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THE BRITISH-AMERICAN REGISTER.

QUEBEC, SATURDAY, 18th JUNE, 1803.

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POLITICS OF FRANCE.

SIR,—If you think the fragments herewith inclosed worth the notice of the Public, you will much oblige one of your readers to insert them, or any part of them, in your Register. They are transcribed from the journal of a gentleman now travelling in France. The work itself is under the press, but not yet ready. Yours, &c.

SWENSKA.

France has the forests of Germany for the use of her dock-yards; with Holland, she acquires an extent of coast and a chain of sea-ports, which may enable her to raise a numerous navy in a few years.

It has been said, that the Consulate intends to raise an enormous navy, and to distribute it as follows: in the Mediterranean, France shall maintain - - - - - 30 } 65 sail of
Spain - - - - - 20 } the line
The Italian states, in- } of battle
cluding Naples - 15 } ships.

From Cadiz to the Texel.
France shall maintain 100 } 160 sail of
Spain - - - - - 40 } the line of
Holland - - - - - 20 } bat. ships.

Should the French compose a navy in this manner, and oblige their allies to keep up 95 sail of the line for the service of the republic, the Dutch and Spanish officers and men will be under the immediate orders of their

masters, the *French*. The inconvenience of separate commanders, which has so often frustrated the best combined plans of confederate forces, will thereby be avoided.

The heavy navies of France will not, however, be in a state to give much uneasiness to her rival neighbour. Should Buonaparté seriously set about building line of battle ships, Great-Britain may congratulate herself and let him go on. Lucky gamblers play boldly; but, when they meet with a few successive checks, they lose their clue, and become more disconcerted than others. The Consul has hitherto staked high, and with remarkable success; should he attempt to pursue his fortune upon the ocean, his preparations will be analogous to his usual measures; skirmishing is not in his tactics; if he send a fleet to sea, it will be such a fleet, as France never could boast of before; but if the spirit of the British nation do not entirely subside in the interval, that fleet will be beaten; every effort, which revenge can devise, will be made to augment its force, and it will be beaten again; its creator may then lose his temper, and France will lose her stake in the game.

The light *flotillas*, which the republic is preparing, may, perhaps, merit the attention of the British government, more than all the heavy navies of Europe and America together. *It is certain*, that at this moment, arrangements are making to form and repair such *depôts* and convenient harbours, between Brest and

the Ems, where 1500 to 2000 light vessels may be kept in safety and constant readiness; to act either offensively, or to defend their own coast, as occasion may point out, or require: it is equally certain, that immense quantities of materials and stores, for the construction and equipment of these vessels, are already collecting from all quarters: and, there it no doubt, that *the Consulate intends to extend this naval system of light squadrons to America and the West-Indies.*

This statement of the natural and moral sources of France, are by no means exaggerated; the estimates we have given, are far under what an intelligent government might derive from the inexhaustible treasures of that overgrown empire. Fortunate, perhaps, it may be for the yet independent nations of Europe, that those sources of irresistible force are in the hands of Frenchmen!

Except when the personal characters of leading men, may, now and then influence the measures of a government, the politics of every state is, to secure its independence, augment its power, and elevate its rank. These objects cannot be pursued singly, they are interwoven with one another. The independence of a state can only be secured by an unremitting progression in power, of which rank is a consequence. Almost all states have begun to decline, as soon as they ceased to rise. The ambition, avarice, and ignorance of individuals, allow nations no interval of stationary quiet and security.

In modern times, the only governments that seem to have acted upon any digested system, are the French since the commencement of the reign of Louis XIV. and the Russian since that of Peter I. These

two monarchs felt the internal strength of their respective empires, and measured the powers of their neighbours.

When Louis assumed the direction of affairs, he found himself hemmed in, on the side of Germany, Italy and Spain, by Austria; and on all other sides, by Great Britain and Holland. To break through that circumvallation, was an enterprize worthy of a young aspiring monarch; and as enterprizing princes generally do, he succeeded. By the valour of his arms, seconded by the infatuation and treachery of his neighbours, he levelled down all the bulwarks of his opponents; and laid Europe open to the inroads of France. He broke the power of Austria, and thereby destroyed the union and force of the German empire; he made Spain a province of his dominions; annihilated the arrogant and independent spirit of the Dutch* and deprived Great-Britain of all her useful connections on the continent of Europe†. His successors made but a poor use of the means he left at

* The Dutch struggled long and bravely to consolidate the independence and political rank of their country; from 1709 to 1712, they believed they had succeeded; but one of those unforeseen fatalities, which, in a moment destroys the works of ages, blasted all their hopes. The change of system in the British Cabinet, or rather the change of men, (for it is not known to us, that ever a system was adopted there) produced the infamous treaty of Utrecht. The Dutch having spent immense treasures during the war, and obliged to abandon all the advantages they had acquired by it, their proud spirit of independence and ambition for military and naval glory, sunk into a fallen hatred towards Great-Britain. That hatred never diminished; on the contrary, the connexions between the houses of Brunswick and Nassau Orange, and our interference, sometimes by intrigue and sometimes by force, in favour of the Stadtholderate, made every Dutchman our inveterate enemy; and has, in the end, made Holland a department of France.

† Since the peace of Utrecht, Great-Britain has had for allies, Portugal, the Stadholder, Hanover and the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel. In every continental war, these powers have been conquered by the arms of France, and have been ransomed either by British money, or by British con-

their disposal, it is true, but they adhered to the leading principle of his system; they kept fast hold of Spain; took all the measures, which a court like that of Versailles could be expected to devise, to weaken the House of Austria; to attach Holland to France, and undermine and divide the British empire. To direct the government of Spain, to subdue the Low countries, and to attach and secure Holland in the interests of France, were considered as the most effectual means to ruin the maritime trade and destroy the power of Great Britain. These three objects were the principal articles in the political creed of the French monarchy. They are now accomplished! How far their effects may ultimately justify the calculations that have been made upon them, will depend upon the British cabinet. The result will, in all likelihood, be shortly seen.

