## news release

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## CANADA CONDEMNS INTRANSIGENCE OF HAITI'S MILITARY COMMAND

Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet today condemned the refusal by Haitian military leader Lieutenant-General Cédras to meet a senior military/civilian delegation from Canada, France, the United States and Venezuela. Canada was represented by Rear Admiral Kenneth J. Summers and Canada's Chargé d'affaires in Haiti, Louis Robert Daigle.

"The General's refusal to meet the mission demonstrates once again that the Haitian military is clearly responsible for the continuation of the Haitian crisis. It is the military that reneged on commitments made under the Governors Island Agreement and they must take the blame for the situation that has led to the imposition of sanctions," Mr. Ouellet said.

The mission -- representing the group known as the Friends of the United Nations Secretary-General on Haiti -- was to have delivered a strongly worded message conveying the unanimous views of the four countries as well as the Special Envoy of the Secretaries General of the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

The aide-memoire that was to have been presented to Cédras by the mission today in Port-au-Prince was left with his staff instead. The document outlines clearly what actions must be undertaken by the military before sanctions will be lifted. A second aide-memoire was presented in Washington to exiled Haitian leader, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Texts of both are attached.

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## AIDE MEMOIRE

The international community remains steadfast in its determination to see the return of constitutional government and the return of the democratically elected President to Haiti. To this end, the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and the four countries represented here have undertaken extraordinary diplomatic efforts and unprecedented economic sanctions. In order to minimize human suffering and to ensure that the sanctions are sustainable, they have put in place a major program of humanitarian assistance. To provide a positive incentive to bring about the result we seek, they have put in place a massive prospective package of reconstruction and development assistance.

As a result of these efforts, the Haitian military was brought to the bargaining table last summer, and the Governors Island Agreement was signed. The Friends of the Secretary General remain committed to the Governors Island process for bringing about the goals we seek of the return of constitutional government and of President Aristide to Haiti.

Primary responsibility for the delay in implementation of the Governors Island Agreement lies with the Haitian military leadership. The Friends have made clear in their Statement of Conclusions following their meeting in Paris December 13-14 that the sanctions should remain in place until the military has taken the steps within its competence to comply with all of its obligations under the Agreement. They have also made clear their view that the Security Council of the United Nations should consider additional sanctions measures should the military fail to comply with its obligations. A high-level mission of the Friends will be presenting their position in this regard to the military leadership tomorrow in Port au Prince.

While the military bears primary responsibility for the current situation, it is also the case that successful completion of some of the steps provided for in the Governors Island Agreement requires the active cooperation of parties other than the Haitian military authorities. It is the task of the Haitian parties to work out the procedures and political arrangements required to bring about compliance by both sides with their obligations under the Governors Island Agreement and the broader objective of national reconciliation it envisions. For example, some steps require the active cooperation of the executive and the military, such as the international cooperation with respect to the police and military envisioned in paragraph 5(c) of the Governors Island Agreement, and the establishment of appropriate security arrangements. Moreover, both the President and the Parliament have essential roles to play in (a) the enactment of the legislation called for in the Agreement (notably laws on the creation of a new police force and on amnesty); (b) the nomination and confirmation of a new Commander in Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces in accordance with Constitutional processes; (c) the nomination and confirmation of a new Chief of Police in accordance with Constitutional processes. Similarly, the nomination and confirmation of a new Prime Minister and the approval of his program of government require action by both the President and the Parliament.

Inasmuch as no political party has a majority in both chambers of the Haitian Parliament, it is incumbent upon the President to assemble a sufficient majority among the democratically elected members of the Haitian Parliament to pass the laws and nominations needed to bring about implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. While the Friends

reject any political role for the armed forces in a new government, they consider the need to establish coalition majorities among democratic elements in a parliamentary system to constitute an essential aspect of constitutional democracy and not an illegitimate form of "power sharing."

The Friends see much merit in the concept of a package approach which would bring about the implementation of the remaining steps of the Governors Island Accord in which arrangements could be made and implemented in large part simultaneously. This approach both would bring about the rapid progress in implementation sought by the international community and the Haitian people, and would address the expressed reluctance of each of the Haitian parties to proceed with carrying out its obligations until the other party has fulfilled its own.

The Friends urge the Haitian President to consider support for a conclave to be held under the auspices of the Special Envoy of the Secretaries General of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States at a time and place to be determined by the Special Envoy.

## AIDE MEMOIRE

The Friends of the United Nations Secretary General (Canada, France, the United States of America and Venezuela) wish to advise the leadership of the Armed Forces of Haiti of the following:

The Friends of the Secretary General remain committed to the Governors Island process for bringing about the goals we seek of the return of Constitutional government and of President Aristide to Haiti.

