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THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

WHAT is Philosophy? The difficulty of answering this question arises from the wide range and variety of speculations included under the common name. It seems easy to define Philosophy while we confine our attention to some particular branch or period, but a definition wide enough to cover the whole field is more difficult. Mr. George Henry Lewes, in his *History of Philosophy*, proposed at first to define it as "an attempt to explain the phenomena of the universe;" but afterwards abandoning this as vague and unsatisfactory, he proposed a threefold definition of Theology, Science, and Philosophy. Theology is the systematization of our religious conceptions; Science the systematization of our knowledge of the order of phenomena; and Philosophy the systematization of the conceptions furnished by Theology and Science. These definitions, though far from satisfactory, afford a convenient starting-point for our inquiry. We must not, however, allow ourselves to be misled by the word "systematization." The formation of an artificial system into which our various conceptions are to be ingeniously fitted is neither Theology, Science, nor Philosophy; but an investigation into the true meaning, and nature of the conceptions presented by Theology and Science, with a view to reducing them to a system, may be Philosophy, even though it fail in the attempt to discover any completely satisfactory system. We may ask also the preliminary question, Why does not Science, which is so busy with the formation of systems, go a step further and itself perform the work which Mr. Lewes assigns to Philosophy? The answer clearly must be that we look for some higher principle of generalization than Science can apply. Science deals only with phenomena, but Philosophy has always sought to penetrate further, and to discover what lies behind or beyond phenomena. If we abandon this attempt as impossible, as Mr. Lewes and many others would have us do, no real distinction remains between Science and Philosophy; and to call the highest generalizations of Science by the name of Positive Philosophy is only an attempt to conceal the fact that we have no Philosophy left. Theology also has an answer to give to the questions which transcend the range of Science. Theology asserts that God, as the Creator and Upholder of the universe, is behind the transient phenomena which reveal themselves to the senses. In the various phases through which Philosophy has passed, its answers have sometimes conflicted with, sometimes supported, those of Theology; so that Mr. Lewes' definition is, to say the least, inadequate as far as Theology is concerned. Not all Philosophy can be described as systematizing the conceptions of Theology: no doubt, this has sometimes been the relation between the two, but by no means universally.

The questions which go beyond the range of Science fall under two heads, one relating to the external world, the other to ourselves. Our natural belief in the reality of the external world, and our not less firm conviction of our own freedom, both require explanation; and Science, dealing only with phenomena, has none to offer. The knowledge which it gives us is relative knowledge, based upon the information of our senses. What we term the properties of an object are the powers it exerts of producing sensations in our consciousness. An object is to us nothing else than that which affects our senses in a certain manner; even an imaginary object is but our conception of something that would affect our senses in some new way. Thus our knowledge about objects consists originally of nothing but the sensations which they excite in ourselves. But though this is true Science takes no further notice of it, and is content simply to admit it, and then to pass on to the study of objects and their properties as they appear to us—that is, of phenomena.

Philosophy, on the other hand, would fain pursue the questions which this view of the relativity of our knowledge opens out to us. If all we know directly about an object consists in the sensations which it excites in us, have we any valid ground for believing in the existence of anything which is not a sensation, as a substratum or hidden cause of sensations? Are we justified in saying that "Things in themselves" really exist, and that whenever there is an impression produced on our senses from without, there is a "Thing in itself" which is behind the phenomenon and a cause of it? Can we know anything about this Thing in itself, beyond the bare fact of its existence? Do the attributes which we ascribe to outward things contain any other element besides sensations and an unknown cause of sensations? Are the attributes of filling a portion of space, and occupying a portion of time, properties of our senses, or of the unknown thing in itself, or do they result from the nature and structure of our mind? If we see a thing in a place, is it because the Noumenon, or Thing in itself, is in a place, or because it is a law of our perceptive faculty that we must see in some place whatever we see at all? Or is it possible that our ideas of Space and Time, Substance, Cause, and the rest, are put together out of ideas of sensation by the known laws of association? These are some of the chief questions in relation to the external world with which Philosophy has attempted to deal. We cannot deny their interest and importance, but considering that similar questions have been put forward ever since the first beginnings of Philosophy, that the answers given to them have been very various, and that philosophers are not yet agreed as to their truth, it is not surprising that some should regard them as unanswerable, and urge that it is time to abandon a profitless inquiry. Among the few conclusions of Philosophy which may be regarded as almost universally accepted is this of the relativity of our knowledge, and if the statement that all our knowledge is relative is really equivalent to the admission that noumena are altogether unknown and unknowable, then it is evident that the demonstration of this fact is all that remains to us of metaphysics, and we seem to be compelled to abandon all further philosophical speculation, and to fall back upon the study of phenomena. But even this does not abolish Philosophy altogether. If it be true, as Mr. Lewes contends, that the great lesson of the long history of Philosophy is the demonstration of the impossibility of every form of metaphysics and ontology, it still does not follow that the inquiry by which this negative result has been reached has been barren in the past, nor even that similar inquiries must necessarily be useless in the future. The demonstration of the impossibility of ontology has been reached (if it has been reached at all) by a tentative method. Every means has been tried to penetrate the veil of the senses without success. But though the special objects of the inquiry of Philosophy may have eluded us, the inquiry itself is not without value.

Nor is it just to compare Philosophy with Science to the disparagement of the former. In early times there was not so clear a line of demarcation between the two departments as there is now. Many of the problems of ancient Philosophy we should now rather class as scientific questions, and these as they have been solved have passed over to the realm of Science. One great distinction between the conclusions of Philosophy and those of Science, much insisted on by Mr. Lewes, is that the latter are capable of verification, the former are not. But this may be expressed in another way. As soon as means are found to verify any conception of Philosophy, it is removed from the region of speculation, and called an established theory of Science. It is hard in such a case that all the praise should go to Science for its superior method and certainty, while Philosophy, which pointed out the way in the midst of doubt and obscurity, is taunted with inability to verify its results. We may instance the atomic Theory, which certainly in the first instance belonged to Philosophy; but when atomic weights were thought of, and verification by means of the balance rendered possible, then Science laid claim to the result and inherited the labour of Philosophy. In like manner, the Philosophic distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter has led up to the work of modern Science in explaining phenomena in terms of matter and motion, and so bringing them under the domain of mathematical calculation.

In another way the contrast drawn between Science and Philosophy seems unfair. We are pointed to the splendid practical results of Science in contrast to the alleged barrenness of Philosophy. But the immediate practical results necessarily belong to the study of phenomena. If all the questions of Philosophy could be finally answered, if the contention between realists and idealists could be set at rest for ever, the result could not be practical in the same sense in which the results of the study of chemistry and electricity are practical. Even in Science itself there are wide regions of theory which lead to no directly practical result. Yet we do not therefore despise them. Again, the question is raised of the comparative certainty of the conclusions of Philosophy and Science. Mr. Lewes is never weary of telling us that the conclusions of Science are capable of verification, and thereby reach a certainty which is unattainable by Philosophy. But in sober fact this so-called verification is nothing more than confirmatory evidence, which renders the conclusions to which it is applied more probable than they would be without it, but by no means confers absolute certainty upon them. The constant advance of Science, of which we boast, takes place not only by the ever-fresh addition of new scientific conceptions to those previously held, but also by the continued modification of the conceptions already existing. That which at one time has been accepted as a verified truth, after a few years is shown to have been only a rough approximation to the truth, and gives place to a newer conception, recognized in its turn as the latest truth of Science, but destined in all probability to be itself replaced before long by a still further advance. It follows that our present scientific conceptions, notwithstanding their verification, cannot be accepted as absolute truth ; but it is strange to see how often this obvious conclusion is missed and present scientific conceptions are spoken of as established truths, in sharp contrast with the exploded errors of the past. The following sentence, quoted from a recent publication, is a fair sample of the statements frequently made in the name of Science:— "We now *know* that animal heat is generated by the oxidation of some of the constituents of the blood in the muscles, and by their healthy influence, and not by the destruction of their tissues, as was till recently *supposed* by physiologists." But if physiologists, or other men of Science, have been till recently mistaken, is it reasonable to assert in this unqualified manner that their present opinion constitutes knowledge? And if not, what becomes of the boasted certainty of Science?

Perhaps, however, it will be said that after making all due allowances for the changes of scientific conceptions in the past and in the future, there is still a marked contrast between the steady advance of Science and the involved progress of Philosophy returning continually upon itself. Everywhere Science, with its all-conquering methods, is seen steadily advancing, drawing more and more subjects under its rule, yielding answers to more and more problems; while metaphysics remains impotent to furnish satisfactory answers, and is continually coming back again to conclusions which seemed to have been long left behind. Schelling, we are told, revives the spirit of Plotinus. The absolute idealism of Hegel is nothing but the scepticism of Hume in a dogmatic form. His famous axiom that Being and Not-Being are the same, is a repetition of the doctrines of Empedocles and Heraclitus. Here, again, the contrast drawn between Science and Philosophy is hardly fair, since it keeps out of sight the difference in their subject matter; nor is the contrast which actually exists so great as it is made to appear. Science deals with phenomena, and here steady progress may be reasonably expected, for in dealing with phenomena we can make use of mechanical aids. Just as the arts of life advance with the improvement of tools and machinery, so Science advances with the improvement of instruments and mechanical means of observation. Philosophy, on the other hand, deals with matters which, as they are beyond physics, so are they beyond the reach of physical methods of observation. Again, in the field of science fresh observations are continually made and recorded with ever-increasing accuracy, so that the store of facts ready to hand grows larger day by day, and the work of drawing inferences from these facts is enabled to go on with accelerating rapidity. The case is different with Philosophy. The mind, the only instrument of the philosopher, may have advanced somewhat in power and capacity, but it is obvious that it has not been improved to the extent that the instruments of Science have been ; nor, from the nature of the case, can there be any such accumulation of observations for the use of the philosopher in the very fringe of our knowledge, the border-land of the unknown, as that which has been made for the man of science in the whole vast field of empirical knowledge. Thus the modern and ancient philosopher do not differ so greatly from one another as the men of science do in respect to the means at their disposal for reaching the truth at which they aim ; and therefore it is the less surprising that thinkers in the earliest and latest times should, on some points, have reached the same conclusions. But even when this is the case, it does not necessarily follow that no progress has been made. The movement which Mr. Lewes would represent as circular may more properly be called spiral. It comes back, indeed, in a certain sense, to the point from which it started, but on a higher level of understanding. In Philosophy, as well as in other subjects, it sometimes happens that the acute or happy guess of an early speculator is not far from the truth ; but still there are defects and errors in the statement which, when brought to light by further inquiry, cause the first view to be abandoned for another, and that in turn to give place to a third, and so on, till at last the course of speculation returns to a conception or theory very similar in appearance to that which was first propounded. But in such a case we cannot say that no progress has been made, or that nothing has been gained. The long inquiry has thrown light from many directions upon the original conception, and cleared it of many of its difficulties and ambiguities. The Atomic Theory will furnish us with an example of this process in a matter which is now regarded as belonging to Science. The Atomism of Democritus is not merely an anticipation of the Monadologie of Leibnitz; it presents in many respects a striking analogy to the latest conclusions of Science, but we do not, therefore, accuse Science of having travelled in a circle and made no progress. Aristotle's account of the origin of abstract ideas or universals will furnish another example more within the domain of Philosophy. The universal, he says, comes before the particular conception; the most general conceptions are the most primitive. Thus, if we see something at a great distance we cannot tell what it is, we can only place it under the general conception of substance; when we approach nearer, we are able to recognize it as (say) an animal; when we see it close, we can distinguish the particular species. So an infant will call every man "dada," showing that he has the general conception of man before he acquires the particular conception of father. On this Mr. Lewes remarks that "The fallacy is patent. It confounds an indefinite with a generalized conception."[1] Yet modern speculation comes round again to a very similar thought when Professor Max Müller tells us that general conceptions are formed not by the power of the mind in the process of abstraction in the first instance, but by its weakness in being unable to grasp all the details which go to the formation of the particular conception at one time.[2] But the thought, though similar, is not identical with Aristotle's, and it will, perhaps, be found not quite so easy to dismiss it as a fallacy, supported as it is by the history of the growth of language. Let us take another example from the ethical side of Philosophy. Aristotle teaches that the first principles of ethics are to be derived from the essential character of man; they are to be found in the idea of man as such, and must express the end for us as men, *τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*. One of the latest writers on ethics, Professor Schurman, still holds this to be the foundation of his science. But yet he says truly that the question of the good-will, with the correlated question of freedom and necessity, came first with Christianity into the living consciousness of modern Europe. Thus, though he adopts the principle of Aristotle, he does not adopt it without development ; but, he says, the truth of ethics is contained potentially in his system, an implicit explanation of modern difficulties is latent in his principles.[1]

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[1] *History of Philosophy*, 3rd edit., i. 295.

[2] *Three Introductory Lectures on the Science of Thought.* Appendix, p. 26.

One point more with regard to the Philosophy of the past. The remark which Mr. Lewes makes about Plato may well be extended to Philosophy in general. "To appreciate Plato," he says, "it is necessary to keep before us the luminous thought expressed by Wordsworth, and frequently reproduced by De Quincey, which classes all literature under two divisions—the Literature of Power, and the Literature of Knowledge."[2] The amount of actual knowledge that we can extract from the writings of philosophers may be small, but the dynamic influence of philosophic thought has been a great intellectual force for twenty centuries ; it still remains, and will ever remain, a source of power.

So far we have been considering the question of the progress made by Philosophy in the past. A still more interesting question is, What progress can we reasonably expect it to make in the future ? Let us consider what prospect there appears to be of a solution, or of any nearer approach to a solution, of the problem which Philosophy sets before us with regard to the external world. All our knowledge comes to us through our senses. But by our senses we know only phenomena, only that which appears ; only that which appears to us ; and only as it appears to us. Can we then go behind the phenomena, and say that they are certainly caused by a Thing in itself, a Noumenon ; and can we form any conception as to what the Thing in itself is ? Our modern philosophers, for the most part, tell us that we cannot. It is not only unknown, but unknowable. But if this is so, there still remains the question, Where are we to draw the line between the known or knowable phenomena and the unknowable noumenon? In the illustrative examples given by writers on Philosophy, the impressions actually made upon our senses seem to be commonly spoken of in the phenomena, and it is thus implied that that which lies behind these impressions, and is the external cause of them, is the Thing in itself, or Noumenon, which is said to be unknowable. But as a matter of fact, we are able to go some considerable way behind these impressions on the senses, and to recognize that which we conceive as being the proximate cause of them. Modern Science has made considerable progress in the knowledge of the molecular constitution of bodies, and in showing the dependence of the properties of bodies on this molecular constitution. How, then, are we to regard this knowledge? Is it a knowledge of phenomena only, or of the external cause of phenomena? Mill, and others, have pointed out that if we could know much more than we do know about Matter, in consequence of our senses becoming more acute, or even of our obtaining additional senses, if such a thing were possible, this knowledge would still be relative in precisely the same way in which our present knowledge is relative, and therefore would be only further knowledge of phenomena, not of noumena. But this argument can hardly apply to the case we are now considering, seeing that the knowledge we speak of has been gained in quite a different way, not by any quickening of the senses, but by the exercise of the reasoning powers. It is true we reason on the data supplied by the senses, but the conclusions reached are not represented as sensations, or even as possibilities of sensation. Perhaps we do not form a very clear idea of what we mean by molecular constitution and molecular motion, but we certainly do not regard them as anything that can be a direct object of sensation. We cannot see or feel molecular vibrations as such, but we believe them to be the cause of sensations in ourselves, which we do not recognize as motion at all, but as light, or colour and heat. We do not conceive it as being in us or in our sensations as motion, but only in the body itself.

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[1] *Kantian Ethics, and the Ethics of Evolution*, pp. 58, 62, 66-7.

[2] *History of Philosophy*, i. 221.

