vital role of women in the process of development. This program should be designed to support the private sector and to provide a strong focus on the most pressing needs of those that specialize in health care, education and training for the poor. The vital role of women in the process of development should be recognized and supported. In addition, Canada should make its financial development assistance program available to the governments of Central America, which are the most in need of such support. In the area of health care, Canada should support the strong focused aid program in Central America.

25. The Special Fund should continue to support the private sector and to provide a strong focus on the most pressing needs of those that specialize in health care, education and training for the poor. The vital role of women in the process of development should be recognized and supported. In addition, Canada should make its financial development assistance program available to the governments of Central America, which are the most in need of such support. In the area of health care, Canada should support the strong focused aid program in Central America.

26. The Central Bank should continue to support the private sector and to provide a strong focus on the most pressing needs of those that specialize in health care, education and training for the poor. The vital role of women in the process of development should be recognized and supported. In addition, Canada should make its financial development assistance program available to the governments of Central America, which are the most in need of such support. In the area of health care, Canada should support the strong focused aid program in Central America.

OBSERVATIONS

1. The international community should encourage and offer to assist the five Central American countries in complying with the democratization provisions of Esquipulas II, such as by helping to develop human rights and democratic institutions.
2. It is the Committee's judgement that in launching Esquipulas II, the five Central American countries have taken a first giant step toward peace. The international community must now encourage further progress by providing significant amounts of additional economic assistance to the region as a whole, on an urgent basis.
3. It is an important objective to assist the five Central American countries to diversify their international economic and other relations and thereby diminish their dependence on two countries, the United States and the Soviet Union.
4. The United States, in the spirit of Esquipulas II and to encourage the Sapoa negotiations, should end its economic embargo against Nicaragua and similarly abandon its policy of opposing loans to Nicaragua by the international financial institutions. Further, the United States should be encouraged to maintain the cutoff of military assistance to the Contras. United States participation in the Special Fund for Central America will also be important to its success.
5. In the same spirit of international cooperation that should be part of Esquipulas II, we would welcome and encourage Soviet participation in a multilateral effort to support region-wide economic recovery and development in Central America.
6. The Committee expresses its hope that the possibility of a ceasefire in the Salvadoran civil war will be actively pursued in El Salvador and Washington.
7. The Committee strongly urges the parties in conflict in Nicaragua to proceed with the Sapoa negotiations. Failure on either side to bargain in good faith would be a betrayal of Esquipulas and plant the seeds of immediate trouble.

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THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PROCESS: A CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT MULTILATERAL EFFORTS

January 9, 1983

Foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela meet on the island of Contadora, Panama, issue Declaration, and establish the Contadora Group.

April 12-13, 1983

Initial phase of official contacts and visits by Contadora foreign ministers to the countries directly concerned. As a result of consultations held, it was agreed to initiate a new phase of joint meetings of the Contadora foreign ministers with the foreign ministers of the five Central American countries. The first three meetings were held, all in Panama City, on April 20-21, from May 28-30, and from July 28 to 30, 1983 respectively.

July 17, 1983

The Presidents of the Contadora countries met in Cancun, Mexico. The Declaration issued on that occasion proposed guidelines for the negotiating process as well as specific commitments the implementation of which would ensure peace in the region.

September 7-9, 1983

The Contadora and Central American foreign ministers meet again in Panama City. On the basis of the Cancun Declaration, they adopt on September 9, a Document of Objectives listing 21 objectives in all. It contained principles on which an eventual solution of the Central American problems should be based, as well as a definition of the specific areas of negotiation and the terms of reference for the formulation of the essential legal instruments and machinery.

January 8, 1984

At the end of a joint meeting of Contadora and Central American foreign ministers in Panama City, a document was adopted entitled "Principles for Implementation of the Commitments Undertaken in the Document of Objectives."

April 1984

External Affairs Minister MacEachen visits Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras and Colombia to obtain first-hand knowledge of the problems arising from military intervention and the rising tide of refugees. Upon return offered, if asked, Canada's help in design of a Control and Verification Commission (CVC).

