



doc
CA1
EA
98C12
EXF

Canada ^{and the} Early Cold War 1943-1957



Le Canada au début de la guerre froide 1943-1957

Edited by/Compilé par Greg Donaghy



cop. 1
.b3291662(E)
.b3291674(F)

Canada and the Early Cold War, 1943-1957



Le Canada au début de la guerre froide, 1943-1957

Données de catalogage avant
publication (Canada)

Vedette principale au titre :

Canada and the Early Cold War,
1943-1957/Le Canada au début de
la guerre froide, 1943-1957

Comprend du matériel préliminaire
et un article en français
ISBN 0-660-60748-4
N° de cat. E2-179/1998

1. Canada — Relations extérieures
— 1945-
2. Canada — Politique et gouverne-
ment — 1935-1957
3. Canada — Relations extérieures
— Histoire
4. Guerre froide
5. Politique mondiale — 1945-
I. Donaghy, Greg
II. Canada. Ministère des Affaires
étrangères et du Commerce
international
III. Titre : Le Canada au début de la
guerre froide, 1943-1957

FC602.C32 1998 327.71'009'044
C98-980302-3F

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication
Data

Main entry under title:

Canada and the Early Cold War,
1943-1957/Le Canada au début de
la guerre froide, 1943-1957

Includes prefatory material and an
article in French.
ISBN 0-660-60748-4
Cat. no. E2-179/1998

1. Canada — Foreign relations —
1945-
2. Canada — Politics and govern-
ment — 1935-1957
3. Canada — Foreign relations —
History
4. Cold War
5. World Politics — 1945-
I. Donaghy, Greg
II. Canada. Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade
III. Title: Canada and the Early Cold
War, 1943-57

FC602.C32 1998 327.71'009'044
C98-980302-3F

Copyright © of the collective work lies with the Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada – 1998.

Copyright © of the individual articles lies with the respective authors.

Available in Canada through your local bookseller or by mail from Canadian Government Publishing – PWGSC
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0S9

Catalogue No. E2-179/1998

ISBN 0-660-60748-4

Le droit d'auteur © sur l'ouvrage collectif appartient au ministre des Travaux publics et des Services gouvernementaux – 1998.

Le droit d'auteur © sur chaque article appartient à l'auteur.

En vente au Canada chez votre libraire local ou par la poste auprès des Éditions du gouvernement du Canada – TPSGC
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0S9

N° de catalogue : E2-179/1998

ISBN 0-660-60748-4


Cover and interior design: Richard Bingham/Flex Media, Toronto

55753640(e) b3a91662

557 53640 (e) b3291662
557 53725 (f) b3291674

Canada ^{and the} Early Cold War

1943-1957



Dept. of External Affairs
Min. des Affaires extérieures

MAY 4 1999
M A I

RETURN TO DEPARTMENTAL LIBRARY
RETOURNER A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE DU MINISTERE

Le Canada au début de la guerre froide


1943-1957

Edited by/Compilé par Greg Donaghy



Ministère des Affaires étrangères
et du Commerce international

Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade



contents

table des matières

Preface <i>Donald W. Campbell</i>	8	Préface <i>Donald W. Campbell</i>	9
Introduction <i>Greg Donaghy</i>	14	Introduction <i>Greg Donaghy</i>	15
Acknowledgments	35	Remerciements	37
The Cold War's Cradle: Canada, the Great Powers, and Germany, 1943-1948			
<i>Angelika Sauer</i>			39
Eyes West: Canada and the Cold War in Asia			
<i>Robert Bothwell</i>			59
"A Fine Romance": Canada and the United Nations, 1943-1957			
<i>John English</i>			73
Realists at Work: Canadian Policy Makers and the Politics of Transition from Hot War to Cold War			
<i>Denis Stairs</i>			91
« L'instant kantien » : La contribution canadienne à la création de la « Communauté nord-atlantique », 1947-1949			
<i>Stéphane Roussel</i>			119
<i>Kanada-Votchina Amerikanskogo Imperializma</i> : Canada and Canadian Communists in the Soviet "Coming War" Paradigm, 1946-1951			
<i>J.L. Black</i>			159
The Cold War, Canada, and the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child			
<i>Dominique Marshall</i>			183
The ABCs of Canada's International Economic Relations, 1945-1951			
<i>Hector Mackenzie</i>			215
Notes on Contributors	252	Notes sur les collaborateurs	253

PREFACE

Donald W. Campbell

"Although the foreign policy of any country must from time to time be adapted to changing circumstances, there are in it continuing threads which represent the ideals, as well as the interests, of a people. A knowledge of past policy is therefore of value not only to scholars who study and interpret Canadian history but also to those who seek a broader understanding than a knowledge of current events can provide."

Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs,
DOCUMENTS ON CANADIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS, VOLUME 1

This book, and the conference that gave rise to it, underline concretely the value that we attach to our past and the inspiration that we draw from it. Initially established in 1909 as little more than a mailbox for diplomatic correspondence, the Department of External Affairs quickly came to occupy a prominent place in the machinery of government in Canada. Between its creation and 1945, it played an important role in the country's transformation from a small, colonial state on the periphery of world affairs into a confident middle power ready to shoulder its international responsibilities.

The people who oversaw this transformation were a remarkable group of men and women, who helped determine the values and traditions that define the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade today. One of the most important early influences on the Department was O.D. Skelton, a former dean of arts at Queen's University, who served as under-secretary of state for external affairs from 1925 until his death in 1941. During his 16 years with the Department, he established a tradition of rigorous recruitment standards that emphasized a distinguished scholarly

PRÉFACE

Donald W. Campbell

« Si la politique étrangère d'un pays doit à l'occasion s'adapter aux circonstances, elle n'en comporte pas moins une trame continue qui représente l'idéal aussi bien que l'intérêt d'un peuple. La connaissance de la politique passée a donc son utilité, non seulement pour les érudits qui se livrent à l'étude et à l'interprétation de l'histoire du Canada, mais aussi pour ceux qui cherchent à voir au-delà de l'événement quotidien. »

Paul Martin, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures,
DOCUMENTS RELATIFS AUX RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES DU CANADA,
VOLUME 1

Le présent ouvrage, de même que la conférence qui y a donné naissance, souligne concrètement la valeur que nous accordons à notre passé et l'inspiration que nous en tirons. Établi tout d'abord en 1909 en tant qu'organisme dont la fonction ne dépassait guère la correspondance diplomatique, le ministère des Affaires extérieures est rapidement devenu un rouage important de la machine gouvernementale fédérale. Entre sa création et l'année 1945, il a ainsi joué un rôle déterminant dans la transformation du pays : de petit État colonial évoluant à la périphérie des affaires mondiales, le Canada s'est transformé en une solide moyenne puissance prête à assumer ses responsabilités internationales.