If, however, we imagine that thus, or in any other way, we are approaching a knowledge of the thing in itself, we are met by the assertion constantly made that things in themselves are not only unknown, but unknowable, and it therefore becomes necessary to consider carefully what this assertion really means. Mr. Lewes, in his remarks upon Kant, sets down as the first result of the critical Philosophy, that a knowledge of things as they are in themselves is impossible, and consequently ontology, as a science, is impossible. But though Kant in terms denies the possibility of a knowledge of pure object, yet it has been pointed out that he does in fact make many assertions about it. He affirms that noumena exist, and thus applies to them the category or conception of existence. He affirms that they really exist; thus applying to them the category of reality. He affirms that they are noumena, or objects of our *nous*, thus applying to them the category of relation. He affirms that they are objects of our belief, thus applying to them the conception of credibility. He supposes that there are noumena existing besides himself, thus applying the category of plurality. The peculiar merit of his doctrine is held to be that he distinguishes noumena from phenomena, thus applying to them the conception of difference.[1] In like manner, Herbert Spencer makes many positive assertions about that which he declares to be unknown and unknowable. And Mr. Lewes himself tells us that the fundamental principle of classification is that it should be objective and founded on the relations of objects, not subjective and founded on their relations to us.[2] But how can this be, if we really know nothing whatever about objects except their relation to us? The inference from this inconsistency is that in this matter we are very liable to be misled by ambiguity of terms. Knowledge itself is a relation between the thing known and the person knowing, and therefore it follows of necessity that all our knowledge must in this sense be relative, and we can have no knowledge of the thing as it is in itself, out of all relation. But this is a mere truism. To say that all our knowledge is in this sense relative, is merely to say that we can never know anything without knowing it. And yet it is difficult to see in what other sense it can be affirmed that the thing in itself is unknowable. We must admit that at present it is unknown, but why except in this paradoxical sense should it be unknowable? In our first crude observations we attribute to the object much that we afterwards find to be really due to ourselves; but from the very first Philosophy assures us that there is a true object, which is the external or objective cause of those phenomena of which we ourselves are the subjective cause; and as our knowledge increases, we continually learn how to eliminate from our conception of the object more and more of its subjective elements, and in so doing we continually approach nearer to the conception of the object as it is in itself. To say that we have no knowledge whatever of the thing in itself is a mere paradox. We know that it exists. This, according to Herbert Spencer, is the most certain of all our knowledge.[1] Also, if the thing produces effects of which our sight, hearing, or touch can take cognizance, it follows—and, indeed, it is but the same statement in other words—that the thing has power to produce those effects.[2] So much, at least, we already know about the thing in itself; and if we keep clear of the unwarranted supposition which so long barred the way to progress—that the properties of things must be *like* the effects produced in us—what is to hinder us from ultimately knowing more about it? It is sometimes argued that we can never free ourselves from the illusion of the senses, because we can never obtain any standpoint of observation out of or beyond our senses. But this would seem to prove too much. An exactly similar *à priori* argument would show that we never could have learnt the true motions of the planets, because we can never obtain any standpoint of observation out of and beyond our earth, which moves with them, and therefore all that we can ever see is their relative, and not their actual motion.

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[1] *History of Philosophy*, ii. 485.

[2] *Ib.*, i. 233.

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[1] Spencer's *System of Psychology*, Part i. chap. iii., iv.

[2] Mill's *Examination of Hamilton*, p. 14.

THE BOOK OF ENOCH.

DATE, AUTHORSHIP, AND GENERAL RESULTS.

THE uncritical receptivity of primitive Christianity regarded the name attached to this book as a sufficient attestation of its genuineness. Thus, as we have seen, Tertullian, while acknowledging that some in his day declined to accept the work, because it was not included in the "Armarium Judaicum," the Hebrew canon, himself opined that it was written by Enoch, and either preserved in the time of the Flood, or restored by Noah under Divine inspiration. Nor have there been wanting some good people in our own times, with more credulity than critical ability, who have freely accepted the antediluvian authorship and endeavoured to prove that the writer was inspired to predict events down to modern times. I have seen some passages in our book distorted even to enunciate the claims and operations of the British and Foreign Bible Society and the sinister actions of Russian politics. But leaving these dreams, let us come to something more practical. No one nowadays believes that the patriarch Enoch had any hand in the composition of the Book which bears his name. This appellation is only another example of the pseudepigraphic idea which dominated so many writers in the period immediately preceding and succeeding the commencement of the Christian era. The sanctity and remarkable destiny of Enoch, the hoar antiquity with which he was associated, designated him as a fit personage to be the mouthpiece of revelations designed for a special purpose and needing the authorization of a great name. That no allusion to the production is made in the Old Testament is obvious; that some portion of it was extant in the first Christian century is certified by the quotation in St. Jude's Epistle. But this certainty will carry us but a little way, as no one can read the work without concluding that it is not the composition of one author or one age, but exhibits difference of origin and date ; and if the section from which Jude took his extract presupposes a Jewish and pre-Christian source, other parts may be of quite another character and have no pretension to any such claim. It is a difficult matter (even when we have distributed the work into its several sections) to determine the relation of these parts to each other, and to assign to them their proper position in the treatise. There is no external testimony to appeal to, and we must be guided in our conclusions entirely by internal considerations.

Now in all these writings occurs this marked characteristic. There is past history given in the form of revelation, combined with hopes and predictions of the future. In the former case events are pretty accurately represented, either actually or symbolically ; in the latter the seer allows himself free latitude for the display of imagination and the possible development of previous prophetic hints. The difficulty consists in exactly defining the point where history terminates and prediction commences. Usually no hint is given of any such interchange ; one phase passes into the other with nothing to mark the passage. If in any particular instance we could say with certainty, here the author writes of contemporary events, and here he crosses from the actual to the ideal, we should at once possess a criterion for determining the date of the composition. Some such opportunity is supposed to be found in chap. xc., where at verse 16 the emblematical account of past history merges into the expectations of the future. The vision to which we refer (chaps. lxxxv.-xc.) traces the annals of Israel from Adam to the great consummation of mundane affairs. If our readers will refer to the former article on this Book,[1] they will see that in this Apocalypse the chosen people are represented under the image of domesticated animals, while heathens and enemies are denoted by wild beasts and birds of prey. The allusions are fairly intelligible unto the Captivity ; but now comes the paragraph which has exercised the ingenuity of interpreters, and upon the exposition of which the determination of our date depends. About the time of the destruction of

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[1] *Theological Monthly*, July, 1890, pp. 13 ff.

Jerusalem the Lord commits the punishment of the chosen people to seventy shepherds, who are told which to kill and how many, at the same time intimating that they will exceed their commission and destroy many more than the appointed number. These seventy shepherds are divided into four series, consisting respectively of 12, 23, 23, 12 members. The last of these members would bring us to the author's own time. Can we with any probability elucidate this riddle? The explanations have been as numerous as the commentators, and we might easily refute their theories by simply comparing one with the other. Out of the confusion thus created we may thank Dillmann and Ewald for delivering us. They and others[1] have seen that an attempt was here made to give a new interpretation to the seventy years of which Jeremiah had spoken as the period of the Captivity, and which had not been followed by that complete restoration which had been anticipated. Hereupon the literal exposition was surrendered; and another theory was started which would account for the partial failure and point to its remedy. The seventy shepherds are foreign and heathen rulers, represented in the prophets as seventy weeks; and they continue to oppress the chosen people till overcome by the great horn, whose victories herald the advent of the Messiah. There is great difficulty in defining the seventy rulers, and it is only with much accommodation that history can be forced into agreement with the writer's supposed idea. Hence it has been proposed to see in these shepherds, not kings, but angels appointed to superintend the chastisement of Israel at the hands of her enemies. As Drummond points out, these shepherds receive their commission at the same time, which would hardly have been the case had they represented successive monarchs.[2] If, however, we hold the usual interpretation of the vision, we must explain it in the following way:—The first group of twelve shepherds comprises five Assyrian kings, three Chaldæan and four Egyptian, from Necho II. to Amasis, under whom, more or less, the Israelites suffered injuries. The second group of twenty-three consists of Persian monarchs, from Darius and Cyrus. These 12 + 23 make up 35, the half of the seventy. The next group, consisting also of twenty-three, is composed of Græco-Macedonian kings, from Alexander to his successors, the Ptolemies, Seleucidæ, down to Antiochus Epiphanes. The final twelve range in the Syrian line, from this Antiochus to the close of the reign of Demetrius II. This lands us at B.C. 125. The stirring events of the previous twenty or twenty-five years are symbolically depicted. The little lambs of the vision are the pious who rose against the Syrian tyrants, the ravens who tore and devoured them ; the sheep with horns are the Maccabæan leaders, who at first had but little success ; and one of them in particular was carried off by the enemy. This is Jonathan, the son of Mattathias,[1] who, B.C. 143, was treacherously murdered by Tryphon, in Gilead. In similar figures are represented the defeat and death of Judas and Simon. The great horn which afforded refuge to the persecuted is John Hyrcanus, and the account of the terrible conflict between him and the enemies of Israel merges here into the Apocalyptical future. So it is at this point that we may place the meeting of history and revelation, and consequently the composition of this portion of our Book.

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[1] Especially Drummond and Stanton.

[2] See chap. lxxxvii. 2. Drummond, p. 40.

But our task is by no means ended even if we have satisfactorily determined the age of one section. Were the work one whole, and evidently the production of one author, to fix the date of one portion would be sufficient to determine the approximate date of the rest. But we have every reason to see in the various divisions different authors and different times of composition. Without entering minutely into details, we may say that it is now generally agreed that at least three authors have contributed to the work. The earliest portion, and that which forms the ground-work of the whole (omitting certain interpolations) is found in chaps. i.-xxxvi. and lxxii.-cv. There is nothing to guide one to the date in the first thirty-six chapters, but in the latter part of this section there are plain insinuations of the same conclusion that has already been reached. The writer in chaps. xciii. 1-14 and xci. 12-17 (which has been displaced) gives another sketch of the world's history divided into ten weeks, or periods. In agreement with the personification, Enoch intimates that he himself lived at the close of the first epoch. The next five weeks are marked with tolerable distinctness as the epoch of Noah, of Abraham and Isaac, of Moses, of Solomon, of the Captivity. At the end of the seventh week comes the vision of Messiah's kingdom. We have to determine the duration of this last period. It is impossible to affix any definite number of years to each week, as the duration of each plainly varies most considerably; it has, therefore, seemed expedient to reckon by generations, counting seven to a week in the earlier times and fourteen in the later periods.[1] This looks like an arbitrary proceeding, one of those accommodations to which critics resort in order to confirm a foregone conclusion. But there are substantial grounds in this case for the notion. It will be seen that seven generations each will cover the first five weeks, the first being from Adam to Enoch, the last from Salmon to Rehoboam. The sixth, according to Drummond's calculation (omitting, as in St. Matthew, Ahaziah, Joash, and Amaziah), consists of fourteen generations from Abijam to Salathiel. The seventh, taking the series of high priests, and excluding Jason, Menelaus, and Alcimus, as Philo-Græcists, ends with Jonathan, Simon, and John Hyrcanus—thus landing us at the result previously obtained by another road. Of course, there is a doubt concerning the conclusion of the series; but in any case the discrepancy will amount to little more than twenty years, and the date of composition of the original work may be fixed between B.C. 153 and 130, or in the latter half of the second century before Christ.[2]

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[1] This Mattathias was the youngest brother of the great Judas Maccabæus. The "great horn" is by some supposed to represent Judas himself, but the particulars of the vision do not well suit this theory. See Dillmann and Stanton.

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[1] Drummond, p. 42.

[2] There is an allusion in this vision which seems to imply that the Book was composed in this seventh week. It is said (chap. xciii. 10) that in this week to the just "shall be given sevenfold instruction concerning every part of His creation." This doubtless refers to the portion of our work which treats of natural phenomena.

If we are satisfied with the results thus obtained (and nothing more reliable is to be discovered), we have settled the approximate age of two considerable portions of our book. Another section (chaps. xxxvii.-lxxi.), containing the three parables or similitudes, affords little internal help for determining its date. Ewald finds a reason for considering this to be earlier than the rest, because the enemies herein denounced are foreign and heathen, while in the other parts the sinners are faithless and renegade Israelites, such as were not heard of till the time of Antiochus Epiphanes. But on the same ground Hilgenfeld concludes that it was written after the fall of Jerusalem; so that no argument can be securely based on such asserted peculiarity. There is one historical allusion which has been supposed to give a hint in this direction. In chap. lvi. we are told that the Parthians and Medes shall work destruction in the Holy Land, and shall in turn suffer vengeance at the hand of the Lord; and it is argued hence that an incursion by them had recently happened, as in B.C. 40, when they overran Phœnicia and Palestine,[1] or that any rate they were the enemies most dreaded in the author's time. But the inference is wholly unwarranted. The writer is not referring to any historical events that had come under his own cognizance, but is giving expression to his predictive anticipations based on the revelation of Ezekiel, chaps. xxxviii., xxxix. A surer criterion is found in the Messianic references, which show marked development when compared with the statements in the former part, as we shall see later on. It is also noted that, while the Book of Jubilees (which we suppose to have been written at the earliest in the century preceding the Christian era) shows acquaintance with other portions of our work, it never makes any allusion to the marked peculiarities of these three parables. From this we gather that this section was unknown to the writer of the "Jubilees," or was then not extant. The language used at the commencement of the section implies the existence of other books of Enoch. We here read, "The second vision of wisdom, which Enoch saw;" and the "similitudes" which succeed are evidently the complement of the preceding revelations, introducing themes of higher character, and rising from mundane and material elements to matters of heavenly and spiritual signification. We may reasonably conjecture that it was composed some few years later than the preceding portion.

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[1] Joseph. *Antiq.* xiv. 13. *Bell-Jud.* i. 13.

There remain the Noachian sections, which are introduced often most inappropriately, and are now found in chaps. liv. 7-lv. 2, lxv.-lxix., cvi.-cvii., and scattered confusedly in some other places.[1] They are probably derived from some lost Apocalypse of Noah, and have been inserted by some late editor, who, without much critical skill, wove the materials into a form which would give a *quasi* unity to the whole. The last chapter (cviii.) is probably the latest of all, though there is nothing in it to determine its date accurately.

The great fact which seems most surely ascertained is that the Book of Enoch is, with the exception of some few possible interpolations, of pre-Christian origin. It was written certainly before the Romans had obtained possession of Palestine, as throughout the whole work there is no mention whatever of them, and they never appear as the enemies of Israel. No knowledge of the New Testament is anywhere exhibited; the name of Jesus never appears; His death and resurrection are not mentioned:[2] all that is of Christological import might fairly be gathered from the Old Testament. The writer especially had studied the prophecies of Daniel, and derived much of his language and matter therefrom, amplifying what he found in previous utterances, and colouring it with his own poetical and often crude fancies.[3]

As to the place where the authors lived, we have good reason for asserting this to be Palestine. This situation best accords with the circumstances revealed in the various treatises. Here we find individuals and the nation oppressed by foreign influence, and fervent aspirations for relief and freedom, showing a state of things which could only be experienced in the Holy Land itself. The attempts which have been made to determine the writers' locality by reference to the astronomy and geography of the treatises is quite futile. In both sciences the seers were far from being adepts, and to guide oneself to a decision through the fog of imaginary and erroneous details is a hopeless task.

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[1] *E.g.*, xxxix. 1, 2; lx; and perhaps xvii. and xix.

[2] It is curious that in the "Testaments of the xii. Patriarchs," under *Levi*, occurs an allusion to a prediction of Messiah's rejection, death, and resurrection, stated to be found in the Book of Enoch. No such passage is now extant in that work, and if it ever existed, it was probably a Christian interpolation.

[3] See Dr. Pusey's *Lectures on Daniel* pp. 382 ff.

