





**IMAGE EVALUATION  
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic  
Sciences  
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET  
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580  
(716) 872-4503

1.0  
1.2  
1.4  
1.6  
1.8  
2.0  
2.2  
2.5  
2.8  
3.2  
3.6  
4.0

**CIHM/ICMH  
Microfiche  
Series.**

**CIHM/ICMH  
Collection de  
microfiches.**



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques

1.0  
1.2  
1.4  
1.6  
1.8  
2.0  
2.2  
2.5  
2.8  
3.2  
3.6  
4.0

**© 1986**

Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below.

L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Coloured covers/<br>Couverture de couleur  | <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured pages/<br>Pages de couleur   |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Covers damaged/<br>Couverture endommagée   | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages damaged/<br>Pages endommagées   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Covers restored and/or laminated/<br>Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée  | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages restored and/or laminated/<br>Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cover title missing/<br>Le titre de couverture manque   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/<br>Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured maps/<br>Cartes géographiques en couleur   | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages detached/<br>Pages détachées  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/<br>Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Showthrough/<br>Transparence   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured plates and/or illustrations/<br>Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur  | <input type="checkbox"/> Quality of print varies/<br>Qualité inégale de l'impression   |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bound with other material/<br>Relié avec d'autres documents  | <input type="checkbox"/> Includes supplementary material/<br>Comprend du matériel supplémentaire   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion<br>along interior margin/<br>La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la<br>distorsion le long de la marge intérieure   | <input type="checkbox"/> Only edition available/<br>Seule édition disponible   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blank leaves added during restoration may<br>appear within the text. Whenever possible, these<br>have been omitted from filming/<br>Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées<br>lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte,<br>mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont<br>pas été filmées. | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata<br>slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to<br>ensure the best possible image/<br>Les pages totalement ou partiellement<br>obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure,<br>etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à<br>obtenir la meilleure image possible. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Additional comments:/<br>Commentaires supplémentaires:  |  |

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/  
Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

10X	12X	14X	16X	18X	20X	22X	24X	26X	28X	30X	32X
						✓					

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:




Législature du Québec  
Québec

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol  $\rightarrow$  (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol  $\nabla$  (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:

Législature du Québec  
Québec

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminent par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole  $\rightarrow$  signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole  $\nabla$  signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.



11  
OUR

*Vol. 52*

**FREE TRADE POLICY**

**EXAMINED**

WITH RESPECT TO

**ITS REAL BEARING**

UPON

**NATIVE INDUSTRY, OUR COLONIAL SYSTEM,**

AND

**THE INSTITUTIONS AND ULTIMATE DESTINIES**

OF

**THE NATION.**

*BY A LIVERPOOL MERCHANT.*

LONDON:

WHITTAKER & CO., AVE MARIA LANE;

LIVERPOOL: LACE AND ADDISON, AND W. GRAPEL.

1846.

THE TWENTH CENTURY

THE TWENTH CENTURY

ERRATUM.

Page 9, line 21, for *exportation*, read *importation*.

# FREE TRADE

AND

## NATIONAL AND COLONIAL INDUSTRY.

---

When the astounding measures of Sir Robert Peel's government were first promulgated to the world, the entire British nation seemed to reel under a sense of their gigantic importance. The Free Trader himself stood aghast at the prospect of that great experiment being tried, for the successful result of which he had so ardently and confidently pledged himself; whilst those, whose study and boast it had been to "walk in the light of the constitution," and to be guided by the experience of the past, saw in those measures the surges of a social revolution advancing to overwhelm the time-honoured institutions, the religion, the laws, and the liberties of this great empire.

"The boldest held their breath,  
For a time."

The exciting strife of party stepped in to allay the national ferment. We lost sight for a moment of our sense of the perilous character of the measures, in our detestation of the glaring inconsistency and apostasy of the minister who had propounded them. After a while we heard the arguments, which, coming from the lips of agitators steeped in selfishness and hostile to the permanency of all that the nation revered of its "old ways" and cherished interests, had stirred up our anger and disgust, repeated in bland accents by statesmen to whom we had been accustomed to look as the safe and able guardians of our common weal. We thought that we were about to embark in an untried course of policy diametrically opposed to that under which this empire had progressed in greatness, in wealth, in industry, and in social comfort; and we had a confused and lingering trust that, much as we might dislike the change and despise the motives of its authors, our country's destinies were confided to the hands of men who would bear them through the ordeal to which they were about to be submitted, without material injury being suffered to approach any interest which we had valued, or any institution which we had loved. We began to persuade ourselves that the change had become imperative upon us; and that its character would be mitigated in danger by its being brought forward under the auspices of Conservative rulers.

Thanks to the few consistent men, "amongst the faithless faithful only found," who have stood firm in defence of the country's true



interests, and in opposition to our temporary blindness—thanks moreover to the chance, arising out of the state of Ireland, which has afforded us breathing time to reflect upon the tendency of those measures and to extricate ourselves from the state of bewilderment into which their first promulgation precipitated us—we are now capable of approaching them, with some hope of arriving at a just conclusion, with respect to their probable effect upon the national prosperity. We are getting rid of the absurd thought that there is *only one* course of safety left open to us. We are discovering that the destinies of this mighty empire are not indissolubly connected with the extent of rottenness to be found amongst our potatoes. The elaborately detailed statistical facts, got up by philosophers, as to the condition of this esculent, are ceasing to fright us from our propriety; and *we dare* now approach the consideration of the question, whether the policy of Great Britain is to be determined by the accident of the condition of a root, which affords the staple support to the most depressed only of her population, or whether it is to be dictated by considerations of permanent interest and of justice. We have time to pause and to ask ourselves whether it is absolutely necessary that, to meet a temporary emergency, we must break through those wholesome rules of national policy, which have served us for centuries, and, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary, which we do not see, might serve us for centuries to come. *We dare* now, and happily we have had leisure, to lay aside the conventional deference which we have been accustomed to pay to Statesmen and to Party Leaders; and, upon a question so largely affecting the interests and the social position of every individual in this great empire, to think for ourselves—in a word, to look our probable position, under the operation of the measures proposed to our acceptance, fully and fairly in the face.

It is my object, in the following pages, to endeavour to assist my fellow-countrymen in arriving at a just conclusion of the enquiry to which their happily awakened reason is now addressing itself. I wish to ask—not what miserable motives, what debasing and selfish considerations of party, have urged a conservative Ministry to embark in the work of carrying out these measures—but to examine coolly, and I hope I shall be able to do so impartially, their tendency, as regards the various interests of this great empire. In the performance of this task I ask the reader to take nothing of mine for granted. I claim from him no faith in any *mere opinion* which, in the course of that task, I may express. Whatever I state I shall endeavour to *prove*, from the best evidence within my reach, and when I state that I have no motives to influence me beyond those which any honourable man may fairly acknowledge—no motives beyond an earnest desire to see the good of my country, and the true interest of my fellow-countrymen of every class promoted, I trust I may be acquitted of the possible charge of intrusion; and that what I have to offer to the public may receive a candid consideration.

The pleas put forward in behalf of the measures, now offered to

the acceptance of the nation, are various; and some of them are not a little contradictory. It is said that we have arrived at that state of things that we can no longer, within our own means, produce sufficient food for our population; and that we must call in not the occasional, but the constant, aid of the foreign agriculturist. I must confess that I doubt this fact, and the consequent necessity insisted upon. The production of the soil of this kingdom has been shown to be capable of vast increase. The very parties who urge us to embark in the race of agricultural competition admit the fact, when they tell us that the native agriculturist *has nothing to fear from that competition*. We possess, moreover, in our Colonies, fertile soils of vast extent, tilled by British industry, which, under a just and wise treatment by the Mother Country, would rapidly be in a condition to supply bread stuffs and other food, not only for Great Britain, but for the whole of Europe. The lapse of half-a-dozen years, the withdrawal of that frenzied agitation, directed against native and colonial agriculture, which depresses the spirits and the enterprize of those engaged in it, and some tangible ground afforded them that their interests and the fruits of that enterprize would no longer be interfered with by continual legislative tinkering, would place Great Britain in a position of *complete independence of other nations* for the food of its people.

This plea then, that we cannot produce that food within ourselves breaks down altogether. I might go on to examine the value of other pleas of a similar character, all of them put forward to draw us away from the *real object* of the authors of these measures. I will not, however, tax the reader's patience by doing so; but at once come to the true and broad question at issue between the free-trader and the advocate of protection to native industry. The object of the former, against which the advocate of a just amount of favour to the native industry protests, is to give an unnatural impetus to our foreign commerce; to erect a great Manufacturing and Commercial Aristocracy as the paramount interest of the kingdom, and ultimately to re-model our institutions upon their own pattern. In carrying out this object, and gratifying their unsatiable cupidity, they are prepared to sacrifice alike the Landowner, the Farmer, the Shopkeeper, the Tiller of the soil, and the Artizan. They are prepared to break up our great Colonial system, which they already treat as valueless, and to seek for the commerce and consumption of the world for their products solely by means of that *Cheapness*, which they hope to acquire when the industrious classes of the nation, withdrawn from other pursuits, shall have been thrown more helplessly into dependence upon them for employment.

I am far from going the length of saying that *all* the manufacturers who are members of the League are actuated by these sordid motives, or entertain these destructive views. There are many amongst them—honest, honourable and humane men—who would shrink from the baseness and wickedness which they involve. There are some who conscientiously imagine that they see in prospect as the result of Free Trade, a cheaper loaf and more employment for the

working man, unaccompanied by the reduction in the amount of his wages or by injury sustained by other classes of the community. There are, however, men—and they are a majority of the advocates of free trade—who look expressly and *especially* for cheaper labour, as the result of a supply of cheaper food for the labourer. Disown the impeachment as they may, the fact of its being justly merited is continually oozing out. The labourer they regard as a property, as much as they regard a power loom or a spinning frame a property. They resent every legislative interference with their control over the human machine as much as they would such interference with the iron machine. Look at the pertinacity with which they have all-along resisted any attempt to restrict the hours of labour! The advocate of a Ten Hours Bill would have about as great an amount of tolerance, if he presumed to give expression to his opinions upon the subject in any company composed exclusively of manufacturing employers, as an abolitionist would meet with in a company of American planters. Although their rejoinder, to appeals made to them to reduce the amount of toil extracted from the operative, has been all along an implied pledge to concede. that boon when the removal of restrictions on the importation of food would enable them to do so, the prospect of that concession being shortly made has brought them no nearer to the fulfilment of such pledge. It must be left to themselves, they say, to arrange terms with the work-people. They told us this very session, in the debate upon Lord Ashley's motion, that a portion of their body were voluntarily coming down to 11 hours, as the duration of a day's toil in the factory or the loom shop; and at this moment they are preparing to back out from the concession, as unprofitable in its operation, and to insist upon the full amount of the bond which the existing law allows them.

In all past contests between capital and labour, the former has been uniformly the victor; and under our new policy it will be successful in determining the future position of the labourer in the social scale. We are told that a high or low price of food does not involve a high or low price of remuneration for industry. We have had figures paraded before us to prove the fact. We shall find it, however, to be a law of nature that men *will* and *must* work for the minimum amount with which life can be supported. All experience tells us so. In every country, not newly peopled, where the means of subsistence are abundant and cheap, the price of labour is low. The native of our Indian possessions, who can subsist upon a meal of rice, gives his toil for what will purchase that meal. The Irish peasant, who can subsist upon potatoes as his daily food, is content to labour for what will afford him potatoes. We have recognized this law in our legislation itself. We say to our pauper population—“we can keep you within the walls of the union workhouse for a certain amount per head: choose between that and the money wages which is offered for your labour as independent and self-sustaining beings” We have, moreover, in our manufacturing system, a coercive power upon the labourer beyond the ordinary law of human

nature. The steam-engine is incessantly roaring in the ears, and treading upon the heels, of the manufacturing operative; and reminding him painfully of his decreasing value in the social system. Lessen the cost of fuel—give increased speed or efficiency to the wheels of the spinning frame or the power-loom—and you make it incumbent upon the human being, who competes with the mere machine, to toil harder, and accept of less remuneration, for his bread. We have mechanical ingenuity constantly pitted against industry, dictating the terms upon which it shall be employed. We have, year by year, a less amount of time and labour entering into the production of a given quantity of manufactured fabrics; and if the power which capital possesses, combined with other influences and known tendencies of our human nature, is not regarded as sufficient to determine the result of the struggle of the labourer I think that we might very well afford to lay aside all attempts to solve any problem bearing upon our future destinies as human beings.

Another question, apart from the mere consideration of wages, is worth looking at. Say that the experiment of Free Trade is successful; that we have, as its result, a vastly stimulated foreign commerce; that we employ for a time all the available labour of the country; that we draw increased masses of our population into our manufacturing districts, and that we remunerate them adequately for their industry. Admit all this; but look at the possible consequences of a reverse or a crisis. We have, say one half of our population, dependent upon the accident of pacific relations being kept up with us by foreign powers. A hostile tariff—the stoppage of a single market—can throw an entire section of the community upon the nation for support. The want of prudence and of forethought of the manufacturer himself can do this. He may stimulate production. He may draw largely upon the prospect of the future. He may divert industry from its accustomed channels by promises of employment, which he may find it impossible or inconvenient and unprofitable to fulfil. Where is our remedy for the consequences of his improvidence? In our present quasi-feudal system we have that remedy. If the great landowner ceases to employ the labourer upon his property, or to remunerate him adequately, we have the produce of that land as a security that he shall not starve. But we have no security that the millowner, to-day employing a thousand hands, shall not to-morrow close his factory and retire into irresponsibility for the subsistence of those whose labour has realized his fortune, or *into the Gazette*, as the result of his want of skill in conducting his affairs. Look at our present position in the existing crisis of the nation. We have had three years of prosperity—three years in which the manufacturer and the merchant have been growing in wealth. Yet, so little has been the provident conduct of either, that we have now to devise by legislation *a mode to protect them from the result of their own improvidence!* The railway mania attracted their cupidity. They gambled as only maniacs will gamble. The legislature has to step in to provide for them a mode of exit

from their vast and multitudinous engagements. Is industry not suffering from this misconduct of those by whom it is employed? It is suffering. We have bodies of men who *have the face* to tell us, and to tell the legislature, that commerce is paralyzed, and will remain so until the passing of the measures of Sir Robert Peel is determined upon. Yet every man knows that *the pinching point* is the amount of capital locked up in these ridiculously extended speculations. I hold, however, the opinion that it has been a happy event for the nation, and for humanity, that the gains of the commercial and manufacturing classes have been expended in this direction. For the good of all they might have been worse applied: for the good of those applying them they might have been infinitely better applied. From fifty to a hundred millions of money is the difference in the value of railway property between present prices and those of a few months ago; and yet not a working man—scarcely a trader—is the richer. But let us canvass for a moment what might have been the result of a similar mania, directed towards the stimulation of manufacturing capability. We should not be asking now what we are to do with a few secretaries, engineers, surveyors, and other similar people, who can fall back upon their original pursuits and amount of employment, but what we are to do with *masses of our population* brought together to carry on avocations which we have been deceived in our hopes of employing them. A few actions against provisional directors, a hubbub amongst disappointed speculators, the claims of attorneys for their costs, and engineers for their pay, are different affairs from the demand of a deluded manufacturing population for *their bread*. We should have created a few manufacturing hives, and been stung for our pains.

