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


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
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SECOND SERIES—1903-1904

VOLUME IX

SECTION II

ENGLISH HISTORY, LITERATURE, ARCHÆOLOGY, ETC.

A few remarks on "The Siege of Quebec" and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, by A. Doughty, in collaboration with G. W. Parmalee; and on the Probable Site of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, by A. Doughty.

By P. B. CASGRAIN

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1903



VII.—A few remarks on "*The Siege of Quebec*" and the *Battle of the Plains of Abraham*, by A. Doughty, in collaboration with G. W. Parmelee; and on the *Probable Site of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham*, by A. Doughty.

By P. B. CASGRAIN,

(Communicated by B. Sulte and read May 19th, 1903.)

Amidst the well deserved encomiums which have welcomed the recent publication of the above remarkable work on the *Siege of Quebec*, we have much pleasure to join in a cordial approbation.

All students of Canadian history and, we may add, the English speaking people of the whole British Empire, ought to be thankful to the authors and to Mr. Doughty, in particular, for his diligent and successful researches, his arduous and unremitting labours, his skill and tact in finding and obtaining through high protection and influential recommendations, ready access to many valuable documents deposited in public archives abroad, and in various private collections. He may also be congratulated, jointly with the editors, on the magnificent form in which he has been able to extend them to the literary world.

The additional papers now published will throw further light on many details and incidents of the most important events which resulted in the conquest of "*La Nouvelle-France*," and secured against her the supremacy of England in the New World.

The beautiful interesting six volumes now before us deserve more than the cursory notices generally extended to new publications, with more or less appreciative truth or commendable sagacity and critical ability. They require a full and complete review by a learned and competent authority, and we frankly admit our incapacity to do so with adequate justice either to the authors or to the reader and public at large. Therefore we earnestly invite our learned men and scholars to a fair and sound critical examination of the whole subject which is not yet exhausted as we shall see.

They will thereby continue the praiseworthy and successful efforts of the authors to promote and perfect the knowledge of this eventful period.

Their primary object, after a careful scrutiny of the new documents brought to light, would be to ascertain whether they are, as we have heard it alleged, subversive of our former acquired notions on the subject, and in what particulars; or whether they do not generally confirm the lessons we have learned from the historians of the past.

By passing through an impartial and judicious ordeal and scrutinizing with a severe test the import and value of the divers documents and plans brought forth, and carefully comparing, analyzing and weighing what appears to be conflicting evidence, we may reasonably expect to definitely settle what little remains of difficult, obscure or doubtful points and debatable ground respecting this grand historic achievement.

In the meantime we may be allowed to venture a few remarks on some particular data on which we happen to differ, as presented to us by Mr. Doughty and his collaborators; and we anticipate they shall not be constructed amiss. For be it well understood we have not the least idea of disparaging the value of the scholarly and elaborate production of the authors in its general embodiment, but it would be undignified and unmanly on our part, if by reason of the consensus of approval and praise we have seen and heard, we were to be thereby silenced, and deterred from expressing our views when occasions arise for a reasonable criticism, based upon the very documents we have the opportunity of perusing for the first time.

If, therefore, we should meet in the course of the narrative what may appear to us inaccurate, erroneous, or contradictory assertions or incomplete statements; one-sided appreciations, deductions and conclusions more or less venturesome; discrepancies and disagreements between the collaborators themselves, or between the proof and the suppositive or inventive process of the writers,—then we are bound to point them out for the sake of historical accuracy; however supported they are by much display of learning, great skill, and nice ingenuity of exposition; and we feel the more obliged to expose them because they are often rendered attractive by an agreeable style, presented in a handsome and appropriate garb, and adorned with artistic illustrations, all which tend to prepossess, even captivate the superficial or unwary reader.

In pursuing, for the present, a limited investigation and confining it to two principal points, we shall endeavour to carry it with due caution and discrimination, avoiding acrid or unnecessary disputations or petty criticisms. A temperate discussion, supported by well grounded considerations, tends more to display the literary value of the work and the attainments of Mr. Doughty personally. This course is rather complimentary than otherwise.

We may premise by submitting that although we acknowledge the head author of this extensive publication to be a persevering and fortunate collector of precious historical documents, yet we cannot refrain from expressing our matured opinion that he and his contributors have not always shown a strong and sure grasp in handling them, and have been misled into some avoidable errors.

For it looks most strange that with all the former known materials in hand and the accretion of the present documentary information received and at his early disposal, Mr. Doughty, in first instance and by his paper, should have woefully failed to arrive at a true and correct conclusion on the main object of his contention, as to the battle of the Plains of Abraham, that is to say, the real position of the armies when ready to engage; and should have produced in support thereof a plan of the battle such as his Plan A, by him affirmed, *bonâ fide*, to be then perfectly accurate.

And what is more surprising is to see his collaborators, specially Mr. Chambers having remained so long "blind" over palpable errors, apparent to the naked eye on this Plan A.

This arraignment, improbable as it may seem at first, is nevertheless but too well grounded.

It needs no further proof than the preliminary one drawn from the own showing of the four joint collaborators. For without disclaiming or in any way discarding the first plan and finding of Mr. Doughty, upon whose faith they assumed both to be accurate and trustworthy, but, on the contrary extolling them as entirely reliable and conclusive, they now come out with a very different version and a totally changed plan of battle.

This, of course, is a tacit but an unavoidable admission of the previous mistake; which it would have been more proper to candidly acknowledge, as soon as it was perceived by them, particularly when they could not help seeing the utterly false position given to both armies, since their attention was called to it by an article in the *Quebec Morning Chronicle*, August 4th, 1900.

Otherwise, if these writers allow both plans and respective versions to subsist on the same footing and be reputed as equally true and correct, the reader will remain at a loss to make a choice as to the one to be relied on; or may be inclined *a priori* to reject both as antagonistic, because they are drawn from the same materials and sources.

Under the modest title "The Probable Site of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham," Mr. Doughty has determined positively this exact site according to his conception of it in 1899.

In view of elucidating the two main objects and ultimate conclusions of his paper, that is to say: first, the disposition of the contending armies in battle array on the field, and secondly the complete elimination of the Race-course as part of that field, he has marshalled his evidence and arguments with such seductive ingenuity and consummate skill as to

¹ Cf. *Quebec Morning Chronicle*, April 2nd, 1900. *Mr. Doughty's able contribution on the subject; also id.*, May 3, 1900. *North American Notes and Queries*, June, 1900, and August, 1900.

present a *prima facie* apparently clear case and satisfactory as such even to many learned readers; until a closer examination revealed the total fallacy of the whole fabric and mode of exposition.

In the meantime it was headlong asserted in the press by a correspondent, more bombastic in tone than perspicuous in discernment, that "he (Mr. Doughty), is absolutely satisfied that his conclusions are buttressed by truth and cannot be assailed."¹

Certainly there is much that is plausible in the argumentation of the writer, and though we disagree with his solution on both points adverted to, his paper is singularly interesting to study, and deserved a better result, instead of being now discarded by him and meeting a disastrous failure as to the position of both armies, compared to which the small blunders he found in Hawkins are insignificant.

The connection of this paper with the more complete work which is its legitimate and grown up offspring, is so close and direct that, for the sake of argument and comparison, they must be reviewed together and placed in juxtaposition.

It would be more satisfactory to us not to refer, in any way, to that paper, if we could pass over several material errors we see in it, and specially in the plan A, as mere oversights or inadvertences, had not Mr. Doughty since reaffirmed in a deliberate manner their perfect truth and accuracy, being confirmed, as he alleges, by the further plans he had since received from Europe.

And were it not also that the insertion of the same paper in the transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, was hastily put in before having been examined and discussed by the section; as explained by the Editor, who at first sight judged it "a paper of special value and must assist the student in coming to a correct conclusion." There it remains unchallenged, though admitted now to be erroneous.

We are sorry to say we cannot fully commend the second version and plan, as being also correct, because the same course of reasoning has been partly followed; and they must also come to grief in part, but not to the same extent as the former, which caused us to stagger at first sight.

We shall therefore take issue on the findings of Mr. Doughty on the two above mentioned points; and to avoid all misunderstandings, we shall quote his statements in his own words.

He says in his paper, p. 410; note :

1st. "Towards the close of my paper I mentioned that two important documents relating to the battle were in Europe and that at the

¹ Cf. *Quebec Morning Chronicle*, April 2, 1900. *North American Notes and Queries*, June, 1900, p. 15, and August, 1900, p. 93.

"time of writing I had not received copies. Since this paper has been in the press I have received the two plans referred to, and they confirm in every respect the accuracy of the positions established on plan "A."

..... According to this plan "the army was not at any time drawn up upon the ground forming the present race course."

2nd. "The condition of the ground now forming the race course would have prevented operations there on the day of the battle." Id., p. 418. And the same is repeated, Vol. II, p. 295, more emphatically. "On the day of the battle the ground known as the race course was in such condition that it would have been impossible for an army to have been drawn up there in the position indicated on the several plans."

"The ground now commonly known as the Plains of Abraham, which has recently been acquired by the city for a park, formed no part of the famous battle field of September the 13th, 1759.—Id., Vol. II, p. 289.