June 1984

Contadora Group presents a formal draft of an Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America, outlining the main points needing agreement: namely internal measures to be taken to restore peace,

a proposal for the adherence or ratification by Central American states to different international treaties, the strengthening of economic integration in the region, and reciprocal security measures and methods of verification.

July 1984

Official request made by Contadora for Canadian comments on the verification process. These were submitted August 23 (included basic criteria for establishment of CVC).

September 7, 1984

Second draft document of the Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America is delivered to the foreign ministers of Central America at the 7th joint meeting of Contadora and Central American foreign ministers in Panama City. A deadline of October 15 was fixed for the Central American governments to make their views known on the matter.

September 21, 1984

Nicaragua indicates its willingness to sign the 2nd Contadora Act. But although Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica were initially inclined to accept the Act, the United States prevails on them to reconsider. These three countries proceed to raise objections.

October 20, 1984

Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica introduce a counterproposal to Contadora, the Act of Tegucigalpa, which is immediately rejected by Nicaragua.

December 1984

Canadian government provides in confidence detailed comments on security elements of 2nd draft and proposed Tegucigalpa amendments. Between July 1984 and August 1985 Canada provided additional comments four times at request of Contadora.

September 12-13, 1985

Contadora foreign ministers present another draft of Contadora Act which incorporated many of Canadian suggestions relating to verification and control mechanisms. Nicaragua, citing plan's failure to prohibit U.S. military activity in the region, rejects the plan on November 11.

May 24-25, 1986

Esquipulas I — 1st meeting of 5 Central American Presidents. They fail to reach agreement on the Contadora draft treaty, Nicaragua insisting it will not sign until the United States stops aiding the contras. The creation of a Central American Parliament is proposed.

August 7, 1987

Esquipulas II — The five Central American Presidents sign a regional peace plan proposed by President Arias of Costa Rica.

March 24, 1988

Sandinista and contra rebel representatives agree at Sapoa, Nicaragua on a 60-day ceasefire commencing April 1. Other provisions include a gradual amnesty for Nicaragua's estimated 3,300 political prisoners, return of exiles, and movement of contras to "truce zones" within Nicaraguan borders.

April 7, 1988

A meeting of the Executive Commission of Foreign Ministers indicates its intention to invite Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain to form a "technical auxiliary group" in order to design a mechanism for verification and control under Esquipulas II — this decision to be confirmed at a subsequent meeting.

June 21-22, 1988

Meeting of the Executive Commission of Foreign Ministers in Tegucigalpa fails to resolve differences between Honduras and Nicaragua over a World Court case and consequently is not able to issue the invitation for the formation of the technical auxiliary group.

Late June

There are reports of a proposed summit meeting of the five Central American Presidents in San Salvador, on August 7, 1988, the first anniversary of the Esquipulas II Agreement.

... to establish a mechanism for verification and control under Espinoza II - this design is confirmed at a subsequent meeting.

June 21-22, 1988 (CVC) - memorandum for the President of the CVC.

Meeting of the Executive Commission of Foreign Ministers in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Differences between Honduras and Nicaragua over a World Court case and consequently is not the intention for the formation of the technical advisory group.

There are reports of a proposed summit meeting in the Central American President in San Salvador on August 7, 1988, the first anniversary of the Espinoza II Agreement.

El Salvador requests that the United States provide the Act of Espinoza II but the United States prevails and the Act is not provided.

July 1988

July 1988 - El Salvador introduces a general proposal to Honduras, the Act of Espinoza II, which is immediately rejected by Nicaragua.

September 1988

Canadian government sends a confidence detailed comments on security elements of 2nd draft of Espinoza II. Negotiations between July 1988 and August 1988. Canada provided detailed comments in regard to security of Espinoza II.

September 12-13, 1988

Canadian foreign minister presents another draft of Espinoza II which incorporated many of Canadian suggestions relating to verification and control mechanisms. Nicaragua, citing plan's failure to prohibit U.S. military activity in the region, rejects the plan on November 11.