Thus far I have left it as an admitted fact that the result of the measures of Free Trade, now propounded to us, must produce an increased aggregate employment for the national industry. I doubt this assumption. I see that our Home and Colonial Trade absorb a vastly greater amount of the national industry than the whole of our other markets. In *the amount* of our exports the labour employed is vastly out of proportion to the labour employed in manufactures consumed at Home or in our Colonies. To the great corn growing countries of the continent we send principally only half manufactured articles. We send to the north of Europe, from which we look for our supplies, principally yarns, the products of machinery, or minerals. We know, moreover, that these countries are rapidly creating for themselves a supply of necessary fabrics, to supersede those produced by the industry and skill of our own artizans. We see them directing against us such hostile leagues as the *Zollverein*, the meaning and the object of which is but too apparent. We do not know that our improvident liberality will induce them to follow our example and mitigate the restrictions of their tariffs. The utmost result, which the most sanguine free-trader sees to these measures, is an increase of the money amount of our exports to foreign countries. A greatly increased amount of the labour which enters into them he is a bold man who predicts.

Nor is it an axiom that increased imports from foreign countries

lead to increased exports to those countries. The balance of trade we know must be adjusted in our favour to enable us to progress; but that progress has hitherto invariably been regulated by the extent of our dependence upon the capabilities of our own soil for the subsistence of our people. The free-trader says—"Receive the produce of this or that country and it will take in return our manufactures. Give us foreign corn, and our industry will be prosperous." Upon this subject I may be allowed to quote a few facts and figures contained in the speech of Sir Howard Douglas, delivered in the House of Commons, on the 12th of February, and for which, as it was curtailed of its fair proportions and its value by the metropolitan press, I resort to the pages of Hansard. Sir Howard says:—

I shall not repeat what I have hitherto said on this part of the subject, further than to assert that the past depression, and the restoration of prosperity abundantly show, and I am prepared to prove this, that an increased importation of foreign corn does not produce a corresponding exportation of British manufactures. I refer now to the figures I have compiled to make a few observations upon that maxim of the economists, which affirms that the importation of foreign corn produces a contemporaneous and co-extensive exportation of British manufactured productions. Was the year 1836 a prosperous year? The exports of that year were £53,368,572. The exportation of wheat and wheat flour was a minimum; it was 861,156 quarters, and the price was 48s. 9d. Were 1840, 1841, and 1842, prosperous years? The exports of British productions declined to £51,406,430 in 1840, and to £47,381,023 in 1842; but the importation of foreign wheat and wheat flour in those years was a maximum—namely, 2,526,645 quarters in 1840; 2,910,263 quarters in 1841; and 3,111,290 quarters in 1842; and the prices 63s. 3d., 64s. 3d., and 70s. 3d. respectively; and by a maximum price, I mean, greater than the importation of foreign wheat had ever been since 1697. Were the years 1843 and 1844 unprosperous years? The wheat imported was 843,419 in the former year, and 1,145,833 in 1844, and the prices 50s. 1d. and 51s. 3d. Now, according to the theory of the economists, the prosperous years ought to have been unprosperous; and the years of depression the reverse. This establishes, I think, the truth of what I had the honour of saying in this House on a former occasion; that there is a great difference between that plenty and low price which are produced by unlimited foreign importation—that the one quickens, the other deadens the home market—that England is England's best customer—and that the contemporaneous exportation from England in return for foreign corn, would be chiefly in British gold. Perfect free trade consists in the absence of restrictions on both sides. In this case there is a co-extensive and contemporaneous exchange of the productions of each other.

A reduction of the reward of manufacturing labour I conceive to be the natural, the immediate, and the inevitable result of the ministerial measures, or of any measures, which tend to divert industry from other branches of employment, and to direct it towards manufacturing pursuits. The immediate connexion of the price of labour with the price of food I do not choose at present to discuss. I could even afford to throw it overboard altogether; and leave Sir Robert Peel and his ministerial and whig-radical allies to make the most of their elaborately and cunningly selected figures and data. There is a natural tendency towards decline in the wages paid in all manufacturing pursuits. The experience of the last 25 years in nearly every branch of manufactures has borne witness to the fact. In all cases it may not be strikingly apparent from the money amount paid to each operative for his week's labour; but where this is so it must be borne in mind that the same operative now

performs three and even *four times* the work which he did for the same remuneration 20 years ago. Where the cotton spinner formerly attended to 600 spindles only, he attends now to 2400. Where the power-loom weaver was only able to attend to one loom, he attends now to two and even three, and these working at increased speeds. In every branch of manufactures, human labour we find is being year by year more economized, and the productive power of the mere machine enormously increased.

The obvious result of this feature in our manufacturing system is to diminish its power of providing for the employment of the people in proportion to the increased amount of manufactures produced. For instance, we imported from the United States, to be worked up into yarn and goods, in 1822, cotton to the extent of 329,906 bales. In 1845 we imported upwards of four times that amount, or 1,499,600 bales. Now, will any man assert that in the latter year the cotton trade of the kingdom afforded profitable employment to four times the number of operatives, or paid four times the wages that it did in the former? Certainly no man would be so hardy. But if this cannot be said of the gross amount of the cotton manufacture, including of course that most valuable portion of it, consisting of the finest and fully perfected fabrics consumed in the home market, far less can it be said of the coarse and low-priced fabrics which principally compose our foreign trade. In 1841 we exported 366,946,452 yards of plain calicoes. In 1842 we exported 366,040,519, whilst in 1843 our exports of the same fabric sprung up to 520,041,635 yards, and last year they were 613,138,645 yards. Did our hand-loom and power-loom weavers increase in the ratio of 61 to 36 between 1845 and 1841, or did they increase in the ratio of 52 to 36 between 1842 and 1843? They did no such thing. We heard of no extensive migration from the agricultural to the manufacturing districts in those years. There was a sudden expansion of the demand; but the manufacturing districts were able to meet it without any material addition to their existing stock of labour.

Such a further increase of exports as is predicted as the result of Free Trade I admit may produce such an increased demand for labour as may for a while check the downward tendency of wages. But mark the changed circumstances into which the nation will have fallen! We shall have reduced the reward of agricultural industry. We shall have diminished the temptation to increased agricultural enterprise, for I hold with Sir Howard Douglas that "it seems a strange proposition, and one contrary to all experience, that the way to encourage the production of articles of any kind is to expose that branch of industry to unequal competition." By the same process we shall have checked emigration to our colonies; and thus thrown an additional number of hands upon the home labour market. These must of necessity press into the manufacturing districts for employment; and political economists tell us that it is the proportion of the supply to the demand for any commodity which regulates its price. We know what was the effect

of the irruption of the pauper population of the southern counties into the manufacturing districts, which took place in 1835 and 1836. We know, from the letters of Mr. Greg and Mr. Edmund Ashworth to the Secretary of the Poor Law Commissioners, for what it was intended—viz., to reduce wages. The wages of the weavers of Bolton—proved by a parliamentary commission to have been subsisting upon 2½d. *per head per day!*—had been advanced 10 per cent; and the latter eminent Leaguer regarded this addition of a potato to the poor weaver's daily meal as a symptom of approaching ruin to manufacturing prosperity, which the machinery of Somerset House was to be put in operation to ward off. We know how successful was the effort made—the extensive reduction of wages which followed and the wide spread suffering and wretchedness which were created, when at length a period of manufacturing prosperity succeeded to the few years of active prosperity which had induced the effort to “equalize,” as the phrase was, manufacturing with agricultural prices of labour. We have never yet heard from official sources how many of the ten thousand of the agricultural pauper population reached the homes which they had been seduced to leave, or how many sunk, amid the fever and pestilence of the then almost depopulated manufacturing towns and villages, into untimely graves.

The same struggle between the agricultural and the manufacturing labourer, but upon a more extensive scale, and more fearfully earnest, must inevitably follow the adoption of the present measures. It is *intended* to follow them. Manufacturers are to absorb the dispossessed labour of the country; and, measuring their capability by the data laid down above, there can remain little doubt that the supply of labour will very soon become out of all proportion with the demand for it. I have no doubt that our Free-traders contemplate the ordeal through which the labouring community is thus to be made to pass with considerable equanimity. They calculate that they will have a cheap loaf to reconcile the labourer to his reduced amount for *money* wages. They would however do well to remember the promises which they have made and the inducements which they have held out to him during this contest. The operatives of the manufacturing districts *do not* contemplate a reduced scale of remuneration for their industry, concurrent with a reduction in the price of food. They have been taught that, in the manufacturing Elysium which free trade is to create, they are to have, at once, more food and the present, or an increased, amount of means to pay for it. Will it be safe, I ask, thus practically, to tell the working man that he has been the dupe of imposture—that, whilst professing to seek only, or mainly, his interest, we have left him precisely where he was? Look at the temper of the manufacturing and the industrial classes at the present moment. An able writer in the Church of England Quarterly Review just published, thus remarks upon it:

Before, however, the gigantic speculations upon human labour, in which the manufacturers here and elsewhere fondly indulge, can be carried out to completion, something yet remains to be consulted—that is, the *will* of the labouring



classes. There is a mind whose secret workings and deep communings with itself the world does not seem to heed; there is a voice whose fearful accents in all their strength and power the world has not yet heard—the mind and the voice of the working population throughout Christendom, burdened beyond the power of further endurance, and asking on every hand, where the region of righteous resistance begins? If governments take not good heed, this mind and voice will one day give utterance to the sense of wrong unjustly inflicted in forms and ways that will shake from their foundations all the existing institutions of the earth. The doctrine that the only true capital is labour, however specious and unsound in its application, is gaining fast hold of the minds of the masses. The claim of the workman to eat the fruits of the earth—to partake of the gifts of God—to be warm and to be clothed—to be fed when he is hungry, and to be sheltered from the storm, in fair return for the toil of his arm and the sweat of his brow, is daily making itself heard in accents that cannot be mistaken. A *communism* of interests—of indignation at the infliction of past wrongs—of determination to resist fresh oppressions, is binding the labouring classes of all lands into one powerful fraternity. To meet this growing confederacy is by far the most difficult task of the statesman in the present day; for it is by far the most fearful and dangerous element with which he has had yet to deal.

A strike amongst the manufacturing work-people against reduction of wages, following a measure which was to postpone the period of such reduction almost indefinitely, will be a very different affair to those strikes—fearful enough in their result—which have taken place in past times. It will be a final struggle on the part of the labourer for his future position in the social fabric. We have no further delusive dreams of mitigation of his sufferings, by the supply of cheaper means of supporting existence, to hold up before his eyes. He will say *now*—“I must have a security that I can live by my labour, or I must experiment as I please upon those institutions which practically place me in the position of a machine, and not of a human being with wants which eat into the life and lacerate both the body and the soul.” The character of such experiments, from such a source, I need not dilate upon.

Such results must follow from any measures which render us permanently dependent upon other countries for food, and displace that home industry by which our supply of food has been accustomed to be produced. We cannot give our money to the Foreigner and to the British farmer at the same time. If we enable the former to consume more extensively our products, we lessen proportionately the power of the home grower to consume. It is a transfer, which we make, of customers who take the amount of their whole earnings from the British manufacturer for those who will only take a portion of the value which they supply.

But in viewing the possible and too probable results of this measure upon our aggregate commerce, we have to look to a far wider field than is presented within the limits of Great Britain herself. Grant even that the British farmer may be able to maintain himself under the competition to which we are about to expose him. Say that we shall be in a position to absorb, in manufacturing employment, the dispossessed labour of our agricultural population. Say that by the application of capital and science to the improved cultivation of our soil we enable the British farmer to maintain his position in the social fabric, and to emerge successful from his struggle

with the Foreigner. We have another country—Ireland—which must inevitably succumb under that struggle. We have a population there reduced to the minimum capacity of earning by their labour on the soil the means of supporting existence; to whom that bread which we are cheapening is a forbidden luxury; who are utterly dependent upon the British markets, and from whom the loss of a few shillings per quarter upon the corn which they grow must take away the means to purchase the wretched meal of potatoes upon which they live. Already the surplus labour of that country has contributed fearfully to urge on the reduction of its price in our own manufacturing districts. Manchester has a population of eighty thousand souls of Irish birth struggling with its native population for bread. Liverpool has a like number. Take away the remuneration afforded to Irishmen in supplying the British markets with food and you draw fresh thousands to our shores who will be content to labour for their daily potatoes. You cannot talk of the application of capital to cultivation there enabling agriculture to maintain itself. Ireland has no capital save its labour. You cannot point to your system of model farming as capable of being carried out there. To create a model farm you must depopulate a village. Ireland has ever been a thorn in the path of our legislators. It has been Sir Robert Peel's "chief difficulty." And, before concluding upon the adoption of his present measures, Ireland's position ought to receive especial consideration. You can have no creation there of manufacturing employment to absorb the labour diverted from the cultivation of the soil. Your cheap loaf cannot enable you to procure labour cheaper there, as it may in our own manufacturing districts. For two centuries the remuneration of labour has been less in Ireland than has afforded the means of purchasing, in adequate quantity, even the root upon which its people subsist; yet, where are the manufactures or the increased exports of Ireland? I can see, as the result of these measures, but one course for that country—her separation from the British Empire, and a redistribution of the hold which British capital exercises over her soil.

But we must carry our observations still further.

Within the last century, we have seen growing up around us a vast Colonial Empire—the germs of a great family of kindred nations—located in every clime, producing every necessary and every luxury of the human race, and looking to Great Britain as their common mother. We have bound these rising nations to us—such has been at least our past policy—not so much by the force of our arms, as by the extension towards them of that protection to the industry of their population, which native subjects have enjoyed. So close is this bond that not a pulse of the political or social body of Great Britain can throb in pain, or beat in pleasure, without bringing home a sympathetic reply from our fellow-subjects in every quarter of the globe. Our recent glorious successes in India:—is there a settler in the far West of Canada, a planter in the West Indies, a trapper in Oregon, a farmer at the Cape or in Australia, who, on reading the Gazette, containing the despatches which record

them, will not exclaim—"God be thanked?" These Colonies are our children—selfish and short sighted men may say expensive ones. We have given them our laws, our language, and our religion. We have given them the most enterprising spirits of all ranks amongst our population, who find, in the scope, which they furnish, for industry and ability—a field in these Colonies which the mother country has ceased to present. We have made them our out-posts in the great battle of commerce and of civilization, which we are waging with the world.

And well have they fulfilled their trust. Nobly have they vindicated to the world the claims of British men to pre-eminence in arms, in arts, and in commerce. It is by their aid that Great Britain is no longer a petty island—the *Ultima Thule* of the ancients—but has become a great power, able and worthy to control the destinies of surrounding nations, and in a position to defy, as she has defied, their combined hostility. To our Colonial Empire we owe the growth of the Naval power of Great Britain and its supremacy in every sea. In whatever quarter of the globe the honest enterprize of the British subject is unjustly thwarted, his liberties invaded, or the national honour insulted, it is from our Colonial Stations that the blow is struck in their defence. From our East Indian empire we overawe the rapacity and repress the turbulence of the states with which we are surrounded in that hemisphere, and protect a commerce unappreciable in its value to our Home industry. From Canada our arms can reach the most sensitive part of the American Republic. Our West Indian possessions afford us a *point d'appui* for the maintenance of our trading and other relations with the South American Continent; whilst other smaller dependencies, which, however, we have the right to regard as the seedlings of future tributary empires, at present afford us friendly harbours and succour in carrying on our vast commerce with the nations of the world. By every intelligent mind, which contemplates the commanding position which Great Britain occupies, as a power and as a trading people, its source is discerned in our colonial system. To cripple us *here* has been the object of every hostile effort which has been directed against us.