Nothing can be determined concerning the names of the authors. Does the Apostle Jude, by quoting a passage in the Book as the production of "Enoch, the seventh from Adam," authorize the attribution of the work or of this section to the Patriarch? Such has been the contention of some, who hold that the passage in question at any rate was a fragment handed down by tradition from antediluvian times. But the verse is manifestly an integral part of the paragraph in which it appears, exactly suitable to and connected with the existing context, and it must meet with the same treatment at our hands as the rest of the section. We have seen to what date we must relegate this book, and that it has no pretension to any such hoar antiquity as the critics above would assign to it. Doubtless it was well known in early Christian times, and Jude and his contemporaries were familiar with it. Without any idea of giving a decided opinion concerning its authorship, and citing the words merely in illustration of his statement (as St. Paul quoted Menander and Aratus), Jude cursorily appeals to a work with which his readers were familiar, and gives it that title by which it was generally known. By using this quotation for a special purpose, Jude does not give his sanction to the whole contents of the work in which it is now contained. All that he endorses with his authority is this particular passage; and in attributing it to Enoch, he is speaking either from direct inspiration, or, as is more probable, merely repeating current tradition. We may confidently affirm that of the authors who more or less have contributed to the Book in its entirety we know nothing; nor, indeed, have we any grounds for conjecturing their identity. That they were more than one is proved by the different uses and expressions which obtain in the several portions ; *e.g.*, the title Lord of Spirits, applied to God so commonly in one section, is not found elsewhere ; the angelology differs ; the Messianic presentation is not identical, nor the eschatology. The attribution of the work to Enoch is doubtless owed to the fact that popular tradition assigned to him the reception of revelations concerning the secrets of nature and other mysteries, the discovery of the alphabet, and the writing of the earliest books that the world ever saw.

We have now to speak of the teaching of this Book and the lessons to be drawn from it. Granting that it is of pre-Christian origin, these are of great interest and importance, as bearing on Jewish opinion in days immediately preceding the appearance of Christ. But there is one preliminary question to settle, and that is whether any or what use of this work was made by subsequent Christian writers. A reader at the last Church Congress astonished and scandalized many of his hearers by boldly asserting that St. John in the Apocalypse had merely plagiarized from certain extant productions of a similar nature. This profane theory was not altogether novel, and it requires mention here since the Book of Enoch has been appealed to as strongly confirming the idea of Christian writers' indebtedness to previous Apocryphal literature.

The author of *The Evolution of Christianity*, in republishing Lawrence's translation of our Book, endeavours in his introduction to prove that Enoch's work is the source of many Christian opinions and mysteries, primitive Christianity having "freely appropriated his visions as the materials of constructive dogmas." The writer accepts without question the Archbishop's views of the origin, date, and locality of the work, except that he is inclined to think that the compiler of the Book of Daniel borrowed from Enoch rather than *vice versâ*. He proceeds to give instances of the influence of Enoch on subsequent writers and opinions. A few of these we will cite. The theory of the immobility of the earth, for denying which mediæval physicists were condemned to the stake, is traced to a statement in Enoch (chap. xviii.) concerning the stone which supports the corners of the earth, and the four winds which uphold the earth and the firmament. But the idea is found in Job xxxviii. 6; Ps. xxiv. 2, &c.; and concerning the winds carrying the earth, we may compare Job xxvi. 7 with ix. 6 and Ps. lxxv. 3. The fate of the fallen angels and the happiness of the elect are described in the Book; therefore the Christian view of these matters is derived thence. To this source is traced the teaching concerning the Messiah prevalent in the age immediately preceding and succeeding the appearance of Christ. Then we have a series of passages from the New Testament paralleled by extracts from Enoch which are supposed to have been in the Christian writers' minds when they spoke or composed the utterances which we now possess. Most of these citations are of very insignificant similarity; many are such as might be found in any works treating of analogous subjects, without any notion of plagiarism, and many more are simply derived from the canonical books of the Old Testament. The "meek shall inherit the earth," says our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 5); "the elect shall inherit the earth," says Enoch v. 7. "Woe unto you which are rich; for ye have received your consolation" (Luke vi. 44). "Woe to you who are rich, for in your riches have you trusted; but from your riches you shall be removed" (Enoch xciv. 8). "The things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils and not to God" (1 Cor. x. 20). "So that they sacrificed to devils as to gods" (Enoch xix. 1). The same idea is found in Baruch iv. 7, and in the Sept. Version of Ps. xcv. 5; cv. 37; Deut. xxxii. 17. The "great gulf fixed" between the souls in Hades (Luke xvi. 26) is paralleled by a passage (Enoch xxii. 9), mistranslated "Here their souls are separated by a chasm;" the correct rendering being, "Thus are the souls of the just separated; there is a spring of water above it, light" (Schodde); and our Lord in the parable gives the prevalent opinion without comment. The rapture of St. Paul (2 Cor. xii.) and St. John (Rev.

xvii.; xix.) is similar to what befell Enoch (chap. xxxix.) in some respects; but one is not dependent on the other in details or description. Enoch hears the angels calling on God, as Lord of lords, and King of kings (chap. ix. 3, 4); did St. John therefore borrow the expression (Rev. xvii. 14; xix. 6) from him? The Apostle speaks of the tree of life (Rev. ii. 7, xxii. 2, 14); Enoch also (xxiv., xxv) tells of such a tree, which is plainly derived from Gen. ii. 9; iii. 22, and is alluded to elsewhere, as Prov. iii. 18; xi. 30, &c.; 4 Esdr. viii. 62; "Testament. Levi." xviii. The tribulations of the last days as delineated in Matt. xxiv. are not unlike the predictions in Enoch lxxx.; but no one reading the two would gather that they were borrowed one from the other, the variations being numerous, and actual identity not appearing anywhere. There is a book connected with the judgment in Enoch (chap. xlviii.), as in Rev. xx; but so there is in Exod. xxxii. 32; Ps. lxix. 28; Dan. xii. 1, &c. In Rev. v. 11 the number of angels is called "ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands;" so in Enoch (chap. xl. 1) we read of "a thousand times thousand, and ten thousand times ten thousand beings, standing before the Lord," which is merely like Daniel vii. 10; Deut. xxxiii. 2. The new heavens and the new earth, adumbrated in 2 Pet. iii. 13 and Rev. xxi. 1, are expected by Enoch (chaps. xlv.; xci. 16). The latter passage is perhaps an interpolation, and the former is based on Isa. lxv. 17; lxvi. In 1 Tim. iv. 1, 2 we read, 'The Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, through the hypocrisy of men that speak lies;" and St. Paul is thought to have plagiarized from Enoch civ., "and now, I know this mystery that the words of rectitude will be changed, and many sinners will rebel, and will speak wicked words, and will lie and make great works, and write books concerning their words" (Schodde). Of this character and of no nearer identity are all the passages adduced by the critic as parallel; and we are asked to believe that our Lord and His Apostles, consciously or unconsciously, introduced into their speech and writings ideas and expressions most decidedly derived from Enoch. Few unprejudiced persons will agree with the author of this opinion, whose aim seems to be to throw discredit upon the superhuman origin of Christianity, and to trace it to merely human development. According to him, "the work of the Semitic Milton was the inexhaustible source from which Evangelists and Apostles, or the men who wrote in their names, borrowed their conceptions of the resurrection, judgment, immortality, perdition, and of the universal reign of righteousness under the eternal dominion of the Son of Man." Yet the same ideas run through all the Pseudepigraphic writings, a fact of which our flippant author seems to be wholly unaware. The writer, as he deems, puts orthodox believers in a dilemma: either Enoch was an inspired prophet and the New Testament writers were justified in using his words as Divine utterances, or he was a visionary and fraudulent enthusiast, whose illusions were erroneously accepted by Apostles and Evangelists, who thus lose their claim to inspiration. Happily, there is a third alternative: the New Testament writers have not borrowed from Enoch, save in the single quotation by St. Jude.

But enough of this. Let us see what is the Christology of our Book, and its Messianic utterances.[1] First, as to the names applied to the Messiah. He is called The Anointed One, the Christ (chap. xlviii. 10; lii. 4); The Righteous (xxxviii. 2); The Elect (xl. 5; xlv. 3, 4); The Son of Man (xlvi. 2); Son of the Woman (lxii. 5). This last title occurs only once, and seems intended to accentuate the fact that He is very man. Of the Christian verity, that Jesus was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin, there is no trace. But to this Christ is attributed pre-existence with other Divine attributes. Thus in the second similitude we read (chap. xlvi. 1-3), "There I saw one who had a Head of days (age-marked), and his head was white as wool (Dan. vii. 9); and with him was another, whose countenance resembled that of man; and full of grace was his countenance, like one of the holy angels. And I asked one of the angels, who went with me and showed me all the hidden things, about that Son of Man, who he was, and whence he was, and why he went with the Head of days? And he answered me, and said to me: "This is the Son of Man, who has righteousness, with whom righteousness dwells, and who reveals all the treasures of that which is hidden, because the Lord of Spirits hath chosen him, and his lot before the Lord of Spirits hath surpassed every other through uprightness for ever and ever." The angel goes on to say that this Son of Man will raise up kings and mighty men from their thrones, and hurl those that obey not to destruction, and break the teeth of sinners, and terribly punish those who extol not the name of the Lord of Spirits. Before sun and moon were created, or the stars were made, His name was named before the Lord of Spirits; and, being chosen to do great things hereafter, He was hidden, and revealed only, till He came into the world, by imparting treasures of wisdom to the elect. For in Him dwells the spirit of wisdom, and the spirit of Him who gives insight, and the spirit of instruction and power, and the spirit of those who are fallen asleep in righteousness.[1] He has not yet appeared on earth, but in due time He will come to execute vengeance on sinners and to receive homage at the hands of the mightiest in the world. To Him all judgment is committed, he sits on the throne of Divine glory, and judges both dead and living, and even fallen angels themselves. He will be the joy of the righteous; it will be their high privilege to hold close communion with Him. In all that is said of the glory of the Messiah, He is plainly not conceived of as God; His power is delegated; He is a creature subordinated to Almighty God, joining in the universal worship offered to the Lord of all; clothed indeed with highest attributes, but set at a distance from the supreme Lord. The writer indeed has assimilated the teaching of Daniel and the Prophets, but he is far from realizing the doctrine of St. John.[2]

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[1] Drummond looks with suspicion on most of these allusions to Messiah as interpolations by a Christian or semi-Christian editor. There is really nothing to show the reasonableness of this notion; and were it true, it would be difficult to account for the vagueness of the statements, the reticence concerning the facts of Christ's life, and the apparent inconsistency in some of the expressions used and actions attributed to Him.

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[1] Chaps. xlviii.; xlix.

[2] Chaps. li.; lv.; lxi.; lxix.

The eschatology of the Book is somewhat confused, owing partly to the vagueness of the writer's own opinions, and partly to the variety of authorship. Speaking generally, we may say that the author anticipated the immediate development of Messiah's kingdom. The one object of the production, so far as unity can be traced therein, is to assert the great truth that retribution awaits transgression ; this is confirmed by the history of the past, and emphasizes the announcement of the events of the later days which are matters of prediction. In one passage[1] we are told that the eighth week of the world's history shall be one of righteousness, when vengeance is executed upon sinners at the hands of the godly. At the end of this period occurs a time of happiness and prosperity ; the righteous shall inherit a new Jerusalem and erect a new temple. In the ninth and tenth weeks the everlasting judgment will take place, the present heaven and earth will vanish away, and be succeeded by a new heaven and a new earth, which shall exist eternally in goodness and righteousness. In other passages[2] referring to the same period there is no mention of this time of peace preceding the judgment ; rather the Messianic reign is to be ushered in with war and calamity and desolation, and rest is not won till the evil angels and the wicked rulers are cast into the fiery abyss, and the Messiah, "the white steer," is born. There is no definite statement in this passage concerning the general resurrection as preceding the universal judgment.[3] But from other places we gather that in this matter a different mode awaits the wicked and the righteous. The spirits of the former shall be removed from Sheol, and sent into the place of torment,[4] but the spirits of the righteous shall be united to their bodies, and live on the new earth, sharing the ineffable blessings of Messiah's kingdom.[5] The resurrection of the body is a boon that belongs to the just alone, who were thus compensated for the evil times which they had passed while formerly in the flesh. The final judge is not Messiah, but God Himself, who shall descend from heaven to pass the sentence upon men and angels.[1] This view is common to all the Apocalyptic literature of the period, so that our Lord's statement, "The Father judgeth no man, but hath given all judgment unto the Son,"[2] was a novel idea to His hearers, even to those of them who had learned some portion of the truth concerning Christ's nature and attributes.

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[1] Chap xci. 12-17. The passage belongs properly to chap. xciii., and is inserted there by Dillmann.

[2] *e.g.*, Chap. xc.

[3] A similar omission occurs in the description given in St. Matt. xxv.

[4] Chaps. ciii. 8 ; cviii. 2-6.

[5] Chaps. li. 1, 2 ; lxi. 5 ; xcii. 3 ; c. 5.

Of the intermediate state the description is somewhat obscure. Enoch (chap. xxii.) is shown a place in the far west where the souls of the righteous dead are collected, different abodes being assigned to them according to a certain classification; those who suffered wrong being separated from those who died from other causes. Near them is the locality where the spirits of sinners wait. Here also a division is made between those who had been punished on earth for their sins and those who hitherto had escaped retribution. These transgressors suffer pain in this abode, even as Dives in the parable speaks of being tormented in the flame.[3] Here they have to wait till the day of judgment, when their fate is decided for ever. But some highly favoured souls do not dwell in this western abode. They are taken to Paradise, which is the Garden of Eden in the north country, and whither Enoch himself was translated. This is their temporary home.[4] One sees here a trace of the distinction between the destiny of the souls of the good and those of the highest saints, which is found in some mediæval and in some Catholic theology; and in accordance with which, while some rest in Hades or Paradise, others are raised to heaven at once and enjoy the beatific vision.

As regards angelology, in some parts of the work there is a somewhat strict classification of these heavenly beings. They are innumerable, but among them are distinguished seraphim, cherubim, and ophanim, angels of power and angels of lordship. The ophanim ("wheels") are so named from the representation in Ezekiel i. and x. There is one called the Angel of Peace (chap. xl. 8), who seems to be the highest of all, and to have the direction of things in heaven and earth. The four archangels, Michael, Raphael, Gabriel, and Phanuel, have separate functions assigned to them in connection with Messiah's kingdom. Michael leads the ceaseless praise of God; Raphael presides over the sick and suffering; Gabriel is mighty to assist the oppressed; Phanuel aids the repentant and those who hope for life eternal.[1] As regards evil spirits, these are sometimes supposed to be the fallen angels, whose transgression is continually coming in view; sometimes the spirits of the giants born from their illicit connection with mortal women. Others are called Satans, and at their head is Satan himself, who is represented with his followers not only as leading men astray, but as the agent of God in inflicting punishment on sinners. In this view he is allowed, as in Job, to visit heaven, and prefer accusations against men. Whence these Satans came, and whether they were originally good angels, Enoch reveals not; but he denounces their fate in Messianic times, when they shall be cast into a blazing furnace and tormented eternally.[2]

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[1] Chaps. i. 3, 4; xxv. 3; c. 5.

[2] John v. 22.

[3] Chap. ciii. 7, 8; Luke xvi. 23-25.

[4] Chap. lx. 8; lxi. 12; lxx.

The Book of Enoch shows its variety of authorship by the inequality of literary skill which is found in it. If some passages are of high eloquence, and redolent of piety and reverence and noble aspirations, others are characterized by wild speculation and empty bombast. But with all its faults and shortcomings, it is of great value as introducing us to the views and feelings of Jews, their hopes and convictions, at the period immediately preceding the Christian era, and helping us to estimate the moral, religious, and political atmosphere in which Christ lived. Hence the work is to be regarded not as a mere literary curiosity, but as offering a substantial aid to the understanding of the most important period of the world's history.

WILLIAM J. DEANE.

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[1] Chaps. lxi. 10; lxxi. 3, 7, 8, 13; xl. 1 ff; ix.

[2] Chaps. xv. 8; xl. 7; liii. 3; liv. 6.

THE PRESENT STATE OF RELIGION IN FRANCE.

FRENCHMEN claim for their country a high place in the history of civilization. France, they say, is the brain of the world. Paris is the eye of France. The great ideas that have emancipated humanity have all been forged in the furnace of their revolutions. Their land has become the promised land of liberty.