Les hommes et les femmes remarquables qui ont présidé à cette évolution ont contribué à fixer les valeurs et traditions qui caractérisent aujourd'hui le ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international. O. D. Skelton, ancien doyen de la Faculté des arts de l'Université Queen's, qui a occupé le poste de sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures de

record and forged strong links with the academic community. During the late 1920s and 1930s, Skelton lured a noteworthy group of young academics into the Department, including Lester B. Pearson, Norman Robertson, Hume Wrong and Escott Reid. The ties between professors and diplomats were strengthened during the Second World War when the Department drew heavily on Canada's small academic community to deal with the expanded work load created by the war. The experience helped ensure a close and co-operative relationship between the Department and the university community. This mutually beneficial relationship is one that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade remains determined to foster and develop.

The Department's close links with the academic community have left other legacies, among them the series *Documents on Canadian External Relations*. The idea for a documentary series was first suggested by Fred Soward, an outstanding teacher at the University of British Columbia. Soward, who spent several years in the Department of External Affairs as a special wartime assistant, thought that the rich historical material in the Department's archives might usefully illustrate Canada's march to nationhood during the first part of the 20th century. Although the idea languished for several years, it was revived in the mid-1950s by George Glazebrook, a University of Toronto historian who had pioneered the study of Canadian foreign policy before joining the Department during the Second World War. The Department welcomed the prospect of a documentary series. It was seen as a suitable means of acknowledging Canada's growing international role and its expanding responsibilities. More important, the documentary volumes allowed the Department of External Affairs, which was sometimes perceived as unnecessarily secretive, to respond to public demands for greater access to its records.

Today, more than ever, the Department remains committed to the values of openness and transparency that provide much of the rationale for the publication of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*. Since the first volume in the series was published in 1967, this collection has become an important source for the study of Canada's foreign policy. It represents the basic published record of the foreign relations of the Government of Canada, and provides a comprehensive, self-contained account of Canada's major foreign policy decisions and their underlying rationale. Edited by professional historians in the Historical Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the series is used by scholars in Canada and around the world to explore the evolution of Canadian diplomacy during

1925 jusqu'à sa mort en 1941, est un de ceux qui ont le plus marqué les débuts du Ministère. Durant ses 16 années au sein du Ministère, il a instauré des normes rigoureuses de recrutement qui exigeaient un niveau élevé de connaissances chez les candidats et qui a permis l'établissement de liens durables avec les milieux universitaires. À la fin des années 20 et dans les années 30, M. Skelton a réussi à attirer au Ministère un groupe de jeunes penseurs brillants, dont Lester B. Pearson, Norman Robertson, Hume Wrong et Escott Reid. Les rapports entre professeurs et diplomates se sont affermis durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, époque où le Ministère s'est adjoint de nombreux membres de la petite communauté universitaire du Canada pour répondre à l'alourdissement de la charge de travail attribuable au conflit. C'est cette expérience qui a contribué à l'union étroite, axée sur la collaboration, entre le Ministère et les universités. Et le Ministère est déterminé à voir s'épanouir cette relation avantageuse pour les deux parties.

Les liens solides noués avec le monde universitaire ont aussi porté d'autres fruits, dont la série *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*. L'idée d'une telle série documentaire est mentionnée pour la première fois par Fred Soward, professeur éminent de l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique. Soward, qui a exercé pendant plusieurs années les fonctions d'adjoint spécial en temps de guerre au ministère des Affaires extérieures, avait la conviction que le riche matériel historique contenu dans les archives ministérielles pouvait servir judicieusement à illustrer le cheminement du Canada vers le statut de nation durant la première partie du XX^e siècle. Cette idée est restée sans suite jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit ravivée dans le milieu des années 50 par George Glazebrook, historien de l'Université de Toronto qui a été le premier à étudier la politique étrangère canadienne avant de se joindre au Ministère durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

Le Ministère s'est montré favorable au concept d'une série documentaire, qu'il voyait comme un bon moyen de reconnaître le rôle grandissant du Canada sur la scène internationale de même que ses responsabilités sans cesse plus lourdes. Mieux encore, cette série permettait au Ministère, à qui on reprochait parfois une tendance trop prononcée au secret, de réagir aux demandes de la population en donnant aux Canadiens un accès élargi à ses archives. Aujourd'hui plus que jamais, le Ministère demeure résolument engagé à respecter les valeurs d'ouverture et de transparence qui justifient en bonne partie la publication des *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*. Depuis la parution du premier volume, en 1967, la série

the 20th century.

In the years since 1967 we have published an additional 19 volumes, bringing the total number in the series so far to 20. As the most recent volumes deal primarily with the Cold War, it seemed appropriate to mark the series' 30th anniversary by asking some of the country's leading foreign policy scholars to reflect on Canada's diplomatic record during its so-called "golden age" in the 1940s and 1950s. The papers presented in this volume do that, but they differ about what the Cold War meant for Canada and what it teaches us about Canadian foreign policy. We hope that the readers of this collection and the *Documents on Canadian External Relations* will join this continuing dialogue on the nature of the Canadian diplomatic tradition.

Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada est devenue une importante source de données pour l'étude des relations étrangères du Canada. Principal recueil de documents publiés sur les relations extérieures du gouvernement du Canada, cette série constitue un dossier complet et autonome des grandes décisions canadiennes en matière de politique étrangère et des raisons qui les ont motivées. Publiée sous la direction d'historiens professionnels appartenant à la Section des affaires historiques du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international, elle est consultée par des chercheurs du Canada et du monde entier soucieux d'explorer l'évolution de la diplomatie canadienne au XX^e siècle.