To be brief let us point out the more striking errors of the plan "A," which crystallises the gist and purport of the whole paper, and then we shall put it in juxtaposition with the other plan, Vol. III, p. 96, the new one prepared for and approved by the authors, drawn and supervised by the same draftsmen, MM. Vallée, Charest & St. Michel, to be the true and final criterion of the position of the two standing armies.

The patience of the reader, if not of the earnest student, must necessarily be taxed by constant and tedious references to plans; but this course is unavoidable in order to thoroughly understand the controverted points on this subject.

Referring then to the said plan "A"—

1st. The spot where Montcalm is indicated to be in command, is next to impossible; topographically he is out of sight, as in a well, being at the foot of a hill and facing the rock called "La Roche Bernard" on John street.

2nd. His right wing is carried away down the St. Charles valley in Saint-Sauveur, reaching so far as the crossings of St. Monique and St. Luc streets, more than a mile from the site of the conflict on the Heights of Abraham.

3rd. His left is too near the town, cannot see the enemy, and is too far from the edge of the cliff, not to be easily outflanked there.

4th. The spot where Wolfe fell mortally wounded is carried much too far. He never reached there; this would be a quarter of a mile

from the well known place where he died (the monument); whilst it ought to be only about 100 yards from it, when he was mortally wounded in front of the Louisbourg Grenadiers.

5th. Wolfe's line in consequence is also too much advanced; and in placing it on the slope from the eminence of the gaol towards the town, Mr. Doughty is unfortunately mistaken, for it should be the other slope from thence in the direction of the river, where the Louisbourg Grenadiers and the Otway really stood according to all the plans.

6th. The camp, after the battle, was entrenched between the gaol and Sillery and not between the gaol and the town; all the maps agree on this point.

The Chronicle, Quebec, Canada, Saturday, August 4, 1900, (see appendix "A"), furnishes further details pointing out more fully these and other notable errors, which cannot be characterized and passed off "*as minor details*," and though they were openly challenged and controverted in the press by the above article herewith produced as an appendix, they have remained unexplained and the objections raised thereto unanswered.

These material mistakes having been so signalized were, of course, corrected by the second plan, but only in part, as can easily be ascertained by comparing both together.

Now the task devolves upon us of challenging the accuracy of this last plan and of proving that it is also subject to further and important corrections, in order to arrive at the true dispositions of both armies, according to the best authorities on the subject, and moreover by means of the very plans we are furnished with in these volumes.

Considering the marked discrepancies between the two final plans presented to us as the joint work of the above named experts and draftsmen; and considering that the latter is, as it purports to be, a new and peculiar one, that is to say, *an average plan* combined from and compiled by careful measurements of all the numerous and different plans submitted to them, we have fair cause for feeling diffident, and find a double reason, in order to dispel our reasonable doubts, for examining very closely the mode of proceeding of these experts; and we are entitled to revise their finding and to ascertain the accuracy of their work. And we shall do so, even at the risk of being taxed too sharp and severe a critic, because we are dealing in this instance more with these experts than with the historians themselves; and also for the

reason that we have a sufficient excuse for our criticism in trying to probe to the bottom the truth of historical facts.¹

It must be self evident that from and out of the number of the different plans of the battle submitted to us, one must be found more correct than all the others, and this one we shall try to find and adopt as the most reliable, and in preference to the above *average* or composite plan, which we conceive hardly possible to be historically and topographically correct for moving bodies,—though it may appear so approximately.

Another inference follows; because the *modus operandi* conveys the implicit admission that none of them are really accurate, and in fact they all disagree more or less; therefore each one in particular is less reliable than the written and positive evidence of living witnesses at the time, who, being present, give their own true and precise relation of what they know and have seen, particularly those who have remained in Quebec.

After a close examination of all the plans produced by Mr. Doughty, we attach like him much importance, as to the general position of the contending armies, to the plan to be found in Jefferys, p. 140, which he, Mr. Doughty, reproduced in his paper, p. 304, and has copied from the same one engraved and published in 1760 for the same Jefferys. A view of the action is enlarged on the right corner.

This plan dated 5th September, 1759, drawn by a competent authority, a naval officer, is the first of all, and is the official document sent to the Minister Pitt, with the subsequent additions thereto, giving a view of the action of the 13th. It was not forwarded with the first despatches, not being then ready, but was soon after put in charge by Moncton of Townsend, the officer of distinction who delivered it at London on the 30th November following.

This plan was, with the additions, made immediately after the battle, to accompany the official report of the commanding officers of the navy and army, must be presumed substantially true and reliable. The circumstances of the extension of time required and given to complete it, and the actual presence of the army engineers, such as MacKellar, Holland, Deblieg, Desbarres and Montrésor, all tend to confirm a full reliance to be placed on this plan.

¹ "History is a science which commits itself to no conclusions, except such as the evidence before her warrants. . . ."

"It is only recently, and most opportunely, that Professor Bury has strongly asserted the right of history to be treated as a science. That is to say, that historians should follow methods which lead to scientific certainty."

The Tablet, London, 13th June, 1903, p. 925.

On this first branch of controversy, that is to say, the exact position of the two contending armies in line of battle and ready for action, we have three infallible and immovable land marks to work upon as certain and true basis.

1. The Buttes-à-Neveu and the line of Montcalm thereon, formed *en front de bandière*, that is a straight line of his regulars.

2. The spot where Wolfe expired now marked by his monument.

3. The other spot, quite near, on the eminence of the gaol, where he received the third and mortal wound. Moreover, we have the best of all the plans, the ground itself of the battlefield under our eyes, which hardly covers a square mile.

It is easy to find the true direction of the *bandière* line. It runs from the west side of the Tower No. 2 on top of Perrault Hill, Buttes-à-Neveu, toward and close to the west side of the General Hospital, at an angle of 45° west,—according to the meridian line of Holland, without reckoning the 30' of its error at that time.

The proof of this direction is clearly furnished by Mr. Doughty himself, from his own showing by his plans.

Reference being had;

1. To Jefferys' plan published in 1760, p. 140, and reproduced by Mr. Doughty (Paper, p. 394);—it will be seen on the enlarged view, this line passes somewhat a little west of the General Hospital, as also on the *British Museum* plan, reproduced, Vol. II, p. 257, and Mr. Doughty carries it even more west on his plan "A," p. 378, of his paper; whilst on the other plan, also produced by Mr. Doughty and drawn for him by St. Michel, vol. 11, p. 96, this line of *bandière* is carried east a distance of 233 yards, from the General Hospital, forming a wide gap between these two *bandière* lines, measuring an angle of 28°, 20', between them.

2. To the plan next in date of publication of Jefferys, geographer of His Majesty, drawn from the original surveys made by the Engineers of the Army, vol. 11, p. 272, which is identical with the one published by Thomas Mante, in 1772, in his *History of the late War in North America*;—it will be seen that the French line runs exactly in the direction toward the General Hospital.

3. To the large coloured and valuable plan, vol. 1, p. 264;—it will be seen that the French *bandière* is also exactly in line with the General Hospital.

4. The plan, Vol. III, p. 116, also shows the French *line en bandière*, opposite the English army, in the enlarged view of their disposition; and also the same direction is given towards the General Hospital, though these buildings do not appear on the map giving, on a smaller scale, the position of both armies.

5. The plan made in 1841 for Hawkins, in London, by James Wyld, geographer to the Queen; — the same formation of the French army is to be found.

In fact all the other plans we have been able to examine do not materially differ on this point; and therefore we controvert thereon the finding of the experts and draftsmen of Mr. Doughty on both their plans, and declare them antagonistic and unreliable, so far. We shall adhere to the plans, as they stand, on that point, and discard the average plan.

It is not supposed we are to be called on to prove the site of Wolfe's monument is the correct place where he died; therefore we shall go on to fix the exact spot where he fell in front of the Bragg regiment and the Louisbourg-Grenadiers, on the eminence where the gaol is now built.

Let us preface by adverting to Samuel Holland, assistant engineer and captain in the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Americans, who was at the battle under Wolfe, also at Sainte-Foy, and at the siege of Quebec by Lévis, where he replaced the engineer MacKellar, mortally wounded at the last battle. Holland remained at Quebec till he crossed to England in December, 1763.¹ He was there the guest of the Duke of Richmond during the ensuing winter, and in the spring, 1764, he returned to Canada with the rank of major (?) and the appointment as surveyor-general of the province. He became a legislative councillor and died at Quebec, December 28th, 1801, being 73 years of age.

In his official capacity no one knew better than he the surroundings of Quebec and particularly the Heights of Abraham, which he had surveyed immediately after the taking of Quebec and resurveyed afterwards, as appears by the several plans from his office, and notably the one on the large scale of 200 feet to one inch, drawn by Wm. Hall and by him finished 1790, and where has been traced the meridian line established by Holland in 1785. Holland is one of the army engineers referred to by Jefferys as above mentioned, and therefore may be taken as one of the best authorities as to the incidents of the battle of the Plains and he knew exactly the spot where Wolfe was fatally wounded and the one near by where he expired.