They claim this for their country, and so all the restless spirits of the age fly to Paris when exiled from their native shores. German infidels, Russian nihilists, Irish fenians and land-leaguers, American revolutionaries, all meet there to plot for the overthrow of society. Paris is the crater of a volcano from which subterranean mines are being driven through every country in Europe. The foundations of society are being destroyed; the rights of property, the sacredness of the family, the principles of philosophy, the axioms of logic, are all alike being corroded by their destructive doctrines; and the most venerable institutions of the world are in danger of being levelled with the ground.

This is all the more melancholy when we consider the glorious triumphs the nineteenth century has wrought. Science has discovered new continents of knowledge of which our ancestors never dreamed.

Steam has shortened space and brought the ends of the earth together; electricity has abolished time by travelling as quick as thought; the engineer has pierced the Alps and cut the isthmus of Suez; he has spanned wide estuaries of the sea, and laid his cables along the bottom of the ocean, binding the continents together and making the world one great audience chamber. Geology has made the stony tablets of the rocks a book in which we can read the history of creation; zoology and biology have turned our attention to the mystery of life; and new theories thereon are ruling in the minds of men; chemistry has discovered new elements, and is combining the old in new forms of endless variety. By the help of the microscope the photographer is covering his plates with the portraits of animalcules invisible to the naked eye; and by the help of the telescope he is making a chart of the starry heavens. The spectroscope is revealing unto the astronomer the composition of the most distant planets. The conservation of energy is teaching us that nothing in the universe is lost, that death is but the gate of life for lower orders of beings, and destruction the most complete only the resolving of a body into its elements. The doctrine of evolution is enabling us to look on the old facts of the world with new eyes and to read a new meaning into them.

Now, France has been in the van in this march of science. Victor Hugo long ago proclaimed, in untranslatable language, the dawn of the scientific day. M. Paul Bert brought the fairy tales of science and the long results of time down to the level of the schoolboy's mind. His text-book, *The First Year's Course of Science*, had an immense sale, and is taught in the schools of France throughout the length and breadth of the land. It has recently been translated into English by his wife. M. Pasteur has made his laboratory in the Rue d'Ulm a centre of light for the world.

France has chosen a scientific education for her children, and she has got it. What is the result? What has science done for her? Has science fulfilled the forecast of the poets, and made all things bright as at creation's day? Ah, no! "It has depopulated heaven and disenchanted the earth."

In proclaiming the scientific era, Victor Hugo warns the priest that his services are no longer needed. The world can do without God henceforth.

"O Priest," he says, "in vain thou labourest, in vain thou dreamest, the world no longer understands the God thou dost reveal." He speaks of the Church, but it is empty. The sacred flame is extinguished on the altar like a heart without love. The Bible is an obscure book.

Heine, in his usual vein of careless blasphemy, writes to the *Gazette* of Augsburg, in 1831, that the beggars on the streets of Paris no longer ask a copper in the name of God, but in the name of Napoleon. Napoleon was then the god of the people. The Deity had been abolished in France.

Abbé Bougaud, Vicar-General of Orleans, has written a book on the present state of Christianity in France. He is a priest, the minister of a persecuted Church, the preacher of a despised religion, and this probably has cast a shadow across the picture he paints for us. It is charitable, at least, to think so, for his story is a very sad one. He assures us that in France the individual is without God, the family is without God, society is without God, the State is without God.

The schoolboy who has mastered Paul Bert's course of science becomes an infidel at fifteen. "Why do you ask me to go to church?" he says to his mother, "I no longer believe in God." It is not one here and there, but eighty per cent. of the youth of France who speak thus. The existence of the Deity, a problem which has engaged the attention of the wisest men of all time, is settled by this youngster at fifteen, and is henceforth beneath his notice.

A new era has assuredly dawned on the world. Neither in ancient Israel nor in ancient Greece or Rome, at any period of their history, could it be said that eighty per cent. of their youth were atheists at the age of fifteen. France needs the return of the prophet who shall turn the hearts of the fathers to the children, and the hearts of the children to their fathers, lest God come and smite the earth with a curse.

But the family is also without God. Marriage has become the uniting of dowries or escutcheons; husband or wife may be an infidel. That matters little so long as their temporal interests are secure. The child sees no religion at home; his parents do not pray or read the Scriptures; they do not even attend church. Or if his mother has some reverence for God and Divine things, and tries to enforce the duties of religion, she has great difficulties to contend against. The boy wishes to act like his father, and his father cares for none of these things. He casts aside the restraints of religion as he cast aside the longclothes of his childhood; he has become a man now, and must put away childish things; he goes to school and college, and is there taught that the brain secretes thoughts as the liver secretes bile, that virtue and vice are mere products, like sugar and vitriol.

And so he develops into a child of the age. Alfred de Musset has given us a description of this prodigy :—"Having been smitten while still young with an abominable moral malady, I recount that which happened to me during three years. If I alone were ill, I would say nothing about it, but as there are many others who suffer from the same disease, I write for them. . . . . I was not sixteen years old when I believed in nothing. Neither as a child nor at college did I attend church. My religion, if I had any, had neither rite nor symbol, and I believed only in a god without form, without worship, without revelation. Poisoned from my youth with all the writings of the last century, I had sucked in good time the barren milk of impiety. Human Ambition, that god of the egoist, closed my mouth to prayer until my terrified soul took refuge in the hope of annihilation."

This sad state of unbelief is followed by a period of indifference. The youth who at sixteen denies the existence of God, at thirty has ceased to have any interest in Divine things. His inner nature has become atrophied by neglect. This explains the infidelity of many of our scientific men. The attitude of their minds for a lifetime has been turned away from the things of the Spirit. There is no wonder, therefore, that their spiritual discernment is very feeble.

Charles Darwin tells us that in his youth he was fond of poetry and music. His devotion to research turned his attention away from these for many years. When he had gained the leisure, and would have been glad to enjoy them, he found he had lost the capacity. His ear no longer remained responsive to the measured cadences of verse ; his heart could no longer be charmed away into an ideal world by sweet sounds. And so he warns all who read the record of his life to take care lest they too shall lose the nobler faculties of their being through want of exercise. He recommends the reading of poetry and the listening to music for each of us at least once a week. How much more necessary must the exercises of religion be ?

But the French youth has no religion. Science has explained everything he desires to know. He has the devil's autograph in his birthday-book, and has become a god knowing good and evil.

But his unbelief does not end in negation. To show his scorn of the Church, he seals his letters with the sacred wafers from the altar. He casts aside the restraints of religion. From his fifteenth till his thirtieth year he is not chaste. The fiction of the realistic school inflames his imagination. The dancing saloons offer abundant opportunities for the wildest excesses. The results are very terrible. All men agree that the level of the moral sense has been lowered. Doctors of medicine point out the bad effects of such excesses: they weaken the memory, blunt the mental faculties, turn men naturally tender-hearted into monsters of cruelty, and soften the very marrow of the bones. But while all alike deplore the evil, no one seems able to cure it, and so the disease goes on unchecked. The youth who at fifteen is an atheist, at thirty is a leper, bearing in his flesh the seal of his sin, which will go down with him to the grave.

The nobler class who escape the corruption that is in the world through lust, nevertheless fall into a state of *ennui* and disenchantment. They declare that life is not worth living. The monotonous round of daily life is too tame for them. They are wearied with the ordinary avocations of men. They lose all interest in the things of the world. They have no ambition, for they have nothing to live for.

The literature of the human race has no attraction for them. The human mind for these six thousand years has been speculating on the nature of God and the soul of man; and all literature is permeated with these ideas. But in the new era these are vagaries that are beneath the notice of a philosopher. Unfortunately, the new era is young, and has not developed a literature of its own which might serve as a substitute for these antediluvian notions. And so the child of the age passes his time in *ennui*. When illness attacks him he has no internal strength, and dies of disgust.

It cannot be expected that a man of this order will make a model husband. It is the heart that creates the family, and his heart is dried up. He cannot love; he cannot bear self-sacrifice. The upbringing of children is a burden to him. He has learned from the sophists of the eighteenth century that marriage is only a contract, binding so long as husband and wife do not change their minds. Though the law itself has been abrogated, the spirit of the law remains. Marriage is no longer honourable in all. The husband for a hundred years has been the target at which novelist and wit have aimed their arrows of scorn. And so in France a large proportion of the population who live together as husband and wife are not married at all. In Paris every third child born into the world is born out of wedlock. It is better, they think, to act thus than to marry.

Science, too, has taught the husband an artificial method of limiting the number of his children. His wife is humiliated, and looks on with horror and disgust. But it is done, the population suffers and the family is being ruined. Evil practices are being revived that have remained unknown in Christendom since the decadent ages of Rome.

No wonder that society totters. A restless spirit has taken possession of the people. The eighteenth century banished God from society, and it has been sick ever since. Various remedies have been tried. Self-interest was substituted for religion as the mainspring of action. But men's opinions are found to differ about their interests. They argue, they quarrel, they fight about them. The weaker has to yield because he cannot help it. He yields, but he does not obey. Might becomes right, and the stronger gains the prize.

This philosophy of self-interest was found not to work well, and so the nineteenth century has invented a new mainspring of action. It is honour, or rather the point of honour. Alfred de Vigny is its discoverer. "It is a masculine religion," he says, "without creed and without image, without doctrine and without ritual, with its laws in no part written. How is it, then, that all men believe seriously in its power? They are sceptical and ironical on everything except that. Each becomes serious when its name is pronounced. . . . . Honour is the respect of oneself and the beauty of the personal life become a passion within us. . Always and everywhere it maintains in all its beauty the personal dignity of man." He calls it "the last lamp in a devastated temple."

Modern society seems to him like an old tree on a river's brink, "the trunk is largely open, the wood is destroyed; it contains nothing but rottenness; but its bark lives still, the sap still ascends, and each year it crowns itself with verdure as in the beautiful season of youth. It remains still standing, and will yet brave more than one storm. That is the image of a nation which the point of honour maintains after religion and virtue have fled."

But the point of honour is vulnerable, and can be destroyed. It is a military religion, and does not flourish among commercial peoples. It has its enemies as well as Christianity. Alfred de Vigny is aware of this, and he points out the enemies of honour. They are those who preach success at any price; who say that the end justifies the means. This class is increasing, and there is danger of the bark being cut through, of the "last lamp of the temple" being extinguished.

In practical life the so-called man of honour is not such a paragon of virtue as Alfred de Vigny paints him. In a popular romance the hero manages to keep his word of honour, nevertheless he corrupts his neighbour's wife, ruins his benefactor, and ends by committing suicide.

It is evident that these men do not rightly understand the disease that afflicts society. M. Jouffroy is more correct in his diagnosis. In 1834 he said, "The country suffers; and that which bears witness of the evil is this dull restlessness, this restlessness everywhere manifested, this discontent which betrays itself on all sides, and of which nobody can define the cause or the object.

"Well, gentlemen, in my opinion, that need of society which is not satisfied, that need which entreats, that need which cries out, that need is not at all a material need; it is, in my opinion, a moral need.

Christianity has placed in society a moral order, that is to say, a system of truth on all points which are most interesting to man. Society lives on these truths ; society is organized according to these truths ; society lives in that moral order.

"Three centuries have passed over that order, and these three centuries have abolished that order, have undermined it, deeply undermined it, overturned it in souls, in consciences, in society itself.

"The void left by that immense destruction is everywhere. It is in all hearts, it is obscurely felt by the masses, it is clearly felt by the classes. It is necessary to fill up this void. So long as it is not filled up, I foresee that society will never be at rest ; that nobody will be able to pacify it.

"Such, gentlemen, is the deep and true cause of this social restlessness ; and so long as we do not find a moral remedy for this moral evil, society will remain restless, society will be agitated. Whoever brings not this remedy to it will not be its master ; will have over it only a precarious power. He cannot appease its restlessness, because he cannot destroy the cause.

"The people who do not give an account of that which they need, but who are not the less restless because of that need which torments them, imagine that every material revolution can bring to them that which they long for. This is why they are so anxious for every change of administration, for every change of social forms, persuading themselves that in changing they will make things better. They do not know what is good for them ; for revolutions of the administration, changes of the social order, of government, of laws, are only material changes, and cannot bring about that moral change of which the country has need."

France did not take M. Jouffroy's advice. In private life the philosophy of pleasure continues to hold sway. He who obtains happiness, obtains salvation. But pleasure needs money for enjoyment, and so it became the chief end of life. Money is earned sometimes honestly and sometimes dishonestly, but it is generally foolishly spent. The fashionable man must keep himself in a continual whirl of excitement. He is either entertaining his friends at home or going out to their entertainments. He spends as much on a single dinner-party, on the luxuries of his table, on the jewellery of his wife, on the dresses of his children, as might maintain his household for a year. He is a liberal patron of the theatre and the circus, a reader of the popular literature of the day. Were he honestly able to pay for all this, it might be allowable; but he cannot honestly pay for it. While spending his money for foolish and expensive luxuries, he is running into debt for the necessities of life. To extricate himself, he rushes into the wildest speculations, regardless of the result. If he succeed, so much the better; if he fail, the Seine is near, or America is within reach, where he can hide under an assumed name and begin over again his career of folly.

While the classes are living in this reckless luxury, the masses are pressing steadily upwards. They are young, and strong, and full of energy; the cry of their oppression rises from the country and from the towns. The peasantry in some parts of France are almost slaves. Their labour lasts from four in the morning till eight at night, and their wages are twenty pence a day. They are migrating to the towns, but this only increases the competition for work, and lowers the already miserable pittance of the workers. Their lot is not a pleasant one; they have to contend against machinery on the one side, and against competition on the other. Philosophy tells them that the chief end of man is happiness; but they are in misery. It says the mainspring of action is self-interest. Now, what is their interest? It is to better their condition; and the only way of doing this seems to be to rise up and overwhelm their oppressors. They are more in number; they are better able to bear hardships and dangers; they are so miserable that it matters little whether in trying to mend their life they should end it.

In this way socialistic ideas are spreading among the people at a rapid rate. A new reformation is being carried out before our eyes. In the sixteenth century it was the Church of Rome who had abused her privileges, corrupted her clergy, turned her vast revenues to the spread of vice, and not of virtue; to-day it is property which has abused its privileges and is attacked by the people. It is the absentee landlord, the luxurious merchant prince. The attack was then against the Church; it is now against Capital. The socialists are the new Protestants, and they are a growing power. At a recent congress of socialists in Geneva they published their plan of campaign. It includes the abolition of religion, the abolition of marriage, the entire abolition of classes, the abolition of the right of inheritance, the triumph of the cause of the workers against capital.

Some one asked, "Who will accomplish this work? The answer was, "The people; the social revolution." "But the classes may oppose such a change?" "So much the worse for the classes. The revolution will roll them into the ditch."

These are some of the dangers that are threatening society, some of the ills that afflict it. What now are the remedies recommended to cure them? M. Jouffroy recommended a moral remedy, but nobody listened to him. The private citizen clings to his philosophy of pleasure. His panacea for all the ills of his own life is amusement. The caterer for his pleasure is distracted in inventing something new, some unheard-of monstrosity that will tickle his fancies for an hour. The writer of fiction thickens his plot and spices his pages to touch his jaded palate. A moral remedy, above all a spiritual remedy, is the last thing he would allow either for himself or for his dependants. He hates religion, and takes care that nobody he cares for shall come under its influence. He keeps his mills running till Sunday at noon that his workpeople may escape the temptation of going to Church, and he does not start them again till Monday at noon, that they may have time to recover from their Sunday evening's debauch. All public companies which employ labour do the same. Their workers seldom have the opportunity, even if they had the will, of entering the House of God, or spending the Day of Rest in His service. The Government is no better. It fixes its elections, its public ceremonies generally on the Sunday, at the very hour of public worship. It brings the recruits of the army to Paris. A hundred thousand young men gathered from all the towns and villages of

France are located there for a year. But they are entirely left to themselves amidst the seductions of the gay capital.