Upon this point an able writer—*Mr. Bliss, on the Colonial system*—remarks:—

"During two centuries that policy has been in operation, and within that period has created a larger and richer empire than Rome acquired in seven; and as the present age would judge the opinion of any Roman senator, had Rome produced, or history preserved the conceit, that the greatness of his country was not in consequence of its military policy, but in spite of it, so, probably, will posterity esteem the British statesman who affirms, that the wealth and greatness of this empire are in spite, not in consequence, of the Colonial system. But it was, in fact, from 1806 that the Colonial system, which had been intermitted during the war, was restored, after the hostilities waged by some countries against the power, by others against the commerce of Great Britain, had given her the severest lesson of the miseries and dangers of foreign dependence. In 1807, the Americans, in their wisdom, as the phrase is, of their public acts, interdicted all intercourse with the British dominions, and renounced the commerce of the sea. The intercourse between the northern and southern Colonies immediately re-

vived. War with Prussia had preceded this, war with Denmark followed; and the ascendancy of France, and the extension of the Continental system throughout the north of Europe, caused such embarrassment and dismay in this country, that its Ministers seem to have resolved never again to suffer it to depend upon precarious sources of supply for articles of the first necessity. To the Continental system of France, and the non-intercourse of America, was opposed the Colonial system of Great Britain; and it discomfited both."

But we must *come down* from the consideration of the question in this aspect. We have to consider, not what the Colonies have done for *the greatness* of England, but the more sordid question what they have done for her commerce, and how far they have been, and are, more valuable to us than neutral markets. Bound to us by natural ties, protected by our arms, and their industry favoured in our markets, it is but natural to suppose that the Colonies should have afforded a *preference*, in their fiscal policy, for the products of the mother country. They have done so. The British manufacturer, in consequence, has found in their markets a second *Home Market*. Commercially speaking, as well as politically, they have been a portion of Great Britain itself—clothed by native industry and, so far as protective duties could bring about such a result, resorting to the British market for every necessary, and even for the luxuries of life. The Colonial buyer in any of our marts of commerce is regarded as a natural tributary to our commerce. We look upon him as one bound to us—who cannot help himself—who is naturally and *necessarily* our customer, however we may treat him. We look upon him as one of the same family with ourselves; and he is so, under the existing system. He taxes himself, by a differential duty in favour of our products, to become so. He says to other countries,—“I will only consume your produce upon the same terms as I should do if, instead of being located upon the banks of the Indus or the St. Lawrence, I was still breathing my native air upon the margin of the Mersey or the Clyde.” In every respect, in his eyes, the product of British industry is a *protected* as well as a preferred, article. Let the industry of other countries compete with us in neutral markets; let the linens of Germany and Russia, the hosiery of Saxony, the silks of France, or the heavy cottons of the United States, be open to his acceptance; the answer of the British Colonist, given by the fiscal policy which he adopts, of protection to the industry of the country from which he has sprung, is that he looks upon his British fellow-countrymen as those alone whom he is bound, by nature and by policy, to employ as administrators to his wants and sharers of his prosperity.

The following table, compiled from official sources, will prove the existence of this feeling of natural dependence, and show, as its result, that in the leading articles of our export trade, the consumption of our Colonial possessions in proportion to their population approximates closely to the consumption of our home population, whilst foreign countries—and especially those whose industry we are about to encourage in preference to that of the British subject, or the Colonist—consumes to a limited amount, in proportion to their population:—

CONSUMPTION OF BRITISH MANUFACTURES, PER HEAD OF POPULATION,  
IN FOREIGN AND COLONIAL MARKETS.

COUNTRIES.	Population.	Gross Exports.	Cotton Twact.	Woollen Yarn.	Linen Yarns.	Hardware.	Woolens.
Russia.....	62,500,000	8d. 1-6 2,128,926	5d. 1-6 1,341,756	2-5d. 185,046		1-6d. 40,453	1-5th d. 57,883
Prussia.....	14,330,146	nearly 8d. 505,384	fully 1-6th d. 10,558			nearly 1-6th d. 9,589	1-569
Germany and Switzerland.....	45,000,000	2s. 9d. 6,151,528	11d. 1-18 2,072,987	3s. 516,786		4-5ths d. 156,706	5d. 1,631,573
France.....	34,164,875	1s. 6d. 5-8 2,656,359	1-5th d. 32,431	3d. 77,403	501,241	6-7ths d. 121,585	1d. 1-7 186,039
Holland.....	2,915,396	27 1s. 5d. 5-6 3,131,970	6s. 10d. 1,001,565	1s. 1d. 3-5 165,890		4d. 1-16th 49,354	2s. 9d. 408,761
Belgium.....	4,242,600	6s. 11 3/4 1,471,251	1s. 211,966	3d. 1-15 54,476	Sheep's Wool. 1s. 11 3/4d. 420,257	2d. 36,871	1s. 4 220,461
Denmark.....	2,033,265	2s. 9 3/4d. 296,579	3 3/4d. 27,567			3d. 4,227	3-32 1,778
Sweden and Norway.....	4,156,200	1s. 3d. 261,299	5d. 85,642	1-8s2		3d. 12,730	3d. 41,563
United States.....	20,000,000	7s. 11 3/4d. 7,508,079	3,151	17,959		10d. 827,084	2s. 3d. 4-5ths 2,444,789
North American Colonies.....	1,648,637	21 17s. 4d. 3,070,861	4d. 3-16 28,493	2-5d1	Cottons. 7s. 5 3/4d. 614,373	2s. 0 1/4d. 167,876	6s. 6d. 536,397
West Indies.....		2,451,477	11,981	5		77,525	78,690
Great Britain.....							

3,070,861	2,451,477	11,981	5	2,531	614,373	167,976	58,904
West Indies .....							586,387
Great Britain .....						77,525	79,690

But on other grounds the value of these possessions, as instruments for the extension of its commerce, has been vast. Whilst absorbing the surplus labour and enterprize of our industrious population, they have served as commercial missionaries to spread abroad throughout the world a taste for those comforts and luxuries of life, by the supply of which the commerce of this country is fed. That civilization, those habits and arts, which the British settler has carried out with him to distant and benighted lands, have created everywhere new wants and new markets for the products of British industry, new sources of wealth whereby those products could be purchased. The savage, taught by British example, has exchanged his nakedness, or his covering of skins, for a garment woven by the hands of the Lancashire or the Yorkshire weaver. His rude implements of husbandry, or of warfare, are laid aside for the more perfect implements, supplied by the mechanic of Sheffield or of Birmingham. We have taught him how to raise most economically and abundantly the products of the clime in which Providence has placed him, and to aspire to and struggle to obtain comforts of our own providing, hitherto unknown to him. Our Colonial establishments, moreover, by the protection which their proximity has afforded to individual enterprize, have enabled us safely to extend our commerce into neighbouring countries, not subject to our arms, and to carry there the same wants and habits which we have introduced into those which acknowledge our sway.

That a system such as this which we possess in our colonies—a system, the source as well of our national greatness, and our commercial prosperity, ought to be sedulously cared for, there are few who will dispute. It is assumed, however, that we can enjoy its advantages, to their present extent, under a system of Free Trade; that is, that, after we have withdrawn the protection which we give at present to articles of Colonial consumption, we shall either be able to retain the Colonies themselves as British possessions, affording us still a fiscal preference for our products, although we no longer afford to their industry a valuable equivalent, or, that leaving them to make new arrangements for themselves, and to transfer their allegiance from the mother country, we shall be able to reap from them the same commercial benefit which we now enjoy. That both these assumptions are fallacious I shall hereafter endeavour to show. In the meantime I propose to bring before the reader a few statistical facts, illustrative of the value to Great Britain of her Colonial dependencies, as sources of employment for native industry, and supply for the national wants; and of the prospect of increase, which, in both, they hold out for the future. I shall take the liberty of quoting the following valuable statement relating to *the cotton trade*, recently published by Mr. Isaac Buchanan—an eminent Colonial merchant, and a member of the Canadian Legislature—first, because in the valuable tables of *Mr. Burns*, of Manchester, from which the figures are drawn, we have an authentic record, which no other trade possesses; and secondly, because the outcry for the adoption of the present measure, has come loudest from the parties engaged in this

branch of manufacture. By a reference to "Burns' Commercial Glance" for the past year, the following will be found to have been the exports of the two leading articles of the Cotton manufacture:—"Plain Calicoes" and "Printed and Dyed Calicoes," in 1841 and 1845 respectively, to the under-mentioned Colonial markets. I should remark that, in common with Mr. Buchanan, I include China, although not strictly a Colonial market, partly from its intimate connexion with our East India trade, and the influence which our East Indian possessions afford us in maintaining our relations with that country, but chiefly from the fact of the return of 1841 including the exports to both markets.

"EXPORTS OF COTTON GOODS TO THE COLONIES.

	Calicoes Plain.		Calicoes Printed and Dyed.	
	1841.	1845.	1841.	1845.
	yards.	yards.	yards.	yards.
British West Indies	9,831,280	16,987,142	9,774,290	20,729,641
British Nth. Amer.	7,757,332	11,580,586	10,703,415	13,362,173
Cape of Good Hope.	2,008,352	3,394,241	1,904,239	3,520,302
India & China } .....	113,462,664	{ 166,946,563 }	22,540,756	{ 26,083,138 }
New Holland.....	985,823	{ 3,961,699 }	997,092	{ 2,535,413 }
TOTAL Yards..	134,045,431	309,360,506	45,920,222	70,081,558

The total exports of "Calicoes plain" to all countries in the two years, Mr. Burn sets down as follows:—

	1841.	1845.
Total "Calicoes Plain" to all countries .....	366,946,452 yds.	613,138,645 yds.
To Colonies, as above.....	134,045,431 "	309,360,506 "
Balance, Exports to other countries... yds.	232,901,021	303,778,139

Thus in 1841 our Colonial trade in this staple article of Cotton manufacture, was to our trade with the rest of the world as 134 to 232 millions of yards, or a fraction above one half. In 1845, however, the former was to the latter as 309 to 303 millions, the Colonies having thus become greater consumers than the whole of our other markets!

In the articles of "Dyed and Printed Calicoes" the proportions stand thus:—

	1841.	1845.
Total "dyed and printed Calicoes" to all countries..	278,748,275 yds.	310,850,697 yds.
Ditto ditto to Colonies.....	45,920,422 "	70,081,558 "
Balance, Exports to other countries... yds.	232,827,853	240,769,139

Thus in 1841 the proportion of the Colonial consumption, of this most important class of manufactured fabrics, to the consumption of the rest of the world was as 45 to 232 millions, or short of one fifth, whilst in 1845 the proportion was as 70 to 240 millions, or upwards of two sevenths.

In introducing the above, Mr. Buchanan remarks—

That I may not be accused of selecting unfair data with respect to the Cotton trade, I may remark, that of the total weight of yarn in manufactured cotton goods exported in 1845, viz., 202,350,687lbs., the two leading staples—"plain calicoes" and "calicoes printed and dyed"—referred to below, made up (according to the estimate of Mr. Burn, in his Commercial Glance for the past year, whose general correctness will not be doubted) is 194,080,490lbs., leaving only 8,280,195lbs., to be otherwise accounted for, as entering into the production of the finer and miscellaneous fabrics, of which, however, the Colonies take a fair and yearly-increasing share. The total value of manufactured cotton goods ex-

Commercial  
have been the  
manufacture :—  
in 1841 and  
markets. I  
include China,  
its intimate  
e which our  
relations with  
of 1841 in-

ed and Dyed.

1845.
yards.
26,729,641
13,362,173
3,520,302
26,083,138
2,535,413
3,850,891
70,081,558

in the two

1845.
138,645 yds.
360,506 "
778,139

manufacture,  
of yards, or  
the latter as  
mers than the

stand thus :—

1845.
850,697 yds.
261,558 "
763,139

most import-  
the world was  
rtion was as

to the Cotton  
tured cotton  
les—" plain  
up (accord-  
e past year,  
aving only  
roduction of  
take a fair  
n goods ex-

ported in 1845, not including cotton yarn and thread, is estimated by the same authority at £15,282,447. Of this amount, the value of the undermentioned staples makes up £13,576,279. The fallacy of quoting, in such an enquiry as this, merely gross quantities, irrespective of the sort of goods exported, is exemplified by the fact that, of the other great branch of our cotton exports for 1845—the trade in yarns—amounting in weight to 131,937,935 lbs., and in value to only £6,596,897—an article upon which the least amount of industry is employed, and which is consequently least profitable to us as a nation, nearly two-thirds, or upwards of 90,000,000 lbs. went to those corn-growing countries of the Continent, whose almost worthless commerce with us, we are thus, by our measures, preferring to the valuable trade in finished goods, of which labour is the great component part, provided by our own Colonies and the Home trade. By a reference then to *Burn's Commercial Glance*, for the past year I find the following to have been the exports of the two leading articles of the cotton manufactures :—" Plain Calicoes," and " Printed and Dyed Calicoes," in 1841 and 1845, respectively, to the undernoted Colonial markets. I should remark that I include China, although not strictly a Colonial market, partly from its intimate connexion with our East Indian trade, and the influence which our East Indian Possessions afford us in maintaining our relations with that country; but chiefly from the fact of the returns for 1841 including the export to both markets."

I might have added greatly to the weight of this statement of facts and figures, if I had treated as Colonial markets those military stations—as Malta, Gibraltar, &c.—which, as neutral markets, of which we assume the control, afford us so material an aid in our commerce with strictly Foreign markets. The result, however, is amply sufficient for my purpose. That one half of the exports of the leading branch of the national industry goes to Colonial markets, is a fact sufficient to adduce, and which may well incline thinking men, who seek not the temporary meed of applause given to successful party manœuvring, to pause before entering into an experiment which may place in peril the vast national benefit derived. Clearly this evidence shews that Great Britain, under her Colonial system, is rapidly gaining a position of independence of the world. She has, in that system alone, without courting the trade of other countries by hazardous concessions, a market whose rapid growth promises shortly to absorb the products of an industry not artificially stimulated. She has "ample scope and verge enough" for any ordinary commercial ambition. She has, under the sway of the British sceptre, countries producing all that her utmost wants can require—affording homes to the adventurous and enterprising of her children, and a profitable commerce and remunerating industry to those who still rest beneath her parental wing; and it is difficult to see any limit to the consuming power of those countries, or to their ability to feed the enterprise of the British people.

It is not however the Cotton Trade alone which is thus reaping so vast a benefit from our Colonial Trade. That benefit is diffused throughout the whole frame-work of the National industry. It enters alike the work-shop of the hardwareman of Birmingham, the cutler of Sheffield, the clothier of Yorkshire, our iron works, our foundries, our salt works, and descends into our various mines. Upon all these branches of industry the Colonies are yearly bestowing increased and increasing benefits. To all they afford markets which no hostile effort, by any of the numerous Foreigners who



envy us our commercial greatness, can circumscribe. They are, in a word, the life-blood of our greatness—the great and natural feeders of our industrial prosperity.

EXPORTS TO ALL COUNTRIES IN 1844, AND AVERAGE OF SIX YEARS FROM 1839 TO 1844.

The Averages are taken from Appendix to Mc. Culloch's Edition for 1844.

