


Canadian Studies Grant Programs

Media Policy, National Identity and Citizenry in Changing Democratic Societies: The Case of Canada

> Edited by Joel Smith Duke University, Durham, NC

Canadian Embassy/Ambassade du Canada Washington, D.C. 1997



This manuscript is a product of the Canadian Studies Research Grant Program. The program promotes research in the social sciences, journalism, business, trade, environment, and law with a unique relevance to Canada, or in the context of the bilateral or North American relationship; and the social, cultural, political, and economic issues that impact on these relationships in the 1990s.

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The Canadian Studies Center, Duke University, announces a conference on

MEDIA POLICY, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CITIZENRY IN CHANGING DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF CANADA

The conference will assess and seek alternatives to communication policies meant to develop a national culture. This is urgent when new technologies thwart monopolization of domestic supplies of popular culture and states are committed to democracy and multiculturalism. The focus is on Canada because Canada typifies situations present in many of the world's countries.

> Robert E. Babe Lee B. Becker Richard Collins Marjorie Ferguson John Jackson Elihu Katz

John C. Keane Thelma McCormack Christopher Maule John Meisel Marc Raboy Paul Rutherford Joel Smith

Friday, 6 October 1995 Session 1: 9:00 am-Noon Session 2: 1:45-5:00 pm

All sessions to be held in: The Rhodes Conference Center

Papers will not be read: each session will consist of summaries of papers by authors and general discussion.

> Canadian Studies Center Box 90422, Duke University 2016 Campus Drive Durham, NC 27708-0422

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Saturday, 7 October 1995 Session 3: 8:30-11:30 am Session 4: 1:00-4:00 pm General Discussion: 4:00-5:45 pm

Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy

The conference is open to the public. Information on reasonably priced lodging is available.

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MEDIA POLICY, NATIONAL DENTITY AND CHIZENRY IN CHANGING DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF CAMADA

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Preface

This volume contains the final versions of a set of papers that were presented and discussed on October 6th and 7th, 1995, at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. The theme of the conference, "Media Policy, National Identity and Citizenry in Changing Democratic Societies: The Case of Canada," addresses a set of related issues that have increased in importance throughout this fading century and promise to be even more important in the 21st century. As readers will see, the issues are increasingly universal. The fact that cultural products had to be removed from the table before the U.S.-Canada Free Trade, NAFTA, and GATT agreements could be concluded, and the increasing geographic scope of those agreements, are indicative of their centrality to the future of all countries and their economies. In a sense, then the focus on Canada is only a device to address such subjects as nationalism, national identity, citizen identity, national culture, and the media, and the relations among them.

In an equal sense, the focus really is on Canada. Canada is the first of the OECD (i.e., advanced industrial)countries in which contention over and concern about a national culture has been continuous since its creation, with dismemberment always a possibility. Its leaders and its people have identified these problems explicitly from its moment of birth and have worked, successfully and unsuccessfully, at resolving them. Breakup is a real possibility. The conference, then, addressed particularistic and general concerns simultaneously.

From the general perspective, the passage of seventeen months between the conference and the time that the papers are ready for publication is not consequential. From the perspective of Canada, some of the material might seem dated. However, a close monitoring of the situation indicates that, though some of the details may have changed, the actors, the issues, the tactics and strategies remain the same. Were we to hold the meeting today, only a few of the numbers and names referred to in the papers might change. The issues, analyses, and conclusions would remain the same.

The conferees were all distinguished experts in the field. A draft of the introductory paper was prepared to provide a context in which to prepare their individual contributions. The conferees were to provide drafts of their papers in advance and to offer brief summaries and comments at the meeting; the papers themselves were not read. The conferees and audience members, then, discussed the issues raised and positions taken. Conferees were to revise their papers in light of the discussions. The actual conference adhered to the plan as closely as ever happens at such events. Consequently, because I could anticipate the content of the revisions in only the most general sense, the last part of the introductory paper has been revised and updated several times to accord with the final versions of the papers.

One of the features of the Conference was the use of observers to assess the papers and proceedings at the conclusion of the meetings. Richard Collins and Paul Rutherford, eminent scholars who have devoted much of their careers to these matters, were invited to serve in this role. Accordingly, there is no reference to their reflective papers in the introductory paper. However, I found their comments and the discussions so stimulating that I succumbed to an irresistible urge to comment further and those reflections appear as the final paper in the volume.

The draft of the introductory paper was based on a brief conference prospectus which was provided with the invitations to participate. That prospectus also served as the core of various proposals for financial support. The success of those proposals reflects the importance of the issues in the contemporary world. I want to take this opportunity to thank those who saw the merit of the proposal and responded by providing

the support that made the Conference possible -- the Department of Sociology of Duke University, the Howard E. Jensen Fund, the Josiah Charles Trent Memorial Foundation, the Canadian Studies Center of Duke University and the anonymous supporter who provided the Center with its Communication Fund, the Government of Canada, and the Government of Quebec.

The Conference was sponsored by Duke University's Canadian Studies Center. I want to thank my colleagues at the Center, John H. Thompson (Director), Patrice LeClerc, and Janice Englehart for their encouragement, support, and just plain hard work. I also want to thank my colleagues at Duke -- Allan Kornberg, Frtiz Mayer, David Paletz, and John Thompson -- who chaired our sessions. Linda Stievater worked above and beyond the call during our actual meetings, attending to all the minutiae, from unlocking to locking up, that accompany any conference sessions. Finally, I want to thank Barbara V. Smith, who not only sacrificed Linda's services by sending her to me, but also has aided and abetted this enterprise at every step of the way. She provided the extra touches that made the Conference an event to savor and remember.

Media Policy, National Identity, and Citizenry in Changing Democratic Societies: the Case of Canada

Joel Smith Duke University

Recent events demonstrate how problematic the relationships among the four components of my title are becoming. Accordingly, it is valuable to examine the experiences of a modern democratic country trying to use its media to develop a sense of nationhood in rapidly and drastically changing conditions. Canada is such a country. In a rapidly changing domestic and international environment, its leaders are finding it increasingly difficult to implement media policies to promote national identity and enhance citizen participation. The concerns -- struggle for nationhood, promoting democracy, controlling domestic media for a country's own purposes -- are increasingly common in the contemporary world community. Given their complex relationships, policies that do not address them all simultaneously can be inconsistent, conflicting, and unworkable. The most promising efforts may fail under the weight of national and international events.

Rapid economic and political changes are creating a very different environment from that in which states previously pursued their domestic and international interests. During the last four decades, Canadian leaders have looked to their media (among other means) to delineate and promote a culture with which most Canadians can identify. In their efforts they have assumed that U.S. influence on Canadian media must be curbed and, in turn, that "Canadianizing" the media and promoting a clear image of what being a Canadian means will increase people's attachment to their country and give them the information they need to be effective citizens. If, as is widely claimed, the changing environment is lessening the chances that these policies as they have been implemented can achieve these objectives, our conference deliberations may suggest more realistic goals and strategies for Canada and other countries with similar concerns.

Despite the facts that Canada is a relatively small country, that it is not a dominant media center, and that Canadians may be more interested in economic matters, personal security, and whether the country will hold together than in its media, several aspects of Canada's situation also apply to many developed and developing countries. (1) Innovations in communication and information technology are fueling a merger of media and information systems with far-reaching, though unclear, economic and social implications. (2) Foreign popular cultural materials introduced through the media are considered a threat to the state's ability to act autonomously. (3) A distinctive domestic culture is considered so central to Canada's ability to remain independent¹ that cultural materials have been excluded from negotiations on free trade. (4) Canadian society and Canada's relation to North America have many of the same attributes and problems that confront many members of other emerging regional economies (e.g., the European Community) (cf. Gibbins, 1991:65; Soberman, 1991; Drummond, Paterson, and Willis, 1993; Nevitte, 1995:185).³

Given these parallels, an assessment of current Canadian media policies -- their goals, consistency with other policies, implementation and effects, presuppositions and their validity -- was made the topic of a recent conference. Ten distinguished scholars were asked to draft papers applying their particular expertise to the issues. To provide focus, a draft of this paper reviewed (1) circumstances that impact on Canadian policies, analogs of which apply elsewhere, (2) how Canada adapts to them, (3) factors affecting Canada's ability to develop and regulate its media, and (4) the implicit assumptions that underlie Canadian policies. We met from October 5th-8th, 1995, to review and discuss the issues. The participants drew upon the discussion to revise their papers. Two other distinguished scholars were asked to contribute overviews of the discussions. It is hoped that these papers may be useful to Canada and to countries in similar situations.

The Context of Canadian Policy

Canada's Circumstances

Several pervasive aspects of the social and political environment in which Canadians live and their leaders act almost always impact such matters as media policy. They include relations with the United States, French-English domestic relations, national identity, ethnic diversity, and the character of the Canadian state.

Relations with the United States. During a Canadian sports cable channel panel discussion of franchise problems in the Canadian Football League and a National Hockey League strike, one participant gratuitously remarked that, whenever Americans become involved, Canadian sports develop problems and deteriorate. The other panelists accepted his remark as a truism not requiring comment. The statement in that context surprised me; the sentiment did not. Canada's situation with respect to the U.S. is a festering source of irritation for many loyal Canadians. In their view the U.S. is aggressive and impulsive; Canada is compliant and patient. The U.S. is large and domineering; Canada is small and submissive. The U.S. is wealthy and unrestrained; Canada is poor and restrained. In addition to several armed incursions prior to the Civil War, for more than two hundred years the United States has slighted, affronted, and imposed upon Canada. When Americans act, Canadians are forced into protective reactions. Pierre Trudeau attributed the country's survival to Canadians having learned how to sleep with an elephant.

The American economy impinges on Canada through ownership and distribution arrangements (cf., Clement and Myles, 1994:20-21); it often swamps Canadian-produced supplies and, it is claimed, eventually shapes Canadian tastes and consumption patterns. With respect to audiovisual media, intentionally or not, spillover reaches large portions of the Canadian population. American firms control film distribution and exhibition and, because they also control most English language film production, American films dominate the Canadian market (cf. Pendakur). Popular U.S. magazines with minor editorial additions for the Canadian market absorb large shares of the reading audience and advertising dollar and, consequently, create serious problems for domestic publications. From a Canadian perspective the situation has all the earmarks of cultural imperialism. Consequently, many Canadians feel they have lost the ability to make independent decisions and, perhaps, even their sovereignty. Not surprisingly, politics, policy making, legislating, and public debate are preoccupied with the United States and its impact on Canada's autonomy. The American presence is a constant, inescapable concern in Canadian policy making and implementation.

French-English relations. Since the transfer of New France to Great Britain at the close of the Seven Years War, relations between Canada's French and English communities have been a major source of tension. The French felt resentful of and hostile to the conquerors. The British, wanting to avoid the burdens of governing a hostile, conquered people, arranged forms of rule that left the French colonial society largely intact but isolated from France. Despite their sense of abandonment and isolation from France, the French felt responsible for preserving French culture as they knew it. The English were indifferent to or disdainful of them -- people who even France did not value. The surrender launched a pattern of English social, economic, and political domination and French subordination. The situation was captured by Hugh MacLennan's apt phrase, the "two solitudes." However, Quebec is modernizing, a substantial white collar middle class has emerged, and the Quiet Revolution has dispersed political power to the populace at large.

Francophone Quebecers' success in changing their province did not address another of their gnawing concerns -- the eventual disappearance of French language and culture in Canada outside Quebec as one Francophone community after another, isolated among Anglophones, abandoned the language. Their concern

was intensified as most immigrants to Quebec opted for English rather than French as the language of choice for themselves and their children. Convinced that, despite the Quiet Revolution, opportunities for continued social and economic advancement would remain blocked by English control of Quebec's economy, their despair for their future in Canada continued to grow. It has been funneled into growing support for political independence and two election victories for provincial governments committed to independence for Quebec.

Francophones' efforts to preserve their language and culture have contributed at least as much as discrimination, economic inequality, and the quest for special status for Quebec to French-English tensions. The general uncertainty as to whether Quebec will remain in Canada rises even higher when special steps to preserve French Canadian culture are contemplated or undertaken, e.g., Federal commitment to bilingualism and biculturalism, Quebec's enactment of Bill 101, the 1980 Quebec referendum on sovereignty association (and its failure), patriation of the Constitution, several failed efforts to give special status to Quebec, the almost successful 1995 referendum on independence. Attempts to address Quebecers' concerns generate rancorous debates and raise the ire of both communities. Federal and provincial governments, as well as Canadian businesses and ordinary citizens, operate under a pervasive uncertainty about the future that accompanies the rise and fall of support for separation in Quebec. It is a constant factor in national politics.

National identity. Identification with one's country is believed to generate national support and voluntary compliance with its laws and needs. Therefore, indications of erosion or weakness in people's identification with the country is a cause for concern. The level of preoccupation of Canadian elites with national identity is unparalleled in most countries (cf. Bell, 1992:62-64; Taras, Rasporich, and Mandel, 1993 [who use identity as the theme on which to organize their selected readings for a Canadian studies text])⁵ and may be justified. McGill students I have taught all agreed that they consider themselves members of an ethnic group first and Canadians second.⁶ The 1991 census indicated that 42 percent of Canadians claim at least one ethnic origin other than English or French (Mills, November 19, 1994:B2).

If national identity is weak in Canada⁷, the emphasis on ethnic origins more likely is a symptom than a cause. Little has changed since Confederation with regard to identity. Canadians were not a single group that shared interests and a desire to confederate. The agreement was crafted in difficult negotiations among the colonies and between them and the mother country; it did not express common interests and shared will.8 Agreement required threats, cajoling, and payoffs. Many opposed it. There was no heroism and sacrifice. The process did not lend itself to founding myths or heroes. Adoption of such rallying symbols as a flag and anthem had to wait another hundred years. The British monarch remains head of state.9 The integrative potential of "The Land and the Loneliness" or a mosaic is dubious. Pal, assessing whether recent citizenship programs may have fragmented Canada, concluded (1993:256) that they would not "...have mattered very much had the country possessed some unifying core of symbols or experiences that might have provided a bedrock of national political allegiances. But it did not." Bell attributes (1992:72) the continuing inability of Canadians to bridge the Anglophone-Francophone gulf to Canada's failure "...to create her own symbols of identity." The flag, the anthem, an ethnically diverse citizenry, accomplishments of fellow Canadians, and differences from and affronts by the United States may now sustain patriotism, pride, and a sense of Canadian identity when locating one's self for others or when Canadian independence seems threatened. Whether they provide an adequate basis for a Canadian identity is doubtful.

Though the urgency of strengthening people's identity as Canadians as a bulwark against its neighboring colossus has varied, the continuous concern and efforts to change things are not surprising not only because of the unheroic circumstances surrounding Confederation, but also in light of the periodic rise of support for continentalist proposals ranging from increased ties to merger with the United States¹⁰, the Anglo-French cleavage, and doubts about whether there is a national culture. Nevertheless, despite the

anxiety over identity that drives media and cultural policy, most Canadians profess a Canadian identity. They are quick and proud to identify themselves as Canadians when they win an international hockey match, otherwise achieve on the world scene, or even hear a moving rendition of *O, Canada*. However, these are only symbols associated with an identity. They evoke it. The identity is shallow; there is little behind it.

Canadian identity lacks grounding in a distinctive set of widely shared beliefs, norms, values, and experience -- in short, a culture. At its strongest and most secure, a national identity is an attribute of a politicized group with a distinctive culture. 11 English Canada's culture, like that of the U.S., is a variant on its British origins. It shares its language with other Commonwealth countries and the United States. Shared language minimizes differences from American culture; propinquity and the size imbalance increase Canada's vulnerability to American influence. Differences survive, but they are subtle, not distinctive. Perhaps this is the reason that one of the most effective stimuli for evoking a sense of Canadian identity is to be mistaken for an American. Observers agree that the one thing that Canadians share is a conviction that they are not Americans. 12 However, an emphasis on difference that omits anything substantive or positive is an insufficient basis for unity. Moreover, the nature of U.S.-Canadian differences vitiates their usefulness as a core of a national culture or a stable source of identity. It is not that there are no differences; there are many, but some are difficult to conceptualize, many are not salient or important to the average person, and still others do not favor Canada (cf. Bell, 1992; Hiller, 1986; Goldberg and Mercer, 1986). Most Americans and Canadians speak English, dress alike, practice the same religions, have similar housing, and use similar consumer goods. Despite assertions that Canada has a national culture¹³ and that it reflects their sense of themselves as more peaceful and community-minded than Americans¹⁴, the images that Canadians have of the two countries are not very different from each other in any conventional sense (cf. Bell; Smith, Kornberg, and Nevitte). In sum, the differences are much less tangible than the obvious similarities.

Ethnic diversity. Canadian policy makers can never ignore the fact that, rather than being a stable, bicultural English-French society, the country is the proverbial nation of immigrants (cf. Thompson and Weinfeld, 1995). Each year's immigrants to Canada comprise about 1% of the population. They come from almost every country in the world and comprise a larger proportion of the population than in any other OECD country. In 1971, with the declared intention of easing immigrant acculturation, legislation was enacted affirming every Canadian's right to "preserve, share and enhance their cultural heritage." This was a remarkable about face. Prior to this commitment to multiculturalism the social position of non-charter ethnic groups was best captured by the title of John Porter's classic study -- *The Vertical Mosaic*.

The salience of ethnicity in Canada is not new. Atkinson refers (1994:740) to it sardonically as the country's "...remarkable history of recognizing...difference." Allan Smith (1994[1992]:219-223) explains it by developing what he considers to be a fundamental difference between the understandings of nation and society in the United States and Canada. The former, he suggests, ultimately responds to newly recognized racial and ethnic differences by incorporating them into the national system, the latter by maintaining the differences and changing the shape of the system. Canada's pattern, he claims, was recognizable even before Confederation, when, other than the French, the population was largely of British origin. Rather than putting his longstanding pattern of accepting ethnic groups and encouraging them to maintain their cultural patterns in a positive light, Bodemann (1984:222-223) interprets it as a tactic of Canadian elites to maintain their status by balkanizing the lower classes. Many of Canada's political customs are rooted in the French-English-aboriginal distinction. Canadian censuses report the ethnic and religious origin of every resident. Until 1991, Census enumerators were instructed not to accept Canadian as an ethnic origin no matter how many generations a person's family may have been in Canada. They were even given strategies to counter the claim (Smith and Kornberg, 1969: 346-7). In view of the record of past state discrimination against and persecution of members of non-charter groups (Schwartz, 1983; Bell, 1992:76-77; Atkinson, 1994:741), this

interest originally may not have been as benevolent as it may now be. Official multiculturalism may have changed the strategy; it has not resolved the national concern over ethnic diversity.

The Canadian state. The federal government created at Confederation was intended to be strong enough to command the cooperation and support of provinces that varied widely in their reasons and enthusiasm for joining the new country. It also had to be able to provide an infrastructure for the new country and to govern vast unsettled areas. Confederation being primarily a contrivance of some English Canadians and their British rulers, implemented by and in cooperation with the Parliament at Westminster, the federal government had only tenuous support. Given these circumstances and the state's substantial obligations, its philosophy was conservative, in the sense of accepting responsibility to take any necessary actions to preserve the realm. 15 Accordingly, Canadian administrations have intervened in the private sphere frequently (as have those in the U.S. [cf. Cummings, 1995]). In addition to creating Crown Corporations when deemed necessary, one of the more uniquely Canadian expressions of state conservatism is the continuous parade of Royal Commissions, Parliamentary Committees, Task Forces, and the like. To keep the government informed as to where interventions may or may not be needed, study and inquiry after study and inquiry probe almost every aspect of national life (cf. David E. Smith 1995:626-631). Scrutinies of cultural production and media operation are typical. Hardly a year has passed since 1970 without such an inquiry being under way. Proposals that appeal to the government usually are implemented. Fine tuning government programs and policies is a major Canadian industry.

Despite this close surveillance, over time the federal government has devolved more and more power to the provinces. It collects taxes, distributes much of the proceeds to the provinces for such purposes as education, health, and welfare, and, to a considerable extent, allows them to dispense the funds as they wish. Each year the national and provincial Prime Ministers meet to renegotiate their rights and roles. Paul Martin was quoted (Wells, October 20, 1994:A5) as saying that the federal government didn't need to offer constitutional amendments in opposing the then upcoming referendum on sovereignty because "There is no status quo in the Canadian federation. It's constantly changing." His statement resonates with a portrayal of Canada as a country whose government is forever in becoming. A government that is always being renegotiated and reconstructed may appear forever ambivalent -- strong and interventionist, weak and passive -- and amorphous -- never quite the same from year to year. A national government that appears subservient to its component provinces and frequently changes form, has difficulty generating popular support.

National governments must intervene effectively and forcefully in matters that threaten the state if countries are to survive. The Canadian emphasis on form and procedure may weaken the government's effectiveness in this regard. This may account for the relative¹⁶ ease with which provinces join (and, presumably may leave) the Confederation and the willingness of federal and provincial governments to accept these actions when the decision is made. When the South seceded from the United States there was civil war; should Quebec separate from Canada, there may be some whimpers from the government.¹⁷ Governments that are willing to intervene but weak in following through are often ineffective in implementing policy.

Canada's Adaptations to Its Circumstances

Canada's governments select goals and fashion policies in response to the above conditions. Three of these goals-- promoting a national culture, multiculturalism, and a sense of nationhood -- merit discussion because, in large part, Canadian media policy is crafted to serve them. Their consistency, whether media policy can help achieve them, and how relations with the United States impinge on them are important issues.

Promoting a national culture. In order to promote a sense of national identity, national cultural development and protection are Canadian government priorities. In large part, Canadian media and cultural policies are shaped for this purpose. They are driven by concern that American popular culture may distort or replace the national culture and that this will weaken the country's capacity for independent action. What does this concern imply? If there really is no national culture, it means that a country can exist and survive for long periods without one. It also means that national cultures need not develop automatically from the everyday routines of a country's populace -- or, at least, that the process can be so slow that a country can survive for a long time without one. This raises fundamental questions about national cultures.

"Culture," of course, refers to all the material (e.g., dress, housing, tools) and non-material (e.g., values, language, customs) attributes shared by members of a group. In a simple world each group with its own culture is a society. With growth and mobility, however, societies may no longer have distinct cultures but they do have an identity -- usually a name -- and their people do interact among themselves in an organized fashion and distinguish themselves from others. Identifiable societies may be spatially separated from or interspersed with others.

Political development has decoupled culture and society. (1) When societies develop a political sense and some form of polity they became nations. (2) The formal systems of rule they develop and accept are states. (3) States with sovereignty over territory are nation-states. (4) Disjunctures between state and nation develop when they lose sovereignty (e.g., become colonies, are absorbed) or expand to include part or all of others (e.g., Austria-Hungary, U.S.S.R.), or when states develop with sovereignty over territories occupied by fragments or all of several societies (e.g., Canada, Switzerland, Belgium, Nigeria). (5) Consequently, most nation-states are now countries, areas over which a state has sovereignty but in which the sense of nationhood is variable and problematic. Because most countries no longer coincide with a single integral society and culture, they do not automatically have a distinctive national culture -- one that is the culture of all (or most of) the inhabitants -- though many may have a dominant culture that is treated by the government, the elite, and/or by outsiders as a national culture. These diverse society-nation-state-country contingencies highlight the ambiguity and questionable status of national cultures.

Persistence of the idea that a country needs a national culture, however, suggests that countries have or have had one and that those without one will or must develop one. Why?...because a distinctive culture and exclusive intense interaction is expected to give a sense of identity and motivate people to do anything necessary to survive as an independent entity, i.e., they are easy to mobilize. But whether this is so is dubious. Some single society nation-states fail (e.g., Serbia, Montenegro); some contrived countries (e.g., Belgium, Switzerland, Canada) survive even though a national culture is resisted. In Switzerland, for example, a 1972 referendum on a proposal to have standardized arithmetic and reading tests after the first two years of school lost on the grounds of "no national culture." Such countries may survive only because it suits the interests of strong neighbors or its own constituent groups and/or because it has a ruthless government, but they do survive, often with strong citizen support. Institutional forms (e.g., consociational democracy) that emerge to defuse the tensions that can develop in multicultural countries also may be very important.¹⁹

Aside from these problematic aspects of the concept, the very nature of culture raises questions about the role a state can play in developing or protecting a national culture. Culture denotes the traditional artifacts, activities, values, language, and beliefs shared by members of a distinctive group. Cultures collect; they agglomerate. They are crescive, not built or created. Cultural development requires time and a degree of isolation. A national culture would be one found throughout a country and would have a distinctive language and value system with related practices as its core. As such, the very idea of a single, coherent national culture is largely a fiction. Not only do few, if any, countries have a uniform culture throughout their

territory, extensive status, regional, and rural-urban variations are normal. What may be called a national culture often is that of a societal elite. It could be argued that what a national group does is its culture, but if extra-national groups do the same things or if the national group is an aggregate of distinctively different, largely segregated groups, then there is no distinctive national culture (cf. Servaes, 1993:144-145). Canada's language and values are not distinctive; the mosaic is comprised of different cultures. The goal of creating a national culture may be urgent; whether it is a project which a modern state can accomplish is questionable.

The emergence of strong regional organizations and transnational corporations (TNCs) also has required many countries to forego some traditional protectionist perquisites of sovereignty (e.g., control of trade, independent military activity, travel to and from the country). Consequently, many countries' survival as independent entities may be at stake long before there can be a decisive outcome to their efforts to achieve nation-statehood. Thus, many modern countries that now lack an overarching "deep" (i.e., a world view, values, perspectives) culture are seeking to develop one in inauspicious conditions. It may be that they will only have a national culture in the sense that their unique combinations of ethnic and other groups give rise to unique social and political arrangements (e.g., Canada's multiculturalism, Switzerland's very loose confederation) or agree on an agenda for negotiating common or dominant values. Even if more substantive cultures eventually develop from the repeated distinctive behaviors these systems engender, the arrangements for ethnic coexistence are really unique structures rather than cultures -- by themselves not all that the term culture connotes. But in the contemporary world, if states maintain legitimacy and the support of their citizens, most countries survive. However, despite these gaps between concept and reality, enhancing a national identity based on a national culture remains a goal and chronic concern of the Canadian state.

Multiculturalism.²³ The Canadian government espouses multiculturalism to accommodate its ethnic groups, and to implement it funds various programs intended to serve other goals as well. One such program -- grants to ethnic advocacy organizations -- exemplifies the logic. The fundamental premise is that funding advocacy organizations (e.g., groups interested in promoting ethnic cultural survival, language, sports, women's issues, consumer issues) builds national unity. The complex rationale is that people should have identities that express their interests and attributes, that funded advocacy groups will promote their interests more effectively than unfunded ones and have a higher success rate, and that this will both make people more aware and effective citizens and demonstrate that ethnics (and every other group) have a place in the mosaic that is Canadian unity (Pal, 1993:251-253). On its face, this rationale would seem to resolve any apparent contradiction between state promotion of both multiculturalism and a national culture.

Multiculturalism has opposition. In a recent, heavily publicized, particularly wide-ranging critique, Neil Bissoondath (1994), a naturalized East Indian Trinidadian, accuses it of having had a cynical political rather than an altruistic intent, thwarting immigrants' desire to leave their disparate backgrounds and become Canadians, blocking ethnic groups' understanding of one another, and ignoring the wishes of a majority of Canadians that newcomers become Canadians and fit in to Canada.²⁴ His critique suggests that the policy destroys, rather than builds, unity, and that, by doing so, impedes the project of building a national culture. With respect to unity, emphasizing ethnic differences can encourage divisive ethnic politics by shifting attention from cultural expression and practices to inequalities. The fact that Allophones, unlike Anglophones and Francophones, are not guaranteed language protection is one such possible inequality. Survival of their languages is not a concern of government. Because language is at the core of culture, this inconsistency between cultural and linguistic policy could kindle interethnic contention. Any coincidence of ethnicity and inequality can produce cleavages and conflict, and there is evidence of such coincidence in Canada.²⁵ Finally, the distancing of Francophones from the policy at its inception suggests that for many Canadians membership in an ethnic group still equates to low social status.

With respect to Canadian media, multiculturalism, if successful²⁶, could fractionate an already small market. In view of claims that the market is too small to support quality Canadian cultural production, small ethnic groups desiring their own cultural programming are even more problematic. The approximately thirty percent of the market that is Francophone is served by its own media. If the state succeeds in getting ethnic groups to preserve and practice their own cultures, programming, other than news, public affairs, and sports, would be unlikely to draw audiences large enough to support quantity production of quality material.

A widely shared national culture might be a bulwark of independence, but multiculturalism impedes its development because it provides little to unite the component ethnic groups or to motivate them to create that structure. By itself, the celebration of difference is insufficient to build a shared identity and facilitate mobilization. The Canadian mosaic, the model being promoted as a multicultural alternative to the outmoded ideal of coexisting English and French cultures²⁷, does not help alleviate the chronic concern about independence from the United States. Not surprisingly, a national culture based on multiculturalism and difference, and freed from American cultural influence, has yet to take root.²⁸ To explain the failure, it does not help to argue, as some Canadian cultural protectionists do, that it would take root were it not for the American presence. Not only is the argument counterfactual, it also implies that American cultural themes are more attractive and meaningful to Canadians than the mosaic is (Cf. Hiller, 1986:213).

To encourage acculturation to a mosaic that lacks substance is to promote a semantic fiction. If it provides a rationale not to assimilate, multiculturalism makes Canada a place to be rather than a society to join. It raises issues of personal identity and loyalty that have profound implications for national integration and social mobilization, and, in turn, for Canada's future as an independent country.²⁹ A national culture with multiculturalism at its core is vulnerable on this score. Preserving Canada's rich cultural diversity by promoting multiculturalism can be a significant impediment to achieving national goals through media policy.

Developing nationhood. In his study of Canadian media policy, Richard Collins (1990a:xiii), citing Ramsay Cook, portrayed Canada as a nationalist state rather than a nation-state so as to emphasize Canadian nationhood as an aspiration rather than condition. In a later essay on mass culture in Canada, Rutherford (1993:260) referred to this commitment, noting that "(t)he doctrine of nationalism has bedeviled intellectual discourse in Canada." Other countries, like Canada, have a weak national culture and ethnic, regional³⁰ and religious diversity and cleavages, but many of them were nations -- single societies sharing a common culture -- that lost their nationhood through expansion, invasion, or heavy immigration. Unlike them, Canada never has been a nation. The English -- the conquerors -- and French -- the conquered -- always have been separate and unequal in status. Bell claims (1992:67) that "...for a long time after Confederation, few Canadians could think of Canada as a nation, and no longer a mere colony." Even the British culture of Anglophone Canada only occasionally overridden the diverse traditions and interests of the original provinces.³¹

The effort to integrate the country materially and ideationally has taken many forms since Confederation. Materially it has emphasized creating equity -- in the sense that each political, social, and economic component of the country contributes and receives a fair share³² -- and building an infrastructure. Ideationally, the goal is to get citizens to make Canada a salient aspect of their self-conceptions -- that is, to build a shared national identity. Providing an infrastructure, however, may be antithetical to equity -- and, consequently, to a shared identity -- if the costs and rewards of an infrastructure are unevenly distributed, and that is likely when population and resources are unevenly distributed. Building a transcontinental railroad, for example, placed heavier financial burdens on the rest of Canada than on British Columbia. Subsidies to the National Film Board benefit far fewer people than pay for it. Severe inequalities in wealth and income require redistribution if those at the bottom are to have an adequate life and not become alienated. Inherent material inequities heighten the importance of ideational factors. A shared identity reenforced by a common

culture is crucial for generating the altruism required if contributions and returns cannot be balanced. Canadian governments have been active on both fronts.

Building a nation has involved the Canadian state in building networks to link all parts of a vast territory -- railroads and highways for moving goods and telecommunication networks for moving symbols. 33 When necessary, state enterprises have abetted these projects. Provincial governments have played a similar role, particularly with regard to natural resources. Relatedly, as in many former colonies, there has been great concern with achieving economic independence -- if for no other reason than the state's interest in protecting its own investments. Despite some wavering, then, Canadian governments have participated in the effort to build an economy controlled by Canadians by encouraging and subsidizing private enterprises, by developing public enterprises when private initiative is insufficient, and by protecting these enterprises.

The early tendency of many Canadians to place province, language, and religion before country did not by itself promote a state interest in nation building. The impetus for focussing on media policy came with the onset of broadcasting and the realization that Canadians listened to U.S. radio stations when they could not receive Canadian stations. It continued to take shape with the work of a long line of Royal Commissions and Parliamentary Committees familiarly known by the names of their Chairs -- Aird, Fowler, Davey, Symonds, Applebaum-Hebert, Caplan-Sauvageau. Their studies revealed that broadcasting largely emanated from the United States, that most publishers were foreign-owned and most of their books had foreign authors, that university texts covered American rather than Canadian history, that much of the available broadcasting, including that on Canadian stations, originated in the United States, that most musical performances were in some part American, and that most of the available films were American productions provided by Americanowned distributors for viewing in American-owned theaters. They feared that Canadians might become more American than Canadian³⁴, and recommended creation of what is now the CBC, the National Film Board, and Telefilm Canada, as well as legislation and regulation on such matters as tax benefits to advertisers who use Canadian media and producers of material for these media, Canadian content quotas and rules, import restrictions, and the like. Government participation in and protection of cultural production and entertainment is one way a conservative state has tried to provide an ideational foundation for a Canadian nation.³⁵

In addition to the problems that can arise from pursuing projects that require a delicate balance if they are all to succeed, no state can diagnose problems, engineer and implement remedies, and achieve its goals without confronting many other difficulties. For Canada, with much of its economy foreign-owned and a location requiring accommodation to American actions, demands, and interests, nation-building always has been fraught with problems. Nonetheless, because patriotic sentiments and national support vary directly with perceptions that one's country is being demeaned, threatened, or harmed by others (Tai, Peterson, and Gurr, 1973; Woods, 1976; Smith and Jackson, 1981), the leaders of countries that lack a strong national culture and whose citizens do not share a strong sense of national identity profit from having enemies. They are well served if citizens believe that another country is exploiting and harming them (cf. Schwartz [1981] for evidence of such anti-American sentiments on the part of Canadians). There is evidence that positive feelings for Canada increase when the United States is perceived as acting to Canada's detriment (Tai, Peterson, and Gurr, 1973). If so, it might be costly for Canadian political leaders if they were to succeed in establishing Canada's autonomy and independence from the United States. In a sense, the American presence has been a godsend. It has simplified policy making and implementation by giving it focus. Quota setting and tax regulations are adjusted to desired mixes with U.S. materials and to the reactions of the U.S. government and firms to Canadian actions. Enforcement of Canadian content quotas for French broadcasting is lax compared to enforcement for English broadcasting.36 Non-U.S. media imports are largely ignored. Given the historical legacy and the commitments to bilingualism and multiculturalism, Canadian nationbuilding would be an even more formidable task without the U.S. as a catalyst. Irritation with and difference from the U.S. fans the flames of Canadian loyalty.³⁷

Contextual Changes and Established Media Policy.

During the past twenty-five to thirty years, several factors have changed the parameters within which the Canadian state (and every other Western state) has pursued its media policies. Briefly, they include:

- (1) The erosion of Western economies. Price increases since the oil embargo of the early 1970s, aging populations, growing inequalities in wealth and increased numbers of people in poverty, and unemployment and underemployment owing to a changing economic base have increased the costs of debt service and entrenched government programs. The capacity of states to spend on media and other programs has been drastically curtailed.
- (2) The fostering of international free trade and its requirement that governments neither subsidize nor protect domestic production. Consequently, countries must forego measures that once impeded foreign intrusion and protected domestic initiatives.
- (3) Innovations in telecommunications technology. The capacity to transmit anything that can be rendered in electronic form has increased exponentially. Because the ability to monitor and control the flow of materials has not kept pace, it is increasingly difficult for countries to regulate the supply and consumption of imported media materials.
- (4) High immigration and/or international labor mobility. Rising cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity, sustained by multiculturalism, has made it more difficult to create and promote Canadian culture and identity.

Most Canadian media policies and the programs to implement them are rooted in studies and decisions that antedate these developments. The CBC's mission was set earlier, the Canadian content quota strategy antedates cable and satellite transmission, and tactics for developing Canadian culture and identity were adopted prior to these changes. Consequently, a reassessment of media policy is both timely and desirable.

The Foundations of Canadian Media Policy

Canadians long have considered communication crucial for the country's future. Harold Innis identified it as critical in his lifetime effort to understand Canada (cf. *The Bias of Communication*). More recently, B. W. Powe (1993), in expressing his deep devotion to Canada, stressed the important role of communication. He wrote that, "I perceive communication to be the value of Canada (51)...I call it a communication state...The only way we can live in this country is through advanced technologies of communication (67)." At the governmental level the logic is captured succinctly in a statement by then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney quoted in the introduction to the Canadian Broadcasting Company's submission to the Federal Task Force on Broadcasting Policy to the effect that "...cultural sovereignty is as vital to our national life as political sovereignty" (1985:5). Mulroney's speech writer well may have seen the Royal Commission on Publications' earlier claim that "communications of a nation are as vital to its life as its defences, and should receive at least as great a measure of national protection" (quoted by Globerman, 1987:4). Five pages into the CBC submission (10), in metaphor-laden hyperbole that confuses style with logic, the link between cultural and political sovereignty is explained:

Culture is what the people of a country say about themselves. Culture is how a country's people play, rejoice and laugh. It is how we think, argue and evolve. It is how we

dream and hope; how we reminisce about our history and look to our future. How we tell our children about the past, the present and the future -- their future.

In short, our culture is the central nervous system of our nation. But our geography and our southern neighbor combine to present Canadians with the world's toughest challenge in cultural preservation. Because we are so spread out with 5,000 miles and six time zones from St. John's to Victoria and 4,000 miles from Inuvik to Windsor, communications have become the life-giving arteries of our nation of 25 million.

In fact, from "the last spike" to the satellite dish, our communication systems of rail, air, phone, radio and television have been an enormously significant factor in the existence of Canada.

Without those communicating links we would have no sharing of culture; we would have no nation.

"The communications industry, "Mr. Masse said in announcing the Task Force on Broadcasting, "is the country's lifeline."

The reference to "our southern neighbor" is, of course, no surprise. It expresses sentiments that have pervaded Canada for more than two hundred years. As noted, anticipated and actual U.S. activities are major factors in shaping Canadian policies and their subsequent success or failure. With respect to media, the United States has long been the major source of popular culture for Canadians -- material that many consider antithetical to Canada's needs. For most of this century American media have intruded on Canada and impeded efforts to develop and control a Canadian system. In the submission cited, the CBC's proposals for improving its performance are premised on the paramount need to compete effectively with American programming or suffer the loss of Canadian culture and, ultimately, independence. The importance that national leaders in Canada and other countries place on the media for creating and disseminating cultural material is longstanding.³⁸ Its most recent dramatic expression is the exclusion of cultural materials from the U.S.-Canadian free trade, NAFTA, and GATT negotiations.³⁹

Canada as a Developing Country

Canada can be characterized as the world's most modern developing country. From this perspective it is not surprising that its media policies are driven by concerns that parallel developing countries' concerns with cultural imperialism. Cultural imperialism is a term that describes the dominating intentions of core for peripheral countries (Joel Smith, 1995:274-290). However, the presence of foreign cultural elements is not sufficient evidence that cultural imperialism is at work. The situation needs to be evaluated from the perspective of the cross-cultural contact and diffusion of cultural materials, practices, and ideas that marks human history. Because conditions change and resources are limited, the capacity of cultures to meet needs changes constantly and is never perfect. Although all borrowing may not be for the better, people can recognize at least some of the inadequacies in their own lives and may believe that what they see elsewhere would be better. Consequently, diffusion may occur through the initiatives of receivers as well as of sources. Most societies would not survive or would have a much meaner existence if they did not borrow and appropriate. Diffusion is the main source of cultural innovation and accounts for most cultural similarity.

In the term's usual usage, "cultural imperialism" calls attention to the importance of source societies in diffusion and suggests that they encourage borrowing to promote their control of receiving societies. In the extreme, it implies that sources do more than encourage adoption of cultural material to further a project of gaining control over a target; they even shape the material to maximize its appeal. The goal always is commercial or economic domination; it also may be political. Cultural imperialism links seduction to manipulated monopolization of a market by applying tactics of propaganda to materials that differ from those

of classic propaganda. Rather than slanted news reports, philosophical arguments, and political exhortations, entertainment and seemingly essential goods are employed to create addictions to unnecessary foreign products. Essentially, cultural imperialism is charged when it is suspected that more is involved in diffusion than receiving groups intentionally appropriating and adapting cultural elements from naive foreign sources.

When cultural imperialism diminishes or destroys a target country's independence⁴¹ the dangers for ruling elites are clear. They lose control or may even lose their lives. The outcome for the population at large, however, may be unclear. Displacement of a dictatorial, exploitative ruling elite (e.g., Nazi Germany, Czarist Russia), for example, could improve the lot of the average person. Excluding foreign material can be particularly dangerous for a country if the resulting isolation deters the exposure and revision of abhorrent practices and policies (e.g., apartheid in South Africa accompanied by a prohibition of television, the thousand years of national socialist [Nazi] peace and German dominance implemented by war and genocide).

If exposure to foreign materials can enhance a society by promoting changes that improve the quality of life and/or by revealing its flaws, then measures to exclude or control exposure to these materials can be dysfunctional. On the one hand, they can impede needed change by restricting access to sources of new standards for evaluation and ideas for alternatives. On the other, they can cut off inputs that might catalyze the national support that can develop around negative reactions to foreign materials and ideas.⁴² Given the costs of cultural isolation, restrictions on foreign cultural material are damaging if they are applied regardless of (i) whether the materials are being provided for imperialistic purposes and (ii) whether the consequences of banning them are more deleterious than those of exposure. In a democratic society, such decisions would be made in terms of the consequences for everyone, not just for the elite.

The concern with cultural imperialism usually is not that a country seeks to rule another -- the usual goal of propaganda and military action -- but that its cultural exports implant frivolous habits that receiving countries cannot afford or that will be harmful in other ways. When the United States is accused, the usual charge is that American popular culture fosters undesirable consumerism and life styles that glamorize individual indulgence and accomplishment rather than collective welfare. Consumerism is harmful because it is addictive and leads people to waste resources on things they don't need and would not have wanted. It mortgages their labor to consumption and transfers its value to corporations that provide the unnecessary goods and services. It drains resources and is an economic waste. In the long run the receiving country loses its economic independence and capacity to respond to its unique needs. The issue with respect to cultural imperialism, however, is not whether this is what happens to the foreign consumers of exported American popular culture but whether that is the American intention in exporting.

Do intentions matter if the results are detrimental? First, it matters in terms of remedies. If cultural imperialism is not being practiced, one remedy to damaging imports is not to restrict them and control markets but to negotiate changes in the commodity. As I wrote this, for example, Canadian broadcasters and American producers of the children's program "Power Rangers" were trying to negotiate an agreement on changes in that program to make it acceptable for broadcasting in Canada. Many Canadian parents had complained that the program's reliance on force as the only means to solve problems was unacceptable. The negotiators sought mutually agreeable lines for adjusting the action and scripts. It is in the interests of non-imperialistic exporters to give importers what they want but difficult to accomplish without negotiation when production decisions are made primarily for a domestic rather than an export market. This does not deny that producers anticipate foreign income, only that it is not a priority in production decisions. It is largely because American programming is geared to the domestic market -- that is, that it is not imperialistic in conception -- but is popular outside the country that it is considered undesirable, draws restrictions, and spurs efforts to develop effective domestic competition. In this regard, Canadian scholars (Hoskins, Mirus, and Rozeboom, 1989) have reported finding no evidence of dumping or other unfair pricing tactics in the

exporting of American television programs. Indeed, the United States' share of the international market in television programs has been declining steadily (Cantor and Cantor, 1992:101).

Second, it matters in terms of alternatives. If American popular culture is having deleterious consequences for Canada and there is no cultural imperialism, then, short of changing the United States, all contact would need to be prohibited, for, over the course of human history most cultural diffusion has occurred through direct and indirect contacts among people rather than through the mass media. The media have only increased the rate and range of diffusion. In addition to excluding American popular culture from Canada, then, draconian measures like prohibition of cross-border contacts would have to be imposed. Given the economic importance to Canada of American tourism (Wall, 1993), cross-border family relationships, the complex commercial and military relationships between the two, and the demand of Canadians for southern winter holidays, this scenario is unfeasible. Even if a Canadian government were to mount a radical quarantine, Americans and Canadians could still be exposed to each other in third countries.

The lack of intention to foster consumerism and American life styles, however, does not invalidate the charge that exported American popular culture does this. If so, it can hamper nation building by encouraging the pursuit of personal interest. Nation building, in contrast, requires people to sublimate personal interests, husband and pool resources, and organize to maximize the group's ability to survive and develop independently. Accordingly, one would expect that when conditions favor nation building, i.e., when group identity is strong and there is a strong, viable national culture, there would be little interest in foreign materials and strong support for excluding them. Commitment to the collectivity and identification with its values and norms would be so great that people would find foreign materials alien and distasteful. In contrast, when, as in Canada, imports have wide appeal and do attract large portions of the population, the implication is that they resonate with people's interests, goals, and practices either because there is no national culture and the conditions of life mesh with the imports or because there is a national culture that is very similar to that of the source. Similarities and differences between U.S. and Canadian cultures are particularly pertinent to the second issue -- what would Canada be like if U.S. popular culture faded from the Canadian market?⁴³

Canadian Media Policy

Every country has implicit or explicit policies that guide the regulation of their mass media systems. Their policies tend to reflect their views on two paradoxical aspects of the media -- what they can do to meet national needs and their role in generating problems. One extreme, exemplified by Nazi Germany, is total control -- all media being under strict state surveillance and active censorship and propagandizing being practiced. Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, was an early advocate of using the media to manipulate the public for a regime's purposes. Much earlier, both Marx and Lenin had emphasized the importance of information producing and disseminating institutions for social control.⁴⁴ The other extreme, exemplified by the United States, is market competition with minimum state participation. Most countries -- Canada among them -- fall between these extremes and practice a degree of active control and participation. They develop audiovisual media as partial or complete state monopolies, provide some support to private film producers, and monitor print media that are largely free to operate as they wish.

The extent and mode of state involvement varies among countries and in response to changing domestic and world conditions. However, policies rarely change as rapidly as conditions change, nor, given tradition, long time commitments, and political considerations, are changes necessarily appropriate to new conditions. The consequences for Canada can be seen by considering: (a) how Canadian state interests are expressed in media policy, (b) whether the roles assigned the media in these policies are incongruous, (c) how

such trends as internationalization and privatization may subvert state interests, and (d) whether current policies and programs serve those interests in the present environment.

National interests that underlie media policies. Most rationales for the media policies of advanced industrial democracies, Canada included, involve one or both of two themes. One addresses the polity. It attributes to the media a key role in providing the information people need if they are to be rational participants in the political process and is expressed in commitments to free speech and a free press. It is reflected in a variety of contemporary beliefs (e.g., the press is a watchdog on government; competition fosters honest, objective, and complete coverage of the events people need to be informed about in order to exercise their responsibilities as citizens; the media foster the development of responsible public opinion without which participatory democracy would not be possible) and rests upon a model of the media as information providers, citizens as dependent on the media for information they would not otherwise have, and the state as responsible for assuring that the media play this role and provide a proxy public space for discussion and debate. Elihu Katz, drawing upon Israeli experience, argues that, although this model may be achievable, exceptional monopolistic conditions of state control that do not exist in Canada and rarely have existed elsewhere may be required.

The second theme focuses on national integration and how, by sustaining a national culture, a shared identity that motivates people to respond willingly to their country's needs can be assured. It is expressed in various ways. In countries with strong cultural traditions it may be manifested in both protectionist and promotional media policies. Quasi-monopolistic state media disseminate favorable depictions of domestic cultural materials, ideas, and ways of life, and discourage or prohibit the dissemination of potentially attractive, competing foreign cultural materials. In multiethnic countries like Canada this theme may be expressed as an obligation to build or enhance a national culture. Where the existence or efficacy of a national culture has been in doubt, the mission is to give people a stronger sense of a common national identity that they may not have developed during early socialization. It credits the media with a capacity to influence audiences to imitate or to learn by supplying material that evokes a favorable response.

There is little hard evidence to guide the choice of cultural materials that can do this. Early in the development of broadcasting, many countries subsidized high culture and discouraged or even banned popular culture. These strategies would seem to imply that state functionaries believe that high culture could create a national culture and identity, but that popular culture either does create one that is undesirable or simply is a waste. The early BBC exemplified this approach; it continues to be identified with public broadcasting. CBC radio now identifies itself as Canada's national public broadcasting system.

Compatibility of the interests that underlie media policy. The goals of supporting rational citizen action and building or reenforcing a national culture may be incompatible for two reasons. (1) a commitment to provide information⁴⁵ for rational decision making tacitly acknowledges the legitimacy of diverse interests. The state implicitly accepts the possibility that members of the polity may not and need not be united by common interests, goals, and values. If those diverse interests correlate highly with ethnic background or other indicators of status, it may be acknowledged and employed in social organization as, for example, in corporatism or multiculturalism. Regardless of the systemic response, it also can generate social cleavages and stress if grievances and inequalities develop along those same lines (e.g., class, race, gender, ethnicity). For the provision of information to be rational policy when there is no unanimity of interests, individuals must be able to associate in relatively flexible, temporary coalitions. They cannot be members of deeply divided groups that prescribe and proscribe so thoroughly that people's choices only express group interests. Support for state actions in such divided polities requires such accommodations as consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1975) and elite accommodation (Presthus, 1973; Bodemann, 1984:217).

Promotion of a national culture, in contrast, is intended to establish and reenforce overarching common interests, understandings, values, and goals. Some developing countries have used the strategy to encourage people to submerge individual or subgroup tastes, defer personal goals, and work toward collective goals that require forbearance and self-sacrifice. They do not want to provide information as if people were free to make their own choices among unlimited alternatives; they want to eradicate, minimize, or ignore group differences (as the leaders of the U.S.S.R. did for almost seventy years) and monopolize the media with the regime's vision of what the country can become and what is required to reach that goal. They can not yet afford democracy. Developed countries, though they may not face the problems of new countries to the same degree, want to promote common goals and ideals so that people will accept the regime's perception of the country's problems and how to resolve them. In Canada political leaders have felt a need to generate a sense of common identity and commitment to a shared vision of an independent country and what it can become. This also may be a necessary precondition for preparing citizens to accept unavoidable cuts now being made in valued public services.

(2) The need to provide information in a democracy implies equality among freely acting, rational, decision-making citizens. If everyone could be counted on to draw the same conclusions from the same information, it would only be necessary for one person to have the information and come to a decision. Everyone else could follow that person's lead with confidence because they would know that they would have reached the same conclusion if they had been in that person's place. The concept of individual choice implies that reasonable people possessed of the same information can come to different decisions because the information does not resolve all uncertainty and/or its implications vary with individual circumstances. Realistically, of course, everyone does not possess the same information even if it is available. Moreover, information is relative to the situation of the individual (Joel Smith, 1995:42-46). Consequently, equally rational people provided with the same material will have different ideas about what information they have and what additional information they need. Putting aside these complexities, the commitment to provide information for individual decision making is at least tacit acceptance of individual diversity and disagreement, and the possibility of pluralism and even potential deep divisions. Strong states with dominating cultures, in contrast, emphasize universal norms and values and create pressures for conformity. In a sense, promoting common identities and a national culture, if it is viewed as a tactic to expedite elite control by establishing the preconditions for manipulation, would be at odds with providing information for political action by free individuals. The latter implies equal, self-directed actors, the former a homogeneous group of subordinates who can be manipulated by an elite.

The potential conflict between these two rationales for media policy applies to Canada. Canada is a parliamentary democracy. When elections and referenda occur, efforts are made to assure that each citizen has equal access to an adequate body of information, and each is expected to make a responsible choice. Shortly before I wrote these comments, for example, Paul Martin, the Finance Minister, appeared on national television instructing a parliamentary committee to solicit the advice of ordinary citizens across the country on how to cut six billion dollars from the budget then being prepared. Later, when pressed by reporters as to what might be cut or whether taxes would be raised, Martin refused to answer, saying that the people in their wisdom would provide answers in the hearings. For citizens to do this, they must have reliable, objective, and adequate information. Even if the most fair, well-intentioned media could provide it, the relativity of information is likely to lead people to differ in the advice they offer. By asking the question after he had delegated a committee to go to the public for answers, the journalists were implying that Martin already had a course of action. If so, the whole process is a risky charade unless the media -- or some other information source -- can be relied upon to lead people to the same conclusion. This is a dubious strategy when there is every reason to believe that it is much more likely that the public will not reach a consensus.

An even clearer case of the potential conflict in these media functions was provided by a sideshow to the 1980 Quebec referendum on sovereignty association. At the time, several observers suggested that the CBC should not report on the "Oui" campaign because, given the pronouncements of its spokespersons, to do so without comment would violate the Corporation's mandate to promote Canadian unity and to do so with commentary would violate norms of professional journalism. Objective reporting to inform -- if such a thing is possible -- when the story is disunity conflicts with the mission of promoting nationhood. Perhaps, when these purposes were enunciated, it was expected that the CBC would be so successful in promoting national unity that unity of purpose and integrated action would increase and the paradoxical need to report on disunity would not arise. In that case, the mission of informing the public would not be expected to be problematic.

The impact of privatization and internationalization on media policy goals. Technological and economic developments have changed the environment in which countries implement their domestic policies in at least three respects, each of which may undermine a state's capacity to manage its media to promote democracy or to develop or strengthen a national culture.

(1) In the past, broadcast regulation in Canada and other countries was legitimated by a claimed shortage of vehicles for delivery. The development of cable and satellites has made that claim passé (Lacey: July 15, 1995:C1), but economic constraints inhibit public funding for the production of additional material to meet demand and fill expanded media capacity. In Canada, CBC has had a fixed and now a declining budget for program development and production and new programming has required terminating or cutting funding for other programming. Entrepreneurs argue that these fiscal pressures would be alleviated by the investment of substantial private funds if state monopolies were curtailed and restrictions loosened. Privatizing, though, makes consumer demand the predominant factor shaping the supply of media material and weakens the ability of democratic states to influence what is available. Elsewhere I have summarized (1995: 268) Hoffman-Riem's (1986:126-134) discussion of the impact of privatization as "...captur[ing] a movement away from the primacy of public service as defined by the state's interest in promoting the national culture to the primacy of market demand in shaping broadcasting systems."

The loss of state control is exacerbated even more when domestic media enterprises are parts of TNCs that are not committed to the goals of the countries in which they operate. The growth of such conglomerates may be vitiating the importance of the United States for future Canadian media policies in two respects. (a) It is misleading to refer to the United States or any single country as the source of cultural imports. There is an ongoing debate as to whether the TNCs involved in trade and production are agents of particular countries or control such vast resources that they cooperate or compete with states as equals, or, in some cases, even dominate them. (b) Canada's concerns about cultural imperialism and loss of independence are but one instance of a worldwide trend. Most states have been losing autonomy and exclusive say over their internal affairs. Few (the United States included) can neglect TNCs or other countries when they act. Nor are their economies self-sufficient. The issues are not just Canadian and do not involve only the United States; they are worldwide. Furthermore, satellite transmission respects no national borders.

- (2) Free trade agreements intensify these trends by permitting cultural products to be consumed in any participating country that provides a market. As supplies of imports available to participants grow, media content becomes more culturally heterogeneous and may include more and more material that does not serve or conflicts with longstanding domestic policies. Despite Canada's efforts to increase the supply of domestic materials, as a free trade signatory, it will be increasingly difficult to limit consumption of foreign materials.
- (3) Telecommunications systems capable of providing teletext-like services -- popularly referred to as the "information superhighway" -- are heralded as expediting democracy. However, they raise at least two

concerns. First, the material they provide is determined by those who supply it. This enhances their manipulative potential. Second, digitized information can be sold by units of time or information used and receiving equipment is expensive. Although there always have been costs in securing information, charging for units accessed with expensive receiving equipment maximizes the role of economic status in access. This conflicts with a democracy's commitment to provide access to needed information for everyone. Thus, rather than serve democracy, Canada's forays into teletext-type developments ultimately may increase inequality.

Canadian media policy in the present environment. Canadian media policy is explicitly intended to promote national unity and integration by creating a national culture and by providing the information that citizens need in order to play their roles rationally. In addition to the potential inconsistencies between these goals in a multicultural society in which citizens start with markedly different interests and concerns, several other aspects of Canadian media policy need to be reassessed for a variety of reasons. They can be exemplified by four examples of how the international economic and communication environment is undermining policies to promote production of domestic informational and artistic materials and control imports, and why the former will have to compete with the latter at a mass cultural level. They imply that these policies will fail.

(1) Operating separate English and French broadcasting systems potentially conflicts with creating unity. Not only can the systems be captured by groups that disagree on what the situation is and what information they should provide, but each language also organizes conception and perception in fundamentally different ways. These differences can cause and reenforce disagreements and impede consensus. Moreover, Canadian language policy is bilingualism but cultural policy is multiculturalism. This adds to the problem by separating groups even more. Language is a focal point for cultural integration and a major marker of cultural difference. However, media policy reflects multiculturalism only to the extent that public access television channels may carry programs in the languages of non-charter ethnic groups. To my knowledge, Telefilm Canada only invests in French or English films. (Print media, of course, ostensibly are considered to be exclusively in the private domain and are produced and distributed in response to market forces. The role of the government in subsidizing Canadian publishers seems to be taken for granted.) This is a fundamental inequality in the way that Canada implements multiculturalism in the media system.

Even more fundamental are the inherent inconsistencies between the goals of multiculturalism and of building and strengthening a national culture. The mosaic metaphor by itself is a questionable rationale for their compatibility. Stable multiculturalism within a national culture would require constituent cultures to adhere to the same basic values, accept or at least be indifferent to the variety of modes of behavior and beliefs of other cultures, and be consistent with the overarching national culture. These stringent conditions are not likely to be met. Cultures tend to emphasize their distinctiveness and correctness, legitimize their beliefs and practices in sacred rather than secular terms, and encourage compliance, resist change, and dissuade adherents from straying. Canada's situation in this regard can be an object lesson for developing regional partnerships, for, taken as a whole, their memberships represent multiculturalism, but the record at the political level -- certainly in the case of the European Union and within each of the members -- is that of pluralism. Pluralism admits and negotiates varied economic interests, abilities, and interpretations of a shared culture but does not encourage cultural difference and autonomy. Bissoondath, the critic of multiculturalism, embraces pluralism and suggests that the two have been confused in Canada. Canada may have straddled the issue of assimilation and national identity only temporarily by promoting potentially incompatible ideals.

(2) In the long run, NAFTA and GATT may weaken Canada's efforts to protect and encourage further development of a national culture despite the exclusion of cultural materials from the agreements. One reason is the fact that most of the material imported for the media is intended to be disseminated as entertainment.

Entertainment is a process rather than a material thing. The implications are crucial for understanding the impact of foreign imports and may be clarified by considering entertainment in general. First, entertaining material employs familiar, established symbols in engaging ways. Second, the grounding of the symbols in shared experience means that they are value-laden. Third, the receiver deems the emotional impact of the material valuable. For these reasons, both the material and the experience are likely to be well-regarded by receivers. Entertainment value, then, is personal and, absent outside criticism or re-evaluation by the receiver, unrelated to its sociocultural consequences. In short, given their use of familiar symbols and the positive nature of the experience, entertaining materials are familiar, pleasant, good, and, therefore, likely to be considered personally and socially valuable unless reevaluated later. This, however, only applies when the primary purpose of the producer is to produce material that will make for a rewarding affective experience in the relatively short run and not for other possible ulterior reasons (e.g., profiting, subverting values).

Familiarity, meaningfulness, and acceptability are central to understanding why foreign entertainment fails or succeeds. Material meant to entertain must resonate with the receiver to succeed as entertainment; it must employ symbols likely to evoke an affective response regardless of who consumes it. In a domestic system, aside from technical notations, almost all symbols are value laden and, hence, stimulating receivers' emotional involvement is not a great problem. The same material, if exported, can run into major problems. Foreign receivers are likely to be unfamiliar with the symbols and experiences. The connection of symbol systems -- particularly languages -- to group biases, experiences, and interests (i.e., to culture) was recognized long ago. Elaborated symbols that are meaningful in the producing culture usually carry little meaning for outsiders, and, hence, are experienced very differently and are much less likely to be considered entertaining.

Because symbol systems are grounded in group experience, the greater the gap between an exporting and a receiving group, the less meaningful and, hence, less effective are imports from that source likely to be. Those who find imported material entertaining likely already share so much with the source that it doesn't seem strange or antithetical to their interests, standards, and norms. Because material is entertaining only when it is meaningful and symbols are so intimately tied to values, either the receiving and sending group cultures must have a great deal in common or the individual receiver must have had considerable positive experience with the producer's culture. The protective policies that exclude media imports tend to ignore the fact that cultures have similarities as well as differences and that the most popular imports are already consonant with receivers' understandings, tastes, and values. Concern that they somehow will undermine receivers' beliefs and values seems misplaced (cf. Seiler [1993:308-312] on US.-Canadian similarities; Lee, 1980). There is not much of a market for foreign media entertainment unless it is not very "foreign." ⁴⁷

A second reason that exclusionary policies generally fail is that, regardless of the specifics, cultural imports become available if people want them. Even authoritarian governments that try to curb exposure to foreign television (e.g., People's Republic of China, Iran) find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do so (Tyler, 1993; Anonymous, 1995). The evidence suggests that Canadians want U.S. media products. Thus, even success in protecting culture by excluding cultural products from trade agreements may prove illusory because the provision is likely to be ineffective if it is enforced without regard to context. An example of how neglect of context can erode a protective tactic is provided by a controversy that developed as I wrote this. Canada's Court of Appeals was hearing a case being brought by the U.S. Nashville-based Country Music Television (CMT) cable channel. CMT had been broadcasting in Canada for over ten years and was asking the court to overturn a CRTC decision to grant the request of the new Canadian-based Country Network to ban CMT after Country Network began broadcasting. CRTC claimed that it had no option because the Canadian Broadcasting Act requires it to protect domestic specialty services from foreign competition if a domestic provider requests it. It would be a delusion to expect a market mechanism intended to protect the profits of Canadian enterprises also to protect Canadian culture from American influence for several reasons:

- (a) The new Canadian channel will broadcast a preponderance of American country music. Although it promised to reach Canadian content levels of 30% in 1995 and 40% by 2001, even if the goal is reached, more than half of what is broadcast will be foreign, almost all of it American.
- (b) Most well known Canadian country music performers gained their reputations working in United States. Because they rely on American managers, producers, musicians, record companies, and venues for performing, the American influence on their styles and repertoires is considerable.
- (c) Other sectors of the Canadian economy are not excluded from the free trade agreements. Therefore, most workers reasonably may question why those in one sector are able to require all other workers to relinquish an option they have had for several years. Even more important are the political implications when the state enforces the protected status of cultural products. With unemployment levels above 10% for several years and reduction of the welfare net in process -- including restrictions on unemployment insurance -- workers may withdraw support from a government that allows their sector of the economy to be vulnerable to imports but protects others.
- (d) Canadian firms in the cultural sector operate profitably in the United States. 48 Maclean Hunter, one of the two partners in the Country Network, has large holdings in U.S. cable systems. So did Rogers Communications, the firm with which Maclean Hunter has merged. Such circumstances weakened resistance to strong American pressure to reverse the CRTC's action. In light of the fact that CBC had not asked to have its cable news service protected from CNN, the Country Network's request gave a strong impression that culture was excluded from free trade only to protect the profits of Canadian corporations and not to develop and protect a national culture.

These considerations are illustrative of how contextual factors undermine the protective value of excluding cultural products from free trade agreements. It is no surprise that it has been suggested that free trade essentially ends Canada's ability to implement its cultural policies. Pursuing the programs that those policies call for increasingly may be an empty gesture (cf. Mosco, 1993). Christopher Maule and Keith Atkinson discuss the weaknesses of protectionism and the implications of this case in more detail.

- (3) Canadian cultural policy rests on at least two major assumptions. One is that cultural imports (primarily those from the United States) undermine Canadian identity and, hence, national support. However, there is no strong evidence to support the implicit proposition that national support is based on culture. Certainly that has not been the case with Switzerland, where for five centuries the satisfaction of shared economic, political, and defense interests has sustained national unity in a multilingual country without a widely shared national culture. Culture may expedite national support, but that does not mean it is necessary. The other assumption is that the media are *the* critical source of destructive foreign materials. This neglects the important role of tourism, migration, education, and other forms of cross-cultural interpersonal contact.
- (4) Canadian governments always have considered national integration to be problematic and often have relied on technology to bind the country together (cf. Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, 1980). After Confederation Canada built railroads to link widely dispersed, thinly populated components that did not share common interests and concerns -- other than distrust and a desire to remain independent of the United States (cf. Cummings). Canada still invests more per capita on its communication infrastructure than most other developed countries. With a culturally diverse population of less than thirty million that is encouraged to maintain distinct cultures, Canada's capacity to consume media material is greater than either the private sector or the state can fill domestically. Consequently, technological integration not only requires large investments in developing and installing the latest communication technology (including fibre optic

cable and satellite systems), but, because the domestic material that can be provided to fill the expanded capacity is limited, also creates niches for and actually may encourage inexpensive foreign imports.

The Implicit Assumptions Underlying Canadian Media Policy and the Conference Papers

National support and the role of the media in building and undermining it have been chronic concerns for Canadian governments. Despite periodic commitments to rely on the market to assure that the media build rather than erode support -- manifested most recently in the present government's position on the 'global information superhighway' -- media policy primarily has emphasized protection by selectively excluding imports and subsidizing domestic productions. Regardless of how the details have varied over time and among the media, it is apparent that the policy rests upon several propositions about the relationships among the media, culture, identity, and Canada's situation with respect to them. Putting aside questions about the empirical reality of such concepts as national culture, they are empirical assertions that may lack consistent, sufficient, or any supporting evidence. They include, in no particular order, the following seven:

- 1. Media exposure affects self-identity and national identity. The proposition links identification with one's country with exposure to its media. The linking process is a "black box," but it would require people to know or assume the origins of the material they consume. They might even have to like and believe it. The obverse also is implied -exposure to material from other countries decreases identification with one's own country. Why that should be is even less clear, unless national identity is zero-sum and exposure to foreign material breeds identification with that source. Systematic evidence to support these arguments is weak (cf. Ferguson, 1993).
- 2. Programs to promote a national culture and to provide unbiased information are compatible. Canadian cultural policy is intended to corner the Canadian market by reclaiming and perhaps even monopolizing the media with domestically produced cultural and informational material. Foreign materials are to be minimized. Presumably, exposure to unbiased Canadian-produced information will lead citizens to consensus. The possibility that domestic information can lead reasonable people to disagree and polarize is ignored.
- 3. National cultures are necessary if people are to identify with and support their country. It is assumed that if there is a national culture, most people will identify with their country and feel that it is important to them. They also may support their government, though this does not necessarily follow. However, neither entails the reverse. Perhaps a national culture is not a *sine qua non* for national identity or support. The relationships are in serious question (Schlesinger, 1993; Handler, 1994); at best, they are unclear.
- 4. The concept of unity in difference (a mosaic) is a viable basis for a national culture. Even before the adoption of multiculturalism as policy, the Canadian government promoted a concept of the country as a mosaic. In a mosaic each component contributes equally to the overall image but does not -- indeed, cannot -- lose its separate identity. The mosaic metaphor may appeal to elites; its merits may be lost on ordinary Canadians. It does not identify the picture or pattern to which the pieces contribute; the contribution of any group to the whole is not identified. Nor does it offer a reason for a group to continue to be part of a whole. It certainly does not address any group's problems as part of the mosaic. In short, the fundamental matter of what the mosaic is as a basis for a national culture or identity is ignored. Finally, the ethnic mosaic is out of step with the new Charter's emphasis on groups organized on the basis of transient common interests (Atkinson, 1994:740-745; Pal, 1993:247) and, as policy, implies that assimilation is neither encouraged nor imminent.

- 5. Media addressed to different ethnic groups in their own languages can serve common goals. The CBC is Canada's major investment in the media as instruments to further national integration. It operates both English and French national networks and a Northern service. Each has its own programming, including news and public affairs, so if the professionals in each service disagree on goals, what interests their audiences, or what serves their mission, broadcasting can divide rather than integrate the population. Moreover, the use of divided media for the same purpose requires that the different cultures they serve have equivalent ideas, concepts, values, and goals. This is unlikely, (cf. Smith, 1994[1970]:127-128).
- 6. Popular culture affects self-concepts and national identity but high culture does not. Canadian content rules are applied primarily to American popular culture rather than French and British imports. This may reflect a mild, endemic Canadian anti-American bias. In addition, emphasizing popular culture (e.g., sitcoms, films, sports, music) without supporting data may discriminate by ignoring differences in class tastes. Is imported popular culture harmful and high culture not? If so, why? The money spent to encourage Canadian cultural production goes primarily to works of high and folk culture. But is that what urban lower middle and working class Canadians should or do seek for entertainment? Canadian cultural policy may be elitist in its implementation (cf. Litt, 1992; Rutherford, 1993: 279).
- 7. Canada lacks a(n adequate) national culture. The government's cultural policy sometimes implies that there is no national culture and other times that there is one that is weak and vulnerable. The difference matters; appropriate responses to the two situations are quite different. More important, the very idea of a national culture is questionable.

Obviously, the propositions appear questionable when put so starkly. If they primarily rest on self-evidence, apparent common sense, and anecdotes rather than systematic evidence, they are even more dubious. Because some or all of them underlie policy not only in Canada but also in many other countries, this increases the need to evaluate them. It will be obvious that the conferees have not felt constrained to agree either with my view that these are questionable assumptions rather than established empirical propositions or with one another. Their independence made for exciting sessions, the flavor of which may be glimpsed in the discussions of our two observers -- Richard Collins and Paul Rutherford. There are, however, several implications for policy on which most or all of the conferees would agree, and they are summarized in a brief concluding chapter.

All of the conferee's papers directly or indirectly span and go beyond at least two of these assumptions. Four, however, primarily address the broader parameters (i.e., the fundamental concepts and issues) of the propositions rather than more specific Canadian media policy issues. John Keane considers the concept of national identity. To distinguish it from nationalism, he examines its historical roots. That provides a springboard to address the difficulties in promoting an identity whose implications conflict with competing identities that already are very important to people. He also develops several points which, though not raised in the context of Canada, pertain to matters that are directly relevant to Canada. They include the important role of policy contradictions in the breakup of the U.S.S.R., the roots of national identity in nationalism and the consequent need to insulate it from the destructive aspects of nationalism, the related antidemocratic potential of national identity, and the difficulty in creating and preserving democracy and the importance of communication in this process. Perhaps most important are his observations on (a) the difficulty of generating a national identity in a multicultural situation and what it implies for the prospects of using the mosaic metaphor successfully, (b) the critical importance of identifying and resolving rather than papering over policy conflicts, and (c) the importance of having an 'other' to sustain nationalism. With respect to the importance of policy conflict, Marc Raboy makes the case that Canadian media policy is

marked by contradictions. Keane's comments on the 'other' hark back to Underwood's observation on the role of the United States as a lightning rod for Canadian frustrations. Both raise the implicit question of how to sustain a fruitful, competitive, non-conflictful relationship between the two countries. Keane makes it clear that promoting and sustaining national identity is a continuous struggle when there are ongoing multicultural tensions and domination by a neighbor. It is not a problem that can be resolved once and for all.

Elihu Katz addresses the contingencies between depending on the media to inform the citizenry and to promote identity. He recounts Israel's experience using public television to encourage national integration by exposing a very disparate population to issues of general concern. The project was successful in its early days when Israeli television offered only one channel, but it began to fail when a second channel was introduced. Canada, in contrast, established national broadcasting networks for the same purpose when well-established private Canadian and U.S. stations already were widely available. Katz makes it clear that expanding the vehicles for delivering information need not diversify the material that is available and may even shrink the size of the audience. He explains the seeming paradox by noting that to offer a choice among media automatically creates the alternative of none. By implication, television and similar media can only provide the public space that modern democracy requires if everyone consumes the same materials. Canadian leaders never could implement their effort to expedite democratic participation via public broadcasting because they never had the monopoly required for success. If Katz's analysis is correct, the CBC's failure to attract and hold the vast majority of Canadians as listeners and viewers is entirely predictable. It suggests the lengths to which media policies must be carried if the media are to promote an integrated democratic polity successfully.

Finally, Marjorie Ferguson assesses Canada's situation and its likely future from a broad perspective. She considers the impact of both external forces, as represented by American bilateral and transnational economic policies, and internal factors, in particular, current fiscally conservative economic policies and Quebec's actions in pursuit of its aspirations to achieve sovereignty. With respect to the United States, Ferguson notes that the American presence and its great economic influence are not new; they have always obstructed Canada's cultural project. Admittedly, the privatization and globalization that the United States now promotes may be intensifying the erosion of that project. However, she points out that both the United States and Canada are subject to destabilizing pressures that will affect the future of both countries and their relationship. Moreover, underlying cultural differences, reflected in the contrasting ideals of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness' and 'law and order' in the founding documents of the United States and Canada respectively, can not be underestimated. Nonetheless, Ferguson is concerned about the impact of these current trends on broadcasting and, eventually on the character of Canadian society. In this regard, John Meisel is even more apprehensive. He attributes the decline of CBC's audience share to privatization of the media and the increasing role of market considerations in the CRTC's decisions to the growing influence of private as compared to public broadcasters on the regulators.

With respect to the implications of the success or failure of current media-cultural policy, Ferguson agrees with Thelma McCormack, John Meisel, John Jackson, and other conferees that the federal government's recent spending policies will not provide the money needed to subsidize enough production to fill Canadian media with Canadian cultural material. However, Ferguson adds that even when spending was greater, it was not effective because Quebec separatist leaders were successful in diverting a disproportionate share of the funds to their own political project and using it effectively. Consequently, the rest of Canada has been distracted from pursuing its interests. In this regard, it is not just the amount of funding but how it is spent that is critical for achieving the goals of the cultural project. Perhaps even more important, though, she observes that both the United States and Canada have been too large for a version of the initial Israeli strategy discussed by Katz ever to have worked. However, because -- like Babe -- she takes a position opposite to that of the politicians and bureaucrats I have cited and argues that Canada survives despite and not because of

electronic communications, she concludes that, should current Canadian media-cultural policy fail, it need not, by itself, be catastrophic. For Canada, the United States, or any country, there is no guarantee of indefinite survival as an independent country in its present form as the world evolves.

Finally, Lee Becker, distancing himself from the politically charged rhetoric that accompanies policy issues, considers what media research tell us about the first two assumptions in particular. He suggests that studies of the effects of media treatment of such matters as gender and race indicate that they can help to build identity without violating democratic expectations for objectivity and fairness, and that other observations indicate that people know how to distinguish and handle the provision of information from obvious media efforts to influence audiences. Basically, he warns against underestimating the potential of the active audience. Becker disagrees with Elihu Katz by concluding that the evidence is that monopoly is not a necessary condition for the media to be effective in encouraging national integration (and, implicitly, identity).

The other papers are more pointedly relevant to one or more of the seven propositions. Marc Raboy and John Keane address the third proposition from somewhat different perspectives. Keane implies that the emergence of a national identity is facilitated by shared language, history, and some customs -- essentially at least a minimal national culture. However, by pursuing an analysis that suggests that a political unit comprised of several nations will fail when the dominant nation tries to impose its culture on others, he also may be implying that it can succeed so long as it does not impose a dominant national culture. This would suggest that in multicultural countries, there will be support for the state only if there is no national culture. Raboy, dealing specifically with Canada, posits that politics holds the country together and culture tends to split it apart. Raboy, a Quebec French-Canadian, is well aware of the erosive effects on Canadian unity of cultural politics nationally and as they apply to the media,. He, too, feels the evidence indicates that Canada's future as a single country would improve if there were less emphasis on promoting national culture and more on reaching satisfactory accommodations among cultural groups.

John Jackson addresses the utility of the notion of the Canadian government promoting the image of the Canadian mosaic as the core of a Canadian culture. His premise is that culture emerges from the actions of people, that it cannot be created or imposed by the formal actions of formal organizations. If so, it is meaningless for government negotiators to agree to remove culture from trade agreements; what will happen depends on what people do. By extension, it is equally ineffectual for a government to try to create a national culture around a symbol like a mosaic. The outcome of that project, too, depends on what people do. All that governments can do with regard to national culture, he argues, very much like Raboy, is to try to impose that of a dominant majority. In this regard, it is perhaps surprising, given their strong argument for allowing market forces to determine the content of the media, that Christopher Maule and Keith Atkinson believe that states can take actions that promote culture.

With respect to the fifth proposition that common goals can be served by separate media (i.e., broadcasting) systems addressed to Canada's two charter groups in their own languages, Raboy is particularly critical for several reasons. First, that project has a long history of English Canadian resistance to and denial of what French Canadians have considered a just claim. Second, as I also have noted, there are more than two large language groups in Canada, but only two (plus the First Nations) are being served with their own broadcasting services. In essence, the networks have been a pawn in cultural politics rather than a means of national integration. Third, since 1980 decisions and actions on broadcasting have been driven by market rather than cultural considerations. Consequently, fourth, and perhaps most important, leaders of each group have felt that their service has not been equitably, let alone adequately, funded and this has become a further source of irritation and contention. Ferguson and other conferees noted the use of Radio Canada for separatist

politics. In essence, Raboy questions whether the recommendations of the Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism have been met by the implementation of dual broadcasting.

Many of the conferees address the sixth proposition concerning the efficacy of high cultural materials for building a national culture in terms of the tension between 'the market' and cultural concerns as the driving force behind media policy. Several are deeply concerned with the growing preeminence of market considerations since the first Quebec referendum. Though Maule and Atkinson argue strongly that the preeminence of the market is correct, others (e.g., Jackson) feel that they cannot object to giving market factors a place in setting and implementing policy only because publicly supported media have tended to be elitist in what they fund and provide and have not responded to tastes for popular culture. Both Thelma McCormack and John Meisel, in contrast, are willing to take a position that its critics tend to consider unabashedly elitist. They argue that public funds should be spent to support projects that are unusual and that represent the best of what is uniquely Canadian. Implicitly, these are projects that the majority of members of the public would not support with their dollars in a totally market situation and that is why subsidies are needed. They note that these are projects about which Canadians are proud, even if they are not now interested in consuming them, and that eventually most Canadians will also come to prefer them because the ability of ordinary people to discern value is far greater than they are credited with by those who charge public media with being elitist. Clearly this is a matter that goes beyond immediate satisfactions to such issues as what is an adequate national culture, assuming that one is necessary for a satisfactory life, and what are people's tastes and capabilities and the factors that shape them.

In this regard, Robert Babe's discussion of the myth of technological determinism, alluded to be Marjorie Ferguson also is pertinent. Although it could be taken as an eighth proposition that might be added to my list, it also can be interpreted as an important variation on the issue addressed by the sixth proposition -that popular culture is a commodity and that consumption of commodities is a process that shapes people's definition of who they are. Thus, it can be argued that Canadians, addicted to and influenced by "lpw culture" imports, are coming to define themselves by their shared taste for these materials rather than by their shared experience of living in Canada and collectively building it as a nation. Babe proposes that Canadian and foreign capitalists have developed and promoted communication technology and enshrined it with the myth that technology can and will integrate and develop Canada and is the necessary instrument without which those goals cannot be achieved. This, he claims, is only a tactic to enhance their position in an exploitative market economy. They are able to do so because the technology has much greater capacity than is needed and, therefore, provides a means for distributing excessive quantities of imports. As a consequence, Canadians tend to depend upon and define themselves by what they consume from the media and are distracted from the real task of developing themselves as a nation. Thelma McCormack concurs with Babe's position on the importance of demythologizing technological determinacy. She suggests that the key to developing Canadian culture is to decouple cultural policy from broadcasting policy. If broadcasting is looked at from the perspective of political economy, she argues, it will be clear that what is being promoted as Canadian culture under broadcasting policy is really only a commercial commodity and that the way to promote culture is to support and protect Canadians engaged in distinctive creative activities. The issue of whether culture ever is more than a commodity generated wide disagreement in subsequent discussions.

