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CANADIAN POLICY ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
EXCERPTS FROM OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

**CANADIAN POLICY ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
EXCERPTS FROM OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Antarctic Treaty Accession	1
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT)	1
Arms Registry	1
Bilateral Negotiations	2
Canadian Role	2
Central America	4
Chemical Weapons	4
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)	5
Confidence Building	6
Conflict Resolution	6
Conventional Arms Control	7
Defence White Paper	7
Disarmament and Development	8
East/West Relations	9
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement	9
Multilateral Negotiations	10
Nature of Agreements	10
Naval Visits	11
Neutrality	11
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)	12
North	12
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	13
Nuclear-Powered Submarines	14
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone	14
Objectives	14
Outer Space	15
Peacekeeping	16
Security Policy	16
Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures - 1986	16
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II)	17
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)	18
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)	18
United Nations	19
Verification	19

ANTARCTIC TREATY ACCESSION

Secretary of State for External Affairs, (News Release,
May 4, 1988.)

Canada wishes to endorse a Treaty that has created the world's sole, effective non-militarized area. Canada is acutely aware of the uniqueness of the Antarctica and will, through accession to the Treaty, be better able to work for the protection of its sensitive environment and dependent ecosystems.

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

Secretary of State for External Affairs
(Statement, March 5, 1987)

The Canadian Government has consistently supported the USA in its adherence to the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Any move to a broader interpretation could have significant political and strategic ramifications for international stability and security, and these require close scrutiny and considered analysis. Any unilateral action by either party to the Treaty that could have a negative impact on the current strategic balance would be regarded by Canada with profound concern. Furthermore, the potentially negative implications for the summit process, arms control and East/West relations generally need to be carefully examined before any such action is undertaken. In particular, the Government would greatly regret the implementation of any policy, by either party, with regard to the ABM Treaty that might adversely affect the Geneva negotiations; especially in view of recent developments on intermediate-range nuclear forces. We are sure that the United States is clearly aware of all of these possible consequences and will reflect upon them carefully in the context of its current considerations on this question.

(SEE ALSO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS)

ARMS REGISTRY

Under Secretary of State for External Affairs,
(Arms Transfer Conference, Ottawa, October 21, 1987)

For many countries a register of arms transfers would provide a full inventory of military capabilities. It is perhaps instructive in this regard to note that despite repeated UN resolutions scarcely more than 20 states register with the UN their levels of military expenditure. Canada is one of the few countries that does so.

(SEE ALSO CONFIDENCE BUILDING)

BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador for Disarmament, (United Nations Disarmament Commission, New York, May 3, 1988)

Recent international developments have contributed to an environment that bodes well for arms control and disarmament. In December 1987, the USA and USSR signed the INF Treaty which is the first agreement to eliminate an entire class of nuclear missiles. It is a particularly significant document in that it incorporates the principle of asymmetric reductions as well as precedent-setting provisions regarding destruction of these weapons and verification. Progress, even if not as fast as would wish, is also continuing with respect to an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning deep cuts in strategic nuclear missiles. Such an agreement would be one of the most significant arms control accomplishments since the Second World War and would have important positive ramifications in many other fields of international relations. Another promising development between the two superpowers has been the commencement of negotiations aimed at further limitations respecting nuclear testing.

(SEE ALSO INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) AGREEMENT AND STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START))

CANADIAN ROLE

Prime Minister, (Press Release, December 10, 1987)

I believe there are five essential principles by which Canada should be guided as we enter this new and path-breaking phase of East-West relations.

First, we must do everything possible to promote greater communication between the peoples of East and West. Through visits, through cooperation in the Arctic and in cultural exchanges, through trade, we can do much to break down the walls of distrust and suspicion.

Second, we must continue to make a full and effective contribution to collective defence, alongside our friends and allies. Working together and maintaining a strong deterrent, in conjunction with dialogue, has brought us this far; it can take us even farther. Canada is doing its part, as the Defence White Paper shows.