May 1989

Continuation of meeting of 5 Central American Presidents. They fail to reach agreement on the Espinoza II agreement. Nicaragua insists that the United States stop aiding the Contras. The meeting ends with American withdrawal.

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APPENDIX A

ESQUIPULAS II AGREEMENT

Procedure for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America

PREAMBLE

We, the Presidents of the Republics of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, meeting at Guatemala City on 6 and 7 August, encouraged by the far-sighted and unflinching determination of the Contadora Group and the Support Group to achieve peace, strengthened by the steady support of all the Governments and peoples of the world, their main international organisations and, in particular, the European Economic Community and His Holiness John Paul II, drawing inspiration from the Esquipulas I Summit Meeting and having some come together in Guatemala to discuss the peace plan presented by the Government of Costa Rica, have agreed as follows:

To take up fully the historical challenge of forging a peaceful destiny for Central America;

To commit ourselves to the struggle for peace and the elimination of war;

To make dialogue prevail over violence and reason over hatred;

To dedicate these peace efforts to the young people of Central America whose legitimate aspirations to peace and social justice, freedom and reconciliation have been frustrated for many generations;

To take the Central American Parliament as the symbol of the freedom and independence of the reconciliation to which we aspire in Central America.

We ask the international community to respect and assist our efforts. We have our own approaches to peace and development but we need help in making them a reality. We ask for a

international response which will guarantee development so that the peace we are seeking can be a lasting one. We reiterate firmly that peace and development are inseparable.

We thank President Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo and the noble people of Guatemala for having hosted this meeting. The generosity of the President and people of Guatemala were decisive in creating the climate in which the peace agreements were adopted.

PROCEDURE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRM AND LASTING PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The Governments of the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, determined to achieve the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Document of Objectives, the Caraballeda Message for Peace, Security and Democracy in Central America, the Guatemala Declaration, the Punta del Este Communiqué, the Panama Message, the Esquipulas Declaration and the draft Contadora Act of 6 June 1986 on Peace and Co-operation in Central America, have agreed on the following procedure for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America.

1. NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

(a) Dialogue

Wherever deep divisions have taken place within society, the Governments agreed to urgently undertake actions of national reconciliation which permit popular participation, with full guarantees, in genuine democratic political processes on the basis of justice, freedom and democracy and, to that end, to create mechanisms permitting a dialogue with opposition groups in accordance with the law.

To this end, the Governments in question shall initiate a dialogue with all the domestic political opposition groups which have laid down their arms and those which have availed themselves of the amnesty.

(b) Amnesty

In each Central American country, except those where the International Verification and Follow-up Commission determines this to be unnecessary, amnesty decrees shall be issued which establish all necessary provisions guaranteeing the inviolability of life, freedom in all its forms, property and security of person of those of whom such decrees are applicable. Simultaneously with the issue of amnesty decrees, the irregular forces of the countries in question shall release anyone that they are holding prisoner.

(c) National Reconciliation Commission

To verify fulfilment of the commitments with regard to amnesty, a cease-fire, democratization and free elections entered into by the five Central American Governments in signing this document,

a National Reconciliation Commission shall be set up in each country, responsible for verifying genuine implementation of the process of national reconciliation and also unrestricted respect for all the civil and political rights of Central American citizens guaranteed in this document.

The National Reconciliation Commission shall be composed of: a representative of the executive branch and his alternate; a representative and an alternate proposed by the Conference of Bishops and chosen by the Government from a list of three bishops. This list shall be submitted within 15 days following receipt of the formal invitation. Governments shall make this invitation within five working days following the signing of this document. The same procedure of proposing three candidates shall be used to choose a representative and an alternate representative of legally registered opposition political parties. The list of three candidates shall be submitted within the same period as indicated above. Each Central American Government shall also choose an eminent citizen belonging to neither the Government nor the government party, and his alternate, to serve on the Commission. The agreement or decree setting up the corresponding National Commission shall be communicated immediately to the other Central American Governments.

