

# The Disarmament Bulletin

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A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

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## CFE Reaches 25% Target

At midnight on November 16, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) passed a significant milestone: the end of the first reduction phase. By then, over 17,000 pieces of Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) had been destroyed or converted for non-military purposes under strict procedures and stringent verification measures. Although a number of issues remain unresolved, in practice CFE is serving as the foundation for a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe.

Signed on November 19, 1990, CFE provisions did not enter into force in their entirety until July 17, 1992. Briefly, CFE limits the NATO alliance and states that belonged to the now-defunct Warsaw Pact (or their successors) to equal holdings of TLE and requires extensive exchanges of information to record where this TLE is located and to whom it belongs. CFE also requires the destruction of TLE holdings that exceed national entitlements (collectively called the reduction liability), although limited quantities of some equipment types can be converted to non-military uses. Extensive on-site inspection provisions permit signatories to monitor whether other parties are fulfilling their obligations. Canada has conducted 10 on-site inspections to verify the (to page 2)



Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet with UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in New York on November 10. During his first official visit outside Canada, Mr. Ouellet met with Mr. Boutros-Ghali, Special UN Representative for Haiti Dante Caputo, and the ambassadors of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

## Plus ça change? A Look at European Security

The fall of the Berlin Wall and all that it symbolized has not resulted in the hoped-for era of peace and stability in Europe. Ex-Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union are dotted with instability and war. Other parts of the continent face turmoil and uncertainty. Yet it is not entirely a case of unchanging change. CFE implementation is proceeding apace, promoting security cooperation among the parties and placing limits on future levels of major weapon systems in Europe. The CSCE has developed a small institutional structure and is active in fields ranging from arms

control to forestry to minority rights. NATO is encouraging the growth of democracy in its former enemies and providing support for UN peacekeeping.

Canada has been intimately involved in European security issues since the Second World War. Its interest in ensuring a stable Europe and a meaningful transatlantic relationship remains as vital as ever. This issue of the *Bulletin* looks in depth at Canada's efforts to help put in place a framework of agreements and institutions capable of successfully meeting European security challenges.

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## Ouellet New Minister of Foreign Affairs



On November 4, the Honourable André Ouellet, Member of Parliament for the constituency of Papineau-Saint-Michel in Quebec, was named Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs. He replaces the Honourable Perrin Beatty, who had held the post since June 1993.

Mr. Ouellet has been a member of the House of Commons since 1967 and has held several Cabinet positions during his

years on Parliament Hill. He has served as Postmaster General, President of the Privy Council, Government House Leader, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Minister of State for Urban Affairs, Minister of Public Works, Minister of Labour and Minister of State for Regional Economic Development. He has also served as Minister Responsible for various Crown Corporations, including the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, the Metric Commission and the Standards Council of Canada.

Mr. Ouellet was appointed the Official Critic for Transport in 1985, Official Critic for External Affairs in 1988 and Official Critic for Federal-Provincial Relations in 1990. Between 1990 and 1992, he sat on one royal commission and two parliamentary committees on Canada's constitution: the Belanger/Campeau Commission, as well as the Beaudoin/Edwards and Beaudoin/Dobbie Committees. He was Chair of the Quebec Liberal Caucus in 1968, Chief Political Organizer of the Federal Liberal Party in Quebec from 1977 to 1984, and Co-Chair of the National Liberal Campaign Committee in 1992.

Mr. Ouellet graduated from the University of Ottawa and the University of Sherbrooke Faculty of Law.

accuracy of exchanged information.

Forty-four months will be required to implement the various active phases of CFE, before a residual phase of unlimited duration commences. Following entry into force in mid-1992, states began an intensive program of verifying the initial exchanges of military information. This occurred during the 120-day baseline validation period. Most inspections were designed to verify the accuracy of exchanged information at a representative sampling of military units or facilities where TLE was located. However, some verification activities were conducted to monitor the destruction of TLE, known as "reduction" events. Following the conclusion of the baseline period, reduction activities intensified, particularly in the autumn of 1993 as signatories rushed to meet their obligations. CFE required that 25 percent of reduction targets had to be met by November 16, 1993. Targets of

60 percent and 100 percent exist for the two subsequent 12-month periods, ending respectively on November 16, 1994 and November 16, 1995.

After completion of the three-year reduction period in 1995, a second 120-day period known as the residual level validation period will again permit states to conduct an intensive program of verifying national holdings of TLE. This will be followed by the open-ended residual phase, during which a more modest level of on-site inspections will continue to be conducted.

CFE was originally conceived of as a treaty between two opposing blocs of states. However, the evolution in relations between the members of NATO and other CFE States Parties has exceeded the most optimistic intentions contained in the Treaty preamble, namely to "replace military confrontation with a new pattern of security relations among all the States Parties based on peaceful cooperation."

It is primarily in the implementation of verification activities that CFE participants have demonstrated a cooperative approach to Treaty implementation. CFE verification provisions fully embody the 16 verification principles endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December 1988. These stress that verification should build confidence among states by providing clear evidence of continued confirmation of compliance.

Some aspects of verifying CFE obligations are particularly suitable for implementation through a cooperative approach. For example, TLE reduction events must be notified to all other States Parties at least 15 days in advance of the start of the reduction period and must indicate the expected date of completion of the event. This enables other states to arrange, at minimum, to view TLE before and after it is destroyed and, if desired, to view the entire process. However, because the state conducting a reduction activity is obligated to receive only a single inspection team at any reduction site, States Parties wishing to monitor the activity are effectively encouraged to join forces and form a multi-national inspection team.

Since CFE entry into force, the members of NATO have been very active in coordinating their reduction monitoring activities. Under the guidance of a Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) on which each ally is represented, more than 300 multinational inspection teams have been formed to monitor approximately 165 reduction events notified by other States Parties. Canada has led teams to 20 of these events and participated on the teams of other states at another 54 events.

To enhance the effectiveness of CFE implementation, the VCC initiated a cooperative program with the non-NATO CFE States Parties, which are collectively referred to as the Cooperation Partners. The program comprises jointly-conducted inspections, joint training, and access by Cooperation Partners to the NATO verification database VERITY. In addition, seminars designed to reinforce a cooperative approach to CFE implementation were held at NATO headquarters in January and November 1993. The establishment of this program was motivated by the desire to acknowledge the spirit of openness and cooperation demonstrated by Cooperation Partners during the initial months of application and implementation of CFE.

The program was also designed to



Russian armoured personnel carriers in Wunsdorf, Germany, awaiting reduction in accordance with CFE provisions (the flag decal is courtesy of a zealous Canadian inspector).

address NATO's concerns about the number of inspections that Cooperation Partners have conducted among themselves. Such inspections reduce the number of inspections that can be conducted by NATO allies. The VCC proposed that Cooperation Partners meet their security concerns by participating in inspections led by NATO members (who would be responsible under NATO rules for costs once the inspector joins the team). The VCC agreed to open a number of NATO inspection teams to inspectors from Cooperation Partners. As a result, more than 40 joint multilateral reduction inspection teams were formed and inspected TLE reduction events. In addition, about 25 joint multilateral teams conducted inspections to verify holdings of TLE. However, some Cooperation Partners have noted that the cost of transporting a single inspector by air to join a NATO team can sometimes exceed the cost of sending an entire nine-member inspection team by ground transportation to inspect a neighbouring Cooperation Partner. Issues such as these remain under consideration during NATO discussions with Cooperation Partners.

One of the problems arising at the end of the first phase of the reduction period was the failure of Soviet successor states

to account collectively for the total reduction liability of the former USSR. This obligation arises from an agreement reached by CFE States Parties in Oslo on June 5, 1992, designed to adapt CFE provisions to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The complexity of the accounting has been compounded by the failure of two succes-

or states — Armenia and Azerbaijan — to notify reduction liabilities, and by differences of interpretation in how Russia and Ukraine calculate reduction liabilities for TLE held by coastal defence and naval infantry units.

For their part, Russia and Ukraine have raised another issue. Both have indicated dissatisfaction with the application of CFE rules that constrain their ability to deploy TLE anywhere on their national territories. These rules are the consequence of how CFE was designed to prevent States Parties from concentrating excessive levels of conventional forces on the flanks of the European theatre. For NATO, this includes Norway, Turkey and Greece. Other flank states include Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, portions of their territories are successors to areas of the Soviet Union to which the flank rules applied.

The flank rules make a key contribution towards establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional forces in Europe. However, all States Parties have the right to propose that consideration be given to possible modifications of CFE. Fortunately, CFE created a body — the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) — within which Treaty-related issues can be discussed. The JCG can be expected to examine the flank issue over the next few months, as well as the reduction liabilities of the Soviet successor states. ■

## Canada's Contribution to Europe

In addition to contributions to UN peacekeeping and CSCE missions in Europe, Canada's commitment to European security includes:

- an infantry battalion group, with pre-positioned equipment, to serve in crisis or in war with either the NATO Composite Force or the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) in northern Norway;
- naval and air forces to NATO operations, including the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and the NATO Airborne Warning Force;
- a mechanized brigade group and two squadrons with up to 36 CF-18 aircraft based in Canada, available to NATO in the event of a crisis or war in Europe;
- some 460 personnel to serve on NATO staffs in Europe;
- participation in NATO common-funded programs;
- an offer to train Allied forces on Canadian territory; and
- resources devoted to arms control verification in Europe.

In 1993, Canada contributed \$183.6 million to NATO activities, plus an additional \$25 million in military aid to NATO countries under bilateral agreements.

Canada is also contributing to economic development in ex-Warsaw Pact countries, which is critical to democratic development and essential for stability. Among the G7, Canada is second only to Germany, per capita, in its economic assistance to the former Soviet Union.

