

Number 4

March 1986

REVIEWING THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

by William Epstein

Dep. of External Affairs
Min. des Affaires extérieures

SEP 12 1986

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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly called the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, was signed on July 1, 1968. The treaty is generally regarded as one of the most important treaties in the field of nuclear arms control and as the main pillar of the international structure to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is also generally agreed that the treaty has played an indispensable role in the success of the efforts to prevent the "horizontal proliferation" of nuclear weapons; that is, the spread of such weapons to non-nuclear states, but that it has failed to prevent the "vertical proliferation" of such weapons; that is, their further development, production and deployment by the nuclear powers.

The treaty, in essence, codifies a bargain between those nuclear weapons states (NWS) which became parties to the treaty (the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom) and the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), whereby the latter agreed that they would not manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, in exchange for a promise from the nuclear powers to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. When the treaty was signed the United States and Soviet Union announced their intention to enter into the strategic arms limitation talks known as SALT.

In addition, the treaty reconfirmed and strengthened the previous promise made by the nuclear powers in establishing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. The nuclear powers had undertaken to provide assistance and information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the non-nuclear countries. In exchange the latter had agreed to accept international safeguards over the nuclear materials and equipment provided to them in order to ensure that they were used solely for peaceful purposes. The NPT provided for more far-reaching "full-scope" safeguards; the non-nuclear countries agreed to accept IAEA safeguards not only over the nuclear material and equipment

supplied to them but over all their nuclear materials and facilities whatever their source or origin.

At the insistence of the non-nuclear states who wanted to ensure that the nuclear states would live up to their obligations, the NPT contains a provision that a conference of the parties could be held every five years "to review the operation of this treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty are being realized."

The NPT entered into force in 1970. By mid-1985 it had 130 parties, more than any other arms control treaty. The two other nuclear weapon states, China and France, are not parties to the treaty, nor are some 35 other countries including several near-nuclear states such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Spain.

THE REVIEW OF THE TREATY IN 1975 AND 1980

The first two conferences of the parties held to review the operation of the NPT, in 1975 and in 1980, witnessed some interesting and unusual developments. Unlike most conferences dealing with arms control, there were few differences between East and West; there was an evident commonality of interest among the three nuclear powers and they displayed a sense of co-operative solidarity in resisting the demands of the non-nuclear countries and in particular those of the non-aligned and neutral countries, mainly those of the Third World.

The First Review Conference in 1975 was attended by 57 of the then 96 parties to the treaty. All non-nuclear parties claimed that they had lived up fully to their commitments under the NPT, and the non-aligned ones claimed that the nuclear powers had not done so. The non-aligned stressed the failure of the nuclear powers to implement the provisions of the treaty concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Among their main

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proposals and demands were: (a) an end to underground nuclear testing beginning with a moratorium on testing, (b) a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals, (c) a pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear parties to the treaty, and (d) substantial aid to the developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Several of the non-nuclear countries allied to the United States or the Soviet Union were sympathetic to the proposals of the non-aligned countries and a fragile consensus was achieved on a Declaration, in which the nuclear powers in effect promised to try harder to meet the demands of the non-nuclear countries. In agreeing to the consensus Declaration, the non-aligned countries made an "interpretative statement" that was attached to the Declaration, saying that they stood by their political proposals and that they interpreted the Declaration in the light of those proposals. Thus the consensus Declaration was subject to serious reservations by the largest grouping of states.

The Second Review Conference in 1980 was attended by 75 of the then 115 parties to the NPT. At the time of its convening, none of the demands of the non-aligned countries had been fully met and they were particularly displeased by the failure of the nuclear powers to live up to their obligation to halt the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The non-aligned states were ready to reach agreement on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided for in Article IV of the NPT, and on safeguards, in accordance with Article III. In order to facilitate the assured supply of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, they were willing to explore plans to establish regional nuclear fuel cycle centres that would undertake to provide many of the services required for peaceful nuclear programs. These included an international fuel bank to stockpile natural and enriched uranium and fuel rods; a regime for international plutonium to deal with reprocessing of spent fuel and storage of the plutonium produced; the management of spent fuel, including its storage, and that of highly radioactive wastes. They also favoured full-scope international safeguards by the IAEA over all nuclear materials, plants and activities in all non-nuclear countries. An agreed consensus was readily attainable on all these matters.