2. APPEAL FOR AN END TO HOSTILITIES

The Governments make an urgent appeal that, in those States of the region where irregular or insurgent groups are currently active, agreement be reached to end hostilities. The Governments of those States undertake to take all necessary steps, in accordance with the constitution, to bring about a genuine cease-fire.

3. DEMOCRATIZATION

The Governments undertake to promote an authentic democratic process that is pluralistic and participatory, which entails the promotion of social justice and respect for human rights, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and the right of every nation to choose, freely and without outside interference of any kind, its own economic, political and social system. They shall adopt, in a way that can be verified, measures conducive to the establishment and, where appropriate, improvement of democratic, representative and pluralistic systems that will guarantee the organization of political parties and effective popular participation in the decision-making process and ensure that the various currents of opinion have free access to fair and regular elections based on the full observance of citizens' rights. In order to ensure good faith in the implementation of this process of democratization, it shall be understood that:

(a) There must be complete freedom of television, radio and the press. This complete freedom shall include freedom for all ideological groups to launch and operate communication media and to operate them without prior censorship;

(b) Complete pluralism of political parties must be established. Political groupings shall, in this connection, have broad access to the communication media and full enjoyment of the rights of association and the power to hold public demonstrations in unrestricted exercise of the right to publicize their ideas orally, in writing and on television, and members of political parties shall enjoy freedom of movement in campaigning for political support;

(c) Likewise, those Central American Governments which are currently imposing a state of siege or emergency shall revoke it, ensuring that a state of law exists in which all constitutional guarantees are fully enforced.

4. FREE ELECTIONS

Once the conditions inherent in any democracy have been created, free, pluralistic and fair elections shall be held.

As a joint expression by the Central American States of their desire for reconciliation and lasting peace for their peoples, elections will be held for the Central American Parliament proposed in the Esquipulas Declaration of May 25, 1986.

In the above connection, the Presidents expressed their willingness to move ahead with the organization of the Parliament. To that end, the Preparatory Commission for the Central American Parliament shall complete its deliberations and submit the corresponding draft treaty to the Central American Presidents within 150 days.

Elections shall be held simultaneously in all the countries of Central America in the first six months of 1988, at a date to be agreed in due course by the Presidents of the Central American States. They shall be subject to supervision by the corresponding electoral bodies, and the Governments concerned undertake to invite the Organization of American States, the United Nations and the Governments of third States to send observers to verify the electoral process has been governed by the strictest rules of equal access for all political parties to the communication media and by ample opportunities for organizing public demonstrations and any other type of political propaganda.

With a view to enabling the elections to the Central American Parliament to be held within the period indicated, the treaty establishing the Parliament shall be submitted for approval or ratification in the five countries.

Once the elections for the Central American Parliament have been held, equally free and democratic elections for the appointment of popular representatives to municipalities, congress, the legislative assembly and the office of the President of the Republic shall be held in each country, with international observers and the same guarantees, within the established time-limits and subject to time tables to be proposed in accordance with each country's current constitution.

5. TERMINATION OF AID FOR IRREGULAR FORCES AND INSURRECTIONIST MOVEMENTS

The Governments of the five Central American States shall request Governments of the region and Governments from outside the region which are providing either overt or covert military, logistical, financial or propaganda support, in the form of men, weapons, munitions and equipment, to irregular forces or insurrectionist movements to terminate such aid; this is vital if a stable and lasting peace is to be attained in the region.

The above does not cover aid for the repatriation or, failing that, the relocation and necessary assistance with reintegration into normal life of former members of such groups or forces. The Central Americanism. These requests shall be made pursuant to the provisions of the Document of Objectives which calls for eliminating the traffic in arms, whether within the region or from outside it, intended for persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the Governments of Central American countries.

6. NON-USE OF TERRITORY TO ATTACK OTHER STATES

The five countries signing this document reiterate their commitment to prevent the use of their own territory by persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the Governments of Central American countries and to refuse to provide them with or allow them to receive military and logistical support.

7. NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY, VERIFICATION AND THE CONTROL AND LIMITATION OF WEAPONS

The Governments of the five Central American States, with the Contadora Group acting as mediator, shall continue negotiating on the points outstanding in the draft Contadora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America with regard to security, verification and control.