# CSCE Council Meeting: Building Cooperative Security

The Council of Foreign Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met in Rome on November 30 and December 1. Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet used the opportunity to send a strong message underlining Canada's commitment to the CSCE and to European security. In his opening remarks, he stated: "My government would like today to rededicate itself to the principles and commitments of the CSCE as our unique, transatlantic, pan-Eurasian forum for building cooperative security."

Canada's objectives at the Rome meeting were fourfold:

- 1) to underline our strong support for the CSCE as a vital, pan-European cooperative security institution and the only regional organization with the moral and political authority to deal with conflicts, build democracy and promote respect for human rights in the CSCE area;
- 2) to streamline the CSCE decision-making process, institutions and missions to make the CSCE more effective, particularly in its priority area of conflict prevention and resolution;
- 3) to stress the importance of integrating the "human dimension," which Canada considers to be at the heart of the CSCE concept and thus central to the CSCE's conflict management efforts, into the rest of the CSCE's activities; and


4) to stress the need for political will and realism in the CSCE.

Ministers at the Rome meeting faced a number of important questions. For example, how might the CSCE make better use of its existing offices, instruments, mechanisms and political dialogue for conflict management? How could the CSCE better integrate the human dimension into conflict management? Could the CSCE develop new practical forms of cooperation with NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) or other international and regional organizations?

## Conflict Management

Ministers reviewed the situation in a number of regions of tension or conflict in Europe, and the CSCE role in managing conflicts. On the former Yugoslavia, they urged the early and unconditional return of the CSCE Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, which had been working in these three regions of Serbia to prevent the spillover of conflict, to promote dialogue and to monitor human rights. The Missions were forced to depart Serbia last summer when the Belgrade authorities refused to extend their mandate.

The Council strongly endorsed the recommendations of the CSCE Mission to Moldova, until mid-November headed by



senior Canadian diplomat Timothy Williams. The CSCE would like to see negotiations on a special status for the Trans-Dniester region within the Republic of Moldova; progress in the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of Russian troops; and agreement that the CSCE Mission be allowed to participate in the negotiations over troop withdrawals.

The debate over Nagorno-Karabakh proved the most intractable of all issues before the Council. For almost two years, the CSCE has been leading international efforts to resolve the conflict over the largely ethnic Armenian enclave of Azerbaijan. The CSCE plans to dispatch a monitor mission to the region once a durable ceasefire and settlement have been agreed. In the meantime, to maintain momentum in the peace process, the CSCE had hoped to establish a small mission of diplomats and military officers. In the end, because of the tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this proposal was rejected.

The Council agreed that the mandate of the CSCE Mission to Georgia (Ossetia), currently focused on monitoring and promoting negotiations between the conflicting parties, should be broadened to include human rights and democratic development. The CSCE will consider the appointment of a joint UN-CSCE high-level representative to address the issue of UN-CSCE cooperation in Georgia. As well, Ministers agreed that the CSCE Mission should elaborate "possible arrangements for liaison with joint Georgian, Russian and Ossetian peacekeeping forces with a view to establishing more comprehensive monitoring and oversight." How this decision is implemented will have important implications for further CSCE cooperation with Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States "peacekeeping" missions in other parts of the former Soviet Union (see below).

Ministers decided to create a CSCE mission of four persons to Tajikistan to facilitate dialogue among the various forces in the country, to promote respect for human rights, and to promote and monitor compliance with CSCE principles. The Tajikistan mission will be the first CSCE long-term mission in Central Asia.

The general discussion on strengthening the CSCE's instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management was dominated by one overriding issue:

whether and under what conditions the CSCE should cooperate with Russian or CIS military peacekeeping operations within the area of the former Soviet Union. On the one hand, there is widespread recognition that instability in many areas bordering Russia constitutes a real security threat for Russia and for the CSCE as a whole; on the other, there are the legitimate concerns of Russia's neighbours, which are still uneasy about the process of political transition in Russia. Ministers decided, given the many difficult considerations attached to this issue, that it should be further considered by CSCE delegations in Vienna.

### **Human Dimension**

Ministers' consideration of the human dimension followed closely upon the recommendations of the Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues, held earlier this fall in Warsaw. The Meeting acknowledged the centrality of the Human Dimension (those CSCE commitments, principles and mechanisms involving fundamental human rights and freedoms, democracy and the rule of law) to all CSCE efforts and affirmed that implementation of human dimension commitments by participating states must be a focus of attention in the CSCE's conflict prevention efforts.

Recognizing a worrying increase in intolerance in many CSCE states, Ministers adopted a Russian-proposed declaration condemning "growing manifestations of aggressive nationalism, such as territorial expansionism, as well as racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-semitism."

A number of other specific decisions were taken:

- the decision-making bodies of the CSCE will consider human dimension issues as an integral part of deliberations relating to European security;
- greater emphasis will be given to the human dimension in the mandates of CSCE missions and in the follow-up to their efforts;
- the role and resources of the CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw will be strengthened;
- future human dimension seminars (following those in 1992 and 1993 on tolerance, national minorities, migration and free media) will be held on migrant workers, local democracy and the

Roma (Gypsies).

The High Commissioner on National Minorities received very strong support for his work in addressing tensions involving national minorities. As a result, the Council decided to increase the resources for his office.

### **Forum for Security Cooperation**

The CSCE has long been the principal multilateral forum for negotiations on arms control and confidence-building in Europe. The current institutional home for military-security negotiations is the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC).

Prior to Rome, CSCE states meeting in the FSC in Vienna had concluded work in four areas under the Program of Immediate Action mandated by the Helsinki Document of 1992 (see accompanying article). It was hoped that ministers would be able to endorse these agreements as well as one on principles governing non-proliferation. However, due to Ukrainian objections, accord on the last was not reached and, accordingly, none of the agreements was endorsed. Further work under the Program of Immediate Action, notably on harmonization of obligations and on a code of conduct, will continue in the FSC with a view to agreement by the time of the 1994 CSCE Review Conference and Summit in Budapest.

### **Links with Other Organizations**

For the CSCE to improve its conflict management capacity, it is vital that it develop more sustained and coordinated relations with other international organizations active in this domain, such as the UN, NATO and the WEU. Canada has argued strongly for the necessity of enhanced complementary and pragmatic cooperation between various organizations, particularly with regard to on-the-ground conflict management missions. Canada has worked to reinforce the links between the CSCE and the UN, recognizing the key role to be played at the regional level by the CSCE in such areas as early warning and preventive diplomacy. Canada is also seeking operational links between the CSCE and NATO so that NATO might offer support to CSCE preventive diplomacy efforts. The Rome meeting endorsed recent efforts made by the Chairman-in-Office to develop more substantial relations with the UN.

## Forum for Security Cooperation Considers New Measures for Europe

The CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) was established in Vienna in September 1992 pursuant to a decision reached at the CSCE Helsinki Summit in July 1992. The FSC was designed to build upon such achievements as CFE, the Vienna Document 1992 on confidence- and security-building measures, and the Open Skies Treaty. Work in the FSC is guided by a Program of Immediate Action covering 12 priority areas for new arms control and confidence-building measures. These are designed to maintain the momentum of enhancing arms control, disarmament, confidence- and security-building, security cooperation and conflict prevention in Europe. Unlike the negotiations that produced CFE and Open Skies, participation in the FSC is open to all CSCE participating states.

It is envisaged that work on the Program of Immediate Action will be completed in time for the CSCE Review Conference that begins in Budapest in October 1994. However, spurred by the desire to show progress to the Rome Council, negotiators completed work in the following four areas prior to the Ministers' meeting:

- stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations (to assist the CSCE in preventing areas of tension from escalating to armed conflict);
- principles governing conventional arms transfers (to encourage more responsible approaches to arms transfers);
- defence planning (to increase transparency about long-term planning for military policies and forces); and
- military contacts and cooperation (to facilitate further contacts and information exchanges between military forces).

In the coming months, the FSC will be challenged to conclude work on the more difficult issues under consideration in the framework of the Program of Immediate Action. One of these is a code of conduct governing relations between states. However, given the indivisibility of security within the CSCE, work at the conceptual stage reveals a strong interest on the part of many states in developing rules to standardize behaviour of national governments towards their own nationals, in particular those belonging to national minorities. Preliminary discussions indicate that it will be difficult to develop precise language that results in meaningful rules.

### CSCE Structure

The Rome Meeting took decisions on the future structure and decision-making processes of the CSCE itself, guided by the principle that the institutional structure of the CSCE should remain modest, effective and responsive to the goals of the CSCE. To this end, Ministers established the "Permanent Committee" of the CSCE in Vienna, replacing the "Vienna Group." It will have enhanced decision-making authority and will be responsible for day-to-day operational tasks of the CSCE, including dispatching conflict management missions. The Council also endorsed the decision of the Committee of Senior Officials to establish a single CSCE Secretariat in Vienna, replacing the existing separate Secretariat and offices. The Secretariat in Prague will now function as a sub-office to the CSCE Secretariat. Finally, the Consultative Committee of the Conflict

Prevention Centre was dissolved and its functions allocated to the new Permanent Committee and the existing Forum for Security Cooperation, also in Vienna. These decisions should result in a more effective, action-oriented CSCE.

### Economic Cooperation

The Rome Council reaffirmed the CSCE's role in contributing to sustainable economic development. Following the successful first Economic Forum held in March 1993, a second Economic Forum will be held in Prague in March 1994 and the Secretariat has been tasked with providing support to activities in the economic dimension. Canada has been a strong proponent of a continuing role for the CSCE in economic cooperation, as a forum for discussion that can complement the work going on in specialized bodies and as an essential element in the CSCE's comprehensive approach to security.