Marc Raboy's paper is particularly relevant to the seventh proposition concerning the adequacy of Canadian national culture. He asserts that there is none -- only cultures -- and that this feeds cultural politics. John Meisel, in contrast, argues that there is a Canadian culture and that, given the threats to it, cultural policy generally and media policy specifically should be geared to protect it. Though many of the other conferees take positions on media policy with regard to its cultural role, they tend to be evasive, perhaps because national culture and Canadian culture are both so difficult to define.

Several other policy relevant themes and observations in the papers merit mention. I have hinted at but not systematically described the details of media policy and how it has evolved in this paper. They can be gleaned from the papers by Robert Babe, Marc Raboy, Thelma McCormack, John Meisel, and Christopher Maule and Keith Atkinson. There are, with respect to policy issues, strong arguments that cover the spectrum of alternatives on the need and merits of state management of the media for cultural purposes. Maule and Atkinson take a strong free market position, suggesting that problems that appear to be market failures really are the consequence of a lack of consonance between the domains of the policies and the markets to which they apply. In contrast, both McCormack and Meisel make strong pleas for more forceful government protection and support of Canadian material. Jackson argues for a middle ground that would reflect the unresolvable tensions between an understandable desire for cultural uniqueness and the inherent limitations on a government's ability to create culture. With respect to whether available systematic research on the media and their effects is adequate to direct policy, Becker is skeptical.

In conclusion, it would seem that the conferees almost uniformly see Canada as a country in which market and economic forces have been in conflict with cultural and national forces throughout its history. The issue of national culture is a major focal point of this conflict. Most of the conferees, regardless of whether they believe there is a national Canadian culture or that one is necessary or desirable, concede that it would be the culture of a dominant group rather than everyone's and that this is why it is such a problematic issue for national unity. The media have been a focal point for these concerns at least since Confederation. The state has been the instrument of conflicting forces that for a time wrest control from their opponents and use their control of office to enforce policies to expedite their more embracing project. Neither side, thus far, has been in control long enough to succeed with its project. The issue now is whether media policy can be removed from this conflict and shaped, instead, to serve the broader collective interest. Deciding the validity of the propositions that always seem to serve as the assumptions that justify these policy positions would be a major step toward that goal.

ENDNOTES

- 1. For example, John Meisel, former Chair of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, took precisely this position in response to William D. H. Johnson's (1986) comments on an earlier paper in which Meisel argued (1986:152-168) that Canada will become extinct if it does not protect and encourage its cultural institutions. Meisel responded (1986:178) that Johnson "...surmises that I do not mean that 'Canada as a state will cease to exist.' But that is precisely what I do mean."
- 2. Ted Madger (1993:225-228), citing others who agree with him, argues that the exclusion is more apparent than real in the case of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States.
- 3. Canada's pre-U.S.-Canada FTA experience may have been instructive for the European Community (EC) and the EC's adoption of a social charter may be instructive for Canada in NAFTA (Mosco, 1993).
- 4. Canadian social scientists are absorbed with the United States. They tend to focus on Canadian-U.S. social and cultural differences (cf. Reitz and Breton, 1994) and whether they are rooted in the 'melting pot-mosaic' (cf. Palmer, 1993) and 'revolution-counterrevolution' (cf. Lipset, 1991) contrasts. Canadian economists focus on the 'branch plant' economy and the replacement of Britain by the U.S. as 'head office' (cf. Levitt, 1970).
- 5. Bodemann (1984) identifies this as only one of many concerns and activities of an unusually engaged and dominating national elite.

- 6. As an example of the primacy of ethnicity, during a Croatia-Canada basketball game in Hamilton, at the exciting moments the crowd supported Croatia, not Canada (John Thompson, personal conversation).
- 7. Allan Smith (1994:3) introduces his life's work on Canadian identity by suggesting at least four coexisting and not necessarily compatible images that scholars have created -- a British community dedicated to the preservation of British political forms in North America, hardy beings struggling with the challenges and difficulties of the harsh northern environment, a just bilingual and bicultural society, and an equitable, model mosaic of culture, races, and ethnic groups -- to describe what they believe constitutes Canadian life.
- 8. Rutherford (1978:32), discussing the role of the press in Canadian confederation, suggests that newspapers in each province expected the new country to mirror its own version of communal identity.
- 9. Early in the 1980s, Bodemann, in an analysis of U.S.-Canadian differences, wrote (1984:224) that, "...Americans swear allegiance to their constitution, Canadians swear loyalty to a monarch."
- 10. Nevitte (1995) reports a recent increase in support for various types of closer ties with the U. S.
- 11. In making the same point, Servaes (1993:144-145) refers to the product as a cultural identity. Rex (1996:2.1-2.6) also explicitly links a country's culture and identity. He identifies its political culture with its "bureaucratically structured...economic and political institutions," and adds that "(c)ulture is an ambiguous term and often refers to ways of life...A national society has...its own state controlled religion and an official language...(I)t also has its own literary and artistic traditions, its own cuisine, its own sports and a whole variety of customs and family arrangements which distinguish it from other societies. The national culture in this sense...is likely to be...resistant to change...(A) modern nation's 'identity', therefore has at least a dual reference. On the one hand it refers to the major structuring institutions of the economy and polity; on the other it refers to the 'way of life' in a more domestic and communal sense practiced by dominant groups." Canada clearly has the former, though they have their weaknesses; the latter is problematic. Rex (1996) writes as though normally new countries eventually develop both. However, the cases he uses either began in isolation (the United States) or built upon a preexisting culture. Canada deviates from both scenarios.
- 12. Seiler (1993:303) emphasizes this theme, writing that "Most Canadians are proud (emphasis added) of not being Americans." Earlier, Malcolm (1986:69) had written, only half in jest, that "Canadians can agree on a very few things... Canadians, however, can always agree on who they are not -- namely Americans."
- 13. John Meisel (1986:156) claims that there is a Canadian culture, but describes it as high-brow and appealing only to a minority.
- 14. In view of the possibility that Quebec may separate, Charles Taylor (1991) urges Canadians outside Quebec (COQ) to consider why they would need a country if that were to happen, given that fragmentation or some form of joining the States are reasonable alternatives to maintaining a Canada without Quebec. As a trial exercise, he asks whether there is anything that COQ share that differentiates them from Americans and that would be lost if Canada disappeared. He concludes that there is -- that COQ share a much greater commitment than Americans to 'law and order' and to 'collective provision' in dealing with problems. Stuart Smith's comment (1986:128) that "...the most attractive feature of Canadian nationalism is its modesty..." fits well with Taylor's conclusion. These characteristics all reflect a rather mild, unaggressive, concerned approach to life that typifies Canada.
- 15. An apt contemporary illustration of the Canadian state's caution in relinquishing controls thought to be needed in the public's interest is provided by a recent study of telecommunications regulatory reform in the

United States and Canada (Crandall and Waverman, 1995).

- 16. The term "relative" is important. Provinces cannot come and go at whim and such actions are resisted. Federal officials, for example, claim that there can be no process by which Quebec may separate because the Constitution makes no provision for a province to leave Canada. Moreover, majorities in other provinces are opposed. However, should the process being instituted by the Quebec government lead to separation, the new arrangement probably will not be countermanded forcibly.
- 17. Bell (1992:66-72) describes Anglo Canadians as passive and acquiescent and attributes this to a tradition of submissiveness to Britain that American loyalists fleeing the Revolution brought to Canada. In a similar vein, Lipset (1990:67-68), drawing on his view of Canada as the country of counterrevolution, depicts Canadians as having a "loser's syndrome." These explanations are certainly questionable; these depictions of Anglo Canadians even more so, Their passionate involvement in the recent Quebec referendum and the response of Ontario citizens to the current process of budget cutting do not fit this picture. However, these observations and my statement are much more likely to apply to the government.
- 18. Smith (1993[1986]:78), in a similar but looser vein, emphasizes the coincidence of the ambiguity and importance of the phenomenon, writing that "No two nations exist as nations by reason of the same theory of nationhood, nor by the same criteria...A nation is a culture or society which has seized upon the discourse or discourses of nationalism as being structurally essential to it. Thus, there are no definitions of nations as the subjects of historical experience, only observations of the progress of...tensions that fuel discourses...There are no set ways of being a nation, only debates about the identity of national groups." The variety of ways in which the idea of nation has been used to create a focal point for the coherence of social polities has been captured succinctly by Anderson, who titled his study of the subject *Imagined Communities*. Cf. also Calhoun (1994).
- 19. Gagnon (1991) has explored the way in which Canadians may avail themselves of the lessons to be learned from the experiences of other federal countries that share many of Canada's problems.
- 20. In discussing the urgency of excluding cultural materials from the NAFTA agreement, Allan Smith (1994[1992];108) asserts that there is a "widespread conviction" in Canada that both high and low culture must be state-aided.
- 21. Scholars disagree on whether these developments portend the end of the nation-state, e.g., Pal (1991) believes that it will survive; MacMillan (1991) foresees the end of the nation-state as we know it.
- 22. In a sense, Charles Taylor's (1991) challenge to COQ is to decide if they share a "deep" culture.
- 23. Cf. Smith's (1981) excellent analysis of how multiculturalism has become a theme for nation-building and of the problems that arise in reconciling it with biculturalism and bilingualism.
- 24. Bissoondath is only the most recent widely publicized critic of multiculturalism. Bell (1992:74) refers to others who complain that it "...excuses the refusal to become Canadians." Still others, however, consider it desirable and necessary. William Johnson, the journalist, thinks that Bissoondath is completely wrong (Montreal *Gazette*, November 19, 1994:B5) and that the policy simply asserts that Canada has no official culture, just as it has no official religion, that it liberates members of ethnic groups from the straitjacket of traditional English Canadian culture, and that it does not perpetuate divisions and hostilities.

- 25. Reitz and Breton write (1994:5) that "(t)he maintenance of ethnic diversity would hardly be a valuable feature of a society if it occurred in the context of inequality, or if it resulted in inequalities." After analyzing extensive data that permit a contrast with the U.S. -- which they take as exemplifying more overt and invidious ethnic and racial group discrimination and inequality -- they conclude that despite the popular belief that "(t)he Canadian style is more low-key than the American...(and that)...Canadians have a conscious tradition of 'tolerance',...(I)n terms of their effects on the experience of minority groups...these differences are more apparent than real....(T)he cultural differences between the two countries have not produced less pressure toward conformity in Canada, or less propensity to discriminate in employment or housing." Also cf. Smith (1994[1970]:130). Clark and Morrison (1995), after studying the political consequences of ethnic residential segregation in the Los Angeles CSMA, claim that maintenance of a mosaic pattern can be communally divisive from the standpoint of the larger community.
- 26. If public acceptance is the criterion, thus far multiculturalism may not be successful. "(A) majority of Canadian and American respondents believe that newcomers should blend in with the larger society...Canadians are just as likely as Americans to believe in a melting pot in contrast to a mosaic (Schmid, 1994:38)."
- 27. Cf. Bell (1992:62-91) for a critical exposition of the mosaic metaphor. Bell (76) links the phrase to the publication in 1938 of John Murray Gibbon's *The Canadian Mosaic*.
- 28. Several years ago, Allan Smith wrote (1994[1970]:130) that "The mosaic concept is also an idealization of reality. A greater degree of behavioural assimilation has taken place in Canada than the concept would appear to allow for." Almost twenty-five years later, however, Reitz and Breton (1994:5) write that "(t)he cultural mosaic has become an important cultural and political symbol for Canadians. If the frequency with which Canadian politicians, intellectuals, journalists, and commentators invoke this symbol is any guide, it is deeply ingrained in the Canadian psyche." However, even if the claim is true, there is a logical flaw in using the attention given to the mosaic by this limited elite segment of the population as proof that it is incorporated into the culture as understood by everyone -- unless, of course, the version of Canadian culture represented by this advantaged group is being enforced as the Canadian culture. In all fairness, it also should be noted that the need to accommodate the ideas of a national culture and multiculturalism is recognized. Thus, in a submission to the Cultural Policy Review Committee, the CBC stated (1981:7) that "Cultural policy...must concern itself both with our ability to share and appreciate among ourselves our common heritage and our desire to 'achieve great things together,' and with the ways and means of articulating the uniqueness of our identities of Canada." Of course, placing the two goals in the same sentence and joining them with 'and' hardly resolves their potential incompatibility as stable, long term goals. Indeed, the text then identifies the 'uniqueness of our identities' as the Francophone heritage rather than those of first nations and all ethnic groups." With respect to the widely emphasized differences between ethnic policies in Canada and the United States, Schmid (1994:37) concludes that her "...analysis is in agreement with Reitz and Breton (1994) who conclude that the differences between the Canadian mosaic and the American melting pot are not significant enough to justify the distinction implied by the choice of metaphors." There also is evidence that neither Canadians (Smith, Nevitte, and Kornberg, 1990) nor Americans (Nincic and Russett, 1979) perceive substantial difference between the two.
- 29. According to Atkinson (1994), the situation is more complex because the new charter gives rights to individuals rather than to collectivities. This handicaps the leaders of traditional groups (e.g., political parties) in mobilizing their members to pursue collective interests. However, when the members of groups find the emphasis on personal diversity inadequate to express their identity, as in the case of Quebec, they will seek special status as a group. If Atkinson is correct, it would mean that ethnicity will remain relevant as an organizing principle or become a divisive focus of contention. In either case, multiculturalism, as it is being

implemented, is inconsistent with the sort of individualistic citizen activity envisioned in the charter.

- 30. Most discussion of regional cleavages concern relations among provinces or clusters of provinces (e.g., Atlantic, Prairies). However, there are other, non-politically based natural geographic regions. Neglect of the differences among them hides the fact that the continental terrain creates a set of natural North-South regions that cross the U.S.-Canadian border and do not share common interests (cf. Wonders, 1993).
- 31. Bodemann (1984) attributes the need for nation building to the absence of a national mission. This in turn, he considers an intentional product of national Anglo elites intent on preserving their dominance.
- 32. In Canada, equity and fairness are always at the forefront of attention if for no other reason than their presumed relevance to the continual debates on special status for Quebec. The difficulties they engender also bedevil efforts to resolve various other problems, e.g., the diverse considerations that the Secretary of State must consider in determining funding levels for each of the several special interest groups it supports (cf. Pal, 1993), the fact that constitutional revision to deal with issues of special status (cf. Atkinson, 1994) has been an unresolvable political preoccupation from the moment of patriation. David Milne (1991) has assembled long lists of inequalities in the treatment of various units and groups that have developed in the effort to maintain across-the-board support for the country. The unfairness, if any, seems to be accepted.
- 33. The latter may have received unwarranted emphasis in the view of some scholars (e.g., Babe).
- 34. Citing such conditions, Meisel asserted (1986:152) that "inside every Canadian, whether she or he knows it or not, there is, in fact, an American." He also could have cited a 1975 student awareness survey that disclosed that 63% did not know the names of three Prime Minsters since World War II, 70% did not know the proportion of the population that is French-Canadian, and 61% were unable to identify the BNA Act as Canada's constitution (Bell, 1992:5-6). Despite subsequent efforts to meet these deficiencies, a study of 70 Ontario grade 13 high school students ten years later showed that 40 believed Canada to be a republic, 30 thought that the Governor General and Senate are elected, and 39 did not know the name of the Premier of Ontario. Bell suggested (71) that it was "from watching too much American television (that) many Canadians came to imagine that the rights granted to Americans by the Bill of Rights and the Constitution applied to them." A 1988 study (cited by Taras, 1991:345) found that Ontario university students admired George Washington by more than a three-to-one margin over John A. Macdonald, that they preferred the U.S. to the Canadian political system, and that 74% expected Canada to join the U.S. during their lifetimes. However, recent studies of the information that American students have about the U.S. suggest that they probably would not do better. In my class of thirty-five at an elite U.S. institution, the morning after Spiro Agnew's death I asked who referred to journalists as "nattering nabobs," whether they had heard of Agnew's death, and who he was. Only one student, an NPR morning news "junkie," could answer the questions.
- 35. Despite such efforts, Taras (1991:345-346) feels that "(t)he inability of Canadian television to reflect English and French-speaking Canadians to each other or to cultivate the 'vegetable gardens' of local and regional cultures may have damaged Canada's prospects for survival. To create a television system that could accomplish these tasks would have taken extraordinary acts of will and imagination and a sizable commitment of resources. Instead recent Canadian governments have chosen to see broadcasting as an economic tool rather than an instrument for nation-building." Mark Raboy (cf. Missed Opportunities: The Story of Canada's Broadcasting Policy) has similar views about media policy implementation.
- 36. In contrast to the emphasis on Canadian-produced material for prime time English broadcasting, Radio-Canada, CBC's French language system, participates with Radio-Quebec, TVOntario, and the National Film Board in bringing European French language broadcasts to Canada for prime time broadcasting on TV 5, a

channel devoted to this material (Communications Canada, 1988:21). Also see *The Future of French-Language Television* (1985) for more information on French language broadcasting in Canada.

- 37. Frank H. Underhill, the historian, has said (1964:4) that "there should be a monument to this American ogre who has so often performed the function of saving us from drift and indecision." Because there is little evidence of a desire on the part of the U.S. to absorb Canada, the concern is usually expressed in terms of Canada drifting into a situation in which it would actively pursue that option (cf. Smith, 1986).
- 38. In a 1980 Department of Communications report on the implications of the information revolution for Canada (Serafini and Andrieu), two sections of the chapter on issues raised by these trends are devoted to "the erosion of national sovereignty" (27) and "the decline of national culture" (38).
- 39. Patrick (1989:103) claims that the exclusion is purely cosmetic. "(C)ontrary to popular mythology, the terms established for culture in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement do not exempt the sector from the objectives of the agreement, only from the protections offered by the agreement. In this way, culture is isolated and abandoned in the free market whether it uses old technology or new."
- 40. John Tomlinson's (1991) analysis of the complexities of cultural imperialism and its relationship to media imperialism suggests that this may be an oversimplification -- but adequate for these purposes. Buell (1994) applies Tomlinson's critique to the older literature on cultural imperialism.
- 41. The theme of Canadian dependency is quite common in Canadian scholarship (cf. Smith, 1986). Carroll (1986) takes a skeptical position on this. He suggests that the dependency theme is promoted by Canadian capitalists as a tactic that can be employed to protect their domestic control by rallying the population to protect the *status quo* with claims of invasion by international capitalism.
- 42. One major problem the United States faced in its international programs during the 1950s was animosity bred by the image of the ugly American conveyed by unflattering portrayals of Americans in American television, film, and literature exports. Even earlier, Angus (1938:225-248) reports finding that going to movies and listening to radio programs from the U.S. made Canadian children more critical of the U.S. as violent, immoral, and materialistic.
- 43. Shortly after this was written, Alex Cockburn, an Irish-born American syndicated columnist addressed this issue in a column on why he rejected an invitation to prepare a piece on "50 years of U.S. cultural imperialism" in Great Britain. He explains that he did so because he was aware that cultural importation was a two-way matter and because he did not think it detrimental. In this regard, he wrote (1995:A5) that "...if...the mid-'50s was anything to go by, U.S. cultural imperialism was not meeting with much in the way of stiff resistance," and concluded with the thought that "...the big cultural entrepreneurs experience little hindrance in their zeal for the vulgarization of more or less everything, but there's always still that space, at the margins, for originality whose integrity may only survive for the briefest of moments. These are the moments, nonetheless, that prevent the cultures on both sides of the Atlantic from becoming irrecoverably sterile."
- 44. They, of course, referred to control of the media and educational institutions by capital and the state. Yerxa and Moll, analyzing Canadian information highway policy, recently stated (1995, ¶4), an implication of this proposition... "one of the cornerstones of modern democracy has been popular control of communication media."

- 45. Despite the emphasis on the cultural role of the media, even in its submission to the Cultural Policy Review Committee, the CBC stated (1981:13) that "(a)s the CBC developed there was increasing recognition that broadcast journalism had by far the greatest impact on the public at large of any informational medium. The CBC today is the major provider of information and discussion about Canadian life and issues." In view of the preeminence of the broadcast media, this is a clear claim to a major role in providing information.
- 46. That does not mean that there are no social consequences, only that the producer and consumer may have been unaware of them during production or consumption.
- 47. Taras (1991:345) concedes the absence of difference, quoting Meisel's 1986 remark that "the more lowbrow an American cultural activity, the wider its appeal to Canada,." and says that "...American music and sports, fashions and lifestyles, celebrities and slang have been woven into the Canadian cultural fabric..." Their views reflect John Gray's earlier (1985) comment (quoted by Portman [1993:343]) that "Increasingly, American mass culture is being seen by Canadians as 'normal' culture, and Canadian mass culture as 'abnormal' culture. Canadian artists have moved to the fringe of their own country." Taras attributes this to the dominance of American media in Canada rather than to any prior similarity. However, none of them offer evidence of an earlier very different Canadian popular culture that evoked wide interest and support. In a comparative study of Canadian and U.S. novels Corse notes the importance of distinguishing types of cultural material, writing (1995:1279) that "popular-culture novels differ little between Canada and the U.S. precisely because they are shaped by similar mass-market strategies and read by similar audiences (emphasis added)...(D)ata on the...differences in the timing and the content of canonical literatures, on the other hand, suggests (sic) that such novels have a highly symbolic value tied to the development of the nation-state and are shaped by elite interests in national identity construction (emphasis added).
- 48. Ironically, Vincent Massey, chair of one of the more important Commissions that recommended state support and protection for Canadian media, whose name is used as a shorthand reference to the Commission, was a scion of a family that operated a very successful Canadian multinational -- best known as the Massey-Ferguson Corporation and now part of the Varity Corporation, a transnational conglomerate.
- 49. Hiller (1986:213) is among the few Canadian scholars of a somewhat similar mind. In contrasting the United States and Canada, he writes that "...it usually has been argued that...the Canadian identity has been diffuse because Canadian society has lacked this kind of revolutionary origin (Note omitted). While a national mythology may help differentiate a society and contribute to the arousal of patriotic feelings, it may be wrong to assume that societies are impoverished if they lack this kind of origin, or the heightened collective feelings about the society which result..." Powe (1993:70-71) echoes his thought, writing that "I'll ...call...anonymity part of our invisibility...Our identities are kept hidden...It may be that...the anonymous Canadian, who lives in a place where communication links are a matter of air and vibrations and crossed wires, has no need for a static identity." Webber (1994:184-187) suggests why a few shared core values may be all that is desirable in a diverse modern country.

There is another way of looking at questions of identity and citizenship, one that rethinks what a country is all about. It rejects the notion that countries are typified by long lists of agreed principles, and suggests that a strong focus on shared values or a canonical set of national beliefs betrays a misunderstanding of the substance of political community. Allegiance...does not require a wide measure of agreement on substantive ends. Belonging...does not require that one's values be shared by others. a small core of shared values is vital to the health of a democratic order, but the list...will be relatively short, including basic respect for democratic procedures and political accountability, but not (emphasis added) everything that makes a country what it is...The essential problem with the language of shared values is that it is forced to carry too much weight. It leads one to over-

determine what is important to a country and to citizenship, to constitutionalize visions of a country that do violence to its richness and diversity, impliedly excluding those who do not share those visions...(185) The national character...of all...societies is characterized by a debate through time...(187)

The existence next door of just such an effective and stirring document may be still another unintentional

disservice that the United States has done for Canada.

50. Cf. Anthony Smith's (1993[1989]) homage to Lord Reith, and his success in creating a public service broadcasting system that could pursue its mission and protect itself against political and public pressure for more than sixty years. Those conditions did not exist for the creators of the CBC.

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National Identity, Citizenship And The Media: The European Case

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An old English Canadian joke runs: 'Did you know that if Canada had been lucky it could have had French culture, British law and order, and American technology?' The reply comes quickly. 'What happened instead is that the country ended up with American culture, French law and order, and British technology.' The ironic laughter normally elicited by the joke embodies something of the intellectual affection for nations and the spirit of repugnance at nationalist xenophobia displayed in my recent work on the rise and decline of the modern European doctrine of national self-determination (Keane 1994, 1995a).

This originally European, fundamentally modern doctrine arguably lies at the heart of our conference theme of media, citizenship and national identity and it is therefore important, at the outset, to reexamine the contours of its birth and growth to maturity -- and its more recent demise within the European region.

A child of the eighteenth century, the doctrine of national self-determination still makes its presence felt today. It continues to move the world, sometimes to tears and into battle, and its survival powerfully illustrates why the Enlightenment -- its imagination, its contradictions, its pitfalls, its unsurpassed strengths -- is a project that lives on, a project that we can applaud, complain about, extend or fight against, but a heritage nonetheless that we have not yet shaken off -- as if our world were already beyond the Enlightenment or somehow 'post-modern'. It is true that the doctrine of national self-determination had pre-Enlightenment roots. With the decline of the Carolingian Empire, a new sense of collective identity, national awareness, began slowly to emerge as a powerful social force. It was first championed by sections of the nobility and the clergy, who used derivatives of the old Latin term *natio* to highlight their sharing of a common language and common historical experiences (Beumann and Schroeder, 1978; Guenée, 1981, ch. 3; Beuman, 1986). The 'nation' did not refer to the whole population of a region, but only to those classes which had developed a sense of identity based upon language and history and had begun to act upon it. Nations in this sense were seen as distinctive products of their own peculiar histories.

From the fifteenth century onwards, the term 'nation' was employed increasingly for political purposes. According to the classic definition of Diderot (1751-1765, vol. 11, 36), a nation is 'une quantité considérable de peuple qui habite une certaine étendue de pays, renfermée dans de certaines limites, et qui obéit au même gouvernement'. Here 'nation' described a people who shared certain common laws and political institutions of a given territory. This political conception of 'the nation' defined and included the societas civilis -- those citizens who were entitled to participate in politics and to share in the exercise of sovereignty - and it had fundamental implications for the process of state-building. Struggles for participation in the state assumed the form of confrontations between the monarch and the privileged classes, which were often organized in a parliament. These classes frequently designated themselves as advocates of 'the nation' in the political sense of the term. They insisted, in opposition to their monarch, that they were the representatives and defenders of 'national liberties' and 'national rights'. If the sovereign monarch came from a different nation -- as in the Netherlands during the war against Habsburg Spain -- then such claims were sharpened by another dimension: the struggle for privileged liberties was transformed into a movement for national emancipation from foreign tyranny.²

During the century of Enlightenment, something dramatic happened to the language of 'the nation' and nationhood. The struggle for national identity was broadened and deepened to include the non-privileged classes. Self-educated middle classes, artisans, rural and urban labourers, and other social groups demanded inclusion in 'the nation', and this necessarily had anti-aristocratic and anti-monarchic implications. From hereon, in principle, the nation included everybody, not just the privileged classes; 'the people' and 'the nation' were supposed to be identical. The rumpus sparked by Thomas Paine's Rights of Man (1791-2), the most influential European attempt to 'democratize' the theory of national identity, well illustrates this trend (Keane, 1995b, esp 267-344). Rights of Man sparked bitter public arguments about the merits of monarchies and republics and its insistence that each nation is entitled to its own system of representative government drew attention to the conceptual and political links between citizenship, national identity and communication media.

Paine envisaged something like a holy global alliance of self-governing nations working in harmony for the common good of humanity. Paine was adamant that citizens of all nations, united in their love of republican democracy, had a duty to expose the taxing hypocrisy, fraud and gun-running of monarchic despotisms, understood as aggressive governments accountable only to themselves. And he concluded that the struggle for representative government -- for freedom of the press, periodic elections, fixed-term legislatures, a universal franchise, freedom of assembly, and other civil liberties -- required recognition of the right of each nation to determine its own destiny. 'What is government more than the management of the affairs of a nation?', he asked. 'It is not', he answered. 'Sovereignty as a matter of right, appertains to the nation only, and not to any individual; and a nation has at all times an inherent indefeasible right to abolish any form of government it finds inconvenient, and establish such as accords with its interest, disposition, and happiness' (Paine, 1945, 341).

The thesis that the right of national self-determination is a basic right has enjoyed a long and healthy life since the eighteenth century. Nineteenth-century Europe saw the emergence of two great powers (Germany and Italy) based on the principle of national self-determination, the effective partition of a third (Austria-Hungary after the Compromise of 1867) on identical grounds. The same principle was at work in the two revolts of the Poles in support of their reconstitution as a nation-state, and in the formal recognition of a chain of lesser independent states claiming to represent their sovereign nations, from Luxembourg and Belgium in the west to the Ottoman successor states in south-eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Romania). During our own century, especially after the First World War, the principle of 'the right to national self-determination' was popular among international lawyers, political philosophers, governments and their opponents, who supposed that if the individual members of a nation so will it, they are entitled to freedom from domination by other nations, and can therefore legitimately establish a sovereign state covering the territory in which they live, and where they constitute a majority of the population. From this perspective, the principle that citizens should govern themselves was identified with the principle that nations should determine their own destiny, and this in turn produced a convergence of meaning of the terms 'state' and 'nation'. 'State' and 'nation' came to be used interchangeably, as in such official expressions as 'League of Nations', the 'law of nations' or 'nation-state', and in the commonplace English language usage of the term 'national' to designate anything run or regulated by the state, such as national service, national health insurance or national debt. Such expressions reinforce the assumption, traceable to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, that there is no other way of defining the word nation than as a territorial aggregate whose various parts recognize the authority of the same state, an assumption captured in Karl Deutsch's famous definition of a nation as 'a people who have hold of a state' (Deutsch, 1969, 9).

The principle that nations should be represented within a territorially defined state echoes into our times. In the European region -- to mention several examples -- the birth of Solidarność and the defeat of

martial law in Poland, the dramatic velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia, the collapse of the Berlin Wall to the trumpet sounds of 'Wir sind ein Volk', and the successful struggle of the Demos government and its supporters to achieve Slovenian independence simply cannot be understood without reference to this equation. The same powerful dynamic worked to secure the collapse of the multi-national Soviet Empire. The Soviet Union was an empire comprising a diversity of nationalities all subject to the political dominance of a Russian-dominated Communist Party that ensured for seven decades that the federal units of the Union had no meaningful political autonomy and that demands for 'national communism' would trigger a political crackdown backed if necessary by military force.

This multi-national empire harboured a self-paralyzing contradiction. The Party insisted on subjects' conformity to its Russified definition of policies for securing 'socialism', all the while governing through national cadres, promoting national cultures, encouraging education in the local language and even talking of eventual rapprochement (sblizhenie) and assimilation of nations (slyanie). From the Kruschev period onwards, this contradiction fostered not only the growth of national nomenklatura who ran the republics, particularly in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, as fiefdoms controlled by Party 'mafias' rooted in circles of friends, kinship networks and local and regional systems of patronage. It also stimulated the growth of civil societies expressing themselves in a national idiom, protesting against Russification and ecology-damaging, enforced industrialization, and demanding 'democracy', 'media freedom' and 'independence', thereby lunging with a dagger at the heart of the imperial system structured by the leading role of the Russian-centred Party (von Beyme, 1991; Mitchnik, 1991).

National Identity and Citizenship

The collapse of the Soviet Empire under pressure from struggles for national self-determination adds weight to the thesis that a shared sense of national identity, in Hungary and Russia no less than in Scotland and Slovenia, is a basic precondition of the creation and strengthening of citizenship and democracy, including the freedom of communication so vital for the democratic articulation of agreements and disagreements among citizens. It is of course important to be clear about the concept of national identity. Understood in ideal-typical terms, national identity is a particular form of collective identity in which, despite their routine lack of physical contact, people consider themselves bound together because they speak a language or a dialect of a common language; inhabit or are closely familiar with a defined territory, and experience its ecosystem with some affection; and because they share a variety of customs, including a measure of memories of the historical past, which is consequently experienced in the present tense as pride in the nation's achievements and, where necessary, an obligation to feel ashamed of the nation's failing.³

National identity so defined is a specifically modern European invention and its political importance is that it infuses citizens with a sense of purposefulness, confidence and dignity by encouraging them to feel 'at home'. It enables them to decipher the signs of institutional and everyday life. The activity of others -- the food they prepare, the products they manufacture, the songs they sing, the jokes they tell, the clothes they wear, the looks on their faces, the words they speak -- can be recognized. That familiarity in turn endows each individual with a measure of confidence to speak and to act. Consequently, whatever is strange is not automatically feared; whatever diversity exists within the nation is more or less accepted as one of its constitutive features. The borders between a national identity and its 'neighbouring' identities (of class, gender, religion, race, for example) are vaguely defined and its security police and border guards are unreliable and tolerant.⁴ There is even some acceptance of the fact that members of the same nation can legitimately disagree about the meaning and extent of their nationhood. This tolerance of difference is possible precisely because nationhood equips members of a nation with a sense of belonging and a security

in themselves and in each other: they can say 'we' and 'you' without feeling that their 'I', their sense of self, is slipping from their possession.

Whenever citizens are denied access to a shared sense of nationhood they tend to experience the world as unfriendly and alien -- in the extreme case of enforced exile they experience the nasty, gnawing and self-pitying and self-destructive Hauptweh described by Thomas Mann and others -- and this renders them less capable of living democratically. After all, democratic regimes are the most demanding of political systems. In contrast to all forms of heteronomous government democracy comprises procedures for arriving at collective decisions through public controversies and compromises based on the fullest possible and qualitatively best participation of interested parties (Keane, 1988, 1991). At a minimum, democratic procedures include equal and universal adult suffrage within constituencies of various scope and size; majority rule and guarantees of minority rights, which ensure that collective decisions are approved by a substantial number of those expected to make them; freedom from arbitrary arrest and respect for the rule of law among citizens and their representatives; constitutional guarantees of freedom of communication and assembly and other civil and political liberties, which help ensure that those expected to decide or to elect those who decide can choose among real alternatives; and various social policies (in fields such as health, education, child care and basic income provision) which prevent market exchanges from becoming dominant and thereby ensure that citizens can live as free equals by enjoying their basic political and civil entitlements. Expressed differently, democracy requires the institutional division between a certain form of state and civil society. A democracy is an openly structured system of institutions which facilitate the flexible control of the exercise of power. It is a multilayered political and social mosaic in which political decision-makers at the local, regional, national and supranational levels are assigned the job of serving the res publica, while, for their part, citizens living within the nooks and crannies of civil society are obliged to exercise vigilance in preventing each other and their rulers from abusing their powers and violating the spirit of the commonwealth.

Although democracy in this sense does not require citizens to play the role of full-time political animals -- too much democracy can kill off democracy -- it is always difficult to generate or to sustain its momentum. That task is rendered even more arduous in contexts lacking traditions which are home to the virtues of democratic citizenship: prudence, common sense, self-reliance, courage, sensitivity to power, the knack of making and defending judgements in public, the ability to (self-) criticize and to accept criticism from others in turn, and the capacity to join with others in dignity and solidarity to resist the enervating miasma of fear. The last-mentioned quality is especially important in the democratic transformation of despotic regimes, when fear of power corrupts those who are subject to it and fear of losing power corrupts those who exercise it.

Shaking off fear is always a basic condition of democracy and it is normally assisted by citizens' shared sense of belonging to one or more ethical identities, national identity being among the most potent of these. Fearlessness is not a naturally occurring substance. It is a form of courage or 'grace under pressure' (Aung San Suu Kyi) developed wherever victims of political lies and bullying and violence make a personal effort to throw off personal corruption and to draw on their inner and outer resources to nurture the habit of refusing to let fear dictate their actions. Grace under pressure normally precedes and underpins attempts to institutionalize democracy. To be effective, it must be practised in small daily acts of resistance that in turn feed upon citizens' sense that they speak a common language and share a natural habitat and a variety of customs and historical experiences.

The Rise of Nationalism

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All that has been said so far may be interpreted to mean that the nexus between national identity, freedom of communication, and citizens' self-government within a territorially defined state is a normatively desirable, uncontradictory principle that continues to withstand the test of time; or, more poetically, that when the winds of national feeling blow, the people, like beautiful birds, grow wings and fly their way to a land of independence, speeded on their way by means of free communication. The experience of the French Revolution casts doubt upon any such conclusion. For a time, the rise of Louis Napoleon seemed to reveal a political weakness specific to the French events. Only in our time, after the logic of the French Revolution has been broadly repeated in so many countries, has it become possible to discern the operation of a new aspect of modernity, the unfolding of a process in which the French Revolution proved to be a fundamental watershed. The Revolution destroyed forever the faith in the divine and unchallengeable right of monarchs to govern and it sparked a struggle against the privileged classes in the name of a sovereign nation of free and equal individuals. However, those acting in the name of the sovereign nation were ever more tempted to emphasize faithfulness to la patrie, that is, citizens' obligations to their state, itself the guarantor of the nation, itself said to be 'one and indivisible'. The motto of the ancien régime, 'Un roi, une foi, une loi' ('One king, one faith, one law') was replaced by 'La Nation, la loi, le roi' ('The Nation, the law, the king'). Thenceforward the Nation made the law which the king was responsible for implementing. And when the monarchy was abolished in August 1792, the Nation became the titular source of sovereignty. 'Vive la Nation!' cried the French soldiers one month later at Valmy, as they flung themselves into battle against the Prussian army. Everything which had been royal had now become national. The nation even had its own emblem, the tricoloured national flag, which replaced the white flag of the house of Bourbon. The new spirit of nationalism had surfaced. The struggle for national identity had turned fundamentalist, bringing with it a lust for the power and glory of the nation-state which finally overwhelmed the democratic potential of the revolution. The first nationalist dictatorship of the modern world was born.

The formation of a despotic regime sustained by nationalist appeals to the nation was an utterly novel development -- Europe's Greek gift to itself and to the rest of the world (Godechot,1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Seton-Watson, 1977; Anderson, 1991). Since that time, and despite its extraordinary global impact, the eighteenth-century doctrine of national self-determination has been subject to a smouldering crisis whose contemporary resolution necessitates both a fundamental re-thinking of that doctrine, a more complex understanding of the relationship between national identity and nationalism, and greater clarity in turn about their relationship with the nature of citizenship and democratic procedures.

Max Weber once defined democracy for the benefit of General Ludendorff, and with his approval, as a political system in which the people choose a leader who then says, 'Now shut your mouths and obey me' (cited in Weber, 1975). The impatience with ongoing public clashes of opinion and disagreement implied in this definition of democracy misses one of its quintessential features. Democratic procedures tend to maximize the level of reversibility or 'biodegradability' of decision making. They invite dispute and encourage public dissatisfaction with currently existing conditions, even from time to time stirring up citizens to anger and direct action. Under enduring despotisms -- Salazar's Portugal or Brezhnev's Russia -- things are otherwise. Time appears to stand still. Individuals continue to be born, to mature, to work and to love, to play and to quarrel, to have children and to die, and yet everything around them becomes motionless, petrified and repetitious. Political life becomes utterly boring.

In fully democratic systems, by contrast, everything is in perpetual motion. Backed by a rich variety of means of communication and endowed with liberties to criticize and to transform the distribution of power within state and civil institutions, citizens are catapulted into a state of permanent unease which they can cope with, grumble about, turn their backs on, but never fully escape. The unity of purpose and sense of community of pre-democratic societies snaps. There is difference, openness and constant competition among

a plurality of power groups to produce and to control the definition of reality. Hence there are public scandals which unfold when publics learn about events which had been kept secret because if they had been made public ahead of time they could not have been carried out without public outcries. Under democratic conditions the world feels as if it is gripped by capaciousness and uncertainty about who does and should govern. Existing relations of power are treated (and understood) as contingent, as lacking transcendental guarantees of absolute certainty and hierarchical order, as a product of institutionally situated actors exercising power within and over their respective milieux.

It is this self-questioning, self-destabilizing quality of democratic regimes which not only provides opportunities for the advocates of national identity to take their case to a wider public. It also increases the magnetism of anti-democratic ideologies such as nationalism. Democratic conditions can severely test citizens' shared sense of the unreality of reality and chronic instability of their regimes, to the point where they may crave for the restoration of certainty about 'reality' by suppressing diversity, complexity and openness within and between the state and civil society. Democracies never reach a point of homeostatic equilibrium. They are dogged permanently by public disagreements about means and ends, by uncertainties, confusions and gaps within political programmes, and by hidden and open conflicts, and all this makes them prey to forms of post-prison psychosis (Vaclav Havel), morbid attempts to simplify matters, to put a stop to pluralism and to foist Unity and Order onto everybody and everything.

The events of the French Revolution revealed this dynamic for the first time, confirming the rule that whenever believers in a nation assemble they risk being seduced by the language and power fantasies of nationalism. The distinction between national identity and nationalism -- overlooked by many commentaries on the subject, including Eric Hobsbawm (1990) -- is fundamental in this context. Nationalism is the child of democratic pluralism -- both in the sense that the existence of open state institutions and a minimum of civil liberties, including freedom of communication, enables nationalists to organize and to propagate their nationalism, and also in the less obvious sense that democracy breeds insecurity about power and sometimes fear and panic and, hence, the yearning of some citizens to take refuge in sealed forms of life.

In the European region, nationalism is at present among the most virile and magnetic of these closed systems of life, or what I prefer to call ideologies (Keane, 1992). Like other ideologies, nationalism is an upwardly mobile, power-hungry and potentially dominating form of language game which makes falsely universal claims. It supposes that it is part of the natural order of things and that the Nation is a biological fact, all the while hiding its own particularity by masking its own conditions of production and by attempting to stifle the plurality of non-national and sub-national language games within the established civil society and state in which it thrives.

Nationalism is a scavenger. It feeds upon the pre-existing sense of nationhood within a given territory, transforming that shared national identity into a bizarre parody of its former self. Nationalism is a pathological form of national identity which tends (as Milorad Pavić points out in *Dictionary of the Khazars*) to destroy its heterogeneity by squeezing the nation into the Nation. Nationalism also takes advantage of any democratizing trends by roaming hungrily through civil society and the state, harassing other particular language games, viewing them as competitors and enemies to be banished or terrorized, injured or eaten alive, pretending all the while that it is a universal language game whose validity is publicly unquestionable, and which therefore views itself as freed from the contingencies of historical time and space.

Nationalism has a fanatical core. Its boundaries are dotted with border posts and border police charged with the task of monitoring the domestic and foreign enemies of the Nation. In contrast to national identity, whose boundaries are not fixed and whose tolerance of difference and openness to other forms of

life is qualitatively greater, nationalism requires its adherents to believe in themselves and to believe in the belief itself, to believe that they are not alone, that they are members of a community of believers known as the Nation, through which they can achieve immortality. Nationalism requires them and their leader-representatives (as Ernest Renan put it in *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?*) to participate in `un plebiscite de tous les jours'. This level of ideological commitment ensures that nationalism is driven by a bovine will to simplify things -- by the kind of instruction issued by Bismarck: `Germans! Think with your blood!'

If democracy is a continuous struggle against simplification of the world, then nationalism is a continuous struggle to undo complexity, a will not to know certain matters, a chosen ignorance, not the ignorance of innocence. It thereby has a tendency to crash into the world, crushing or throttling everything that crosses its path, to defend or to claim territory, and to think of land as power and its native inhabitants as a 'single fist' (Ayaz Mutalibov). Nationalism has nothing of the humility of national identity. It feels no shame about the past or the present, for it supposes that only foreigners and 'enemies of the nation' are guilty. It revels in macho glory and fills the national memory with stories of noble ancestors, heroism and bravery in defeat. It feels itself invincible, waves the flag and, if necessary, eagerly bloodies its hands on its enemies.

At the heart of nationalism --- and among the most peculiar features of its 'grammar' -- is its simultaneous treatment of the Other as everything and nothing. Nationalists warn of the menace to their own way of life by the growing presence of aliens. The Other is seen as the knife in the throat of the Nation. Nationalists are panicky and driven by friend-foe calculations, suffering from a judgement disorder that convinces them that the Other nation lives at its own expense. Nationalists are driven by the feeling that all nations are caught up in an animal struggle for survival, and that only the fittest survive. Every other speech of Jörg Haider of the FPÖ in Austria insinuates that 'East Europeans' are endangering the state, the constitution and democracy. Neo-Nazis in the new half of Germany shout 'Ausländer 'raus!', liken Poles to hungry pigs, attribute shortages of bicycles to the Vietnamese and the lack of food to the Jews, and accuse Turks of taking over German communities. French supporters of Jean-Marie Le Pen warn of the Arab 'invasion' of France. Croatian nationalists denounce Serbians as Četniks or as Bolshevik butchers who murder their victims and mutilate their bodies; Serbian nationalists reciprocate by denouncing Croats as Ustaše fascists who are hellbent on eliminating the Serbian nation. Both curse Muslims as Islamicized Serbs or Croats, or as foreign invaders of a land in which they have in fact lived as Europeans for five centuries.

Yet nationalism is not only fearful of the Other. It is also arrogant, confidently portraying the Other as inferior rubbish, as a worthless zero. The Other is seen as unworthy of respect or recognition because its smelly breath, strange food, unhygienic habits, loud and off-beat music, and incomprehensible babbling language places it outside and beneath Us. It follows that the Other has few if any entitlements, not even when it constitutes a majority or minority of the population resident in the vicinity of Our Nation. Wherever a member of the Nation is, there is the Nation. It is true (as Lenin emphasized) that the nationalism of a conquering nation should be distinguished from the nationalism of those whom they conquer, and that conquering nationalism always seems uglier and more culpable. It is also true that nationalism can be more or less militant, and that its substantive themes can be highly variable, ranging from attachment to consumption and a treasured form of currency to boundary-altering forms of political separatism. Yet despite such variations nationalists suffer from a single-minded arrogance. This leads them to taunt and spit at the Other, to label them as wogs, *Scheiss* and *tapis*, to discriminate against them in institutional settings, to prohibit the public use of minority languages ('linguicide'), or even, in the extreme case, to press for the expulsion of the Other for the purpose of creating a homogeneous territorial nation.

This murderous reductio ad absurdum of nationalism surfaced on the southern fringes of Europe during and after World War I, with the mass extirpation of Armenians from Turkey in 1915 and, after the

crushing defeat of the Greek army by the Turks in Anatolia in 1922, the expulsion by Greece of some 400,000 Turks and a reciprocal expulsion by the Turks of perhaps 1.5 million destitute and panic stricken Greeks from the lands of Asia Minor, where they had lived with others since the time of Homer (cf. Eddy, 1931; Macartney, 1931). The herding and murdering of nations was repeated by Stalin and by Hitler, who insisted on the elimination of the Jews and others and organized the transfer of South Tyrolians and other German-speaking peoples living outside the Vaterland to Germany itself. The same bizarre and bloody process has lately reappeared in the armed defense of 'Serbian autonomous republics' and the military occupation by Serbia of Kosovo in former Yugoslavia. The Kosovo region in fact proved to be the testing ground of Serbian expansionism. Its nationalist spokesmen, tossed between the horns of arrogance and fear common to all nationalists, attacked Albanian Kosovars as dirty, backward Muslims who are not a genuine Yugoslav nation (nacija) but a mere unimportant nationality (nacionalnost) of non-Slavs. At the same time, they viewed Kosovars as fanatical conquerors, calling for 'the severing of the right hand of all those who carry the green flag of Islam' (Vuk Draskovic) in the historic cradle of the Serbian Nation, where King Lazar and his army were slaughtered while defending Christendom and civilization against the crescent and scimitar of all-conquering Islam. This same view of Muslims as worthless invaders has torn Bosnia-Herzegovina to shreds. Bosnian Muslims -- the Jews of the late twentieth century -- have been shot at, herded at gunpoint from their burning homes, summarily executed in nearby houses or marched in columns to railway sidings past rotting corpses to concentration camps, where they are raped or castrated, and then made to wait, with bulging eyes and lanternous faces, for the arrival of their own death.

National Self-determination?

Nationalism is evidently a serious and dirty business, in this case resulting in the forcible tearing apart of Yugoslavia and the destabilization of the whole Balkan region, with more than two and a half million refugees and many more killed or wounded or psychologically damaged.

Among its other casualties is the originally eighteenth-century thesis that the defense of national identity is a basic condition of democratic government and the corresponding vision of a holy alliance of self-governing nations working in harmonious partnership for the common good of humanity. That vision is at the same time too simple and too dangerous. It is blind to the difference between national identity and nationalism, underestimates the anti-democratic potential of the struggle for national identity, fails to foresee the murderous reductio ad absurdum of nationalism, and for those three reasons alone it has today left behind a trail of confusion about the proper relationship between national identity, citizenship and democratic institutions.

This confusion cannot be undone by speculative arguments between those who conclude that 'nationalism is the ideology of the twenty-first century' (Conor Cruise O'Brien) and their opponents who rely on the equally broad brushed conclusion that 'the Owl of Minerva is now hovering over nations and nationalism' (Hobsbawm 1990). Such generalizations understate the uneven patterns of distribution of European nationalism, simplify its multiple causes, and short-circuit the normative and strategic problem of how to disarm nationalism. As I see it, there is an urgent need to stretch the limits of the contemporary democratic imagination, to think differently about the intertwined problems of nationalism, national identity, the media and democracy, and to consider how to invent new democratic methods of preventing the growth of democracy's own poisonous fruit.

Solving the problem of nationalism by democratic means is possible, but not easy. The thesis presented here is that since democratic mechanisms, including an open and pluralistic system of

communications media, facilitate the transformation of national identity into nationalism, democracy is best served by abandoning the doctrine of national self-determination and regarding a shared sense of national identity as a legitimate but *limited* form of life. This thesis contains a paradoxical corollary: national identity, an important support of democratic institutions, is best preserved by restricting its scope in favour of non-national identities that reduce the probability of its transformation into anti-democratic nationalism.

In the European context it is now possible to envisage -- by means of this thesis -- a cluster of five interdependent mechanisms which together can curb the force of nationalism and at the same time guarantee citizens' access to their respective national identities:

1. The first of these remedies is actively to decentre the institutions of the nation-state through the development of interlocking networks of democratically accountable sub-national and supra-national state institutions. Their combined effect, if rendered accountable to their citizens, would be to improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions and, more pertinently, to complicate the lines of political power, thereby reducing the room for manoeuvre of single nation-states and frustrating the nationalist fantasy of securing nations through strong, sovereign states that are prepared in principle to launch war on their neighbours or to crush their domestic opponents in the name of national preservation or salvation.

In effect, this remedy involves renewing -- but at the same time democratizing -- the more complex patterns of political power typical of the late medieval and early modern periods. The modern process of European state-building entailed the eclipse of numerous units of power - free cities, principalities, provinces, estates, manors, and deliberative assemblies -- such that the five hundred or so political units that dotted the region in 1500 were reduced to around 25 units in 1900. There are now signs of a reversal of this process of building centralized state institutions. One symptom of this 'scattering' of political power is the renewed interest in local government as a flexible forum for conducting local politics and competently administering local policies, partly in response to the declining effectiveness of macroeconomic management and the retreat of the national welfare state in western Europe (cf. Batley and Stoker, 1991).

The same decentreing of the nation state 'downwards and sideways' is evident in the vigorous development of regional ideas and regional power in areas such as Catalonia, Wallonia, Emilia-Romagna, Andalucia, Scotland and the Basque region. Especially striking is the rapid growth and competitive success of industrial regions comprising interdependent networks of firms caught up in a process of double convergence. Large firms increasingly attempt to decentralize into looser networks of operating units, subsidiaries and subcontractors producing more specialized products through more flexible production methods. Meanwhile, small firms attempt to build themselves into the wider forms of loan finance, marketing facilities, research and development and other common services for which large firms were once renowned, and which are now provided increasingly at the regional level (Sabel, 1989).

Finally, the trend towards a *Europe des regions* has been supplemented by the accelerating growth of supra-national political institutions such as the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, and the European Court of Justice. An earlier phase of experiments with inter-governmental negotiations and economic cooperation has been complemented by a process of treaty-making and a drive to political and legal union which, although still highly undemocratic and controversial, is likely to prove as consequential for the political shape of Europe as the Congress of Vienna in 1814, the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, or the Yalta Summit in 1945.

Member states of the European Community are required on many issues to accept the acquis communautaire, the body of treaties, laws and directives which have been agreed by its makers; there is a

relative shift away from policy making by consensus towards qualified majority voting; and a consequent quickening pace of Euro-legislation in all policy fields. In 1970, for example, the Council of Ministers, on which each member government has a representative, adopted 345 regulations, decisions and directives (the three types of Community law); by 1987 that total had reached 623, and it has risen further since that time, despite intense controversies (evident in the Maastricht Treaty and the 1996 IGC negotiations) about substantive and procedural matters. From standards of central heating and housing to the purity of beer and wine, the cleanliness of beaches and the conditions of women's employment, the populations of the EC are increasingly touched and shaped by European political integration. This process arguably hastens the decline of nation state sovereignty and facilitates the birth of a post-national Europe, in the sense that it adds to the pressure on nationalist movements, parties, governments and leaders to recognize the fact and legitimacy of countervailing political powers, even in such sensitive matters as 'national economic policy' and the resolution of so-called 'national conflicts' like that in Northern Ireland.

2. The formulation and application of internationally recognized legal guarantees of national identity is a vital adjunct of the breaking down of the sovereignty of the nation-state. Such formal guarantees were pioneered in the four Geneva Conventions commencing in 1929 and expressed forcefully in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man ratified by the United Nations in December, 1948: 'Everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions, *national* or social *origin*, property, birth, or other status (italics mine).'

The Badinter proposals for resolving the Yugoslav crisis extend and refine this principle of guaranteeing citizens' entitlement to national identity by means of international supervision, thereby departing from the old Enlightenment maxim that all sovereignty appertains to the territorially bounded nation. The EC report coordinated by the former French Justice Minister and President of France's Constitutional Court, Robert Badinter, called for applications for EC recognition of the statehood of the various Yugoslav republics and shortly thereafter recommended the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia, subject to their government's acceptance of formal guarantees of the civil and political freedoms of national minorities, the acceptance of international arms control agreements, and no forcible redrawing of existing nation-state boundaries.

The report, implemented only in part and wrecked ultimately by war, arguably had far-reaching implications for the subject of nationhood, nationalism and democracy. It supposed that governments have a primary obligation to respect the wishes of their populations, but it did not fall back on the old premise that each nation requires a sovereign state covering the territory in which it lives. 'Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force', wrote J. S. Mill, 'there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart.' The Badinter report spotted a murderous difficulty lurking in this early modern doctrine of national self-determination: If the political boundaries of the earth are to be fixed by the criterion of nationhood then, since nations do not see eye to eye (why otherwise have state borders?) and do not live in discrete geographic entities, then there will be no end to boundary disputes. Every border is seen as necessarily faulty and as capable of improvement through the annexation of some outlying territory in which one's own nation is living; and since this annexation must normally be imposed by the conqueror upon the conquered, the struggle for 'national autonomy' contains the seeds of 'territorial cleansing', pushing and shoving, refugees, statelessness, pogroms and war. The report correctly understood that in the European context civil wars sparked off by nationalist pressures, rather than war between homogeneous nation-states, have become the major threat to regional stability.

The Badinter report also reminded Europeans of the increasingly multi-national character of their states. Of course, most European states have always been multi-national, but recently that fact has been accentuated by large-scale migrations. The permanent entry into western Europe of more than 15 million non-EU people during the past half-century has ensured that mono-national states no longer exist, and that even the oldest and most culturally 'homogeneous' of civil societies in countries or regions such as Spain, England, Portugal, France and Germany are now vertical mosaics of nationalities which do not humbly accept their position as satellites of the currently dominant national identity. The report challenged the early modern assumption that national loyalties are exclusive, and that citizenship and democracy are therefore only possible in a nationally homogenous state.

The report called instead for a new compromise among nations within states. It saw that the peaceful and democratic functioning of European states and societies necessitates reliance upon supra-national monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and it urged recognition of the new principle that the various nations of any single state are entitled to their nationhood, and thus to live differently, as free equals. The Badinter report 'de-politicized' and 'de-territorialized' national identity. It recaptured something of the eighteenth-century view, championed by thinkers like Burke and Herder, that nationality is best understood as a cultural entity, that is, as an identity belonging to civil society, not the state. It saw national identity as a civil entitlement of citizens, the squeezing or attempted abolition of which, even when ostensibly pursued by states in the name either of higher forms of human solidarity or of protecting the 'core national identity' (Isaiah Berlin), serves only to trigger resentment, hatred and violence among national groupings.

3. Of equal importance as a guarantor of national identity and democracy against nationalism is a factor that has been barely discussed in the literature on the subject: the development of a pluralist mosaic of identities within civil society. This third antidote to nationalism is as effective as it is paradoxical. It presumes that the survival and flourishing of national identity is only possible within a self-organizing civil society, which, however, provides spaces for citizens to act upon *other* chosen or inherited identities, thus *limiting* the probable role of national identity in the overall operation of state and civil institutions and political parties, communications media and other intermediary bodies. The paradox bears a striking parallel to the question of religious tolerance: the practice of a particular religion in a multi-religious society requires -- if bigotry and bloodshed are to be avoided -- the principle of freedom of religious worship, which in practice entails recognition of the legitimacy of *other* religions and, hence, the need for secularism which simultaneously guarantees the freedom *not* to be religious. The same maxim ought to be carried over into matters of national identity, for it is clear that to model either state institutions or civil society solely on the principle of national identity means privileging one aspect of citizens' lives, devaluing others, and contradicting the pluralism so vital for a democratic civil society, thus rendering those citizens' lives nation-centred and one-dimensional and, thus, susceptible to the rise of nationalism.

The strait jacketing effect of nation-centred politics in Croatia has been well-described (Drakulić, 1991): 'Nationalism has been forced on people like an ill-fitting shirt. You may feel that the sleeves are too short and the collar too tight. You might not like the colour, and the cloth may itch. But you wear it because there is no other. No one is allowed *not* to be Croatian.' The converse of this point is that an open, self-governing civil society protected by various tiers of state institutions requires the cultivation of a complex habitat of nested spaces in which citizens can protect themselves against the dangers of 'uprootedness' in a democracy by learning how to belong to a variety of organizations which enable them to put down roots, thereby preserving particular memories of the past, a measure of stability in the present, and particular expectations for the future. These spaces can further counteract nationalist pressures by helping citizens to overcome their own parochialism. Through their participation in the relatively local organizations of civil society, citizens find the most effective cure of their localism by learning about the wider world, coming to

see that their sense of national identity -- thinking and feeling themselves to be German, Irish or Turkish -- is not essentially superior to that of other nations, and that nationality is only one possible identity among others.

4. Perhaps the most difficult to cultivate antidote to nationalism is the fostering of an *international* civil society in which citizens of various nationalities can intermingle, display at least a minimal sense of mutual understanding and respect, and generate a sense of solidarity, especially in times of crisis, for example during natural disasters, economic collapse or political upheaval.

During the second half of the eighteenth century, this friendship among citizens of various nations was called cosmopolitanism. Exposure to foreign contacts came in a variety of overlapping and sometimes contradictory ways: young men sent abroad to study; foreigners invited and welcomed as teachers; involvement in European wars which took 'nationals' elsewhere in Europe; increased travel among the 'respectable' classes and regular diplomatic relations with courts; expanding commerce; and the ever faster and wider circulation of foreign fashions in philosophy, letters, books and pamphlets, instruction, dress and social intercourse. A history of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism has yet to be written, but it is clear that in the writings of Pietro Verri, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Paine and others the 'true cosmopolite' and the 'loyal patriot' were one and the same figure (See Venturi, 1972; Schlereth, 1977; Lemberg, 1950; Texte, 1899). There was seen to be no contradiction between feeling oneself to be a citizen of the wider world [nb the Greek roots of kosmopolites from kosmos, world and polites, citizen] and wanting to enlighten and to transform that little corner of the European world where one had been born or had been brought by destiny to live, work, love and to die. The phase of early modern cosmopolitanism soon declined. Paine continued until his last breath to champion the cause of republican democracy around the world and Kant still looked at the history of the world in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, but these figures were among the last voices of a declining age. With the French Revolution the era of cosmopolitanism declined and into its place stepped nationalism, nation-state building and nation-state rivalry. Some continued to work for 'internationalism', guided by the principle that 'in proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end' (Marx and Engels). But slowly and surely the word patriot became charged with all the hatred and love of modern nationalism, while the word cosmopolite became the symbol of an ideal political unity that in practice could never be achieved.

A pressing theoretical and political question in today's Europe is whether a new form of the old cosmopolitanism is developing in tandem with the process of supranational political integration in the West and the attempted dismantling of totalitarian regimes in parts of central-eastern Europe. Is the growth of an international civil society in Europe possible or actual? Raymond Aron (1974, 652-653) is among those who have answered firmly in the negative: 'Rights and duties, which in Europe, as elsewhere, are interdependent, can hardly be called multinational. In fact, they are quintessentially national... Though the European Community tends to grant all the citizens of its member states the same economic and social rights, there are no such animals as "European citizens". There are only French, German, or Italian citizens.'

Aron's conclusion is based not only on the legal tautology that individuals can only become citizens because they belong to a sovereign state which is the sole guarantor of citizenship rights and duties. It also does not take account of the growth of multi-national states and societies and the trend towards the definition of the rights of *European* citizenship, available to all who live within the European Community region. If and when the ratified Maastricht Treaty of Union is finally implemented, this trend will be greatly strengthened. Citizens of any state resident in another member state will be entitled to vote and to stand for office at the levels of local government and the European parliament. Citizens will enjoy the rights to information across frontiers, to petition the European Parliament, and to make use of a Parliamentary

Ombudsman. And they will be entitled, when traveling abroad, to full diplomatic protection by any other member EU state.

These projected entitlements, which are to be examined by the 1996 IGC, provide further evidence that Europe -- at least the Europe of the European Union -- is witnessing the slow, unplanned, blind and painful birth of a new species of political animal, the European citizen. This trans-national citizenry is not vet constitutionally guaranteed. Its 'informal' or pre-legal status renders it less than fully visible, ensures its strength as a normative ideal, and makes it vulnerable to countervailing trends. The habitat of the new European citizen is an emerging international civil society of personal contacts, networks, conferences, political parties, social initiatives, trade unions, small businesses and large firms, friendships, local and regional forums. Within this non-governmental habitat, individuals and groups of various nations and persuasions take advantage of new communications technologies -- fax machines, answer phones, satellite broadcasting -- which break down the apparently 'natural' barriers of geographic distance and state borders, increase the physical and cultural mobility of people, and even simulate the possibility of being simultaneously in two or more places. The new European citizens intermingle across frontiers for various purposes without making a cult of national origins, national identity, and 'foreigners'. These citizens see and feel the importance of the metaxu (Simone Weil). They value nests, such as national identity, in which citizens are warmed and nourished and gain confidence in themselves. Yet they also recognize otherness as a right and a duty for everybody. These new citizens maintain that in the contemporary world identity is more a matter of politics and choice than fate. They have an allergic reaction to nationalism and deep empathy for people suffering discrimination or enforced exile from their cherished nations or territories. They are humble about their national identity, interested in others, concerned for their well-being, and consequently unwilling to indulge the feelings of revenge and narcissistic satisfaction characteristic of nationalists. European citizens are late modern cosmopolitans.

No doubt the internationalization of civil society is destroyed by nationalism and genocidal war, as in south-central Europe, where for many people daily life is now a non-citizens' hell of expulsion, terror, and bloodshed. These social exchanges among a plurality of citizens can also be squeezed or suffocated by the power of transnational corporations (such as Ford, Volkswagen and Sony) seeking to co-ordinate their national markets, to trim and discipline their workforces, and to dominate European social life through profit-driven matrix management and marketing. It is also true that xenophobes and other anti-democratic forces are taking advantage of the new European habitat. Nevertheless the long-term growth of European-wide exchanges among citizens whose social and political views are predominantly pluralist and republican is among the most remarkable features of contemporary Europe. Within these exchanges, there are few traces of Marxian class struggle politics and nineteenth-century dreams of abolishing state institutions, and nationalism is considered an anathema. Instead there is an underlying belief that not only Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, but indeed the world beyond, should be a coat of many colours, a region marked by a precarious, non-violent yet permanently contested balance between governors and citizens.

Sometimes this new democratic republicanism erupts dramatically, as in the velvet revolutions of 1989-1991. At other times, it is expressed through vague references to citizenship rights and duties across frontiers (as in the Maastricht Treaty of Union and the discussion framework of the 1996 IGC). But most often the formation of a European civil society is an undramatic, nearly invisible process that seems unworthy of the attention of journalists, intellectuals and policy makers. It clearly requires detailed sociological investigation. For could it be that this new European citizenry, providing that it is not stillborn and that it is nurtured with adequate funding and legal and political guarantees, will prove to be among the best antidotes yet invented to the perils of nationalism and the poisonous fruits of democracy?

5. The types of answer evoked by this question will be strongly conditioned by considerations of media trends within the region. I have argued elsewhere that we are living in times in which spatial frameworks of communication are in a state of upheaval and that the old hegemony of state-structured and territorially-bound public life mediated by radio, television, newspapers and books is rapidly being eroded (Keane, 1995c; Garnham, 1995; Keane, 1995d). In its place is developing a multiplicity of networked spaces of communication which are not tied immediately to territory, and which irreversibly fragment anything resembling a single, spatially-integrated public sphere within a nation-state framework. The conventional ideal of a unified public sphere and its corresponding vision of a republic of citizens striving to live up to some 'public good' are obsolete. Public life is today subject to 'medievalization', not as Habermas defined it in *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, but in the different sense of a developing and complex mosaic of differently sized, overlapping and interconnected public spheres. This restructuring of communicative space forces us to revise our understanding of public life and its 'partner' terms, such as public opinion, the public good, and the public/private distinction.

Although these public spheres emerge within different milieux in the nooks and crannies of civil societies and states, each is an interest-ridden stage of action that displays the essential characteristics of a public sphere. A public sphere is a particular type of spatial relationship between two or more people, usually connected by a certain means of communication (television, radio, satellite, fax, telephone, etc), in which non-violent controversies erupt, for a brief or more extended period of time, concerning the power relations operating within their given milieu of interaction and/or the wider milieu of social and political structures within which the disputants are situated. Public spheres in this sense never appear in pure form and rarely in isolation. Although they typically have a networked, interconnected character, contemporary public spheres within the European region have a fractured quality which is not being overcome by some broader trend towards an integrated public sphere. The example below illustrate their heterogeneity and variable size, and that is why I choose, at the risk of being misunderstood, to distinguish among three ideal-types of public sphere.

Micro-public spheres (evident within social movement networks and the advanced communications systems of local governments) are spaces in which there are dozens, hundreds or thousands of disputants interacting at the sub-nation-state level. Meso-public spheres, mediated by large-circulation newspapers such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Le Monde, and electronic media such as the BBC and RAI, normally comprise millions of people interacting at the level of the nation-state. Macro-public spheres crystallise around global media events (such as the Tiananmen crisis or the war in Bosnia) and Internet, and normally encompass hundreds of millions and even billions of people enmeshed in disputes at the supranational and global levels of power.

It might be objected that the attempt to categorise contemporary public life into spaces of varying scope or 'reach' is mistaken on both empirical and normative grounds. Empirically speaking, it could be said that contemporary publics are not discrete spaces, as the categories micro-, meso-, and macro-public sphere imply; that they rather resemble a modular system of overlapping networks characterised by the lack of differentiation among spheres. Certainly, the concept of modularisation is helpful in understanding the complexity of contemporary public life, but this does not mean that the boundaries among variously sized public spheres are obliterated completely. On the contrary, modular systems thrive on internal differentiation, whose workings can thus only be understood by means of ideal-typical categories that highlight those systems' inner boundaries.

The triadic distinction among differently sized public spheres can also be contested on normative grounds. During the early years of the twentieth century, at the beginning of the broadcasting era, John

Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems* famously expressed the complaint that modern societies are marked by the fragmentation of public life. 'There are too many publics and too much of public concern for our existing resources to cope with', wrote Dewey. 'The essential need', he added, 'is the improvement of a unified system of methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion, *that* is the problem of the public.'

This neo-republican appeal (repeated more recently by Robert Bellah and others) fails to see that the structural differentiation of public spheres is unlikely to be undone in the coming decades. The continued use of 'the' public sphere ideal is therefore bound to empty it of empirical content and to turn the ideal into a nostalgic, unrealisable utopia. It also ignores the *undemocratic* implications of its own hankering after a unified public sphere. The supposition that all power disputes can ultimately be sited at the level of the territorially-bound nation-state not only cavorts with the dogma of nationalism. It is also a remnant from the era of state-building and the corresponding struggles of its inhabitants to widen the franchise -- and, hence, to direct public controversies primarily at the operations of the sovereign state.

In the era of universal franchise, by contrast, it is not so much who votes but *where* people vote that is the central issue for democratic politics. From this perspective, one that is cosmopolitan, sensitive to the importance of national identity but opposed to nationalism, the proliferation of mosaics of differently sized public spheres ought to be welcomed and practically reinforced by means of political struggles, law, money, and improved communications. Exactly because of their capacity to monitor the anti-democratic exercise of power from a variety of sites within state *and* social institutions, public spheres potentially ensure that nobody 'owns' power and increase the likelihood that its exercise everywhere is rendered more accountable to those whom it directly or indirectly affects.

ENDNOTES

- 1. The example of the English Parliament during the Tudor period is analyzed by G. R. Elton (1986). The French case is considered in R. Bickart (1932).
- 2. The case of the Netherlands is examined in Johan Huizinga (1948-1953).
- 3. The contours of national identity are well examined in Schlesinger (1987), Gellner (1983); and Anderson (1991).
- 4. The spatial metaphor of boundaries is developed in Barth (1981).

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And Deliver Us from Segmentation*

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Preface

This paper addresses a central question raised by recent developments in the media industry -whether the proliferation of television options can segment a national audience and destroy the medium's
potential to function as a public space for a democratic polity. Several developments since World War II -growing alienation from democratic politics, increasing difficulty in generating consensus on public issues,
actual and threatened dissolution of several multicultural countries, disagreements over citizen rights and
eligibility associated with rising numbers of migrants and refugees, discord between proponents of
communitarianism and individualism, retrenchment of welfare state programs including broadcasting -- have
occasioned renewed interest in the requisites of participatory democracy. Among them, many scholars
consider a public space in which to conduct the activities required for civil society to be crucial.

The model for democratic polities is an 18th century legacy -- responsible, rational people gathered in public settings immune from state interference where they can debate, sift, and, perhaps, even acquire the information they need to make political choices. One prototype is the London coffee house of the period. Like all models, it distorts the reality. Most Englishmen could not and did not frequent coffee houses to keep up on the gossip and exchange ideas before making their views known to bureaucrats, elected officials, and royalty. The decline in absolutism during the heyday of the coffee house followed the introduction of printing and the consequent increased availability of informative material, spread of literacy, and appearance of a nascent media. These trends were probably as or more important for the development of participatory democracy, at least among the men who comprised the first limited publics because they had the time and means to acquire and discuss information and make their views known to those who mattered. This process, however inclusive or exclusive, requires places and means to exchange information and the views it fosters.

Populations, citizen eligibility and rights, national borders, and the state have expanded since that time. The members of vastly large, spatially dispersed polities are still potential publics, but they are no longer local, associating in the coffee house, the square, or the town hall. The range of information needed for decisions is much greater; events in every corner of the globe can be pertinent. The quantum change in the historical links among media, information, public opinion, and democratic polities has led to a widely held belief that the mass media -- television, in particular -- have a critical role in facilitating participatory democracy and, ultimately, in contributing to national integration. Increasingly, the media -- because they are reputed to inform, to be public, and to permit one to express one's self -- have been viewed as a surrogate for the bounded, limited public spaces of the past --- as a sine qua non for a new type of civil society.

This is a time of declining participation in and increasing alienation from the political process. The multiplication of over the air and cable television channels and of specialized publications is accelerating the fragmentation of audiences. These developments are accompanied by spreading addiction to the Internet and its chat rooms (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 1996; Yerxa and Moll, 1995). -- mistakenly touted as the new public space. Consequently, the need for a shared space appropriate to the requirements of modern democratic polities remains. The paper bears on whether and how this need can be met.

A review of Israel's experience with segmentation and its impact on the role of television as a public space serving civil society (and its implications for the United States) is an invaluable cautionary tale for Canada and its project of using broadcasting to promote democracy and nation building. Many of the parallels between Israel and Canada are uncanny. Jews defeated and then settled among the Arab residents of what was to become Israel; the English defeated and then settled among the French settlers of what was to become Canada. Both remain countries of immigrants. Israelis live in close proximity to neighboring Arab countries, relations with whom have been marked by conflict and stress; most Canadians live in close proximity to the United States, and, though citizens of the two countries do not experience this as a threat, relations between the two countries also are periodically marked by conflict and stress, though never with the same consistency or intensity as relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Israel's Palestinians want self-rule; Canada's Québécois want self-rule. Both countries are Western-style democracies. The flagship audience-drawing program for each country's public broadcasting system has been a daily prime time news hour. The relevance of Israel's experience for Canada's project is compelling.²

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If one were designing a participatory democracy, one would make provision for a central space in which all citizens could gather together and for dispersed spaces in which they could meet in smaller, more homogeneous groups. Ideally, the agenda would be agreed upon in the central space (forum, agora, town meeting), mulled over in the dispersed spaces (cafe, salon, club, trade union hall, party headquarters), and returned for debate and decision to the central space. In the era of mass society and mass communication, these spaces would be served, even cloned, by generalized media dedicated to the polity as a whole, and specialized media dedicated to the citizens' need to know what like- or right-minded others are thinking.

Making provision for a central space is not a totalitarian idea. All depends on who controls the space and who has access to it. If the space is publicly owned and independent of government, if it is free of commercial exploitation, if all have access and an equal chance, at least in principle, to hear and be heard, it provides an opportunity to set agendas, to map the distribution of opinion, to legitimate the decision-making process, and to sense one's membership in the polity. If these conditions are met, it is obvious that multiple and particularistic spaces cannot substitute for the central space. It is shocking but true by this logic that one can defend the idea of a polity with only one channel of public television commanding attention from all and offering the gamut of views.

It is even more shocking to suggest that multiple and dispersed spaces may keep people away from the central space, unless these function as a feeder system that keeps the priority of the center clearly in focus. Dispersed spaces that lose sight of the center -- or provide escapist alternatives -- may even lead to the center's collapse.

By now, we are well on the road to segmentation, and there is little hope for recovery of the center. We have all but lost television as the medium of national political integration. Not so long ago, most Western democracies had a very few national broadcasting channels that brought everybody together, and a large number of specialized and local newspapers. This ideal was more closely approximated in Europe, where public broadcasting systems -- officially independent of government and free of advertising -- offered a menu of news and public affairs in the very center of prime time, which were then chewed over by the flourishing party press and in the myriad places of political conversation. Comparing Italian and American television news -- some years ago, even before segmentation -- Hallin and Mancini (1984) portrayed the Italian viewer getting up from the national television news, putting on an overcoat, and rushing out to the piazza or union

hall to discuss it.⁴ Indeed, for the first decade of television in Britain, there was only one channel, public service in orientation and financed by a user fee levied on set owners, along with three radio channels differentiated by brow level all under the aegis of the British Broadcasting Authority. Other European countries followed suit. Israel -- one of the more politicized societies -- had a single, BBC-like television channel for two decades. Americans often dismiss these systems as government owned, unaware of the European history of courtly patronage of the arts and universities, which gradually wrested their freedom from their patrons but continued to benefit from a tradition of public patronage.

Land-grant colleges notwithstanding, Americans prefer entrepreneurship to patronage, and thus commercial and competitive broadcasting was established, albeit subject to some regulation. It is noteworthy that there emerged only three national networks that slowly added public-affairs coverage to their entertainment programming and became forums for the American polity -- distinguished ones, at that -- even if the news never quite made it into prime time. Meanwhile, the British retreated somewhat -- in part, because the government wished to bridle the BBC's independence -- and a dual system was established whereby a network of franchised regional stations, no less oriented toward public service but financed by advertising, was established alongside the BBC. Subsequently, both BBC and Independent Television (ITV) have spun off second channels, and more is soon to come (Hearst, 1995).

But that was long ago, or maybe not so long ago. By now, there are hundreds of television channels to choose from -- over the air, on the cable, off the satellite -- not to speak of the video and multimedia systems in which television is implicated. Yet, from the point of participatory democracy, television is dead, almost everywhere. It no longer serves as the central civic space; one can no longer be certain that one is viewing together with everybody else or even anybody else, and the here-and-now of current affairs is being minimized and ghettoized and overwhelmed by entertainment. Television today is like a middle-sized video shop, offering the viewer an effortless choice of old and new movies, and soon it will be a mega video shop offering viewers home delivery of anything that exists on tape. Viewing of the national news on any of the networks stands at about 30 percent in the United States, and newspaper readership continues to decline.

Except for the occasional media event (Dayan and Katz, 1992), television has ceased to offer citizens the experience of shared contemplation of matters of state that demand attention. The polity was rejuvenated and rededicated by events such as the live broadcasts of the moon landing, the Kennedy funeral, the Olympics, the Watergate and Hill/ Thomas hearings, and the fall of Communist Europe. These political ceremonies were of such great moment that the networks virtually combined to take us there. Until the invention of the televised debates, citizens were unlikely to give equal attention to both sides in presidential campaigns (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1943; Katz and Feldman, 1962; Jamieson, 1988). However inadequate, it is the monopolistic coverage of the debates by the networks that mobilizes us to compare and consider -- and feel that we belong. Television takes center stage and gives us a look at both sides -- so that we discuss it the next day. It should not go unmentioned here that television has also emasculated party loyalty in the process.

Even media events may be on the wane. People seem increasingly cynical about political ceremony: the parade of premature Middle East peace celebrations is a current example (Liebes and Katz, 1996). True, the O.J. Simpson trial captured national attention, but its interest was mostly prurient (except at the finish), not issue oriented as was Hill/Thomas, for example. Only near catastrophe -- the Persian Gulf war, the bombing in Oklahoma City -- holds the whole nation in its grip. Otherwise, segmentation seems to be fast displacing national comings-together, and pleasure seems to be pushing public affairs ever more out of sight.

Media Technology and the Nation-state

The media had a lot to do with shaping the nation and holding it together -- not just politically but also economically, socially, and culturally. Thus the newspaper contributed to the consolidation of European nationalism, inviting speakers of a particular vernacular to recognize their commonality and to imagine the polity that might result therefrom (Tarde, 1901; Anderson, 1991). If the newspaper conquered space, the telegraph conquered both time and space, empowering investors in California and New York to compete on an equal footing on Wall Street, thus to establish a single national economy Carey). Radio in Britain gave voice to regional differences in the celebration of national occasions, and people became used to the idea of a united kingdom thereby (Cardiff and Scannell, 1987). Broadcasting in the United States -- radio and television -- also united the nation culturally, and television is said to have leveled social boundaries by providing easy glimpses into the lives of the other gender, the other age group, the other class Meyrowitz).

Technological determinism or not, changes in the organization of the media seem to anticipate, or reflect, the changing structure of society. In Israel, war and severe crisis are marked by the pooling of the broadcast media -- not only for reasons of security -- so that, in effect, there is only one national channel of radio and television to cope with disaster. The public has repeatedly said that it likes this display of unity. The channels also combine to present great media events, such as the signing of a peace treaty. Their disassembly signals that the crisis or grand occasion is over.

Putting aside the question of whether one can speak of the teleology of technology or only of those who govern it, the theory underlying these observations is that media technology and its deployment affect social organization (Innis). Applying this logic to contemporary media technology, it seems altogether clear that the new technology has two, albeit competing, tendencies, both of which overlook and thereby threaten the nation-state. One of these tendencies is toward increasing atomization, such that communication will be increasingly tailored to the measure of its individual consumers. People will be able to customize their electronic newspapers ("anything but the Middle East, please"); they will be able to phone for the movie of their choice and view it alone. The other tendency is toward globalization, such that everybody, everywhere, will be viewing *Dallas* or *Dynasty* or the Olympics at the same time. Neither of these tendencies matches the requirements of the participatory nation-state. Technological determinists would say that the nation-state must therefore collapse in the face of this radical segmentation, on the one hand, and globalization, on the other. There is a lack of fit between geopolitical boundaries and the boundaries defined by the new media technology.

The Road to Segmentation: Why Take It?

As these tendencies accelerate, it is ironic to hear so much optimistic talk about electronic town meetings (Abramson). Perhaps it is possible for presidential debates to be more interactive, and it surely will be possible to announce a town meeting on health care on what remains of one of the networks or on CNN. But will anybody answer the summons? Are there any citizen viewers left? Or should the meetings take place on MTV?

It is all the more ironic because a town meeting or a national assembly was so much more possible before we gave in to segmentation. We threw away the real possibilities that we had, and now we want to reconstitute them. In short, we threw out the baby.