However, no consensus was achieved on halting and reversing the nuclear arms race as provided for in the Preamble and Article VI of the treaty. The nuclear powers would make no concessions on nuclear arms control measures, not even on the early setting up of a working group in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. As a result, no

over-all agreement could be reached and the conference ended in failure without any final declaration or even any formal re-affirmation of support for the NPT.

THE 1985 REVIEW CONFERENCE

By the time of the Third Review Conference in 1985, the outlook for the NPT was gloomier than before. The international situation had deteriorated in the intervening five years and the nuclear arms race was proceeding at the fastest pace ever. Far from the nuclear states living up to their obligations under Article VI "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament," negotiations for several measures of nuclear arms control had either been suspended or were stalemated and, for the first time, there had been no agreement on any measure of nuclear disarmament in the preceding five years. The trilateral negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom for a comprehensive nuclear test ban had been suspended in 1980, and the United States refused to resume them or agree to begin multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament where all five nuclear powers were participants. Global military expenditures had escalated to some 1,000 billion dollars a year to the detriment of world economic and development prospects, and there was the looming threat of a new, incalculable, destabilizing and exorbitantly costly arms race in both defensive and offensive weapons in outer space.

Recognizing that the NPT might face some serious problems at the Third Review Conference, the US, UK, USSR and their allies had made efforts during the preceding year to urge more countries to accede to the treaty and to persuade all non-nuclear powers to soften their positions and to exercise moderation in their demands on the nuclear powers. They stressed that the treaty was essential for the security of the non-nuclear states as well as of the nuclear states and that, by making demands on the nuclear states that were unlikely to be fulfilled, they might undermine the effectiveness of the treaty.

On the other hand, several non-aligned countries urged all other non-aligned parties to arrange to participate in the conference (which was not easy for a number of the smaller countries who found it a burden to provide the necessary personnel and funds), in order to be able to exert as much pressure as possible on the nuclear powers in the hope that they might soften their resistance to the demands of the non-nuclear states.

In the end, 86 of the 130 parties to the treaty participated in the conference. Since the number of participants from the Western and Socialist groups remained static, the total increase in the number of participants enhanced the proportion of the non-aligned states and thus gave them a larger voice in the proceedings. On the eve of the opening of the conference there was great uncertainty and some trepidation about its outcome. In fact a number of Western countries feared that the conference would repeat the 1980 experience and fail for a second time to agree on any final declaration.

From the beginning of the conference it was clear that the dominant issue would be the implementation of Article VI of the NPT, and in particular the disappointment and frustration of many of the non-nuclear weapon states at the lack of any progress towards a comprehensive test ban, which many regard as a prerequisite to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and as a first step towards nuclear disarmament.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, struck a keynote in his message to the conference in which he stated:

“Unless the nuclear arms race between the major powers is halted and the further spread of military nuclear capability deterred, the terrible possibility of wholesale destruction will increase yet further.”

In referring to the commitments in Article VI he said,

“In this respect, the implementation of the treaty has been largely one-sided, to the understandable concern and profound dissatisfaction of its non-nuclear weapon parties. There must be recognition of the fact that restraint on one side cannot reasonably be demanded in the face of unlimited expansion on the other.”

With few exceptions, the speakers in the general debate were critical of the nuclear powers for failing to fulfil their commitments to halt and then reverse the nuclear arms race, and they were almost unanimous in stressing the importance they attached to an end to nuclear testing and the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. They also spoke of the need to preserve the Treaty regime by reaching a consensus document at the end of the conference.

The USSR pointed to its repeated efforts to resume negotiations for a test ban, its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing until January 1, 1986 and its offer to extend it if the United States agreed, as well as its support for a nuclear weapons freeze and nuclear disarmament. The United States repeated that a comprehensive test ban remained a long-term goal but that a test ban would not reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and that the most urgent

task was deep reductions of the existing nuclear arsenals.