Depuis 1967, nous avons publié 19 autres volumes, ce qui porte le total de la série à 20. Étant donné que les plus récents traitent essentiellement de la guerre froide, il semblait indiqué de souligner le 30^e anniversaire de la série en demandant à quelques-uns des plus grands spécialistes de la politique étrangère du Canada d'exprimer leur point de vue sur les réalisations des diplomates canadiens durant ce que plusieurs appellent son « âge d'or », c'est-à-dire les années 40 et les années 50. Les documents présentés ci-après visent cet objectif de réflexion, mais leurs auteurs n'interprètent pas tous de la même manière l'incidence de la guerre froide sur le pays ni ce qu'elle nous apprend au sujet de la politique étrangère canadienne. Nous espérons que le lecteur du présent ouvrage et des *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* se joindra à ce dialogue permanent sur la nature de la tradition diplomatique canadienne.

INTRODUCTION

Greg Donaghy

This collection of essays on Canada and the early Cold War emerges from a colloquium held in November 1997 to mark the 30th anniversary of the publication of the first volume in the series *Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER)*. An examination of Canadian diplomacy during one of its most fruitful periods seemed an especially appropriate way to celebrate the *DCER*'s birth: the Cold War and Canadian postwar foreign policy provided much of the inspiration behind the series.

The sudden and dramatic expansion of the federal government during the Second World War left the Department of External Affairs poorly equipped to handle the vast number of records that proliferated. By the late 1940s, the department had accumulated over 100,000 files and was opening almost 10,000 new files annually. These had long since overflowed the basement of the foreign ministry's East Block offices and were stacked to the rafters in the attic. The papers of the department's first under-secretary of state, Sir Joseph Pope, were even exiled to the basement of St. George's (Anglican) Church.¹

During the summer of 1949, External Affairs brought in F.H. Soward to examine its record-keeping problems and suggest what might be done with its "dormant and obsolete files." He was an ideal choice. An Oxford-trained historian who taught at the University of British Columbia, Soward was also familiar with the department where he had worked as a special wartime assistant for four years. He urged Arnold Heeney, the under-secretary of state for external affairs, to set up an Historical Research Unit directed by an experienced historian. In addition to destroying useless records and transferring important files to the National

INTRODUCTION

Greg Donaghy

Le présent recueil d'essais sur le Canada et le début de la guerre froide fait suite à un colloque tenu en novembre 1997 et marquant le 30^e anniversaire de la publication du premier volume de la série *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada (DREC)*. Un examen de la diplomatie canadienne durant une de ses périodes les plus fructueuses semblait des plus approprié pour souligner la naissance des *DREC*, dont la teneur est fortement inspirée par la guerre froide et la politique étrangère canadienne de l'après-guerre.

Le ministère des Affaires extérieures s'est trouvé démuni face à la multiplication des dossiers occasionnée par l'expansion soudaine et incroyable de l'administration fédérale durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. À la fin des années 40, le Ministère avait accumulé plus de 100 000 dossiers et en ouvrait presque 10 000 chaque année. Tout ce volume de documents avait depuis longtemps débordé du sous-sol des bureaux du Ministère dans l'édifice de l'Est pour s'empiler jusqu'au plafond dans le grenier. Les documents du premier sous-secrétaire d'État du Ministère, Sir Joseph Pope, avaient même été relégués au sous-sol de l'église anglicane Saint-George¹.

À l'été 1949, le Ministère confiait à F.H. Soward le mandat d'examiner les problèmes que posait la conservation des documents et de faire des recommandations sur ce qu'il y avait lieu de faire des dossiers inactifs et désuets. Soward se révéla l'homme de la situation : historien formé à Oxford, professeur à l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique, il connaissait bien le Ministère pour y avoir travaillé quatre ans pendant la guerre en qualité d'adjoint spécial. Il invita alors Arnold Heeney, sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, à créer une section des affaires historiques dirigée par un historien d'expérience. Outre la destruction de dossiers inutiles et

Archives, the new unit would prepare material for "a collection of documents illustrative of policy."² Soward explained that it seemed "eminently reasonable that Canada should consider the preparation and possibly the publication of documentary material, perhaps with an introductory essay and notes as the United States and the United Kingdom have been doing for some time."³

Three factors contributed to the positive reaction accorded Soward's recommendations. Since 1925, when O.D. Skelton became its second under-secretary, External Affairs had recruited many of its senior officers from Canadian universities. They appreciated the value of academic research, and encouraged the free and vigorous exchange of ideas. Moreover, there were specific scholarly and academic considerations favouring the publication of documents.

Like Soward, three of the four members on the informal Archives Committee that advised Heeney were Oxford-educated professional historians. Before joining the department, Gerry Riddell, George Glazebrook and Terry MacDermot were all part of Canada's small and close-knit historical community, which had during the 1920s and 1930s self-consciously transformed itself into a professional, document-based discipline.⁴

There was a second, more potent, influence at work. The continuing effort to mobilize mass support during the Second World War – a war fought for an open and democratic society – convinced Ottawa of the value and importance of public information.⁵ This lesson was reinforced in the immediate postwar period, when Canada and its Western allies confronted a second totalitarian foe, the Soviet Union, in the early clashes of the Cold War. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and his successor as secretary of state for external affairs, Lester B. Pearson, made concerted efforts to explain Canadian policy to domestic and international audiences. A 1948 circular reminded foreign service officers that:

All responsible governments sincerely committed to international co-operation firmly believe that the provision of authentic public information to other countries is an integral and essential aspect of the conduct of foreign affairs. There is also a growing realization that there is a similar responsibility on governments to provide fuller information within each country on foreign policy and international affairs. Fundamentally, the reasons are straightforward enough. The speed of modern communications and of technical developments have created

le transfert de registres importants aux Archives nationales, le nouveau service préparerait le matériel destiné à un recueil de documents représentatifs de la politique mise en œuvre². Soward expliqua qu'il semblait tout à fait raisonnable que le Canada envisage la préparation et même la publication de tels documents, peut-être accompagnés d'une introduction sous forme d'essai et de notes, tout comme le faisaient les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni depuis un certain temps³.