But why? The answers are not so difficult (Blumler). The first reason has to do with the pressure of technology, or at least the way the technology is understood. The idea of limited frequencies -- and thus the rationale for regulation -- was made obsolete both by cable and by satellite; the number of potential channels is almost unlimited. Some nations are resisting this pressure, allowing for only a limited number of cable channels, and controlling the size of satellite receiving dishes by license. But, as plummeting prices invite mass ownership of the needed technology, this will become a lost cause.

A second reason for the rapid multiplication of channels is the mood of liberalism and privatization that is sweeping the world. The cost of financing the BBC, for example, is extremely high, and as the number of commercial channels multiplies, the compulsory license fee looms larger in the minds of those set owners who prefer the other channels any say. This process has been evident since advertising-supported ITV forced the BBC to popularize its programming, for fear that a major drop in its ratings -- below 50 percent -- would foment a revolt among fee-paying viewers. By now, there is a constant call -- sometimes from inside the organization itself -- to allow the BBC to accept advertising or to solicit voluntary subscription in lieu of the license fee.

A closely related reason for rapid segmentation -- that is, for failure to protect the major channels, especially the great public channels of Europe -- has been the emergence of aggressive multinational entrepreneurship on the scale of Berlusconi, Murdoch, Turner, and others. It is remarkable that even conservative governments -- ever ready to promote patriotism and national pride -- are prepared to sell off their public channels, as in France, to the highest bidders (Wolton: 149). Privatization overcomes patriotism, and joining the multinational economy seems a better bet than very expensive locally produced television productions. These governments then lament the low cultural level of imported American programs, and raise the specter of cultural imperialism. It is also just possible that these governments become fed up with the criticism they receive from public channels, and believe -- maybe rightly -- that commercial channels will be kinder.

Israel: a One-channel Polity

Since it is in the early stages of channel multiplication, Israel provides a good case study of this process. Television broadcasting was introduced late in Israel, after years of debate over its likely effects (Katz, 1971). Opponents of the medium, led by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, thought that renascent Hebraic culture would be undermined by the introduction of alien values, that the people of the book would turn into the people of television, that ascetic and pioneering values would be uprooted by consumerism, that ideological politics would be displaced by personality politics. Religious elements feared secularization of the culture. Having seen television in the United States, opponents seemed to believe that I Love Lucy and Kojak were stored on a hard disk inside the set, and that Israeli television would look just like American television. They were not altogether wrong.

Those in favor argued that the medium carried no intrinsic message of its own, that it would do whatever it was told: inform, educate, teach Hebrew, absorb immigrants, foster creativity, enfranchise marginal groups, show Israel to the world, and, altogether, promote national integration -- political, economic, cultural, and social. But proponents who thought that Israeli television would be free to do its own thing were only partly right, because television in a small country has very few degrees of freedom, being heavily dependent on inadequate budgets and too little talent to do all the things that richer and resource-full nations can do (Katz and Wedell).

The half-hearted efforts to establish television after Ben-Gurion stepped down led, first, to an educational broadcasting company, financed by a major gift from the Rothschilds and aimed primarily at schools. A general, BBC-like broadcasting station was established only in 1967, following the Six-Day War, when enemy countries directed television broadcasts to Arabic-speaking Israelis, the more vulnerable sectors of the population. Thus television was inaugurated in Israel not only to right a propaganda disadvantage but because it was thought, wishfully, that the new medium might make for effective communication between Israelis and Arab residents of the newly occupied territories. This distorted beginning, however well-intentioned, gradually righted itself, and by 1969, twenty years after most of the developed countries -- Israeli television was on the air, as part of a BBC-like Broadcasting Authority, which also held a charter for the exclusive operation of radio.⁵

Television controlled by the Broadcasting Authority was the only show in town. Within two years of its inauguration, almost all households owned television sets, and almost everybody watched almost everything on the one monopolistic channel. From the beginning, strong emphasis was placed on news and public affairs. Even without the marketing survey that placed information well above entertainment and education in the ranking of public expectations of the new medium (Katz and Gurevitch), broadcasters were well aware that Israelis expected high-quality news and analysis on radio and television. The channel's flagship program was the 9 p.m. newsmagazine, one of the top programs of its kind anywhere, thanks to the political skills of both producers and viewers. That does not mean that government did not pressure broadcasters or attempt to intervene. Nor does it mean that the channel always resisted this pressure -- in spite of its official independence -- or that every one of the succession of directors-general stood his ground equally well. On the whole, however, the program was highly regarded by all sectors, and it was viewed nightly by some two-thirds of the population and by even more when there was special cause for concern.

Israel watchers, including some of its growing number of liberal politicians, regularly expressed pity for an aspiring democracy that was so impoverished or so constrained or both as to have to depend for televised information on only one channel and one newsmagazine. "Who would believe the news broadcast on a Government-owned channel, financed by a quasi-tax, even if publicly operated?" they asked. The answer: hawks and doves watched it -- and largely believed it; Jews and Arabs watched it -- and largely believed it; even Arabs across the borders paid attention. There is good research to support these statements.

Moreover, the shared experience of viewing often made for conversation across ideological divides. There were plenty of newspapers of all stripes and much political discussion, but the shared central space of television news and public affairs constituted a virtual town meeting. Everybody could reasonably expect his or her family, neighbors, coworkers, friends, and enemies to be in the audience. Indeed, the nightly 9 p.m. newsmagazine became a sort of civic ritual during which the society communed with itself (Liebes, 1992). There was an informal norm that attendance was required and that no intrusions were allowed -- no telephone calls, for example. The lesson of the first twenty years of Israeli television is that participatory democracy may be enhanced, rather than impeded, by gathering its citizens in a single public space set aside for receiving and discussing reliable reports on the issues of the day.

These achievements were reflected far less in the departments of drama and entertainment. As is the case everywhere, much light entertainment was imported, mainly from the United States, and indigenous drama -- light or serious -- was not a great success. Viewers did call for more entertainment, especially more homemade entertainment, but it was slow in coming. Twenty years of monopoly broadcasting had passed, and many viewers, back from touring abroad, felt that paternalism was depriving them of entertainment and cosmopolitan programming. But the symbiosis of Israelis and their national television station is renewed with every new crisis or holiday -- or media event such as Sadat's visit to Jerusalem or Menachem Begin's funeral (Katz, Dayan, and Motyl).

Israel: Segmentation after All

Inevitably, technology and politics and privatization and what is said to be common sense prevailed, and multiple channels have come to Israel, late as usual. Hardly anybody spoke up to say that the society might be better off remaining with a single channel, however anachronistic. The old arguments were dusted off: democracy needs competition; a single channel -- government-owned at that -- cannot be credible; private ownership will increase the quality of programming on both channels; cable and satellite technologies are flourishing everywhere; neglected talent will finally be given its chance, with commissions from a second channel; and the people deserve more entertainment, don't they?

The committee that deliberated whether and how to establish a second channel decided to follow the British again by creating a second authority, chartered to award franchises to produce and buy programs and sell advertising. The days of the week are divided, as in London, among the three franchise holders and join together with the authority to underwrite a news-production company to produce the nightly news. The authority is unashamedly loaded with government officials and lackluster trustees. It took years before the second channel was approved by the parliament, where the most vociferous voices in opposition were the newspaper owners, fearing that their advertising revenue would be diverted to television. They settled for the right to own a minority share of the stock of the companies bidding for the three franchises.

By the early 1990s -- twenty years after the establishment of the first channel -- it became clear that there would be a second channel, as well as regional cable systems, along with commercial radio stations licensed in association with the second television channel. This was channel multiplication with a vengeance. It was also the moment when I made a public bet with the director designate of the new authority that the combined audience for news on both channels would be lower than was the audience for the news on the first channel.

And so it is. News on the second channel -- not very different from the first, of course -- reaches about 15 percent of the audience, while the audience for news on the first channel has plummeted to 15-20 percent. Overall viewing of television news in this highly politicized society has dropped by almost half, from a nightly average of 65 percent in the 1980s to an average of about 35 percent now. Some people have moved to cable entertainment in lieu of either news broadcast; more are not watching at all.

It is possible, but unlikely, that this is an artifact of changing the news hour on Channel One from 9 p.m. to 8 p.m., for fear of being scooped by its new rival, which had decided on the earlier hour. It is possible, but unlikely, that the sharp drop is an artifact of variations in measuring techniques. It is also possible that Israelis suddenly became fed up with being slaves to the news and became tired of its frenetic downs and ups; indeed, a depoliticizing trend is in evidence. The most likely explanation, however strange it sounds, is that the choice between two news programs raised the possibility of a third choice: not to view either. Stated otherwise, the latent message of two competing news programs is that television news is no longer required viewing, because there is no knowing whether one's reference groups are in the audience. The latent message of moving the news to the earlier hour is that entertainment -- not news -- deserves to be at the center of prime time.

As expected, game shows, comedy, and other entertainments predominate on the second channel, and even the highly popular prime-time talk shows -- originally oriented toward public affairs -- are becoming more freakish and prurient, even while continuing to play an important public role, at least so far. Actionadventure and other dramatic series are still largely imported, and late-night movies figure prominently as well. When the directors of Channel Two are reminded that the law specifies that it be a second public

channel, it is evident that they have already forgotten this detail. One of the franchise holders, before being dismissed by his board, managed to say that "the public has a right not to know."

Surprisingly, and against the argument of this article, the first channel has so far responded by moving in the direction of higher quality and a higher ratio of self-produced programming. It is acting as if oblivious to the fact that, after the news, there is a 2:1 ratio of viewing in favor of Channel Two for the remainder of the evening. It seems unlikely that this situation can last; defense of the license fee will require the two channels to be equally populistic as long as they are both trying to maximize their audiences. Further segmentation -- which appeals to specialized audiences -- is available, so far, only on cable.

Television and National Integration

In research on the functions and effects of broadcasting in the First World, too little attention is given to its role in national integration. The rare exception is Cardiff and Scannell's study of the influence of early radio on British national unity. A similar story can now be told for Israel from a study of the uses of leisure, radio on British national unity. A similar story can now be told for Israel from a study of the uses of leisure, culture, and communication conducted in 1970, shortly after the introduction of television, and again in 1990, when the era of monopoly was about to end (Katz and Hass).

In 1970, the newspaper was the predominant medium. Asked to assess the utility of each of five media -- radio, television, book, newspaper, and cinema -- in satisfying each of a variety of different "needs," the newspaper was given first place most often. In 1990, television had displaced the newspaper as the medium that best fulfills more different kinds of concerns, whether overcoming loneliness, for example, or medium that best fulfills more different kinds of most Israelis, television takes only second place to books helping spend time with family. But in the minds of most Israelis, television takes only second place to books or cinema or both with respect to personal values such as knowing oneself, cultivating good taste, being entertained, aesthetic experience, spending time with friends, and improving morale. Where television's role is most prominent -- where it has most clearly taken first place from the newspaper -- is in the area of the collectivity, especially in the emotional aspect of attachment to nation. More surprising, perhaps, is that television is rated the medium most helpful in satisfying national values that are not only affective but television is rated the medium most helpful in satisfying national values that are not only affective but cognitive -- for example, not only does television help most "to feel pride in our State," but it also best helps "to understand the true character of our leaders."

Whether or not this would have satisfied Ben-Gurion is an open question. He would have to concede that television served Israel as a powerful unifying force. It deepened the sense of attachment to the center both in its focus on collective concerns and in its communal way of doing so. "But this is at the expense of reading," might be the retort, and, indeed, the longitudinal study would reveal that there is some decline in the extent of reading books and newspapers, not in number of readers but in amount read. Alternatively, it might be objected, "Alien values have invaded Israeli society during these 20 years," pointing to evidence in the study that the values of self-interest and pleasure have increased between 1970 and 1990, at the expense of altruistic, collectivity-oriented values and activities and future orientation. But it is more likely that Israeli television, given its content, slowed these value changes, say the authors of the study (Katz and Haas). Nevertheless, it remains possible that *Dallas* and *Dynasty* -- not only the 9 p.m. news and holiday celebrations -- have had a part in shaping the values of Israelis (Liebes and Katz, 1990).

The opponents of television also expressed concern that the medium would undermine the party-based politics of proportional representation and contribute to the personalization of politics in Israel. This is exactly v hat is taking place with the introduction of primary election contests, and the new provision for direct election of prime minister, which is strongly opposed by many academics and journalists. The

allegation that television is implicated here is well supported by the unending parade of politicians in the news, in public affairs broadcasts, and on talk shows.

The years of monopolistic public television in Israel have almost certainly had an effect on the forging of national identity, enhancing the sense of belonging, promoting civil religion and the continuity of traditional sentiments, accelerating the spread of spoken Hebrew, and the absorption of immigrants. It may also have contributed to the personalization of politics, to a decline in the extent of reading, to a per capita drop in attendance at spectacles ranging from theater to football games, and perhaps even to relieving the frustrations of suppressing self in favor of obligations to collectivity.

But if the fears of opponents proved more wrong than right during the first twenty years of television in Israel, they are about to be confirmed in the next twenty years with a vengeance. The new era of segmentation will support the growing liberal spirit of individualism, self-fulfillment, hedonism, and privatization. By definition, it will not do much good for altruism, patriotism, collectivity orientation, ideological politics, or the civic need for a shared public space.

For a sad metaphor, consider the following: Memorial Day and Independence Day, which are celebrated on successive days in the Israeli tradition, are the occasion for a deep sense of coming together. For twenty years the Memorial Eve broadcast originated from the Wailing Wall and the Independence Eve broadcast from Mt. Herzl, following which Israel Television put on its festive show-of-the-year for all to smile and cry with and by which to feel part of society and history. This year -- the first year of the second channel -- there were two shows, almost exactly alike, featuring the same politicians and artists, speaking the same communion but in two competing voices.

Conclusion

Throughout the Western world, the newspaper was the first medium of national integration. It was followed by radio. When television came, it displaced the radio as the medium of national integration, and radio became the medium of segmentation. Now, following radio again, television has become a medium of segmentation, pushed by both technology and society. Unlike the moment when television assumed radio's role as the medium of national integration, there is nothing in sight to replace television, not even media events or the Internet.

ENDNOTES

- * Most of this paper was published previously in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 546 (July, 1996), 22-33. Only the preface is new. I wish to thank for permission to republish.
- 1. In a study of the origins of public opinion in 17th century England, David Zaret (1996) reports that the public printing of petitions encouraged a new mode of expression. This, in turn, required construction of the idea and reality of a meaningful public that mattered and that had to be taken into account by powerful decision makers.
- 2. It would be a mistake to overstate the parallels. In particular, although segmentation in broadcasting in both countries has occurred in response to many of the same market forces, in Canada there is also an important structural reason. The separate English and French broadcasting systems established to implement

the government's commitment to bilingualism and biculturalism practically mandated segregated audiences. In addition, though, segmentation within each group is being spurred by further increases in available choices.

- ³ The typical European system of public service broadcasting is described by Blumler (1992). On news in prime time as a defining characteristic of public broadcasting, see Hearst (1992) and Williams (1975). For recent discussions of the continued viability of public broadcasting in Europe, see Scannell (1989), and the debate between John Keane and Nicholas Garnham (1955).
- ⁴ By contrast, American broadcast news is thought to abort in the living room, cf. Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948).
- ⁵ Israel deviates from the BBC model in that the director-general in Britain is appointed by the board of governors, which is appointed by the queen, while in Israel, the director-general is appointed directly by the government on recommendation of the board and the relevant minister. Membership in the Israeli board is also more politicized than in Britain, where party affiliation is overlooked, at least in principle.
- ⁶ Unified ratings have still not been installed in Israel, although this will happen very soon. Two forms of telephone surveys are now prevalent, which either reconstruct "yesterday's viewing" or ask respondents what they are viewing at the moment. The comparison in the text is between face-to-face interviewing in the 1980s with phone interviewing in the 1990s, both about "yesterday."

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Conflicting Goals, Confused Elites, Active Audiences: Some Thoughts on Canadian Media Policy

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This essay develops three separate but related themes. The first is that the conflict between educative and manipulative goals that seems to underlie Canadian media policy is a general one confronting media institutions and those who control them, both at a local community and a national level. The second theme is that media elites often assume media effects and alter their behaviors -- sometimes developing media policy -- in ways that would not be justified by a careful reading of the scientific literature on media effects. The third is that a sensitive reading of the literature on media effects suggests that audiences are affected by media messages, but that audiences are hardly passive in negotiating a consequence of exposure to messages carried by the media.

The implications of these themes for Canadian media policy are discussed, and that policy is linked to issues in the U.S. at present.

Theme 1: Media Can Have Conflicting Goals

Americans, it is my feeling, would generally articulate quite distinct goals for the media systems -- if they would think of the media in these terms at all -- and their school systems. The former are expected to inform and entertain. The latter are expected to educate. The media carry information about the current world, largely for those already operating in it. The latter are expected to prepare young people to live in the world. The clients of the former are mostly adults. The latter deal largely with children.

Most Americans, I think, recognize that the mass media operate for a profit, and the media give discerning adults what they want. The school system is not expected to generate revenues, but rather to husband public resources wisely, and to give to young people what they need, not necessarily what they want.

The distinction between the media system and the school system breaks down somewhat when one speaks of television and its appeal to and potential impact on children. It is here that Americans are most critical of television and, it seems, most willing to accept regulation. Children need some protection from the power of the media.

It is my observation, based on frequent travel to Europe, three extended stays there, and discussions with many European communication practitioners and academics, that Europeans do not make so clearly the distinction common in America. For the European, there is not so much difference between the role of the media and the role of the educational system. Both have an obligation to educate. Both bear the responsibility of informing and uplifting those who use them.

I am not sure where the common folk in Europe stand on this issue. But I am convinced that the media elite -- including many academics -- feel the audiences for media content are not very discriminating, are not able to make good decisions, and are not very sophisticated. Media audience members are not so

different from those who attend schools. They must be protected from the media. And the media must be used to educate them.

Canadian media policy, it seems to me, falls closer to the European side than to the American side. The media are assigned an important role: integration of the country. The media are expected to educate Canadians and inculcate them with values that make them true Canadians.

Not all behavior of the media is likely to lead to this outcome. The use of extensive entertainment materials from the U.S., coverage of divisive themes, the use of one language over another, would be expected to work against this goal. At its extreme, even the routines of news gathering and distribution might work against national goals. A discerning audience would be expected to sort out fact from fiction, the wheat from the chaff. Unsophisticated audience members would not.

Such a characterization of European -- and Canadian -- media policy might mask what is a very important -- but not so often discussed -- issue in media behavior generally, and one that comes into play very much in the U.S. as well. In a series of papers, my colleague Eric Fredin and I have made a distinction between two competing orientations which media institutions can have toward their community: skepticism and boosterism (See Becker, forthcoming; Becker and Fredin, 1987; Fredin and Becker, 1987). It is important to keep in mind that media institutions in the U.S. are largely local in nature, serving local communities much more than the country as a whole. Newspapers serve local markets, as do radio and television stations. Most -- but not all -- television stations are linked to the national system via affiliations with program providers to form a network. (The provider is falsely called the network. In fact, the network is what the provider assembles to distribute programs produced or purchased by the distributor.) Newspapers also are linked nationally through the wire services that provide them with content and the representatives who sell space to national advertisers.

The skeptical stance of the media is a central part of what is often referred to as the "watchdog" role of the press. The media monitor the behavior of a community, and particularly governmental, leaders. Such monitoring is carried out with great suspicion, much in the way a good watchdog views approaching strangers. The press represents the citizenry in dealing with government, just as the watchdog represents the home owner who may be away or asleep as the stranger approach. The press, as with the watchdog, has the interests of the client at heart.

In this skeptical stance, the media focus on what is wrong with the community being served. They cover crime, present stories about aberrations, focus on public and private failings. The media tell the reader or viewer what is wrong, rather than what is right, with the community in which the reader or viewer lives.

The contrasting orientation -- boosterism -- is one in which the media focus on what is going well in the community. The media make much of community accomplishments, both economic and otherwise. Good citizens are singled out for positive attention. The media tell their readers and viewers what is right about the community in which they live. Evidence from surveys of U.S. population show that citizens expect this type of media coverage and are critical of the media for not providing enough of it (Times Mirror, 1986).

The skeptical stance of the media should result in better government and better management of community resources. This can be valuable to the media, since they are institutions within that community and gain and lose as the community improves and declines.

Boosterism also can have positive consequences. Pride in one's community is an expected outcome of positive media coverage of the community. A proud citizenry would be willing contributors to community

causes, engage in community development activities, and be interested in stories about the community. In this way, the citizens would be good consumers of the media, providing a reward to the media for their support of the community.

This relationship between media boosterism and media use may best be seen in the area of sport. In the U.S., at least, the media do much to promote sport, in part, it seems, because they have a good deal to gain from it. There isn't much of an expectation that the media play the critical, skeptical role in dealing with sport, at least in the U.S. In fact, most coverage is quite supportive of sport. Many editors and news directors seem to view sports content as entertainment, rather than news, though it is an integral part of the average daily newspaper and of local television news programming.

The media gain from sport in very significant ways. The content attracts audiences. In fact, newspapers routinely add special sections to their newspapers for major sporting events. These sections are produced to gain advertiser support and, in some cases at least, also increased newspaper sales. Local television and radio stations do special programs with coaches and sports figures to attract audiences.

In short, sport is part of the raw material used by the media to produce the content they sell to their audiences. For this reason, they are big supporters of both professional and amateur sport, which are increasingly difficult to differentiate, in part because of the financial linkages between sport and the media. The media encourage communities to build arenas and stadiums and to seek sports franchises. They are not often -- or at least not always -- watchdogs and skeptics.

I have developed this theme elsewhere (Becker, forthcoming) and do not wish to belabor the point, which simply is that there is much precedence for media promotion of their communities and even the cultures of their communities. In fact, the relationship between media and community identification has been a consistent theme in mass communication research. Two dominant hypotheses exist here, according to Stamm (1985). One argues that community identification is an essential ingredient in motivating citizens to make use of the mass media. Stamm credits Merton (1950) with the initial formulation of this position. The second hypothesis is that use of the local media has impact on community identification. The work of Park (1937) and Janowitz (1952) is in this tradition. The generally positive relationship between media use and communities ties (McLeod, et al. 1994) can be interpreted as supportive of either or both of these interpretations.

The U.S. literature on media effects on identification focuses mostly on community identification, rather than cultural identification, for two reasons, I suspect. First, the media in the U.S., more than in many other countries, are decentralized. Second, the formulation of national media policy in the U.S. is greatly restricted by constitutional constraints on media content regulation, by competition between states and local government and the national government for regulatory authority (particularly in the area of cable regulation), and by deference to market forces as policy. There is, of course, a literature on the impact of media on images of minorities and women (Greenberg and Brand, 1994). The role of media coverage on identification seems to be not fully explored in this literature, though it clearly is an important theme. The literature on media impact on national cultural identification is being addressed by other conferees.

What should be clear is that there exists conflict between policy that treats the mass media as extensions of a state's educational system and one that does not, and between media behavior that presumes a skeptical relationship between the media and the state and one that assumes the media should play some role in support of the state. In the first case, the distinction comes about in part because the audience members are not viewed as competent evaluators in an educational model, while they are treated as discerning

equals -- or at least can be so viewed -- in the noneducational context. At the same time, one can recognize in actual media behavior in the U.S. -- where the second model is in place -- times when the media do play the role of advocate. Advocacy is part of the media's role in a democracy, to be sure. The media seem to suspend their skeptical relationship with their community at times, however, and this suspension of the role allows the media to support community activity. Boosterism of the community probably is good citizenship for media institutions. It probably does help foster identification on the part of members of the community with the community and its goals. It probably helps develop community pride. It probably does result in development of a community culture. In this sense, development of a policy for the media to help create national identity and culture is not in conflict with much media behavior even where there is no such educational role assigned the media. It is only in conflict with a stance that argues the media should come to this behavior on their own -- even if out of their own self interest.

Theme 2: Political Elites Overestimate Media Effects

There is good reason to believe the media play an important role in fostering national identity and creating national culture. There also are some reasons to be cautious in assigning too much influence to the media. The reasons for caution are two. First, much of the research literature that argues for such an effect is limited by the difficulty of making appropriate community or national comparisons in which media behavior is radically different and for which appropriate data on changes across time are available. Second, the literature on individual media effects suggests that such effects, which certainly exist, are not universal. They also are, in certain contexts, not very dramatic.

There is some evidence that political elites are not very sensitive to the niceties of the scientific literature and the caution it suggests. In fact, there is at least anecdotal evidence that elites -- and individuals generally -- often overestimate the effects of the media on people other than themselves. They can change their behaviors as a result of this overestimation of media effects on others. Such changes in behavior may be, quite ironically, one of the most important media effects, though at present it is only a partially documented one.

Elites, particularly those who are elected, care very much about public opinion, and they treat any indicant of public opinion as important. These elites often infer that the routine coverage of political events by newspapers, magazines and broadcast news organizations has significant effects on audience members. As a result, they use the content itself as an indicant of public opinion -- or perhaps public opinion about to be made or altered.

I see evidence that elites use media content as an indicant of public opinion even while making use of their own and publicly used polls and other evidence of what the public believes. They do this because they are very concerned about public opinion and because they attribute effects to media messages and therefore believe the messages themselves are reasonable predictors of future public opinion. In other words, they see media content as indicators of public opinion not yet measured or measurable by public opinion polls themselves.

Davison (1983) has labeled this as a type of "third person effect." Such an effect occurs when Person 1 sends a message, Person 2 receives the message, and Person 2 estimates the effect of the message on a third person (Person 3) who also is thought to have or actually did receive the message sent by Person 1. Davison says that some people (Person 2s) will take action based on this perception of the effect of Person 1's message on Person 3.

Davison seemed to be primarily concerned with the psychological process of inferring influence, and most of the research on the Third Person Effect has focused on the hypothesis that individuals perceive that communication exerts a stronger impact on others than on themselves. Perloff's (1993) review of this literature shows considerable evidence in support of the hypothesis.

Mutz (1989), however, was concerned with the behavior of elites resulting from their estimation of media effects on public opinion. To illustrate this effect, she recounted the behavior of then Senator Gary Hart, who in 1987 withdrew from the Democratic presidential race because of media coverage. Hart made his decision five days after *The Miami Herald* reported a weekend rendezvous with model Donna Rice in his Washington townhouse and after he learned that *The Washington Post* planned to publish a story that Hart was involved with yet a third woman, that is, not the model and not his wife ("The sudden fall," 1987). Hart made the decision to withdraw even though he was a frontrunner in the polls at that time. He later realized his mistake and attempted to reenter the race, but it was too late. Campaign contributors also had used the negative coverage as an indicant of public opinion. The same was true of his staff.

I observed another example of this phenomenon in Columbus, Ohio, where I live. The mayor, hounded by two stories that raised questions about his character, announced that he would not stand for reelection only to waiver later before finally deciding to retire from office. The first series of news stories resurrected an old charge of sexual imposition on a minor; the second detailed an affair between the mayor and one of his administrators, who was appointed by the mayor and who, along with the mayor, was married to someone else. The mayor denied the sexual imposition and was acquitted. He also denied the affair with his subordinate and changed his story only after a local television station tracked him and his administrator to a liaison in Chicago. While the media were relentless in pursuit of both stories, and they dominated news for several weeks, polls that I and colleagues at Ohio State conducted subsequently showed that the electorate rallied around the mayor, who had generally enjoyed very high approval ratings during his time in office. There certainly was no evidence in the poll data that the mayor's decision to withdraw was warranted. The stories in the media were not a good indicant of public opinion in the making.

It isn't hard to find other anecdotal evidence of this sort. Klingaman (1987) reports that a breakthrough in negotiations to end World War I resulted from media coverage and its resultant impact on public opinion. Gorney (1994) argues that lawyers today have come to depend on public opinion as a means of winning settlements out of court that they might not get in court. To this end, they go public with complaints against famous individuals and companies, using the mass media to distribute these accusations, in the hopes the defendants will conclude public opinion is on the side of the plaintiffs whom the lawyers represent.

More systematic evidence comes from a study by Cook, et al., (1983), who found that governmental leaders in the health care area changed their view about which health care issues were most in need of attention as a result of media coverage of those issues. The leaders changed their perceptions of how the public viewed these issues as a result of the media coverage, which did not deal with public opinion on the topic. Cook (1989), in a study of media coverage and congressional legislation, found that legislators often depend on news coverage of issues as a means of convincing fellow legislators to support specific legislation. Pritchard (1986) found that press behavior was the strongest predictor of whether prosecutors engaged in negotiations with the accused rather than go to trial. Pritchard, Dilts and Berkowitz (1987) found that the best predictors of actions against pornographers were perceptions by the prosecutors of the importance of pornography to their constituents and to the local newspapers. Gunther (1991), in contrast, found no effect of self-other discrepancy on jury awards of damages for defamatory stories.

What assumptions of media effects those involved in the formulation of media policy are making may be difficult to fully discern. Clearly, however, policy development depends on some notion of effect. Few would invest much time in regulation if it were believed the behavior being regulated had no consequence.

Theme 3: Political Effects are Seldom Universal

Political elites, it would seem, often assign to the mass media effects that many of us in the media effects community would not consider likely. To put it more simply, at least some elites seem to take the position that media content equals media effects. While most mass media researchers today are more likely to believe that media effects do take place than did researchers writing 30 years ago, they also are much more likely to believe that the characteristics of audience members and the characteristics of media content interact to produce those effects than seems to be true for elites, or was the case when empirical media effects research began early this century (McQuail, 1994).

My own view is that media effects can be understood only if researchers take into consideration what audience members bring with them when they use the mass media, what they do when they make use of the media, and the characteristics of the messages contained in the media. In this sense, media use can be seen as a transaction between the media user and the message creator in which neither is fully dominant (Becker and Kosicki, 1991; Becker and Kosicki, 1995). Media effects do occur, but they seldom are simple, are almost never universal, and are difficult to predict. Certainly estimating public opinion from media content is mistaken behavior.

I come to this conclusion as result of a historical overview of the literature on media effects, reflection on my own research, and an examination and interpretation of my own media behavior and its consequences.

A historical perspective

The consensus among historical writers is that those who undertook the first empirical examinations of media effects assumed that the media were quite powerful (Chaffee and Hochheimer, 1985; DeFleur and Ball-Recheck, 1989; Delia, 1987; Lowery and DeFleur, 1988; McQuail, 1994; Rogers, 1994). The power in the message-sender/message-receiver relations rested with the sender. A properly crafted media message could produce an effect. Audience members were consequently at the mercy of clever message creators, such as the propagandists who operated in conjunction with national policy during and between the two world wars.

Suspicion that this powerful media effects hypothesis was wrong surfaced almost immediately in the early scientific literature. In fact, empirical work undertaken as early as the 1920s provided much evidence that the media were not all powerful. The Payne Fund studies, for example, provided evidence that there were variations in effects among message recipients that could not be fully explained by variation in levels of exposure (Charters, 1933; Wartella and Reeves, 1985; Lowery and DeFleur, 1988). The powerful effects model ran into particular difficulty in the 1940s when the work of Lazarsfeld and his Columbia research team provided evidence of an active audience quite resistant to political communication messages (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944). Audience members were found to be rather selective in their use of the media. Bauer (1964), in his classic piece on the subject, labeled the audience members to be "obstinate" in response to communicator messages designed to influence them.

The empirical evidence in support of this audience activity was actually quite limited. As Becker, McCombs and McLeod (1975) noted, there was even much evidence in these studies of media effects, though these effects were given little attention. The authors seemed more intent on making the case for an active audience -- something already documented in earlier work undertaken to understand the uses audience members made of the media, particularly radio -- the only broadcast medium of the time. The work of Berelson (1949) on newspaper readership and the research of Herzog (1944) on radio serial listeners are prominent examples of this research.

Based on this finding of a selective audience, many media theorists in the period following the classic voters studies argued the appropriateness of a different approach to media research. Rather than asking what effect a message had on an audience members, researchers were encouraged to asked what uses audience members made of the media and what gratifications they obtained from this use (Rubin, 1994). Whereas effects research focused on the consequences of media messages, uses and gratifications research focused on audience needs, motivations, expectations and message interpretations. Media effects were still considered to be possible (Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch, 1974; McLeod and Becker, 1981; Becker and Schoenbach, 1989). Included in an inventory of possible effects were satisfaction of audience needs as well as unintended outcomes, such as information gain, attitude modification, and behavioral stimulation.

Such a limited view of media effects has came under challenge in the 1970s. German researcher Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1973; 1980) and American scholars George Gerbner (Gerbner, et al., 1980, 1986, 1994) and Phillips (Bollen and Phillips, 1982; Phillips, 1983, 1986) have been particularly vocal in arguing that evidence exists for a powerful media model in which audience member characteristics play little role. The agenda setting effects framework of McCombs and Shaw (1972, 1977) does not by its nature specify limitations to the hypothesized effects, though McCombs (1994) contends that he never expected the effects to be universal.

The discovery of audience selectivity by the Columbia research team has had tremendous impact on current effects theorists. Researchers who postulate effects must articulate ways in which the media overcome audience selectivity. Noelle-Neumann and Gerbner postulate that audience selectivity is overridden by activities of the media. Noelle-Neumann (1973) argues that media materials are largely consonant, rendering selectivity ineffective. In addition, repetition of messages makes it difficult for audience members to screen out unwanted content. Third, she argues that effects should be viewed cumulatively, and initial selectivity is rendered meaningless in this sense. Gerbner and his colleagues (1980, 1986, 1994) argue that audience members do not make selective use of the entertainment content of television, and it is this content that produces what they term a cultivation effect. Massive, long-term exposure of large and heterogeneous populations to "repetitive systems of stories" in television cultivates a common view of the world and the culture (Gerbner, et al., 1994, p. 20). Cultivation is defined as the "independent contributions television viewing makes to viewer conceptions of social reality" (Gerbner, et al., 1994, p. 23).

Another group of researchers has argued that media effects can be expected in those cases in which the media have found a way to sidestep audience selectivity. These researchers have largely shifted the focus away from attitudinal consequences of the mass media to the study of information acquisition of one form or another. The basic assumption is that audience selectivity will not limit information acquisition effects, since selectivity is an individual strategy for protecting already formed attitudes, not for limiting exposure generally. The most prominent hypothesis explored in this tradition has been that of agenda setting, which postulates at the individual level that audience members come to reflect in their own assessments of the importance of community issues the agenda of issues of the mass media (See Kosicki, 1993 for a recent review of this literature.).

A third strategy employed by current effects scholars is an outgrowth of the Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch (1973-74) postulation that media effects can occur even if audience members are active. What is required is integration of the idea of audience activity into formulations of media effects arguments. Such models have been presented by McLeod and Becker (1981), Schoenbach and his colleagues (Frueh and Schoenbach, 1982; Schoenbach and Frueh, 1984; Schoenbach and Weaver, 1985), and Becker and Schoenbach (1989), among others. This work has been labeled as "transactional," drawing on the original arguments of Bauer (1964) that communication should be viewed as a process in which two parties expect to give and take from the interaction approximately equitably (Frueh, 1991; Frueh and Schoenbach, 1991).

A major advantage that such a strategy has over either of the other two is that it deals with audience activity generally rather than only with audience selectivity. If selectivity is only one form of audience activity, as seems likely to be the case, then a theoretical perspective that merely argues the irrelevance of selectivity in understanding a particular effect is quite limited in terms of media effects generally. By incorporating audience behavior and characteristics into one's perspective, the theoretician gains the advantage of always seeking to understand effects both by examining the contribution of the audience member and the message sender to the communication situation. The message sender, of course, is represented not only by objective characteristics of the message itself but also by characteristics of the sender that have impact on the environment within which the message is received. The popularity of this strategy is reflected in the recent review volume of Bryant and Zillmann (1994). Contributors who make much of their incorporation of audience characteristics and activity into their effects models include Cantor (1994), Gunter (1994), Harris (1994) and Petty and Priester (1994).

Some self reflection

Such a perspective on media effects is, I believe, parsimonious with our own experiences with the media. We receive many messages from the media as we go about our everyday lives. We see news, entertainment and advertisements in the morning newspaper and on the morning television news programs. We also hear them in the radio, whether it is waking us or accompanying us in the auto on the way to work.

I am quite focused in the morning, and I pay attention to only a bit of what the media put before me. I am likely to pay attention to weather reports. I want to know what the main local and national stories are. I want to see what Garry Trudeau (Doonesbury), Lynn Johnson (For Better or Worse), and Greg Howard (Sally Forth) have by way of entertainment for me on the comics pages. I want to know if the Indians and Red won. I don't much care what sales are underway at the local grocery or department store. My goals determine what I do with the media and what I take away from the exchange.

I contrast this with my media behavior on Saturday and Sunday mornings, when I am more relaxed, less focused, and more likely to pay more attention to the advertisements. I am much more likely to read the paper more thoroughly and much more likely to skim the advertisements. I particularly pay attention to advertisements from the computer stores in Columbus, for I purchase computers for my office and my home. I also watch compact disc prices and promotions, because I am interested in buying them. A good sale on shirts or ties or other such things also is likely to attract my attention.

I read magazines and watch television --t he latter infrequently -- in much the same way. My interests and past experiences determine what I pay attention to and what I take away from the situation. I watch soccer on television rather than tennis. I read about Germany more often than about the UK. I watch travel features about the Caribbean but not soap operas. In each case, I gain information, but it is certainly different information than what another person with different interests and experiences would have. I know the rules

of soccer but cannot even keep score in tennis. I have lived in Germany three different times but only visited the UK on a number of occasions. I know at least a bit about many of the islands in the Caribbean but nothing about the characters in the soap operas.

I am likely to be influenced by an interpretation of world events appearing in one of the "leaders" of *The Economist* or on the back page guest column page of *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. I read *Business Week*, but I rarely find the commentary persuasive. Some of this has to do with the message; some is dependent on my view of the source.

Clearly the idea of an active audience dominates much of the current empirical effects research. Proponents of media effects must articulate ways in which the effect can occur despite the activity. In its simplest formulation, the active audience perspective holds that audience members are involved in the interpretation of messages they receive. This is a notion that suits scholars in the critical/cultural traditions as well as those outside, though the way in which scholars from these different traditions respond can be quite different.

Elsewhere, I and a colleague (Becker and Kosicki, 1995) have distinguished between two general types of audience variables that can be used in effects scholarship. The first is audience orientations, that is, characteristics of the audience members that may result in individualized interpretations of messages. The second type we have termed activities, meaning those things audience members do, such as attending to, manipulating and interpreting the messages in the media. Examples of orientations would include demographic or structural indicators of audience members placement in a social system, amount of media use, media reliance or dependence, or even audience members theories about how the media operate and who they represent. Examples of audience activity include attention to the media (as distinct from simple use) and distinct strategies for use of the mass media. There are a number of methodological problems associated with employment of these audience variables, some of which have been discussed by Becker and Kosicki (1995).

A specific research example

The importance of paying attention to audience members was brought home to me at an important point in my career. Much of my early research focused on political communication. I was particularly interested in what people sought from the mass media during and between political campaigns, and what they obtained as a result. The evidence was that people used the media actively and that they learned from the media as a consequence. I also was struck by how little people knew, how little difference the media made overall, and how indifferent they were to the political process as I understood it.

In the early 1980s I began doing some consulting work in support of a trade mark infringement claim on the part of one fast food -- really hamburger -- chain against another. I conducted telephone interviews in a variety of communities around the country, and what I learned really surprised me. People know a great deal about hamburgers. They can tell you which companies makes which type of hamburger -- by product name -- and are quite clear about the nature of differences.

For example, in five different surveys I conducted in different locations in 1983, the percentage of respondents who correctly told me they would go to a Burger King restaurant to purchase a Whopper ranged from a low of 45% to a high of 80%. The percentage of respondents who correctly told me they would go to purchase a Big Mac ranged from a low of 73% to a high of 91%. When I asked respondents in another community if McDonald's restaurants, Burger King restaurants or Hardee's restaurants were Big Boy restaurants, less than 5% in each case falsely indicated "yes." The respondents who linked the Big Boy

trademark with company names using that mark was higher among those respondents who watched television stations carrying advertisements for the restaurant companies. The same was true for newspaper readership.

I was surprised by all of this at the time, but in hindsight I should not have been. People know about hamburgers because they eat them. They have opinions about the different products. They know where they are sold. They make what are for them meaningful distinctions. They are investing some minimal energy to gain information and formulate opinions that are helpful. For many people -- I think unfortunately -- politics and current events do not have this same level of relevancy. I blame both the media and the political system for this, but I accept it as reality. I also think I understand a bit of it, for it isn't really different from my own behavior when I use the mass media. I am, after all, more in a position to do something about politics and current events than are most people. I also can tell you about fine distinctions between things I care about, such as which airlines I feel I get better service on, which stores have the best selection of reggae music, and which computers offer the best value. I also know something about hamburgers.

One consequence of this discovery was that I have changed my approach to effects research somewhat. I am still interested in aspects of political communication. But I also am interested in why people watch sports programming and what they take away from use of it (Becker, 1991; Becker and Creedon, 1988, 1989, 1990; Creedon and Becker, 1986a, 1986b). I think I have learned something relevant to media theory as a consequence.

Implications of Effects Findings for Canadian Media Policy

It is no more likely that the mass media of Canada have a simple, direct effect on their audiences than is the case in the U.S. While audience activity may vary from society to society, audiences in Canada are no doubt selective in their use of the media, active in processing the messages received, and in some ways resistant to the messages contained in them. Given the availability of messages from nearby U.S. sources, this activity may be manifested in avoidance of messages contained in Canadian media in favor of messages from elsewhere. The new technologies allow every audience member to be her or his own disk jockey, her our own media environment.

Schoenbach and Becker (1989), in a multinational study of media use habits, reported that audiences preferred domestic television programs over foreign ones in countries where both were available, provided the domestic services contain the type of program audiences members want. Channel loyalty, in general, was found to be weaker than program or even genre loyalty. But local products within program type or genre were preferred to imported ones. Canada was not part of the eleven-nation study, but there is no reason to expect anything different from the Canadian citizenry.

Concluding Observations

I suspect that lay reaction to this topic of our meeting in the U.S. would be surprise and a bit of amusement. I think that the reactions would be that America doesn't need national policy designed to create a national identity. The media don't have to be told to foster a national culture.

Or do they? The cover of the September 25, 1995, issue of *U.S. News and World Report* proclaims: "One Nation, One Language? The Battle over English in America." Language is very much at the heart of

the Canadian concern about identity, because language is a crucial part of culture. American concern over an official language is really a concern over perceived threats to national culture.

At present, the debate has not concerned itself with the role of the media in supporting a two language policy. But is it so far fetched to conclude that it easily could in the future. The spread of foreign language programming to the cable channels and then to broadcast television could easily be seen as a way of supporting alternative languages. The U.S. has historically been tolerant of domestic newspapers and magazines in languages other than English. Will that tolerance continue to exist for other media, particularly as national concern over English grows?

As I noted above, there already is in this country much acceptance of the idea that the media should serve as a means of furthering and boosting community development and goals. Citizen acceptance of the independent, watchdog role of the media is countered by this support or boosterism. This is true despite the lack of explicit support for the media in this country.

Canadian policy analysts can take some solace in recognizing the ambivalence about the role of the media in the important area of cultural development. At the same time, they should be cautious of assuming the media can modify easily basic values within the society. Media effects of this sort are likely to be slow in developing, likely to be offset by characteristics and activities of audience members, and likely to be far from universal as a result.

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Shifting Continental Divides: The USA and Canada

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Introduction

Talk about the impact of communication on identity and the consequences for continental divides --cultural and political boundaries -- is global. In Anglo-North America, however, we need not tarry long over questions of McDonaldization, Disneyfication or other forms of so-called 'Americanization'. For reasons of geography, economy, demography, technology and language, Canada experienced these forms of cultural and economic influence first. Like Siamese twins joined along the hip of a 4000 mile continent, when one twin is ten times the size and weight of the other co-existence is often less than comfortable.

In this regard, Friedman's (1992) notion of 'positionality' is apt: 'History and discourse about the making of history is positional, that is, it is dependent upon where one is located in social reality, within society, and within global process' (Friedman 1992, p.194). Positionality is simply an up-to-date, expanded version of location, a concept long used by geographers and others in geopolitical analyses. And where 30 million Canadians are located, four fifths of them English speakers, is next to a neighbour whose \$3.1 trillion economy is the world's largest and whose audiovisual industry exported \$5.1 billion of films, television and music in 1995.

Obviously, Canada's location abutting an economic and cultural colossus with whom it shares a language and a common origin makes it difficult to develop and maintain a unique cultural identity. However, positionality alone does not account for the problem. Internal domestic and broader international processes also undermine a cultural policy that is shaped by political and economic as well as cultural considerations. However, its failure -- if, indeed, it does fail -- is not likely to be as catastrophic as the hyperbole of some Canadian politicians suggests.¹

The Global-Local Dialectic, Continentalism and Economic Nationalism

The notion that processes of globalization sweep all before them is questionable. Nations and nationalisms, like ethnicities and tribalisms, are not dissolving in the wake of impersonal economic or technological forces. Indeed most have rarely been as visible or dynamic as they are now. Even though the economic resources of transnational corporations (TNCs) rival or overshadow those of all but the largest countries, it is doubtful that TNCs want countries to disappear. Nations are among their best customers; they assure the order and stability that TNCs need to operate. Nations still comprise the nexus for complex intersections of political, economic, technological, cultural and social relations within and across systems of symbolic meaning and institutional power. In Anglo North America, globalism and localism coexist inside an often uncomfortable juxtapositioning that varies from one country or region to another.

So in North America, as elsewhere, there is a dialectical interchange between global market forces and local responses where the nation represents the contextually local and where cross-border culture and trade exchange can either mesh or clash. All such dialectical relations are modified by the positional elements of history, and the relative powers -- economic, political and media -- of the parties in the present. In the US and Canada, the general maxim is that global market rhetorics speak of cultural universalism but the

realpolitik is economic nationalism. It carries particular force when "competitive economic nationalism focused on information and cultural industries is a principal motor driving global capitalism into the 21st century" (Ferguson, 1995:440).

Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the current media and telecommunication wars being waged across the 49th parallel. Headlines such as 'US accuses Canada of 'unfair' cultural barriers', 'Copps sets stage for war over culture,' 'Canada blocks US book chain on cultural grounds', 'US challenges Canada over magazine tax' are increasingly common, with Canada taken to the World Trade Organization over the latter. These media trade confrontations, it should be noted, occur under a *de jure* NAFTA umbrella that concedes Canada's right to cultural protection but *de facto* subjects it to repeated challenge. And all that is before we consider the separatist ambitions of the Bloc and Parti Québécois and their playing of 'the culture card' inside Canada itself.

Given that economic nationalism expressed as continentalism has driven US foreign policy from the Monroe Doctrine to NAFTA, its neighbors' concerns with collective identity and state-culture relations would seem to be immutably tied to the destiny and aspirations of the world's largest economy and exporter of popular culture. At various times Canada has seemed on the brink of becoming the 49th, 50th or 51st state. So in one sense the propensity to shifting continental divides has always been present; in another sense, those shifts are perhaps only beginning.

Almost a century ago, a British journalist who advocated 'the Americanization of the world' wrote: What Americans think on the question of the future of Canada is not difficult to discern. One and all would disclaim any attempt to annex Canada against her will; but one and all regard absorption as her inevitable destiny, and while they would not hasten the hour when the frontier-line disappears, they would rejoice to see the Union Jack disappear from the Western Continent (Stead, 1902 [1972:48].

In September, 1996, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) addressed this theme in a television series called 'What Border? The Americanization of Canada'. Increasingly it no longer seems possible to shrug off the latest round of media and culture wars across the border and inside Canada as 'plus ca change'. The substance of recent policy manouevers in Ottawa and Washington, and Ottawa and Quebec -- what might be called Canada's 'second front'-- indicate everything is changing, but this time things may not remain the same.

To make the case that US-Canada relations are changing but will not end Canada's independence, I offer a short account of historical differences in the evolution of American and Canadian national identities, noting that both countries present textbook cases of the familiar theoretical concepts of constructed identities, invented traditions and imagined communities (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Ranger, 1983). Then I briefly look at cross-border cultural politics, policy and media trade practices, before examining aspects of economic and political relations between Quebec and the ROC (Rest of Canada) in the context of the 1995 Referendum.

Space, place and geographic positionality

When we speak of national identity in the US and Canada it is important to recognize the strength of regional, provincial or state loyalties and identities that sometimes stop at borders and other times do not. Native Americans and Canada's First Nations developed tribal identities across lateral and horizontal positionalities prior to their political and later physical enclosure. The Hispanic and Latino presence along Anglo North America's southern rim similarly illustrates the continental, spatial-geographic as well as economic and cultural variation in North American identities. These lines tend to run North-South more often

than they do East-West making it possible to conceptualize these transborder complexities along three dimensions: the spatial, the political-economic and the social-cultural.

The spatial dimension. The postmodern notion that national boundaries and identities are outmoded by transborder trade and technologies is confounded by simple arithmetic and the rising demand for national recognition and status, generally by small-scale tribal or ethnic groups. In the US and Canada, where the latter is the world's largest landmass, and the other equally bi-coastal, the spatial dimension is important in four respects: horizontal, lateral, national and continental disjuncture as well as conjuncture. These invite contradiction and conflict as much as concurrence. Such divides frequently follow transborder, continental rather than national lines; the possibilities for regional fragmentation go far beyond Canada's Quebec. Although more of an apocalyptic notion than realpolitik probability, the suggestion that North America could comprise nine nations not three, each following continental, economic, and cultural -- not existing -- divides, is not without logic (Garreau (1981).²

The political-economic dimension. The historic imbalance of economic, military and political power between the US and Canada has accelerated under the opportunities NAFTA offers to wrap economic nationalism in the flag of 'free trade'. In a situation where Canada's economy is increasingly tied to that of the US, its ability to defend its cultural policies is circumscribed.

The socio-cultural dimension. The communication dimension is also affected by the skewed continental distribution of political and economic power. Here the advent of television magnified earlier patterns of print media and radio cross-border penetration. Cable and satellite technology further enlarged anglophone Canada's consumption of US primetime, while producing rather different consequences in Quebec. Yet, despite Canadians sharing the same broad heritage of prosperity, democracy and sit-com entertainment with Americans, there remains a remarkable divergence in social values reflected in founding documents that set the maintenance of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness' and 'law and order' as goals for the US and Canada respectively (albeit, there is now strong evidence of a developing convergence, cf. Nevitte, 1996; Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basanez, 1996), political history, and institutions. Many of the latter, modeled on those of Britain, remain (e.g., the social safety net and universal health care), but others are eroding under the force of global market logics, federal deficit finance reform, and a government willing to jettison electoral commitment to preserving a distinctive Canadian media presence in its haste to implement the 'information society' and to capitalize on the markets that it promises to open.

The 'Melting Pot' and the 'Cultural Mosaic'

Here the US and Canada present two different visions and versions of the concepts of hybridization and mixing so favoured by Latin American theorists (see, e.g., Garcia Canclini, 1995; Barbero, 1993). Both countries have been multicultural, multilingual and multiracial for over five centuries. Both accord with Keating's (1996) concept of 'civic nationalism', that confers citizenship on all within its borders, regardless of ethnic, racial or linguistic heritage, while fluctuating from any common code of practice. For successive waves of new Americans and new Canadians the yawning spaces of the continent required that traditions be invented and communities imagined to bind the parts and the peoples to the whole. From these continuous processes of construction and reconstruction came two nations, forged by different histories and institutions, with one divided by language, the other by race.³

America. The Revolution demanded America create 'new nation' myths and symbols. Consequently many historians maintain America's collective identity is creedal, a secular religion of shared beliefs in American exceptionalism, uniqueness and individualism, grounded in liberty, democracy, free markets and

constitutionalism (see, e.g., Woodward, 1988a, b; Lipset, 1996). Today consensus about what America is and who Americans are is elusive. What Gitlin (1995) regrets as the 'twilight' of commonality and shared dreams, Geyer (1995) states no longer exists, claiming Americans are 'no more'.

Another element in the selective history of America's collective memory is a political culture centred on a dualism of difference where ideas of pluralism and 'e pluribus unum' intersect and contradict, and where ethnicity and race, not class, still mark the deepest divides. Unlike nations such as Britain, where class remains the text and subtext of social life, economic caste is a less salient category in America's public, private and academic discourse, though it is a major focus of social science analysis and policy initiatives.

Canada. History, position and location wrote a very different script for Canada. Conquest and empire loyalty, not revolution, authored Canada's collective and selective memory narratives. There, until very recently, traditions were not so much new and invented, as recycled, a mix of old and older. (And in Quebec, to a remarkable degree, still are.) The contrast in national psyches is typified by novelist Margaret Atwood's reputed remark that "if Americans suffer from megalomania, Canadians suffer from paranoid schizophrenia". Internally, Canada remains a country divided further by regional economic and cultural differences as well as language. Lacking a common creed or pantheon of revolutionary heroes and symbols, Canada before and after Confederation in 1867 and the proactive federalism of Pierre Trudeau in the 1970s, remains a nation of 'Two Solitudes'.

The Role of Cultural/Media Policy

National media play an important role in small democratic societies such as those of western Europe. In countries the scale of the US and Canada, that role is infinitely more tenuous and problematic. To the extent that market restructuring and technological abundance foster audience fragmentation, there has been a commensurate decline in the means of mass communication that permitted citizens to join symbolically in antional community through shared media rituals and messages. This concept of citizenship once fed national public broadcasting systems, now both the institutions and the concept are under threat. Historically, public broadcasters such as the CBC, as well as private networks such as ABC, CBS, or NBC (in their advertisements as well as programmes) provided continent-wide, shared national public spaces, though, because they always had competition, never to the extent of the situation in Israel that Elihu Katz describes.

In Canada. In Canada, the national broadcasting project is in retreat under pressures from competing technologies and services and declining audiences. But the coup de grace comes from recent federal policy decisions, including the fiscal slash and burn directed at reducing the CBC to something closer to America's neutered PBS. These developments can be looked at in two ways. First it shows that broadcasting and cultural policy are being reconfigured as economic policy and rerouted as ancillary to information highway, information society politics (Ferguson, 1995; also cf. Raboy, this volume). And where Canada was formerly a model that Europe and other nations looked to for cultural defensive strategies, today all roads look increasingly alike. (For an in depth discussion of the European case, see Schlesinger and Doyle, 1995.)

Second, in Canada's case there appears to be a withering of public interest in and debate over such issues, especially amongst the elites⁵, with the 'cultural' being shown its place by the 'financial' and 'political'. Canada is privatizing. Starting with the National Film Board and the CBC and moving on to book publishers' grants, the federal government is intent on developing cultural industry exports in sound recordings, television and film. To quote the editor of the *Canadian Journal of Communication*, "If you want to be optimistic, you can say we are indeed beginning to break the hegemony of US cultural products. That's good. But the price

we are paying is cultural articulation".⁶ Partial success in breaking the US hegemony is a double-edged sword that exacts the price of reducing media produced by Canadians for Canadians.

On the print media side, the story is mixed. Given that almost three-quarters of all books and magazines sold in Canada are 'foreign', without Bill C58 to protect the advertising base of Canadian periodicals it is certain that fewer would exist. Canada's news weekly, *Macleans*, has overtaken *Time*, and now sells over half a million copies with two and a half million readers per week. (Multiply by ten for approximate US figures.) In terms of democracy and press freedom to voice its citizens concerns, one applauds *Macleans*, whose editor explains:

Our readers tell us it is important for Canadians to have their own news magazine, to have a national magazine covering issues through the prism of their experiences. But for every *Macleans* there are five or six publications on the verge of extinction.⁷

In America. The record of successive administrations illuminates the extent of US protectionist measures at home and initiatives abroad fostered by decades of corporatist collusion between Washington and Hollywood that secured world screen and distribution dominance in the first place (see, e.g., Thompson, 1986; Jarvie, 1992). Now with countries worldwide reordering industrial priorities to qualify for information-society status, "infotainment and telecom nationalism" appears poised to become an old-new favoured category of official support (Ferguson, 1995).

But the neocorporatism found in the deregulation of media and culture industries is a transborder phenomenon. It is found in the 1996 US *Telecommunications Act*, promoted by industry and Congress alike as the route to greater consumer choice, faster technology and cheaper services. To date, though, the Act's visible consequences are an acceleration in further media ownership concentration rather than rewards to consumers (see, e.g., Bogart 1996:15). Similar, if less easily spotted trends are evident in Canada, too. There the Chretien government among other corporate-friendly moves, granted Canadian citizenship to Seagrams-MCA, a major Hollywood player.

Culture, language and national identity: Canada's Complexity

By law, multiculturalism and bilingualism are features of Canadian citizenship. In the US both concepts are contested, multiculturalism is frequently decried and bilingualism is countered by English First initiatives to legislate one official language. (In Quebec, of course, language is an even more explosive issue.) However, a major myth about Canada is the claim that communication technologies have been causally connected to statehood and national identity (Babe, 1989); it is truer to say that Canada exists in spite of modern communications, not because of the telegraph, radio, cable or satellites.⁸

Canada's media dilemmas remain positional, the consequences of economy and technology as well as cultural and audience preferences, exacerbated by geographic proximity. Today many of the same cultural concerns are global, no longer local North (or South) American affairs. Efforts to use "Canadian content" quotas and Telefilm Canada production subsidies to maintain political and cultural distinctiveness continue, but increasingly are threatened as Canada's government moves rapidly to a commercial model in the cultural marketplace. Visibly lower on the policy agenda are high production and marketing costs in a small domestic market that carries the increased marginal costs of bilingualism and where economies of scale accrue only to foreign competitors. Canada's dilemma's are not unique, nor are its experiences in dealing with them.

The Separatists, the Federalists and the Quebec Referendum9

A Vancouver talk show host called it the "Neverendum". This was the 1995 political event labeled an exercise in 'social democracy' by the Parti Québécois that sought to sever unconstitutionally, or if it proved more profitable, only partially sever, Quebec from the rest of the country. One of Canada's foremost political philosophers and a twelfth generation Quebecer explained "Quebecers show they are Canadians by being Quebecers". But the same caveat holds for Nova Scotians, or British Columbians, and given North America's vastness and multiple identities, 'being Canadian', like 'being American', is always a "matter of the heart" as the separatists claimed for themselves. In countries peopled almost entirely by migrants and their descendants, collective identity is always multi-faceted, a mixture of old, new, regional, state or provincial loyalties that exist alongside and inside those of national citizenship.

If a nation's political culture is consists of what its citizens remember, in countries made by migration, national identities reflect and incorporate many remembered selves. And that history is communicated via words, symbols, rituals, institutions, media and language, with the latter assuming greater or lesser importance in some contexts than others. Here the idealist argument that nationality is shaped by a 'nationalism born out of [such] preoccupation with status' (Grainfield, 1992:488) corresponds with Weber's observation about nation-state aspirations that the 'more power is emphasized, the closer appears to be the link between nation and state' (Weber, cited in Tiryakian & Nevitte, 1985: 64). Preoccupation with both status and power accords with the politics of separation in Quebec. This is manifest in the skill with which its proponents 'play the culture card'. Here this can mean two things not un-connected; either cultural policy is linked to the desire for cultural survival and development, or cultural difference is used as a political tool directed towards sovereignty.¹¹

Playing the culture card

Part of the different script history wrote for Canada compared with that of the US is the story of what used to be known as French-Canada, or Quebec. The narrative of separatism developed since the 1960s involves a juxtaposing, some might say demonizing, of the ROC (Rest of Canada) against a francophone Quebec. These alternative narratives or collective memories are constructed with grounding in specific arenas of communication and identity: language policy, schoolbook history, popular culture and media production. Often obscured in the public articulation of these strategies is the extent to which the ROC picks up the price tag of cultural and social support.

Language laws

The use of language laws to preserve linguistic purity and make Quebec monolingual, at least publicly, contravene national bilingual policy. Such laws, as Bill 22 in 1974 and Bill 101 in 1977, made French Quebec's one official language, outlawed public displays of English, and created language watchdog bodies. Despite this denial of freedom of speech and expression to residents for whom French is not their first language, and a Supreme Court ruling that such restrictions violate Canada's Charter of Human Rights, the language wars persist. By 1990 Quebec had four provincial agencies with an annual budget of \$24 million to guard linguistic purity (Richler 1993:). The persistence of this issue is demonstrated by the post-Referendum renewal of 'french only' initiatives, and a countermove by Quebec's anglophones, the Alliance Quebec, to regain some of their language rights. 12

Textbook Histories

Canada lacks America's rich symbols and media-reinforced mythology of Americanness, one reason it may be more vulnerable to selective history interpretations. Thus, it is not difficult to imagine possible outcomes when such a country's collective memories are constructed from two very different versions of the same stories, the one inclusive, the other exclusive. A comparison of francophone and anglophone history

texts found, for example, that in terms of historical period emphasis, 80.5 per cent of French texts were devoted to the pre-1760 period, 19.5 per cent to the last 235 years; English texts were about 50:50. In French texts, 98.1 per cent of heroes were French Canadian (1.9 per cent English); in English texts, 49.5 per cent were French and 50.5 per cent English-Canadian (cited in Bell, 1992: 193). The children raised on these selective memories are Quebec's journalists, educators and politicians today.

Federal francophone cultural policy

Federal cultural support policies have been highly successful in Quebec, less so in the ROC. There are three reasons for this. First, Anglophone Canada is linguistically more open to US media products; second, Quebec's cultural industries have benefited from a longstanding higher ratio of federal cultural dollars; third, and equally significant, Quebec's media and education policies are inward-directed. It is no accident of history that the founder of the Parti Québécois was a popular broadcaster on Radio-Canada, the french language arm of the CBC. The French network's role in the growth of Quebec nationalism is becoming clearer; the CBC's divided institutional structure as well as language played a part (see, e.g., Balthazar, 1997). In television particularly, as Bombardier (1985:178) stated a decade ago, 'unlike what happened in other developed societies where television became a window open to the world, in Quebec television has been first and foremost a window opened onto the distinctive culture of Quebec'. The political potential of audio-visual media under such conditions is considerable.

Media Separatism

This inner-directed, media separatism is part of a federally-aided popular culture that only occasionally contributes a Cline Dion to Canada and the world. Richly nourished by grants, both provincial and federal, Quebec's artists and filmmakers are among the most subsidized anywhere. The series of Canadian Prime Ministers from Quebec who have governed for all but eighteen months of the past twenty eight years have preached federalism but practised provincialism, as separatists have played the culture card with considerable success. In 1992-93, Radio-Canada received 40 per cent of the CBC's countrywide budget, Quebec received 47 per cent of Telefilm Canada's and 51 per cent of Heritage Canada's countrywide budget (Riley, 1995: B8). In 1995, the federal government transferred from Ottawa to Quebec a total of \$38 billion, plus \$8 billion for welfare, health, social programs, including nearly \$4 billion in equalization payments. As almost one third of Quebec's revenues, \$1,590 for each resident, this is 25 per cent above the per-capita national average (Montreal Gazette, 28 October 1995, p.A7). A one-way system of redistribution with which other provinces grow restive.

Continental and Other Divides...to be continued....

This sketch of shifting cultural boundaries, communication and identity that impact on Canada's efforts to maintain cultural integrity highlights the significance and force of three factors -- continental scale, regional loyalties and economic nationalism -- that coexist inside the rubrics of NAFTA and the global market. The continued vulnerability of Canada's national print and audiovisual media to those of the US and its continued contestatory relations with Quebec's separatists illustrate but two of the complexities involved.

As vast and heterogeneous, as multilingual, multiracial and multicultural as the US and Canada are, perhaps it is something of a miracle that they cohere as nation-states at all. It merits reflection, therefore, that however rock-like America's collective identity appears alongside Canada's perpetual ferment, the cleavage potential based on ethnicity, language or region knows no national boundary. The legacies of history and processes of nation construction and reconstruction are still in play in Anglo-North America as elsewhere.

ENDNOTES

- * A somewhat different version of this paper was presented at the 'Cultural boundaries: Identity and communication in Latin America' seminar, Stirling University, Scotland, 16-18 October 1996. Forthcoming in *Media Development*, special issue, seminar collected papers,
- 1. In this regard, see some of the remarks cited by Joel Smith in his introductory paper.
- 2. Garreau's nine 'nations' were: the Breadbasket, Ecotopia, the Empty Quarter, Mexamerica, Dixie, the Islands [Caribbean], New England, the Foundry [northeast 'rustbelt'] and Quebec.
- 3. The divided loyalties of multiple collective identities are examined more fully in Ferguson (1997). The contemporary distinction between language and race may, however, hide an earlier parallel. Eighteenth and 19th century discussions of French-English relations in Canada often referred to the two as races.
- 4. The pertinent label is novelist Hugh MacLennan's (1972), a variation on Lord Durham's verdict of "two nations warring in the bosom of a single state".
- 5. However, the case might be made that it is among the elite that support for the CBC is strongest. Those who do not oppose the decrease in support seem to enjoy making the point that the membership of Friends of Canadian Broadcasting, the most vocal pro-CBC lobby, is primarily drawn from the elite.
- 6. My thanks to Rowland Lorimer, the editor and Director of the Canadian Centre for Studies in Publishing, Simon Fraser University, for his helpful email on this subject, October 1996.
- 7. Robert Lewis, editor-in-chief, telephone interview, December 1995; reconfirmed November, 1996.
- 8. Ironically, Canada's launch of the world's first domestic satellite in 1962, and expansion of satellite services in the 1970s, opened the floodgates of American television to remote northern as well as border areas.
- 9. A Fellowship at the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, Columbia University, Fall 1995, enabled me to study the Referendum process and the 'Oui" Committee's media politics firsthand. I am grateful to the Freedom Forum for this learning experience.
- 10. Charles Taylor, McGill University, personal interview, 26 October 1995.
- 11. My thanks to Fred Fletcher of York University for his helpful comments and for clarifying this thought, December 1996.
- 12. See Richler (1992: 2 and passim) for details of Quebec's language purity agencies and their actions; see also Schneider (1996) for an account of anglophone activism and the new force of the 'Angry Anglo'.

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Nationalism, National Cultures and The Means of Communication: an Essay On Official and Popular Cultures

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A paternal Government does its best to compel us to buy Canadian clothing, beets and sugar, and partially succeeds, but neither protection nor any other forcing process will do very much for giving us the finer products of the hands and the brain (Toronto, *The Globe*, April 25, 1891, cited by Davison-Wood, 1981).

In Canada at present there is a tendency to oppose regionalism to nationalism. I believe that to deny regionalism is to deny the Canadian nation as it historically and geographically exists and as it is likely to exist in any foreseeable future. For Canada is by definition a confederation, and a confederation is something quite different from the centralized and long out-dated nation-state of the type developed in eighteenth-century Europe (Woodcock, 1987:23).

Computing is not about computers anymore. It is about living. [Computers are at home, in the office, on our laps, in our pockets.] As we interconnect ourselves, many of the values of a nation-state will give way to those of both larger and smaller electronic communities. We will socialize in digital neighbourhoods in which physical space will be irrelevant and time will play a different role (Negroponte, 1995:6-7).

These three statements point to the major axes around which Canadian political and economic discourse revolves. The first, an 1891 editorial comment, was a response to Federal Government assistance to the arts -- a reaction to cultural nationalism that implied an axis of discourse organized around the poles of nationalism and continentalism.\(^1\) The second, a 1980 statement, suggests the interplay and struggle between centralisation and regionalisation or the relative strength of Federal and Provincial authority.\(^2\) The third, from the recent book, Being Digital, opens two other axes: the struggle between private and public enterprise and the tense interaction between state regulatory power and new, rapidly developing means of communication. I will return to the latter toward the end of this essay. The other three axes -- nationalism versus continentalism, public versus private enterprise, and regionalisation versus centralisation -- have preoccupied Canadian political and economic discourse since Confederation and have set the context for broadcasting policy.

To clarify the basis of my analysis, I make a distinction here between discourse and interests that somewhat parallels Margaret Archer's (1988) agency/structure distinction. This is to draw attention analytically to discourse as dialogical and active -- as signing and symbolizing what has been, what is, and what is becoming in contrast to interests as organized status and power. The interests of organized status and power are expressed in discourse; the interests of counter-movements and the full range of everyday living experiences are also expressed in and through discourse. Few would argue that discourse -- the creation and reproduction of language and imagery -- is not at the core of the construction and deconstruction of meanings; in a word, *culture*. Accordingly, culture and cultural development may refer to dominant, traditional, or emerging meaning systems; the latter two challenging the dominant. Therefore, one cannot conceptually oppose culture to market-place economics, or keep culture out of or put culture into trade negotiations. Market-place economics is a culture -- a set of meanings and prescriptions for action -- as are anti-market

public policy objectives (cf. Wuthnow, 1988, for an extensive analysis of dominant and counter-discourse). Culture can only be put into or taken out of trade negotiations if one specifies the cultural configuration at issue. In Canadian/U.S. trade negotiations the references are not to culture *tout court* but specifically to industrial complexes (public and private) that produce and distribute particular types of discourse, an important point if one is to address public policy regarding instruments of communication. We cannot oppose cultural development *per se* to market place thinking or to technology for that matter; we can oppose only a specified and particular set of goals for cultural development to the market place, keeping in mind that the proponents of market-place thinking will have their own agenda for cultural development.

There is, however, a tendency to cast culture and, therefore, cultural development on the side of angels and the market-place or commodification on the side of demons. Though I do not wish to enter into a dissertation on demonology, I do want to be understood as taking the position that each side has its share of demons and angels. The Reform Party critic on cultural policy is articulating a fairly coherent culture and, in so doing, is presenting a configuration of meanings in opposition to accepted tenets on cultural policy—this too, for better or for worse, is cultural development. Culture is the creation and reproduction of meanings, regardless of what those meanings might be.

Accordingly, each position on the proposed axes of discourse is a particular cultural configuration generating discourse around questions pertaining to the meaning of civic life, public policy and the role of the state. In this paper I will explore these axes in order to set the context in which electronic media are used and regulated. Attention will be given first to the conceptualization of culture and nationalism as particular cultural configurations. I will then be in a position to elaborate on the axes of discourse and relate them to broadcasting and related regulatory policies in Canada. This will be followed by a consideration of possible directions for policy, particularly with respect to the new technologies of broadcasting and communication.

Culture And Discourse

For most Canadian social scientists outside of Quebec the path of Canadian (read English-Canadian) culture is well trodden and safe; it is one which is at times cherished and at times lamented. Cherished or lamented it is defined in relation to the United States; that is, in intellectual and political circles Canadian culture is commonly taken as the negation of American culture. Elsewhere (Nielsen and Jackson, 1991) we have stated that the said and the sayable, the imagery and the imaginable of cultural industries in English-Canada simulate a sense of nation in an otherwise absent national culture. Canada's sense of culture has been and continues to be either abstractly pan-Canadian or concretely local. For almost thirty years anglophone Canadian intellectuals have known that their francophone colleagues do not share the same pan-Canadian sense of self, nor do they see themselves as a region of the country. Still, the cultural industries along with the English-Canadian intellectual formation, itself an integral part of the industry, continue to simulate a homogeneous sense of presence in an otherwise absence of such a culture. Canadian culture is problematic and so, therefore, are cultural policies, most of which, since even before Confederation, have been cast negatively vis-a-vis the United States.

Given what is known about English-Canadian television viewing, policies are not only negatively defined but appear to have very little to do with behaviour "on the ground." Does this suggest perhaps two levels of culture, not "high" and "low" or refined and philistine, but the official culture of public policy and cultural industries and the popular culture of everyday life? The distinction between official and popular culture introduced here is not normally found in discussions of radio and television broadcasting. Following

the late Marcel Rioux (1984:2), popular culture is *not* defined according to that which attracts the most attention or the highest ratings, but in relation to official culture as:

the shared perceptions, values, knowledge, learning, and technologies that are derived from western society's education system and its media ... A culture is *produced* by a small number of individuals, and is then diffused and *consumed* ...

Official culture is just that, the systems of meaning produced, reproduced and propagated by society's institutions, appropriately labeled cultural industries. Popular culture is the creation and use of everyday meanings which evade, undermine and generally oppose official culture. It may draw on tradition or it may represent new, emerging configurations. The key then, is not a particular artifact, "Seinfeld" versus "Masterpiece Theatre" or rock versus the classical repertoire, but the source and use of the product. Seinfeld may well be "official" culture for it does originate in established media institutions, but the key question is, is it or any similar artifact passively consumed as an "official" representation, or actively exploited to serve oppositional or alternative ends? *Policy*, a systematic representation of particular cultural configurations, is inescapably official culture. A consideration of the nature of "culture" may clarify the issue.

The traditional anthropological definition refers to culture as a whole way of life. Specifically, "...patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols ...(C)ulture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952:181)." A later definition by Raymond Williams (1981:13), though more contemporary, is not all that different: "...culture [is] the signifying system through which necessarily...a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored." Two points are worth noting here. First, in so far as meanings are created and sustained in the whole variety of human practices and structures, culture encompasses the political, economic, and social domains; that is, one can quite legitimately speak of an economic or a political culture. Second, signifying systems point to structures, neither practices nor agency. Structures call to mind the body of acquired and accumulated values, ideas, norms and affective patterns. We have so defined "official culture." On the other hand, practices and agencies call to mind creative action through which cultural patterns are sustained, altered, and opposed; it includes actual day-to-day living in which people "make-do," resist, and subvert established patterns ("popular culture") and the work of people in positions of authority intended to harden established patterns or establish patterns in their own interests ("official culture") (cf. de Certeau, 1984, especially Chs. III and VII).

Keeping these two points in mind, at any one time, in any one socio-cultural space there will be an official, dominant cultural pattern sustained by cultural actors and, of equal import, there will be archaic, residual, and emerging patterns present (cf. Williams, 1977). In between, around, and underneath this process will be popular culture -- the "making-do," evasion, and subversion arising from the exigencies of everyday life. Indeed, the television viewer, radio listener, and internet user is very much a bricoleur/bricoleuse. Cultural policy (or any other type of policy), of necessity, will sustain the official (authorial) discourse, although at times a struggle for dominance of the agenda for cultural development may be going on between, for example, the political and economic or the social and political spheres of interest. Discourse, in this sense, is the utterance, the dialogical instance in which an actor takes into account the other, either externally or internally constituted. What must be understood is that the authors of policy (ultimately agents of the state), in this case broadcasting policy, create a unified and whole discourse drawn from heterogeneous sources and voices, a discourse which may well include conflicting archaic, traditional, and emerging ideas and patterns of ideas -- ideas rooted in nationalism and in the appropriate role of the state.

Nationalism

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Nationalism, Anderson (1991) informs us, is a cultural artifact and, as such, yields an imagined political community -- it is a constructed vision defining a people and/or territory. Literature on the nation and nationalism generally draws attention to a distinction somewhat corresponding to the difference between "ethnic" and "civic" nations. The route of the former, according to Anthony Smith (1938:xiii), is "via culture and imputed descent of a more or less compact group," while the route of the latter is "via state centralisation and territorial homogenisation of ethnically heterogeneous groups." Canada, though closer to the latter, originated in a mix of civic and ethnic nationalisms. Nevertheless, in either case and, most especially in the latter, the state assumes the task of creating a national imagination; in Gellner's words (1964:169), nationalism "invents nations where they do not exist"; in effect, nationalism creates and sustains new cultural artifacts, "invents nations where they do not exist"; in effect, nationalism creates and sustains new cultural artifacts, a complex of representations, symbols, and discourse pointing to the nation. Considering the role of the state (as distinct from "the nation"), Gellner's proposition may be extended to read that the state may invent the nation and an attendant nationalism.

The inventing of Canada and its attendant nationalism would appear to have its roots during the early 19th century that the "new nationality" described by Frank Underhill (cited by Paquet, 1968:52) signaled the emergence of nationalism and the never ending quest for a national identity on the part of intellectual and economic elites. This new nationalism was not the romantic and imaginary nationalism of shared history and common origins, of popular culture, if you wish, rather, it was the nationalism of bankers, railway investors, land speculators, and such (Paquet, 1968:52). It came to a head in mid-century during the period of reciprocity, the continuing annexation movements, and the earlier bankruptcy of the canal schemes in Upper Canada. In a word, it was the economic nationalism of the Confederation project, a nationalism which readily linked with cultural industries. As early as 1858, D'Arcy McGee, later a "Father of Confederation," argued for tariffs and release from the Imperial Copyright Act in order to protect Canadian literature. In his words, "Every Country, every nationality, every people must create and foster a national Literature, if it is their wish to preserve a distinct individuality from other Nations (cited by Davison-Wood, 1981:127)."

'The national policy' of Confederation -- protective tariffs, transportation links, the wheat economy, and the centralization of the banking system -- is not usually thought of as including culture, but the very process of linking divers peoples and centralising diverse interests technologically and organizationally could not help but serve to legitimate the state and define a new official culture.

For rulers the problem was thus not simply that of acquiring a new legitimacy... (T)he identification with a 'people' or 'nation', however defined, was a convenient...way of solving it, and in states which insisted on popular sovereignty, by definition the only way... Government and subject citizen were inevitably linked by daily bonds, as never before. And the nineteenth century revolutions in transport and communications typified by the railway and telegraph tightened and routinized the links between central authority and its remotest outposts. (Hobsbawm, 1991:81-84)

This is the project which gave rise to broadcasting and other cultural policies, a project defined in and for the protection of narrow economic interests and the dissemination of a centralised vision of a nation state in a nineteenth century mold.

The Role of the State

The state invents the nation and develops an appropriate nationalism (a particular cultural configuration) in the political, economic and social spheres. Although this is not necessarily the sequence that all existing nations and nation-states experienced, it was and is the case with Canada. To step back a bit, that all existing nations and nation-states experienced, it was and is the case with Canada. To step back a bit, the role of the state in capitalist formations is to fulfil two contradictory functions -- accumulation and

legitimation. The state must simultaneously create and reproduce the conditions "in which profitable capital accumulation is possible [and] ...create the conditions for social harmony" (Panitch, 1977:8). To push either function to its logical conclusion would defeat the other. There is a related contradiction. It lies in a culture of possessive individualism which is deeply embedded in western liberal-democratic states. Individualism carries with it the substantial gains of the rise of liberal democracies over the past three centuries -- individual rights, the right to trial by peers, universal suffrage, free speech, freedom of association -- while at the same time the culture of individualism holds a "possessive quality...found in its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his [sic] own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them" (Macpherson, 1962:3) or, by extension, to society for the welfare of others.

The contradiction is clear enough -- the pursuit of individuality to its conclusion defeats the collective bond necessary for the society, the nation and the state to continue to exist. Although there is no logical correspondence between the elements of each contradiction, the extent to which the state pursues its legitimation functions will tend to strengthen collective bonds and, thus, crowd accumulation and individualism. This is the irony of broadcasting regulations; the Canadian state requires a modicum of control over what are traditionally instruments of nationalism, a control contributing to the legitimacy of the state while simultaneously providing the conditions for capital accumulation in related (cultural) industries. To this we may add the absence of any strong national commitments within a population whose sense of self is constituted at the local or regional level of everyday life, an identity which, if pushed beyond the concrete, depends on a regional/central, Quebec/Canada, or Canada/America alterity; negative identities in all respects. Compounded with this identity is a strong possessive individualism which, again ironically, now appears more and more to privilege capital accumulation over legitimacy and individual over collective values. The axes of discourse earlier proposed emerge from these dilemmas and generate the struggles around broadcasting policies. But, underneath this discourse, at the concrete level of lived experience, people go about making-do with the outcomes of policy.

The Axes of Discourse

The axes of discourse, introduced above, are composed of polar types of cultural configurations. Thus, for example, private and public enterprise are opposed cultural configurations. The cultural dynamics -- economic, political, and social -- internal and external to Canada, shift the dominant (official) discourse in one or the other direction, shifts which, in turn, both direct and respond to shifts on the remaining two axes.

Private vs. Public Enterprise. Debates over private versus public ownership and control are at the core of public policy. The neo-conservative move to privatise crown corporations continues to threaten the very existence of the CBC, the National Film Board, Telefilm Canada and related activities, but this really has very little to do with whether one 'likes' these agencies or not. A particular economic culture (rooted in capital accumulation and possessive individualism) maps on to a particular set of interests to reinforce a particular strategy. It is called globalization or re-structuring, euphemisms for a reorganization of the means of production that no longer requires the nation-state of the 19th century as a support for capital accumulation. Consequently, the old cultural systems legitimating the nation state also are no longer required.