COUNTRIES.	1844.	AVERAGE OF 6 YRS. 1839 @ 1844.	PROPORTION OF 1000.
Russia.....	£2,128,926	£1,816,124	34.646
Sweden.....	108,475	146,363	2.792
Norway.....	152,824	119,407	2.278
Denmark.....	286,679	212,972	4.063
Prussia.....	605,384	359,179	6.852
Germany.....	6,151,528	5,799,992	110.645
Holland.....	3,131,970	3,476,818	66.326
Belgium.....	1,471,251	1,063,925	20.296
France.....	2,656,259	2,660,892	50.755
Portugal proper } Azores, } Madeira, }	1,242,422		
Spain and Balearic Islands ..	509,207		
Gibraltar.....	1,049,567		
Italy and Islands.....	2,509,240		
Malta.....	200,009		
Turkey & Continental Greece	2,291,404		
E. I. Co's Territories & Ceylon	7,695,866	5,939,479	113.306
China.....	2,305,617	1,161,652	22.169
Brit. North Amer. Colonies.....	3,070,861	2,066,374	50.866
West Indies.....	2,451,477	2,998,486	57.201
United States.....	7,938,079	6,283,544	119.809
Brazil.....	2,413,538	2,357,266	44.969
Sundries.....			
Gross Exports in 1844, to } Foreign Parts..... }	£58,584,292	£52,419,926	1,000

Thus, whilst to *all countries*—

The gross shipments in 1844 were.....	£58,584,292
The average, 1839 to 1844, was.....	52,419,916
Showing an increase of 11½ per cent.....	£6,164,366
The shipments to British America were, in 1844.....	£3,070,861
The average, 1839 to 1844, was.....	2,666,374
Showing an increase of 15 1-6th per cent.....	£404,487

A similar increase in the proportion of their imports to our entire foreign trade, will be seen to have taken place in our other Colonies.

A most important feature moreover in the Colonial Trade of this kingdom is the fact, that it employs almost exclusively British Shipping. To illustrate this fact, a valuable compilation, made by Mr. Court, the able Secretary of the Under-writers' Association of Liverpool, enables me to give the following, as the experience of the year 1845, so far as that port is concerned. To enable the reader to institute a comparison between the Shipping employed in our Colonial and in our purely Foreign Trade I give the data of the two separately; and append those which may be considered to relate to enterprize either purely native or arising out of our Colonial facilities:—

CLEARANCES OUT OF THE PORT OF LIVERPOOL TO COLONIAL PORTS  
FOR THE YEAR 1845.

	VESSELS.		TONS.	
	BRITISH.	FOREIGN.	BRITISH.	FOREIGN.
Demerara .....	42	none.	12,266	none.
Halifax .....	56	none.	23,088	none.
Jamaica .....	51	none.	13,896	none.
Maranham .....	19	none.	7,839	none.
Miramichi .....	23	none.	10,860	none.
New Brunswick .....	106	1	55,927	165
Newfoundland .....	63	1	9,099	1,910
Nova Scotia .....	20	none.	5,323	none.
Quebec .....	331	none.	85,145	none.
East Indies, China, &c.....	328	4	132,390	2,298
Mobile .....	39	23	31,018	13,529
<b>TOTAL SHIPS.....</b>	<b>1,078</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>486,863</b>	<b>17,002</b>

To the same ports in 1843, I find that the clearances from Liverpool were, of British vessels 781, against 1078 in 1845; Foreign vessels 10. The tonnage was, of British vessels 328,754, against 486,863 in 1845; and of Foreign 2663. The total clearances from Liverpool to *all Countries* was, in 1845, of British vessels 2860, and Foreign 1232; and the amounts of tonnage were—British 895,198; Foreign 469,387, the Colonies therefore employing *upwards of one half of the whole tonnage of the port*. The same results, I have no doubt, would be shewn by similar returns from all the western ports—Glasgow, Bristol, &c., whilst the shipping trade of the Thames will approximate to them.

The following will shew the amount of employment to our shipping afforded by a few of those Foreign markets, for the trade of which our various Colonial possessions and stations afford us facilities and protection.

CLEARANCES OUT OF THE PORT OF LIVERPOOL TO QUASI-COLONIAL PORTS  
FOR THE YEAR 1845.

	VESSELS.		TONS.	
	BRITISH.	FOREIGN.	BRITISH.	FOREIGN.
Africa .....	93	9	25,431	967
Pernambuco .....	20	1	5,175	268
Bahia .....	34	1	8,147	326
Gibraltar .....	34	1	3,607	70
La Guayra .....	18	2	2,763	247
Malta .....	26	3	5,297	114
River Plate .....	45	1	10,290	213
Santa Martha .....	13	none.	1,786	none.
Vera Cruz .....	15	none.	2,597	none.
West Coast of South America.....	100	3	32,307	515
<b>TOTAL SHIPS.....</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>97,400</b>	<b>3,596</b>

At very little trouble, and with perfect fairness, I could have extended the above statement. I shall, however, leave it as it is, and proceed to lay before the reader a very different picture, shewing the extent to which our shipping is employed by those countries in favour of whose products Parliament is now legislating. And, first,

They are, in a natural feeders

ANS FROM

or 1844.

PROPORTION OF 1000.

34,646  
2,792  
2,275  
4,063  
6,852  
110,645  
66,326  
20,296  
50,755

115,306  
22,160  
50,866  
57,201  
119,809  
44,969

1,000

584,292  
419,916

164,366

070,801  
366,374

104,487

to our en-  
our other

rade of this  
ritish Ship-  
d by Mr.  
tion of Li-  
nce of the  
e reader to  
ur Colonial  
ur Colonial  
separately;  
enterprise  
s:—

let us direct ourselves to the United States. In 1845 the clearances from Liverpool for the following American ports were:—

	VESSELS.		TONS.	
	BRITISH.	FOREIGN.	BRITISH.	FOREIGN.
Boston.....	6	76	2,355	43,140
Charleston.....	16	30	8,055	14,837
Baltimore.....	none.	15	none.	7,945
New Orleans.....	74	106	51,159	66,765
New York.....	30	192	17,783	146,459
Philadelphia.....	1	44	155	26,053
<b>TOTAL.....</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>79,417</b>	<b>305,229</b>

The following statistics, derived from returns (part of 4, section A. of Revenue and Commerce, 1844,) recently presented to the Houses of Parliament, by command of her Majesty, exhibit similar results, as regards the shipping of the whole kingdom; shewing that in all our dealings with the Foreigner hitherto, the British shipowner has received the minimum of employment and remuneration, whilst our Colonists have strictly and fully paid their debt of gratitude to this and every class of the British nation. In 1844, we have the following as the *total arrivals in Great Britain from Foreign parts*:—

	<i>Vessels.</i>	<i>Sailors.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>	
British.....	19,687	195,728	3,647,463	or 72 2-9ths per cent.
Foreign.....	9,608	76,091	1,402,188	„ 27 7-9
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>29,295</b>	<b>271,819</b>	<b>5,049,601</b>	<b>100</b>

Whilst in the same year we had the following arrivals from our *British North American Colonies* alone.

<i>Ships.</i>	<i>Sailors.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>
2,284	30,222	789,410

The trade of these Colonies alone, therefore, employed about 21 9-14ths per cent. of the whole amount of our British shipping, and about 15. 3-5ths per cent. of British and Foreign together. A very different picture is presented in the *arrivals from the United States in 1844*:—

	<i>Vessels.</i>	<i>Sailors.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>	
British.....	373	8,170	206,183	or 37 4-5ths per cent.
Foreign.....	575	11,157	338,737	„ 62 2-5
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>948</b>	<b>19,327</b>	<b>544,920</b>	<b>100</b>

We thus imported the bulk of our produce and the raw materials of manufacture from that country in *American ships*, worked by *American crews*, whilst the whole of our importations from *British America* were brought by *British shipping*! Our trade outwards to the United States shows a similar result in favour of the commercial marine of that Republic as will be shown by the following table, given on the authority of the United States Almanac for 1846:—

DOLLARS.	
Gross Imports to 30th June, 1844, (12 mos.)	106,425,035 @ 4 dols. 84 cts. is £22,403,932 17.1
By Foreign Ships.....	14,260,362 „ „ 2,946,355 15.8 or 13 1-7 & ct.

The tonnage, it will be seen, is not given, but the money value is

the clearances

TONS.	
SH.	FOREIGN.
355	43,140
355	14,857
69	7,945
783	66,765
55	146,469
	26,053
17	305,229

of 4, section  
ented to the  
xhibit similar  
m; shewing  
the British  
t and remu-  
their debt  
n. In 1844,  
ain from Fo-

per cent.

s from our

oyed about  
h shipping,  
together. A  
the United

er cent.

w materials  
worked by  
om British  
utwards to  
commercial  
wing table,  
846 :—

13 1-7 ct.

ey value is

the same criterion, which shows, that while Foreign ships formed 27 7-9ths per cent. of the tonnage inwards to Great Britain, the Foreign arrivals into the States only amount to 13 1-7th per cent. Their own tonnage therefore carries 86 6-7ths of all the imports from abroad. From Great Britain herself nearly the whole of their importations are carried in American bottoms, our own ships going out to the cotton ports almost invariably in ballast, or with a freight little more remunerative.

In one branch of our Colonial trade, the import of timber from our North American Colonies, which is menaced with utter destruction by Sir Robert Peel's measures, an amount of employment is created for British shipping, the value of which to the nation is almost inappreciable, whilst the foreign timber which we are about to substitute for it in our consumption, is nearly exclusively conveyed in foreign bottoms. The following data, furnished by Mr. Alderman J. Bramley Moore, chairman of the Liverpool Dock Committee, in an able speech in the Town Council upon Dock affairs, conveys a striking lesson with respect to the value of the timber trade of British America to the shipping interest of that town.

I have with me a very elaborate document, which it would take too much time to read, but I will run over the heads of it for the information of the Council. For it I am indebted to a gentleman with whose accuracy every one is acquainted: it has been drawn up by Mr. Rankin. I will give you the results from 1838; and from this statement, it is necessary to observe, all vessels bringing any cargo besides timber are excluded. The number of vessels exclusively employed in the timber trade, and their tonnage, beginning with the year 1838, were as follows:

BRITISH AMERICA.			BAL TIC.	
YEAR.	VESSELS.	TONNAGE.	VESSELS.	TONNAGE.
1838.....	305.....	160,415.....	72.....	22,788.....
1839.....	339.....	170,591.....	58.....	17,415.....
1840.....	230.....	133,400.....	48.....	14,000.....
1841.....	318.....	174,948.....	40.....	11,923.....
1842.....	365.....	91,179.....	33.....	11,239.....
1843.....	311.....	154,518.....	61.....	17,253.....
1844.....	369.....	189,414.....	51.....	14,144.....
1845.....	453.....	239,854.....	113.....	33,792.....

Thus you see that in 1844, when the timber trade was said to have commenced its decline, there were then 418 vessels, of 202,471 tons; and in 1845, the enormous number of 566 vessels, of 273,646 tons. Now, this alone will show the importance of the timber, and how inadequately that trade has been accommodated in Liverpool. There has been an extraordinary increase in several descriptions of timber. I will just notice the Mahogany trade, to which attention was directed, and particular accommodation afforded, some four or five years ago, by the Dock Committee. The number of logs imported since 1838 is as follows:

In 1838 there were.....	10,918 logs.
In 1839 there were.....	11,441 "
In 1840 there were.....	7,214 "
In 1841 there were.....	6,600 "
In 1842 there were.....	7,739 "
In 1843 there were.....	8,760 "
In 1844 there were.....	16,248 "
In 1845 there were.....	28,840 "

I will now give you, for the last four or five years, the increase for all descriptions of timber in pieces and feet. I will take you back to 1838:

In 1838 there were.....	15,000,000
In 1839 there were.....	16,000,000
In 1840 there were.....	11,000,000
In 1841 there were.....	16,000,000

Mr. RATIBONE asked whether these were pieces ?

Mr. MOORE.—They are pieces and feet, by string or scale measure. In calipers, they would be about fifteen per cent. more :

In 1842 there were.....	9,000,000
In 1843 there were.....	17,000,000
In 1844 there were.....	24,000,000
In 1845 there were.....	28,000,000

We have here a vast and increasing source of employment for that great producer of the nation's power, its commercial marine, which we are about to transfer from the British Colonist and shipowner to the foreigner. For every shilling of the timber thus imported from our Colonies, the products of British industry are returned, whilst the Baltic, whence we draw our supplies of foreign timber, takes the minimum amount of our exports and employs almost exclusively foreign shipping. The Danish, the Swedish, or the Norwegian vessels which come to us timber-laden, do not take return cargoes of British products to their own country. Their usual destination and cargo is to South America, or the Brazils, with a cargo of salt, or in ballast, bringing back to the continent of Europe sugars, which might otherwise furnish freights for British shipping. We are thus building up a marine power for those countries which, with our present policy, will shortly enable them to cope, as maritime nations, with Great Britain herself.

In all human probability then—judging from past experience—looking closely at the usual determination of human action, and weighing its incentives—what must be the effect of our present policy upon the connexions at present existing between these valuable possessions and the mother country? Bear in mind the tie of interest which now binds them—protection of British products by the Colonial consumer, and corresponding protection of Colonial products by the British consumer. This bargain—this basis of our mutual relations—the British Legislature is proposing to annul. We are throwing our Colonial Empire—a part of it in its infancy—upon its own resources. We are taking from it the most material advantages of its connexion with us; and leaving with it *the burthen*—for such it must become—of our friendship and relationship. What tie is left? The tie of blood is a weak one. What is to prevent these Colonies seeking other alliances and other friendships amongst the great family of nations? What is to prevent them “setting up for themselves” and becoming independent states? There are men, and even legislators, amongst ourselves, who are ready to concede that this should, under any circumstances, be their course. But suppose that they do not go this length—suppose that they merely say to us, “You have thrown us from you as children; you have divorced us from the great family from which we spring; you have made us *aliens* by your legislation; and, at least, you ought to allow us to shift for ourselves; to exercise the privilege, which you have claimed, as based upon unerring wisdom, to buy in the cheapest market, and sell in the dearest. We cannot, in justice, resist such an appeal. It is too unmitigably reasonable. We are bound to say to our Colonies, and they

will insist upon their right to the concession, "take your own measures for the advancement of the industry of your population. Form your own contracts for the regulation of your commercial intercourse with other countries. For ourselves, we have no longer a right to ask for more than that amount of preference in your markets for our commodities which, under your new relations, you may find it *your interest* to afford us."

This, undoubtedly, must be the immediate course of a portion, at least, of our Colonies. Special circumstances may bind some of them to us for a few years to come: India, because we have a hold upon the ownership of its soil; our infant possessions, because they are as yet unable to protect themselves from external aggression; our military stations, because they exist only as connected with the armed power of Great Britain, may maintain their present position in relation to us *for awhile*. But even this cannot last long; and we much doubt whether the proposal for the termination of the connexion will not come from the manufacturing interests of Great Britain herself. Let our Colonies pursue the course which, in strict justice, they are entitled to do, and we shall very shortly have some member of the British senate, backed by no inconsiderable number of the British people, enquiring, "for what do we tax ourselves to retain Canada from the grasp of the American Republic, or the British West Indies from throwing themselves into the same protecting arms?"