Speakers from non-aligned countries repeated their long-standing demands made at the first two review conferences and added a call for a nuclear weapons freeze. They also urged early agreement at the bilateral US-USSR negotiations to prevent an arms race in outer space and to end it on earth. Mexico served notice that if the conference was unable to agree on a final declaration by consensus, it should proceed to adopt one or more resolutions by voting.

The rules of procedure of the conference called for all decisions to be taken by consensus if possible. If no consensus was obtainable, decisions could be taken by a two-thirds majority vote. Obviously if a substantial consensus could be worked out, that would be preferable as it would reflect the support of all parties. In the context of the conference, even the *threat* of a vote could adversely affect the atmosphere.

A number of speakers referred to the fact that in 1995 a conference must be called to decide on the future of the NPT and that the decision would be taken by a majority of the parties. The clear implication of these statements was that time was running out on the treaty and that it was necessary for the nuclear powers to fulfil their obligations, in particular as regards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race, if the treaty was to endure.

THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

It was agreed that after the general debate the work of the conference would be undertaken by three main committees of the whole. Committee I was to deal with the disarmament aspects of the treaty, Committee II with safeguards and Committee III with cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

While there was much discussion in Committees II and III on the safeguards against diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful to military purposes and on the entire range of questions concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, there were no insuperable obstacles to reaching agreement on these subjects.

Some difficulties were encountered when several states, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Switzerland, hesitated to support a call for full-scope safeguards on all exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology to non-nuclear states. A satisfactory compromise was reached, however, whereby all non-nuclear states were urged to make a legally binding commitment to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, and all nuclear supplier states

were urged to take effective steps towards achieving acceptance of such safeguards as a necessary basis for the transfer of nuclear supplies to non-nuclear states.

As regards cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a number of positive recommendations were agreed upon, including international and multilateral collaboration in such fields as international fuel cycle facilities, spent fuel and nuclear waste storage, and international plutonium storage. In addition, the statement called for assistance in the case of an armed attack or threat of attack on safeguarded nuclear facilities, and also for greater assistance to developing countries in promoting their nuclear power programs.

A group of states, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, urged the separation of civilian and military nuclear materials and, in a rather weak compromise, the Final Document affirmed the great value to the non-proliferation regime of commitments by the nuclear powers that they would not use the nuclear supplies, provided to them for peaceful uses, to make nuclear weapons and suggested that the IAEA could verify observance of such commitments.

The above examples are illustrative of a large number of recommendations made with respect to safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In general it can be said that the recommendations made were more specific and detailed than those which had been agreed on previous occasions.

The greatest difficulties arose in Committee I concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The United States startled some delegations by the strength of its opposition to a comprehensive test ban, which it denied was the first step towards achieving the objectives of Article VI. Members of the US delegation considered that the uncertainties of verification of a test ban at the present time would make it a confidence-eroding measure rather than a confidence-building one; they claimed that negotiations leading to deep reductions of nuclear weapons were the best way to deal with the nuclear threat, and that this was in full harmony with Article VI.

The arguments of the US against a comprehensive test ban prompted Mexico and Sweden to make a strong defence of that measure both as a necessary first step and as an easily verifiable one. They maintained that a test ban would reduce the risk that cuts in the nuclear arsenals would be nullified by the development of new nuclear systems. Sweden also stated that its experience from a fairly dense seismic network in Sweden showed that detection capabilities of magnitude 1 could be obtained, that is, for explosions down to a yield of about 1 ton or .001 kiloton.

Due mainly to the position of the United States, which was supported by the United Kingdom, it was not possible to reach agreement in Committee I on a text dealing with a comprehensive test ban treaty, and the Committee's report contained a bracketed unagreed paragraph on that subject.

Since it seemed clear that no consensus could be obtained on the text submitted by Committee I, Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico announced that he would propose several draft resolutions to the Conference and asked that they be put to the vote if no compromise could be reached.

THE ADOPTION OF THE FINAL DECLARATION

Three draft resolutions were prepared calling for

- (1) the resumption in 1985 of negotiations by the three nuclear powers for a comprehensive test ban treaty,
- (2) a moratorium on testing pending the conclusion of a CTB treaty,
- (3) a freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons.