### Looking Ahead

For Canada, the Rome Council meeting provided an excellent opportunity for Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet to underline the new government's commitment to European security and to the CSCE in particular. This reaffirmation, plus the Minister's own interest in the CSCE, was well received. Canada, which has played a major role in re-positioning the CSCE as a cooperative security organization focused on conflict management and the root sources of tensions, will continue to remain active in all aspects of CSCE work.

The next key event on the CSCE agenda is the Budapest Review Conference and Summit, to be held October-December 1994. Between now and then, CSCE states will focus on implementing the decisions taken by the Rome Council and on preparing the work program for Budapest.

The way ahead seems fairly clear, if not easy. The CSCE's institutional development is more or less complete; what is now required is fine-tuning to ensure the various institutions function in a coordinated and effective manner. The CSCE needs to continue to address its capacity to manage conflicts; for example, its response to proposed cooperation with "third party" peacekeepers will need to be clarified well before Budapest. The military-security negotiations under the aegis of the FSC will need to proceed smoothly if Heads of Government in Budapest are to approve further agreements under the Program of Immediate Action. Considerable effort will also be needed to ensure that the human dimension is effectively integrated into the mainstream of the CSCE's political and security work.

As evidenced by the Rome Council meeting, the CSCE will continue to face serious problems in its efforts to promote cooperative security in Europe: problems arising from conflicts in the CSCE area, from the difficult process of political and economic transition still underway, and in the CSCE's relationships to other regional organizations. In Canada's view, however, the CSCE has the framework of principles and commitments, institutions and operational instruments necessary to address effectively future challenges in Europe. The last obstacle to the CSCE's effectiveness is one that rests with each CSCE state: political will. ■

## CSCE Network Aids Information Exchange

November 1993 marked the second anniversary of the inauguration of the CSCE Communications Network, which provides a direct means of exchanging electronic mail between participating states. The decision to establish the Network was contained in the Vienna Document 1990. Use of the Network complements existing diplomatic channels, but enables more rapid exchanges.

Like its predecessors, the "hot lines" of the Cold War, the CSCE Network is a classical confidence-building measure; however, it provides more than a channel for the timely and direct exchange of information during crises. The Network facilitates the implementation of information and notification measures designed to enhance military transparency. It has become an important tool in implementing the provisions of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document 1992. Similarly, it may play a key role for the Open Skies Treaty.

Three CSCE institutions and the foreign ministries of 32 CSCE states are linked via the Network. All "stations," which consist of readily available personal computers, transfer and re-

ceive messages using public Packet Switched Data Network (PSDN) services. Messages are routed to a central computer switch located in the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands, which automatically relays the messages to all intended recipients.

The Network has shown its usefulness in exchanges of information on CSCE meetings, military forces, annual calendars of military exercises, and military budgets. Its speed is particularly useful in sending notifications concerning verification inspections. Although users are free to send messages in any of the six official CSCE languages, most messages are sent using formats that reduce the need for translations.

Although a European company produced the overall design, the Network has a small but significant Canadian component, reflecting Canadian industry's strength in telecommunications. The electronic mail program is based on computer software developed by OSIware Incorporated of Burnaby, BC. In addition, the hardware interface between each station and the PSDN is produced by Eicon Technology Corporation of Montreal. ■

## Open Skies Awaits Entry Into Force

The Open Skies Treaty was signed March 24, 1992 in Helsinki by Canada, the US and 23 European states. The aim of the Treaty is to develop greater openness and transparency by opening the airspace over signatory states to flights by unarmed surveillance aircraft. The agreement can be helpful in resolving uncertainties associated with the implementation of other arms control accords or confidence-building measures. Allowable sensors include cameras, synthetic aperture radars and infrared devices. Each of these systems complements the others to permit the acquisition of imagery on a 24-hour, all-weather basis.

By the end of 1992, Canada and the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic had deposited their Instruments of Ratification. In the first 11 months of 1993, the two co-depositaries — Canada and Hungary — received additional Instruments from Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary and Iceland. Several other states have indicated that they are close to completing national ratification procedures. The Treaty will enter into force (for those states that have deposited Instruments) after a total of 20 Instruments have been deposited, as long as these include those states assigned passive quotas of eight or more overflights (namely Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, the UK and the US).

The Treaty created an Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) with a mandate to oversee Treaty implementation and operation. The OSCC has held several sessions since Treaty signature. Within this body, decisions have been taken on such topics as the split in the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the establishment of a new scale of distribution for common administrative costs. The OSCC has also agreed on extensions to the period of provisional application so that states have more time in which to deposit their Instruments of Ratification.

Working groups have met to discuss issues such as sensors, flight rules and procedures, notifications and formats, and communications and data. The texts of several OSCC decisions have been negotiated, and will enter into force simultaneously with the

Treaty. While awaiting the Treaty's entry into force, some states have held trial overflights for training purposes. Such flights are also useful for verifying the appropriateness of technical rules under consideration within the OSCC. In April, Canada participated in a trial conducted by the US over Alaska and western Canada. Subsequent trial flights were conducted in 1993 by the US over Hungary, by Germany and the UK over Russia, and by Russia over the UK and Germany.

In response to national programs of fiscal restraint and the economic restructuring affecting many signatories, efforts are underway to minimize the anticipated costs of implementing Open Skies. The Benelux states, for example, have invited other states that operate Lockheed Hercules C-130 aircraft to cooperate in acquiring and sharing a set of sensors suitable for use on that airframe. Canada and several other states have responded positively to this suggestion. As an additional cooperative venture, mem-

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### Working groups refine details of implementation.

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bers of the Western European Union are considering the formation of a pool of aircraft that could be used to conduct overflights on a cost-recoverable basis for signatories.

With a view to broadening the potential usefulness of Open Skies flights, some signatories have proposed using the regime to conduct environmental monitoring flights. A two-day experts seminar was hosted by the OSCC in December 1992 to discuss the relevance of Open Skies sensors and operational procedures to monitoring environmental problems. While supportive of the need to address environmental issues on a priority basis, some states have expressed concern about the impact that environmental monitoring flights might have on conducting the flights for which the Treaty was originally designed. ■

## North Atlantic Council Meets

Strengthening the integrity of the alliance, preparing for the NATO summit scheduled for January 10 to 11, and consulting with allies on the threats to peace and security in Europe were among Canada's objectives at the North Atlantic Council meeting held in Brussels on December 2. Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet represented Canada in the discussions, where allies considered NATO's ongoing support for UN peacekeeping and the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies in the former Yugoslavia. They also discussed NATO's role in implementing a potential peace plan in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the Brussels meeting, Canada continued to support NATO reform. The Soviet threat against which the alliance was constituted has been replaced by the risk of instability, unpredictability and uncertainty on NATO's periphery. NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted in November 1991, recognizes the changing security situation in Europe. The emphasis is now on the creation of a more flexible structure — relying on lighter, more mobile forces — and an increased capability to contribute to conflict prevention and management, including peacekeeping. A multinational Rapid Reaction Corps is being developed and is expected to be fully operational by 1995.

Canada is also encouraging further interaction and cooperation between NATO and other security structures in Europe. This includes refining the mechanisms necessary to provide support to organizations such as the UN and the CSCE in the areas of crisis management and peacekeeping. It also includes the further development of institutional relationships between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). Canada is in favour of a strong European voice through the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The security challenges in Europe can only be addressed through a framework of interlocking and complementary institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. NATO, NACC, the CSCE, the EC, the WEU, and the Council of Europe together form the beams of the evolving European security architecture.

In the emerging security environment, NATO's *political* vocation, as embodied in Article 2 (the "Canada" article) of the North Atlantic Treaty, is assuming greater importance. More emphasis is placed on dialogue and cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In particular, NATO is playing a major role in assisting those countries to complete their transition to democracy. Through the NACC, the NATO allies are seeking to contribute to an overall climate of security and thereby to enable Cooperation Partners to direct their material resources to economic and social development. Substantive programs of regular consultation and practical cooperation are being pursued.

Canada is now preparing for the January NATO summit. Canada's primary objectives are to support efforts to reinforce NATO solidarity and to increase NATO's capacity to contribute to stability in Europe. In Canada's view, the summit should:

- promote the projection of security by NATO across Europe through peacekeeping, a partnership with Russia and Ukraine, and arms control;
- confirm that NATO can incorporate a positive expression of the ESDI;
- articulate an updated view of NACC's role; and
- discuss the issue of NATO expansion. ■

## NACC Adopts 1994 Workplan

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) foreign ministers met in Brussels on December 3 to adopt a workplan for 1994 and to discuss ethnic conflicts, minority rights and disputes between NACC member states. Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet attended on behalf of Canada.

NACC was created in November 1991 to provide a forum for dialogue between NATO allies and the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. Cooperation focuses on political and security issues where NATO allies can offer their expertise: defence planning, civilian-military relations, the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes, and scientific and environmental programs (see *Bulletin* #21). In addition to NACC ministerial meetings, there are regular consultations at the level of ambassadors. ■

## NATO Contributes to UN Peacekeeping

Common to the recent conflicts in Europe — from Nagorno-Karabakh to Bosnia-Herzegovina — is the danger posed to the security of members of NATO, as well as to broader European security. NATO foreign ministers therefore agreed in June 1992 to make NATO's resources and expertise available for CSCE peacekeeping and, in December 1992, for UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Since then, NATO has taken a number of measures in support of UN peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia.

- In June 1993, NATO offered protective airpower for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the performance of its duties.
- In November 1992, NATO provided a staff unit consisting of some 100 personnel, plus equipment, supplies and financial support, to UNPROFOR's Bosnia-Herzegovina command headquarters, located near Zagreb.
- A joint NATO/Western European Union naval force was deployed in the Adriatic Sea in July 1992, in support of UN trade sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. In the first four months of operation, the force monitored some 1,700 ships and boarded approximately 200. As part of a normal rotation of NATO resources, HMCS Gatineau was on patrol with the task force in the Adriatic in September 1992.
- NATO has deployed airborne early-warning aircraft (AWACS) to enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnian airspace, from flight paths over the Adriatic and in Hungary.
- NATO prepared contingency plans for the delivery of UN humanitarian aid and for the monitoring of heavy weapons.
- NATO has been developing plans to support a peace agreement among the parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, under the overall political direction of the UN.

