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CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND SELECTED ATTENTIVE PUBLICS

Prepared for: Department of External Affairs (DL 1)

By: R.B. Byers, Carleton University

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I - Introduction:

Within any political system the decision-making process is normally complex, and foreign policy formulation is the result of both domestic and external factors. This generalization is particularly true in an industrialized democratic society such as Canada, where there are often highly articulate and active groups which have opinions on various aspects of foreign policy. These groups form the attentive public, and in some situations can have considerable influence on the formulation of both short-term and long-term foreign policy objectives.

The attentive public can serve several useful functions:

i) it can act as a source of new ideas to serve as stepping-stones for future policy objectives, ii) it can function as an opinion-maker for other elements of the attentive public and the general public, and for this reason it is important for the Government to clearly explain its foreign policy objectives, and iii) it can serve as a guide to the Government in order to gauge the general acceptance of existing policies, and the extent to which there is demand for change.

The purpose of this study is to deal with the last of these functions in an examination of present attitudes, and attitude change, toward NATO, NORAD, and peacekeeping on the part of political parties, the academic community and the editorial press in Canada. The primary time focus is the 1960's with some reference to earlier periods for the purpose of comparison.

Part One deals with the attitudes of the attentive public toward NATO. The three chapters in Part One outline the existing NATO attitudes of the three major political parties, academics and selected Canadian newspapers. In the case of both political parties and the press the question of attitude change over time has also been investigated. In the section on 'Active Academics and Selected Publics: Some comparisons in Chapter III are made between the various elements of the attentive public and the general public using available empirical data. Part Two deals with the attitudes of the attentive public toward NORAD and follows the same format as Part One, with a section in Chapter VI where comparisons are made between the attentive public and the general public. Part Three discusses peacekeeping as either an alternative or a complement to NATO since a majority within each attentive public group visualizes peacekeeping as one or the other.

Three appendices are included at the end of the study. The first gives a brief survey of Government statements and positions on the main issues used in the Chapter on NATO and the Press. The second includes foreign policy attitudes of delegates to the annual meeting of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs held in Ottawa on June 10-11, 1967; while the third contains an article by Prof. C.B. McPherson as an example of revisionist academic opinion, and an excerpt from a paper by Prof. Harald von Riekhoff as an example of traditionalist academic opinion.

For the reader who is restricted by time considerations the summary at the end of each chapter, and the two sections where comparisons are made between the attentive public and the general public provide the major conclusions of the study.

PART ONE - NATO

II - Canadian Political Parties: Attitudes Toward NATO

For purposes of analysis three main periods can be distinguished when considering the attitudes of political parties toward NATO. The first period, from 1949 to 1957, was one of relative party consensus marked with minor disagreement, and in many ways party attitudes constituted a bi-partisan approach to foreign policy. The second period, from 1958 to 1963, in sharp contrast to the first was one of acute party dissension and conflict over a basic issue: nuclear weapons. With the settlement of the nuclear weapons question, a third period seems to have started to take shape from 1964 to the present. There are two very notable features of this third period. The first is a search on the part of the Liberal Government for a more stable foreign policy than was visible during the period of party conflict; and the second is a slow movement in the direction of an all-party consensus on the future Canadian role in NATO.

An in-depth analysis of the attitudes and positions taken by the three major parties on the main issues which have involved NATO is not possible in a report of this length. Party attitudes, however, will be studied in each of the three periods in order to give a rough appreciation of attitude change over time.¹

Relative Party Consensus: 1949-1957

In the fall of 1948 general agreement existed among the major parties as all three had endorsed NATO at their national conventions, and in the election of 1949 the treaty did not arise as an election issue.² One reason for the unanimous acceptance was the insistence of the Canadian government to have Article Two included in the treaty, and all parties envisaged NATO to be much more than a military alliance. In November, 1949 during the debate on the signing of the treaty Mr. Pearson referred to the implications of the article hoping that the "widest possible economic collaboration" would be forthcoming. But it was made clear that NATO was a necessity because of the inability of the UN to solve the problem of collective security.³ Gordon Graydon (PC), in replying to the Minister's speech supported NATO, was concerned about the future of the Canadian obligation. The CCF speakers tended to stress Article Two and Angus McGinnis was convinced that "we have not done as much to promote and co-ordinate economic co-operation among the nations signatory to the Atlantic pact as we have on the military side."⁴ This led to a discussion by the CCF on the benefits of economic co-operation which was consistent with their prescribed policy outside the House of insisting NATO operate within the broad confines of the Brussels Treaty.⁵

During the early 1950's there was continued emphasis on the economic aspects of the treaty. But this was coupled with a growing awareness of the threat of communism which kept all three parties in fairly close agreement on the necessity of collective self-defence. Consequently, when Canadian troops were sent overseas in late 1951 there

was little opposition to Mr. Claxton's opinion that such a move was in the defence of Canada. In describing party attitudes during the first few years B.S. Keirstead stated that "the CCF emphatically, the Conservatives with reservation...and the Liberals...were all agreed that NATO defence needs in the short-run must be measured against the long-run needs of the European powers to re-establish viable economies."⁶ Although the Conservatives offered some criticism to the effect that Canadian defence at home should not be weakened at the expense of Europe, this line of criticism was not pushed too far since general agreement did not exist within the party. In fact Howard Green had earlier criticised the government for being indecisive about raising forces for NATO in Europe.⁷ Thus for the first three years of NATO, until the Lisbon Conference of 1952, there was almost a bi-partisan approach to NATO policy for all major parties.

After Lisbon, the CCF became increasingly apprehensive about the military emphasis being placed on NATO which they considered detrimental to the social and economic aspects of the treaty. A party press release (March 4, 1952) at the 12th National Convention read as follows:

While continuing to support Canada's participation in NATO, the CCF is opposed to certain recent developments in this organization. NATO policies seem to have fallen completely under the control of the military to the exclusion of necessary social and economic considerations in the building of western collective security.

But while CCF members were disenchanted with the military aspects of NATO, the Conservatives were concentrating on "the uneconomic use of resources and the inadequacy of the total effort."⁸ The Liberals were left in the middle maintaining commitments had been fulfilled, but there would be no increase in the number of troops in Europe.⁹

There were two other military issues that arose during the early years of NATO. The first was a general debate in 1955 over the European Defence Community and German re-armament. The Liberals and the Conservatives supported the inclusion of Germany in NATO once France had defeated the EDC, but prior to this the Conservatives had pressed the government for increased assistance to France so that the EDC would be signed.¹⁰ The CCF, on the other hand, split over the German question partly as a result of party policy as expressed outside the parliamentary party.¹¹

The second development, and the one which was to have far-reaching effects in terms of domestic politics, was the increased emphasis being placed on tactical nuclear weapons. Neither the Liberals, nor the CCF, were particularly enthusiastic about the adopted nuclear strategy, while the Conservatives seem to have accepted it without many misgivings. But, on the whole, this question was not of great concern to any of the political parties.¹² The Liberal party, however, gave

strong support to the military side of NATO as is clearly indicated in the Speaker's Handbook 1957 (p. 95-96). The CCF, on the other hand, while not completely rejecting the NATO strategy would have liked less emphasis on the military aspects and more on the economic. One reason for fairly strong CCF support for NATO the middle 1950's was the increased emphasis on the need to implement the economic co-operation and consultation aspects of the treaty. The Committee of Three was set up to report on ways to implement Article Two, and the Liberals continued to press strongly for increased consultation within NATO along political, economic, and cultural lines.¹³ The Conservatives did not stress this aspect of NATO to the same extent as the other parties.

The picture emerging from this first period is that while "Canada's defence policies...were supported by a remarkable consensus. Issues of defence policy were not politically important...and played only minor parts in the national elections of 1953 and 1957."¹⁴ The conclusion just quoted is substantiated by table No. 1 which indicates party support for NATO during the first period, and while somewhat over-simplified it does show that considerable consensus existed.

Table No. 1 - Political Parties and Support for NATO: 1949-57:
Relative Consensus Achieved.

<u>Issue</u>	Support for				
	military force level	increase force level	Art. II	increase economic & political aspects	NATO nuclear strategy
Party					
Liberal	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes (qualified)
Progressive Conservative	Yes	Yes (qualified)	Yes	Did not stress	Yes
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation	Yes (qualified)	No	Yes	Yes	No (qualified)

Note: A 'Yes: qualified' means support with reservations, and a 'No: qualified' means rejection in part.

For three of the five issues mentioned general agreement existed and for the other two, increased force level, and nuclear strategy, only qualified disagreement. All parties supported NATO, and even though there were differences in emphasis, no bitter disputes arose over basic policy.

Needless to say, this was in marked contrast to the following period.

Party Conflict and Dissension: 1958-1963

The major cause of party conflict over NATO arose as a result of the nuclear strategy adopted by the alliance and the question of Canada's role vis-à-vis this policy; but prior to 1959 there were only a few signs to indicate this would become controversial. Previously all parties had given at least qualified support to the NATO strategy of employing tactical nuclear weapons and on occasions when this subject could have been raised in the House of Commons there was no discussion.¹⁵ There were, however, signs that party positions would soon change. The resolution on foreign policy adopted by the CCF National Council in May, 1958 suggested "that the further distribution of nuclear weapons to the countries of NATO be stopped."¹⁶ This resolution marked the first real step away from the consensus on NATO. The framework for future CCF policy was presented to the Council in a paper prepared by Russell Bell, the Research Director, advocating a two part argument for the disengagement of forces in both Europes, and the denuclearization of NATO as the first step. According to Mr. Bell the concept of regional military alliances was "no longer valid in the context of today's military developments."

Thus while the CCF were having their first real doubts about NATO the Liberals, at their 4th National Convention in January of 1958, continued to support the "fullest Canadian participation in NATO," but advocated "more effective political consultation, economic co-operation and cultural exchanges." The Conservatives, for their part, announced the acquisition of the Bomarc 'B' to replace the Avro Arrow as the first of five weapons systems acquired that could employ nuclear warheads. (Others were the F-101B Voodoo, the F-104 Starfighter, the Lacrosse missile, and its replacement the Honest John rocket.) From the systems acquired it should have been apparent Canada would fulfill a nuclear role in both NORAD and NATO. Mr. Diefenbaker in his statement to the House on February 20, 1959 noted that "the full potential" of the Bomarc and Lacrosse missiles "is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads." The Prime Minister went on to say that the Government was negotiating with the U.S. for the "acquisition of nuclear warheads."¹⁷ At this early stage of the debate the Liberals were still in favour of accepting the prevailing NATO strategy (tactical nuclear weapons), and Mr. Pearson stated that if the decision was made to acquire nuclear weapons then "the government must insist that any such weapons are under Canadian control and operation."¹⁸

By 1960 the picture had changed considerably. In the defence debate of August the Liberals reaffirmed their support for NATO, but now opted for a conventional Canadian role. Mr. Pearson stressed the need for a non-nuclear deterrent, and admitted his views on tactical nuclear weapons had changed.¹⁹ Here he was supported by members of the CCF who were only willing for Canada to remain in NATO as long as it worked toward disengagement in Europe and adopted a non-nuclear role. The CCF parliamentary party was supported at its National Convention of August 8-11, 1960 when the following resolution was passed: "Since NATO has

become a purely military alliance, Canada should immediately withdraw from NATO in favour of promoting peaceful economic and cultural activities through the agencies of the UN." It should be noted that Mr. Douglas and other leading members of the party opposed the resolution and it only passed by a vote of 85-72 after many delegates had left the meeting.²⁰ The resolution, however, was an indication of the feelings of a large segment of the party.

During 1960 the Government shifted from its fairly forthright position on the nuclear question to an increasingly evasive position which was followed until after the 1963 election. On January 18, 1960 the Prime Minister announced that "eventually Canadian forces may acquire nuclear weapons if Canadian forces are to be kept effective."²¹ While being evasive on the nuclear issue the Government made it very clear NATO was still an essential aspect of Canadian defence policy. In a speech to the Ottawa Canadian Club in November, 1960 the Prime Minister noted that while some people were advocating withdrawal from NATO "we must not and dare not discard it."²² Nevertheless the evasiveness continued throughout the following year, and there were signs of a party split on the horizon since the government appeared determined to proceed with the acquisition of nuclear bearing weapons without warheads and to continue nuclear training. Mr. Green resolutely continued to pursue the limitation of nuclear weapons at the United Nations²³ and Mr. Harkness continued to stress their importance. While the Conservatives were avoiding a decision, the Liberals at their 1961 National Convention ratified the non-nuclear views of the parliamentary party and according to Prof. Soward, gave "somewhat grudging" adherence to NATO.²⁴

Some of the most interesting developments during 1961 resulted from the merger of the CCF and the Canadian Labour movement into the New Democratic Party. Up to the formation of the new party, the CCF had advocated withdrawal from NATO with party leader Hazen Argue stating that "in this day and age and at this time Canada would be better advised to disassociate herself from regional military alliances."²⁵ This statement was contrary to that taken in the brief submitted by the Canadian Labour Congress to the Prime Minister on February 2, 1961, which noted that "Canada must work in concert with those nations which share her outlook and interests."²⁶ Needless to say, these opposing positions presented a conflict at the founding convention of the new party later in the year; but a compromise was reached which supported NATO as long as it did not involve nuclear expansion. The NDP position on nuclear weapons remained one of consistent opposition, and the party defence spokesman, Mr. Brewin, felt the acquisition of such weapons "would be military useless, politically disastrous and morally unjustifiable."²⁷

Unfortunately the election of 1962 did little to clarify the Conservative stand on nuclear weapons, and during the campaign it never became an important issue. Undoubtedly this was largely due to the confusion which existed within the Liberal party. After what had been a fairly clear position in 1961 the Liberal election platform seemed to indicate that the party would accept nuclear warheads if they were

absolutely necessary, which meant there was little difference between the two old line parties on this question.²⁸ Apparently both the Liberals and the Conservatives were of the opinion that no votes would be lost by refusing to take a positive stand, but that the anti-nuclear vote would be of significance if warheads were advocated. While domestic forces could not bring the question into its proper focus, the Cuban crisis of the fall of 1962 more than served this purpose.

The seriousness of the crisis seemed to have impressed upon the Opposition Leader the necessity of coming to grips with the need to fulfill alliance commitments. Added to the Cuban crisis was the now famous Norstad interview. During his visit to Ottawa on January 3, 1963, General Norstad made it quite clear that Canada had accepted certain commitments by acquiring the various weapons systems, and these commitments were not being fulfilled.²⁹ Under these circumstances Mr. Pearson came to the conclusion that these commitments had to be honoured, and this could only be done by accepting warheads for the systems. On January 12, 1963 in a speech to the Scarborough Liberal Association he took a strong stand to this effect:

In short, both in NATO and in continental defence, the Canadian Government has accepted defence commitments for Canada in continental and collective defense which can only be carried out by Canadian forces if nuclear warheads are available.³⁰

The above position became the official party doctrine as outlined by "The Policies of the Liberal Party" (election platform, 1963). The platform makes the point that the present weapons systems were designed to operate with nuclear warheads, and should be equipped with them. It also stated that the party was opposed to the arrangements for the acquisition of the systems (this is highly debateable) but now it was important to honor international commitments. At the same time the platform called for an increased emphasis on conventional forces, coupled with a re-examination of NATO defence policy.

The clarification of the Liberal position should have forced the Government to adopt a more concrete stand. However, at the annual Conservative Convention no resolution was passed on the question since Mr. Diefenbaker asked to be given a free hand. When Parliament reconvened on January 23, 1963 the Prime Minister delivered an ambiguous speech and the party position remained unclear. The interpretation given by the Minister of National Defence was rejected by the Prime Minister, and the split within the party became acute, leading to the resignation of Mr. Harkness on February 4, 1963. The following day the Government went down to defeat.³¹ During the ensuing campaign the nuclear issue was not clarified by the Conservatives, but after the election of a Liberal Government alliance commitments were fulfilled.

The various party relationships concerning the acquisition of nuclear warheads and support for NATO during this period are contained in table No. 2.

Table No. 2 - Political Parties and Support for NATO: 1958-63:
A Period of Conflict.

<u>Issue</u>	Acquisition of nuclear weapons			would support a Canadian nuclear role	support for NATO, general
	1958-59	1960-62	1963		
<u>Party</u>					
Liberal	Yes	No	Yes qualified	Yes qualified	Yes
Progressive	Yes	Yes qualified	undecided	undecided	Yes
New Democrats (CCF)	?	No	No	No	No qualified

Note: A 'Yes, qualified' means support with reservations, and a 'No, qualified' means rejection in part.

When compared to Table No. 1 the lack of party agreement between periods is only too apparent. At no time, or on any question, were all parties in agreement. Furthermore, only the NDP showed any signs of internal consistency. While neither of the old line parties advocated withdrawal from NATO it was not until early 1963 that one of them (the Liberals) came out with a clear statement on Canada's NATO role. Even this was put in terms of unfilled commitments, and not in terms of a strong endorsement of NATO strategy. The NDP went much further than the other major parties as they became increasingly disenchanted with the alliance, and as a result advocated withdrawal if Canada adopted the nuclear strategy of the alliance. In terms of party consensus the outlook was indeed bleak when the Liberals formed the government in 1963.

Toward a New Consensus: 1964-67

With the settlement of the nuclear issue the Liberal Government indicated its desire to establish a more stable pattern of defence policy. Such a desire was indicated in Mr. Pearson's Scarborough speech when he suggested it was time to examine "the whole basis of Canadian foreign policy." The need for a more realistic and effective role than the existing one, in both NATO and NORAD, was necessary; and while Mr. Pearson ensured continued support for both alliances it was clear that some changes could be expected.

The first step in the search for greater stability was the formation of a Special Committee on National Defence, which submitted

its first report to the House of Commons in December, 1963. The recommendations of the committee were unanimous in accepting a Canadian role in NATO, but suggested further study was needed before pronouncing on the final disposition of the forces. Even though there was only agreement on the fundamental principle that "Canadian forces should remain in Europe" ³² it represented a welcome change from the earlier period. But while the committee recommend further study before formulation of new policy the Minister of National Defence was preparing his White Paper on Defence.

Tabled in March 1964 the White Paper purported to outline Canadian defence policy for the next ten years, and raised two important points for this study. In reviewing NATO strategy the White Paper accepted the strategy of graduated deterrence, and in recognizing NATO as a nuclear-armed defensive alliance" accepted that "one can not be a member of a military alliance and at the same time avoid some share of responsibility for its strategic policies."³³ In this situation the Government decided to accept the existing roles for the Canadian forces in Europe,³⁴ and accepted the position that the troops would not be withdrawn from Europe. (See Appendix 1 for further statements on this point.) Here the groundwork was laid for an issue which was to become increasingly important in the next few years. Should the Canadian forces remain in Europe? And, whether they remain or not, what should be their primary role? Only the NDP considered this question to be of great importance in 1964-65.

Andrew Brewin's Stand on Guard (1965) ably expressed the party's position:

Canada should abandon the effort to maintain a forward brigade in Germany and contribution to the air strike forces in Central Europe....Canada should concentrate on a highly mobile conventional tri-service force available for peacekeeping...and also as a mobile reserve for NATO.³⁵

This statement would seem to indicate that Canada should pull out of Europe, but earlier Brewin rejects this position by suggesting Canada "maintain a mobile force in Europe as part of the mobile reserve."³⁶ The Conservatives, on the other hand, maintained there was no nuclear commitment on the part of Canada in Europe (at least some of the party hierarchy took this stand), and the Liberals committed themselves to opt out of the nuclear role as soon as practicable. (This seems to have been accepted as either: i) when the military usefulness of the systems are outmoded, and this is agreed upon by the other members of NATO, or ii) at the end of the life span of the present systems).

On the other major external NATO issues which arose prior to 1967 the Government and Opposition parties were in substantial agreement. Canadian participation in some form of multi-lateral nuclear force never became a partisan issue, and when the question of France pulling out of the integrated military structure became crucial there was no serious party dissension. (See Appendix 1 on both these issues for the position of the Government). However, the White Paper did raise another party issue

which had implications for NATO.

As part of the Government's effort to find a more stable base for defence policy it was decided to integrate the Armed Forces as "the first stage toward a single unified defence force for Canada."³⁷ The bill to abolish the Chiefs of Staff was passed in July, 1964, and the second step, the re-organization of the command structure along functional lines, with Mobile Command assuming a central role, was announced in June, 1965. Command re-organization was followed on late 1966 by the bill to unify the Armed Forces which passed in April, 1967 after a bitter struggle in the House of Commons. While the effect of unification on Canadian commitments to the alliance system was not apparent from 1964-66, the relationship became a central issue in 1967. Prior to this the opposition to unification had not been focused on the strategic implications of the policy.

By late 1966, however, the implications of the policy raised three inter-related questions which became important to all parties:

- i) did unification only make sense if Canada opted out of the NATO and NORAD alliances? Or, could commitments be fulfilled within the framework of the new defence structure?
- ii) Even if the present commitments could be maintained, should Canada re-negotiate to change the NATO role?
- iii) What is the future of NATO in the light of party positions taken in response to the first two questions?

The question of commitments and unification became a serious party issue during the Defence Committee hearings on the bill to unify the services. Lt. General R.W. Moncel in his appearance before the committee on February 20, 1967, stated the problem in its clearest fashion:

In the light of the commitments that are undertaken ...in the White Paper, a unified force has no place. Now if you want to change the commitments to a commitment...which would call for a unified force then unification per se is obviously a good thing.³⁸

The Government had always rejected this contention and in both the White Paper and on moving second reading of the unification bill (December 7, 1966) stated its intention to retain the existing commitments.³⁹ During third reading Mr. Martin was of the opinion that "unification, if it is permitted to develop as planned, should in no way hinder our ability to fulfill our foreign policy commitments." In fact it should help "to fulfill present and future commitments with progressively improving efficiency."⁴⁰ The above statement, however, was not the same as saying that commitments would not be re-negotiated to fit the new defence structure even though unification per se does not necessarily mean commitments have to change.

The Liberal party rank and file seemed to opt for the later position at their October National Convention in the fall of 1966 where the resolution called "for a military role in NATO which offers to NATO the forces we develop in accordance with our national defence policy." Here one gains the impression that the party felt unification would

result in changed commitments. If the Liberal rank and file were unsure of the ultimate effect of unification on foreign and defence policy, the NDP MP's were not in any better a position.

The NDP had, until the end of 1966, been consistent supporters of unification. The major reason for this was that the party saw the Armed Services being restructured along lines which would enable them to perform the task of a self-contained mobile force concentrating on the peace-keeping role. However, both Mr. Brewin and Mr. Winch, the NDP members of the Defence Committee, came to the conclusion unification only made sense if NATO and NORAD roles were either scrapped or substantially changed.⁴¹ When the bill cleared the Defence Committee the two NDP members, in a press release, threatened to withdraw their support unless the Government decided to drastically alter the NATO and NORAD commitments. Mr. Brewin's position was made quite clear when he said that "unification makes sense if some of our present commitments are to be abandoned but that we cannot maintain all our present commitments and concentrate on the mobile role."⁴² As a result of this issue the NDP party split over unification on the final vote.

While the Conservative party did not split over the issue, they did not base their main arguments on the commitment issue, but concentrated more on the problems of morale, tradition, loss of personnel, uniforms, etc.⁴³ It was pointed out on occasion, however, that it would not be possible for the Navy to continue operating at its pre-unification level, and this amounted to a unilateral reduction of the NATO force level commitment.⁴⁴ This argument was never employed to its full potential, and while the NDP made the commitment question central to its doubts about unification the Conservatives made no such attempt. By the time the Conservative's Montmorency Conference took place in August 1967 it was agreed that unification was a dead issue.⁴⁵ (Table No. 3 shows the basic party relationships on this question.)

In turning to the question of maintaining our present NATO role the Government (Liberal party supported) made it fairly explicit in the White Paper and throughout the unification debate, that the role was "to maintain troops in Europe for the foreseeable future."⁴⁶ The Minister of External Affairs made it clear, however, that this position was not immutable.

I do not exclude the possibility that in the future it may become feasible to withdraw our forces in Europe and to make our entire contribution from bases in Canada. But such a course of action is neither feasible nor desirable at the present time.⁴⁷

But this does not mean the Government was not advocating change - in fact just the opposite. According to Mr. Hellyer the White Paper policy involved two things on this point: "First, a change in role, ultimately: and secondly, a modest reduction in the over-all Canadian participation of the continent of Europe."⁴⁸

But no sooner had Mr. Hellyer and Mr. Martin reaffirmed the Government's position on NATO than Walter Gordon, in a speech at the University of Western Ontario, suggested Canada withdraw from Europe. "We may wonder whether Canada should continue to maintain air squadrons and a brigade in Europe any longer." He went on to imply that the sensible thing to do would be a complete withdrawal from NATO, but this was ambiguously worded.⁴⁹ While Walter Gordon's position undoubtedly has some support within the Liberal party, it seems that the position taken by Mr. Hellyer and Mr. Martin will prevail - at least for several years. Therefore, the general Liberal position in late 1967 can be summed up as favouring both the maintenance of troops in Europe, with some reduction, and a change in role in line with the proposals of the 1964 White Paper.

At the same time the Conservatives had their equivalent to Walter Gordon. On January 11, 1967 the former Minister of External Affairs, Howard Green, in an article to the Vancouver Sun questioned the value of stationing troops in Europe. According to Mr. Green, West Germany was powerful enough to defend herself, (Of course this begs the entire question of the NATO 'control' function.⁵⁰) and "our troops could be just as useful to NATO if based in Canada" in the role of mobile reserve. After all "they might even be needed to defend Canada's West Coast if China continues on her aggressive course." The Green article was not supported in the House of Commons, and those MP's that spoke on the subject supported in principle the necessity of stationing troops in Europe; but there was also mention of the need to change the NATO role. Mr. Harkness felt "Canada's defence policy primarily must be based on strong support for NATO and a willingness on our part to make a proportionate contribution to its strength...."⁵¹ The main party debate over NATO, however, did not take place in the House.

At the Montmorency thinkers conference Party President Dalton Camp, in a very perceptive speech, raised the question of foreign policy alternatives. An alternative to keeping troops in Europe exists, but it would mean a re-alignment of Canadian foreign policy. For the present, however, Camp was willing to opt for a "psychological buttress" in Europe which obviously meant a greatly reduced role, while the Camp position represented the minority view at the Conference no consensus was reached on the question on stationing troops in Europe. The final report took the position "that Canada should maintain armed forces sufficient to meet its obligations under collective security agreement..." But no mention was made of troops in Europe.⁵²

While the party hierarchy - Stanfield, Roblin and Diefenbaker (took the firmest stand) - called for a reappraisal of the NATO role, none would go as far as Camp in advocating reduction of NATO troops. Further to the stand taken by party leaders, the policy thinkers group at the Leadership Convention in September rejected the Camp position, but noted that roles and commitments would have to be re-negotiated as circumstances change.⁵³ Therefore, the Conservatives seem to be in a period of flux, and it is to be expected that in the near future the party position will be clarified with the election of Mr. Stanfield as party leader. On the whole, there seems to be qualified support for

keeping the troops in Europe, and agreement that the role should be re-considered.

The party that has shown the greatest consistency on the question of troops and roles for NATO has been the NDP, but the party position seems to have hardened since 1964-65. In January of 1967 in a speech at London, Ontario Mr. Brewin stated that Canada is "maintaining a defence against something that is non-existent" since conditions have changed to such an extent that our NATO forces are completely obsolete.⁵⁴ The Fourth Constitutional Convention meeting in July, 1967 came to substantially the same conclusion. Resolution 216 asked for the withdrawal of the Brigade Group and the Air Division, and the 1965 Brewin suggestion of a mobile brigade in Europe was not included.

Table No. 3 shows that despite disagreement over unification (now pretty well a dead issue) and the stationing of troops in Europe, there is substantial agreement over the need to re-negotiate the NATO role, and even - at least in the long-run - over what role should be adopted for Canada.

Table No. 3 - Political Parties and Support for NATO: 1964-67:¹
Toward a New Consensus

<u>Issue</u>	could commit- ments be ful- filled with armed forces unification?	should troops remain in Europe?	should NATO role and commitments change?	should Canada remain in NATO?
<u>Party</u>				
Liberals	Yes	Yes (qualified)	Yes	Yes
Prog. Cons.	No (qualified)	Yes (qualified)	Yes (qualified)	Yes
New Democ Party	No	No	Yes	Yes (qualified)

1. Not shown in the table are two further issues which had all party agreement:
 - i) that Canada was wise not to get involved in the MLF. and
 - ii) that NATO should continue after the withdrawal of France from the integrated command structure.
2. A 'Yes, qualified' means support with reservations, and a 'No, qualified' means rejection in part.

The table indicates that the future may see a growing consensus concerning Canada's NATO role, and, as the following section shows all parties agree that NATO has a future. (This does not mean that any one of the parties will not change its position overnight.)

The clearest statements regarding Liberal party policy vis-à-vis the future of NATO have come from Mr. Hellyer and Mr. Martin. In appearing before the Defence Committee during the unification hearings the Defence Minister said "the Canadian government still believes that this organization has performed and is continuing to perform a most useful function....We believe that we should continue to adhere to the alliance and to do what we can to keep it strong." This is substantially the position taken by the External Affairs Minister in his testimony before the Senate External Affairs Committee in March 1967. The Minister stressed the benefits that NATO provides: i) It has "deterred possible Soviet military or political penetration of Western Europe." ii) In all probability Soviet and East European leaders look upon NATO "as a stabilizing force in Europe." iii) The alliance has also helped Western Europe to recover and gain its confidence. iv) It has also "provided an effective framework for consultation and, if necessary, for action." Here the Minister was referring primarily in terms of providing a framework so that a mutual disengagement in Europe would be possible.⁵⁵

After the Hellyer and Martin statements, the Walter Gordon and Dalton Camp position was discussed in public. This made it necessary for Mr. Martin, in speaking at the Director's Luncheon of the Canadian National Exhibition to reiterate the Government's stand on NATO. But, at the same time the Minister made it quite clear that the ultimate objective is to maintain peace until a political settlement in Europe makes NATO unnecessary. However, no deadline can be placed on when such a settlement can be obtained. This does not mean that Canada cannot broaden the base of its foreign policy activities - i.e., by emphasising peacekeeping. But as long as no settlement is possible then NATO must remain in existence.⁵⁶ It should be noted, that is not the same as saying that the Canadian contribution to the alliance will remain constant.

In effect the latest Conservative statements are quite close to the Liberal position. Mr. Diefenbaker, in his last statement on NATO as Party Leader, mentioned he was willing to support the Minister's position while making it quite clear that "NATO must be maintained."⁵⁷ Even though Dalton Camp's position is far removed from the official government position, as well as the rest of the Conservative party, a careful reading of his speech indicates that he realizes we have to rely on alliance systems for the present. In his case, it was the future Canadian policy he was concerned with in advocating "disarmament, non-proliferation and the development of a special role in foreign aid and assistance" as basic pillars of foreign policy.⁵⁸ However, neither Mr. Stanfield, who feels Canada "should participate on some basis in joint defence," nor Mr. Roblin, who advocates review for NATO, are willing to go as far as the Camp proposals.⁵⁹ The Stanfield-Roblin position was accepted at the leadership conference where NATO was supported despite some indecisiveness on the part of the policy group. But what seems clear is that the party is willing to support NATO for the present while searching for possible alternatives to the present role.