Trois facteurs ont contribué à l'accueil favorable qu'ont reçu les recommandations de Soward : d'abord, depuis 1925, année d'entrée en fonction d'O.D. Skelton à titre de deuxième sous-secrétaire, le Ministère avait recruté bon nombre de ses hauts dirigeants au sein des universités canadiennes. Ces cadres valorisaient donc la recherche universitaire et encourageaient un échange d'idées libre et vigoureux. Enfin, de nombreuses considérations liées à l'avancement des connaissances militaient en faveur de la publication de documents.

À l'instar de Soward, trois des quatre membres du comité informel des archives qui conseillaient Heeney avaient fait leurs études d'histoire à Oxford. Avant leur arrivée au Ministère, Gerry Riddell, George Glazebrook et Terry MacDermot évoluaient tous dans le milieu restreint et homogène des historiens canadiens, lesquels avaient volontairement transformé leur domaine dans les années 20 et 30 en une discipline professionnelle fondée sur la documentation⁴.

Une deuxième influence, plus puissante, se faisait aussi sentir. En effet, les efforts soutenus en vue de mobiliser l'ensemble de la population durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale – qui se voulait une lutte pour une société ouverte et démocratique – avaient convaincu Ottawa de la valeur et de l'importance de l'information publique⁵. Cette conviction s'était encore renforcée immédiatement après la guerre, alors que le Canada et ses alliés occidentaux avaient dû faire face, au cours des premiers affrontements de la guerre froide, à un deuxième ennemi totalitaire : l'Union soviétique. Le premier ministre Louis Saint-Laurent et son successeur au poste de secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Lester B. Pearson, concertent leurs efforts pour expliquer la politique canadienne aux Canadiens mêmes et à l'étranger. Une circulaire de 1948 rappelle ce qui suit aux agents du service extérieur :

Tout gouvernement responsable qui s'engage sincèrement à instaurer une coopération internationale a la ferme conviction que la transmission d'informations publiques authentiques aux autres pays constitue une partie intégrante et essentielle des

the physical conditions whereby the world has become a neighbourhood. Foreign affairs today are not the exclusive province of government, but are of direct, immediate and vital concern to the man and woman in the street.⁶

The *DCER* was effectively part of Canada's response to the Cold War's ideological dimensions.⁷

A third factor also helped foster an environment where this kind of historical enterprise might thrive. The country's economic, military and political accomplishments during the Second World War promoted a new and confident sense of Canadian nationalism. By the late-1940s, it seemed fitting that Canada should develop a more mature and active cultural life. In foreign policy circles, there was a widespread sense that as Canada dealt more often with the world's older and more urbane nations it should, in Paul Litt's words, "do something to match their cultural refinement."⁸ In citing American and British precedents to justify his proposed documentary project, Soward appealed to the department's pride in its contribution to transforming Canada from "colony to nation."

Much of the literature on Canada and the early Cold War reflects that pride. Canada's postwar foreign policy, it is often suggested, represented a sharp break with the irresponsible and complacent policies pursued by Ottawa during the "low dishonest decade" of the 1930s. The Second World War made it clear that Canada could not retreat into the relative safety of North America, and imbued a younger generation of policy-makers with a strong and vigorous "internationalism." As one of the central architects of Canada's Cold War diplomacy later recalled, "passive isolation and disinterest" gave way to "active participation and commitment."⁹ There was evidence to support this view. The search for postwar political and economic order thrust Canada, which had emerged from the war stronger than ever before, into the midst of Western efforts to establish renewed mechanisms for collective security and international trade. The impression that the fundamental character of Canadian foreign policy had been transformed by the war was reinforced when Louis St. Laurent succeeded the ever-cautious W.L. Mackenzie King, first as secretary of state for external affairs, and then as prime minister.¹⁰

This transformation in perspective, so the argument runs, was accompanied by an equally important change in the very character of Canadian diplomacy. St. Laurent, and the men he gathered around him, notably Lester B. Pearson, his deputy minister and successor as foreign minister, seemed to

affaires extérieures. On se rend de plus en plus compte qu'il incombe aussi à l'État de fournir, à l'intérieur même de ses frontières, des renseignements plus complets sur la politique étrangère et les affaires internationales. Fondamentalement, les motifs sont assez clairs : la rapidité des communications modernes et de l'évolution technique a mis en place des conditions matérielles qui font de la planète un village. Les affaires étrangères aujourd'hui ne sont plus la chasse gardée du gouvernement; elles intéressent aussi de façon directe, immédiate et cruciale tous les Canadiens⁶.

La série constitue effectivement la réaction du Canada aux aspects idéologiques de la guerre froide⁷.

Un troisième facteur créa les circonstances propices à une entreprise à dimension historique. En effet, les réalisations du pays sur les plans économique, militaire et politique durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale nourrissaient un nationalisme canadien nouveau et empreint de confiance. Il est donc normal, à la fin des années 40, que le Canada se soit donné une vie culturelle plus développée et dynamique. Dans les milieux de la politique étrangère, on éprouvait en général le sentiment que, étant donné ses contacts plus fréquents avec des nations plus anciennes et plus policées, le Canada devait s'efforcer d'atteindre le même degré de raffinement culturel, comme le dit Paul Litt⁸. Lorsqu'il cite des précédents américains et britanniques pour justifier son projet documentaire, Soward mise sur la fierté que tirerait le Ministère d'avoir contribué à faire passer le Canada du statut de colonie à celui de nation à part entière.