The members of the group of non-aligned and neutral countries decided to sponsor the three draft resolutions as their own, and they were introduced in the conference by Mexico as draft resolutions of the Group of Non-aligned and Neutral States. The President of the Conference announced that, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, if no consensus agreement could be reached within 48 hours on the draft Final Declaration prepared by the Drafting Committee, the draft resolutions would be put to the vote on the last day of the conference on the expiration of the 48 hour period of deferment. He called in the meantime for renewed efforts to reach a consensus.

The submission of the draft resolutions brought a dramatic change to the entire situation and to the mood of the conference. Whereas up to that point the conference had proceeded in a businesslike but rather low-keyed, routine manner, it suddenly had reached a critical point that would be decisive for the final results of the work.

The Western and the Socialist countries, for different reasons, were very anxious to avoid a vote. The United States and its allies thought that a vote would divide the conference and weaken the NPT. They accordingly were prepared to agree to almost any reasonable compromise that could lead to a consensus and thus avoid the necessity of having to resort to a vote in which they feared they would be in the minority. They would have preferred a deadlock with no Final Declaration to being outvoted.

ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFERENCE

The Soviet Union, because of its policy of solidarity with the United States on matters concerning the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, also wanted to achieve a consensus and avoid a vote. But the Soviet Union and its allies were in a much better position than were the Western powers. They let it be known that if the consensus did proceed to a vote, they would vote for all three resolutions, which did in fact coincide with Soviet policy.

Of the 86 states participating in the conference, some 50 were non-aligned and neutral states, about 20 were Western states and some 10 were Socialist states. Thus it seemed clear that, with the Socialist states voting for the resolutions, as well as some Western states as was likely, they would probably be adopted by the necessary two-thirds majority. In these circumstances, in order to avoid an adverse vote, Ambassador Lewis Dunn of the United States found it necessary to make some concessions in an effort to reach a compromise consensus. He and Ambassador Garcia Robles together with some other delegates entered into negotiations to seek an acceptable solution.

In the final hours of the conference a compromise was worked out that made it possible to adopt a Final Declaration of some 26 pages by consensus.

The compromise language that was included in the Final Declaration was as follows:

“The Conference, except for certain states, deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral Nuclear Test Ban Treaty banning all nuclear tests by all states in all environments for all time had not been concluded so far and, therefore, called on the nuclear weapon states party to the treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985, and called on all the nuclear-weapon states to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament.”

The Declaration also noted that certain states considered deep and verifiable reductions in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons as having the highest priority. (The ‘certain states’ were the US and the UK.) It also noted the readiness of the USSR to proceed forthwith to trilateral and multilateral negotiations to conclude a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

It was also agreed that a declaration by the Group of Non-aligned and Neutral States as well as their draft resolutions calling for a moratorium on nuclear testing and for a nuclear weapons freeze should be included as an integral part of the Final Document.

The Conference also agreed that a fourth NPT review conference should be held in 1990.

Contrary to general expectations the conference was not a disaster or even a failure. It turned out in fact to be a success, albeit a partial one, somewhat similar to the first review conference in 1975. It differed, however, in an important respect from the 1975 conference. In that conference the non-aligned and neutral states could not command a two-thirds majority vote and they found it necessary to express their reservations to the consensus Final Declaration. In this conference the non-aligned and neutral states were confident they could obtain a two-thirds majority for their positions and thus were able to have their views reflected in the Final Declaration, while the United States and the United Kingdom found it necessary to express reservations.

Had the United States and the United Kingdom agreed with the non-aligned and neutral states to give a comprehensive test ban treaty the highest priority and to resume the trilateral negotiations in 1985, then the conference would have been an outstanding success.

Nevertheless, the 1985 review conference has demonstrated that voting power has now shifted, or is in the process of doing so, from the nuclear powers and their allies to the non-aligned and neutral states, together with such of the nuclear powers and their allies as may join them in seeking to halt the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by demanding a comprehensive test ban.

In the Final Declaration the parties solemnly declared their conviction that the NPT is essential to international peace and security and reaffirmed their continued support for the Treaty and its objectives — to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race, and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

As a result of the commitment and persistence of the non-aligned and neutral states, the Final Declaration for the first time focused primary attention on the disarmament aspects of the NPT and stressed the overriding importance of a comprehensive test ban as having the highest priority in “the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.”