The revolution has, in no wise altered the politics of France; it has changed the actors and they have adopted new measures. *But they are measures much more dangerous to the peace of the civilized world than those of their predecessors.* Instead of grovelling, in obscure intrigue, deceit and circumvention, the champions of the Republic have substituted a bold system of treachery, violence and military despotism. During the few years, that they have exercised the supreme authority, *the Republic has achieved all that Louis XIV. perhaps, ever intended;* France is raised to an eminence of power, which in that prince's time, would have made him as completely master of Europe, as he was of Alsace and Navarre. *The treaties of Lunville and AMIENS, have made the First Consul a more formidable potentate, than those of U-*

trecht and Rastadt made the chief of the House of Bourbon.

However, although the Republic may certainly be considered, as completely mistress of the south-west-half of continental Europe, there is another power, of equal force, and perhaps of superior strength, that claims a similar dominion over the north and eastern-parts. We have before said, the political powers and military force of continental Europe, are divided between the governments of France and Russia. These two mighty empires, are come in contact: Berlin, Vienna and Constantinople, can only be considered as three neutral posts, situate in their line of demarcation. By the reduction of other states, the politics of Europe are much simplified; but that very circumstance renders the respective positions of the two dictatorial powers more critical. The intermediate field of their usual machinations is cleared, the slightest motion of the one, must now directly affect the other.

A free, independent and secure communication between the southern provinces of Russia and the Mediterranean, was an essential article in the fundamental system of the Czar Peter; it has been pursued, with more, or less energy, by all his successors; and it is of such importance to the Russian empire that it can never be abandoned.

The navigation of the Black Sea, was a standing project in the politics of the French monarchy; it is now obtained, and to preserve it, is a consideration of the utmost consequence to the Republic. The Turkish government, sunk as it is, into a lethargic effeminacy, an open passage through the Archipelago and the Dardanelles, give to France, not only the

quests; or retaken by other powers subsidised for that purpose: witness the surrender of our colonies at every peace, and our subsidies to Prussia, &c.

direction of the trade and that empire, but what, to the consulate, is an object of infinitely greater importance, it lays open the only vulnerable part of the frontiers of Russia.

In the present state of things, can Russia and Republican France go mutual sharers in the trade and government of the Turkish empire? This is by no means likely; nay, we may venture to say, it is impossible. Which of the parties then is to give up its pretension? The cabinet of Petersburg must certainly know, that should the Consulate be allowed to assume an ascendancy at Constantinople, or, to intermeddle in the affairs of Turkey, the fate of Moscow may again be disputed at Pultava! Will the present government of France retract and leave the Seraglio and St Sophia to the desecration of Russians? In that case, a Cossack and Highland army, seconded by a Russian and British fleet, might yet confine the empire of Buonaparté to the government of his Gauls of the West. Or, can the ambition of Russia and the avarice of France be satisfied with a partial partition of Turkey? It is a known fact, that the Consul did propose to the court of Petersburg, to leave Moldavia, Wallachia, Bessarabia, Bosnia and Servia, to the disposal of Russia and Austria, on condition that France might possess Candia, Negropont and other Greek islands in the Archipelago. But Russia, would as soon see France in possession of the canal of Constantinople and the Crimea, as suffer her to fix her feet on posts that might soon command the communication between the Black and Mediterranean seas. Had the British ambassador arrived at Paris a few months sooner than he did, his Excellency could have informed Buonaparté, that Russia would not connive with France for the Turkish provinces north of the Danube. His Lordship himself

had the honour, as an agent, to sign away the property of those countries to the empress Catherine II. This monument of British shame was subscribed to by Sir Charles Whitworth, at Peterburgh, on the 22d July, 1791. We hope it will not prove ominous!

Oczakow was not only the key to the northern provinces of Turkey, it was to Constantinople, what Bergen-op-Zoom and Maestricht formerly were to Amsterdam; and what the Pyrennees might yet be to Madrid. That post in the hands of Russia, to offer her the sovereignty of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia, was ridiculous enough.

The Russians at Akkirmann and Soroko, and the French, or their auxiliaries in Malta, the Sultan with his Seraglio have the comfortable prospect of very soon passing, either *au fil de l'épée, ou sous le knuds*, into the kingdom of Mahomet. It is remarkable, that when the Emperor of Turkey was obliged to surrender Oczakow, the King of England was mediator with 36 line of battle ships armed, in his favour; and when Malta was ceded to be possessed by France, Great-Britain was also an ally in co-operation with Turkey. To propose an entire partition of the European dominions of the Turks, to whom give Thrace and Constantinople? Besides, Russia will never agree to a division that shall leave the Grecian islands to France.* Nor can it

* Were the Chief Consul to admit, amongst the fractional parts of his political calculations, the value of the characters and abilities of the men he finds, here and there, at the head of the public affairs of other states, he might, perhaps, at this moment, be induced to possess himself of such posts and strong holds in the Levant, as would insure to the Republic at once, the dominion which she will otherwise have to fight for. Who knows but such is his design? We cannot however, presume, that those governments which are most immediately interested, can be so immersed in ignorance and toil to all sense of public duty and personal safety, as not to see through the perfidious manœuvres of the Consulate,

be expected that the Consulate will leave the Bosphorus to Russia.

Thus between these two governments matters seem to become nearly to a crisis. Considering the characters of each respectively, and the powers and attitude of the two empires, if the Consul possess only half of those transcendent talents which his penegyrists are willing to allow him, he must certainly see, that their present cordiality cannot be of long duration.* And he is no doubt likewise aware that while Great Britain can powerfully interfere, to risk a quarrel with Russia would be imprudent and dangerous.

In this situation it appears to us, and indeed daily occurrences seem to confirm our opinion, that the plan of the Chief Consul is, to manage the Court of Petersburg until he disengage his rear; that is, *until he shall tie down the British Government to passive inactivity.*

To point out the measures by which the rulers of France intend to reduce

* It is truly pitiful, to see public ministers and men charged with the defence of nations cajoling themselves in the hope, that Russia and France will quarrel and fight! Quarrel they certainly will; but when that event takes place, woe to their neighbours! While at peace, their mutual preponderance requires only dependency and obedience: at war their hostilities will impose upon the eastern continent, submission and slavery.