The Friends hold the Armed Forces leadership primarily responsible for the delays that have occurred in the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. The military leadership has violated its obligations in a number of respects. Especially egregious have been (a) its arming of civilian groups, which constitute a security threat to members of the military as well as to the human rights of the civilian population; (b) its connivance in creating conditions that made impossible the landing of the military and police mission that the Haitian military leadership had itself requested and helped plan; (c) the failure of the Commander-in-Chief to carry out his commitment to take advantage of early retirement by October 15, 1993, and (d) its dissemination of false and misleading information to the members of the Armed Forces as well as to the civilian population.

The Friends will support the maintenance of the existing international sanctions until the Haitian military has taken all necessary action within its capacities to bring about the fulfillment of the Governors Island Agreement. In accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, they consider that the sanctions should be suspended only when the military authorities in Haiti have:

- 1) Created the proper environment in which legislative actions called for in the Governors Island Agreement can be taken. The military authorities should, for example, (a) support the pending legislation to create a new civilian police force as well as for legislation concerning amnesty and for the ratification of the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the new chief of the civilian police, (b) guarantee the security of all the parliamentarians in order that they may consider such legislative action in a secure environment, (c) permit and facilitate the presence of international observers to provide further confidence to the parliamentarians, and (d) unconditionally cease all acts of bribery and intimidation, direct or indirect, aimed at influencing the parliamentarians.
- 2) Facilitated the changes in the leadership of the police and military called for in the Governors Island Agreement. The Commander-in-Chief must carry out his engagement to retire. The military authorities must take steps to facilitate the nomination by the President and the confirmation by the Parliament of a new Commander-in-Chief. All members of the General Staff should make clear their willingness to accept reassignment to such positions commensurate with their rank as the new Commander-in-Chief may select, and must accept such new assignments when they are made. Similarly, the current Chief of Police should publicly affirm his willingness to be reassigned to another position in the military once the legislation creating a new civilian police force is enacted, and must accept such reassignment when it is made.

- 3) Created the proper environment for the return of the democratically elected President and maintenance of constitutional order. The military authorities should, for example, (a) publicly reaffirm their acceptance of the return of the President, and (b) guarantee the security of the President, including the development of practical security arrangements to be established within the framework of the new civilian police. Finally, the military authorities should (a) take the necessary steps to revoke any outstanding authorization to carry weapons for persons who are not members of the duly constituted military or police forces of Haiti, or who are not employed by an authorized security guard company or by international or diplomatic missions, and (b) take all necessary measures to strictly enforce the laws prohibiting the unauthorized carrying of weapons or the possession of automatic weapons or other instruments of war.
- 4) Created the proper environment for the deployment of the United Nations police and military assistance mission as a part of a settlement and as conditions permit. The military authorities should, for example, (a) make a clear public statement endorsing the presence of this mission and (b) provide all necessary facilities for the mission, including security arrangements. Accordingly, the military authorities must fully control all groups opposing the presence of the mission.

The Friends recognize that the successful completion of some of the steps provided for in the Governors Island Agreement requires the active cooperation of parties other than the Haitian military authorities. The sanctions adopted by the Security Council are based solely on the failure of the Haitian military authorities thus far to fulfill their commitments. Accordingly, should the Haitian military in good faith take all necessary action within its capacities to bring about the fulfillment of the Governors Island Agreement, as outlined above, the sanctions should be suspended regardless of the actions of other parties. However, should the Haitian military fail to act in good faith to fulfill all its obligations, the sanctions should be maintained regardless of the compliance of the other parties.

If the military is failing to comply actively and comprehensively with the obligations stated above by January 15, 1994, the Security Council should meet to consider additional measures, including making the embargo already applied by the OAS universal and mandatory, applying further sanctions against main supporters of the military authorities or limiting non-commercial flights into and out of Haiti.

It is the task of the Haitian parties to work out the procedures and political arrangements required to bring about compliance by both sides with their obligations under the Governors Island Agreement and the broader objective of national reconciliation it envisions. The Friends are committed to facilitate this task, and support a national conference of all Haitian parties having a role to play in bringing about the implementation of the Governors Island process. The Friends request that the Haitian military state whether it is prepared to attend such a conference as proposed by the acting Prime Minister and to participate actively and in good faith in it. It is to be emphasized that such participation would involve only those matters in which the military has a legitimate constitutional role to play, and that there will be no political role for the armed forces in the government or in the selection of a new government.