The non-nuclear states have sent a clear message to the nuclear parties that they must abide by their treaty obligations to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race if the NPT is to endure. The NPT has been given a reprieve, not a clean bill of health. Since the future of the treaty must be decided in 1995 it is important that the nuclear powers receive and act on that message soon. If they do, then the 1985 NPT review conference will be regarded as a real turning point and not merely as a qualified success.

AFTERMATH OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE

At the 40th session of the General Assembly in 1985, although the members of the United Nations noted with satisfaction that the Third Review Conference of the NPT had adopted its Final Document by consensus, their other actions showed the persistence of their commitment to a CTB as essential for the success of the NPT.

Resolutions initiated by Mexico and Sweden, and by Australia and New Zealand, recalled the final document of the NPT Review Conference and called for the immediate beginning of negotiations for a CTB. Both resolutions passed by overwhelming margins, the first by a vote of 124-3 with 21 abstentions and the second by a vote of 116-4 with 29 abstentions.

Only the United States, the United Kingdom and France voted against the Mexican-Swedish resolution, and Grenada joined them in voting against the Australian-New Zealand resolution. France is not a party to either the 1963 partial Test Ban Treaty or the NPT. China, which is also not a party to either treaty, abstained in both votes.

During the General Assembly, as at the Third Review Conference, there was evident frustration and resentment among the non-aligned and neutral countries over what they regarded as an attempt by the United States to re-interpret the provisions of Article VI of the NPT. Whereas hitherto all parties seemed to agree that the cessation of the nuclear arms race and in particular a comprehensive test ban was the first priority in halting and reversing the nuclear arms race, and that the only obstacle was the question of the adequacy of verification, it now appeared that the United States had down-graded a comprehensive test ban treaty to a long-term goal and now gave highest priority to deep cuts in the numbers of nuclear weapons.

This change in the United States position was emphasized when the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that before the United States resumed negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, there must be an agreement on "deep reductions in the level of nuclear weapons, maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent, improved verification capabilities and expanded confidence-building measures." In one document, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stated that negotiations for a comprehensive test ban should not take place even if verification problems were completely solved.

In the light of these developments, a number of the non-nuclear countries seem to have decided to take matters into their own hands in an effort to stop all nuclear testing. During the Third Review Con-

ference of the NPT several consultations took place among some non-aligned countries to consider the possibility of calling for a conference of the parties to the 1963 partial Test Ban Treaty to amend that treaty in order to prohibit underground tests.

Article II of the partial Test Ban Treaty provides that any party to the treaty may propose amendments to it and, if requested by one-third of the parties, the Depository Governments (the USSR, UK and US) "shall convene" a conference of the parties to consider the amendments. Any amendments must be approved by a majority (57) of the votes of all of the parties (112) to the treaty including the votes of the three Depository Governments.

At the General Assembly, Mexico and five other non-aligned countries presented a resolution which recommended that the parties to the treaty should carry out "urgent consultations among themselves as to the advisability and most appropriate method" to take advantage of Article II of the treaty "for the conversion of the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty." The General Assembly adopted the resolution by a vote of 121-3 with 24 abstentions. The USSR voted for the resolution, and only the United States, United Kingdom and France voted against it. A few Western and non-aligned countries, including Canada, abstained. China did not participate in the vote.

This resolution is an important development in the long history of the efforts to achieve an end to all nuclear testing. While it has a long way to go, it provides an entirely new approach, one that holds out more hope for action than the other resolutions calling for a CTB adopted this year and in the previous quarter of a century.

Since 121 states voted for the resolution, it should not be a difficult task to obtain a request by one-third (38) of the 112 parties to the 1963 Test Ban Treaty necessary to require the three Depository States to convene an amending conference in order to consider amendments that would convert the partial treaty into a comprehensive test ban treaty. Nor should it be difficult to obtain the 57 parties required to approve such amendments.