These negotiations shall also cover measures for disarming irregular forces prepared to avail themselves of amnesty decrees.

8. REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The Central American Governments undertake to attend, as a matter of urgency, to the flows of refugees and displaced persons caused by the crisis in the region, providing them with protection and assistance, particularly in the areas of health, education, work and safety, and to facilitate their repatriation, resettlement or relocation provided that this is voluntary and carried out on an individual basis.

They also undertake to seek assistance from the international community for Central American refugees and displaced persons, to be provided either directly, through bilateral or multilateral agreements, or indirectly, through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other organizations and agencies.

9. CO-OPERATION, DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

In the climate of freedom guaranteed by democracy, the Central American countries shall adopt such agreements as will help to speed up development, in order to make their societies more egalitarian and free from misery.

The strengthening of democracy entails creating a system of economic and social well-being and justice. To achieve these goals, the Governments shall jointly seek special economic assistance from the international community.

10. INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION AND FOLLOW-UP

(a) International Verification and Follow-up Commission

An International Verification and Follow-up Commission shall be established consisting of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, or his representative, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, or his representative, and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Central America, the Contadora Group and the Support Group. This Commission shall be responsible for verifying and monitoring fulfilment of the commitments set forth in this document.

(b) Support and facilities for reconciliation and verification and follow-up bodies

In order to reinforce the efforts of the International Verification and Follow-up Commission, the Governments of the five Central American States shall issue statements of support for its work. All nations interested in promoting the cause of freedom, democracy and peace in Central America may adhere to these statements.

The five Governments shall provide all necessary facilities for the proper conduct of the verification and follow-up functions of the National Reconciliation Commission in each country and the International Verification and Follow-up Commission.

11. TIMETABLE FOR FULFILMENT OF COMMITMENTS

Within a period of 15 days from the signing of this document, the Central American Ministers for Foreign Affairs shall meet as an Executive Commission to regulate, encourage and facilitate compliance with the agreements contained in this document and to organize working commissions so that, as of that date, the processes leading to fulfilment of the agreed commitments within the stipulated periods can be set in motion by means of consultations, negotiations and any other mechanisms which are deemed necessary.

Ninety days after the signing of this document, the commitments with regard to amnesty, a cease-fire, democratization, termination of aid to irregular forces or insurrectionist movements, and the non-use of territory to attack other States, as defined in this document, shall enter into force simultaneously and be made public.

One hundred and twenty days after the signing of this document, the International Verification and Follow-up Commission shall review the progress made in complying with the agreements set forth in this document.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The elements set forth in this document form a harmonious and indivisible whole. By signing it, the Central American States accept in good faith the obligation to comply simultaneously with what has been agreed within the established time-limits.

We, the Presidents of the five Central American States, having the political will to respond to our peoples' desire for peace, sign this document at Guatemala City on 7 August, 1987.

(Signed) OSCAR ARIAS SANCHEZ
President
Republic of Costa Rica

(Signed) JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE
President
Republic of El Salvador

(Signed) VINICIO CERESO AREVALO
President
Republic of Guatemala

(Signed) JOSE AZCONA HOYO
President
Republic of Honduras

(Signed) DANIEL ORTEGA SAAVEDRA
President
Republic of Nicaragua

APPENDIX B

INDIVIDUALS AND WITNESSES MET BY THE COMMITTEE

Ottawa

Adolfo Aguilar Zinser

Senior Associate

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Linda Allain

Development Policy Officer

Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC)

John P. Becker

Counsellor

Embassy of the United States States of America

Michael Bell

Assistant Under-Secretary for Latin America and the Caribbean

Department of External Affairs

Special Ambassador Morris Busby

United States of America

Gerry Caplan

Mission for Peace

Andrei A. Choupin

First Secretary

Embassy of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

Jean Christie

Executive Member

Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC)

The Right Honourable Joe Clark, P.C., M.P.