Should a bishop propose any plan for their education or amusement, the newspapers cry out against the infamy, and the officers oppose it with a polite but firm resistance. These young men enter Paris innocent and virtuous, they do not leave it so.

Christianity in France is attacked on all sides. The wit scoffs at it. The philosopher undermines its teaching. The novelist throws the glamour of his genius over the foulest vices, and tries to make them respectable, and even sublime. The private citizen ignores it. The statesman uses the power of his office in banishing it from the institutions and laws of his country. All join hand in hand to suppress the truth of God and to drive it from the earth.

Christianity has taught the world one method of governing men founded on the ten commandments and the sermon on the mount. Each man is taught to love God with all his heart, and to love his neighbour as himself. This method met with the approval of some of the Roman Emperors, who were themselves pagans, and who preferred Christians for the servants of their households. But this method was not approved of by the people of France. And so they have to take the only other method possible: that is, external restraint. The law must be obeyed, the ten commandments must be kept, willingly or unwillingly, from the love of God, or from the fear of the magistrate.

An English statesman has told us that force is no remedy. Nevertheless, force is being very widely used as a remedy in every nation of Europe. Coercive legislation is the order of the day. Modern times have seen the rise of standing armies; our own time sees them increase until Europe has become a camp of armed men. The police force, too, is a modern institution; that force increases and is supplemented by detectives serving their country in the dress of ordinary citizens. In our own land the law now compels the parent to educate his child. The millowner is regulated in the treatment of his operatives by the Factory

Acts. Our mines are under Government inspection. Our public-houses are closed at a fixed hour by Act of Parliament. Trades unions regulate the hours of labour and the rate of wages of the individual workmen. Scandalous abuses are brought to light every year, which show that men are ready to do anything, however mean or however wicked, if they can make money by it. They cannot be trusted to be a law unto themselves. And so every Session sees some new measure of coercion becoming law. Every day our liberties are being curtailed, and tyranny marches onward under the banner of freedom.

But force can only be a temporary remedy for the ills of society, and so at every fresh outbreak there is a cry for more severe, more extended coercion, more men, more ships, more money. This cannot go on much longer, or the dreariest despotism will settle down upon the world.

Bougard sees a hope of better things for his country in the prospect of a religious revival. He sees many signs of this. The aristocracy of France in the last century were sceptics; the aristocracy to-day are sincere believers. The moral revolution that M. Jouffroy longed for is in the air. De Maistre declared that a moral revolution has already begun. One of two things will happen, he said : either a new religion will be founded, or Christianity will revive in an extraordinary manner.

Schlegel declared that we are to have a new exhibition of Christianity, which will unite all Christians and bring back unbelievers themselves to the fold. Saint Bonnet said, "We are entering on a revolution in the souls of men such as has not been since the day of Pentecost. The very hopelessness of France may become her salvation. This dull restlessness, this universal disenchantment may be only the working of the Spirit of God convincing her of her sin in rejecting Him."

Europe at this present hour is in the wilderness listening to the Baptist, preaching the Gospel of Repentance, and listening also to the glad tidings he proclaims that the kingdom of Heaven is at hand.

THOMAS PRYDE.

CHARLES HENRY VON BOGATZKY.[1]

THE name of Bogatzky is a familiar one with Christians of all denominations in all parts of the world where English and German are spoken. In these two languages he has edified and comforted, or otherwise helped in the Christian life, hundreds of thousands in all ranks of society. The most popular of his works, indeed the only one now obtainable in English, is his *Golden Treasury*, which has taken a place beside Doddridge's *Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul*, and Baxter's *Saints' Everlasting Rest.* For at least four generations it has had a large circulation in Great Britain and her Colonies, and in the United States.

Bogatzky has been compared with our own Cowper, but the likeness is not very striking, though they had many things in common. Cowper was a genius, which Bogatzky was not. People read, and we would fain hope still read, Cowper because he was a genius, and many admired his gifts who scorned, or were wholly indifferent to, his evangelical faith and spiritual devoutness. On the other hand, though Bogatzky's writings were read by all classes, and chiefly, it would seem, by the high and noble, they were read for the rich vein of spiritual instruction everywhere to be found in them, not for their brilliant thoughts, their melting pathos, or their well-rounded periods. He was not an orator, he was not brilliant, he was not highly intellectual, but he was good, plain, simple, clear, and his writings are commonly full of all those things which minister to spiritual edification.

Both men belonged by birth to the upper circles of society, and both were comparatively poor; but while poor Cowper was the subject of a mental disease, inducing a morbid state of mind which invested him with a perpetual gloom for months, and even years, with few lucid intervals, Bogatzky was happily free from both, living a life of simple faith in God for all things, for the body and for the soul ; and, though not ignorant of Satan's devices, and sometimes exposed to severe temptations, he so leaned upon the arm of his beloved Saviour that his life was one steady ascent from the wilderness of this world, and his path that of the just, which shineth more and more unto the perfect day.

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[1] *The Life and Work of Charles Henry von Bogatzky*, author of *The Golden Treasury*. By Rev. John Kelly. Religious Tract Society.

The Bogatzky family was of Hungarian origin. The paternal grandfather of Charles Henry fled from his own country in a time of persecution, when many Lutherans were martyred for their faith. He bought the estate of Jankowe, in the Manor of Militsch, Upper Silesia. His second wife was the grandmother of Charles Henry. She adopted and brought up a child named Elizabeth Wutgin, who spoke highly of the Christian character of her foster-mother. She relates how she used to speak of Jesus and heaven so that her young heart was made to burn, and she wished so to live that she might go to heaven and see the Lord Jesus. The good woman also pictured vice in such colours that the child was willing to endure anything rather than sin against her Saviour.

On his mother's side Charles Henry was a descendant of the excellent Dr. Kess, Canon of Breslau, a man beloved by all on account of his general pastoral fidelity and uniform kindness. Charles Henry believed that on himself especially a blessing rested as a descendant of this good man, because God had counted him worthy to bear witness for Him both by tongue and pen.

The year 1890 is the bicentenary of the birth of Charles Henry, which took place 7th September, 1690. His father, Johann Adam von Bogatzky, was an officer in the Imperial service, who rose to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. His mother's maiden name was Eva Eleonora von Kalkreut. She was a woman of earnest Christian character and faith. She loved the Holy Scriptures, and highly valued Arndt's *True Christianity*, a book held in high esteem by the godly in

Germany. She was of delicate health, had many illnesses, and never went into society. Elizabeth Wutgin was his kind and faithful nurse until her death. She often prayed with him and for him, and he confessed with gratitude in after life that much of the blessing resting on him and his labours was due to her prayers.

Bogatzky's education was much hindered by change of residence and school. His father was in active service, and his mother had many cares and trials. Two years he spent under a private tutor at the house of his mother's sister; then he went to a school in Zduni, Poland, and afterwards he went to Silesia to be instructed in a private family. On his mother's return the family estate was sold, and she settled at Zduni, because there was a Protestant church, attended by nearly all the gentry in the Manor of Militsch.

Before leaving his mother, Bogatzky formed a strong resolution as to his future. He would make God his Friend, fear Him always, and wilfully offend Him never. He tell us, however, that his resolutions and prayers at this time did not proceed from a pure source, nor from a due care for his soul and its eternal salvation, but only from a desire to live happily in the world.

After a time he went to be a page at the Court of Wiessenfels. He had long wished and prayed for such an appointment, and also that it might be at a Christian Court. In answering his prayer, the Lord ordered that he should be placed in a gay and worldly Court, and His mercy was shown, not in placing him where there were no temptations, but in preserving him from evil where they were both many and fascinating. He was to endure hardness as a good soldier of Jesus Christ. Just here he was led to see how all things worked for his good.

By the conduct of a professed friend, communications between his mother and him were intercepted, and he had no supplies of money. Thus he was unable to join the other pages (twenty in all) in their gay diversions. It was common for the pages at Ducal and other Courts to live in the castle, but Bogatzky had private apartments at the house of the tutor of the pages, whose wife was a Christian woman, and lent the youth edifying books. Then he had a three months' illness, and was unable to attend to his duties. During this time he read the Bible through, and when he was better he began to compose rhymed prayers and hymns. The tutor observing his taste for poetry, gave him instructions which were helpful to him.

Once again the good hand of God was seen towards him. The Swedes had invaded Saxony, and the Duke of Wiessenfels, retired to Frieburg, and all the pages were dismissed excepting two, Bogatzky and another. The day they left Wiessenfels, and not more than half an hour after Bogatzky's departure, a troop of Swedish horse came up in full pursuit of a troop of Saxon dragoons ; passing through Wiessenfels, they overtook them outside the town and killed many. No one wearing the Ducal uniform was safe ; and had they been half an hour earlier or Bogatzky half an hour later, there is little doubt but that he would have been shot.

On his way from Italy to Silesia, his father passed through Wiessenfels, and ordered him to request his dismissal, that he might learn to ride and prepare for a soldier's life. Illness again overtook him, and he came to a conclusion not to enter upon military duties, as he saw the temptations to which he would be exposed. His father did not insist on his compliance, saying, that as his son trusted in God, no doubt He would provide for him in some other way.[1] His mother was glad at his decision, yet was puzzled to know what would be her son's future, and some of her relations predicted that he would be a disgrace to the family. The young man, however, believed that God had something in store for him, and comforted his mother as best he could. The Psalms were a source of consolation and strength to him ; also, he was much helped by a letter addressed by Luther to Melanchthon, in which the place of faith and patient waiting on God were urged. Some measure of that faith sustained his mind, and the end proved that it was not misplaced—deliverance came in a way he little expected.

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[1] From the *Life of Bogatzky*, translated by Samuel Jackson and published under the superintendénce of Rev. E. Bickersteth in 1856, it appears that, after the death of his mother, his father took a very decided part in commanding his son to join him in Hungary, where he had procured him a cornetcy, having also gone so far as to have Charles Henry's name emblazoned on the colours of the regiment. He felt the claims of the fifth commandment, though he was twenty-six years of age ; also he felt a strong disinclination to the service, and a fear as to his spiritual interests. He sought the advice of Francké and Freylinghausen, at Halle, which was adverse to his father's request. He wrote a submissive letter, requesting him to let him continue his studies. This so irritated him that he wrote to his son to expect nothing more from him, as he would have nothing more to do with him. Psalm xxvii. 10 was the young man's comfort ; and it does not appear that hereafter his father had any communication with him.

About this time Henry XXIV., Count Reuss of Köstritz, came to Breslau with the Countess and a lady, Mrs. von Gensau, an old friend of Mrs. Bogatzky. Through this lady young Bogatzky was introduced to the Count. He urged Bogatzky to prepare to enter the University, which he at length consented to do, the Count promising to aid in his support.

After studying at Breslau so earnestly that an illness ensued, he went to Jena. The work of God, meanwhile, had not decayed within him. In reading Scriver's *Treasury of the Soul*, especially the sermon on the Holy Ghost, he was filled with great spiritual joy. Light was given him also to see that true Christianity is not a matter of forms and ceremonies, nor external duties, but a living power, a blessed life. He saw more and more through the hollowness of all his former professions and hopes. He had confounded the graces of the Holy Spirit with human virtues, and had striven after the latter very much in his own strength and for his own honour and good name. Even the patience and meekness and love of the "Spotless Lamb" had been contemplated chiefly as an example, without any trust in Him and His merits as his Atoning Saviour, the Lamb of God which taketh away the sins of the world. His faith, too, was more a faith of the head than of the heart. His "I believe" had more to do with the intellect than with a broken and a contrite spirit casting itself in utter weakness and unworthiness on the Crucified. And so it was there was wanting that self-surrender of which afterwards he was so conspicuous an example.

In pursuing his studies, Bogatzky's desire was to devote himself to theology, but his friend and patron, Count Reuss, urged that, while there were many godly pastors, there were few godly statesmen. He therefore for a time relinquished theology in favour of the study of jurisprudence, with a view to public service.

After studying law for two years at Jena and one year at Halle, he was led to devote himself to theology, to which change his patron consented. At Halle his intercourse with Professor A. H. Francké, Freylinghausen the hymn-writer, and others, was to him an unmixed blessing.

Bogatzky continued to have very low views of himself, while, on the other hand, his conceptions of Christ were more scriptural and exalted. Just before he paid a visit to Silesia, on account of the death of his mother, he obtained further light and help from the verse of a hymn, which Mr. Kelly has "roughly rendered into English verse":—

"Now no more can guilt depress me,
Thou hast borne it all for me,
Not a spot is found upon me,
I from all my guilt am free.
For Thy sake I now am clean,
Thou my covering art, I ween."

These are the sentiments he here expresses:—"By it (the above verse) the high article of justification was rightly opened to me for the first time, and I believed that, although I was polluted, unclean, and corrupt in myself, I was perfectly pure, white and beautifully arrayed in Christ, and that I ought to be of good comfort."

To the deeply interesting narrative, well and clearly written, we must refer the reader for the narration of events at Halle, in connection with Bogatzky; as also for the very instructive narrative of Mischké and his ministry, and the founding of his Orphan House at Glauchau, in Silesia. When it became clear to Bogatzky that his health, and especially his voice, would preclude his entering on the duties of a pastor, he went into Silesia, his father being now dead, and spent his time chiefly at Glauchau, in the work of a lay evangelist. In this good work he experienced much help, and was the means of great blessing to many. While at Breslau one day he was singing the hymn—

"O precious blood,
O crimson flood,
From Jesus' wounds forth flowing," &c.,

when he came to the verse—

"Flow, freely flow,
No peace below,
Nor comfort e'er can cheer me,
Unless the sin
That gnaws within,
Now, precious blood, thou cleansest."

"He was filled with such consolation that he desired to receive by faith all the blood of Christ, and was enabled to appropriate the atonement accomplished by it. Then the thought was borne in upon his heart, 'Lo! thou desirest all the blood of Christ should flow upon thee, and thou obtainest thy desire, should not love and beneficence toward thy neighbour flow out from thee in return?'" He acknowledged his duty, and sought for objects towards whom to show them. He found such objects in two captains of the Swedish army, God-fearing men, who were in need, and whose faith was confirmed by his kindness in their necessities. In recording this incident, he says, "We shall be ready for any duty towards God and towards man, and we shall have power to do it, if we only keep Jesus the Crucified in His blood and righteousness before our eyes and our hearts. From this health-giving fountain the whole of our Christianity must flow, if it is to be acceptable to God."

These sentiments, or, rather, *principles*, are distinctly those which animated Bogatzky through the whole of his public life; the same as those traceable in Francké, and, before him, in Dr. Spener ; and, indeed, in all the sober-minded Pietists. They are the essential principles of Evangelical Christians everywhere and always ; only with this difference, that while some are only too slightly tinged with them, others have a real baptism.

Bogatzky did not marry until he was thirty-six. He had to wait for an Imperial permission, as Barbara Eleonora von Felso, the lady of his choice, was his first cousin. She had been led to Christ by his instrumentality, and they were doubly, indeed in every sense, one.

They had many trials by reason of straitened means and the wife's repeated illnesses, but these were blessed to them both, and Bogatzky himself was the better qualified from experience of both the bitters and the sweets to comfort others.

Bogatzky had two sons and a daughter, the latter dying in infancy ; but his married life was short. Mrs. Bogatzky was a truly godly woman, and had a gift in prayer, it is said, beyond even her husband. She usually conducted family worship in the morning, and Bogatzky in the evening. They had been married only six years when she was called home. They were visiting at the time at Menze, the seat of the Countess of Gefug. Thus she said, as she lay in her painful illness—

"I am now lying here in these beautiful earthly rooms, and enjoying all care and nursing; but my spirit is soon going to enter those heavenly mansions where it will be perfectly and eternally well with me."

And thus wrote her husband, "And the Lord took her to Himself into those heavenly mansions in full peace and living hope of eternal blessedness, on November 11th, 1734, in the forty-first year of her age."

Turning in the very brief space that remains to Bogatzky's writings, we name first of all his fifty-six different publications (not including his autobiography, which was not published until 1801), his one work best known to English readers—*The Golden Treasury*. This was commenced in his student days, but only so far as the texts are concerned.