Most ably this portion of the subject was treated by the honourable member for Liverpool, in his speech in the House of Commons on the 12th of February:—

I have often imagined—and it was for this that I moved for, and obtained the order of this House, for the extensive returns which are now preparing, namely, the various colonial tariffs and commercial relations at present subsisting between all the Colonies of the Empire and the mother country, and between the Colonies themselves—that it might really be possible to treat Colonies like counties of the country, not only in direct trade with the United Kingdom, but in commercial intercourse with each other, by free trade among ourselves, under a reasonable moderate degree of protection from without, and so resolve the United Kingdom, and all her Colonies and possessions, into a commercial union such as might defy all rivalry, and defeat all combinations. Then might colonization proceed on a gigantic scale—then might British capital animate British labour, on British soil, for British objects, throughout the extended dominions of the British Empire. Such an union is the United States of America—a confederation of sovereign States, leagued together for commercial and political purposes, with the most perfect free trade within, and a stringent protection from without; and signally, surely, has that commercial treaty succeeded and flourished. Such an union, too, is the German Customs' League: and it has succeeded to an extent that really is, in so short a time, miraculous. But free trade—the extinction of the protective principle—the repeal of the differential duties—would at once convert all our Colonies, in a commercial sense, into as many independent States. The colonial consumer of British productions would then be released from his part of the compact—that of dealing, in preference, with their British producer; and the British consumer of such articles as the Colonies produce, absolved from his; each party would be free to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market. I defy any hon. Member opposite to say, that this would not be a virtual dissolution of the Colonial system. The British flag might still fly for a time, where sound British policy had raised it, in every part of the world. The colonists would regard it still with the veneration to which it is entitled. Our navies might still guard

their coasts and waters, and our troops hold military possession of their lands; but then would come the question of the economists, in debates on the Navy, Army, and Ordnance Estimates, what is the use of Colonies? They consume not, as of old, the productions of the United Kingdom in any greater degree than if they were Foreign States; we no longer consider and treat the Colonies as domestic sources essential for the supply of the materials of our manufacturing industry, and the elements of our maritime power; and it will be difficult to answer that economical argument, when, moreover, we shall have discarded our Colonies, for considerations of a wretched pecuniary economy, and sacrificed national objects, and high destinies, to the minor, and the comparatively mean, calculations of speculative wealth. I have said what the effect of free trade must be on the Canada Corn Bill. What will be the effect of the extinction of protection, when fully carried out, on the British North American timber trade? I am not speaking of the terms proposed in this new Tariff, but of the total abolition of all differential duties, which must be the result of this measure. When this is carried out with respect to sugars, what is to become of the British West Indies? How will they be effected by free trade in sugar? for the perfect extinction must be carried out to the extent even of admitting slave-produced sugar, as already demanded, and as we have already done slave-produced cotton. What is to become of the coffees of Ceylon—and what of British India—that boundless space, in which, in the valley of the Ganges alone, sugar sufficient for the supply of the whole world might be produced?

That our empire in British America, at least, will adopt the extreme step of transferring its allegiance from us, and entering into intimate relations with the United States, if not even becoming a portion of that republic, has already resolved itself into a moral certainty. In the sympathizing movement of 1837 and 1838, this course was only staved off by the resolved loyalty of the population of the Upper Province of Canada, allied to us by the tie of protection which we then afforded to their agricultural industry. We are dissolving this alliance. The tie is no longer to exist; and we have the following assurance, from the lips of a loyal and patriotic man—Mr. Isaac Buchanan—well acquainted with the temper and feelings of British America from which he has recently returned—that that important Colony, for its own sake, will and *must*, as the result of the passing of Sir Robert Peel's measures, seek other relations than those which she now possesses with this country. Mr. Buchanan says, in a letter addressed to the members of the British Parliament:—

It is clear that the Colonies of British America and the West Indies will be the first we shall lose, the interests of both *now* leading them to become members of the American union.

Take for instance the case of Canada.

Can any one for a moment doubt that, as soon as it is known on the other side of the Atlantic that Canadian wheat has no longer any protection in England, the Canadians will at once insist on the repeal of Mr. Gladstone's Act, which gives protection in the Colonies to British manufactures?

Nine-tenths of the Canada trade will thereupon go to the markets of New York and Boston. The overburthened people of England will, *in their turn*, begin to feel that they are going to the expense of defending a Colony which has ceased to be of any use to the empire, *as consuming its manufactures, or employing its sailors and shipping.*

And any hint from England of a desire for separation will be cheerfully responded to by the people of Canada, who will be writhing under the feeling that England has *dishonourably* broken promises of protection to Canadian wheat and timber, made by every ministry from the timber panic of 1808 downwards, and will have got their eyes open to the fact that (as there remains no longer any, the slightest bond of interest between Canada and the mother country) *no reason can*

*be given* why the Canadians should risk their lives and properties in defending nothing! or should allow Canada to be any longer used as the battle-field of European and American squabbles.

The Canadians will, moreover, see, that as their wheat is *practically* excluded from the English markets, their only chance is to get it introduced into the markets of the United states. The republic, however, will not *Free Trade* with Canada, and a political connection will have to be consummated between them, to give Canada the American protection of 8s. sterling per quarter against British or European corn.

Whether, therefore, England wishes it or not, Canada will certainly cut her connection immediately.

That such a course is the reasonable course—the only course which sensible men should adopt—needs little proof. Our Canadian Trade is peculiarly a *protected Trade*. The Canadas are *transatlantic England*. They are not so much *Colonies* as *Counties* of Great Britain. The ocean divides us from them, and that is all. In feeling, in interest, in religion, in blood, they are *of us*—a part of the British empire, performing for us more important tasks than any other of our Colonial possessions; and, whilst doing this, repaying us amply for all our efforts in behalf of their liberties and their prosperity. Through them we hang upon the skirts of the American republic. Through them alone we can insist that we are not isolated from a share in the commerce of a continent. Tariffs may keep the products of our industry from participating in the supply of a new world; but a settlement in that world, with a vast frontier, which no customs regulations are sufficient to guard, will ensure to us consideration and concessions, which no other instrumentality could gain for us. To perpetuate this connexion, however, the tie must be one of *mutual interest*. British America, if no longer recognized as the child of a protecting mother, will not remain the child of an unnatural step-mother. In a word—and I am borne out in the assertion—Canada is only ours so long as she is treated as a portion of the great family, of which Britain is the head, and finds her advantage in that connexion and relationship.

That such is the view taken by the people of the United States themselves, the following remarks, from a recent number of the *New York Herald*, will show:—

The intelligence from Canada is beginning to be of a very interesting character. The Provincial Parliament began its session on the 20th instant, and was opened by a speech from the now Governor General, the Earl Cathcart.

Upon the receipt of the proposed tariff of Sir Robert Peel, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction manifested towards it in the Canadas. It was thought that by abolishing the duties on grain, the Western part of the United States would receive such an impetus; as to affect, in a material degree, the commercial and grain growing interests of Canada, and facilitate emigration thence to the United States.

It certainly did not require much sagacity or farsightedness to arrive at this conclusion, nor to perceive that it would be a means of *hastening the annexation of these colonies*, a measure which time and the moral effect of our institutions and laws, will finally consummate. But Sir Robert Peel felt the effect of the powerful pressure at home, and was obliged to go with it, as he could not stem it; and hence his determination to carry out his new commercial system, although it must, in the nature of things, assist to hasten an event which he would deplore.

I may say, too, that Canada has a *right* to feel *peculiarly* grieved,



and even insulted and mocked, by our present policy. Three years ago, by our Canadian corn bill, we said to her that her relationship to us was to be perpetual. We recognised her expressly as a member of our family, by our Canadian corn bill. We encouraged her to enter upon great works, to facilitate her connexion with us. We tempted her to expend millions in improving and cheapening her communications with the Atlantic; and thus cheapening her products in our own markets, and at the same time affording facilities for the introduction of British products into hers. We have led her to incur a large debt for this purpose. We have forestalled her resources for years to come; and, at least, the duty is incumbent upon us, and it is a poor tribute to justice, although nevertheless not one contemplated by Sir Robert Peel's measure, to take upon ourselves the burthen which the Canadas, relying upon our good faith, and the consistency of our rule, have imposed upon themselves.

It may be said that our trade with British America is nothing compared with the trade which we carry on with neutral markets; that it is a small fractional part of our aggregate trade with the world. Here again I must quote from the returns (so far as the cotton trade is concerned), with which Mr. Buchanan's publications have furnished me; and, in doing so, I may add a remark or two which that gentleman, in any of his publications which I have seen, has not recognised.

It is assumed by the advocates of Sir Robert Peel's measures that our trade with the United States is more worthy of being cultivated than our trade with British America. I give here, from the *Commercial Glance* of Mr. Burns, the statistics of our cotton trade with both countries for the years 1841 and 1845, by which it will be seen that whilst the United States, aided, no doubt, by their own native producers of manufactured fabrics of cotton, have been retrograding in the amount of their purchases from this country, our British American possessions have increased in more than an equal ratio as consumers:—

COMPARATIVE VIEW OF EXPORTS TO UNITED STATES AND BRITISH AMERICA.

"Plain Calicoes" to United States, in 1841 .....	11,957,053 yds.
Ditto to British America .....	7,757,332 "
Balance in favor of United States in 1841..... yds.	4,199,721
"Calicoes, printed and dyed" to United States in 1841.....	26,025,281 yds.
Ditto ditto to British America .....	10,703,415 yds.
Balance in favor of United States in 1841..... yds.	15,321,866
"Plain Calicoes" to United States in 1845 .....	12,412,981 yds.
Ditto to British America .....	11,580,586 "
Balance in favor of United States only..... yds.	832,395
"Printed and dyed Calicoes" to United States in 1845 .....	13,097,851 yds.
Ditto ditto to British America .....	13,362,173 "
Balance in favor of British America in 1845..... yds.	264,322
instead of 15,321,866 yards AGAINST in 1841 !	

I shall perhaps be told by the cotton manufacturer that he has

no objection to resign *his part* of the consideration which these colonies and the mother-country extend to each other as the basis of the connexion; that he expects still to be able to command the Canadian market by the cheapness of his goods. In every sense he will find this a woful mistake. To what extent is he at present able to introduce his coarse and low priced fabrics of cotton into the United States? To a very limited one. America protects rigidly those manufactures which her own growing skill and enterprise can produce; and many she has almost ceased to import at all. Her coarse woollens, for the consumption of her agricultural population and the working classes in her towns, she can manufacture for herself. Year by year she is becoming more self-dependent for every article of use or comfort, for the production of which highly skilled labour is not required. Let British America therefore once adopt the step of allying herself with the United States; and her market for these articles becomes closed to us. She will supply herself from the United States, with every article which the present almost prohibitory Tariff of that republic shuts out from the consumption of its own citizens.

I may be told, however, that when we have opened our markets to the timber and corn of foreign countries, they will consume more largely of our manufactured goods. Past experience certainly does not warrant the assumption. In 1844 the reduction of the duty upon Baltic timber from 55s. to 25s. came into operation; and I find the following to have been the result with respect to the export of the staple manufactures of cotton—plain calicoes and printed calicoes—into the following countries:—

PLAIN COTTONS.			
COUNTRIES.	1843.	1844.	1845.
Denmark..... yds.	444,377	839,366	467,012
Prussia..... "	1,568	3,206	1,248
Russia..... "	1,056,533	901,985	823,577
Sweden and Norway .. "	710,458	886,993	753,941
PRINTED COTTONS.			
Denmark..... yds.	542,665	395,803	285,064
Prussia..... "	851	600	5,510
Russia..... "	60,631	231,779	160,908
Sweden and Norway .. "	603,031	585,385	519,674

There is no evidence here of these countries becoming greater consumers of our fabrics. Yet we took last year of Foreign timber 642,000 loads against 351,000 loads in 1841—thus almost doubling our consumption of that article, and at the same time throwing away a large amount of revenue.

That the United States in particular will not meet our suicidal liberality, by reducing their Tariff and thus destroying that great manufacturing interest amongst her own population, which she has so sedulously laboured to erect, we have the following significant announcement in a late number of the New York Herald, remarking

upon the changes proposed in this country, the news of which had just reached America by the Steamer of the 4th of February:—

“We can never carry into operation such a liberal commercial policy as Great Britain. Our tariff must be continued at a revenue standard. The bulk of the revenue for the support of the general government, is derived from duties upon foreign imports, and to that source we must ever look for supplies. We could not establish an income tax, or any direct tax, for the support of government; and all we can do, therefore, under the circumstances, is to remove all unnecessary restrictions from our tariff laws, and levy a duty upon imports merely for revenue. This is all any foreign government can expect, and it is as far as we can go.—The tariff act now under consideration of the Committee of Ways and Means, is decidedly upon the revenue standard, as near as such a standard can be anticipated. It will rather go below that point than exceed it; and we think it possible that alterations, and we fear additions, may be required in the rate of duty upon many items, to bring it up to the proper level. The *ad valorem* principle, applied to all articles, is an experiment, and its operation is a matter of much uncertainty.”

That public opinion in the United States is in favour of protection to native industry, *independently of revenue necessities*, will be made sufficiently apparent by some extracts from recent numbers of *Hunt's New York Magazine*, which I have given in an Appendix.

Nor has the Home consumer derived the benefit of the reduction which has thus transferred so large a portion of the supply of timber from the British Colonist to the Foreign grower, and of freights from the British to the Foreign shipowner and sailor. The following extract from the admirable speech of Lord George Bentinck, of March 20th, in the debate upon the present measures, is sufficient to settle this question in the negative:—

“The Government it was said, by its reduction of duty had prevented the price of American timber from rising to an enormous amount. In 1842 he (Lord G. Bentinck) and others who represented the Ship-owner's interest warned the Earl of Ripon that the reduction then proposed in the differential duties would either go clean into the pockets of the Baltic growers, or else would greatly injure the Canadian trade; and now the House should hear how Canadian timber had been somewhat reduced in price but the larger part of the remission of duty had gone into the hands of Foreigners. It appeared by a list of invoice prices furnished to him by Mr. Rankin of Liverpool, a member of one of the greatest American houses, that the price of Red Pine in Canada in 1839 and 1840 was 9d. a foot; in 1841 9½d. The year 1842 ought to be omitted. It was a year of entire stagnation of trade and supplied no criterion. The mean price then for the three years preceding 1842 was 9½d. a foot; for the three years since 1842 it was 7½d. The price of yellow pine was 4½d. before the reduction of differential duties, and it fell to 4¼d. afterwards—a depreciation of ten per cent. Now turn to the price of Baltic timber; and here he should have the pleasure not only of quoting from the writings of a Cabinet Minister, but of one who sets such value on what he had written and said that rather than contradict it by his conduct in the House he resigned his seat in the Cabinet. Mr. Gladstone (hear, hear,) in his pamphlet written in 1845, to shew the great advantage the consumer had gained by the reduction of duties, said that another year would be necessary fully to shew the benefit of those alterations, but stated that already he had ascertained from trustworthy sources of information that the price of Dantzic or Memel timber in the London market had fallen from £5 12s. 6d., a load to £4 8s. 9d. since 30s. of the duty had been taken off; that shewed a reduction of £1 3. 2d. leaving 6s. 3d. (the rest of the 30s) to go into the pockets of the foreign producer. The year had now expired which Mr. Gladstone required; and it appeared from *Prince's price current* (probably the same authority as he took) that in January 1846 the price varied from £4 10s. to £5, (hear, hear,) and yet Ministers were refusing to reduce excise duties, which were paid by British consumers, and limiting them—

selves to the reduction of customs duties on articles which compete with our own productions or those of our Colonies (hear.) But Mr. Gladstone took also the Liverpool market and stated that the price of Dantzic fir, common and middling, sold there in January 1841 varied from 26½d. to 27d. per foot; in 1842 the mean price was 25d. and in 1845 it was 20½d. In 1846 it appeared by a Liverpool trade circular that it had risen to 23d. and 24d. But the result was that out of 30s. duty remitted in 1842 the foreign grower put 24s. 9d. into his pocket, and the consumer got a reduction of only 6s. 2½d. per load. (Hear hear.) It might be said that the trade of the Canadas had nevertheless enormously increased; but that had not arisen from any reduction of duties but from the great demand for timber for Railways; and not one Railway the less would have been constructed if the differential duties had remained as before. So far as increase of consumption was concerned, consequent upon the reduction of the duty, that reduction had proved an unmitigated loss; and but for the increased consumption caused by the great Railway speculation, for which Her Majesty's Minister would hardly take credit, the Canadas would have suffered grievously in their exports."