## Canada Responds to the Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia

Canada participates fully in international efforts to promote a peaceful settlement to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and to provide relief to its victims. In September 1991, Canada led the call for the UN Security Council to deal with this issue. In August 1992 in London and again in December in Geneva, Canada took part in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, co-chaired by the UN and the European Community (EC, now known as the European Union). Canada has been an active supporter of all Conference efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the crisis.

### Peacekeeping

Canada has contributed one of the largest contingents to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR): more than 2,000 Canadian troops now monitor UN-protected zones in Croatia and provide protection for relief convoys and refugees in Bosnia. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is providing 44 monitors to UNPROFOR. Another 12 Canadian Forces members serve with an EC-CSCE mission monitoring ceasefire agreements throughout the former Yugoslavia.

Canadians have undertaken some of the most difficult UN assignments. In June 1992, some 750 Canadian troops were deployed to Sarajevo to reopen and secure the airport so that the airlift of relief supplies could begin. In January and February 1993, 180 Canadian troops were deployed temporarily to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to monitor developments in the border areas with Serbia. In April 1993, another 220 troops were sent to Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia to ensure the presence of UNPROFOR in the besieged city; a company of Canadian troops remains in this "safe area."

### Humanitarian Assistance

Canada's total contribution in humanitarian assistance for the victims of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia since autumn 1991 now approaches \$40 million, including \$1.75 million for victims of sexual violence. These contributions have been used to support the purchase and delivery of food, medical supplies, clothing and shelter, and to assist refugees and displaced persons.

Canada also participates in the international airlift to the besieged city of Sarajevo. From the start of the airlift on July 3, 1992, a Canadian Forces Hercules C-130 transport airplane has conducted approximately 930 relief flights to Sarajevo, for a total delivery of more than 14,000 metric tons of food and medical supplies.

In September 1993, Canada announced a series of Canadian initiatives — totaling almost \$2 million — to help restore medical facilities in the war-torn regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They include: water purification equipment; support for

Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 1992, and of Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 8, 1992. Diplomatic relations were established with Slovenia on January 8, 1993, and with Croatia on April 14, 1993. Canada supported the resolution of the UN General Assembly admitting the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into the UN on April 8, 1993. Canada, along with other Western countries, has condemned Serb aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina and has urged Serbia and Croatia to stop interference in that country. On September 22, 1992, together with several other

Canadian Forces photo



Canadian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia.

the emergency power supply for the two major Sarajevo hospitals; equipment and training by Canadian rehabilitation experts for five community health centres; medical supplies and medicine; and teams of Canadian medical specialists.

### Diplomacy

As a member of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Canada maintains diplomatic contacts with all legitimate parties concerned by the crisis, inside and outside the former Yugoslavia. Canada has repeatedly called upon the parties to end the violence and to work towards a negotiated settlement.

Canada recognized the independence of

nations, Canada co-sponsored the resolution that suspended Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) from the proceedings of the UN General Assembly and called on Belgrade to submit a new application for UN membership. Canada also supported the temporary suspension of Yugoslavia from the CSCE.

Canada supports international efforts for a more effective implementation of trade sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). On April 27, 1993, Canada imposed strengthened UN sanctions against Yugoslavia, including the freezing of state assets in Canada and additional trade restrictions. Two Canadian naval vessels have

participated in NATO's enforcement of sanctions in the Adriatic. Canada also leads the multinational sanctions assistance mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which helps to ensure compliance with sanctions. In February 1993, Canada led a multinational fact-finding mission on sanctions monitoring in Albania.

Canada has taken part in CSCE conflict prevention missions in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. Serbia refused to renew the mandate of the CSCE missions and the monitors were forced to leave at the end of July 1993. Canada also participated in a similar mission to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, led a CSCE fact-finding mission to Kosovo and took part in a CSCE mission to investigate human rights violations in detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Canada's financial contribution to various preventive diplomacy missions now totals more than \$2 million. ■

## European Security: the Nuclear Dimension

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a number of steps were taken to bring the Soviet nuclear arsenal — left in the hands of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine — under unified control, to reaffirm negotiated and unilateral arms reduction measures, and to ensure that only one state — Russia — inherited the Soviet Union's status as a nuclear weapon state.

- Centralized control over the weapons was established in Moscow, with the governments of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan gaining a de facto veto over their use.
- All tactical nuclear weapons were shipped to Russia for storage and eventual dismantlement and destruction.
- All four successor states and the US signed in May 1992 a protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) committing all five to fulfil the terms of the Treaty, to carry out the reductions in a certain time frame and committing Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to accede to the NPT "in the shortest period of time." This is known as the Lisbon Protocol. Since May 1992, Russia, Belarus and

Kazakhstan have ratified START and Belarus has acceded to the NPT. Kazakhstan is committed to acceding to the NPT but appears to be delaying formalization of the decision until President Clinton's scheduled visit in January.

More troubling is the position of Ukraine, which has procrastinated in fulfilling its commitments concerning the disposition and destruction of nuclear weapons, ratification of START and accession to the NPT. In November, the Ukrainian parliament agreed to a highly conditional ratification of START and the Lisbon Protocol. One of the conditions involves disavowing Article V of the Lisbon Protocol, which requires Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Others concern the provision of financial and technical assistance for dismantling weapons, the provision of international security guarantees, and compensation for the value of nuclear weapons components.

Ukraine's stance risks derailing the strategic arms reduction process and complicating the extension of the NPT in 1995.

On establishing diplomatic relations with Ukraine in 1992, Canada sought assurances that Ukraine would fulfil its arms control commitments, particularly pertaining to nuclear weapons. On several occasions since then, Canadian ministers and officials have urged Ukraine to follow through, most recently during discussions between Foreign Affairs Minister Ouellet and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko at the CSCE ministerial meeting in Rome. ■

## Suffocating the Nuclear Threat

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation strategy is predicated on:

- 1) preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to states beyond the five acknowledged nuclear powers (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China); and
- 2) achieving reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, with the aim of eventual elimination.

Fundamental to this strategy is defence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A global non-proliferation regime is incon-

ceivable without the NPT. The norms established by the Treaty form the foundation of all other efforts aimed at countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Over the years, Canadian efforts have been tailored to achieve the greatest non-proliferation advances possible, in light of prevailing political and security circumstances. This has resulted in several notable achievements, including increased NPT adherence, tightened nuclear supplier guidelines and bilateral US-Soviet nuclear arms reduction treaties. Stronger, more targeted efforts are now in order.

The indefinite extension of the NPT at its 1995 extension and review conference is Canada's primary objective. The other two options available — extension for a fixed period or periods — do not guarantee preservation of the Treaty and the

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### Canada pursues a long-term, multi-faceted non-proliferation strategy, of which NPT is the cornerstone.

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benefits it provides. In the context of the review portion of the 1995 conference, Canada is also pressing for a further strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system. Two regrettable examples underscore the importance of this goal: North Korea's defiance of the inspection obligations it freely entered into when it acceded to the NPT and concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and Iraq's conduct of a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

Canada is also working with other nuclear suppliers to promote more effective controls on the export of material, equipment and technology relevant to nuclear weapons. In addition, Canada is contributing to the International Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine, which aims to find peaceful employment for ex-Soviet nuclear weapon and missile specialists.

To supplement the NPT, Canada is working towards an early conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, scheduled to begin in the Conference on Disarmament in January (see *Bulletin* #22). In Canada's view, the resultant treaty should be open to signature by all and sustained by a strong verification system. Canada's expertise in verification is enabling us to play a leading role in ongoing CD consultations on a CTBT.

Canada believes that work to define precisely the issues involved in a convention prohibiting the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes (popularly known as a "FIZZ ban"), should begin as soon as possible, perhaps by an appropriate group of experts.

Recognizing that regional insecurity fosters the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, Canada is involved in processes aimed at reducing tensions and enhancing mutual confidence in several regions, including the Middle East and South Asia. Canada has supported nuclear weapon free zones in Latin America and the South Pacific, and favours the development of such zones elsewhere.

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation strategy is a long-term, multi-faceted one that demands considerable effort and patience. It aims at progressively creating a body of international law that will, over time, result in the elimination of nuclear weapons. There is, regrettably, no quick way to end the nuclear threat. In 1978, then-Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau enunciated a "strategy of suffocation" at the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. Among other things, he called for the conclusion of a CTBT and a FIZZ ban. The 1993 session of the UN General Assembly saw, for the first time, the adoption by consensus of resolutions on both of these topics. It took 15 years and a sea change in international relations to bring Mr. Trudeau's agenda to the table. We are, as it were, only at the end of the beginning.

## Canada Criticizes Chinese Test

Canada expressed deep concern and profound disappointment at China's detonation of a nuclear device at its testing facility in Xinjiang in early October. By conducting a test on the eve of negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty, China has failed to demonstrate the leadership that is essential on the part of nuclear powers in international non-proliferation efforts. Canada has on numerous occasions urged China not to engage in nuclear testing. We continue to call on China to join all other countries in ceasing nuclear testing immediately and to contribute positively to negotiation of a CTBT.

## CWC Moves Closer to Implementation



Numbers of destroyed R 400 binary chemical weapon bombs being verified by UNSCOM inspectors in Iraq. LCol Jim Knapp of DND is on the left.