The search for an alternative role is also the concern of the NDP as expressed at their July (1967) Convention. While the party is explicit about the obsolescent of the present role (the other parties

not being as explicit) it still envisages the alliance performing a worthwhile function - i.e., to help negotiate further steps in the East-West detente, and it may provide a framework to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.⁶⁰

Summary:

In an analysis of the attitudes of the major political parties toward NATO three periods are distinguishable.

i) 1949-1957: Relative Party Consensus.

During this first period there was only minor party disagreement and in many ways a bi-partisan approach toward NATO existed. Here the inclusion of Article II in the treaty helped to ensure party consensus, and in the early 1950's all three major parties agreed that the threat of Communism was important. The CCF was the first party to show dissatisfaction when it felt the Lisbon Conference of 1952 put undue emphasis on the military aspects of NATO, but the Liberals and the Conservatives did not disagree with the military policy of the alliance. None of the parties, however, showed much concern over the nuclear strategy adopted by NATO, and the nuclear question never became a party issue. Table No. 1 shows that all three parties gave general support to the stationing of troops in Europe, and the need to implement Article II of the treaty. Only the Conservatives advocated increasing the force level in Europe and the party was not in complete agreement on this point.

ii) 1958-1963: Party Conflict and Dissension

The main issue of party conflict arose over the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The CCF started to have doubts about the NATO nuclear strategy in early 1958, and by 1960 was advocating withdrawal from the alliance. This position was altered slightly when the CCF and the Canadian Labour Congress, who supported the alliance, became the NDP in 1961. From 1961 to 1963 the NDP would only accept a Canadian role in NATO if it was non-nuclear weapons, but from the spring of 1960 to the election of 1963 the party position (and the Government's) became increasingly evasive. By 1963 it was clear that a serious internal party split existed over the nuclear issue. The Liberals, on the other hand, had supported the acquisition of nuclear weapons during 1958-59, but by 1960 had shifted to an anti-nuclear position and advocated Canada assume a conventional role in NATO. The Cuban crisis of late 1962 and the Norstad interview in early 1963 helped to convince Mr. Pearson that Canada had not fulfilled her commitments to NATO (and NORAD). Consequently he took the position that a Liberal Government would fulfill these commitments by acquiring the necessary nuclear weapons. (The party positions on the nuclear issue are shown in table No. 2) The Conservative party never clarified its position on the nuclear question during the 1963 election, but still maintained strong support for NATO.

iii) 1964-1967: Toward a New Consensus

With the settlement of the nuclear issue the Liberal Government expressed a desire to establish a more stable pattern of defence policy which took form in the establishment of a parliamentary defence committee and the White Paper on Defence in 1964. The White.

Paper and subsequent events raised several questions since the Government had committed itself to the maintenance of the existing NATO role (for the time being), and to unification of the Armed Services.

The decision to unify the Armed Forces became a partisan party issue. The Liberals maintained present commitments could be met with a unified defence force, the Conservatives had some major reservations, especially the Naval commitments; and the NDP took the position that with unification our present commitments could not be met and made no sense. All three parties are in agreement however, that NATO commitments should be changed even though the time period differs. The NDP want changes now, the Liberals in the near future, and the Conservatives would not object to changes sometime in the future if conditions permit. On the question of withdrawal of Canadian troops from Europe the NDP has advocated immediate withdrawal while, in general, the other two parties accept the present force level.

Despite disagreement over the present commitments all parties accept a Canadian role in NATO and seem to be moving in the same direction; that is, toward a new role shaped by the changing political and military situation in Europe, and, in case of the NDP, unification of the Armed Services. The role which would probably gain the greatest party consensus is that of a conventional mobile force capable of operating either on the flanks of NATO or in mobile reserve on the central front. The NDP would prefer a conventional mobile force kept in reserve in Canada. This type of force is definitely what Mobile Command is producing and if the present commitments are renegotiated, which seems to be the intention of the present Government, it is possible that even greater consensus may be achieved.

A word of caution, however, is probably in order. It is quite apparent that an outspoken minority, within all three parties, as well as an increasing number of academics and newspapers (Chapters III and IV) advocate complete withdrawal from NATO. If the re-negotiated role produces the kind of inter-party strife that existed over the nuclear weapons issue it is quite possible that the majority of Canadians will become so alienated over Canadian participation in NATO that complete withdrawal may become preferable.

III - Academics and Attitudes Toward NATO

The first point to be emphasized is that there are only a very limited number of scholars who have made Canadian foreign policy their main field of academic research. If this group is expanded to include those who have published in the field but whose main interest lies elsewhere the number is not any more than thirty. Several sets of factors have contributed to this situation.

The first set deals with the nature of the academic community. Until the recent expansion of the number of universities, as well as the size of departments, there have been few openings available to academics whose main interest is international politics. Furthermore, there are only a limited number of outlets which have been utilized for publishing

articles on Canadian foreign policy. These include the International Journal, Commentator, Canada Month, Canadian Dimension, the Canadian Forum, and the Queens Quarterly, of which only the first deals exclusively with international politics. No French-Canadian journal deals with foreign policy, and consequently few French-Canadians have done any work in this area. Furthermore, only an extremely limited number of articles dealing with Canadian foreign policy have appeared in foreign journals.

A second set of factors arises as a result of the relationship between the academic community and the Government. In Canada the academic interested in foreign policy operates under more restrictive limitations than his American counterpart. Unlike the American experience there is virtually no job mobility from university to government and back again. Furthermore, the problem of governmental secrecy, and the fifty year rule on many government documents makes research on contemporary issues most difficult, and in some cases impossible. Whether the academics should pursue a more active role in attempting to overcome these handicaps, and whether the Government should try to induce more academics to do research on foreign policy issues is an interesting question, but it certainly seems desirable. Consequently, the role of the academic in the area of foreign policy research has been minimal compared to other areas. However, there has been enough written on the question of Canada's role in NATO to make meaningful generalizations concerning attitude patterns.

In this study academics are defined as those individuals who either teach at a Canadian university or, are in a position so that much of their time is spent on academic research and contribute to scholarly journals (John Holmes). Excluded are those individuals who write on international politics, but would normally be classified as journalists (John Gellner and Blair Fraser). Also excluded are those individuals who have contributed to scholarly journals or have written books discussing Canadian policy, but whose main occupation is not academic research or university teaching (Mike Pearson, Paul Martin, Andrew Brewin, Walter Gordon, James Minifie). Academics are either 'active' academics - those who have written on Canadian foreign policy; or 'non-active' academics - those who have not written on Canadian foreign policy, but have an opinion and in all probability express it in face-to-face contact with other faculty members and students. This form of attitude expression may be just as important as that taken by the 'active' academics, since the 'non-active' group is by far the largest and the university provides an adequate forum for the expression of opinion. No attempt will be made to discuss the attitudes of the non-active academics.

In the following section active academics will be classified according to their general attitude patterns toward NATO. After classification an analysis of why NATO has been rejected or supported will be undertaken. A concluding section will make comparisons between the selected attentive public groups and the general public.

General Academic Attitude Patterns:

Since the number of active academics is quite small, and only four (James Eayrs, John Holmes, Peyton Lyon and Kenneth McNaught) have consistently written on Canadian foreign policy over a number of years, it is difficult to classify academics by specific issues. What is possible, and perhaps more worthwhile, is to classify them according to general attitude patterns. Nearly all the active academics fall into one of two categories:

i) the 'traditionalists' are of the opinion that Canada's most suitable foreign policy is one of interdependence. Interdependence implies support for regional military organizations, but not the rejection of the United Nations as a universal organization. Peacekeeping and foreign aid to the developing nations are considered important, but should not displace the interdependence of the alliance systems.

ii) the 'revisionists' advocate Canadian withdrawal from all regional military organizations, and complete rejection of the policy of interdependence. For most revisionists Canadian foreign policy must be independent to be effective. While often not sure what form an independent foreign policy will assume the revisionists tend to include universalistic principles as basic to a realignment of Canadian foreign policy. This takes the form of increased emphasis on the United Nations, peacekeeping and assistance to the developing nations. James Eayrs has referred to the revisionist attitude in the following terms:

It is not a neutrality of isolation, a neutrality of withdrawal from the world. It is rather the opposite: a neutrality of engagement, a neutrality of commitment. The neutralist appeal in Canada is precisely an appeal to get out of certain obligations in order to enter into others, no less and perhaps even more demanding, but said to be more productive of results.@

The impression one gains from reading the Toronto Globe and Mail (the English-speaking paper closest to being a national paper) is that the revisionists constitute a majority of the active academics. Needless to say, as table No. 4 clearly indicates, this is the case.

Table No. 4 - General attitude patterns of 'Active' academics toward NATO.

Revisionists (rejection of NATO)	<u>Partial rejection</u>	Traditionalists (support for NATO)
<u>Total rejection</u>	Lloyd Axworthy Stephen Clarkson James Eayrs Alistair Taylor	Maxwell Cohen John Holmes Peyton Lyon Robert Preston Saul Silverman Harald von Riekhoff WL Morton
DP Gauthier Donald Gordon JL Granatstein Thomas Hockin Kenneth McNaught CB' McPherson Edward McWhinney Jack Warnock Escott Reid		

Note:* This list does not guarantee that all active academics are included, but rather shows that two main groups exist with the revisionists out-numbering the traditionalists two to one.

@ - James Eayrs, Northern Approaches: Canada and the Search for Peace, 1961, pp. 168-89.

Revisionist Attitudes and Academics:^{1.}

The anti-NATO argument encompasses three key themes which run through the majority of writings by revisionists. One theme accepts the proposition of a changed Europe (politically, economically and militarily) to such an extent that NATO has outlived its original function. Europe is now capable of defending herself, and therefore NATO should be discarded. While the first theme visualizes no alliance whatsoever, the second centres around the value of the Canadian contribution. The Canadian military commitment has no strategic value, and its main function is political. Since Canadian influence is minimal, why should there be a contribution of troops to Europe? An offshoot of this theme rejects the present Canadian role, acceptance of tactical nuclear weapons, but since it is apparent the Government insists on contributing to NATO then the commitment should be of a conventional form. Withdrawal is preferable, but if not then the Government should change the role. The third major theme of the anti-NATO group is the need for Canada to have an independent foreign policy. Only by disassociation from U.S. dominated alliances is it possible for Canada to be truly independent, and once independent Canada will be able to assume a more important role in the international system. This theme often stems from a rejection of present U.S. policies, primarily in Vietnam.

If the anti-NATO group did not go beyond the three above mentioned themes they could be classified as isolationists. However, the majority would adopt a universalistic type of foreign policy encompassing two major elements: i) the need for a massive increase in assistance to the developing nations to help close the widening gap between the developed and the under-developed nations of the world, and ii) the need for more positive action in the area of peacekeeping as a means of enhancing stability in the international system. The remainder of this section will develop the above positions in greater detail.

The theme of a changed Europe is argued by Edward McWhinney² because "the political security system that has dominated Europe for most of the postwar period is out of date, and the facts that gave it its original raison d'être have long since disappeared." At the time of the Cuban crisis the twin bloc system "lost its motive force as a system designed to contain the expansionist drives of either side."

Therefore, there is a need to "re-examine the original basis of NATO and the extent to which if at all, it corresponds to present day European realities." McWhinney's solution is to initiate a non-aggression pact between East and West Europe. Providing there would be a "consensus to the final settlement and stabilization of political frontiers" a joint European regional security council could be composed of both sides and the present alliance systems could be liquidated. In effect the above proposal would completely eliminate American and Canadian military participation in Europe, but no mention is made of Canada's role in Europe.

While the McWhinney type of argument sees a changed Europe with mutual disengagement as the solution, the first theme of the anti-Nato group is normally put in terms of a rebuilt Western Europe with the threat of an aggressive Russia having dissipated.³ From this position it is considered only logical "that the alliance should be splitting apart since it has served its usefulness." The changed Europe theme was also presented at the Carleton Conference on NATO in January 1966: "A case was presented that NATO was created to reinvigorate a war-torn Europe and to keep Russia from capturing it by weight of arms and propoganda - and that as neither of those threats now existed NATO should be packed down, disengaged and wound up".⁴ Unfortunately, this line of discussion only deals with unilateral disengagement. However, from the changed Europe position it is only a short distance to the Canadian participation theme.

The second theme, presented most forcefully by James Eayrs, argues that the Canadian military contribution is of no strategic value, and that the main motivating factors influencing the Canadian role in NATO have always been political. More specifically, Eayrs argues the role of the Air Division only adds overkill to an already powerful offensive air force. The 1964 White Paper policy of allowing the Air Division to reduce at its normal attrition rate over the next decade is indicative of its strategic value. The Army Brigade Group is in roughly the same position, and the role of the Group is questioned. If it is to stop Russian aggression then 50,000 troops are needed, but if the Group exists to serve as hostages in Europe then 5,000 is probably an excessive number. Therefore, "whatever the reason for our commitment to Western European defence, it is clearly a political commitment rather than a military commitment.... Our military establishment is employed not so much in the direct defence of Canada as in buttressing and underpinning our diplomacy."⁵ From here the Eayrs argument goes on to suggest that since "our contribution in Western Europe is largely symbolic" it is most difficult to know how much should be spent on defence, but approximately \$500 million should be sufficient. While Eayrs does not directly ask for withdrawal from NATO, there could be no other option available if the budget was cut by two-thirds. Needless to say Eayrs has not always held this opinion, and during the late 1950's and early 1960's was an advocate of the Canadian role in NATO.⁶

In the above argument the lack of a strategically important military contribution is cited as the main reason for withdrawal from

NATO; but many of the revisionists only use this as a secondary argument to the third theme, and are more explicit than Eayrs on the question of withdrawal.⁷ For example McPherson refers to "Canada's possible military contribution to the Western deterrent" as one "of rapidly decreasing importance," but this point is not central to his argument. Furthermore, while Eayrs is critical of the subordination of the military function of NATO to the political, McPherson comes to the opposite conclusion since it is only logical that "the military part of Canada's defence policy should be subordinated to the political part."⁸

A variation of the military participation theme is presented by the writings of Kenneth McNaught, who has always been opposed to nuclear weapons. Canadian acceptance of nuclear weapons means that "we contribute to an alliance which every hour of every day is prepared to obliterate civilization in circumstances which cannot be precisely defined...."

Nuclear weapons offer no real security and Canadian political parties have been avoiding the real alternatives: "namely continued endorsement of the nuclear arms race, or rejection of the nuclear alliance in favour of a militarily non-aligned role in the United Nations." Continued support of NATO offers no security to ourselves or our allies, and it tends to encourage proliferation.⁹ (One of the arguments of the traditionalists sees NATO restricting proliferation). Both Alistair Taylor of Queens University, who wants Canada out of the nuclear role and with it a phasing out of all regional commitments,¹⁰ and C.B. McPherson agree with McNaught on this point. However, the McNaught thesis presents the case in its most radical form. It should be mentioned that some of the traditionalists are also skeptical of the nuclear role, but do not take the argument to the point of withdrawal from NATO.

The main argument of the anti-NATO group, however, is the need to have an independent foreign policy, and the major premise for such a policy is freedom of action vis-a-vis the United States. Utilizing an independent foreign policy would "maximize the effectiveness of a realistic Canadian defence policy and Canada must above all make clear her independence of U.S. policy" according to C.B. McPherson. His discussion on this point is worth quoting at some length:

It is sometimes argued that by becoming a faithful and co-operative supporter of U.S. policies, taking our expected place in NATO and in any other arrangements that might be proposed by the U.S., we would gain significant influence with the U.S. It should now be apparent that this is not so. For a blanket endorsement of U.S. policy, or anything that appeared to be such endorsement, could only harm us with the other western and non-aligned nations, and so directly diminish our possible influence in the desired direction within the U.S. government itself.¹¹

While the McPherson argument is quite sophisticated others are not quite in the same category. John Warnock (University of Saskatchewan) sees the military alliance as being almost completely dominated by the U.S., and therefore Canada must withdraw since it "has no influence in international

politics and is generally viewed as a meek spokesman for the United States."¹² But neither McPherson nor Warnock really address themselves to what the new relationship with the U.S. would be if Canada were to become non-aligned. Stephen Clarkson would solve the new Canada-U.S. relationship by making "a fundamental distinction between our foreign policies on the one hand and our U.S. policy on the other. While pursuing what we consider to be the best policy abroad, it is in our national interests to place the strongest emphasis on the maintenance of good neighborly relations with our partner."¹³ Needless to say, this completes a circular type argument on the need for independence from the United States.

While the main themes of the revisionist group are isolationist and neutralistic, the proposals presented for new directions of Canadian foreign policy are motivated by universalistic principles. Such proposals normally see expansion in the future employment of the Canadian armed forces, and in economic assistance to the developing nations. The military aspect, an increased emphasis on peacekeeping, will be dealt with in the peacekeeping section of the paper, but a few words should be addressed to the economic expansion proposals.

The increasing economic disparity between the developed and developing nations is one of the most pressing problems facing the world today, and for the industrialized nations to ignore the problem would be an abnegation of their responsibility towards our fellow man. Escot Reid (Principal Glendon College) expresses the need for action in this area on the part of Canada:

The most serious gap in the defences of civilization is the gap between what the rich developed nations of the world should be doing to help the poor countries speed up their economic development and what they are, in fact, doing. It is a gap which Canada can move into.¹⁴

Both Clarkson and Eayrs agree with the above position, and cite the example of a shift in the Canadian defence budget of \$1 billion to foreign aid. Such a shift would decrease Western defence expenditures by 1%, but would increase aid to the developing areas by 20%.¹⁵ According to Clarkson "the idea of substantial economic aid...must obviously provide the cornerstone of our effort for international co-operation."¹⁶ It is most difficult to disagree with the need for increased economic assistance to the developing nations, but does this mean that NATO must be rejected to accomplish this task?

Traditionalist Attitudes and Academics:¹⁷

Nearly all the traditionalists would agree that "the dissolution of NATO in favour of a mere series of formal bilateral alliance commitments would seem to constitute a distinct regression to traditional political patterns, opting for a minimum of security and leaving untapped important potentials for political control and stabilization."¹⁸ In supporting this general position the main arguments of the pro-NATO group can be divided

into two categories: i) those aimed at primarily counter-acting or off-balancing the anti-NATO arguments;¹⁹ and ii) those advocating functions for NATO which are unique to a policy of interdependence, and have not been taken into account by the revisionists.

The first category includes those arguments which purport to show that the threat to peace and security in Europe is not extinct, and that Canada's security remains closely linked with NATO. Admittedly, the relative strength of the Canadian participation has decreased; but, the forces in Europe are performing a function deemed essential by NATO, and unilateral withdrawal would have an adverse effect on the alliance. Furthermore, the political aspects of the contribution are just as important as the military since it gives Canada a say in the formation of policy. It is at this point that interdependence proves to be essential. Rather than limiting Canadian influence, interdependence enhances our ability to mediate in conflict situations, and the Canadian role in peacekeeping has not been adversely affected by participation in NATO. Interdependence serves to increase international co-operation, and gives Canada a voice in many centres of the world which would normally be closed to a middle power. Subservience to the U.S. is greatly exaggerated by the anti-NATO group, and there is no need for unity of policy on all questions. In fact to demand unity would be harmful to the alliance, and to argue unity is necessary on all questions is to misunderstand the difference between unity of purpose (objectives), and how these objectives should best be attained. Because of the alliance system the U.S. understands that disagreement over certain types of policy does not mean disagreement over fundamental objectives. Thus, there is no real question of Canada being subservient to the U.S. and agreement on common objectives should not be mistaken for subservience.

Above and beyond the arguments refuting the revisionists are those which give NATO a special role in the international system, and there are at least four worth mentioning:

- i) NATO helps to ensure the continuation of a 'security community' in at least embryo form among alliance members.
- ii) There is an important 'control' function which takes the form of helping to control any expansionist tendencies on the part of West Germany, and secondly, helping to control proliferation of nuclear weapons. This adds stability to both Eastern and Western Europe.
- iii) In the case of war the alliance system increases the option for a conventional response.
- iv) NATO can serve as an agent for East-West détente, as well as increasing contacts between East and West. (This is not the same as the McWhinney argument which asks for immediate mutual disengagement).

The remainder of the section will expand on the above mentioned arguments of the pro-NATO group.

In looking at the first category Peyton Lyon (Carleton University) has noted that:

Whenever cold war tensions relax, there is an understandable tendency to place less emphasis on military alliances. This is not necessarily wise. Softer Soviet policies could be merely tactical, designed to gain an advantage by persuading the West to drop its guard, or encourage dissent in western ranks. It may require considerable effort to keep NATO intact during such periods.²⁰

No doubt a considerable degree of detente has been achieved, but "dangerous tensions will remain in the heart of Europe, still the world's most explosive continent, until all the nations in the area are convinced that none is conspiring to alter the existing borders by force." Furthermore, "if you dismantle our defence system precipitately and unilaterally, is it not conceivable that the Soviet appetite would revive?"²¹ While none of this denies the economic, political and military recovery of Western Europe, it does question the revisionist position that, because of the recovery, NATO is no longer needed. But this does not explain why Canada should contribute.

According to John Holmes (Director-General of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs) "NATO provides for the more effective defense of Canada, and by maintaining troops in Europe, Canada is entitled to some voice in the affairs of a continent that has twice drawn it into bloody sacrifice."²² This would seem to indicate both a military and a political role for the forces in Europe, and disagrees with the Eayrs' position. Harald von Riekhoff (Carleton University) agrees with Holmes, since Canada by providing "elite forces in a state of immediate combat-readiness, comparable only to that of the US forces in Germany, has appreciably assisted SACEUR...in laying the foundation for a modern conventional defence posture as part of NATO's strategy of flexible response."²³ Furthermore, unification and the \$1.5 billion re-equipment programme will ideally suit Canada for a mobile role in NATO. In terms of a military function this would seem to be considerably more than most revisionists attribute to Canadian participation.

The role in Europe is further enhanced when the concept of deterrence is considered, and to argue that a force of 5,000 men cannot contribute to deterrence is to misunderstand the underlying principles. Deterrence fails once force is employed, but force levels must be maintained to assure that deterrence is credible. Furthermore, the concept operates on the nuclear, the conventional, and the para-military level. In the case of NATO the first two demand a certain level of military preparedness. With a strategy of flexible response the conventional deterrent becomes most important, and a token force level will not supply the needed credibility. Where Eayrs does seem to be on firm ground is in arguing that the present nuclear role* adds little to the overall deterrent, but this does not mean a conventional role is not needed.

* (Especially the role of the Air Division)

At the same time, the psychological and political effects of a unilateral withdrawal "would have a disproportionate impact on the morale of the other members," and would "be interpreted as an acceptance of the inevitability of the breakup of NATO."²⁴ The political aspects of Canada's role can not be rejected as easily as the anti-NATO group would like, since the political benefits accrued from the alliance are substantial. Internationalists such as John Holmes admit that our alignment has been both a "factor of strength and also...a handicap." But, on the whole, the alliance system "has given us influence where the great decisions are made - not much perhaps, but more at least than most middle powers can command."²⁵

The staunchest supporter of interdependence as a means of gaining influence, however, has been Peyton Lyon, and the problem of achieving influence is a central theme of The Policy Question. "The soundest Canadian policy is to seek to influence world affairs primarily (but not exclusively) through the exploitation of our standing in Washington and in NATO." Furthermore, "being a partner in good standing of this organization (NATO) accounts for a considerable portion of Canada's ability to influence the course of international affairs."²⁶ While the revisionists argue NATO restricts Canadian participation in other foreign policy areas, the traditionalists take just the opposite position. "There is reason to believe that the non-aligned have taken us much more seriously, because we are a country which they think has the ear of Washington and London, then they would have done if we floated free."²⁷ In the area of mediation²⁸ Canada does not seem to have suffered as a result of NATO ties as the UN membership question in 1955, UNEF in 1957, and an active role in disarmament are good examples. Thus there seems to be little evidence to indicate that Canada could be any more effective in international politics if we were non-aligned, and this also applies to the present Vietnam situation. Nowhere does the above statement have greater applicability than in the area of peacekeeping. Rather than argue that the NATO and peacekeeping roles are incompatible, it is more logical, based on the number of operations in which Canada has participated, to argue that they are complementary. The high level of professionalism can largely be attributed to the NATO role and the training it provides for the Armed Forces.²⁹

The relationship between a reduction in the defence budget (i.e., in effect opting out of NATO) and increased foreign assistance to the developing nations does, however, raise some interesting points. There is no doubt a reduction of \$1 billion in defence expenditures would see an increase in foreign assistance, and the revisionists would like to see aid become a major cornerstone of foreign policy. Traditionalists agree foreign aid should be increased, but at the same time they maintain the cornerstone of Canadian foreign must remain the North Atlantic area.³⁰ - An obvious problem of priorities exists - the North Atlantic area, the developing areas, or both? Needless to say, this question is at the root of the entire discussion between the two groups of academics.

Since the traditionalist position explicitly accepts a policy of interdependence as the most effective, the question of subservience to the US never becomes that important an issue. Implicit in the acceptance of interdependence is surrender of a certain amount of sovereignty, and the important thing is to ensure this is offset by gains in other areas. Furthermore,

because of the unique Canadian situation vis-à-vis the U.S. a need exists to trust American leadership* because no other alternative exists, since "Canadians can not disengage themselves from the consequences of United States decisions."³¹ But at the same time there is no question of complete unity of policy within the alliance or with U.S. policy. If unity becomes an end in itself paralysis will be the result. Therefore, diversity must be allowed to flourish within NATO, and the Canadian role should be one of "support without satellitism."³² In looking at the Canadian foreign policy experience it should be apparent that room for diversity obviously exists, and on top of this the "NATO alliance has always been counterbalanced by our other associations, especially the Commonwealth."³³ However, if "our real fear is of gradual, semi-conscious absorption into the much more populous, wealthy, and dynamic society to the south"³⁴ opting out of NATO will not solve the problem. In fact it would cut important multi-lateral ties which serve to counterbalance the dominant U.S. position. But what of the second category of arguments which support continuation of the alliance system?

NATO performs a special role of assuring the continuation, in some form, of a "security community" in the Atlantic area.³⁵ A security community is one in which members are agreed conflict shall be resolved by the processes of peaceful change, and this entails resolution of disputes without resort to the use of force. Therefore, one of the main benefits of such a community is that the threat of war among members no longer exists. NATO has not yet succeeded in producing a true security community - for example the possibility of armed conflict between Greece and Turkey - but it has certainly increased stability, and greatly diminished the threat of war within the alliance. This in itself is a meaningful step forward from traditional bi-lateral alliances.

A second task is the function of 'control'. NATO has often been considered as a means of controlling and funneling the aspirations of the German nation, and within the last several years this has assumed increased importance. According to Peyton Lyon "the principal purpose of NATO has now become the meeting of Germany's legitimate security needs without recreating the independent German forces whose very existence would reverse the present trend towards détente and stability in the heart of Europe."³⁶ It seems reasonable to expect the Russians to react to any agreement to create independent German forces, and here NATO performs a valuable role in controlling any change in existing military force levels. A further aspect of the control function sees alliances as "one of the principal tools available to superpowers in their anti-proliferation crusade."³⁷ The case of France indicates NATO has not been entirely successful in this area, but for both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. the alliance system offers greater opportunity to control any expansion of the nuclear club than a traditional alliance system.

The third argument is related to the strategy of flexible response since acceptance of the strategy increases the range of options available if war should occur. Needless to say in any bi-lateral series of agreements the

* The Vietnam conflict has caused a fair number of academics (and other Canadians) to question American leadership.

same range of options would not exist as an integrated military structure is needed to ensure that the strategy is credible. While there is no guarantee the right response would be forthcoming, the present integrated command structure offers more assurance than any previous arrangement. Furthermore, Canadian participation insures the Government of some voice in the shaping of the strategy to be followed.

A final function sees NATO as "an agent for co-ordinating the increased volume of East-West contacts and negotiations as the consequence of any emerging détente."³⁸ Any meaningful progress toward a final political settlement in Europe will probably only take place with a gradual reduction in force levels, and over a fairly long period of time. Here NATO has a role to perform since the existing structure allows for meaningful deliberation on such questions.

At the moment the majority of Canadians would probably agree with the traditionalists, but the anti-NATO arguments warrant close consideration, and this is particularly true since NATO has increasingly come under criticism from various elements within Canada. It may be that the more positive aspects, i.e., the last four points, should be stressed to a greater degree by the Government. There is little doubt that the voices being raised against NATO are increasing. (See following section, Chapter IV and Appendix No. 2).

Active Academics and Selected Publics: Some Comparisons.

In looking at the attitudes of the general public it seems safe to generalize that, in all probability, the majority supports Canadian participation in NATO. A CIPO survey in 1960 showed that 59.0% of the sample knew about NATO, and of these 72.3% approved of Canada's participation; and significantly, only 4.0% disapproved.³⁹ In November, 1962 a survey conducted by the Canadian Peace Research Institute showed that 52% of the national sample thought that the level of Canadian military forces in Europe was 'about right', and another 19.0% were of the opinion that the force level should be increased. Only 10% felt that the troops should be brought back to Canada. (See table No. 5) In the same survey 58% of the national sample stated that the West should increase its overall military strength to meet the threat of communism. (See Table No. 6) Furthermore, in February, 1964 only 17.0% of a CIPO poll expressed the opinion that Canada should maintain her own defences, and 66.8% were willing to support a joint defence pact between the U.S. and Canada.⁴⁰

The above attitudes on the part of the general public, however, do not mean that most Canadians are satisfied with present foreign policy. There is a good deal of ambivalence in overall attitudes since the majority of Canadians would like to see a more independent stand on foreign policy questions. In a survey conducted in October, 1966⁴¹ a majority of the sample (63.0%) stated that Canada does not show enough independence vis-à-vis the U.S. on both domestic and international questions. But to interpret this attitude as comprising a rejection of the policy of interdependence on the part of the general public may be very misleading. It would seem that while accepting the need for alliance commitments there is also a desire for Canada to show greater independence on foreign policy questions. The same attitude pattern was found to exist among the delegates to the annual meeting of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in June, 1967 (See Appendix No. 2). It seems safe to say,

therefore, that the percentage of active academics favouring withdrawal from NATO is not representative of the general public.

Groups within the attentive public do not support the stationing of troops in Europe to the same extent as the general public as Table No. 5 points out.