The industry of the Empire and of the Colonist has therefore been *doubly* sacrificed by the operations of the change of 1842. We have checked a trade which employed exclusively British labour and shipping, and is paid for chiefly by the products of the British artisan, for one which employs exclusively Foreign labour and shipping, and not only refuses to take our manufactures in return, but pockets the largest share of the duty, which we remitted to encourage it to do so, and denies us the cheapness for which we contracted!

That the population of British America is already seriously alarmed at the position in which the proposed measures of Government threaten to place them is clear from the advices and journals received by the Halifax mail steamer, a few days ago arrived; and the feeling is evidently shared by the Governor General of Canada himself. In his speech at the opening of the Canadian parliament, on the 20th ulto., Lord Cathcart thus indicated his first impressions, at least, upon the subject:—

The last intelligence from the Mother Country indicates a most important change in the commercial policy of the Empire. I had previously taken occasion to press upon Her Majesty's Government a due consideration of the effect that any contemplated alteration might have on the interests of Canada. But until we have a fuller exposition of the projected scheme, which a few days will probably bring to us, it would be premature to anticipate that *the claims of this Province to a just measure of protection* had been overlooked.

I am not at all inclined to believe that the Despatch of Mr. Gladstone, in reply to the communication of the Governor General, has altered his previous views, or is calculated to allay the aggravated feelings of the Canadian people. The Colonial Secretary in the despatch in question, which is dated from Downing-street, on the 3rd March, and went out to Canada by the Packet of the 4th, somewhat too plainly indicates that the policy of Great Britain is henceforth to be determined upon *irrespective* of Colonial interests. He says:—

"The interests of Canada have occupied the place to which they are justly entitled in the deliberations of Her Majesty's Government upon this important subject, and upon others which are akin to it. At the same time I need hardly point out to your Lordship, that *there are matters in which considerations imme-*

*diately connected with the supply of food for the people of this country, and with the employment of its population, must be paramount."*

The employment of the Colonial population, or the maintenance of those great interests which the past access of that population to the British markets has established in the Colonies, is secondary to the gratification of the cry of the manufacturer at home for a cheap loaf or cheap timber! In the face of this broad declaration on the part of the Home Government, that the Canadian people are henceforth to be treated, in its legislation towards them with respect to *the two great staples of their production*, as foreign countries rather than dependencies, whose welfare that Government is bound by as strong ties of justice to protect as those which regulate its duties towards the population of Great Britain herself, there can be little hope that the Canadas can be brought to feel any great longing to retain the existing connexion.

I need not enter at any great length into an examination of the grounds on which Mr. Gladstone endeavours to soothe the fear of injury being inflicted upon Canadian interests by the Government measures, and to show that that country is in a position to sustain the competition to which she is called upon to submit the industry of her population. With respect to her corn, Mr. Gladstone says:—

"I have much satisfaction in reflecting, that if Canada will have to enter into competition with the western states of America and engage in this rivalry, when no longer covered by any protective duty, at least she will not be called on to make the effort without some advantages on her side. Among them I reckon light taxation; the assistance she has received from British credit and funds in the construction and improvement of her internal communications; her more regular and steady course of trade with this country; her low tariff, so favourable to importation, and, on that account, so powerfully tending to encourage her reciprocal commerce outwards; *some advantage in point of proximity, as compared with the most westerly states of the Union, which are also her most formidable rivals in cheapness of production; and, lastly, the means of carriage, without transhipment, by the St. Lawrence, which cannot be had by the Erie Canal.* She will likewise have this in her favour, that her corn trade will have become a settled one of some standing, with all its arrangements made and in full operation, while any regular commerce in that article with the United States must be a new creation, and must go through the processes attending its self-adjustment to processes as yet untried.

"And if it be true that New York offers some advantages as compared with Montreal, particularly in regard to the rate of insurance, on the other hand, I consider that *the shipping of British North America has many advantages over that of the United States in the competition for freights*, as it is conducted at less expense, and is, I must assume, navigated with equal vigour and equal efficiency."

I think it would not be difficult to shew that a portion at least of the advantages which Canada is here said to enjoy over the Western States of America no longer exists; and that, at all events, when protection is taken away altogether from her agriculturists, a great many of the existing arrangements of her commerce will also be diverted into another channel. The following statements and figures prepared for a Montreal journal by a gentleman in New York, intimately connected with the trade, very materially weaken the force of the Colonial Secretary's fond anticipations:—

EXPORTATION OF FLOUR TO LIVERPOOL VIA MONTREAL AND NEW YORK,  
UNDER PRESENT CORN LAWS OF GREAT BRITAIN.

Duty on United States Wheat, floured in Canada, per barrel.....	s. d.
Extra freight from Montreal to Liverpool, over New York charges.....	2 3
Average excess of insurance.....	2 0
Cost of importation and grinding in Canada, over the expense of shipping direct to Montreal from Cleveland.....	0 3
	<hr/>
	1 0
	<hr/>
	5 6
Differential duty in favour of Canadian produce, for the next three years, per brl.....	2 3
Probable difference in freight from the West to Montreal, via New York.....	0 9
	<hr/>
	3 0
	<hr/>
Balance in favour of New York as the shipping port.....	2 6

"This balance in favor of this city, will hold good during the three years fixed upon for the continuance of the remaining protection under the corn laws of Great Britain, and the continuance of the present rate of tolls on our public works."

"If, after the expiration of three years, the present protection in the corn laws of England should be abolished, there will be an increased exportation of breadstuffs from this port, as we should draw that trade from Canada, to a greater extent than yet realized. The reduction of tolls on our public works is likely to proceed more rapidly than on those of Canada, and we shall, therefore, be better able to control this trade in a few years hence, than we are now. Under the contemplated equalization of duties in Great Britain upon Canadian and American flour, shipments can be made as annexed:—

EXPORTATION OF FLOUR TO LIVERPOOL, VIA NEW YORK AND MONTREAL.

Freight, per barrel, from Toronto to Oswego.....	s. d.
Do. do. Oswego to New York.....	0 6
Do. do. New York to Liverpool.....	2 0
Average rate of insurance, (1 per cent.).....	2 6
	<hr/>
	0 3
Cost of transport from Toronto to Liverpool, via New York.....	5 3
	<hr/>
Freight, per barrel, from Toronto to Kingston.....	0 6
Do. do. Kingston to Montreal.....	1 9
Do. do. Montreal to Liverpool.....	4 6
Average rate of insurance, (2 per cent.).....	0 6
	<hr/>
	7 3

"This leaves a balance in favour of that city of two shillings per barrel. So far as the trade in breadstuffs between Great Britain and North America is concerned, under the present formation of the corn-laws, and under an equalization of duties of Canadian and American flour, it is pretty evident that the bulk of it must be carried on between this city and Liverpool, but to what extent it will be carried, is a matter of much uncertainty and doubt."

With respect to the alleged "many advantages" which the shipping of British North America enjoys over that of the United States, upon which Mr. Gladstone depends to prevent this diversion of our commerce from the St. Lawrence to New York, and from British bottoms to those of the Republic, I cannot see where those advantages lie. It is true that the shipping of British America is constructed at less expense; but then it can only be said to have paying cargoes one way. A vessel, which has brought to New York a valuable cargo of dry goods, can afford to return, corn laden, to Great Britain at less rates than even a cheaper ship, which has come out almost in ballast, can sail from Montreal or Quebec with a cargo. Mr. Gladstone, I suspect, will find this delusive argument

slip from beneath his feet ; and especially so when, by the present measures, the British Government has withdrawn the temptation to emigrants to settle in Canada, and directed the surplus population of this country to the western states of the American union, as affording them equal, if not superior, fields for their enterprize and industry. It is well known that a large portion of our shipping employed in the trade with British America goes out with emigrants to those settlements ; and, when we take away this remunerating employment for the outward voyage, the freight homewards must be a seriously increased one.

With respect to the timber trade of Canada, the same despatch says :—

“ Not only are they (the government) free from the apprehension that the proposed remission of 10s. per load on foreign timber and 12s. on foreign deals will cause a contraction of the trade from British North America, but they are sanguine in the anticipation that that trade will continue, notwithstanding the proposed change, to extend itself.”

A differential duty of 15s., proposed, as “ upon the average nearly covering the difference between freights from the Baltic and those from British North America to Great Britain,” he apprehends will preserve to us this trade ; and he argues, that as importation of Canadian Timber has increased under the measure of 1842, so it will continue to increase when a further amount of protection shall have been withdrawn. Candour, however, ought to have induced him, before holding out this unstable argument to the Colonist, to have reminded him of the fact, that very special circumstances, most favourable to the developement of the Timber consumption of Great Britain, have been in operation since 1843. The progress of Railway construction, the increased general prosperity of the country, and other concurrent causes (amongst the rest the fact of the Baltic grower having himself appropriated the remitted duty, and rendered his timber comparatively dearer than Canadian) have supported the British grower in the competition to which the measure of 1842 submitted him. Let these special circumstances cease to operate, and it is by no means a certainty that, even with his present protection, the Canadian may not have a period of suffering before him. Reduce that protection, however, to 15s. from 24s., its present amount, and the ruin of this branch of colonial industry is certain. The lumberers of that Colony will not, like the serfs of the northern European countries, work for a minimum amount of remuneration. Render their employment unprofitable and they betake themselves at once to their farms ; their timber ceases to employ our shipping, our sailors, and their own saw-mills, and to pay for British manufactures. Under the proposed duty (the freight from the Baltic being about 17s. per load against 38s. from British America) the Baltic grower will have a protecting duty of six shillings per load (or the difference of freight of 21s. less the duty of 15s.) over the Canadian ; and thus, if the quality of the article furnished us by the latter were as good and its cost as little at Quebec as that of the former at Memel or Dantzic, the trade must be a losing one and be abandoned. The

Colonist obviously cannot support himself with less than 21s. as the differential duty, even at the present relative prices of the different descriptions of timber in the British market.

The effect upon our commerce with the Canadas of their ceasing to be a colony may be judged of by the following statistics, which again I borrow from Mr. Buchanan's letters :—

"The trade of America *when our Colony* in 1769 employed, on an average of three years, 1078 ships and 28,910 seamen, and the value of the goods taken from Great Britain was £3,370,000; the export of the colony being £3,924,606.

"The population of the United States is now nearly ten times what it then was, without any great permanent increase in our exports to America (causes, over which we had no control, brought them down in the year 1842 to £3,528,107)."

"I cannot better finish off this statement than by repeating that, while the trade of British America and the West Indies, stated in 1843 to be only £14,000,000 employed 2900 ships of 970,000 tons, and 60,000 seamen, our trade with the United States, estimated at 22,000,000 (three-fifths being imports of raw cotton, &c.), is carried in 350 ships, of 233,000 tons; and the import from China, amounting to £5,000,000, is brought in 84 ships of 39,712 tons."

I observe that the *Morning Chronicle* sneers at the notion that our Canadian population regard the progress of our Free Trade policy with any feelings of alarm; and quotes the opinions, with respect to it, of Mr. Papineau, of all persons in the world. I must say that I was quite prepared for this. I know that we have not as yet had conveyed to us the feelings of the parties most interested in the question—the agricultural residents of the upper province. The next packet will bring us the expression of the feelings of this class of our Canadian population. In the meantime, Sir Robert Peel may quote his Montreal advices, which I take to be of much the same value as the statistical tables upon which he wishes us to place such implicit reliance; and with respect to which I shall have a few words to say before I conclude.

In direct opposition, however, to the representations of the *Morning Chronicle*, as to the feeling with which these measures were viewed in Canada, I quote a very contrary statement from *his own Washington correspondent* :—

A good deal of restlessness has been exhibited in Canada since the announcement of Sir R. Peel's new commercial policy reached the regions of the Saint Lawrence. *Many of the loyalty disposed begin to fear the effect* which the new commercial relations which England is likely to contract with the United States may have upon the connection between the colony and the mother country; whilst others, who do not attach so much value to British connection, regard the repeal of the corn laws in England *as the first step towards the peaceable establishment of an independent government in Canada.* "With Free Trade, what can England now want with colonies?" is now often asked both here and in the British provinces. It is very evident that the Canadians, generally, *most cordially dislike the great feature of Sir R. Peel's new commercial policy.* The timber interest which is predominant in Lower Canada, is very uneasy, whilst, in the upper province, the mill owners and the forwarders are amongst the loudest of the croakers. That both of these latter will suffer by the English ports being thrown open for grain to all the world is very obvious, when it is considered that the one had all the grinding, whilst the other had all the inland carriage, of the large quantity of American wheat which found its way into the English market by the St. Lawrence, under the very convenient discrimination of the Canada corn bill. Wealthy associations have been formed, and extensive mills have been built, for



the express and exclusive purpose of grinding American wheat, and then sending it to the home market as colonial produce, with the colonial brand upon it. The shares in these establishments are fast tending to discount, and their permanent depreciation is certain upon the success of the present movement in England. The Canadians are also beginning to speculate upon the *cui bono* of the gigantic system of internal improvement, for the completion of which, within the last quarter of a century, the colonial resources have been drained, the imperial treasury has been drawn upon, the province has been burdened with a heavy debt, and the credit of the mother country pledged to some extent for its redemption. The very least that the Canadians expect, if their carrying trade is destroyed, is that the home government will relieve them of the burden with which the Rideau Canal has so long pressed upon the provincial exchequer.

And I may add the following letter which appeared in the *Liverpool Standard* of the 21st April, and comes, I am assured, from a gentleman in Upper Canada of extensive experience as a merchant, and most guarded and cautious in the formation and expression of his opinions :—

“The abolition of all protection on Canadian or Colonial produce in Britain will, ere long, produce a change in the feelings of the Colonists, and, it may be, in the mother country also. If the Colonists have no protection, they will seek to buy where they can best please themselves; and the bond of mutual interest which at present binds them to Britain will be loosened, and in time entirely broken; and the time will come when it becomes no longer the interest of Britain to retain the connexion. That time will be very much hastened by the late changes, and it becomes us to inquire whether we would continue in business in Canada either as an independent country or as a state of the union; for it would not surprise me if the *present generation* even have to ask themselves such a question.”

The Free Trader, who still looks forward to enjoying the Trade of our Canadian possessions, does not sufficiently bear in mind the nature of that trade. He knows that the merchant of Montreal or Quebec buys largely of British manufactures, and pays for them—how? By the very articles—Corn and Timber—for which we are about to transfer our demand to the United States and continental Europe. The basis of all trade is barter in some shape; and that of Canada is peculiarly one of barter. The agriculturist of the Upper State exchanges his wheat, his beef, or his pork with the storekeeper for the manufactured products of Manchester, Glasgow, Birmingham and Sheffield. The lumberer exchanges his labour for the same articles. The storekeeper goes through the same operation with the merchant, and the merchant with the home manufacturer and the home consumer. Canada has nothing to give us for our goods but her timber and her agricultural products. Refuse to take these—render colonial agriculture an unprofitable pursuit—destroy her timber trade—and *Canada ceases to consume*. The result is inevitable.