Third, I reaffirm our goal of vigorously promoting progress in arms control and disarmament. The objectives in the nuclear, space, chemical and conventional field that I set out in 1985 are as valid today as they were then. We will continue to work in every forum available to us - in NATO, in the Conference on Disarmament, in conventional arms talks - to

achieve this purpose. We may not be at every negotiating table, but our commitment and expertise will be brought to bear wherever they can contribute effectively.

The goal in all these areas is stability; stability at lower levels of arms, and stability in the relationship between offence and defence.

An enduring security structure, however, requires a broader basis of confidence than we have had in the past.

Canada's fourth principle, therefore, is to encourage a more constructive Soviet role internationally. We welcome a world in which the Soviet Union is a committed, responsible partner, whether in political or economic matters. We encourage this, and look to the Soviet Union to match its words with action.

Fifth, we will continue to stress the human side of East-West relations. Canadians believe deeply that families wishing to be reunited should be permitted to do so. We believe in religious freedom, the right to emigrate and the right to dissent. We will continue to raise our voice on these matters at the Vienna Meeting on European Security and Cooperation. And we will not cease until we are satisfied that international standards are being met.

Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, (8th World Congress of the IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War), Montreal, June 3, 1988.)

Canada is committed to playing an active role in the arms control and disarmament process. Firstly, recognizing and respecting the bilateral nature of the some of the key negotiations, Canada regularly communicates its views and support to both the USSR and the USA. It is, however, Canada's view that we are entering a period in which multilateral arms control agreements will be increasingly significant and necessary. Canada is an active member of all the significant multilateral arms control and disarmament bodies-including the Conference on Disarmament, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks, and the new mandate negotiations on conventional stability in Europe and the CSCE. Canada is especially committed to the role of the U.N. in international peace and security. We are the fourth largest contributor to that organization and are actively involved in seeking to strengthen its role including the contribution it can make in the arms control and security process.

(SEE ALSO CONFIDENCE BUILDING, CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, EAST-WEST RELATIONS, NORTH, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO), OBJECTIVES AND STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES-1986)

CENTRAL AMERICA

Secretary of State for External Affairs, (42nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, Sept. 22, 1987)

Canada supports the initiatives of the Central American presidents. We are prepared to provide our expertise mechanisms which, once peace is possible, can help it endure. The disputes must be resolved by those actually involved in the conflict, but Canada is prepared to contribute to that process in any direct and practical way open to us.

Canadian aid to the region has been steadily increasing, as has our funding and acceptance of refugees. We have expressed our view that the root problem in Central America is poverty, not ideology; that the real need is development assistance, not military activity; and that intervention by outside powers will only aggravate the tensions. We have supported the Contadora process, and have made available to Contadora the expertise Canadians have acquired in the techniques of peacekeeping.

(SEE ALSO CONFLICT RESOLUTION)

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Ambassador for Disarmament, (42nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, First Committee, New York, October 13, 1987)

Nuclear weapons, of course, are not the only weapons of mass destruction. There are also chemical weapons... The known existence and use of chemical weapons underline the importance of concluding as soon as possible a comprehensive ban on these abhorrent weapons. We should note that real progress has continued during the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament. A treaty banning chemical weapons will require the most complex set of verification measures ever included in a multilateral arms control agreement. It is therefore important that the negotiators proceed with special care and diligence, making as much speed as is consistent with thoroughness.

Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, (McGill University Centre for Research in Air and Space Law Symposium on Space Surveillance for Arms Control and Verification, Montreal, October 21, 1987).

It perhaps needs to be emphasized that the successful conclusion of a treaty is of importance not solely, perhaps not even mainly, in that limited context. Chemical weapons pose a global problem. CW capabilities and arsenals are not confined to the East-West context. In other areas of the world, CW capabilities exist and may have a proportionately greater

military significance there... We must hope that countries from all regions recognize a common interest in the earliest possible conclusion and implementation of an effective ban, and will make their proportionate contribution to the final stages of the negotiation.