Une bonne partie des écrits portant sur le Canada et le début de la guerre froide traduisent cette fierté. Les auteurs mentionnent souvent que la politique canadienne de l'après-guerre s'écartait radicalement de l'irresponsabilité et de la complaisance des politiques mises en œuvre par Ottawa durant la décennie « malhonnête » des années 30. La Deuxième Guerre mondiale a montré clairement que le Canada ne pouvait se retrancher derrière la sécurité relative du continent nord-américain et a donné à la nouvelle génération de décideurs un goût prononcé pour l'« internationalisme ». Comme se le rappellera par la suite l'un des principaux architectes de la diplomatie canadienne durant la guerre froide, l'isolement passif et le désintérêt ont alors cédé la place à une participation et à un engagement véritables⁹. Les faits étayaient cette opinion. En effet, la recherche d'un ordre économique et politique après la guerre avait propulsé le Canada, sorti plus fort que jamais du conflit, au cœur des efforts

distil equal measures of idealism, pragmatism and imagination into a uniquely Canadian diplomatic style. Canadian diplomats were apt to avoid "bilateralism" in favour of a "multilateralism" that simultaneously promised an era of international cooperation, resolved traditional tensions in Canada's diplomacy and maximized Canadian influence. Freed from the naked self-interest of the Great Powers, Canada exploited its status as a disinterested "middle power" to carve out a role for itself as an effective and reliable mediator, a visionary anxious to build a global community. In the process, Canadian diplomacy during the early Cold War earned a reputation that continues to define Canada's place in the world today.

Although the notion of a "golden age" survived the revisionist assaults of the 1960s and 1970s, it has been evident for some time that the orthodox view required reconsideration. In recent years, the revisionist exercise has accelerated as new document-based research on Canada's international relations during the early Cold War underlines the need for a more elaborate and nuanced reappraisal of postwar diplomacy. While it seems obvious that there was *more* Canadian foreign policy after 1945 than before, the extent and character of this diplomacy seems less certain than it once did. The notion that there was a sudden or significant change in Canadian foreign policy after 1945 has been challenged by a number of scholars. Some have emphasized the substantial role King continued to play in the policy-making process despite the ascendancy of St. Laurent and Pearson,¹¹ others have stressed prewar and wartime developments as evidence of a basic continuity in approach that characterizes Canadian foreign policy;¹² and most have insisted on the fundamentally pragmatic and realistic nature of Canadian diplomacy.

The papers in this collection reflect this continuing effort to define more precisely the nature of Canadian foreign policy during the early Cold War. For some, the idealism traditionally associated with Pearson's foreign policy remains paramount. This is true of Stéphane Roussel's contribution, which addresses Canada's approach to the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty between 1947 and 1949. Roussel contends that Canadian policy-makers were motivated primarily by vague and ill-defined notions of a "North Atlantic Community." Deeply influenced by the liberal democratic ideals of Pearson and St. Laurent, Canada hoped that the new alliance would eventually lead to the formation of a supranational entity and the union of the Western democracies. The idealism of Pearson and St. Laurent was neither novel nor unique, Roussel explains, but was inspired by a utopian tradition that stretches back to the 18th-cen-

déployés par les puissances occidentales afin de mettre en place de nouveaux mécanismes régissant la sécurité collective et le commerce international. Tout laissait croire que la guerre avait transformé la politique étrangère canadienne dans son essence, impression qui se confirma lorsque Louis Saint-Laurent succéda à W.L. Mackenzie King, partisan de la ligne prudente, tout d'abord en tant que secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures puis comme premier ministre¹⁰.

Cette perspective nouvelle, d'après certains, s'est accompagnée d'un bouleversement tout aussi important dans le caractère même de la diplomatie canadienne. En effet, Louis Saint-Laurent, ainsi que les hommes dont il s'est entouré, notamment son sous-ministre Lester B. Pearson qui a pris sa relève par la suite en tant que ministre des Affaires extérieures, a selon toute apparence créé un style diplomatique propre au Canada qui était empreint d'idéalisme, de pragmatisme et d'imagination. Les diplomates canadiens avaient tendance à éviter le « bilatéralisme » au profit du multilatéralisme qui, d'une part, présageait le début d'une ère axée sur la coopération internationale et, d'autre part, résorbait les tensions qui régnaient depuis toujours au sein de la diplomatie canadienne tout en élargissant l'influence du pays. Libéré des considérations égocentriques des grandes puissances, le Canada a tiré parti de son statut de « moyenne puissance » indépendante et s'est donné un rôle de médiateur efficace et fiable, l'image d'une nation visionnaire désireuse de construire une communauté internationale. Par le fait même, la diplomatie canadienne s'est taillé dès le début de la guerre froide une réputation qui définit encore aujourd'hui la place qu'occupe le Canada sur la scène mondiale.

Bien que la notion d'un « Âge d'or » ait survécu aux attaques des révisionnistes des années 60 et 70, il est évident désormais que le point de vue traditionnel doit être réévalué. Récemment, le révisionnisme a progressé : une nouvelle recherche documentaire sur les relations extérieures du Canada durant les premières années de la guerre froide souligne la nécessité de procéder à une évaluation plus poussée et plus nuancée de la diplomatie après la guerre. Même si l'expansion de la politique étrangère canadienne après 1945 est indubitable, sa portée et son caractère semblent moins bien cernés qu'on a pu le croire. Plusieurs historiens mettent en doute l'apparition soudaine d'une politique étrangère canadienne renouvelée après 1945, et certains citent par exemple le rôle considérable que Mackenzie King a continué de jouer dans le processus stratégique, malgré l'influence de Saint-Laurent et de Pearson¹¹. Selon d'autres, l'évolution survenue avant et pendant la guerre témoigne d'une continuité fondamentale dans l'approche qui caractérise la politique étrangère du Canada¹²; la

ture German philosopher Immanuel Kant, his *Projet de paix perpétuelle*, and the criteria he set out for a "Pacific Federation of Free States."

Roussel's emphasis on Pearsonian idealism as the defining characteristic of Canadian policy toward the North Atlantic Alliance is at odds with the views of most of the other contributors. The political scientist Denis Stairs substitutes Metternich for Kant as the inspiration behind Canadian policy. Steeped in a European realist tradition, Canadian politicians and diplomats acknowledged the fundamental importance of power and geography in determining a state's foreign policy. "Security politics," Stairs argues, "were geopolitics." A classic balance of power analysis, reinforced by Ottawa's experience with the Great Powers during the Second World War, determined Canada's pragmatic approach to reconstructing international order after the war. Canadian interpretations of Soviet and American behaviour in the initial phase of the Cold War, the focus of Stairs' work, were also shaped by traditional geopolitical considerations. Hence, for Canadian diplomats, carefully controlled calculations of power and national interest – not ideology – were crucial in developing an effective diplomatic strategy in the Cold War context.