Private enterprise rhetoric carries with it a particular logic of organization and control. Organization tends to be centralised, though there is a movement afoot in the private sector which sees the possibility of greater control and productivity in decentralization (it will take the public sector a generation to catch up with this movement) (cf. Gerlach, 1996). The success of methods of control is measured in the market place. For the CBC and similar public agencies this means an ever increasing interest in ratings and advertising income.

There is little complementarity between public and private enterprise; the logical unfolding of one stands in contradiction to the logical unfolding of the other (for example, it is next to impossible to reconcile the individualism of private enterprise with the collectivism of public enterprise). The CBC as a public corporation exists solely to promulgate a particular vision of Canada and to support related Canadian cultural industries. These objectives run contrary to the current movement of capital. This objective becomes less and less possible to achieve in the logic of marketing. The contradictions are clear enough.

Nationalism vs. Continentalism. The nationalism/continentalism axis is central to the English-Canadian national project. The opposition to a mythical America lies at the base of the pan-Canadian, centralised national vision. According to one recent analysis (Bashevkin, 1991), this particular vision, propagated by the major publicly owned and subsidized cultural industries in English Canada, "...remains a minority perspective at most times, an outlook that is limited by the pull of competing political identities within Canada and by the reality of broader continental and global influences"(28). It is this vision of the nation which had its origins in pre-confederation days and surfaced as a reasonably well defined cultural configuration in the Canada First movement following confederation. As Bashevkin observes (17):

Leaders of [this movement] wrote at length about the northern climate and icy land that, in their view, provided the core strength and spirit of Canada [read English-Canada]. Drawing on the dominant social Darwinist and Romantic idea of the day, George Parkin maintained that the severity of the Canadian climate would ensure national vigour, order and strength.

These were the 19th century Imperial Tories, their imagery reaching across generations transforming Darwinism and romanticism into 20th century literary and artistic archetypes. Their assertions of distinctiveness served to create the negative 'other' -- the United States -- upon which English-Canadian identity was to be built. The "belief that the US was an unstable, excessively democratic society, overrun with immigrants from southern [Europe]" (17) sustained the official view of Canada into the 1920s.

By the 1920's and into the 1930's the cause of nationalism and its essential anti-Americanism was taken up by politically progressive circles. The English-Canadian national project became associated with a culture of collective responsibility and collective democracy, opposing the culture of possessive individualism. This is the cultural configuration of definition of self and other that dominated the League for Social Reconstruction and the Canadian Radio League, the latter being the major lobbying force for a nationalised broadcasting system during the 1930s. This shift in the nationalist discourse had a more than passing effect on public policy. It changed, slightly but significantly, the orientation of policy from blatant support for capital accumulation to the legitimation function, from private to public values. It also signaled a change in ontological assumptions from "the liberal, individualist concept of man [sic] as essentially a consumer of utilities, an infinite desirer and infinite appropriator...[to a] concept of man [sic] as an enjoyer and exerter of his [sic] uniquely human...capacities, a view which began to challenge the market view" (Macpherson, 1973:24-25). Ambivalence, attested to by C.B. Macpherson(1973) and, later, by Charles Taylor (1991), perhaps more than any other quality defines the boundaries between these two ontologies.

The concept of public broadcasting along with other collectively oriented policies with respect to education, health and welfare were introduced as a consequence of this shift. To continue to exist in its present form the CBC requires the cultural underpinnings of a centralised pan-Canadian nationalism and this, in turn, depends on a continuing anti-continentalism and a collectively oriented ontology. What may be clear is that as privatisation pushes toward continentalism, nationalism and public enterprise go hand-in-hand.

Centralisation vs. Decentralisation.

We're becoming more centralized. I am a regional producer -- my salary is paid by the region and there are about five others here -- every single one of us produce exclusively for the network, its a bone of contention and a rather sore point at the moment because we need help. I am a department of one --I produce over 50% of the "ideas" programming coming out of Toronto. (Don Mowat, 1994:interview)

There is resentment expressed here -- resentment of central control and a central vision deemed universal. Nationalism requires a marshaling of forces in central places to reproduce and diffuse its particular definition of social order. The logic of market culture combined with a nationalist cause further limits opposing visions and regional visions within the mainstream. You may be familiar with the failure of the early attempts of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Quebec to obtain licences to operate provincial radio stations, and Manitoba's reluctant surrender of the field of public broadcasting to the CBC in 1947. The debate continues within and outside the CBC. With respect to television, it is well documented by Wayne Skene's (1993) analysis of conditions in the CBC. Debates over the regional question are a rather permanent fixture in the CBC with the Corporation expressing considerable ambivalence over the years. The debate has centred around central versus regional production (aesthetic control), central versus regional broadcasting (budget allocations for local versus network diffusion), and regional versus central management control. Centralisation appears to have won the day in television and remains a strong contender in radio.

With respect to public policy you will recognize the tension between private and public enterprise, nationalism and continentalism, centralism and regionalism. The pole of each axis in constituting a cultural configuration forms a matrix in which political and cultural practices are born and nurtured or aborted. Perhaps one can visualise all three revolving around a central point, clockwise and counter-clockwise, with practices and discourse moving, sometimes in tandem, sometimes independently, along each axis from pole to pole. Theoretically, a move toward the nationalist pole on one axis tends to trigger a move toward the centralist and public enterprise poles on the other two. A move toward the continentalist pole will tend to trigger a move toward the regionalist and private enterprise poles on the other two. To put it another way, the three axes, as a system, constrain the limits of action within corresponding social systems -- the questions of budget allocations, advertising, regional and network production emphasis and so on. And, they constrain the directions assumed by policy formulation and implementation. Both cultural industries and the state are caught in this web of contradictory forces. At this moment it would seem that continentalism and privatisation dominate at the expense of nationalism and public enterprise. A decentralisation also appears to be in the wings as the Federal Government loses the economic resources to implement centralist policies.

The Policy Context

Canadian public policy has been and continues to be instituted in this field of contradictory forces. The major issue of the moment rests on the apparent shift backwards to the ontology of possessive individualism as the principal moving force. This is not the only difficulty. First, the 'new nationality' of Confederation was imposed upon a very diverse population in order to pursue, with the instruments of state in hand, high investment economic adventures. Canada's nationalism did not emerge from the lengthy political, economic and social history of a people. To be sure, Quebec did not fit this mold, as is now patently clear, but its elites joined in the pan-Canadian adventure. The new notables drew on the British connection in initially defining 'a people' and a nationality. To this was added an anti-Americanism. These definitions provided the base for public policy in the arts and letters and later in science and electronic communications.

Second, the drive to create a unified nation-state required a centralisation in theory and practice. Enter the continuing struggle between centralisation and decentralisation as local populations attempted to assert their identities in the face of a national project to create 'a people' sufficient in self awareness to support east-west economic ties and act as a bulwark against American cultural intervention. The nationalism carried both centralising and anti-continental views, a vision which was to be imbedded in public policy. Finally, the movement in the early part of this century toward an official collective orientation served to advance the cause of public welfare, a welfare which would be melded with nationalism and centralisation and, finally, in the eyes of many define Canadian culture.

Policies formulation and implementation for popular culture (the alternative being the oppositional and subversive activity of everyday living) is, by definition, official culture; it will inevitably be resisted. Whatever policies regarding licence fees for ownership of receivers (should they return), Canadian content, Canadian ownership, use of satellite receivers, etc., are introduced, a significant proportion of the population will subvert the rules, partly out of sheer self-interest, partly in spite of any commitment to Canadian nationalism which does exist, and partly because of much stronger regional identities and, in the case of Quebec, a stronger national identity.

Policies and the Future

More recent inquiries into cultural activity, following initial probes in the mid- and late 19th century -- the Aird Report (1929), instrumental in the formation of the CBC; the Massey-Lévesque Report (1951), instrumental in the formation of the Canada Council; the Fowler Report (1957); the Applebaum-Hébert Report (1982); and the more recent Caplan-Sauvageau Report (1986) -- have continued to articulate a national policy in the domains of culture and science. They articulate a vision of national unity that coincides with the economic nationalism of Confederation. The initial British commonality linked with a recognition of the 'founding races' (French and English) and the later institutionalisation of anti-Americanism were tactics to reinforce the chances that the principal project -- the invention of the nation -- would succeed. The strategy required a centralised, pan-Canadian vision. This was the so-called cultural side, designed to complement the economic side -- a use of the instruments of state to publicly finance the infrastructure (railways, canals, communications networks) necessary for private economic exploitation. The whole yields a total Canadian culture caught in a principal ontological contradiction, essentially a possessive individualism versus a collectivism, and in a series of secondary discursive contradictions that revolve around the cultural configurations of nationalism, centralization and public enterprise. Certainly policy initiatives and actual policies have struggled to locate a safe place along the axes. Now there may not be a safe place to land.

Broadcasting. Broadcasting regulations revolve around several issues: (1) the relative strength of public and private input, (2) competition vs monopolistic conditions in the private sector, (3) consumer/broadcaster relations, (4) Canadian content, and (5) regional/national emphasis. The private/public question refers directly to the CBC, its role in broadcasting, and its financing. As noted above, the 1920s switch to a collective, public orientation in social and political arrangements sparked the move to nationalise broadcasting, a move which, at the time, coincided with the economic interests in national identity. Policy tensions on this dimension have remained rather high since then. Recently, the CRTC (which had already favoured monopolistic conditions in the cable industry) made it quite clear that it favoured cable over direct-broadcast satellite (DBS), a position which dramatically failed during the summer of 1995. Furthermore, once the CRTC backtracked and recognized DBS, the federal government felt it necessary to make a rare intervention in order to create competitive conditions. Meanwhile, on the CBC front the choices appear to be complete privatisation (the Reform Party position), reduction in size and coverage with some sort of

alliance with the National Film Board and Telefilm Canada, or additional funds pumped in through a CRTC created Canadian programme fund (under court challenge at the time of writing). Whatever alternative is followed, the CBC will face increasingly drastic cuts in funding. Relative to other policy areas, judging especially from provincial initiatives and rhetoric in Alberta and Ontario, public policy based on a sense of collective responsibilities exercised through the state is in serious jeopardy.

It is evident that the Canadian content rules are rooted in the nationalist project of English-Canada. The rationale is based on the assumption that only programs produced by Canadians will hold back American cultural encroachment and permit young and old citizens alike to develop and retain a strong Canadian identity. There is no evidence that a drama produced by Alliance will strengthen Canadian identity. If there is a Canadian culture, it will filter material as received. Viewers and listeners are not passive recipients and in the course of everyday life will persist in subverting official policy. A portion, 30% according to 1994 CRTC hearings, of Canadian music on radio will not strengthen Canadian identity, but it will help the Canadian music industry, composers, writers and instrumentalists. The fact that the CRTC required CTV to expend \$18m (Cdn) on Canadian entertainment programming in the year ending in August 1995 and set rules for Canadian content does little for Canadian identity but an awful lot for the Canadian entertainment industry (CRTC, 1994a). Likewise the desire to require the CBC to "increase the Canadian content of the full-day broadcast schedules on both...television networks to an annual average of 90%" (CRTC, 1994b) is, perhaps, unrealistic unless the Corporation receives additional financial assistance. However, it would, if put into effect, give yet another boost to the Canadian entertainment industry. For all practical purposes Canadian content has ceased to be associated with discursive practices reflecting oneself to oneself and more with industrial protection, perhaps laudable, but certainly not the same goal.

The regional/national issue has occupied considerable time in CRTC hearings over the years. The following note appeared in the Massey Commission report (1951:33), "Complaints that the programmes of the CBC are excessively centralised came with singular unanimity from practically every part of Canada, excepting, not unnaturally, Toronto and Montreal." In spite of the Massey Commission's subsequent call for strong regional input, the ambivalence expressed by the CBC was indicated in its use of Regional Advisory Councils. In a memo dated October 10, 1950 it was noted that, pursuant to Section 12 of the Canadian Broadcasting Act, by-law 17 provided for a Western Regional Advisory Council covering Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta and a Council for British Columbia. However, despite this provision,

[T]hese two Advisory Councils have not been active for a number of years ... it was found that no very useful practical purpose was being served. The experience of the Corporation has been that advisory Councils trying to cover the whole field of programs do not operate usefully in practice ... very useful work has been done by advisory bodies working on specific program fields ... These have developed as the need for them appeared (Canada. National Archives, 1950).

On August 20, 1951 an internal memorandum from I. Dilworth, CBC programme director, reacted strongly to the Massey Commission recommendations on Regional Advisory Councils. In my opinion, he noted (Canada. National Archives, 1951a), "such advisory groups on a regular basis are not only unnecessary but cumbersome and embarrassing." A week later, a memo from E.L.Bushnell (Canada. National Archives, 1951b) noted that he had been asked to review the situation and recommended that, "as the Advisory Councils were created under By-Law 17, which in my opinion is mandatory rather than permissive, it would seem essential that either the Councils in the four Western Provinces be re-established or the By-Law rescinded." The recommendation was accompanied with reservations regarding regional councils and their possible negative effects on program control.

The regional question remained contentious. In 1957 yet another inquiry (Fowler Commission) called for decentralisation of programming. However, the proposal was qualified in the following manner:

After carefully examining the various factors that come into play, we are of the opinion that a certain amount of decentralization will increase the usefulness -- without necessarily improving the quality -- of radio and television in this country but that there are limits beyond which it would be both impractical and undesirable to go (Canada. Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1957:70).

The Report went on to note that "programmes involving ideas [e.g., fisheries broadcasts, public affairs, social and human relations] rather than the arts" would be amenable to a certain level of decentralisation. As for the arts, "From the purely artistic point of view, the national audience deserves the best and in almost every case the best will be found in the larger centres." In conclusion,

[D]ecentralization should never be undertaken merely for the sake of satisfying regional pride. The result of indiscriminate decentralization can only be of negative value: the Canadian public will have to pay more money for less quality (71).

Centralisation was early on linked with high, aesthetic quality, decentralisation with the demise of quality -- a position to which regional production centres have by now adjusted at the expense of creating strong production units outside of central places (this has been much more of a problem in television than in radio in so far as the CBC is concerned). It was assumed that private broadcasters would meet local needs while the CBC would broadcast nationally, a policy thrust which was not too successful. The 1991 Broadcasting Act continued to call for regional input. To these contradictions, to this profound ambivalence over private and public, region and nation and continent, we add new complications.

The Information Superhighway. The superhighway has become a rather irritating metaphor for what amounts to a set of rather dusty gravel roads which at times intersect with a secondary paved road, all without a satisfactory road map. The referent may include one or both of two communication systems relatively new to the public -- the internet, world-wide-web and the like, or the linking of telephone and cable. The latter appeals for commercial possibilities, the former for an interactive capability to connect people and interests, though they too have commercial appeal. The impact of total digitalisation of communications media is seldom considered. Bits are bits we are told, the end result will be a complete mix of audio, video and data, transmitted with a "table of contents" and downloaded for later use. "Think about the consequences of a broadcast television show as data which includes a computerized description of itself. You could record (i.e, download) and view based on content, not time of day or channel" (Negroponte, 1995:18-19).

With much of this now in place and the rest to follow within the next two decades, what are the policy implications, especially in the current mode? At the moment policies are in their infancy or simply do not exist. The following seem to call for some attention -- access (who gets access and who doesn't?), privacy (how is one's privacy protected in an electronic commercial milieu?), policing (is everything admissible and available to everyone?), Canadian content (does it make any sense in a digital world?), and ownership of delivery and production systems (monopoly control or competition and is there a place for the public sector?).

Privacy, policing, and monopoly control get most attention at the moment; open access is simply assumed. Apart from showing concern, the National Information Advisory Council did little but report in the fall of 1995 that Canadians want the state to take a role in insuring privacy, not much of anything has been done. The Council was reported to be considering "options from legislation to electronic codes. The fear expressed in this case was in relation to banking and shopping.¹⁰ Policing seems to be receiving the most attention, especially in relation to hate messages and pornography. In Canada and the United States existing laws have permitted the state to prosecute in child pornography cases.¹¹ In July 1995 a twenty year old

Torontonian was sentenced for "creating and distributing child pornography on a computer bulletin board" under the two year old kiddie porn law. The RCMP and Metropolitan police now monitor communications. Arrests for similar offenses have been made by the FBI.¹² There is, however, no policy specialized to electronic communications. In the absence of policy, police forces are beginning to monitor the networks on a regular basis. In May the National Information Advisory Council recommended legislation to clean up pornography and hate on communications networks, including a recommendation for a technical council (Kainz, 1995).

On the question of ownership, mergers of telephone companies, computer interests, cable companies, and entertainment companies suggest that if the end is not a total monopoly, there will be very few players, surely a threat to open access and use. The CRTC has a history of privileging cable companies and specialty channels, though, as noted above, the position was curtailed this summer in the light of consumer reaction. Nevertheless, though phone companies are now permitted to carry TV signals (limited by the usual content rules) and cable owners may carry telephone services, the telephone companies must wait on the cable companies before proceeding. Another example was approval of the Rogers-McLean Hunter merger, the rationale being that giants are needed to compete with giants. As for a public presence on the networks there is CA*net, through which the majority of Canadian users (mainly in schools, universities, governments and commerce) access Internet and the World-Wide-Web. CA*net followed NetNorth, in operation in 1984 and the Canadian equivalent to BitNet. There is also CANAIRE (Canadian Network for the Advancement of Industry, Research, and Education) mandated in 1991 to establish a high speed network funded by Government, Stentor (all major Telephone companies), Unitel, and several other stakeholders. There are also FreeNets, community operated networks (Shade, 1994). Policies in all of these areas are in their infancy.

Privacy of business transactions, policing, and ownership are the main issues at the moment. Personal privacy (cf. Cavoukian and Tapscott, 1995), access, and entertainment and educational content currently are minor issues, though undoubtedly as access increases the remaining two will gain importance in policy debates. As might be expected where nationalism plays a significant part in broadcasting policy, there has been some mention of Canadian content with respect to entertainment and educational information.

Future Policy. Ultimately policy goals are a judgement call originating in a particular political culture. Social science may state the options, provide evidence for the options, and articulate the assumptions underlying the options, but judgements can only be validated on philosophical and moral grounds.

Two sets of underlying assumptions, each with theoretical options, need to be stated prior to examining policy options. One set involves optional assumptions with respect to the political philosophy upon which policy is to rest. One option is to base policy on a political-economic culture of possessive individualism. Theoretically, this would privilege total deregulation and privatisation¹³ It would privilege continentalism and perhaps decentralisation of certain legitimation functions of the state. Another option is to base policy on a political philosophy rooted in precepts of collective responsibility, in effect, a democratic commonwealth. This would privilege public ownership and regulation where necessary to control the excesses of private capital and maintain local participation in electronic media production and distribution. In Canada this option would tend to favour pan-Canadian nationalism over continentalism, a position which, given the realities of everyday life in Canada and global capitalism, would require some adjustment.

With considerable ambivalence,, until very recently Canadian public policy has tended to favour the latter option and, accordingly, is subject to two major sets of contradictory forces. One involves liberalism, which attests both to the free development of human capacities and to its opposite -- "inherited from classical liberal individualism,...man [sic] is essentially an infinite consumer" (Macpherson, 1973:63). The citizen is conceived differently according to the precept assumed. In the first case the citizen is a person free to develop

his or her capacities to the fullest within the context of moral rights and obligations. In the second the citizen is free though constrained, not by moral obligations but by his or her ability to participate in the market-place.

The other set is more elusive. On the one hand, the concept of Canada as a nation -- of pan-Canadianism -- was invented by the proponents of classical liberalism and the market-place economy, a concept which required the use of technology in transportation and communications not only to provide the necessities for east-west trade but also to create a common identity and loyalty to the state via nationalism. Accordingly, the nationalisation of broadcasting, though prompted by an amalgam of voluntary, citizen-based, and free associations, was also favoured by the state in the name of nationalism and the market-place. This does not mean that private enterprise did not oppose the move, it did and the current Canadian Association of Broadcasters arose from that thrust. Is it possible that the CRTC's current ambivalence in policies and decisions are rooted in ambivalence over basic political assumptions?

On the other hand, with regard to centralisation/decentralisation and the Quebec question, apart from any referenda on sovereignty, Quebec expresses a national identity at both the official and popular levels. Quite different policies flow from an assumption that Canada is minimally a dual nation state or a composite of provinces, all of which share identical cultures and corresponding identities. Putting the Quebec question aside, at the level of everyday life there would appear to be no English-Canada. Considering the multiplicity of self-definitions breaking principally along the centre/region axis, one might well ask, "what is 'the Canada'?" There are a variety of answers: Canada is bicultural, multicultural, two nations, one nation plus an added distinct society, one nation plus several regions, some thirty-seven different ethnic groups and no less than four aboriginal coalitions. The slogan, "diversity in unity" is simply an inadequate expression of life on the ground -- a community of communities may be closer to the reality. In any case, policy makers must decide from which vision of Canada to proceed. They may proceed from the now century old position -the pan-Canadian; later pan-Canadian; bilingual, later pan-Canadian; bilingual, multicultural vision -- or from a set of assumptions which admits to a dual nation-state, recognizes aboriginal claims to self-development, and begins with a recognition of the profound identificational strength of the regions, named either as provinces or groupings of provinces (excluding the nation of Quebec). Although these latter assumptions are usually rebutted as contrary to the spirit of Canadian unity, the rebuttal ignores the possibility that relations between the provinces and the federal state and among the provinces are fragile, and that regional identities, in contrast, are strong.14

Policy Options

What are some of possibilities for policy in the context of two optional political cultures? Any policy exercise immediately is in the domain of official culture. The task is to bring official and popular culture closer, to meet the wants of everyday life without abdicating leadership democratically vested in the state. The options and their policy implications that are sketched out in this section should be taken as ideal types. As is characteristic of ideal types, they are not intended to describe empirical cases veridically. Thus, though it will be apparent that the United States is an obvious prototype for Option I, the United States has a strong and effective freedom of information law that fits much better with Option II.

OPTION I, POLITICAL CULTURE: "The Possessive Individualism of Classical Liberalism"

The Role of the Citizen: A dual commodity/consumer role, free to develop human capacity to the fullest within the constraints of the market-place and unfettered by state regulations except as required to prevent outright anarchy in the market.

Response to the National Question: Diminishing interest in the face of continental free-trade and the globalization of all economic relations.

Response to Centralisation: To the extent that Quebec participates in the continental economy, the Quebec question is irrelevant in the long run. In the short run, in response to the economic need for control and certainty, there will be pressure for both Quebec to remain in Canada and centralisation in Canada as a whole. However, regional devolution to reduce national deficits and debt will be accepted in the short run.

Policy With Respect to Traditional Broadcasting: At the extreme, a call for privatisation of the CBC (and other cultural industries and institutions such as the National Film Board, Telefilm Canada, National Gallery, Museum of Civilization, etc.) and provincial broadcasting units (i.e., Access Alberta, TV Ontario; Radio-Quebec; etc.). Pressure will be placed on northern broadcasting and community broadcasting to demonstrate commercial viability. The realities of the current political culture would probably modify this stand to a drastic reduction of the CBC and related industries with some tolerance of northern and community broadcasting. Counterefforts will be made to combine public units, such as the CBC and the NFB to save public broadcasting per se, but provincial units will be privatised. The CRTC would be retained to regulate behaviour in the broadcasting market-place.

Policy With Respect to The Information Superhighway: CANAIRE will continue to be encouraged as a consortium of public and private interests. Publicly subsidized development of technology for private profit will be emphasized. The tendency will be to commercialize existing FreeNets and CA*net (the latter through pressure on education budgets). At the most general level and most certainly in rhetoric, open competition with respect to telephone, cable, television, and combinations thereof will be supported on the belief in the enormous commercial value in combinations and online shopping and banking. However, in practice, monopolistic controls will develop, especially in delivery systems. Access will not be considered a problem, on the belief, contrary to the evidence, that every home has a computer and a modem that its occupants can operate. Rhetorically, the myth of global villages, electronic communities, freedom of individuals to communicate globally, and free access to ever increasing bodies of information will continue.

Privacy and censorship will be the principal issues receiving regulatory attention in spite of the near impossibility of anything beyond minimum control in a digital environment. Privacy will receive priority not only because of its threat to the commercial value of public access to online commercial transactions but also because of the threat to corporate and scientific use of networks, where security and privacy is fragile at best. Censorship will get attention in response to pressure from powerful special interest groups to control "hate literature" and from religious and feminist interest groups to control pornography. Something similar to the V-chip now in use may be developed, but technically the potential for censorship remains slim.

OPTION II, POLITICAL CULTURE: "The Individual Free to Develop Human Capacities"

The Role of the Citizen: A person free to develop his or her capacities to the fullest constrained by moral obligations to the commonwealth. This role implies that people gain access to information and knowledge according to their needs and wants rather than market-place constraints. But there are practical constraints -- the requirement to support politically and economically public communications networks.

Response to the National Question: There will be strength in regional identifications and, possibly, in the long run, strong national identification. The needs and wants will be for complete access to information world-wide. Canadian content rules are detrimental to these needs and rather silly. To this extent the response to the national/continental dilemma will tend to be continental and coincide with Option I responses, except that continuing priority to community will maintain a psychic investment in the interest of locale.

Response to Centralization: Within this framework, any one of the three constitutional positions could be adopted: (1) a sovereign Quebec position; (2) a dual nation position; or (3) a pan-Canadian position. The more that the typical citizen as defined in this option is sensitive to Quebec's history and to community concerns over the dictates of the "open economy," the more likely will that citizen adopt either positions (1) or (2). As noted above there will remain, again especially in positions (1) and (2), regional identifications that are strong enough to mount opposition to any centralising tendencies.

Policy With Respect to Traditional Broadcasting: A strong commitment to public broadcasting will be maintained, though not necessarily to the CBC. It should be noted, however, that a poll conducted for the Friends of Canadian Broadcasting toward the end of the summer of 1995 found that 63% favoured preserving the CBC's current level of funding while 19% stated that they favoured increased funding! A public presence in broadcasting is axiomatic within the framework of this option, but it must respond to interests "on the ground" -- to the popular -- rather than to current official views of the nation. CBC and SRC radio networks are likely to be kept intact. CBC television could be collapsed with Newsworld, the new unit specialising in news, current affairs, and documentary work. Drama and sports broadcasting could be left to the private networks. The new CBC could maintain its national network, turning local programming and resources over to provincial and territorial public broadcasting where they exist and are prepared to assume the responsibility -- Quebec, Ontario, Alberta (currently being privatised under Option I above), British Columbia, and Northern Broadcasting. Otherwise the CBC could maintain local production units (as in the Atlantic Canada, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Yukon). Local broadcasters, those provincially owned and those owned by the CBC, could be given access to the national public (CBC) network.

Regarding licensing and the supervision of programme content, CBC and SRC could be dealt with separately, their constituencies are sufficiently different that resources and content require separate consideration. The CRTC could continue to grant and supervise licenses to national network broadcasters in television and to all radio broadcasters, with the exception of public radio. Provincial authorities could grant and supervise licenses to local publicly owned broadcasters. Canadian content rules could be dropped, encouraging private and public broadcasters alike to form national and international production consortia.

Policy With Respect to the Information Superhighway: The priority under this option will be the widest possible access to information for the general population. Given the cost of hardware, software, online fees, and space to work in, access will continue to be very limited. As unemployment increases and the wages of the employed decrease further, the business dream of everyone online is doomed. Although the September 18, 1995 edition of Canadian Social Trends reported that only 25% of households have a home computer (excluding those used for business purposes and those limited to games) and only one-third of these have modems, one year later it was reported that 56% of adults use computers ([Anonymous], Montreal Gazette, 1996). Additional data suggest that operational knowledge is concentrated among the wealthy (28% of those with incomes under \$20,000 could operate computers while 86% of those with incomes over \$100,000 had the skills) and the young (81% of those between 15 and 24 had the skills while only 36% of those over between 55 and 64 could operate computers) (Beauchesne, 1995). By 1996 ownership and skill appeared to be increasing, however slightly. High educational levels, urban residence, and age continue to be associated significantly with internet use (Evenson, 1996). However, with respect to residence, internet providers are beginning to appear in small towns (under 10,000 population) in Ontario and perhaps elsewhere.

It would appear that for some time to come the large majority of citizens will not have access to the huge fountains of available knowledge. They will, through telephone lines, have access to commercial, financial and consumer services and to video. The benefits of the information explosion will be severely limited. If information is the key to wealth and control then electronic communications are likely to solidify class, gender, and ethnic hierarchies. This is unacceptable under Option II. Public policy must make the

technology and the skills needed to use it available to more and more citizens. The first step is to protect free networks, with subsidies if necessary. The second step, a provincial responsibility, is to insure access to the technology and operative knowledge in the educational systems. The third step, could be to make personal computer facilities publicly available at the community centre level. Such a program could be financed by the private sector, encouraged by limited federal and/or provincial resources tax credits. Since everyone cannot possibly have a PC at home, at least many more would have access.

All other issues take on lower priority until increased access is addressed. Privacy is problematic. In 1995 a security flaw was discovered in Netscape -- no one can be sure if personal or corporate financial information is secure ([Anonymous], Montreal *Gazette*, 1995). Public awareness of security problems will certainly discourage use. The problem is more a technical than a public policy issue, other than to state that privacy has a priority. Policing or censoring the network is also problematic, morally and technically. To the extent that electronic network communication is like telephone communication, police "listening in" is a violation of free and open access to information. Regulations will do little to prevent the appearance and reappearance of unacceptable and reprehensible material on the networks -- the systems are simply too vast with respect to points of origin of messages crossing national boundaries on a world-wide basis. Policing should be kept to a specified minimum, and tied to existing criminal law without further legislation for the time being.

A Concluding Comment

Policy is literature, not in an aesthetic sense (though I suppose an aesthetically pleasing policy document is within the realm of possibility) but in a political sense. Policy formulation is a discursive activity bounded by existing canons of political discourse, located in a particular time and space. The objective of this essay is to bring the context of broadcasting policy formulation and implementation into prominence. The simplest and most obvious statement to make in this respect is that broadcasting (or any other social) policies respond to the political and economic demands of the day. The policy context increases in complexity when "nation building" merges with political and economic exigencies, a trend that has affected and continues to affect Canadian broadcasting policy. Consequently the root discourse will be an amalgam of political, social, economic and nationalist discourse, discourse that derives from a total culture.

In this latter sense policy reflects prevailing political theories -- individualism or collectivism, for example. In Canada nationalism (as opposed to continentalism) and centralism (as opposed to regionalism) are added to the context of policy formulation. Policies have tended toward a centralised (with considerable ambiguity on the part of the CBC itself) anti-continental position. The very existence of broadcasting regulations per se suggests a tendency toward collectivism. At its extreme, possessive individualism would seem to call for the absence of regulation except as required to control excesses of capital accumulation. The fundamental contradiction between possessive individualism and the humanist conception of individuals free to develop their capacities, when mixed with a nationalist thrust, increases in intensity. If the trend is toward possessive individualism, then a clash with the 19th century nationalism -- unitary, homogeneous, and communal -- of English-Canada is bound to add to present policy ambiguities. Within English-Canadian nationalism itself there are ambiguities around multiculturalism and bilingualism.

But this is not all. I also have focused on the deeper clash between official and popular cultures (i.e., policy and everyday life) to reveal the gap between official conceptions of the nation and daily life at the local level. Any attempt to constrain popular use of the media is doomed to fail. Popular conceptions must be taken into account, although the very act of policy formulation will always run counter to popular experience.

With everyday lived culture -- popular culture -- in mind, research currently not prominent in communications policy formulation requires mention. First, because effective policy should be based on clearly articulated political and social theories, rather than keeping silent about them, these fundamentals should be the object of prior theoretical research. Second, although much is known about how many people use radio and television, what they watch and listen to, and their preferences, very little is known about the radio, the television set, the home computer, and network access as *cultural sites* -- as locations where meanings are produced and circulated and where official culture is evaded and subverted. Most research presents policy makers with constructed people, passive and free of context and constraints. Research designed around the concept of cultural sites that would employ life history, ethnographic, and qualitative approaches would inform policy decisions from a base hitherto ignored. Knowledge provided by these two lines of inquiry could move policy closer to "the ground."

ENDNOTES

- 1. This is an early expression of cultural nationalism, a nationalism clearly expressed in the Canadian/U.S. Free Trade discussions and, later, in the NAFTA discussions.
- 2. This was the central issue in a Federal-Provincial conference held in Jasper, Alberta in August 1996. Alberta and Ontario pushed hard for complete provincial authority over social programmes, a position which Quebec federalists have long held. Though they did not succeed, the question of federal control over social programmes is once more top priority on the English-Canadian agenda.
- 3. The distinction between official and popular culture played a major role in Rioux's (1984) discussion of emancipatory practices and critical sociology.
- 4. Indeed, Hardin (1974) specifically addresses Canadian economic culture.
- 5. I have drawn heavily from the work of Bakhtin (see especially, Emerson and Holquist, 1986:103-131).
- 6. See a collection of articles severely critical of the concept of "globalization" in Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 32:3 (August, 1995).
- 7. CBC Radio drama from the beginnings through to the 1960s contained a critique of possessive individualism and generally expressed a left-liberal view. See Howard Fink and John Jackson (1987, 1989).
- 8. According to Joanne Chianello (Ottawa Citizen, June 29, 1996), "Everyone from major Canadian banks to the federal government is announcing programs for conducting electronic transactions over the Internet...many companies are betting on substantial revenues from Internet transactions."
- 9. Except, perhaps, Bell Canada and other telephone companies in their bid to eclipse cable.
- 10. Bronskill, Vancouver Sun, October 15, 1994. Encryption appears to have provided the answer for the moment. Software is available at no cost on the Internet.
- 11. Ironically, there is a conflict between privacy and control. The encryption software that may provide privacy for commercial transactions can prevent the policing of messages. Canadian providers appear to be ready to adopt a code of ethics as the latest move with respect to hate messages and pornography. The fact remains that neither government, police, nor the providers themselves can adequately police the Internet.

- 12. Bindman, The Gazette, Montreal, July 9, 1995. Note that on the weekend of August 23, 1996 the Canadian Association of Police Chiefs met under the theme, "Cyberspace: Policing Crime."
- 13. If pushed to its extreme, possessive individualism would call for rescinding all policy in this field.
- 14. Charles Doran (1966) accepts this possibility as a starting point in his analysis of the possible consequences of secession by Quebec.

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Pas de deux: Media Policy and Cultural Politics in Canada and Quebec

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Introduction

Canada, as Richard Collins (1990) might have written, is a polity in search of a culture. This is a country, after all, with a well-defined political but no cultural centre. Politics in Canada tends to reinforce and strengthen the centre, while culture -- which, in Canada, is anything but national -- tends to split it apart. In an era of globalization and widespread confusion about the future role of the nation-state, Canada provides ample examples of what Armand Mattelart (1995) has called "la revanche des cultures", or "revenge of the cultures".

Until recently, media systems were seen as mirrors through which a national culture was sure to be reflected (Raboy et al.). Canadian media have always presented a pesky counter-example of the problem with this hypothesis. Today, as national broadcasters control a decreasing share of every country's audiovisual space, analysts, practitioners and policy-makers worry about the possible impact on national consciousness. They may take some solace from the Canadian example. Or then again, it might just scare the living daylights out of them.

With respect to the problematic nature of the relationship between media and "nationhood", Canada provides a remarkable case in point. Here is a country that is literally held together by cultural discord. Its cultural policy, by systematically managing to achieve the opposite of its stated goals, has enabled Canadians to create a series of cultural institutions through which they have been able to fulfil many of their aspirations in spite of the best intentions of their political leaders.

There may be an interesting lesson here. Take for example, the question of national identity. Identity today is increasingly multifaceted, and national identity is a particularly contested issue in many countries, even among some of the most politically stable. This poses a particular challenge to broadcasting, which has traditionally been organized at the national level. Where national broadcasting has been well-established, it has almost invariably been through the presence of a strong, often highly centralized national public broadcaster (the obvious exception being the United States). It is not only the external pressures of globalization that challenge this model today, but also the internal pressures brought about by the fragmentation of traditional notions of nationhood (see Anderson, Pietersee, Barber). If national broadcasters today wish to speak to the real concerns of their publics, they have to rethink their approaches to one of national broadcasting's most cherished objectives: the cementing of national unity. This task may be especially difficult for politicians to accept - as it has been in Canada (Raboy, 1996b).

As I have written elsewhere (1990), Canadian cultural policy, historically, has aimed to strengthen the Canadian political and cultural space both with regard to the invasive, integrationist thrust of North American continentalism and the fragmentary, disintegrationist pressures from within. In doing this, it has had to take account of the tension between the need for political unity and the demand for cultural pluralism. On the surface, these imperatives may appear to be contradictory. In fact, the maintaining of multiple cultural spaces within a common political framework is the essential characteristic of the Canadian project.

We don't always act as though we realize this. Paradoxically, cultural policy in Canada has always been driven by politics and economics. It has been aimed, ultimately, at keeping the country together while creating a robust climate for the development of Canadian cultural industries. At the highest level, federal cultural policy has sought to reflect a unitary political structure. At the same time, it has fostered the flourishing of a range of cultural institutions which speak to the expectations of the various Canadian publics. This is especially true with respect to the historic issue of linguistic duality in broadcasting.

This well-known story is rife with contradictions -- so much so that neither federalists nor sovereignists dared venture onto this slippery terrain in the 1995 referendum debate. Having developed a series of strong, centralized national cultural institutions, mandated to oversee and promote the flourishing of two national cultures, in English and in French, federal cultural policy has fostered and supported two visions of Canada and the world. Paradoxically, by all accounts, it has been more successful at fostering the québécois alter ego to a certain monocentric vision of Canada, than at underscoring the Canadian difference with respect to the United States.

The extent to which this has been so can best be illustrated by recalling the history and evolution of the Canadian approach to linguistic duality in broadcasting.

Linguistic Duality in Canada's Broadcasting Policy¹

1928-1945: Creating a system... and its problems

Although broadcasting in Canada actually began in 1919 (Vipond), the basic framework of the Canadian broadcasting system was laid out in 1929 in the Aird report (Canada. Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting). Remarkably, the central issues in Canadian broadcasting today are essentially the same as they were at that time.

The Aird commission recommended wholesale nationalization of the then largely commercial radio system, and creation of a national publicly-owned monopoly to operate all broadcasting in Canada on a basis of public service for the information, enlightenment and entertainment of the Canadian people. Even before its report was tabled, however, the Quebec government of Louis-Alexandre Taschereau passed legislation authorizing Quebec to erect and operate its own radio station, as well as produce programs for broadcast by existing commercial stations.

Before acting on the recommendations, Ottawa asked the Supreme Court to determine whether jurisdiction over broadcasting lay with the Dominion or the provinces, and in 1931 the Court ruled in Ottawa's favour. An appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London took another year to resolve, and so it was only in 1932 that Ottawa had a clear signal to legislate.

The Canadian Radio Broadcasting Act of 1932 created a national public broadcaster, the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, which had the additional responsibilities of regulating the activities of the private broadcasters. This double mandate would be transferred to the CRBC's successor, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, when it was created in 1936.

Aird had proposed that content over broadcasting be overseen by assistant commissioners in each of the provinces, but this interesting recommendation was not followed. Instead, the CRBC set out to create a

single national radio service in English and in French, using both languages alternately so that both English and French audiences heard the same programme. In other words, the CRBC took the view that there was only one radio audience in Canada, made up of members of two different language groups.

As the CBC reflected in its submission to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism some thirty years later: "Obviously, such an alternative was only workable as long as the program needs of both groups could be met by a single network." Indeed, as the demands of each group for a more complete service continued to grow, "the Corporation [was presented] with a situation which could only be met adequately by duplicate networks, English and French" (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1964: 5).

The most compelling factor for the CRBC to move away from a single service using two languages to "parallel services" in each language as early as 1934 was the absolute, militant refusal of anglophone communities in the Maritimes, Ontario and western Canada to accept the presence of French on the air. This has been documented in the memoirs of Canadian radio pioneers such as E. A. Carbide, Hector Charlesworth, and Austin Weir, according to whom French programming on national radio sparked "a queer mixture of prejudice, bigotry and fear" (Weir, 151).

By 1941, separation of the two services was complete -- although the original CBC news service, created to meet the demands of covering the Second World War, operated bilingually. Paradoxically, yet to be expected, the institution of separate services was welcomed by French-Canadian nationalists, who had feared becoming the marginalized minority within a single, nominally bilingual service. The French network achieved a degree of administrative autonomy because of "the need for national unity raised by the war", but no sooner was it in place than it became the focus of a national crisis (Lamarche).

In January 1942, the government announced it would hold a plebiscite on conscription. In the ensuing campaign, the Quebec-based Ligue pour la défense du Canada, a broad front of political and social leaders opposed to conscription, sought to use the public airwaves in order to urge their fellow citizens to vote "No". The CBC, by order of the government, denied the "No" voice access to its stations. The opponents of conscription were able to promote their cause by purchasing paid advertising on commercial stations, however, resulting in another paradox: the identification of "public" broadcasting as an oppressive agent of centralized federalism, and of French-Canadian entrepreneurial capital as a progressive force (Laurendeau).

1945-1963: Consolidating the system ...and the syndrome

Citing the educational nature of broadcasting, as "a powerful medium of publicity and intellectual and moral training", the government of Quebec under Maurice Duplessis claimed that Quebec had the constitutional authority to create a provincial broadcasting service, and passed legislation setting up Radio-Québec in 1945 (Quebec. Statutes). This legislation was never put into effect, however, after the federal minister responsible for broadcasting, C. D. Howe, announced in the House of Commons that, "since broadcasting is the sole responsibility of the Dominion government, broadcasting licences shall not be issued to other governments or corporations owned by other governments" (Canada. House of Commons, 1946: 1167).

Meanwhile, outside Quebec, the "parallel services" of public broadcasting were developing unequally. While the CBC's English- language radio service extended from coast to coast by 1938, the same could not yet be said for French-language service even in the 1950s. The Massey commission reported in 1951 that French-speaking communities outside Quebec were still poorly served by the CBC (Canada. Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, 297). Six years later, another

commission (chaired by Robert Fowler) found that many parts of Canada were still unserved in French, and suggested that this was more than a question of available resources: "It remains a moot question, however, whether Canada has yet reached the stage of complete national maturity where the introduction of French on the airwaves of Ontario... would not be regarded by a substantial majority as an intolerable intrusion rather than the cultural complement that in truth it would be" (Canada. Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 242).

The Conservative government elected in 1957 sought to build up the commercial side of Canadian broadcasting, and paid little attention to its role in the complexities of the national dilemma. This was most apparent in its response to the historic Radio-Canada producers' strike of 1958-59, which saw, among other things, the rise to political prominence of René Lévesque. Lévesque, then a well-known television journalist, became an outspoken supporter of the producers, who were seeking their first collective agreement with the corporation. He would often say that if the strike had shut down English television instead of French -- there was only one Canadian channel in each language at the time -- the government would have forced a settlement in half an hour. As it turned out, Radio-Canada was paralysed for 68 days, and the producers' strike took on mythical proportions as a main reference point of Quebec nationalism.²

1963-1980: National unity and struggles for power

When the Liberals returned to power in 1963, the Pearson government publicly identified cultural policy in general and broadcasting in particular as strategic weapons in its struggle against the rising and increasingly radical nationalist movement in Quebec. In the House of Commons on November 13, 1964, secretary of state Maurice Lamontagne announced the government's intention to rationalize and centralize the activities of all federal cultural agencies under the jurisdiction of his office, and to create a cabinet committee on cultural affairs. Under the new policy, the national broadcasting service, the CBC, would play a central role:

The CBC is one of Canada's most vital and essential institutions at this crucial moment of our history. The CBC must become a living and daily testimony of the Canadian identity, a faithful reflection of our two main cultures and a powerful element of understanding, moderation and unity in our country. I f it performs these national tasks with efficiency, its occasional mistakes will be easily forgotten; if it fails in that mission, its other achievements will not compensate for that failure" (Canada. House of Commons, 1964-65: 10084).

This was the clearest enunciation of the CBC's mission, in the government's eyes, since the war. It became clearer still during the next few years. At parliamentary committee hearings in 1966, Liberal backbenchers from Quebec and Radio-Canada middle management executives sparred over their respective views of the CBC's role vis-a-vis the emerging question of "separatism". When a new broadcasting act was introduced in October 1967, it contained a clause that read as follows: "The national broadcasting service [CBC] should... contribute to the development of national unity and provide for a continuing expression of Canadian identity" (Canada. Statutes, 1967-68, art. 3.g.iv.).

In the House, secretary of state Judy LaMarsh said the national unity clause was "perhaps the most important feature of the CBC's mandate in the new bill" (Canada, 1967-68a: 3754). But the NDP's R.W. Prittie expressed the fear that the clause could be used as an excuse for a witch-hunt against Radio-Canada journalists who did not toe a strict federalist line. Gérard Pelletier, then chairman of the parliamentary committee on broadcasting and soon to join the Cabinet at the side of his lifelong friend Pierre Elliott Trudeau, admitted he had doubts about it "lead[ing] some people to believe that it is not a matter of promotion but of propaganda" (Canada. House of Commons, 1967-68: 6017). And an important observation on the clause's implications came from Conservative MP David MacDonald, a future minister of communications:

"When we begin to move into areas such as ... national unity, we are in effect moving away from the concept of public broadcasting toward the idea of state broadcasting whereby the broadcasting system of the country becomes an extension of the state" (6025).

After some vigorous debate, the broadcasting act passed, with the controversial clause intact. Radio-Canada's interpretation of its mandate to promote national unity led to bizarre incidents such as keeping its cameras trained on the parade at the 1968 Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day celebrations in Montreal, while police and demonstrators fought a bloody battle on the sidelines. During the October Crisis of 1970, the federal cabinet closely oversaw what was and was not broadcast by Radio-Canada, and a few months later a string of management "supervisors" appeared in the corporation's newsrooms, with no apparent function other than political surveillance (Raboy, 1990: 204-208). The former head of Radio-Canada news and public affairs, Marc Thibault, remembers one official whose job was to monitor all news programs and count the number of times the word québécois was used (Thibault).

The situation culminated with Prime Minister Trudeau's instruction to the federal regulatory agency, the Canadian Radio- television and Telecommunications Commission, to inquire into CBC news coverage in the wake of the election of a Parti Québécois government in Quebec in November 1976.

The CRTC dutifully investigated and reported, in July 1977, that the CBC had indeed failed "to contribute to the development of national unity" -- but not in the sense meant by the prime minister. The problem was not a bias in favour of separatist politics, the CRTC said, but deficient representation of Canada's "two solitudes" to one another. In English and in French, the CBC did not pay adequate attention to the regions of Canada; it was too centralized and aloof, too influenced by commercial pressures, too bureaucratic. "In the modern world," reported the CRTC, "political and economic developments tend to centralize; cultural developments, on the other hand, tend to be regional, arising in much more sharply delimited areas" (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission. Committee of Inquiry into the National Broadcasting Service: 9).

The 1977 CRTC inquiry appears to have been a turning point in the Liberal government's view of the role of media in Canada's constitutional struggle. Political expectations of the CBC diminished, and in the important run-up to the Quebec referendum of 1980, the corporation was left to establish and carry out an internal policy of news coverage according to rigorous journalistic standards and the principle of "the public's right to be informed" (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1979: 377-424). Ultimately, the referendum campaign was covered by CBC as a straight news event, while the government sought to mobilize the federalist constituency directly, particularly through advertising (Johnson, Stark).

The role of the CBC aside, political struggles surrounding the national question continued to mark the evolution of Canadian broadcasting in the 1960s and 1970s. From 1968 on, renewed demands from Quebec for constitutional powers in broadcasting highlighted the constitutional debates of the day and marked the evolution of communications in Canada. In its brief to the constitutional conference convened by prime minister Lester Pearson in February 1968, Quebec claimed the right to play the role of a national state in matters pertaining to language and culture, including broadcasting. As instruments of education and culture, radio and television rightfully belong under provincial jurisdiction, the Quebec brief argued. The court ruling of 1932 was "unacceptable"; federal agencies like the CBC should be made to reflect the "bicultural rerality" of Canada; jurisdiction over broadcasting should not be the exclusive domain of the federal government (Quebec, 1968).

In the coming months, debate focussed on the question of "educational broadcasting". The new broadcasting act stated that "facilities should be provided within the Canadian broadcasting system for educational broadcasting" (Canada. Statutes. 1967-68, art. s.2.i.). Yet, education was clearly under provincial jurisdiction. Returning to Quebec from the constitutional conference, premier Daniel Johnson declared that his government had decided to apply the province's 1945 law establishing Radio-Québec (Quebec. Legislative Assembly, 3). By the end of 1969, Ottawa and the provinces had settled on a definition of educational broadcasting under which, in the 1970s, provincial public broadcasting agencies would begin operating in four provinces.

In the early 1970s, negotiating a strong role for Quebec in communications policy became one of the hallmarks of Quebec premier Robert Bourassa's program for achieving "cultural sovereignty". In a series of important policy statements, Quebec proposed "to promote and maintain a québécois system of communications" (Quebec. Ministère des communications du Québec, 1971), and to become "master craftsman of communications policy on its territory" (Quebec. Ministère des communications du Québec, 1973).

The cornerstone of Quebec's policy was to be the Régie des services publics, an agency regulating utilities falling under the province's jurisdiction, which Quebec saw as equivalent to the CRTC. In 1973, the Régie began to regulate the 160 cable companies then operating in Quebec, although they were already subject to the regulation of the CRTC. Within a year the inevitable occurred: in applications to serve a community in the lower St. Lawrence region near Rimouski, the Régie and the CRTC awarded licences to two different applicants. It took until November 1977 for the Supreme Court to decide the case in favour of the CRTC, ruling that Ottawa had exclusive jurisdiction over cable (Canada. Supreme Court, 191-210).

Under the Parti Québécois government of the 1970s, Quebec did not directly engage with Ottawa over communications policy. The PQ carried over the policy thrust of the Bourassa government but basically abdicated in view of its lack of power over communications under the existing system. When pressed, PQ politicians would state that political sovereignty was the only solution to Quebec's communications problems (Quebec. National Assembly: B-2095). Paradoxically, the PQ was thus a lot less aggressive than its predecessors in seeking concrete gains from Ottawa in this area. It concentrated instead on developing the programs and policies begun by previous Union Nationale and Liberal governments: Radio-Québec, now a full-fledged broadcaster, and the particular Quebec form of participatory communication known as "community" media.

1980-1990: The triumph of the market

Both in Ottawa and Quebec, communication policy took on a new, yet strangely similar, shape after the referendum of 1980.

In Ottawa, as we saw earlier, the view of the CBC as the centerpiece of Canadian cultural policy had begun to shift in the late 1970s. With the referendum out of the way, the entire cultural sphere took on a distinctly economic vocation. In July 1980, the arts and culture branch of the department of the secretary of state and ministerial responsibility for culture were transferred to the industry-oriented Department of Communications. The diffusion of culture would henceforth depend increasingly on its industrial base and the DOC would be concentrating on the growth of "cultural industries," Communications minister Francis Fox told the parliamentary committee (Canada. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Communications and Culture, 1980-83: 2/9).

The new orientation was underwritten by the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee (chaired by Louis Applebaum and Jacques Hébert) that reported in 1982, and was spelled out in detail in a series of policy statements signed by Fox in 1983-84 (Canada. Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee; Department of Communications, 1983a, 1983b, 1984). Since then, federal policy has been marked notably by a gradual withdrawal of fiscal responsibility for public service broadcasting (CBC budget cuts), privatization of television production (through the Telefilm fund) and the introduction of a wide range of new commercial cable-delivered television signals (pay-tv and both optional and non-discretionary subscriber-funded specialty services). In general, the 1980s marked a shift from the political to the economic, and the eclipse of the traditional sociocultural objectives of broadcasting in Canada.

The new approach in Quebec was strangely similar, as in the post-referendum context of the early 1980s, Quebec appeared to lose interest in the sociocultural possibilities of communications altogether, and placed its emphasis on industrial development. Ottawa and Quebec thus found themselves on the same wavelength, as the PQ discourse on communications became increasingly economistic, and its policy industrially-oriented. Instead of making jurisdictional demands, Quebec in the early 1980s seemed determined to outpace Ottawa in shifting the accent in communications from the cultural and political to the industrial and economic spheres (Quebec. Ministère des communications du Québec, 1982, 1983).

A historic shift occurred with the election of the Mulroney Conservatives in 1984. In general, the government's early initiatives with respect to broadcasting coincided with its general thrust towards reduced public spending and expanding the role of the private sector in the Canadian economy (Canada. Task Force on Program Review, 1986). But broadcasting and communications generally quickly emerged as one of the sectors on the cutting edge of its plan for "national reconciliation" after the institutionalized antagonism of the Trudeau years.

Brian Mulroney's choice of Marcel Masse to be his Minister of Communications was an astute one in this regard. Masse was not only a loyal Tory, but a well-known Quebec nationalist who had been a cabinet minister in the Union Nationale government which had fought, in the 1960s, for more provincial power through agencies such as Radio-Québec. He was the ideal minister for thawing relations with Quebec while applying broad government policy to communications.³

Tendering the olive branch to Quebec in communications was also a move to deflect criticism from the Tories' attitude towards national public broadcasting. Even as his government was administering crippling surgery to the CBC budget, Masse was fond of reminding audiences of the Liberals' attitude towards public broadcasting: "We're not the ones who threatened to put the key in the door of the CBC because we didn't like its news coverage," he told a meeting of Quebec journalists in Montreal in December 1984 (Masse).

In February 1985, Ottawa and Quebec signed the first agreement between them in communications since creating their respective communications ministries a few months apart in 1969. The industrial thrust of the accord was evident, aiming at technical innovation and support for the production, development and marketing of communications goods and services, especially in export markets (Canada/Quebec, 1985; Tremblay). The two governments also set up a permanent joint committee, chaired by the two deputy ministers of communications, to pursue further areas of collaboration.

The committee's first effort produced an important report on the future of French-language television, whose central recommendation was crucial to the developing federal policy with respect to broadcasting. It proposed "that the special nature of the French-language television system be recognized within the Canadian broadcasting system, and that government policies and regulations be adapted accordingly" (Canada/Quebec.

Federal-provincial committee, 2).⁴ Such a proposal would recognize, for the first time, the historic reality of parallel development of Canadian broadcasting since the 1930s. It would also mark a major shift in Ottawa's official attitude, which had always been that there is but one policy for Canadian broadcasting, not two.

In addition to a series of specific proposals, the report proposed general ongoing consultation between Ottawa and Quebec. A "harmonization" agreement for the development of French-language television was signed soon thereafter (Canada/Quebec, 1986). Since then, areas of federal-provincial cooperation have included working groups on cable television, children's advertising, and computer software (Tremblay, 83), and the idea of tailoring policy to meet the distinct needs of different markets has been reflected notably in CRTC decisions (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, 1987) and in the functioning of the Telefilm fund.

Quebec public opinion welcomed the new distribution of resources in communications, which was seen as a move away from the traditional approach of massive, and exclusive, federal involvement in cultural affairs (Bissonnette, 1985). This, it was recalled, had begun as a kind of benevolent state intervention in the 1950s in the wake of the Massey report, only to be transformed into a strategic weapon for the promotion of national unity under the Pearson, and particularly the Trudeau governments.

The Mulroney government's first term in office was also marked by a series of formal initiatives with respect to broadcasting policy: a comprehensive review group chaired by Gerald Caplan and Florian Sauvageau (Canada. Task Force on Broadcasting Policy), lengthy hearings and a report by the responsible parliamentary committee (Canada. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Communications and Culture, 1988), a ministerial policy statement (Canada. Communications Canada, 1988), and, finally, a new broadcasting act (Canada. Unpassed Bills, 1988a).

The Caplan-Sauvageau task force welcomed the proposals of the federal-provincial committee on French-language television (Canada. Task Force on Broadcasting Policy, 157), and reiterated many of its key proposals. It proposed "that the distinctive character of Quebec broadcasting be recognized both in itself and as the nucleus of French-language broadcasting throughout Canada" (223). French- and English language services within the CBC should be recognized as serving "distinct societies", and be allowed to take "different approaches to meeting the objectives assigned to public broadcasting" (217). The CBC's French network budgets should be reviewed to bring hourly production costs for television more into line with the higher amounts allocated to English production (253). As for the CBC's national unity mandate, the task force found it "inappropriate for any broadcaster, public or private... It suggests constrained attachment to a political order rather than free expression in the pursuit of a national culture broadly defined" (283-4). The task force proposed to replace it with "a more socially oriented provision, for example, that the service contribute to the development of national consciousness" (285).

The parliamentary committee that studied the Caplan-Sauvageau recommendations made two pertinent proposals of its own. One concerned making the law reflect the CRTC practice of "tak[ing] into consideration the distinctive characters of French and English broadcasting when implementing broadcasting policy" (Canada. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Communications and Culture, 1988: 418). The other extended the task force proposal on CBC budgets, specifying that production costs be established "so that the quality of the Canadian programs of the English and French networks would be comparable" (363).

The government's position was formalized in the policy statement Canadian Voices Canadian Choices, signed by Flora MacDonald and made public a few days after the report of the parliamentary committee in June 1988. Here it was recognized that

"The problems and challenges for English-language broadcasting and French-language broadcasting are not the same... [and that] these differences between the English and French broadcasting environments necessarily require different policy approaches for each" (Canada. Communications Canada, 1988: 6-7).

The legislation tabled at the same time (Bill C-136) featured a half-dozen clauses referring to the linguistic duality of the system. The key clause specified that "English and French language broadcasting, while sharing common aspects, operate under different conditions and may have different requirements" (Canada. Unpassed Bills, 1988a, art. 3.1.b.). The CBC's mandate was changed to read that "the programming provided by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation should... contribute to shared national consciousness and identity" (art. 3.1.n.iv.). An amendment introduced at third reading added that it should "strive to be of equivalent quality in English and in French" as well (Canada. Unpassed Bills, 1988b, art. 3.1.k.iv.).

Bill C-136 died in the Senate on September 30, 1988, as Parliament was dissolved for the national elections (Raboy, 1990: 329-334). It was reintroduced virtually intact, however, as Bill C-40 in October 1989 (Canada. 34th Parliament, second session).

While the debate on Bill C-136 had generated almost no controversy over its constitutional implications, this was not the case with Bill C-40. When the new bill went to legislative committee in January 1990, the minister -- now once again Marcel Masse -- was compelled to reiterate the general thrust of the legislation as it had been expressed in Flora MacDonald's policy statement of June 1988 and to explain the rewording of the CBC's national unity mandate (Canada. House of Commons. Legislative Committee on Bill C-40, 11).

The semantic soul-searching culminated in a highly partisan parliamentary debate only months before the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990. In the Legislative Committee, New Democratic Party critic Ian Waddell accused the government of "Meeching" the CBC, before asking minister Masse point blank if he was a "separatist" (17-18). Liberals peppered CBC and CRTC spokespersons with leading questions about the CBC's ability to serve the country if the wording of its mandate was changed. But the government's majority in the House of Commons proved more reliable than its constitutional deal with the provincial premiers, and the Act passed essentially intact (Canada. Statutes, 1991).

The 1990s - Broadcasting, Culture, Communications, and Nation-Saving

For about seventy years, as we have seen, broadcasting policy has been one of the main arenas for playing out the paradoxical issues of Canada's constitutional politics. Royal commission reports from Aird (radio broadcasting) to Massey (arts and culture) to Laurendeau-Dunton (bilingualism and biculturalism) have included some of the best efforts at making Canada work. Resulting legislation, funding programs and regulatory policies have reflected more mundane, sometimes partisan concerns.

Inevitably, the institutions and practices of Canadian communications have reflected the inconsistencies of Canada rather than the national unity designs of their architects. In one sense, they have fostered a dualistic view, but instead of tapping this as a source of strength, the Canadian policy apparatus continued to struggle against it during the 1990s.

The federal government was still spending close to \$3 billion a year in the area of culture and communication, much of it explicitly earmarked to efforts at promoting national unity. In 1991, in the wake of the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Communications and Culture undertook an investigation aimed at exploring the role of culture and communications in Canada's constitutional future, in the belief "that the constitutional issue is as much cultural as it is political" (Canada. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Communications and Culture,, 1992b: ix). The Committee sought to establish the relationship between cultural identity, cultural diversity and political unity, and the role of communications systems in this process.

Characteristically, the Committee identified the CBC as a critical institution, and, regarding regulation, proposed "...the continuation of a single, federal authority over broadcasting and telecommunications [the CRTC], with provincial and regional consultation in the national application of a comprehensive communications policy" (xi). In general, it recommended that "...the federal role in both culture and communications must be maintained and, indeed, strengthened" (xiii).

This conventional federal position was, to say the least, somewhat incompatible with the view Quebec was then articulating in every possible venue regarding jurisdiction, to the point that it could be seen as a virtual exercise in non-communication.

In keeping with the Mulroney government's constitutional position, however, the multi-party committee endorsed "the recognition of Quebec in the charter as a distinct society within Canada, based on its French-speaking majority, its unique culture and its civil law tradition (...)" (app. B), while recognizing the problem of limiting this to Quebec and thus ignoring or negating other aspects of Canadian distinctiveness. The Committee's report elicited a formal response from the government (Canada. Communications Canada, 1993), but nothing in the way of concrete action.

Quebec, meanwhile, was insisting on full repatriation of powers in culture and communication — while remaining characteristically vague about just what that might mean in any context short of full-blown sovereignty. Beginning with arts community testimony before the Bélanger-Campeau commission on Quebec's political and constitutional future (Quebec. Commission sur l'avenir politique et constitutionnel du Québec), and the Quebec Liberal Party's Allaire Report (Quebec Liberal Party) in 1991, forces in Quebec civil society persistently and consistently re-articulated a 'cultural sovereignty' position first developed in the early 1970s and, in some respects, dating back to the Taschereau government's abortive attempt to outflank Ottawa in the radio field in the late 1920s. A blue-ribbon committee chaired by Musée de la civilisation director Roland Arpin⁵ (Quebec. Gouvernement du Québec, Groupe-conseil sur la politique culturelle du Québec [présidé par Roland Arpin]) recommended Quebec seek full powers in 1991, and the ministry for cultural affairs tried to flesh out what this might look like in a document which became Quebec's official cultural policy the following year (Quebec. Gouvernement du Québec, ministère des Affaires culturelles).

Quebec's cultural policy would be concentrated in four main areas: 1) affirmation of cultural identity (promoting the French language, heritage activities, and reinforcing dialogue between cultural groups in Quebec); 2) support for the creative arts; 3) access and popular participation in cultural life; 4) new instruments of support (a ministry of culture, an arts and culture council modeled after the Canada Council, partnership with municipal authorities).

Looking at specific proposals in terms of dollars and cents provided a clearer view of the problem, however: under the existing constitutional arrangement, Quebec simply did not have the power to exercise significant influence in this sphere. Its strategy for development of cultural industries, for example, was based on a funding agency called SOGIC, which had provided a total of \$118 million in loans, guarantees and

subsidies across the range of the cultural industries between 1979 and 1991 - about 10% of what Ottawa spends on the CBC alone in just one year.

Conflicting interpretations of who spent how much on what in culture and communication provided some of the less edifying material in the constitutional debate, but at least gave some indication of the scope of the issue. Thus, according to a study done for the Quebec ministry of cultural affairs (Samson et al.), Quebec financed arts and culture to the tune of \$482 million in 1990, while in the same year, Ottawa spent \$283 million in Quebec, excluding the part of CBC operations that could be attributed to Quebec. When one factored in this amount -- an estimated \$450 million -- one can begin to appreciate both the nature of such guerres des chiffres, as well as the centrality of broadcasting to federal cultural strategy with respect to the national question.

As we have seen, the mechanics of dualism in Canadian broadcasting constituted an important aspect of the broadcasting policy review of 1985-90. In the framework of reduced available public funding, attention in Quebec was now drawn to the need to close the gap between money earmarked for French- or English-language CBC production. In the process leading up to the new broadcasting legislation, Quebec-based lobby groups had succeeded in including a provision that CBC programming should "strive to be of equivalent quality" in English and in French -- a neat peg on which to hang arguments for more money. Taken together with the emphasis on linguistic asymmetry that was equally part of the new context, however, the *textual* provisions of the new policy did not prevent the creation of new aberrations, such as the informational inequality that resulted from introduction of the CBC's cable television all-news service, "Newsworld", in English only.⁶

Here, the full essence of the Canadian dilemma could be appreciated. Does "programming of equivalent quality" imply an equal distribution of resources? Where do you distinguish between "distinct characters" and "different policy approaches"? Is symmetrical programming an imposition, or is asymmetry a smokescreen for discrimination? The CBC budget is an opaque document that begs for interpretation, but no matter how you read it, the linguistic breakdown indicates that budget allocation is based neither on demographics nor on strict application of the principle of dualism -- oscillating around 37 %, it is a solution characteristic of the compromise that is Canada: at one and the same time fair enough, yet sure to please no one.

The historic ambiguity of Canadian cultural policy with respect to duality was evident in the text of the agreement signed by federal, provincial, territorial and aboriginal leaders in Charlottetown on August 28, 1992. In a single paragraph under the rubric "Culture", the accord managed both to give exclusive jurisdiction over cultural matters within provinces to the provincial authorities, and assert the continuing responsibility of the federal government in "Canadian" cultural matters. Furthermore, the federal government should retain responsibility for national cultural institutions, including grants and contributions delivered by these institutions (Canada, 1992).

The document contained what the Toronto Globe and Mail (Godfrey) described as "the makings of a minefield". On the question that captured the most public attention -- Which level of government would henceforth be expected to patronize the arts? -- no clear answer was forthcoming. Were governments proposing to divide the turf, or share it? How precisely could one reconcile such clearly contradictory notions as "exclusive jurisdiction over cultural matters within the provinces", "continuing responsibility of the federal government in Canadian cultural matters", and "responsibility for national cultural institutions, including grants and contributions delivered by these institutions"? While a film documentary on the James Bay hydroelectric project or local radio in the Gaspé were quite arguably "cultural matters within a province", funding the documentary, or regulating radio would most likely continue to fall under the responsibility of

"national cultural institutions". Establishing the hierarchy of authority in such affairs could keep the wheels of the constitution industry turning for a long time indeed.

In fact, the new arrangement would have eliminated none of the ambiguity or policy overlap in the cultural sector (Julien). More to the point (from a Quebec perspective), it would have enshrined Ottawa's legitimacy in an area that had traditionally been the provinces', constitutionally, if not in fact.

In short, the Charlottetown accord would have constitutionalized the structural imbalance in the pragmatics of cultural dualism in Canada -- unlike the Meech Lake accord, which would have validated the symbolic goal that drives cultural and communication policy in Quebec. What we have instead is a most symbolic goal that drives cultural and communication policy in Quebec. What we have instead is a most uncomfortable status quo, still struggling to find a suitable alternative to both centralized federalism and the breakup of the federation.

Conclusion

In October 1994, the Canadian Parliament debated a bill to establish the Department of Canadian Heritage, a new government ministry which would consolidate a variety of activities which, in the words of the minister, Michel Dupuy, "have a common objective namely, promoting Canadian identity."

The new ministry would combine such activities as communications, cultural industries, language policy, national parks and historic sites, amateur sport and multiculturalism. The keyword in the name of the new ministry, heritage, the minister stated, refers to "the set of signs that enable us to recognize ourselves as new ministry, heritage, the minister stated, refers to "the set of signs that enable us to recognize ourselves as individuals who belong to a group or even a country" (Canada. House of Commons, 1994: 6416).

The opposition Bloc Québécois critic on cultural policy, Suzanne Tremblay of Rimouski, saw things differently. First, she pointed out, the administrative reorganization and merging of several departments leading to the creation of "Heritage" was a primarily economic operation, "unacceptable both for Canadians and for Quebecers". Regarding the proposed division of jurisdictional responsibilities between the departments of Heritage and Industry, she pointed out that the bill put the minister of Heritage in charge of content "while his colleague from Industry will be in charge of the means required... In other words, the former will be responsible for culture, while the latter will look after the business side of things." This aspect, she added "makes us fear the worst as regards the future of Canadian culture."

Of course, Tremblay's strongest words were reserved for the part of her critique that scrutinized the bill through the prism of Quebec nationalism. The bill, she noted, "shamelessly infringes on what so far has been considered provincial jurisdiction: culture" (6419). In this respect, it underscored "the steadfast obstinacy of the Canadian government in refusing to recognize the distinctiveness of Quebec society". More specifically, she framed her argument in these terms:

Under a Canadian federalism, English Canada has the right to defend its culture against the American invader, but Quebec should drop its own culture... They want to make us all one nation and deny there are two. There are two nations in this country, and the act to establish the Department of Canadian Heritage should reflect an awareness of the situation in Quebec and the flexibility that Quebec needs to develop and prosper. (6421)

Now the problem here lies in the type of meaning one ascribes to the constructs 'Canada' and 'Quebec'. 'Canada' generally refers to the set of political institutions that have evolved since 1867, and until further notice, includes Quebec. 'Quebec', on the other hand, is used far more ambiguously, and depending

on the context, its meaning can range from referring to an unproblematic component part of Canada all the way to a putative separate state. Most of the time it is somewhere in between, and reflects the tension of the unresolved aspects of the national question in both Canada and Quebec -- as I think a close textual reading of Tremblay's statement makes clear.

Indeed, many claim that there are far more than two nations in Canada, and here we have to consider the link between political structures and symbolic constructs. 'Canada' in its simplest sense refers to an existing political structure. Linguistic duality in Canada's cultural policy has been the result of a (rather successful, I think) strategy for accommodating the most serious threats to that political structure on the basis of conflicting views of nationhood within Canada. The strong federalist attachments of French Canadians outside Quebec and English Canadians within Quebec is evidence of this. On the other hand, this aspect of federal cultural policy has also led to frustration among the two linguistic majorities: the francophone majority within Quebec would like political control over the instruments of French-language cultural development -- hence the demand for repatriating jurisdiction over culture and communications to the province; elsewhere in Canada, the anglophone majority feels it is unduly subsidizing French-language culture.

Thus, in the latest, year-long parliamentary committee debate on the future mandate and financial structure of the CBC (Canada. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage), a common theme of the Bloc Québécois concerned closing the gap in the budgets attributed to French and English services of the CBC, especially television. This has been a demand of francophone groups since the extent of that gap was documented by the Caplan-Sauvageau task force in 1986, and is justified by the argument that it takes the same amount of money to produce quality programming in English or in French, irrespective of the size of the audience served. The commitment to provide "equivalent services" in English and in French --written in to the CBC's mandate in 1991 -- is contingent on equivalent funding, the argument goes.

According to uncontested published reports at the time (Dion), the penultimate draft of the parliamentary committee's report included a call for reduction in the linguistic funding gap. But, at the last minute, when the Bloc Québécois announced it would issue a minority report objecting to the maintaining of "the political aspect of the Corporation's mandate" ('to contribute to shared national consciousness and identity'), the Liberal majority on the committee reportedly scratched the equivalent funding proposal. This kind of political trafficking is perfectly coherent with the history of Canadian cultural policy, where the accommodation of francophone demands is used alternatively as a bargaining chip with nationalist politicians and a carrot dangled before the francophone public in order to buy its support (or, at least, passive submission).⁷

As a result, another paradox of Canadian cultural politics is the realization that a sovereign Quebec would have more political control but over less resources than are presently available to francophone culture (assuming that a sovereign Quebec would attribute a similar proportion of public funds to cultural spending).

Cultural policy was not a high-profile item in the September 1994 Quebec election campaign -- a "warm potato" was how one journalist described it (Baillargeon). Short of promising to spend one per cent of the Quebec budget on cultural subsidies, the PQ's electoral program on culture was paper-thin. Otherwise, there was no indication of what precisely Quebec would do with the new powers it would acquire. Paradoxically, as the otherwise pro-péquiste publisher of *Le Devoir*, Lise Bissonnette, wrote in a pre-election editorial, the Quebec Liberals actually had a better track record on culture than the PQ (Bissonnette, 1994). "While they had literally carried the PQ to power by providing it with a soul and a driving force," Bissonnette wrote, "the artistic milieu was left emptyhanded at the end of the PQ era in 1985." The Liberals, meanwhile, brought in legislation on the status of the artist, an umbrella cultural policy, a cultural funding agency

(Conseil des arts et des lettres du Québec - CALQ), and a new crown corporation for providing grants to cultural industries (Société de développement des entreprises culturelles - SODEC).

In broadcasting, there was little word on PQ plans. In all likelihood, Quebec broadcasting legislation and regulation would closely follow the Canadian model, in which, as we have seen, Quebec has had a prominent hand. But would a sovereign Quebec maintain public funding of broadcasting at present levels? The PQ government's attitude towards Radio-Québec was good grounds for skepticism on this question (Lesage).

On the other hand, there may be a more significant basis for differentiating between Ottawa and Quebec as prospective policymakers with regard to communication. Historically, various authors have noted the preponderant attention paid to the state and to public institutions as motors of social and cultural development in both Canada and Quebec (Hardin; McRoberts and Posgate). In the current climate of fiscal retrenchment, analysts have remarked that Quebec, almost alone among Canadian provincial and federal governments, continues to promote a relatively social-democratic attitude towards the role of the state. (See most recently, the *Globe and Mail* editorial, "Beyond public and private", 28 September 1995 [anonymous], which found this deplorable.)

In the area of communication, this distinction emerges in recent policy proposals regarding the establishment of the new information infrastructures known metaphorically as the "information highway". In April 1994, the federal government created an Information Highway Advisory Council to examine the issue and come up with a plan. The Council's report (Canada. Information Highway Advisory Council, 1995) was made public on 27 September 1995. It contained over 300 recommendations. The document, as reported in the *Globe and Mail* (Surtees), "embraces a pro-marketplace thrust" so prominent that the only non-business representative on the advisory council, Canadian Labour Congress vice-president Jean-Claude Parrot, felt compelled to state a dissenting opinion. Among other things, the report recommends making competition the driving force on the information highway and liberalizing foreign ownership requirements in broadcasting and telecommunications (while maintaining the traditional emphasis on Canadian content and public broadcasting as promoters of Canadian culture and identity). The key idea, repeated in several places in the report's 227 pages, was this: "In the new information economy, success will be determined by the marketplace, not by the government." (Canada. Information Highway Advisory Council, x).

Meanwhile, with somewhat less fanfare, a Quebec report on the same subject was published two months earlier, in the dog days of July 1995. Here, the emphasis was on the information highway's potential impact on education, health care and social services, the promotion of language and culture, the organisation of public services and, residually, the development of industry and export markets. Under "equality of access", one reads: "It is necessary to guarantee the right to information and knowledge for all citizens, without regard to their financial resources or their language of use, in order to avoid the division of Quebec society into two groups, those who have access to the information highway and those who do not" (Quebec. Conseil de la science et de la technologie, Comité consultatif sur l'autoroute de l'information, v).

This is not to deny the obvious benefits to industry of such a policy, for as the report continues to say: "Facilitating accessibility in fact constitutes a way of stimulating demand for products and services" (37). Indeed, like its Ottawa counterpart, the Quebec committee that drew up this report was top-heavy with major industry players like André Chagnon of the cable giant Vidéotron and Charles Sirois of Teleglobe Inc. (who both served on the two councils, providing an interesting example of the way the present constitutional arrangement enables some to butter their bread on both sides). But the difference could be read in passages in which the report develops notions such as the idea that building the information infrastructure should be seen as a "social investment", whose economic benefits will be reaped by future generations (42-43).

Characteristically, most of the legal and regulatory instruments required to orient the emerging technological environment remain under Ottawa's jurisdiction. Thus, while the federal government indeed has the power to act on its advisors' report, the Quebec report included the necessary recommendation that the Quebec government "use all means available to see that federal laws and policies regarding the information highway not only recognize the cultural specificity of Quebec but also allow Quebec to develop and reinforce it" (33).

In an age of globalization, one may be tempted to marvel at proposals that are contingent on a more active role for the state. But public attitudes towards collective institutions surely rank among the most significant markers of cultural distinction, and just as Canadians generally identify their social safety net, gun control and the CBC as characteristics that distinguish their country from the United States, the Québécois continue to define their difference in terms of the French language, the decentralisation of powers and the role of the state as the motor of social, economic and cultural development.

It is not likely that under the present federal structure Ottawa will relinquish any significant power to Quebec in the area of communication. But, regardless of Quebec's choice with respect to political sovereignty, its manifestations of cultural difference will not disappear. This is why it is clear that short of a radical constitutional restructuring, the dilemmas and incoherencies of Canadian cultural politics are going to remain with us for the foreseeable future. The challenge remains to keep looking for institutional arrangements that turn this into a source of strength.

ENDNOTES

- 1. Parts of this historical section have been published in Raboy (1996a).
- 2. Gérard Pelletier (1983), also a Radio-Canada personality at the time and later a federal cabinet minister, has pointed out that much of the problem was attributable to the fact that the French network executives in Montreal lacked the authority to negotiate on behalf of the corporation, while the head office in Ottawa did not bother to take it seriously.
- 3. After leaving federal politics in 1992, Masse resurfaced to chair one of the PQ's consultative commissions leading up to the sovereignty referendum of 1995.
- 4. According to a senior official of the Ministère des communications du Québec interviewed by the author in June 1990, a few days before the collapse of the Meech Lake accord, this proposal was "Meech before its time".
- 5. Later named deputy minister of culture by the Parizeau government.
- 6. The problem was finally corrected when the CRTC approved the CBC's application for an equivalent French-language service, le Réseau de l'information (RDI), which began broadcasting in January 1995.
- 7. The debate over the Report provided other signs of the present tortured state of Canadian national politics. While the Bloc subscribed to the Report's reiteration of the continuing role of the CBC as a public broadcaster, the Reform Party also dissented from the majority report, falling back on its platform which calls for the privatization of CBC television activities.

8. The CRTC was also asked to advise on the areas under its authority, broadcasting and telecommunications. It reported in May 1995 (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, 1995).

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Media Technology and the Great Transformation of Canadian Cultural Policy

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At work in the Canadian mind is, in fact, a great and dynamic polarity between technology and culture, between economy and landscape (Arthur Kroker, 1984:8).

Introduction

Great Transformations

In a deservedly famous work economic historian Karl Polanyi depicted the passing of feudalism and the rise of capitalism as comprising three basic transformations: Nature, in becoming commoditized, was transformed into "land," a mere factor of production; human beings in being commoditized were transformed into "labour," also a mere factor of production; and finally social inheritance became the commodity "capital" (Polanyi, 1957[1944]:68–76). The price system, in other words, "penetrated" (Innis, 1956[1938]) not only allocations of final outputs, but as well social processes of production.

For Polanyi these transformations, while fundamental, were not unmitigated blessings. Indeed, he lamented, in coming to rely almost exclusively on prices and profits as indicators of social conditions, the trading classes lost thereby all means of sensing

the dangers involved in the exploitation of the physical strength of the worker, the destruction of family life, the devastation of neighborhoods, the denudation of forests, the pollution of rivers, the deterioration of craft standards, the disruption of folkways, and the general degradation of existence including housing and arts, as well as the innumerable forms of private and public life that do not affect profits.

Nonetheless, Polanyi observed,

the middle classes fulfilled their function by developing an all but sacramental belief in the universal beneficence of profits (Polanyi, 1957[1944]:133).