(SEE ALSO OBJECTIVES AND VERIFICATION)

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Ambassador for Disarmament, (United Nations Disarmament Commission, New York, May 5, 1987)

On February 7, 1986 the Canadian Government announced its decision to spend \$3.2 million over three years to upgrade the Yellowknife Seismic Array as a major Canadian contribution to research into monitoring an eventual comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). In October, 1985, a two-year research grant was awarded to the University of Toronto to examine the effectiveness of using regional seismic data, to discriminate between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions, including those conducted in decoupled situations. And in October of 1986, Canada hosted a technical workshop for seismic and data communications specialists from 17 countries to discuss the exchange of seismic waveform data.

Ambassador for Disarmament, (United Nations General Assembly, First Committee, New York, November 4, 1987)

The realization of a negotiated and verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty has long been, and remains, a fundamental Canadian arms control and disarmament objective. This objective can never be achieved, however, without the full support and cooperation of all the nuclear weapon states. Therefore, while negotiations between the superpowers are of crucial importance, the importance of efforts at the multilateral level must not be underestimated.

Canada supports a step-by-step approach to the realization of an eventual comprehensive test ban treaty. A meaningful start within the Conference on Disarmament would be the consideration of the questions of scope, compliance and verification. We should not lose sight of the fact that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is not an end in itself, but is rather a means to the ultimate goal which is the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. I would submit that the primary purpose of the reduction and cessation of nuclear testing should be to enhance confidence in the global arms control and disarmament process.

(SEE ALSO MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, OBJECTIVES AND VERIFICATION)

CONFIDENCE BUILDING

Secretary of State for External Affairs (Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III), New York, June 13, 1988.)

Canada sees confidence-building as essential to arms control and disarmament. We regard the concepts of openness, transparency and predictability as imperative. The establishment of agreed procedures for inspections at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in September 1986 is an accomplishment which stands as a precedent and model for other arms control negotiations, at bilateral or regional levels.

The principles essential to the success of confidence-building measures should be promoted on every occasion. In this regard, we urge members of the United Nations to comply with the General Assembly recommendation on reporting annual military expenditures. Only 20 or so countries regularly comply with this recommendation. It is a small step, but we cannot hope to take larger steps without more members of this Assembly giving effect to our own recommendations.

(SEE ALSO ARMS REGISTRY, OBJECTIVES AND UNITED NATIONS)

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Minister of National Defence, (Empire Club, Toronto, January 15, 1987)

Reductions in nuclear weapons alone are not sufficient to enhance our security. The debate continues to centre on whether it is weapons or people and their political systems which cause conflicts. The truth is it is probably both to some extent. Competition in arms may indeed fuel mistrust, and temporary advantage may encourage adventurism. However, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and the fostering of mechanisms to bridge the differences that give rise to mistrust and conflict, are absolutely essential if we are to build a better and safer world. If conflicts are to be resolved in non-military ways, then each and every one of us bears a responsibility for encouraging the processes of conflict resolution and peace-making.

(SEE ALSO CENTRAL AMERICA, PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY POLICY)

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Ambassador for Disarmament, (United Nations Disarmament Commission, New York, May 5, 1987)

Canada strongly supports an increased focus of international attention on the subject of conventional disarmament. At least 80% of global spending on arms is directed to conventional armaments. More than 20 million people have died in conflicts fought with conventional weapons since 1945. We believe it must be borne in mind, that as progress is made in achieving nuclear arms limitations, questions concerning levels of conventional weapons will become increasingly important.

Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, (McGill University Centre for Research in Air and Space Law Symposium on Space Surveillance for Arms Control and Verification, October 21, 1987)

Already, the pending INF agreement has triggered vigorous discussion about the most desirable combination of conventional and nuclear military forces which ought to be retained in order to preserve and strengthen stability in the European theatre, a debate which will predictably continue for some time. This increased awareness of the interrelationship between conventional and nuclear forces, particularly at the theatre level, has doubtless been one of the factors which has given impetus to the efforts to formulate a mandate for negotiations among members of the two major alliances, within the CSCE framework, on conventional force levels in Europe. At the strategic level, the USA and USSR have recognized in their own agreed negotiating mandate, the importance of giving attention to the balance between offensive and defensive forces. If we are successful, over the coming period, in moving toward significantly reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, those interrelationships among different kinds of force deployments, and related arms control measures, will acquire yet greater importance.

(SEE ALSO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, CONFIDENCE BUILDING, AND STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES-1986)

DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

Minister of National Defence, (House of Commons, Tabling of White Paper, Ottawa, June 5, 1987)

The main thrusts are, first, that Canada will continue to base its security policy on three pillars: the maintenance of an adequate defence; the pursuit of equitable and verifiable arms control and disarmament measures; and participation in

peace-keeping operations and negotiations to achieve peaceful settlements of international disputes; second, that Canada will remain a committed member of NATO and will continue to contribute land, sea and air forces to the integrated military structure of the North Atlantic Alliance; third, that within this framework we will remain an active partner in continental defence arrangements with the United States and contribute forces to the joint North American Aerospace Defence Command; and fourth, that to meet the changing alliance needs and national requirements, the force structure of the Canadian forces will be modified over time to meet the requirement for a well balanced three ocean Navy, including the acquisition of nuclear powered submarines and a second batch of Canadian patrol frigates; to consolidate in NATO's central front our major land and Air Force commitments in Europe; and to revitalize the reserve forces to make them capable of supporting and sustaining our military commitments both at home and abroad."

(SEE ALSO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO),
NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES, OBJECTIVES, PEACEKEEPING,
SECURITY POLICY AND VERIFICATION)

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Ambassador for Disarmament, (World Federation of United Nations Associations, Ottawa, August 17, 1987)

Disarmament and development are fundamental tenets of Canadian foreign policy. The principal objective of Canadian development assistance is to promote economic and social progress in developing countries. In choosing to focus such assistance largely on a regional basis, the Canadian Government recognizes that development has an important role in reducing regional instability caused by basic economic and social deprivation, which can in turn lead to arms build-up and hostilities.

Secretary of State for External Affairs, (Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III), New York, June 13, 1988)

Last year, the Disarmament and Development conference issued a final document stressing the multi-dimensional nature of security. The participants rejected both a direct linkage between disarmament and development and the creation of a fund. Nations like Canada already have mechanisms for providing funds to development, as does the United Nations itself, and in many developing countries there are ample existing claims upon any resources made available through disarmament.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Ambassador for Disarmament, (Cross-Canada Tour,
December 8, 1987)

At their Reykjavik Summit of 1986, both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev suddenly projected a vision of a nuclear-free planet, which startled the world with its implication that East-West confrontation might possibly give way to a new approach to international cooperation. This vision requires many steps to bring it about, but the continuing discussion of the full meaning of Reykjavik itself represents a new sense of direction for the international community.

INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) AGREEMENT

Secretary of State for External Affairs, (Communiqué,
December 8, 1987)

This agreement is an unprecedented breakthrough in efforts to reverse the nuclear arms spiral and engage in actual reductions in nuclear arms rather than just their limitation. The INF accord will result in the complete elimination of an entire category of nuclear missiles and is therefore the first nuclear disarmament agreement in modern history.

The outcome of the INF negotiations has reaffirmed the validity of NATO's December, 1979, "double-track" decision. It underlines the important role Alliance unity and solidarity have played throughout. The difficult decisions taken over the past 8 years on the issue of INF have had a direct bearing on the successful outcome of these negotiations. Canada is satisfied with the results and looks forward with anticipation to similarly successful conclusions to other arms control negotiations currently underway.

Prime Minister, (Statement, December 10, 1987)

On Tuesday December 8, (1987), President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed an historic agreement to eliminate intermediate range nuclear missiles. I am sure that all Canadians applaud this treaty as a pragmatic step towards a better and safer world. It is a celebration of common sense over adversity.