John English shares this view of the importance Canadian diplomacy attached to the cautious and pragmatic pursuit of the national interest in his study of Canada and the United Nations (UN). He draws extensively on recent volumes of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, taking deliberate aim at those who would argue that idealistic Canadians set out bravely in 1945 to construct a better and more cooperative world order through their UN diplomacy. The reality, he argues, was more complex and ambiguous. While Canadians embraced the UN with enthusiasm, making it a central focus of Canada's approach to the world, their diplomats were cautious players, who "eschewed idealism and opted for the sensible rather than the sensational."

Dominique Marshall draws similar conclusions, but she is more critical of Canadian policy in her examination of the UN and its efforts to draft a new Declaration of the Rights of the Child. St. Laurent's cabinet, she contends, feared the impact a UN human rights covenant would have on the country's social fabric, and its potential to complicate federal-provincial relations. The Cold War reinforced Ottawa's doubts about the wisdom of trying to define and protect human rights at the international level. In the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), where East and West divided most often over the nature of human rights, Canadian diplomats responded with an unimaginative kind of "apolitical functionalism."

plupart mettent en lumière la nature essentiellement pragmatique et réaliste de la diplomatie canadienne.

Les documents du présent recueil reflètent des efforts soutenus qui visent à définir plus précisément la nature de la politique du Canada à l'égard du reste du monde durant les premières années de la guerre froide. Certains estiment que l'idéalisme associé depuis toujours à la politique étrangère de Pearson demeure primordial. C'est le cas de Stéphane Roussel, dont l'article traite de la démarche du Canada dans le cadre de la négociation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord entre 1947 et 1949. Roussel soutient que les décideurs canadiens étaient motivés principalement par l'idée vague et mal définie d'une « communauté de l'Atlantique Nord ». Fortement influencé par les idéaux démocratiques libéraux de Pearson et de Saint-Laurent, le Canada espérait que la nouvelle alliance entraînerait par la suite la constitution d'une entité supranationale et l'union des démocraties occidentales. L'idéalisme de ces deux hommes n'avait rien de nouveau ni d'unique, d'après Stéphane Roussel, mais s'inspirait plutôt d'une tradition utopiste qui remonte à Emmanuel Kant, philosophe allemand du XVIII^e siècle, à son projet de paix perpétuelle et aux critères qu'il établit pour ce qu'il appelle la « fédération pacifique des États libres ».

Roussel, en posant l'idéalisme de Pearson comme facteur déterminant de la politique canadienne envers l'alliance de l'Atlantique Nord, se démarque de la plupart des autres auteurs. Selon Denis Stairs, expert en sciences politiques, c'est Metternich et non Kant qui inspire la politique canadienne. En effet, imprégnés de la tradition réaliste européenne, les politiciens et les diplomates canadiens reconnaissent l'importance fondamentale de la puissance et de la situation géographique d'un pays dans la détermination de sa politique étrangère. Selon Denis Stairs, la politique de sécurité est une géopolitique : une analyse traditionnelle de l'équilibre des pouvoirs, soutenue par l'expérience d'Ottawa auprès des grandes puissances pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, a orienté l'approche pragmatique du Canada dans le rétablissement d'un ordre international après la guerre. L'interprétation du comportement de l'Union soviétique et des États-Unis par les instances canadiennes au début de la guerre froide, objet principal des travaux de Denis Stairs, a également été façonnée par des considérations traditionnelles de nature géopolitique. Dès lors, pour les diplomates canadiens, un calcul minutieux fondé sur le pouvoir et l'intérêt national – non pas l'idéologie – s'est révélé crucial dans l'élaboration d'une stratégie diplomatique fructueuse dans le contexte de la guerre froide.

Dans son étude portant sur le Canada et les Nations Unies, John English souscrit à cette évaluation de l'importance qu'attachait la diplomatie cana-

Uninterested in the struggle for human rights, Canada was modestly absorbed in building "an efficient, technical, and non-partisan bureaucracy."

Canada's participation in the Asian Cold War was also modest, based on a sound assessment of Canadian interests and capabilities. In a broad survey of Canadian attitudes and policies toward Asia, Robert Bothwell argues that Canada's European outlook and North Atlantic perspective, and its lack of resources, constrained Ottawa's interest in the Asian Cold War. In Korea, and later in Indochina, Canada assumed its unwanted burdens moved by "the prospect of war in Europe... not war on the continent of Asia." The exception was in India. Its size, the shared imperial heritage, and the minimal resources required to maintain the connection, encouraged Ottawa to pursue a "special relationship" with New Delhi. Ottawa sought to strengthen the Western position in Asia by marrying "Canadian strategy with Indian tactics." This limited policy for an Asian Cold War suited Canada.

Hector Mackenzie and Angelika Sauer, who discuss Canadian diplomacy in two very different contexts, implicitly echo the view that Canadian policy-makers met most Cold War challenges armed with an acute sense of their country's national interest and the limits of its influence. However, both authors are really more interested in addressing the continuities that characterize Canadian policy before and after the onset of the Cold War. Sauer challenges the traditional belief that Canada's perspective on Germany, along with its policy toward the former enemy, changed dramatically in the transition from the Second World War to the Cold War. She argues instead that there was no radical break from the past. Canadians never saw the German problem in isolation, but as a function of the relationship between the Great Powers. As this evolved, Canada's understanding of the German problem and how it could be solved changed accordingly.