Table No. 5 - Attitudes toward the stationing of Canadian troops in Europe (November, 1962).⁴²

Question: There has been talk about Canadian military forces in Europe; Do you feel that:

Group code	<u>N</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>P</u>
We should increase the size of our armed forces in Europe?	19	6	12	12	4
Their size is just about right?	52	53	42	29	60
Their size should be reduced?	4	8	4	17	8
They should all be brought back to Canada?	10	17	0	15	22
Dont know	<u>15</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>6</u>
Totals	100	100	100	100	100

Code: N - national sample, C - Peace Research contributors, B - business leaders, L - trade union leaders, P - politicians (federal)

While 71% of the national sample was in favour of either increasing the size of the Canadian contribution or leaving it at its present size, the various attentive public groups varied from to low of 41% for the labour leaders, to 54% for business leaders, and 59% for contributors to the Peace Research Institute, to a high of 64% for parliamentarians. Thus it would seem that the elite groups are less willing to support the Canadian role in Europe than is the general public. But at the same time only 22% of the politicians and 15% of the labour leaders were willing to have the troops return to Canada. Significantly, none of the businessmen are of this opinion. While the attitudes of the various groups vary on this question, a consensus nevertheless seems to exist (at least it existed in 1962) that Canadian participation should continue.

Support for the alliance system in general is indicated below, where the CPRL survey asked for attitudes towards the military strength of the West.

Table No. 6 - Attitudes toward the military strength of the West.⁴³

date?

Question: Some people think that the best way to prevent war is for the West to increase its military strength so as to be more powerful than the Russians. Others think that this would lead to an arms race which may cause a war. What do you think? Should the West try to increase its military strength or not?

	<u>N</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>P</u>
Yes, should increase	58	33	29	10	19
Keep an equilibrium between great powers	-	-	40	42	42
We have the arms race, but it does not necessarily mean war.	-	-	21	2	2
No, should not increase	32	58	2	36	25
Dont know or other	10	9	8	10	12
TOTALS	100	100	100	100	100

Code: N - national sample, C - contributors to CPRI, B - businessmen, L - trade union leaders, P - politicians.

While this question does not directly mention NATO, if it is linked with the question in table No. 5, a fairly good indication of the degree of support for NATO is suggested. Among politicians 61% stated that the West's strength should be increased or kept in equilibrium with the Soviet Union (i.e., would presumably mean an increase if the U.S.S.R. increased its military strength). This corresponds to 64% of the politicians in table No. 5 who said the Canadian commitment to NATO should be increased or is just about right. In other words, the politicians as a group were most aware of the correlation between the Canadian commitment to NATO and the overall military strength of the West. The businessmen were almost as perceptive on this point since 59% (compared to 54% in support of the Canadian role) agreed the military strength had to be kept up. While only 41% of the trade union leaders were in favour of the Canadian commitment, 52% were agreed the military strength of the West had to be maintained at the same level as the East's. On the other hand, the greatest disparity existed within the general public since only 58% were in favour of increasing the force level of the West to meet the East's force level (compared to 71% who were in favour of the Canadian role in NATO). This was not surprising, however, since the "common knowledge level" of the various groups in this survey from high to low was as follows: politicians, businessmen, trade union leaders, contributors to the CPRI and the general public.⁴⁴ The Canadian Peace Research survey suggests the general public (in late 1962) was more favourably inclined toward Canadian participation in NATO than were the various attentive public groups in the study.

One attentive public group that does not seem to fall into this pattern is the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. At the annual meeting of the Institute in June, 1967 a short questionnaire on attitudes toward Canadian foreign policy was circulated to most of the 132 delegates at the annual meeting. (See Appendix No. 2). Table No. 7 indicates the degree of support for continued Canadian participation in NATO among the delegates to the meeting. The first thing to notice is that 75.9% of the sample.

Table No. 7 - Support for continued participation in NATO among delegates to the annual CIIA meeting, June, 1967.

Question: Presuming NATO continues after 1969 should Canada remain a member of the alliance?

	<u>total</u> sample	<u>sex</u>		academics	<u>occupations*</u>		others
		M	F		Profess- ionals	interested citizens	
Yes	75.9	83.3	55.5	90.9	70.4	58.8	100.0
No	13.9	15.0	11.1	9.1	22.2	11.8	-
Undec- ided	9.9	1.7	27.8	-	7.4	23.5	-
No ans- wer	1.3	-	5.5	-	-	5.9	-
Totals	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No's	(79)	(60)	(18)	(22)	(27)	(17)	(10)

Note: @ - includes six civil servants, and four members of the communication media.

* See Appendix 2 for breakdown by occupations.

were agreed that Canada should remain in NATO after 1969. This is some three percentage points higher than the CIPO poll taken in 1960, and approximately fifteen percent higher than the CPRI survey of November 1962. When broken down by sex, 83.3% of the males approved of continued support, but only 55.5% of the women were of the same opinion. Furthermore, 27.8% of the women delegates were undecided. When looking at occupation groups it is noted that only 58.8% of the interested citizens were in favour of Canada in NATO after 1969, and 82.4% of the 17 delegates in this category listed 'housewife' as their occupation. Therefore, quite a split exists between male-female attitudes on the NATO question. If the delegates had been distributed according to adult population the total percentage in favour on this question would have been considerably less. Needless, to say, this is a most important point to keep in mind if one wishes to make comparisons with the general public.

For the purpose of this study, however, the most interesting conclusion is that as an attentive public group the CIIA seems to be predominately in favour of continuing Canada's role in NATO. It can be argued that the CIIA is more attractive to traditionalists than to revisionists; but despite this line of reasoning the support given to NATO at the 1966 Liberal National Convention and at the Conservative Leadership Convention would indicate that NATO has fairly wide support among other attentive public groups. Support for NATO also emerged from the Carleton University Conference on NATO in January, 1966. The majority of some sixty delegates drawn from the Government service, the universities, and from business favoured Canadian participation in NATO.⁴⁵

Summary:

Academics who have written about Canadian foreign policy can be classified as either revisionists or traditionalists. The revisionists reject the present policy of interdependence, and advocate a complete realignment of Canadian foreign policy. NATO and NORAD are no longer needed, and the emphasis of Canadian policy should shift to the UN, peacekeeping, and increased assistance to the developing areas. The traditionalists support regional military alliances, and believe a policy of interdependence is best suited to Canadian needs. The UN, peacekeeping and foreign aid are supported, but they cannot replace the need to rely on NATO and NORAD. Table No. 4 lists individual academics by category.

Revisionist arguments against NATO encompass three main themes. The first argues Europe has changed politically, economically and militarily to such an extent that NATO has outlived its usefulness since Europe can now defend itself and the Russian threat no longer exists. The second theme argues the Canadian military contribution to NATO serves no strategic purpose, and its main function is political. Since no real political benefits are forthcoming Canada should withdraw from NATO. The third theme argues for an independent foreign policy. Only by disassociation from U.S. dominated alliances is it possible to have an independent foreign policy which will enable Canada to assume a more important role in the world. The role which can be performed most usefully is to adopt a programme of massive assistance to the developing nations in order to close the increasing economic gap between the industrialized and the developing nations. The revisionists see this as the most pressing problem in the world. The majority of revisionists also see Canada continuing to perform a positive role in the area of peacekeeping.

The traditionalist arguments can be divided into those that counter-act the revisionist position, and those that stress functions for NATO which are unique to the alliance. Included among the first group are arguments which maintain that the threat to Europe is not extinct and that Canada's security remains closely linked to NATO. While the relative strength of the Canadian contribution has decreased over the years, Canada still performs a function deemed essential by other NATO members. In terms of political influence the contribution gives Canada some say in policy formation. In this respect interdependence enhances our ability to mediate in conflict situations, and gives Canada a voice in many centres of the world which would normally be closed to a middle power. Interdependence does not mean subservience, and as a firm ally of the United States influence in Washington


is enhanced. Most traditionalists would like to see foreign aid increased and the peacekeeping role continue, but this does not mean Canada has to withdraw from NATO to perform these functions.

NATO also contributes to the peaceful solution of conflict situations among the NATO members, and serves the important function of controlling any expansionist tendencies on the part of West Germany. The other part of the control function is that NATO helps to control proliferation of independent nuclear forces. In this respect it adds stability to both Eastern and Western Europe, as well as increasing the options in terms of conventional response in case of war. An added role for NATO is that it can serve as an agency for increasing East-West contacts and thereby help to further détente. The traditionalists argue these are essential functions, and if NATO were to be dismantled some other arrangement would have to take its place.

When the revisionists and the traditionalists are compared with other groups within Canada support for NATO can be ranged along a continuum. The two academic groups are at either extreme with the labour leaders and the NDP at the lower end, and the general public and the CIIA* showing the most support for NATO after the traditionalists. It should be noted, however, that there is a serious lack of statistical data and the following diagram can only be considered as a rough approximation.

Diagram No. 1 - Support Continuum for NATO by Groups and Parties within Canada, 1967. 46.

Support for NATO
by groups



The diagram suggests that the two largest political parties are not far out of touch with the general public, and as the conclusion to the section on parties indicated there seems to be a move toward some form of all-party consensus on the NATO question.

While this may well be true the diagram makes it clear that at the present time this consensus is by no means solidly based. The revisionists, part of the Labour movement, and segments of the NDP are in favour of withdrawal from NATO. Minority groups within both the Liberals and the Conservatives advocate complete withdrawal, and in all probability a segment of the general public feels the same way. The study of the Canadian Institute of

* Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

International Affairs⁴⁷ indicates an unfavourable swing in attitude away from NATO, and the CIIA as a group is one of the strongest supporters of Canadian participation. This seems to add up to increasing disillusionment with the Canadian role in NATO, and while the level of disillusionment is not high it is increasing. If effective leadership is not forthcoming from the traditionalists, the major political parties and the Government it can be expected that the percentage of the general public in favour of NATO will decrease.

IV - NATO and the Press: Editorial Attitudes

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the editorial opinion of major Canadian newspapers toward NATO. The chapter on political parties presented a broad scope approach; and the chapter on academics made comparisons with the attitudes of other groups in Canada as well as outlining the reasons for support or rejection of NATO. The following analysis will take a different approach by concentrating on six external issues which have generated editorial comment, and measure the paper's position in terms of support for the Government's position on these six issues (See Appendix No. 1 for Government statements). The six issues are: i) a broader base for NATO, 1959-1962, ii) the need for increased consultation within the alliance, 1960-1963, iii) the Berlin crisis of 1961, iv) the NATO nuclear force concept including the Norstad proposal, the Polaris proposal and the MLF, 1960-1965, v) France's withdrawal from the integrated command structure, 1965-1966, and vi) the commitment of Canadian forces to Europe, 1966-67. A final section will deal with editorial attitudes toward the future of NATO.

Selection and Coverage of Newspaper Opinion:

An analysis of editorial attitudes for the period 1960 to 1967 presents difficulties which did not arise in the preceding chapters. One problem concerns the choice of newspapers. In 1966 there were 109 (102 in 1960) English and French dailies in the country. This number obviously precluded any analysis of more than a few. A limiting factor was provided by the clipping service of the Department of External Affairs which provides newspaper comment for some 34 daily newspapers. Of these 26 are Canadian papers covering all the major urban centres of Canada, and 19 were chosen for this study. Unfortunately coverage is only partial in most cases (even after supplementing the Department's service with the service provided by the Privy Council Office, the Library of Parliament, and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs). The following table indicates the division of papers according to degree of coverage.

Table No. 8 - Selected Canadian Newspapers: Complete or Partial Coverage of NATO Attitudes.

Complete Coverage
Halifax Chronicle Herald
Ottawa Citizen
Montreal Gazette
Montreal Star
Toronto Globe and Mail
Toronto Daily Star

Partial Coverage
Edmonton Journal
L'Action Catholique
La Presse
Le Devoir
Le Droit
Le Soleil
Ottawa Journal
Toronto Telegram
Regina Leader-Post
St. John Telegram Journal
Windsor Star
Winnipeg Free Press
Vancouver Sun

A Note on the Measurement of Opinion:

The difficulties of measuring opinion are many but, with this warning in mind it seems useful to give some indication of the direction and intensity of editorial support for the Government's position on the various external issues under consideration. If this is done, a paper can be classified as either pro or anti-NATO vis-à-vis the Government's position on any specific issue, and also given an overall score in terms of general support (for NATO) for the 1960-1967 period. (The position taken by the Government on the various issues is contained in Appendix I, which is used to supplement the chapter on political parties).

Therefore, the six external issues are listed in the following order of importance as indicators of support for NATO:

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Value of Issue</u>
A broader base for NATO _____	1
Consultation with NATO _____	2
Berlin Crisis of 1961 _____	3
NATO nuclear force concept _____	4
France's withdrawal _____	5
Canadian commitment to NATO in Europe ____	6

The above issues (and corresponding values) can be related to a five point Likert scale, with the Government's position on each issue being assigned a value of three. If a paper supports the Government and nothing more, it is given three points for that issue. If it goes beyond the Government's position it is given four or five points. Similarly, if a paper shows less support on an issue than the Government it is given one or two points. By relating the five point Likert scale to the value for each issue, it is possible to obtain an overall support score for NATO. Using this system, the following minimum, government, and maximum scores are obtained.

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Government</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
Broader base	1	1	3	5
Consultation	2	2	6	10

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Government</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
Berlin (1961)	3	3	9	15
Nuclear force	4	4	12	20
France	5	5	15	25
Force Level	6	<u>6</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>30</u>
Total Score		21	63	105
% Support * Score		20	80	100

* A % support score is used since complete data is not available for all papers.

Ideally, a pre-test should have been conducted to see if the above ordering of the issues corresponds with that of other individuals interested in foreign policy issues. This was not done, but if the reader wishes to change the ordering, the values allocated to each issue can easily be re-arranged and a new score obtained. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the score given each paper is subject to interpretation, but it is felt that the analysis has been carried out in a fairly systematic manner. Despite the obvious drawbacks to this approach it seems preferable to a purely descriptive study. With more time (and resources) many of the shortcomings should be overcome to make the approach more scientific.

External Issues and Support for the Government's NATO Policy:

The six external issues under consideration cover the period from 1959 to 1967, and make it possible to speak of support for the Government's NATO policy over time. Implicitly this is also taken as support for NATO since both the Conservative Government (1957-63), and the present Liberal administration have, in general, been strong supporters of NATO.* Two aspects of support will be considered: Firstly, there is the question of overall support for NATO policy. However, this must be linked with the type of issues which arose during the period. Is there a tendency to give the Government more support for one type of issue than another? The second aspect refers to the consistency of editorial support. How many papers changed from a pro to an anti-Government position (or vice-versa), and how many maintained a consistent attitude? Furthermore, are there specific types of issues which warrant more attitude change than others?

Table No. 9 shows the editorial attitude patterns in terms of (%) support for the Government's NATO policy on the six external issues. The

* The only issue which was not supported by either Government was the formation of a NATO nuclear force.

table makes no distinction between the Conservative and Liberal administrations since the majority of papers have not shown party partisanship in their attitudes toward NATO on these issues. The consistence of support patterns for most papers is very surprising, and NATO support does not seem directly related to political party. The overall pattern, however, is not that encouraging in terms of NATO support, since only 37% (7/19) of the papers scored 60% or better - that is, had a score equal or better than the Government. This is largely a result of the weighting factor since only 55% of the papers supported the Government's stand on the NATO nuclear force (or pressed for the formation of a NATO force), and at present only 50% support the Government's stand on the stationing of Canadian forces in Europe.

Table No. 9 - Editorial Support Scores for the Government's NATO Policy, (External Issues).

<u>Paper</u>	<u>External Issues</u>						<u>Total Score</u>	<u>% Support Score</u>
	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Ottawa Citizen	4	8	15	12	25	24	88/105	84
Winnipeg Free Press	5		12		18	24	59/75	79
St. John Telegraph Journal			12		15	24	51/70	76
Toronto Telegram	5		9	20	15	18	67/95	70
Regina Leader Post	3	10		12	13		38/62	61
Ottawa Journal		4	15	8	15	18	60/100	60
Le Droit, Ottawa	3		6		15		24/40	60
<u>Government's Position</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>63/105</u>	<u>60</u>
Montreal Gazette	2	6	8	8	15	21	60/105	57
Le Soleil, Quebec			6	12	15	18	51/90	57
Edmonton Journal	3		12		15	12	42/75	56
Windsor Star					15	15	30/55	54
Toronto Globe and Mail	4	8	9	12	15	6	54/105	51
Vancouver Sun	1	10			10	15	36/70	51
La Presse, Montreal	3		9		10		22/45	49
Halifax Chronicle Herald	2	6	3	10	5	18	44/105	42
Toronto Star	3	6	6	4	15	9	43/105	41

<u>Paper</u>	<u>External Issues</u>						<u>Total Score</u>	<u>% Support Score</u>
	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Le Devoir, Montreal				12	10	6	28/75	37
L'Action Catholique, Qué.					5	12	17/55	31
Montreal Star	2	5	3	10	5	6	31/105	30

Issue Code: 1. Broader base for NATO (1959-62), 2. Consultation within NATO (1960-63), 3. Berlin crisis (1961), 4. NATO nuclear force (1960-65), 5. France's withdrawal (military command) (1965-66, 6. Canadian forces in Europe (1966-67).

An example from table No. 9 will show why the weighting factor was employed. The Toronto Globe and Mail supported Government policy for five out of the six issues. This would seem to indicate it is a fairly strong and consistent supporter of NATO, which it was up until 1965. Since that time the Globe has pressed for the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Europe, and has questioned the utility of continuing the alliance system. However, with the weighting factor it is possible to take account of this attitude pattern. Similarly, the Montreal Gazette has shown increasing support for NATO since 1960, and this can also be taken into consideration. Consequently, the overall support score for the Gazette is higher than that of the Globe.

Of the five papers with scores greater than 60, the Ottawa Citizen (84) and the Winnipeg Free Press (79) have been the staunchest supporters of NATO. This does not mean they have not been critical of how the alliance has functioned, but on every issue they offered solutions which would strengthen the concept of an Atlantic Community. The St. John Telegraph Journal (76) and the Toronto Telegram (70) have also been consistent supporters of NATO and Government policy on most issues. At the low end of the support scale are the Montreal Star, l'Action Catholique, Le Devoir, and the Halifax Chronicle Herald with scores ranging from 30 to 42. Since a score of 20 representing the minimum, the above papers can not exactly be considered as strong supporters of either the Government's policy or of NATO.

The remainder of the papers all fall within a range of 11 support points vis-à-vis the Government's score of 60, with La Presse (49), the Vancouver Sun (51), and the Toronto Globe and Mail (51) being the furthest away. However, three of the papers with less than 60 - the Windsor Star, the Montreal Gazette, and Le Soleil - are close enough to the Government's position (within 6 points) to say that, in general, they are favourably inclined toward NATO. (This is substantiated in the section dealing with NATO's future). The remaining paper, the Edmonton Journal, shows a decreasing pattern of support.

From the data in table No. 9 there seem to be four general attitude patterns with respect to NATO policy. These patterns, and the papers in each are outlined by the following table:

Table No. 10: General patterns of support of (nineteen) Canadian newspapers for NATO.

<u>Consistently anti-NATO</u>	<u>Generally or increasingly anti-NATO</u>	<u>Generally or increasingly pro-NATO</u>	<u>Consistently pro-NATO</u>
L'Action Catholique Montreal Star	Edmonton Journal Halifax Chronical Herald La Presse Le devoir Toronto Globe & Mail Toronto Star Vancouver Sun	Le Droit Le Soleil Ottawa Journal Montreal Gazette Regina Leader Post Windsor Star	Ottawa Journal St. John Telegraph Journal Toronto Telegram Winnipeg Free Press

The next task is to look at each of the issues separately, and give examples of editorial opinion in each case. Table No. 11 only presents the raw data from table No. 9 before weighting, and it should be remembered that weighting has to be taken into account even though percentages will be taken directly from table No. 11. When all six issues are considered, without

Table No. 11 - Overall Editorial Support for the Government's NATO Policy (External Issues): (Percentages in brackets).

<u>Number of Papers</u>	<u>External Issues</u>						total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Supporting Government	9 (69)	8 (80)	8 (62)	6 (55)	12 (63)	8 (50)	51 (63)
Not supporting Government	4 (31)	2 (20)	5 (38)	5 (45)	7 (37)	8 (50)	31 (37)
Totals	13 (100)	10 (100)	13 (100)	11 (100)	19 (100)	16 (100)	82 (100)

Issue code: 1. Broader base for NATO (1959-62), 2. Consultation within NATO (1960-63), 3. Berlin crisis (1961), 4. NATO nuclear force (1960-65), 5. France's withdrawal (military command structure), (1965-66), 6. Canadian forces in Europe (1966-67).

- Complete coverage of the 19 papers would have involved 114 responses. Table No. 11 (and table No. 9) is only 72% complete. This is largely a result of incomplete files for the earlier period - 1959-65 - since the first four issues are only 63% complete compared with the last two issues (1966-67) which are 92% complete.

weighting, the Government's NATO policy was supported on 51 out of 82 occasions (63%), and rejected on 31 occasions (37%). It is interesting to note that for the first four issues in the period (1959-65) the Government was supported 66% (31/47) of the time, but for the last two issues (#'s 5 and 6) only received 57% (20/35). This may well indicate a decreasing pattern of support for NATO policy; but, on the other hand, for the two low support issues - the NATO nuclear force (No. 4) and Canadian forces in Europe (No. 6) - the majority of editorial opinion developed in different time periods. This is one reason why it may be useful to distinguish between different types of issues when considering editorial support patterns.

The six issues can be divided into three categories:

i) issues which produce latent and diffuse attitude patterns - the need to broaden the base of NATO, and the need for greater consultation within the alliance, ii) issues which produce latent and specific attitude patterns - the Berlin crisis of 1961, and France's withdrawal from the integrated command structure, and iii) issues which produce manifest and specific attitude patterns - The NATO nuclear force and Canadian forces in Europe. A manifest attitude is an explicit formulation of an opinion and in the case of NATO involves Canadian military participation. A latent attitude takes the form of a behavioral or mood opinion; is often more implicit than explicit and does not involve direct military participation. A diffuse attitude may indicate the desire for change, but is usually stated in such a manner that it seldom provides an accurate guide for policy decision-making. A specific attitude, on the other hand, is more easily handled in terms of policy formulation.*

Using the above categories and referring to table No. 11 it is apparent that those issues which were latent and diffuse (issues No. 1 and 2) received the greater degree of support. In isolating the latent and diffuse issues, support for Government policy was 74% (17/23) compared to a low of

* G.A. Almond and G.B. Powell, Comparative politics, 1967 pp 86-87

52.5% (14/27) for issues (No. 4 and 6) categorized as manifest and specific. This pattern of support seems to indicate that the majority of editorials are in favour of Government policy on NATO when it speaks of general policies of a diplomatic or political nature such as the need for NATO members to concentrate more on broadening the base of the alliance. These policies are welcomed as long term goals involving no immediate change, and consequently can be put forth by the Government and the newspapers in such terms that it becomes quite unreasonable to oppose them. But at the same time these objectives are most difficult to transform into concrete policy. This has certainly been the case with respect to a broader base for NATO. Manifest policies involving any increase in Canadian military participation have been rejected by the press.

From 1959 to 1962 editorial reaction to Government statements on the need to broaden the base of the alliance were welcomed by 69% of the papers included in Table No. 11. There were two aspects of the issue for both the Government and the press. One dealt with the traditional desire for increased economic and political cooperation under Article II of the treaty. The second was the need to cope with the Russian threat elsewhere in the world. The Conservative Government never really accepted an expansion of NATO to meet the threat of communism elsewhere in the world. There were, however, some statements in late the late 1950's and early 1960's which implied the Government was considering the possibility (See Appendix No. 1), and this was a question which created some comment from the press.

Four papers, The Winnipeg Free Press, the Toronto Telegram, the Toronto Globe and Mail and the Ottawa Citizen, indicated greater support for the above issue than the Government. (See Table No. 9). The Toronto Telegram strongly endorsed an expansion of NATO since "the time is ripe for transforming (NATO) into an effective weapon to meet communism on the new front of economic development and national self-determination." (20-12-60), and the alliance must meet the "Soviet political and economic offensive which threatens to outflank it in other parts of the world." (8-5-61). The Winnipeg Free Press tended to stress the traditional Article II argument, and advocated some form of political community based on economic integration since "the reconstruction, and even survival, of NATO must be through the channels of commerce." (4-5-61). Editorials in the Toronto Globe and Mail (13-3-61, 5-4-61, and 18-6-61), agreed with the Telegram on the need to give NATO a more active role in economically combating communism in order to close the North-South gap. It also advocated more be done in the direction of forming an Atlantic Union (19-1-62), but a month later felt that the "momentum for development had shifted to the European Common Market." (10-2-62). The Ottawa Citizen took substantially the same position as the other three papers: "The task of NATO now is to go beyond military policies, to work out an economic and social program that would meet the Russian challenge on the battlefield of the future." (28-11-60).

Opposing the Government's position on this issue was the Vancouver Sun which was not overly concerned about Communist expansion into Africa and Asia, since it had been halted in Europe and this was the main function of NATO. (11-4-61) The Sun noted that "as an instrument of political and economic unity NATO has not fulfilled expectations." It "remains a creaky military expedient for the defence of Europe." (4-5-62). The Montreal

Gazette took much the same position, and in noting that NATO "remains primarily a military alliance" saw "no reason why social and cultural co-operation should take place." (20-12-60). However, by the middle of 1961, the Gazette came around to the view that NATO might have to deal with problems outside the alliance area, for example in the Congo. (12-5-61). The Montreal Star (23-11-60), 10-5-61) and the Halifax Chronicle Herald (14-2-61) also objected to any expansion of the NATO base. As table No. 9 indicates the remainder of the papers expressing opinions on this issue tended to support the Government's position. Considering some Government statements indicated a desire to expand NATO functions to help in the developing areas, the percentage agreement obtained in the press was quite high. But the statements were phrased in very diffuse terms, and once a concrete situation arose - U.S. involvement in South East Asia - it was agreed in most circles that NATO should not become involved.

The second issue, need for greater consultation, had even more support from the press than the first, as 60% of the papers agreed consultation had to be increased. This has always been a continuing issue, but during the early 1960's the Conservative Government put considerable effort into the necessity of solving NATO's problems at the highest political level. (See Appendix No. 1). The Vancouver Sun, while opposed to the first issue, became one of the strongest supporter's of greater consultation by advocating a common foreign policy for the West. "Canada should already be leading a determined effort of the 11 minor NATO powers to establish the necessary common policy for the West." (4-5-62). While the Regina Leader Post was the only other paper supporting "a policy of unity" (9-5-61, and 4-5-61), the Toronto Globe and Mail and the Ottawa Citizen were strong supporters for greater consultation within the alliance. According to the Globe NATO consisted of "equal, sovereign states", and all members should be consulted; but because of a lack of adequate consultation the alliance was "united on only a few points" and on everything else the members worked "independently and often at cross purposes." The solution was to have a Heads of Government meeting since "a co-ordinated NATO policy" was required. (1-11-60, 10-4-61). During May and June of 1961 the Ottawa Citizen was agreeing with the position taken by the Globe. (9-5-61, 11-5-61, 17-6-61).

The Ottawa Journal and the Montreal Star were the only papers to question the Government's position. In the case of the Journal this is rather surprising since it is a known Conservative paper, and its' support score is identical to the Government's. (See table No. 9).* The Journal agreed more co-operation was needed, but at the same time made it quite clear that the U.S. must have the greatest say within the alliance. (18-5-59). The Montreal Star was opposed to de Gaulle's concept of triumvirate leadership (20-10-60), and at the same time was critical of the "lack of basic co-ordination". However, for the Star, the Cuban crisis indicated that the U.S. had "neither the time nor the inclination for consultation." (11-12-62). Even though the Montreal Star has one of the lowest support scores (30% in table No. 9), it could be argued that on the second issue both itself and the Ottawa Journal were more realistic than the Vancouver Sun or the Regina Leader Post.

* This suggests one of the difficulties of relying on clipping services. Undoubtedly, in some instances, the editorials in the various files are not representative of editorial opinion. The only solution is to go through each paper separately, and cover all the editorials during any given period. If time permits this is the only way to conduct a survey of editorial opinion.

The other papers which expressed an opinion on this subject fell between the two above mentioned positions, and supported the Government position. As with the first issue, the majority of papers expressed their opinions in fairly diffuse terms, and this made support for NATO much easier as table No. 11 clearly indicates.

Issues classified as latent and specific seem to have almost as much support as those which are latent and diffuse. The Berlin crisis on 1961,* and France's withdrawal from the integrated command structure fall into this category. Combined support for these two issues was 62.5% (20/32), and while lower than those issues categorized as latent and diffuse, nevertheless still warranted majority support. It could be argued that France's withdrawal, and the transfer of Canadian forces was more manifest than latent, but for the most part response on this issue was one of mood and the majority of editorials seem to have been written in this vein without stressing the Canadian contribution.

Prior to September, 1961 when the opinions of the press on Berlin were latent 62% (8/13) had previously agreed with the position taken by Mr. Diefenbaker in his Halifax speech (See Appendix No. 1). Strongest support again came from the Ottawa Citizen and the Ottawa Journal. The Citizen stated very emphatically that Berlin must be kept free (14-6-61), since "the front line is in Europe," and until the crisis is over the best answer might be "to raise Canada's establishment there to division strength." (31-7-61). For the Ottawa Journal it was a question of honour since "the people of West Berlin cannot be abandoned," and "we would fight in Berlin if necessary because it is here that freedom is taking a stand." (16-6-61, 28-7-61). The Winnipeg Free Press, the St. John Telegraph Journal, and the Edmonton Journal also took a firm stand. The Free Press made the point that "the security of West Berlin has been an obligation of the NATO community for years...Any weakening in that unity strengthens the Russian campaign to gain control of Berlin." (26-7-61).

At the other end of the scale, in opposing a firm stand on Berlin, was the Montreal Star and the Halifax Chronicle Herald. From the beginning of 1961 the Star agreed a free Berlin was the end objective, but only through negotiation and to achieve this an imaginative approach was needed to avoid war (19-6-61) since Canada would be involved. (27-7-61). After the Halifax speech by the Prime Minister, the Star asked what were the West's

* Prior to Mr. Diefenbaker's speech of September 1, 1961 the issue remained latent and specific. After this date it became manifest and specific, since the Canadian Government had clarified its' position, and the following week announced a build-up for the Armed Forces. Editorial attitudes in this study deal mainly with the period prior to September 1, 1961 when the issue was still latent.

commitments to Berlin, and implied none by stating that "American commitments are to the Western Allies, not the West Berliners." (16-8-61). The Halifax Chronicle Herald did not make a distinction between commitments to the rest of the alliance and West Berlin, but it called for a permanent division of Germany because then the Berlin problem would not be as acute (27-7-61). After the Halifax speech editorial opinion expressed the desire for the crisis to be handled by the U.N. (16-8-61).

However, the majority of the press seems to have accepted the Government's position of remaining firm, but willing to negotiate on other issues. La Presse expressed alarm over the possibility of nuclear war arising from the crisis, and wanted pressure exerted on both sides to reduce tensions (27-7-61). The Toronto Globe and Mail felt the NATO role of organizing to meet the threat was correct, but the West should be willing to negotiate (8-8-61, 10-8-61). In most cases the press saw Canada being involved, but that Canada had very little say in the final outcome or the solution to the crisis. In this respect the problem of France's withdrawal from the integrated command structure posed a parallel problem for the press.