As of November 30, 151 countries had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Only four had ratified the Convention, a number that will have to increase dramatically to reach the minimum 65 necessary for the Convention to enter into force as early as January 1995. At the Hague, the CWC Preparatory Commission is increasingly active as it continues to build the foundations of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Preparatory Commission has held four plenary sessions and several meetings of experts groups, studying different aspects of the practical application of the Convention. Groups have discussed issues related to verification, including equipment requirements and the procedures for challenge inspection, as well as the conversion of chemical factories and security procedures.

The Preparatory Commission will see a rapid expansion during 1994 to ensure a complete transition to the OPCW. Canada has increased its participation on the Commission by naming Mr. Ian Mundell of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade as its representative. Mr. Mundell will be joined in the new year by a counsellor specializing in technical questions. This permanent delegation demonstrates the importance Canada attaches to efforts to eliminate CW.

One of the most important elements of the CWC is the requirement for a national authority in each State Party. In Canada, the Authority will be responsible for coordination among the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, the relevant government departments and the OPCW. Its functions will include the following:

- (with the aid of Statistics Canada) collecting and compiling statistics on the Canadian chemical industry and transmitting these to the OPCW;
- supporting all routine and challenge inspections by OPCW personnel;
- distributing in Canada information provided by the OPCW;
- advising the Canadian delegation to the OPCW;
- participating in technical meetings of the OPCW; and
- ensuring liaison with the Canadian chemical industry.

The National Authority will begin operating during 1994 to prepare for CWC entry into force. The Authority will have to undertake a program to inform Canadian industry of the implications of the CWC. The impact of challenge and routine inspections, particularly on the protection of production patents, is of concern to industry. A series of consultations will enable businesses to be involved in the procedure of implementing the CWC in Canada.

## BTWC Verification Experts Complete Study

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) includes an undertaking to consult and cooperate in solving problems that may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. It also makes provision for lodging a complaint with the UN Security Council in relation to a breach of obligations. It makes no other provision for verification, a fact that has led to proposals from various quarters for strengthening the BTWC.

In September 1991, the Third Review Conference of the BTWC agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, open to all States Parties, to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. This study, which completed its work in September 1993, is often referred to as VEREX.

Since one of the issues frequently raised in VEREX had to do with concerns about the potential loss of commercial proprietary information in the course of an inspection, the Netherlands and Canada decided to organize a trial inspection that would target such concerns as one purpose of the exercise. In May 1993, a trial multinational inspection (involving the

Netherlands, Canada and the UK) took place in the Netherlands at a state-of-the-art vaccine production facility to test inspection procedures that might eventually come to apply under the BTWC.

The inspection team concluded that its suspicions would have been aroused had there been a significant diversion of activity, equipment or materials to the production of biological weapons. The team also concluded that commercial confidentiality did not stand in the way of the effective conduct of the inspection. The report of the Netherlands/Canada trial — one of only two such trial inspections conducted — was submitted to VEREX and is reflected in the final report of the experts' study.

VEREX itself identified and evaluated 21 potential verification measures, all singly and some in combinations to highlight any synergies that might result. The experts' report was adopted by consensus, a significant achievement given the amount of work channelled into four intense sessions. The next step, if a majority of States Parties (68) requests it, will be for the depositaries (namely the US, the UK and Russia) to convene a conference to examine the experts' report and decide on

any further action.

By the end of November, Canada and some 49 other States Parties had already submitted their requests that such a conference be convened. At this rate, the chances are good that the conference will take place in the fall of 1994. This does not mean, however, that the establishment of a verification regime for the BTWC is just around the corner. The conference, and the States Parties as a whole, will need to decide what further action to take and how to go about taking it.

In the meantime, the UK has organized another multinational trial inspection for December, once again involving participants from the Netherlands and Canada. If a BTWC verification regime is to be established, answers will have to be found to the question of how to determine compliance or non-compliance with the Convention while at the same time taking into account the reality (as opposed to the anxiety) of concerns associated with the potential loss of commercial proprietary information. As was the case in negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the assistance and cooperation of industry will be particularly helpful in finding those answers. ■

## Disarming Iraq: UNSCOM Sets Verification Precedents

For more than two and one half years, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have cooperated jointly in a monitoring and verification program to verify compliance by the government of Iraq with obligations it accepted under UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). Under that resolution, Iraq agreed unconditionally not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. It also accepted unconditionally the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all chemical and biological weapons and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km. The IAEA, with the support and cooperation of UNSCOM, assumed the international responsibilities relating to nuclear weapons; UNSCOM undertook the international supervision obligations in the other three areas of concern.

Between May 15, 1991 and November 1, 1993, UNSCOM and the IAEA undertook 64 on-site inspections in Iraq to ensure Iraqi compliance with its obligations under Resolution 687. Approximately one-third of the inspections were related to the nuclear weapons program, another third to the ballistic missile field, and the remainder to matters associated with Iraq's inventory of chemical weapons as well as with Iraq's biological weapons research program.

The hallmarks of UNSCOM's inspection program have been thoroughness, balance and innovation. In the chemical weapons area, with the completion of baseline inspections, action has focused on destruction activities relating to the massive inventory (numbering in the thousands) of chemical weapons and immense quantities of chemical agents and precursors amassed by Iraq. Destruction of precursors, chemical agents

and ammunition should be completed by mid-summer 1994.

In the ballistic missile area, efforts have concentrated on three aspects: establishing a definitive material balance for the SCUD missile inventory, acquiring an accounting of Iraq's production capability in the ballistic missiles area, and establishing a means for longer term monitoring as required by UN Security Council Resolution 715 (1991). UNSCOM's intensive ballistic missile inspection program has provided a degree of confidence that the total inventory of SCUD missiles has been accounted for and that a residual SCUD capability in Iraq is unlikely.

The importance of UNSCOM's activities for multilateral verification can hardly be overestimated. The credibility of the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection and monitoring program under difficult — often confrontational — conditions has established

a solid experience base for multilateral verification. In addition to on-site inspections, UNSCOM has pioneered the use of overhead imagery as a supporting tool. Such imagery has been used to reinforce the thoroughness and the objectivity of the inspection program. Helicopter imagery provides a time-series photographic record of sites that will need to be monitored under plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. Additional innovations in the application of technologies using sensors such as gamma radiation detection, forward-looking infrared radar and ground penetrating radar add a new dimension to the development of multilateral verification techniques.

The attempt by UNSCOM to implement a long-term monitoring of resolution-relevant activities in Iraq has been hampered by Iraq's persistent refusal to acknowledge its obligation under Resolution 715 (Iraq has recognized only Resolution 687). UNSCOM has thus attempted to move the process ahead by developing an interim monitoring capability, acting under the terms of the relevant resolution. The prime objectives include the continuing collection of data on missile programs in Iraq and the deterrence of covert programs in prohibited missile systems. Experience gained will be useful in implementing long-term monitoring once Iraq acknowledges its obligations.

Recent talks in New York between senior Iraqi ministers and UNSCOM officials suggest that a new period of cooperation may be at hand. Newspaper reports in late November stated that Iraq has now decided "to accept the obligations" (concerning mandatory long-term monitoring) as stated in Resolution 715. Rolf Ekéus, UNSCOM's Executive Chairman, was quoted as acknowledging that the Iraqi statement could constitute a "major breakthrough."

As a result, it could be possible to draft a public statement that spells out what Iraq might still do to be in full compliance. Presumably, a long-term monitoring and verification program would have to be in place for some months before UNSCOM and the IAEA would be prepared to confirm to the Security Council that Iraq was in full compliance with the provisions of applicable resolutions. Such a confirmation would be required to recommend an end to the sanctions presently being enforced against Iraq. ■

## Successful First Committee

The 48th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA 48) met in New York from September to December. Canada's priorities in the First Committee, which considers arms control and disarmament issues, were to confirm and strengthen existing global non-proliferation instruments such as the NPT, the CWC and the BTWC, and to support negotiations for a CTBT in the CD. Canada played an active role in promoting these objectives, with largely successful results. Canada was also the lead sponsor of a verification resolution and of a resolution dealing with the prohibition of the production of fissionable material.

Virtually all western states called for the indefinite extension of the NPT and the negotiation of a CTBT. Many delegations chastised China for its recent nuclear test. China in turn stated that it supports a total test ban within the framework of a complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. Many countries called for a firm international response towards North Korea, which is not complying fully with its IAEA safeguards obligations. There was also strong support for effective implementation, on a universal basis, of the UN Arms Register.

### Verification

Canada was successful in having its resolution on verification passed by a vote of 127 in favour, 0 against and 19 abstentions (EC, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway and the US). The resolution calls for a UN Group of Experts study on the role of the UN in the field of verification.

The findings of a Canadian-chaired 1990 UN study on the subject were based on research conducted in the late 1980s, before the end of the Cold War. There has been a sea change in the international environment since that time, and the new study will examine the impact of these changes on verification and the role of the UN therein. Particular attention is to be paid to the ways verification can facilitate UN activities with respect to confidence-building, conflict management and disarmament. The study group is also asked to:

- explore the further development of guidelines and principles for UN involvement in verification; and
- review the conclusions of the 1990 Experts Group with particular attention to approaches for integrating verification information by the UN.

### Cut-off

Canada was pleased to take the lead on the resolution entitled "Prohibition on the Production of Fissionable Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices." The resolution, which was adopted by consensus, calls for a treaty that would cut off the production of such fissionable material and for the treaty to be negotiated in an appropriate international forum.

### CTBT

The First Committee adopted by consensus a decision supporting the commencement of negotiations in the CD on the comprehensive banning of nuclear tests. This was the first time in the First Committee's consideration of the issue that consensus was reached.

### CWC

The Netherlands, as lead sponsor, was not successful in having this traditional consensus resolution passed by the General Assembly. Proposed Iranian amendments to what should have been a procedural matter led the resolution to be withdrawn. This was unfortunate as over 150 states have now become signatories to the landmark CWC.