When the Czar and the Consul draw forth their legions in hostile array, mediation, armed coalitions, neutral conventions and demarcation-lines, will be of little avail. These powers have long been unused to cabinet warfare, and to courtier *étiquette* in the field. The intervention of other states, may hasten their own subjection, but cannot ward off their fate. The chieftains of Russia and France will meet nearly on the centre of the world: the object of their quarrel will not be a bishoprick, a sugar island, nor who shall read their mass in Latin, or say their prayers in Greek: they will fight, for the possession of the *Hellspoint* and *Bosphorus*, two posts on which hangs *now* suspended, the empire of our eastern hemisphere. Such contending parties will not come out to skir-mish and then mutually retire; nor will they fight for conquests to give away; the one will keep the field,—and with it the dictatorship of the world.

the British Government to inaction: is here unnecessary; they are already plainly exhibited to the world. When the rest of Europe was beaten off the field, Buonaparté saw, that to fight with Great Britain alone, was an unprofitable trade; the archives of Versailles, furnished him with several striking examples: but in that same library, the General learned, that in a campaign of diplomatic negotiations victory was certain; this was certain; this was tried, and, *the Consulate make it no secret, that, the success far exceeded the most sanguine expectation.* Since our continental alliances have been reduced to a few needy subsidiaries, the only means which we have had to check the ambitious projects of France, were, to keep the French colonies and trade under the guns of a preponderating navy. This check the Consul has not only removed, but he has also inverted the position. *The peace of Amiens has left the British colonies under the Guns of France;* every passage to and from our possessions abroad is now flanked by posts already garrisoned, or to be garrisoned by the republic and her auxiliaries; and *England herself is half-encircled by the naval depôts and rising flotillas of her enemies.* Buonaparté considers Great-Britain, as being reduced to the necessity of hereafter confining all her military and naval operations to the defence of her own dominions.* Abroad he has now no vulnerable point for us to attack; and our communication with the continent of Europe and Africa, depends immediately upon his will. These circumstances open to the republic, another advantage of a more serious nature, and which, the Con-

* No state, once reduced to fight in its own defence ever sought long. It is now about a century, that the military operations of Holland, Austria and Turkey have been confined to the defensive; and the warfare as well as the independence of these states, may be considered as having nearly ceased.

ful believes, will lay open and expose to his tactics, *the very soul of the State*; namely, the financial sources of the nation.

Buonaparte's opinion on the finances of England has been repeatedly expressed to the following effect :

1. That the annual expenditure amounting to such an immense sum, the ministry dared not augment it; and therefore they made peace.

2. That the peace, having enabled the Republic to secure all the valuable possessions of France, Holland, Spain and Portugal, and to exclude Great Britain from the continent of Europe. when occasion may require, the British merchants and men of property, seeing the nation deprived of every possibility of making new conquests and of extending their commerce and manufactures, will not come forward with their money to enable the government to recommence a war, which can produce nothing but public danger.

3. That, should a ministry obtain the confidence of the public, so as to be able to raise the funds, to re-equip the navy and organize the army, with the other expences attendant on warlike preparations, would, in the course of the first two years, absorb a capital, the interest of which, would require ten millions sterling to be raised annually upon the public: a sum, that, added to the present expenditure, would either revolutionize the country, or make a national bankruptcy inevitable.

So that, although the ministry in parliament declared the resources of the nation to be still abundant to continue the war, it was perfectly evident that the danger which they apprehended from the pressure of the public

burdens, was the real cause that made them sue for peace.

It is rather unmannerly of Buonaparté, to say, that old England sued for peace! However, if it be true, as the world really believes it is, that the terms of the peace have broken down these bulwarks, which centuries of warfare, "heaps of treasure" and streams of British blood had "raised around the British empire," and that the soul and body of the empire itself, are thereby exposed to the uplifted daggers of a Jacobin Republic, we cannot, should we dislike the Consul's Philippic, with any sort of plausibility deny the fact.—At no period of the war was the situation of France so critical, as just when the preliminaries of London were signed. To have lost the battle of Marengo, might have lost the progress of the campaign, but the consequence would have been nothing more. At the juncture we refer to, the existence of the Republic, the destiny of France, hung upon the will of an irritated and all powerful enemy. The British navy was completely mistress of the Ocean, of the Gulph of Mexico, the Baltic, Mediterranean and Indian seas; from the Point of Florida to Cape Horn, and from Madagascar to Japan, every island, port and place, were under our command, and at our disposal; as were also the continent of Africa, Egypt, Syria, Natolia, Cyprus, Candia, the Morea and Grecian islands, Malta, Sicily, and Lisbon. No nation ever stood in such a posture. And sue for peace! A frank declaration to the world, and a liberal proposition to the court of Petersburg and to the United States, would have instantaneously rallied all the sovereigns of Europe and America (the king of Spain not excepted) around the British standard. Then we might have consolidated our maritime em-

pire, every state that bordered on the sea would have become our natural ally, and all civilized nations our cordial and constant friends. And France, republic or monarchy, no matter which, might have been finally remanded within the limits of her own legal dominions. These Buonaparté saw, and by an address, (or, perhaps, from our want of address), he snatched away the fruit of all our toils. The very means we then possessed, to have interwoven the interests of Europe and America with our own, the Consul is now dealing out to unite the world in enmity against us.

It cannot fail to be highly gratifying to the present rulers of France, to hear maintained in the British senate, a doctrine in itself preposterous, and in its effects the most dangerous that ever was introduced into the councils of a king—to wit; that, “to retain in peace conquests made in war, marks ambition, rouses the jealousy of other powers and creates enemies to the state: whereas, to give up conquests bought with our blood, manifests magnanimity and moderation, and quiets the anxiety of our neighbours: the latter is therefore, insound policy to be preferred.” We shall not comment on this dangerous and cowardly precept; but merely observe, that if it be persisted in, Great Britain will not long be the envy of her neighbours. She is now, no more their dread!

Jealousy arises from rivalry, which implies a pretension to equal power; as Great Britain lately stood, no such pretension could have been set up; or if it had, to what purpose? In possession of the object, and able to defend it, the jealousy of rivals soon dies in its own impotence. If, to avoid the jealousy of those whose rivalry we always despised, we have (as it is said) given up the object, viz.—the

sources and securities of our maritime preponderance, we have no great chance to meet with a similar modesty on the part of our neighbours. While Buonaparté can command their obedience, all the powers of Europe may burn with jealousy as long as they please, for what he cares.