Mackenzie similarly emphasizes continuity in his discussion of Canadian trade policy. Although the prewar balance that Canada maintained (offsetting its US trade deficit with a surplus with Britain) was destroyed by the war, Ottawa's approach to international trade and finance "was still dominated by its principal bilateral relationships." While Canada embraced novel multilateral schemes for international economic cooperation, it kept one eye firmly on its financial and trade arrangements with Britain and the United States. Not surprisingly, when it came down to dollars and cents, Canadian politicians and officials were only too ready to set aside their multilateralist preferences in favour of pragmatic solutions to

dienne à la préservation prudente et pragmatique de l'intérêt national. Il puise largement dans les volumes récents des *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*, réfutant les arguments de ceux qui avancent que des Canadiens idéalistes se sont servis de leur présence au sein des Nations Unies pour se lancer bravement en 1945 dans la construction d'un monde meilleur et plus harmonieux. La réalité, d'après M. English, est plus complexe et plus ambiguë : s'il est vrai que le Canada a adhéré avec enthousiasme aux activités des Nations Unies, dont il a fait l'axe de son approche du monde, ses diplomates étaient des gens prudents qui laissaient délibérément de côté l'idéalisme et privilégiaient davantage le bon sens que le sensationnalisme.

Dominique Marshall tire des conclusions semblables, mais elle se fait plus critique à l'égard de la politique canadienne lorsqu'elle examine les Nations Unies et les efforts qu'elle a déployés pour rédiger une nouvelle Déclaration des droits de l'enfant. Le cabinet de Louis Saint-Laurent, affirme-t-elle, craignait l'incidence qu'aurait un engagement des Nations Unies relatif aux droits de la personne sur le tissu social du Canada et d'éventuelles complications dans les relations fédérales-provinciales. La guerre froide est venue confirmer les doutes d'Ottawa quant à la sagesse d'une définition et d'une protection d'envergure internationale dans le domaine des droits humains. Au sein du Conseil économique et social des Nations Unies (ECOSOC), c'est lorsqu'il s'agissait de définir les droits de la personne que les divisions entre pays de l'Est et de l'Ouest se faisaient le plus souvent sentir; les diplomates canadiens ont réagi en adoptant un « fonctionnalisme apolitique » qui témoignait d'un certain manque d'imagination. Peu intéressé par la lutte pour les droits de la personne, le Canada se consacrait à une tâche plus modeste, soit l'instauration d'une bureaucratie efficace, technocratique et non partisane.

La participation canadienne à la guerre froide en Asie s'inscrivait dans cette modestie en se fondant plutôt sur une évaluation éclairée des intérêts et des capacités du Canada. Dans le cadre d'une vaste enquête portant sur les attitudes et les politiques canadiennes envers l'Asie, Robert Bothwell fait valoir que, le Canada étant tourné vers l'Europe et voyant les choses dans une perspective nord-atlantique – et ses ressources faisant défaut –, l'intérêt canadien dans le conflit asiatique est resté limité. En Corée, puis plus tard en Indochine, le Canada a assumé un fardeau qu'il ne souhaitait pas, non à cause des risques de guerre sur le continent asiatique mais en raison de la perspective d'un conflit en Europe. La seule exception a été l'Inde : en effet, la taille de la péninsule indienne, son passé impérial britannique semblable à celui du Canada et les ressources minimales nécessaires au main-

the country's economic problems.

Larry Black's paper on the Soviet worldview is a step removed from this discussion on the nature of Canadian foreign policy. But like the other papers in this collection, his study of the Soviet Union's view of Cold War Canada constitutes an extended reflection on an important question for all diplomatic historians: the nature of the relationship between ideology and policy. Drawing on the Communist view of Canada to illustrate his case, Black contends that Soviet Cold War policy was defined primarily by Stalinist ideology. Thus, Moscow concluded early on that Canada was simply the prize in an Anglo-American struggle for Western primacy and the "platform" for an anticipated assault on the USSR.

Black's emphasis on the ideological contrasts with the pragmatism that dominated policy formation in Canada and helps underline the point that reverberates throughout this volume: Canada's postwar foreign policy was essentially realistic and modest, defined by the immutable forces of geography and history.

lien des liens entre les deux pays ont incité Ottawa à préserver une relation privilégiée avec New Delhi. Le Canada a cherché à consolider la position occidentale en Asie en conjuguant la stratégie canadienne et les tactiques indiennes. Cette politique restreinte envers la guerre froide en Asie convenait au Canada.

Hector Mackenzie et Angelika Sauer, qui discutent de la diplomatie canadienne dans deux contextes très différents, partagent implicitement l'opinion selon laquelle les décideurs canadiens ont relevé la plupart des défis présentés par la guerre froide avec un sens poussé de l'intérêt de leur pays et des limites de son influence. Cependant, les deux auteurs cherchent plutôt à analyser la continuité qui distingue la politique canadienne avant et pendant la guerre froide. Sauer remet en question la conviction bien établie selon laquelle le point de vue du Canada face à l'Allemagne, ainsi que sa politique envers son ancien ennemi, s'est transformé en profondeur dans la période de transition qui va de la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale jusqu'au début de la guerre froide. À son avis, il n'y aurait pas eu de coupure radicale avec le passé, car les Canadiens n'ont jamais envisagé le problème allemand de façon isolée mais plutôt en fonction des rapports entre les grandes puissances. Au fur et à mesure que ces liens se tissaient, le Canada voyait la question allemande et les solutions possibles de manière différente.

Hector Mackenzie souligne également le phénomène de la continuité dans son analyse de la politique commerciale canadienne. Même si la balance commerciale canadienne d'avant la guerre (où le déficit commercial avec les États-Unis était compensé par l'excédent des opérations avec la Grande-Bretagne) a été rompue par la guerre, la démarche d'Ottawa en matière de commerce et de finances à l'échelle internationale restait dominée par ses principales relations bilatérales. Alors que le Canada adhérerait volontiers aux nouveaux régimes multilatéraux visant la coopération économique internationale, il ne perdait néanmoins pas de vue ses arrangements financiers et commerciaux avec la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis. Il n'est donc pas surprenant que, là où l'argent entrait en jeu, les politiciens et dignitaires canadiens n'hésitaient jamais à mettre de côté leurs préférences pour le multilatéralisme et à se rabattre sur des solutions pragmatiques afin de résoudre les problèmes économiques du pays.