The agreement requires the complete dismantling and destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. For the first time in the nuclear age, a whole class of superpower weapons will not be merely limited, but eliminated completely.

(SEE ALSO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO))

MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

Secretary of State for External Affairs, (Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III), New York, June 13, 1988.)

There has also been some movement forward in non-East-West forums but it has been much less spectacular. The Conference on Disarmament has made some progress on negotiations on a global convention to ban chemical weapons, but the repeated reports about the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War only demonstrates how far we are from an effective agreement and the urgency of our obligations. There was also progress in last year's successful Disarmament and Development Conference, the endorsement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the Third Review Conference of the Treaty, the inclusion of conventional disarmament on the agenda of the United Nations and the consensus report of the UNDC on verification.

Indeed, one of the happy consequences of the Reagan-Gorbachev summits is to broaden the responsibility for arms control. For some time, the focus of arms control discussions was to encourage the superpowers to act. Now the superpowers are acting, and the question becomes whether other states are prepared to demonstrate themselves the leadership we have asked of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is no longer enough to advocate action by others. Whether the issue is chemical weapons or adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or fidelity to the recommendations of the General Assembly, the new climate involves new obligations for all of us.

(SEE ALSO CHEMICAL WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT), UNITED NATIONS AND VERIFICATION)

NATURE OF AGREEMENTS

(Secretary of State for External Affairs, (Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III), New York, June 13, 1988)

Experience has shown that successful arms control and disarmament agreements share a number of essential qualities. The first and most obvious is enhanced security. Arms control agreements must maintain and enhance the security of all those involved in the negotiation.

There are other essential qualities as well.

One is mutual benefit. Realism in arms control demands that a successful negotiation offer something for all parties.

Negotiations must also be substantive. We must not spend our time negotiating the non-essential or the frivolous. A proliferation of arms control forums is not likely to lead to more arms control agreements unless they have clear and substantive mandates.

Arms control agreements must also be crafted to ensure that the benefits of limits on weapons are not undone by redeployment or by qualitative improvements to remaining weapons.

A fifth, and related criterion, is non-transferability of the threat. Arms control agreements will achieve little and are unlikely to succeed if they remove the threat from one region by increasing it in another.

Finally, an arms control agreement must be verifiable. The agreement must include not only thorough verification provisions, but the substance of the agreement must be such that compliance can be effectively demonstrated.

(SEE ALSO VERIFICATION)

NAVAL VISITS

Minister of National Defence
(Empire Club, Toronto, January 15, 1987)

Canada's policy of granting access to Canadian ports by allied naval vessels, some of which may be equipped to carry nuclear munitions, is criticized by those who would ban nuclear weapons from our waters. These ships, while not Canadian, contribute to the Defence of Canada within the Alliance.

Since navies must be ready for action at all times, they must load and carry stores and ammunition for all contingencies. Port visits are frequently made on the occasion of exercises during which allied ships practise combined operations to the mutual benefit of all. They are a normal and necessary ingredient of Canada's membership in an Alliance and of acceptance of the protection offered by collective defence.

(SEE ALSO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)
AND SECURITY POLICY)

NEUTRALITY

Minister of National Defence
(Empire Club, Toronto, January 15, 1987)

Bearing in mind our geographic location, I do not believe that a neutral cordon around Canada would make us safer or improve the global situation by the example it would set.

Even if we could afford it, the cost for Canada of going it alone would be very much greater, with no assurance that we would be any more secure. Arguably, we could end up being much less so. In any case how could we hope to enforce Canadian neutrality or even verify that it was being respected?

To opt out would be to give up the collective development of all security measures, which includes arms control, in the North Atlantic Alliance. A disarmed or neutral Canada would not have become part of the process of security and cooperation building in Europe begun with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. We could not then have contributed to the success of the Stockholm Conference, nor have a seat at the table of the current Vienna meeting continuing the Helsinki process. We could not have become participants in European conventional arms control negotiations, and could not be part of allied consultations on nuclear arms control.