When he traced his meridian on the Plains, he chose Wolfe's redoubt (called by that name on account of the ground where the hero had fallen), and he located the first meridian stone at the southwest angle of the redoubt, with the intention of determining and fixing, as we really believe, the very spot for the future.

¹ Cf. Captain Bentick to Bouquet (in French), London, 7 Dec., 1763, B.M. 21, 661.

And so far he has been successful. For Bouchette, who had studied under him and became his successor in office, refers to the circumstance as follows:—

"The four meridian stones fixed in 1790¹ by the late Major Holland, then surveyor-general of Canada, are placed at convenient distances from each other across the plains, they represent a line "astronomically north" (variation since from 12° 35' W. to 17°, May, 1903)," and were established for the purpose of adjusting the instruments used in public surveys of lands, one of them that stood in the angle of a field redoubt where General Wolfe is said to have breathed his last, has been greatly impaired by the pious reverence of curious strangers, who, wishing to bear away a relic of anything from the spot consecrated by the hero's death, have broken off pieces of the stone placed there thirty (25) years after the event." Cf. Bouchette *Topography of Canada*, 1815, pp. 466-67.

The field book of Holland, if found¹, will ascertain his intention as to the first stone of his meridian at the time of that important operation.

The field books and journals were returned by Wm. Chewett, Pennoyer, Rankin and others, and ought to be found in the Imperial Departments, London.

For Holland,² as Engineer-in-Chief at Quebec, claimed a number of plans that had remained in England in charge of Major Desbarres, with whom he had left them in 1776,— on being ordered suddenly from London to Portsmouth, from which place he wrote for them, but without effect. Since which, at different periods, he renewed his application but with no better result; and on the 10th of November, 1790, he sends a catalogue to enable His Majesty's minister to direct the transmission of such plans, etc., including³ this meridian line.

¹ The meridian of Holland must have been traced on or before 1785, since Jeremiah McCarthy, land surveyor, says: "J'ai prit le rhumb-de-vent selon la véritable méridien (sic) de Monsr. S. Holland, Ecuier, arpenteur général, tiré proche de Québec."

Procès-Verbal de bornage, Rivière-Ouelle, 18 juillet 1786. This date of 1790 seems to imply that the four stones were either replaced by others or made more conspicuous than formerly. In all cases the first duty of Holland in his official capacity (1764) would be to establish, to his satisfaction, a known meridian to work upon. Bouchette may perhaps fix that date, 1790, as the time the meridian was traced on the map at its completion.

² Writing to the Governor, Lord Dorchester, Quebec, November 1st, 1790, he represents that several of the principal and original plans and surveys of the Province were wanting. They were left by him in the care of Major Desbarres in May, 1776. Within a late period many of these documents were returned and have remained dormant in boxes at Ottawa.

³ "Meridian Line at Quebec (2 cop.), 4 chains to 1 inch." *Archives of Canada*, Q., Vol. 49, p. 167, 119.

After Bouchette, we find in the same department, John Adams, R.M.S.D., re-affirming the statement relative to the position of this first stone, as being the place where Wolfe fell. On a plan made by him from actual and original survey, 1822, engraved by E. Bennett, Quebec, and dedicated to Lord Dalhousie, there is marked in front of and the west side of the redoubt: "*Wolfe's Redoubt near which he fell.*" Though the redoubt has disappeared its location is well settled and known by the plans. It covered a part of the ground of the east wing of the gaol, and the stone was planted in its yard, in line with and twenty feet from the west wall of this wing.

This plan may be seen at the City Hall, and the quoted inscription may well serve to account for the continuation of the interest and reverence attached to this spot by visitors and strangers. For it was, down to the year 1835, the date of the first monument to Wolfe, on the Plains, the only visible sign on the Plains to remember his glorious death, and was at the time believed by many to be the actual spot where he died, until the erection of the monument determined forever the sacred ground where "he breathed his last."

This continued and beloved tradition, based upon this meridian stone, if untrue, could not possibly have been countenanced by a number of living witnesses, who had been at the battle. No one will believe that Holland, during more than fifteen years that he saw the people's reverence for this landmark, could lend himself to a shameful deceit; the more so as there were at the time, in and around Quebec many survivors of Wolfe's army, such as the two Frasers, Nairnc, James Thomson, etc., also Carlton, Lord Dorchester, afterwards Governor-in-Chief of the Provinces, without reckoning a great many more abroad, and particularly his co-workers in the original plans.

The cherished memory of Wolfe went on increasing in Quebec, as proved by the erection (began 1827), of the monument to him and Montcalm, his brave opponent, and terminated in 1834, when affixing together thereon the names of the two heroes.

Shortly afterwards (1835), the Governor, Lord Aylmer, erected the first monument on the Plains.

It is a pleasure to quote on this subject the brilliant scholar, the learned and gentlemanly editor of the old *Albion*, our late Dr. John Charlton Fisher, LL.D., who wrote in the *Quebec Mercury*, September 17th, 1835, an interesting and appropriate article bearing closely to the site of the above meridian stone. It is headed:—

"Monument on the Plains of Abraham to the Memory of Wolfe."

"The last anniversary (1834) of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham was aptly chosen as the day on which the names of the heroes *Wolfe and Montcalm* were affixed on the sarcophagus, on which rests

the beautiful obelisk raised in their honour by and during the government of the Earl of Dalhousie (1827). The return of the anniversary may be appropriated to a brief description of the monument lately erected by Lieutenant-General Lord Aylmer, while governor-in-chief of the provinces, which completes the series of testimonials offered by posterity to the memory of the devoted and the brave."

After mentioning the monument to Wolfe and Montcalm and the slab in the Chapel of the Ursuline Convent, "Honneur à Montcalm, etc.," he continues:

"A monument to Wolfe on the spot where he died was alone wanting. The exact spot was known to but few, while the interest attached to it was increased by the lapse of time.

"The last contemporary of the Battle was no more¹ and the site would in a few years have become a subject for conjecture.

"Although the stone, which formed his death couch, had been preserved in its original position, it had been sunk beneath the surface, in order to protect it from pilgrims who came, not to enrich but to rob the shrine, by carrying away as relics pieces of the rock, hallowed by the death of Wolfe.

"These considerations, it may be imagined, suggested the design of erecting a monument on this spot to Lord Aylmer.

"And as no accurate description of it has yet appeared, and as the spot is constantly visited by strangers, the following particulars, which may be depended upon as correct, will doubtless be interesting to the public."

"The monument lately erected by Lord Aylmer to the memory of Wolfe, on the spot where he died, is situated in a field, the property of Hammond Gowen, Esq., between the house of C. Campbell, Esq., and the race-course, and adjoining the *Grande-Allée*. The ground necessary for the site was presented by Mr. Gowen to his Lordship for the purpose; and the monument is distinctly seen from the road.

"The monument is a truncated column, etc. The inscription, which is deeply cut in the column, is brief and emphatic, containing a modest and delicate reference to that upon the slab in honour of Montcalm.

"*Here died Wolfe victorious.*"²

¹ Mr. James Thomson died in 1830. He was in his 98th year when Lord Dalhousie, on the 15th Nov., 1827, addressed him as follows: "We honour you here as the companion in arms and a venerable living witness of the fall of Wolfe; and do us the favour to bear witness on this occasion by the mallet in your hand."

² In 1848, Sir Benjamin Durban erected the one now over it, burying underneath the remains of the old one. A strong iron railing protects it.

"The spot where Wolfe received his third and last wound was in front of the Redoubt¹ on the rising ground, somewhat on the right and in advance of the monument. He was thence borne to the rear and supported against the rock, lying on the surface.

"In a small field, the property of Mr. Moorhead, between the one in which the monument is situate and the property of Charles Campbell, Esq., about fifty yards to the north from the column, immediately joining the fence, may be seen the remains of a well whence Wolfe was supplied with water, when lying faint and dying on the spot now marked by the column. This has been ever since known to the old inhabitants of the neighbourhood as "Wolfe's Well;" but in consequence of a horse having been drowned in it about four years ago, was filled up with rubbish, to the great regret of many who have never ceased to hold it in hallowed remembrance.

"Such is the interest attached to the scene of the glorious event, that a public debt of thanks is due to the distinguished General Officer, who during his administration of the province acquired by Great Britain at the price of Wolfe's death, has taken care at his own expense, to mark this sacred spot in so conspicuous and appropriate manner that it never afterwards can be overlooked and forgotten.

"Quebec, September 13th, 1835, J.C.F."

It it were in regard to topography alone, it is obvious too much importance cannot be attached to point out the very spot where Wolfe fell. A searching light thrown on surrounding details and circumstances, will lead us to the point we are looking for. The location of the above stone corresponds very closely with the distance of *about 100 yards*, given by James Henderson of the 28th regiment, who then stood quite close to the General and carried him off at once to the rear, *Id. Vol. III, p. 215*. The measured distance from the centre of the monument to the meridian stone is 380 feet, only 26 yards more and closely corresponding to such space of "*about 100 yards*."