### Transparency in Armaments

This resolution was passed by consensus. A group of governmental experts will meet in 1994 to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. Canada fully supports this process and on many occasions has called for the

expansion of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production. Canada's submission to the Register included both the required data and information about our military holdings and production.

## UNDC

The resolution adopted at UNGA 48 indicates that three items will be considered at the 1994 UNDC session. These items are:

- the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons;
- the role of science and technology in the context of international peace and security; and
- international arms transfers.

## First Committee Reform

A resolution regarding rationalization of the work of the First Committee was adopted by consensus. The resolution incorporates many suggestions that Canada has been advocating for a number of years regarding reform of the First Committee. These proposals include adopting realistic priorities and ensuring fewer resolutions, including combining similar resolutions and eliminating the obsolete. The resolution also reorganizes the annual agenda of the First Committee by adopting a thematic approach in which resolutions are clustered in broad topic areas such as:

- nuclear weapons;
- other weapons of mass destruction;
- conventional weapons;
- regional disarmament and security;
- confidence-building measures, including transparency in armaments;
- outer space;
- disarmament machinery;
- other disarmament measures;
- international security;
- related matters of disarmament and international security.

The next issue of the *Bulletin* will include a list of arms control and disarmament resolutions adopted by UNGA 48. ■

## Correction

In *Bulletin* #22 (p. 16), GODOS was incorrectly named. The acronym stands for the Group of Democratically/Disarmament Oriented States.

# Moving Beyond Veneer of Agreement to Global Norms

*The following are excerpts from the statement by Ms Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, to the First Committee at UNGA 48, delivered on October 22 in New York.*

## CTBT

While it is all too obvious that the end of the Cold War has unleashed new threats of weapons proliferation, it has also opened the way for unparalleled cooperation and progress across the range of proliferation issues. No more compelling evidence of the new opportunities exists than the historic decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament on August 10, 1993 to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments for all time.... CD members are now in the process of defining a specific mandate for, and the organization of, the negotiations with the aim of beginning negotiations in January 1994. Our goal must be a multilaterally negotiated global agreement containing strong verification and sanctions procedures. This process would, in our view, increase in credibility and international acceptance if the CD could agree forthwith to expand its membership to include all those wishing to be members.

The decision to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty responds to a long-standing and central Canadian arms control objective. It comes at a particularly important juncture as a number of countries have linked the conclusion of a CTBT and indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Canada firmly rejects that negative linkage as a strategy more likely to shield potential proliferators than to promote the goals of vertical and horizontal non-proliferation.

At the same time, there is no doubt that further testing, for whatever reason and on whatever scale, will complicate the process of indefinitely extending the NPT and the goal of universal accession. Conversely, rapid completion of a CTBT would provide potent evidence of the determination of the nuclear weapon states to meet their Article VI commitments. This in turn would reinforce the moral authority of the nuclear weapon states —


that is, of the UN Security Council Permanent Five — and along with it their ability to exercise effective leadership in response to countries seeking to stand against this international norm. It is therefore with regret and concern that Canada responded to the Chinese nuclear explosive test as we are about to embark on the CTBT negotiation. A unique opportunity for China to play a leadership role in the negotiation and the NPT extension process is in danger of being frittered away. We urge China to reconsider its testing program in favour of unequivocally assuming its share of the burdens and responsibilities of leadership in this post-Cold War multipolar world....

## NPT

As important as a CTBT is in precluding nuclear warhead modernization and in helping to constrain horizontal proliferation, it is no panacea. It is not a substitute for sustained action by the international community on all fronts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the heart of which is the NPT and the IAEA system of safeguards.

We therefore continue to call upon the DPRK to comply with the safeguards agreements it freely entered into with the IAEA. Canada welcomes the accession to the NPT of Belarus and the progress that has recently taken place towards that end with respect to Kazakhstan. We call on the Ukraine to take similar steps.

Since this Committee last met during UNGA 47, the formal preparatory process has begun for the 1995 conference on the review and extension of the NPT. Canada brings to this process the firm belief that indefinite extension of the NPT is fundamental to our continuing efforts to forestall the horrendous consequences of unfettered horizontal proliferation, to provide the framework for peaceful nuclear commerce, and to promote vertical nuclear disarmament. We take great satisfaction in the number of expressions of support for indefinite extension that were made in the general debate at the opening of the General Assembly this year. Canada looks forward to working with other States Parties to the NPT to ensure that we are in a position by the second Preparatory



Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason at UNGA 48.

Committee meeting in late January to address all outstanding procedural issues in a productive and forward looking manner.

### **Cut-off**

A legally enforceable, multilaterally negotiated and credibly verifiable prohibition on the production of fissionable material for weapons or other nuclear explosive devices will be another important building block in our non-proliferation architecture. Canada has for many years introduced a resolution in this regard which has received overwhelming but not universal support. In light of recent very positive developments, including an initiative by President Clinton, it might not be overly optimistic to suggest that the time for a multilateral "cut-off" convention may well have come.

### **CWC**

Canada is gratified that over 150 states have now become signatories to the landmark Chemical Weapons Convention. We would urge those that have not yet signed to do so at an early date. Canada also welcomes the considerable progress that is being made at the Preparatory Commission in The Hague in advance of the Convention's entry into force, hopefully in 1995. Just as last year's consensus resolution provided momentum for the signing conference in Paris, so we trust will this

year's resolution add renewed impetus to the vital work of bringing the Convention into force....

### **BTWC**

With regard to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), Canada joins with others in welcoming the very substantial report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts established to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint....

The experts' study has reinforced [Canada's] position that measures can be taken to strengthen the BTWC with regard to verification of compliance. We are, as a result, preparing our request to the depositary governments to convene a conference to examine the report and to decide on any further action. We commend the report to other BTWC States Parties and, without pre-judging the outcome of their consideration, trust that due attention will be given to the question of making a similar request to the depositary governments to convene such a conference.

### **Verification**

Last year, Canada initiated a resolution on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification that called upon Member States to provide their views on: additional actions that might be taken to imple-

ment the recommendations of the 1990 United Nations Group of Experts Study on the role of the UN in the field of verification; how verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements can facilitate United Nations activities with respect to conflict resolution; and additional actions with respect to the role of the UN....

In Canada's view, a follow-on study to that of the 1990 Group of Experts would be timely and useful, particularly bearing in mind that the Cold War constraints that so limited the scope of the original study simply no longer apply....

### **Transparency in Armaments**

In his annual report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General cited the "historic significance" of the establishment of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. We fully concur with his assessment of the potential of such confidence-building measures to contribute to the Organization's efforts in the field of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking and we wholeheartedly welcome his decision that the UN Register "become a priority task" for the Centre for Disarmament Affairs. It is indeed gratifying that 79 Member States of the UN have now complied with the Register in its first year of operation. But we must not be complacent. We must work to ensure universal adherence to this vital component of transparency in arms. The confidence-building goal of the register will be achieved only with both universal adherence to the register and its further expansion.

On this latter point, there is a clearly established path. A group of governmental experts will meet in 1994 to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. Canada fully supports this process and on many occasions has called for the early expansion of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production. We have already made this additional information available in our own reporting to the Register and draw attention to the fact that a significant number of other countries have also done so....

### **UNDC**

The value and the vitality of the Disarmament Commission as a multilateral forum for meaningful dialogue on a limited range of issues has been amply demonstrated in the last three years. Yet, on the

matter of new items for its agenda, we remain stymied despite intensive efforts during the last General Assembly, during the Resumed Session and during the 1993 session of the Disarmament Commission itself. Canada hopes that delegations will redouble their efforts towards finding a timely solution to this procedural problem so that we can turn our full attention to the substance of the work before us....

## **Reform and Revitalization**

Disarmament at its core is concerned with creating the conditions under which countries will place less reliance on armaments and more reliance on alternative processes for ensuring their viability and well-being against all manner of threats, however defined. During the post-Cold War era of interdependence, integration and globalization at the international level, in contrast to increasing tribalization and fragmentation at the local level, it seems clear that the tools for building such alternative mechanisms must be increasingly regionally and cooperatively based.

In this new institution-building process, the United Nations has both a "top down" or global/normative/framework role to play and a "bottom up" or operational role to play, the latter at the regional, sub-regional and local levels.

Arms control and disarmament — both in the strict sense of negotiating agreements to limit/control/manage armaments and in the broader sense of building confidence among nations by promoting greater openness in military matters — are tools in the process of building collective/cooperative security, just as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are tools to this end. All aspects along this continuum need to be addressed if the goal of collective/cooperative security is to be reached. Countries must be encouraged to develop concrete mechanisms to prevent and to resolve disputes peacefully. For such mechanisms to work, there must be an ever-enlarging consensus on the proper role of power, armaments, the use of force and, above all, on the limits of the use of force.

From this perspective, then, arms control and disarmament relates to cooperative efforts (at every level from local to global) to control the use of force and to promote collective security based on agreed rules of interstate, and increasingly intrastate, behaviour, including rules on

the use of force.

This assessment of the post-Cold War disarmament agenda and its implications for the multilateral disarmament machinery has led Canada to identify three goals in the reform and revitalization process: (1) practical integration of arms control and disarmament into the broader international security agenda in the work of the First Committee, along with its more effective functioning; (2) strengthening of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs as the institutional focal point of these efforts; and (3) increased priority to regional approaches to disarmament and to the "regional role" of the UN in this regard....

Canada strongly endorses the measures that the Secretary-General has taken to ensure that the UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs is fully capable of meeting the new opportunities and challenges we face. In particular, Canada shares the view that the Centre's work should be more directly geared to the Organization's efforts in the field of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Indeed, Canada believes that a very good start, under very difficult circumstances, has already been made to this end. I refer to the work of the three UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament, together with the UN-sponsored program of regional conferences.