(SEE ALSO CONFIDENCE BUILDING, CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) AND SECURITY POLICY)

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

Ambassador for Disarmament

(Downtown Rotary Club, Edmonton, February 25, 1988)

The maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime is critical both to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries and ensuring the safe transfer of technology and materials for the development of nuclear power systems. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Canada worked to uphold at the 1985 review, now numbers 131 states, making it the largest multilateral arms treaty in the world.

(SEE ALSO OBJECTIVES)

NORTH

Secretary of State for External Affairs, (Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues, Tromso, Norway Dec. 9, 1987)

Our Government's response to the joint parliamentary review of international relations focussed on four broad themes of a "comprehensive northern foreign policy". These themes are:

- affirming Canadian sovereignty;
- modernizing Canada's northern defences;
- preparing for the commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and

- promoting enhanced circumpolar cooperation.

In Canada's view, the best prospects for progress toward enhanced security in the Arctic lie in a balanced, step-by-step approach to arms control and disarmament. Our security in the Arctic is a direct function both of the solidarity and cohesion of the Alliance, the climate of East-West relations and progress toward balanced reductions of nuclear weapons.

(SEE ALSO EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO))

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

Minister of National Defence, (Empire Club, Toronto,
January 15, 1987)

Canada has freely chosen to combine with other like-minded democracies in collective security arrangements in the unshakable belief that it is through collective defence undertakings that our protection is best assured.

We are not in NATO and in Europe today simply out of a spirit of altruism. We are there because our interests as a nation require us to be there and because the loss of a free Europe would be a grave blow to our ability to maintain our democratic freedoms here in Canada. There can be no doubt that the defence of Western Europe continues to be critical to the defence of the Canada we wish to preserve.

The NATO strategy seeks, by maintaining credible forces, to prevent the outbreak of war. Our goal is to convince a potential opponent that the cost of attack simply outweighs any benefits: to convince any aggressor that it simply isn't worth it.

Prime Minister, (North Atlantic Assembly, Quebec City,
May 23, 1987)

I can assure you that is the intention of this government that Canada should continue to play its full part in the North Atlantic alliance, to consolidate and enhance our role in the alliance; to maintain and reinforce our participation in the integrated NATO command structure. There is no doubt that the alliance is evolving.

NATO remains vital to the defence of Europe and North America, and to our way of life. It remains an alliance in the best sense of the word -- while each partner acts in its own national interest, with its sovereignty undiminished, all are determined to act in the common interest.

(SEE ALSO DEFENCE WHITE PAPER AND SECURITY POLICY)

NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES

Minister of National Defence

(House of Commons, Tabling of White Paper, Ottawa, June 5, 1987)

The navy vessels which we are planning to acquire will be delivered through the next decade and beyond and will last, and represent Canada's naval capability, well into the next century. Our studies have shown us that in that time frame the most effective way of conducting anti-submarine warfare operations in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans would be with a balanced Maritime force comprising surface vessels with helicopters, nuclear-powered submarines and Maritime patrol aircraft. This balance is now lacking. Such a balanced fleet mix will also offer Canada the option of submarine operations under the ice of her northern waters.

(SEE ALSO DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, NORTH, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) AND SECURITY POLICY)

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE

Minister of National Defence

(Empire Club, Toronto, January 18, 1987)

Would the declaration of Canada as a nuclear-weapon-free zone make Canadians safer? Unfortunately, such a unilateral act does not provide the security its advocates suggest. A nation of nuclear-free zones is not a nuclear-weapon-safe nation. Such a declaration would not by itself eliminate a single nuclear weapon or reduce the differences which divide East and West. Indeed, as the Toronto Sun observed, "it serves more to comfort our enemies and confound our allies". I do not believe that any worthy aim would be achieved by divorcing Canada from weapons and policies which, despite our action, would continue to provide security to Canadians. Along with all our NATO partners, we have rejected this course as illusory.