Secretary of State for External Affairs

David Close

Assistant Professor

Department of Political Science

Memorial University of Newfoundland

Don Cockburn
Member, Latin American Working Group
Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America — Canadian Council of Churches

Eduardo F. del Buey
Desk Officer responsible for the Central American Peace Process
Caribbean and Central American Relations Division
Department of External Affairs

Julio Dixon
Coordinator
Central American Indigenous Organization

Tim Draimin
Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives

Bernard Dufresne
Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops representative to the
Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America — Canadian Council of Churches

Lt. Col. Don Ethell
Department of National Defence

John Foster
Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives

Ambassador Alejandro Flores Mendoza
Embassy of the Republic of Honduras

José Garcia Lozano
Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC)

Richard Gorham
Roving Ambassador for Latin America and Permanent Observer of Canada to the Organization
of American States

John Graham
Director General
Caribbean and Central America Bureau
Department of External Affairs

Aurora Gramatges
First Secretary
Embassy of the Republic of Cuba

Ambassador Dr. Marco A. Guillen
Embassy of the Republic of Costa Rica

David Haglund
Director
Centre for International Relations
Queen's University

Ambassador Rafaël Hernandez Martinez
Embassy of the Republic of Cuba

Hal Klepak
Professor of Strategy and International Relations
Collège militaire royal de St-Jean

Ambassador Sergio Lacayo
Embassy of the Republic of Nicaragua

Gordon Longmuir
Director
Caribbean and Central American Relations Division
Department of External Affairs

Professor S. Neil MacFarlane
Department of Government
University of Virginia

Andrei Makarov
Minister-Counsellor
Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Randy Mank
Desk Officer (Nicaragua, El Salvador)
Caribbean and Central America Bureau
Department of External Affairs

Ambassador Thomas Niles
Embassy of the United States of America

Liisa North
Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives

David Pfrimmer
Chairperson
Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America — Canadian Council of Churches

Professor David Pollock
Norman Patterson School of International Affairs
Carleton University

Ambassador Ernesto Rivas-Gallont
Embassy of the Republic of El Salvador

Donald Rojas Maroto
President
World Council of Indigenous People

John Robinson
Vice-President, Americas Branch
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

Father Tim Ryan
Executive Director
Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America — Canadian Council of Churches

Konrad Sioui
Vice-Chief, Quebec Region
Assembly of First Nations

Nancy Stiles
Country Program Director
Central America Branch
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

Lt. Col. J. P. Thompson
Directorate of International Policy
Department of National Defence

Laurel Whitney
Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives

Ambassador Federico Adolfo Urruela-Prado
Embassy of the Republic of Guatemala

César Velasco
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.
Embassy of the Republic of El Salvador

Adolfo Aguilar Zinser (*see Aguilar*)

Central America

Nicaragua

President Daniel Ortega Saavedra

Father Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann
Foreign Minister

Dr. Rafael Solis
First Secretary of the National Assembly

Lt. Col. Javier Carrion

Cardinal Obando y Bravo
Archbishop of Managua

Violeta B. de Chamorro
Director
La Prensa

Father Xabier Gorostiaga
Economic and Social Research Organization
CRIES

Enrique Bolanos
President
COSEP

Lino Hernandez
Permanent Commission on Human Rights

Roxanne Murrell
Canadian University Services Overseas (CUSO)

Joan Campbell
Tools for Peace

Father Lou Quinn

Father Robert Smith

Gisele C. Bonin
College de Maisonneuve, Montréal

Grant Bobbitz
Farmers for Peace

Ed Carson
Change for Children (Alberta)

Joseph Curcio
Scarborough Foreign Missions

Ada Liz Garcia

Joe Gunn
Save the Children Canada

Thirza Jones

Micheline Jourdain
Organisation canadienne pour la solidarité et le développement (OCSD)

Wes Maultsaid
Canadian University Services Overseas (CUSO)

Sue Mitchell
CAN ACT

Beat Rohr
CARE Canada

Guatemala

Vice-President Roberto Carpi Nicolle

Dr. Julio Martini
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs

Miguel Angel Ibana
Social Democratic Party

Manuel Godinez
Acting Secretary General and Secretary for Workers and Campesinos
Social Democratic Party