Mr. Doughty had, in first instance, marked the spot on his first plan "A," (p. 378 of his paper), quite near the Orphan Asylum on the Grande-Allée; that is somewhat over a quarter of a mile east of the monument. He has now receded from this place on his second plan to the eminence of the gaol, coming back near the Holland stone, and indicating by a red star his finding on his plan, Vol. I, p. 96. It is distant only 250 yards from the monument as we shall see.

This egregious discrepancy must unavoidably lead us to distrust both plans and his expert draftsmen when compiling their average plan.

¹ The front is indicated on the plans by the *flèches* pointing west, and as indicated by Adams & Holland.

Moreover we are in a position to demonstrate on view of the other plans above referred to and by his own documents, that this red star is carried by Mr. Doughty

1st. Too far north, and

2ndly. Too far east,—

though he affirms, Vol. III, p. 204, that "*there is no longer any possible doubt where he (Wolfe) fell;*" and he refers to the indication on the King's map, in the British Museum as a proof. It would have been more satisfactory to the reader to have seen reproduced and published that small part of this large map (a copy being in the possession of the authors (Vol. VI, p. 281), in order to let him judge for himself, instead of relying on Mr. St. Michel's average plan, who remains convicted of previous fatal errors. Perhaps we might, on examination, find him and the authors again in error on this as on the other points above referred to.

Moreover this famous very large map¹ was made abroad, a certain time after the battle, and borrowed and compiled from maps on a small scale then in existence, and not from actual operations on the ground; and it must not clash with these; and moreover ought not to counter-balance the certain knowledge and convincing evidence of the witnesses who remained on the spot, at Quebec, and visited it for years thereafter as a shrine of glorious reverence and deep sympathy.

Let us assume for the moment that this red star points to the corresponding place on the King's map. It is easily proved that all the three companies of the Louisbourg Grenadiers stood, not on the eminence of and in front of the gaol, nor in front of the monument, but somewhat further down on the slope from this eminence, beginning therefrom and in the direction of the river, exactly where Mr. Doughty, in first instance had placed the Otway; and therefore the whole right wing of Wolfe must be drawn nearer to the verge of the cliff, because :

(a) The first plan of St. Michel (Paper, p. 378), renders this clearly apparent by the position occupied by the Otway near the brink of the cliff, and not adjoining the gaol as shown on the second plan;

(b) On Jefferys' plan, the official one accompanying the dispatches, the same Otway will also be found close to the cliff and the Louisbourg Grenadiers, on the slope, a little in advance on its left;

(c) The other *correct plan* of Jefferys', Vol. II, p. 272, "*considered of great importance,*" Vol. VI, p. 280, places no less than five regiments on the south side of Louis road, including two of them further south than the lower road of the Plains, and therefore these two are, on the

¹ The scale is not given, but we calculate it to be 100 feet to 1 inch.

slope of the eminence, whilst Mr. Doughty's plan shows only one, the Otway, there and adjoining the gaol;

(d) The combined plan of Deblieg, Holland and Desbarres, Vol. I, p. 264, (36 inch by 18), seems a reduced copy and not a fac-simile of the original (size 5 ft. 10x2 ft. 4 in. Vol. VI, p. 280). The line of the English differs considerably from that of the Doughty plan which, in contradiction to that of these three engineers, places Braggs' regiment on the *north* side of St. Louis Road, instead of the *south* side and on the eminence.

(e) We would prefer relying on the official plan of 1841, by Jas. Wyld, geographer to the Queen and of H.R.H. Prince Albert, dedicated to the members of the United Services of the British Empire,—in preference to the one of Mr. St. Michel, and locate the Braggs regiment south of the road, then the Louisbourg-Grenadiers on the slope, in circular form, and the Otway quite near the cliff. We cannot, therefore, admit with Mr. Doughty "that all the plans agree as to the exact position of Braggs' regiment and Louisbourg-Grenadiers, when they received the French assault," for the simple reason that his and his alone disagrees with them all; but we take note of his remark and admission, that this last map of Wyld prepared for Hawkins, "his latest work, agrees with the maps of those who were present, is in itself significant." (Paper, pp. 402-403.) We therefore stand by it with his approval.

It is unfortunate that Mr. Doughty contradicts himself in thus placing the Braggs north of the road, the Otway adjoining the gaol, and the whole of the Grenadiers on the eminence, whilst he says elsewhere the Braggs, 28th regiment, occupied the eminence, the Grenadiers stood on their right, and the Otway was extended between these and the ridge of the cliff.

He writes, Vol. III, p. 120:—

"Prior to the arrival of these reinforcements some of the Canadian troops had endeavoured to slip around the declivity between the British right and the St. Lawrence. The movement was quickly observed by Wolfe, who advanced some platoons from the Louisbourg-Grenadiers and the 28th Regiment (Braggs) to the small rising ground on his right, to intercept it, and as soon as Otway's regiment, the Thirty-fifth came up, he further strengthened his right by extending that battalion between the Grenadiers and *the precipice* (sic) sloping towards the river, and to form part of a second line upon the right."

And in Vol. V, p. 30, we read the following passage of *the Fragment of the Siege*: "The Louisbourg-Grenadiers were extended on the right of these regiments to the river." That portion of the slope continues from the eminence, which is said "distant about 500 yards from the ridge." Vol. III, p. 118.

Thus Mr. Doughty reverses Wolfe's tactics and leaves a wide gap for the enemy to slip along the cliff and outflank his right. And here we may add that Mr. Doughty has fixed (Paper, p. 384), the effective range of the musket against troops in column 200 yards (Wolfe also). Thereby he nullifies the then required efficiency of the fire of the Otway as Wolfe would have had it.

Our conclusion then is that on the Doughty plan, the Otway, the Louisbourg-Grenadiers and the Braggs must necessarily be all carried down southerly some 100 yards distance towards the cliff, and the spot marked by the *red star* shall come nearer south, so as to be in line with the meridian stone, if not out-passing it. The Sergeant-Quartermaster Johnson, present on the field, confirms this southern position (Vol. V, pp. 103-4), on the right wing, occupied by the Louisbourg Grenadiers, at the head of which Wolfe sometimes commanded and sometimes at the head of the former,—“and advanced at the head of the Louisbourg Grenadiers, with charged bayonets, when another shot pierced his breast.”

We have seen that Wolfe had just sent the 28th regiment, Braggs, to the small rising ground on his right (the eminence of the gaol), so that it could not stand *north* of the St. Louis Road, as Mr. Doughty will have it. It must be left standing where directed by Wolfe, about 100 yards south of the road, having on its right the first company of the Louisbourg Grenadiers. So much the worse for the average plan of the experts and the red star of Mr. St. Michel.

Next we intend to prove satisfactorily that the alleged distance east from the monument to the point of the red star is overstretchcd and is not 300 yards.

First of all, according to the scale of this plan, it is only 750 feet or 250 yards; also the same measure is found on the official plan of the cadastre. This is, to begin with, a recoil of 50 yards.

Secondly, adopting as a basis for correct measurements, the true *bandière* line above mentioned in the direction of the General Hospital, and closing west the angle of $22^{\circ}, 20'$, which it forms with the *bandière* given by Mr. St. Michel, we shall have *mutatis mutandis*, another retrogression of the whole English line proportional to the cord opposite the star, about 85 feet, or 28 yards, reducing in consequence the 300 yards to 224 only.

Now since the exact distance from the meridian stone to the monument is exactly 126 yards, there remains only the small difference of less than 100 yards between the landmark of Holland and the point indicated by Mr. Doughty: a trifle. But, even without reckoning these deductions, the whole difference could not exceed 174 yards. We shall not therefore allow Mr. St. Michel to remove our well known land-

mark,—since he has demonstrated his professional *savoir-faire* to be on a par with his historical accuracy as to St-Sauveur.

If we are to believe the evidence of James Henderson, the very best witness on the occasion, who supported Wolfe to the hollow ground in rear, a distance of "about 100 yards;" and consider that the 224 yards of Mr. Doughty would hardly out-pass the eastern limit of the redoubt; and that our basis and calculations are not mere verbal criticism, nor intended for a mere show of accuracy, but to arrive at a certainty of knowledge and conviction, based upon reliable geometrical lines, measurements, boundaries and land-marks; also the broad fact that, in contradiction to the large distance first given of a quarter of a mile, Mr. Doughty comes back so close to Holland's land-mark; and moreover, when we take into account the continued popular tradition and reverence (without any doubt ever being raised), for this sacred spot,—it is reasonable to believe, with the weight of the evidence before us, that Holland has irrevocably marked the spot where Wolfe fell; and it will, to the latest day, continue to be visited with the same deep interest and patriotic emotion. It would, in our estimation, be cavilling and hair splitting not to adopt the redoubt as the place where Wolfe fell, and wherefrom it took the name of WOLFE'S REDOUBT.

We next come to the second point of controversy;—does the race-course form part or not of the battle field?

The general outlines of the battle are not in dispute among former historians; and men of learning agree in placing the brunt of the fight on and between the eminence of the gaol and the Buttes-à-Neve or Martello Towers along there.