Mr. Kelly, in his Preface to a recent edition of *The Treasury*,[1] says, "He was in the habit, in 1716, in Halle, on the high festivals, of writing texts of Scripture appropriate to the occasion, on slips of paper with select verses of hymns, and distributed them among Christian friends. These papers were collected together in the house of Count Reuss, who desired Bogatzky to seek out more of such texts and verses, and have them printed as 'a little text chest.' . . . . He undertook the work, collected texts that he had found quickening, and whenever he could not find suitable verses in any hymn, he wrote some himself. The collection was not published until after the break-down of his health, the consequent abandonment of his theological studies, and his departure from Halle."

This work was published in 1718 without any title, and consisted of two hundred small loose sheets, so as to be convenient for placing in a little chest. Fifty copies were sent to Halle, and twice republished without his knowledge under the title of *The Golden Treasury*. His modesty would never have given his little work so beautiful a title. In 1721 and 1722 he increased the number of sheets to three hundred, and in 1734, as the result of persistent solicitation, he added sixty-six other numbers. The addition of remarks and reflections came afterwards. He lived to see the twenty-ninth German edition, and its translation into many other languages.

The English Bogatzky, or *Golden Treasury*, is an adaptation rather than a translation, excepting so far as the texts are concerned. Rev. Roger Bentley, vicar of Camberwell, edited the first English edition in 1795. He substituted for passages in Bogatzky portions from the writings of Owen, Romaine, Bishop Hall, Bishop Horne, Newton, William Law, and others, and exchanged Bogatzky's verses for selections from Dr. Isaac Watts. The work is still in demand.

Of Bogatzky's hymns we must not attempt to speak, further than that they are like himself and his other works, and have been, in a few cases, translated, as in *Hymns from the Land of Luther*, *The Chorale Book for England*, by Miss Winkworth, and by Mr. Kelly in the volume before us.

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[1] *A Golden Treasury for the Children of God, &c.* By K. H. von Bogatzky. Religious Tract Society.

He wrote altogether four hundred and eleven hymns.

His works had one uniform aim—to check and remove the wrong, to cherish and nurture the right. This he did first in himself, by God's grace, and then sought to promote the same work in others by his books, some of which were large, extending to several volumes, while others were small books, or even pamphlets. These works have done much to mould the mind and character of very many, especially among the upper classes, in his own day and since. They have been the means of planting, nourishing, and extending the work and kingdom of God in thousands of cases.

Before Bogatzky finally made his home at Halle, he spent five years at Saalfield, living chiefly in the Castle of Duke Christian Ernest. He was made useful to the Duchess, and to many besides. He left Saalfield in 1745, and spent the rest of his days at Halle, excepting, of course, occasional visits elsewhere; having rooms at the Orphan House, and devoting himself to literature and such Christian work as his often feeble health permitted. All through his life he had been a true friend to the young, and to the last he delighted to have young people about him. He out-lived many stronger men, notwithstanding his many bodily infirmities, and he even passed his eighty-fifth birthday.

The last two years of his life he was confined indoors a good deal; but he was always calm and cheerful, stayed on Him who had been his trust and confidence all along. And so, in the faith of the Gospel and assured hope of eternal life, he feel asleep 15th June, 1774.

In these days of change with some, doubt and uncertainty with others, and a widespread unsettledness of opinion and principle, Bogatzky's writings, principles, and character are worthy of close study; and such study, by the blessing of God, must be advantageous.

R. SHINDLER.

WELLHAUSEN ON THE PENTATEUCH.

III.

IN the last paper certain *a priori* difficulties were discussed which seemed to call for a solution before it would be possible even to approach Wellhausen's theory of the genesis of the Israelitish polity. We proceed now to discuss the question more in detail. The doctrine which is accepted in Germany is, as we have seen, that it is possible to take the Old Testament to pieces, as one would take a watch to pieces, and to reconstruct it in its original shape, assigning each portion to its proper author; and this, though we have no external authority to guide us, and though we have not the slightest historical evidence of the existence of the authors who are supposed to have written the various portions. One more *a priori* objection will be mentioned before we pass on to detailed criticism. Mr. Rust, in a recent pamphlet, has taken exception to this treatment of historical documents on linguistic grounds. His words, which are given below, are worthy of attention.[1] The theory, at least, compels us to abandon a rule which appears to have had no other exception, namely, that there is always a very close connection between national literature and the national life.

We proceed to examine some of Wellhausen's statements.

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[1] "To what a chaos has it reduced the study and literature of the Hebrew language! There is not a language like it in the world. It has neither age nor youth, neither growth nor decay. Its most archaic portions are the latest written; its death songs the sweetest it ever sung; its highest and best productions were poured forth with the most lavish spontaneity when it was rapidly retreating into a mere dialect of the Syrian tongue. We used to be told that the time of Hezekiah and Isaiah was the culminating point of its creative vigour. In Jeremiah and Ezekiel, in Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah, we were taught to trace its gradual decay; in Ecclesiastes we were to see its close approximation to Rabbinical Hebrew; and in Daniel we could trace it to within a century of the Christian era. We have now to learn, that when removed to Babylon, this singular plant attained its highest stature."—*The Higher Criticism.* By the Rev. C. T. Rust, p. 17. Mr. Rust is plainly no bigoted upholder of the traditional view.

It is difficult to select amid a somewhat bewildering variety; but in those we fix upon we shall endeavour to give a good general idea of his line of argument, if argument it may be called. First of all, he tells us that the narrative of the creation of heaven and earth is due to the author of the Priestly Code, *i.e.*, with Leviticus, is subsequent to the Exile. He declines to enter into the question of the development of its story;[1] but this, it seems fair to contend, is precisely what he ought to have done. Instead of a bare assignment of this narrative to its author, we ought to have been told how the conclusion was arrived at. Especially ought it to have been explained how, while in the first sixteen chapters of Leviticus the word Elohim only occurs four times, and in the "peculiar collection of laws," as Wellhausen calls them,[2] from chapters 17 to 26 inclusive, very seldom indeed, and never without a pronoun attached, the writer of Gen. i. employs Elohim throughout as the proper name for God.[3] It may be safely asserted that there is not a single phrase or word in Gen. i. which betrays post-exilic origin. Thus what facts there are bear very strongly against the probability of Wellhausen's theory; while, on the other side, we have nothing but assertion, unless the six pages of linguistic criticism, to which we have already referred, be seriously regarded as argument.

We are next told[4] that the first sentence of the Jehovistic account (Gen. ii. 4) has been omitted by the redactor. We are even supplied with the words which have been thus removed. They are, "It was all dry and waste." There can be no doubt that the historian here suddenly ceases to use the word Elohim for God, and speaks of Jehovah Elohim instead, a mode of speech which he continues to adopt until the end of the third chapter, with three exceptions, however, in chap. iii. 1, 3, and 5, where he returns to Elohim. It has been contended that the writer has embodied a different, and in some respects a contradictory account in Gen. ii. 4-7, and that he has made an extract from a different document. This statement certainly requires more proof than it has received. There is no real contradiction between the one account and the other—nothing which may not without difficulty be harmonized. It is not unfair to suppose that a man who undertakes to write a narrative from various documents which lie before him would have intelligence enough not to insert accounts which are palpably self-contradictory. The burden of proof, therefore, clearly lies with those who assert that the two accounts are irreconcilable. The change of name, however, in chap. ii., from Elohim to Jehovah Elohim undoubtedly has a significance, though if this be conceded the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch is not disproved. The author of the Pentateuch may very likely have used documents in this portion of his narrative. A man in the situation in which Moses is described as placed would have been extremely likely to have had in his possession written traditions of early history. We know, from the Babylonian histories and monuments, that a Chaldean tradition of the Flood existed, which, in all its main features, agreed with the account we have in the Book of Genesis.[1] It has been already remarked that every account containing the name Jehovah, or more properly Jahveh, must necessarily be post-Mosaic. Therefore, if the narrative of the Fall is, as it has all the appearance of being, of great antiquity, Moses must unquestionably have re-written it ; while if, as seems probable from the use of Elohim there, he found the account of the Creation in an earlier document, he very likely inserted it unaltered. No one, however, seems to have remarked that the combination "Jehovah Elohim," as distinct from "Jehovah our" or "your Elohim," is itself very uncommon. A brief examination of the way in which these two words are dealt with, however, may not be out of place. The first six or seven chapters of Genesis may serve as a sample of the rest, though it were to be wished that a careful and accurate analysis could be made of the use of these two words throughout the Bible.

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[1] *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israel's*, p. 312.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 53.

[3] This argument is met by the statement that the author of the Priestly Code uses Elohim up to the time when "Jehovah" is first met with in Exod. iii. He must have been to an extraordinary extent on his guard, and yet we are told that he makes so many ridiculous mistakes!

[4] *Ibid*, p. 314.

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[1] This tradition is supposed by Rawlinson and George Smith to be as old as 2000 B.C. ; originally found in Berosus, it has lately been discovered on the monuments.

As we have seen, in Gen. i. 1—ii. 3, Elohim is exclusively used. In chap. ii. 4—iii. 24 we have Jehovah Elohim throughout, save in three places, where, it is to be observed, we have not Jehovah, but Elohim. This passage therefore is Jehovistic, though it must not be forgotten that Moses himself may have been the Jehovist. In chap. iv. we have neither Elohim, nor Jehovah Elohim, but Jehovah, save in ver. 25, when Elohim is used. Thence to chap. vi. 5 we have Elohim, with two exceptions, occurring in chap. v. 29 and vi. 3. In the rest of the narrative down to the end of chap. vii. we have the terms Jehovah and Elohim used interchangeably. It is assumed that these phenomena imply a "redactor," who has compiled from a Jehovistic or an Elohistic narrative, carefully copying the *ipsissima verba* of his originals. Is no other theory compatible with the facts? Is it absurd to suppose that, even if we except Gen. i. as showing more than usual signs of being an excerpt from older documents, the whole narrative has been re-written by one who accepts Jahveh as the name of the covenant God of Israel, but uses it interchangeably with the older name, just as a Christian writer uses Jesus and Christ? Is the theory impossible which is suggested by some English divines, that the use of the two names of God may sometimes be conditioned by the desire of the writer to regard God at one time as He is regarded by other monotheistic thinkers, and at another as the special Protector and Guardian of His covenant people. If the redactor *did* copy from two narratives lying before him, they must have been singularly alike, and some explanation is needed of the reasons for his insertion of Elohistic fragments in the Jehovistic narrative, and *vice versâ*. Certainly the explanation does not lie on the surface; nor has any satisfactory one as yet been given.[1] These are the questions which we desire to see fairly discussed. Instead of this, we are referred to the general consent of critics who do not condescend to notice the arguments brought against them. Canon Driver has told us[1] how the books of Chronicles are composed; how the compiler does not hesitate to take bodily passages from older works when it suits his purpose; and he argues thence that compilation was rather the rule than the exception among Hebrew writers. But while the author of Chronicles does undoubtedly copy whole passages from the books of Kings, it is by no means his invariable custom to do so. No one can help seeing that he frequently re-writes his author. Take, for instance, the history of Solomon in 2 Chron., as compared with the same narrative in 1 Kings. We find not only additions and omissions, but frequent alterations in the language and inversions of the order of the phrases, showing that the author was content very frequently to reproduce the spirit of the original narrative without binding himself to its exact words. It is needless to multiply instances; yet let any one compare the narrative of Solomon's dream in 1 Kings iii. with the same narrative in 2 Chron. i., and he will see what is meant.[2] The comparison, therefore, between the histories in the books of Kings and Chronicles lead to the conclusion that while the embodiment of passages from older documents as they stood is not excluded, yet that earlier authorities were also used as we are accustomed to use them now; that is to say, while they were followed, they were not always slavishly copied.[3] And it is at least just as possible that older narratives were re-written, and the names Jehovah and Elohim used as the object, or even the caprice of the writer may have suggested, as it is that a system of piecing and patching was adopted of the most unintelligent description, which sometimes led to the insertion of a quarter of a verse, or even half-a-dozen words, from one narrative into the middle of a passage from another.

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[1] Gen. iv. 25, v. 29, vi. 3, 6-8 require explanation. So does the fact that Elohim (chap. viii. 15) causes the flood, but Noah raises an altar to Jahveh. See also chap. xvii. throughout, xx. 18, xxi. 1, where the rest of the narrative is Elohistic, xxii. 11, 15, 16, &c., &c.

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[1] *Contemporary Review*, Feb., 1890, p. 216.

[2] Or 2 Chron. ii. 3-18 compared with 1 Kings v., and vii. 13, 14.

[3] As Canon Driver's words are very express, "It was not like that of a modern author to re-write the narrative in his own words, but that of a compiler to make excerpts from the sources at his disposal, and to incorporate them, with or without alteration as the case may be, in his work," it may be as well to give some other instances beside those given above. We may also ask by the way, for the sake of a clear understanding on the point, whether "alteration" is, or is not, a different thing from "re-writing." A comparison of the narrative in 2 Kings xi. with that in 2 Chron. xxii. and xxiii. gives distinct instances both of "excerpting" and re-writing. Nor is the latter confined to insertions about the Levites. See

Another of Wellhausen's assertions is that the book of Judges has been carefully gone over by the Deuteronomic writer in the interests of his party. The Israelites are represented in that book as sinning against light—the light being the laws contained in Deuteronomy, a book which was not written till the time of Josiah. It is obvious that this assertion is rendered necessary by the theory. If the laws in Deuteronomy were not in existence in the time of the Judges, all the passages which refer to them must of course have been inserted afterwards. But if this be the case, the absence of all mention of the ark or the tabernacle on which Wellhausen lays such stress is unaccountable. If the Deuteronomist has actually, as we are told he has, subjected the whole history to revision in order to assume the existence of the law he desires the Israelites to keep, it is a little strange that he omitted, as it is contended that he omitted, to insert any passages referring to the very ceremonial worship that it was his object in re-writing the history to recommend. The omission is at least as fatal to Wellhausen's theory as it is to the traditional view. That it is not incompatible with the latter will

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in particular 2 Kings xii. 4-16, compared with 2 Chron. xxiv. 4-15. The narrative in 2 Kings xi. suggests the inquiry who the men were who were to "come in" and to "go out on the Sabbath." At first sight it certainly looks as if the Levites, as ecclesiastical attendants, though not expressly mentioned, are distinctly understood. So again 2 Kings xiv. 1-6 is re-written by the author of Chronicles (2 Chron. xxv. 1). The reference to Deuteronomy in the narrative in Kings is also noticeable. The rest of the story of Amaziah consists of "excerpts" from Kings and of passages "excerpted" or re-written (of course, we cannot say which) from some other book or books. The whole story of the invasion of Sennacherib is not "excerpted," but re-written in Chronicles (comp. 2 Kings xviii. with 2 Chron. xxxii.). Enough has been said to show that Canon Driver's statement must be accepted with some reserve.

be shown presently. We will at present confine ourselves to the question of the Deuteronomic revision of Judges. There is another objection which seems almost fatal to Wellhausen's theory. Can it be conceived that, writing after the destruction of Samaria and the carrying away captive of the Israelites, the redactor, not only in Judges, but even in Genesis and Deuteronomy, has permitted passages to stand which tend to the glorification of fallen Ephraim. We are told, as we have seen,[1] that the blessing of Moses is "an independent document of Northern Israel." What induced the Deuteronomist and the redactor to insert this and the blessing of Jacob in their history, though each of these assign so conspicuous a place to the tribe of Joseph, it is difficult to conceive. It is just possible that it was in order to emphasize the punishment of that tribe for its apostasy. But if this were the case, the work would seem to be just a little overdone, and likely to jar somewhat upon the strong patriotism of the Jew, which, *ex hypothesi*, the writer intended to evoke or to confirm. But this is not all. After the first chapter of Judges there is literally no mention whatever of Judah save the contemptible attempt on the part of the men of that tribe to betray Samson into the hands of the Philistines. The whole history of Judges relates to Northern Israel.[2] Ephraim is throughout the prominent tribe. The tone it adopts towards deliverers of other tribes, such as Gideon and Jephthah, is significant enough of the pre-eminence it claimed. The isolation of Judah is supported by the clear proof that a strong line of demarcation existed between this tribe and the rest in the time of David,[3] and the selection of Jeroboam to rule over the ten tribes is a further confirmation of the fact that Israel at large preferred the hegemony of Ephraim to that of Judah. But all this is only compatible with the fact that the book of

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[1] *Theological Monthly*, June, p. 370.