Adrian Ramirez
Assistant Secretary General
Confederacion de Unidad Sindical de Guatemala (CUSG)

Ricardo Wilson-Grau
Editor
Infopress Centroamericana

Liam Mahoney
Peace Brigades International

Reverend Ignacio Ellacuria
Rector
Universidad Centroamericana de El Salvador

Maria Julia Hernandez
Director of Tutela Legal

François Prevost
Canadian Hunger Programme

Christine Becker
Jesuit Refugee Service
Calle Real Refugio Camp

Costa Rica

President Oscar Arias

José Luis Valenciano
President of the Legislative Assembly

Rodrigo Madrigal Nieto
Foreign Minister

José Maria Mendiluce
Deputy Regional Representative
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Alfredo Cesar
Contra Representative

Ana Guadalupe
FMLN

Mario Lopez
FMLN

Cesar Marti
FMLN

Central America

El Salvador

President José Napoleon Duarte

Alfredo Christiani

President

ARENA Party

Ricardo Acevedo

Foreign Minister

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova

Minister of Defence

Ruben Zamora

Vice-President

Frente Democratico Revolucionario (FDR)

Monsénor Gregorio Rosa Chavez

Auxiliary Archbishop of San Salvador

Felix Blanco

Central Trabajadores Salvadoreños (CTS)

Reverend Ignacio Ellacuria

Rector

Universidad Centroamericana de El Salvador

Maria Julia Hernandez

Director of *Tutela Legal*

François Prévost

Canadian Hunger Foundation

Christine Reesor

Jesuit Refugee Service

Calle Real Refugee Camp

Central America

Honduras

President José Azcona Hoyo

Policarpo Callejas

Principal Advisor for Foreign Affairs

Minister of Foreign Affairs

General Humberto Regalado Hernandez

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

Guillermo Caceres Pineda

Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs

Colonel Roberto Martinez

Head of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Colonel Aquiles Riera

Commander of Public Security Forces

Colonel Edgardo Mejia

Air Force

Oscar Anibal Puerto

CODEH

Ambassador Everett Briggs

Embassy of the United States of America

Donald Johnson

Political Counselor

U.S. Embassy

Michael O'Brian

Public Affairs Officer

U.S. Embassy

John Sanbrailo

Director

U.S. AID, Honduras

Van Blumenthal

Representative

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Colonel Mark John

United States Air Force

Washington — New York City

Ambassador Peter V. Vaky

Chairman
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Chris Arcos

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Department of State

Hon. Jim Wright, Speaker

House of Representatives
Democrat — Texas

Hon. David Bonior

Democrat — Michigan

Hon. Mel Levine

Democrat — California

Hon. Bruce Morrison

Democrat — Connecticut

Hon. Mike Lowry

Democrat — Washington

Hon. Mickey Edwards

Republican — Oklahoma

Hon. Nancy Johnson

Republican — Connecticut

Hon. Cass Ballenger

Republican — North Carolina

Hon. Jim Bunning

Republican — Kentucky

Hon. John Rhodes

Republican — Illinois

Hon. Olympia Snowe

Republican — Maine

Hon. Rod Chadler

Republican — Washington

Joao Clemente Baena Soares

Secretary General
Organization of American States (OAS)

Major General Indar Rikhye
President
International Peace Academy

Christopher C. Coleman
Director of Dispute Settlement and Negotiation Programs
International Peace Academy

Ambassador Carlos Gutierrez
Mission of Costa Rica

Ambassador Fernando Andrade-Diaz-Duran
Mission of Guatemala

Ambassador Julio E. Icaza-Gallard
Mission of Nicaragua

Jorge Eduardo Ramirez-Mardonez
Minister-Counsellor
Mission of El Salvador

Pablo Edgardo Pastor
Economic Counsellor
Mission of Honduras

Alvero De Soto
Special Assistant to the Secretary General
United Nations

Francesc Vandrell
Senior Political Affairs Officer
Latin American Issues
United Nations

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*Issues Nos. 1 to 5 inclusive and Issue No. 6 which contains this Report*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

John Bosley, P.C., M.P.,
Chairman

(Text)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 4, 1988

(15)

The Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America met *in camera* at 3:40 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 306, West Block, the Chairman, John Bosley, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: John Bosley and Bill Blaikie.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference.