Even Hawkins, who is so severely taken to task by Mr. Doughty, says: "The severest fighting took place between the right of the race stand and the Martello Towers."

The assertion of Mr. Chambers (?) in the *Quebec Morning Chronicle*, April 2nd, 1900, that:—

"It is generally understood that the fiercest of the fight took place upon that ground which is now the race-course, and this stand has been taken by Sir James LeMoine and P. B. Casgrain,"—is simply unfounded in fact. V. *Conférence par P.-B. Casgrain*, 14 décembre 1899, in *Transactions of the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec*, 1900.

The pretensions of these writers and of those who are conversant with the subject, go no further than to show that this part of the Plains necessarily formed part of the battle field, as a ground to be held and kept by all means, being the key of the position and the only road and means of communication with the fleet for the stores and ammunitions; that military operations did effectively take place there on that day; that

part of the English line was drawn up on this ground and marched to the eminence; that Webb's reserve stood on the race-course during the fight; that the 3rd batallion, the Royal Americans, was detached further back on Marchmont to secure the landing, and "stood there as a post to protect the rear;" *Vol. II, p. 296*, and that whilst the English were there and forming around, they lost more men than during the rest of the day. *Vol. V, p. 54.*¹

Unfortunately for Mr. Chambers he is the guilty party for giving currency to the erroneous version of this event which he now repels. He says in *Chambers' Guide to Quebec*, p. 93:—

"The Plains of Abraham, properly so called at the present time, stretched away from near the St. Louis toll gate westward, upon the south side of the road, and extend from the highway to the brink of the steep precipice overhanging the river. The battle field is government property, but is at present rented as a pasturage for the cattle of city milkmen.

"It was during the British assault upon the French position on this rising knoll (yonder knoll of the gaol), that General Wolfe received his death wound."

Leaving aside this statement, we shall continue on the second point, and in support of our contention we abide exclusively by the proof to be extracted out of the writings, plans and appendices to be found in the volumes of *The Siege of Quebec* now before us.

As it is rather difficult to represent on a map moving bodies, we place more reliance, as to the march of troops, on the evidence given by the officers then in their command, than on any other source.

Colonel Hon. Malcolm Fraser was in command of the Fraser Highlanders on that day, and thereafter remained at Quebec, as also his friend and neighbour, Captain Nairne of the same regiment. We quote from his journal where he gives a clear, concise and true statement of what they both did, and saw with their own eyes on this occasion.

"We had several skirmishes with the Canadians till about ten o'clock when the army formed in line of battle. . . . in front the town of Quebec about a mile distant" (the mile is 66 yards beyond the east line of the race course); in the rear, a wood occupied by the light infantry (who by this time had taken possession of the four gun

¹ Hawkins may not be wrong when he extends the battle from the race-stand, for the reason that so far the English had already lost "more men" in killed and wounded in skirmishing than in the general action." *Moncrief, V, p. 54.*

"1,500 of their best marksmen kept a continued fire upon our line for some time before the battle became general." *Sergeant Johnson, V, pp. 103-104.*

"battery"); and the third battalion of the Royal Américains. In the "space between which last and the main body, the forty-eighth was "drawn up as a body of reserve." This general disposition of the army, that is to say, the line, the reserve and the rear, is confirmed by the historians, and also by several of the maps and plans of the battlefield and forms a total linear space less than 1000 yards from front to rear. (2,950 feet), that is to say from the gaol to the post on Marchmont.

Col. Fraser continues: "The army was ordered to march on slowly in line of battle, and halt several times, till about half an hour after ten." Here begins the real point of controversy, the gordian-knot, which we shall try to untie before cutting it. Did the army march in line as thus stated? or was it formed into line at once on the eminence of the gaol and from thence extended on each side? We shall use the words of Mr. Doughty on this march. (Paper, p. 378) "By referring to plan A, it will be seen that a very short march would be necessary to bring the army to the line indicated on the plan." He means from the eminence of the gaol, past de Salaberry street, to a point near the Orphan Asylum, where Wolfe is indicated to be in command and fall, 1175 feet of actual march.

As Wolfe's Redoubt, where he fell, stood only 475 feet from the eastern boundary of the race course, this slow march would then commence 1175 feet west of this redoubt and be a space for marching of 700 feet, on the plains towards town. We are willing to be generous and give away 500 feet to Mr. Doughty, being satisfied with the remainder. And thus we shall be west of, near to and on line with Maple avenue, "on the open ground," and the perfect level shown there in all direction; the same referred to by Captain Knox when speaking of the ground upon which the army halted after its march towards town in files as being "an even piece of ground which Mr. Wolfe had made choice of."

The first formation may reasonably account for the heavy losses then and previously thereto suffered on the English side by the galling fire on their whole line, continued from a few bushes and a little hillock from Canadian and Indian skirmishers, snap-shooters and skulkers, on each wing and on the rear. Vol. V, pp. 28, 104.

Knox, quoted by Doughty (Paper, p. 374), states that after the line was formed..... "About nine the two armies moved a little nearer to each other.".....

"Les deux armées," says *Le Journal de l'Armée*, ...ées par une petite colline, se cannoaient depuis "environ une heure."

Mr. Doughty himself confirms such eminence in front (Paper, p. 402). "The General before the battle, while reviewing the position

"of the armies, saw that it was an advantageous position and sent a few men to occupy it."

This *colline*, the eminence of the gaol, or hillock, evidently had not yet been reached by the English, and it obstructed Wolfe's view of the enemy; also concealed his troops from them. The letter of James Henderson, of the 28th Regiment, Braggs, dated at Quebec, October 7th, 1759, is exactly in point:..... "the general viewing the position of the two armies, he took notice of a small rising ground between our right and the enemy's left which concealed (sic) us from that quarter, upon which the general did me the honour to detach me with a few grenadiers to take possession of that ground and maintain it to the last extremity, which I did till both armies was (sic) engaged. And then the general came to me and took his post by me. But, oh..... was scarce a moment with me when he received his fatal wound."

Wolfe had scarcely given the order to advance when he sank to the ground. Vol. III, p. 203.

In fact the first and final formation of the line of battle "were formed immediately in front of the eminence of the gaol," Vol. III, p. 118, 9; the right near the summit of the cliff overlooking the St. Lawrence, and the left *en potence*, near the Ste. Foye road. The crest of this eminence between the two armies was reached by this line so formed and is well delineated on the plan, Vol. II, p. 254, showing there the array of the English army. "Mr. Doughty repeats that shortly after nine, the two armies moved a little nearer;" this short march may have been the last halt of the English after attaining the above crest. In any case this advance could not and did not exceed, at most, the 300 yards beyond the front of the monument, according to Mr. Doughty; and such space we reduce to 100 yards.

Mr. Doughty says, III, p. 207: "It is quite clear he (Wolfe), survived his removal to the rear of the army but a few minutes." As it is well known he asked as a favour to be laid down, being unable to go any further; what about the 200 yards additional? The presumption would be that he would have expired on the way.

This much being said and so far settled, as to the place of the formation of the line and its last stand, we shall see how it has a direct bearing on determining the position of the 48th Regiment, the Webb, under Colonel Burton, forming part of the second line or reserve on the right, and drawn up in eight subdivisions. We need not trouble ourselves with the reserve on the left; it was ordered to stand and stood "800 paces from the line," that is 2000 feet. Vol. III, p. 93. Some of the plans even show the Webb in line with it. II, p. 257.

It must be known that on the plains there existed two roads, the *Chemin St-Louis*, and another, the lower one, leading from the Foulon, running not far from the cliff, and joining the first named road at the eastern end of the race course, in a diagonal direction, and rather free and indefinite there. This lower road was never legalized, that is to say, made a public highway or legally settled as such by a *procès-verbal du Grand-Voyer*. It always remained till quite lately, a road of convenience, *de tolérance* and is now shut. This is the "convenient road" mentioned by Knox.

A glance at the different maps in these volumes, I, p. 264,—II, p. 257—II, p. 272, letter K,—and Hawkins' plan, will show that the reserve of the Webb was stationed between these two roads, at a distance from the line varying from 800 paces (II, p. 257, III, p. 116), to much less no plans, Vol. I, p. 264 and p. 257. On Hawkins' map it appears more distant than the space between the two armies. A fair average would locate the Webb at *mid-distance* between the main line on the eminence and the post in the rear, the Royal Americans; and in any case somewhere on the ground of the race-course, not nearer than the old stand, being the least possible distance by the plans, that is to some 400 feet from its eastern side. The whole space of the battle field thus occupied by the British troops (without reckoning the advanced platoons and scouts), would not then exceed 20 *arpents*, to use this better understood measure.

Now we are at a loss to understand the possibility, by Mr. Doughty, to extricate the Webb from the Plains or race-course. The standing of Burton's reserve within 30 yards from the spot where Wolfe died, forcibly reminds his placing of Montcalm's right in St-Sauveur.

Is it then unfair to ask the collaborators to this part of the narrative, if they all persist in affirming that the Webb reserve was not on the race-course, because we frankly give them credit that their false conclusions are errors in argument, not a breach of veracity. A submissive silence could be taken as a suppression of truth or a reticence.