And there, of course, we stand today. In our economic/political system, markets have indeed became the "organizing principle of society" (Polanyi, 1957[1944]:75), and many aspects of social, cultural, and economic life now conform to market logic and to market values. Jerome Davis is one who has set forth aspects of pecuniary cultures conforming to the logic and values of markets. Some of the central cultural values promoted in and required by the market system, according to Davis, are:

- o acquisitiveness. In market-centred economies it is deemed desirable that individuals be able to acquire and hold as much property as they can. Restrictions on acquisitive behaviour, therefore, are to be as slight as possible. Selfishness and greed are seen as a virtues; altruism and empathy, while not necessarily vices, are at best second order virtues, ones not to be promoted extensively.¹
- o individualism. For Adam Smith the wealth of a nation was simply the aggregation of the wealth of the individual inhabitants. Whatever effectively promoted individual wealth, Smith believed, promoted also wealth for all. And, Smith continued, since each individual knows best his or her own unique circumstances, including personal wants, needs, and skills,

national wealth is most effectively pursued by minimizing constraints on individual enterprise. Collectivities, associations, and co-operative action therefore, according to the logic and values of the marketplace, are evils, and consequently are afforded epithets such as "monopoly," "monopsony," and "collusion," names whose negative connotations may indeed, unfortunately, be apt on account of the ethics of acquisitiveness and greed characterizing our economic and cultural order. In a non-capitalist gift economy, words such as "co-operation" and "joint effort" might be more suitable.

competition and laissez-faire. Competition according to marketplace ideology is the agent transforming acquisitive behaviour and the greed "instinct" of individuals into the broader social good. Competition, when effective, means that no producer or buyer has significant market power, that no one is able therefore to exploit customers or suppliers (including "labour"), and that each producer will be responsive to market demand. Davis quotes Nation's Business, official organ for the United States Chamber of Commerce, as follows: "Our rulers will best promote the improvement of the nation ... by leaving capital to find its most lucrative course, commodities their fair price, industry and intelligence their natural reward, idleness and folly their natural punishment" (Davis, 1935:33). How current this statement does seem!

oprofit. Profit motivation, according to Davis, "is undoubtedly the most important of all the norms of capitalism." Indeed, "the fundamental assumption upon which [the] capitalist system has been established, and which alone can justify its existence, is the belief that every man, being free to seek his personal gain in competition with his fellow men, will profit only inasmuch as he is able to serve others efficiently and effectively" (Davis, 1935:37). Profit in pecuniary economies is the single most important signifier of what is good, what is true, and what is beautiful. Large profit rates signal not only a job well done, but point also to areas deserving expansion in the future.

o materialism. As Davis notes, "no system could be more materialist than capitalism itself. ... Social ends and values are not important or are given mere lip service. ... Possession and consumption of things are the real goods. Liberty, freedom, equality, and other non tangible values [for example justice, equality, a healthy environment, community and, in the case of Canada, Canadian nationhood] are thought [at best] to be by-products in that struggle" (Davis, 1935:30–31; emphasis added).

The Great Transformation of Canadian Cultural Policy

Upon inception in 1867 Canada, of course, was already essentially a capitalist or market-oriented state, albeit one concentrating on resource extraction—principally fish, fur, timber, agriculture, and on commercial transactions. Therefore its manufacturing sector was ill-developed, according to Innis, and its infrastructure of transportation and communication was built primarily to support he export of "staples." As Innis put it, "The economic history of Canada has been dominated by the discrepancy between the centre and the margin of western civilization" (Innis 1967[1930]:385). Be that as it may, Canada did not experience dramatic transformations in factors of production of the order set forth by Polanyi as typifying the emergence of capitalist economies from feudalism. Nonetheless, it is argued here, Canada underwent, and continues to undergo, an analogous transformation in the field of cultural policy. Cultural activities and artifacts, previously deemed to have either an intrinsic worth (that is, an inherent beauty, goodness, or truth), or a value deriving from contributions made in pursuing non-market/anti-market goals, are increasingly being judged, financed, and undertaken on the basis of market criteria like set out by Davis to promote market ends. This great transformation in Canadian cultural policy is the over-arching theme of the present chapter.

Given the writings of Karl Polanyi, Jerome Davis, Harold Innis, and others, one would expect a priori that nations like Canada with market economies would as a matter of course pursue cultural policies conforming to the logic, functioning, values, and norms of the Market.³ In market economies commoditized cultural artifacts, after all, command prices and so contribute to GNP, that is to the "wealth of the nation," at least according to Market ideology. Public policy in the cultural sphere, therefore, one would expect, would be most likely to be designed to eliminate all or most obstacles to the commoditization of culture and to be supportive of "cultural industries" (Adorno, 1991); and indeed, manifestations or fulfilment of this expectation include bilateral and multilateral trade treaties that entail the "free flow" or heightened commodity status of information (Braman, 1990). Furthermore, one would expect that non-market or antimarket cultural artifacts (which in Canada often comprise the truly indigenous cultural artifacts) would increasingly be viewed, in a sea of commercial culture, as anomalies, if not indeed as being alien and subversive, that pressures (monetary, political, moral) would arise to remove or reduce them, if not entirely then at least from the mainstream media. As this filtering proceeds, public "taste" will in turn tend to become even further attuned to the form and content of cultural artifacts in the commodity mode, and people will accordingly tend increasingly to reject even more strongly cultural items and activities not conforming to market norms.

Historically, however, the expectations regarding cultural policy for capitalist economies have not been entirely fulfilled in Canada. From 1928, the year the Aird Royal Commission was appointed to report on broadcasting, until even the present, there has in fact been an explicit stream of cultural policy, possessing a substantial measure of public support, that has been designed to *oppose* market forces and the concomitant drift toward continentalist cultural integration.

Recent decades, however, have seen a withering of public resolve in this regard, and hence there has been a continuing and accelerating transformation of Canadian cultural policy, from one designed to preserve and foster nationhood into one congruent with and supportive of the commodity mode. Cultural policy, in other words, increasingly is being set so as to be in conformity with the logic and the cultural values of markets, and hence increasingly cultural policy serves to reinforce the logic and values of markets, including the principle of continental or indeed world-wide cultural/economic/political integration.

This "great transformation" of cultural policy has necessarily carried with it changes in attitudes, in rhetoric, and in policy stances toward media (or more generally, "technology")—the means of culture. In what follows primary attention is accorded broadcasting, although parallels with film policy are noted briefly.

The First Stage: Cultural Policy as Anti-Market

Initial Non-intervention.

Prior to 1928 the Canadian government was essentially passive with respect to radio broadcasting. While provisions for issuing radio telegraph licences to private commercial stations were in place as early as 1922 (Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1957:297), the federal government remained otherwise largely aloof. Its passivity is illustrated particularly by its non-intervention with regard to fundamental industry restructuring taking place in 1923. The non-intervention years 1920 to 1928 were characterized also by the dominance of unregulated market forces in broadcasting. Canadian station owners displayed little originality, concentrated on recorded music and popular American programs, some even affiliating with U.S. networks, the noteworthy exception being a radio service provided by Canadian National Railways, a crown corporation, which provided an original, albeit limited service as a competitive ploy to lure rail passengers

from its arch rival Canadian Pacific.⁵ Other features of this essentially unregulated era included: interference from stations broadcasting from the United States and Mexico, and a dearth of facilities serving less populated regions (Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1957:298).

"The State or the United States"

It was against this background that the government in 1928 appointed a Royal Commission, headed by Bank of Commerce President Sir John Aird, to "examine into the broadcasting situation in the Dominion of Canada and to make recommendations to the Government as to the future administration, management, control and financing thereof" (quoted in Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1957:299). The Aird Commission, reporting in September 1929, declared, "We have heard the present radio situation discussed from many angles with considerable diversity of opinion. There has, however, been unanimity on one fundamental question—Canadian radio listeners want Canadian broadcasting," a service, however, unlikely to be provided in abundance, the Commission adduced, under private enterprise with advertiser funding. Consequently, Aird adjudged that the interests of Canadian listeners and the Canadian nation alike would be served by introducing "some form of public ownership, operation and control behind which is the national power and prestige of the whole public of the Dominion of Canada" (Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1929, as quoted in Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1957:300). "In short," as Frank Peers concluded, "the commission recommended a publicly owned system with no private stations, and programs which should have only a limited commercial content in the form of 'indirect advertising'" (Peers, 1969:47).

Stated otherwise, the Aird Commission recommended that attempts should be made to deploy the technology of radio broadcasting in the manner of a "time-binding" (or culture-preserving) medium of communication (Innis, 1971[1951]); radio, that is, should be used purposefully to contravene market ("space-binding") forces that were then threatening indigenous cultures and Canadian political sovereignty. Aird's position was expressed not only in the Report's concrete policy recommendations, but as well by various phrases sprinkled throughout, such as: "education in the broad sense," "public service," "fostering a national spirit and interpreting national citizenship," "promoting national unity," "mould the minds of the young people to ideals and opinions that are ... Canadian" (cited in Peers, 1969:47–48).

Significantly, the Aird Commission recognized that pursuing time-binding or culture-conserving goals by means of essentially space-binding media, would require consciously modifying market forces, particularly with regard to the proliferation of facilities. Indeed Aird recommended closing down transmitters not needed by the public broadcaster.

The Aird Commission's anti-market, pro-culture position was adopted subsequently by the influential Canadian Radio League, a voluntarist organization formed to lobby for general implementation of Aird's recommendations. According to the League's co-founder and leading spokesperson Graham Spry, commercial pressure within an unregulated, advertiser-financed system produces "stultified uses of broadcasting," programming "designed for and serving principally companies desiring to advertise themselves or their products," concentration of ownership and control, manipulation of public opinion by vested interests, and arrangements between Canadian stations and American chains whereby the former "broadcast American rather than Canadian programmes" (Spry, 1931:154-5, 157).

Appearing before the 1932 Parliamentary committee charged with studying the Aird report and making recommendations, Spry delivered his famous dictum, "The State or the United States," to highlight the fact that in broadcasting free market economics leads inexorably to continental cultural homogenization. Spry asked,

Why are the American interests so interested in the Canadian situation? The reason is clear. In the first place, the American chains have regarded Canada as part of their field and consider Canada as in a state of radio tutelage, without talent, resources or capacity to establish a third chain on this continent. ...In the second place, if such a Canadian non-commercial chain were constructed, it would seriously weaken the whole advertising basis of American broadcasting. The question before this Committee is whether Canada is to establish a chain that is owned and operated and controlled by Canadians, or whether it is to be owned and operated by commercial organizations, associated or controlled by American interests. *The question is, the State or the United States* (Spry, extracted in Peers, 1969:89; emphasis added).

The Public Service Era.

Promoting a bill in Parliament in May 1932, the very depth of the Depression, to establish a public broadcasting agency, Prime Minister, R. B. Bennett declared,

First of all, this country must be assured of complete control of broadcasting from Canadian sources, free from foreign interference or influence. Without such control radio broadcasting can never become a great agency for the communication of matters of national concern and for the diffusion of national thought and ideas, and without such control it can never be the agency by which national consciousness may be featured and sustained and national unity still further strengthened. ...

Secondly, no other scheme than that of public ownership can ensure to the people of this country, without regard to class or place, equal enjoyment of the benefits and pleasures of radio broadcasting. Private ownership must necessarily discriminate between densely and sparsely populated areas. This is not a correctable fault in private ownership, it is an inescapable and inherent demerit of that system. It does not seem right that in Canada the towns should be preferred to the countryside or the prosperous communities to those less fortunate (Bennett, as quoted in Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1957:303).

As noted by the 1957 Royal Commission on Broadcasting, these remarks of the Prime Minister "were endorsed by the Opposition and the leader of the third party represented on the Parliamentary Committee. Parliament, with only one dissenting voice, accepted the recommendations of the Committee and the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission [CRBC] ... was created by Act of Parliament" (Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1957).

One significant way in which the government departed from the recommendations of the Aird Commission, however, was in its preservation of private stations, albeit subject to the understanding that they could be taken over at some later date. In the interim, they were to be regulated by the CRBC.⁶

In 1936 the CRBC was superseded by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), a crown corporation intended to be more independent of the government. Despite overt and covert politicking by private sector interests, the CBC remained pre-eminent in Canadian broadcasting for over twenty years, a status reaffirmed by successive parliamentary committees and as well by the 1951 Massey Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences. Note for instance the following ringing endorsement by the 1942 House of Commons Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting:

The principle laid down by previous parliamentary committees that the Corporation should extend its services so as to give a complete national coverage, if necessary by taking over

privately-owned stations, should be followed and the Corporation should take over any privately-owned broadcasting stations considered essential for national coverage. The private broadcasting stations have no vested interest in the sound waves they are allowed to use. The Government should not hesitate to terminate any licence when it is in the public interest to do so (Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting 1942, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:1095).

Turning Point.

A turning point of immense importance occurred in 1957 with publication of the *Report* of the Royal Commission on Broadcasting (Fowler Commission). On the one hand, the Commission reiterated the nationalist, cultural, public service, anti-market goals that had been associated with Canadian broadcasting since the Aird Commission. It declared, for instance,

The natural⁸ flow of trade, travel and ideas runs North and South. We have tried to make some part, not all, of the flow run East and West. We have only done so at an added cost, borne nationally. There is no doubt that we could have had cheaper railway transportation, cheaper air service and cheaper consumer goods if we had simply tied ourselves into the American transportation and economic system. It is equally clear that we could have cheaper radio and television service if Canadian stations became outlets of American networks. However, if the less costly method is always chosen, is it possible to have a Canadian nation at all? (Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1957:9; emphasis added).

One could hardly ask for a clearer, more concise statement of the inherent opposition between indigenous control and market economics, between non market goals and economic efficiency, between government intervention and laissez-faire. Clearly in this extract the Fowler Royal Commission expounded the anti-market philosophy articulated by the Aird Commission, the Canadian Radio League, R. B. Bennett, and by other nationalist, pro-culture forces. In stating that countries should not always choose the cheapest option, Fowler stood firmly against economic orthodoxy's doctrine of "comparative advantage" which maintains that all countries benefit by forbearing to produce items that can be produced relatively more cheaply elsewhere, instead concentrating on producing items for international trade that can be produced relatively more cheaply at home, a doctrine that over the years has proven to be of immense value to the stronger of the trading partners.

On the other hand, however, and this of course is the main point, the Fowler Commission departed markedly from the philosophy enunciated by Aird and from its own just-quoted endorsement of Aird's philosophy, by declaring: "Private broadcasters are integral parts of a single system" of broadcasting, and in recommending: "The presence of private elements in Canadian radio and television should be continued and accepted as a permanent part of the Canadian pattern" (Report, 1957:94).

Parallels with Movies.

Parallel to broadcasting is the history of motion pictures in Canada. From 1896 to 1939 market forces totally dominated (Morris, 1978:1; Pendakur, 1990), until creation by the federal government of the National Film Board as an instrument of cultural policy to help oppose market forces (Evans, 1984). As with broadcasting, so too with film, however. Attempts were made, beginning particularly in 1968 with creation of the Canadian Film Development Corporation (CFDC, now Telefilm Canada), to enlist private enterprise to pursue cultural and nationalist goals, goals that are however fundamentally antithetical to the logic of markets (Crean, 1976:71).

The Second Stage: A Faustian Bargain

Enlisting Private Enterprise.

The federal government acted quickly upon receiving the 1957 Report of the Royal Commission on Broadcasting. First, it authorized creation of a second television service (CTV) to be made up entirely of private stations to compete with the CBC. Next, it created a Board of Broadcast Governors (BBG), independent of the CBC, to regulate activities of both public and private sector stations and networks. In this way private elements of Canadian broadcasting were apportioned a status commensurate with that hitherto reserved for the public sector.

Perhaps believing that pursuit of anti-market, pro-cultural goals depended less on ownership patterns (public vs. private) than upon free vs. constrained market forces, the government charged the BBG with regulating both public and private broadcasting in a manner that would ensure that both sectors contributed to Canadian cultural, anti-market goals. Pursuant to that mandate the BBG soon promulgated the first Canadian content quotas for television: 55 percent of the air time, the Board decreed, was to be filled with programs "basically Canadian in content and character." Programs deemed by the Board to be in compliance with that exigency included broadcasts of events occurring outside the country in which Canadians participated, and events which were "of general interest to Canadians."

Enshrouding the private sector with the mantle of public purpose meant that private stations, no longer deemed an alien force, now and henceforth needed to be protected by government from the strains of the marketplace in order for them to be better positioned to pursue the noble anti-market goals with which they had been entrusted. The BBG, as noted by John Bake, was not negligent in affording such protection.¹²

Reporting in 1965, however, the Committee on Broadcasting, headed by Robert Fowler (who had chaired also the 1957 Royal Commission on Broadcasting) was quite critical of the performance of both private television broadcasters and the BBG. The Committee noted, for example, that the advent of private television stations in areas served previously only by the CBC, had caused a *decrease* in the audience to Canadian programming: private stations had concentrated on diffusing U.S. programs in their prime time hours. According to Fowler, about two-thirds of the programming on private stations in prime time was American, compared to 39 percent on the CBC. Nor did private stations, according to Fowler, widen the scope of programs available to Canadian viewers; rather, they "merely increased the broadcasting of popular entertainment, mainly American in origin." Fowler added, "although the volume of available programs increased, there was little if any increase in more serious programs directed towards limited audiences" (Committee on Broadcasting, 1965:35).

Fowler, however, assigned blame for inadequacies in performance not so much to private sector stations that were after all only pursuing profits within constraints established by the regulator, as to the BBG. Fowler viewed the BBG as being quite inadequate as a regulator, and this for a number of reasons. One was that it had not vigourously enforced its own Canadian content regulations. According to the Committee, "Only recently has the BBG taken enforcement action; four stations were prosecuted and each was fined the ridiculous amount of twenty-five dollars." Fowler continued, "No licence has been suspended for non-compliance with the Canadian content regulations" (Canada, Committee on Broadcasting 1965:46). Indeed the content quotas had been continuously suspended by the Board. In addition, according to the Commission, the BBG's content regulations were full of loopholes: The Committee commented wryly that "compliance with the Canadian content regulations should clearly not depend, for example, on the number

of foreign state funerals or major sporting events that happen to fall within a particular period" (Canada, Committee on Broadcasting, 1965:49).

More generally, the Fowler Committee concluded that time-based content quotas were quite impractical, arguing:

A half-hour program of excellent quality may cost far more than several hours of quiz-shows and the like, and will undoubtedly be worth more in this context, but will still only be chalked up as half an hour of Canadian content. We believe that, taking all these factors into account, enforcement of Canadian content by universally applicable regulations is impractical (Canada, Committee on Broadcasting, 1965:49).

The federal government evidently accepted Fowler's declaration that deficiencies in the conduct and performance of the Canadian broadcasting system were attributable ultimately to inadequacies of the BBG as a regulator, rather than to entrusting private enterprise to accomplish non-market, indeed anti-market ends. The BBG, therefore, was to be sacrificed on the altar of Canadian nationalism, and replaced by a more powerful agency, the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC). Furthermore, the government concluded, it was advisable that the new regulator receive more explicit and detailed guidance as to its purposes, namely supervising Canadian broadcasting to achieve cultural, anti-market goals.

Broadcasting, then, immensely lucrative at least in potential, already having been penetrated, particularly beginning in 1958, by profit-oriented, private enterprises, meant that the government, a decade later, was loath to try and ease private stations out of a field still cloaked, however, with cultural, anti-market purposes and rhetoric. As the government's 1966 White Paper on Broadcasting confirmed:

Any statement of policy related to broadcasting in Canada therefore starkly poses this question. How can the people of Canada retain a degree of collective control over the new techniques of electronic communication that will be sufficient to preserve and strengthen the political, social, and economic fabric of Canada, which remains the most important objective of public policy? ... Broadcasting may well be regarded as the central nervous system of Canadian nationhood (Canada, Secretary of State, 1966:4).

New legislation, creating the Canadian Radio-Television Commission, was enacted in 1968.

The Canadian Radio-Television Commission.

The Broadcasting Act of 1968 went much further than had the predecessor Act in entrenching private broadcasting. According to the new legislation,

Broadcasting undertakings in Canada make use of radio frequencies that are public property and such undertakings constitute a single system, herein referred to as the Canadian broadcasting system, comprising public and private elements.

While the new Act proclaimed a special role and importance for the CBC, nonetheless henceforth broadcasting (echoing a recommendation of the 1957 Royal Commission) was to be viewed as "a single system comprising public and private elements." Furthermore, both elements of the system were to contribute to pro-cultural, anti-market goals.¹³

To cajole, persuade, require, force, or otherwise induce private stations to adhere to the spirit of the new Act, the CRTC was empowered to license new stations, to renew, suspend or revoke licenses, to attach conditions to licenses, to enact and enforce regulations, and to hold public hearings (Babe, 1979:29–48; also

Johnston 1980). By the Act, private broadcasters were again firmed up in their status as chosen instruments. Hence the CRTC, like the BBG before it, concluded that private stations needed protection from the strains and tensions of competition, whether domestic or foreign, in order that they might better pursue the antimarket charge that had been set for them.

Chosen instrument status for private broadcasting, it is now to be emphasized, foreshadowed the present-day ideology of technological nationalism insofar as there ensued a conscious government policy of encouraging the extension of private broadcasting facilities throughout the country. After all, chosen instruments, at least in theory diffusing Canadian culture and preserving Canadian nationhood, should not be confined to the major "markets"!

However, the time was not yet ripe (which is to say that pro-market ideology had not yet totally supplanted pro-cultural, anti-market sentiments) to allow a full-blown ideology of technological nationalism (discussed below) to replace the rhetoric of cultural nationalism, cable television being a particularly poignant case in point.

The Blight of Cable

For the period 1968-1976 particularly, and continuing until about 1980, the CRTC assumed a jaundiced view of cable TV. For the Commission in these early years cable was at best a blight upon broadcasting. In a major 1969 policy statement, the Commission fretted that unencumbered cable growth and the concomitant increase in penetration into Canada by American signals "posed the most serious threat to Canadian broadcasting since 1932 before Parliament decided to vote the first Broadcasting Act." In the Commission's opinion, cable growth "could disrupt the Canadian broadcasting system within a few years" (CRTC, 3 December 1969). Consequently the CRTC tried to promulgate a set of highly restrictive policies toward cable television (Babe, 1975:228–242). Whatever else the Commission's declarations, policy proposals, and initiatives may have meant, they certainly did not presage that cable television had been enfolded by the CRTC within the doctrine of technological nationalism. That fundamental shift in ideology or rhetoric, as far as the CRTC was concerned, awaited publication of the Therrien Report, discussed below, in 1980.

Nonetheless, right from the beginning, something was amiss, the CRTC seemed to recognize. In the 1969 policy statement in which it set forth some of its most restrictive cable policies, the Commission addressed made mention of certain misgivings it had with regard to the fairness and logical consistency of its policies. It is worth quoting the CRTC on this:

The Commission feels strongly that no part of the Canadian population should be penalized in order to preserve or to protect vested interests: either financial interests of investors in private broadcasting or privileges accumulated by particular groups in public broadcasting. The Canadian broadcasting system is worth safeguarding only if it provides the Canadian population with essential services which could not be provided otherwise. It would not make sense to protect a Canadian system based essentially on the retailing of programs "using predominantly non-Canadian creative and other resources." Certainly Canadians should not be denied access to the best material available from other countries. Any broadcasting system must remain constantly open to ideas coming from other parts of the world. Nevertheless the efforts of Canadians to maintain an independent broadcasting system can be fulfilled only if this system achieves the high expectations established by Parliament in the Broadcasting Act of 1968. (CRTC, 3 December 1969, emphasis added).

In this statement the Commission indicated that it did not intend to preside over a competitive war between private broadcasters and cable companies regarding who had the right to import American television programs. It indicated further, with impeccable logic, that private broadcasting should not maintain its newly achieved status of chosen instrument if it did not contribute significantly to Canadian cultural aspirations and show itself to be a vital force in resisting continental cultural integration.

Performance of the Private Sector as Chosen Instrument

Television broadcasting profits during the 1970's soared (Babe, 1990:211), but culturally the performance of the private sector left much to be desired. The CRTC, however, like the BBG before it, cast blind eyes on non-compliance with its Canadian content quotas (Babe, 1979:141–148) and showed itself also to be quite "understanding" when stations failed to keep their "Promises of Performance" attached as conditions to their licences (Babe, 1979:64–99; 141–156). On the other hand, the Commission on occasion did express deep frustration with the performance of its chosen instruments, as the following extract illustrates:

The Commission on other occasions expressed its concern about the disproportionate influence of mass-marketing strategies on North American broadcasting and particularly, of course, on Canadian broadcasting. ... Techno-economic considerations place constraints on the striving for cultural originality and artistic excellence in broadcast production. Unique, carefully crafted programs involving concentration of resources and orchestration of talent become merely the exception. Instead, everything which can move or speak is subject matter for the industrial image manufacturers, who exploit live resources on a scale without precedent in the history of communications. ... Broadcast programs often seem intended to titillate rather than to touch, to entertain rather than to initiate, to shock rather than to reassure, or keep in perspective, to simplify rather than to refine, to satisfy an anonymous audience rather than to facilitate individual opportunities for expression, and they impose on their audiences a limited number of expeditious and lucrative formulas instead of enlarging the possibilities of viewer choice (CRTC, 1974:10, 16).

Given such patent deficiencies, one could well question the wisdom or sincerity of continuing to treat private sector television broadcasting as a chosen instrument to pursue goals of Canadian culture and Canadian nationalism. It was, in other words, becoming all too apparent that Canadian private broadcasters were not merely making extraordinary profits, but that these profits stemmed from the definess with which they selected American television programs for rediffusion in Canada—a sharp antithesis to the goals set for broadcasting and to the ostensible reason for the existence of private stations and networks. The fiction that had been inaugurated by the Fowler Royal Commission in 1957, that private enterprise could regulated or cajoled into serving anti-market goals, had about run its course. (See particularly the retrospectives provided by Hardin, 1985, and Babe, 1979).

Fortunately for the private sector stations, however, a modified ideology or rhetoric, again justifying their existence, was readily at hand to substitute for the doctrine of cultural nationalism. The doctrine, of course, was that of technological nationalism.

Phase Three: Technological Nationalism

Two Doctrines of Technological Nationalism

Maurice Charland has defined technological nationalism as ascribing to technology "the capacity to create a nation by enhancing communication" (Charland, 1986:197). An additional, and today more current meaning, is the notion that countries cannot really achieve economic status in the world without being at the cutting edge of technological advance; that evolving technology, particularly in the communication field, is the key to national economic success and respect in the global marketplace. These two meanings of technological nationalism, while inconsistent in certain respects, are however of one accord in the implication that technological development is *inherently* desirable, and therefore should be given full sway.

Foreshadowing Doctrines of Technological Nationalism

As Charland remarks, Canada particularly has been prone to the first of these doctrines of technological nationalism. Our creation mythology, after all, centres on the CPR, ascribing Canadian nationhood to the space-binding railway, ¹⁷ making it but an easy extension to apply purported nation-building properties to communication media as well. Indeed Charland points out that the rhetoric of nation-building through communication technology was applied to broadcasting as early as 1927 by Prime Minister MacKenzie King, whose voice had been broadcast for the first time across the country earlier that year.

Publication of the 1957 Report of the Royal Commission on Broadcasting, as we have seen, gave further sway to the notion of nation-building through communication technology, what I will henceforth refer to as the "primitive doctrine of technological nationalism." The Royal Commission advised in effect that radio and television transmitters, regardless of modes of ownership and even when funded by advertising, could serve anti-market, pro-cultural, and nation-building goals. The Commission, however, qualified that conclusion in advising that a regulatory board be established to mold the conduct of the private sector minions so as to achieve anti-market, social purposes. In other words the Commission did not deem communication technology in and of itself to be sufficient to achieve nation-building purposes, and in that sense had not totally succumbed to the primitive myth of technological nationalism.

Likewise, the Board of Broadcast Governors, in being reluctant to further expand the private sector subsequent to licensing a new, second private television service in the larger communities, was not acting fully in accordance with the primitive myth of technological nationalism. Nor was the CRTC in its early years when it regarded cable television as a serious threat to the very survival of the Canadian broadcasting system.

On the other hand, however, private television broadcasting facilities certainly did proliferate under the aegis of the CRTC, evidently due to an understanding that such facilities and services were good things in and of themselves, despite occasional recriminations by the Commission. In thus expanding the private sector, despite obvious and deep deficiencies, the CRTC was acting in accordance with a doctrine that ascribes ultimate goodness to technology *per se*.

Implementation of the Primitive Doctrine: Technology as Nation Builder

The federal government's 1968 White Paper on a Domestic Satellite System for Canada endeavoured to forge strong links between communication technology and nation-building, contending that satellites would be a means of "integrating remote communities into the Canadian mainstream" and of "protecting and strengthening Canada's cultural heritage," adding that "a domestic satellite system is of vital importance for the growth, prosperity, and unity of Canada" (Department of Industry, 1968:36, 38). Appearing before a parliamentary committee the following year, A. E. Gotlieb, Deputy Minister of Communications, likewise intoned:

[The satellite] will introduce a new dimension into life in the North and thereby make it much more possible for that part of Canada to be a single, national, cohesive whole by integrating the more remote areas into the common whole. ... I hate to use clichés, but I think there is an analogy with the railway here. When it was opened up, I imagine very, very few people lived at the end of the line where the last spike was driven, but the fact this facility went in, I think, transformed the character of the country (A. E. Gotlieb, 1969:25).

The year 1968 saw creation by the federal government not only of the CRTC (which, as we have seen, initially adopted a stance of cultural nationalism as opposed to a full-blown technological nationalism), but as well of the Department of Communications (DOC), staffed largely by engineers, lawyers, and economists. As noted by Caplan-Sauvageau, from the outset DOC "was particularly anxious to link culture, which it sometimes described as a form of software, to the potential of new communications technologies" (Canada, Task Force on Broadcasting Policy, 1986:18). Initially, however, DOC had little direct role in implementing broadcasting and cultural policy, the Secretary of State's Department retaining most responsibility for the federal government's cultural initiatives. Rather, DOC was confined primarily to spectrum management, to fostering technological initiatives such as communication satellites and Telidon, to negotiating jurisdictional matters with the provinces in the fields of culture and communication, and to conducting/sponsoring research studies. In that latter regard DOC organized the Telecommission, chaired by A. E. Gotlieb, as a joint government-private sector inquiry into the role of telecommunications in Canada. Reporting in 1971, the Telecommission went a great distance in promulgating a doctrine of nation building through communication technology. The Report opened by quoting Francis Bacon, often held to be the patriarch of scientism and technology (Babe, 1996:69-85; also Roszak, 1973; and Leiss, 1990), establishing thereby the tone for the entire document. 18 In the view of the writers of the Report,

The technologies of telecommunications and computers, effectively used in combination, could make a striking contribution to economic prosperity and the general quality of life in Canada; to the development of remote and sparsely populated regions of the country; to the extension of French and English broadcasting services from coast to coast; to the ability of individuals and groups in Canada to express themselves and communicate their views in the language of their choice; and to Canadian acceptance of responsibility for participation in the achievement of international objectives, especially social and economic development of less fortunate countries in many parts of the world (Canada, Telecommission, 1971:7–8).

In articulating this "primitive doctrine of technological nationalism," the Department of Communications in these early years revised the past in attempts to incorporate communication technology into the Canadian creation myth, and also mythologized the future by positing nation-building prospects contingent upon communication technology.

Likewise, in proposing a new framework for communication policy in 1973, then Communications Minister Gérard Pelletier declared that "the existence of Canada as a political and social entity has always been heavily dependent upon effective systems of east/west communication ... [counterbalancing] the strong north/south pull of continentalism (Minister of Communications, 1973:3). Even by the late 1980's the mythic discourse of Canadian nationhood through communication technology had not entirely disappeared, as the following extract from DOC's 1987 policy document, Communications for the Twenty-First Century, illustrates:

Communications have always played a central role in Canada's history. From the fur trade of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to the canals and railways of the nineteenth, from the broadcasting networks, airlines and highways to the telephone and satellite systems of the twentieth, communications technologies have helped Canadians reach new frontiers,

settle and develop the wilderness, and build both a society and culture that are unique in the world for the degree to which they depend on good communications systems (Department of Communications, 1987:5).

The Mature Myth: Technological Imperative

But nation-building through communication technology is a hard myth to sustain in an age of globalization and burgeoning transnational communication. Put simply, communication technologies weaken nation states.

This fact has been acknowledged by none other than the Canadian Government. In its review of Canada's foreign policy, for example, the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons recently opined: "Globalization is erasing time and space, making borders porous, and encouraging continental integration." The Joint Committee continued, "National sovereignty is being reshaped and the power of national governments to control events, reduced" (Canada, Special Joint Committee, 1994:1). Inducing globalization, according to the Special Joint Committee, has been an "explosion of technology ... a revolution in transportation, communications and information processing." And behind these technologies, the Joint Committee affirmed, stand transnational enterprises: "Non-governmental actors have become major international players. The primary agents of globalization are in fact the transnational corporations (TNC's)" (Canada, Special Joint Committee:4).

It is not difficult to see why the Special Joint Committee reached these conclusions. Improvements in telecommunications permit transnationals to administer in real time activities of foreign divisions from central locales, gleaning information and monitoring electronically activities, dispensing orders, and exploiting international divisions of labour. Satellite and other advanced forms of telecommunications enable transnational managers hastily to relocate production sites to non-unionized locales, to zones offering more favourable tax treatments, to jurisdictions with lax but "business-friendly" environmental regulations, and to zones proffering "pro-business" health and safety legislation (Suzuki, 1994; Melody, 1991). This too the Special Joint Committee acknowledged:

The transnational mobility of capital generates pressures for deeper harmonization of national policies. In the competition for competitive advantages governments must deal with pressures to cut back on social programs and environmental programs that may raise the cost of producing goods and services, and to lower corporate taxes (Special Joint Committee, 1994:4; see also Babe, 1995:199–210).

Against this back-drop, the myth of nation-building through telecommunications begins to ring quite hollow. Hence the need once more to revise a myth if private, corporate interests in broadcasting and telecommunications are to be accommodated.

In recent years, therefore, the federal government's nationalist rhetoric has once more shifted ground, largely forsaking the doctrine of nation-building through communication technology to promote instead the doctrine of technological imperative, the notion that Canada has no choice but to be at the forefront in introducing communication technology.

Rhetorically, a definite turning point occurred with publication in 1981 by the Department of Communications of *The Information Revolution and its Implications for Canada*. Written by two senior DOC bureaucrats, Shirley Serafini and Michel Andrieu, the booklet argued that irrespective of any misgivings Canadians might have concerning national sovereignty or other matters, an information revolution was indeed underway, necessitating the deployment of new communication technologies. According to the authors,

The information revolution is a worldwide phenomenon causing significant structural changes in the economies of all countries, regardless of national differences in institutional arrangements or public policies. This strongly suggests that, like the industrial revolution, the information revolution is unavoidable. Consequently, the objectives of public policy should be not to prevent the revolution from occurring, but rather to turn it to our advantage (Serafini and Andrieu, 1981:13).

And further,

Canada has no choice but to promote vigorously introduction of the new technology in order to maintain and increase its international competitiveness. ... The information revolution is international in nature and reflects a fundamental structural change through which all developed economies are passing. ... The only strategy with a chance of success is one which attempts to take advantage of the benefits of the technology with respect to devising new products and improving productivity. Any attempt to slow down the revolution out of concern for possible employment effects will backfire. Such an approach would inevitably lead to an erosion of Canadian industry's competitiveness, resulting in declining exports, falling output and collapsing employment (Serafini and Andrieu, 1981:96, 94). 19

Serafini and Andrieu acknowledged, perhaps for the first time in a document published by the Government of Canada, that communication technology erodes national sovereignty, and in so doing they implicitly repudiated the primitive myth of technological nationalism that their Department had been promoting since its inception. Nonetheless, they went on to insist that this "information revolution" was simply unavoidable in the context of global developments, and in so doing they thereby became harbingers for the revised mythology that is so current today.

In a 1983 policy document from DOC, even program content was enfolded into the new rhetoric. Content, in this document, was justified as rationale for deploying new technologies:

Canadian high technology industries should benefit directly as cable operators retool their plants to carry these new programming and non-programming services. Cable companies will require significant amounts of new capital equipment—such as earth stations, scrambling and descrambling equipment and a variety of other types of cable hardware. Canadian high technology industries manufacture much of this equipment, and jobs should be created as a result (Canada, Department of Communications, 1983b:7).

In 1987 the DOC charged that Canadians had not yet become sufficiently imbued with the revised mythology. Claiming that a "persistent lag in information technology diffusion [posed] a serious problem of national proportions," DOC lamented: "We do not have a culture that promotes the use of new technology" (Canada, Department of Communications, 1987).²⁰

At about the same time the CRTC too began being imbued with the doctrine technological imperative. A factor that slowly came to influence the Commission in this regard was transference to the CRTC in 1976 of regulatory responsibilities for federally regulated telecommunications common carriers such as Bell Canada. Historically telecom carriers had been regulated under provisions of the *Railway Act* which provided that rates should be "just and reasonable" and free of "undue preference" and of "unjust discrimination," provisions certainly far removed from a mandate of safeguarding, enriching and strengthening the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada!

A landmark in the shift of CRTC's stance toward technology was the Therrien Committee's 1980 Report on the Extension of Service to Northern and Remote Communities. That Committee had been formed upon invitation of the Minister of Communications who wanted broadcasting services by satellite, including pay television, to be extended throughout Canada, particularly to remote areas, in both official languages. Therrien responded with a ringing endorsement:

For the past ten years or more, advisory or consultative committees have been urging governments to start planning so as to ensure that Canada will be able to maintain its rightful place in a totally new telecommunications universe, but for the most part their urgings have been in vain. This new technological universe is already taking shape at a pace that is inexorable. An astonishing variety of broadcasting services is now available thanks to satellite carriage, and this is only the tip of the iceberg (CRTC, Committee on Extension of Service to Northern and Remote Communities, 1980:2).

Given this presupposition, Therrien recommended that the government "regard new technology and innovative approaches to services as a welcome opportunity to provide better broadcasting for everyone in Canada." It continued,

The Committee believes that there is no longer room for retrospective tunnel-vision about television. We are already living in a new communications universe. The total nature of that universe cannot be precisely identified, but many of its features and its outlines are already clearly visible. ... With regard to what can be done now to get the whole machine moving, the Committee [recommends] ... that immediate action be taken to provide alternative [i.e. private, commercial] Canadian programming for reception in remote and underserved areas.

The next steps must be to initiate action, without any delay, aimed at achieving the objective of providing as wide a range of services as possible to be carried on Canadian satellites (CRTC, Committee on Extension of Service to Northern and Remote Communities, 1980:36–37).

The CRTC acted quickly and thereafter continuously on Therrien's advice. Between 1982 and early 1995 it licensed over thirty new Canadian pay, pay-per-view, and specialty channels, and as well authorized numerous U.S. satellite services for distribution by cable (CRTC, 1995:6). As the 1986 Task Force on Broadcasting (Caplan-Sauvageau) put it, "Over the years the CRTC has significantly diluted the notion of a 'predominantly Canadian' broadcasting system, always in the name of the *Broadcasting Act*" (Task Force on Broadcasting, 1986:14).

In 1991 Parliament enacted a revised *Broadcasting Act*. Among the provisions of the new *Act* is the following:

The Canadian broadcasting system should be regulated and supervised in a flexible manner that ... is readily adaptable to scientific and technological change; [and that] does not inhibit the development of information technologies and their application or the delivery of resultant services to Canadians ..." (*Broadcasting Act 1991*, s. 5.2).

The CRTC has accepted enthusiastically the implied technological imperative of this provision. In 1994, for example, evidently awe-struck by an ostensible "political, economic and cultural revolution" that is outpacing "the ability of regulators to recognize and define, let alone control" (CRTC, 1994:49, 51; emphasis added)²², the Commission proposed revamping its entire regulatory framework, "converging" telecommunications and broadcasting. Likewise, reporting to the government in 1995 on an imminent Canadian Information Highway, the Commission enthused:

The information highway is more than cable and copper wire; it is a metaphor for the promise and uncertainty surrounding the emergence of a world-wide communications network driven by innovation, competition and technology (CRTC, 1995:5; emphasis added).

One could hardly ask for a clearer example than this of mythological posturing with regard to technology.

Thirty years ago in Lament for a Nation, George Grant informed us of what is at stake for Canada in embracing the technological imperative. He wrote:

North American liberalism expresses the belief in open-ended progress more accurately than Marxism. It understands more fully the implications of man's essence being his freedom. As liberals become more and more aware of the implications of their own doctrine, they recognize that no appeal to human good, now or in the future, must be allowed to limit their freedom to make the world as they choose ... Nationalism [in a technologized, liberal state] can only be asserted successfully by an identification with technological advance; but technological advance entails the disappearance of those indigenous differences that give substance to nationalism (56-7, 76).

Today, of course, Information Highway initiatives are routinely framed within the rhetoric of technological imperative and technological nationalism (Babe, 1995:199–210). According to Industry Canada, a relatively new department that absorbed portions of the now defunct Department of Communications,

If Canada is to succeed in a global economy based on the creation, movement, storage, retrieval and application of information, our communications networks must be knitted into a seamless and powerful information infrastructure serving all Canadians. ... Canada's information highway must be linked and integrated with the networks of our trading partners as part of a seamless, global information infrastructure. This global reach will allow businesses and individuals to access information markets, clients and partners around the world (Canada, Industry Canada, 1994:5, 25).

The Myth of Technology

For Dallas W. Smythe, "modern technology is a mystifying term which describes the ongoing capitalist system, nothing more." While appearing to be "nonpolitical," Smythe continued, "in reality, ["technology"] is one of capitalism's most potent propaganda weapons" (Smythe, 1981:20). Indeed, according to Smythe, the word "technology" may rival 'free flow of information' as the propaganda term most valuable for monopoly capitalism in [this] century" (Smythe, 1981:217).

Historical analysis of Canadian broadcasting/communication policy and rhetoric lends credence to and amplifies Smythe's position. Upon inception in 1921, radio broadcasting was controlled by private sector interests, and therefore broadcasting technology meant advertising, "entertainment" (i.e., diversion or distraction of audiences), American programs, profit seeking, and propagation of a consumerist ethic; as remarked by Daniel Czitrom, radio became the "latch key" whereby advertisers invaded nearly every home (Czitrom, 1982:77), or at least homes located within the more lucrative and populous zones where broadcasting facilities were concentrated. The congruence of radio "technology" and capitalism in this early period is, then, apparent.

In 1929 the Aird Commission, however, endeavoured to change fundamentally the meaning of radio. Aird wanted to transform radio broadcasting into a communication medium that would be set in opposition to continentalist cultural pressures. Radio, Aird believed, should be non-commercial, used to enlighten and to educate. Aird envisaged a radio medium predominantly Canadian in content and character, serving rural and remote regions as well as populous centres, a medium owned and controlled as a public enterprise by Canadians to help build community and nationhood. Aird, then, denied the "technological imperative" by contending that the consequences of radio, merely a human invention, depend upon *choices* regarding the deployment of media technologies, and concerning patterns of ownership and control. If retained by advertisers and private sector broadcasters, Aird adduced, radio would certainly continue to serve continentalist economic interests, concomitantly eroding Canadian community, while on the other hand if consciously deployed in the public sector to achieve non pecuniary ends, radio could prove useful as a counterpoint to continental, market-induced integration. As we have seen the Conservative government of the day, by and large, acted in accordance with Aird's recommendations, and for over twenty years Aird's alternative, anti-market, pro-cultural meaning, first for radio and then for television, held sway.²³

Commercial forces, however, even with the advent of the CRBC in 1932, persisted, grew stronger, and finally came to dominate, with the result that the meaning of broadcasting shifted back once more to what commercial enterprisers, in their profit seeking, wished to make of it. No longer, evidently, is the distinction between public and private, non commercial and commercial, seen by policymakers as being essential, or even as important. Today, rather, the spectre of privatization hovers over even educational broadcasters (ACCESS, TV Ontario), and one questions how many years the CBC has left as a public sector institution.

"Technology," "convergence," and "information revolution," in our day are code words, rhetorically standing for "global capitalism," "transnational enterprise," "international market forces," "dominant economic interests," and so forth. In a 1983 policy document, for instance, the Department of Communications declared, "The new broadcasting environment is simply one facet of that sweeping, international movement. Based on the proliferation of new technologies and computer-communication services for the creation of knowledge and transmission of information, this 'information revolution' is now taking Canada into a new, cultural, economic and social world where there are few existing rules" (Department of Communication, 1983b:4). Substitute the phrase "global capitalism" or "transnational enterprise," or "a compliant Canadian government" or "capitalist ideology" into the above quote for the term "information revolution," and the code is broken; political/economic power plays come to the fore once more, new insights become possible, and resistance once more seems feasible.

Smythe asked, "Is the *idea* that technology is autonomous, i.e., politically neutral and universal, itself a political concept?" "Yes," he answered, "it is a political concept and reactionary as well." For," he continued,

the reification of technology as a universal tendency (an autonomous factor) inevitably leads people to regard technology as something that is happening to them without their consent, awareness, or the possibility of their controlling it. ... In every sense of the word, "technology" is a reactionary political fact in the present state of the peoples of the world (Smythe, 1995[1973]:236, 237; emphasis added).

Power, in the absence of responsibility is, of course, the essence of totalitarianism. The mythic doctrine of technological imperative, now being promoted so fervently by the Canadian government and by Corporate Canada, by denying the *possibility* of human choice, and hence denying also human responsibility, is the most assuredly a totalitarian ideology, advantageous of course to those who would relieve themselves of the burden of responsibility for outcomes.

To de-mythologize technology, by showing once again that artifacts are innovated and deployed by human agents, is as Jacques Ellul affirmed equivalent to resuming the fight for freedom (Ellul, 1980:246). With Canadians being propagandized by their governments and business leaders into believing that convergence, information highway, privatization, and deregulation of communication are necessary and inevitable, voices such as those of Smythe, Ellul, Grant, Polanyi, Davis, and Innis are well worth harkening to once more.

ENDNOTES

- 1. This idea was set out by none other than Adam Smith, who wrote that markets, once generated, operate like an "invisible hand," channeling economic activity so as to maximize the wealth of the nation, even though this goal is "no part of [the participant's] intention." Indeed, to the contrary, "by pursuing his own interest [a person] frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it." As I have noted elsewhere, however, Smith was a paradoxical writer, in *Theory of Moral Sentiments* lauding empathy as the highest of human virtues (Babe, 1996:69–85).
- 2. "Human nature," including a fundamental selfishness, is assumed as an article of faith in conservative ideologies. See, for example, the chapters comparing Malthus and Veblen in Babe (1996: 125–158); also Smythe (1981:17–18).
- 3. Elsewhere I have pointed to Market as one of the great mythologies or god-words of our era, others being Technology and Evolution. All are deemed to be omnipotent forces or concepts that cause inevitable progress. See Babe, 1996:69–85.
- 4. At that time Bell Telephone Company of Canada and radio equipment manufacturers (General Electric, Westinghouse, and Marconi), hitherto deadlocked with regard to radio patents, agreed to split broadcasting (one-way, point-to-mass communication) from telecommunications (two-way, point-to-point communication), and to preserve these divisions as exclusive domains. See Babe, 1990:189–207.
- 5. Canadian National Railway's radio department was set up in 1923. CN equipped its parlour cars with receiving sets so that passengers could settle back comfortably in their seats and enjoy "Romance of Canada" (a series of plays on Canadian themes); the Toronto Symphony Orchestra; condensed versions of great operas, operettas and musical comedies; "The Nation's Business" (a discussion program involving leading politicians); and indeed "Amos N' Andy." CN's program service was diffused over its own transmitters sprinkled across the land.
- 6. In the legislation the CRBC was given powers to purchase existing stations, to construct new ones, and to "take over all broadcasting in Canada," subject to Parliamentary approval. Funding for the CRBC was to be entirely through Parliamentary appropriation in amount no greater than the revenues accruing from annual licence fees paid for broadcasting receivers and transmitters.
- 7. Looking toward the age of television, Massey was prescient, forecasting that high programming costs could well create immense pressures on the private sector to become "mere channels for American commercial material." Consequently, Massey recommended that no private television stations be licensed until CBC had firmly established itself in the field, and thereafter any and all private stations should be required to affiliate with CBC and be regulated by it.

- 8. In deeming market forces to be "natural," of course, the Commission is tipping its hand as to what will follow.
- 9. For a general (i.e., not culture-specific) critique of comparative advantage, see Daly and Cobb (1989:213-218).
- 10. Under the legislation the broadcasting service was to be "basically Canadian in content and character" and the BBG was to ensure "the greater use of Canadian talent by broadcasting stations" (Broadcasting Act 1958, s. 11, as cited in Committee on Broadcasting, 1965: 45). As David Ellis remarked, the new legislation stripped the CBC of all responsibility for goals of national purpose; national goals, rather, "such as they were, were now reserved for the board under its objects and purposes, in section 10" (Ellis, 1979:46). Section 10 of the 1958 Act read:

The Board shall, for the purpose of ensuring the continued existence and efficient operation of a national broadcasting system [i.e., the CBC] and the provision of a varied and comprehensive broadcasting service of a high standard that is basically Canadian in content and character, regulate the establishment and operation of networks of broadcasting stations, the activities of public and private broadcasting stations in Canada and the relationship between them and provide for the final determination of all matters and questions in relation thereto (1958 *Broadcasting Act*, as cited in Ellis, 1979:46).

11. Detailed accounts of the development of Canadian content regulations are given in Peter S. Grant, "The Regulation of Program Content in Canadian Television: An Introduction," and in Grant, *Broadcasting and Cable Television Regulatory* Handbook-189, and in Bake 1972, and Babe 1979:20-22.

12. According to Beke (1972:116),

Once additional broadcasters were allowed into each market, the Board of Broadcast Governors reverted to a protectionist policy and limited further expansion; in fact, throughout the remainder of its life, the main function of the BBG was seeing to the economic well-being of the private broadcasters.

In addition to a restrictive licensing policy, the BBG prevented stations from soliciting advertising outside their designated markets, denied educational stations operated by universities the right to advertise, and on occasion treated two cities as one market for licensing purposes (Beke:116-117).

13. According to section 3,

The Canadian broadcasting system should be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians so as to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada.

The programming provided by the Canadian broadcasting system should be varied and comprehensive and should provide reasonable, balanced opportunity for the expression of differing views on matters of public concern, and the programming provided by each broadcaster should be of high standard, using predominantly Canadian creative and other resources.

14. According to the Commission's first Chairman, the indomitable Pierre Juneau, "Every time we talk about developing cable as if it were a utility, like telephone or hydro or water, what you are saying in fact is, 'Let's make sure you get those four American channels available faster than they would otherwise be available.'

- ... Our mandate is not to wire up Canada as fast as possible for American television" (Juneau, quoted in Manitoba, Department of Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services, 1974:34).
- 15. For example, it announced that it would not authorize distant head-ends or microwave for cable systems, thereby preventing systems far from the border from rediffusing U.S. signals, a policy incidentally that if implemented would have precluded the development of cable in much of Manitoba, the Atlantic provinces, and in all northern regions of the country. Furthermore the Commission announced that in any event cable rediffusion of foreign signals would be limited to one commercial and one non-commercial signal (Canada, CRTC, 1969). As well the Commission twice refused to license pay-TV, a service much sought after by the cable industry, and furthermore it prohibited cable program originations deemed to be "competitive" with over-the-air broadcasting (Babe, 1990:211).
- 16. It is ironic, yet understandable in the context of the CRTC's protectionist position toward the private sector, that it reserved these harsh comments, directed at the entire North American television broadcasting industry, for a decision renewing the licence of the CBC.
- 17. This, of course, being contrary, however, to the position arrived at by Harold Innis in his mammoth study on the fur trade. There Innis concluded that the CPR simply fulfilled what the fur trade had begun. According to Innis, "It is no accident that the present Dominion coincides roughly with the fur-trading areas of northern North America.... Canada emerged as a political entity with boundaries largely determined by the fur trade" (Innis 1967[1930]:393-4). Innis's conclusion does not overturn a basic proposition of this chapter, however, namely that today and for many years market forces have been continentalist. It was Innis's own position that timber, which superseded the fur trade, was continentalist, fostering a north-south instead of an east-west axis of trade. Different staples induce different effects, Innis believed.
- 18. The Report opened as follows:

Telecommunications policy may have to be re-shaped if full advantage is to be taken of the opportunities that technology affords and if socially undesirable effects are to be avoided. For, in the words of Francis Bacon, "he that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils; for time is the greatest innovator (Telecommission, 1971:i).

- 19. Subsequently Francis Fox, Minister of Communications, took up these thoughts virtually verbatim (1983a:19) in *Culture and Communications: Key Elements of Canada's Economic Future*, his brief to The Royal Commission on The Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada.
- 20. A useful critique of this document is provided by Taylor (1988).
- 21. As of 25 October 1993, the *Telecommunications Act* replaced the telecommunications provisions of the *Railway Act*. The new *Act* adopts some of the phraseology associated with broadcasting in setting forth goals, even while legislating greater reliance on market forces. More particularly, the goals of telecommunications policy are now stated to be:
 - (1) to facilitate the orderly development throughout Canada of a telecommunications system that serves to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the social and economic fabric of Canada and its regions;
 - (2) to render reliable and affordable telecommunications services of high quality accessible to Canadians in both urban and rural areas in all regions of Canada;
 - (3) to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness, at the national and international levels, of Canadian telecommunications;

(4) to promote the use of Canadian transmission facilities for telecommunications within Canada and between Canada and points outside Canada;

(5) to foster increased reliance on market forces for the provision of telecommunications

services and to ensure that regulation, where required, is efficient and effective;

(6) to stimulate research and development in Canada in the field of telecommunications and encourage innovation in the provision of telecommunications services;

(7) to respond to the economic and social requirements of users of telecommunications services; and

(8) to contribute to the protection of the privacy of persons.

- 22. The Commission evidently deemed its admission concerning its incapacity to be of such significance that it was restated in its report to the government on the information highway. See CRTC (1995:11).
- 23. Here too, George Grant is helpful. In Lament for a Nation he contrasted both socialists and "true" conservatives with classically-inspired liberals. Both socialists and conservatives, according to Grant, believe that individual freedom (or individual greed) must to some extent be restrained in the name of some common good. Likewise, with C. B. Macpherson, we ask, "Is the liberalism we are talking about the freedom of the strong to oppress the weak following market rules, or does it mean equal effective freedom of all to use and develop their capabilities. The latter freedom," Macpherson noted, "is inconsistent with the former." See George Grant, 1995[1965]:72; and C. B. Macpherspon, 1977:1.

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Alt. Spicer. Ciao, Baby

Thelma McCormack York University

"Would any government seriously consider tearing down Chartres Cathedral or the Taj Mahal if it could be shown that building a luxury hotel, shopping mall and conference centre on the site . . . would make a greater net addition to the country's GNP than could be yielded by the existing tourist traffic?"

----Eric Hobsbawm (1994:426-427)

I

In November of 1994 when Bill Gates -- Mister Microsoft -- bought Leonardo Da Vinci's notebooks, it symbolized a new relationship between technology and culture. The cost was \$30.8 million dollars, not much, apparently for Mr. Gates who is said to be worth \$14.8 billion dollars and certainly not excessive for the intellectual and philosophical promise it held out. But since November when that transaction took place there is little evidence of any change, any indication that capitalism and the Renaissance may have met and fused into a new epistemology or that we have found a way of transcending the Cartesian dualism between mind and body, technology and culture. They remain estranged, as far apart as they have ever been, and run parallel to similar dichotomies in modern thought -- private and public, individual and collective, atomistic and holistic, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, sacred and profane.

One version of this dichotomy is the large centralized nation-state and the small anti-statist participatory community. Most observers believe that the former is losing its meaning and its various functions because of exogenous forces that include the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Russian system of communism (Hobsbawm, 1994). Others, however, regard the decline as part of a resurgence of a more self-sufficient and social democratic communitarianism (Walzer, 1983). Our concern here with national-identity is embedded in both models and will be more fully discussed later.

They are the subtexts of two recent government reports, one by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Canada. CRTC, 1995) and the other from the Ministry of Industry (Canada. Information Highway Advisory Council, 1995) (For purposes of discussion we will refer to the first as CRTC, the second as Highway.). Both reports attest to our continuing fascination with technology and both recognize that the new information technology -- cable, computers, satellite transmission, Internet, fax, modems, cellular phones, on-demand services -- provides an opportunity to reshape Canadian thinking about communication, to draw up new policies that are no longer rooted in an earlier period of nation-building and, more latterly, the Welfare State.

Canadian telecommunications policy in 1995 is the gateway to the new neoconservative, neo-Positivist model of state and society. But Canada has held no serious national debate on these issues taken singly or collectively. If in the 1990s scholars can talk about "market socialism" and "welfare capitalism," we owe it to ourselves to examine in a broader and more critical context specific policies which are being quietly accepted and adopted as approved. The Ottawa message is that these policies are both desirable and inevitable, combining the myth of progress with the myth of fate, as if these policies are beyond choice and determined apart from history. Take it or leave it, we can either facilitate or obstruct them, and if we engage in the latter it would seriously disadvantage us economically in a competitive game where time counts. Further, it would handicap us in our negotiating positions on international trade. But, these same policies may be self defeating so that we lose our niche in providing a qualitative produce and service. Nevertheless, Ottawa has not encouraged any analysis of the general direction of neoconservatism nor of the specific policy initiatives. We remain spectators as our communications systems and our institutions are being transformed by an economic logic that gives little attention to human capital.

To appreciate just how radical the transformation is, you must go back to the Massey Report (Canada. Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, 1951) which envisaged the then media of communication as part of the total set, a matrix of the "arts, letters and sciences." Everything from church organs and folk arts to museums, film, universities, libraries, design, historic sites, national monuments, architecture, sculpture, ceramics and the performing arts were included. Together, folk culture and middlebrow, popular culture and highbrow, academic culture and journalistic constituted a whole, a broad resource base or what Mr. Massey with his civility called the "spiritual foundations of our national life." From that foundation a national identity would emerge and form the basis of a coherent, unified and what we would today call a "distinct" society. To neglect this could only mean that sooner or later Canada with its small and widely dispersed population would become fragmented and decentralized. Eventually, it would segué into the American Empire, and lose the integrity of its culture *malgré lui*.

The Massey Report opens with a quotation from St. Augustine's *The City of God*. That alone conveys some idea of its humanism in contrast with the positivism in the two reports discussed here. Yet, not everyone was enthusiastic about the new nationalism of the Massey Report or appreciated the role of government as patron.¹ Nevertheless, it captured the post-war, mid-century optimism about the future of Canada. Throughout the country, in all regions and classes, among both linguistic groups there was a deep commitment to nation-building which we can still see today in Quebec and in many of the post-colonial countries of the developing world (McCormack, 1981). And it was this excitement about a sovereign, Canadian-centered future that prevailed. It nurtured self-respect, gave impetus to economic growth and led to Constitutional patriation.

Ironically, the policies based on the Massey report succeeded too well. Thirty years later we had too many writers, too many artists, too many film makers, too many ballet companies, too many curators, too many conductors and musicians and a new but a steadily increasing group of art students, arts programmes, arts administrators and arts economists.² The Applebaum-Hébert Report (Canada. Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee, 1982) reflected a growing concern about their future. The focus was on the creative and interpretative sectors, on the artists and performers, not and this will become important later on, the large number of behind-the-scenes people who constituted the cultural labour force. Unlike earlier cultural reviews, the Applebaum-Hébert Report shifted away from such institutions as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the National Film Board to the market place and marketing. This was mainly due to the influence of its Vice-chair, Albert Breton, an economist, but it also reflected a shifting ideological climate The report assumes that the private sector would play a greater role and become more accountable; young people would be free to create their own independent companies for production and distribution. Even the Canadian Opera Company was put on notice that it could run its affairs on a more business-like basis (McCormack, 1984). An unsold ticket, according to the report, was an opportunity lost forever. Two of its recommendations illustrate the intention of reducing the role of the state and any dependency on public funding. The National Film Board would become a training programme and give up making films, while the CBC would give up all advertising revenue -- commercial television would be seen only on the private networks -- and restrict itself to the news. The report also encouraged artists to make greater use of the new technologies like computer graphics and electronic music and even proposed a special monetary incentive to use a technology that now existed but was being unused.

The reaction to the report was largely negative.³ The noise and hostile criticism soon led to a counter report authored by Robert Caplan and Florian Sauvageau (Canada. Task Force on Broadcasting Policy, 1986) who attempted to reinstate the place of the public sector. They recommended what they called a "programme-driven system" (McCormack, 1987). But the Caplan-Sauvageau report was too little and too late; the die had been cast. In the Fall of 1992, Keith Spicer, Chairperson of the CRTC, flew to Amsterdam where he told his European counterparts that Canada's response to globalization was "privatization, modernization, liberalization and deregulation." They are, he said (1992:717) "the principal strategies Canada has adopted to increase the competitiveness of our telecommunications infrastructures in the international market place."

The Two-Tier system. Between the Massey Report and Mr. Spicer's speech in Amsterdam, Canada had moved toward a two-tier system, one that focuses on culture and the public sector, the other on information and the private sector; one that looks toward creating a national identity, the other on building a robust supply-side economy. If the two were balanced it would create an interesting dialectic within the Canadian mind. But they were not; indeed, they are grossly unbalanced. Funds for the public sector have been so drastically cut-back that the survival of the arts communities and the institutions like the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation are endangered, a condition that can only disempower many in the cultural industries -- film, theatre, dance, music, literature and the visual arts -- performers as well as the large numbers of technicians and people involved in back-stage and support activities. The process is taking place in universities as well. The justification given for these measures is fiscal responsibility, but the depth of the cuts suggests a different, more political agenda. In any case, it was not the outcome anticipated by the Applebaum-Hébert report, but it was a process for which it must bear some responsibility.

The CRTC and Industry Canada reports carry the general direction and philosophy of Applebaum-Hébert one step further.⁴ Having moved toward a private-sector market model, they discovered how narrow our domestic market was. In a country the size of Canada if there was not a vigorous export policy the cultural sector would collapse. Hence, they turned their attention to ways to increase export of our cultural goods and the development of co-productions, while the function of government, according to the *Highway* (xii), is not to regulate and not to provide grants and other incentives to create the new music, dance, theatre, sculpture and painting but to promote export opportunities for the cultural industries. Both reports and related documents pay lip-service to protecting Canadian culture from outside influences, chiefly the U.S., but the overall intention is to (1) eliminate all forms of protectionism in the way of subsidies, (2) free the private sector and encourage competition, and (3) disaggregate the arts, distinguishing between the commercial arts which are, like many other products, exportable in dollars and cents, and those which are, like education, non profit, or, as arts economists say, "market failures." These non profits and market failures survive on soft money and are exportable by invitation only -- film festivals, visiting professors, tours of dance companies, orchestras and art exhibitions, and professional journals. It was a recognition and proscription of a two-tier system.

The two-tier system is, of course, very close to the U.S. model where the growth of the arts and humanities were not heavily dependent on public-sector funding until well after World War II. The great private universities (e.g., the Ivies, Chicago, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, Duke, Rice) and museums were built by philanthropists who endowed them as well. The public sector for the creative arts and humanities remained small and it, too, is being presently down-sized.⁵ Funds for the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities have been slashed, and Congress has recently advised the Public Broadcasting System that it will no longer receive funding. PBS was directed to create a privatization

plan which would "remove public broadcasting from the congressional budget process forever" (Nelson, 1995:16). An alternate proposal was to use some of the funds created by the new technologies to create a tax-exempt Trust Fund.⁶

Private broadcasters in Canada look with envy on the U.S. system which is free to maximize its advertising revenue without worrying about meeting Canadian content requirements. The Federal Communications Commission, which long ago gave up the language of television as a "vast wasteland," Communications Commission, which long ago gave up the language of television as a "vast wasteland," highway report was good news because it brought them one step closer to their goal of dropping all pretense of providing serious Canadian culture that failed to attract large audiences or advertising revenues. "Art takes the off-ramp on info highway report" was the headline in the Globe and Mail (September 30, 1995) the off-ramp on info highway report" was the headline in the Globe and Mail (September 30, 1995) describing the Report (1995) of the Canadian Content and Culture Working group, a sub-committee of the Advisory Council.

Fear of Americanization is still present in the reports but the urge to create a distinctive nation-state is not. In an earlier period, just after World War II when the Massey Report appeared, Canadians viewed their neighbours as friendly but, nevertheless, too eager to turn Canada into a branch-plant economy, too willing to invest and then spend their dividends elsewhere. Having been a colony, Canada was suspicious of American imperialism. Half a century later in the 1990s anti-imperialism as a political force became anti-Americanism as an arbitrary prejudice, something to be tolerated but not taken seriously. The new reports almost rejoice in the extent of U.S. culture in Canada as evidence of an openness and proof that Canada no longer cares about protectionism. The Honourable John Manley, speaking at the G7 meeting in Brussels (1995), was proud of our tradition of foreign saturation of Canadian culture (Canadian Content and Culture (Working Group of the Advisory Council of the Information Highway, October 1995:45). We have, he said, Working Group of the Advisory Council of the Information Highway, October 1995:45). We have, he said, or English daily television fare is foreign-produced; 95% per cent of our films are foreign-produced; 88% of sound recordings on Canada's radio waves are foreign produced. "In fact," he concluded, "we have developed a policy framework that suits our historical reality."

Our historic reality, in this case, is the vision of an unplanned economy where the U.S. becomes the "invisible hand." The CRTC defines Canadianization as access to more channels that provide works by Canadians. As long as a Canadian signal comes to the consumer, the obligation based on the Broadcast Act is fulfilled. But any group seeking a new license must meet the tests of market viability. The fallacy of this policy which, at first, looks fair and neutral, and which promises greater choice is that it does not start from a level playing field. Serious programming with relatively small audiences and low ratings is, then, shoved off to the periphery, to small galleries, university-run radio stations, libraries and other venues that are not well populated and lack the precious asset of market viability. The processes through which we learn taste and cultural preferences then repeats the pattern: what is available, familiar becomes a chosen interest.

In the reports there is no intention of overcoming this discrimination, but some assistance for quality programming would be available to producers from a tax placed on cable owners based on "gross revenues derived from their broadcasting activities" (CRTC, 1995:40-41). In good times the pool could be large; in bad times it would dry up. And there is the further question of whether the cost would be passed on to consumers in higher cable fees. Meanwhile the CRTC reports that on a purely voluntary basis the cable companies contributed \$40 million; and, since no formula has been agreed on, the CRTC recommends (41) that the voluntary system continue.

Applicants for new channels will undoubtedly learn that they are expected to specify the kind of a contribution they would make for the Development Fund. As for the kinds of programming eligible for

funding, the CRTC was considering "innovative" formats and those which are ordinarily under-funded, e.g., children's programmes. The Highway report drew on the same taxation model and made no commitment to the public sector. Public TV which remains desperately underfunded will still be expected to produce the critical in-depth documentaries and the controversial talk-shows. All of this without a whisper of a Charter challenge.

The choice for Canadians: The U.S. and France. Realistically, the U.S. is the main beneficiary of the two-tier system, and it has no illusions about the priority of economy over culture. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Lester C. Thurow, the distinguished economist at M.I.T. says (1994:191) that "the United States cannot...permit the Europeans [read Canadians] to limit American movies and television programs to 40 percent of their markets. To do so," he continues, "is to make the entire American economy less dynamic and less technologically sophisticated and to generate lower American incomes than would otherwise be the case."

France, however, was not prepared to allow the U.S. to extend its cultural hegemony. Or if it did so, it would not be at France's expense. If, to paraphrase Hobsbawm, they tore down Chartres Cathedral it would not be for an American theme park. But Canada? In Windsor, Ontario, a beautiful small art gallery on the Detroit River was converted into a gambling casino Las Vegas style, while the art gallery collection moved to the shopping mall. The example of France demonstrates first that hegemonic theory notwithstanding, not all economies or cultures are so easy to penetrate; and, second, that where there is a political will, telecommunications can take several different directions.

II

What happened to national identity? Canadians may be too complacent, overly confident that they have achieved a national identity or, at least, it is no longer at risk. National identity has become a latent factor in Canadian life, something that can be mobilized for special occasions or for a national crisis. But the ethos of 1949 has ebbed away, and what remains of it is no longer nourished by the media. Elsewhere in other countries the same process is taking place, and the term "nation" has lost any fixed meaning; it is more and more used idiosyncratically and with post-modernist abandon as in "Queer Nation."

Quebec is the exception. Since the Quiet Revolution it has moved toward establishing a Québecois identity around language and a mix of multi-cultural groups including indigenous populations. As part of a federalist system, Quebec's national identity remains compromised and undeveloped, pegged to parties rather than a larger unit; at the same time, a younger generation of Péquistes have moved in partnership with the labour movement toward a model of social democracy. In their eyes Federalism represents an internal scenario, the Canadianization of the new francophone elites, graduates of the new universities who are French-speaking at home but move and belong in the world of transnational corporations, law firms, and business offices whose headquarters are in New York, Geneva, Sao Paulo. The threat of federalism, then, is not centralization nor the loss of a special status, it is the internal debate between social activists in the province and the elites who live in Quebec, call themselves Québecois, indifferent to the labour movement, vote to separate but effectively live elsewhere and identify with a broader international intelligentsia.

Outside of Quebec, Canadians have grown less concerned with finding or expressing a national identity. Artists, writers, poets, painters, playwrights and others no longer feel they have an obligation to express the distinctiveness of the Canadian experience, while the same academics who fought to Canadianize their universities, faculties, and curricula have become critical in principle of any form of affirmative action and "political correctness." Indeed, the nationalism of the 1940s and 1950s often feels old-fashioned,

uncomfortably passé; at worst, it has become part of a xenophobic intolerance of visible minorities, aboriginal peoples as well as immigrants, refugees and other newcomers -- a nasty intolerance which takes the forms of image stereotyping, employment and housing discrimination, as well as hands-on redneck violence.

What makes the Massey Report speak to us today is something else, not its politics and hope for a coherent pattern of values but its model of a social structure, an organic society with participatory communitarian values and where, in Bellah's (1985) words, the "habits of the heart" are communal responsibility rather than individualistic. In contrast, the alternate model is a Positivist one, atomistic, individualistic, based on the primacy of economic self-interest and a belief in value-free knowledge. In the first model we are motivated by the search for meaning through visual images, metaphors, and myths; in the second we are looking for information to solve problems or reduce cognitive dissonance. In the first we are "members" of a community who develop a "natural" consensus; in the second we try to achieve contractual agreements (Walzer, 1983). In the first, policy changes require wide public consultation; in the second, only consultation with the shareholders, managers and a narrow group of experts.

These models are, of course, abstractions; in reality they overlap and contradict themselves. The first draws on contemporary communitarianism; the second on theories of modernity. Both, however, make an analytic distinction between means and ends, between technology as a means and the economics of conservatism (or social democracy) as an end. Much of the discourse on telecommunications technology conflates them.

Ш

Why telecommunications? And why, now? What is there about the 1990s in Canada that has made telecommunications so high on the public agenda or so strategic?

Telecommunication holds a special position not because it is so important for the economy8 -although this should not be underestimated -- but because it has a strategic value. Deregulation where none has existed or where the industry or service has been underregulated is more convincing to the public than it is in other economic sectors. Consumer opposition is more likely to develop in areas where the public has been long accustomed to regulation and believes it to be necessary in the public interest. But, in addition to the strategic value of concentrating on telecommunications there is a powerful psychological appeal. Telecommunications is something more positive, more exciting and imaginative, than the continual dwelling on the gloom and doom of "deficit reduction," a phrase which implies a negative cut-back crisis and conjures up images of deprivation, of elderly patients lying on gurneys in hospital corridors. Telecommunication is play. Young, groovy, and postmodern, it is the clever wild-child who is unconstrained by Oedipal fictions and thrives on science fiction. Words like cyberspace, telematics, cellphones, bytes, digitalization, Infobahn, the chip, cyberspeech, video-on-demand, near-video-on-demand, cyborgs, virtual this and virtual that separate the generations and create their own insider circles and secret handshakes. The young "techies" who hang out at discount computer stores, read the magazines, and talk the talk create a subculture of their own. Their icon is Bill Gates who looks more like them than he does the ruthless wheeler-dealer he is. But above all, telecommunications represents an irresistible vision of liberation -- from time and space, from the authority of older print-based forms of literacy, from the canons of taste and the traditional normative constraints based on liberal democracy. If the automobile industry defined our economic ethos in the first part of the twentieth century, telecommunication is the overarching symbol of the latter half, and they bear a certain resemblance to each other: images of speed, transcending boundaries, and self-driven.9

The simple answer, then, to "Why telecommunications?" and "Why, now?" is that if we are going to usher out the Welfare State we want to usher in something fresh and new, untainted by the politics of the past, a scenario which invites collective fantasy and helps to repress some of the old history we have had with previous forms of a laissez-faire economy.

Beyond this is the recurrent myth of technological determinism, the belief that values are shaped by technology, and that, in turn, leads to a new way of work, education, family life and lifestyle. The beauty of technological determinism, as Marshall McLuhan discovered, is that no explanation need be given and no one can be held accountable. There are some options but not enough to reverse the general direction of progress. If high-definition television is available and if we have a hundred channels beamed directly into our homes, these are harmless and hard gimmicks to resist.

No one likes being left behind; no one likes spitting in the wind, but most social scientists, especially those with any knowledge of the history of technology, are critical of technological determinism. They are often attracted to another myth, even more dramatic and more insidious, about history itself. We are, they argue, on the cusp of a major historical transformation to a knowledge-based society which will profoundly change how we work and live, how we worship, and indeed our whole educational system. "From time to time throughout history," the Science Council says, "a technology comes along that alters forever people's conception of their world."

Just as the steam engine was the culmination of a Renaissance dream of a power economy, so in our own day the airplane for example has trans formed transportation, annihilating distance (1982:11).

But that is a small step toward the new Information Economy. Its magnitude is no less than the Industrial Revolution, and we must either adapt to it or not survive. Any advantage we have over other countries is related to our progress in becoming a knowledge-based society with a population schooled in the literacy of this new system and the institutions that develop around it. As the Science Council says (13), "Our expectations increase; we hunger for more."

We are in the midst of social transformation. Unlike the changes in the agrarian or industrial revolutions, those in the new age of communications will occur not over decades or centuries, but over days, weeks, months. By the time a product or service is on the market, the next generation has already left the drawing board. Information flow will become not just faster, but instantaneous (*Highway*, 1995:88).

The era of the resource-based economy is over, according to the Science Council's Final Report (12). Our wealth now lies in ideas.

The implication of this type of discourse is that we are in a whirlwind process of social change comparable in magnitude to the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But the indicators of social change are not specified and when we begin to seek them the changes taking place are more modest, nothing comparable to the demographic shift from rural to urban, from extended family to nuclear, from a collective ethic to the work ethic. The population in industrial countries has not fluctuated widely; the work ethic is still part of our character structure, and, the assembly-line factory system remains a major part of our production though its dark satanic mills may be located off-shore. Thus claims of a larger-than-life change in our social structure remain suspect and they must be measured against the diffusion of power, the extent of rights, and the gap between the Haves and Have nots. These are the indicators which inform the dissent of Jean-Claude Parrot, the Labour member of the Advisory Council on the Information Highway.

The Parrot Dissent and the Parrot Paradigm. Parrot, in his minority report (*Highway*, 1995:215-227), makes short shrift of the (empty) rhetoric of progress and looks instead at the social costs in terms of human capital. The new wealth generated by telecommunications may be concentrated in a few hands or widely distributed, while the social costs (unemployment, under employment) are borne by some more than others. Parrot criticized the council for not examining "the impact of information technology on employment and the workplace." Quoting Eric Hobsbawm, Parrot begins by acknowledging the implosive quality of the new technology and the extent to which the old infrastructure is unable to control it. The inadequate response to it and the ideologically biased response creates, he says, a "permanent crisis."

Free trade, deregulation, privatization and cuts to social programs and public services have been at the core of this agenda. We have also witnessed the effects of this agenda here and around the world -- increasing gaps between rich and poor, more poverty, more insecurity and, at the root, an unrelenting employment crisis (216).

Nothing in the main report or in the CRTC report suggests that an outcome of the new telecommunications would be a stabilization of a volatile economy, a mechanism for smoothing out the bumps and extreme boom and bust cycles, the catastrophic fluctuations in interest rates. Nothing can prevent the drain on the economy of military incursions. They remain driven by an economic system, not a technology. For Parrot the most extreme outcome of the new structure, apart from technological unemployment, is the growth of home work which the committee did not address.¹⁰

Parrot's comments about the growth of home-based work is more appropriate to computers and the reorganization of work, of the fate of infrastructures of large corporations and to their large numbers of white-collar (mostly women) and semi-professional personnel. But the broader significance of the Parrot dissent is that he reverses the picture from black to white by looking first at the labour force and the public generally and then the technology. The reports all emphasize how the new technology will create jobs, but the reality is different. For example, in his recent report to investors, Brian Canfield, Chairman and CEO of B.C. Tel writes:¹¹

Although cost-cutting has become a way of life for all of us at BC TELECOM, we cannot shed our costs fast enough over the next 17 months by relying on small, incremental steps alone. Therefore, a major component of our cost reduction efforts is the elimination of approximately 2,000 jobs by the end of 1996.

Bell and others have announced similar lay-offs.

What happens to a company when it takes such Draconian measures? How much confidence can one have in its management? Were the unlucky 2,000 redundant? And if they were, why did the company wait? Or is all of this a "show" for investors, financiers, and the competition? Indirectly, Parrot raises the question of whether companies which devalue human capital may find themselves producing an inferior product or a fault-ridden service that could short-circuit the increase in wealth expected. As we look later at some of the specific examples of the neoconservative economics in telecommunications, this hypothesis may be clearer. Meanwhile, Parrot, like many others looking at the shape of economic organization, starts with the assumption that experience and human capital may make for better although less competitive companies. It cannot be said often enough that the stability of the neoconservative economy is in no way guaranteed; the same factors that led to economic crises in the past, the Great Depression, or, more recently, to the collapse of Savings and Loan Societies in the U.S., may still be operative. The technology may be fail-safe, but the political economy is not.

To summarize, the new technology has found a symbolic legitimacy on several levels and it is becoming so internalized that we are hardly aware of it. The train, we are told, has already left the station,

and we can't afford to wait any longer. The new telecommunications is often perceived as inevitable, an attitude which acts as a disincentive to any kind of intervention and facilitates passive acceptance. Similarly, it is perceived as contributing to the democratization of culture confusing mechanical accessibility with pluralism, and information with knowledge. All of this is taking place in a context where national identity is no longer a powerful mobilizing force; other loyalties draw artists and social activists. Although it continues to be a subtext in Canadian life, it has been superseded by economic rationality.

IV

Neoconservative policy and broadcasting as a "public utility." Neoconservative economics is characterized by deregulation, privatization and competition. Of these, deregulation is the key. By deregulation we mean lifting or suspending the rules for how we conduct our economic lives, removing the constraints on prices, on hours of work, on safety risks and health hazards. But it goes beyond specific cases to a more general condition. The goal of the new neoconservative economics is to wipe the slate clean and make non-regulation the norm, regulation the exception, or in Stephen Breyer's words the "weapon of last resort." Reversing a trend of half a century, the burden of proof is on those who support regulation. The assumption is that the Good Society is either an unregulated one (it regulates itself) or an under-regulated one reserved only for extreme flaws in the market or in atypical situations as in wartime. In Socialist countries the first choice is nationalization or public ownership, just the opposite. Our approach is through private enterprise. The Information Highway (Highway, 1995:x) will succeed or fail within the private sector.

The private sector should build and operate the Information Highway. Those who make the investments should bear the risk and reap a fair reward.

Nothing is said about the private sector being exclusively Canadian. On the contrary, it has always been understood that privatization would require foreign investment on a large scale, larger than had been indicated in legislation.

In general, regulation has been applied to economic behaviour -- that is, to prices, but in the past few years other criteria have been introduced which are more social and intangible. Environmental damage, racial discrimination, human rights are some of the examples of a departure from the market model (Breyer, 1982). Telecommunications overlaps both. With a two-tier system discussed earlier, it is more than likely there would be some degree of conflict between the entrepreneurial price-oriented model and the public environmental model.

Social economists have commented on the disappearance of the concept of the public utility. Canadian broadcasting, with its mix of private and public ownership could be thought of as a public utility; the channels must be licensed and observe certain rules that limit what they can do. Canadian content requirements (based on a point system reflecting Canadian authorship, Canadian actors, Canadian producers, etc.) have, of course, been among the most contentious as private broadcasters carry on their campaign to reduce the ratios. Constitutionally, however, there has always been a problem about licensing conditions that apply to broadcasting and not to the print media.

The difference between the print and the broadcast media was scarcity, but scarcity, we are told, has now been effectively eliminated. When a wire the width of a silk thread can carry thousands of messages, the electronic media have an advantage over print. The late Ithiel de Sola Pool questioned this proposition. "We are more likely," he wrote (1990:47), "to be moving from an era of scarcity not to an era of abundance but to another era of scarcity at a higher level."

Deconstructing the concept of scarcity is essential to understanding the politics of media regulation. In the present circumstances print media have become scarce, not for lack of newsprint or good writers but primarily because of concentration of ownership and absentee ownership -- the Rupert Murdoch syndrome. Nevertheless, the argument for deregulation (or no regulation for new entrants) continues to be made on the grounds that there is no longer a "natural monopoly." Gordon Kaiser (1984) summed it up when he said that "the underlying catechism of the new religion is the belief that there is no longer a natural monopoly in either the equipment or service markets."