I have been privileged to have been involved in the "Katmandu" regional cooperative security dialogue process since 1991. This "track two" process under the auspices of the Asia Pacific UN Regional

Centre has been instrumental in promoting discussions on confidence-building and transparency, non-proliferation in its global and regional dimensions, and conflict prevention and resolution. Such work by the United Nations in the regional context is an essential complement to activities at the global level....

Concrete steps have also been taken to rationalize the procedures in the First Committee. We commend in particular the full integration of our work on arms control and international security questions. Given this procedural breakthrough, delegations will have to work hard to ensure that the substance of the resolutions on the maintenance of international security are equally forward looking.... [T]he central question of how to integrate the work of the First Committee into the broader international security context so as to deepen understanding of the concepts of preventive diplomacy, confidence-building and post-conflict peace-preserving measures...is work we must tackle in earnest if we are ever to be able to get beyond the thin veneer of agreement that currently exists on the practical implementation of global norms in concrete situations.

A genuine consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation norms lies at the heart of any enduring system of international peace and security. Under your able guidance, Mr. Chairman, we have begun the task in earnest of ensuring that the multilateral disarmament machinery plays its full part in elaborating that consensus. ■

## **First Report of UN Arms Register**

On October 18, the Secretary-General presented to the UN General Assembly the first report of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The report gives data on 79 countries' imports and exports of seven categories of conventional weapons systems for the year 1992. This is the first time in history that governments have made such data public as part of an international reporting exercise.

All major arms exporting countries supplied data, with the exception of South Africa and North Korea. Among importing states, major non-reporters include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Thailand, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates and Syria. However, the data reported by major exporters makes

public the majority of arms transferred to these states. It has been estimated that more than 98 percent of arms exported in the seven categories during 1992 are publicized in the Register.

States participating in the register listed the transfer of 1,733 tanks, 1,625 armoured combat vehicles, 270 combat aircraft, 40 attack helicopters, 40 warships and 67,878 missiles and missile launchers. The US remained the principal exporter of arms in these categories, followed by Germany. Greece and Turkey were the major recipients of arms, due to the "cascade" effect of European states reducing inventories to meet the levels established by the CFE Treaty. ■

## Peacekeeping: Rwandan Mission Expands, Haitian Mission Stalled

The UN has expanded its African operations with the creation of the UN Assistance Mission in **Rwanda** (UNAMIR). UNAMIR's task is to help implement the peace agreement worked out between the Rwandan government and opposition forces. The UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), commanded by Canadian Brigadier General Romeo Dallaire, will be incorporated into the new mission. General Dallaire has been appointed the force commander of UNAMIR, which at its peak is expected to include over 2,500 military personnel.

Canada has completed the withdrawal of its infantry battalion from the United Nations Force in **Cyprus** (UNFICYP). To maintain its presence in the operation and to demonstrate its commitment to resolving the conflict in Cyprus, Canada has agreed to provide up to 10 military personnel to UNFICYP headquarters.

The withdrawal of all international military personnel from the UN Transitional Authority in **Cambodia** (UNTAC) was completed at the end of November, marking the successful conclusion of the operation to provide a stable environment for national elections. A democratically elected government is in place in Cambodia and has started the job of rebuilding the country.

In late September, the Security Council authorized the creation of the UN Mission in **Haiti** (UNMIH). The mission was designed to train a new police force once the Haitian Parliament passed legislation separating the existing police force from the armed forces. In addition, international military peacekeepers were mandated to undertake engineering and construction projects to help rebuild Haitian infrastructure.

Canada committed 100 RCMP officers, including the UNMIH commander, Chief

Superintendent Jacques Lemay, and 110 military engineers to help with the construction work and training. Canadian personnel had been only partially deployed when it became apparent that the Haitian military and police would not cooperate with UN forces in the implementation of UNMIH's mandate. With the mandate unachievable, Canada decided to withdraw its personnel from Haiti.

The UN has authorized the creation of an interdiction force to enforce sanctions imposed on Haiti for its non-compliance with the Governors Island Agreement, under which the Haitian military had agreed to the return of exiled President Aristide and his resumption of presidential power. The Canadian navy is contributing to the enforcement task force, which is commanded by the US. Canada will revisit the issue of redeployment with the UN, dependent on conditions in Haiti. ■

## Sydney Workshop Aids Mid-East Peace Process

As Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization were signing their historic agreement in Washington, Canada hosted a workshop on maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs) at the Canadian Coast Guard College in Sydney, Nova Scotia, from September 12 to 14. The workshop was held under the auspices of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the Middle East Peace Process.

Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan/Palestinian delegation, Oman, Qatar and Tunisia attended the workshop, which was one of a series of such events taking place under the auspices of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group. In addition, the co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process (the US and Russia) sent delegations, as did Sweden, China and Japan.

The workshop concentrated on two types of maritime CBMs. The first was the negotiation and implementation of agreements aimed at the prevention of incidents at sea. The second was enhanced cooperation in regional maritime search and rescue activities. Hypothetical simulations were used to stimulate discussion in both areas. Canada's hope that the re-

gional parties would leave the workshop with fresh perspectives on how they might develop maritime CBMs was exceeded. Participants agreed that practical steps should be pursued to enhance regional cooperation both in preventing incidents at sea and in search and rescue operations. They expressed the hope that Canada would continue to act as a host and facili-

tator of the talks.

Canada presented a report on the workshop to the plenary meeting of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group in November in Moscow. The plenary directed Canada to organize a follow-on workshop, which will be held in the Middle East in the first two months of 1994. ■



Participants in the Sydney workshop.

## Hemispheric CBMs Earth-to-Space Tracking Workshop

The OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security held its first ever meeting of governmental experts to discuss confidence-building measures (CBMs) from November 17 to 19 in Washington. The purpose of the meeting was two-fold: it permitted an exchange of views among governments on national perspectives towards CBMs, and it established the agenda for a subsequent workshop of experts, to be held in Buenos Aires in mid-March.

The Canadian delegation, led by Mr. Mark Moher, Director General of the International Security, Arms Control and CSCE Affairs Bureau of DFAIT, presented a paper on Canada's conceptual approach to CBMs. The presentation stressed the broad, interdisciplinary nature of CBMs and emphasized that confidence-building in any region must take account of the social, economic and political aspects of security. A second Canadian presentation was made by LCol Bernard Couture of the Directorate of Nuclear and Arms Control Policy at DND. Colonel Couture emphasized the Canadian approach to CBMs from a practical standpoint, discussing, among other things, the close cooperation between the Canadian Forces and the civilian authorities in the negotiation and implementation of CBMs.

Other national presentations provided overviews of the security situation throughout the hemisphere. It became clear that many regional states do not have security concerns bearing great resemblance to those of other regions. While traditional military CBMs may have some utility in dealing with specific concerns, the larger approach to regional security will have to focus on broader matters.

The March meeting will include:

- a more detailed discussion of the CBMs currently in force in the region;
- consideration of CBMs in force in other regions and their possible applicability to the Western hemisphere;
- examination of the political environment for successful confidence-building in the OAS region;
- examination of the extent of cooperation between the OAS and the UN on regional security matters, and the latest UN developments regarding CBMs.

Canada is consulting with the Chair of the Committee to determine where we can make the most useful contribution. ■

In September, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) held a unique workshop on Earth-to-space tracking at the Algonquin Space Complex in Algonquin Park, Ontario. The workshop, which ran from September 12 to 18, was hosted by the Toronto-based Institute for Space and Terrestrial Science (ISTS) as part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Verification Research Program.

Three UNIDIR representatives, eight scientific and political experts from Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Russia and the United Nations, and six Canadian observers participated. While at the Space Complex, the group examined the political, technical and economic aspects of Earth-to-space tracking as part of efforts to control weapons in outer space. They also visited the facilities of Telesat Canada in Ottawa, where they continued their discussions with Telesat experts.

The workshop focused on current and future developments relating to arms control in outer space. Comparing diplomatic and scientific approaches, participants looked at confidence-building measures (CBMs) potentially applicable to space activities. These could involve formal or informal international measures, the aim of which is to establish confidence among states concerning the peaceful nature of their activities in or related to outer space and to assist in preventing the weaponization of outer space. Proposed CBMs and verification measures examined by the group include:

- international exchanges of information on planned and operational activities in outer space;
- the need for information exchange on rocket launches of all kinds;
- the need for international notification of such activities as launches, spacecraft functions, orbital parameters, planned manoeuvres, spacecraft lifetimes and disposal plans, and potential atmospheric re-entry; and
- specifics of Earth-to-space tracking, including the detection, recognition, description and identification of objects and manoeuvres in space.

Delegates also explored the increasingly critical problem of space debris. Between 7,000 and 9,000 objects currently orbit the Earth at a variety of altitudes and in varying sizes, ranging from paint chips one centimetre across to non-operational satellites in parking orbits. The proliferation of space debris may progress to such an extent that it eliminates space exploration. Some mathematical models have developed scenarios in which the increasing accumulation of debris in Earth orbit would destroy any spacecraft within a short period of its launch.

The workshop represented the initial meeting of an international study team set up by UNIDIR and is a natural extension of UNIDIR's earlier research on verification and on arms control in outer space. Dr. Wayne Cannon, head of the ISTS Space Geodynamics Laboratory, is one of the scientific experts on the team. UNIDIR plans a second workshop for the spring of 1994 in Europe, with the publication of the project's findings tentatively scheduled for the third quarter of 1994. ■

### Focus: On the CSCE

With the end of the Cold War, a number of states, including Canada, have placed increased emphasis on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a vehicle for helping to maintain security and stability in Europe. It is widely acknowledged that CSCE meetings during the Cold War helped contribute to a lessening of East-West conflict by providing channels of communication. It is now hoped that the CSCE can serve as a tool for crisis management and prevention.