(SEE ALSO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) AND SECURITY POLICY)

OBJECTIVES

Prime Minister, (North Atlantic Assembly, Quebec City, May 23, 1987)

Within the field of arms control and disarmament our Government has six specific objectives:

- negotiated radical reductions in nuclear forces and the enhancement of stability;

- maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
- negotiation of a global chemical weapons ban;
- support for a comprehensive test ban treaty;
- prevention of an arms race in outer space; and
- the building of confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of conventional military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

(SEE ALSO CANADIAN ROLE, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT), CONFIDENCE BUILDING, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) AND STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES-1986)

OUTER SPACE

Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, (Departmental of External Affairs Workshop on Outer Space and Arms Control, Ottawa, May 15, 1987)

I think it is fair to say that Canada has been second to none in making substantive contributions to the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on this subject. We have sought to expand the existing pool of knowledge in this area through the preparation of three working papers on the outer space issue that have been tabled in the CD. These deal with the stabilizing and destabilizing characteristics of arms control agreements in outer space; with international law relevant to arms control in outer space; and with technology relevant to outer space. These papers are not meant to reflect a particularly Canadian Government viewpoint but rather to build upon the pool of information in this area and to outline the issues in a comprehensive fashion.

Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, (Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, July 26, 1988)

It is clear that the multilateral dimension of arms control in outer space is gaining increasing importance and will continue to do so. This is as it should be. Given 1) the potential for an arms race in outer space, 2) the increase in the number of countries with significant interests and capabilities in space and 3) the continuing growth in space activities, the Canadian government believes that it is appropriate that this dimension should take on and, indeed, that it must take on increasing significance.

(SEE ALSO OBJECTIVES)

PEACEKEEPING

Minister for External Relations and International Development, (House of Commons, Ottawa, August 24, 1988)

The use of our armed forces for peacekeeping or truce supervision, under United Nations or other international auspices, serves our national interest as well as the broader community. That is why we agreed in October 1987 to increase the strength of our contingent in Cyprus to offset the withdrawal of the Swedish troops. That is why we agreed more recently to take part in the Observer Group in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is why we did not hesitate when asked by the Secretary General to take part in the United Nations Iran-Iraq operation.

(SEE ALSO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, DEFENCE WHITE PAPER AND SECURITY POLICY)

SECURITY POLICY

Prime Minister, (North Atlantic Assembly, Quebec City, May 23, 1987)

Canada's security policy comprises three interrelated elements:

- a strong commitment to collective defence in NATO and NORAD;
- participating in peacekeeping and other conflict resolution efforts;
- encouraging effective arms control and disarmament.

(SEE ALSO CANADIAN ROLE, CONFLICT RESOLUTION, DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, OBJECTIVES AND PEACEKEEPING)

STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES - 1986

Under Secretary of State for External Affairs (International Conference on Implementing a Global Chemical Weapons Convention, Ottawa, October 7, 1987)

Arms control has traditionally largely confined itself to the issue of military capability, leaving the question of intent to largely declaratory political gestures. Herein lies the great significance of the agreement in Stockholm in 1986 on specific measures, subject to agreed verification procedures, designed to increase mutual assurance about the benign military intent of parties to the agreement. The notably efficient and effective way in which challenge inspections of conventional military exercises were recently conducted on the territories

of the USSR and of the German Democratic Republic respectively is a most welcome development. So, too, are recent formulations by official spokesmen of the USSR which speak in terms of a "sufficiency" of military force. More than at any time in recent years, parties on all sides of the East-West divide seem to accept that security is a matter of mutuality. Neither side can feel secure unless both do.