What we are seeing, then, is the passing of the concept of public utility, not only in broadcasting but generally (cf. Kahn, 1983). Closer to home, Ontario Hydro, one of the oldest public utilities will very likely be privatized in the near future (Toronto *Star*, July 8, 1995:Section E; *Globe and Mail*, Oct. 19, 1995). If the public utility was the link between economy and society, between self-interest and the social contract, eliminating it from our policy repertoire or treating it as a necessary evil handicaps those who want to understand the role of public utilities in a liberal economic democracy. Nevertheless, the concept of a public utility stands in opposition to the spirit of deregulation. Telephone is an example of a privately owned public utility which has flourished under a regime of regulation, but the companies expect to flourish even more with deregulation.

Competition. The modern telephone was born in the era of the Robber Barons; a century later the corporate memory remains. Big deals, double-crosses are still part of the story of development (Surtees, 1994). The industry's strategies may reflect too many years of being regulated, an accommodation that has become dysfunctional.

Telephone is a classic example of a regulated service where competition would have been both costly to the consumer and the service unreliable. Rural areas, in particular, would have been the losers if there had been market competition. But recently, when the United States broke up the AT&T telephone monopoly, Canadian regulators began looking at our own system and listening with greater sympathy to telephone companies who wanted to be free of regulation and enter into competition, not in all areas but in long distance rates. In addition, the new fibre optics meant that they could compete with the new cable companies. Long distance telephone service in Canada has now become competitive, and UNITEL, formerly CNCP, was born to do battle with other phone companies, but mostly with cable. The story of UNITEL, financed by Rogers, AT&T and several banks, reads like a Russian novel. It would take more space than we have here to detail its financial woes, and what it would tell us is something about the way the acquisition games are being played, how precarious it is, and the high cost of competition.

The decision of the CRTC to allow major change in the basis for telephone rates is a lesson in the cooperation between regulator and regulated. In brief, the CRTC has allowed the telephone companies to redraw the line between local telephone service and long distance. "Rate rebalancing" was based on the premise that local telephone service was, according to the companies, subsidized, costing the consumer less than the real costs; the difference was passed on to long distance service. But this meant that long distance rates were artificially high, and the companies could not enter into competition. Regulation 94-19 (CRTC, September 16, 1994) allowed them, then, to reverse the earlier practice, and to change from a "rate of return" method for establishing price to a rate "capping" system. Regulation 94-19 brought distress to the ordinary consumer but joy to the pro-competition pro-deregulators, to Stentor, the organization of telephone companies. An alternate policy would have been a uniform long-distance rate similar to postage from one part of the country to the other. Had that option been put to the public, it is unlikely that we would be soon confronting higher rates on domestic calls (cf. Pool, 1990:235-236).

The new "rate rebalancing" scheme is not a response to a business need, a way of recouping a long-term loss by the telephone companies; the new rates, local and long distance, represent a new proactive initiative, intended to position Bell and other companies in their coming struggle with cable companies for market dominance. Specifically, it is intended to finance the research and development that would allow the telephone companies to convert from copper wire and coaxial cable to fibre-optics which allow for clearer, faster, and a larger volume of transmission. Instead of attracting investors or venture capital, Bell and its new rivals are passing the costs on to those who stand to gain nothing in the way of profits and for whom a domestic telephone service is a social necessity. In an ideal world it would be free, but in this model, when telcos are making profit, it is passed on to the stockholders without any necessary decrease in rates to the consumer; when they are not making money, the consumer could find an increase in rates. It demonstrates an old maxim of classical economic theory, privatize the profits and socialize the costs. 15

Among themselves, the various telcos are agreed that they can deliver cable services, but cable companies oppose this and have moved to block the CRTC from granting the telcos the permission. There is, of course, considerable controversy over whether telephone companies should compete with cable companies when the latter are unable to compete with the telcos; meantime, the telephone companies are competing against each other and against Bell. "Beware long-distance minefield," a *Globe and Mail* investment reporter warns, as he describes the failure rate among the small, new contestants.

Mergers and Vertical Integration. The new model is illustrated by the recent merger of Rogers Cable, Inc. and Maclean Hunter Ltd., a deal approved by the CRTC. According to The Globe and Mail it took five law firms, four investment banks and one accounting firm to consummate the merger. Editorial opinion did not welcome the 3.1 billion Rogers buy-out of Maclean Hunter. Writers and commentators found the arguments disingenuous. Maclean's magazine hardly mentioned the merger and not until January 16th did it deal with "negative option" marketing. When Rogers was confronted at the CRTC hearings with an Angus Reid survey which showed a strong rejection of the proposed deal, he quickly came up with his own poll showing how much Canadians welcomed it. Of seven-hundred and fifty unsolicited letters, seven hundred of them, a Rogers spokesperson said, supported the deal. Rogers claimed to have Decima and Environics, two of the major market research companies, on his side.

One of Rogers's executives acknowledged under questioning that Rogers paid only 6.7 million dollars in tax last year, but, he continued, Rogers was creating jobs for Canadians and all of those folks paid taxes, didn't they? Louis (Bud) Sherman of the CRTC said with a perfectly straight face that competition is important for newspapers; monopoly is important for cable. One-newspaper cities are contrary to public interest; one-cable cities are not. Further, the Bureau of Competition saw nothing untoward in the Rogers/Maclean Hunter merger. After all, George Addy is quoted as saying, it is not as if we had two cable companies competing and now we have one.

When questions were raised about a conflict of interest if Rogers controls the cable and the editorial department as well, Rogers shrugged and said "Bigger is better." Spicer shrugged and said, "Bigger is better." In fairness to them, what they both meant is that when big cable goes toe-to-toe with big telcos, bigger is an advantage; the pockets are deeper. Otherwise they disregard thirty years of organizational theory and practice which emphatically demonstrate that bigger is seldom better in terms of productivity or efficiency or human relations. Indeed, a combination of bad judgment in organizational development, acquisitions fervour, and rogue financing may be the fatal flaw that could deliver our telecommunications industry into the hands of the Japanese keiretsu.

Rogers and his colleagues want vertical integration,; that is, control over the whole process; control over the manufacture of the products, carriers (telephone and/or cable), content producers and marketing. Ideally, it would include control over those who interpret the content and process. Vertical integration, they argue, is essential for global competition. Not all economists, however, are agreed that international competition is necessary or desirable for economic growth of a country. In any case, banks are needed to finance these convergences, and banks are the major users of the services.

V

Speaking on "Morningside." Keith Spicer, chairperson of the CRTC, told its host, Peter Gzowski, that Canadian content requirements would soon be gone, while in other interviews he indicated that the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's days were numbered. (Preston Manning, Member of Parliament and head of the Reform Party, was much more forthright in urging that the CBC be sold.) Instead, Spicer suggested, we could measure Canadianization in the number of Canadian channels available to Canadian audiences.¹⁶

Public opinion polls do not support the view that measures an obligation to provide Canadian content in the numbers of Canadian channels. Canadians may not watch Canadian content on Canadian channels but they want it to be there, and they know the difference between the carrier and the content. Another aspect of this debate takes place in GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.) and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) policies. In 1987 during the Canadian-U.S. free-trade discussions the Canadian negotiators crossed their hearts and hoped to die if culture was on the table. "Culture was not on the table," they said, and pointed to the cultural exemption clause, Article 2005. Skeptics who recalled past experiences when the U.S. State Department rattled the sabre -- the hand on the sabre, as I recall, was Henry Kissinger's -- threatening retaliation over movies and popular music recordings, were less impressed by this mantra and were not too surprised by the unfolding of subsequent events. Reality was Chapter Thirteen of the NAFTA agreement which deals with telecommunications and tells a different story. Short and to the point, it guarantees that the U.S. can transport data sets along the highway without obstacles, that there are no special rates or price advantages for Canadians either as producers or consumers. Anything else, according to the agreement, would be anti-competitive and discriminatory.

The recent decision of the CRTC to remove a U.S. country music channel for a Canadian one brought Mickey Kantor, point man for U.S. trade policies, to his feet. It was, he threatened, a violation of the NAFTA Agreement (Chapter 13). Fortunately, the matter was resolved through some quiet diplomacy, but it can flare up again. Other countries have used GATT to protect their culture, and I do not think it is beyond the realm of possibility that an independent Quebec would take the same path as France. But it is not a certainty Recently, Gingrich held a breakfast meeting for a group of entertainment executives where, according to Variety (1995:20), he pledged to "tear down international trade barriers on Hollywood's behalf." "The was warmly received by Hollywood execs many of whom in the past have been heavy financial contributors to the Democrats."

What is lacking in Canada is the political will, that sense of national sovereignty that responds quickly and decisively to any encroachment on its territory, spatial or spiritual. As a result the Americanization taking place is not just in the free-trade, in the content of what is available to Canadians; it may also be in the method. With each of these moves the CRTC may become more like its U.S. counterpart, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). What differentiates them now is primarily the role of the executive branch. More disturbing from a Canadian perspective is the current pressure from Conservative

Republicans, led by the Speaker, Newt Gingrich, to abolish the FCC entirely, replacing it, if at all, by a toothless organization with no precedents for putting the public interest ahead of the private. Public interest watchers are equally concerned with the way in which the public either does not understand decisions being made or is not being told (cf. Hickey, 1995). It will be interesting to see what happens to the CRTC if the FCC is eliminated.

There is, I think, a great danger that if our IV a conservative government

Let me conclude by going back to Bill Gates and Leonardo, capitalism and the Renaissance, technology and culture. There is no sign of a rapprochement between them, and if it comes, it will require a different economic and regulatory environment, a more reflective one with less panic about the rate of technological development. The present neoconservative environment which differentiates between communication as instrumental and communication as social, between private and public funding, makes it difficult to re-write the script. But the failure to examine these issue in a serious public forum is derelict, especially when one considers the selective consultations that were made. Judging from the composition of persons on the CRTC and those on the Advisory Council, it seems clear that there never was an intention to have a representative group (see Appendix),

In these comments I have looked at several claims which I consider doubtful. The first is that the new telecommunications is changing our social structure at a fundamental level. I have suggested that the indicators of social change are not the speed with which we can transmit information, but measures of inequality. Other claims are, I believe just as specious. One is that we will acquire greater choice in our entertainment. The truth is that despite the proliferation of channels and the opportunities to manage them, there is very little variety. Ratings determine programming, and as long as that is the case we have a very narrow set of choices. Television, whether it is controlled by us or by the networks will offer us very little that is new, original or experimental; it will remain middle of the road, conservative and mainstream, while socializing the next generation to expect the same.

Closely related to the myth of a radical change (from a production civilization to an information based one) is the idea that modern telecommunications can bring us back from the numbing passivity of being "couch potatoes" who view what major networks decide we can. Control over programming, we are told, through pay-per-view, video-on-demand or near video-on-demand has passed to the consumers who now have more choice about what they see and when they see it. We need to question this as well, for much that is described as interactivity is sheer busyness and does not cut into the alienation of our modern society.

Finally, a distinction should be made between information and knowledge. Information is a universe of cognitive dust. Chunks can be transmitted through coaxial cable or in print but they are, as Norbert Wiener, one of the founders of modern cybernetics pointed out, meaningless until the information becomes part of a problem-solving activity. It is because we are problem-solving that we seek information which we then alter into social knowledge as much for the pleasure it gives us as for its practical value. The fact is that all human societies are knowledge-based, from the most rigid and traditional to a modern think-tank. Any society requires knowledge constantly to carry out its daily activities; and the more customized and labour-intensive production is, the greater the need to transmit knowledge from one generation to another, from masters to apprentices.

These claims reveal something about what we are missing in our lives, about the loss of communication and the fear of being manipulated, and the extent to which our major institutional systems

of communication have failed to touch any deeper chords of community. But I have also tried to suggest that the telecommunications spokespersons and the government have convinced themselves that the new unplanned, deregulated, competitive and privatized system will, in fact, work in its own terms. What we have seen instead is a degree of irrationality and misperception in management and the CRTC, of public relations euphoria that the media themselves believe, a formula of self-deception that can reverse the short term gains in profits and productivity. Beyond a certain point competition becomes the problem.

There is, I think, a great danger that if our new conservative governments, provincial and federal, keep cutting back on funding for the public sector, that a great many young people who were educated and trained here, who want to make an artistic or professional contribution to our national life and whose work and insights we need to develop the fullness of community life, will leave, while others may stay and work in small co-operative and communal groups. But unless there is a major change at the policy level, we will become like people suffering from dream deprivation, a condition where people who sleep through the night wake up tired. Key figures in developing our policies, like Keith Spicer, have in no way attempted to mitigate the drift. Instead of adversary, he is advocate; instead of speaking on behalf of public interest, he is preoccupied with arbitrating between the competing parties, telephone and cable.

The proposal has been made that the cable companies contribute to a fund for quality programmes out of their profits. This is certainly one part of a solution, but not the major thrust which requires a commitment to the public structure and the allocation of funds that would make it both secure and sufficient to carry out a full schedule and plan ahead. The CRTC has very broad powers, and its chairperson is in a position to address the question of national identity, but his preoccupation has been more moral than political, the elimination of violence from television programming, a policy that appeals to certain constituencies but hardly inspires a nation.

I have tried to locate this discussion between two models, the communitarian and the nation-state. But beyond this I think all of us who care about the future of education, science, and the arts must construct a third model, neither organic nor individualistic. Technology will occupy a subordinate place to social relationships, and technology will be integrated with science and humanities. If we are to halt the slide or think about rebuilding the knowledge and cultural sector without throwing out the new technology an environmental model might be more appropriate. It would mean that before companies are allowed to invest in technology, that we do a social assessment on them.²¹ If we do not move in that direction, I fear our sovereignty may survive as a legal and geopolitical entity but our soul as a "distinct" society will not.

ENDNOTES

- 1. Academics were pleased with the recommendation to form the Canada Council which would assist them to travel abroad, organize conferences, and publish or show their work, but many saw it as parochial and backward looking, modernization in reverse, preferring something more cosmopolitan and Euro-centered; others regarded it as Orwellian and paternalistic, and still others were concerned about its protectionist implications.
- 2. According to Statistics Canada (1984:547) between 1971 and 1981, the total population increased 13%, the total labour force by 39%, and the total arts labour force by 74%. Arts companies went from 20 theatres in 1971 to 133 in 1981. In 1971 there were 316 museums; in 1981, 547.
- 3. A former head of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Al Johnson, called it a "made-in-the-U.S.A." report, while a Calgary columnist prophesied that it would do to broadcasting what the cancellation of the

Avrow Arrow had done to the Canadian aerospace industry (McCormack, 1984).

- 4. There were other reports. For example a 1982 report of the National Science Council of Canada anticipated many of the ideas in the Highway Report.
- 5. The National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities have been under constant attack by conservative members of Congress and independent scholars (cf. Banfield, 1984).
- 6. As the system shifts to digital, the public system will be able to sell many of its channels. By auctioning them off a considerable fund would be created.
- 7. A phrase used by Newton Minow, a former chairperson of the FCC.
- 8. According to the Highway Report (5) the information technologies sector contributes 7% of gross domestic product. It is among the fastest-growing sectors in the economy.
- 9. Both, I should add, have been challenged by production in another country, Japan, and inspire retaliatory measures.
- 10. What Parrot discovered was a total lack of interest, an unwillingness to look at this or other possible negative outcomes in terms of the workplace environment. He lists the various questions raised by home-based work that were identified by the International Labour Organization (ILO) but not addressed here. Summarizing them, Parrot refers to "social isolation, balancing work and family life, monitoring of work, protecting work jurisdictions." Furthermore, he says, government reports talk about creating employment, but not about job creation, retraining, and a working partnership with trade unions, or about new labour legislation. He concludes with a proposal that government should require of our new employers, individual or corporate, "a mandatory provision of employment and workplace impact statements from firms that apply for federal regulatory approval, tax incentives or other financial assistance for the development of Information Highway initiatives."
- 11. B.C. Tel is owned 50.5% by GTE, a major local phone and cellular service provider in the U.S. This large segment of foreign ownership has kept B.C. Tel. from acquiring a cable license, but, according to Mr. Campbell, they hope to get an exemption and have good reason to believe that the CRTC will grant them the exemption.
- 12. A service or goods were defined as a public utility where there was a tendency for monopoly to develop which could endanger the provision of necessary services to the public. The utilities were privately owned, and from time-to time, the regulatory agencies that controlled the price they could charge were accused of being a captive of the industry they were regulating.
- 13. This does not preclude situations in which the regulatory environment can benefit public utilities at the expense of the public interest, i.e., regulators can manipulate "rate of return" so that the public finances an inefficient bureaucracy, research, and other costs that should be passed on to investors.
- 14. Rogers recently withdrew under pressure from U.S. bankers who represented U.S. investors.
- 15. Meantime, the race is now on within the CRTC as B.C. Tel and AGT in Edmonton enter their various statements before the CRTC is expected to issue its document.

- 16. Several CRTC watchers have told me that I exaggerate his importance in the decision making, and that Mr. Spicer's views are often contradictory and inconsistent. Their observation is that Mr. Spicer lacks any leadership.
- 17. 1. "Cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this Agreement except as specifically provided in Article 401...paragraph 4 of Article 1607... and Articles 2006 and 2007 of this Chapter.
- 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, a Party may take measures of equivalent commercial effect in response to actions that would have been inconsistent with this Agreement but for paragraph 1." (Canada-United States Trade Agreement).
- 18. In an interview with Marie Malavoy, minister of culture in Quebec, she said (Globe and Mail, Nov. 19, 1994), "I think I'd be wasting my time defending the Charte de la langue française if there's nothing interesting in French on the Internet."
- 19. Writing about GATT, Daniel Singer (1994) talks about the Italian film industry. "Last Fall," he says, "as Federico Fellini's coffin was lying in state in a Cinecitta studio, people were really mourning the virtual death of the Italian cinema. They could have extended their rites to Western Europe's film industry as a whole."
- 20. In the U.S. the FCC is fully independent of Congress and the President; in Canada, CRTC decisions must be approved by Cabinet, but the two are closer to each other than they are to any other system (cf. Tyler and Bednarczyk, 1993)
- 21. This was basically the point Jean-Claude Parrot was making in his dissenting statement on the Highway report (1995:215-227).

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Canada and the Global Media Obslight 1995 and Beyond

In what follows, we shall exemine, charge facilitationage of the foregoing introduction, the factors bearing on Canadian motion policy under conscidential appendictions, cassider their consciousness for the figure of Canadian broadcasting, and conclude by returning to the worldwide centext. Inci Smith's pener (1995), nurroducing this conference, has identified these topics relevant to our general thome as being particularly performs for the present analysis. Their substitution of the present analysis. Their substitution of the present analysis and continue topics televant to our general thome as being minimal opalization (pp. 22-23); they are addressed below

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Canada and the Global Media Challenge: 1995 and Beyond

John Meisel, FRSC Queens University

Introduction

If the Chinese proverb about living in exciting times is even mildly valid then most of humanity has reason to feel sorry for itself as it comes to the end of the twentieth century. We are closing one epoch in the history of the world and entering a new one, the nature of which is still very much being defined. Central to the transformation is a realignment in the dominant value system driving everything else. The ubiquitous weakening of the political left is one of the critical events marking the turning of the tide. It is related to the decline in the power of the state, an attrition of confidence placed in the public sector as a vital guarantor of human well-being, and a reappraisal of the appropriate role to be attached to individuals and collectivities in democratic communities.

A cornerstone of the belief system which underlay the evolution of the welfare state, characteristic of both mid- and late-twentieth century capitalism and social democracy, was a strong attachment to the value of the individual personality. Individuals were considered paramount, although in some societies, it was held that their ultimate fulfillment had to be mediated through policies catering to the interests of social classes. But whichever the particular route thought appropriate for this fulfillment, the basic assumption, which in the West guided much of public policy, was that what people made of themselves depended in large part on the social and economic conditions surrounding them. The full potential of everyone could only be realized under appropriate societal conditions and it was in large part the responsibility of the state to ensure that they prevailed. In some cases it was assumed that the role of the public sector was to provide the environment in which private initiatives would bring about the desired end, in others direct state intervention was deemed necessary. The two were often mixed but in either case the responsibility of the state was pivotal.

As we enter the twenty-first century, the cardinal premise linking the growth of_individual personalities to state policy is under attack and in many places in the process of being abandoned. Thatcherism, Reaganomics, the world according to Gingrich, Klein, or Harris is more misanthropic than its predecessor in that its Darwinian faith in the survival of the fittest contradicts previous notions about the perfectibility of people, provided suitable conditions prevailed.

These sweeping and cosmic observations may seem out of place in a paper addressing the challenge to Canadian broadcasting at the turn of the century, but they are nothing of the sort. For in most countries of the world -- the USA being the notable exception -- public broadcasting was in large part motivated by the premise that, given the necessary pre-conditions, individuals would rise to the occasion and realize the potential inherent in their personalities. The quintessence of this position is encapsulated in the mission Lord Reith bestowed on the BBC in its formative stage. The role of the state, through its public broadcaster, was to elevate public taste and to enrich individual personalities by making available programming of high intellectual and artistic merit.

Although the United States, as just noted, avoided the conventional public broadcasting model and instead developed a market dominated system, most of the world originally opted for a public broadcast monopoly. Canada, as in many other ways, became a half-way house with a mixed system comprising both public and private components.

Current Challenges

In what follows, we shall examine, against the backdrop of the foregoing introduction, the factors hearing on Canadian media policy under currently evolving conditions, consider their consequences for the future of Canadian broadcasting, and conclude by returning to the worldwide context. Joel Smith's paper (1995), introducing this conference, has identified three topics relevant to our general theme as being particularly pertinent for the present analysis. They are (1) technological change, (2) privatization, and (3) internationalization (pp. 22-23); they are addressed below.

Before dealing with them, however, a point of central importance must be stressed; Canada's efforts to sustain national identity are exceedingly far-flung and complex. Not only are government efforts to shape broadcasting and telecommunications relevant, but also those affecting cultural life generally and the cultural industries, as well as virtually any aspect of the country's economy, social institutions, sport events, and political life. The media are only one player (Meisel, forthcoming a), albeit one of the most relevant, and even as thorough and searching an introduction as that of Joel Smith is obliged by the exigencies of space to ignore such essential elements as the National Film Board, Telefilm Canada, the Canada Council, and copyright law, to mention only a few proximate items, let alone more distant ones -- export and import or immigration regulations, for example. A reasonably complete treatment of our conference topic, therefore calls for the consideration of aspects not normally included in the mandate of a single conference.

Technology

The ultimate consequence of the revolution animating communications technology is the fusion of all electronic media into one, reasonably accessible, package. Another principal feature is the availability of unprecedented quantities of services, information bases, bulletin boards and programs from all parts of the world. Both of these characteristics of the current state of information technology make it virtually impossible to regulate what is available to consumers from this unprecedented flood of information and entertainment.

In a field undergoing such rapid change it is not surprising that catchy buzzwords characterize some of the terms and twists of the new developments. With respect to the communications scene, "convergence" has been one such modish term. But its meaning changes. In the nineteen eighties it referred to the likely imminent overlap and duplication of services offered by telephone and cable companies. Ten years later it applies to the even more far-reaching coming together of telephony, television and computers. A single screen can now provide its owner with the riches emanating from a computer, unlimited data and reference material from on-line banks, CD-ROMS, scenes recorded by a camcorder, the library of classic and current films available on video tape, e-mail and fax messages, as well as "real time" or delayed television programs. Thus the boundaries which heretofore segregated printed, oral, telephonic, and broadcast communications have crashed and with them much of the capability of any government agency to control traffic. The state has yet to discover how to cope with the problems of the multi-media age. Sophisticated improvements in satellite, cable, fibre optic, switching, and other telephonic technology have made it possible for that traffic to cover the entire globe.

Among the many consequences none is as relevant to the concerns of this paper as the fact that the owners of the appropriate equipment -- and their number is growing exponentially -- are now their own entertainment programmers. The often-used metaphor of the magazine stand well describes the transformation of broadcasting into narrowcasting. Each viewer can now construct his or her own

entertainment menu which may contain the most esoteric items of interest to highly specialized or idiosyncratic viewers as well as programs catering to a mass audience. For broadcasters, the most important effect of this state of affairs is that the body of viewers which was once fairly homogeneous is being smashed into smaller fragments.

To satisfy their appetites for information and entertainment, audiences draw not only on the goodies provided by the new modes of communication but also on some well-established sources which nowadays are often overlooked. As we shall see, when dealing with the new balance between public and private broadcasting in Canada, radio still plays an important role in the 500 channel universe. Neither do books and magazines show any signs of disappearing.

Privatization

We noted at the outset that, as dusk descends on the twentieth century, a dramatic decline is evident almost everywhere in the confidence accorded the public sector. "Privatization," "deregulation," "letting the market decide," "user fees" -- these are the shibboleths of the day. Throughout the world, even in such old bastions of public broadcasting as the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, the monopoly of the once inviolate state-owned radio and television corporations has disappeared in favour of a fertile field of competing private firms. In various settings and under diverse circumstances a modus vivendi is being sought between public and private broadcasters in which the roles of each are being redefined according to some notion of the public interest. For although the public sector is under attack virtually everywhere, broadcasting is acknowledged to be of such primordial importance that all states impose some regulation on their practitioners. Even in the United States the Federal Communications Commission shapes more than the merely technical aspects of broadcasting.

Many countries are therefore exploring how to cope with a mixed broadcasting regime of the kind Canada has experienced since the nineteen thirties. It consequently makes a lot of sense to survey the current Canadian situation, particularly since Canada too is witnessing an unprecedented onslaught on its public broadcasters. In undertaking this survey we shall focus on the CBC, leaving aside the important and likewise besieged "educational" broadcasters operating in several provinces.

The physiognomy of any mixed broadcasting system is determined by three principal players: the public and private broadcasters and a regulator having some sort of overview over broadcasting matters. In Canada the respective roles of these three actors have undergone considerable change since the earliest involvement by the government. Figure I presents a very rough indication of how the role of the principal shapers of the system altered over the last sixty years. It is no more than an exceedingly rough assessment by one observer of how the influence of the three groups of actors has shifted over time, beginning with the first era (1930-1958) when the Canadian Broadcasting Company was not only the public broadcaster but also the regulator of the whole system. The (Aird) Royal Commission (1929), which examined Canada's broadcasting scene in the late nineteen twenties, recommended the creation of a public broadcaster and also urged the abolition of the private sectors. The latter had already commenced radio services prior to the establishment of the Aird inquiry. But the government of the day did not wish to go so far and opted for the mixed system characteristic of Canada ever since. It did, however, as just noted, assign the licensing and regulatory functions to the public broadcaster rather than to an agency autonomous of the two broadcasting sectors. Subsequent eras in our schema correspond to the period in which the first quasi-independent regulator, the Broadcast Board of Governors, held sway (Stewart and Hull, 1994) (Period II), the phase dominated by the 1968 Broadcasting Act (c.25) and its creation -- the CRTC2 (III); the epoch following the

passing of a new Broadcasting Act which somewhat curtailed the power of the CRTC (IV); and, finally, Phase V marked by the most severe budget cuts imposed on the CBC.

(Insert Figure 1 here.)

The numbers in the figure have been assigned on a totally arbitrary basis as follows; it was assumed that the total number of points "possessed" by the three most important players was 10. This number was then apportioned among them. Thus in Phase I the CBC (which was also the regulator) was assigned 9/10 and the private broadcasters 1/10. By Phase V, the balance has shifted completely, with the CBC being reduced to 2, and the regulator and the private broadcasters to 4 each. Figure I makes it clear that the CBC has suffered a major decline in influence and that the private broadcasters are more powerful than ever. Regulation (and it here includes both the decisions of the CRTC, and those of the cabinet) is still a major factor but, in the light of technological innovation and some new organizational initiatives among broadcasters, it is not at all certain how long the Canadian system will remain amenable to conventional regulation.

One of the lessons of Figure I is that the process of privatization is not a new phenomenon but rather that, in Canada, at any rate, it has been under way from the beginning of public broadcasting. There are ongoing, long-established factors challenging public broadcasting, as well as recent ones arising from the current passion for privatization.

Long Term Factors

Capitalism's innate energy and increasing search for profits are without doubt among the principal causes for the continuous efforts of the private sector to weaken public broadcasting in Canada. Private broadcasters operated before the creation of their public competitor and, in the Canadian Association of Broadcasters, they constituted the nucleus of an organization which was not only among the first Canadian big lobby groups but for a long time also one of the most active and powerful. It has never tired of chipping away at what it has consistently considered the unwarranted privileges and prerogatives of the CBC. As we just saw, it has been remarkably successful.

Among the several reasons for the CAB's (and later the cable lobby's)⁵ effectiveness in enlarging the private sphere, two are particularly noteworthy. The first relates to the enormous actual and potential profits to be derived from radio, and later, television, advertising. As one Canadian media tycoon stated in a different context, a television license was a license to print money (see Braddon, 1965). Broadcasters were therefore mightily motivated towards seeking ever more lucrative opportunities for increasing profits by enlarging their access to new stations, networks, and, hence, audiences. They and those wishing to join them in exploiting the electronic media were therefore relentless in pushing aside any obstacles they saw to the mining of new markets. In various ways, the public broadcasting system was one of these obstacles; the other was the restraining hand of regulation.

Lucrative rewards thus provided powerful incentives for efforts to compete with and curtail the public sector. They also furnished the means for waging battles seeking to redefine the nature of the whole broadcasting regime. Broadcasters and cable operators, and their trade associations, were very well heeled and, because of that, capable of mounting vigorous campaigns aiming at the extension of their sphere of activity. They were also strategically placed. For it was not only their ability to make generous contributions to party funds but also their easy contact with politicians which enabled them to influence legislators of all

parties, and governments in particular. Relationships between the media and the powers that be are often ambiguous and uneasy. They are mutually dependent, particularly with respect to news coverage and political reporting. And it is in part the role of the printed and electronic press to act as a watchdog encouraging governments to act properly and wisely. This inevitably leads to tensions but it also ensures that contacts between politicians and the press are frequent and intense. Broadcasters have, as a result, found it easy to establish close links with governments and to benefit from the debts and obligations arising from their symbiotic relationship.

The other reason for the success of the private sector in reducing the place occupied by the public broadcaster grows out of the exuberant energy characteristic of capitalism. Private broadcasters have been able to add variety to the programming available to Canadians by creating shows different from those offered by the CBC. Many of these have considerable mass appeal. Unrestrained by the mission imposed by Parliament on the public broadcaster, they have acted as conduits of American network shows to the Canadian market. The CBC also presents U.S. programs but has increasingly sought to offer Canadian entertainment, particularly in prime time. At any rate, the existence of private broadcasters has enlarged the access of Canadians to more diverse programming, much of it American. They have clearly found a way of catering to Canadian tastes, already favourably predisposed to American television, which arrived in Canada before the domestic product. By increasing their share of audiences, the private broadcasters have convinced politicians and regulators that they occupy a legitimate and needed role in the Canadian broadcasting system. As their audiences have increased, it has become more difficult to defend very large expenditures by governments on the public broadcaster, the number of whose viewers is continually shrinking.

More Recent Developments

This brings us to an ongoing problem but one which has been intensely acute as the result of severe difficulties currently being experienced by the Canadian economy. Continually growing deficits have, in the eyes of most observers and of the international financial community, weakened the economy to the point where remedial measures were inescapable. Among them, the cutting of deficits and curtailment of government expenditures has been a top priority. Allocations to the CBC have therefore come under heavy pressure and have undergone successive reductions culminating in really draconian cuts as part of the efforts by the Chretien government to reduce the rate of deficit accumulation. The President of the CBC felt himself betrayed as a result and resigned after the Chretien government announced very severe cuts in the CBC's Parliamentary allocation.

External pressures prompted by economic conditions and the absence of strong support for the CBC among both Conservative and Liberal politicians have consequently contributed materially to the shrinking of the public sector in broadcasting. But it is unrealistic to ignore the possibility that some of the wounds of the public broadcaster are self-inflicted. Like many large-scale organizations, particularly those only tenuously accountable to its owners, the CBC has become something of a sclerotic, flabby monolith. Administratively it is top heavy and in its outlook subtly imperious and self indulgent. A sense of proud superiority -- in part justified by some excellent programming -- has resulted in insensitivity to the political context in which it found itself and has also contributed to whopping errors in programming. Thus the transformation by some misguided "reformers" of the popular ten o'clock "News" and the "Journal" into the "Prime Time News at 9 P.M." -- the folly of which was patently obvious to most observers -- was approved by the top management. It led to a dramatic decline in audiences and to the CBC's news and public affairs programming attracting fewer viewers than its major rival, the privately owned CTV network.

The present plight of the CBC raises the question of whether there are endemic weaknesses (as well as strengths) associated with public broadcasters. This is an issue which has not received adequate discussion, partly no doubt because the subject elicits Pavlovian reactions from both opponents and supporters of public broadcasting. There is little doubt (although empirical evidence is lacking) that generally public and private broadcasting undertakings tend to attract different personality types. An international conference of public broadcasters I attended some years ago agreed, for instance, that employees of state-owned radio and television companies tended to be more left-leaning in their political outlook than their colleagues in the private sector. Is there also a tendency to be more Reithian or simply distrust anything that might attract mass audiences?

Whatever the answers to these sorts of questions, the CBC has not been able to stem the secular decline of its audience, partly no doubt, but only partly, because of the fragmentation of viewership over which it has no control. It is likely that if certain characteristics of public broadcasting organizations and of public broadcasters do affect the manner in which they are able to compete for audiences, the present financial crunch and declining confidence in the public sector exacerbate the effects of these conditions. It is difficult to be at one's best and to innovate boldly when budgets are being severely cut, when one is the subject of never ending reviews by several government bodies, 6 and when widespread skepticism about any government enterprise permeates the land. At any rate, an ongoing, slow decline has been evident in the capacity of CBC TV programming to hold on to a reassuring audience share, and this despite an ever increasing reliance on filling the evening hours with sports events. The latter, while attracting viewers, play havoc with regular scheduling of public affairs and other programs and thus alienate "serious" viewers who expect the public broadcaster to provide services which are not normally forthcoming from the private sector. This long time decline has, in combination with the aforementioned external pressures, resulted, by the late nineteen eighties and early nineties, in a serious drop in morale, in a loss of ability to respond to the enveloping crisis, and in growing uncertainty on the part of the public and government as to whether the CBC can meet the newly emerging responsibilities of public broadcasting.

But although these are trying times for the public sector in broadcasting, it would be misleading to conclude that its days are numbered. The question is by no means "Will private broadcasters drown or supplant their public competitor" but "What kind of public broadcaster will emerge from the present reviews?" Two sets of factors account for the near certainty that public broadcasting has a future in Canada: (1) There is still considerable support for the CBC and for public broadcasting and (2) the private sector is not without its problems and risks.

The Image of Public Broadcasting

The CBC is deeply embedded in the consciousness of a very large number of Canadians. Poll data make it abundantly clear that the idea of public broadcasting receives strong support. It is becoming increasingly evident that despite a seeming absence of shared values, Canadians do exhibit certain common attitudes toward their country of which they are proud. But unlike the case with almost all other nationals, it is not the adulation of military heroes or of other historic figures but the values attached to certain Canadian institutions, policies, and attitudes that incite the loyalty and cohesion of Canadians. The non-violent nature of society, perceived tolerance, and the county's welfare and medical insurance system show up in polls as the elements out of which Canadians build their shared sense of identity. The public broadcaster, though it may not attract TV audiences as large as its supporters would like, is also an important institution in this context, one which has become a defining contributor to the Canadian psyche.

Not only is there significant mass support for the CBC but there is also a more focused and, therefore intense, valuation of the CBC by a special constituency: the friends of public broadcasting. A pro-CBC lobby group was launched some years ago under this name⁹ but I am here thinking of a larger, less well organized and defined group of people who have a strong ideological commitment to public broadcasting. Most of these not only watch it¹⁰ but also believe that it is an essential institution in part because it strengthens Canadian identity. These individuals are not merely passive supporters of the CBC but can also be counted upon as vocal advocates of public broadcasting.¹¹

A closely related and overlapping group consists of the extremely loyal CBC radio audience. There is near unanimity that the national radio services perform at an extraordinarily high level and make a unique contribution to Canadian life. Unlike CBC television, the radio services are quite distinctly different from those provided by the private sector and are greatly appreciated as such by their audiences. For one thing, they carry no commercials. The CBC listeners are not only loyal but also articulate and capable of exercising political pressure. Their socio-political status and consequently their educational qualifications give them a voice in the debates over the role of public broadcasting in Canada far exceeding that which one would expect from their numbers.

Among the qualities in programming expected from the public system by its friends and consumers is that it contributes to a sense of the county's identity. Joel Smith has accurately portrayed the link perceived by many Canadians between the existence and strength of this sense and broadcasting, particularly television viewing (see Meisel, 1986). The flooding of Canadian airwaves with entertainment fare from the United States is seen by many as dangerous and the public broadcaster is expected to play a major role in providing the required corrective. CBC radio is widely applauded for having met this expectation but CBC television is not. Despite its efforts in recent years to provide the most needed antidote to US programming -- Canadian drama -- the question remains whether the public broadcaster is sufficiently effective in its nation-building role. We shall return to this point in the conclusion. Whatever the verdict, the basic predisposition of Canadians, as well as of the "public broadcasting community" we have just discussed, backed by such often effective lobbies as the Friends of Canadian Broadcasting and the Canadian Conference of the Arts, combine to make the disappearance of public broadcasting highly unlikely.

Failings of the Private Sector

Among the reasons for the continuing support of the CBC and the lack of satisfaction with the private sector is the awareness that the latter has been a most reluctant source of Canadian programs, particularly in the critical but expensive field of drama. Although much patriotic lip service and breast-beating has been heard from the broadcasters since the very beginning of radio, action has, as ever, spoken louder than promises. And the action has largely consisted of mumbled whispers -- inaction resulting from the heavy reliance on cheaply acquired American programs instead of the seeking of Canadian alternatives. Even in the (now vanished) days when private broadcasters generated extremely large profits, they invariably resisted and, whenever possible, bypassed the regulator's efforts to get them to offer Canadians a genuine choice between American and Canadian entertainment. Although a small improvement has recently been evident, it is far from reassuring. The record of the private sector is all too consistent: when a choice is to be made between investing in Canadian drama and foregoing profit, the bottom line supersedes the Maple Leaf. The result is that 64 per cent of TV programs in Canada originate abroad, mostly in the United States, and that 93 percent of TV drama watched in Canada is American (TVPlus, 1995:2).

The economics of North American television production and distribution go a long way towards explaining the behaviour of the private sector. It is extremely expensive, in the small and fragmented

Canadian market, to produce quality programs that attract sufficiently large audiences and so produce adequate advertising revenues. But the record indicates that private broadcasters for the most part lack the motivation and creative capacity needed to overcome the economic challenges posed by Canadian programming. The explanation for this lies in the general practices of Canadian business, the logic of market driven capitalism and in the relative weakness of the Canadian regulatory regime (cf. Meisel, 1989a, 1989b, 1990, 1995). It costs less effort and is less risky to buy inexpensive American shows than to create Canadian ones.

The same logic leads the private North American television industry to develop programs which make few demands on the viewer, the formula-based structure and cliché-ridden conventions of which have in the past appealed to very large audiences. Certain themes -- brutal violence, power struggles among wealthy clans, crises in the medical world, car chases in nearly identical cops and robbers adventures -- are imitated ad nauseam and, until now, obviously with considerable commercial success. Although there are and have been some rare exceptions, overall this has led to a television scene which, as has often been noted, was described as a wasteland by one former chairman of the F.C.C.¹³ Large audiences in both Canada and the United States partake of this wasteland but they are diminishing in number, and in both countries, but particularly in Canada, there is serious concern over the consequences for society of the prevailing television regime. This concern nourishes the unwillingness of significant numbers of Canadians to abandon public broadcasting and regulation.

Internationalization

Western capitalism at the turn of the 21st century is marked by an accelerating trend towards megamergers. Vast horizontal and vertical integration, reaching across continents and international boundaries, are characteristic of the newly emerging pattern. Major industries and enterprises providing an infinite variety of services are losing their original identities and are becoming immense conglomerates spanning the world. The larger these monstrous economic organizations become the less they are mindful of the social and ethical concerns which once guided the pioneers of the industrial age. The new massive economic and financial aggregations are totally impersonal, amoral machines guided by little else than an insatiable thirst for organizational aggrandizement, colossal economic power, and financial gain. Personal or any other kind of accountability in such organizations vanishes behind impenetrable veils spun by similarly impersonal organizations specializing in corporate law and accounting. Neither the shareholders nor political authorities can easily retain any real control under these conditions and it is therefore difficult if not impossible to ensure that the mighty new giants pursue policies responsive to national priorities. The immense power of these economic concentrations also often enables them to exercise enormous influence on the domestic policies of states.

The era of mega-mergers has not spared the media industry, already undergoing concentration as the result of the convergence triggered by the technological innovations discussed above. Indeed, the communication sector is at the forefront of the structural changes resulting from the contemporary take-over mania. Companies manufacturing entertainment and communications hardware are being intertwined with creators and deliverers of programs in a bewildering dance of changing partners. In the 1980s Sony acquired Columbia Pictures and all its affiliates; subsequently Viacom bought Paramount, Seagram took over the film and media giant MCA, Disney became the proprietor of Capital Cities/ABC, and Westinghouse acquired control of CBS. The Australian media tsar Rupert Murdoch has created Fox, the hugely successful new U.S. TV network, and owns the News Corporation of America as well as numerous broadcasting enterprises in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. Hardly a week goes by without news that yet another corporate restructuring

is to occur. At the time of writing, the media are a-buzz with accounts of the attempts by Time Warner (itself the result of a previous mega-merger) to gain control of Turner Broadcasting with its numerous networks, including the fabled Cable News Network (CNN).

A good idea of the vast compass of the new giants can be gleaned from the current holdings of Time Warner Inc. (TWI) even without the impressive Turner empire. In the programming field it owns Cinemax and Home Box Office; Time Warner Cable has 11 million subscribers; Warner Bros. is one of Hollywood's biggest producers (Batman, Lethal Weapons, the TV shows E.R. and Friends); TWI is the world's largest recorded music company; the company owns the Book-of-the-Month-Club, Little Brown and Co. and Warner Books; its magazines include *Time*, *Fortune*, *People*, *Entertainment Weekly* and *Sports Illustrated*. In 1994 it had revenues of US\$15.91 billion but a loss of US\$91 million. Turner, on the other hand, with revenues of US\$2.8 billion, showed a 1994 revenue of US\$21 million (Milner, 1995).

In the context of the present analysis the critical point about what the film industry is no doubt tempted to call Merger-Mondo is that, while the big players are unquestionably cosmopolitan (the USA, Australia, Canada and Japan stand out -- although the Japanese have retreated somewhat from their presence in the US entertainment field), the content of film and television entertainment throughout most of the world is dominated more even than ever before, directly and indirectly, by the American entertainment industry, however organized.

Joel Smith suggests that no national culture or interests are any longer insulated from the intrusive presence of the new transnational corporations, including those of the United States (1995:24). This is correct only in part. Whatever the ownership profile of corporations providing entertainment in the U.S. and elsewhere, the content strongly reflects American culture even when foreigners create their own shows (which are often clones or lame adaptations of models universally made popular by American prototypes). Smith notes (and discounts) the Canadian fear of American imperialism in the cultural field; he fails to acknowledge that there is not even an infinitesimal danger that United States cultural life might be in any way influenced by foreign imports or the participation of non-Americans in cultural industries operating in the United States. Blinding parochialism rampant in the United States (viz. not only this inability to recognize the difference between the worlds enveloping a giant and a pygmy, but also the near total absence of non-American programs on U.S. commercial networks) and the immensely powerful and successful entertainment industry ensure that, whatever the world configuration of corporate ownership, the cultural life of the United States will remain American. Despite the universalizing trends, therefore, the United States is completely immune from danger, at least in the cultural sector. For in it, universalizing, in effect, means Americanizing.

For Canadians (unlike for other nationals), this reality poses no new major threat, however; it is simply a continuation of an ongoing condition to which they have become accustomed. Continually, means have been sought to counter the crushing weight of the American cultural presence next door and spilling over the border. A publicly owned broadcasting company and film producer, the regulatory activities of the CRTC, the Canada Council, Telefilm Canada, numerous policies designed to assist various cultural sectors, and other programs and schemes such as tax laws have all been deployed towards this end. They have had some success, although its extent is subject to debate. What is clear now is that the technological changes and tendencies towards privatization discussed above require that new approaches be devised to protect Canadian culture, and that corporate internationalization is the least threatening factor to Canada of the three discussed in this paper (For a full discussion, see Canada, Industry Canada, 1995).

Only two of its aspects require brief discussion. One concerns the possibility, which, however, needs testing, that, other things being equal, very large, transnational corporations are more aggressive and insensitive to the goals of national policies than smaller domestic enterprises. If this were so then the pressure

on Canadian content and ownership regulation and related policies might increase. But American companies and industry organizations have hardly been shrinking violets shying away from deep and devastating intrusion into Canada. The humiliating outcome for Canada of the dispute between the CRTC and the American Country Music Network (Fagan and McKenna, 1995) and the repeated success of Jack Valenti and the Motion Picture Association of America in thwarting the plans of both the Ottawa and Quebec governments to reduce American control over film distribution in Canada are only two examples of the sway United States cultural organizations hold over Canada.¹⁵

Another possible consequence for Canada of the ongoing internalization is that Canadian companies might become subject to takeovers by a transnational giant. It was rumoured, for instance, that Alliance, a major Canadian film producer, was a candidate for inclusion in the Turner empire. Canadian legislation prohibits or limits foreign ownership of certain communications companies and can therefore be expected to protect key cultural industries in the future. It must however be admitted that in the publishing industry Canadian governments have not always been successful in forestalling foreign acquisitions and that our friend Time Warner has succeeded, in the case of *Sports Illustrated*, in circumventing Canadian rules seeking to protect Canadian magazines from American firms dumping their so-called split-run editions in Canada. The intestinal fortitude of Canadian governments, as the Free Trade Agreement demonstrates, cannot always be taken for granted, and Canada's failure to ensure that cultural issues in American-Canadian relations will not be linked to trade disputes in other sectors makes the smaller country vulnerable to American cultural encroachments on its sovereignty. This being the case, the protection against foreign takeover in an age of internationalization cannot be taken for granted. But internationalization is no greater threat than Americanization, it may be less of one, as we shall see.

Conclusion

In the face of the developments discussed so far, it is difficult to reach confident conclusions about the future course of broadcasting policy in Canada. Only one thing is certain; substantial changes are inevitable with respect to virtually every aspect of it. As I noted above, it is particularly new technologies and shifting views on the appropriate relationship between the public and private sectors which call for revisions or even reversals in the old ways. The loss of support for individualism and for socio-political regimes favouring the enhancement of the individual personality also injects a new element likely to elicit modifications on the part of most if not all broadcasters, regulators, and governments generally.

Without detracting from the observations about these shifts in attitudes noted at the opening of this paper, it is essential to recognize that social values change considerably over time. The current wave of rampant privatization, deregulation, and anti-statism, while strong and genuine enough, is not likely to go unchallenged indefinitely. Reactions and countervailing trends are almost certain to emerge in due course and to lead to a partial rehabilitation of the state as an instrument of social policy. This is not to say that it is reasonable to expect anything like a return to the heyday of government intervention characteristic of the post Second World War welfare state but rather that a new mix of private and public endeavour will succeed the current era of near laissez faire.

The broadcasting field, particularly in Canada, is one where renewed public involvement must be expected. But the role of the public broadcaster, and to some extent also that of the regulator, is likely to be less central than heretofore. The pivotal defence of the Canadian presence among the emerging multi-media configurations and public support for Canadian culture will not be left to chance or exclusively in private hands. Emphasis is likely to shift towards greater reliance on such indirect means as tax laws and regulation,

criminal proceedings (in relation to cyber porn, for example), federal-provincial collaboration in educational programs related to the multi-media, indirect (as well as some direct) support for the creation of various kinds of programming, non-programming software for domestic use and export, and the increased involvement of the present Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade as well as the continued intervention of Heritage Canada or its successor. The CBC is almost certainly going to receive a more focused mandate and the CRTC will continue to exercise some influence, although new technologies, as we have noted, make much of traditional regulation ineffective. Some provincial governments are also likely to become involved because, among other things, of the economic importance of the communications industries.

It is also probable -- and here our imagination is becoming even more foot loose and fanciful than heretofore -- that the notions of national identity and nation building may alter quite profoundly. There are two reasons for this, which can only be sketched here in a most cursory manner (For a fuller, preliminary development of these points, see Meisel, forthcoming b). One arises from the fact that Canada has undergone a most fundamental change in recent years and the other from the insufficiently appreciated nature of the internationalizing process.

To begin with the latter, it is now commonplace to point to the manner in which the global village has replaced the old state system. International relations, i.e. relations among states, have become transnational ones, in which private firms, NGOs, transnational conglomerates, and others conduct all manner of transactions, cutting across traditional borders, thereby reducing the latter's importance. We dealt with one aspect of this phenomenon in the section entitled "Internationalization." The characteristics and many of their consequences of this process are widely discussed. It is less often noted that the universalizing of economic activities, entertainment, values, and so much else is also accompanied by a contrary trend.

The dislocations, uprooting, and denationalizing experiences associated with globalization leave a void in most people's lives, a void they seek to fill with new or strengthened recourse to familiar, personal, local experiences that provide a haven from the strange, impersonal, boundless universalism enveloping them. An offsetting particularism emerges which attracts people to those things which are part of their domestic, familial, and local existence. The contrast is nicely illustrated by the coexistence of two phenomena which I have frequently noted. On the one hand, *USA Today* -- a universal, satellite delivered, colourful, printed equivalent of TV news clips -- is available and read everywhere the English language is known. It has become a media giant. On the other hand, news sheets, distributed without cost to the readers, carrying shopping information and other local intelligence are equally popular. If one wishes to advertise for a lost kitten, there is no doubt which of the two publications is more appropriate.

Thus local interests and ties still fashion attachments binding people to sub-international communities. There is no evidence that members of the European Union are any less devoted to their countries than their ancestors, and events in the former Yugoslavia eloquently demonstrate the still powerful pull of tribalism. At the same time, attachments to particularistic anchors are affected by one's engulfment in the larger world community. The old nationalisms are modified by the experiences gained from membership in the global village. Thus, where many Canadians once complemented their Canadianism with loyalties to their own or their forefathers' ancestral homeland, they are more inclined these days to respond to the networks fashioned by such things as the Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA, world-wide women's or aboriginal links, or groups sharing a certain life style -- gays and lesbians for instance.

There is, however, one very important modification to be observed in this pattern which results from the fundamental changes affecting Canada, to which I referred above. Up until the period immediately following the Second World War, Canada was essentially a British country and was seen as such. It is true that a tacit accord prevailed between the Anglophones and the Francophones which more or less protected

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The old type of Canadian identity has therefore undergone a major transformation in which being a Canadian now means something quite different than before. Citizenship and belonging to the Canadian community bestows privileges and entitlements which are not only related to ethnicity and religion but also to one's sex or whether one belongs to a group which is considered to be disadvantaged. Aboriginals now enjoy a special status, the benefits of which are still being worked out.

While these provisions have without doubt encouraged many Canadians to participate more fully in the life of the country, and particularly in that of the particular group with which they identify, they are also seen to pose problems. The diversification of loyalties, of course, fragments the shared sense of belonging one expects from citizens of one country. It may therefore be more difficult to achieve rational consensus and a strong Canadian national will which is needed when new challenges must be confronted. But on the other hand, and this is a critical point in the present context, many Canadians, because of their identification with Canada and some other community -- women, Chinese, aboriginals and so on -- are particularly well suited to fit into a world experiencing both universalizing and particularizing tendencies. Internationalization in broadcasting leads to programming inspired by experiences from many lands, not only the U.S.A. It is therefore more likely to be congenial to the new Canada than the old Americanization is.

Under these conditions a sense of national identity becomes more diffused than is normally the case and may often display country-wide shared characteristics as well as parochial ones identified with a specific group. If broadcasters, and particularly, of course, the public one, are to contribute to this sense, they must be exceptionally versatile and experimental, for the national identity is in the process of being forged, in part in response to demographic change.

Assuming that the CBC, once the current review process is completed, can shed some of its elephantine qualities and become an agile, open, flexible organization, perhaps infusing its television productions with the sensitivity and creativity it has applied to radio, there is no reason why it should not play a unique and sorely needed role in Canada's mixed system. It will, however, not manage to do this until it stops allocating a major portion of its resources to providing a commercial service almost indistinguishable from that offered by the private broadcasters.

One other important issue arises from Joel Smith's paper and the present discussion: the question of elitism. The latter is rejected these days as incompatible with the times and the egalitarian spirit prevalent in the western world at the turn of the century. This may be too hasty a reaction. Much depends, of course on one's definitions. I take elitism to mean that, for various reasons, some people are better equipped to undertake certain tasks than others and will assume leadership roles in the areas of their special competence. Their views in these matters can be expected to be better informed and generally superior to those of less qualified people. One broad area in which elitism manifests itself is in aesthetics and the arts, and beyond them, in the area of lifestyles — how, for instance, people spend their time, particularly their leisure time. In this domain it is, I believe, acceptable to argue that activities which engage the individual's creative energies and lead to a realistic understanding of the human condition are better than those which are merely means of escape, or mechanistic repetitions inducing a state of near stupor. It is better to read *War and Peace* than a kid-porn comic.

There is, of course, nothing wrong with sheer escapism occasionally, so long as it does no one harm, but a constant and exclusive diet of it diminishes the individual. It is this view, I believe, which underlies the Reithian position. It assumes that *ceteris paribus*, some things are worth doing more than others, and that there are individuals who are better qualified than others to decide which they are. This position reflects a more generous attitude to the non-elites than is usually displayed by the elite-bashers. It assumes that most individuals are capable of growth of learning and of a rich, creative lif, provided that the appropriate stimulation is present.

Those in the broadcasting area who reject the elitist view and insist that only the market can appropriately decide what programming should be available either fail to endow the public with the capacity to learn and, given the opportunity, to improve its taste, or do not believe that the airwaves are a public good which should, at least in part, be used for the benefit of society. It is, therefore, those who rail against elitism who are often the misanthropes and snobs whereas the defenders of elite roles assume that the capacity to enjoy quality programs is widespread, provided that they are available and people are given the time to develop the taste for them.

In an era in which faith in the capacity of the individual to make the most of himself or herself and in which the old doctrine of what used to be called "the perfectibility of man" is no longer in fashion, the critical element justifying public broadcasting is overshadowed by commercial opportunism. But, as I argued above, opinions, fads, and fashions change and a return to a more generous view of humankind is likely. Vestiges of it persist to this day. strengthening the basis for the Canadian support for public

broadcasting we noted above. This support will, in my view, ensure the survival of the CBC and will, in the longer term, make it available for the day it is again accepted that there is a difference between good and bad taste and between worthwhile and wasteful pursuits, that some people know better which is which, and that there is nothing reprehensible in the state enhancing the chances of individuals to lead rich and full lives. A responsible elitism will then again attain at least some respectability.

This optimistic explanation is plausible in Canada but much less so in the United States for reasons too complex to be explored here. The difference is enormously important, for it points to a profound contrast between the Canadian and American cultures — a contrast that speaks however, to an important element in what distinguishes Canada from the United States. It is to be expected that Canadians will continue to seek policies designed to protect the distinguishing features of their country in the face of outside pressures. In doing so, a more elitist approach is likely to continue being evident in Canada than in the United States.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ In Canada, a government-sponsored inquiry, the Information Highway Advisory Council has delivered its report to the government dealing with these issues (1995). It contains over 300 recommendations.
- ² The Agency was first called the Canadian Radio-Television Commission, but when it assumed the regulation of telephony in 1976 it was renamed the Canadian Radio/Television and Telecommunications Commission in a happy stratagem enabling it to retain its original acronym. the CRTC.
- ³ Because of the enormous preponderance of television, Phases III to V describe the situation with reference only to that medium. If radio were included, the CBC would receive a higher score. In phase V the regulator includes not only the CRTC but also the cabinet which had, by that time, adopted a more intrusive role towards regulation. Cable companies are included among broadcasters.
- ⁴ It is noteworthy that even in countries which, until recently, clung to a public broadcasting monopoly, private interests sought for a long time to invade the public space. In Britain, for example, Radio Luxembourg and other offshore commercial broadcasters have competed with the BBC for audiences since before the Second World War. France has had a similar experience.
- ⁵ The Canadian Cable Television Association (CCTA), while usually very much at odds with the broadcasters' lobby, nevertheless joined it when it came to championing the cause of the private sector both with respect to the regulator and the public sector.
- ⁶ In the last two years or so the CBC has been the subject of several inquiries, ranging from routine (but harrowing) licence renewal proceedings before the CRTC to a major set of hearings by a Parliamentary committee, an internal examination by the Heritage Ministry, and, most important, a still ongoing (1/10/95) probe of itself, the National Film Board and Telefilm Canada by a blue-ribbon troika headed by Pierre Juneau, a former President of the CBC, Chairman of the CRTC, and Deputy Minister of Communications. Peter Herrendorf, former Vice President of the CBC and currently head of TV Ontario, and Catherine Murray, a communications professor, are also members. Likewise, within the CBC itself there are searching review proceedings under way.
- ⁷ An August-September, 1995, poll (N = 1205) conducted for Friends of Canadian Broadcasting showed that 78 percent of respondents thought that the CBC does an excellent, very good, or good job of fulfilling its

mandate; 71 percent thought that the government should be committed to preserving and rebuilding the CBC. (Canadian Conference of the Arts, 1995b).

- ⁸ Canada's most widely read newsmagazine, *Maclean's*, annually tracks the country's mood in extensive surveys taken just before Canada Day (July 1). The tenor of the 1994 and 1995 polls is encapsulated in the titles of the two articles summarizing the findings: "In Search of Unity: A new poll reveals a love of country and a mood for compromise" (_______, 1994) and "A Quiet Passion; A *Maclean's* poll finds deep patriotism -- and tough attitudes on separatism"(______, 1995).
- ⁹ The preeminent pro-CBC interest group, Friends of Canadian Broadcasting, was originally called Friends of Public Broadcasting.
- ¹⁰ In this context one should, however, note a classic cartoon which appeared some years ago in the *Toronto Star*. It showed a couple watching TV, a discarded newspaper on the floor bearing the headline "CBC ratings drop to lowest ever." The man, clutching his drink and gazing upon a lady's cleavage on the screen, says "I'm totally supportive of the CBC's mandate to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political and economic fabric of Canada...I just don't want to watch them do it." (The CBC's mandate is a direct quotation from the Broadcasting Act.)
- It is relevant that Canadians constitute a strikingly large proportion of the viewers and supporters of PBS stations near the Canadian border. WNPE Watertown, which can be viewed in the Ottawa and Kingston areas of Ontario, acknowledges this fact by showing the Peace Tower of the Parliament Buildings and by playing part of "O Canada" when it closes each broadcasting day, as well as presenting the appropriate American symbols. The appeal of the U.S. so-called public broadcasters (they are, of course, not "public" in the sense that the CBC is) indicates that it is not only Canadian content but the nature and quality of programs which attracts -- or perhaps the *absence* of certain unpalatable programs offered by the private sector.
- ¹² An interesting (and intensely debated) change is evident in this context between the mandates assigned the Corporation by Parliament in the two Broadcasting Acts. The 1968 Broadcasting Act stipulated that the national broadcaster should "contribute to the development of national unity and provide for a continuing expression of Canadian identity" (2 g iv). In the 1991 Act this changed considerably. Now the CBC is asked to "contribute to shared national consciousness and identity" (3 m vi). "Unity" is not mentioned.
- ¹³ It must, in fairness be noted that Newton Minow is usually quoted, misleadingly, out of context: "Where television is good," he actually said in 1961, "nothing -- not the theatre, not magazines or newspapers -- nothing is better. But when television is bad nothing is worse...A vast wasteland."
- ¹⁴ Similarly, when during the Free Trade negotiations Canadians stressed the vulnerability of Canadian culture to the American colossus, Clayton Yeutter, the US trade ambassador replied, "In a sense both have their cultures at stake. I am prepared to take the risk of having American culture subject to greater Canadian influence under a free trade agreement. I hope Canada is prepared to run the same type of risk." Ha! Cited in an editorial in the *Globe and Mail* (______, 1987).
- ¹⁵ The United States government has formulated a Global Audiovisual Strategy seeking to eliminate even the fragile cultural exemption. The relevant document reads in part, "Ensure that existing cultural restrictions are not included in future FTA negotiations, including eliminating the [Canadian] FTA cultural exemption. Influence outcome of G-7 and APEC and future discussions of an FTA in the Americas to ensure

that language liberalizing market access for content is included." The issue has become acute as the NAFTA partners prepare to include Chile. The chief Canadian negotiator, Keith Christie has so far firmly resisted any "substantive reopening or rebalancing of rights and obligations as between current members as part of an accession negotiation." On the other hand, the Information Highway Advisory Council (Canada. Industry Canada, 1995) recommends that Canadian ownership requirements for communications firms be watered down. "U.S. Global Audiovisual Strategy," as published in *Inside U.S. Trade* (Canadian Conference of the Arts, 1995a).

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Trade Disputes and Canadian Cultural Policies*

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Introduction

In political but not everyday conversation, Canadians consider firms producing and distributing movies, television and radio programming, records, books and magazines part of the cultural industries. They are labeled "cultural" because their products are thought to contribute to the development of Canadian culture and are subject to cultural policy which consists of a mix of content requirements, licensing conditions, tax provisions, subsidy funds and foreign ownership restriction. The mix of policy instruments differs across the cultural industries. By making "Canadian voices available," cultural policy attempts to protect Canadians from becoming whatever they might become in their absence.

Cultural policy is based on the premise that commercial cultural products made by Canadians differ significantly from those made by foreigners. In the absence of supportive policy, distinctive Canadian products would not be available because their cost exceeds their commercial value.

For much of the output of the Canadian cultural industries, the premise that its content embodies a different national sensibility conflicts with reality. The commercial environment for a significant portion of the business conducted by the cultural industries is the same for domestic and foreign firms. For these lines of business, potential markets are not delineated by national boundaries but are shaped by interest, language, and purchasing power. Canadian firms producing for these, sometimes thin, sometimes thick, but always international markets respond to a demand influenced by both foreign and Canadian consumers, with the latter often in the minority. In the main, commercial firms are market oriented and do not voluntarily spend resources pursuing imprecise visions of national identity, although they may claim the opposite in their public discussions of policy. For a child watching an animated series, such as *Madeline*, made for the international market for children's programming, the impact on the child's development of whether the show was, or was not, produced by a Canadian company would appear to be insignificant.

For owners of and workers in Canadian cultural industry firms, the current policy situation is the best of all possible worlds. Canadian products are subsidised and protected domestically while enjoying relatively more unencumbered access to foreign markets than Canada grants foreign products. This state of affairs may be short-lived. The continuation of an inward-looking cultural policy and the openness of foreign markets is threatened by economic factors, rooted in new technological developments, and by a changing international economic regime. Fibre optics, laser signals, satellite transmission, and digital encoding and compression have significantly reduced the cost of the distribution, storage and production of music, text and audio-visual material. Some of the new systems, such as satellite broadcasting, also have important economies of scale in distribution and marketing. The cultural industries respond to local, regional, national, and international markets. The new technological developments make the international market more important and broaden the markets for all products. This is true of both mass-market and niche market products that have audiences in many countries.

There is no necessary connection between the location of markets for a cultural or entertainment product and the nationality of the persons or firms serving that market. A substantial number of firms producing "American" films, records, and television programs are not American-owned. Regardless of

ownership the product remains oriented to mass-audience success in the United States and abroad. The authors are unaware of anyone referring to the films of Columbia or Fox as instruments of Japanese or Australian cultural imperialism. The concerns that prompted Pendakur (1990) to write Canadian Dreams & American Control are also unlikely to be assuaged by the recent change in ownership of Universal studios. If Seagrams is a Canadian company then Universal Studios is a Canadian firm and its decisions are under Canadian control. We are confident that if Pendakur writes a sequel it will not be titled Canadian Dreams Fulfilled Under (Partial) Canadian Control.

That demand drives content and not ownership is true not only at the level of mass market products but also in small but international markets like those for academic books. The Pendakur book, which laments the failure of an American dominated cultural industry to fulfil the author's view of Canadian dreams provides an excellent example. The book is published by the press of one American university, Wayne State, while its author is employed by another prestigious American university, Northwestern.

Treaties governing international trade, investment, intellectual property rights and labour movement partially constrain Canadian cultural policy. Canada's treaty obligations and rights have recently been expanded substantially by the free trade agreement with the United States (CUFTA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the revision and extension of GATT negotiated in the Uruguay Round. All these agreements affect the general trade and investment environment and the NAFTA and GATT constrain copyright policy. In the trade negotiations preceding these agreements, Canada's stance was that "culture was not on the table." Nevertheless, the international regime for the cultural industries was affected by explicit clauses that ran counter to that general dictum and by general clauses governing investment and the rights of other countries to retaliate to new cultural policy initiatives by Canada.²

Canadian actions are also circumscribed by a less predictable set of retaliation possibilities by the governments of other countries. The diplomatic efforts of the United States, the major market for Canadian English-language cultural products, have recently become more focussed on the trade implications of the cultural policies adopted by Canada and other culturally protective countries. What Canadians label the cultural industries, Americans call the entertainment industries. Although the United States has foreign ownership restrictions in broadcasting and cable, it has not adopted content restrictions nor financial and tax subsidy plans to the same extent as Canada and similarly-minded countries.

How will the new international regime and the changing economic and technological environment for the cultural industries affect the development of Canadian cultural policy? We search for seeds of an answer to this question in the resolution process of three recent issues concerning the cultural industries: the removal of the American specialty channel, Country Music Television, from the approved list of foreign specialty channels; the imposition of a prohibitive excise tax on split-runs of magazines in response to a Sports Illustrated initiative; and, the terms governing the provision of satellite services in Canada. Each of these issues involves a conflict with American interests. Each is affected differently by the recent changes in the international regime and each has historical precedents that provide a helpful point of comparison for identifying signs of changes in Canadian policy.

Country Music Television

In 1994, the CRTC announced the removal of the Country Music Television (CMT) channel from a list of American services that can be carried by Canadian cable companies and its replacement by the New Country Network (NCN), a Canadian owned service. The changeover occurred on January 1st, 1995. CMT appealed the CRTC decision in the Canadian courts and lost. It then filed a 301 complaint to the USTR.³

On June 21, 1995, the date on which the USTR was due to respond, possibly, suggesting a list of retaliatory measures, the companies involved proposed an arrangement to resolve the dispute. CMT would take a 20% equity interest in NCN, a level of foreign ownership permitted by Canadian ownership policies. The new specialty channel would be called CMT Canada. The proposal also mentioned an increased percentage ownership position for CMT, should this be permitted by Canadian legislation.⁴

Beginning in 1983, the CRTC developed a policy for licensing Canadian specialty channels. In a complementary initiative, the Commission outlined a linkage policy permitting cable to offer specified American specialty channels in discretionary tiers with Canadian pay and specialty channels. If a Canadian service was granted a license and no American service covering the same area appeared on the approved list for linkage, no competitive American service would be subsequently added to that list. In 1984, the year that CMT was first authorized for Canadian cable carriage, the CRTC's policy also called for terminating an American specialty channel's eligibility for linkage if a similar Canadian specialty service was licensed. Changes to this policy were announced on November 30, 1987. In a related set of decisions approving the licenses of a number of new specialty channels and clarifying linkage requirements, the Commission announced that termination of an American channel's eligibility for linkage upon the licensing of a Canadian alternative would be discretionary rather than mandatory.

CMT was the first American service which had appeared on Canadian cable systems to have its eligibility terminated. Seven years before the CMT decision, the issue of a newly licensed Canadian service facing an established American counterpart had arisen but the outcome was different. When the CBC's news channel, Newsworld, was licensed in 1987, the two CNN news services were already operating in Canada. The CRTC licensing decision for Newsworld notes that the CBC did not ask for the removal of these services from the eligibility list. The CRTC also noted that in the Newsworld application the CBC had drawn attention to an "active partnership" which it had enjoyed with CNN for a number of years and to the reaffirmation of both CNN and CBC of "their intention to maintain this relationship." Although the precise nature of this partnership between the CBC and CNN is not public information, it involves the exchange of news programming. Canada is one of the few countries in which CNN has no bureau. Presumably, the services provided by the CBC have relieved CNN of the need to invest in such facilities in Canada. At the licence renewal hearings for Newsworld the CRTC reiterated that it was not asking for the American service to be delisted.

The case of CMT illustrates the difficulty of identifying services that are in a format competitive to a Canadian service. The Commission decided that CMT would be removed but permitted the American-owned Nashville Network (TNN) to continue operations in Canada. TNN plays country videos but not to the extent that CMT and NCN do. The Nashville Network and CMT have the same owners (Westinghouse Electric Corp. and Gaylord Entertainment Co.). Of the two services, Nashville is the more profitable. At the time of its removal in 1994, CMT had been on the CRTC eligibility list for ten years and had built up a substantial audience of viewer-listeners. It also claimed to have promoted Canadian country music performers in the United States as well as Canada.

The resulting dispute has been handled in several fora. First, CMT appealed the regulatory decision in the Federal Court of Canada and was refused the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The appeal in the Federal Court was made on the grounds that the principles of natural justice had been violated because CMT was not allowed to participate in the oral hearing that preceded the decision by the CRTC.

CMT then filed a 301 petition to the United States Trade Representative (USTR) complaining of its treatment in Canada. The USTR responded on February 6, 1995 stating that Canada had acted in an

"unreasonable and discriminatory" manner and called for public comment within thirty days. In a letter to the Canadian Trade Minister, the USTR indicated it would complete its investigation by June 21, 1995.

A news report (Wall Street Journal, May 19, 1995, B12), stated that American officials were drawing up a list of targets for retaliation. The list included Teleglobe Inc., Cineplex Odeon Corp, and MuchMusic, a rock music video channel, and mention was made of imports of Canadian maple syrup, bacon, fur coats and phonographic recordings. Retaliation might thus occur inside or outside the cultural sector. In a previous dispute concerning regulatory actions which affected border broadcasters in the United States, retaliation had involved disallowing the deductibility of convention expenses for income tax purposes when Americans attended conventions in Canada.

Two other actions occurred. The USTR wrote to the Canadian Minister of International Trade requesting a review of Canadian policy. In effect, the USTR was asking whether Canada was likely to make a practice of delisting foreign cable services. A second response was the announcement of discussions between the two firms providing the country music services regarding a solution to the dispute. CMT and NCN were at first reported to have been unable to reach a settlement. However on June 21, the formation of an equity venture was announced. CMT acquired its 20% share from Rogers for an undisclosed amount and announced that it would no longer blacklist Canadian videos, thus giving wider distribution to Canadian artists in the United States.

Details of these corporate discussions are not in the public domain. Private negotiations seek an outcome that is better from each party's perspective than the outcome expected from formal dispute resolution mechanisms or, in the absence of such mechanisms, from precedents of the political processes resolving similar disputes in the past. It is possible, in our opinion highly probable, that one or both governments encouraged the parties to resolve the dispute privately and may have suggested alternatives to consider. Although the Newsworld-CNN interaction was very different on the surface, private arrangements between the parties also played a significant role in diffusing conflict. In that case, assuring the continuation of contractual arrangements agreed to before the licensing of the Canadian service made it attractive for the CBC to oppose the delisting of CNN's services.

In the absence of a private settlement of the CMT case, it is not clear what sequence of political actions would have occurred. Obligations of both countries under the FTA, NAFTA and the GATT⁹ affect the likelihood of different sequences. The first step in a political resolution is crucial in determining the sequence. Canada's reaction would depend on whether the United States retaliated in a culturally related or some other area. The coherence of private responses in the respective countries would also have a significant effect. In this regard, the response made by interested parties in the United States to the 301 process would be important in shaping the case to which the Canadian government would have had to respond.¹⁰

Sports Illustrated

In 1993, Time Warner announced that it would produce a split-run edition of Sports Illustrated in Canada. The U.S. edition of Sports Illustrated already circulates in Canada. A split-run would be a Canadian edition of Sports Illustrated with most of the same news and editorial content as in the U.S. edition but with Canadian advertising content. In making this decision, Time Warner was challenging a Canadian policy which aims to channel advertising revenue to Canadian periodicals and discourage the siphoning off of these revenues to foreign (American) publications. Attention was paid to this issue almost half a century ago and it has since been the object of a series of inquiries and policies.

Briefly the historical context is as follows.

- •1951: The Royal Commission on National development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences recognised the contribution made by magazines to the development of national understanding. Subsequently a 20 percent tax on all advertising in split-runs of foreign periodicals in Canada was proposed and implemented from January 1st, 1957. Following the election of a conservative government, the tax was repealed in June 1958.
- •1961: The Royal Commission on Periodicals chaired by Senator O'Leary recommended that:
 - 1. Canadian advertisers not be allowed to deduct expenditures for tax purposes for advertising directed at the Canadian market and placed in a foreign periodical;
 - 2. foreign periodicals containing advertising directed at the Canadian market be prevented from entering Canada.
- •1965: Section 19 of the Income Tax Act and Tariff Item 9958 implemented these recommendations but *Time* and *Readers Digest* were grandfathered and exempted from the legislation.
- •1976: The Canadian government introduced Bill C-58 to amend Section 19 of the Income Tax Act and eliminate the grandfathering provision. Advertising deductibility for tax purposes required that periodicals be at least 75 percent Canadian owned and contain content that is not substantially the same (i.e., 20 percent or more the same) as the issue of a periodical that was printed edited or published outside Canada.

These public acts induced significant private responses by two of the important players -- Reader's Digest and Time. After 1976, Reader's Digest responded by creating a foundation in Canada that permitted it to qualify for 75 percent Canadian ownership and, since it was a digest of previously published works, it was allowed to avoid the "different material" provisions. The Canadian edition of Reader's Digest was published by a firm (foundation) controlled by Canadian directors whose equity had been provided by a subsidiary of Reader's Digest in the United States from which editorial services were contracted. A veneer of Canadian ownership was provided and approved by the Canadian tax authorities, but there is little doubt that the American parent company made the critical editorial and commercial decisions. (For further details, see Litvak and Maule, 1980, 80-82).

Time closed its Canadian bureau in 1976 but continued to sell advertising in Canada by reducing the rate charged to Canadian advertisers so that on an after tax basis the cost-per-thousand for advertising was competitive with advertising placed in a Canadian periodical. It continued to print in Canada the copies sold there but was also able to import copy as it was grandfathered re Tariff item 9958.

Time Canada's financial performance since the passage of Bill C-58 in 1976 shows that at first advertising levels fell but within two years had been restored to their previous level. Magazine revenues have increased from \$14.2m in 1978 to \$35.8m in 1989. From 1990 to the present, the financial information filed with the Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act (CALURA) has been classified as confidential by the Canadian authorities at the request of Time Warner. 11

In January 1993, Time Canada Inc. announced plans to print a split-run edition of *Sports Illustrated* with Canadian advertising by using telecommunications linkages to ship the editorial content into Canada. Tariff Item 9958 does not apply as it relates only to items shipped physically into Canada. Section 19 would apply but the advertising rate could be set at a level competitive with the after tax rate for advertisements in

Canadian periodicals. The first issue of Sports Illustrated Canada (SIC) was published in April 1993. It continues to be published as of July 1995.

This action by Time Canada breached the spirit of the 1976 legislation and elicited retaliatory public actions. The government confirmed its longstanding support of the Canadian periodical industry and in March of 1994 set up a Task Force of nine persons, five directly connected to the publishing industry, one to the advertising industry, two lawyers and one trade policy advisor to recommend appropriate action.

The Task Force made nine recommendations of support for the Canadian magazine industry -- see Appendix 1 (Report of the Task Force, 1994:vi - viii). The principal proposal was for an 80 percent tax to be imposed on the advertising content of magazines distributed in Canada that contain advertisements "primarily directed at Canadians and editorial content which is substantially the same as the editorial content of one or more issues of one or more periodicals that contain advertisements that, taken as a whole, are not primarily directed at Canadians" (Report of the Task Force, 1994:65).

A magazine would be substantially the same if it was more than 20 percent the same -- the difference should also be "significant and not merely cosmetic or trifling." This content guideline would be the same as the content guideline for the deductibility of advertising under Section 19 of the Income Tax Act. The Excise Tax proposal, which has been accepted by the government, would in effect target split-run editions of all periodicals regardless of how they were compiled and distributed in Canada.

The Task Force would have continued the exemption for *Time* and *Reader's Digest* and permitted *Sports Illustrated* to be exempt for seven issues per year, the number published in the year preceding the report. The Canadian Magazine Publishers Association, representing Canadian periodicals, objected and the government has proposed not to exempt any issues of SIC. The American edition of *Sports Illustrated*, similar to other foreign publications, continues to be circulated in Canada with the same content and advertising as editions sold in its domestic market.

The first reading of Bill C-103, An Act to amend the Excise Tax Act and the Income Tax Act, took place on June 22, 1995. The Bill imposed an excise tax at the rate of 80% of the value of all advertisements contained in a split-run edition distributed in Canada. Section 39 exempts from the tax all those periodicals which published split run editions in the 12-month period ending on March 26, 1993. *Harrowsmith*, a major Canadian consumer magazine with a split-run edition sold in the United States, is thereby excluded from the tax. SIC was first published in April 1993 and continues to be published as of July 1995 since the legislation has still to be passed.

Satellite

The successful introduction of two sophisticated high-powered satellite broadcasting services to the United States market in May of 1994 initiated a sequence of private and policy responses in Canada. Of the two American services, DirecTv and USSB, the former was the more important from the Canadian perspective.

DirecTv provides about 40 cable tv channels, a la carte subscription to various pay channels, and 40-50 channels of pay-per-view (ppv) movies and special events. Revenue is generated by selling packages of specialty channels, pay options, and movies or special events. An 18" dish and smart receiver/decoder costs about \$1000.

DirecTv can be received in southern Canada with the same equipment sold in the United States. Reception in the far north of Canada requires a larger dish. As the launch of DirecTv became imminent, digital satellite broadcasting services were discussed in hearings on the structure of the broadcasting system held by the CRTC in 1993. The testimony at the Hearings were used by the CRTC to develop its case for controlling the impact of American DTH broadcasting on the Canadian system. In DirecTv's testimony, company officials argued that the CRTC's authorization was not required to offer American DTH services in Canada but they did not present a formal legal opinion to that effect. Mr. McKee, DirecTv's general manager for Canada, stated that the service would carry one or two Canadian channels and that its ppv service was interested in carrying Canadian cultural events such as the Stratford Festival performances.

After this appearance and before the structural hearings report was released, the CBC and Power Broadcasting Inc. announced a partnership to supply DirecTv with programming. Two channels have been supplied based on the CBC's current programming augmented by its own past programming and an inventory of programming purchased from private television. DirecTv also carries a Canadian music channel produced by CHUM. The president of the Canadian Cable Television Association, Ken Stein, responded to the news of the CBC initiative by stating:

The CBC is an agent of the government and responsible to parliament. It has made this deal well in advance of the publication of the CRTC's findings on the restructuring of the Canadian broadcasting industry, which seems to say the government has given its blessing to an open skies' broadcasting policy. (Toronto Star, May 28, 1993, W4)

In its structural report, the CRTC took the position, which appears to be legally correct (Tacit and Simcoe, 1993; Whitehead, 1994), that any broadcasting undertaking operating in whole or in part in Canada must be licensed. No physical presence in Canada is required to be judged as operating in whole or in part in Canada. A billing system that includes customers in Canada suffices.

Having developed a position to keep an American service out, the CRTC turned to the problem of encouraging a Canadian alternative. In May of 1994, Bell Canada Enterprises (BCE), Canadian Satellite Communication (Cancom), Tee-Comm Electronics Inc., Astral Communications Inc., Allarcom Pay Television Limited, and Labatt Communications Inc. formed DTH Canada Ltd. for the purposes of bringing digital satellite broadcasting to Canadian homes. Three large cable companies -- Rogers, Shaw, and CFCF -- developed a competing plan. On May 17, 1994 an improbable agreement in principle among all these interests was reached to establish a single marketing agency. Cable spokespersons immediately claimed that the new service would support and not compete with established cable franchises.