[2] Not even by a slip does the historian speak of Judah. Compare this with the language of the Psalms, especially such as Ps. xlviii. and lxxvi.

[3] 2 Sam. xix. 40-43. Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, p. 242, says, that the book of Judges is unquestionably Jewish, not Israelite, in its origin, although Judah finds no place in Deborah's song, and though Othniel is the only judge from that tribe. As usual he gives no reasons.

Judges is veracious history. No one writing with the set purpose of magnifying Judah would have circulated a narrative which tended to prove that Israel, and not Judah, had been conspicuous in the early history of the people. A similar argument may be drawn from the repeated references in Judges to kingly rule as the only panacea for the evils of a distracted country.[1] It is hardly possible to suppose these words written in times when disgrace and disaster had brought kingly rule into disrepute. The probability is strongly in favour of such words as these having been written, at the latest, in the reign of Solomon. And the position of some of the earliest episodes in the book as an appendix at the end affords, so far as it goes, a presumption that we have the book of Judges as nearly as possible in its original form, and that it was not re-written in the age of the Deuteronomist or redactor. The laws of literary composition must have been understood by the time of the Exile. The present position of the Appendix does violence to them. And the mention of Phinehas, the son of Eleazar, marks the early date of the events in which his name appears.

We next come to the argument from the silence of Judges in regard to the existence of the tabernacle or its worship. We may, in passing, notice the fact that there *is* a mention of the tabernacle in the early part of the first book of Samuel, the chronology of which is by the best authorities supposed to run parallel with that of the latest portion of the book of Judges. This mention, however, is of course easily disposed of by asserting it to be an interpolation.[2] As usual, no attempt at proof of such an assertion is given. It is necessary to Wellhausen's position, and therefore it is true. Yet at least the mention of the tabernacle worship will be found, on examination, to fit in admirably with the spirit of the time, and to be so interwoven with the history of David as to make it very difficult to detach it. And it should also be remembered that the absence of any mention of the tabernacle and its worship admits of a very easy explanation on the assertions of the writer of the book himself. The religion of Israel was too lofty and spiritual for the people to whom it was prescribed. Almost with one consent they abandoned it for the more attractive worship of the neighbouring nations. Their land was, in consequence, given over to the incursions of those neighbours, and the religion of Israel was reduced to much the same condition as Christianity was in England after the incursions of the Danes. In fact, it would be quite as reasonable to contend that Christianity was invented and the Bible written at the Reformation, as to contend that the non-observance of the Jewish law was a proof of its non-existence. There was scarcely a precept of Christ that was not systematically violated in the days succeeding the fall of the Roman Empire, and the superstitious and hierarchical system prevalent in the Church at that time contained very little in common with primitive Christianity. Except in the monasteries, the Bible was almost unknown, and the various pre-Reformation translations of it issued from time to time by authority had a very small circulation. The condition of the Jewish Church at various periods of its history resembled that of the Christian Church in the middle ages. But its degradation was more complete, because it was at best but a code of laws, while Christianity was animated by a regenerating Spirit. If the work of the latter in early and mediæval times may from one point of view be described as a partial failure, it is by no means surprising that Judaism should have failed to produce conformity to the Mosaic enactments, when so far in advance of the moral and religious condition of the people for whom they were framed. In fact, the whole after history of Israel seems inexplicable, except on the supposition that the lessons of the Captivity and the predicted result of disobedience to the Divine law had produced an indelible impression on the minds of the Jewish people.[1]

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[1] Judges xvii. 6; xviii. 1, &c. It is true that these words only occur in the detached fragments at the end of the book.

[2] Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, p. 43. The words *Ohel Moed*, "tent of meeting," only occur in 1 Sam. ii. 22. But the words Hecal (temple—the word signifies any large building) and Beth Jehovah (house of Jehovah) are found throughout the narrative. Some of our English critics take exception to the statement in 1 Sam. ii. 18, 19, on the ground that the me'il and the ephod there mentioned are priestly vestments. We meet with reports every week in the Church papers of choir boys vested in surplice and cassock. These are also priestly vestments. Are we justified in rejecting all accounts of choir boys so vested as unhistorical?

Another argument (and this time it is certainly more than a mere assertion) is drawn from the frequency of sacrifices at other places than at the one sanctuary. Samuel sacrifices at Gilgal (1 Sam. xi. 15) and at Bethlehem (1 Sam. xvi. 2). Elijah sacrifices on Mount Carmel (1 Kings xviii.), and no remark is made of the breach of the Mosaic law. Above all, we read of Gibeon as the "great high place" in 1 Kings iii. 4. Solomon's conduct is scarcely condemned in 1 Kings, and no remark is made in the more distinctly sacerdotal narrative of Chronicles. But the real reason seems to have escaped most of the critics. Wellhausen seems to think it impossible that the ark should have been taken out of the tabernacle, and he fancies he has detected a contradiction in the statement in Chronicles that the tabernacle[2] was at Gibeon. It is difficult, without more information than we at present possess, to say what was and what was not impossible when impious men like Hophni and Phinehas were in practical possession of the high priest's office. But Wellhausen has omitted to notice that the writer of Chronicles expressly states that the ark was in one place and the tabernacle in another,[3] and the whole narrative in the books of Samuel tends to confirm the statement. That there should be some relaxation of the rule of the law under these exceptional circumstances seems in no way incredible.[4] Nor is this all. It is an entire mistake to imagine that the tabernacle always remained at Shiloh. In the concluding chapters of the book of Judges it is expressly stated that the ark was at Bethel. It is quite possible that the tabernacle may have been taken by Samuel to Gilgal. It is equally possible, too, that under exceptional circumstances the general law might be violated. We find, in the latter part of Judges, in a narrative whose antiquity can surely hardly be questioned, the Israelites represented as sacrificing at Mizpah for special reasons, even in the days of Phinehas the son of Eleazar. Such an admission as this would hardly have been allowed to pass unrevised by those whose first object it was to prevent the repetition of such conduct. As to Elijah, it is impossible to see how the most ardent supporter of the Mosaic law could have blamed him. The narrow literalism of the Scribes and Pharisees is nowhere to be found in the history of Israel previous to the Captivity. And the idea of his summoning the king of Israel and the prophets of Baal to meet him at the temple at Jerusalem, in order that the ritual of the law might be duly observed, is too absurd to be entertained for a moment. The argument, however, is a fair one, and no doubt the occasional breach by good men of a law so stringent may fairly be alleged as a difficulty. But the difficulty is not serious enough to compel us to give up the historical character of the narrative. It admits of other reasonable explanations, possibly such as that Elijah may never have seen a copy of the law, and our information of the actual condition of Israel at the time is too scanty to justify us in setting such explanations aside as inadmissible.

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[1] Wellhausen himself (p. 387) can see that, "if laws are not kept, that does not prove that they are not there," though, seeing the conclusions that may be drawn from the remark, he immediately proceeds to modify it.

[2] See passage cited, p. 274.

[3] 2 Chron. i. 3, 4. See also 1 Chron. xvi. 37-40, a passage Canon Driver seems to have overlooked. It harmonizes the statements in the other two passages.

[4] Especially when it is remembered that it was the fate of Uzzah which induced David to abandon his apparent intention of restoring the ark to the tabernacle.

The discrepancies between Deuteronomy and the so-called Priestly Code will be discussed in the next paper. But the greater part of the difficulties alleged by Wellhausen are either manufactured or greatly exaggerated. Thus he declares that there is not a single word of truth in the account of Samuel's victory over the Philistines, because of the fact that the Philistine power was once more supreme when Saul became king.[1] As well might he assert that the battle of Brunanburh was a myth because of the complete subjugation of the Danes by Alfred, or that the survival of the Eastern Empire till 1452 was impossible because the Saracens in the ninth century had all but confined it within the walls of Constantinople. It is quite possible that the misgovernment of Samuel's sons may have opened the door to the re-establishment of Philistine rule. It is, at least, rather a strong course to dismiss the whole narrative as unhistorical because it presents some difficulties. History proverbially repeats itself, and history is full of improbabilities. The history of the siege of Leyden, as related by Motley, is as improbable as the Exodus, and if a similar story were recorded in the Old Testament, critics of Wellhausen's type would say that there was "not a word of truth" in it; that it was concocted to exaggerate the cruelty of the invaders and the heroism of the inhabitants of the land, and to create a belief in miraculous Divine interpositions. Especially would the story of the fall of the wall, leaving, as it did, the whole city undefended, having frightened away soldiers so valiant and experienced and hitherto so successful as the Spaniards, be dismissed with the most absolute contempt. To re-write history on the principle of abstract probabilities would be as futile a task as it would certainly be a dull one.

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[1] *Prolegomena*, p. 260.

Among the instances of the skill of Wellhausen in finding contradictions where an ordinary intellect finds none, the story of Deborah and Barak stands pre-eminent. Most of us have read Deborah's song and the narrative that precedes it without discovering any glaring inconsistency. But in fact, we are told, the two stand in the most open opposition. The history deliberately falsifies the facts. Out of the kings of Canaan it makes one, as though Canaan were a single kingdom. Sisera, the head of the whole confederacy, descends in the narrative to the simple position of a general.[1] Sisera is killed in his sleep by a nail through his temples, whereas as a fact the blow was given while he was in the act of drinking, and he lay dead in the place where he fell. In our innocence we had supposed that the poet was permitted to indulge in a little idealism. It is a mistake. His statements must be as strictly accurate as a mathematical formula. It is a wonder that Wellhausen did not go a little further, and, to use a favourite expression of his school, tell us that the historian "knows nothing" of the historical incident of Sisera's mother waiting for his return!

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[1] One wonders sometimes whether critics of this school have ever read history. For instance, the tale of eight kings rowing their over-lord Edgar on the Dee.

A few more instances of the manner in which the Old Testament history is dealt with must suffice. The account of the relations of the sons of God to the daughters of men (Gen. vi. 2) is dismissed as an "erratic boulder" (p. 334). Abraham is a "free creation of unconscious art" (p. 338), the "latest figure" in the company, and probably invented after Isaac! The Priestly Code omits all narratives in which any moral exception could be taken (p. 353). We are not told what induced the redactor to restore them, nor in fact can we possibly know that the Priestly Code omits them. We can only know, on Wellhausen's principles, that the redactor has chosen to relate them as they stand in the earlier history, and not as the author of the Priestly Code has told them, if he *does* tell them.[1]

Further instances might be given, but it is time to pause. Enough has been said to enable the reader to understand Wellhausen's method, and to enable him to judge whether it is likely or not to lead to any valuable results. And it should be added that what has been said of Wellhausen may with equal fairness be said of any one else. That *all* their arguments are unfair or misleading is not asserted. But a very large part of them consists in exaggeration of difficulties, manufacture of contradictions, startling and unproved assertions, combined with a systematic tendency to ignore all arguments of opponents.

I had hoped to be able to make some general remarks on the character of the history in Genesis, the signs it presents of the use of documents, and the probable antiquity of these documents. But I must abandon my intention. In the next and last paper I hope to discuss the modern theory of the Mosaic law.

J. J. LIAS.

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[1] Wellhausen is very severe on the round numbers in Judges, and on the date of Isaac's death. It does not occur to him to treat such passages as possible interpolations, though he resorts freely to this hypothesis when it suits him.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

Dogmatics. *The Scriptural Doctrine of Sacrifice and Atonement* (1) is a scholarly and a very useful treatise, which will confer honour on the author and benefit on all who study it. It keeps closely to its title, and the inquiry is conducted with perfect fairness, and with such completeness that the course of the controversy which has surrounded the faith in this respect may be clearly seen. There is some repetition in the work, but not more than is rendered necessary by the state of the case; and, after all, judicious repetition forms the hammer-strokes that drive the truth home. Dr. Cave is not concerned to prove the authenticity, or the genuineness, or the age of the canonical books: what he has set himself to do is to display the doctrine of sacrifice as found therein. The treatise before us is called the second edition, but every page in the present work has been carefully revised in the light of the latest relative researches, and the literary references have also been brought down to date. Dr. Cave tells us that he has endeavoured to write the book as a member of the great Church catholic; and we think he has succeeded. The opinions of the various writers on this subject are stated with impartiality and fulness; the author's own conclusions are set forth with modesty; and we can heartily echo Dr. Cave's expressed desire that his work may "continue to aid Christian thought, whether upon the supreme sacrifice of our dear Lord, or upon those lower sacrifices of ours to which His great love constrains us." In the introduction Dr. Cave states his subject, and says that his aim is dogmatic, and not apologetic. "With the Rabbinic, Patristic, Tridentine, Augsburg, Socinian, or Westminster doctrine we are only indirectly concerned, as each may serve to elucidate the teaching of Holy Writ. Still less have we to do with that comparative method, now so much in vogue, which forms its estimate of truth from the *consensus* of all religions. The Bible is our *fons et judex*, the source or the test of all opinions legitimate to our inquiry."

Book I. is entitled Preparatory, and contains a chapter on the origin of sacrifice, which Dr. Cave does not consider had anything evolutionary about it. He lays some stress on the Paradisaic sacrifice, which he considers was the ideal and original, though to us it seems greatly conjectural. The second chapter is taken up with a consideration of the development and significance of patriarchal sacrifice; showing that it was intended on the one side to teach the heinousness of sin, and on the other the means of restoration. "The interest of the patriarchal age to a student of the Scriptural doctrine of sacrifice centres in the offerings of Adam and Abel. So long as the hand of Eve was unstretched to the forbidden fruit, so long sacrifice was simple, fearless, entire, and consisted in the total consecration of body, soul, and spirit. The problem of subsequent sacrifice was so to alleviate or annul the consequences of the Fall as to restore that earliest stage of trustful and complete surrender of the whole nature as a θυσία ζῶσα. Towards the solution of that problem, but a meagre advance was made in the pre-Mosaic times." Part II. is taken up with the Mosaic doctrine of sacrifice, and contains a full and complete account of the wonderfully intricate and significant system that was instituted under the law. Dr. Cave points out that through all these were two underlying principles: *atonement*, which means the covering up of sin so as to render it unprovocative of the wrath of God; and *presentation*, or the way in which sinful man was to approach God acceptably. Part III. brings out the post-Mosaic doctrine of sacrifice, which is carried through the times of the Judges, Kings, and Prophets; and chapter iv. contains a capital review of the theories connected with the Old Testament sacrifice. Dr. Cave is against the allegorical method of interpreting Scripture, for he holds that allegorizing is unhistorical, and makes ingenuity a test of truth. Book II. Dr. Cave entitles "Pleromatic," and is occupied with the New Testament account of Christ's atoning work, which is treated with reverence, and tolerable completeness. Chapter iii. is a most important one, giving as it does the simple New Testament statement of the Atonement, drawn out with great skill. Chapters iv. and v. present us with a condensed examination of the numerous theories respecting this doctrine, which leaves little to be desired. Chapters vi., vii., and viii. are taken up with a comparison of the Old and New Testament sacrifices; and then follow two chapters about the sacrifice of the Lord's Supper, in which the Romanist, Lutheran, Zwinglian, Socinian, and Calvinistic theories are considered, their foundations shown, their weak points brought out, and the true Scriptural doctrine stated. The work concludes with two chapters on sacrifice in the heavenly world, and an appendix on the Hebraic sacrificial terms and their Hellenistic equivalents, on Azazel, and the Jewish interpretation of Isaiah liii. The whole forms a treatise which deserves a high place in contemporary theology, and which will add to the reputation of the author, and bring credit to the body of Christians of which he is so eminent a member.