Ambassador for Disarmament, (Downtown Rotary Club, Edmonton, February 25, 1988)

Confidence-building measures are important not only in their own right but also because they improve the East-West negotiating atmosphere. Canada was a member of the 35-nation conference in Stockholm on Confidence-and-Security-Building Measures in Europe and actively aided the implementation of the agreement, which provides a system of greater military transparency in Europe. Another important aspect of "confidence-building" is the promotion of East-West exchanges, both official and unofficial. There are a number of specific exchange agreements between Canada and the Soviet Union (e.g. Arctic scientists) as well as with other East European countries (medical exchanges with Poland, sports exchanges with the German Democratic Republic). A wide range of private exchanges includes art exhibits, musicians, academics, athletes, authors.

(SEE ALSO CANADIAN ROLE, CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS)

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT II)

Prime Minister, (North Atlantic Assembly, Quebec City, May 23, 1987)

Although arms control can assist in improving political relations, it cannot, by itself, remake those relations. But arms control does create precedents, rules of the road which can guide the competition. It does create a framework of predictability. This is why the Government of Canada has consistently expressed the view that the SALT agreements and the ABM treaty should be adhered to by both sides.

(SEE ALSO ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY (ABMT), BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START))

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)

Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament
(Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, July 1987)

The evident seriousness with which the USA and the USSR are pursuing additional arms control agreements is a further reason for encouragement. In particular, the priority attention now being given to the negotiation of a major reduction in strategic nuclear weapons deserves our full support. The successful conclusion of such an agreement would be a key contribution to the central objective of the arms control process - enhanced security at much lower levels of armaments.

(SEE ALSO ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY, BILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS AND STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT II))

STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE (SDI)

Secretary of State for External Affairs, (Statement,
March 5, 1987)

Canada has expressed its support for the Strategic Defence Initiative research program as a prudent measure in light of significant similar Soviet activity in the field of ballistic missile defence. We believe, however, that any transition to a greater dependence on strategic defences should be undertaken on a mutually agreed basis by both superpowers and should be combined with significant reductions in strategic offensive forces. We would urge the USA to continue this efforts at the Geneva negotiations to accomplish this latter goal in seeking an agreement with the USSR on the basis of the latest American proposal. At the same time the SDI program should continue to be pursued within the current restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. We welcome the assurance by Secretary of State Shultz that the USA Administration considers premature any decision on deployment of a ballistic missile defence at this point.

Prime Minister, (North Atlantic Assembly, Quebec City,
May 23, 1987)

Strategic defences should not be seen as intrinsically good nor as inherently evil. Canada has supported research into strategic defence because knowledge is required in order to make informed and meaningful judgements.

(SEE ALSO ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY (ABMT)
AND BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS)

UNITED NATIONS

Secretary of State for External Affairs, (Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III), New York, June 13, 1988)

The strength of this institution is not the responsibility of any one group of nations; it is the responsibility of all its members. We must work in support of the UN and not undermine it. We cannot ask it to do the impossible. We have to set realistic goals, and we have to give it the means to achieve these goals.

(SEE ALSO CANADIAN ROLE AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS)

VERIFICATION

Ambassador for Disarmament, (Downtown Rotary Club, Edmonton, February 25, 1988)

Through Canada's extensive work in verification, we have become recognized at the United Nations as a world leader in this subject, which is now seen to be of critical importance in the negotiation an implemenation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. In 1983, Canada launched a verification research program, with a \$1 million annual budget, which concentrates on verification techniques for seismic monitoring, chemical weapons use, and the feasibility of space-based satellite sensing. This latter is an exciting, far-seeing program.

Ambassador for Disarmament, (United Nations Disarmament Commission, New York, May 3, 1988)

Since last year there have been major developments with respect to the issue of verification, both in a bilateral framework and a multilateral one. The innovative verification provisions of the INF Agreement, the continuing discussions between the USA and USSR on verifying a nuclear test ban, and the challenge inspections conducted pursuant to the Stockholm Document, are all examples of such developments. Verification remains at the very heart of the arms control and disarmament process: for without agreement on effective verification measures there can be no meaningful arms control or disarmament.

(SEE ALSO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, CONFIDENCE BUILDING, INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) AGREEMENT AND STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES-1986)



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