At 4:42 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 1988

(16)

The Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America met *in camera* at 3:44 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 306, West Block, the Chairman, John Bosley, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Bill Blaikie, John Bosley and Gabriel Desjardins.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Bob Miller and Greg Wirick.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference.

On motion of Bill Blaikie, *it was agreed;*—That the Committee authorize payment for the official gifts used during the Committee's visit to Central America.

On motion of Gabriel Desjardins, *it was agreed;*—That the Committee authorize payment of hospitality expenses incurred during the Committee's visit to Central America.

On motion of Bill Blaikie, *it was agreed;*—That the members of the Committee and the necessary staff travel to Washington, D.C. and New York City from June 1 to June 3, 1988.

At 4:33 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1, 1988

(17)

The Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America met *in camera* at 3:38 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 306, West Block, the Chairman, John Bosley, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Bill Blaikie, John Bosley and Bud Jardine.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Bob Miller and Greg Wirick; *From the Department of External Affairs:* John Graham, Director

General, Caribbean and Central America Relations Bureau and Richard V. Gorham, Roving Ambassador for Latin America and Ambassador and Permanent Observer of Canada to the Organization of American States.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference.

On motion of Bill Blaikie, *it was agreed*;—That the Committee authorize the Chairman to host a luncheon on Friday, June 3, 1988 in New York City for the Permanent representatives to the United Nations of the five Central American countries.

At 4:23 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 1988
(18)

The Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America met *in camera* at 3:47 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 701, La Promenade Building, the Chairman, John Bosley, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Blaikie, John Bosley and Gabriel Desjardins.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Bob Miller and Greg Wirick.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference.

The Committee considered a draft report to the House.

On motion of Gabriel Desjardins, *it was agreed*;—That the Committee hold a working dinner later this day, in order to continue consideration of a draft report to the House.

On motion of Bill Blaikie, *it was agreed*;—That the Committee authorize Greg Wirick, Research Adviser to the Committee to attend a seminar organized by the Working Group on Latin America to be held in Toronto on Saturday, June 18, 1988 and that the necessary travel expenses be paid.

At 5:04 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 1988
(19)

The Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America met *in camera* at 3:48 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 307, West Block, the Chairman, John Bosley, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Bill Blaikie, John Bosley and Bud Jardine.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Bob Miller and Greg Wirick.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference.

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft report to the House.

At 4:45 o'clock p.m., the sitting was suspended.

At 4:14 o'clock p.m., the sitting resumed.

The Committee continued consideration of a draft report to the House.

At 6:30 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 1988
(20)

The Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America met *in camera* at 3:40 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 701, La Promenade Building, the Chairman, John Bosley, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Bill Blaikie, John Bosley and W. R. (Bud) Jardine.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Bob Miller and Greg Wirick.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference.

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft report to the House.

On motion of W. R. (Bud) Jardine, *it was agreed*;—That the draft report, as considered and amended, be adopted as the First Report of the Committee, and that the Chairman be instructed to report it to the House.

On motion of Bill Blaikie, *it was agreed*;—That the Committee authorize the printing of 5,000 copies of its First Report to the House, 4,000 in English and 1,000 in French, under a special cover.

After debate, the motion was negatived.

On motion of W. R. (Bud) Jardine, *it was agreed*;—That the Committee authorize the printing of 5,000 copies of the First Report to the House, in a tumbled format and under special cover.

On motion of Bill Blaikie, *it was agreed*;—That the Committee authorize the production of a Spanish version of its First Report to the House and that 1,000 copies, under special cover, of this version be printed.

At 4:43 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Richard Rumas,
Clerk of the Committee.