The question of French's withdrawal not only posed a threat to the concept of collective self-defence, but also had domestic overtones for Canada. Consequently, the Government was placed in a most difficult situation since it supported the prevailing NATO strategy (rejected by General de Gaulle) realizing that this could have adverse affects on Franco-Canadian relations. Therefore, while supporting a closely integrated NATO, the Government sought the retention of a French presence within the alliance (See Appendix No. 1). The majority of the press agreed with this approach to the crisis, and 63% (12/19) of the papers in table No. 11 supported Government policy. Furthermore, table No. 9 shows that more editorial opinion was closely aligned to the Government's solution than on any other issue - 47% (9/19) of the papers have the same score as the Government.

Only the Ottawa Citizen was willing to go further than the Government in an effort to meet the demands of General de Gaulle and to keep France within NATO. (Elements of the French Canadian press were also quite sympathetic with de Gaulle's position, but they did not show the same degree of support for NATO). The Citizen realized a "considerable degree of compromise" would be needed if Europe's role in NATO was to be increased, and on this point "the course of wisdom is to try to meet French objections more than half-way." (22-2-66). One of the reasons for this proposal was the Citizen's belief that "a shift in power is inevitable", and ways must be found to keep NATO operating as an effective organization (2-3-66), if only "in truncated form." (11-3-66). Bi-lateral agreements (rejected by the alliance) were one answer since France must "play a full part in European defence". Otherwise, de Gaulle would be isolated and tempted to engage in "unpalatable diplomatic adventures" in Eastern Europe. Blame for France's withdrawal lies with the entire alliance (12-4-66) and "it is inconceivable that political progress toward a political settlement in Central Europe could be made without French participation. To isolate France would be to retard settlement, and the political stability it would bring." (25-5-66).

At the other extreme was the Halifax Chronicle Herald and the Montreal Star since neither paper offered support for NATO. In an editorial

on April 4, 1966 the Chronicle Herald was wondering if "de Gaulle's strategy does not have much to commend it" since there are those who agree "any continuation of an armed alliance like NATO will do more harm than good." The Star had taken this stand as far back as 1964, when it said de Gaulle had "rightly seized on the fact that NATO, as originally conceived, had lost its purpose." (14-12-64). When the crisis broke in 1966 the paper agreed with the President of France that NATO as "originally set up ...has served its purpose," but there was no reason to assume the changes brought about by de Gaulle were not changes for the better. (22-3-66).

The remainder of the English speaking press took the middle road between the Ottawa Citizen and, the Montreal Star and Halifax Chronicle Herald. The Winnipeg Free Press saw de Gaulle's action as "a complete reversal of the integrating trend in Europe," and this trend increased the danger of U.S. and French isolationism (19-3-66). The Free Press felt the General's plea for a pre-war alliance system was a "retreat from reality". However, the crisis would pass if the alliance members stood together to strengthen NATO by "extending its integration, military, political, and economic." (28-3-66). The Winnipeg paper saw the French action as quite a severe blow to their continual theme of Atlantic unity. For its part, the Toronto Globe and Mail, as early as 1960, saw General de Gaulle as a threat to solidarity within the alliance (3-12-60), and in 1965 warned that unless the differences over strategy between the U.S. and France were settled the latter "probably will become little more than an associate member of NATO." (3-6-65). In this same editorial entitled "NATO must be saved" the Globe concluded the French attitude "should not be allowed to wreck the solidarity of a valuable and necessary alliance." (Two years later, according to the Globe, the alliance was neither valuable nor necessary). When the break occurred the Globe asked other NATO members to "take a long-range view, rather than lapse into angry retaliation." (15-3-66), and supported Mr. Martin's stand, while rejecting the charge that his motives were based on domestic considerations. Interestingly enough while most papers disagreed with de Gaulle's position, very few showed outward hostility of a personal nature.

The French press in Canada showed tendencies similar to the English press, but stressed the imbalance of power within the alliance, and generally felt the U.S. could have acted sooner to prevent the split. (Le Droit, 5-4-66). They tended to have more sympathy with de Gaulle's position, but in spite of this both Le Droit and Le Soleil supported the Government. Le Droit took the position that "on peut ne pas croire avec le général de Gaulle que le danger a disparu", (23-2-66), and when the break came the paper felt Canada "est très bien placé pour concilier les vues divergentes de ses associés." (22-3-66). Furthermore, the split did not mean the Atlantic Alliance had lost its raison d'être since the U.S. UK, France, and Canada "sont des alliés naturels." However, "pourquoi maintenir l'OTAN... quand les Etats-Unis, en prenant parti contre les pays d'Europe occidentale, renforcent les positions de l'URRS (ou de la Chine) dans le monde?" (29-3-66). Despite Le Droit's criticism of the U.S. it still tended to support the Government. Le Soleil in an editorial "L'utilité du compromis" (10-6-66) took a position similar to Le Droit on the need to find a compromise, but both La Presse and Le Devoir were more favourable to de Gaulle's position than the Canadian.

In La Presse, Roger Champoux (23-2-66) was of the opinion that de Gaulle's press conference in February, 1966 was "sur le ton modéré," and implicitly agreed "des accords bilatéraux devraient correspondre mieux aux exigences nationales françaises." Guy Cormier (14-3-66) felt "la décision française relève d'un pari sur la paix. En ce sens, elle projette un espoir. L'espoir que le stalinisme, qui a rendu nécessaire la création de l'OTAN ne puisse plus jamais ressusciter." Despite M. Cormier's opinion that there was no real threat from the U.S.S.R., he said Canada would not side with France on this issue. (24-2-66). Jean-Marc Léger in Le Devoir saw the crisis in terms of conflicting strategies, and the main point was whether bi-lateral as well as multi-lateral agreements could be used within the alliance. He did not see why both could not be employed. "Puisque s'affrontent deux conceptions inconciliables de l'OTAN, ce serait sans doute là la moins mauvaise solution et qui, après tout, sauverait l'essentiel." (10-3-66).

While none of the four above papers explicitly rejected the alliance, l'Action Catholique asked why Canada did not borrow "une page au président de Gaulle." "L'alliance avait été conçue structurée selon un contexte à la fois politique et stratégique qui est tout simplement dépassé." (23-2-66). On this point l'Action Catholique was agreeing with the Montreal Star. Therefore, both English and French press attitudes on the question of France's withdrawal ran from support to rejection of the Government's policy on this issue. But what of the issues classified as manifest and specific?

For issues in this category any decision by the Government would have direct repercussions on the Canadian military establishment, and this is one of the essential distinctions between issues which are manifest and those which are latent. Once there is a question of either increasing or decreasing the Canadian force level the issue becomes considerably more explicit, but this does not mean that attitudes are no longer shaped by latent factors. In some respects the two issues in this category are most indicative of support for NATO since it involves an actual military contribution instead of a diplomatic or political contribution. Whether or not this generalization is accepted, there is no doubt that support for Canadian military contributions to NATO is the lowest (52% - table No. 11) issues 5 and 6 (14/27) of the three types of issues.

In many ways the Government's attitude toward a NATO nuclear force is a meaningless indicator of support when compared with the other issues. While 55% of the press in table No. 11 supported the Government, neither the Conservative nor the Liberal administrations took a strong stand on this issue. For the Conservatives the Norstad proposal was a non-proposal, and the Liberals were equally evasive in taking a determined stand one way or the other (See Appendix No. 1). The pattern of behaviour on this issue was very logical in terms of the domestic crisis over nuclear weapons, and consequently the idea of an MLF was allowed to die a natural death. The majority of the press was quite agreeable to this solution.

The Toronto Telegram was the only paper in table No. 9 which indicated any real support for the nuclear force concept. The Telegram felt the Norstad proposal deserved the support of Canada since it would make it "unnecessary for a dozen or so countries to obtain their own" nuclear weapons.

In this respect the NATO force would enhance world peace (16-12-60). In 1963 the paper held the same opinion since "proliferation of independent deterrents would be intolerable. A wholly integrated NATO force with a workable chain of command is the most practicable solution." (23-5-63). In complete opposition to the Telegram's stand was the Toronto Star which was opposed to nuclear weapons in any form, and this meant both independent nuclear forces and a NATO force. Canada "should withdraw from NATO rather than participate in such schemes." (2-4-61). In 1964 the Star held the same opinion since the MLF had "no military value" and could "endanger the essential American veto over the use of nuclear weapons." (22-9-64).

While papers like the Montreal Gazette (24-11-60), 20-11-61) and the Halifax Chronicle Herald (29-11-60), 26-11-64) took a fairly strong stand in opposition to a NATO nuclear force, the majority of papers were willing to follow much the same pattern as the Government. The overall impression is one of not getting Canada committed any further. This may well have been the best decision in the light of present attitudes toward the Canadian role in NATO on the part of some elements within the attentive public. Participation certainly would have complicated any renegotiation of Canada's role. After this brief survey of attitudes toward any further military commitments, it is now possible to turn to the present Canadian role in Europe.

The question of present European commitments to NATO seems to be in a state of flux, and according to some commentators this is partly a result of uncertainty on the part of the Government over Canada's future role in NATO. Needless to say these two aspects are closely linked, and in some cases the stand taken on troops in Europe reflects the opinion of the paper on the future of NATO, and vice versa. To pro-NATO supporters table No. 11 certainly presents an unsettling picture since 50% of the papers do not support the Government's present position. In terms of support this is the lowest overall rating of the six issues, and at the same time is the most indicative of present support for NATO. Of equal importance is that papers, such as the Toronto Globe and Mail, the Edmonton Journal, and the Windsor Star, which have supported Government policy in the past have indicated doubts about NATO policy.

As was the case with the majority of other issues, the papers showing the greatest support for maintaining troops in Europe are the Ottawa Citizen, the Winnipeg Free Press, and the Saint John Telegraph Journal. In an editorial on May 6, 1967 the Citizen noted the pending U.S. and U.K. withdrawals, but felt they would not weaken the alliance since the foreign exchange problem would be lessened. The Canadian situation, however, is different because our balance of payments position is strong, and the 11,000 troops in Europe do not make that much of a difference. Furthermore, our present commitments are now at a minimum to be creditable. In the future it may be possible to reduce the force, but not unless there is a substantial reduction of Warsaw Pact troops. The Citizen position was in agreement with an earlier Free Press editorial. The argument that Canada can thin out its troops proportionately to the U.S. is not valid because of the relative size involved. "Any reduction of the Canadian force would render it useless," and Canada "cannot withdraw, even under the disguise of a troop reduction, without betraying its basic commitments." (29-3-67). For the St. John paper "cutting NATO forces would be a

calculated risk" (22-10-66), since "basically the situation there (Europe) has not changed." At the same time, the stationing of troops "pays off in better international understanding." (13-2-67).

Two papers, the Toronto Globe and Mail, and the Montreal Star, have advocated the withdrawal of Canadian forces, and two others, the Halifax Chronicle Herald and Le Devoir, have implied as much by questioning the need for NATO (see under section on future). As far back as 1962 the Globe was suggesting Canadian troops in Europe do little to increase the strength of the alliance, and resources could be put to better use if the forces were withdrawn so that the financial saving could be given directly to NATO (7-8-62). In 1966 its' opinion remained the same, but no longer offered to turn the savings over the NATO (23-9-66). By July, 1967 the paper felt "NATO's new strategy and our own emphasis on peacekeeping would be served by the withdrawal of forces from Europe, and the commitment of more home-based, air-mobile units." (28-7-67). The Montreal Star shared the opinion of the Globe because the Canadian forces are serving a political rather than a military function, and "a cut in military emphasis and cost would not be out of place." (22-3-66). It is interesting to note that both papers have accepted the policy advocated by the NDP while neither are known for their support of the NDP during general elections.

While not as outspoken as the Toronto Globe and the Montreal Star, other papers also questioned the overseas commitment. L'Action Catholique noted "le maintien d'une force de l'Air et d'une brigade de l'armée en France et en Allemagne est un fardeau considérable pour le Canada." (23-2-66). The Toronto Star stated that "Canada should be prepared to reconsider her own position" (14-3-66), and hopefully our future role "would include a diminished military role." (13-4-66). By 1967 the Star was suggesting a regiment instead of a brigade, and one air squadron instead of the present number because it would be "safe and reasonable to reduce the Canadian forces to actual token size." (9-2-67). The Vancouver Sun on January 19, 1967 argued that the troops "serve to reassure our friends in Europe that we are with them in spirit and can be depended upon to swing our best efforts in joint defence." However, after the announced U.K. cutback the Sun felt Canada should "reconsider its NATO commitments" (17-2-67).

In conclusion it would seem that there is increasing press dissatisfaction over the Canadian role in Europe. This is partly a result of the changed military and political climate in Europe, but also attributable to the increasing demands by segments of the attentive public for a basic re-orientation of Canadian foreign policy.

Editorial Attitudes and NATO's Future:

There are four basic positions which can be taken vis-à-vis the future of NATO. NATO should or will;

- 1) be revised upwards to make it a more effective organization. This can take the form of an increased military contribution (no support in Canada), a re-organization of the alliance to take account of shifting power within the alliance, or a revitalized alliance incorporated into some form of economic and political community.

- ii) be maintained in essentially the present form, with emphasis on the concept of collective self-defence within an integrated command structure.
- iii) be revised downwards with less emphasis on the military aspects of the alliance, but nevertheless maintaining the concept of collective self-defence through a more traditional form. This category could also include increased emphasis on the economic and political aspects of the treaty, but, if accompanied with reduced military effectiveness it would result in a downward revision.
- iv) be dismantled since the alliance no longer serves a useful function.

In considering these four positions some regard must be given to the question of how attitudes are formed. An attitude can be based on either a 'cognitive' evaluation of what the individual thinks will result after studying the facts of the case, or an 'affective' evaluation based on his emotions and what he would like to see in the future. Both these aspects are functioning in cases of attitude formation, and in some instances they come into conflict with each other.

Table No. 12 shows the four positions outlined above with the papers in each category. In cases where a conflict seems to exist between the cognitive and affective aspects of attitude formation an arrow indicates the direction in which the paper would like to see NATO move. Where this is most apparent is with the papers who feel NATO will remain essentially as it is today, but at the same time, would like to see more concentration on the economic and political aspects of the treaty. (This attitude is congruent with the support given for the first two external issues).

Table No. 12 - Editorial Attitudes Toward NATO's Future

<u>Withdrawal and/or Disintegration</u>	<u>Revision Downwards</u>	<u>Maintenance of Status Quo</u>	<u>Revision Upwards</u>
Halifax Chronicle Herald	Edmonton Journal Toronto Star	Le Droit Le Soleil	Toronto Telegram Ottawa Citizen
Le Devoir Montreal Star	← Toronto Globe and Mail La Presse L'Action Catholique	Montreal Gazette → Ottawa Journal St. John Telegraph Journal Vancouver Sun → Windsor Star → Regina Leader Post →	Winnipeg Free Press

Notes: 1. Arrows indicate what editorial opinion would like NATO's future to be i.e. a conflict exists between the cognitive and affective aspects of attitude for nation.

The first point worth mentioning is the close similarity between the distribution of papers in table No. 12 with those in table No. 10. The only inconsistency exists in the case of the Vancouver Sun which has been classified as generally anti-NATO for the external issues, but when discussing the future accepts the existing alliance structure. For the remainder of the papers, those who see NATO functioning at its present level (or higher) were generally pro-NATO, while those that see it being revised downward or dismantled were generally anti-NATO. To what extent this indicates the affective evaluation as being dominant is difficult to say: but it may imply that internal issues, such as the nuclear weapons debate and unification of the armed forces, have not had an important affect on overall attitudes toward NATO.

The three papers advocating revision upwards stressed two main points: i) the need for NATO to remain a strong alliance to serve collective self-defence within an integrated command structure, and ii) the need for revision within the alliance to bring NATO up to date and, hopefully, to broaden the base to encompass the economic and political aspects of the treaty. The Ottawa Citizen on April 12, 1966 stated that a strong alliance was needed to deter possible Russian aggression, to control West European rivalries, and to complement the EEC. Three days later it pointed out that NATO has not been capable of adapting to new circumstances and this is a necessity if NATO is to save itself. Apparently this was partly achieved at the Paris meetings during December, 1966 since "a sense of direction" was restored "to an organization that remains a cornerstone of Western security." (17-12-66). The Winnipeg Free Press (31-3-66) emphasized the need for a strong NATO, but earlier had pointed out that the alliance was "very sick" and strong leadership (24-3-66), along with a drastic re-organization (8-10-66), was needed to restore the confidence of the late 1950's. In making these points it should be remembered that both the Ottawa Citizen and the Free Press are among the staunchest supporters of NATO.

For the three papers advocating NATO is no longer necessary (the Halifax Chronicle Herald (19-4-67) implicitly takes this position) the main arguments are similar to those of the revisionists. Jean-Marc Léger writing for Le Devoir presents the following case:

Les deux grandes alliances...ne correspondent plus au climat des relations internationaux aux conditions politiques présentes et au rapport des forces. Davantage, elles interdisent toute issue, paralysent toute initiative vers une nouvelle phase de la détente...Une nouvelle étape est devenue nécessaire: celle d'une large coopération entre tous les pays européens, mais cette coopération est rendue impossible par le maintien d'alliances désormais périmées, inutiles et dangereuses. (20-6-66).

The Montreal Star (22-3-66, 14-12-66) takes substantially the same position as Le Devoir, but emphasizes the need for a shift to peacekeeping. (27-5-67).

The Toronto Globe and Mail is fairly indicative of those papers who advocate a downward revision of NATO. According to the Globe, NATO has been a "cornerstone of foreign policy. But because there has been no substantial

body of opinion in Parliament opposed to NATO policy, the faith has not been subject to much public scrutiny and the cornerstone has not been examined to see if it is any longer of much value." (23-9-66). The Globe also believes the military function is outmoded (27-7-66), and a fundamental revamping of the military role is required (28-7-67). While not completely rejecting NATO, there is no doubt the Globe is leaning in this direction, which seems to be the case for most of the papers in the same category. One of the reasons for this shift is because "our whole foreign policy is becoming increasingly involved with peacekeeping and with economic and technical assistance to the developing world." (Toronto Globe and Mail, 13-5-67).

For the remaining category, support of the existing alliance structure, the Regina Leader-Post serves as a good example. The Leader-Post is of the opinion that "aggression will remain stopped as long as NATO remains a full-fledged security system," and this means an integrated defence system. (22-3-66). The Regina paper dismisses the argument "that an integrated alliance perpetuates the cold war (20-4-66), but if the alliance is to cope with the new climate in Europe some changes will have to be made. While the papers in this category support closer economic and political cooperation within the alliance, most of them realize that the military function of NATO is essential.

Summary:

Several important points emerge from a survey of editorial opinion toward the Government's NATO policy since 1959. First of all, contrary to most domestic issues, the majority of the papers have taken a fairly bi-partisan approach to Government policy. Well known Liberal and Conservative papers did not exhibit a shift in their consistency patterns when the Liberals formed the government in 1963. Table No. 9 indicates that Liberal papers such as the Winnipeg Free Press and the Ottawa Citizen, and Conservative papers such as the Toronto Telegram and the Ottawa Journal have been consistent supporters of NATO from 1959 to the present (1967). Similarly, the Montreal Star, a Liberal paper, has shown consistent opposition to NATO. While this is not true for all papers the degree of consistency is much higher than expected.

Secondly only a minority of papers surveyed have shown more support for NATO than the Conservative and Liberal Governments from 1959 to 1967. Papers such as the Ottawa Citizen, the Winnipeg Free Press, the Saint John Telegraph Journal and the Toronto Telegram have generally advocated that Canada assume a greater role in NATO, and that economically, politically, and in some cases military NATO be made into a stronger alliance. Generally opposing both the Government's NATO policy and NATO itself have been such papers as the Montreal Star, L'Action Catholique, Le Devoir, the Toronto Star, and the Halifax Chronicle Herald. The remainder of the papers surveyed fall between these two groups of papers. (See Table No. 9).

Thirdly there seems to be a definite progression in terms of support patterns vis-à-vis the type of policy under consideration. Agreement between the press and the Government is highest for those issues which stress the need for greater economic and political cooperation within the alliance,

and broadening the base of NATO, that is, policies which are general in orientation and contain little specific content to facilitate policy formulation (to say nothing of implementation). In the two cases where specific issues arose, Berlin and France's withdrawal from the integrated command structure, the Government's policy received a substantial degree of support from the press, but less than for the more general issues. On issues which would have required an increase in Canadian military participation such as the various plans for a NATO nuclear force the press was almost completely opposed. With respect to Canada's present military commitment in Europe the press seems evenly divided. (Table No. 11).

Fourthly, and most important, NATO is receiving less press support at present than at any time during the 1960's. This may only be a passing phase arising out of the crisis over France's withdrawal and the partial U.S. - U.S.S.R. détente: but on the other hand an increasing segment of the press questions the value of NATO and Canada's role within the alliance. The fact that half the papers commenting on the Canadian forces in Europe are in favour of withdrawal or a reduction is indicative of increasing dissatisfaction. Papers that have often supported NATO in the past such as the Toronto Globe and Mail, the Edmonton Journal and the Vancouver Sun have in some instances become increasingly anti-NATO. The Montreal Gazette is the sole paper that has shown increasing support for NATO since 1959.

The reasons employed by both the anti and the pro-elements of the press are similar to those used by the traditionalists and revisionist academics. It is interesting to note that the Toronto Globe and Mail shifted away from support for NATO after carrying lengthy items by such revisionists as James Eayrs and Stephen Clarkson. Similarly, the Montreal Star became more outspoken against NATO after carrying an item by Edward McWhinney. Here is an indication that academics have an influence on other attentive public groups.

The majority of the press, however, have not withdrawn their support for NATO as table No. 12 clearly shows. Of the 19 papers surveyed, 12 remain in favour of continuing the alliance, but nearly all stress the need for revision and change within NATO.

PART TWO - NORAD

V - NORAD and the Political Parties:

While NATO was initially accepted by all three major parties and, after a period of party conflict, a consensus seems to be emerging on Canada's future role in NATO, NORAD has never had all-party agreement and there has been a continuing debate over the strategic value of the arrangement. In some circles this is considered surprising since NORAD has allowed Canada to contribute directly to the defence of North America, while it can be argued that the NATO contribution is not directly related to Canadian defence. The acceptance of NORAD has been handicapped by the dominant position of the U.S., and during the 1960's the argument has been presented that the bomber threat no longer exists which has deprived NORAD of any strategic value. Furthermore, the controversy over the acquisition of nuclear warheads greatly complicated any rational debate of the function of NORAD. This type of argument has been consistently employed by the NDP (CCF before 1961) in advocating termination of the NORAD agreement, and during the 1960-62 period the Liberals were in favour of restricting NORAD to a passive defence posture.[@] As table No.13 indicates the Conservatives have, in principle, been the most consistent supporters of NORAD when compared to the other major parties.¹

Table No.13-Attitudes of Canadian Political Parties toward NORAD

Termination or non-renewal	Decreased commitment		Status quo	Increased commitment
	Passive Defence	Indefinite Defence Posture	Active & Passive Defence	Indefinite Defence Posture
Camp (1967)	← (rejected) ←		Conservatives (1957-66)	→ (1967)
	(1960-62)	(1959)	(1957-58)	
			^ Liberals	
			(1963-67)	
Gordon (1967)	← (rejected) ←			
(1961-62)	(1963-66)			
^ CCF → - NDP				
(1958-61) (1967)				

- Notes: 1. Dotted lines indicate changes in party positions.
 2. Solid lines indicate proposals by senior party members during 1967 which were rejected by the party.

[@] Passive defence refers to the warning and detection functions of NORAD performed by the various radar warning systems. Active defence refers to the identification and interception role first performed by the CF-100, and now by the Bomarc system and the Voodoo interceptors.

When the agreement was originally signed and debated in the House of Commons during May of 1958 the Conservatives accepted both an active and a passive defence role for Canada within the new structure; but, according to one commentator, tried to put NORAD in the "most politically palatable terms," by calling it an "operational control" rather than a command, and by attempting to link it closer to NATO.²

The Liberals adopted much the same position as the Government, but were more outspoken concerning the desirability of obtaining concessions from the U.S., as well as incorporating NORAD into NATO. McLin feels that Mr. Pearson "endorsed this course with a vigor that is explicable only by the fact that they (Liberals) were out of office, and free of the responsibility of having to try to convert it into fact."³ The attitude probably stemmed from the Fourth National Liberal Convention in January 1958 where the party considered the defence of North America as the primary responsibility for Canada, but also expressed the desire to link NORAD to the command structure of NATO.

The CCF, on the other hand, were opposed to NORAD from the outset and voted against the agreement during the initial debate. The party's attitude remained consistent for the remainder of the time it existed as a party. Hazen Argue (party leader) stated in March, 1960 that Canada was not an effective partner in NORAD as no consultation was possible with the U.S. in such a relationship. The monies saved from opting out of NORAD would be better spent on assistance to the developing nations and for peacekeeping purposes.⁴ Needless to say, the party voiced strong opposition to the Canadian acquisition of the Bomarc system. In August 1960 at the 16th National Convention of the CCF a resolution was passed stating that Canada should withdraw from NORAD since it did not provide for the effective defence of Canada and it meant Canada could not pursue an independent foreign policy. Despite the fact that the Canadian Labour Congress opposed this policy in 1961 (see Chapter II) the founding convention of the NDP went on record to the effect "that Canada should at once terminate the NORAD agreements."

While the NDP was asking the Government to withdraw from continental defence, Mr. Diefenbaker in early 1961 made it quite clear that the policy was not going to change. "There are those...who clamour for Canada to renounce its defence agreements with the United States, to withdraw from NORAD...We should not be wise to act on such advice...Canada's interests are promoted by staying in the circle to which it belongs."⁵ Similarly in his first major speech as Defence Minister Mr. Harkness stressed the need to rely upon alliances.⁶ While support in principle was given to NORAD emphasis on disarmament tended to reduce Conservative interest in the defence relationship with the U.S.

During the early years of NORAD the Liberals, with Mr. Pearson in the forefront, were pressing for inclusion of U.S. Canadian defence under NATO, and on April 7, 1960 the Liberal leader suggested that if this was not possible "then we should re-examine our whole attitude towards North American defence in its present establishment."⁷ During the August

defence debate both Mr. Pearson and Mr. Hellyer wanted the Government to opt out of the Sage-Bomarc operation, but maintain the warning and detection functions of NORAD.⁸ According to the Canadian Annual Review for 1960 the Liberals were "prepared to tolerate NORAD...for the time being,"⁹ but obviously the parliamentary party was suggesting a decreased commitment to a passive defence role. This was confirmed at the plenary sessions of the National Liberal Party in 1961 when a resolution was adopted "to withdraw from NORAD in so far as the present interceptor role is concerned," but at the same time "provide for an appropriate Canadian contribution" in the form of passive defence. Apparently this was a compromise resolution which fell "short of the outright withdrawal favoured by some delegates."¹⁰

The Liberal attitude was reinforced by the increasing debate over the acquisition of nuclear warheads, and by 1962 "the nuclear arms issue monopolized the discussion of defence."¹¹ The nuclear issue also ensured that the NDP would continue to reject the agreement, and the following statement was used as a platform plank during the 1962 general election; "NORAD was intended to meet the threat of the manned bomber; with the development of missiles, it is obsolete. Furthermore, there is every danger that the Bomarcs will be equipped with nuclear warheads. The NORAD agreements should therefore be terminated."¹² The Conservatives, on the other hand, refused to equip either the Bomarcs or the Voodoos with nuclear warheads, but still maintained Canada could perform a useful role in both the passive and active defence roles.

While the election of 1962 did not bring the NORAD question (or the nuclear issue) into focus, the Cuban crisis convinced some Canadians that the response of the Government "had been hesitant, uncertain, and inglorious." Furthermore, there was the impression that Canada did not live up to her NORAD commitment despite the denial of the Defence Minister. Unfortunately, the Conservative case was not helped when the Minister of External Affairs declared that NORAD was part of NATO and consequently not involved in the Cuban crisis.¹³ Despite the Cuban crisis and the reversal of the Liberal stand on the nuclear issue, the Conservatives went into the election of 1963 without clarifying the Canadian role in NORAD. It is apparent that the party had no desire to relegate the Canadian role to one of passive defence, but at the same time would not supply warheads for the weapons systems so they could function with maximum effectiveness.

With Mr. Pearson's Scarboro speech in January, 1963 the nuclear deadlock was broken and on the question of continental defence the Liberal leader said it was necessary "to take whatever steps are feasible for the protection of our territory; through suitable measures for passive, as well as active defence."

After the election of a Liberal administration in 1963 the new Minister of National Defence, Mr. Hellyer, in an appearance before the newly formed Special Committee on National Defence, supported an active role for Canada since "the bomber threat" remained "a very larger

proportion of the total threat than was expected." But if maximum effectiveness was to be obtained nuclear warheads were necessary.¹⁴ It is of interest that the Conservatives never rejected the nuclear NORAD role during the committee hearings, and that the NDP shifted from their position of demanding complete rejection of NORAD. One of the first shifts in the NDP position was a speech by Mr. Douglas in Vancouver during the early part of 1963 (17-2-63) where he stated that "Canada should continue to supply and maintain warning systems" for NORAD.¹⁵ The NDP shift undoubtedly helped to account for the all-party agreement reached in the first report of the Special Committee on National Defence (20-12-63) where it was recommended that "Canada remain a member of NORAD, since the defence of North America is a joint responsibility," and as long as the bomber threat continued "Canada must share in the defence against that threat." However, the recommendations made no clear distinction between the active and the passive aspects of North American defence which in large part allowed for the all-party agreement.

When the Liberal Government's White Paper on Defence was tabled in 1964 a "downward trend in continental air defence" was predicated, but Canada would always be expected to be involved in "some form of air defence operations." However, as the bomber threat diminished there would be "a gradual phasing-out" of the present arrangement, and subsequently the resources allocated to air defence would "gradually decline." While the question of deploying an ABM system was considered important there were "no major questions of policy" which were "ready for solution" in 1964.¹⁶ During the 1964-66 period the Liberal party publicly maintained this position, and continued to accept both the active and passive roles for Canada.¹⁷ At the National Liberal Party Conference in October of 1966 the plenary resolution simply stated "that Canada continue its participation in NORAD." There is little evidence to indicate that the Conservatives disagreed with the Liberals during this period, and the NORAD question did not assume much significance for any of the major parties.