### Origins of the CSCE

The idea of a conference of European states to discuss security on the continent was first advanced at a Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest in 1955. At the time, Western countries responded negatively, suspecting that the project's ultimate aim was to reduce the influence of the United States in Europe. The Warsaw Pact raised the notion again in 1966, and in 1969 Finland responded by exploring reactions towards the idea in the capitals of 30 Euro-

pean states, Canada and the United States.

After a preliminary round of consultations and some political concessions, the first stage of the CSCE was convened in Helsinki on July 3, 1973. Participants agreed that given the number and diversity of matters on the agenda, items would be sorted into different "baskets," depending on their nature (the term comes from a British diplomat, who recalled that his mother used to sort balls of wool into different baskets according to their colour). They also agreed that all decisions would be taken by consensus.

The Helsinki conference concluded with the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975. The first basket of the Act deals with security and contains 10 principles guiding relations among participating states. The second basket contains recommendations on cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment. The third covers cooperation in humanitarian fields, such as human rights, information and culture.

Following the Helsinki conference, the principles and recommendations recorded in the Final Act were developed and extended by meetings of experts and larger "follow-up" meetings of all participating states. The first follow-up meeting took place in Belgrade from October 1977 to March 1978. Marked by rancour, it failed to reach any conclusions. The second took place in Madrid from November 1980 to September 1983.

## CSBMs

The Madrid Follow-Up Meeting agreed to the establishment of negotiations on military confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Europe, which took place in Stockholm from January 1984 to September 1986. In the Stockholm Document (1986), the 35 participating states agreed on a series of CSBMs that improved on those agreed at Helsinki in 1975 and included notification and observation of major military activities.

The third CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, held in Vienna from November 1986 to January 1989, agreed on a second, bifurcated stage of security negotiations, involving: 1) another set of CSBM negotiations among the 35 CSCE states; and 2) a set of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) conducted between the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but remaining "within the frame-

work of the CSCE process." These talks resulted respectively in the Vienna Document and the CFE Treaty of November 1990. The Vienna Document 1990 contained 16 new CSBMs and subsumed measures from the Stockholm Document.

CSBM negotiators continued to meet, working towards a more comprehensive document which they completed in March 1992. The Vienna Document 1992, which encompasses the measures of the previous documents and includes all states of the former Soviet Union, mandates more detailed measures relating to exchanging information, providing advance notice of military exercises and limiting those exercises.

The fourth CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, held in Helsinki in 1992, approved the Helsinki Document 1992, which establishes the mandate for the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). The FSC, a negotiating body for security issues, is designed to build upon such achievements as the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document 1992 and the Open Skies Treaty. It includes all CSCE members (now numbering 53). The FSC began meeting weekly in September 1992, not in traditional "rounds" but continuously, with occasional breaks.

## The Institutional Framework

From its origins as a series of multilateral conferences, the CSCE has evolved into a regional organization with a modest institutional structure. The framework for political consultation and decision-making involves meetings of Heads of State or Government every two years, meetings of Foreign Ministers (the **Council**) at least once a year, periodic meetings of a **Committee of Senior Officials**, as well as the **Permanent Committee** of Ambassadors in Vienna, the CSCE's permanent forum. Responsibility for coordination of and consultation on all current business lies with the CSCE **Chairman-in-Office** (at present the Foreign Minister of Italy), who is appointed by the Council. The Chairman-in-Office may be assisted by the preceding and succeeding Chairs (known as the **Troika**). Review or follow-up conferences precede the meetings of Heads of State or Government. Their aim is to review activities and consider further steps to strengthen the CSCE. The next Heads of State or Government meeting is scheduled for December 1994 in Budapest.

In addition to political bodies, the CSCE has, since its first step in the direction of becoming an organization with the Charter of Paris in 1990, established a number of positions and permanent institutions. In June 1993, the CSCE appointed its first **Secretary-General**, Ambassador Wilhelm Hoeynck of Germany.

- A **CSCE Secretariat** in Prague provides administrative support to the political consultation process. It also maintains CSCE archives and provides information about the CSCE to the public.
- A **Conflict Prevention Centre** in Vienna, with a Mission Support Unit, assists the Committee of Senior Officials in its preventive diplomacy and conflict management missions, and gives support to the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures.
- The **Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights** in Warsaw promotes compliance with CSCE human dimension commitments, organizes seminars on human rights concerns, and facilitates contacts and the exchange of information on elections in CSCE states.
- The **High Commissioner on National Minorities** provides "early warning" and "early action" in regard to tensions involving national minorities issues.
- The **CSCE Parliamentary Assembly**, with a Secretariat in Copenhagen, encourages contacts and the exchange of information on parliamentary practices and democratic development.

All CSCE institutions and activities are financed by assessed contributions from CSCE participating states, with the exception of the salaries of seconded personnel, which are paid by the countries from which the individuals have been seconded.

## Canada and the CSCE

Canada regards the CSCE as the principal regional security organization with the moral and political authority to deal with the root causes of insecurity in the European region. The CSCE's advantages include a membership that encompasses all European states — including all the states of the former Soviet Union — plus Canada and the United States. It has a set of underlying principles to guide its relations, it works by consensus, it is flexible, with a minimum of infrastructure, and it has at its core a strong commitment to human rights and democratic development.

## Forecast

*Arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, January through April.*

**Ongoing:** CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Vienna

**Ongoing:** CFE Joint Consultative Group, Vienna

**Ongoing:** Open Skies Consultative Commission, Vienna

**January:** CTBT negotiations due to begin in the CD, Geneva

**January 17-21:** NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee meeting, New York

**January 25 - March 31:** CD in session, Geneva

**March 14-18:** OAS meeting of experts on CBMs in the region, Buenos Aires

**March 22-23:** Australia Group regional seminar, Buenos Aires

**March 28-31:** Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting to review activities conducted under the provisions of the Vienna Document 1992, Vienna

**April 18 - May 9:** UN Disarmament Commission, New York

Since 1989 and the dramatic changes in Europe, Canada has worked hard and with great success to promote the evolution of the CSCE from an East-West forum into a cooperative security forum and a strong regional organization. Canada is encouraging the development of flexible and pragmatic CSCE relations with other regional organizations such as the European Union, NATO and the Council of Europe, as well as with the UN.

In 1990, recognizing that the new Europe was likely to be unstable, Canada put forward a series of proposals for establishing conflict prevention and management mechanisms, including the Conflict Prevention Centre. Canada promoted the concept of cooperative security, which recognizes that human rights, democratic development and economic stability are all integral and interdependent components of security.

At specialized meetings on the third basket, or "human dimension," Canada secured commitments in new areas, such as independence of the judiciary and women's rights, as well as additional commitments in the area of national minorities. Canada was instrumental in the development of a human dimension inter-state reporting mechanism, designed to encourage states to implement the commitments they had made.

At the CSCE Helsinki Summit in 1992, Canada played a key role in shaping the final document and was directly responsible for commitments in areas such as racism and intolerance, international humanitarian law, peacekeeping, humanitarian ceasefires and indigenous populations. As well, Canada secured commitments to continue cooperation on issues related to the transition to market economies by establishing this focus for one meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials each year, to be known as the Economic Forum.

In 1992, some of Canada's proposals on preventive diplomacy and conflict management became reality: CSCE states agreed to establish early warning mechanisms and fact-finding and long-duration missions. Since then, the CSCE has been active in conflict prevention efforts, deploying more than a dozen fact-finding missions, representatives and longer-term missions with differing mandates designed to assist in solving security problems. CSCE missions are or have been deployed in Estonia, Moldova, Latvia, Georgia-Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan and two states of the former Yugoslavia. In addition, the CSCE has sent a team to analyze the situation of ethnic minorities in Hungary and Slovakia, teams to assist states near Serbia-Montenegro in the application of UN sanctions, teams to inspect places of detention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and missions to new participating states to report on their human rights situations. Canadians have taken part in nearly all of these missions and have led two of them.

In September 1993, Canada hosted the CSCE's first-ever experts meeting on the sustainable development of forests. The event, which was held in Montreal, resulted in substantial progress, as experts developed a set of criteria for sustainable forest development.

For Canada, the CSCE represents a relatively low-cost investment in European security. Our assessed contributions, which cover institutions, meetings and missions, totalled approximately \$1.76 million in 1990-91, \$1.64 million in 1991-92 and \$1.84 million in 1992-93. At the CSCE Council meeting in Rome on November 30 and December 1, Canada reaffirmed its commitment to the CSCE as a vital, pan-Eurasian, transatlantic institution.

## Acronyms

BTWC — Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention  
 CD — Conference on Disarmament  
 CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe  
 C(S)BM — confidence- (and security-) building measure  
 CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
 CTBT — comprehensive test ban treaty  
 CW(C) — Chemical Weapons (Convention)  
 DFAIT — Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade  
 DND — Department of National Defence  
 EC — European Community (now Union)  
 ESDI — European Security and Defence Identity  
 FSC — Forum for Security Cooperation  
 IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency  
 ISTS — Institute for Space and Terrestrial Science  
 JCG — (CFE) Joint Consultative Group  
 NACC — North Atlantic Cooperation Council  
 NPT — Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  
 OAS — Organization of American States  
 OPCW — Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons  
 OSCC — Open Skies Consultative Commission  
 START — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty  
 TLE — Treaty-limited equipment  
 UNDC — United Nations Disarmament Commission  
 UNGA — UN General Assembly  
 UNIDIR — UN Institute for Disarmament Research  
 UNSCOM — UN Special Commission  
 VCC — (CFE) Verification Coordinating Committee  
 WEU — Western European Union

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