I can imagine, indeed, a modification of the present measures and remedial steps within the reach of the government which might materially lighten the heavy blow which, in their present naked state, they threaten to deal against the industry of British America and, through it, against the greatness of the British Empire itself. A moderate fixed duty upon Foreign corn—say 8s. or even 5s. per quarter—would assist the Colonist in sustaining that blow. England might also be nobly generous, and relieve Canada of the interest of

her debt, contracted mainly upon the faith of the British markets being kept open to the produce of its industry. If she wishes to retain the employment provided for her shipping in these possessions, and prevent its passing into the hands of the United States, she will at once throw open, toll free, the St. Lawrence Canal. But should she unhappily take none of these steps—should she surrender herself implicitly to the blind leading of theorists and pander to the selfishness of a race of men whose God is gold—to whom associations the most holy, ties the most dear, memories the most hallowed, are no more regarded than rotten sticks—the doom of these noble Colonies, I feel assured, is fixed, and a people allied to us closely by relationship, by religion, by community of language and of feeling, will be precipitated into the embrace of republicanism, and be driven to join with the democratic masses of the United States in the indulgence of heart burning and hatred towards their common mother.

The fate of the British West Indies is, by the carrying out of these measures, as certainly sealed as is that of our British American possessions. With difficulty these colonies, so valuable to our commerce, have sustained themselves under the effects of the diminution of protection to which they have been submitted. Hundreds of estates, once yielding a fair return for the enterprize and capital engaged in their cultivation, are now unprofitable, or nearly so, to their owners. We were in hopes that the planters there might, by the application of increased skill and capital to the soil, and the means being afforded them of procuring an increased supply of labour, have ultimately recovered a portion, at least, of their prosperity. This hope, however, the hand of government is about to dash to the ground. The planter knows he cannot compete with foreign slave-owning states; and when he sees that every successful effort which he makes to improve his existing position serves only as an invitation to the home government to deal a fresh blow against him, he will cease from the effort in despair. A great consuming colony whose commerce employs almost exclusively British industry and British shipping, will sink into insignificance, or seek new alliances with countries whose legislation will do its industry justice. A rising nation of coloured freemen, by whose aid we might have spread the light of civilization and christianity over an entire continent, unapproachable by any European pioneer, as the lamentable results of past efforts have shown, will be suffered to relapse into the indolence and inactivity of barbarism; and the noblest experiment ever made by a great and generous people—the attempt to raise the products of tropical climes without dipping our hands in blood and tarnishing our name by the brand of slavery—have been made in vain.

Yet what is the valuable nature of the commerce which these proscribed Colonies bring, at this moment, to the mother country? I have shown above the large and increasing imports of British produce and manufactures which they take, as compared with foreign countries. I shall now give their imports of the goods which they take from the Manchester manufacturer, who is clamouring for

their ruin; and compare the rate of their increased consumption of these fabrics with that of the United States, the favourite market, it would seem, with the cotton manufacturer—

COMPARATIVE VIEW OF EXPORTS TO UNITED STATES AND BRITISH WEST INDIES.

"Plain Calicoes" to United States in 1841.....	11,937,053 yds.
Ditto to British West Indies .....	9,831,280 ,,
Balance in favor of United States..... yds.	2,125,773
"Plain Calicoes" to United States in 1845.....	12,412,981 yds.
Ditto to British West Indies.....	16,987,142 ,,
Balance in favor of British West Indies in 1845... yds.	4,574,961
instead of 2,125,773 yards against in 1841.	
"Calicoes, printed and dyed" to United States in 1841.....	26,025,281 yds.
Ditto ditto to British West Indies .....	9,774,720 ,,
Balance in favor of United States in 1841..... yds.	16,250,561
"Calicoes, printed and dyed" to United States in 1845.....	13,097,851 yds.
Ditto ditto to British West Indies .....	20,729,641 ,,
Balance in favor of British West Indies in 1845... yds.	7,631,790
instead of 16,250,561 AGAINST in 1841 !!	

We lose the British West Indies inevitably by the passing of these measures; and mark the result. The grasping hand of the American republic clutches them by its favourite mode of annexation; and thus annihilates, at a blow, the supremacy of the power and the commerce of Great Britain in a whole hemisphere. With the American flag flying from the summit of the Government House at Jamaica, and the Bermudas under her rule, what can resist that republic in its efforts to command the commerce of those seas?

Before proceeding further let me address myself to a matter which, I humbly conceive, is an important one, and ought to be very maturely weighed before either branch of the Legislature arrives at a conclusion with respect to the proposed measures of Government. We have been in the habit of seeing Ministers, when promulgating their views with respect to any measure, fortifying themselves by official tables, from which they have quoted as if coming from unerring authority. Peason might err. Men of business experience might place confidence in facts and figures which had come before their own observation. But let a return from the Board of Trade, or any other board, tell us that right is wrong—that black is white—that loss is profit, or profit is loss—and we are to believe the assertion implicitly, the evidence of our own senses and pockets notwithstanding. We have had the necessity of these very measures, and the working of past legislation in the same direction proved (!) to us upon such authority. Sir Robert Peel is nothing unless he is statistical. With four and twenty hours' notice he would convince you—if you could believe him—by statistical returns, that you were insane, or even that more difficult matter to gulp down, that he was a consistent statesman. The proceedings in the House of Commons on the 21st of April have, however, happily relieved the nation of this hallucination; and I notice the fact, as bearing upon the correctness of some data with respect to the timber trade contained in

a speech of Lord George Bentinck, from which I have quoted above. In that very speech his lordship complained of the *gross* manner in which a motion of his for some returns, as to the effect upon the price of timber of the measures of 1842, had been responded to; and proceeded to give, from other sources, the data, which I have already quoted, shewing that the benefit of the reduction of duty *had not* gone into the pocket of the consumer. The return in question came out a week ago, establishing a *contrary result*. Well, what is the upshot? Why, that Sir Robert is compelled to acknowledge that he is in error, and to confess the most glaring incompetence in the authority which he has been accustomed to quote from so triumphantly! The question was as to the *price of timber*. The answer of the compiler of the *false* return is—but I must quote it entire:—

“ April 21.

“ Sir,—In answer to your requisition, calling on me to state in what department the error in the return of the values on Memel and Canadian timber arose, I have to regret to state that it was in the landing surveyor's department. The nature of the mistake is, that the prices were necessarily taken from the *Prices Current*, which are not official Customs' documents, but a mercantile list, in which some of the values quoted include the duties, whilst others do not. The heading of the space containing the values—viz. 'value in bond,' led to the error; it applied only to the upper half of the column, not to that part in which these prices were entered; and this distinction was not observed. I have to express my regret at this error, and to remain, Sir,

“ Your most obedient Servant,

“ E. Cardwell, Esq.

M. STURT.”

I am far from wishing that this unhappy Mr. Sturt should be held up as failing in the fulfilment of his duty. He only fulfilled it *too well*. The Premier wanted a return, shewing that the country had obtained cheapness in Foreign Timber to the extent of the duty remitted; and he got it. Unfortunately the *Error(?)* was found out. What reliance after this can we place in Statistical Documents?

But let me come to the most material question—the bearing of these measures upon the future position which this country is to hold amongst nations, and their effect upon her social condition and the maintenance in their integrity of those institutions which have contributed to build up and, through ages to come, would have guaranteed her greatness. Taking our views as to the operation of these measures from the Free Trader himself; admitting, for the moment, their entire success in producing the effect anticipated from them; it is clear that we are about to create a new order of things—to redistribute the influence and power of the various classes and interests of society, as at present constituted—in fact to reduce the nation to the position of one dependent upon the accidents of foreign supply and demand not so much for its food as for the reward of that industry, by the successful exercise of which its food is to be purchased. We are about to lessen the present influence in the constitution of the owner and the tiller of the soil, and throw a preponderating amount into the hands of the masses congregated in our manufacturing towns, whose unwieldy number we are to increase

beyond calculation. The result, I predict without fear, must be a rapid march towards democratic rule; and the overthrow of every institution, hitherto associated with and maintained by the aristocratic element in our mixed constitution. What is the character and leaning of those masses in the present day? It is towards levelling measures; the five points of the Charter, and the right of the labourer to dictate terms to his employer. What is the *known* bias of the very men whose agitation has brought upon the nation the proposal, by a Conservative Ministry, of these measures? It is towards the destruction of aristocracy, the removal of the church as a recognized and protected pillar of the country's greatness and happiness, and the establishment of a new order of things, in which there is to be only a mass of defenceless and disaffected labour at one extremity and overgrown capital at the other,—no middle state—no place of rest or pause. Throw out of order for but a moment such a social fabric as this, and who dares to contemplate the result? Who can tell us with certainty in what frantic efforts the passions or the despair of a million of men thrown idle by any derangement of the machinery of our commerce may not be tempted to expend itself? We have the calamity which resulted from the Chartist insurrection of 1839 within our recollection. We have the manufacturing riots of 1842 before us. We have seen Manchester itself for four and twenty hours in possession of a turbulent mob; and when we have created a dozen Manchesters—when we have thrown an additional million of our population into dependence upon the accidents of commerce, the mercy of capital, their own caprices, or the guidance of demagogues, what have we to stand between the institutions of the country and their fury.

I see in the carrying out of these measures the carrying out of a social revolution, and the transfer of political power from those who now hold it into the hands of a demoralized and disaffected democracy. There is no retarding influence to check such a consummation. The experience of all history shews that countries situated as Great Britain must be under such a system have ever progressed towards democratic rule and ultimate anarchy. I may be mistaken; but if so, the past has been all a mistake, or human nature is no longer what it was.

But it is necessary, we are told, which is plunging us into this course. We are bound to the wheels of a relentless machine, which must crush us if we resist its impetuous moving. We have, Sir Robert Peel informs us, only to decide this question, "shall we progress or shall we turn back." I answer him, "shew us that such progress, brought about by such means, is one towards the increased greatness of the nation, and the increased happiness of the people, and we will resign ourselves into your guiding; but, if you cannot, we are content to go back into the old ways of our fathers, and to cling to the shelter of those institutions under which we have become the great people that we are." Sir Robert Peel points to Ireland as the spur of necessity which is goading him on. I point to one vast Colonial Empire as the safety valve which is to

relieve us from our difficulty. We want two million quarters more of wheat yearly he says, and employment and the means to eat more generous food for the starving millions of the sister isle. I point to British America as the solution of the dilemma. You have in Canada West a territory the most fertile in the world, capable of growing not two millions, but twenty millions of additional food. Enable the surplus agricultural population of Ireland and of England and Scotland to carry their industry there: and for every family which you locate and place in a position to earn their bread by the sweat of their brows, you create increased employment for the British artizan, and increased food for the British people. You may withdraw your Coercion Bill for Ireland. You may dispense with eleemosynary doles of maize. You may withdraw your armies of policemen, and dispense with your staff of bailiffs, process-servers, and proctors. *People your Colonies. Draw even closer round you, rather than relax, the ties of affection and of interest which should bind them round you:* and who can foresee the majestic power and greatness which you will erect for this people. Go on in your present course. Throw from you your colonies; depress your native industry; ruin your commercial marine; and *the progress of this country towards extinction as a great state is fixed and inevitable.*

## APPENDIX.

The following extracts, from an article on the PROTECTIVE SYSTEM, in *Hunt's New York Merchants' Magazine*, will give a very correct idea of the view of the Americans, on the subject of Free Trade :—

“The Protective System originated with the mother country, and was interwoven even with our Colonial existence. When, therefore, we separated from Great Britain, we adopted the same policy, and turned that system, which England had employed for her special benefit, to our own account. This system has grown up with us, and is essential not only to our prosperity, but to our independence as a nation. We might as well dispense with our fleets and our armies, recall our foreign ministers and consuls, annul all treaties with foreign powers, and repeal all laws in relation to navigation and commerce, as yield the principle of protecting our own industry against the policy of other nations. We might, in fact, as well give up our national existence, as yield the great principle on which that existence is founded, and without which our independence could not be maintained.”

“The cottons and woollens manufactured in the country, constitute but a small part of the aggregate product of our manufactures; and many of the smaller species of our manufactures, our household productions, require protection quite as much as the larger establishments, engaged in the cotton and woollen business. But there is no propriety in considering this as a policy relating to the manufacturers alone. The question is, not whether a few men shall be raised to opulence, but whether the nation shall be independent; not whether manufactures shall be built up, but whether industry shall be encouraged and rewarded. The merchant, the navigator, the mechanic, the artisan, the farmer, the day labourer, as well as the manufacturer, has each an interest in this policy. It is ‘who go down to the sea in ships, and do business in the mighty deep,’ and those ‘whose ploughshare turns the stubborn soil;’ the adventurous pioneer in the western wilderness, and the humble mechanic, wherever his lot may be cast; these have as deep an interest in the American system as the manufacturer in the Eastern States, as we shall attempt to show hereafter.”

“Labour is the great source of wealth and prosperity; and that system of policy which stimulates industry, and gives to the labourer the reward of his toil, is best adapted to the wants of the country. The protective system is purely democratic in its tendency. It fosters industry, and enables the poor man, who has no capital, but his own labour, no surplus but what is found in his own sinews, to acquire a competency to support and educate his family. It is designed not for the few, but for the many; and though it will be productive of the common good, its peculiar blessings will fall upon the labouring classes.”

“If trade will regulate itself, why do the wisest and most prosperous governments make laws in favor and support of their trade? Why does the British Parliament employ so much time and pains in regulating their trade, so as to render its advantages particularly useful to their own nation? Why so preposterous as to abide by and enforce their boasted navigation act? But so far is trade from regulating itself, that it continually needs the help of the legislation of every country as a nursing father. If we Americans do not choose to regulate it, it will regulate us, till we have not a farthing left in our hands. Unless we shortly regulate and correct the abuses of our trade, by lopping off its useless branches and establishing manufactures, we shall be corrected, perhaps, even to our very destruction. The mechanics hope that the legislature will afford them that protection they are entitled to; for, as the present hateful *system of trade* and scarcity of cash, occasions numbers of them to want employment, though they are able and ready to furnish many articles which are at present imported, they conceive that duties ought to be laid on certain imported articles, in such a manner as to place American manufactures on the same footing as the manufactures of Europe, and enable them to procure bread and support for their families.”

“These evils proceed from a want of one supreme controlling power in these States. They will be done away by adopting the present form of government. It will have energy and power to regulate your trade and commerce—to enforce the execution of your imposts, duties, and customs. Instead of the trade of this country being carried on in foreign bottoms, our ports will be crowded with our own ships, and we shall become carriers for Europe. Heavy duties will be laid on all foreign articles which can be manufactured in this country, and bounties will be granted on the exportation of commodities; the manufactures of our country will flourish; our mechanics will lift their heads, and rise to opulence and wealth.”

"These extracts are full to the purpose for which we have made them. They shew us most conclusively, that, at the time of the adoption of the constitution, the people desired the protection of their manufactures, and regarded that protection as one of the elements of the commercial power. These writers speak of 'regulating trade, so as to encourage our manufactures;' and when they complain of the decline of the manufacturing interests, they will ascribe it to some defect in the commercial arrangements of the states."