Even the NDP did not show much concern over continental defence from 1963 to 1966, and at the Third Federal Convention in July, 1965 no mention was made of either NATO or NORAD as China, the UN financial crisis and Vietnam occupied the time of the delegates. Softening of the NDP position, and acceptance of the passive defence role can be seen in Brewin's Stand on Guard (1965) when he stated there was need for "agreement to continue the useful detection aspects of NORAD," but "to discontinue the active defence aspects" which "are now poised against a non-existent threat." Scrapping the active defence elements would not mean "the termination of the joint defence arrangements."¹⁸

By 1966, however, NORAD had again become a party issue. This was partly a result of unification of the Armed Services; but the main factors were obviously the impending U.S. decision on some form of ABM system, and the upcoming Government decision in 1968 on the future of NORAD. The Government maintained that the existing arrangement would continue, while admitting that the major question was the U.S. ABM system.¹⁹ When the ABM issue became more important during 1967 Mr. Hellyer

reiterated the Government's support for NORAD, and maintained that "re-signing of the NORAD agreement would not automatically commit Canada to participate in the ABM program if the United States should decide to proceed."²⁰ Prior to this statement, however, the President of the Privy Council, Walter Gordon, had expressed doubts concerning Canadian participation in an ABM system and NORAD. In an address to the National Press Club in April 1967 he suggested that "if the superpowers continue to build up their offensive and defensive force...it may be the better part of wisdom for a small nation like our own to reconsider its whole position."²¹ Three weeks later Mr. Gordon was more explicit and suggested that withdrawal may be the only alternative. Since that time Mr. Martin has made several policy speeches indicating Canada will continue to participate in NORAD since no Canadian government could pull out of NORAD without "a complete transformation in our relations with the U.S."²² Therefore, as table No. 13 suggests the Liberal party from 1963 to the present has returned to its 1957 position of supporting both the active and passive aspects of NORAD.

Within the last year the NDP has also returned to its original position of totally rejecting NORAD. In February 1966, Mr. Brewin, the defence spokesman for the NDP, noted the "obsolete nature of our active air defence" under NORAD; but by April 1967 had hardened his position by calling NORAD "an obsolete form of defence," and "we should not be continuing a form of defence which prevents us from doing the things that are virtually essential...to the security of the world" - that is, peace-keeping.²³ The Brewin position was accepted in Resolution 216 at the Fourth Constitutional Convention of the NDP in July, 1967 when it was agreed that "the passing threat of armed bombers has rendered the integrated command under NORAD unnecessary. NORAD should therefore be scrapped." To deal with the bomber threat the resolution states "Canada should continue to co-operate in the detection of any invasion of North American air space." How this would be accomplished without NORAD is not explained, but there is nothing to indicate the party would accept the maintenance of the passive system under NORAD even though it is admitted this is still a necessary task.

The Conservatives have been the only major party to place increased emphasis on North American defence within the last several years and this was only agreed upon after a great deal of intra-party debate. Mr. Diefenbaker in a speech at Miami University on February 17, 1967 suggested that the NORAD agreement "might well be terminated"²⁴ in 1968.^e This was followed by Party President Camp's suggestion for a complete re-alignment of Canadian foreign policy at the Montmorency Thinkers Conference in August 1967 since it is not possible to "have national security through military means." While a minority within the Conservative party argued against continuation of NORAD, the policy group of the party at the National Leadership Convention in September rejected this position by "favouring re-negotiation with a more adequate system of continental defence against missile, aircraft, submarines, and other possible enemy actions."²⁵ There is no doubt that this statement indicates an increased commitment to NORAD

^e By late 1967 Mr. Diefenbaker was supporting NORAD renewal.

in all environments of continental defence, but it does not make clarify the party position on the ABM question. Whether the parliamentary section of the party is willing to accept the above policy recommendation remains to be seen.

Summary:

Generally speaking less party consensus has existed in the case of NORAD than in the case of NATO. The CCF was opposed to the agreement from the outset, and the NDP (1961) has maintained this position except for the years from 1963 to 1966 when the party indicated a willingness for NORAD to continue a passive defence role in the area of detection and warning. By 1967, however, official NDP statements returned to the 1957 position and advocated the termination of NORAD.

The Liberals initially supported both an active (identification and interception) and a passive defence role for Canada. By 1959 the party advocated a decreased commitment to NORAD, and from 1960 to 1962 felt the proper role for Canada was one of passive defence. Just prior to the formation of a Liberal Government in 1963 the party reversed its stand and accepted both a passive and an active defence role for Canada which it supports today.

The Conservative party has been the most consistent supporter of Canadian participation in NORAD, and from 1957 to 1966 accepted in principle both aspects of the defence role. At the 1967 Montmorency Thinkers Conference, and at the Leadership Convention the party put increased emphasis on NORAD to cover all aspects of North American defence. (See table No. 13)

Within both the Liberal and the Conservative parties, however, minority groups favour termination of the NORAD agreement with Walter Gordon and Dalton Camp being the respective leading proponents in each party who have adopted this position. Obviously no consensus exists within the parties, nor among all three major parties; but it is interesting to note that the Liberals and the NDP have returned to their original policy positions of 1957. The Liberal party attitude partly reflects the responsibilities of forming the Government, while the NDP attitude rests on the undesirability of becoming involved with the ABM issue and the opinion that the bomber threat no longer exists. There is the added factor that the NDP are more inclined toward a policy of independence with emphasis on foreign aid and peacekeeping than are the other two major parties. Ironically the Conservative policy recommendation accepted at the Leadership Convention of upgrading continental defence may involve a further Canadian commitment to nuclear weapons.

VI - Academic Attitudes and NORAD:

One of the most striking features of a survey of academic attitudes toward NORAD is that with very few exceptions the defence arrangement has not been subjected to separate analysis, and the amount

of research on the strategic and political implications of North American defence by Canadian academics is almost nil. When the implications of NORAD are considered it is either within the general context of Canadian-American relations or overall defence and foreign policy. One outcome of this situation is that the number of academics who have expressed opinions on NORAD is much less than the corresponding number who have expressed opinions on NATO. Despite the smaller number of academics concerned with NORAD, they can still be classified as either revisionists or traditionalists, and none who are classified as revisionist for NATO are classified as traditionalist for NORAD, or vice-versa. A further feature of the question of academics and continental defence is that a limited number of American academics have made useful contributions, and their attitudes are included in this chapter. Following a brief section on the American academics, the remainder of the chapter will deal with the Canadian academic attitudes, and end with a few words on public attitudes toward NORAD.

American Academics:

Melvin Conant (The Long Polar Watch, 1962) raises the problem of radical changes in the needs of Canadian-American defence which "have continuously altered and complicated the task of fashioning an effective air defense for the continent." Consequently, "many thoughtful Canadians believe that recent developments in military technology have cancelled out their search for a meaningful role in the defense of North America. Fifteen years of effort to help meet the major security requirements of the air age have ended with the gloomly conviction that any role open to Canada can now only be a marginal one." (This was written before the debate over an ABM system.)

Despite Conant's acknowledgement of the problems facing Canadian participation in continental defence he comes to the conclusion that the alternatives to continued participation are very few if "Canada wishes to act responsibly and to bear its fair share of the military burden...." One of the main reasons Canada is willing to share the defence burden is to assure "the common defense of the larger community of which it is an essential part, and without which it cannot preserve its own identity." While the shift toward greater reliance on missiles is continuing, Conant feels the need for defence against the bomber threat will remain throughout the decade, and even longer if the U.S.S.R. maintains a substantial bomber fleet. Otherwise any attacking bomber force would have a 'free ride' to target area, and because of this the Canadian contribution is essential to the defence of the continent.¹

Klaus Knorr, writing in the International Journal during the winter of 1962-63, substantially agreed with the Conant analysis and came to the conclusion "that Canada's contribution to North American and NATO defence is neither obsolete nor obsolescent" since the detection and communication functions of defence have to be organized on a continental basis for maximum effectiveness.² Both Conant and Knorr, however, were writing in the early 1960's and recent technological developments have made at least two U.S. academics more pessimistic about NORAD and the Canadian contribution to continental defence.

David Baldwin of Dartmouth College warns that "even if Canada had been vital to continental defence in the past, one would...want to be cautious about projecting this role into the future." Caution is required since the basic assumption that Canada lies across the route of attack on North America can no longer be taken for granted since i) China is replacing the U.S.S.R. as the main threat to the U.S. ii) the missile carrying submarine means both coasts can be employed as launching areas, iii) as use of satellites increase the strategic importance of Canada decreases. According to this line of reasoning "there is little evidence that American dependence on Canada for help in defending the continent will increase during the rest of the century."³ The recently published McLin study on Canadian defence policy also suggests that the NORAD role has decreased in importance, but an active air-defence system is still required since its scrapping would give undue advantage to any attacking force. He also notes that there has been fear in Canada "of a weakening commitment to the joint command" on the part of the U.S. but it is not likely that the U.S. will renounce the agreement.⁴

All four examples of U.S. academic opinion rest primarily on a military assessment of Canada's contribution to NORAD and the strategic value of the agreement. In turning to Canadian academic opinion, the political considerations become just as important as the strategic factors.

Revisionist Attitudes and Academics:

The revisionists can be divided into three sub-categories: i) those who advocate a complete realignment of Canadian foreign policy, and thereby implicitly reject NORAD in the process, ii) those who explicitly reject NORAD, but tend to place their emphasis on anti-NATO arguments with North American defence being given only cursory consideration, and iii) those who devote some attention to the problems of continental defence, and either implicitly or explicitly reject NORAD. Unfortunately, the majority of the revisionists are in the first two sub-categories which accounts for one of the reasons why little research or analysis can be found on the Canadian role in NORAD.

Among the revisionists who advocate a complete realignment of foreign policy without explicitly rejecting NORAD Stephen Clarkson, Escott Reid, and CB McPherson are the best examples. Stephen Clarkson makes his position in NATO quite clear (Chapter 2), but makes no mention of NORAD. While he notes the desirability to "reduce our bilateral dependence on the United States," and the need to "downgrade the military" Clarkson does not give any analysis of North American defence needs. CB McPherson (see Appendix 3) deals almost exclusively with NATO while noting the "overriding importance" for the Canadian Government to maintain a policy of independence from the U.S., but no mention is made of Canadian-American defence relations. Escott Reid in his proposed realignment of foreign policy for the next decade (Chapter 2) is even more circumspect than Clarkson or McPherson since he mentions neither alliance system. What seems clear in all three cases is that NORAD is implicitly rejected by the proposals to realign foreign policy.⁵

Among the revisionists who explicitly reject NORAD, but do not subject the agreement to separate analysis are Lloyd Axworthy, Donald Gordon, and Jack Warnock. Axworthy writes that "our contributions to NATO and NORAD are not crucial," and asks what strategic value is performed by Canada in NORAD and NATO. Similarly, "Warnock argues for rejection of both alliance systems since the U.S. completely dominates NATO and NORAD, and Canada cannot assume an independent role in the world by being aligned to the U.S.⁶ In most cases the same arguments are used to reject both NATO and NORAD: that is lack of a strategic role, Canadian influence is minimal, the U.S. dominates the alliance, Canada must have an independent foreign policy, etc. Only the revisionists in the third sub-category deal with NORAD as a separate entity.'

According to James Eayrs "the threat of attack upon the North American continent...has caused us the most profound searching of mind and heart - not necessarily in that order." One of the major causes is that "insofar as security is a function of deterrence, the security of Canada was, is, and will be, primarily and ultimately the responsibility of Americans....The United States is Canada's protection and protector, to a degree surely unknown heretofore in the history of the states system." For this reason the major question is what role Canada should perform in support of the U.S. role. Eayrs states that the Canadian contribution to NORAD has been considerable, but "what was done was done as much, if not more, in deference to United States feelings and United States pressure than in deference to the feeling that the national security of Canada would be imperiled if it were not done." This makes the contribution essentially political, and "has had less to do with Canadian-Soviet relations than with Canadian-American relations; moreover, our contribution has been marginal...and is likely to become even less significant in the future."⁷ While Eayrs does not explicitly suggest the termination of NORAD, it is implicit by his proposal to cut the defence budget by \$1 billion.

Another revisionist, Jack Granatstein, has recently dealt with NORAD and feels that until the ABM question arose the case against renewal of the defence agreement was clear-cut. The ABM issue means that the Canadian Government will have "to face - and very soon - one of the most crucial decisions in our history" since a Canadian ABM system with a shelter program would cost approximately \$10 billion. Such a decision would tie Canada even more closely to the U.S. and the unified defence structure would probably fall by the wayside. One answer to the dilemma is for Canada to make a "decision not to get into an ABM system and not to continue the NORAD agreement." This would "have some constructive influence" on the U.S. debate by "hopefully strengthening the argument of those who are resisting this proposed next step in armament escalation."⁸ (This was written before the U.S. decision to build a limited ABM system was announced). At the Conference on 'America as World Environment' in April 1967 Granatstein felt it would be "highly unlikely" that "the Canadian government would be able to resist American diplomatic pressure and the demands of the Canadian public to install elements of such a system in Canada" if the U.S. went ahead with an ABM system.⁹

Traditionalist Attitudes and Academics:

Just as the revisionists use many of anti-NATO arguments to reject NORAD, the traditionalists apply pro-NATO arguments to support NORAD: that is, as the threat from Russia still exists, the alliance system is not outmoded, Canadian influence is enhanced through the alliance system and by a policy of interdependence, etc. Of the traditionalists, Peyton Lyon and John Holmes have been writing about Canadian-American relations and NORAD for the past seven or eight years, and their attitudes best reflect the traditionalist approach.

In 1961 Peyton Lyon was of the opinion it might have been better if the air defence of the continent had been entrusted to NATO instead of "a new bilateral organization", but it was "difficult to understand the strength of the aversion to NORAD." To leave NORAD would be to abandon whatever influence Canada possesses over the vital decisions of North American defence. Being a member of the alliance system does not mean that Canada cannot show independence in other areas, and Lyon felt there was no indication that the Canadian role in the world would increase if the policy was one of non-alignment.¹⁰ In The Policy Question (1963) Lyon returned to the question of being independent from the U.S. since "Canadian concern to remain independent...works against the greater objectives of peace and freedom when it inspires policies that weaken continental defence." The revisionist argument that NORAD is primarily used to protect U.S. bases neglects the essential point as "neither side would respect our territory in an all-out war," and therefore, "the overriding consideration is that peace may very well depend upon the apparent invulnerability of the American deterrent." While the U.S. supplies the deterrent "Canada's chief contribution is to the defence of the deterrent - a defence that increases the invulnerability of the deterrent and thereby reduces the risk of war." NORAD performs this function adequately, and since the bomber threat will continue until at least 1970 an effective defence must be maintained. This means "the emphasis in defence matters must now be on interdependence. Insofar as overall control is concerned, the best we can do is to seek arrangements that permit Canadian participation in decision-making proportionate to our contribution to the joint defence."¹¹

The theme of interdependence runs throughout the writings of Peyton Lyon, and his latest statement on the need for "a policy of close alliance" with the U.S. is based on the following propositions:¹²

1. The United States, the wealthiest and most powerful country on earth, is a significant factor in almost every situation, whether it chooses to act or not to act.
2. Geographic and cultural factors give Canada the opportunity to exercise more influence in Washington than is exercised by any other country of comparable power.
3. This influence, in favour of diplomatic flexibility and military caution, has generally been on the side of sanity.

4. Canada, by exploiting its close relations with Washington, exerts greater influence in world affairs than it would through its relations with any other country or group of countries.
5. The belief that Canada has a special standing in Washington, access to American intelligence, and insight into American thinking, is a source of strength in Canada's dealings with other countries, including the neutrals and Communists; it is scarcely if ever a handicap.
6. The fact that Canada has its own views, and determines its own policies, can be demonstrated without prejudicing good relations with Washington by the public airing of every difference.

In 1964 John Holmes referred to the Canadian-American alliance as "a bilateral alliance within a multi-lateral framework," and included not only NORAD but the Ogdensburg Agreement, NATO and the other bilateral arrangements. He noted that "the political implications of the military alliance...are not clear...but the application must be left to political leaders who can adapt them to the military necessities of each situation and the current temper of their respective countries." Since the partnership "is based not merely on common fear but also on a recognition of common interests and attitudes" any reduction of Russian pressure would be unlikely to cause disintegration. It should be realized, however, that the U.S. would "prefer to act in concert with its allies, but if it can't it may be expected to act anyway," and any difficulties arising out of the NORAD agreement does not necessarily reflect a "lack of American good intentions as much as the disproportion between the apparatus of the participants." Holmes noted that through NORAD Canada had "accepted its military responsibility" and "has no possibility and no intention of remaining neutral" in the event of a major war. If this is the situation it is better to have some say in the defence measures undertaken for the continent rather than to rely solely on the U.S.¹³

In the fall of 1967 Holmes noted that the U.S. "cares less and less what Canada does because it has a declining interest in our territory for its defenses in a missile age." This gives Canada greater room for independent action, but even "if our functions in world politics draw apart, the cultural, spiritual and economic bonds are indissoluble." What will probably result is that the cry for a realignment of Canadian foreign policy will increase since "it is participation in NATO and NORAD which is the subject of controversy...(and) Vietnam is, of course, at the heart of the matter." A further difficulty is related to the declining Canadian influence in the world while our ambitions increase, and this is partly reflected in the demands for realignment. There is a danger, however, "of the new impatience in the country" since it is possible to "lose our sense of proportion and the good reputation we have acquired." Here Holmes is warning those revisionists who think that a realignment of Canadian foreign policy will mean Canada can become a great power. He

agrees with the revisionists that Canadian troops will probably be out of Europe within the next few years and consequently "military detachment from Europe" will increase, but "detachment from the United States (is) something quite different." In short, some form of continental defence is essential since "the enduring validity of the argument...is that we avoid being trampled by putting our relations with a super-power on a basis in which we claim formal equality."¹⁴

While other traditionalists outside of the active academics such as the late R.J. Sutherland, General C. Foulkes, and D.W. Jones¹⁵ have contributed to the NORAD debate Lyon and Holmes are the best examples of the traditionalist argument. The other difficulty is that Lyon and Holmes are the only traditionalist academics who have dealt with the military aspects of continental defence within the last several years. In referring back to table No. 4 the percentage of revisionists vis-à-vis the traditionalists is greater for NORAD than for NATO. This may partly be reflected by the number of active academics dealing with NORAD, but there is no doubt that on balance the revisionists outnumber the traditionalists by quite a wide margin on the NORAD question.

Active Academics and Selected Publics: Some Comparisons:

When compared to the general public the majority of revisionists within the active academics is by no means representative. In September 1961, 66.4% of the public felt Canada was "becoming more and more dependent on the U.S. for air defence," while only 19.3% thought that this was not the case (14.2% had no opinion); and 68.1% approved of "Canada's defence becoming merged more and more with the U.S.," while 21.7% objected to such a tendency.¹⁶ Between September 1961, and February 1964, the percentage of support by the general public for NORAD remained constant since 66.8% felt Canada should follow a joint defence plan with the U.S., while 17.0% wanted Canada to look after her own defence. Interestingly enough only 2.6% thought Canada should disarm and become a neutral nation, and only 2.7% were in favour of the U.S. assuming the responsibility for the defence of Canada.¹⁷

Even though a fairly constant majority of the general public has supported an integrated command structure for North American defence, less than a third have been satisfied with Canadian defence policies. The following table shows the trend in the satisfaction level for defence policies from 1957 to 1963 (the last date the question was asked).

Table No. 14 - Attitude of the General Public Toward Canadian Defence Policies - 1957-1963 (expressed in percentages). ¹⁸

	December 1957	March 1959	January 1960	June 1962	April 1963
Satisfied	32.0	31.2	25.0	33.0	24.4
Dissatisfied	33.8	43.0	45.7	33.7	50.4
No opinion	34.0	26.7	29.0	29.7	22.2
Rejects	-	-	-	3.5	2.9
Totals	99.8	100.9	99.7	99.9	99.9

Table No. 14 indicates an obvious ambivalence between general public support for both NATO (Table No. 7) and NORAD on the one hand, and support for overall defence policies on the other. For the period from 1957 to 1963 the satisfaction level for overall defence policy was at least 30% lower than the acceptance level for NATO and NORAD. This ambivalent attitude may be partly explained by the desire for a more independent foreign policy, but probably more important was the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Canadian Government.

Table No. 15 makes it quite clear that nuclear weapons have become increasingly less acceptable to the general public. Since September 1961 there has been a drop in acceptance from 61.4% to 34.4% in June 1966, and the percentage of the population rejecting nuclear weapons has risen from 30.5% in 1961 to 43.8% in 1966.

Table No. 15: Acceptance of Nuclear Weapons by the Canadian Public: 1961-1966 (expressed in percentages).¹⁹

	September 1961	November 1962	March 1963	June 1966
Yes	61.4	54.4	48.6	34.4
No	30.5	31.6	31.0	43.8
No opinion	8.0	8.2	14.0	17.5
Qualified	-	5.6	3.5	4.1
Rejects	-	-	2.5	-
Total	99.9	99.8	99.1	99.8

The data seems to suggest that the main source of dissatisfaction with Canadian defence policy is related to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and not to the two alliance systems. But at the same time the general public sees little correlation between the roles performed by Canada in NATO and NORAD, and the weapons needed to perform these roles most effectively. This generalization is further supported by the desire of the policy group of the Conservative party at the September 1967 leadership convention to expand the Canadian role in continental defence, and not mention what type of weapons would be involved. Because of this ambivalent attitude Conant feels "the sweeping and never ending changes that have taken place in military technology, and therefore in strategic thinking and continental defence, have often been imperfectly understood by both American and Canadian public opinion, and this has resulted in a dangerous gap between expert and public appreciation of the increased stakes involved."²⁰ Conant goes on to suggest one of the reasons for this gap is because "the Canadian government in Ottawa has not been sufficiently alert to and knowledgeable about the swiftly moving changes in defense requirements."²¹ It could be that by framing explanations in the most

politically acceptable terms the military implications are downplayed. Consequently, the need to correlate the acceptance of the present NORAD role with the weapons required to fulfill the present role is never really appreciated by the general public and certain elements of the attentive public. Conant, however, assumes that if this gap is closed the general public will more readily accept the needs of continental defence. This is debatable as just the opposite could occur - that is, the public could well become less inclined toward NORAD if all the strategic implications were understood. But what of the attentive public and NORAD?

Unfortunately nothing has been published on the attentive public and NORAD which makes it difficult to write in specific terms. The only data available is the survey of the annual meeting of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs taken in June 1967. Table No. 16 indicates that 63.3% of the respondents were in favour of renewal of NORAD, while 21.5% opposed. A breakdown by sex shows that 66.7% of the male delegates supported renewal compared to 55.5% of the female delegates, and while opposition to renewal by sex indicates a difference of only 2.2%, 12.2% more female delegates were undecided than male. By occupation the academics were 14% above the average with 77.3% in favour of renewal, while

Table No. 16: Support for Renewal of NORAD among Delegates to the Annual Meeting of the CIIA, June 1967.

Question: In your opinion should Canada renew the NORAD agreement with the United States in 1968?

	Total Sample	Sex		acade- ics	Occupations		
		M	F		profess- ionals	interested citizens	others [®]
Yes	63.3	66.7	55.5	77.3	63.0	52.9	60.0
No	21.5	20.0	22.2	13.6	18.5	23.5	30.0
Undecided	12.7	10.0	22.2	4.5	14.8	23.5	10.0
No answer	2.5	3.3	-	4.5	3.7	-	-
Totals (Nos.)	100.0 (79)	100.0 (60)	99.9 (18)	99.9 (22)	100.0 (27)	99.9 (17)	100.0 (10)

Note: [®] - includes six civil servants, and four members of the communication media.

the interested citizens were below the sample average with only 52.9% in favour (this percentage could well be close the support for NORAD among the general public in 1967). The professionals were 63.0% in favour of renewal which was almost identical with the sample average. It is interesting that the 63.3% who agree NORAD should be renewed corresponds almost exactly with the attitude of the general public as it existed in 1964.

In comparing the findings on NORAD with the NATO attitudes of the CIIA delegates (table No. 7) it is clear that the level of support for NORAD is less than the level of support for NATO. Only 63.6% of the sample supports NORAD while 75.9% supports NATO. The same pattern of support exists between male, female, and occupational attitudes with the level of support being less for NORAD in each case.

Summary:

Academic research on the political and military implications of NORAD is very limited, and nearly all academics who have expressed an opinion refer to continental defence within the context of general Canadian-American relations or overall Canadian foreign policy. During the early 1960's the few American academics who wrote on NORAD were generally agreed that the Canadian role was worthwhile and made a positive contribution to North American defence. In the last several years, however, American academics have become more skeptical about NORAD and the need for the U.S. to rely on Canadian geography.

While the opinions of American scholars have rested primarily on a military assessment of NORAD and Canada's role, the Canadian academics have shown more concern with the political implications. In Canada the academics can still be divided into the revisionist and the traditionalist groups (Table No. 4) as was the case for NATO. In the case of NATO academic opinion showed an edge in favour of the revisionists, but for NORAD the revisionists far outnumber the traditionalists.

Only a minority of the revisionists, however, give any analysis of Canadian-American defence needs. The majority either implicitly reject NORAD; or reject NORAD with the same arguments used to reject NATO: that is, no military role exists, Canadian influence is minimal, the U.S. dominates the alliance, Canada must have an independent foreign policy, etc. The traditionalists also employ NATO type arguments in support of NORAD: that is, the Russian threat still exists, the alliance system is not outmoded, Canadian influence is enhanced through the alliance system and by a policy of interdependence, etc. Very little has been written by academics about the ABM system and the implications for Canadian defence which is a good example of the general lack of interest in continental defence.

When the revisionists and traditionalists are compared with other groups in Canada who have expressed an opinion on NORAD the following continuum seems to exist.

Diagram No. 2 - Support Continuum for NORAD Renewal by Groups and Parties within Canada, 1967.




Diagram No. 2 shows that only the revisionist academics and the NDP oppose renewal of NORAD. The general public, the Liberal Party and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs delegates to the 1967 annual meeting all indicate majority support for renewal, while the Conservative party and the traditionalist academics strongly favour renewal. In the case of NORAD the public is offered more a choice between the Liberals and the Conservatives since the latter have shown - or seem to be showing - more support for NORAD than the former. As was the case for NATO, the majority of Canadians and the attentive public accept the alliance, but at the same time there is evidence to suggest that the public would like to see a change in role which is indicated by their rejection of nuclear weapons for Canada's Armed Services.

This last point suggests that an ambivalent attitude exists on the part of the general public between support for NORAD (and NATO) on the one hand, and their obvious dissatisfaction with general defence policy and the possession of nuclear weapons on the other. This may indicate an information gap exists between the Government and the general public. If the gap is closed, however, there is nothing to guarantee that acceptance of NORAD would increase as has been suggested by one American academic.

VII - NORAD and the Press: Editorial Attitudes:

The most important question from the editorial point of view has been the renewal of NORAD, and editorial attitudes can usually be classified into one of two groups: i) support of the present role or in a few cases the need to upgrade North American defence, and ii) rejection of the agreement, or the demand to decrease our NORAD commitment. While these two main categories can be distinguished very little editorial opinion has been expressed if a comparison is made with NATO. An obvious gap in editorial attitude exists in this area of defence policy. Furthermore, in many cases the opinions that have been expressed were not explicit and quite often the papers seemed unsure of what stand to take on the question of Canada's role in NORAD. This is reflected in some cases by the lack of attitude consistency, and in others by the desire to present both sides of the question without opting for one or the other.

Table No. 17[@] indicates that of the nineteen papers which were found to have expressed an opinion on NORAD a majority are either in favour of renewal (9/19) or have advocated an increased commitment to North

[@] - Six papers which were included in the NATO section, L'Action Catholique, Le Droit, Le Soleil, the Halifax Chronicle Herald, the Toronto Telegram and the Windsor Star, have been omitted from the NORAD section because the three Government clipping services consulted did not contain editorials from these papers. Six other papers have been included in the NORAD section, but had to be omitted from the NATO section because of the lack of editorials. This indicates an inconsistency in the various clipping services - or editorials have been removed - which would have to be rectified in order to obtain a truly accurate picture of editorial opinion.

Table No. 17 - Editorial Attitudes Toward NORAD: 1964-67

<u>Non-renewal</u>	<u>Decreased Commitment</u>		<u>Status Quo (renewal)</u>	<u>Increased Commitment</u>
	Passive Defence only	Indefinite Defence Posture	Active and Passive Defence	Indefinite Defence Posture
Le Devoir	Toronto Daily Star	Financial Post*	Edmonton Journal (1964)*	Calgary Herald (1964)
Montreal Star		La Presse*	Montreal Gazette*	Victoria Daily Times (1964)
Toronto Globe and Mail*			Ottawa Citizen	
Vancouver Province (1965)			Ottawa Journal*	
Winnipeg Tribune (1964)*			St. John's Evening Telegram*	
			St. John Telegraph Journal*	
			Vancouver Sun	
			Winnipeg Free Press	
			Victoria Daily Colonist	
<u>Totals:</u>				
5	1	2	9	2

Notes: * - indicates position is implicit only. If no date then last editorial date is 1967.

American defence (2/19). Of the remaining eight papers, five have advocated termination of NORAD, two have opted for a decreased commitment of an indefinite defence posture and one would like Canada to assume a passive defence role. It is interesting to note that while the ABM system has been discussed no editorials were found that indicated a desire for Canadian participation. Several, however, did mention that Canada would have to get involved if the U.S. decided to build such a system.

Of the two papers which supported an increased commitment to NORAD the Victoria Daily Times (24-9-64) noted that the present defence structure has been overtaken by technological developments, and the Canadian contribution would have to change to meet these changes. One way would be to help "pay for the development of new weapons," and to continue "to supply personnel." The Calgary Herald (28-9-64) took a similar stand in noting that while the techniques of North American defence are changeable Canadian responsibility for its share is not. Consequently, Canada must participate in "the air and space system" which the U.S. introduces. Both self-respect and the practical considerations of defending the continent indicate continued Canadian participation. Both these opinions were expressed in late 1964 (last editorial available), and by late 1967 it is quite possible the editorial positions could have changed.

Among the papers that have supported NORAD in 1967 at least three have taken this stand partly in response to the Dalton Camp proposal that Canada withdraw from all alliances. The Vancouver Sun (6-5-67) in an editorial entitled "No Place for Neutrals" rejected the Camp position as "flying in the face of morality, experience and plain commonsense" since leaving NORAD would be "a declaration of neutrality." The paper admitted Canada's role is not easy, but neutralism is not the answer. The Winnipeg Free Press (1-5-67) also rejected neutralism as it would leave "the back door open for attacks against the United States." The Free Press agreed with the Sun that opting out of NORAD would imply acceptance of neutralism. The Victoria Daily Colonist (23-4-67) had earlier agreed that withdrawal from NORAD spelled neutralism for Canada and rejected this position.

Beyond the question of neutrality and its implications for NORAD the Winnipeg Free Press also argued that there is no question of Canada acting alone for defence purposes (27-4-67). The Ottawa Citizen (20-2-67) adopted much the same position as "defence planning is most effective on a continental basis" and by remaining in NORAD Canada shows a "willingness to co-operate with the U.S. in defending North America." The big advantage politically is that it gives Canada a voice in how the continent will be defended. While the bomber threat has decreased it still exists and a defence against it must be maintained (The Montreal Gazette implicitly agreed 1-10-67).