To return from this digression. The British ministers, deprived of every prospect of gaining by war, now talk of getting money to enable them to recommence hostilities. For, if they could still add to the national debt and public imposts, that very circumstance would ruin the government. The British ministry must, therefore, to preserve the state, maintain the peace, and that proud nation must be a passive spectator of the rising glories of France.

Such is the opinion of the Chief Consul; and, we are sorry to add, that it is more, or less, the opinion of all the governments of continental Europe.

To justify his calculation and insure the pacific neutrality of Great-Britain, Buonaparté will keep the government in a continual state of suspense. To oblige the ministry to carry the annual expenditure, more and more above the receipt of the public revenue, the Consulate will order, or pretend to have ordered, squadrons of gun-boats and light vessels, to be built and armed on the Mississippi, on the Riogrande de la Madalena, and on the Oronoco. The republic will form, or talk of forming settlements, on the Red and Winnipeg lakes, in Tupinamb and Capdel-rey. Orders will likewise be given, to build squadrons on the Euphrates, at Bassora, Gombaroon, on the Indus, and on the lakes in Siba; to take possession and fortify the islands of Salfetta, Ormus and Kis-

mish; the posts of Aden, Zeila, the islands and ports of Camarana, Erquiko and Monbaza, will be ceded to France;* and the republic will make settlements in Sindi, Guzerat, Aracan and Pegu.† A treaty with the emperor Alexander to reinstate the Mogul and hereditary princes of Indostan in their former rank and possessions, will be approved of by the Sophi of Persia, consecrated by the Grand Lama and cried through the streets of London, Calcutta, Madras and Delhi. A senatus-consultus, prohibiting the importation of British manufactures and the consumption of British cured fish in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Turkey, and forbidding the transit of British produce through Holland and up the Rhine, will be talked of, perhaps really issued: and a convention to recover and maintain the liberty of the sea, under the auspices of France and Russia, will be acceded to by all the maritime states of Europe.‡

* To possess and secure the command of the gulph of Ormus and straits of Labelmandel, is not a new speculation; if the late Empress Catherine II. would have countenanced the views of France, that project would have been attempted in 1785 and 1786. Perhaps Buonaparté may have more influence in the councils of the present emperor than Vergennes had in those of Catherine.

† With respect to the Dutch settlements abroad, as they were given up at Amiens, they will be garrisoned and stored without any unnecessary parade or pompous demonstration. It is inconceivable how the people of England can be so far deluded, as not to see, that the *ci-devant* Dutch colonies in Asia, Africa and America, are, and must necessarily be, subject to the Consulate. Every body knows, that, the Batavian Republic is a department of France: and it requires no very deep sagacity to see, that Buonaparté will make the appurtenances of his departments subservient to the execution of his future projects.

‡ To these demonstrations, will no doubt be added some diplomatic altercation; for instance, the French minister may tread upon the British Ambassador's toes at Peterburgh, or at Constantinople; a Danish ballast-singer may be paid to draw another resemblance of the King's minister at Copenhagen, a French jew buying, or pretending to buy mulekats there, may again attempt to purchase a passport at his Excellency's office; the vice president of Iray wil arren, or cause to be decorated some dozens of our English beaux from Rome

Besides these menaces abroad, we shall be amused with the Consul's preparations at home; dozens of line-of battle ships will be launched monthly in the ports of Holland, France and Spain; gun-boats will rise in the channel like mushrooms; and St. Valery, Boulegne, Mardik, Dunkirk, and Flushing will be converted into spacious impregnable naval harbours.* Naval manœuvres,† military encampments, sham fights and reviews, will be exhibited, to astonish and terrify the swarms of our gaping countrymen, who, to the disgrace of the British name, are daily flocking to cringe and bow before their sovereign's tumid foe!

Britons have for many ages been considered as the people possessing the most laudable and dignified national pride: they are the only people in Europe who have neither been beaten, nor in any wise humiliated during the course of the late revolution war; and it is remarkable that after the peace, they are the only people who, in a contemptible admiration for a rebel chief, have lost sight of their own and their country's worth. Other nations have been despoiled and conquered, they have bowed to the tyrant's sceptre by compulsion; but peers of England, British senators, and Englishmen of all descriptions seem to regret the valor of their defenders; they are proud to be noticed in the ring of Buonaparté's gallic slaves; and hurry in

or Naples; and the Prefect of Switzerland will, by mistake, hang an English secretary there for a spy, &c.

* We believe it is intended to make St. Valery the grand naval depot for the flotillas and light squadrons of the republic, in the channel.

† In case of another war, these manœuvres will be so managed, as to make it appear to the people of England, that no serious invasion is intended; and squadrons will no doubt be sacrificed to show, that if such really was intended, to land would be impossible. To disarm, or turn our opponent off his guard is always an advantage; no matter by what means.

crowds to offer their oblations to the soul priestess of that polluted temple of treason (the Tuilleries), still rancid with a sovereign's blood! We cannot here avoid mentioning a circumstance that lately happened on the continent: one of the first monarchs in Europe, desired a nobleman at his court to prepare to go as his Ambassador, or rather Plenipotentiary, to Buonaparté; the other replied, "for the first time that ever a ——— demurred to execute the order of his master, I am, upon this occasion, proud to disobey your Majesty's commands. As an officer, I cannot be the instrument to compromise the dignity of my sovereign's crown; and as a gentleman, I dare not dishonour a nobleman who wears my name and your Majesty's uniform."

The late king of Prussia said to an English gentleman of our acquaintance—"you (meaning the British nations) are now making a last effort to subjugate Europe to fight with France until you secure to yourselves, a monopoly of the trade of the world; should you succeed, you will then soon make us repay your subsidies with usury."—Whatever the people of England may be told to the contrary, we can, from a personal knowledge of facts, affirm, that this doctrine is believed in every cabinet and by every political economist on the continent of Europe. The present dependent state and certain subjugation of Portugal, the ruin and conquest of Holland, and degradation of Spain, with a thousand circumstances of a similar nature, are artfully laid to our charge; and all the little scurrilous predictions, of our decline, that issues from the numerous presses now in all countries devoted to the cause of our enemies, are read and heard with avidity and pleasure by the people of all ranks and professions.