The Committee of the House, consisting of three, one of whom was a member of the Convention, reported an address to the President, in which are these remarkable words:—"We concur with you in the sentiment that agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, are entitled to legislative protection." This address, containing this full avowal of the doctrine of protection to manufactures, was unanimously adopted.

"The propriety of sustaining our own interests, and fostering our own industry, is so obvious, that little need be said upon the subject, further than to answer some of the principal objections which have been made against this policy. But before we consider these objections, it may be well to take a passing notice of the doctrine of 'Free Trade,' which is put forth at the present day with some degree of confidence. And what is this boasted doctrine of Free Trade? If it means anything that is intelligible, it means that all duties on imports should be removed; and that all laws and treaties which secure any advantage to our own commerce and shipping over that of other nations, should be annulled. In a word, this doctrine goes on the ground that an American Congress should cease to legislate for the American people, and legislate for the world. I do not say that the advocates of Free Trade avow this, or that this is their design; but I do say that their principles involve this idea—and if they were carried out to their full extent, such would be the practical result."

"But there is a sort of looseness in the phrase 'Free Trade,' which renders this discussion embarrassing. The advocates of this doctrine do not tell us with sufficient precision what they mean by the phrase. If they mean that we should take off all restrictions from commerce, whether other nations do or not, it is one thing; but if they mean that we should do it towards those nations which will reciprocate the favour, it is quite another thing. But the phrase must imply a trade which is mutually beneficial, or it must not. If it does not imply a trade that is mutually unrestricted and mutually beneficial, that is a good reason for rejecting it. I have not made sufficient proficiency in the science of political non-resistance, to advocate a system of trade which enriches other nations by impoverishing us. I cannot consent to open our ports, duty free, to those nations which throw every embarrassment in the way of our commerce. My political creed does not require me to love other nations better than my own. But if Free Trade implies a trade mutually advantageous, I am willing to adopt it; but this can never be done by taking off all commercial restrictions. If the trade is to be mutually beneficial, it must not only imply a reciprocity in commercial regulations, but a similarity in condition."

"We, as a nation, are peculiarly situated. We are separated from the Old World by distance, and by the nature of our institutions. Our leading characteristic is, that our citizens are freemen, and are labourers. The nature of our institutions tends to elevate the working classes, and to secure to the labourer an ample remuneration for his toil. This raises the price of labour—it makes the labourer a man. So long as we retain this, our national characteristic, by protecting our own industry, our country will be prosperous. But let the pleasing but delusive doctrine of Free Trade obtain in our land—let that policy under which we have grown up and prospered be abandoned, and let us open our ports to the fabrics of those nations whose hardy labourers can obtain but a shilling a day, and board themselves, and it requires no spirit of prophecy to predict the embarrassment and distress which would ensue. When our navigators are driven from the ocean, and our manufacturers and mechanics from their mills and their workshops, and all are compelled to cultivate the soil, the beauties of Free Trade would be realised. We might have agricultural products, but we should have no market. Being dependent upon other nations for many of the comforts of life, and at the same time deprived of a market for our produce, we should be compelled to toil for a mere pittance, and should, like Tantalus in the fable, perish in the midst of agricultural plenty."

"Here, then, we take our stand; and we are happy in being supported by the Free Trade men themselves. *It is the duty of our Government to adopt measures to counteract the injurious effects which the policy of foreign nations is calculated to have upon our commerce.* If Great Britain, or France, or any other nation, should enact a law tomorrow, imposing new and severe restrictions upon our commerce, there is scarcely a Free-Trade man in our land who would not cry out for some countervailing measure on the part of our Government. What we should ask of foreign nations in such a case would be, that there should be a reciprocity of interest—a fair and equitable competition between our own and foreign labour. If this competition was destroyed by the special act of a foreign government, we should protest against it."

"Our manufacturers, therefore, must abandon their business altogether, or the price of labour must come down to the European standard. Is this desirable? Do the Free-Trade men wish to see the hardy labourers of this country reduced to the necessity of toiling fourteen or sixteen hours a day for the paltry sum of 1s., exclusive of board? This is the European rate of wages, as appears from a Report made to the English Parliament, in 1840. We will give a brief statement of the price of wages, as gathered from that Report—



“Average Prices, per week, of the Hand-loom Weavers in Europe, including the Weavers of Silk, Cotton, Linen, and Woollen, in all their varieties, &c. &c. per week.”

Great Britain .....	4	1	1
France .....	7	5	0
Switzerland .....	5	0	0
Belgium .....	6	0	0
Austria .....	3	0	0
Saxony .....	2	1	0

These are the average prices given for adult male labourers, female labour being from 30 to 80 per cent. less. Here is a picture of foreign labour in 1840. But, low as these prices are, it appears by a Report to Parliament, in 1841, that the prices had fallen at least 10 or 12 per cent. from the preceding year. We ask again, whether the friends of Free Trade, who profess to be the friends of the people, are desirous of seeing the free, independent labourers of this country brought down to the European standard—to the miserable pittance of eight or ten pence a day? A greater evil could not be inflicted on our citizens—a more withering calamity could not befall our country. The wealth of a nation consists principally in the labour of its citizens; and, as a general thing, there can be no surer test of national prosperity, than the price that labour will command.”

“This objection to our argument for protection, drawn from the low price of labour in foreign countries, is founded on the principle, that sound political economy requires that a nation should, at all times, and under all circumstances, allow its citizens to buy where they can buy cheapest, and sell where they can obtain the highest price. But, plausible as this doctrine, may appear, it is far from being sound. In time of war, when our commerce is obstructed, a citizen might buy cheapest of the enemy, and, in return, dispose of his products to them at the highest price. But even the advocates of Free Trade would not contend for this. They would admit that such a trade should be restrained for public considerations—for purposes of state. Now, the very principle which would justify restraint in this case, will justify a protective tariff. Public considerations justify the one as much as the other. If it be proper, in time of war, to interdict a trade which might be profitable to some of our citizens, it may be equally proper in time of peace. Our government is instituted for the benefit of the people in peace as much as in war; and public consideration should have a controlling influence at one period as much as at another.

“Again, this doctrine would be as fatal to our shipping as to our manufacturing interest. If it be at all times wise to purchase at the cheapest market, it would also be wise to employ the cheapest carriers.”

“It is with a nation as with an individual—the market where he can buy cheapest is not always the best, even in a pecuniary point of view. It may be good policy in an individual to buy at the dearest market—it may be nearest at hand, or it may be the best market at which he can sell his products. The cheapest market for purchase may require payment in specie, while a dearer market may receive other commodities in payment. The cotton manufacturers at the north might purchase their cotton in India, as they undoubtedly would to some extent, if the duty on cotton were taken off; and they might find it profitable to themselves, especially as they could buy cheaper, and at the same time open to some extent a new market for their fabrics; but as this would injure the home market for the cotton-grower at the south, the injury inflicted upon the planting states would be greater than the benefits obtained by the northern manufacturer. For reasons of state, a preference should be given to domestic cotton. The northern manufacturer who consumes one hundred bales of cotton grown in this country, not only gives employ indirectly to those who labour to produce that article, but he gives employ to those who raise the meat and grain which the laborer consumes while raising the cotton; whereas the manufacturer who consumes one hundred bales of cotton raised in India, encourages foreign instead of domestic industry. In the former case, the profits of the entire business are kept in the country; while, in the latter, half of the profits accrue to foreigners. The same remarks may be made upon other manufactured articles. He who patronizes domestic manufactures, creates a home market, and so encourages our own industry. The people of Tennessee, for example, by wearing American cottons, even if they should cost a trifle more than the foreign fabric, would thereby not only promote the interest of the country, but their own. By patronizing the domestic manufacture, they not only prevent a greater competition in the production of their great staples, corn and wheat, but, by sustaining the manufacturer, they increase the demand for their own products. The southern planter, while growing his cotton, and the northern manufacturer, while converting it into cloth, are both living upon the corn and wheat of Tennessee; or, which is practically the same thing, on the corn and wheat of some other state, whose bread stuff comes in competition with their own. But if they wear the fabric of British looms, made of cotton grown in India, they lose all these advantages.”

“If we adopt the policy of procuring every thing abroad, because it can be obtained cheaper, we shall in a short time find our industry paralysed, and our resources so reduced, that even cheap articles will be beyond our reach. Ask the industrious mechanics, and the hard-working farmers in the Interior—those whose means are limited, and who are compelled to husband their resources—and they will tell you the advantages of exchanging the products of their labour for the articles they purchase—of getting things in their own line, without paying money, as the phrase is. This homely expression embodies more true political economy than the more elegant one of purchasing in the cheapest market.”

"The protective system is as important to the agriculturist as to the manufacturer. Though the enemies of this system have represented it as hostile to the farmer, I am fully persuaded that this is a great mistake. In the first place, agricultural products enjoy as high a protection as manufactures, to say the least. I will give a few articles as a specimen, and will resolve the duty into an *ad valorem* rate, founded on the price current at Boston, six months after the present tariff went into operation:—

Cotton, duty 3 cents per lb. ....	44	equal to	40	per cent <i>ad valorem</i> .
Wool, 30 per cent, and 3 cents per lb. ....	44	"	"	"
Beef, 2 cents per lb. ....	62	"	"	"
Pork, 2 cents per lb. ....	55	"	"	"
Ham and Bacon, 3 cents per lb. ....	50	"	"	"
Cheese, 9 cents per lb. ....	175	"	"	"
Butter, 5 cents per lb. ....	41	"	"	"
Lard, 3 cents per lb. ....	44	"	"	"
Potatoes, 9 cents per bushel ....	30	"	"	"
Flour, 1 doll. 25 c. per bbl. ....	27	"	"	"
Wheat, 25 cents per bushel ....	28	"	"	"

Here we have a list of eleven articles of agricultural products, and they average 54 per cent. protection—a rate much higher than is enjoyed by manufactured articles. Neither have we, in this estimate, adopted the doctrine of anti-tariff men, and supposed that the duty increased the price to the amount of the duty. If we adopted that mode of estimating prices, we should have swelled the per cent. of protection much higher. I know it is said that these duties are unavailing, as these articles need no protection; but this is a great mistake. These articles have been imported into the country, on an average, for the last five years, to the amount of nearly 2,000,000 doll. annually.

"There is an identity of interest between the manufacturer and the agriculturist. They are not enemies, nor even rivals, but intimate friends. Viewed on a large and liberal scale, manufactures and agriculture are only different departments of the same great system of national industry; and whatever tends to give prosperity to the one will give prosperity to the other. They both need the fostering care of the government."

"Compared with the foreign, the home market is the most valuable, in every respect. A market in a manufacturing district, at home, is always more sure than any foreign market. The demand is constant, and can always be relied upon; whereas, the foreign market is always uncertain. Suppose that one of the Western States had 100,000 barrels of flour to dispose of annually, and they looked to Great Britain for a market. That market would depend upon the crops in Europe. When the crop was good upon the Continent, England would take but 50,000 barrels; and when the crop was short, she would want 150,000 barrels. Though her annual demand would amount to 100,000 barrels, on an average, yet it would fluctuate from 50,000 to 150,000. Under these circumstances, the farmer could make no calculations how much wheat to sow. This uncertainty, depending upon contingencies which he could not possibly foresee, would hang like an incubus upon him, and paralyze his efforts. But let the same State depend upon the home market, created by manufactures, and the farmer can calculate with great certainty. He knows that there are 100,000 persons employed in manufactures, and that they will want a barrel of flour each; and he knows that the crops on the eastern continent will have little or no connexion with the demand here. Under these circumstances, he knows, with a good degree of certainty, how much to sow; and, being sure of a market, his industry will redouble, and he will realize a greater profit from his labour. Every practical man knows that much depends upon the certainty of a market; and, from this glance at the subject, it must be seen, at once, that the home market is more sure than the foreign. But this difference between the foreign and home market would be still greater in time of war. In case of hostilities with a great maritime power, like Great Britain, whether our commerce were with her or any other foreign nation, it would be in a great degree cut off, so that the foreign market would fail. These considerations show, conclusively, that the home market must, after all, be the farmers' chief dependence—his market in peace, and his only reliance in war."

"But it is said that protection is injurious to commerce. No objection can be more fallacious than this. We have already seen that our commerce drew its first breath in the protective system, and that its last respiration is to be ascribed to the same policy. And it is a strange position, that the very policy which first created, and still sustains commerce, is injurious to it."

"Without protective duties, a large portion of our sugar would be imported in its refined state; but the duty of six cents per pound upon refined sugar, induces the sugar-refiners to import the brown sugar, which they bring to our refiners into loaf. Now it must be manifest that more shipping is employed in bringing to our refiners the raw sugar, than would be requisite to bring the lesser quantity of the refined to supply the wants of the people. Our manufactures, by increasing the business connexion between different portions of the country, increase the coasting trade and the internal commerce. Add to this the amount of manufactured products which are shipped to foreign countries, and I think it will appear that our commerce is not injured by stimulating the industry and developing the resources of the country."

"The remarks which have been offered upon prices, brief as they are, are deemed sufficient to show that no objection can be made to the protective system on the ground of its raising the price of the fabrics protected. In some instances it will not raise the price

at all; in others, only for a short period; and if, in other cases, it does produce a permanent increase of price, that is more than compensated for in the stimulus which this system gives to industry, in the home market which it creates, and in the general prosperity which it produces."

"We are in favour of the protective system, because we believe it is calculated to promote the interest of our country, and our whole country. We believe that there is no question of national policy in which the people have so deep an interest, as the one we have been considering. We are in favour of it, because it will promote the interest of the manufacturers, and save from ruin the 300,000,000 dollars of capital invested in that useful department of human industry. We are in favour of it, because we regard it as essential to agriculture, that great and paramount interest, which is the foundation of every other. But, above all, we are in favour of the protective system, because it promotes the interest of the labourers of the country. This, after all, is the interest which requires most protection. The rich man can rely upon his money for his support. If the times are hard, his money becomes more valuable, as it will command a better interest, and furnish him more of the comforts and luxuries of life. But to the poor man, the labourer, who has no capital but his ability to toil—to such a one a prostration of business is absolute ruin. Now, as the protective policy is calculated to revive business, and give the labourer the due reward to his toil, we regard it as the poor man's system—as his rightful inheritance.

"This system has already done much for the poor man. There is no article of clothing which goes into the consumption of the poor man's family so extensively as cottons in various forms; and this policy has reduced the price of common cotton cloth more than three quarters. Those shirtings which in 1816 would cost thirty cents per yard can now be purchased for six cents; and other cottons have fallen nearly in the same proportion. We commend this to the special consideration of those who eat their bread in the sweat of their brow, who constitute the great mass of the people.

"We say, in conclusion, that Congress not only possesses the power to lay protective duties, but the good of the country demands the exercise of this power. So thought the 'father of his country'—so thought the patriots and sages of the revolution. And shall the mere theorists of this day, with their refined closet-dreams, lead us from the paths which our fathers have trod, and which experience has shown us to be the paths of wisdom and prosperity?

"Every feeling of national honour, every dictate of patriotism, every interest in the country, cries out against it."

produce a perma-  
which this sys-  
neral prosperity

culated to pro-  
there is no one  
the one we have  
interest of the  
sted in that use-  
ard it as essen-  
dation of every  
it promotes the  
which requires  
If the times are  
est, and furnish  
e labourer, who  
ness is absolute  
ive the labourer  
-as his rightful

article of clothing  
y as cottons in  
cloth more than  
yard can now  
ame proportion.  
in the sweat of

o lay protective  
So thought the  
on. And shall  
from the paths  
e paths of wis-

interest in the