Among the papers rejecting the NORAD commitment the Montreal Star (13-5-67) has taken the position that all alliance commitments hinder Canadian foreign policy, and in order to make foreign policy more effective it is necessary to get out of NORAD (13-5-67). Le Devoir (21-9-67) has put greater stress on the

need to remain independent from the U.S. and "si le Canada veut conserver son indépendance même relative, il doit résister fermement aux empiétements des Etats-Unis sur notre territoire sous prétexte de défense continentale." Another paper which has recently been explicit on the NORAD question is the Toronto Daily Star (14-3-67). The Star has supported a decreased commitment to a passive defence role, as the main function for Canada should be "to help in the detection of manner bombers."

While the above attitudes are explicit in their intent, nine of the nineteen papers in table No. 17 have only implicitly expressed their attitude toward NORAD (those papers marked*). This is quite interesting since NORAD is up for renewal in early 1968. The impression gained from the majority of these papers is that they are not sure which position to take on the renewal question. In one sense these papers are clarifying the issue by presenting both sides of the question, but the hesitancy may be related to the complexity involved with providing an analysis of the defence needs for the continent. For example the Ottawa Journal carried at least two pro-NORAD editorials (9-3-67, 20-7-67) which were reprinted from other papers, but in neither case did the Journal express its own opinion. Here is implicit support for NORAD. The St. John Telegraph Journal (16-9-67) implicitly supported NORAD by taking a stand against a further cut in service personnel since it would be doubtful if all commitments could be met. The editorial mentions NORAD as one of these commitments. The St. John's Evening Telegram (13-7-67) tended to take the same position.

Among the papers that have implicitly rejected the present Canadian role in NORAD the Financial Post (25-3-67) mentioned that the cost to Canada of not renewing the agreement could be very heavy both economically and diplomatically. On the other hand, renewal might be a "monstrous mistake." La Presse (21-9-67) also opted for an indefinite defence posture with a decreased commitment as Canadian participation would weaken Canadian credit in other areas of international politics. The missile question, however, complicated the question and consequently it might be necessary to become involved. The Toronto Globe and Mail has implicitly rejected NORAD since 1963 (or earlier). On January 3, 1963 it asked what advantages are being obtained from participation, and if political consultation is not forthcoming from the U.S. Canada "might consider withdrawal." (This was written in the light of the Cuban crisis). By late 1967 the Globe was agreeing with the position taken by Dalton Camp as his proposals "would enable us to make an important contribution." Furthermore, NORAD and the problems of the ABM system could get Canada involved in a senseless arms race (12-8-67). The Globe, however, does not explicitly state NORAD should be rejected. To a certain extent this tendency to reserve judgment also appeared in some of the NATO editorials, but not the same degree as with NORAD.

In all probability one of the factors affecting editorial opinion is the complexity of North American defence. Consequently, the papers may be unwilling to be as forthright in a situation which is quite complex and where data is not readily available. Added to this problem is that few academics, journalists or politicians concern themselves with NORAD,

and very little is written on this aspect of defence policy. What does appear is primarily descriptive. Peter Newman's articles in the Ottawa Journal (8-4-67 to 11-4-67) are the exception and not the rule, and the lack of analysis obviously is a factor in limiting editorial comment.^e A good example was the analysis by Peter Newman since his articles and the Camp proposals resulted in at least three papers, the Winnipeg Free Press, the Vancouver Sun, and the Victoria Daily Colonist, making their stand on NORAD more explicit. This would seem to indicate that on complex issues, such as the need to renew NORAD, the press shows more willingness to express an opinion where previous stands have been taken by politicians, academics or journalists. If positions are not taken by other segments of the attentive public an information gap can arise where papers become unsure of what stand to advocate. This would seem to be the case with NORAD.

The information gap on NORAD also shows up in the consistency patterns of some of the press. The Montreal Gazette (27-5-67) noted that "in practice NORAD has not worked out too well" and is "becoming increasingly obsolescent." It would be understandable if the U.S. downgraded NORAD, and "this might be just as satisfying to the Canadian... government." By late 1967, however, the paper implicitly maintained the present NORAD structure should be maintained (1-10-67). The Financial Post showed similar tendencies. In 1965 (16-2-65) it felt Canada could not have an independent defence policy since "geography has given us a fact from which we cannot escape," yet by 1967 (25-3-67) to renew NORAD could be a "monstrous mistake". The Toronto Globe and Mail has also been somewhat inconsistent on the NORAD issue. In early 1963 (3-1-63) the paper suggested NORAD might be terminated, but by the middle of 1963 (6-6-63) was agreeing with the U.S. proposal to station U.S. NORAD aircraft in Canada as it would increase the efficiency of continental defence. In March of 1967 (25-3-67) the Globe advocated a decreased commitment to continental defence, but later on the year (12-8-67) implicitly rejected renewal. While some inconsistency was apparent in the case of NATO, the question of Canadian participation and the renewal of NORAD caused greater indecisiveness on the part of the press.

To what extent the indecisiveness can be attributed to the rapid changes in military technology, of which the ABM system is the best example, is difficult to say. What the editorials do suggest, however, is that this type of factor contributed to attitude changes more than political factors such as the lessening of U.S.-U.S.S.R. tension. While the ABM question was discussed few papers were willing to deal with the implications for Canada if the U.S. went ahead with deployment. The Toronto Globe and Mail called the ABM system "super-megaton madness" (13-7-67) and noted that it could lead to one of "the most senseless arms

^e - The editorial comment contained in the clipping files of the Privy Council Office, the Parliamentary Library and the Dept. of External Affairs from 1962 to 1967 is less than what appears on NATO for any single year.

escalation" in history (12-8-67). According to the Toronto Daily Star (14-3-67) Canada has "no business in a war game involving anti-ballistic missiles." The Ottawa Citizen (20-2-67) supported NORAD renewal and admitted the anti-missile question complicated the situation since Canada would be involved. (The Ottawa Journal and the Victoria Daily Colonist agreed (Ottawa Journal 20-7-67).. The Winnipeg Free Press (27-4-67) emphatically stated that "Canada must remain in NORAD" while admitting the big question was the role for Canada in an ABM system. Interestingly enough the U.S. decision to build a limited ABM system did not provoke a debate in the press over the implications for Canada. Again this indicates a general lack of interest, and possibly understanding, in the area of continental defence.

Summary:

Of the papers found to have expressed opinions on NORAD the attitudes usually fell into one of two groups: i) support for renewal and the present Canadian role, and ii) rejection of the agreement, or the demand for a decreased NORAD commitment. Eleven of the nineteen papers in Table No. 17 indicated support for NORAD, while the remaining eight advocated revision or termination. Some of the pro-NORAD press felt non-renewal would imply neutrality on the part of Canada. Further to this line of reasoning, cooperation in Canadian-American defence is a necessity. When the present role is discussed these papers tend to agree that the bomber threat still exists and here NORAD is performing a useful function. The anti-NORAD papers take the position that the present defence structure has been overtaken by events in the area of military technology. Furthermore, alliance commitments hinder the implementation of an independent Canadian foreign policy.

General agreement seems to exist that the ABM question is important, and most papers reacted unfavourably to the proposed deployment of such a system. Few, however, discussed the implications for Canada, and when the U.S. announced the building of a limited anti-missile system not much reaction was visible on the press.

In contrast to NATO editorial attitudes, the opinions on NORAD have been much more indecisive, and nine of the nineteen papers were not explicit in the stand taken on NORAD renewal (papers marked with * in Table No. 17). One of the reasons for indecisiveness seems to be the complexity of North American defence coupled with the feeling that Canada should assume some responsibility for the defence of its territory. Added to this is the fact that few academics, journalists or politicians have concerned themselves with this area of defence policy. Consequently the majority written on North American defence is primarily descriptive.

The result is that when compared to NATO, editorial opinion on NORAD is much less and an information gap seems to exist. The press is not sure what stand to take partly because of a lack of information about the implications, both political and military, of either renewing NORAD or terminating the agreement.

PART THREE - PEACEKEEPING

VIII - Peacekeeping: Alternative or Complement to NATO?

Peacekeeping has been described by one commentator as "the most revolutionary development in the field of international organization since the end of the Second World War."¹ Canada has assumed an essential role in this area of international politics in order to increase international stability, and hopefully to help preserve world peace. To this end contributions have been made to every peace force set up by the United Nations. Whereas distinct differences and disagreements are apparent within most groups of the attentive public over Canadian participation in NATO, the same degree of disagreement does not exist in the area of peacekeeping. "The leaders of all Canadian political parties have endorsed this role for the country's forces, and there is now more unanimity on the principle of Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations than on any other aspect of Canada's foreign relations."² Criticism, however, has increased within the last few years over the inability to solve the basic problems inherent to the peacekeeping function. This is especially true since the withdrawal of UNEF and the Middle East War of 1967. Despite this setback for the U.N. (and Canada) peacekeeping remains one area of Canadian foreign policy where no clear dividing line splits groups within the attentive public. Peacekeeping, therefore, has to be measured in slightly different terms in order to show where distinctions lie within the attentive public. One essential distinction is that some segments of the attentive public visualize peacekeeping as an alternative to present Canadian participation in NATO, while others maintain its complements a policy of interdependence. Another distinction is the amount of emphasis put on the need for some form of international police force. These two aspects of peacekeeping will serve as the foci for the following discussion.

Political Parties:

While Canada had made contributions to three observer and supervisory forces UNMOGIP (1949), UNTSO (1949) and the ICC (1954), and to the U.N. command in Korea the present day concept of peacekeeping gained its first real impetus from the Suez crisis of 1956. Through the efforts of Mr. Pearson the Canadian role in this area came into its own, and there was all-party agreement on Canada participating in UNEF. "The concept of UNEF itself was not attacked from any quarter of the House of Commons. Neither was the principle of Canada's contribution...."³ From 1956 to 1967 none of the major parties disagreed in principle with a Canadian role in the other operations in which Canada participated. Not all parties, however, have emphasized peacekeeping to the same degree.

The first official recognition by any extra-parliamentary party was in 1958. In January of that year the Fourth National Liberal Convention passed a resolution stating the party would continue to support UNEF and stressed the necessity to plan for a permanent U.N. peace force. This latter point was to be a continuing theme throughout the majority of Liberal pronouncements from 1957 to 1967. During a meeting of the External Affairs Committee in 1958 Mr. Pearson endorsed the resolution of the party⁴ as he has been one of the motivating forces within the

party for the creation of a permanent international force. Initially neither the CCF nor the Conservatives showed the same degree of enthusiasm for peacekeeping or a permanent international force. Upon forming the Government in 1957 the Conservatives supported Canada's role in UNEF,⁵ but were not overly optimistic that a permanent force could be created.⁶ Prior to 1960 the CCF party agreed in principle with peacekeeping, but it was not made part of the party platform in official pronouncements.

Until 1960, therefore, the Liberals were the strongest supporters of peacekeeping becoming an important factor in Canadian foreign policy, and was the only party to embrace the need for a permanent international force. The other major parties agreed with the Liberal position, but not to the same extent. At this time there was no conflict between the peacekeeping role and Canadian participation in the alliance system. It is true that the CCF members were having serious thoughts about NATO, but peacekeeping was not mentioned as an alternative.

The CCF attitude changed radically at the Sixteenth National Convention in August, 1960 where it emphasized that peacekeeping was a clear alternative to NATO. The party urged the Government to withdraw from NATO, and then Canada could "make her most effective contribution to world peace by converting her military resources for use in an international police force." With this declaration the party lines became more clearly drawn on whether peacekeeping was to be an alternative or a complement to existing international commitments.

With the outbreak of violence in the Congo and the formation of ONUC in the summer of 1960 all parties agreed that Canada should contribute to the force, and the resolution received unanimous support in the House of Commons.⁷ While the Conservatives did not stress the need for a permanent international force, the CCF party at their annual convention took the position that the Congo emphasized "the need for a permanent international police force," and that Canada should have forces immediately available for such a purpose. The NDP took substantially the same position at their founding convention and pledged that an NDP government would "immediately create a well-equipped mobile force at the call of the United Nations." At their National Rally in 1961 the Liberals passed a resolution which agreed in principle with the earlier CCF position on this question. Debate in the House of Commons during 1961 indicated all three parties were in agreement on the use of Canadian troops in the Congo.⁸

In the 1962-63 period peacekeeping was the least controversial of the defence and foreign policy issues since the nuclear weapons question dominated foreign policy debate. The Conservative party did not emphasize the need for specially trained peacekeepers and saw the function as complementary to NATO commitments.⁹ In 1963 both the Liberals in their election material, and the NDP at their Second Federal Convention supported a permanent international force. Since the Conservatives visualized peacekeeping as a secondary function of Canada's Armed Services while they were in office it was not until the formation of a Liberal Government that peacekeeping obtained official recognition as an essential element in

government policy. With the tabling of the White Paper on Defence in March, 1964 peacekeeping was included as one of five major priorities for the Armed Services. To ensure Canada could respond with the necessary type of troops the Government decided to re-equip the Army as a mobile force and put greater emphasis on the air and sea lift capability of the forces; but the re-equipment programme was not primarily related to the increased emphasis on peacekeeping. The White Paper made it quite clear that UN operations were to complement existing commitments as "the best results can be accomplished through the establishment of regular military formations, which need not be earmarked exclusively for United Nations service and which can be used for other roles as required."¹⁰ This statement was coupled with the announced intention of the Government to stay in NATO.

The position of the Liberal party has been fairly consistent in maintaining that peacekeeping complements existing commitments to NATO. There have been some indications, however, that the party is putting greater emphasis on the peacekeeping role and downplaying other commitments. The Speaker's Notes for the 1965 election campaign state that the main danger is in the area of limited war and to meet this danger the Liberal Government has decided on a shift in defence policy. The Notes go on to say that "Canada will have a highly mobile, flexible force capable of going anywhere, engaging in a wide variety of peace-keeping or peace-restoring operations....At the same time, it will have the capability of contributing, in a realistic manner, to our alliance strategy of deterrence to all-out war." From this quote the emphasis seems to have been placed on peacekeeping. At the 1966 Liberal Party Conference in October, 1966 resolutions were passed supporting NORAD, NATO and peacekeeping, but calling for a role in NATO which would be developed "accordance with our national defence policy." The resolution on defence policy called for "an independent defence policy tailored to further Canadian political and military objectives at home and abroad." Even though they are stated in very general terms, and may appear contradictory, these resolutions indicated a swing toward peacekeeping while maintaining the status quo on NORAD, with a change in the NATO role to fit the new defence structure brought into being as a result of unification of the Armed Forces. The extra-parliamentary party view has been clarified by statements from Mr. Hellyer and Mr. Martin who have maintained that in the foreseeable future Canada will continue existing commitments in NATO (Chapter II). Therefore, on the whole, the party and the Government has accepted the point of view that peacekeeping is complementary to the alliance system.

The CCF party in 1960 definitely saw the peacekeeping function as an alternative to NATO. With the formation of the NDP the party shifted more toward the Liberal position as it would accept a NATO role providing it was non-nuclear (Chapter II). According to Andrew Brewin, a leading party spokesman for defence policy, "Canada should concentrate on a highly mobile conventional tri-service force available for peace-keeping services throughout the world and also available as a mobile reserve for NATO."¹¹ Clearly the emphasis is on peacekeeping, and during the debate on unification the party saw a conflict between the creating of a mobile force and the maintenance of present commitments. At the

Fourth Constitutional Convention in July, 1967 the party accepted a NATO role; but Canada was considered "particularly fitted to discharge the role of fire-extinguisher" and noted that geography has given Canada "a unique opportunity to concentrate on a contribution to peacekeeping under the United Nations." The Convention resolution warned, however, that "recent events have underlined the futility of mere 'peace-keeping' without using the time gained for positive action to solve the problems, usually economic, which caused the strife in the first place." Compared to the 1960 CCF position the 1967 NDP statement visualizes peacekeeping as more important than NATO, but does not reject the latter. At the same time the NDP does not look upon the two as complementary. When compared to the Liberal party, the NDP position clearly downgrades NATO while emphasizing peacekeeping.

The Conservative party, on the other hand, is distinct from both the Liberal and NDP positions. At the 1964 National Conference on Canadian Goals no mention was made of peacekeeping. In fact the only paper on foreign policy dealt with the Commonwealth. When the White Paper was tabled the Conservatives tended to be fairly critical, and when unification became a partisan issue in 1966-67 the party accused the Government of creating a mobile peace force to the detriment of existing commitments. Peacekeeping was not emphasized at the Montmorency Thinkers Conference nor at the Leadership Convention in September, 1967. In both cases emphasis was placed on increasing the NORAD role and holding the line on NATO. This approach is consistent with Conservative policy toward peacekeeping which has supported a Canadian role in this area, but clearly on an ad hoc basis and strictly as a complement to other military commitments.

Differences obviously exist between the three major parties on the degree of support given to peacekeeping when compared to alliance commitments. Distinctions also exist on the emphasis which has been placed on the need for an international police force. The Conservatives have never seriously advocated the formation of such a force, and since 1961 the NDP has placed increasingly less emphasis on this aspect of peacekeeping. At its founding convention the NDP called for a permanent international force, but by 1963 the party only called for "a contingent of Canadian troops permanently at the disposal of the United Nations Secretariat." Since 1963 no mention has been made of a permanent force. The Liberals have been the only party to consistently advocate some form of international peace force. When setbacks occurred at the U.N. the Government called the 1964 conference in Ottawa to explore the possibility of creating a standby force outside of the U.N., but at its call if the need arose. Since that time the party has also continued to press for a permanent force within the U.N. Latest party statements in October, 1966, have supported Government efforts in this direction.

While it is true, therefore, that consensus exists on the principle of Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations obvious differences exist between the three major parties. When compared to support for NATO the Liberals have adopted a middle of the road policy with support for each commitment. The Conservatives have placed greater emphasis on NATO, while the NDP has indicated greater support for peacekeeping.

On the question of a permanent international force the Liberals have shown the most support followed by the NDP, and then the Conservatives who have not emphasized this aspect of peacekeeping. Within the last several years, however, the NDP position is quite close to that of the Conservatives on this question.

Academic Attitudes Toward Peacekeeping:

As a generalization most traditionalists visualize peacekeeping as a complement to a policy of interdependence, while a majority of revisionists maintain peacekeeping should be the primary focus for Canada's military role. For example Peyton Lyon has argued that "Canada has already been able to contribute more than most countries to the United Nations without defaulting on its NATO obligations,"¹² and NATO should continue to be a major focus for Canadian foreign policy (Chapter II). Stephen Clarkson, on the other hand, has argued "Canadian forces have proved their capacity to act as a peacekeeper between warring small powers," but "we are likely to be more effective peacekeepers if we are not identified military with the former imperialist powers."¹³ Majorities within both groups of academics agree peacekeeping per se ought to be a suitable role for Canada, but disagree with the emphasis to be placed on peacekeeping vis-à-vis other policy areas. Beyond this distinction a common theme underlies the majority of writing that has appeared on peacekeeping in the last several years. The theme is one of pessimism over the future capability of the U.N. and Canada to create the technical and political atmosphere to ensure peacekeeping operations will be successful.

Donald Gordon, a revisionist, has suggested "the time may very well have come for placing greater emphasis on alternative devices to peacekeeping as primary vehicles for both our foreign policy and the dissemination of our Canadian ideology."¹⁴ He goes on to point out four reasons why peacekeeping has been attractive to Canadians. Firstly, there is the 'fire brigade' concept as it is argued Canada is well equipped to deal with brush fire wars. Secondly, peacekeeping is suppose to enhance Canadian influence and prestige. Thirdly, it serves domestic purposes, and lastly, it is considered 'an inescapable' task because no other alternative exists. Gordon feels none of these arguments are really valid, and goes on to give reasons why Canada should reconsider her peacekeeping function.

The first problem is the 'alliance factor' of belonging to a white, 'have' North American complex. The real difficulty here is that the aims of the Western Alliance and the aims of the U.N. are diverging which could mean future operations would be against Canadian interests. Related to the alliance factor is that a 'formal institutionalization of divisions' can arise - that is, our participation in NATO could be adversely affected (written before Gordon advocated withdrawal from NATO). Participation could also mean Canada will not be able to speak as fully and frankly on the various crises since our forces would be involved. According to Gordon the Congo operation is a good example as Canadian refusal to speak out "contributed to a...unnecessary delay in securing a settlement there." This argument is based on the premise

that Canada would have more influence if it did not participate in the various operations. A further factor is one of 'ambiguity'. Since peacekeeping involves compromises and the U.N. moves from weakness to weakness then Canada is put in the same position. The last argument against further peacekeeping is related to the domestic situation. "Canada herself is basically an underdeveloped nation....If we are going to send out best diplomats and our best soldiers and our best equipment on various peacekeeping ventures, we have got to bear in mind the kind of price that we are going to pay domestically." For these reasons Gordon contends Canada should take a serious look at peacekeeping as an instrument of foreign policy in the future.¹⁵

James Eayrs has also been pessimistic about peacekeeping as "the environment in which interposition (peacekeeping) is carried out has changed since the days of the Suez crisis. The success of Suez has encouraged us to regard it as a prototype. It was in fact an aberration.... We will only deceive ourselves if we imagine that in 1965 we are as uniquely qualified to undertake these missions as we were in 1956."¹⁶ Peyton Lyon seems to agree with the Eayrs position as he feels it will be unlikely if Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations is welcomed in the future. One problem may be that "the likeliest demands of peace-keepers in the future will be such that many Canadians will be opposed to participation." Furthermore, "our leadership during the misguided attempt to secure a legal solution to the financial difficulties, essentially a political problem, has rendered our activity suspect to France, the Soviet Union, and others who share their views." According to Lyon, however, this is no reason to abandon enthusiastic support for peacekeeping. "Rather it is to caution that the role may not be as satisfying to Canadians in the future."¹⁷

Pessimism has also been apparent in academic attitudes toward a permanent international force.¹⁸ Eayrs has written that on face value a standing force seems sensible and attractive, but it has "little chance of adoption; nor is its adoption desirable" since it assumes the existence of a concert of great powers, the host countries would want a say in the composition and in most cases improvisation would be unavoidable to meet different situations.¹⁹ John Holmes²⁰ feels that arguments in favour of a permanent force are indisputable, but are politically unfeasible which puts him in substantial agreement with Eayrs.

While pessimism cuts across traditionalist-revisionist lines not all academics have taken this position. Some revisionists (Chapter II) see this function as the clear alternative to the alliance system, but in the majority of cases serious analysis of the implications of future participation is lacking. Jack Granatstein is one of the few academics who remains quite optimistic about future operations, and considers peacekeeping to be the only defence objective which possesses growth potential. According to Granatstein "the need for peace-keepers can only increase, and it seems probable that the U.N.'s appeals for troops will continue to go to those nations that are prepared. Canada is."²¹ When compared to other academic attitudes the optimism shown here is the exception rather than the rule.

Attitudes of Selected Publics:

The general public has tended to support U.N. efforts in the area of peacekeeping, and for the most part has approved of Canadian participation in the various operations. The general public attitudes, however, seem to vary considerably by the seriousness of the crisis. For example in May, 1956 before the Suez War only 45.0% of a national sample thought the U.N. should ask member countries to supply troops for a police force and 30.2% disapproved. Furthermore, only 36.0% approved of Canada contributing. When the decision was made to commit a force to Suez in November, 1956, however, 79.0% of a national sample approved of the U.N. decision, and it seems reasonable to assume a majority agreed with Canadian participation.²² When the Cyprus dispute occurred in early 1964 the majority of the public (54.6%) agreed to contribute troops to the U.N. force and only 31.6% disapproved of such action.²³ A survey conducted by McDonald Research Limited published in March, 1964 found that 62.2% of the public approved of sending troops to Cyprus while 32.9% disapproved.²⁴

There has also been majority support from the general public on the question of a permanent international police force. The Canadian Peace Research Institute survey in November, 1962 found that 78.0% of a national sample favoured a strong, permanent U.N. army (table No. 18), and the McDonald Research Survey in March, 1964 found that 69.9% of their public favoured permanent Canadian military support for an international U.N. force while only 23.7% were opposed. Unfortunately no continuing question has been asked by the CIPO on either a permanent U.N. force or peacekeeping attitudes in general. Table No. 18, however, indicated that in late 1962 all segments of the public surveyed favoured a strong U.N. force.

Table No. 18: Support for a Permanent U.N. Army (1962).²⁵ (Expressed in percentages).

Groups code -	<u>N</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>P</u>
Strong, permanent U.N. army would be a danger to our national freedom	11	11	23	4	17
Strong, permanent U.N. army would protect, rather than endanger, our national freedom	78	84	58	88	83
Don't know	11	55	19	8	0
Totals	100	100	100	100	100

Notes: Group code - N - national sample, C - contributors to the Canadian Peace Research Institute, B - businessmen, L - trade union leaders, and P - politicians.

Source: Canadian Peace Research Survey, November, 1962. Question No. 10.

Only the attitudes of the businessmen (58%) differ from the general pattern in favour of a U.N. army. Interestingly enough this is 20 percentage points lower than the support level of the general public. Support from the labour leaders, parliamentarians and contributors to the Peace Research Institute are all above 80%. The high percentage of support in table No. 18 is probably partly attributable to the way the question is worded; but it does indicate majority support existed in late 1962 for a permanent U.N. forces in all segments of the public surveyed.

A further indication of support for the peacekeeping role was obtained at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs annual meeting in June, 1967. Table No. 19 shows that 54.4% of the respondents agreed with the present emphasis being placed on peacekeeping with a further 26.6% expressing a desire for greater emphasis, while only 15.2% thought too much emphasis was being placed on peacekeeping. The data seems to show that women are more favourably inclined toward a peacekeeping role

Table No. 19 - Support for Peacekeeping Among Delegates to the Annual CIIA Meeting, June, 1967. (Expressed in percentages)

Question: At the present time Canadian foreign policy places considerable emphasis on the peacekeeping role. Do you feel that this emphasis is.....

	total sample	sex		occupation groups			
		M	F	1	2	3	4
Not enough	26.6	25.0	27.8	27.3	33.3	23.5	-
About right	54.4	51.7	66.7	59.1	40.7	64.7	80.0
Too much	15.2	20.0	-	13.6	22.2	-	20.0
Undecided	2.5	1.7	5.5	-	3.7	5.9	-
No answer	1.3	1.7	-	-	-	5.9	-
Totals	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
No's	(79)	(60)	(18)	(22)	(27)	(17)	(10)

Occupation code - 1. academics, 2. professionals, 3. interested citizens, 4. civil servants and communication.

for Canada than men as 94.5% of the female respondents either agreed with the present emphasis or said it was not enough. This compared with 76.7% of the male respondents. In terms of occupational groups the professional occupations seem to be the least satisfied with the present degree of emphasis being placed on peacekeeping, while the civil servants and

communication people are the most satisfied. The other interesting point is that the academics are more closely aligned with total sample support than was the case with NATO and NORAD were they were well above the average.

Another area of peacekeeping which has caused considerable speculation during the latter half of 1967 is the future of Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations as a result of the withdrawal of UNEF. The CIIA delegates were asked to express an opinion on the effect of UNEF's withdrawal in relation to the need for Canadian peacekeeping. (The Middle East War started five days before the survey). On this question the respondents were clearly divided into three categories; as 24.1% said UNEF withdrawal had lessened the need for Canadian peacekeeping, 31.6% said it was not affected and 30.4% said the need was enhanced. A majority, therefore, expressed the opinion that Canada still has a role to play in the peacekeeping area. The CIIA does not seem as pessimistic as many of the active academics, but this was also borne out in the NATO and NORAD sections of the survey. Table No. 20 shows that on the future need for Canadian peacekeeping there are no real differences by occupational groups or sex as the support patterns are similar to the total sample.

Table No. 20: Effect of UNEF's Withdrawal on Canadian Peacekeeping: Attitudes Among Delegates to the Annual CIIA Meeting, June, 1967. (Expressed in percentages).

Question: What effect has the withdrawal of the UNEF force from the Middle East had on the need for Canadian peacekeeping?

	total sample	sex		occupational groups			
		M	F	1.	2.	3.	4.
Lessened	24.1	26.7	16.7	27.3	29.6	17.6	30.0
Not affected	31.6	31.7	33.3	27.3	37.0	35.3	30.0
Enhanced	30.4	28.3	38.9	31.8	33.3	29.4	20.0
Undecided	10.1	8.3	11.1	13.6	-	11.8	-
No answer	3.8	5.0	-	-	-	5.9	20.0
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
No's	(79)	(60)	(18)	(22)	(27)	(17)	(10)

Occupation code - 1. academics, 2. professionals, 3. interested citizens, 4. civil servants and communication.

If comparisons are made between the attitudes of the general public toward NATO (Chapter II), NORAD (Chapter VI) and peacekeeping the existing data suggests the public visualizes peacekeeping as complementing the

commitments undertaken in the other military areas of foreign policy. No large differential exists between the support levels for the two types of commitments. It is possible that individuals who support peacekeeping do not support NATO and vice-versa, but until research is undertaken in this area no firm conclusions can be presented. The CIIA survey found the majority of delegates supported both NATO and peacekeeping. In this case the two are complementary.

Summary:

The main purposes of this chapter have been to investigate the extent to which groups and political parties in Canada visualize peacekeeping as an alternative to existing military commitments, especially NATO; the general support given to peacekeeping as a foreign policy instrument and; finally, the amount of support that exists for a permanent international police force.

With respect to the first question Table No. 21 shows that a majority of the public and attentive public groups visualize peacekeeping as a complement to existing international commitments. Only the NDP and a majority of revisionist academics would like peacekeeping to be an alternative to NATO.

Table No. 21 - Peacekeeping as an Alternative or Complement to NATO by Groups and Parties, 1967.


Alternative
NDP
revisionist
academics

Complement
Liberals
Conservatives
general public
CIIA
traditionalist academics

Within these two categories support is divided as the July, 1967 NDP statements support NATO to a certain extent and some revisionist academics see no future for peacekeeping. The same situation exists within those groups that see peacekeeping as a complement to existing international commitments. Public opinion polls give approximately the same degree of support to both NATO and peacekeeping, and the differences in support levels that do exist are not large enough to conclude the general public sees peacekeeping as an alternative.

Even though the Liberal and Conservative parties, the traditionalist academics, the CIIA and the general public accept peacekeeping and NATO as complementary the degree of support for the former varies widely among the various groups. For example the Liberal party has generally shown strong support for the peacekeeping function while the Conservatives have only indicated weak to medium support for this role. On this point the Liberals are in agreement with the NDP and the revisionist academics. The CIIA as an attentive public group also shows strong support for peacekeeping. The general public seems to fall between the two major parties by giving what might be called medium support to peacekeeping. (See Diagram No. 3)


Diagram No. 3 - Support Continuum for Peacekeeping Operations by Groups and Parties within Canada.



The traditionalist academics do not support peacekeeping to the same extent as the revisionists. While both groups of academics would like to see Canada continue in the peacekeeping area the majority of writing in the last few years has been increasingly pessimistic about the future acceptability of Canada as a peacekeeper.

In discussing the attitudes toward some form international peace force only the Liberal party is still actively advocating such a proposal. The enthusiasm for such a force seems to have reached a peak in late 1964 or early 1965. Since that time the NDP has not discussed the formation of an international force at their party conventions, and no polls have been taken to test the attitude of the general public. The Canadian Peace Research Survey in late 1962 showed the public and labour leaders to be strongly in favour of a U.N. force with businessmen showing weak to medium support. In 1964 a national survey found nearly 70% of the public supported such a proposal.