"Let those fools read them," say our English Politicians, "what is that to us." Did we not know the end proposed, and see the effects daily produced, by the newspaper-statements and comparative views circulated by the secretaries, clerks, and emissaries of the consulate, we might perhaps join in the chorus with our *dotard* countrymen. But we see in those productions, the advertisements and *programme* of the most formidable combination that ever was planned against an empire. And, although we know that it will not be believed conviction compels us to affirm, that Buonaparté's pamphlets and pensions have more effect in confirming the several states of Europe in their enmity towards Great Britain, than all the subsidies the British treasury can ever pay, will have in conciliating their friendship. Subsidies are, no doubt, considerations to the agents and commissaries employed in paying and receiving them, and they may have a certain momentary value with the mistress of a prince, or a minister, but they never were, nor will they ever be, a national consideration to any state. The spoils of the British empire are, on the contrary, object of the most seducing nature; scattered as they are, they suit the interests and ambition of many speculators; and the Council's liberality will, perhaps, increase, as he augments his means; We do not mean to infer, that Great Britain has any imminent danger to apprehend from the organized enmity of Europe; but as that enmity can in no wise, promote the interest of England, but, on the contrary, may prove more or less detrimental to them we think it might be as well to prevent its organization; especially as that could yet be done with much facility and to the great and permanent advantages of the British empire.

Dissertations will be periodically

circulated on the continent to shew, that the trade and manufactures of Great Britain are ruinous to all other countries, that for these hundred years past, the maritime preponderance of England has hung like a mill stone upon the neck of Europe and America; and that her politics have ruined all those states with whom she has been connected.

Other essays will be distributed amongst the people of England, setting forth, that the national debt is a burden laid on the poor, merely to augment the wealth of the rich; that is the cause of all the taxes and of the high price of provisions; that if it were abolished, porter would be sold at two pence the pot, and bread at three pence the quarter loaf; and it will be demonstrated, by metaphysical sophistry, that to pay the debts of generations past, and to fulfil the engagements of transient ministers, is no part of the duty of freemen. *To this will be added, a parallel drawn between the present state and future prospects of Great Britain and France:* wherein will be set forth,—the one, as having in 1762 passed the meridian of her power; in 1782 lost one half of the sources of her maritime trade; and as having in 1802 given up, or exposed the other half to the discretion of France; as possessing but a precarious revenue, to be pressed out of an equally precarious commerce; subject to an enormous expenditure, which may be augmented, or doubled by a single gesture by the first Consul; in fine, as a state now reduced, despoised, by the greater powers and hated by the lesser. Whereas,—France will be represented, as having by the revolution increased her European territory by one 4th; abolished her debt, doubled her revenue, tripled her power; and as having acquired more real sources of maritime trade than all Europe possesses besides; as

being now at the head of the political world, dictating to the most powerful states and protecting the weaker. In short, Great Britain will be, we may say is already, and with but too much truth, held up as being on a rapid decline; with her remaining powers resting merely upon paper, ships, wet-docks, and canals; while the republic is cried up as having built her growing prosperity and future grandeur upon solid acquisitions of territory, produce, and population*.

Such are, and will continue to be, the means, by which the rulers of France will endeavour to embarrass the finances, fatigue the Government, and depress the spirit of the British nation. *The inveterate enmity of those rulers can never be removed; for unless Great Britain be reduced to a passive inferiority, they cannot consider their republic as consolidated or secure.*

It is said, and industriously propagated, that Buonaparté having established his authority in France, it is become his personal interest to cultivate a pacific understanding with all his neighbours. And that, as he is now capable of maintaining ties of political rela-

* The present state and future prospects of Great-Britain and France compared, is, according to Parisian news, to be exposed to the public by a well known disciple of Abbé Sieyès. This arch emissary, had some of his materials arranged and presented to the King of Prussia by Colonel C—— at Berlin already in 1798. Having seen the manuscripts, we recollect, that to deliver the industry of Europe from the oppression of our *chopman laws*, as they were termed; was strongly recommended to the humanity of that young monarch. No doubt the heavy debts of our Jamaica planters, and the restrictions under which European settlers labour in Bengal, have by this time moved the compassion of this philanthropic jacobin; and we shall very soon see, a plan drawn up, according to which, the former may pay off their burdens by an act of the assembly of the island, and the latter by a similar deed, may re-assume their natural freedom of trading with whom they please. It is not unlikely, that the First Consul may think proper to disapprove of this plan; but he will certainly permit its being made public; and Mr. ——— is a supple negotiator; he has his secretaries in *mercurio* than one.

tionship with other powers, it is *their interests to support his authority.*

This reasoning has no doubt originated with the Consul's confessor, bishop Talleyrand. That it should have gained admittance and approbation in the Councils of Europe and America, seems to be owing to the baneful influence, of that hideous genius, which jacobinism and rebellion have set loose upon mankind. The fact is,—when Buonaparté signified his desire for peace, his authority *was not established*; his situation, as well as that of the republic, was, as we have mentioned, extremely critical; he sought peace with his neighbours, that he might have time to establish his authority, and to save the republic from what he considered, and what might have easily been brought about its almost certain destruction. The Consul foresaw the effects which the conquest of Egypt was to produce both in England and France; he saw the still greater effects, which, Great Britain holding the destiny of the Turkish empire in her hand, might then have produced at Peterbourg; and he knew that in America, a single word to the purpose would have obliged president Jefferson to change his system, or his place, and might have barred France, for ever, from that side of the Atlantic; nor could he consider Portugal an equivalent for Brazil. Besides, the arms of both Portugal and Spain might have been turned against him.* Under these circumstances was peace obtained,

* In this position, the Consul knew, that to have adopted a certain system of politics (which may yet be necessary when it will be more difficult to carry it into practice) the British government might, in the space of six months after the surrender of Alexandria, have drawn forth into action, all the power of Austria, Russia, America, and Spain, against the republic: not to fight for subsidy, nor for the commercial interests of Great Britain, but to fight for their own interests.