Both the CRTC and the industry players realized that delay in providing an approved service to Canadians would be costly. Although revisions of the Radiocommunications Act had provided tougher sanctions against owning or selling an illegal decoder, enforcing against the use of such decoders for receiving DirecTv or taking other actions against the service would be expensive and politically unpopular. By May 1995, the estimates of the number of greymarket Canadian subscribers to DirecTv varied between 25,000 and 70,000.¹²

Early in 1994, the CRTC's Chairman, Keith Spicer, and the Broadcasting Vice-Chairman, Fernand Belisle, met with the CEO of DirecTv in Colorado. According to the CRTC's account of events, DirecTv was advised that the CRTC's policy "with respect to DTH is to encourage the use of Canadian satellite facilities" and that a Canadian partner was needed for the granting of authority to market in Canada.

In March of the same year the CRTC started hearings on a proposal to exempt Canadian DTH suppliers from licensing requirements. ¹³ In the same month, the Commission was informed that DirecTv and Power would form a partnership that would comply with Canadian ownership requirements. The deadline for participation in the hearings was such that the new partnership was not able to provide evidence. The CRTC did not extend its hearings so that what had now become a Canadian alternative with deep pockets and experience in DTH could participate.

In its August 30, 1994 decision, the CRTC exempted DTH services from obtaining a license provided they meet specified conditions. The most controversial condition was that Canadian satellites must be used for providing all programming. The wording did not provide any leeway for using American satellites when they were appreciably cheaper, a practice which was condoned by the CRTC with regard to delivery of American signals to cable companies.

Power DirecTv's plan to serve the Canadian market included meeting all the content requirements imposed on cable that were relevant to satellite distribution. Power DirecTv was also committed to providing all the licensed non-pay Canadian services on its Canadian service. Pay per view (ppv) services would be based on DirecTv's American service modified to meet Canadian content provisions for such services in Canada. In addition a French language ppv service would be provided. Because its services would be transmitted from two satellites that were in different positions, a new antenna would have to be designed and manufactured for the Canadian market. The Canadian dish would be larger than its American counterpart and have two horns. The Power DirecTv decoders sold in Canada would be programmed to black out shows forwhich Canadian copyright had not been obtained.

This plan failed to comply with the exemption conditions because DirecTv planned to provide its own ppv service rather than use the two regional monopoly services licensed by the CRTC and because American sourced programming would be transmitted from an American satellite. Allowing the first deviation was strongly opposed by Viewers' Choice in the east and Home Theatre in the west. The second deviation made economic sense as the ppv services were already available on the signal from the American satellite. To replicate these transmissions from a Canadian satellite would be very expensive. George Addy, the Director of Competition Policy in Canada, described this requirement of the CRTC's exemption order (1994a, b, 1995) as "enormously inefficient."

Earlier, Mr. Addy's office had reservations about the alliances formed with the CRTC's blessing and encouragement. After an antitrust investigation was threatened by the Bureau of Competition Policy, the cable-led initiative withdrew from the marketing alliance and DTH Canada was dissolved. A new firm called Expressvu rose from the ashes of DTH, with BCE, WIC, Cancom, and Tee-Comm as shareholders. Expressvu promised the delivery of 100 channels of which 25 would be digital audio and 22 ppv services by September of 1995.

Having been shut out of the business, Power DirecTv vigorously sought relief from the Government while Expressvu lobbied hard to maintain the exemption policy as written. The government responded by announcing a review of satellite broadcasting policy and appointed three commissioners, Gordon Ritchie, Robert Rabinovitch, and Roger Tasse to examine the issue. According to press reports, the Power DirecTv group were more pleased by the composition of the committee than the Expressvu interests. A report was tabled on April 6, 1995.

In Direct-to-Home Satellite Broadcasting: Report of the Policy Review Panel the commissioners recommended:

licensing DTH satellite distribution undertakings,

separate licensing of ppv service providers,

DTH systems and ppv services can have common ownership,

only Canadian programming services must be carried by Canadian satellites,

a tax of 5% on gross revenue of both distribution systems and ppv services to finance Canadian programming,

at least one French language ppv service will be licensed,

a satellite distribution service must carry at least one French language ppv service, and

a licensed DTH distributor must meet similar content requirements to those imposed on cable.

The panel suggested that the government issue to the CRTC two directives imposing these suggestions. Under the Broadcasting Act, the government can issue such directives on matters of policy, but not concerning the implementation of policy. A draft directive has to be presented to the relevant committees of each House of Parliament. These committees hold hearings and issue reports within forty days. Within three weeks of receiving the panel's report, the Government issued two directives in line with the recommendations and presented them to the House of Parliament committees. Whether the directives were ultra fires or not was an issue of contention in the Hearings. The CRTC, which had been criticised for creating an illusion of "open" entry in the exemption order, when in reality only one company group was in a position to qualify, claimed in effect that the directives were thinly veiled instructions to authorize Power DirecTv. Its view was supported by the witnesses from Expressvu, other companies and associations as well as Pierre Trudel, a Professor from the Centre for Research in Public Law at the University of Montreal.

The House Heritage Committee provided a terse one page report containing six "should" statements and no discussion of the background or the issues raised. The Senate Committee wrote a more detailed report. Both committees were concerned with the breadth of the order and the precedents established. The Senate committee recommended inter alia more general wording while the House Committee admonished the Government to "avoid the possibility of litigation by defusing the contentious legal issues related to these orders." The Government modified the original orders to allow Expressvu to meet its announced starting date and setting a November 1, 1995 deadline for the licensing of all other services meeting the conditions of the directives. The distribution and ppv undertakings must make significant financial contributions derived from a percentage of gross annual revenues to the production of Canadian programming. The November 1, 1995 date gives the CRTC more time to hold licensing hearings than the September 1, 1995 date recommended by both committees. The final orders each incorporate a section, suggested by the Senate report (p. 40), that the CRTC cannot refuse to license a DTH distribution service or a ppv service because in its opinion the applicant is not economically viable.

The binding directives of the government were released on July 7, 1995. On July 18, 1995 the Globe and Mail reported that Expressvu would not meet its launch date except for the province of Quebec16 because of problems in obtaining a microprocessor chip for the set-top box. The availability of transponder space on Canadian satellites has also been cited as a reason for the delay. If everything goes according to plan, and little has so far, two satellite broadcasting services will be competing for the custom of Canadian viewers sometime in 1996.17

Policy interpretation

The tea leaves left by these cases reveal some "noisy" signals about the technological currents affecting Canadian cultural policy, their importance and the course being charted by those in charge of that policy. An important signal is that institutional and contractual adaptation is an important means for resolving disputes. A related lesson is that ownership constraints generate unnecessary difficulties in realizing such a resolution.

Two of the cases, CMT and satellite broadcasting, reveal the importance of private contracting arrangements in resolving conflict and realising gains from exchange. The contractual arrangements between CMT Canada and the parent American company are unknown but likely involve complex obligations to use the resources of the minority partner and transfer of managerial rights not usually granted to a minority partner. Similarly, the obligations and rights of Power Broadcasting Ltd. in Power DirecTv are not known. In both cases, more information will be forthcoming during the CRTC hearings with respect to the changed ownership of the country and western partnership and the licensing of Power DirecTv. Even though institutional and contractual arrangements were successfully developed, their negotiation were probably made more difficult by ownership limitations. In the CMT case the parties have agreed that if the constraints are relaxed, the foreign investor will increase its share by 50% of its present level.

If the Canadian ownership restrictions are to ensure Canadian control and decision making, that purpose is unlikely to be realised either under the present or more liberal limitations, as a significant part of what the foreign parties bring to the joint ventures are some mix of managerial, marketing and technological skills. In some instances, only the illusion of Canadian control will exist. Certainly this was the case in 1976 when *Reader's Digest* undertook a corporate reorganization in Canada in order to conform to Canadian tax and tariff policies but left the parent company in effective control of its minority owned operations in Canada.

Satellite broadcasting creates a particularly strong imperative for joint ownership solutions because of the signal spillover. We doubt that a large number of these services can coexist serving North America and that even one service will be viable serving only Canada. Choice for Canadian viewers will be considerably expanded if services broadcasting to North America can be adapted to provide authorized services in Canada. If there are five such services does it make more sense to require that separate companies with 80% Canadian ownership be formed to provide the Canadian option, that a capital constraint be designed on a North American basis, or that no constraints be imposed at all? We would not be surprised if there were further private arrangements suggested between the parties presently contesting to provide satellite broadcasting services in Canada. That Expressvu would seek an American partner makes economic sense. Some accommodation between Expressvu and DirecTv Power would be more unlikely but not, in our opinion, impossible.¹⁸

Inward-looking vs. outward-looking policies

A second signal concerns whether the interests of Canadian business, creative and technical personnel are better served by content policies which are inward-looking or the abandonment of the current focus and the adoption of more outward-looking policies that exchange access to the domestic market for reciprocal treatment in foreign markets. The cases give a mixed message on how the Canadian authorities read this issue.

The magazine decision is clearly inward-looking. The excise tax has two effects. It rules out the expansion of American magazines in Canada, using the strategy of split runs, and vice versa. In the short run, rents and incomes in the Canadian magazine industry would most likely have fallen had split runs been allowed. For example, the tax aimed at *Sports Illustrated Canada* (SIC) affects a magazine for which there is no direct competitor in Canada. SIC competes for readers with the American edition of *Sports Illustrated* and the sports sections of other publications. For advertisers, SIC has a much broader range of competitors. We examined the May 15, 1995 issue of SIC and found messages from 26 advertisers displayed on 24 pages of advertising in a 78 page edition. Ten full pages are devoted to advertisements for automobiles or

automotive products.¹⁹ Presumably some of these ads would have appeared in Canadian magazines had SIC not been published.

If SIC had been successful, other split-runs would have been targeted at the Canadian market. The rationale for Canadian policy has been that Canadian content promotes cultural identity, at least as far as general interest magazines are concerned. Since these are largely supported by advertising revenues, the policy encourages advertisers to buy space in Canadian magazines. This is somewhat different from the policy to promote Canadian content of broadcasting and cablecasting, where the intent is to assist the development of Canadian artists and composers. It can, of course, be argued that such persons also will promote Canadian identity providing that viewers and listeners can detect the nationality of their product, such as country music, which we believe is doubtful.

The interests of different Canadian magazine publishers are not uniform. The Canadian Magazine Publishers Association (CMPA), which lobbied on behalf of the excise tax, represents periodicals that have a clear Canadian connection and those that do not. Among the 326 members of the CMPA, in the former category are Aboriginal Voices, Canadian Foreign Policy, and Lethbridge Living. Among the latter are CyberStage, Journeywoman, This Week in Bible Prophecy, and Victorian Harvester. They appear to cater to generic interests rather than those directly connected with Canadian identity (Annual Report 1994-1995, 6-7).

The preferred policy for the owners of a magazine dealing with the new technologies will differ from that of the owners of a magazine on local Canadian matters. At the time of the tax change only one major Canadian owned magazine, *Harrowsmith*, published a split-run edition in the United States. Its right to continue was assured by a carefully worded grandfathering provision. In the future, any Canadian periodical that decides to service the American market with a split-run from Canada will be subject to the tax. To protect the Canadian advertising market for Canadian oriented magazines the new policy prevents a successful Canadian magazine with a lucrative potential audience in the United States from using split runs as a strategy for penetrating in the American market.

In protecting advertising revenue for Canadian-oriented magazines, policy makers may be building walls around a wasting asset. New technologies such as the Internet are being used by periodical publishers to promote and distribute their product. The Internet may also be used as an advertising medium which will compete with magazines and other carriers. There is little likelihood that Canadian policy can control this source of competition.

The effect on Canadian incomes and rents of the resolution of the CMT case is not clear. Would Canadian talent have received more exposure and higher incomes under the Canadian NCN than under the new CMT Canada? Canadian artists strive to gain recognition outside as well as inside Canada in order to enhance their reputations and incomes at home and abroad. The CMT name is probably a valuable asset in gaining access to the larger country music market in the United States. If an agreement had not been reached, American retaliation would have probably occurred lowering income and rents in the activities affected.

In the satellite broadcasting case, the government imposed a shift in policy on a reluctant CRTC. The directives encourage open licensing and the removal of a regulatory barrier -- exclusive use of Canadian satellites --t o more integration on a North American basis. Although the debate often focussed on licensing vs. exemptions from licensing, this difference is, in our opinion, not particularly significant. The CRTC exemption policy would allow any party that qualified to enter. What is important are the conditions that

have to be met in order to provide the service. From an economic perspective, the relaxation of the satellite constraint is far more important in creating a more effective potential or actual competition.

Under the exemption and the new regime anyone qualified can enter. This feature is important as it means that the regulator cannot levy discriminatory "taxes" on each participant in the system through different license requirements. The same tax must be imposed on all participants, as is the case with the 5% levy on revenues of ppv and satellite distribution undertakings which is part of the new regime.

Technological changes have reduced the cost of providing more programming and timing options. The rapid growth in VCRs, higher cable penetration rates, and subscription to satellite services reveal that consumers value these options. A host of different audiences exist, few of which coincide with the boundaries of the nation state. As a result there is increasing dissonance between the national culture rhetoric of Canadian cultural policy and what listeners and viewers are doing. We perceive a noisy transition of policy towards fulfilling the apparent aspirations of viewers, and a more contradictory rhetoric emerging.

For example, two departments, the Department of Industry and the Department of National Heritage, most directly affect Canadian cultural policy. The press release accompanying the issue of the satellite directives contained remarks about the directives from each Ministry that were reminiscent of a good cop-bad cop routine. The Minister of National Heritage stressed the national culture line with the traditional buzz words, "They require financial contributions for Canadian production, protect a distinct Canadian market for pay-per-view film distribution, and ensure Canadian ownership and content. Canadian voices and images will be front and centre on DTH satellite signals." The Minister of Industry stressed consumer choice and the adjective Canadian was applied only to the noun 'consumers,' "The Orders issued today will mean that the licensing of Canadian direct-to-home services will take place in a dynamic and competitive environment. Canadian consumers are the real winners here. They will soon be able to access a wider range of programming choices."

Monopoly vs. competition

The new satellite broadcasting policy represents a shift from the interrelated monopolies in satellite distribution with monopoly ppv services favoured by the CRTC to a more competitive environment. The clause in the directives requiring that the CRTC not "refuse to issue a licence on the grounds that the economic viability of existing licenses may be affected" is extremely important. The risk of failure will now be borne by entering firms. Under the old system discrimination in licensing usually taxed but occasionally subsidised an authorized service. For instance, the Canadian content obligations of a licensed firm in financial trouble would be eased to restore economic viability.

The resolution of the CMT case differs from the other two in not addressing the general issue raised by the dispute -- clarifying the rights of licensed American specialty channels. Addressing this issue requires reexamining the way in which Canadian specialty services are licensed. One possibility is that the open licensing embraced in the panel of experts report and government directives on satellite broadcasting will be adopted in this area. Another possibility is that the inward looking policy adopted in the *Sports Illustrated* case will prevail and the controlled licensing of further Canadian specialised channels will continue. With specialty channels the current policy is that, if a new Canadian channel is licensed and requests the delisting of an already established American counterpart, the American channel will be removed from the cable menu. A parallel policy with magazines would have been to allow split runs of *Sports Illustrated* by a Canadianized partnership. When an equivalent Canadian magazine decided to publish, SIC would be asked to stop publication. In some dimensions, the current Canadian magazine policy is more open than the specialty

channel policy. With magazines, a new Canadian periodical receives certain tax and mail advantages over an established American counterpart but the American magazine is still available in book stores.

A further irony is that the new CMT arrangement will resemble a split-run if a basically American programming service adds a certain amount of Canadian content and is able to sell advertising in Canada. The difference from a split run is that the Canadianized version must be owned by a Canadian entity rather than, as is the case in the *Sports Illustrated* example, by the owner of the American service. Under these circumstances, it is not clear what Canadians gain by the ownership restriction, except that capital which could be invested elsewhere is tied up in imitative ventures.

The original decision in the CMT case illustrates the inward looking policy towards the licensing of Canadian specialty services. Under that policy, the CRTC vetted the business plans of applicants and if the Commission thought the service would be viable, granted a license. Canadian content obligations were tailored to the CRTC's projection of viability. When the licenses were renewed or if bankruptcy threatened, Cancon obligations would be adjusted.

The damages caused by a policy that dampens entrepreneurial initiative and substitutes bureaucratic tests of viability for market tests are not generally appreciated. A puzzling aspect of Canadian broadcasting developments in the seventies and eighties was the difference in the response of Canadian and American public and private entrepreneurs to the demand for specialty and pay programming services by cable companies in Canada and the United States. Canada was cabled earlier and more densely than the United States. Canadian cable companies were also successful in developing a number of cable franchises in the United States. Given this situation, the difference in responding to the challenge of providing additional programming for cable is striking.

Contrast the explosive growth of American specialty channels -- CNN, ESPN, USA, Nickelodeon and many of others -- and pay services -- HBO, Showtime, Disney and many others -- with what happened in Canada. What has been the most dynamic and profitable sector of American broadcasting in the last two decades has been the most passive and imitative in Canada. Why did our lead in cable not spawn forward linkages? Why are there not continental services owned and managed by Canadians with large profits and cash flows financing major investments in programming and international expansion? Why is an American children's channel like Nickelodeon expanding into other countries while Canada does not have a specialty children's channel?²⁰

One possibility is that Canadian entrepreneurship was not up to the task. That might be true but in our opinion native entrepreneurship was never given a chance to reveal itself. The micro management by the CRTC of the timing and nature of specialty services dissipated the opportunity. Proceeding cautiously may have preserved the profit base of traditional broadcasters or at least slowed down its decline but, in our opinion, it prevented the development of a far greater source of profits and viewer surplus. The placing of Trio, the international version of Newsworld, and the MuchMusic channel on an American distribution system in the 1990s seems very little very late. Even that accomplishment was earned not with the encouragement but the thinly veiled hostility of the CRTC. Note that in the United States, specialty services do not require licensing nor are they subject to ownership restrictions.

At the same time that the specialty service window of opportunity was being missed, a Canadian telecommunications equipment manufacturer, Northern Telecom, saw a similar opportunity in the unregulated market for telecom equipment in the United States. A company that was once an inward looking manufacturer of Western Electric products for sale in Canada became a multinational force selling almost exclusively state-of-the-art proprietary products. In 1994, Canadian sales represented only 13% of Northern

Telecom's revenues and the most rapidly growing market for its products were in non-North American markets. The Northern Telecom example also illustrates that taking an international perspective often requires abandoning protective measures at home. On March 31, 1994, Northern Telecom abandoned its supply contract with the dominant Canadian telephone company, Bell Canada. Negotiated in 1939, the supply contract gave Northern Telecom first notice on provisioning of Bell Canada. The contract was abandoned under pressure from the United States.

When the questions of who provides, how, and who receives at what price are decided politically rather than by the market, the consumers' voice is weaker. The CRTC funds access by associations representing consumers to its telecommunications hearings but not to its broadcasting hearings. Another voice for the consumer is the Director of Competition Policy. Whereas the typical consumer group promotes what it believes are pro-consumer regulations, the Director advocates protecting consumers by developing more competitive environments. Even if the current efforts of the Director were reinforced by subsidised interventions by consumers association into broadcasting hearings, the information received would be a pale reflection of what is typically marshaled and recorded on an open market.

Unfortunately, an open market for differentiated services like cablecasting may result in either too many or too few services. The information to fine tune corrections for this "failure" of competition is not available to policy makers. These arguments may justify a uniform tax or subsidy that shifts the equilibrium but do not justify detailed discriminatory management of entry that stifles dynamic initiatives.

In the satellite case, the Director played a significant role in encouraging a more competitive solution than the CRTC plan. The Senate report on the directives also suggested adding a clause ordering the CRTC "to consider the benefits of more consumer viewing and listening options when deliberating on applications for DTH distribution undertaking licenses" (Standing Committee on Transport and Communications, 1995, 40). This clause was not included in the final directives but the first direction in each directive enjoins the CRTC to license so as to promote a dynamically competitive market.

International

The integration of broadcasting between the United States and Canada has also been affected by the general integration of trade, investment, and labour movement in North America. Only the CMT case ended up in the initiation of a 301 protest in the United States and a formal claim that Canada was in breach of the NAFTA investment code, but all the cases triggered less formal discussions and concerns in both capitals to resolve the issues without generating a retaliatory sequence. Since a private reconciliation was achieved, the CMT dispute did not generate any court decisions that might have clarified the extent to which Canada's cultural industries are covered by recent trade treaties.

Our interpretation of the events is that regardless of what the trade treaties state, any substantive new action by Canada to shut American players out of the Canadian market will likely lead to some form of retaliation by the United States. In an interview with Peter Gzowski (CBC Morningside, January 26, 1995), the American ambassador to Canada, while expressing sympathy with Canada's cultural policy -- "I would not fault a single Canadian for wanting to protect and preserve, and, frankly, promote and spread that culture" -- reminded the audience that Americans viewed the CRTC action as confiscating the investment of Westinghouse which is a major employer in other Canadian sectors. The ambassador noted that Westinghouse "has been a good corporate citizen, and they get scared when something is just pulled away. Particularly when we feel there's as much or more Canadian content with our (CMT) station.²¹

Conclusion

The three cases illustrate that Canadian policies regarding broadcasting, cablecasting, and periodicals are being assailed from all sides. Technological change is the driving force shaping new contractual and organizational arrangements and forcing the CRTC as regulator to make decisions that are attempts at micromanagement in political and commercial circumstances that it cannot control. We may be witnessing the demise of the CRTC at least in performing its traditional roles.

A possible verdict is that broadcast regulation in Canada has actually stunted the growth of industry development by encouraging firms to look inward rather than to international markets. Signs that this may be changing is the move by the CBC in cooperation with Power Corporation and DirecTv to deliver satellite signals to the United States and the success of CMT and Harrowsmith with split-run editions. At the same time, Canadian firms such as Alliance, Atlantis, and Nelvana are producing for international markets while Vancouver and Toronto are promoting their locations as off-shore production sites.

ENDNOTES

- 1. Although the book discusses the political economy of Canadian film policy, readers interested in its content will be scattered internationally. The proportion of non-Canadian sales for such a book will typically not be trivial. Similarly, an art film's commercial success often depends as much on success in the United States as a feature film, and funds from American distribution are often crucial to its commercial viability.
- 2. A more detailed discussion of the provisions of the international trade and copyright regimes can be found in Acheson and Maule (1995 forthcoming).
- 3. Section 301 of the United States Trade Act of 1974 as amended by the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 (Title III, Trade Act of 1974, 19U.S.C. 2411 (Supp. 1993) allows the government, firms, or citizens to file a petition with the USTR alleging illegal or unfair actions by governments. If the USTR decides to initiate an investigation, it "must publish a summary of the petition, provide opportunity for public hearing, and request consultation with the foreign government or instrumentality concerned. If the case involves a trade agreement and no mutually acceptable resolution is obtained, the U.S. must involve the dispute resolution procedures of the agreement (Jackson, 1991, 105)."
- 4. The proposed arrangement is subject to appropriate regulatory procedures in Canada. The details of the arrangement will determine whether a public process of review by the CRTC of the existing license is undertaken. The minister responsible for Canadian Heritage has proposed consideration of increasing the foreign ownership permitted for broadcasting undertakings in Canada (see Canada Gazette, October 8th, 1994, Part 1).
- 5. In Public Notice 1984-81, p. 13, the CRTC stated:
 - ... should the Commission license, in the future, a Canadian service in a format competitive to an authorized non-Canadian service, the latter *will be* replaced by the Canadian service (emphasis added).
- 6. In 1987-260, p. 85, the Commission wrote that if in the future a Canadian service was authorized, "the non-Canadian service could be terminated" (emphasis added).

- 7. Why the CRTC would expect the CBC to make that request is unclear, since, at the time of the hearings on the Newsworld application, the earlier policy requiring mandatory exclusion of an American station offering a competitive format was in place. The new discretionary policy was only announced after the preparation of the applications and the public hearings on them.
- 8. CMT and TNN are owned by the same American companies which were concerned that the more profitable TNN might be delisted.
- 9. A General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) affecting the cultural and other service industries is now part of the GATT/WTO.
- 10. Details of the principle arguments made on behalf of CMT can be found in the submission made by Dewey and Ballantine to the USTR on March 6, 1995. Submissions were made by about ten other companies including Time Warner, which tied its concerns to the *Sports Illustrated* issue.
- 11. In 1980, it was concluded that "The issue posed to Canadian policy-makers by the performance of *Time* in Canada is whether other foreign periodical publishers, seeing the success of the *Time* format, will attempt to enter and operate in Canada on similar terms (Litvak and Maule, 1980:79)." Thirteen years later, the issue has resurfaced with the same player, now Time Warner, entering another horse from its stable into the race for Canadian advertising revenues.
- 12. The illegal customers must arrange to be billed through American addresses and must either have access to an American phone exchange or forego interactive elements like ordering ppv services since DirecTv has chosen not to sell its American service to any customer with a Canadian telephone area code. To put these numbers in perspective there are estimated to be over 500,000 backyard dish owners in Canada. Of these only 32,000 to 34,000 are subscribers to Cancom, which has offered an approved DTH package since 1981. Many of the dish owners subscribe to no Canadian service. Consequently, they contribute no revenue to Canadian providers and are unaffected by content regulations.
- 13. The suggestion was originally made by TeeComm Electronics and Telesat, Canada's satellite provider, which is controlled by telecommunications interests.
- 14. Comments of the Director of Investigation and Research on DTH and Pay-Per-View Proposed Directions to the CRTC, The Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications, June 7, 1995, p. 4. The Director estimated that "This would cost hundreds of millions of dollars in additional costs over the average 12 year life of a satellite."
- 15. The cable interests are developing a headend in the sky (HITS) service to provide ppv to remote cable systems and subscribers not economically served by cable.
- 16. No expertise in political science is needed to observe that the process described was extremely political. With respect to the decision to launch first in Quebec, a Globe and Mail article commented: "The Quebec government regards Expressvu sympathetically because the consortium had planned to go ahead with its launch in defiance of the federal government, claiming Quebec had jurisdiction over communications, sources said." July 18, 1995, B1. We doubt that this was the motivation, since the large parties that own Expressvu have large stakes in activities regulated by the CRTC. We do suspect, however, that, given the sensitivity of regional issues in Canada, not opening marketing at a national level would be a strategic mistake.
- 17. No legal challenges to the validity of the orders had been issued by the time of writing this account.

- 18. The two competing DTH satellite broadcasters in the UK eventually merged to form BSkyB (Chippingdale, 1991).
- 19. The list of advertisers with full or partial pages includes Toyota, General Tire, Joop (eau de toilette), Participaction, American Express, Heart and Stroke Foundation, Pontiac, GM Smart Lease, Preferred Stock Cologne, Motomaster, Adidas, Johnson and Johnson, B.F.Goodrich, International Trucks, Compaq, Chevrolet, Spruce Meadows, Lumina Van, Crown Scalp Stimulator, Better Hearing Institute, Mizuno Golf Company, Honda, Strength Shoe, Foster Parents Plan, and Stihl.
- 20. YTV was licensed in 1987 to provide a youth service. Children up to 5 years old are the target audience for 30% of its program schedule.
- 21. The timing of the dispute coincided with an automotive trade dispute between the United States and Japan. It was helpful if the American administration could show that it was being tough on a number of trade

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A Revisionist View. Media Policy, National Identity, and Citizenry in Changing Democratic Societies: the Case of Canada.

c 1996 Richard Collins London School of Economics

Everyone has two careers...Theirs and running the CBC (Skene, 1993:207).

How come I don't feel like coming to the defence of the beleaguered old CBC any more (Caplan, 1993:17)?

Introduction

Joel Smith identified five major structural constraints within which Canadian media, and chiefly broadcasting, policy has been made. They are: Relations with the United States; French English relations; National identity; Multiculturalism; and the Character of the Canadian state. Restating the structural constraints identified by Joel suggests that Canada's constraints are not hers alone.

One might re-state "relations with the United States" as one instance of a pervasive global experience of internationalisation -- whether specifically in communications or generally in politics, culture and economic life. "French English relations" and "Multiculturalism" might be re-stated as instances of a generally increasing heterogeneity of populations within states. "National identity" might be re-stated as one specific instance of a general view that contemporary societies are threatened by a loss of social cohesion as collective identities are eroded and pluralised. And the final category, the character of the Canadian state, might be re-stated as one instance of the increasingly interventionist and federal character of modern states. Whereas once sharing of political sovereignty took place within states, as Canada shares sovereignty between Provincial and Federal Governments within Federation, increasingly sovereignty is shared between states.

But, although the forces shaping Canadian media policy are not exclusively Canadian the Canadian case is distinctive. Canada's experience of these increasingly general conditions and constraints is more intense and long lived than in other countries. This does much to account for international interest in the Canadian case -- the rest of the world is becoming more like Canada. However, no other country has experienced both the combination and the intensity of the factors which have shaped Canadian media policy. And this makes the Canadian case unrepresentative. The two principle contradictions on which Canadian policy makers are skewered, what Joel calls relations with the United States and French English relations, nowhere else exist together. Moreover, the third of Joel's factors, that of the "third force" -- multiculturalism -- is similarly uniquely Canadian. Canada has a more multicultural character than any other country (except perhaps the United States) -- as Porter stated "it is unlikely that any other society has resembled a huge demographic railway station as much as has the non-French part of Canada" (Porter 1965 p 33). Since Porter wrote, the composition of Quebec's population has changed and pluralised and, above all, Canada's first peoples have grown in political importance. Canada's halting Constitutional re-engineering must thus acknowledge not only the "indépendantiste" aspirations of Quebec and the discontents of a more powerful West but also the growing autonomy of Canada's first peoples.

The matrix in which Canada's media policy is shaped is changing under the simultaneous impact of several forces. Not least that of Canada's, as yet incomplete, redefinition of itself. Once a coherent doctrine for Canada's media could be articulated relatively simply -- though successful implementation was never easy.

R. B. Bennett's much cited statement (during debate in the House of Commons on the Broadcasting Act of 1932 which established the CRBC) foreshadowed many other similar definitions of the media's mandate:

become a great agency for communication of national thought and ideals and ...the agency by which national consciousness may be fostered and sustained and national unity still further strengthened (House of Commons Debates, 12 May 1932; quoted in Ellis, 1979:8).

Yet, whilst Bennett's conceptions of both nationalism and the media's role would still command the assent of many Canadians such agreement seems increasingly a nominalist, and not a substantive, consensus. The form may be the same but the content has changed. Canadian nationalism was once, as Gibbins argues persuasively, made up of five distinct forms which could be seen "as interwoven threads in a complex national tapestry, or perhaps as interrelated dimensions of a larger national phenomenon" (Gibbins, 1995: 2). These provided "a means by which tenuous bridges are built across a deeply segmented country" (Gibbins, 1995:ix). But now Canadian nationalisms are becoming less "accommodating" and "indifferent and at worst hostile to bicultural conceptions of the political community" (Gibbins, 1995:12). And the five constitutive elements (anti-Americanism; state enterprise nationalism; international nationalism or Canada as global peacekeeper; bilingualism and biculturalism; multiculturalism in a bilingual framework) of Canadian nationalism which Gibbins (1995:2) identified have all weakened.

If the goal of Canada's media policy can be summarised as the desire to have its media "produced in Canada by Canadians about Canada" as Lionel Chevrier put it in 1952 (cited in Mandate Review Committee, 1996:33) then it has not been obviously successful. And when successful, as it has been in newspaper publishing, the problems of success may appear as bad as those of failure. True, the extent to which Canadian policy may appear to have failed is, to a considerable extent, an effect of the linguistic competence of the observer. The negative effects are much more pronounced in English Canada than in Quebec (although Francophones outside Quebec are poorly served). English Canadians obdurately persist in consuming exogenous media, particularly U.S. television, English Canadians (and here their Francophone compatriots, at least the Québécois majority, echo their behaviour) consume nugatory amounts of media products emanating from the other Canadian language community. Programming, particularly on English Canadian television, is less and less diverse and CBC, the principal English language public service broadcaster, offers a programming diet which is increasingly indistinguishable from its commercial rivals'. As Daryl Duke, one of the CBC's most telling critics, stated, CBC drama is made in "slick American style formats" (Duke, 1993:16) and its news is "a lunar landscape of the glib and the ordinary" (Duke, 1993:21).

The difference in Francophone and Anglophone experience can be apprehended through a comparison of French and English Canadian academic experts' comments to the House of Commons Select Committee on Canadian Heritage enquiry into the future of the CBC. Francophones were, rightly, far kinder to Radio Canada than were Anglophones' to the CBC.² The problems, achievements, and opportunities of Radio Canada and the CBC are radically different and the experiences and judgements of one language community cannot be read across to the other. Media policy problems are more pronounced and more challenging in English Canada than in French. My comments address the English case except where I make specific reference to the Francophone situation. Moreover there has been a striking change in recent years (perhaps since 1990) in the tone and tenor of discussions of national media policy and institutions in Canada. Whereas formerly a need for stronger intervention by the Canadian state was vigorously asserted (see, *interalia*, the 1986 Caplan-Sauvageau Report on Broadcasting Policy), latterly the effectiveness and appropriateness of the nationalist and interventionist thrust of policy has been more critically assessed. For example, Canadian-owned local newspaper monopolies are becoming increasingly common throughout Canada with a consequential decline in the quality and choice of comment and information available to Canadians. One of the few remaining independently owned newspapers, The Toronto Star, commented on

this trend in early May 1996. It cited the Communications, Energy and Papermakers Union comment (on the growing holdings of Hollinger Inc, the company controlled by Conrad Black), "Black will own or influence 45% of Canada's newspapers" (Toronto Star. 1 May 1996:C8), and reported that a spate of recent mergers promised to establish monopolies in English language newspapers in three Canadian provinces. These developments provoked the astounding, but eminently sensible, comment by an academic expert on Canadian journalism that it "may be time to lift the 20% foreign ownership restriction on Canadian newspapers to create more competition" (Toronto Star. May 11 1996:E8). The Globe and Mail echoed this conclusion in an editorial two weeks later (after Hollinger's seizure of control of Southam was consummated) stating "restrictions on foreign ownership...discourage outside investment and undermine market dynamism" (Globe and Mail May 28th 1996:A16).

Nowhere is the critique of the former nationalist paradigm more pronounced than in discussions of the standard bearers of Canadian identity in the audio-visual sector; the National Film Board and the CBC. Two recent official reviews (House of Commons 1995 and Mandate Review Committee 1996) and devastating critiques by former senior CBC insiders, notably Daryl Duke (1993) and Wayne Skene (1993), suggest that the linchpin of Canadian media policy -- the CBC -- is sadly flawed.

The Mandate Review Committee's judgement (1996:24) echoed, albeit in more measured terms, Daryl Duke's (1993:20) judgement that "The CBC must be held responsible for depriving Canadians of the capacity to understand what is happening to their country and to themselves." It judged:

that these public organizations [i.e., the CBC, the NFB and Telefilm Canada RC]...are in great danger of becoming unable or incapable of meeting core duties; let alone new duties.

Canadian Media Policy and the CBC.

Canada has devised three principal instruments to realise its broadcasting policy goals. They are: public sector broadcasters -- notably CBC/Radio Canada; production subsidies -- notably those disbursed by Telefilm Canada; and specific conditions attached to broadcasting licences by the federal regulator, the CRTC -- notably Canadian content regulations. These interventions in media markets have sought to foster economic activity by Canadian firms in the audio-visual sector and redress perceived market failure to realise national³ and public service⁴ goals. The Mandate Review Committee found that, for the most part, Telefilm had worked well and stimulated film and television production and exports. The Mandate Review Committee commented (1996:193) that "Telefilm's role must become even more important." However, whether or not the sums disbursed by Telefilm constitute a good economic investment and whether the resulting works strengthen Canadians' sense of themselves remain open questions.

The Nielsen Commission in 1986 (Task Force on Program Review, 12) judged that "the economic rationale for cultural programs is not strong." The evidence provided by the Mandate Review Committee supports this judgement. It estimates Canada's audio-visual export earnings to be \$148.8m in 1993/4 -- roughly equivalent to the cost of Parliamentary appropriations to fund Telefilm Canada, which amounted to \$146m in 1993/4 (and \$122m in 1994/5). The Mandate Review Committee observed that the disparity between the cost of production of a Canadian television drama and acquisition of an equivalent foreign product -- even when mitigated by a subsidy from Telefilm -- was such that only Canadian productions which were exported could defray their production costs and that therefore the content of English language Canadian drama tended to be pitched to the demands of overseas, rather than Canadian, markets.⁵ Effectively, therefore, subsidies to Canadian producers were incentives to produce works for overseas rather than

Canadian consumers. As the Nielsen Commission observed, the economic rationale for such programs is not strong.

The Mandate Review Committee, composed of Pierre Juneau, Catherine Murray, and Peter Herrndorf, reviewed the role and performance of the Federal Government's three chief proactive interventions in the audio-visual sector: the CBC, the National Film Board (NFB) and Telefilm Canada and reported in 1996. The pervasive public concern about the performance of Canadian public sector cultural institutions which led to the establishment of the Mandate Review Committee (and the House of Commons Select Committee on Canadian Heritage review of CBC's future [House of Commons, 1995]) was reinforced by the Mandate Review Committee's findings. The Committee found that half of the NFB's staff were administrators, that the fixed and overhead costs of the NFB reduced production opportunities, and that the NFB had a poor record in reaching users. Bad enough, but the CBC's problems dwarf the NFB's.

CBC's efficiency and the construction of its new Broadcast Centre in Toronto were passed over lightly by the Mandate Review Committee (Pierre Juneau was formerly President of CBC and Peter Herrndorf was formerly a Vice-President of CBC) but were major concerns for the House of Commons Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage study, "The Future of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in the Multi-Channel Universe". The Standing Committee heard striking evidence concerning CBC's misallocation of resources -- notably from a former CBC senior manager who stated that CBC's "organizational structure was outdated, too highly centralized and too expensive" (House of Commons, 1995:44)6 -- and found CBC's conduct so deficient that it recommended that efficiency in all operations be explicitly specified as part of CBC's mandate (House of Commons, 1995:9). It found, as did Skene in his analysis (1993:55), that the CBC is "hugely over-administered...in an archaic management structure, an antiquated corporate decision-making process and a distorted system of priorities that places higher emphasis on maintaining the organizational structure than on making programs," and urged that CBC be completely re-engineered (House of Commons, 1995:45). Skene's injunction echoes that of Laurent Picard (cited in Nash, 1994:406), President of CBC from 1972 to 1975, that "The desire for management control over an organization like [the CBC] just didn't make sense...you need decentralisation. It's the only way to manage it". Twenty years on from Picard's analysis the CBC is more, not less, centralised.

These injunctions may seem dramatic, although the Select Committee's recommendation that CBC make annual efficiency gains of 2% puts them into perspective, but are modest indeed when measured against the charges laid by Skene and others. Skene stated (1993:30) that:

The CBC now only existed marginally to make programs for Canadians; it had its priorities monumentally backwards. After decades of stunted growth and lost purpose, it existed to exist.

Thanks to CBC and its Broadcast Center on Front Street in Toronto, the public sector has acquired a state of the art monument to the television and radio production techniques of the 1960s. Just at the time a broadcast quality programme can be made with something not far removed from a camcorder and edited on something not far from a PC, a sublime talent for backing the wrong horse at the wrong time has endowed the Canadian taxpayer with one of the finest pyramids of the 20th century. The Front Street pyramid will ineluctably become a black hole sucking CBC production into Toronto as its high fixed costs scream to be set off against a high throughput. To heap absurdity on absurdity, the television studios in the Front Street building are on the top floor! Not the optimal position for moving equipment, props and scenery in and out. The contrast between CBC's production centre and that of CFTO, the lead station of the commercial CTV network, located in a workmanlike structure in an unfashionable part of Toronto (next to Route 401), is eloquent.

Stating that there is a high level of general satisfaction with the performance of CBC Radio and Radio Canada would be to exaggerate. But criticisms of their performance is a long way from being as vocal and pervasive as criticisms of CBC English Television. Indeed, the Mandate Review Committee (1996:47) commented that "CBC Radio reflects the principles we believe should govern the CBC". CBC Television's share of prime time viewing has declined to below 10% in 1996. Moreover, of those viewers 39% are in households without cable, i.e., households that, whether or not by their own choice, have few alternatives to CBC television (House of Commons, 1995:22). Moreover, the Mandate Review Committee recognised that a significant part of CBC's share was due to its sports coverage. The Committee argued from this finding that, because CBC competed against commercial broadcasters for sports rights, the presence of sports programmes (in quantities which the Mandate Review Committee judged excessive) in CBC's schedules added little to the choices which would have been available to viewers if CBC did not exist. It judged (1996:41) that "the CBC carries too much professional sports."

The failures of the Canadian media are believed to matter chiefly because their failure is presumed to threaten the continued existence of the Canadian state. I offer some observations on the extent to which this belief is well founded below. The putative political importance of the media lies in a pervasive belief in a "double determinism". First, that media consumption determines attitude and behaviour formation, and second, that cultural identity, chiefly shaped by media consumption, determines political identity. Both presumptions are, of course, contestable but underpin the provisions of section 3 of the Broadcasting Acts of 1968 and, in a softened form, 1991 and inform the litany of slogans found in official reports and policy papers such as, "There can be no political sovereignty without cultural sovereignty" (CBC, 1985:9), "Culture is the very essence of our national identity" (Department of Communications, 1987:5), "a nation's fictional repertoire is its lifeblood" (Flora MacDonald when Minister of Communications, in The Globe and Mail. (10 Feb 1987:12). The strength and pervasiveness of this belief has led to a fetishisation of the importance of high cost audio-visual fictions, television dramas and feature films, on which Canadian identity is deemed to depend (to the detriment of other types and genres of representation) and an insufficiently critical assessment of the character and quality of those Canadian fictions which are made.

Nationalism and Double Determinism

What conditions would have to be satisfied if the policies Canada has devised to deal with the problems Joel identified were to be successful? First, we would need to be satisfied that the media did strongly influence those who consume them. Media scholars will need no reminding that there is no consensus in the scholarly community about the effects of the media and that recent developments in scholarship on audience and effects have emphasised the audience's active role in making meaning (see inter alia Ang, 1996; Fiske, 1987; Hall, 1980; Katz and Liebes, 1985; Morley, 1980, 1992). Indeed, Lee Becker states (1995:6) that "Political elites....assign to the mass media effects that....the media effects community would not consider likely....some elites seem to take the position that media content equals media effects." Furthermore, the disparity between Canadians' commitment to values different from Americans'9 (see Lipset, 1990) and English Canadians' gigantic and long standing consumption of American media suggests a weak, rather than a strong, media influence. However, there is a powerful countervailing case, as Desaulniers (1982) eloquently testified, in the key role played by the mass media in strengthening the cultural and political identities of Quebec and thus its demand to be "maitre chez soi" whether as a "distinct society" within the Canadian Confederation or as a sovereign state.

Second, we would need to be satisfied that cultural cohesion is necessary for legitimate and robust political institutions. Given the number of states which lack the ethnic and cultural homogeneity prescribed for state building in "the principle of nationalities," there are grounds to question the necessity of the

congruence between polity and culture for the legitimacy and stability of political institutions. Certainly, we are living through a period of nationalist resurgence but unless, like Fukuyama (1992), we believe that we have reached the end point of history, we would be foolish to close our eyes to the past when more multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-national states existed.

And third, if Canada's policies were to succeed, the instruments through which to realise goals should be efficient and appropriate for their purpose.

Social cohesion, national identity and identity entitlements

Is there a poor foundation for the nationalist presumptions that have informed Canadian broadcasting policy and practice? I'm notorious for having polemicised against these ideas in my Culture, Communication, and National Identity (Collins 1990). Undoubtedly I put my case too strongly. I would not now write (1990:138): "Canada holds together as a state with considerable success"and (328) that "Canada...survive[s] in robust health." I clearly overestimated the commitment to union in English Canada, I did not foresee rejection of the Meech Lake Agreement, which had been promptly ratified by the Province of Quebec and was accepted by the majority of Provinces. However, at least at the time of writing, the perils of Pauline continue. Canada carries on, albeit with increasing precariousness, with no vigorous advocacy of a cogent case for federalism and only about 50% of the population of the Province of Quebec supporting the constitutional status quo. But the dream of nation, of a community of people like us enjoying untrammelled sovereignty, continues to captivate Canadians of both language communities.

But the reality both of Canada as a whole and of English Canada (but not Quebec) defies the stipulations of nationalist theory. Perhaps Canada will fall apart and vindicate some of the stipulations of nationalist theory. Perhaps the English Canadian case is freakish -- how many other societies are there with high levels of consumption of exogenous media and values different to those of the society whose media it consumes? To answer this question demands more case studies than we possess. However, there are some other cases which cast light on this central tenet of Canadian media policy.

Anna Melich's fine empirical study (1990) of the role of television in the formation of the identities of Swiss schoolchildren tells a somewhat similar story. The developing case of the European Union may add a further instance of a state structure which embraces several linguistic and cultural communities under a common political roof but the pace and direction of Europe's political development is insufficiently clear for firm conclusions yet to be drawn. But these cases seem to weigh lightly in the balance when compared to the weight of the orthodoxies of strong media influence and the nationalist stipulation that polity and culture must be congruent (Gellner, 1983) if states are to be legitimate and robust.

Melich's (1990) study of Swiss schoolchildren's television consumption and the extent to which their sentiments of collective identity are affected by foreign television suggests that a strong sense of Swiss identity can and does co-exist both with extensive consumption of foreign television (from France by Francophone Swiss, Germany for Swiss German speakers, etc.) and with little consumption of Swiss television other than that in the native language of the viewer. The children studied characteristically watched much foreign television (Francophone Swiss children watched a lot of French television but little Swiss television in German and/or Italian and their compatriots, speaking languages other than French, watched little French language television, etc.) yet retained a strong Swiss identity. Melich wrote (1990:130): "A notre avis, ni la pluralité, ni les spécificités régionales de la Suisse sont menacées par les nouveaux média." The data in Lipset's "Continental Divide" (1990) is similarly difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of double determinism. Lipset's collection of comparative survey data on English and French Canadian and American

attitudes to a host of issues from crime to parenting suggests that Canadians' values are comprehensively different to those of Americans. His study, read together with a plethora of studies (see *inter alia* Collins, 1990; Peers, 1969, 1979; Rutherford, 1978) which testify to extensive penetration of Canada by American media from the nineteenth century to date, suggests, like Melich's findings, that polity and culture do not have to be congruent in modern states.

Melich's and Lipset's studies challenge the nationalist, modern, presumption about the necessary isomorphism of polity and culture. They suggest that neither collective identity nor life values are strongly linked to television consumption and that values and political identities in Canada and Switzerland are relatively independent of television and media consumption. Of course, generalisation from the base of these studies is unwise. Not only are the studies limited in number but both concern multi-lingual states. And in at least one of the cases there are powerful forces -- notably Quebec nationalism -- seeking closer approximation between polity and culture than now obtains.

This is not to state that cultural homogenisation has not been a vital element in state building in many instances and that affinity, whether religious, cultural, linguistic, ethnic or whatever, between the citizens of a state is not often a source of strength. But only that it is not necessarily so. Whereas, as Eugen Weber (1976) so persuasively documented in his magisterial "Peasants into Frenchmen." France created itself through cultural homogenisation, other states did not. The United Kingdom is a case in point where state building took a looser and more pluralistic form -- Scotland has a different legal code and educational system than England, the Welsh and Gaelic languages (now) receive official support, confessional schools are financed from public funds, and Northern Ireland had substantial devolved political power exercised through its own Parliament (until terrorism closed it). This is not to suggest that all was, or is, well in the UK or to deny the force of contemporary challenges to the integrity of the UK state, still less to justify the UK's slow formal acknowledgement of religious, national and ethnic differences among its citizens -- only to suggest that the tight model of congruence between polity and culture is not an exclusive norm. There is more than one way to build a state and more working, and workable, models of the relationship between politics and culture than those who discuss national media policies sometimes acknowledge.

There is a historical analogy which may illuminate these contemporary questions. It was once widely believed that states could be robust and legitimate only if citizens shared religious beliefs -- that there was, in short, a state religion in the same way that nationalism presupposes a state culture. Cuius regio, eius religio. Clearly, there is no contemporary consensus on the value of secular and theocratic states. Readers will not be surprised to find I favour secular states, but clearly the existence of Pakistan, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and a host of other states suggests that my preferences are far from universal. However, the point is not which form of government is to be preferred but whether stable states can exist if their citizens do not share a common religion. There is ample empirical evidence to suggest that they can and, of course, the United States was the first state to be established as a secular political community.

Arguments from analogy are seldom decisive; to show that states can exist without a shared religion does not show that they can do so without a shared culture. But the analogy suggests that the term culture requires much more specific definition in this context than it has customarily received. Moreover, if cultural cohesion is necessary to stable and legitimate political institutions then we are all in trouble. For, if such cohesion is necessary to peace, order and good government, then measures to reduce social, cultural and ethnic incoherence are surely legitimised. Those who don't fit can be expelled or suppressed because their different presence threatens the stability of society itself. Large scale migration¹⁰, the growing interdependence of the world economy, tourism, and, yes, the pervasive (albeit slow) internationalisation of media and communications is making cultural hybridisation and variety more general and will, if the principle of nationalities prevails, call up countervailing responses.

The disintegration of multinational states, notably the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the resurgence of European nationalisms may suggest that the principle of nationality provides the only satisfactory basis for a stable state. But if so, a dark and bloody future awaits those many who are unfortunate enough to live outside the pale of an nationally cohesive *and* locally dominant community of sufficient size to defend itself. In this context there is some comfort to be taken from the historical precedent exemplified in the successful establishment of principles of religious tolerance and of stable long lived secular states.

But I continue to believe, overstated though some of my formulations of 1990 undoubtedly were, Canada is best understood as a society with a principle of coherence different to that postulated in nationalist theory. Lipset's catalogue of differences in Canadian and American values seen together with Rutherford's documentation of the comprehensiveness and longevity of circulation of United States' media in Canada suggests that the double determinism -- media consumption determines cultural identity and cultural identity determines political identity -- which has informed Canadian media policy is not manifest in at least the English Canadian case. Melich adds supporting evidence from another context to suggest that polity and culture may be weakly linked. But, if we grant at least a provisional assent to this ensemble of propositions, we must account for how societies with decoupled polity and culture do cohere. Are there alternative means of achieving and theorising political cohesion in culturally discontinuous polities?

There are at least three: Lijphart's model of consociational democracy, corporatism, and Mitrany's functionalism. Corporatism is, to most European eyes at least, irrevocably tainted by its incarnation in the Fascist dictatorships of Hitler, Mussolini, and Salazar. Lijphart's notion of consociational democracy presupposes (1977:53) "cooperation by segmental leaders in spite of the deep cleavages separating the segments. This requires that the leaders feel at least some commitment to the unity of the country as well as a commitment to democratic practices." This condition does not appear to be satisfied in Canada at the time of writing (though, clearly, it has been satisfied in Canada at other times) (See Macrae, 1974). Accordingly I turn to functionalism which was explicitly formulated as an alternative to nationalism.

Functionalism

The "father" of functionalism, the Romanian David Mitrany, developed his theory, (or what he modestly described as an uncovering and clarification of "the relation of things" [1975:17]) in response to what he saw as the blight of nationalism, a doctrine which he characterised (1975:143) as a "ruthless political what he saw as the blight of nationalism, a doctrine which he characterised (1975:143) as a "ruthless political stress for uniformity." One of Mitrany's disciples, Taylor, defined (in Mitrany, 1975:x) the principles of functionalism as:

that man can be weaned away from his loyalty to the nation state by the experience of fruitful international co-operation; that international organization arranged according to the requirements of the task could increase welfare rewards to individuals beyond the level obtainable within the state; that the rewards would be greater if the organization worked, where necessary, across national frontiers...individuals and organizations would begin to learn the benefits of co-operation and would increasingly be involved in an international co-operative ethos, creating interdependencies...from small beginnings. In Professor Mitrany's view, the functional approach could eventually enmesh national governments in a dense network of interlocking co-operative ventures. Furthermore, one important pillar of their authority -- the loyalty of citizens -- would have been weakened in the development at the popular level of a socio-psychological community which stressed superordinate 'co-operative' goals, but which nevertheless posed no apparent threat to the existing cultural attachments of groups and individuals.

Clearly the structure and practices which Taylor outlines (and which suppose a separation, rather than the congruence between culture and political structures customarily stipulated in nationalism) are quite different to the presumptions which have underpinned Canadian broadcasting policy. Functionalist theory thus suggests that political and cultural discontinuity can be reconciled with social stability and that the modern stipulative congruence between polity and culture may be neither necessary nor desirable. Indeed no less than Altiero Spinelli -- one of the founding fathers of the European Union -- claimed that the nascent European Union was built on functionalist foundations. Spinelli coupled the names of Mitrany and Jean Monnet stating (cited in Mitrany, 1975:75) that "It was natural enough to transfer this line of thinking (i.e., functionalism - R.C.) to the field of European reconstruction, and it was a Rumanian, Mitrany who became the theoretician of functionalism. Jean Monnet during the war years had elaborated the idea of applying the functional approach to that of the coal and steel industries and it was from this that there emerged the European Coal and Steel Community, the first...example of a functional supranational authority."

However, although the functionalist perspective offers an attractive potentiality as a policy paradigm and some empirical evidence of its sustainability, a further important issue requires consideration. Are rights abridged in such discontinuous cultural/political conjunctures? This question may appear strange because the essence of functionalism is a refusal of the cultural norms of nationalism. Functionalism is therefore a doctrine friendly to the rights of cultural minorities. As Mitrany stated (1975:34) in his critique of nationalism, "Its [nationalism's - R.C.] early champions, Mazzini and others, looked to nationality to open doors towards free international communion; with nationalism it has become a gate barred against outsiders and all their ways." However, it is not a doctrine which can readily be reconciled with the realisation of a putative human right to a collective cultural identity -- a notion implicit in the advocacy of some powerful contemporary proponents of an active European audio-visual policy who invest political institutions, whether nation states or the European Union, with the role of realising that right.

Mitrany, therefore, provides an alternative theory of political cohesion -- one which accounts for the continuing existence of the Canadian state but, depending on the nature of the resolution of the post-Meech Lake crisis in Canadian political arrangements, perhaps not for its future. Yet, this dusty functionalist rationalism doesn't meet the realities of a demand for a media regime which permits realisation of identity entitlements.

If states can hold together on functionalist rather than nationalist lines, then the principal rhetorical rationale for Canadian media policies may be thought to have been abolished. But this is a pragmatic question. A distinct issue of principle is also at stake -- an issue which has customarily been buried within the pragmatic nationalist case. To take a representative and eloquent example, Crean and Rioux refer (1983:12) to the Canada of the Federal policy of bilingualism and biculturalism (their critique applies a fortiori to multiculturalism) as "a bland bilingual, multicultural papulum" which "denies the existence of our two national societies and trivializes the authentic regional divergences of our cultures." That is, a B&B Canada was a Canada which denied English and French Canadians their identity entitlements.

Charles Taylor (1993:48) argues that:

The core of the modern conception of rights is that respect is owed the integrity of the human subject. This obviously entails that the human subject has a right to life, to liberty; on Lockeian assumptions, also to property. But if we add the Romantic understanding of identity, as essential to human subjecthood, then plainly there is something else here to which we have a right, namely, that the conditions of our identity be respected. If we take the nationalist thesis that these are primarily our belonging to a linguistically defined nation,

we have the beginnings of another justification of the rights of nations to political expression.

Taylor here (1993:45) includes in the bundle of modern, largely individual, rights the right to a collective identity and to the public expression of that identity and therefore to a political roof under which individuals may realise their rights, including their rights to the expression and enjoyment of:

certain values, certain allegiances, a certain community perhaps outside of which I could not function as a fully human subject. Of course, I might be able to go on living as an organism outside any values, allegiance or even community. But what is peculiar to a human subject is the ability to ask and answer questions about what really matters, what is of the highest value, what is truly significant, what is most moving, most beautiful and so on. The conception of identity is the view that outside the horizon provided by some master value or some allegiance or some community membership, I would be crucially crippled, would be unable to ask and answer these questions effectively, and would thus be unable to function as a full human subject.

The demand to "function as a full human subject" which Taylor discusses in the context of nationalism -- only within a national community can an individual fully realise the bundle of rights to which she or he is entitled -- echoes through much of the rhetoric of Canadian broadcasting and cultural policy. Cook (1986:85) refers to nationalism as "the articulated will of a community to preserve its distinctiveness." The Mandate Review Committee (1996:45) commented on the deficiencies in CBC's representation of Canada to itself. "The CBC will not be able 'to contribute to shared national consciousness and identity' if people do not hear or see themselves on CBC. The CBC cannot be truly national if it is not strongly rooted in the regions." Crean and Rioux's arguments similarly plead for a media regime permitting Canadians to function as full human subjects.¹²

In one register the goal of achieving a broadcasting system which enables Canadians to function as full human subjects complements nationalist policies designed to cement social cohesion in Canada through the creation of a singular Canadian collective identity. But in other respects it contradicts the nationalist, unificatory, goal as Crean and Rioux's formulations indicate. Here two of the factors Joel identified pull in opposite directions and this antithesis constitutes one of the chief difficulties for Canadian broadcasting policy.

Differentiating Canada from the USA suggests the production of media products different from US products. But if such productions are to have a general impact and effectivity they must be popular. It is axiomatic that popularity requires imaginary identification between the viewer, listener, or reader and the world represented in the work(s) in question -- notably (but not exclusively or necessarily) through language. Language, as Kedourie stated (1966: 68), "is not only a vehicle for rational propositions, it is the outer expression of an inner experience, the outcome of a particular history, the legacy of a distinctive tradition." Hence the separate evolution of the Anglophone and Francophone media in Canada and the resentment of Anglophones outside the Ottawa/Montreal/Toronto triangle and Francophones hors du Quebec at the domination of their media worlds by their respective centres and under-representation of their respective peripheries.

In the late 1980s Hetu and Renaud (1987) showed that few English Canadian productions circulated in French Canada and even fewer French Canadian works circulated in English Canada. Little has changed, as the findings of the Mandate Review Committee demonstrate. If broadcasting is, as Canadian broadcasters

and politicians have often claimed, vital to national unity then one might reasonably expect it to do better in representing Canada's communities to each other. Hetu and Renaud stated (1987:48):

l' information collective, celle qui crée une reconnaissance commun d'une réalité commune, celle qui est a la base d' un sentiment d' appartenance et d' identification a une nation n' existerait donc qu'a travers onze émissions, dont trois francophones ne rendent compte que du Québec et huit anglophones ne citant que le Canada anglais.

If the nationalist presumptions which underpin Canadian broadcasting policy are well founded it must be acknowledged that the elaborate infrastructure and ensemble of institutions created by the Canadian state to "contribute to the development of national unity and provide for a continuing expression of Canadian identity," as the strong formulation of the 1968 Broadcasting Act ran, or as the 1991 Act states, "contribute to shared national consciousness and identity," has been remarkably deficient. If an integrated, B&B, broadcast image of Canada has been conspicuous by its absence, so, too, for the most part, has been an image of Canada outside Eastern Ontario and Western Quebec. Whose identity entitlements have been realised through the battery of state regulations and interventions designed for that purpose? Not those of the regions, and the ineluctable economic pressures exerted by the CBC pyramid on Front Street will keep it that way.

My discussion of these issues is open to criticism for its neglect of what Vipond identified as the most popular and significant element in the Canadian broadcasting system -- the private sector. As she states (1992:713), "private stations have always been in the majority in Canada and have always attracted the largest audiences." Meisel also testifies to the growing importance of the private sector (1995:5). However, given the perception that public broadcasting in Canada is embattled and vulnerable, it is seldom appreciated how enormous the public broadcasters in Canada remain. The Mandate Review Committee estimated that the annual revenues of Canadian private broadcasters in 1993/4 were approximately \$1.5bn. Whereas CBC/Radio Canada's revenues for 1994/5 were \$1.25bn (\$951m in Parliamentary subventions and \$297m in advertising receipts), to which must be added the income of the Provincial public broadcasters -- TVOntario, ACCESS and Radio Quebec. Clearly, particularly if the television activities of the National Film Board and Telefilm Canada are considered, the public sector disposes of higher levels of resources than does the private sector. Moreover, the public sector transmits many fewer hours of both radio and television programming than does the private sector.

What next?

An audit of Canadian broadcasting policies would surely find them lamentably deficient. Grounded in theoretical presumptions that are, at best, questionable; putting at centre stage an institution, the CBC, which has been unable to devise programming sufficient to retain even a 10% share of television viewing and which has misallocated capital resources on a heroic scale; and issuing in a subsidy and regulatory regime which has created neither an internationally competitive production industry nor Canadian programming that satisfies anything other than the most formalistic definitions of Canadian content. Comparison with the analogous Australian situation is instructive. True, the failures are most striking in the Anglophone context, (Radio Canada's performance and the quantity and quality of French language Canadian content shine in comparison to their English language equivalents)¹⁶ but, although judged within their respective linguistic contexts the achievement of Francophone broadcasting surpasses Anglophone broadcasting, none of these measures, notionally sanctified for their nation building and integrative effect, have much mitigated the mutual ignorance of Canada's two solitudes.

Some of these deficiencies were squarely faced by the Mandate Review Committee, which stated (1996:22):

We own radio and television networks, but in English Canada most of the stories available to us are American. We own one of the most elaborate and sophisticated cable systems in the world. But only about 14% of all the fiction it carries in English Canada is Canadian.....We have developed a feature film and television production industry, but a good deal of its product is created especially for the American market without reflecting a Canadian reality.

Two principle future courses of action have been proposed for the CBC. The Mandate Review Committee and the House of Commons Select Committee propose a modified status quo -- enjoining greater efficiency, a changed, and more secure, funding regime for CBC, a clearer mandate expressed in performance indicators and so on. A strategy of reform in short. Others, such as Wayne Skene, Colin Hoskins, and Stuart McFadyen, enjoin revolutionary change believing either, or both, that the CBC is so degenerated an institution as to be unreformable or that its structure, organization and ethos is simply no longer appropriate for realisation of Canadian public policy goals. Given that there is a consensus that difficulties are most marked in respect of the CBC English Television Services and that, if it ain't broken don't fix it, I will consider possible alternatives for CBC English Television Services and remain silent in respect of Radio Canada and CBC English Radio.

First, it is important to state that the primary goal of public policy must be to achieve cultural/political objectives within Canada. Although the Canadian audio-visual sector has increased exports (and attracted growing numbers of US firms to produce in Canada) export successes have been bought at a very high price paid by public funds. Moreover, by and large, the products exported ("Traders", "ENG", etc) have no discernable Canadian content or themes. The Canadian audio-visual "industrial policy" has created a successful stand-alone industry servicing U.S. productions and realising real gains for the Canadian work force, tax base, etc., and an artificially sustained and very costly industry producing works in Canada for the U.S. market. Essentially the Canadian tax payer has subsidised the United States television viewer. Valuable economic activity requires no continued public subsidy and continued public resourcing for the Canadian audio-visual industry should be directed towards securing for Canadians a media sector adequate for the purposes of a modern democratic society and which enables Canadians to realise their "identity entitlements."

Realisation of identity entitlements is not simply a matter of collective self-expression. Thus conceived the entitlement is empty for it implies no communication or exchange with others and holds out the prospect of a society and media system structured to promote a dialogue of the deaf in which all strive to tell the world about themselves and accept no responsibility for structuring the message that they wish to convey to others in such as a way that others will find it interesting or useful. Thus, public funding should be allocated following Sydney Newman's exemplary criterion (1974:46) that "The cost of art..has to be in relation to the number of people whose imagination it will excite." Realisation of identity entitlements certainly points towards a media order which enables communities to speak to themselves but also implies one in which those communities recognise an obligation to communicate with others in a way the others find meaningful. Thus communication is required within and between language communities and regions.

Skene's Western jeremiad against the CBC's domination from the "golden triangle," and particularly from Toronto, echoes Hardin's (1985) critique of the CRTC. Both argue that the Canada represented by the broadcasting system is narrowly Central Canadian. Skene outlined an alternative plan (1993:126-127) whereby CBC regional managers would have "access to a 'national offers system' that acted as a creative doorway into the network schedule." Skene's model promised both to better realise the identity entitlements of Canadians outside the "golden triangle," (and of all Canadians since the plan also promised "an ETV [English Television] network schedule...that contained ninety-five percent Canadian content in prime time,

and ninety percent Canadian content overall" [1993:125]) and to promote efficiencies in the CBC by devolving power, production and control of resources to the regions.

However, the instruments through which identity entitlements are to be realised must be appropriate to their purpose. Recognition, well documented and pervasive, that the standard bearers of the Canadian identity project -- the CBC and NFB -- have themselves degenerated unacceptably and are no longer able to fulfil their roles poses a peculiarly sharp dilemma for Canadian nationalists for whom, as Gibbins stated (1995:2), the public sector was an integral part of Canadian identity itself -- or as Graham Spry said, "The State or the United States" in evidence to the House of Commons Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting in 1932 (cited in Raboy, 1990:40). Accordingly, whilst there is much to be said for the "commissioner broadcaster" model that Hoskins and McFadyen proposed to the House of Commons Select Committee on Canadian Heritage Hearing on the Future of the CBC, and for adoption of a "Producer Choice" regime of internal markets within organisations like CBC (see Skene [1993:68-69, 258-259 and passim.] for testimony to the potential efficiency gains available under a "Producer Choice" system), such dramatic re-engineering would challenge one of the foundational differences between Canada and the U.S.A. (and U.K.).

Independent producers commissioned by nodes in a regionally dispersed, commissioning, scheduling, and broadcasting organisation operating with internal markets and "Producer Choice" would promote innovation and efficiency and provide points of entry for new firms and voices. Clearly, continued public funding for Canadian broadcasting is required. Gaetan Tremblay's evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Canadian Heritage Hearing on the Future of the CBC eloquently testified to the need for it. Tremblay stated that no *teleroman* in Quebec covered its production costs (House of Commons Select Committee on Canadian Heritage. Minutes of Proceedings. Ist Session. 35th Parliament. 17th November 1994 45:34). Yet, most *teleromans* are extremely popular with Québécois televiewers and produced at considerably lower cost than the average for Canadian drama production.

However, the success of Channel 4 in the U.K. to which Hoskins and McFadyen appealed in making their case for a commissioner broadcaster CBC is more context specific than they acknowledge. Moreover, whilst "Producer Choice" has made the BBC more cost efficient and liberated resources for programming, the combination of the de-centralisation implicit in "Producer Choice" with "Birtism" has set loose a frustrating and time consuming paper chase in the BBC which has, rightly, provoked much bitterness among programme makers. As in the U.K., the benefits of decoupling production from broadcasting and production from use of in-house facilities could be realised in part as well as in the whole. Channel 4 acquires all its programming but the BBC and ITV systems only part - at least 25% of qualifying programming -- from the independent production sector. The goal is not to move to independent production as an end in itself but to promote innovation and efficiency -- a system based on an independent quota, a scheduling/broadcasting unit (like the UK's ITV Network Centre) which deals on equal terms with in and out of house producers and "Producer Choice" will do much to do so.

Conclusion

The strengths of U.K. television (and particularly its drama) is conditional on the existence of structures in which new entrants can acquire skills and on programme supply arrangements which permit schedulers to strip programmes across the week and the month to attract and retain viewers. The presence of the *teleroman* in the schedules of Quebec broadcasters is a source of considerable strength for the broadcaster and programme producer sectors in Quebec and the absence of English Canadian equivalents (present in the U.K. in programmes like "The Bill" and "Eastenders" and in Australia in "Neighbours," (Prisoner Cell Block H," etc.) means that English Canada lacks a vital "nursery" for talent. Thus, a successful

implementation of the desirable commissioner broadcaster model in English Canada will require careful attention to creation of an ensemble of programmes and a stronger role for the broadcaster than the Channel 4 model might suggest. Moreover, realisation of the identity entitlements of the whole of Canada through representation of the whole of Canada is likely to require some form of regional quotas. That said, the potential benefits of a commissioner broadcaster CBC are likely to outweigh those of a continued "outdated, too highly centralized and too expensive" (House of Commons, 1995:44) CBC.

To ensure that the cost of broadcasting is "in relation to the number of people whose imagination it will excite" as Newman (1974:46) might have put it and that the dialogic character of Canadian identity entitlements is achieved, the commissioner broadcaster CBC should be charged with achieving a specified audience share for the channel in specified national and regional markets. Such a requirement doesn't necessarily mean that only high rated programmes and channels would receive public support. It would be quite appropriate for the rating PI to be set relatively low for programmes designed for minority audiences. Given the obdurate persistence of Canada's "two solitudes" it would be further desirable to require broadcasters transmitting publicly funded programmes (whether commissioned by the CBC or subsidised by Telefilm) to achieve a modest share when screened in the other official Canadian language community. Such programmes would undoubtedly be distributed by broadcasters "domiciled" in the second language community and the requirement for a significant number of programmes to "cross over" between language communities would promote functional co-venturing relationships between broadcasters and producers in English and French Canada.

Funding public broadcasting and programme production in Canada is, as the Mandate Review Committee recognised, a real problem. The waste inherent in funding the CBC annually is obvious and the Committee's proposal to levy a "distribution tax" seems attractive. The tax would provide public broadcasting with an assured revenue stream, assist CBC planning and financial housekeeping, and insulate broadcasting from Government pressure. However, raising the costs of communication (even with the modest exception of local residential telephony) is unlikely to assist the development of new media and communication services in Canada. It will toll the "Superhighway" to preserve terrestrial broadcasting. Better to raise revenues from exploitation of the central publicly owned broadcasting resource -- the radio frequency spectrum. Both the U.S.A. and the U.K. in different ways have shown that considerable sums can be raised from spectrum auctions.

Why not require commercial broadcasters (and other spectrum users) in Canada to pay market clearing prices for the spectrum they use and (as has been done in the U.K.) auction broadcasting licences returning the revenues generated to subsidise production of Canadian content? It may be objected that such a policy would encourage broadcasters and advertisers to migrate to U.S. carriers. It would. But so too will a communication distribution tax of the kind advocated by the Mandate Review Committee. Continued Canadian use of Section 19 of the Income Tax Act is likely to be a more effective instrument to mitigate the adverse effects of the policy I propose than would be any measures open to the Canadian Government to inhibit the migration of telecommunication traffic to the United States as a consequence of the proposed Communication Distribution tax.

Marc Raboy (1990) has characterised Canada's broadcasting history as one of missed opportunities. It continues to be so. The fetishised character of Canada's aspiration to exercise communication sovereignty and the associated attachment to established instruments, notably the CBC, created to realise this aspiration has led to pervasive misrecognition of both threats and opportunities. The particular nationalist character of the pervasive Canadian emphasis on the *political* importance of the media in Canada -- which Skene (in spite of the insistent rhetorical emphasis on drama in the broadcasting policy discourse) claims (1993:130) has led to Canadians being "subjected to one of the highest information-to-entertainment television ratios in the

world" -- has blocked development of appropriate broadcasting policies. But there are signs of changing times and ideas. Achievement of Canadian policy goals are henceforth to be more likely if sought through the medium of what Brecht called the "bad new things" rather than the "good old ones." The good old CBC has failed. It is time to develop a bad new one.

ENDNOTES

- 1. See, for example, NAFTA and the Free Trade Agreement; the declining competitiveness and efficiency of public sector organisations; the Canadian military's role in Somalia; the failure of Meech Lake and the Charlottetown Accord; the augmented strength of the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois/Parti Québécois.
- 2. See House of Commons Select Committee on Canadian Heritage. Minutes of Proceedings. 1st Session. 35th Parliament. 17th November 1994:45.
- 3. I refer to federal initiatives. Some provinces have also established public service broadcasters and subventions to producers of Canadian works.
- 4. Stewart and Hull (1994:4) usefully define public service broadcasting as "a publicly owned system of broadcasting mandated to provide high quality programmes to satisfy a wide range of tastes in all regions of the country without slavish adherence to ratings figures.
- 5. The Mandate Review Committee estimated that the cost of an hour of high quality US television drama was c\$1m and that of a comparable hour of Canadian drama \$750,000. The US product could be acquired by Canadian broadcasters for \$50,000. Even with a Telefilm subsidy of up to 49% of cost (the maximum permitted -- but more than usually awarded by Telefilm [Mandate Review Committee, 1996:198]) Canadian broadcasters were worse off by \$325,000 if they defrayed the remaining costs only in the Canadian market. Usually Canadian broadcasters paid a higher licence fee for the Canadian drama production (so that commercial broadcasters could meet Canadian content regulations and so that CBC could meet its mandate requirements). However, even when paying a licence fee of 20-30% of production cost, producers could achieve a positive return only when assured of a foreign sale. To stay in the black Canadian producers of drama must either reduce production costs without compromising quality and/or ensure a foreign sale. Foreign sales are, of course, most likely when either overt Canadian content of the works in question is minimised (as in the contemporary cases of productions such as "Traders" the Atlantis/Global production, or "ENG," the Alliance/CTV production) or of a risibly stereotyped kind (see CTV's "Due South"). There is no evidence of Canadian broadcasters reducing costs -- indeed subsidies weaken their incentives to do so.
- 6. Wayne Skene, formerly manager of CBC television in British Columbia and in Alberta, stated that "more money is spent on salaries for clerical staff in the CBC than on all the creative talent put together" (House of Commons Select Committee on Canadian Heritage. Minutes of Proceedings. Ist Session. 35th Parliament. 17th November 1994 45:10).
- 7. Wayne Skene made a similar argument in respect of CBC's occupancy of its landmark building in Vancouver (House of Commons Select Committee on Canadian Heritage. Minutes of Proceedings. 1st Session. 35th Parliament. 17th November 1994 45:19).
- 8. I make no comment on the degree to which the share of listening achieved by CBC Radio is a cause for satisfaction -- English language radio achieved a share of 11.4% and French language radio a share of 9.5% in their respective universes (Mandate Review Committee 1996:49).
- 9. I use this term as a convenient shorthand for citizens of the U.S.A.

Designing Culture: Reflections on a Post/modern Project

Paul Rusberford University of Toronto

Toward the end of the conterence, one of the second non-academics commented to use on the mean for some sort of summary quilining what sorts of techniques had worked to promote or proserve Canadian culture. That was a sound proposed, and it fulfilles one of the sims of the conterence initially outlined by Joel, Smith: namely to discover in what ways the Canadian experience was an exemplar for other nations. But after pendesing the significance of our deliberations, I decided that any such scannary really wouldn't be appropriate. The conference had not been about what assessed as a even about what failed, rather the conference had been about a kind of easing, neither a completence nor a detest, more a waning or an unraveling, as if time had run out on the Canadian project of designing culture.

The papers did not quite constitute a requiem for that once confident crucade. Instead most the authors had taken up a variety of contrasting poses and guises. Joel Smith opened the conference as the skeptic and critic. Thelms McCurmack was angry and Robert Babe militant show what had been less, both indulging in some conspiracy lumbing to find the villams. Eithu Katz was nostalgie, even poetic, although for an imagined common space which existed in many different lands when talevision was young. John Meisel was cautiously optimistic about the future, as to a lesser degree was John Jackson, by contrast Keith Acheson and Christopher Maule were definitely, indeed implacably, personistic about the future of cultural policy. John Keane, Lee Bakes, and Marjorie Ferguson played the role of sympathetic outsiders (with one caveat Professor Ferguson was once Canadian) who identified the many obstacles that stood in the way of designing culture these days. I detected a wry sense of amusement in Marc Raboy's feeting that things had worked out so well, as if by accident, in the promotion of cultures Canadian and Québecois. Stiff the concluding remarks of my compatriot, Richard Collins (who was also caffed upon to muse about the proceedings), evoked in my mind the sober demension of the accountant telling people to move on - the world had changed and the project was no more.

You may well ask which project. On the one hand the desperate desire to invers Canada, to use John Jackson's words, has been a concern of politicians and journalists since before Confederation in 1867. On the other hand we still have with us a public broadcaster, a National Film Board, and other such agencies indeed there is even a spanking new Department of Canadian Heritage. Most of the participants offered a version of history which located the roots of their argument back in the past, though not always the same past. The most grand was Robert Babe's story of a "Great Transformation" from an anti- or non-market cultural policy to a market-dominated policy. Babe's story perforce discounts the substantial role of capitals; enterprise in cultural development since the dawn of mass communications in the late hindebenth county. Moreover, like the rest of the papers, it presumes that the history of cultural policy in Canada is all of one piece, not marked by discontinuities which have rupoured the patterns of the past.

That presumption doesn't do justice to what has happened in the past fifty years. That doesn't deals with a specific project, a set of causes and honource caterprises which has persisted throughout the era of television, an era that hasn't yet closed. Indeed a central concern of this cultural project has been how to shape television to suit the evolving needs of the Canadian community. The story of this project, moreover, occurs against the background of what may well be a "Great Transformation." though of a quite different sort, from the so-called age of modernity into the (maybe temporary) condition of postmodernity.

- 10. Between 1985 and 1992, for example, immigration to western Europe roughly trebled from little more than 1m per year to somewhat more than 3m per year. In 1985 there were 1,020,000 immigrants to western Europe and in 1992 there were 3,040,000 (The Financial Times 15.4., 1993:23).
- 11. Latterly some have sought to give the European Union a more classically nationalist character by fostering a shared European identity, culture, and mass media so as to make European culture congruent with the European polity (see, *inter alia*, Collins, 1994:especially 41-52).
- 12. I have to acknowledge here that, although I cited all these examples in my *Culture*, *Communication*, and *National Identity* (Collins, 1990) I was blind to the matter of identity entitlements and saw the issue wholly in nationalist terms.
- 13. Hetu and Renaud's research may appear a little dusty but I know of no more recent study. An alternative, albeit enigmatic, source is CBC's undated pamphlet, "CBC Cross-Cultural Programming: Bridges Linking English- and French-Speaking Canadians," listing (without giving dates) "a few examples of co-operation between the CBC, the SRC, Newsworld and RDI."
- 14. See also Toogood (1969).
- 15. In 1993-4 TVOntario had operating revenues of \$79,440,000 of which 83.4% came in subventions from the Ontario and Federal Governments (source: TVOntario Annual Report, 1993/4). In 1993/4 (prior to its privatisation) ACCESS Alberta had operating revenues of \$18,038,900 of which 89% came in subventions from the Alberta Government (source: The Alberta Educational Communications Corporation Annual Report, 1993/4). In 1993/4 Radio Quebec had operating revenues of \$87,296,437 of which 75% came from the Government of Quebec (source: Radio Quebec Rapport Annuel, 1994/5). It is impossible to disaggregate the revenues of The Knowledge Network channel in British Columbia from the \$41,624,700 operating revenues of the British Columbia Open Learning Agency in 1993/4 -- of this total the British Columbia and Federal Governments contributed 70% (source: Open Learning Agency Annual Report, 1994/5).
- 16. Radio Canada enjoys a larger share of the overall CBC budget than is proportional to the size of the Francophone population in Canada. However, it's share of television viewing in its universe is more than twice that achieved by CBC. Its reach is superior to that achieved by CBC (Mandate Review Committee, 1996:63).
- 17. The term used for the controversial introduction of internal markets into the BBC in the early 1990s.
- 18. Thelma McCormack's (1995) passionate "Alt Dot Spicer Dot Ciao, Baby" exemplifies the strength of the sentiments so challenged.
- 19. The term loosely signifies a plethora of centralising management and organisational changes introduced by John Birt, Director General of the BBC.

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Designing Culture: Reflections on a Post/modern Project

Paul Rutherford University of Toronto

Toward the end of the conference, one of the invited non-academics commented to me on the need for some sort of summary outlining what sorts of techniques had worked to promote or preserve Canadian culture. That was a sound proposal, and it fulfilled one of the aims of the conference initially outlined by Joel Smith: namely to discover in what ways the Canadian experience was an exemplar for other nations. But after pondering the significance of our deliberations, I decided that any such summary really wouldn't be appropriate. The conference had not been about what succeeded, or even about what failed; rather the conference had been about a kind of ending, neither a completion nor a defeat, more a waning or an unraveling, as if time had run out on the Canadian project of designing culture.