Let us now come to some active military operations on the same race-course from the beginning of the day.

We shall not take into account the landing of the troops on the beach at l'Anse-des-Mères, right opposite, and all along the beach of this ground, then forming part of the whole property belonging to the Ursuline nuns down to river and low-water mark.

But this act of hostility so far, was resisted from above the cape, as we shall see.

On this subject we read that:

After the capture of Vergor's post (see this post indicated by tents, Plan, V, 11, p. 257) his dying guards were still lurking *in the adjoining*

field or field of Indian corn extending on Marchmont and on the Plains. They were followed by a few grenadiers and the party who had reached the summit of the cliff. "The fugitives fled before them and, being vigorously pursued, their lieutenant, his drummer, and several of the men were taken prisoners. The remainder escaped from the field, passing through the bushes which surmount the cliff and endeavoured to reach the shelter of the town." They fled to and joined the post at l'Anse-des-Mères.¹

They must necessarily have covered the ridge of the race-course on their way, because they kept firing all along on the boats.

For we read again:

Col. Howe having taken possession of the St.-Michel (Samos) battery, "drove in all the small parties which were posted on the heights and annoyed our columns going up the Hill." The Townshend Papers, Vol. V., p. 214; *ibid.*, p. 268.

"The light infantry was disposed, some in the woods upon our left flank, to cover that side, and others to scour the face of the bank towards the town." Vol. V, p. 50.

And this is confirmed also by Moncrief, who says, that after the taking of Vergor's picket and some prisoners,— "the remainder made their escape along the edge of the bank toward the town, and with some small flying parties posted there kept firing upon some of our boats, which had by mistake dropped down too far that way, where the general was obliged to follow in his own boat to order them back." Vol. V., p. 50.

Vol. III., 81.—"A few of the boats of the second division, swept down by the ebb tide, had passed the landing place and were endeavouring to effect a landing at l'Anse-des-Mères, somewhat nearer the city. They did not accomplish their purpose, for some of the pickets who had escaped from the posts commanding the precipice, prevented their disembarkation. Then Wolfe came."

¹ The site of *L'Anse-des-mères* properly so called according to Bouchette, would be placed at the south-west extremity of Cape Diamond, not very far from the wall of the citadel, where a small cove is indented in the cape and is now called Diamond Harbour.

It is to be found in the same locality under the same name of *Anse-des-mères*, according to the plan by A. Larue, surveyor, published by Wm. Cowan & Son (without date, but known to be 1832), and lithographed by Allan & Ferguson, for Robert Weir, wholesale stationer, Glasgow.

But it is now well known, that from early times, the popular appellation of l'Anse-des-Mères, was at mid-distance from the town and the Foulon. Franquet, the French King's engineer (1752), placed it *à un quart de lieue de celle du Foulon*;—that is on line with the east end of the race-course; it is known to-day as such. The plan Vol. II., p. 272 (also in Mante), shows the last boats landing there, having been carried down so far and they were fired at from the post above.

Other operations on the same Plains preceded the real conflict.

We have seen that as soon as the remainder of the Otway came up with the second convoy, it was ordered straight to re-enforce the right and intercept the enemy's advance along the edge of the cliff. They must, in consequence, have followed the lower road on the Plains leading in right direction to the post assigned to them.

It is unlikely that this regiment, out of a loss of 54 men in killed and wounded, none should have then fallen from the constant fire of skirmishers, so numerous all round, as may be seen on the maps and especially on the one of the British Museum. Vol. II., p. 254. This is the more likely because the Otway, during the conflict, was stationed on the second line as a reserve.

At the same time, the British brought to the front two brass 6-pounders, which the sailors had dragged up the Foulon path and along the lower road.

This operation is distinctly indicated on the same map of the British Museum, thus: "*D, English artillery march;*" the two pieces following this road and joining the St. Louis road. There they were placed in position with the line by about eight of the clock.

Seeing again the number of flanking parties surrounding the English on all sides, it is probable some of the sailors and gunners must have also been fired at, and may be comprised among the eight gunners and matrosses of the artillery killed and wounded.

Now, whether the race-course was or was not a fit ground to deploy troops, the above described military moves and operations nevertheless took place there.

At all events, the foregoing skirmishes and operations seem a sufficient rebuttal to the broad assertion of M. Chapais, that not a soldier did fight on the race-course, and not a drop of English or French blood was shed there on either side.

We may now appeal to the commanding officer, Brigadier-General Townshend, who declared prisoners of war all the French wounded lying in the General Hospital, because it formed part of the battle field; he would not have scrupled to extend the whole battlefield from the Samos battery and Vergor's post to the same hospital. A military writer would not hesitate to extend it from the landing place to the pontoon-bridge on the St. Charles river, since the firing continued all along.

It seems to us that any reader must have a mighty and inveterate proposition to struggle with, should he be unable, with these data, to recognize the race-course as forming part of the battlefield.

For him, and in last resort, we shall proffer the best, and in our apprehension, a convincing final evidence from the authentic "*Memoirs*

of the Siege of Quebec," by Quarter-Master Sergeant John Johnson, who is admitted a good witness and a competent authority.

We shall simply quote his own words in relation to the battlefield: It is proper to state that Sergeant Johnson took part in the first battle of the Plains, and was also fighting hard at the battle of Ste. Foye, or rather Sillery, as more properly named by the English. We take it as well known that Lévis won the day by taking his enemy's left in flank and in rear, having succeeded in pushing Colonel Poularies with the Royal Roussillon far enough along the cliff, so that by a rush in flank and by a reverse attack, he broke General Murray's line, and thereby decided the victory by a complete rout and flight of the English troops.

This happened at the west end of the race-course.

Here is what Sergeant Johnson says three times as to the battle-fields: "It did not appear that either the officers or men were in the least intimidated, as, trusting in the same good Providence, that had gained us that glorious victory, on the same ground the thirteenth of the preceding September." Vol. V., p. 120.

. "Again, Although our men were as zealous for the service of their country, and the honor of His Majesty, as they were in that battle fought on the same ground the thirteenth of the preceding September; *Id.*, p. 122.

. In two memorable actions: One on the thirteenth of September, the glorious day wherein we gained the full reward of our toil and labour in the siege of Quebec; and again on the twenty-eighth of April, on the same ground. *Id.*, p. 159.

It is then not surprising that the common sense of the people of the Dominion, supported by the same sentiment from abroad, cut short the controversy and settled *de facto* the disputed historical point.

The Federal Government, yielding to the pressure of public opinion, purchased the Plains of Abraham and handed them over to the city of Quebec, to be used and kept as a park and a national possession. They are thus to remain in perpetuity a testimonial in honour of the brave soldiers of the two great nations who inhabit this country, who then shed their blood, fighting against each other on these grounds, and now live together in peace and amity, for its common welfare. But above all, they shall be held in cherished and holy remembrance of the dying heroes

WOLFE AND MONTCALM.

Humanum est errare.—Therefore, we invite students possessing historical, military and geometrical qualifications to revise our findings, and we will be glad to correct any error we may have fallen into,

because it will turn to the more perfect discovery of truth and to the best advantage of our history; also it will serve to enhance the value of Mr. Doughty's able and remarkably useful contribution.

APPENDIX.

WHERE THE BATTLE OF THE PLAINS OF ABRAHAM WAS FOUGHT. AN ANSWER TO MR. ARTHUR DOUGHTY.

The Question Discussed by Mr. P.-B. Casgrain.

A brief review of the paper published in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, 1899-1900, Vol. V, p. 359, "The probable Site of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham," by Arthur G. Doughty.

K. Henry — What is this Castle called that stand hard by ?

Montjoy — They call it Agincourt.

K. Henry — Then we call this the field of Agincourt.

—*Shakespeare, Henry V., Act 4, scene 7.*

So might have said the immortal Wolfe, to his surrounding companions, when, dying in the arms of victory on that glorious day, the 13th September, 1759, he cast a last failing glance on the field around him:—"Let this be called the battle of the Plains of Abraham."

And so it will be known for ever by that appropriate name and all the field around the spot where he breathed his last.

Credit is due to the author of the cited monograph for his 18 months' researches to elucidate, according to his own light, the "probable" site of that memorable battle.

We are fully convinced that he is as intent on arriving at the whole truth as he and we are intent on suppressing no portion of it.

Should the writer have erred, as we propose showing, it is meet erroneous statements and unwarranted conclusions should not pass unchallenged; otherwise they might go abroad in future as uncontroverted historical facts, the more so, because they appear under the auspices of a learned and distinguished body such as the Royal Society of Canada.

We are not yet sure, unless further and better proof be furnished us, that, as alleged in the *Morning Chronicle* of April 2nd, in reference to the same paper, "the author has made a discovery to which older and more distinguished men have been blind for years * * * * and that the ideas that have prevailed among the ignorant and learned alike for nearly a hundred years have been woefully unfounded."

The contention of Mr. Doughty is that the race course does not form any part of the battlefield and that the fighting was confined between de

Salaberry street and the walls of the city (p. 360); moreover, that the condition of the ground now forming the race course would have prevented operations there on the day of the battle (Note 5, p. 418).