It may be said, that had Buonaparté felt himself in the predicament we have mentioned, he would not have been so haughty and imperious during the negotiation. The contempt with which the Con-

and it is no wonder Buonaparté should wish to preserve it; at least until he acquire the means to command peace or to defy war. When he believes himself in that situation, we shall see how far, and upon what terms, he is disposed to maintain his pacific relationship with his neighbours. Buonaparté has great advantages over his contemporaries. He was brought up in the world, and in active life. Beginning his career as a subaltern, his profession obliged him to think; and the habit of thinking no doubt taught him to calculate. The revolution enabled him to see men of all descriptions exposed without disguise; and now consul, he easily sees through the masks of those who have the vanity or folly to attempt to deceive him. This adventurer is in possession of absolute power has the means to make that power irresistible, and has experience at an early period of life. He is the patron and protector of all sorts of principles, professions and prejudices, and is himself bound by none.—Amongst the absurdities of the times, it is not one of the least, to hear the legislators of Great Britain propping up the power of the British empire by the discontent and broils which they foresee generating in France and with the jealousy which the politics of the republic is said to be raising amongst other continental governments. The obstinacy of infatuation is astonishing! Should the people of France be angry with the man who snatched their country from the precipice of inevitable ruin, and who raised *them* to the dictatorship of the world? And will they oppose his endeavours to consolidate their situation? But they are oppressed, said John Bull! If we ask with what?—the whole of John's *corps diplomatique* can-

ful seemed to treat the negotiation, and his arrogance upon that occasion, might be accounted for, by several reasons; but, that to mask his anxiety was one leading motive, is certain.

not tell. In politics and in public society, oppression is relative. To attempt to scare Buonaparté with the jealousy of other powers, is, perhaps, still more ridiculous? Those who have any power, are his associates in despoiling those who have none. What benefit could the change of the name of a chief produce to Great Britain, or to Europe? Would a General Moreau or a Masena be less a Frenchman than Buonaparté? No,—but we say they may be less *habile!* When the ability of enemies becomes a consideration with Britons, then alas! our legislators may go home and plant potatoes.

It must be evident to the world, that the present rulers of the republic, from whatever point of view they are taken, can only be considered as rebel chiefs. They were born subjects of their king, most of them held offices in his service, and at mature age, swore allegiance to his government; he is alive, and at this time is morally, as well entitled to sit on the throne of France, as any hereditary monarch can be to sit on the throne of his ancestors. These usurpers know, that, however pliable and passive the politics of other governments may have, now and then, appeared, it cannot be presumed that legitimate sovereigns should prostitute the dignity of their stations, and expose the safety of their persons and families in so palpable a manner, as voluntarily to sanction the rebellion, robberies, pillage, and plunder of the republic; and associate in treaties of friendship and mutual support, with the irreconcilable enemies of all legal government. The chief consul knows, that the treaties which he has imposed upon other states, are extorted bonds, and will never bind the conscience. He is well aware, that when his authority in France has occasion for help from

abroad, his part of the drama will be nearly out. Nor can he suppose that his neighbours are less sensible that the support of France implies her dominion. In short, he knows that his authority can only be legalized by ultimate success; and that *while any legal government possesses the means of opposition and resistance, the success of the French Republic cannot be considered as secure.* The consul may profess peace and friendship with all states; and he may offer alliances to the great, and protection to the weak; but every legitimate sovereign should know, that when the missionaries of Buonaparté approach his throne, they come either to spoil, crush, or undermine it. The destruction, or subjugation of all independent nations, especially of all rival powers, is with the rulers of France, *a principal of self-preservation,* and is, therefore, *interwoven with the very existence of their military community.*

We would not be understood to say, that the present government of France intends to conquer, and incorporate with the Republic, all other European states. On the contrary, we do not suppose that the consulate would with Holland, Spain, nor perhaps Italy, more immediately under the police of France than those countries now are: nor, do we believe, that while Great Britain and Russia continue in their present posture, Buonaparté would countenance a farther reduction of Austria, nor the expulsion of the Turkish government from Europe. We consider the real system of the French Republic, to be neither more nor less, than, *an universal ascendancy raised upon natural sources sufficient to maintain a preponderant power.* Such an ascendancy is essential to the existence of the Republic, and it will be pursued as long, as that fabric does exist. The obstacles which stands most

directly in the way of that pursuit, is *the naval empire of Great-Britain*; its reduction is therefore the object, upon which the hero of the nineteenth century must first employ his natural and moral faculties, and all his supernatural talents. [*Cobbett's Register.*]

THE CONTRAST, NO. 2.

The second example, we draw from Charles the second's reign: so little did England, at that time, regard the Balance of Power, that in the year 1664, War with the Dutch was entered upon, by the inconsiderate advice, and at the instigation of Parliament. This produced a close correspondence with France, tending greatly to enlarge and strengthen that Monarchy, and has since cost England a profusion of blood and treasure. It was not long however, before the eyes of the nation began to open. France was making rapid strides in power, England debilitating her resources, therefore in January 1668, a strict alliance, and in the Month following a Treaty of Commerce was concluded with the United Provinces. Charles the XIth. of Sweden acceded to the Treaty which henceforth was called the Triple League, to support the Peace made at Aix-la-Chapelle.† It was stipulated by a secret article that, in case His most Christian Majesty should refuse to accept of the Peace with Spain, as concerted by this Treaty, England and Holland were bound to wage War against France both by Sea and Land, until matters were again brought back to the condition they were in, at the Ratification of the Pyrenean Treaty.

The views of the triple league were to restore to Europe that Balance of Power, which two successful wars carried on by France against Spain

had much endangered. To understand the motives which led to this alliance, we will take a brief and cursory view of the changes which took place in the relative situation of these two Powers, and the circumstances which preceded them.

The superiority that Spain had derived from her immense wealth and extensive possessions, the Tyranny and high hand with which she exercised that superiority prior to the memorable Treaty of Munster concluded in 1648, had raised the jealousy and indignation of the other European Powers to such a degree, as made them behold with pleasure, the many and important concessions drawn from Spain in that Treaty; and demonstrate, by public rejoicings, their satisfaction at the humiliating terms, by which alone, the Catholic King obtained Peace with the United Provinces, after a vigorous War of eighty two years. The Empire, France and England, it is true, each in their turns had contributed to their support. This powerful combination produced the desired effect, for not one of the seventy nine articles of the Treaty but was calculated directly for the Benefit of the United Provinces; not one, but carries the evident mark of a forced condescension on the part of Spain.