What will be difficult is to obtain the approval and ratifications of all three depository states. In view of the Soviet vote for the resolution, it can be assumed that the USSR would approve and ratify any such amendments approved by the Conference. Since the US and the UK, however, voted against the resolution, it can be expected that they will not approve any such amendments and that the amendments will therefore fail to be adopted even if there are more than 57 votes in favor of them. Whatever the outcome, the mere holding of the amending conference will attract wide public interest and focus attention on the overriding desire and need to

end all nuclear testing. It will also provide the occasion and stimulus for all governments to review their positions on the test ban and perhaps renew their support for it.

Moreover, if such amendments are approved by a substantial majority of parties to the treaty at the amending conference, that will be an event of great political significance. It will certainly create very strong pressures on the nuclear powers, not only internationally but more important, domestically, not to ignore the wishes of the parties to the treaty. Even if these pressures are insufficient to move the

present governments in the US and UK, they may induce a succeeding government in each of the two countries to proceed to approve and ratify such amendments or at least to resume negotiations for a CTB treaty. If, despite the anticipated domestic and international pressures, they persist in refusing to accept such amendments or to negotiate and agree on a CTB treaty, that would bode very ill for the continued viability and future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So long as all the three nuclear parties fail to agree on a Comprehensive Test Ban, the Non-Proliferation Treaty will remain in jeopardy.

APPENDIX A

STATES PARTY TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY:

- | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| *Afghanistan | *Guatemala | Paraguay |
| Antigua and Barbuda | Guinea | *Peru |
| *Australia | Guinea-Bissau | *Philippines |
| *Austria | Haiti | *Poland |
| Bahamas | *Holy See | *Portugal |
| *Bangladesh | *Honduras | *Republic of Korea |
| Barbados | *Hungary | *Romania |
| *Belgium | *Iceland | *Rwanda |
| Benin | *Indonesia | Saint Christopher and Nevis |
| *Bhutan | *Iran | Saint Lucia |
| *Bolivia | *Iraq | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines |
| Botswana | *Ireland | Samoa |
| *Brunei Darussalam | *Italy | *San Marino |
| *Bulgaria | *Ivory Coast | Sao Tome and Principe |
| Burkina Faso | Jamaica | *Senegal |
| *Burundi | *Japan | *Seychelles |
| *Cameroon | *Jordan | Sierra Leone |
| *Canada | *Kenya | Singapore |
| Cape Verde | Kiribati | Solomon Islands |
| Central African Republic | Lao People's Democratic Republic | *Somalia |
| Chad | *Lebanon | *Sri Lanka |
| Congo | Lesotho | *Sudan |
| Costa Rica | Liberia | Suriname |
| *Cyprus | *Libya | Swaziland |
| *Czechoslovakia | *Liechtenstein | *Sweden |
| Democratic Kampuchea | *Luxembourg | *Switzerland |
| *Democratic Yemen | Madagascar | *Syria |
| *Denmark | *Malaysia | *Thailand |
| Dominica | *Maldives | Togo |
| Dominican Republic | Mali | Tonga |
| *Ecuador | *Malta | *Tunisia |
| *Egypt | *Mauritius | *Turkey |
| El Salvador | *Mexico | Tuvalu |
| Equatorial Guinea | *Mongolia | *Uganda |
| *Ethiopia | *Morocco | *USSR |
| Fiji | *Nauru | *United Kingdom |
| *Finland | *Nepal | *United States |
| Gabon | *Netherlands | *Uruguay |
| Gambia | *New Zealand | *Venezuela |
| *German Democratic Republic | *Nicaragua | *Vietnam |
| *Germany, Federal Republic of | *Nigeria | *Yugoslavia |
| *Ghana | *Norway | *Zaire |
| *Greece | *Panama | |
| Grenada | *Papua New Guinea | |

The following four countries have signed but so far not ratified the Treaty: Colombia, Kuwait, Trinidad and Tobago, and Yemen Arab Republic.

* indicates participation in the 1985 Review Conference in which 86 of the 130 parties participated.

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William Epstein is Senior Special Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, and a former Director of the United Nations Disarmament Division; for many years he has been a strong advocate of the NPT and the CTB and has written extensively in favour of these measures. Mr. Epstein attended the Third Review Conference of the NPT as an observer.

The views expressed in the paper are the sole responsibility of the author and should not be taken to represent the views of the Institute and its Board of Directors.

Published by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. Additional copies are available from the Institute: 307 Gilmour Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K2P 0P7.

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