The papers did not quite constitute a requiem for that once confident crusade. Instead most the authors had taken up a variety of contrasting poses and guises. Joel Smith opened the conference as the skeptic and critic. Thelma McCormack was angry and Robert Babe militant about what had been lost, both indulging in some conspiracy hunting to find the villains. Elihu Katz was nostalgic, even poetic, although for an imagined common space which existed in many different lands when television was young. John Meisel was cautiously optimistic about the future, as to a lesser degree was John Jackson; by contrast Keith Acheson and Christopher Maule were definitely, indeed implacably, pessimistic about the future of cultural policy. John Keane, Lee Baker, and Marjorie Ferguson played the role of sympathetic outsiders (with one caveat: Professor Ferguson was once Canadian) who identified the many obstacles that stood in the way of designing culture these days. I detected a wry sense of amusement in Marc Raboy's feeling that things had worked out so well, as if by accident, in the promotion of cultures Canadian and Québécois. Still the concluding remarks of my compatriot, Richard Collins (who was also called upon to muse about the proceedings), evoked in my mind the sober demeanor of the accountant telling people to move on - the world had changed and the project was no more.

You may well ask which project. On the one hand the desperate desire to invent Canada, to use John Jackson's words, has been a concern of politicians and journalists since before Confederation in 1867. On the other hand we still have with us a public broadcaster, a National Film Board, and other such agencies indeed there is even a spanking new Department of Canadian Heritage. Most of the participants offered a version of history which located the roots of their argument back in the past, though not always the same past. The most grand was Robert Babe's story of a "Great Transformation" from an anti- or non-market cultural policy to a market-dominated policy. Babe's story perforce discounts the substantial role of capitalist enterprise in cultural development since the dawn of mass communications in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, like the rest of the papers, it presumes that the history of cultural policy in Canada is all of one piece, not marked by discontinuities which have ruptured the patterns of the past.

That presumption doesn't do justice to what has happened in the past fifty years. This essay deals with a specific project, a set of causes and honoured enterprises which has persisted throughout the era of television, an era that hasn't yet closed. Indeed a central concern of this cultural project has been how to shape television to suit the evolving needs of the Canadian community. The story of this project, moreover, occurs against the background of what may well be a "Great Transformation," though of a quite different sort, from the so-called age of modernity into the (maybe temporary) condition of postmodernity.

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I want to reflect on this particular project of designing culture, offering an essay which is hardly a requiem (because the project hasn't died) though perhaps it is a provisional autopsy. Along the way, I will requiem (because the project hash tuted) though property and the project hash tuted to highlight the peculiarities of designing culture. Overall my present some modest ironies, a few anecdotes to highlight the peculiarities of designing culture. present some modest fromes, a few affectives to another theory and post-structuralist critique, perspectives that were comments are informed by small doses of cultural theory and post-structuralist critique, perspectives that were comments are informed by small doses of the conference. That absence is in itself strange, given their largely absent from the proceedings of the conference. prominence in the wider realm of philosophy, though perhaps it is more a reflection on the nature of analysis prominence in the wider realit of philosophy, and sociology seems so influential. in the field of communications studies in Canada where economics and sociology seems so influential. in the field of communications studies in contract to a thorough-going assessment of the postmodern Possibly this essay will suggest there could be some virtue to a thorough-going assessment of the postmodern attributes of Canada's cultural project?

I Genesis

The Tolerant View

In its early years the Canadian content regulations were given such a wide definition that In its early years the Canadian content of the could include an address by President Kennedy, apparently because this was deemed they could include an address by President Kennedy, apparently because this was deemed of general interest to Canadians (cited in Weir, 1965:373).

What made the project 'modern'? The easy answer is the times: the late 1940s were a moment of high What made the project modern: The day and the sound in the sound point modernism, especially in a largely undamaged North America. The more sophisticated answer would point modernism, especially in a largely undamaged North America and reason, these trivials and the sound point modernism. modernism, especially in a largery undarriaged and reason, those triumphant metanarratives: a to some of the attributes of the project: a belief in progress and reason, those triumphant metanarratives: a to some of the attributes of the project. a control in project, a control in a general Liberal vision of the attributes of the project. a control in a general Liberal vision of the control in a general vision of the control in a general vis heady mix of liberalism and nationalism, a geoperature of the postwar country: amongst Designing culture came to constitute one element in a general Liberal vision of the postwar country: amongst Designing culture came to constitute one clearly amongst the other projects were the elaboration of social welfare, planning an unlimited economic expansion, and the construction of an internationalist foreign policy.

The project had its origins in the agitation of the intelligentsia for 'a new deal for the arts in Canada." The project nad its origins in the agreement. In the last years of the war literary, artistic, musical, and Implicit in that comment was a sense of grievance. In the last years of the war literary, artistic, musical, and Implicit in that comment was a sense of green and interest, artistic, musical, and academic institutions, mostly though not exclusively in English Canada, had begun to organize and agitate academic institutions, mostly though not exclusively in short there was a class dimension organize. academic institutions, mostly though not exclude. In short there was a class dimension to the initiation of the to win federal attention for their varied pursuits. In short there was a class dimension to the initiation of the to win federal attention for their variety parsons to win federal attention for their variety parsons, writers, professors, actors, and so on were seeking new wave of cultural nationalism: artists of all sorts, writers, professors, actors, and so on were seeking new wave of cultural nationalism. artists of all sorts, interes, processors, actors, and so on were seeking recognition for what they did, a new status, subsidy and other kinds of support, perhaps more or better paying this March of Culture, of courses recognition for what they did, a new status, subsided that the support, pernaps more or better paying jobs. Self-interest was not the only engine driving this March of Culture, of course: spokespeople articulated jobs. Self-interest was not the only engine driving the arts, letters, humanities, and sciences to the course of the course o jobs. Self-interest was not the only engine arts, letters, humanities, and sciences to raise the quality of life the mission of civilizing Canada, boosting the arts, letters, humanities, and sciences to raise the quality of life. the mission of civilizing Canada, boosting the day, bear, managed, and sciences to raise the quality of life and the reputation of the nation. Consequently this "cultural formation", to use Raymond Williams' (1981) and the reputation of the nation. and the reputation of the nation. Consequently as the support of a wider constituency that included voluntary apt term, would secure the often enthusiastic support of a wider constituency that included voluntary associations and the fans of public radio.

Things came together during the investigations (1949-51) of the Royal Commission on National Things came together during the investigation of the Massey Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, more often known as the Massey Commission. The Liberal Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, and the last the invassey Commission. The Liberal government of the day was amenable to the growing pressure (the organization of the British Arts Council government of the day was amenable to the government appointed. By government of the day was amenable to the geometric flow of galazzation of the British Arts Council in 1945 had made the whole notion respectable). In 1949 the government appointed a Royal Commission in 1945 had made the whole notion respectable. Wincent Massey, and dominated by the increase Royal Commission in 1945 had made the whole notion respectatory. The government appointed a Royal Commission chaired by Canada's own highbrow, Vincent Massey, and dominated by the ivory tower but for a lone chaired by Canada's own highbrow, vincent a dissent that focused on broadcasting. chaired by Canada's own nignorow, vincent induser, and dominated by the Ivory tower but for a lone French-Canadian engineer (who would present a dissent that focused on broadcasting). That commission was French-Canadian engineer by the CBC, trade unions and farm associations observed. French-Canadian engineer (who would present a discontinuous and farm associations, churches and universities, lobbied by existing broadcasters, by the CBC, trade unions and farm associations, churches and universities, and by a parade of arts and literary groups.

The Massey Report of 1951 swiftly became the bible of the newly emerging wave of cultural nationalism. For this elegant and erudite Report (and how often could that be said of a government document?) furnished both a persuasive justification as well as a set of measures to design culture in Canada. It put forward a line of argument about "cultural defenses" linked to the pervasive rhetoric of the Cold War, a very common ploy in the early 1950s: "We are defending civilization, our share of it, our contribution to it (Canada. Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, 1951:274)." Except the chief enemy was really the United States, not the Soviet Union: the commissioners found the products and messages of the American media scattered all over Canadian lives, most especially English-Canadian lives. The Report showed little understanding or sympathy for the mass entertainment made in America that so pleased Canadian consumers -- the highbrow bias of the majority of commissioners was blatant. "Culture is that part of education which enriches the mind and refines the taste," they solemnly declared (Canada. Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, 1951:7). From this standpoint the Royal Commission was an entry in the international revolt of the highbrow, the culture wars ongoing in Canada, Britain, and especially the United States during the 1940s and 1950s. Here too was another reason for labeling the new project 'modern', since it mirrored the disdain the artistic and literary intelligentsia had for mass culture and the determination to erect a protected enclave of High Culture. The Report presumed that a properly designed culture would insulate Canadians against the trash of a Hollywood or a New York. So it proposed a host of recommendations to encourage creativity, including the founding of what would become the Canada Council.

But the most important recommendations by far were about television. By the late 1940s TV was rapidly becoming commonplace in Britain and the United States, where it was threatening to rival radio in significance. The prospective arrival of the new medium in Canada had provoked an orgy of speculation and hyperbole in newspapers and magazines. That obsession with technology Babe finds in the 1980s was also evident in the postwar years: TV was called "electronic miracle", "home marvel", "cette merveille technique", "the ultimate instrument of mass communication". The commissioners wisely decided that television would be the crucial mode of communication during the rest of the century, which meant its development had to be controlled by the state. They endorsed an existing government decision (of March 1949) to delay the introduction of television until the CBC could launch national services in French and English. Indeed the Report foresaw a permanent CBC dominion over television, hoping thereby to prevent the onslaught of advertising which was sweeping the American airwaves, although the commissioners by no means ruled out private investment and private stations. The CBC's Board of Governors was admonished to "exercise a strict control over all television stations in Canada to avoid excessive commercialism and to encourage Canadian content and the use of Canadian talent (Canada. Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, 1951:305)." Canadian TV must be an engine of Canadian culture.

Where the Report trod lightly was in its treatment of the print media. It relied upon a long quote from a past Royal Commission on the Press in Britain to establish how central newspapers and magazines were to the practice of democracy. But it refused to judge their performance, pointing instead to problems such as the prevalence of foreign news and magazines in Canada. The reason for the forbearance was simple, what a later generation might call a category error: newspapers were labeled political vehicles, their independence protected from the dictates of the state or its agencies by principle and history, by that hallowed freedom of the press. Journalism wasn't culture, apparently. No matter how significant communications were to the success of the cultural project, there were limits to the kinds of state controls considered permissible over the behaviour of the media. This contradiction and this tension would persist throughout the story of designing culture.

The other zone of sensitivity was the French language and Quebec's culture. French-Canadian intellectuals might be equally attracted to the notion of state patronage. But they were also much more

interested in fostering Quebec's culture, and some francophone nationalists worried that any Canadian initiative might threaten this priority. The Report was careful to extend its blessing to all things French as well as English, to argue that a Canadian culture would embrace what was Québécois. In later years two of the most prominent cultural nationalists were francophones: J. Alphonse Ouimet, general manager and eventually president of the CBC in the 1960s, and Pierre Juneau, one-time head of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (hereafter CRTC) and in the 1980s also president of the CBC. Even so, the cultural project, then and later, better expressed the nationalist ambitions of English than French Canada, where a parallel movement (discussed by Marc Raboy) pursued similar kinds of goals. The cultural crisis was always more acute in English Canada anyway, because of the massive presence of American messages. Besides Ottawa's project could only encompass distinctions that were limited, restricted, to ensure the pre-eminence of a pan-Canadian culture.

There was an irony about the beginnings of the cultural project that would only become clear later on. The whole process had underlined the vigour of the public sphere in the immediate postwar years. Although the project had its origins in the concerns and interests of a specific formation, it had been carefully debated in a variety of forums, notably the commission hearings and the press. The energy and interest of voluntary associations was especially striking: reading the briefs and proceedings of the commission conveys the impression of an extraordinarily lively dialogue about the role and future of culture. The result was a considered judgment which, however elitist in intent, was fundamentally democratic in character: the state had received directions from agents of the public to take action for the common good. Even Jürgen Habermas (1991), had he known or cared, might have been pleased.

II Missions

CBC the Americanizer

The CBC actually introduced regular broadcasts of American football to Canada during the early 1960s in its efforts to compete with CTV broadcasts of Canadian football (Rutherford, 1990:131).

Cultural nationalism was a loosely-knit, and slowly evolving, body of ideas and proposals, eventually a shared rhetoric which all sorts of people could draw upon, and thus a credo rather than a doctrine. Joel Smith has outlined seven assumptions that came to constitute the implicit foundations of Canadian media policy, of which the most central was that mass media could build a national culture and promote a sense of identity. I wish to focus attention instead on the particular goals and missions which emerged during the course of the project.

But first a word about the master problem. One expression of the modernity of this project was its identification of a single, root cause, the source of all evil as it were. That cause was the power and the aggression of American civilization, whose menace to Canada, indeed to human values, was best expressed in the works of the dynamic duo of Anglo-Canadian academe, Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan. The culture of 'baseball and bubble gum', of Mickey Spillane and Milton Berle, of 'the almighty dollar' and its hucksters could all too easily sweep northwards and stifle any possibility of a different Canada. It was this threat of cultural annexation, later defined as the menace of media imperialism, which fostered the all-important sense of crisis and justified the credo of cultural nationalism. It could be expressed in loud laments about opportunities lost for Canadian expression, in reams of statistics about the spread of American media, in disquisitions on the sickness of Hollywood movies, or in sombre warnings about some future

ending of political independence. All came back to the necessity to protect and nurture a Canadian difference in the face of the constant barrage of mass culture made-in-the-USA.

That initial mission of civilizing Canada soon lost its primacy in the public debate over the media, although it continued to influence the conduct and views of influentials. (There are echoes of this tradition in John Meisel's claim that "a constant and exclusive diet" of escapism "diminishes the individual".) So during the 1950s, and even into the 1960s, the managers of CBC television offered large doses of ballet, concerts and operas, and above all classical and contemporary plays, in both French and English, to please the highbrow palate. The opinion persisted, moreover, that the villain of the story was none other than commerce, those businessmen who treated culture as a commodity, who wished to import as much American trash as the market would bear. Time and again nationalists would blame the merchants, such as private television in the 1960s or cable in the 1970s, for threatening the cultural project, in terms similar to those used by Thelma McCormack in her paper. The actual task of civilizing Canada, though, was left to opera and ballet companies, museums and galleries, the Canada Council, and the like.

A more congenial goal, because more popular, was cultural sovereignty. Here the intent was to create common symbols, shared fictions, and celebrated performances that reflected the Canadian imagination. This mission was especially crucial for English Canada because it lacked that strong tradition of popular history and literature, a vibrant sense of a collective identity, evident in French Quebec. The requisite brand of culture could embrace the Wayne and Shuster Show (one of the first great performances on anglophone television) or La famille Plouffe/The Plouffe Family (the first of the hit téléromans which was also won some fame amongst anglophone viewers) as well as Shakespeare or Mozart. Davidson Dunton and the rest of the CBC leadership in the 1950s were continually putting forward this gospel in public speeches as well as in briefs to government committees and commissions. Likewise the promise of cultural sovereignty underlay the infamous Canadian content regulations which controlled first television programming (from 1959) and later radio programming (from 1970). In fact similar claims became commonplace in the briefs put by private interests to the Board of Broadcast Governors (hereafter BBG) and later the CRTC when searching for new TV licenses. Indeed this goal could be used to cloak all manner of special pleas, whether those of Canadian magazines seeking protection or Canadian publishing houses after subsidies. Success promised to construct a Canadian alternative that would offer local artists a better means of expression as well as build a sense of cultural allegiance to the nation. The equation, sometimes explicit, was between cultural sovereignty and political sovereignty.3

This aim led into a newer mission, namely the task of re-inventing Canada, which emerged in the mid-1960s and flourished during the next decade when Pierre Trudeau sought to impose his national vision upon the country. That "pan-Canadian, bilingual, multicultural vision," in John Jackson's words, forecast a thoroughly liberal Canada where every citizen enjoyed equal rights and owed first allegiance to the nation-state. It required better tools of management. One was a new broadcasting czar, the CRTC, with fresh powers to determine radio and television. A Department of Communications (1969-1993) was launched to direct media policy and, after 1980, the arts as well. There was an increasing effort to use private enterprise to advance the cultural project. In his paper Robert Babe points to the example of Telefilm Canada (then called the Canadian Film Development Corporation), born in 1968 to fund a feature film industry. Another instance was the CRTC's touching faith during the early 1970s in the ability of Global TV to bring an additional Canadian voice to the airwaves in southern Ontario. Indeed, by the end of the decade, the notion that culture was an industry, that it must generate jobs and profits as well as aesthetic triumphs, was winning more and more adherents, including Communications Minister Francis Fox (as Marc Raboy notes). What these and other examples signified wasn't only the decline of the anticommercial thrust explicit in the first stages of the cultural project, but a change in the overall political and class significance of designing culture. Initially the project had represented a modest challenge to the power of capital to determine public policy. Now any breach was healed, at the level of government, and the alliance of the elites reconstituted, all in a new bureaucratic arrangement of compromise and regulation. It was a situation that Antonio Gramsci, the theorist of hegemony, would not have found at all unusual.⁴

One remarkable aspect of this procession of missions was the way it involved a kind of gender shift, in tone and language. Women had been carrying out the actual task of civilizing Canada long before arts councils and the like took up the cry, a story well-told by Maria Tippett in her *Making Culture*. The single woman on the Massey Commission, Hilda Neatby, a history professor, made a public name for herself as a critic of commerce and equally firm champion of the humanities. Civilizing meant, among other things, nurturing, and carried with it a feminine connotation. But the missions of cultural sovereignty and even more re-inventing Canada were discernibly masculinist in tone. Here the causes of defence (evident in the Massey Report) and assertion -- of will, of power -- seemed much more prominent. Here the talk of crisis, the metaphor of (electronic) rape, and the fear of penetration were commonplace. Indeed re-inventing Canada had as its hero that grand voice of cold reason, none other than Pierre Trudeau.

Present in the credo were the traces of utopia (and dystopia), using the term in Paul Ricoeur's sense as "an alternate to the present power." In contrast to ideology, the other side of the cultural imagination, utopia serves to explore the possible, and so to contribute to a sense of identity: "What we call ourselves is also what we expect and yet what we are not (Ricoeur, 1986:310, 311)." The Massey Report, for instance, contains an extraordinary passage extolling an imaginary world of intimate and participatory culture ("communication was on a voluntary and personal basis") before the onset of the machine drove Canada out of its Garden of Eden (Canada. Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, 1951:19-22). Compare that fantasy of nostalgia to the nightmare of commerce and carnival satirized in a novel by Ralph Allen, *The Chartered Libertine* (1954), in which the CBC is sold to private interests who convert it into a showcase for American programmes. Or consider the assorted dreams of Canada as a peaceable kingdom, a land of order, freedom, serenity, harmony, beauty, etc., etc., so unlike the United States. Such images were present in the numerous government commercials of the Trudeau era. These utopias and dystopias were fictions, not blueprints but desires and fears, evidence of the poetic strength of the cultural project.

III The Game of Politics

We Like American!

The top six shows on the English TV channels in the week of January 16-22, 1986 were all American: The Cosby Show, Family Ties, Miami Vice, Dallas, Simon and Simon, Walt Disney (Task Force on Broadcasting Policy, 1986:210). That preference has been typical throughout the history of Canadian television.

The state had inherited from past waves of moral and cultural protectionism a variety of means to exercise power. The oldest was restriction, first adopted in the nineteenth century when the tariff required customs officials to keep pornographic and irreligious material out of the country (Rutherford, 1978:112). In the early twentieth century that technique was employed by the newly organized movie censorship bureaus of the provinces, though by the end of the 1930s they were more often cutting out scenes than banning whole features. The second technique was promotion, such as the exemption once given newspapers from postal charges (condemned as a "tax on knowledge") during the 1880s and 1890s (Rutherford, 1982:67, 96, 114). Shortly afterwards, the federal government gave a subsidy to the Canadian Associated Press to enable it to pay overseas telegraph charges for a summary dispatch of British news. Promotion eventually gave birth to

ownership. During the 1930s a Conservative government created public radio and a Liberal government created the National Film Board, though the latter was conceived more as an instrument of propaganda than of movies as people knew them. The final technique was direction: thus the CBC's board of governors controlled the licenses of private radio and established the rules of programming prior to the organization of the BBG.

All of these techniques were employed by the state to discipline communications. Perhaps the single most successful initiative occurred in the 1950s when the CBC received funding sufficient to extend a television service across the length of the country. That success depended on the regulation of private enterprise, however: most of the new television stations were privately owned, although each was slaved to the CBC's network. This regime realized, briefly, the ideal that Elihu Katz spoke about -- CBC television constituted one common public space for anglophones, Radio-Canada another for francophones, where they could commune in front of the small screen. There is some reason to think that in Quebec this situation promoted, or at least enabled, a cultural renaissance as well as a more vigorous public debate. But in English Canada "monopoly television", as critics called it, was extremely unpopular, which was why the Conservative government that came to power after 1957 authorized independent, private television. At least in the Canadian context, Katz's vision amounts to a utopian dream, particularly appealing one supposes to the champions of public broadcasting. A dream yes, but not just a fancy: the vision of a common space remains a powerful tool of critique that discloses one of the political costs of too much choice.

The many efforts to actually design culture tell a very complicated story of advance and retreat, compromise as well as surrender, sometimes victory but more often defeat. One reason is that there were so many different players in this particular game of politics:

•the nationalist lobby: the successors to the initial formation that could encompass independent artists and writers, an intellectual organ like the Canadian Forum, unions like ACTRA, or associations such as the later Friends of Canadian Broadcasting.

•the political parties: generally speaking the Liberal party was more sympathetic to the cultural project than the Conservative party, which was of significance because the Liberals were in office for most of the time between 1945 and 1984. That said the Diefenbaker interlude of 1957-62 was of crucial importance because it marked the end of "monopoly television".

•the federal government and its instruments: sometimes these could be at odds, such as in the early 1980s when the cabinet and the CRTC disagreed over the introduction of pay television. Sometimes the regulatory agencies have seemed a bit too sympathetic toward their purported 'subjects'. Keith Acheson and Christopher Maule suggest that the CRTC's tenderness toward traditional broadcasters may well have hampered the development of Canadian specialty services.

•the public media: both the CBC and the NFB pursued separate nationalist goals (at one point early on the NFB hoped to secure control of television) that might well conflict with the intentions of the government. During the late 1970s the CBC planned to embark upon a renewed bout of Canadianization (outlined in something called the Touchstone document) that would cast back the American devils. That ran afoul of the new austerity drive of the Trudeau government.

•the provincial governments and their agencies: particularly in the case of Quebec, whether the complexion of the government was separatist or federalist, there was a tendency always to resist any extension of federal authority. One of the great defeats of the federal government occurred in the late 1960s when it had to give up its scheme for a Canada-wide

system of educational broadcasting, because of the opposition of the provinces which claimed well-nigh exclusive jurisdiction over anything educational.

•the private broadcasters: these constituted what might, by and large, be called the antinationalist lobby. Once they were almost a united front in the form of the Canadian Association of Broadcasters which did win from government the creation of the BBG in 1958, thus removing the regulatory powers from the earlier CBC. But as private broadcasting grew larger, so too the industry became more complicated, and by the 1970s there were divisions between cable and traditional broadcasting, never mind between competitors such as Global or CTV.

•magazines: There was intermittent pressure from Canadian magazines to restrict the American invasion, in particular to prevent Canadian advertisers from securing a tax exemption for buying space in foreign publications. One significant compromise did involve Time Canada and Reader's Digest, two American magazines that were allowed exemptions from tax regulations in the mid-1960s to enable them to continue. In the next decade, Time Canada lost its exemption, although Time itself remained a major force in the Canadian market.

•the daily press: these media were usually on the sidelines, although tax laws prevented their takeover by outside interests. It is impossible to generalize about the response of so many different newspapers to the enormous variety of initiatives over the span of four decades. Still publishers and managers were highly suspicious of any proposals to restrict chain ownership or regulate the conduct of journalism, notions which surfaced briefly after a Senate investigation on the mass media in the late 1960s and a Royal Commission on Newspapers (the Kent Commission) slightly over a decade later.

•the public: the last player, and presumably the object of the whole exercise, though one that was typically defined as an audience rather than a public. Viewers in Vancouver, Hamilton, and Toronto did individually take action in the 1950s when they purchased antennas which allowed them to pick up the American signals directly, thus foiling the intentions of the CBC. Later they took to cable to provide more choice, meaning more American channels, and better reception, resisting efforts by the CRTC to restrict this choice.

The reference to the public as audience points to the major tragedy of the whole story. That public broadcasting constituency which had been so active in the late 1940s seemed to wane in the television era, perhaps because the CBC successfully resisted efforts to make it more responsive to different publics. The members of the nationalist lobby were increasingly converted into the clients of the state who depended on its largesse for money and jobs. More important, over time, and most especially during the Trudeau era, the federal bureaucracy developed its own agenda, even its own "technologies of power", to use the terminology of Michel Foucault, as it sought to shape Canadian life. The particular missions of re-inventing Canada and securing cultural sovereignty were only part of a much wider campaign to engineer the country, to make Canada healthier, safer, more just, more united, and so on. Decisions and compromises were fashioned behind the scenes by officials of the government or the corporations, sometimes representatives of organized interests, in which the public played little part. Managed news, carefully constructed polls, publicity, in a word propaganda was employed to secure the compliance of the citizenry.

Consider that last technology of power. It was the Liberals, as Marc Raboy has noted, who imposed a clause in the 1968 broadcasting act on the CBC making it an instrument of national unity in the ongoing disputes with Quebec. The Trudeau government established a short-lived Information Canada, dubbed "the Ministry of Truth" (Stewart, 1971:220), to ensure the state's messages got through to the public - this initiative

met with considerable press opposition. An escalating series of government or government-sponsored position papers, studies, reports, task forces, and commissions amounted to what has been called "bureaucratic propaganda" (Altheide and Johnson, 1980) for the ideal of re-invention. The Trudeau administration even took to creating spectacles, whether Canada Day celebrations or television commercials, to get Canadians to affirm their loyalty to the common nation. The Canadian Unity Information Office set up after the 1976 pequiste victory in Quebec spent millions of dollars (\$32 million alone touting Trudeau's constitutional scheme) to re-educate Canadians (cited in Ryan, 1995:267). Ministers publicly defended the need to use the techniques of mass persuasion to counter, as one put it, "negativism" (Fleming, 1981). The federal government, in short, sought to sell Canadians on the wisdom of nationhood, itself evidence of the increased importance of advertising, or more properly of constant propaganda, in the emerging postmodern era.

The result was that deformation of the public sphere which Habermas claimed was the political burden of the welfare state. Propaganda, of course, amounted to monologue, not dialogue. The public were no longer participants, although they remained objects and clients of the "apparatuses of security" (Foucault again), whether in the cultural project or any other state scheme (Foucault, 1978; 1991:esp. 102-104).

IV The Unraveling

How Easy It Is To Lose Citizenship

In 1991 an album of Bryan Adams, a Canadian rock star, failed to qualify under the rules as Canadian content because it was co-written with a British producer and recorded outside Canada (cited in Romanow and Soderlund, 1996:213).

In retrospect 1984 marked the moment when the cultural project lost its momentum. No wonder: that was the year Pierre Trudeau retired, the Liberals lost the election to the Conservatives, and Brian Mulroney took office. What all this signified was the onset of a different kind of politics that might well be called "postmodern": not only had power changed hands, the political paradigm had shifted, indeed what counted as knowledge had changed.

I mean by the term 'knowledge' a mix of mythology, ideology, and commonsense. The presumptions about the desirable, the possible, the permissible, not just what the state could do but what it ought to do, both the means and the ends of power, had begun to alter rapidly after the late 1970s. Government officials came to worship new, or at least renovated Truths, even before the Liberal debacle. A number of the authors at the conference emphasized aspects of the sea change. Robert Babe made much of the increasing fascination of some civil servants with technology and its supposed ability to transform the cultural environment. Marc Raboy called the decade of the 1980s "the triumph of the market" when the arts became an industry and culture a commodity. Thelma McCormack pointed her finger at the triumph of a neoconservatism that touted the virtues of privatization, competition, and deregulation. John Meisel highlighted the declining confidence in both the public sector and the state. All are intertwined, of course. Lurking behind these forces, as Marjorie Ferguson suggested, is the effects of globalization, the convergence of just about everything -commodities, money, data, images, people, ideas -- in a single, unified, world culture. The trouble with these claims, and especially the last, is that they can so easily have a totalizing effect: they suggest some new paradigm, some doctrine or ideology, even a renovated metanarrative has gained virtually complete command over the minds and actions of humanity. Instead, I would argue, what makes postmodern times so confusing is the lack of a single commanding structure of thought.

How much the context had changed struck home in the election of 1988. That election was fought over the acceptance of a Free Trade Agreement with the United States, an agreement in which culture was protected according to the Mulroney government. Nonetheless many writers, artists, and intellectuals in English Canada spoke out loudly against acceptance, arguing Canada's soul was imperilled. They were probably right: the soul of their version of Canada was at stake. Even more impressive, though, was the massive propaganda campaign mounted by business interests to convince voters that free trade was essential to the survival of prosperity. Both sides, in short, exploited the insecurity of Canadians about their future. In any case the victory of free trade (because the government won the election and because, soon after, the Liberal party gave up its opposition) signified the inevitability of continentalism which could not but undermine the cultural project.

That became abundantly clear soon after when, as John Thompson has explained (1992:esp. 195-197), the Mulroney government backed away from earlier initiatives to enhance Canadian control of film distribution and the Canadian presence in book publishing. In each case American pressure meant the sacrifice of the goal of cultural sovereignty. Meanwhile the Mulroney government had begun to make cuts in the funds for the CBC, particularly in 1984 and 1990 that forced reductions in staff and programming. Nor did the return of the Liberals to power in 1993 end this unraveling. Keith Acheson and Christopher Maule have shown how trade disputes have defeated the purposes of cultural policies in recent years. The CBC has been compelled to submit to another round of budget cutting. The share of spending of the new Heritage portfolio (which includes the CBC, NFB, Telefilm Canada, as well as other cultural agencies) has fallen from a high of 2.2% in 1993 to 1.6% in 1996 (Phillips, 1995:378). The contraction continues.

V Simulacrum

How Ottawa Sometimes Treats Immigrants

In 1996 MCA Inc., a huge American-based media conglomerate forty times bigger than its nearest Canadian competitor, received from Ottawa "citizenship papers" that will enable it to share in all the incentives and tax breaks of being Canadian. Why? Because MCA is largely owned by Seagram Co (Globe and Mail, 20 July 1996:C1).

What has been achieved? A case can be made for the mission of civilizing Canada, that is the state subsidy of the arts, music, and letters which the marketplace would never support. A case can also be made for efforts to encourage a Canadian presence in the realm of popular entertainment, if only to ensure some outlet and some access to indigenous products. That assistance is obviously vital to actors, writers, producers, technicians, musicians, performers, distributors, administrators, critics, and anyone else employed in the tiny 'universe' of Canadian cultural production. In short the argument that the project does foster cultural industries has obvious merit. But can that achievement justify the whole paraphernalia of restrictions, promotions, preferences, exclusions, and so on? Does the Canadian state need to spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually to subsidize culture? Has state intervention prevented the emergence of a more vigorous cultural marketplace? You can never answer 'what if?' questions, of course.

In any case an outside observer might well wonder why the cultural project persists. It certainly has failed to solve that master problem of American dominance. Anglophones and newcomers in Canada have time and again chosen to consume American culture in preference to their own. In 1993, for example, around three-quarters of the shows anglophones watched on TV were foreign, perhaps a slightly worse ratio than the situation in 1967. Contrast that with the situation amongst French Canadians: roughly 65% of the programmes they watched were domestics.⁶ In English-speaking Canada American novels usually dominate

bestseller lists, Hollywood's films win the huge audiences, imported magazines still flood the newsstands, American singers are the top stars, and so on: mass culture made-in-America is the chief source of popular culture in English-speaking Canada at the end of the twentieth century, just as it was at the middle or indeed at the beginning of the century. The little that remains, the rock music or movies or TV dramas that are labeled Canadian usually imitate styles and looks common elsewhere, especially in the United States. "Inside every Canadian, whether she or he knows it or note, there is, in fact, an American," wrote John Meisel (1992:184-185) in another context. "The magnitude and effect of this American presence in us varies considerably from person to person but it is ubiquitous and inescapable." Whatever sense of nationality prevails in English Canada depends upon the public arts, that is the news media, the political parties, and more recently propaganda. The Canadian experience is an excellent example of the decoupling of culture and nationality, of the popular arts and political citizenship, discussed elsewhere by Richard Collins (1990).

But, strange as it may seem, the state's vocal commitment to the cultural project has persisted. The 1988-89 Annual Report of the now defunct Communications Canada boasted that its mission was no less than "NATION BUILDING; helping Canadians share their ideas, information and dreams" (Romanow and Soderlund, 1996:206). Politicians and bureaucrats still proclaim how central the CBC is to Canadian life (witness a 1996 report provocatively entitled "Making Our Voice Heard: Canadian Broadcasting and Film for the 21st Century"), even though its share of the anglophone audience threatens to sink permanently below 10%. Two authors, John Jackson and John Meisel, cite a 1995 poll (albeit based on a telephone survey, a most unreliable source of intelligent opinion) which suggests that Canadians massively support public broadcasting. Even the not-quite-born Information Highway is supposed to submit to the old shibboleths: "Government must act to ensure that when we look into the electronic mirror, we see a Canadian face," according to a front page report in the *Toronto Star* (2 October, 1995). Most of the Canadians at the conference (Acheson and Maule were a conspicuous exception) seemed very reluctant to question the cultural project. That was left to 'outsiders', notably Joel Smith and Richard Collins.

Are Canadians in a state of denial? Not quite: but they are, in a bizarre fashion, living what once might have been called a lie. Nations are imagined communities that must be constantly reaffirmed. At one level, call it the level of symbolism, the utility of the cultural project lies in the act of assertion. The project persists in both rhetoric and fact because its very existence serves to assert a sense of Canadian difference, irrespective of what the project actually produces or whether it produces anything substantial at all. The willingness to fund cultural agencies, to proclaim cultural sovereignty, to resist American pressures amounts to a performance and a projection of Canadian sovereignty which is vital to the collective sense of self, in Ottawa and in Canada outside Quebec. What has become so important is playing the game, and how the authorities play the game, rather than winning or losing that game. Like medicare, the cultural project represents a way "we" differ from "them", Canadians from Americans, a point which Lee Becker makes in his paper. Ending that project would diminish that sense of self.

We are witness to an attribute of the postmodern condition: how surfaces count more than depths. That explains the prominence of promotion, publicity, and advertising these days. Here is a situation where appearance is reality. Canadian culture is one of Jean Baudrillard's simulacra, a signifier without a referent, in a social landscape full of such. Or, to be precise, it has become a third-order simulation that "masks the absence of a basic reality" (Baudrillard, 1983:11). The phrase "Canadian culture" resists definition. Examples remain difficult to find. A close look reveals something that always recedes, melting away into the shadows. The promise remains but the substance is absent. Vincent Massey, a godfather of modern Canada, would not be amused: the cultural project has become a species of propaganda in an age of hyperreality.

ENDNOTES

- 1. This editorial comment in the C.A.C. News no 2 (April, 1949) was actually inspired by the news of the appointment of the Massey Commission (cited by Tippett, 1990:185).
- 2. Cited in Rutherford (1990:19). I also discuss there the explosion of hype over television. Witness, for example, this comment by Fergus Mutrie, the CBC's director of TV in Toronto in 1950: "Someone has said that the topics most talked about today are the atom bomb and television the difference between the two being that we know how to use the bomb (21)."
- 3. One of the most compelling expressions of this equation is Miller's closing comment (1987:387) that '...If we do not continue to hear and see our own faces, or our own backyard, or reflect our own imaginative perspective on the world, then soon when we look into the window of our television screen, we will see instead a one-way mirror. All the faces behind that looking glass will belong to someone else. When you look in a mirror and see someone else's face, something crucial to your survival is breaking down. If this does happen, all of us will begin to forget who we are."
- 4. The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci was the originator of the concept, Raymond Williams was the English Marxist who refined the theory for a later generation. Hegemony refers to a structure of domination in which the authority of the ruling bloc rests upon its command of consciousness. Success depends, in part, on the bloc's ability to negotiate compromises as well as to encompass difference. See the entry for hegemony in Williams (1983:144-146).
- 5. This constituted the introduction to the Mass Media chapters.
- 6. 1993 statistics from Romanow and Soderlund (1996:88); 1967 comparison from Rutherford (1990: 141-2).
- 7. I have explored these themes at much greater length in "Made in America: The Problem of Mass Culture in Canada" (1993).
- 8. This was the opening line in a story about a forthcoming recommendation of the Information Highway Advisory Council's working group on Canadian content and culture.

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Afterthoughts: Research, Conclusions, Policy

Joel Smith Duke University

Concluding the work of a good conference always leaves regrets. With rare exceptions any resulting publication fails to do justice to the excitement of the occasion. No one person can ever represent the efforts and positions of all the conferees adequately, and a successful conference can never complete its work. The proceedings always open more issues than they resolve. To avoid some of the deficiencies of the conference format, the conferees were asked to finish their papers only after the meetings. In addition, Richard Collins and Paul Rutherford, two distinguished students of Canadian media policy, were asked to comment on the proceedings. Their observations capture the broad diversity of views that the conferees brought to the table. Paul Rutherford's observations, in particular, suggest that there can be no specific policy recommendations that simply start with what is and tinker with it, perhaps even that there are no policies that can succeed and still leave a democratic Canada. Although Richard Collins does not go quite so far, his proposals for Canadian media policies call for drastic changes that will require careful monitoring to preserve democracy.

As Paul Rutherford suggests, each of us came to the table with views shaped by the period when the debate on media policy first engaged us. Consequently, we do not always address one another. Nor is there a simple way to summarize our conclusions. That observation in itself is of considerable value. Rereading the papers and reviewing my notes convinces me that there is considerably more of value in our efforts. Therefore, in a move that may be patently unfair to the other participants, I also am summarizing my views on what our deliberations suggest with respect to necessary and desirable research, matters that need more attention, and policy implications for Canada and, as appropriate, other countries.

Research

Our emphasis on Canadian media policies may divert attention from that fact that the issues that Canada faces have wider import. The underlying rationales for these policies are embedded in political projects -- nationalism, imperialism, nation building, generating political support and compliance -- that implicitly or explicitly involve theories of the state, society and culture, the social role of the media, the sources and consequences of identity, and the like. Therefore, to a considerable degree, we were interested in identifying propositions that must be valid if recent and current Canadian media policies are to succeed. These propositions derive from general theories that would apply in any similar country. Each, if valid, has implications for any media policy intended to develop and support national integration, independence, and the survival of democracies. In this regard it is critical to remember that their validity rests on systematic empirical testing, not anecdotal evidence. Seven of these propositions were stated in the introductory paper that functioned as our agenda. All but one have direct or indirect empirical referents and are potentially testable. The dilemmas countries face in trying to control their media and the cultural products they provide always seem to call for immediate action; waiting for research to test the assumptions that underlie actions that seem reasonable may be an unaffordable luxury. However, the knowledge that comes from empirical testing is critical for policy makers who will have to deal with similar issues in the future.

The propositions themselves vary in terms of whether they are directly testable. At least one -- the seventh, which states that Canada lacks a(n adequate) national culture -- is normative and may never be testable even though it is a major rationale for cultural and media policy in Canada and many other countries.

For an assessment to be widely accepted, there would have to be consensus on a concept of an adequate national culture that could be used as a standard against which to compare Canada. That is a normative exercise. A testable theoretical proposition about the adequacy of a national culture requires a theory of how and why countries vary in this respect. The test would require data on many more cases than Canada. This is not the place to reach a scholarly consensus on a concept of an adequate national culture (or even to examine whether there can be such a thing). Without one, however, there can be no theory that would account for how countries vary from that standard.

Two of the other propositions -- that which posits the efficacy of a mosaic concept for developing and supporting a national culture (4), and that which posits a relationship between cultural and informational programs (2) -- also are normative but might be tested indirectly. With respect to the fourth, without a meaningful concept of national culture and a specification of its features, any direct inquiry into the possible role of a mosaic concept -- unity in difference -- is not possible. However, studies of the relation of levels of intergroup conflict to levels of state efforts to promote a mosaic concept could be indirectly relevant. Such relationships might be examined in samples of countries at the same time or within single countries at various points in time. The second proposition implies a positive relationship between the amount and type of information people acquire and the extent to which they are likely to share norms, values, and goals. That proposition could be tested with sample survey data, and appropriate data might be available for several countries at several different times.

The remaining four propositions (i.e., 1, 3, 5, and 6) are more directly testable. Such available data sets as the Eurobarometer studies, the World and Canadian Values studies, and the U.S. General Social Survey and National Election Studies may provide adequate measures of the various concepts over time.\(^1\) They offer opportunities to observe variation among countries and within countries over time. Aspects of the fifth proposition (concerning the capacity of ethnically specialized media in a country to serve common goals) also might be tested with organizational and linguistic studies because it addresses the producers of the material and the medium of message representation as well as the responses of receivers. The third proposition, which posits a relation of national culture to national identity and support, requires that a case be made that the extent of concurrence on values, norms and goals, as well as the dominance of a national language, are adequate indicators of the extent to which a country has a national culture. Though the most immediate impact of the conference may come from the assessment of current policies, it would have little longer term value if it did not also stimulate research on the propositions that underlie policies.

Major Unresolved Issues

In the course of the discussions we frequently observed that the issues surrounding Canadian media policy arise from many conditions common to contemporary societies — the loss of solidarity that comes with growth and contacts with other societies, the displacement of the relationship between state and society, the erosion of consensus and sense of citizen responsibility that can accompany the growth of individualism, the insecurities that arise from economic and political competition and conflict among states. In that sense, the concerns of Canadians with their media are symptomatic of deeper issues that, in varying degree, apply to all contemporary societies. Media policy may be one limited way to address these conditions, but they were not created by the media alone nor can the media alone mitigate them. Given that so many countries have survived under these conditions for so long, several conferees (e.g., Marjorie Ferguson, Richard Collins) took the position that Canada is not on the verge of coming apart as a country and that to charge the media with preventing this is to assign them a misconceived and unnecessary task.

With respect to judgments of the efficacy of Canadian media policies, several conferees suggested that disappointments arise because we are unrealistic and expect too much of policy. We enter policy deliberations assuming that we have identified problems accurately and precisely, that they do not change as the conditions that give rise to them also change, and that the policy decisions taken can be perfect prescriptions for resolving them. Despite the fact that we may be wrong in any of these respects, we conclude that the failure to achieve our goals indicates problems with the policy. If we were to remain aware that policies are efforts to deal with aspects of an environment that are perceived only imprecisely and are judged by standards of the moment to be problematic, that are implemented by means whose connections to the desired ends are understood only imprecisely at best, and that both the environment that gives rise to a sense of problem and the circumstances in which the policies are implemented constantly change, we might be much less demanding in our expectations and less concerned and disappointed when policies fail to achieve their goals. Paul Rutherford, in his typically perceptive reflections, also observes that the policies pursued at any time (and their closely related predecessors) are the record and product of decades of political contests for national power. In Canada, media policy is only one dimension of cultural policy, which, in turn, is the arena in which competing groups try to impose their version of what this country that is a nation in becoming should be. He suggests that what is important about the struggle over a "no win" cultural policy and the media policies it shapes, is the integrative impact of collective interest in the project, not its efficacy, realism, possibility for success, or actual outcome. Although his imaginative suggestion may well be right, continually setting goals and failing to achieve them eventually can have its own high costs.

Except for this proviso, Rutherford's analysis resonates with my experience in evaluation. Long ago, in an assessment of the U. S. Department of Agriculture's Market News Service, the agency officials with whom I dealt wanted its value measured in terms of dollars and cents returns to farmers despite strong arguments that most farmers were not in a position to use market news effectively in deciding when and where to sell their crops. There were, however, data that showed that the material played a key role in keeping many farmers committed to farming. They drew upon it heavily in playing the many non-marketing roles in the complex network of relationships that constitute being a farmer. Even though this was a time when farmers were leaving the occupation in droves and, consequently, support for the programs that provided their jobs was eroding, these officials could not see beyond measuring the value of the service in any terms other than its original economic rationale. In contrast to my failed efforts on that occasion, Rutherford succeeds in making a persuasive case for the possible unanticipated functions of Canada's media policies. It is a case that needs to be made and emphasized (even though it would be even more compelling if there were data to support it) because we risk not seeing the greatest value of some policies if we judge them only by whether they reach their initial, ostensible goals. Canada's survival may be helped more by the continuing effort to use the media to build a nation than it would be by achieving that goal. If, however, we are not satisfied with evidence of latent functions and demand that media policies succeed in the terms set for them -- that is, if we deem it inappropriate or not enough that the ongoing effort to manage the media generates common interest and concern and require, instead, that media materials produce that result directly -- then several other matters will have to be addressed. Among these are:

Identity. Many years ago in Mio, Michigan, a small farming community isolated in the northern pine forests of the state's lower peninsula, I interviewed a man who had married a young women from that community and had moved there to work on her family's farm. Although the subject of the interview was farmers' use of farm market news, when the questions turned to the media that distributed it he began to tell me how he laid awake at night and listened to the dance band remote radio broadcasts from Chicago where he had grown up and lived as a young man. These broadcasts, he said, reminded him of who he was and how good life might be now that all he had was constant, unrewarding, bonebreaking work in this isolated place. He gave passionate testimony to how a truly significant sense of identity can be maintained in inhospitable

circumstances -- he claimed that it was the only thing that kept him going -- and to the role of the media in sustaining it. Market news did not make him a farmer in his own sense of self; dance band broadcasts from Chicago reaffirmed his sense of who he really was.

I recount this incident even though it has no direct connection to Canadian media policy to illustrate how deeply concern for one's identity can affect our thinking even though it is intangible, and the complex role of the media in creating, changing, and/or sustaining it. Identity is a difficult concept to work with in a conference in which it is not the central focus because there are so many different ideas about what it is, how it is formed, and what it does for us. In the last instance, my respondent's identity did not account define who he was. One manifestation of the concept's ambiguity to play the role without allowing it to national identity whether that term's referent is different from personal identity or a possible component of personal identity that may be present or absent in each person. In either case, and this is not limited to our papers and discussions, the components of identity (or separate identities) often are treated as if they are always present in consciousness and always influencing action. A more realistic alternative is that identities and their components are latent and enter consciousness only as they become relevant. Thus, for example, identifying ourselves with place usually becomes relevant only when we are asked where we are from, and how we do this usually depends on where we are and who is asking.

The unresolved ambiguities of national identity showed themselves during our deliberations in several ways.² Is it a collective phenomenon whose meaning is known to citizens of a country and/or outsiders (e.g., knowing what being a Canadian or an American connotes, [cf. Smith, Nevitte, and Kornberg]) but that need not be a component of one's self, or does it have meaning only if it is important to a person in identifying his or her self and whatever connotations it has for that person are specific to him or her? Regardless of the relation of national identity to personal identity (cf. Hedley, 1994), how is it formed? This certainly is relevant to any expectations about the relation of the media to national identity. Do the media create, reinforce, or both create and reinforce identity, or do they have no direct relation to it? Is national identity, as John Keane asks, a warm, nurturing sentiment or a necessary underpinning to fanatical, arrogant nationalism? Are identities best thought of as having an important orienting function in people's conscious decisions about action or is it simply a catalogue of labels that make it easy for others to mobilize them? These and similar questions are pertinent to such complex issues as whether the project of nation building can be divorced from nationalism, and whether supranational bodies can be used to sustain democracy and resolve nationalistic conflicts without also doing away with the sense of nationhood.

We certainly did not do much more than touch upon the complex issues of identity, national identity, the nation, and nationalism (cf. Calhoun, 1994). I would suggest tentatively that identity be thought of as personal, as comprised of a complex bundle of statuses and evaluations (e.g., a good scholar), as entering and leaving consciousness in whole or part in response to circumstances, as one of many factors that shape behavior in problematic situations that allow for reflection before action, and as constantly evolving in response to new experience and reenforcement and challenge by others. If so, national identity is an entity that refers to country or nation and its content can vary from nothing to great detail. It can take two forms -a publicly-shared concept that there is a group with a name that also may or may not include a specification of qualities of the group and/or its members, or a private idea about who one is that also may or may not include details associated with the national term. That would not be inconsistent with the independent existence of stereotypes of what being French or English or German or Canadian or anything else implies. These stereotypes may or may not be incorporated in part or in whole in a personal sense of national identity. Because a personal identity thought of in this fashion never has to be examined for consistency, people may have competing and incompatible identities and need not be aware of the inconsistencies. Hence, they also don't need to resolve the inconsistencies. Given the complexities inherent in the phenomenon, any effort to

use the media to promote unity, integrate a country, and generate public support for it must be based on an understanding of the nature of both personal identity and national identity, how the two relate, and how they develop and are sustained.

Culture. Our discussions also came up against a variety of problems associated with the concepts of culture and national culture. In my draft paper I distinguished between culture as a group's practiced behavior and standards and national culture, which, if it is truly national in a country that contains several groups with different cultures, must be either a statistical contrivance that applies to all residents of a country only in varying degrees or the culture of a dominant group that is able to impose it on all the other groups. John Jackson makes a somewhat similar distinction between high culture — that of a dominant elite and, presumably, analogous to my view of national culture — and popular culture — that which is produced by the informal, repetitive, every day actions of most ordinary citizens and somewhat analogous to my view of culture. He adds, as a third category, cultural industries — institutions that disseminate the practices of either group as commodities for commercial purposes. It this sense the media are a cultural industry, control of which is contested by the different proto-cultural groups in a country.

Several participants expressed the view that, looked at in this fashion, whether elite or popular, culture can be a mechanism for control and, hence, domination and, if so, that cultural policy can be a political project. If countries are not nations because they are not coterminous with single societies having a single culture, then the key issue that needs to be debated is who should be in control -- that is, who has the right to decide what elements of whose culture should be shared and made available if the state is to be able to count on its citizens sharing at least some attributes? Subsidiary to this issue is the matter of control of the cultural industries. The extent to which decisions on such issues fall into the political arena is dramatized by Marc Raboy's observation that media policy as implemented in Canada -- i.e., rules as to who should produce and whose products should be purchased -- is really industrial policy. Thelma McCormack's observation that the issues with which we dealt would be clearer if we examined them from the perspective of political economy is very much to the same point.

Canadian culture. The issue of whether there is a Canadian culture obviously is subsidiary to the more general question of national culture. Nonetheless, in as much as so much of Canadian cultural and media policy is said to be needed to protect and promote that culture, conferees often took stands on the matter. Some, like Richard Collins, have accepted the idea. Others expressed doubt in various ways. The empirical evidence that might resolve the question is mixed because of disagreements on such fundamental matters as what would constitute a distinctive culture, and, if there could be agreement on that matter, whether Canadians' behavior in the every day world matches that standard. The importance of the issue and its ambiguities are illustrated in two entirely different contexts by Neil Bissoondath's critique of multiculturalism in his recent Selling Illusions and Collins' assumptions in his assessment of the conference proceedings.

Neil Bissoondath's critique of multiculturalism addresses the concern for Canadian culture directly. He charges that the policy is so undefined that it threatens people who have difficulty grappling with the changes in Canada wrought by the new diversity, that they respond by romanticizing a traditional past without having to give it content, that the romanticized past is an exclusively English and French situation that has been lost irretrievably, and that the consequence of the contrast between the uncertainties of the amorphous multicultural present and the certainties of the traditional past is prejudice toward and discrimination against nontraditional immigrants because they don't fit into that picture. If as Bissoondath implies, Canada's past culture was either Victorian British⁴ or no culture at all (because conditions at the time of Confederation did not require one and, hence, its absence went unnoticed), then cultural change was inevitable and necessary. Multiculturalism, because it unintentionally may foster discriminatory practices⁵, takes the blame for a

process that was inevitable. These are issues for cultural policy that involve questionable assumptions about the nature of culture and effects of the media. At a minimum, multiculturalism as policy doesn't automatically imply a Canadian culture that must adjust to multiculturalism, nor is it an obvious facilitator or supporter of such a culture. Indeed, if Bissoondath's analysis is valid, it implies that, at its most, Canadian culture is a vague, ill-defined, amorphous phenomenon that provides little of the coherence expected in a group with a vital, widely shared culture. At its least, it can be taken to imply that there is none.

In contrast, Richard Collins accepts both the existence of a unique Canadian culture that differs from U.S. culture and the need to protect it as a central rationale for promotional or protectionist media policies. He makes the claim and cites the extensive work of Seymour Martin Lipset to support it to justify his proposals for expediting the role of the media in cultural policy. As one who for many years asserted in an annual 'Canadian society' lecture for beginning Canadian Studies students that "Canadian society really is different from American society in a great many ways but that the differences are very subtle" and used Lipset's almost thirty-five year old comparison of the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and Australia (1979:249) as documentation, I would have been quite prepared to agree with Collins' premise. However, in seeking to dramatize American exceptionalism by contrasting American values with their Canadian counterparts for a series of lectures on American values, I recently obtained World Values Survey data contrasting the United States and Canada. An examination of those data compelled me to drop my plan because almost every table I examined showed Canada and the United States to be quite similar and both to differ sharply from Mexico, in one case, and from the European democracies, in the other. Indeed, Nevitte's title, The Decline of Deference, testifies to the extent to which a unique culture may have eroded, for deference to status and authority frequently are singled out as a defining U.S.-Canadian difference. Charles Taylor's decision to resort to 'law and order' and 'collective provision' in dealing with problems as the dimensions of difference from the United States that justify the continuation of a Canada outside of Quebec rather than unification with the United States should Quebec secede also shows how weak the evidence for a distinctive Canadian culture is. Some resolution to these widely varied positions on Canadian culture is necessary for a meaningful discussion of how media policy can address cultural conditions.

Globalization and privatization. Lee Becker, John Meisel, and Marjorie Ferguson, coming from completely different perspectives, all conclude that the globalization of telecommunications will not obviate the importance of local media. Locally relevant material provided by local media will still be needed in a globalizing world. Thus, even if transnational corporations (TNCs) acquire local media, these outlets will continue as such, or new outlets that do this will be launched. Evidence to this effect was provided almost fifty years ago by Morris Janowitz (1952), whose study of local community weekly newspapers in Chicago showed that they survive in a metropolis with competing dailies because they link people to their local neighborhoods in ways that facilitate their every day lives and reenforce their sense of self. The process is not all that dissimilar to that which helped my Chicago native survive as a Mio farmer. To the extent that Canadians have cultural rather than economic concerns that privatization accompanied by consolidation with TNCs will deprive them of national systems, the implication is that the concern is misplaced.⁷

The public sphere and democracy. The initial issue raised with respect to democracy was the possible conflict between expectations that the media can both fill an unbiased information-providing role and promote a national culture. It suggests an implicit contradiction between self-determination and manipulation. As our discussions developed, the notion of a democratic function for the media expanded to include the idea that they, and in particular the new media, can provide a public space for developing consensus on what the important issues are and how best to deal with them -- that they can serve as town meetings and coffee houses may have served in the past to help form a meaningful public opinion. Elihu Katz's paper and discussions sparked by several other papers suggested that broadcast media must be

publicly-owned or publicly-managed monopolies if they are to attract the widespread participation necessary for a public space to be an inclusive forum in which issues that affect everyone are discussed.

Several conferees stressed the importance of realizing that a public monopoly intended as a public space can just as easily be an instrument of state domination. To avoid this there must be some way to guarantee access to everyone, but this is not an easy condition to meet. The Internet and its chat rooms fractionate the population by ability to participate and interests. The provision of comparable supplies of alternative viewpoints also has not proven to be feasible; equal time requirements to achieve this have eroded because time when almost everyone is available to watch or listen is much more limited than the alternatives that claim time. Fairness requirements are almost impossible to enforce because they require judgments based on relative standards.

These difficulties probably are linked to the nature of identity in complex societies. In a world of multiple, cross-cutting identities that feed individualism and dissensus, is the very notion of a public sphere -- a structured system in which everyone can participate with the same interests and the same commitment to arrive at consensus -- a realistic possibility? Paul Rutherford suggested that, despite their problems as a public space, non-monopolistic media do have the advantage of eroding and diffusing centralized power. Several conferees also noted that the inadequacies of the media for democracy are always laid to the media, never to citizens. We do not consider whether people are living up to their responsibilities as citizens and how to get them to do so. We assume that any steps to be taken in this regard must be directed to the media. Basically, the needs of modern democracy and the expectations for citizenship need to be clarified before these responsibilities are laid on the media.

Media effects. It may be testimony to the minefield that the study of media effects is that only Lee Becker had the courage to address the matter directly. I admit to avoiding it. I choose instead to talk about the social role of the media. Recently, to justify this approach, I cited two articles by reputable scholars who, after reviewing research on media effects, came to diametrically opposite conclusions as to whether reliable, valid evidence supports claims that there are any (Smith, 1995:157-159). Every effort at media policy making, though, ignores these unresolved disagreements and presumes that there are effects.⁸ In many cases, the mechanisms by which these effects occur also are assumed to be known. This is not the place for a litany of conflicting concepts about the nature and mechanisms of effects. However, valid, reliable knowledge of the effect process is a necessity for policy makers who set goals and expect to achieve them. There is no way to formulate and implement media policies to achieve goals without understanding how the media produce outcomes that are or are not wanted. Very likely we will not have such knowledge soon, if ever.⁹ The media are just one among innumerable factors that interact to shape our world. They do not exist or operate in a vacuum. They impact upon, are affected by, and reflect the settings in which they exist. At best we may only be able to suggest alternative ways to think about expectations for the media in the contemporary world.

Policy

The conferees have taken some very different positions on such matters as nationalism, the risks for Canada's future as an integrated country, Canadian culture and its status, the role of market versus public control, and other crucial matters. Nevertheless, there also was explicit and implicit concurrence on some matters that might provide some guidelines and suggestions for Canadian media policy. Here I summarize some of these possibilities. They are not intended to cover the spectrum of integrated strategies that may be desirable, e.g., auctioning of dedicated licenses, production subsidies (cf. Vormann, 1991:135-142).

Conferees made several general observations about policy and media policy that may help clarify the domain of policies and the sorts of actions required to implement them. The need to be clear about domains is basic. It frequently was noted that the different programs that implement media policy actually represent variously media policy, cultural policy, and industrial policy. Each has different goals and is implemented by different means. Moreover, how we think about the media and their operations is central to setting policy. These matters tend to be neglected and taken for granted. In this regard, Thelma McCormack suggested that in order to de-emphasize considerations of profit in the debate on state support, the media ought to be treated as public goods, like the environment, streets, or the armed forces. Nevertheless, because public financing is difficult when there is not widespread public support or use, Richard Collins suggested that Canadian media need to become more financially self-sufficient by producing material that is more competitive in the export market, selling rights to the broadcast spectrum, etc.

Marc Raboy called attention to how the structure of policy making and implementation undermine its effectiveness, noting, for example, that all symbol preparation and movement are treated as equivalent. As a consequence, Canadian policy makers do not distinguish sufficiently the media and telecommunications even though such key issues of privacy and access are entirely different for the two. Moreover, Canadian policy is made and implemented in both federal and provincial legislative bodies and interpreted (also a policy making process) by numerous federal (e.g., CRTC, CBC, Canadian Heritage) and provincial agencies with little coordination. He also emphasized how unrealistic it is to expect integration among the federal and provincial units when national unity is such a contentious issue.

In a different but related vein, John Meisel suggested that Canadian policy makers often do not analyze situations and respond to them as systemically as they might. Specifically, Canada and other countries may not be able to solve their media problems until the United States, the major exporter of media material, solves its problems. In the "Power Rangers" case, for example, the nature of the product created the controversy. But this also is an issue in the United States, where violent programming for children is also a concern but enforcement of legislation to control it is lax. Although Canadian concerns about American imports might abate if Americans could solve their media problems, the 'country music' case suggests that, even if the improbable were to happen, the issue would not go away. Observations such as these can provide major guidelines for policy makers before they address more specific alternatives. The problem of course, is that these are all contentious political issues.

In addition to the many ideas proposed by the conferees, I included some comments about and suggestions for policy in my draft introductory paper. Because that material may have led them to ignore those possibilities, I want to conclude by repeating them. The Canadian content regulations for broadcasters that have been so widely criticized are a practical starting point for this purpose. Over the years a varying proportion of programming considered Canadian has been a goal for and/or a criterion against which to judge broadcasting performance. The criteria for qualifying as Canadian also have varied. Moreover, the audience usually is not informed as to which material is considered Canadian or why. Although the criteria and proportions have varied because it has not been feasible to exclude U.S. broadcasting and offer almost exclusively Canadian material, that has been the goal for both public and private Canadian broadcasting.

Three aspects of Canadian content -- subject matter, quality, and participation in production -- should be considered separately because by doing so it becomes clear that Canadian content regulations serve more than media policy. The three may or may not be related. Subject matter, in so far as it encourages the choice of Canadian themes, primarily implements cultural policy. Participation in production or performance primarily implements economic or industrial policy. Even anonymous Canadian participation in production may qualify material as Canadian because there is not enough obviously Canadian entertainment material to enable broadcasters to meet quotas without curtailing broadcasting during hours that U.S. stations are still

on the air. Moreover, it creates jobs for Canadians. Only quality, insofar as it involves the performance and judgment of media professionals, is primarily in the realm of media policy. The expectation is that, all other things being equal, Canadians will choose Canadian material if it is available. Many things are involved in all other things being equal, but quality is a paramount consideration. No one argues that Canadians would prefer poor Canadian productions to high quality foreign productions. I consider the three in this order.

In practice, the subject matter criterion for Canadian content has two facets. One pertains to the "Canadianness" of material, the other to whether it is acceptable for broadcasting in Canada. 11 A naive view would be that the regulation addresses only the first, but several cases in which public reactions to programming get the attention of regulators (e.g., "Power Rangers," pornographic films) indicate that the second is equally important. More is required than "Canadianness. If so, the regulation is intended to encourage not any portrayal of Canadian culture but acceptable portrayals of Canadian culture. This raises several questions. Does the policy, as implemented, condone and permit manipulation from above by high ranking government administrators and/or an elite segment of the public that can express itself forcefully? In as much as a prohibition can be considered censorship, it is also a free speech issue that raises a question as to whether ends justify means in Canadian culture. And spanning both facets of the subject matter criterion is that basic question that bedevils Canada and needs to be answered if there is to be Canadian content in more than a perfunctory sense. Is there a Canadian culture that programs should reflect -- if so, what is it? These are issues for cultural policy that cannot be resolved through media policy. Attempts to do so involve the questionable assumptions about the nature of culture and effects of the media that have already been elaborated. At a minimum, multiculturalism as policy needs to be reexamined. 12 It neither automatically implies nor facilitates or supports a Canadian culture, but it can hamper one. Canadian culture, considered either from the perspective of its consonance with multiculturalism (cf. Bissoondath) or its uniqueness in contrast to U.S. culture (cf. Nevitte, Maule and Atkinson, and others), is a questionable justification in cultural terms for Canadian content regulations -- or other media policies of a more general nature -- at best.

To the extent that the goal is primarily to direct more Canadian personnel and money into production, then Canadian content regulations clearly relate to economic and industrial policy. Would Canadian communication officials be happy if a large number of high quality programs about Canada shown in Canada were produced in the U.S. without any Canadian participation? The FTA and NAFTA leave no doubt that Canadian policymakers want Canadian entrepreneurs and workers to produce Canadian material. Canadian production makes jobs for Canadian workers. Jobs are an issue in an economy with high unemployment, particularly if the skills required by media industries cannot be used in another industry or retraining is not feasible. Jobs also are an issue if they require rare expertise that could be needed in Canada and the people who have the skills are leaving for more attractive employment elsewhere. Addressing these issues involves job creation, salaries, working conditions, and the like. In addition to creating jobs that serve the domestic market, there is an interest in maintaining Canada's position in the international telecommunications market. This requires decisions about how Canada's comparative advantages can be exploited in a world economy. All these are familiar labor and trade policy issues and not unique to the media.

The quality of Canadian content is an issue for media policy. Production values reflect artistic merit and are affected by the quality and capacity of production, distribution, and reception equipment and facilities and how they are used. Equipment development and acquisition may require subsidies. Canadian firms have been active in development and may need government help to continue to compete. Depending on where one stands on Babe's view that Canada is overly dependent on technology for integration, this could also be an economic matter. If, however, there is merit to the argument that all Canadians have a right to high quality programs, then, matters of "Canadianness" or culture aside, it is an issue of media policy. It is hard to believe, however, that the Canadian content regulations are intended to make Canadians consume only

domestic material at any cost. If every aspect of quality -- not just its "Canadianness" -- is the issue, then government policies must address the tastes and skills that shape audience behavior as well as the supply.

In this regard, in discussing U.S. media policy under First Amendment constraints and commitment to a *laissez faire* economy, I have proposed the earliest possible public education in media consumption (Smith, 1995:213-214). The same proposal would be appropriate for Canada. Indeed, it also was suggested by a participant in the public debate on the Power Rangers who opposed its removal. The goals of early education in media consumption (e.g., learning to distinguish media representations from reality, learning how the media can deceive, distort, and mislead) are pertinent anywhere. Canadian children also might be taught how to enjoy and appreciate something without being influenced to copy it. There is no reason not to enjoy any cultural product of any country if it does not lead one to denigrate or abandon one's own. Children need to learn how to evaluate, and that dissatisfaction is not a reason to withdraw support. That is part of socialization. Canadians need to feel free to dislike or disagree with Canadian material and to enjoy foreign material without equating this with abandoning Canada. Most important, Canadians and their leaders have to make a Canada that merits support.

Training in media consumption is more dynamic than protective and promotional communication policies directed primarily to communicators. States' concerns about domestic society legitimize their roles as monitors and rule setters (e.g., CRTC, FCC) and their right to communicate (in the case of public broadcasting). The choice of these roles is based on assumptions that communicators determine not just the material available in a system but also its meaning, and that material determines effects. They implicitly posit a passive consumer subject to either the hypodermic-like effects or cultivation processes. They ignore the possibility that consumers may be active and that control is an ongoing process of competition among a field of interested internal and external actors rather than power concentrated in the hands of communicators.

Consumer education recognizes these possibilities that redresses the power imbalances in the communicator-communicatee relationship by helping receivers to be more discriminating and discerning and more aware of their potential power as communicatees. Commercial media entrepreneurs know that without consumers they are out of business. A multifaceted media policy ought to reflect the fact that communication is a process to which many active participants contribute, that each has some resources and power to shape the operation and survival of a system in which it occurs. At a minimum, consumer education should provide the skills needed to play the communicatee role effectively. If successful, it might minimize the impact of imports either by curtailing demand or ameliorating any of their deleterious cultural effects.

Protectionist media policies have little promise. Aside from their affinity to censorship, it is doubtful that they can be successful in light of innovations in media technology. One cannot deprive Canadians of cable, satellite dishes, or any other new technology they know exist. Pressures to deregulate and privatize, together with proximity to the United States, also make it difficult to control supplies of equipment and cultural commodities. Because the prospects for self-control also are not promising, the option of educating both old and new consumers is even more attractive.

Policies that promote the production of Canadian material are always attractive, but the emphasis must be on quality. Canadians are much more likely to be attracted to and impressed by fewer domestic productions that always are excellent than by a large supply of mediocre to bad material. They might even decrease media consumption, regardless of the provenance of the material, if their tastes were honed on high quality Canadian material. The idea that Canada has to produce enough to fill all its media with Canadian material has not been challenged with this alternative. In addition, such material might improve Canada's position in the export market.

Attention to quality also bears on the production of a national culture. Aside from whether it is feasible, it is a dangerous project. It implies that someone or group decides what it should be and how it is to be instilled. It provides a mechanism for manipulation -- a problem with all culture. Cultures emphasize stability and conformity rather than change and innovation. A naturally developing culture has the virtue of offering security and identity while being open to change and diversity. A manufactured culture shaped and imposed from above, no matter how well intentioned, is an entirely different matter. Atkinson (1994:744) has suggested that the elite politics required to maintain a mosaic that accommodates diversity probably would produce the sort of culture that is "...less likely to produce a challenge to the status quo."

In emphasizing culture, we may lose sight of the fact that it is a construct -- a concept created by scholars. Media and cultural policy address popular culture (e.g., folk art, commercial entertainment) and/or high culture (painting, drama, literature) and idealize the possibility of a national culture (i.e., culture constructed to tie to a political entity, a possibility that Handler has dismissed [1994:27], cf. Collins [1990b]); they do not address culture in the ethnographic sense. A culture in that sense is the tradition of patterned ways in which a group has accommodated to its circumstances. Cultures develop naturally; they are not purposely planned or manipulated. The people who exhibit these patterns do not consider their routines to be a culture. It is self-evident and obvious to them that their normal patterns of behavior, shared norms, values, and goals are appropriate and acceptable. Only outside observers objectify them as culture. Viewed in this light, the call to protect or develop a national culture may be a statement about someone's goals and interests rather than an assertion about a unique assemblage of material objects, behaviors, beliefs, attitudes, norms, and values needed for the country to survive (cf. Bissoondath; Leong, 1989). If so, who is it that knows what the national culture should be and wants to implant it (cf. Yerxa and Moll, 1995, ¶4)? I would suggest that the call for a national culture is an appropriation of the scholarly concept of culture for the political arena by an elite whose interests would be furthered if there were such a thing. 13 Elsewhere, I also have suggested (1991; 1995:288-289), as has Collins (1990a:32-37), that a national culture and efforts to build, preserve, or enhance one are concerns of interest to political leaders, intellectuals, and some segments of an upper class, not to the population at large (cf. Corse, 1995).

Why would an elite be concerned with culture? Put crassly, the interest is power (cf. Bodemann, 1984; Carroll, 1986). Control of an effective national culture (i.e., one to which everyone in the country subscribes) offers the potential for manipulating the population. The existence of a culture means that most of those who share it behave as it prescribes and are self-motivated to do so. People who behave predictably are subject to social control. In a society with an effective culture, authorities can rely on approved modes of leadership to mobilize support for their policies and actions. In modern societies, social order and voluntary compliance with demands that are costly but perceived as necessary by leaders (e.g., paying taxes, serving in the armed forces, not endangering the public health, repressing impulses to violent dissent) are increasingly problematic. a country's leaders are always concerned with avoiding social disorder and maintaining the potential for social mobilization. A widely shared national culture is a check against unpredictable behavior and incipient dissent. The promotion of a national culture then, may be, as much as anything, a response to these, by now, almost universal concerns of societal elites.

In a contemporary country, a national culture primarily contributes to the survival of and a good life for the group as a collectivity and for its leaders. It may or may not do so for ordinary people as individuals. Objectified cultures are conservative, they emphasize the established rather than change. By telling people how to think about reality, what is right and what is wrong, what to do and what not to do, what is worth achieving and what is not, they function as conformist ideologies that discourage individual initiative. A policy of building and protecting national culture implies that people's welfare is tied to that of the national entity, that their lot in life will not improve if they deviate from the prescribed norms. Accordingly, the tactics it provides leaders for mobilizing citizen support and conformity are likely to succeed. In sum, the

promotion of national culture may serve the interests of state authorities; it may or may not serve those of its citizens. This is particularly the case if the justification, undesirable American influence, is misunderstood. As a calculated goal, it is dissonant with Canadian traditions and social democracy.

The Future

Despite having questioned Canadian efforts to develop and inculcate a national culture and identity through the media and having suggested that concerns about U.S. media may be exaggerated, I also accept the argument that the Canadian government cannot simply abandon communication regulation and let market factors alone determine the country's media fare. Indeed, my suggestions regarding education recognize the state's role in shaping the lives of its citizens -- it simply suggests that the state divert its investments and intrusions from one institution to another. Nor do those suggestions guarantee that a differently educated populace will support what the state's leaders consider to be necessary actions for maintaining sovereignty. The maintenance of national integration and state support are chronic problems in a world in which migration is increasingly common and national borders are increasingly permeable. In addressing the question of whether there is any reliable solution to the strains that the Canadian government faces in the developing telecommunications arena, I have been struck by two cogent, but not easily reconcilable analyses of the current situation.

Mark Starowicz, a CBC executive producer and staunch proponent of state support for public broadcasting, has recently (1993) stated a case for why that institution can contribute the development of a national culture that can help buttress Canadian independence. He accepts the premise that a national culture is a necessary condition for independence and admits Canada's difficulties in that regard. Listing many of the reasons discussed in this volume, he acknowledges that "a Canadian should be the last person capable of defining a national culture...It is impossible...to define a Canadian national culture as some function of defined territory, common language, and common heritage" (92). He goes on to observe that Canada is characterized by competing values, and, because this is the case, that its "(n)ational culture...could be usefully seen as a *process*" (92) in which some values and ethics may become dominant for a while but almost certainly will be replaced in a decade or two. After showing how well this depiction fits the Canadian situation, he asserts (93):

(H)owever cacophonous the process, and despite those that are excluded, there is by and large an underlying consent on a set of rules by which to argue, and a place in which to do it -- the nation.

I propose this working definition of national culture: A country's or ethnic group's aggregate values (social, political, economic, ethical and artistic), not necessarily harmonious, at any given time; a constant process. This definition does not require homogeneity; it recognizes culture as dynamic; it allows art and entertainment to be defined as a form of communication rather than as a product. (National identity, I propose, might be usefully defined as a subset of the above definition. Simply, the dominant social political, economic, ethical and artistic values and characteristics of a particular country or ethnic component, at a particular time).

I do not wish to discuss some of the obvious problems with these definitions because it should be clear by now that I am aware of the complexities of the issues he is trying to resolve and that I understand the difficulties with which he is grappling. Besides, I would only repeat the points I already have made. I do, however, want to juxtapose Starowicz's ideas with a very different perspective on these issues (Price, 1995:233-234):

(E)very state holds a conversation with its subjects as to the legitimacy of its existence. In this conversation, the state is engaged in self-justification, in making the case for the loyalty of its citizens. Some states may have so weak a franchise without the use of force or fiction that the creation and propagation of a narrative of legitimacy is all-consuming, pervasive, and devastatingly revealing of the regime. Even in democratic societies, however, the necessity for generating and maintaining a narrative of community is a universal occupation. What is important is that these ideas and images are part of every state's definition. Governments are virtually compelled to generate or favour images that reinforce the relationship between their subjects and themselves. The state may claim to intervene in the market-place of ideas out of defence of its culture, a valid and relevant ground for intervention, or, more ambitiously, to encourage a world outlook that extends its dominion. National identity, so theatrical and compelling a concept, becomes, as I have argued, the often elegant collection of images that the government (or a series of interest groups) manufactures or encourages to keep itself in power.

Starowicz' proposals address the processes of competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation that go on in informal fashion in all contemporary democratic societies. When they are pursued in a tolerant, understanding manner, they exemplify the ideal of a working democracy in which the role of government is minimal. But Starowicz writes as though the ideal always is adhered to and as if the state does not exist or, at least, that it exists only when it is needed to expedite the process. But the state does exist, needs to legitimate itself, and, as Price makes abundantly clear, is consumed with issues of support and self-preservation. Moreover, the ideal of peaceful subgroup competition is frequently violated and, when it is, state intervention may be required. There are no guarantees that the many groups that comprise today's socially heterogeneous countries will always work out their differences peacefully and there are no stateless socially heterogeneous countries were not self-interested, they are compelled to monitor the ongoing competition for dominance and control and, frequently, to intervene in order to keep the peace. Moreover, as Price also makes clear, the invention and promotion of myths can be preferable to force as the mode of intervention. This places the state in the position of promoting some particular culture and identity, not the vague undefined process of accepting an ongoing competition with forever shifting outcomes that Starowicz suggests as adequate.

Neither Starowicz nor Price is ignorant or naive; their differences reflect the dilemma of all contemporary countries -- people trying to exercise democracy and states struggling to maintain stable conditions in which they can do so. The result is an ongoing dialectic, a continuous movement between polarities of minimal intervention and group competition in an uncontrolled market, on the one hand, and state intervention to reestablish and maintain these conditions, on the other. All the while there is a continuous need on the part of the state to maintain itself with popular support and to legitimate its right to intervene when it does. Canada exemplifies everything that both Starowicz and Price discuss -- different groups engaged in a sometimes friendly, sometimes acrimonious ongoing competition for cultural dominance, a state with a strong franchise that has been allowed to grow weak, and a state that needs to generate and maintain a narrative of community. In these circumstances, there is no ideal role for the state with respect to the media. We are likely to see more of the same.

ENDNOTES

1. These and other available data sets also might provide material needed to examine the second and fourth propositions.

- 2. Rex (1996:2.6) also sees the concept as ambiguous, assigning it at least two meanings. However, they differ from those discussed here.
- 3. In this regard it is useful to refer to Rex (1996:2.6), who associates a nation's identity with the way of life of "dominant groups" (emphasis added).
- 4. Rutherford (1978) writes that the Canadian press promoted cultural values for Canada in at least two different 19th century periods.
- 5. There is evidence that suggests the existence of discriminatory practices (cf. the references in Chapter 1 to the work of Reitz and Breton, also Ray and Moore, 1991).
- 6. In a heroic act of gracious scholarly cooperation, Professor Neil Nevitte provided from Toronto on one day's notice draft manuscripts of two forthcoming books in which analyses of these data are reported (Nevitte, 1996; Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basanez, 1996).
- 7. Marjorie Ferguson had already expressed this view earlier when she wrote (1993:49) that "The more compelling story is that *any* distinctively Canadian television and radio survive, given seven decades of American variety, drama, and overspill." If my McGill students are to be believed, though, what makes this material distinctive is its slow pace and poor production values as compared to U.S. material. The more conventional view of critical media scholars that globalization will destroy independent national media is expressed succinctly by Mowlana (1993). Economic conservatives who promote transnational economic integration also anticipate the disappearance of local markets (cf. Blank, 1992).
- 8. Rutherford (1978:64, 75) implies that Canadian politicians have acted on the assumption that the press has effects. He explains politicians' behavior in two cases as responses to newspaper editorials, the politicians' assumption being that the editorials would be read and their positions accepted by readers.
- 9. Perhaps uncertainty about media effects is now gone. Recently Page (1996:23) wrote that "(t)he days of belief in 'minimal effects' by the media are over. A large body of evidence now indicates that what appears in print or on the air has a substantial impact..." However, he then urges further research on how the media have their effects and whether they provide or simply convey the stimuli. Even if Page is right about media effects, apparently we still don't know very much about their most important aspects. In this regard I side effects, apparently we still don't know very much about their most important aspects. In this regard I side with Smith (1993[1986]), who questions the concern that the consumption of foreign media materials has with Smith (1993[1986]), who questions the concern that the consumption of foreign media materials has hypodermic-like effects that undermine a person's national identity (cf. Ferguson, 1993:53), and writes (74) hypodermic-like effects that undermine a person's national identity (cf. Ferguson, 1993:53), and writes (74) that "The complex of causes and effects simply stuns the logical processes of the mind: it is impossible to think through the myriad of variables that are contained within the communication process, the totality of human interactions which constitute culture."
- 10. Mildred Schwartz (1981) earlier had pointed to the more general policy interdependency of the two countries.
- 11. Vormann interprets the Applebaum-Hebert Report as proposing a much more negative version of this dichotomy. He writes (1991:46) that "(t)he report created a very elitist distinction, where 'bad' films are dichotomy. He writes of mass-market values and 'good' films will be good precisely because they are distinctively defined in terms of mass-market values and 'good' films will be good precisely because they are distinctively Canadian," and refers to that aspect of the report as cultural nationalism.
- 12. Rex (1996:4.5-4.13) distinguishes several types of policy responses to cultural diversity ranging between assimilation and permanent maintenance of cultural differences. He espouses a type that seems to be much

- like Canada's and suggests that, except for "symbolic ethnicity and the maintenance of a symbolic heritage through festivals and similar occasions," the groups will develop a common culture after three or four generations. Even if the historical record supported his prediction, Canada may not have that much time.
- 13. Vormann concurs insofar as his assessment of Canadian content strategies can be construed as bearing upon an aspect of the program of building a national culture. He argues (1991:58) that "...the nationalistic call for access to the broadcasting system and the notions of program variety and quality show a tendency toward elitism. Any government intervention with respect to these goals may be perceived as paternalistic (references omitted)." This is consistent with Taras' (1991:345) characterization of Meisel's position as being that "Canadian culture has a high-brow quality..."
- 14. Servaes (1993:144-145) is explicit about the potential of an elite-promoted national culture and identity for social control. He writes that "...cultural identity may...imply...the rejection of values, institutions, and forms that destroy social cohesion; and...may include the use of so-called traditional values and norms, or arguments emphasizing... 'cultural uniqueness' to legitimize marginalization or the existing status quo."

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