Still, under, apprehensions, created by the remaining Power, and strengthened by the ambitious views of His Catholic Majesty, Europe tacitly acquiesced to the article of agreement between France and Spain signed and sealed in the Island of Pheasants, in the River of Bidassoa, on the confines of both Kingdoms, November the 7th 1659, commonly call'd the Pyrenean Treaty; altho' by this Treaty, France increased in territory, wealth, Population and Industry, and acquired an important chain of strong fortified Posts for her frontier.

† Martin's Recueil des Principaux Traités.

The War between these two nations had continued for the Period of 25 years, and it was thought that the losses of Spain in its prosecution, added to the many and great advantages she was forced to abandon by the treaty of Peace, would provide sufficient security against the restless spirit of Dominion which, at that time appeared to absorb every other pursuit of the Spanish Court.

In fact, by the Munster and Pyrenean Treaties, Spain lost many of her possessions, her resources were diminished, and enervated by the strong and convulsive exertions she had made during an arduous and almost general conflict which had lasted for more than a Century, she was fast sinking in the scale of Power.

After the death of Philip the fourth of Spain, Lewis the 14th considering it a favorable opportunity to enforce his unjust pretensions to the Dukedom of Brabant, the Counties of Hainault and Namur, besides several other portions of the Low Countries, invaded them at the head of a Powerful army in 1667. Prompted even at that early period, by those views of aggrandisement which were one day to stimulate him to attempt Universal Dominion, Lewis waved all consideration of honor or justice, and as well by Machiavelean arts, as by the sword, he strung every nerve to render himself master of the destinies of Europe, by reducing Spain to the narrow and desolating exigency of becoming subservient to his schemes; aided by incomparable talents and abilities in every department of state, his plan was almost realised, when the Triple League already spoken of, was opportunely concluded, gave arrest to the imperious Monarch's ambitious career, and Peace to Europe.

It is evident therefore, that En-

gland manifested, by her conduct, in these Treaties that, the due preserving the Balance of Power, was her constant pursuit; and according as the scale varied too much in favor of one or other of the contending Parties, the same Policy governed her measures. All Europe rejoiced at the conclusion of the Triple League; France, by the succession of two able, designing, and highly ambitious Ministers, Richelieu and Magazin, had acquired a greatness of Power truly formidable. Notwithstanding the fears this power naturally gave rise to, about the year 1671 the triple League was broken, thro' the ascendancy of certain religious principles which at that time engross'd the English Court; and in March 1672, War with Holland was again proclaimed, but very much against the advice of Parliament: so that in the year following the Lords and Commons represented to the King that, "France was profiting by this unnatural contest, and was increasing, by the means of England, in power, strength and reputation:" they advised a speedy treaty with the United Provinces, in order to a solid and lasting Peace. The inclinations of the Court were unfortunately not found to correspond with this salutary advice. It was not till the year 1677, that the apathy which had passed the nation, the Lethargy which had so long intranced its Councils began to subside. Reflecting upon the immense treasure of blood and money expended by their ancestors to keep the Continental Powers within their due and moderate limits, with what acrimony did the people revile themselves for basely administering to the plans of France by assisting her to erect an Empire far more alarming, than the most excessive growth of the Spanish Monarchy! For some time after the restoration, the Court was drown'd in luxury, and plung'd into

every kind of corruption; the Gentry softened into Pleasures by the example of a young Prince, and the body of the people enervated, attentive only to the means of satiating vicious appetites. All this time the arms of France were victorious. The inferior states stoop'd to her fortune, and courted her power. Spain tho' weak, and Austria supported only by the German valour, true however to sound principles of Policy were her rivals. England that could alone afford strong and effectual opposition, was fated, in those days, to behold the Guardianship of her liberties and interests in polluted hands, and her public spirit expiring upon a scaffold raised by pensions, bribes and offices.

Silvestris.

(Tu be continued.)

Observations sur le procès de M^r. Peltier extrait du Papier Officiel du Gouvernement François.

Un nommé Peltier a été condamné par les tribunaux de Londres, pour avoir imprimé de misérables libelles contre le premier Consul. On ne conçoit pas trop pourquoi le ministère Anglois a voulu donner tant d'éclat à tout ceci.

Dans le système de l'Europe, toutes les nations civilisées ont réciproquement des devoirs à remplir; elles doivent se montrer d'autant plus de respect que le système opposé qui ne laisse pas d'avoir des partisans dans tous les pays, ne tendroit à rien moins qu'à nous jeter dans la barbarie et dans l'anarchie. (Quoique cette phrase soit officielle, elle ne laisse pas que d'être intelligible. Quoique le premier Consul soit étranger, son journal officiel pourroit être écrit en François.)

On conçoit donc tout aussi peu l'intérêt qu'ont peut avoir, en Angleterre à soutenir et à autoriser toutes les infamies que vomissent les libellis-

tes du pays, et moins encore celui qu'on a à y protéger les libellistes François qui s'y sont établis pendant la guerre, que l'on conçoit l'inutilité de cette procédure d'apparat et d'ostentation. (Cette phrase n'est pas plus Française que la précédente. Il est vrai qu'elle n'est pas moins officielle.)

L'alien bill donne au ministère le pouvoir de chasser les étrangers, et le ministère en use largement. Plus de vingt François domiciliés et connus, ont été renvoyés d'Angleterre sans plus de formalités. Il y a peu de jours encore que le citoyen Bonnacarrère, chef de bataillon de la garde nationale de Paris, ayant un procès à Londres, et sa femme y étant malade, reçut l'ordre d'en sortir sous 48 heures. (Il y a aussi une faute dans cet article; et le style est celui d'un étranger qui étudie la langue Française. Peut-être l'auteur est-il né dans quelques-unes des îles de la Méditerranée. On est tenté de le croire, en voyant qu'il a la prétention d'apprendre au Roi d'Angleterre ce que S. M. doit faire pour montrer à l'Europe qu'elle se respecte.)