Diagram No. 4 - Support Continuum for a Permanent International Force by groups and parties within Canada.



These relationships are outlined in Diagram No. 4 which also shows that the Conservative party has never seriously pressed for a permanent force. A majority of both groups of academics seem to agree that it is politically unfeasible. Those academics who have expressed an opinion on this question are split on the desirability of such a force.

APPENDIX NO. 1

Government Positions on Major External Issues Involving NATO.

During the 1959-1967 period there have been at least six external issues which have attracted editorial attention and can be used as indicators of editorial support for NATO. The importance placed on these issues by the Conservative Government prior to 1963, and by the Liberal Government since then has varied because of the series of crises that have confronted NATO. In this situation the six issues follow a fairly consistent chronological pattern and have been dealt with in this way by the press and the two Government's involved. The six issues are 1. the need to broaden the base of the alliance in terms of political and economic transformation (1959-1962), 2. the need for greater consultation within the alliance on the Heads of Government level (1960-1963), 3. the Berlin crisis of 1961, 4. the issue of a NATO nuclear force, including the original Norstad proposal, the Polaris fleet and finally the MLF (1960-1965), 5. the problem of France's withdrawal from the integrated command structure (1966-1967). The purpose of this appendix is to present statements by the Conservative and Liberal Government's on these issues in order to make comparisons with editorial attitudes. These statements have been used as the basis of the Government's position in Table No. 10.

Issue No. 1 - Broadening the Base of NATO - 1959-1962.

This issue was discussed by both the Conservative and the Liberal Governments during the 1959-1967 period, but was only considered important by the press from 1959 to 1962. Government statements will be limited to this period. For the Conservatives there were two aspects of the issue. One of which dealt with the need to expand NATO so it could cope with the economic efforts of the Soviet Union and other communist nations to expand their influence to other parts of the world. The Government placed some emphasis on economic development, and the advantage NATO had in dealing with any communist action to sway the underdeveloped areas of the world. This was stated in very general terms and any expansion of NATO in this area was to be economic and not military.

In his New Years Message of 1958 Sidney Smith noted that at the Copenhagen meeting "there was general agreement on the importance of co-ordinated effort to ensure economic prosperity - notably by the expansion of international trade and by aid to under-developed countries. Consultation on methods and machinery for co-operation within this field will take place within the alliance".¹

This same opinion was expressed by Howard Green to the House of Commons on April 26, 1961 after he returned from the Oslo meetings. "NATO, however, continues to have a most important role to play in assessing the implications for the alliance of the economic developments and policies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and ... in developing the political will among NATO countries to find solutions for economic problems which threaten to weaken the alliance or which threaten to provide opportunities for the extension of Communist influence".²

The second aspect which dealt with the broadening of the base of the alliance was, of course, the continued support for economic and political development within NATO. Even though this was not emphasized to the same extent as during

the early 1950's it was often discussed by the Conservative Government. On the Tenth Anniversary of NATO Mr. Diefenbaker stated that NATO "is more than a military alliance. It must develop and expand the economic principles in the Treaty...."³ Howard Green made the same point on his return from Oslo in 1961 as the future of NATO was related to its "ability to adopt itself to a changing world....It has to face complex new challenges, political, economic, psychological, as well as military, which are continuing to develop."⁴

Issue II - Consultation - 1960-1963.

The question of the role of the smaller powers within the alliance led both Howard Green and John Diefenbaker to frequently speak out on the need for greater consultation as a necessary step to keep NATO functioning properly. On his report to the NATO Council in October of 1959, Mr. Green mentioned that "the Canadian Government has consistently emphasized the great significance of political consultation within the Alliance." Even though he went to say that he was "encouraged by the considerable progress which has been made"⁵ it became clear, on his return to Ottawa, that in his opinion discussion by the big powers had to be more open while giving the smaller powers a greater say in policy decisions.⁶

The Prime Minister agreed with Howard Green, and in his DePauw University speech of June, 1960 Mr. Diefenbaker noted there was a "special obligation on the larger more powerful members to make a reality of consultation, and to reconcile the responsibilities of leadership with those of true partnership. I tell you frankly...still more can be done."⁷ In July of 1960 Mr. Green was stating to the House that "we are still plagued by the question of consultation in NATO....It is obvious you cannot keep an alliance strong if you do not have adequate consultation...."⁸

Issue III - Berlin, 1961

The Berlin crisis was on the horizon during the early part of 1961, but did not come to a head until August 13, 1961 when traffic between East and West Berlin was restricted and the wall started to go up. Two days later the Prime Minister took a strong stand on the Berlin question in a speech given in Halifax. The closing of the border had united the free world, and NATO forces should be armed with the best weapons possible while being brought up to strength. On the moves by Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Diefenbaker stated that "We will not permit him to succeed by any effort to undermine the basic unity of purpose of the free world, or divert us from our determination to preserve the freedom of West Berlin and Western rights of access to that city."⁹ This statement was followed by the hint that Canada might increase its European NATO commitment, and in a speech on September 1, 1961, Mr. Diefenbaker said that "Canada in NATO is responsible for its share of European defence....Under NATO we have undertaken to regard an armed attack against Berlin as if it were an attack on Canada."¹⁰ In backing up this strongly worded position the Government announced on September 7th that the Canadian forces in Europe would be increased by approximately 1,000 troops, and that the ceiling of the armed services would be raised from 120,000 to 135,000.¹¹ While taking a firm stand on Berlin the Government also made it quite clear that negotiation was necessary to solve the differences between the East and the West.

Issue IV - NATO Nuclear Force - 1960-1965

During the period of 1960-63 the Conservative Government had to deal with the Norstad proposal for an independent nuclear force, and then Kennedy's offer to supply NATO with five Polaris submarines as the nucleus for a NATO force. In both cases the Government's attitude was that of silent rejection. When the first proposal was brought up at the Oslo meetings in 1960 Green reported back to the House that it was presented "as a concept only" and not an "actual proposal." The Minister said the idea would be given careful consideration, but went on to mention to problem of control.¹² When the Polaris proposal came up in May 1962 Green on returning from Athens insisted that the allocation of the submarines to NATO did not directly affect Canada.¹³ With the problem of tactical nuclear weapons raging at home the Minister had little desire to get embroiled in another nuclear force.

This attitude was taken up by the Liberal Government in 1963, but rejection was made more explicit when the MLF was suggested. Pearson in explaining the Canadian position to the House stated that:

I do not think that it will be likely that we would wish to add to our existing responsibilities and commitments by participating in this kind of multilateral nuclear force. But this is a matter which will be given the consideration it deserves.¹⁴

Martin was still referring to this statement in April of 1964.¹⁵ and in November of that year noted that "there has been general agreement not to press forward with this project by any particular deadline. This is a turn of events which we in Canada welcome."¹⁶

Issue V - France's withdrawal: 1965-1966

The divergence between France and the remainder of the alliance had been noticeable for several years before the break came in early 1966. The initial Canadian position was not too clear on this issue. France was essential to the alliance declared the Prime Minister to the Ottawa Canadian Club in early 1965, and it was "impossible to contemplate an Atlantic coalition without France." Mr. Pearson also made the point, however, that the future of NATO lay in the direction of coming "closer together, organically, on the old treaty basis,"¹⁷ but de Gaulle would not accept this approach.

When the break came in March, 1966 Mr. Martin lined up with the rest of the alliance by reading to the House a joint NATO statement. NATO is "essential to the security of our countries....We are convinced that this organization is essential and will continue. No system of bilateral arrangements can be a substitute."¹⁸ In a speech to the Windsor Rotary Club, however, the Minister expressed sympathy toward France while making it clear he was not persuaded by the French arguments.¹⁹ An attitude of conciliation toward France continued during the year while Canada and other member countries were adjusting to the NATO relationship. In his Springfield speech of June, 1966 the Prime Minister stressed the importance of France to the future of the Atlantic nations. "I do not see the Atlantic nations

going...forward together to a secure and hopeful future without France." 20 By the end of the year it was apparent that the alliance had adjusted to the withdrawal of France, and the members felt that NATO had "a more constructive and unifying spirit." 21

Issue VI - Canadian troops in Europe

The commitment of forces to Europe is an issue that has continually caused various groups within Canada to demand the withdrawal of all troops. This had made it necessary for governments to give reassuring statements that the forces will remain in Europe "as long as international disquiet and justifiable fears require Canadian participation." 22 The framing of the commitment in these terms has meant that the Government could withdraw the troops whenever it negotiated their removal with our NATO allies and there has always been this element of doubt concerning the stationing of troops in Europe

When the White Paper on Defence was tabled in March 1964 it noted that "our major defence contribution for some time will continue to be participation in collective security defensive arrangements, mainly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." 23 During his speech to the Cleveland Council on World Affairs Mr. Martin noted that "in the absence of durable political settlements, we regard the continued participation of North American land and air power in the defence of Western Europe as both vital and inescapable." 24 Shortly before this statement, however, the Prime Minister had said that "we may have to consider new arrangements by which Europe takes responsibility for the security of one side of the Atlantic, North America for the other....Canada will have to consider very seriously whether the contribution we are presently making overseas to NATO is the best use of our resources for the defence of peace." 25 Since 1965, however, public statements would indicate that the present European commitment will remain for the next few years at any rate. This is supported by the second reading of Bill C-243 to unify the Services in December of 1966, and by Mr. Martin's statement that "Canada's interests and responsibilities require an appropriate continuing contribution to the military strength of NATO." 26 These statements coupled with the move of the air units to their bases in Germany indicate the government's current thinking - at least public thinking - on the question of troops in Europe.

APPENDIX NO. 2

The Canadian Institute of International Affairs and
Foreign Policy Attitudes.

At the annual meeting of the CIIA in June, 1967 a short questionnaire was handed out to delegates in order to ascertain foreign policy attitudes toward NATO, NORAD and peacekeeping. Of the 132 registered delegates 79 respondents filled out the questionnaire for a 59.8% return. At the time the questionnaire was circulated approximately 100 delegates were in attendance. While the results are by no means representative of the general public, they are probably representative of a good section of the CIIA as an attentive public group.

One of the difficulties encountered in coding the results was the classification of delegates by occupational groups. A substantial number of academics were among the respondents and no classification problem was encountered with this group; but in order to obtain occupational groups of statistically significant size some occupations had to be grouped together. Engineers, lawyers, CA's, military personnel, economists, scientists, etc., were classified in one category as professionals. Interested citizens was another group which included housewives, school teachers, librarians, secretaries, retired individuals, etc. The civil servants and communication media people were classified as a separate group.

The questions in the survey which were directly related to the study have been included in the body of the report, and will not be repeated in the appendix. (See Tables No. 7, 16, 19 and 20). The remainder of the questions are of interest as they help to give a more complete picture of the attitudes of the CIIA delegates as an attentive public group whose main interest is international politics and foreign policy.

The CIIA attitudes toward NATO in Table No. 7 are concerned solely with attitudes at a specific point in time. What is needed now is some indication of attitude change over time. This was attempted in the survey by asking the respondents if their attitude toward "Canada's participation in NATO" had changed. The results to this question are contained in the following table, and

Table No. 22: Attitude Change Toward NATO by delegates to the Annual
CIIA Meeting - June, 1967 (Expressed in percentages)

Question: Has your opinion concerning Canada's participation in NATO changed?

	Total sample	Sex		Occupations			
		M	F	Academics	Professionals	Interested Citizens	Others @
Yes	45.6	45.0	44.4	45.8	48.1	52.9	20.0
No	46.8	50.0	38.9	45.5	48.1	35.3	70.0
No answer	7.6	5.0	16.7	9.1	3.7	11.8	10.0
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.9	100.0	100.0
#'s	(79)	(60)	(18)	(22)	(27)	(17)	(10)

Note : @ - includes six civil servants, and four members of the communication media.

obviously there has been a considerable change since 45.6% of the sample answered 'yes' to the question, while 46.8% have consistently held the same opinion. The male delegates seem to be more consistent than their female counterparts, but 16.7% of the women did not answer the question which may account for part of the disparity, since the percentage of males and females who did change their opinion is almost identical. In turning to the various occupations, the academics and the professionals have almost identical split on the question with the former group having 45.8% changing their opinion, and 45.5% remaining consistent, while the latter group is evidently split at 48.1%. The interested citizens are more prone to change their opinions, while the civil servants and communication people ('Others' in the table) are just the opposite.

While the percentage of the sample who have altered their opinion is interesting, what is really needed is the direction of change in opinion - that is, to either a 'more' favourable attitude, or to a 'less' favourable attitude toward NATO - on the part of the 45.6% (36 delegates) who answered 'yes' in the table 22. The direction of change is contained in table No. 23.

Table No. 23: Direction of Attitude Change toward NATO by Delegates to the Annual CIIA Meeting - June, 1967

	Total sample	Sex		Occupations		Interested Citizens		Others @
		M	F	Academics	Professionals	Citizens		
More favourable	16.7	18.5	12.5	40.0	7.7	20.0	-	
Less favourable	75.0	74.1	75.0	50.0	84.6	70.0	100.0	
No answer	8.3	7.4	12.5	10.0	7.7	10.0	-	
Totals #'s	100.0 (36)	100.0 (27)	100.0 (8)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (2)	

Note: @ - includes one civil servant and one communications media person.

There is no doubt that the direction of change is away from support for NATO. Of the 36 delegates 75.0% are less favourable toward NATO, while only 16.7% are more favourably inclined. This indicates a decreasing pattern of support for NATO within an attentive public group that has shown exceedingly strong support for the Alliance. The results in table No. 23 do not mean that NATO is rejected by the respondents who are less favourably inclined toward NATO as Table No. 7 makes clear, but rather that they see the value of NATO decreasing. It is interesting to note that 40.0% of the academics moved to a more pro-NATO position which is considerably higher than the other occupational groups.

Respondents who indicated a change in attitude were asked if they could attach a date to the change. Nineteen of the 27 delegates who became less favourably inclined answered this question, and of these ten have shifted to a less pro-NATO attitude since 1964, six shifted between 1960 and 1963, while the remaining three shifted prior to 1960. Again these results show a decreasing pattern of support for NATO over time, and the rate of decrease is increasing.

After the delegates expressed an opinion on the future of Canadian participation in NATO (Table No. 7), NORAD renewal (Table No. 16), support for peacekeeping operations (Table No. 19) and the effect of UNEF's withdrawal of future Canadian peacekeeping (Table No. 20) they were asked to state which of the three foreign policy activities was the most important to continue if Canada only had the military and financial capability to support one of the three.

Table No. 24 - Priority support for NATO, NORAD and Peacekeeping among Delegates to the annual CIIA meeting, June, 1967.

Question: If Canada only had the military and financial capability to support one of the following foreign policy activities - NATO NORAD, or peacekeeping - which would you consider most important?

	Total sample	Occupational groups					
		M	F	1	2	3	4
Peacekeeping	53.2	50.0	61.1	54.5	51.8	52.9	50.0
NATO	26.5	28.3	22.2	27.3	22.2	29.4	30.0
NORAD	15.2	16.7	11.1	18.2	18.5	11.8	10.0
No answer	<u>5.1</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>10.0</u>
Totals	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
#'s	(79)	(60)	(18)	(22)	(27)	(17)	(10)

Occupation code: 1. academics, 2. professionals, 3. interested citizens, and 4. civil servants and communication people.

As might be expected peacekeeping was considered most important by the majority of respondents. Of the total sample 53.2% felt peacekeeping was most important compared to 26.5% for NATO and 15.2% for NORAD. The same pattern of support existed for both male and female delegates, and for all occupation groups. Obviously the pessimism that has been expressed by academics writing about peacekeeping in the last several years has not had any affect on the delegates to the CIIA meeting. The results in this table support the contention that peacekeeping has become more acceptable than NATO and NORAD. Unfortunately, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion has not investigated this question, and no comparisons can be made with the general public.

Another area of interest is the extent to which Canadians would like Canada to follow a more independent foreign policy, and whether this policy should be non-aligned. On this point the CIIA delegates showed an ambivalent attitude when compared with their support patterns for NATO and NORAD. While a clear majority also adopted for a more independent type of foreign policy.

Table No. 25 - Support for a more independent foreign policy among delegates to annual CIIA meeting, June, 1967.

Question: Should Canada pursue a more independent foreign policy?

	Total Sample	M	F	1	2	3	4
Yes	63.3	60.0	72.2	54.5	70.4	82.4	30.0
No	20.2	25.0	5.6	37.4	11.1	-	50.0
Undecided	7.6	3.3	22.2	9.1	3.7	17.6	
No answer	<u>8.9</u>	<u>11.7</u>	-	-	<u>14.8</u>	-	<u>20.0</u>
Totals # 's	100.0 (79)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (27)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (10)

Occupation code: 1. academics, 2. professionals, 3. interested citizens, and 4. civil servants and communication people.

In Table No. 25, 63.3% of the delegates felt Canadian foreign policy should be more independent, while only 20.2% disapproved of greater independence. (This type of attitude pattern is quite similar to that existing within the general public in Tables No. 14 and No. 15). While 22.2% of the female delegates were undecided on this question, 72.2% were in favour of greater independence which is higher than the corresponding male percentages in both cases. The civil servants and communication people were most satisfied with the existing policy mix of independence and independence followed by the academics. Among the interested citizens, however, 82.4% favoured a more independent type of policy, while none agreed with the existing degree of independence. The results of Table No. 25 do not necessarily mean that the delegates feel Canada should become non-aligned. Only 14 of the 79 respondents (17.7%) were in favour of such a policy.

What seems likely is that ambivalence will normally exist within both the general public and attentive public groups. This means that when surveys are conducted in the foreign policy area ambivalence should be expected and must be tested if the results are going to be meaningful indicators of foreign policy attitudes.

APPENDIX NO. 3

Examples of Revisionist and Traditionalist

Academic Attitudes Toward NATO.

This appendix contains an article written by C.B. McPherson, taken from the Canadian Dimension, Dec.-Jan. 1963-64, as an example of revisionist academic attitudes toward NATO. The second article is an excerpt from an unpublished paper by Harald von Riekhoff as an example of traditionalist attitudes toward NATO. Both these articles are considered to be among the better writings on NATO.

Ref: Canadian Dimension, Dec.-Jan., 1963-64

BEYOND THE NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUE

By C.B. McPherson

Political versus Military Defence

Any discussion of Canadian policy that goes beyond the question of Canadian acquisition of nuclear arms should start from the proposition that the military part of Canada's foreign and defence policy is of virtually no importance compared to the political part of it. By the political part of Canada's foreign and defence policy I mean the part concerned with great-power disarmament and reduction of world tensions -- the actions and statements of the Canadian Government in disarmament conferences, in the United Nations, and in meetings and diplomatic exchanges with other governments.

That the political part is far more important than the military part, and that the military part should be judged by its effect on the political part, can easily be demonstrated.

Given the destructive capacity of present nuclear weapons systems, the defence of any country requires the prevention of nuclear war. This assumption is made by all the nuclear powers. It is the assumption underlying and justifying the policy of deterrence.

Canada's possible military contribution to the Western deterrent is of rapidly decreasing importance. The Western deterrent consists of (i) U.S. strategic nuclear weapons (ICBMs, Polaris submarines and SAC manned bombers), (ii) U.S. and NATO tactical nuclear forces in Europe, and (iii) U.S. and allied conventional forces in Europe.

The U.S. strategic nuclear weapons are by far the most important part of the Western deterrent. Changes in military technology in the last few years (concentration on hardened ICBM bases and on Polaris submarines) have reduced the value of any possible Canadian military contribution (which could only be a contribution to the defence of U.S. bases) to an insignificant amount, and will reduce it still further.

U.S. and NATO tactical nuclear forces in Europe, to which Canada could make a small military contribution, are already of very doubtful deterrent value and will become useless as soon as France has her independent nuclear force.

U.S. and allied conventional forces in Europe will continue to be needed. Canada could make a military contribution there, but the effectiveness of such contribution has to be measured against the alternative of a Canadian military contribution to UN Peace-enforcement forces.

Mutual deterrence is the only defence both East and West now have, but is inherently unstable and increasingly likely to start rather than prevent nuclear war. Each side must seek improvement in speed and accuracy of its nuclear destructiveness. The swifter the weapons, the greater the threat of war by human

or mechanical failure. This danger is known and acknowledged by scientists and political leaders on both sides.

It follows that nothing short of nuclear disarmament, and ultimately complete and general disarmament, can defend any country. This also is known and acknowledged by the political leaders of both sides.

The possibility of reciprocal disarmament depends on the prior or simultaneous reduction of East-West tensions and of the sources of East-West conflict other than the armaments themselves. This is almost self-evident but is often overlooked. Neither side is inclined to commit itself to a scheme of arms control or disarmament as long as the other sources of conflict are undiminished.

It follows from the decreasing importance of Canada's possible military contribution to deterrence, and from the increasing urgency of disarmament and reduction of tensions, that the military part of Canada's defence policy should be subordinated to the political part.

Before we can consider what the most effective Canadian political defence policy would be, we must make some assumptions about the sources of East-West tension, and about the factors which influence and determine foreign and defence policies within the two super-powers and elsewhere. We can then state what the most effective general line of Canadian policy would be.

Sources of East-West Tension

The immediate and persistent source of East-West tension, apart from armaments themselves, is the strength of those within each bloc who reject the possibility of peaceful co-existence whether on ideological or power-political grounds.

On both the Soviet side and the Western side the source is the strength of those within the governments who deny the possibility of peaceful co-existence because they believe that the capitalist world (communist world) necessarily seeks to destroy the communist world (capitalist world), or because (as may be expected in the case of military establishments) they see their own position within the country to be dependent on fostering that belief.

Neither of these beliefs is necessarily true, but the existence of each tends to make the other true. Thus the two beliefs together tend to be self-fulfilling. Each belief encourages actions and policies by the one side which gives the other side reason to think that its belief is true. If either this Eastern or Western belief is true or if either is allowed to become true, there can be no possibility of avoiding indefinitely an all-out nuclear war. We must therefore proceed on the assumption that they are not entirely true and that they can be made less true.

It follows that every country which still has some choice in its foreign and defence policy should direct its policy towards counteracting those beliefs and so diminishing world tensions and increasing the possibility of general disarmament. This should be the main thrust of Canada's policy. Evidently, Canada can

work in this direction only by working with, and on, those forces both within the U.S. and elsewhere which reject the belief in the implacable hostility of East and West.

Forces Influencing Policy Elsewhere

Foreign and defence policy in each of the super-states is not determined monolithically by the head of the state but is subject to conflicting internal pressures. This is well-known in the case of the U.S., where the shifting constellation of forces (White House, State Department, Pentagon, Air Force, industrial lobbies, Senate House Committees, etc.) is freely reported. Close observers of the Soviet Union find a similar pattern there. In both countries there are forces which accept and forces which reject the implacable hostility assumption.

Each of the super-states, as leader of a bloc, is subject to some extent to pressures from the other nations of that bloc, in the sense that the long-range policy of the super-state has to be adjusted to the behaviour it can count on from its important allies. Thus the policies of Poland and Yugoslavia, not to mention China, have shaped Russian policy, and the policy of France is shaping U.S. policy. The policies of most of these allied states can be assumed to be subject to similar internal pressures, both by those who accept and those who reject the implacable hostility assumption.

The long-range policies of both the Eastern and Western blocs are influenced by the policies of the non-aligned nations (mainly the newly-independent African and Asian nations). Each bloc has an interest in winning their general approval or at least in preventing them giving their full support to the other bloc. And the non-aligned nations, being now so numerous, have an effective public forum in the United Nations. The non-aligned nations, in refusing to line up with either bloc, have rejected the belief in an unavoidable division of the world into two implacably hostile sides. The very existence of the non-aligned nations has prevented a bipolar division of the world; hence they must be counted as forces working against the heightening of cold-war tensions.

Maximum Effectiveness of Canadian Policy

A Canadian policy designed to counteract the forces making for heightened cold war, must seek the maximum possible net influence in three areas together: with those forces within the U.S. government which reject the implacable hostility assumption; with other members of the Western bloc who reject or might reject the implacable hostility assumption; with the non-aligned nations, who have rejected that assumption.

We may neglect possible influence on forces within the Soviet bloc, since no direct Canadian influence there is to be expected.

It should be emphasized that it is the net influence that must be calculated. That is, actions which might increase our influence in one of these areas at the cost of diminishing it in another area must be judged accordingly.

There can be no doubt that the U.S. is the most important country to influence, simply because of its weight in the West. If Canada could expect to have a significant influence on U.S. policy, even at the cost of having no

influence elsewhere, the right Canadian decision would be to go for that. But this choice does not arise. For Canada can have no influence on U.S. policy unless Canada has influence elsewhere. For only if Canada has some influence with other nations, can Canada's influence be used at all by those within the U.S. Government, who could use our support. For example, in a tug-of-war-between say the White House and the Senate, on some issue in which the President wanted and the Senate leadership opposed, the policy we thought desirable, the only possible way the President could privately use Canada's support would be for him to point to the actions Canada might get shrugged off quite easily by the Senate; or otherwise. Canada by itself could be shrugged off quite easily by the Senate; a group of nations whom Canada could get to act with her could not be shrugged off as easily.

Since Canada's influence within the U.S. depends directly on Canada's influence with the other Western nations and with the unaligned nations, it follows that, for Canada to have any influence in the desired direction even within the U.S. government, Canada must make clear to those other nations (as well as to the U.S.) her determination to maintain an independent foreign and defence policy. This must mean that Canada cannot afford to go so far in ingratiating herself with the U.S. as to diminish seriously her standing with other western and the non-aligned nations.

It is sometimes argued that by becoming a faithful and co-operative supporter of the U.S. policies, taking our expected place in NATO and in any other arrangements that might be proposed by the U.S. we would gain significant influence with the U.S. It should now be apparent that this is not so. For a blanket endorsement of U.S. policy, or anything that appeared to be such endorsement, could only harm us with the other western and the non-aligned nations, and so directly diminish our possible influence in the desired direction within the U.S. Government itself.

There is a further reason why it is impossible to maximize Canadian influence in the desired direction with the U.S. by committing ourselves to a general acceptance of U.S. policies. The reason is simply that U.S. policies are, and except for external pressures will continue to be, as likely to go in the undesired as in the desired direction. For the U.S. having undertaken the overwhelming proportion of the burden of military defence of the West, and having undertaken to carry it out by a policy of massive nuclear deterrence, has necessarily given a very powerful place to the military-industrial interests who are committed to the arms race and to the foreign policies that go with it. U.S. policy must be expected to go on being heavily influenced in this way. To accept all the main lines of U.S. policy in the hope of influencing U.S. policy would thus be self-defeating.

In short, to maximize the effectiveness of a realistic Canadian defence policy, Canada must above all make clear her independence of U.S. policy. This is to be done not with any chimerical intention of being a wholly independent and self-sufficient state, or of asserting her independent sovereign status, but to free herself to work for a more realistic long-term world policy in ways which the U.S. cannot do because of its size, its reputation and its commitment to massive deterrence.

Immediate Canadian Policy

A. General Line

The general line of policy which emerges from the foregoing analysis is as follows:

1. Of overriding importance is the Canadian Government's maintaining a clear independence of U.S. policy, so increasing Canadian influence and enabling it to be used consistently for the lessening of East-West tensions and for the promotion of multilateral disarmament.
2. Further, since the lessening of tensions and the prospects of disarmament are helped by the very existence of the non-aligned nations, and would be further helped by a strengthening of those nations, that Canadian aid to underdeveloped countries should be significantly increased.

B. NATO Policy

1. As to Canada's position with respect to NATO, the most convincing step Canada could take to demonstrate its independence of U.S. foreign policy and so to play the part it should play in world affairs, would be to withdraw from NATO, since NATO is bound to remain a military alliance dominated by U.S. foreign policy (unless, indeed, the policy of France destroys U.S. domination of NATO, in which case the military usefulness of NATO would also be destroyed).
2. Since the Canadian Government, and the opposition parties are not yet ready for withdrawal from NATO, we must consider whether any policy short of withdrawal from NATO is both feasible and useful.

The minimum policy consistent with the aim of strengthening Canada's possible contribution to world disarmament and reduction of world tensions seems to me to be as follows:

- (a) The Canadian Government should be urged to decide, and immediately announce its decision, to negotiate a non-nuclear role for Canada in NATO.

This would reduce, as far as it can be reduced, the damage already done by the government's having signed the nuclear agreements to which Mr. Pearson alleged Canada was committed by the previous government.

- (b) The Canadian Government should be urged to decide, and immediately to communicate its decision (in the first instance through diplomatic channels) to the other Western and the non-aligned nations, that it will remain in NATO only if the U.S. takes some new clear initiatives in breaking the disarmament negotiations deadlock. The initiatives might be those proposed by Osgood. (Charles E. Osgood: An Alternative to War or Surrender; Univ. of Illinois Press, 1962, 183 pp., \$1.45) or Etzioni (Amitai Etzioni: The Hard Way to Peace, A New Strategy; Collier Books, 1962, 285 pp., \$1.10).

This is not to put all or even half the blame for that deadlock on the U.S. Government; it is simply to say that if the balance of pressures within the U.S. could be tipped in that direction it is probably that the balance in the Soviet Union, which Canada cannot directly hope to influence, might reciprocally be similarly tipped.

The Canadian Government, by taking such a stand and letting that stand be known privately by the other nations, might both hope to exert Canada's influence immediately in the only hopeful direction, and at the same time increase its influence with the other Western and the non-aligned nations.

3. If this is the minimum useful Canadian policy short of withdrawal from NATO, it has still to be asked whether it is feasible. In view of its inherent difficulty and presumptuousness, it is probably no more feasible than outright withdrawal from NATO.

NATO: CHANGING ALLIANCE FUNCTIONS UNDER CONDITIONS OF A
NUCLEAR EQUILIBRIUM - A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE. pp. 25-31.

Harald von Riekhoff
Carleton University

December, 1965

CANADA AND NATO

In a manner each member's position within the Alliance is unique, but the Canadian position may be characterized as being "more unique" than that of others. Our hybrid position derives from the fact that geostrategically we form an integral part of the North American continent and thus share the same defence needs as the United States, while in terms of power we bear closer affinity to the smaller allies than to our immediate neighbour. With the smaller allies Canada shares the frustrations of restricted influence and the concern with inadequate consultation -- the desire for more consultation on subjects lying beyond the NATO area has been balanced by Canadian opposition to the extension of NATO authority and commitments to other areas --, together with a natural aversion to great power directorates. Our strategic vulnerability, however, like that of the United States is restricted to nuclear weapons of intercontinental range, without being exposed to the threat of destruction by conventional arms, tactical nuclear weapons, or nuclear MRBMs, all of which threaten our European allies. Furthermore, the validity of the American nuclear guarantee applies to no other ally with the same degree of absolute certainty as it does to Canada and, contrary to general allied experience, has been enhanced by the increasing vulnerability of the United States.