On the other hand, what is now asserted, as based on tradition and the documentary evidence, is that the English army was formed into line across the race course and extended from the ridge of the cliff to and beyond the Ste. Foye road; that the opening of the battle on the English side took place when and after they had advanced on the eminence of the gaol, where they awaited the fire of the enemy; and that on returning the fire and charging, the fight extended from thence to the walls of the town and down the valley of the St. Charles to the bridge of boats.

Mr. Doughty ignores the operations at Sillery, in the morning, the firing and skirmishing between the two foes for more than an hour by outposts, before and during their forming into line; also the advance, by several halts, during half an hour, before the battle, of which he treats very lightly.

Mr. Doughty will allow us, therefore, a fair, impartial and brief criticism in examining carefully some of his statements and more particularly the plans on which he bases his theory and on which he relies as the gist of his contention.

1. Referring to the plan A, p. 378, being a reliable plan of the City of Quebec, with the neighbouring country extending to Marchmont,—as it appears to-day,—the position of the regiments of both armies, English and French, are indicated by black marks, as standing ready for action.

This plan is drawn by St. Michel, June, 1899, and enlarged from the original, which is on a very small scale, and which was edited in 1760 by Thos. Jefferys (not Jeffreys) in his "Natural and Civil History of the French Dominion in North and South America," London, 1761.

The extreme right of Montcalm, composed of the burghers of Quebec and Indians, is made there to extend in the valley of the St. Charles, now St-Sauveur, from below the Coteau Ste-Genevieve, opposite Martello Tower No. 4, so far as the corner of the modern streets St. Luc and Ste. Gertrude, covering a space of more than half a mile in length in a westerly direction.

We confess we hardly credit our eyes, so contrary is such position to all the historians and to Mr. Doughty's own text.

(a) We have always read and believed that both armies, as a whole, met on the Heights of Abraham.

(b) That the burghers of Quebec and the Indians occupied the crest of the Coteau Ste-Genevieve and extended even beyond the reserve of the English left.

(c) On the plan they are entirely cut off from the main body by the steepness and height of the *coteau* and by their distance.

(d) In that position they have no enemy to encounter, and would have to scale this cliff before reaching him.

(e) This position differs *in toto* from Mr. Doughty's own text.

At page 391 he quotes Entick as mentioning the "Canadians as being placed on the bank, and on the borders of the Cote Ste-Genève, and on his plan, which is apparently the same as Jeffreys, the Canadians are shown to be in this direction."

And what is more, he himself says that on the plan (A) it will be noticed that the Canadians are placed on the sloping ground of Cote Ste-Genève.

They ought to be, but they are not.

"All this evidence," he adds, "confirms the accuracy of the plan, so far as the position of the Canadians are (sic) concerned.

We admit our impossibility of conciliating the text with the plan, however carefully measured and prepared by Mr. Charest (p. 365). It is erroneous.

(f) If so, it remains evident, as a consequence, that the whole line of Montcalm, being thus carried up half a mile, without any apparent gap, is shown not to be able to extend far enough on its left to meet properly the right of Wolfe, which reaches very near the edge of the Cape.

(g) P. 401. To maintain the French battalions drawn into a straight line, *en front de bandière*, as he was forced to do, he is more unfortunate than Mr. Hawkins, whom he alleges to have been so because he proved too precise as to the relative positions of the army (French).

Mr. Doughty might have found the terminus *a quo et ad quem* on Jeffreys' plan and in the text of the latter; and also on Hawkins' plan of 1841 (which he does not controvert); that line passes from the General Hospital to the heights of the *Buttes-à-Nepveu*, or Martello Tower No. 2.

(h) By placing the French line midway between Lewis Gate and the *Buttes-à-Nepveu*, on his plan A, Mr. Doughty has failed to observe, as a fact under his eyes every day, that the down grade from these *Buttes* to that middle point is such that the troops could not see, nor even be seen by the enemy from thence.

2. Now let us examine the position of the English battalions on the same plan.

Their front is nearly a straight line, having the two extremities formed *en potence* towards each cliff, and a reserve at some distance behind.

(a) The Amherst Regiment is placed on the verge of the coteau Ste. Geneviève, one branch of the *potence* covering it and the other facing west towards the Indians.

(b) This formation at this point is impossible according to Mr. Doughty's own text, because it would be exactly in the middle of the French line of Canadians bordering the same coteau.

(c) The object of forming *en potence* there would cease to exist, since it was formed with the view of preventing the French from turning the English flank at that point.

(d) This *potence*, as a matter of fact, was at some distance from the cliff and near Ste. Foye road, and was covered in rear from the Indians by the Royal American and light infantry.

3. By thus disposing the English line as shown on the plan A, it will be seen :

(a) That Wolfe met his final death wound at a long distance, about a quarter of a mile from the spot where he is known to have died, whereas he was not carried in rear more than about 100 yards after he fell, according to various and undoubted authorities, such as the Grenadiers who supported and carried him to the rear. (James Henderson and others.)

(b) As the fighting was continued by the resistance of the 1500 Canadian sharpshooters in the intervening copice, who exerted themselves at this instant with more than common ardour (Entick 4, p. 119), it is hardly possible that Wolfe, having passed beyond that point, could have been safely carried back to such a long distance without eminent danger and severe contest, in which case some mention of it would be found in some of the writers.

(c) The two mortal wounds of Wolfe did not permit carrying him at such distance, he was in the agonies of death and expired soon after the last shot he had received.

"He first received a ball through his wrist, which immediately wrapping up, he went on with the same alacrity, animating his troops by precept and example. But in a few minutes after, a second ball, through his body, an inch below the navel, and a third, just above his right breast, obliged him to be carried off a small distance in the rear, where roused from fainting in the last agonies by the sound of 'they run,' he eagerly asked, 'Who run?' and being told the French, and that they were defeated, he said: 'Then I thank God; I die contented,' and almost instantly expired." (Entick, 4, p. 118, published 1763.)

But what is most singular is that Mr. Doughty (p. 407), contradicts his plan and confirms Entick as follows:

"During this interval, however, that is between the time of firing, when Wolfe received his wound, and the time when the pursuit commenced, Wolfe was on the spot where he died. It was after he had been

wounded; after he had been carried to the rear of the front line, and while lying upon the ground, that he was told that the enemy was giving way. It is, therefore, apparent that he must have fallen very near to the place where the firing occurred."

If so, how comes it that on this plan A, General Wolfe is made to advance and fall on the Grande-Allee, about 70 feet from the Western gable of the Female Orphan Asylum, that is to say, nearly a quarter of a mile from the spot where he died. All the ingenuity and figures of Mr. Doughty cannot remove this land mark of the monument, nor the truth of the inscription: "Here died Wolfe Victorious."

Nor can he oblivate the tradition of the fatal spot, marked with reverence by Major Holland, as a meridian stone, on the eminence of the gaol, from whence the fainting hero was carried to breathe his last. (*Bouchette, Description Géographique, &c.*, p. 483).

These discrepancies between the text of the writer and the plan he produces to demonstrate the correctness of his contentions, seem to us so palpable, that we venture to assert that the whole of his system being built on such a foundation, it must necessarily make the whole fabric fall to the ground.

Mr. Doughty might easily have had Jefferys' diminutive plan verified by projecting it on a large map of the locality, by means of a negative on glass, on the proper scale, by the magic lantern. It would give him a perspective view, and reproduction mechanically correct and more reliable than any other hand drawing.

Thus he would have been able to follow Jefferys' text so as to comply with his plan and adapt that plan correctly to the ground measurements of to-day.

3. On some other less important points Mr. Doughty continues to be inaccurate and sometimes obscure. It should have been made more clear in what direction he extends the slope of the hill he mentions on plan No. 1. It ought to be toward the river and not towards the town.

Also he might have settled at once the exact position of the "King's mill" and adjoining bakery-house, which were situated opposite the horn-work, (*Johnstone, p. 44*).

He took considerable trouble to find the distance of a musket shot.

Wolfe himself had marked that distance: "The fire is to begin in a regular manner, when the enemy is within shot, at about two hundred yards." *Instructions, etc.*, 1755, *Entic*, Vol. IV, p. 93.

4. Another point developed by Mr. Doughty we find altogether novel: It is the probable route taken by the British army in its march

towards the town in files, as indicated on plan No. 1, that is to say, a march straight from the hill of Wolfe's Cove towards the Ste. Foye road, in a N. N.-West direction.

(a) This march was not possible, being through the woods of Sillery.

(b) It had no immediate object, not tending towards the town.

(c) There were two branch roads at hand leading directly to the level ground chosen by Wolfe on the plains. The lower road was good and convenient. (Knox, p. 78).

(d) That direction north is flatly contradicted by the text (p. 371), cited by Mr. Doughty, from Knox, which is east towards the town.

"Here we formed again, the river and the south country to our rear, our right extending towards the town, our left to Sillery, and halted a few minutes."

"We then faced to the right, and marched towards the town by files, till we came to the Plains of Abraham, an even piece of ground, which Mr. Wolfe had made choice of, while we stood forming upon the hill."