Nous connoissons des individus établis et domiciliés depuis 30 ans à Londres, qui ont depuis peu été atteints par cette mesure. Pourquoi donc s'amuser à trainer avec appareil devant un tribunal respectable des étrangers malfaiteurs tels qu'il en paroit toujours à la suite des grandes commotions politiques? Il suffit que les sous-ministres de Lord Pelham leur disent sérieusement, n'écrivez plus, et ils se tairont; et s'ils ne le font pas, *l'alien bill* donne le pouvoir de les chasser.

Le Roi d'Angleterre doit au respect de sa personne, et à l'honneur de sa nation, de mettre enfin un terme à ces outrages faits à un gouvernement et à une nation voisine avec qui il est en paix, et auprès de qui il tient des Ambassadeurs aussi distingués par leur rang, que recommandables par leurs qualités personnelles.

Cependant il faut convenir que si cette procédure étoit inutile, elle a donné lieu, au moins Magistrats distingués du tribunal criminel de Londres, de faire preuve de sagesse, et de se montrer dignes d'administrer la justice chez une nation si éclairée et si recommandable à tant de titres.

The News. Letters from Liverpool of the 8th May, were received in Town yesterday evening, by the Sally. These letters state, that Lord Whitworth had left Paris, that the French Ambassador was preparing for his departure from London, and that War was, therefore, considered as inevitable. Letters of the 1st June, from St. John's Newfoundland, by the Lovely, contain accounts of a similar nature.

We give this intelligence as we have it, and every one may attach to it that degree of credit which he thinks it deserves.

ORIGINAL POETRY.

Vers à Mademoiselle P...y C.....d.

SUR UN RUISSEAU.

O Toi, qui reposais sur ton urne tranquille,
Toi, que mille Rochers couvroient de leurs ramparts,
Ruisseau, pourquoy sortir du fond de ton azyle ?
Ah ! crains le bruit et les regards ;
Un soleil impasant, des campagnes riantes,
Des jours étincelans et des nuits plus touchantes,
Teut promettre le bonheur, mais tout a des hasards :
Tu t'échappes, tu suis guidé par l'espérance ;
Mais ce bonheur dont l'apparence
Fait frémir tes flots agités,
Ce bonheur que tu suis n'est qu'une ombre infidèle :
En vain ton murmure l'appelle ;
Il fuira désormais à pas précipités.
Loin de ces amoureux ombrages,
Hélas ! ne crois pas que toujours
Lés Cieux, d'un rayon pur éclairent tes rivages ;
Il s'élève de noirs orages,
Même au milieu des plus beaux jours.
Je parle en vain : tu suis le penchant qui t'entraîne
Vers la rive inconnue où tu dois reposer :
Tu vas chercher la région lointaine,
Qui pourra le débâfuser.
En cet instant la nature est parée
Des plus éclatantes couleurs ;
Le Soleil plane seul dans la nuit la voute azurée ;
Tout sourit, Amusé de présages trompeurs

Tu fuis le vallon solitaire ;
Et dans ton cours, ô Ruisseau téméraire,
Tu ne prévois que d'aimables erreurs,
Hé bien ! obéis donc à ta pente invincible ;
Et quitte de ces bords les constantes douceurs.
Puisse ton onde, en sa course paisible,
Ne voir, n'arrêter que des fleurs !
Puisse les Dryades charmantes,
Sous un feuillage toujours frais,
Confiées à tes eaux errantes
Le doux trésor de leurs attraits !
Que ta source heureuse et sacrée
Frémisse en les touchant, d'amour et de plaisir !
Qu'à tes flots caressans la bergère livrée,
Trouve, dans son âme enivrée,
Le premier sentiment ou le premier désir !
Et si jamais travestissant ma Patrie,
Tu viens baigner, après quelques détours,
Cette terre hélas ! si chérie,
Où j'ai vu naître les premiers jours
Mes sentiments pour Marie....
O Ruisseau fortuné ! ralentis un moment
Le cours impatient de ton onde incertaine ;
Va soupirer aux pieds de celle qui m'enchaîne,
Et porte lui les vœux du plus fidèle amant !
Heureux Ruisseau, quand sur ta rive
Elle ira rêver en secret,
Si, sur ton onde fugitive,
Elle jette un regard distrait :
Ah ! qu'une émotion, ... que son cœur interprète,
Lui dise que tu viens du fond de ma retraite :
Dans le plus triste de mes jours,
Que mon image retracée
Occupe un moment sa pensée
Du souvenir de mes amours !

MARCHE'S A QUEBEC, 18 Juin, 1803.

Farine p. q.	115 Sd.	à 150	Lard par lb.	7 1/2 d
Son - do - -	55	Suif do	6 1/2 d	à 9 d
Pois par minot	55 à 85	40	Beurre en Tin.	11 d
Patates p. do.	2/6 à 35.	120	Ditto frais	15 à 17/3
Avoine p. do.	33	Dinde p. coup.		75
Bœuf par lb.	- 50	Oies p. do	25	6d à 45
Do. p. quartier (point)		Poulets p. do		2/6 à 35
Veau par lb.	6d à 7 1/2 d	Anguilles		
Do en quartiers	25	6d	Morue	5d à 25
Mouton p. lb.	7 1/2 d	Foin par cent		355 à 505
Do. p. quartier (point)		Paille par do		125
Sain Doux do 9d à 15 3d		Bois p. corde		125
Beef p. Tierce 44. 105.		Pork p. barl.		5 1/2. 105. 41.
Pain Blanc 3 lb. 2 onces		Bis 3 lb. 12 onces.		6d

METEOROLOGICAL TABLE, JUNE 1803.

Days.	Mo. Age.	Weather.	Wds.	Barometer.		Thermo.	
				Inches.		Degrees.	
				M.	A.	M.	A.
12	(fine		29.5	29.4	68	83
13		fine		29.4	29.4	62	77
14		fine.		29.4	29.4	64	68
15		fine	-	29.5	29.5	61	75
16		thun. shw.		29.4	29.3	64	70
17		cloudy.		29.3	29.3	63	74
18		fine		29.4		70	

☉ N. Moon. ☽ 1st. Quar. ☉ P. Moon. ☾ 1st 1/2.