Those basic considerations which induced Canada to play an active part in the founding of the Alliance are still valid to-day. Canada's role stemmed from the realization that her interdependence with Europe was so complete that where she had been engaged in two wars in that theatre she could not, under increased factors of interdependence, hope to escape a similar involvement in future. Secondly, it was understood that under the demands of modern warfare a posture of deterrence (in the classical form) and the infrastructure for a meaningful defence in Europe would have to be constructed in peace-time and that for this purpose the peace-time engagement of the United States was indispensable. The Alliance was thus designed to serve as an instrument for crystallizing the latter's involvement in Europe as it existed then as the result of American occupation duties and to prevent a relapse into isolation. Finally underlying the concepts of interdependence and alliance co-operation was the Canadian predilection for a multilateral approach. The latter was partly derived from our natural penchant for compromise and co-operation, as drawn from our national experience, and partly rooted in the instinctive preference for collective rather than bilateral association with our powerful American neighbour.

The military side of Canada's basic contribution to NATO has undergone relatively few changes over the past decade; the latter, however, may be said to have changed in meaning as the result of altered strategic and international political conditions. The assignment of one army brigade and one air division to the NATO "shield" forces in the central sector in Europe has remained unaltered, with the exception of the additional earmarking of one battalion for AMF flank duties. While the presence of Canadian forces in Europe can no longer be said to exercise its original effect in an emergency situation that determined their initial assignment, the presence of these elite forces in a state of immediate combat-readiness, comparable only to that of the U.S. forces in Germany, has appreciably assisted SACEUR, against certain European reluctance, in laying the foundation for a modern conventional defence posture as part of NATO's strategy of flexible response. In his attempt to

improve the quality of the allied "shield" forces and their state of combat-readiness, SACEUR has frequently found it psychologically more expedient to refer them to Canadian, rather than only to U.S. forces, as a model. The presence of non-German forces in the front rank may also enhance NATO's "controlling" and stabilizing functions in future. By providing tangible front-line evidence of NATO's interdependence the presence of these forces can be said to form an integral part of the present nuclear deterrence which derives its legitimacy as much from psychological and political as from military factors.

The decision about Canada's future military role in Europe cannot, therefore, be made on the basis of exclusively military criteria. On the other hand, Canadian authorities cannot ignore that a contribution to the political and psychological aspects of the deterrent will not be made by mere military "representational" functions, that is to say by substituting symbolism for military effectiveness. The cause of deterrence will not be served unless forces are fully identified with the strategic concepts of the Alliance and equipped for their specific role as part of this strategy. A situation will therefore have to be avoided where, according to the Minister of National Defence: "The brigade was becoming a borderline case because of its lack of up-to-date equipment. It was questionable whether it was fulfilling Canada's commitment to NATO." ¹³

A more significant contribution perhaps to the overall deterrence posture of the Alliance than that provided by the presence of Canadian forces in Europe may have been made by Canada's participation in NORAD, whose primary goal is the protection of the American retaliatory force and thus constitutes the very essence of the continued credibility of the deterrent. While the North American continent is part of the NATO area, the Alliance exercises no planning or control functions over NORAD. Unless Canada assumes major research and operational duties in the defence of the North American continent against the threat of ICBMs and nuclear submarines, the importance of the Canadian role in this vital sector will decline with the waning of the bomber threat.

The Atlantic Alliance can also be said to draw indirect benefits from the war-preventive nature of Canada's peace-keeping activities even though these are neither conducted under the auspices of the Alliance nor, Cyprus excepted, within the NATO area. Partly owing to the general problem of co-ordinating NATO activities in relation to the "third world", and partly as the consequence of differences among allies in their evaluation of UN peace-keeping functions, ranging from Portugal's general hostility to French and Belgian criticism of one particular peace-keeping effort, no satisfactory way has yet been found to transfer these "credits" to the ledger of Canada NATO contributions. Canada's success in this form of international activity and her useful credentials in the field of arms control and inspection have justified this plea for flexibility and diversity in the workings of the Alliance. In order to utilize the specific qualifications of different allies, a certain division of roles and of labour is necessary, all the more as nuclear conditions have on the one hand enlarged the technical limitations of non-nuclear powers, while paradoxically imposing greater restrictions on the freedom of action and options available to nuclear powers than apply to non-nuclear powers.

¹³ Cited in the Montreal Star, December 18, 1963.

Lately peace-keeping has enjoyed a more favourable press in this country than continued participation in NATO, to the extent that the exclusive participation in peace-keeping functions has been suggested as a substitute for our NATO functions. This line of thinking shows certain weaknesses on several counts. In the first place, it rests on the faulty premise that NATO membership is incompatible with peace-keeping functions elsewhere. Our previously successful combination of the two roles alone would tend to impair this argument. In fact, it may be argued that it is precisely our membership in NATO which has enhanced our peace-keeping role insofar as "representatives" from the various power and ideological groupings are being called upon to participate in these missions in order to preserve a balanced distribution in this force.¹⁴

Secondly, the argument treats peace-keeping as a substitute for our NATO obligations rather than a complementary function. A conflict in the "third world" may have the most serious implications for the prospects of peace, it does not however, involve our most vital and immediate security needs as would an attack anywhere in Europe. The strategic real estate value of West Europe is second to no other area, nor is our interdependence with the "third world" as immediate and complete as it is with Europe. It was this realization which promoted Canada's active role in the creation of NATO in the first place while we have avoided similar alliance commitments elsewhere. Finally, the argument tends to imply a preference for a neutral role for Canada. Our identification with Western spiritual, cultural, and political traditions is too complete to support the practice of neutrality in the form of non-alignment which is based on the partial non-identification with these values, if not their rejection. Even neutrality in the legal-technical sense, as for example practised by Sweden, clashed with the strategic reality of our Siamese-twin relation to the principal power of the Alliance. It must also be realized that Sweden supports her neutrality with an impressive defence posture. In view of the size of Canada's territory in relation to her population, an adequate system of self-defence in support of a position of neutrality would make exorbitant demands on our resources.

Our attachment to NATO rests on a pragmatic foundation and evokes less of an emotional response than do our ties with the Commonwealth or the international community as symbolized by the United Nations. However, it is difficult to deny that without the Alliance Canada would be less secure, less informed, and less influential in world affairs than we are as active members of NATO. The Alliance assists in deterring aggression to a greater degree than could be achieved by the mere passive reliance on the factors of uncertainty. It can also serve as an instrument of stabilization during phases of renewed social and political unrest in Europe.

Despite the military significance which Canada attaches to NATO, the political aspects of the Alliance are regarded as having greater consequence. It is therefore not surprising that our military commitments have, in part at least, been determined with a view to our political role in the Alliance. As a member

14. Also the high technical quality of the Canadian forces, which made them such a valuable adjunct to peace-keeping missions, is to be a large degree the result of our NATO commitment.

with a sizable military contribution, Canada has been able to give vigorous promotion to the emerging institutions and practices of consultation. As an instrument for the continuous exchange of information and the process of planning and consultation, NATO offers distinct advantages to the smaller powers, involving them in information and consultation activities as a matter of routine rather than the sporadic act of grace by the great powers. In view of Canada's particular position vis-à-vis the United States, NATO may also be said to act as a safety mechanism against neutralism on the one hand, and satellite status, on the other.

With its permanent apparatus to adjust diverging policies and to facilitate routine transactions among a group of countries with a high co-efficient of interdependence, NATO represents the most advanced form of peacetime alliance system that has yet been devised. Even as such, however, it has distinct limitations. From this one may conclude that the recognition of the inherent limitations underlying a pluralistic alliance and an allowance for diversity constitute the best guarantee for the Atlantic Alliance's continued survival and flexible adaptation to changing circumstances.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II - Political Parties and NATO

1. The minor parties are excluded since they have had little influence on foreign policy, and with the exception of the Social Credit in 1962 have not attained substantial representation in the House of Commons.

Because of occasional contradictory opinions within the three parties, coupled with the problem of individual interpretation, it should not be expected that all the shifts in party positions will be included.

2. Brian Crane, An Introduction to Canadian Defence Policy, p.22.
3. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, (1949), II, 1842-44.
4. Debates, (1949), II, 1857.
5. Statement on North Atlantic Security Pact, adopted by the CCF National Council, January 30, 1949.
6. B.S. Keirstead, Canada in World Affairs, 1951-53, p.144. See pp. 129-164 for early developments.
7. Debates, (1951), III, 2331-2.
8. Keirstead, p.149.
9. Debates, Feb. 11,(1953),1856-57. Also see Feb. 10th and 13th.
10. Debates, (1953-54), IV, 3499-5000.
11. D.C. Masters, Canada in World Affairs, 1953-55, p.141-2. On CCF policy outside parliament see the resolutions from the Alberta CCF Convention, December 3-4, 1954.
12. James Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs, 1955-57, p.62.
13. Eayrs, pp. 66-74. Also see speeches by Mr. Pearson, Statements and Speeches (57/10) and Mr. Martin Statements and Speeches, (57/24).
14. Jon B. McLin, Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957-63, p.30.
15. McLin, pp. 133-34 for his account of the lack of interest on this question.
16. The CCF resolutions and quotations were obtained thanks to the kind permission of NDP National Headquarters which made their archives available. Quotations referring to the CCF not specifically footnoted are from this source.

Liberal statements are from official party sources and fall into the same category as the CCF references. Unfortunately, the Conservatives were not willing to supply any information and consequently there are few references to official party sources other than the parliamentary section of the party.

17. Debates, (1959), II, 1221-24.
18. Debates, (1959), V, 537.
19. Debates, (1960), VII, 7610.
20. Canadian Annual Review for 1960, John Saywell, ed., p.56.
21. Debates, (1960), I, 73.
22. Statements and Speeches, 60/41, p.4.
23. Canadian Annual Review for 1961, p.157.
24. Ibid, p.108.
25. Debates, (1961), III, 3444.
26. Canadian Annual Review, 1961, p.108.
27. Debates, (1962-63), III, 3141.
28. Canadian Annual Review for 1962, p.106.
29. Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power, pp.353-54. Also Canadian Annual Review for 1963, pp.284-85.
30. Toronto Globe and Mail, January 14, 1963.
31. Newman, Chap. 24, and Canadian Annual Review for 1963, pp.5-16 and pp.281-312.
32. Canada, House of Commons, Interim Report of the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence, December 20, 1963, p.19.
33. Canada Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence, 1964, p.19. (Here after referred to as White Paper (1964).)
34. White Paper (1964), p.12 and 13.
35. Andrew Brewin, Stand on Guard (1965), p.75.
36. Brewin, p.52.
37. White Paper (1964), p.19.

38. Canada, House of Commons. Standing Committee on National Defence, 1967, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 22, p.1305. (Hereafter referred to as Defence Committee Minutes).
39. Defence Committee Minutes, (1967), No. 15, p.533-35, and No. 25, p.1574 and 1590 for Mr. Hellyer's position.
40. Debates, (1966-67), XIV, 14564.
41. See for example Mr. Winch's questioning of Mr. Hellyer. Defence Committee Minutes, 1967, No. 15, pp. 532-36.
42. Debates, (1966-67), XIV, 14731. See Toronto Globe and Mail, 23-3-67 for press release.
43. Debates, 1966, IX, 9307 ff for Conservative arguments on unification.
44. Debates, (1966-67), XIV, 14559 for remarks by Mr. Churchill, and Debates, (1966-67), XIV, 14664 and 12434 for remarks by Mr. Harkness.
45. The Progressive Conservative Policy Advisory Conference of the Centennial Convention, Report on the Montmorency Conference, August, 1967, p.84. (Hereafter cited as the Montmorency Report).
46. Defence Committee Minutes, (1967), No. 15, p.533, Mr. Hellyer to the committee.
47. Debates, (1966-67), XIV, 14563. The same point was made in the Minister's statement to the Senate External Affairs Committee on April 15, 1967, but added "obviously our contribution must relate to changing requirements."
48. Defence Committee Minutes, (1967), No. 15, p.534.
49. Ottawa Citizen, 13-5-67.
50. Harald von Riekhoff, "The Changing Function of NATO," International Journal, (Spring, 1966), XXI, No. 2, pp.157-72.
51. Debates, (1966-67), XIV, 12433.
52. Montmorency Report, p.84. For Mr. Camps speech see either the Report or Journal of Canadian Studies, (August, 1967), II, No. 3, p.46.
53. See Toronto Globe and Mail, 14-16-8-67, and 2-9-67 for opinions of party hierarchy, and Globe and Mail, 7-9-67 for policy group position.
54. Toronto Daily Star, 31-1-67.
55. Defence Committee Minutes, (1967), No. 15, pp.533-34 for Mr. Hellyer's quote, and for Mr. Martin see Minutes of the Senate Committee on External Affairs, March 15, 1967.

56. Toronto Globe and Mail, 28-8-67.
57. Globe and Mail, 2-9-67.
58. Camp, Journal of Canadian Studies, p.51.
59. Ottawa Citizen, 14-8-67, and Toronto Globe and Mail, 16-8-67.
60. New Democratic Party, Fourth Constitutional Convention, Resolutions, July, 1967, No. 216.

Chapter III - Academics and NATO

1. See Appendix No. 3. Article by CB McPherson is one which presents the neutralist position in its most persuasive form.
2. Edward McWhinney, "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Has the time arrived for a new security system?" Toronto Globe and Mail, 6-6-66, p.7.
3. John W. Warnock, "Canada and the Alliance System," Canadian Dimension, (March-June, 1966) vol. 3, No. 3-4, pp.36-39, and David P. Gauthier, "Canada and NATO: Let a Dying Alliance Die," Commentator, (April, 1965), Vol. 9, No. 4, p.16.
4. Smith, "Looking Kindly at NATO."
5. James Eayrs, "Military Policy and Middle Power: The Canadian Experience," in J. King Gordon, ed., Canada's Role as a Middle Power (1966), p.79. See p.78 for the main argument. Eayrs article can also be found in The Globe Magazine, October, 1965. For a response to the article by an internationalist see letter by Peyton Lyon in the Toronto Globe and Mail, 16-11-65.
6. James Eayrs, "Canada, NATO and the Nth Power Problem," Canadian Forum, April, 1959, and Eayrs, "The Over-Loaded Alliance," in Northern Approaches (1961), pp.57-69.
7. Warnock, "Canada and the Alliance System," p.38, and Lloyd Aworthy, "Canada and the World Revolution," Canadian Dimension, (1966), vol. 3, No. 3-4, p.32.
8. McPherson, "Beyond the Arms Race," p.14 (see appendix No. 3). On this point the internationalists are in full agreement with McPherson.
9. Kenneth McNaught, "Boredom with The Bomb in 1964," Saturday Night, August, 1964, pp. 15-17.
10. Alistair Taylor, Both Swords and Ploughshares, 1963.
11. McPherson, "Beyond the Arms Race," p.15. Stephson Clarkson, "Charting a course for Canada's foreign policy," Toronto Globe and Mail, 12-7-67,

- p.7, agrees with McPherson. Also see Clarkson, "Muddled Views on Middlepoweriship," International Journal, (Summer, 1966), XXI, No. 3, p.369.
12. Warnock, "Canada and the Alliance System," p.39, and Gauthier, "Canada and NATO," p.18.
13. Clarkson, "Charting a course for Canada's foreign policy."
14. Escott Reid, "Canadian Foreign Policy, 1967-1977: A Second Golden Decade?" International Journal, XXII, No. 2, (Spring, 1967), p.173. Nowhere in this article does Reid express his opinion on NATO.
15. Clarkson, "Charting a course for Canada's foreign policy," and Eayrs, "Canada's Military Establishment: A Waste of Money?" The Globe Magazine, October 23, 1965, p.28.
16. Clarkson, "Charting a course...."
17. See Appendix No. 3. Extract of article by Harald von Riekhoff, "NATO: Changing Alliance Functions Under Conditions of a Nuclear Equilibrium - A Canadian Perspective," pp.25-31. Unpublished paper, Carleton University, December, 1965 (Reprinted with permission of the author,) as a good example of the pro-NATO group.
18. Harald von Riekhoff, "The Changing Function of NATO," International Journal, (Spring, 1966) vol. XXI, No. 2, p.159.
19. Peyton V. Lyon, The Policy Question (1963) presents the most complete case for a policy of interdependence coupled with quiet diplomacy. In part it is a response to the writings of the neutralists such as James Minifie, Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey (1960) who takes a strong neutralist stand.
20. Peyton Lyon, "Defence Policies Related to Foreign Policies," Special Studies prepared for the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence, House of Commons, Canada, supplement 1964-65, p.27.
21. Lyon, "No time to get out of NATO," Commentator, (June, 1967), Vol. XI, No. 6, p.21. See Edward Corrigan, "(No) Time To Get Out of NATO" Commentator, September, 1967, p.25-26 for a reply to the Lyon position. In a letter to the Toronto Globe and Mail, 10-6-67, Corrigan refers to "the accredited oracle of the Liberal right wing, Peyton V. Lyon...."
22. John Holmes, "The Diplomacy of Middle Power", The Atlantic Monthly, November, 1964, p.108.
23. von Riekhoff, "NATO: Changing Alliance Functions...." p.26. (See Appendix III). Also Lyon, The Policy Question, p.28-30.
24. Lyon, "No time to get of NATO," p.22.

25. John Holmes, "Is there a Future for Middlepowermanship?" in Gordon, ed., Canada's Role as a Middle Power, p.26. In the Atlantic Monthly, November, 1964, Holmes expressed the same opinion: "Canadian influence is bound to be limited, but that, the process of decision-making being indefinable and unpredictable, it is better to be an insider than an outsider," p.108.
26. Lyon, The Policy Question, pp.60 and 28.
27. Holmes, "Is there a Future for Middlepowermanship?" p.26. Also Lyon, The Policy Question, p.59.
28. Saul Silverman, "Canada and NATO Revision," Canadian Dimension, 1966, vol. 3, No. 3-4, pp. 34-36.
29. von Riekhoff, "NATO: Changing Alliance Functions...." pp. 28-29, (See Appendix No. 31). Lyon, "No time to get out of NATO," writes: "Also nonsensical is the claim that participation in NATO inhibits Canada's role in UN peacekeeping. NATO membership, indeed, has helped us contribute effectively to the UN, and there is no reason to conclude that our forces will suddenly cease to be useful both to NATO and the UN." (p.22).
30. Lyon, The Policy Question, pp. 15 and 79. Also Maxwell Cohen, "Foreign Policy: A Centennial View," Montreal Gazette, 25-4-67, p.6.
31. Holmes, "The Diplomacy of a Middle Power," p.111.
32. John Holmes, "The Relationship in Alliance and World Affairs," in John Sloan Dickey, ed., The United States and Canada, (1964), p.101. This article is one of the most comprehensive in explaining the Canadian-American relationship within the alliance system. On the question of diversity within the alliance see Holmes, "The Advantages of Diversity in NATO," in Karl Cerny and Henry Briefs, eds., NATO in Quest of Cohension (1965), pp.289-302.
33. Holmes, "Is there a Future for Middlepowermanship?" p.26.
34. Lyon, The Policy Question, p.46. To bring the Lyon thesis up to date see his paper "Maximizing Canadian Influence: Quiet Diplomacy Revisited" presented at the concluding conference sponsored by the University League for Social Reform (Glendon College, April 22, 1967) on America as World Environment.
35. von Riekhoff, "The Changing Function of NATO," pp.157-72 deals with all four of the following arguments in favour of NATO. Karl W. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, (1957), p.5 for the concept of 'security community'!
36. Lyon, "No time to get out of NATO," pp. 21-22. Also see Silverman, "Canada and NATO Revision," pp. 34-36.
37. von Riekhoff, "The Changing Function of NATO," p.161.

38. von Riekhoff, p.162. Also see Mr. Marv⁺in's testimony before the Senate Committee on External Affairs, March 15, 1967.
39. CIPO poll No. 280 (January, 1960). Total card count - 679. All CIPO polls are closely representative of the national population.
40. CIPO poll No. 306 (February, 1964). Total card count - 676. Also see under the NORAD section of the paper.
41. Canadian Facts, Political Study, October, 1966. Sample size-790 taken from urban areas over 10,000 population, and with respondents 18 years and over.
42. John Paul and Jerome Laulicht, In Your Opinion, (1963), Question No. 17 (b), p.83. Based on a survey conducted in November, 1962 by the Canadian Peace Research Institute with the following sample sizes: national sample - 1,000, CPRI contributors - 190, businessmen - 48, trade union leaders - 48, politicians - 48.
43. Paul & Laulicht, In Your Opinion, Question No. 22, p.85.
44. Paul & Laulicht, In Your Opinion, p.110. This conclusion was reached after computing the percentage in each category of the common knowledge score to an absolute score on a five point system with zero for none correct to four points for all four questions correct.
45. Norman Smith, "Looking Kindly at NATO," Ottawa Journal, 11-1-66. Kenneth McNaught, a neutralist, was appalled at the consensus reached at the Carleton Conference since NATO was regarded as a success and was considered to have a future. "NATO: A Sacred Cow," Saturday Night, March, 1966, p.14.
46. Based on CIPO polls No. 280 and 306, the CPRI survey (see footnote No. 5), table No. 4 (p.8), and the CIIA survey (table No. 7, p.11). For an analysis of party attitudes see the section on NATO and political parties.
47. See Appendix No. 2.

Chapter V - NORAD and the Political Parties

1. For an analysis of the early years of NORAD see J.N. McLin Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1967, Chap. III.
2. McLin, p.51 and 54.
3. McLin, p.55.
4. Debates, (1960), III, 2506.
5. Quoted in Canadian Annual Review, 1961, P.108.

6. Debates, (1960-61), VIII, 8221, September 12, 1961.
7. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceeding and Evidence, 1960, No. 13, p.334. (Hereafter referred to as External Affairs Committee.) Also see Debates, (1959), p.1498. Mr. Martin was of the same opinion. "If we are going to turn over our sovereignty, we should not do it to the United States, we should do it by a collective move." External Affairs Committee, 1960, No. 13, p.333.
8. Debates, (1960), VII, 7606 & 7634.
9. Canadian Annual Review, 1960, p.122.
10. Canadian Annual Review, 1961, p.108.
11. Canadian Annual Review, 1962, p.88. For an in depth analysis see McLin, Chap. VI and, P.V. Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-63, (forthcoming).
12. Toronto Daily Star, January 9, 1962.
13. Canadian Annual Review, 1962, pp. 125-36.
14. Defence Committee Minutes, 1963, No. 1, p.16.
15. Quoted in Canadian Annual Review, 1963, p.306.
16. White Paper on Defence, 1964, p.14 & 23.
17. Mr. Martin's statement to the Ottawa Journal, September 18, 1964.
18. Brewin, Stand on Guard, p.63 & 65. Also pp. 55-56 on need to maintain passive defence role.
19. Defence Committee Minutes, 1966, No. 1, p.16.
20. Debates, 22 June 1967, 1817.
21. Toronto Globe and Mail, April 20, 1967. Both the Winnipeg Free Press, May 1, 1967 and the Victoria Daily Colonist, March 24, 1967 rejected the Gordon position.
22. Speech to the Canadian Club on November 11, 1967. Also see speech to the CNE Director's Luncheon on August 29, 1967.
23. Debates, 1966-67, II, 1469, and 1966-67, XIV, 14446.
24. Fredericton Daily Gleaner, February 18, 1967. See denial by the Pentagon in Toronto Star, February 18, 1967.
25. Montmorency Report, p.83.

Chapter VI - Academic Attitudes and NORAD

1. Melvin Conant, The Long Polar Watch (1962), pp.57, 122, 124, 8 & 22. Also see the following articles by Conant, "Canada's Role in Western Defence," Foreign Affairs, 40, No. 3, April 1962, pp.431-442. "Canada and Nuclear Weapons: An American View" International Journal, 18, No. 2, Spring, 1963, pp.207-210.
2. Klaus Knorr, "Canada and Western Defence," International Journal, 18, No. 1, Winter 1962-63, pp.1-16.
3. David A. Baldwin, "Canadian-American Relations: Myth and Reality," in Fourth Annual Orvil E. Dryfoos Conference on Public Affairs, Canadian-American Relations, (Sept. 1967, The Public Affairs Center, Dartmouth College), pp.20-22.
4. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p.201-2.
5. Clarkson, "Charting a course for Canada's foreign policy," Toronto Globe and Mail, July 12, 1967, Reid, "Canadian Foreign Policy, 1967-1977: A Second Golden Decade?" International Journal, 22, No. 2, Spring 1967, pp. 171-181.
6. Axworthy, "Canada and the World Revolution," Canadian Dimension, 1966, vol. 3, Nos. 304, pp.31-33. Warnock, "Canada and the Alliance System," Ibid, pp.26-39.
7. Eayrs, "Military Policy and Middle Power" In Gordon, ed., Canada's Role as a Middle Power, pp.70-76, and 82. Also see McNaught, Saturday Night, March 1965.
8. Granatstein, "NORAD: Renew or Not?" The Canadian Forum, June, 1967, pp. 1-2.
9. Granatstein, "Triservice Unification and Alliance Commitments: Policy versus Practice," unpublished paper prepared for Conference on 'America as World Environment', April 22, 1967, Glendon College, p.9. In this paper Granatstein did not completely reject NORAD. "In fact, a case can be made for Canada's keeping its foot in the NORAD door and offering, as a minimum, air space and communications to the United States in return for information and such protection as the ABMs may provide."
10. Lyon, "Problems of Canadian Independence," International Journal, vol. 16, No. 3, Summer 1961, p.254-55.
11. Lyon, The Policy Question, pp.48-51.
12. Lyon, "Maximizing Canadian Influence: Quiet Diplomacy Revisited," unpublished paper prepared for the Conference on 'America as World Environment,' Glendon College, April 22, 1967, pp.2-3.

13. Holmes, "The Relationship in Alliance and in World Affairs," in John S. Dickey, ed., The United States and Canada, pp.98-9, 109, and 128. Also see Holmes, "Canada and the U.S. in World Politics," Foreign Affairs, vol. 40, No. 1, October 1961, pp. 105-17, July 1963, pp. 659-72.

14. Holmes, "Growing Independence in Canadian-American Relations," Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, No. 1, October 1967, pp.151, 153, 155-56, 160, 162, and 166.

15. R.J. Sutherland, "The Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation," International Journal, vol. 17, No. 3, Summer 1962, pp. 199-223. General C. Foulkes, "The Complications of Continental Defence," in L. Merchant, ed., Neighbours Taken for Granted, (1966), and D.W. Jones, "Canada's Serach for a Role in Continental Defence," Unpublished MA thesis, Carleton University, 1964.

16. CIPO No. 291, September 1961, sample size - 676.

17. CIPO No. 306, February 1964, sample size - 694.

18. CIPO's: No. 263, December 1957, sample size - 2,122.
No. 274, March 1959, sample size - 710.
No. 280, January 1960, sample size - 680.
No. 297, June 1962, sample size - 2,698.
No. 302, April 1963, sample size - 2,625
(last time question asked).

19. CIPO's: No. 291, September 1961, sample size - 676.
No. 299, November 1962, sample size - 705.
No. 301, March 1963, sample size - 1,974.
No. 319, June 1966, sample size - 671.

20. Conant, The Long Polar Watch, p.170.

21. Conant, p.171.

Chapter VIII - Peacekeeping: Alternative or Complement to NATO?

1. Goodspeed, D.J., ed., The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967, 1967, p.239.

2. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, p.239.

3. Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs, 1955-1957, p.271.

4. External Affairs Committee, 1958, 1st session, No. 3, p. 108.

5. Statement and Speeches, 57/43. Sidney Smith, Speech to U.N. General Assembly, November 22, 1957.

6. Debates, (1959), II, 1402-04, Sidney Smith.

7. Canadian Annual Review, 1960, p.115.
8. Debates, (1960-61), XI, 2093 ff.
9. For example no mention is made of peacekeeping in the 3rd Report to the House of the Special Committee on Defence Expenditures, 1960 No. 27, pp. 629-632.
10. White Paper, p.16. Also p.24. See the Canadian Annual Review, 1964, pp. 218-44 for a good coverage of peacekeeping activities during 1964.
11. Brewin, Stand on Guard, p.75.
12. Lyon, "Defence Policies Related to Foreign Policies," in Special studies for Defence Committee, p.31.
13. Clarkson, "Charting a course for Canada's foreign policy, Toronto Globe and Mail, 12-7-67.
14. D. Gordon, "Canada as Peace-keeper," in J.K. Gordon, ed., Canada's Role as a Middle Power, p.52.
15. Gordon, "Canada as Peace-keeper," pp.52-64.
16. Eayrs, "Military Policy and Middle Power," in Gordon, pp.81-82.
17. Lyon, "Maximizing Canadian Influence: Quiet Diplomacy Revisited," paper given at American as World Environment Conference, Glendon College, April 1967, pp.15-16. Edward McWhinney has argued that the Middle East crisis of 1967 ended Canada's role as a peacemaker. Ottawa Journal, 5-6-67.
18. J.K. Gordon, "International Police Force," Special Studies for Defence Committee, pp. 65-86 on the technical problems for an international force.
19. Eayrs, Northern Approaches, pp. 108 ff.
20. Holmes, "The Political and Philosophical Aspects of U.N. Security Forces," International Journal, 19, No. 3, Summer, 1964, pp. 292-307.
21. Granatstein, "Triservice Unification and Alliance Commitments, Policy vs. Practice," America as World Environment Conference.
22. CIPO poll No. 248 - May 1956, sample size 1,408.
CIPO poll No. 251 - November 1956, sample size 1,192.
23. CIPO poll No. 307 - April 1964, sample size 723.
24. McDonald Research Poll, sample size 1,100. Financial Post, March 14, 1964.
25. For reference and sample sizes see Chapter III, footnote No. 42.

Appendix No. 1 - Government Positions on Major External Issues
Involving NATO.

1. Statements and Speeches, Department of External Affairs, 58/3, p.6.
2. Statements and Speeches, 61/5, p.14.
3. Statements and Speeches, 59/17.
4. Statements and Speeches, 61/5, p.14.
5. Statements and Speeches, 59/38.
6. Ottawa Journal, 5-11-59. Mr. Green took this position in many of his speeches. See SS 60/11, 60/41 and 61/5.
7. Canadian Annual Review, 1960, p.102.
8. Debates, (1960), IV, 6296.
9. Statements and Speeches, 61/11, p.4.
10. Statements and Speeches, 61/9, p.2.
11. Debates, (1960-61), VIII, 8225
12. Debates, (1960-61), I, 963-64.
13. Canadian Annual Review, 1962, p.101.
14. Debates, (1963), I, 790.
15. Debates, (1964), III, 1707.
16. Statements and Speeches, 64/31.
17. Statements and Speeches, 65/3.
18. Debates, (1966), III, 2875.
19. Statements and Speeches, 66/12.
20. Statements and Speeches, 66/27.
21. Debates, (1966-67), XI, 11281.
22. Mr. Diefenbaker, Debates, (1958), I, 772.
23. White Paper on Defence, 1964, p.21.
24. Statements and Speeches, 65/7.
25. Statements and Speeches, 65/3.
26. Debates, (1966-67), XI, 11281.

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