We shall leave Mr. Doughty losing his way north in the woods of Sillery, and follow Wolfe, arriving on the plains by the direct road he had in mind to take, and from thence gaining the Ste. Foye road with part of his troops, who marched there unopposed.

5. So intent is Mr. Doughty of confining the battle between De Salaberry street and the walls of the town, that he disbelieves or misapprehends the relation of the nuns of the General Hospital, when they say: "Nous vîmes de nos fenêtres ce massacre," and again, "L'ennemi maître de la campagne à deux pas de nous." (p. 391).

From personal observation he says no troops could be seen from thence, who were on the level ground (meaning on the heights). But the Journal of the Nuns here refers to the pursuit by the English as far as the hospital and the bridge of boats, where, in fact, the brunt of battle took place, and where the Highlanders lost so heavily. This locality was part of the field of battle, so much so, says Mr. Doughty (p. 389), that such of the enemy as were wounded that day, and lay there, were made prisoners, the hospital being considered a part of the field of battle."

6. Mr. Doughty places Borgia's house at 100 yards east of Maple avenue, on the Ste. Foye road. Since the English were repulsed from it and that house set on fire by the French, causing their enemy to retreat to their former position, that position necessarily must have been some 100 yards at least west of Maple avenue, and therefore, in line with the race-course.

7. Again he is in error when he takes upon himself to place the four gun battery, as recorded by Hawkins, at the redoubt (Plan No. 1), marked by Major Holland on the eminence to command the St. Lewis and Ste. Foye roads.

Hawkins did not fall into this mistake. He says, p. 344: "The first care of General Wolfe was to capture the four gun battery on the left of the English, which was accomplished by General Howe." Thus the Samos battery is disposed of. So far there is no discrepancy with Mr. Doughty.

But Hawkins (p. 354) mistook the remains of the battery near the race stand as existing on the 13th September, 1759, and as it appears on the plan published by him in 1841, which contains the works, etc., made on the Plains after the battle. But on the accompanying plan of the details of the battle this error is corrected and no redoubt is to be seen there.

The subsequent redoubt was mounted, as it was believed, with the four guns captured from the Samos battery. Mr. Doughty will admit his misapprehension of Hawkins and charge the latter so far as he was mistaken on a minor point, whilst "The Picture of Quebec," he admits, "is an exceedingly interesting work, and by a great many is accepted as an authority of the highest order." (P. 397.)

Mr. Doughty will pardon me in saying he is a newcomer to this country and we welcome his accession among us. But he ignores our early traditions, and we shall continue to hold, as transmitted to us by our ancestors, that the spot where Wolfe received the fatal wound was marked by Major Holland at the corner of the redoubt, called "Wolfe's Redoubt," built on the eminence of the gaol, immediately after the battle of the Plains; and that he expired at the short distance in the hollow where now stands his monument, distant only 75 yards from the race-course.

Let me give him the names of a few witnesses serving under him, who survived the immortal hero many and many years after the conquest, such as the venerable Mr. James Thompson, who died in 1830, at the ripe age of 98 years; Major Samuel Holland, who survived till 1802; Malcolm Fraser, of the 78th, till 1815; Simon Fraser, captain in the same regiment, till 1812; and on the French side, Dr. P. Badelard, till 1802; and a number of Canadian militiamen, among others the grandfather of Garneau, our historian; the father of the Hon. Elie Gingras, M.L.C., who at the age of 19, was serving under Montcalm; both of whom transmitted directly to these their descendants faithful relations of the war.

It is hard to be told that we have all been woefully in error for the last hundred years as to the site of the battle, and that the square

space of ground called the race-course could not have been trodden by any soldier on that day.

Nevertheless Mr. Doughty asserts that the Third Battalion of the Royal Americans was detached to the ground of Marchmont and occupied the whereabouts of the present buildings to preserve the communication with the beach and the boats. This, he adds, proves that the line of battle was not in the immediate vicinity of the Marchmont property. The inference is not to be so lightly drawn. The true reason is affixed and precedes: it was because "the two armies moved a little nearer to each other," and the Third Battalion, which had been left to guard the landing, was detached from there at that time for the purpose. Mante, (not Manthe), p. 255.

This indicates that the line was not then far away and that this battalion formed part of the rear guard as well, in case of a possible retreat. More than that, the communication thus secured between this rear and the front line and advanced outposts cannot but be considered otherwise than covering the field of battle from Marchmont towards the town on a space hardly more than half a mile.

How Wolfe could avoid trespassing on the race course, when two roads were leading and joining through it, and not take advantage of the shortest cut before him, we are at a loss to understand. It would have been impossible for him to form his right wing near the cliff and reserve behind without utilizing a part of it, the more so as he rested this wing on the lower road.

But without going outside of my own family tradition, I may inform Mr. Doughty that the three brothers Duperron, Louis and François Bâby, my great-grand-uncles, served during the whole of the seven years war, down to the capitulation of Montreal. François, then 26 years of age, survived to October, 1820, and was a contemporary of and in immediate contact with my mother, Elizabeth Anne Bâby, his grand-niece, born in 1803, and who died at Quebec at the ripe age of 86 years. From that source she was possessed of many incidents and details of the war.

On the other hand she knew Marguerite Cassault, wife of Jean-François Casgrain, my great-grandfather. This old lady had lived 25 years under the old régime, and had been an eye-witness at Château-Richer, her native place, of the devastation and burning of all the surrounding country by Wolfe, as also of the shelling and destruction of her home in Champlain street. Let me add further that this Jean-François Casgrain, her husband, born in 1716, was present at Fontenoy, 11th May, 1745, and was serving then in the "Carabineers," surnamed "Les Invincibles;" and these, together with the *Brigade Irlandaise*, as is well known, retrieved the day which had been nearly lost. Wolfe, then a young lieutenant of 18 years of age, was in the opposite ranks, though not on the field

that day, but soon after they met at Lawfeldt, to meet again at the siege of Quebec in 1759, where Casgrain, though lame from former wounds, still served the Lower Town batteries against the English fleet. He died in 1802, very near completing his 86 years. If therefore, personally, I rely with some degree of confidence upon the veracity of the persons alluded to, who were well acquainted with the men and events of their times, in a comparatively limited community, Mr. Doughty will allow me, with all due respect for his attainments, to differ from him, and retain my old cherished ideas on both battles of the Plains of Abraham.

So far we have confined ourselves exclusively to the review of this monograph, in pointing out Doughty vs. Doughty. It would require a more complete criticism by comparing him with the divers writers on the subject, weighing each authority and the whole of them in a true scale, and not taking approximate estimates of distances as correct or convenient data. A careful and studious writer might do this with the view of adding valuable and precise information to one of the most salient points in Canadian history.

Note.—This appendix is not intended to form part of the above notes, nor presented in violation of the rule as to printed documents,—but simply to spare the reader's time and trouble in referring to the files of the *Quebec Morning Chronicle*, in order to ascertain the date and nature of the objections raised and published against some of M^r. Doughty's views and statements.

APPENDIX B.

Since the editing of this paper Mr. Doughty has published his third and new plan of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, to be seen on the *Map of Quebec, engraved for the book QUEBEC UNDER TWO FLAGS*,—a valuable work written by him in collaboration with Dr. Dionne, F. R. S. C. Referring to this map and to the site of the battle—he says in *Appendix*, p. XXVI :—“ The exact position of both armies is shown on the plan accompanying this work, and a more detailed description is to be found in the *Siege of Quebec and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham*.”

The two last plans, if both correct, should therefore shew the same exact positions, and there ought not to be any noticeable discrepancy between them, that is to say, such as worthwhile of being submitted to the attention of the general reader.

However it is fit, in respect to historical accuracy, to point out the divergence we find in comparing the second and the third plans. Of course we eliminate altogether the first one accompanying the first Paper.

As to the 3rd one we observe that :

(a). The english line of battle is drawn straight and parallel to de Salaberry street—whilst in plan No. 2 it is convex and irregular.

(b). The Burton reserve in eight subdivisions is removed higher up towards St. Foye road and is more distant from the main body.

(c). The two Royal Americans divisions ought to be behind the Amherst and not between the main line and the reserve.

(d). The Otway is removed, and properly so, from the gaol to the verge of the cape,—thereby correcting the error we have noticed on plan No. 2, at pages 115 and 116.

(e). The Amherst *en potence* is reversed, its angle pointing east, whilst it points west on plan No 2.

(f). But the principal discrepancy consists in changing the spot where Wolfe fell. Having already affirmed, vol. III, p. 204, that *there is no longer any possible doubt where he fell*, and indicating the place by a red star, west of Gaol street, Mr. Doughty now removes it east to the other side of the street, a distance of 333 yards from the monument according to the scale of the cadastre — a divergence of 33 yards.

(g). Another point which has an important bearing on the english position, is the proper location of the House of Borgia, the most advanced post of Wolfe on St-Foye road and where he had rested his left wing.

We intend to prove, by a another Paper, the impossibility of placing it behind his main line and that it must be found in front of it.

April 7th 1904

P.-B. CASGRAIN.