Revelation and the Bible (2) does not open up any new field of Biblical inquiry, and the method of handling the matter under review is "studiously unscholastic." It is a *popular exposition*, intended for ordinary readers who are interested on the subject of Revelation and the Bible, and who are in want of systematized information on the perplexing problems which spring from it. One of its especial objects is "to reconcile the discrepancies, the inaccuracies, and other forms of imperfection found in the Bible with the Divine character and claims of the revelation, and with the supernatural element in the facts of the history in which it was originally embodied." Mr. Thomson points out, with considerable detail and plainness, the distinction to be drawn between revelation and the Bible. Revelation and inspiration are both the result of Divine action. The object of both is to impart to man the knowledge of Divine things. Both revelation and inspiration could occur without the knowledge received by man being committed to writing. There might be revelation without inspiration. "In His act of revelation God unveils that which He desires men to know; in His act of inspiration He opens the eyes of men's minds to see that which He has unveiled. Moreover, the act of revelation and the act of inspiration might not take place at one and the same time, and the record of revelation might be at a still separate time. The Bible revelation has a special character: it was communicated through the course of a sacred history; this history was distinguished by supernatural activity on the part of God among men; it was communicated for a special purpose, and recorded by men specially inspired." Mr. Thomson goes into considerable detail to show what the special revelation from God is; such detail indeed as almost seems needless; but there may be benefit in it for persons of varied ideas and propensities. His exposition of the discrepancies in the Bible record and his method of explaining them are not new or more satisfactory than many that have gone before; but, upon the whole, the effect of reading this exposition will undoubtedly be to strengthen the faith of those who desire to believe, but are barred by difficulties. Mr. Thomson believes in the plenary inspiration of the Bible, and as regards its main object of making us wise unto salvation, in its perfect inspiration; but he considers that all the statements in the Scriptures are not inspired, and need not be. His work is a detailed commentary on the text as given by the Revisers:—"Every Scripture inspired of God is also profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction which is in righteousness." The style of the work is somewhat prolix, but it contains a great deal worth thinking about, and we can commend the author's intention, even where we cannot agree with his conclusions.

The theory of evolution, nowadays, meets us on all sides, and almost at all times; it is assumed as proved by all sorts of people, scientific and otherwise, and it is taken for granted in all kinds of periodicals. It is, therefore, a very good thing that a master, such as Sir J. W. Dawson undoubtedly is, has undertaken the task of stating what this theory really is, what are the props that support it, and what are the objections to it. This he has done in a handy volume, entitled *Modern Ideas of Evolution* (3). As the author says, "If the universe is causeless, and a product of fortuitous variation and selection, and if there is no design or final cause apparent in it, it becomes literally the enthronement of unreason, and can have no claims to the veneration or regard of an intelligent being. If man is merely an accidentally improved descendant of apes, his intuitions and decisions as to things unseen must be valueless and unfounded. Hence it is a lamentable fact that the greater part of evolutionist men of science openly discard all religious belief, and teach this unbelief to the multitude, who cannot understand the processes by which it is arrived at, but who readily appreciate the immoral results to which it leads in the struggle for existence, or the stretching after material advantages." After bringing under review the opinion of Lamarck, Darwin, Wallace, Romanes, Haeckel, Huxley, Weissman, Le Conte, and other famous writers on this subject, Sir J. W. Dawson concludes that "it will be the safest, as well as the most candid and truthful course, both for the scientific worker and the theologian, to avoid committing himself to any of the current forms of evolution. The amount of assumption and reasoning in a vicious circle involved in these render it certain that none of them can long survive. On the other hand, the extensive investigation as to facts, and the varied discussions which have arisen out of Darwinism, cannot fail to leave an impression on science, and to increase our knowledge, at least, as to the modes of creative development. The winnowing process has already begun, and our immediate successors may be able to secure the pure grains of truth after the chaff of improved hypotheses have been swept away." The little volume is a most interesting and useful *resumé*, which cannot be too widely read or too deeply pondered.

(1) *The Scriptural Doctrine of Sacrifice and Atonement.* By Alfred Cave, B.A., D.D. New Edition, revised throughout and partly re-written. Edinburgh : T. and T. Clark. 1890. Price 10s. 6d.

(2) *Revelation and the Bible*, a Popular Exposition for the Times. By Rev. W. D. Thomson, M.A. Edinburgh : Macniven & Wallace. 1890.

(3) *Modern Ideas of Evolution.* By Sir J. William Dawson, C.M.G., LL.D., F.R.S., &c. London : The Religious Tract Society. 1890.

Essays. Professor Blackie has collected in a volume five essays (1) which have but a slender connection. They are all readable, and to some extent forcible, but there is nothing very remarkable about them. The first is on the social aspects of Christianity, a subject now much debated, but the Professor does not greatly advance the discussion. He considers that there ought not to be any poor-laws—that "no man has a right to be saved from starvation; starvation may, in certain cases, be the best thing for him, as it certainly is the best thing for society to be saved from the necessity of prolonging the existence of an altogether worthless character." This sounds harsh; but then, if Christianity had its due effect, it would not have to be carried out. The essay on Scottish Nationality is an eloquent panegyric on the Professor's countrymen, in which it is stated that the Scotch are the hardest workers, the most enterprising and successful colonists; conscientious, well-principled, and reliable as workmen; and that these and many other virtues are the fruit of a religion which is "personal, not ceremonial, and means character." On the other hand, the Professor is afraid that the Scotch are historically not only a tasteless, but a dirty people; and as there has been a defective development in the emotional religion of the soul, Scotland has no place in the grand array of great musical composers. Professor Blackie says that to whatever sum of virtues the Scotchman is justly entitled to claim, we may add this additional one, that he has "a guid conceit o' himsel;" but though he regrets the process of "Anglification," which is going on nowadays at a great rate, the Professor does not desire Home Rule for Scotland. He speaks with the authority of a master on the Philosophy of Education, and the Essay on this subject is the weightest in the volume. Its strength and value lie in enforcing truths which deserve to be often repeated—truths which are incontrovertible, and yet too frequently forgotten, to the detriment of all concerned.

The Gospel and Modern Substitutes (2) is a volume of eleven essays written with the object of bringing out the "inexhaustible fulness of the Gospel of Christ in relation to Modern Creeds that contest its supremacy and claim to supersede it." The author thinks that the more excellent way to deal with modern problems is the way of comprehension. He is not satisfied with the organized Christianity of to-day, with its rule-of-thumb, its conventional deadness, and its worship of success; and he is of opinion that the "best method of treating modern systems is not to take up strong negative ground on the one hand, or strong aggressive ground on the other, but to show how Christianity contains the best of all systems." He claims for Christ the best of everything in science, positivism, and socialism, because he believes the fulness of Christ and His Gospel to be infinite. The object aimed at is not a polemic or an apologetic, but an eirenicon." We hardly suppose that Mr. Matheson will be entirely successful in his object. His work will hardly convince gainsayers, or persuade ordinary people that science and Scripture are entirely in agreement; but we think it will perform a useful work in sustaining the faith of those who already believe, and possibly in settling the minds of waverers, and comforting some whose minds are saddened by conflicting opinions. It is pleasantly written, and evinces deep sympathy with men of all views. Mr. Matheson seems to think he can absorb agnostics, convince scientists, persuade positivists, and satisfy socialists, and there cannot be a doubt that if Christianity were more fully preached and more perfectly practised in the world, these modern substitutes for it would have no *raison d'être*. It is satisfactory to think that there is a growing idea in the minds of men that the Gospel is to be carried out in daily life, and that the love for our neighbour is a great part of it. Mr. Matheson is strongest on social questions; and while his remarks on the distribution of wealth and the nationalization of the land are somewhat impracticable, his ideas on the giving of relief, on the housing of the poor, and such matters, are worth earnest consideration. It is somewhat amusing, however, to find that while he considers Christianity to have quite enough inherent vitality to deal with agnosticism, and positivism, and the opposition of science, it must call in the aid of legislation to repress drunkenness and other social evils. Mr. Matheson is certainly not a pessimist; and he points out that there are "two paths along which human progress can and will be accomplished: culture, education, knowledge; but with or without God. If with God, that path will be the path of the just shining more and more unto the perfect day; but if without God, that path will lead downward to the deep, where no light falls and no deliverance comes. Christianity and art," Mr. Matheson says, "ought to be viewed as harmonious influences in human life. Art has found its highest opportunity for interpreting beauty in life under the light of the incarnation of the cross of Christ, and therefore the Gospel claims for Him the ministry of art in every shape and sound, in every form and colour. As Christianity claims the service of art, so art should view it as the regnant power." All for Christ, and Christ in all, seems to be Mr. Matheson's gospel; and we certainly think that he takes both a hopeful, healthy, and helpful view of this all-absorbing matter.

(1) *Essays on Subjects of Moral and Social Interest.* By John Stuart Blackie. Edinburgh: David Douglas. 1890.

(2) *The Gospel and Modern Substitutes.* By Rev. A. Scott Matheson, Dumbarton. Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier. 1890. Price 5s.

Sermons. The Rev. F. S. Schenck has very usefully employed himself in constructing a volume of discourses on the Ten Commandments, showing how their principles apply to the common life and occupations of the present day. *The Ten Commandments in the Nineteenth Century* (1) consists of eleven sermons delivered to the congregation of the Brick Church, Montgomery, New York State, of which Mr. Schenck is pastor, and apply in the first instance to the faults and failings of the American people; but human nature in New York State is not different from that on this side the Atlantic, or in any other part of the world, and therefore these sermons will be useful far beyond the walls within which they were uttered. They are pleasant to read, sound, plain, and practical. They are well printed on good paper, but the volume, as a material thing, is heavier than any book of the same size that we can recollect.

More Echoes from a Village Church (2) is a little volume of charming addresses delivered, as we suppose, in the church of the village of which Mr. Harper is Rector. They well deserve a wider scope, and we can commend them not only as notes and models for country preachers, but for family and private reading. They are short, simple, and satisfactory; their theology is sound; their tone is excellent; and though their author says he feels they are not what they ought to be, yet they bear the impress of careful preparation, wide reading, and hearty sympathy, and withal an attractive modesty. We cordially echo the spirit in which they are issued.

Sermon Stuff (3) is better than its title. It is a volume containing fifty skeletons of sermons, and two sermons fully written out. The sketches are clear, concise, and comprehensive, displaying much reading and resource. They are broad in tone, in sympathy, and withal in opinion; but in order to be used with effect they must be well thought out. This is no drawback, but rather the contrary.

Sermons Preached in the East (4) are plain and practical pulpit efforts up to the average level, but not beyond it.

(1) *The Ten Commandments in the Nineteenth Century.* By F. T. Schenck, Pastor of the Brick Church, Montgomery, N.Y. New York and London: Funk & Wagnall. 1889.

(2) *More Echoes from a Village Church.* By Rev. F. Harper, M.A., Rector of Hinton Waldrist. London: J. F. Shaw & Co. 1889.

(3) *Sermon Stuff.* By S. D. McConnell, D.D., Rector of St. Stephen's Church, Philadelphia. London: R. D. Dickinson. 1889.

(4) *Sermons Preached in the East.* By Charles Henry Butcher, D.D. London: Elliot Stock.

Miscellaneous. We believe that the Rev. J. G. Kitchin spends a good deal of his time very usefully in explaining the treasures of the British Museum to numbers of people; and undoubtedly his little work entitled *The Bible Student in the British Museum* (1) has been written with the best intention, and might do a great deal of good. But alas! Mr. Kitchin apparently reckons without his hosts, the Museum authorities; for these gentlemen have just rearranged the Egyptian, Assyrian, and other galleries, and so changed the places and positions of the exhibits that *The Bible Student* is even now out of date. Mr. Kitchen's book does very well for the sculptures which are attached to the walls, and therefore have an element of permanency in them; but for table-cases, &c., it is of little use, as an afternoon spent in the Museum showed us to our regret.

The Working Men's Lord's Day Rest Association and the Lord's Day Observance Society are both in their separate ways doing a good work in trying to preserve the inheritance of the Lord's Day, which we have to thank our Puritan and other forefathers for. It would undoubtedly be a bad day for this country if the Lord's Day ceased to be kept with anything like quiet and solemnity. As Dr. Gritton shows in his little book entitled *The Day of Joy* (2), Sunday is not intended to be a day of gloom, but of gladness, yet of gladness derived from rational and religious enjoyment rather than of mere pleasure-taking. The publications of the Working Men's Association are carefully prepared by the Secretary, Mr. C. Hill, and we hope they are widely disseminated and carefully perused.

The Pearl of Days (3) is a very attractive magazine, which Sunday scholars of all sorts should have in their possession.

Mr. Atkins' little work, *Moral Muscle, and How to Use It* (4), is a brotherly chat with young men, containing a vast amount of wise counsels in a pointed and attractive style. The valuable brochure forms delightful reading, and is calculated to promote the cause of a pure and Christian manliness.

(1) *The Bible Student in the British Museum.* By the Rev. J. G. Kitchin, M.A. Cassell and Co. Limited: Paris, New York, and Melbourne. 1890. Price 1s.

(2) *The Day of Joy.* By John Gritton, D.D. London: Lord's Day Observance Society. 1889.

(3) *The Pearl of Days.* Vols. i.-viii. Compiled by Charles Hill. Working Men's Lord's Day Rest Association.

(4) *Moral Muscle, and How to Use It.* By Frederick A. Atkins. With an Introduction by J. Thain Davidson, D.D. London: James Nisbet & Co.

Eternal Life. Expositions on St. John's Epistles. By Rev. J. M. Gibbon. London: Richard D. Dickinson.

A new feature is introduced into these expositions. They are made up almost entirely of brief, pointed, and pregnant paragraphs; consequently they are valuable as pulpit aids of a right kind.

The British Weekly Pulpit. Volume II. A Companion Journal to *The British Weekly.* London: *British Weekly* Office. 1890.

For studying the masterpieces of our living preachers this seems the best "Pulpit" series.

The People's Bible. Vol. XII. The Psalter. By Joseph Parker, D.D. London: Hazell, Watson & Viney.

The writer of *The People's Bible* appears at his best in this volume, called "The Psalter"; and notwithstanding the formidable array of existing commentaries on this portion of the Holy Scripture, this rich homiletical treasure must have a place on the preacher's bookshelves.

Greek Vocabularies, for Repetition. By A. M. M. Stedman, M.A. London: Methuen & Co.

In Germany more helps of this kind exist than with us. We heartily welcome this list of words, arranged into 169 groups of manageable size. Though not professedly written to aid Greek Testament students, yet to such it would be most acceptable. The well-arranged vocabulary makes learning by rote a real pleasure to an intelligent pupil, and especially under the guidance of an intelligent teacher, and also opens up avenues of thought.

St. Paul: His Life and Times. By James Iverach, M.A. London: James Nisbet & Co.

On first thoughts it may be questioned if there was room for another work on St. Paul when the English field has been occupied by Conybeare and Howson, Lewin, and Farrar. Mr. Iverach has been able to start out a new line for himself. He skilfully weaves into an attractively written and a highly valuable biographical sketch a refutation of destructive German Rationalistic criticism. The reader, therefore, will not only be instructed, but confirmed in the faith.

Our Lord's Miracles of Healing. By T. W. Belcher, D.D., D.M., and M.S. London: Griffith, Farran, Okeden & Welsh.

The miracles of healing are scientifically grouped in accordance with the nature of the disease which our Lord healed. Few persons possess the great training and special knowledge to enable them to bring such a large amount of interesting and instructive matter to bear on the illustration of the subject treated. Though the writer endeavours to confirm the faith of his readers, however, like so many Christian Evidence writers, he is apt to make too large concessions which do not in any way satisfy the unbeliever, but may occasion great dissatisfaction and distress to the believer.

The Old Documents and the New Bible. By J. Paterson Smyth, LL.B., B.D. London: Samuel Bagster & Sons. Dublin: Eason & Son.

The best book that has yet come into our hands as an easy text book for the people in biblical criticism. A comparatively dry subject for most minds is made attractive to all classes of thinkers.

Henderson & Spalding, Printers, Marylebone Lane, London, W