L'article de Larry Black sur la vision du monde de l'Union soviétique se distingue de la discussion relative à la nature de la politique étrangère canadienne. Par contre, à l'instar des autres documents de la collection, son étude de la perception qu'avait l'Union soviétique du Canada à l'époque de la guerre froide constitue une réflexion poussée sur une question

NOTES

1. F.H. Soward, Memorandum for the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, June 22, 1949, RG 25, Volume 2634, File 997-F-40, National Archives of Canada (NAC).
2. F.H. Soward, Memorandum for the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, June 22, 1949. On Soward and the nationalism that infused his historiography, see Margaret A. Ormsby, "Introduction", in Harvey Dyck and K. Peter Krosby, eds., *Empire and Nations: Essays in Honour of Frederic H. Soward* (Toronto, 1969), pp. xi-xvi. See also, F.H. Soward, "Inside a Canadian Triangle: the university, the CIIA, and the Department of External Affairs: A personal record," *International Journal*, XXXIII (Winter 1977-78), pp. 66-87.
3. F.H. Soward, Memorandum for Mr. MacDermot, RG 25, Vol 2643, File 997-F-40, NAC.
4. Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing, 1900-1970* (Toronto, 1976), pp. 29-30.
5. Robert Bothwell and John English, "The view from inside out: Canadian diplomats and their public," *International Journal*, XXXIX (Winter 1983-84), pp. 59-62.
6. Cited in L.A.D. Stephens, "Study of Canadian Government Information Abroad 1942-1972: The Development of the Information, Cultural and Academic Divisions and their Policies," 1977, unpublished mimeograph, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Library, Chapter III, pp. 13-14.
7. Ironically, when the first volumes of the *DCER* were finally published in the late 1960s, they were widely criticized for being too discreet and for failing to illustrate the operations of the Department of External Affairs. For further details, see Greg Donaghy, "Documenting the Diplomats: The Origins and Evolution of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*," a paper presented to the National Library of Canada's *Savoir Faire* series, February 17, 1998.
8. Much of this discussion is based on Paul Litt's study, *The Muses, the Masses and the Massey Commission* (Toronto, 1992), pp. 17-22.
9. L.B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2, 1948-1957* (Toronto, 1973), pp. 28-32, cited in Leigh Sarty, "The Limits of Internationalism: Canada and the Soviet

importante pour tous les historiens de la diplomatie : la nature des liens entre l'idéologie et la politique. S'inspirant du point de vue communiste sur le Canada, Black affirme que la politique soviétique durant la guerre froide se définissait principalement à partir de l'idéologie staliniste. Par conséquent, Moscou a conclu très vite que le Canada constituait simplement l'enjeu de la lutte anglo-américaine pour la domination en Occident et le « tremplin » d'une attaque prévisible contre l'URSS.

L'importance que Black accorde à l'idéologie contraste avec le pragmatisme qui a dominé la formation de la politique au Canada et met en lumière un thème qui sous-tend le volume : la politique canadienne étrangère de l'après-guerre était essentiellement réaliste et modeste, mais se définissait également d'après les forces immuables de la géographie et de l'histoire.


Blockade of Berlin, 1948-1949," in J.L. Black and Norman Hillmer, eds., *Nearly Neighbours: Canada and the Soviet Union – from Cold War to Détente and Beyond* (Ottawa, 1990), p. 56. The classic and most elegant discussion of the postwar transformation in Canadian foreign policy is John Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957*, 2 Volumes, (Toronto, 1979 and 1982). For a more recent formulation of this theme, see Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto, 1993).

10. Hector Mackenzie, "The Cold War and the Limits of 'Internationalism' in Canada's Foreign Relations, 1945-1949," York Centre for International and Security Studies, Occasional paper Number 47, July 1997, pp. 6-7.
11. See, for example, Norman Hillmer and Donald Page, eds., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 13: 1947* (Ottawa, 1993), p. xix; and Hector Mackenzie, *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 14: 1948* (Ottawa, 1994), pp. xiv-xxv. See also, Greg Donaghy, "The Politics of Indecision: Canada and the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, Spring 1996, pp. 115-31.
12. See, for example, Reg Whitaker, "From World War to Cold War," in Greg Donaghy, ed., *Uncertain Horizons: Canadians and their World in 1945* (Ottawa, 1997), pp. 305-23.

NOTES

1. F.H. Soward, Note à l'intention du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, 22 juin 1949, RG 25, volume 2634, dossier 997-F-40, Archives nationales du Canada.
2. F.H. Soward, Note à l'intention du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, 22 juin 1949. Sur Soward et le nationalisme qui inspire son historiographie, voir Margaret A. Ormsby, « Introduction », dans Harvey Dyck et K. Peter Krosby, dir., *Empire and Nations: Essays in Honour of Frederic H. Soward* (Toronto, 1969), pp. xi-xvi. Voir également F.H. Soward, « Inside a Canadian Triangle: the university, the CIIA, and the Department of External Affairs: A personal record », *International Journal*, XXXIII (hiver 1977-1978), pp. 66-87.
3. F.H. Soward, Note à l'intention de M. MacDermot, RG 25, vol. 2643, dossier 997-F-40, Archives nationales du Canada.
4. Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing, 1900-1970* (Toronto, 1976), pp. 29 et 30.
5. Robert Bothwell et John English, « The view from inside out: Canadian diplomats and their public », *International Journal*, XXXIX (hiver 1983-1984), pp. 59-62.
6. Cité dans L.A.D. Stephens, « Study of Canadian Government Information Abroad 1942-1972: The Development of the Information, Cultural and Academic Divisions and their Policies », 1977, photocopié inédit, bibliothèque du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international, chapitre III, pp. 13 et 14. [Traduction libre]
7. Ironiquement, lors de leur publication à la fin des années 60, on a vertement critiqué les premiers volumes de la série *DREC* pour avoir fait preuve d'une trop grande discrétion et pour avoir omis d'illustrer les activités du ministère des Affaires extérieures. Pour plus de détails, voir Greg Donaghy, « Documenting the Diplomats: The Origins and Evolution of Documents on Canadian External Relations », communication présentée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada dans le cadre de la série *Savoir Faire*, 17 février 1998.
8. Une bonne partie de cette discussion se fonde sur l'étude de Paul Litt intitulée *The Muses, the Masses and the Massey Commission* (Toronto, 1992), pp. 17-22.


9. L.B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, volume 2, 1948-1957 (Toronto, 1973), pp. 28-32, cité par Leigh Sarty dans son article « The Limits of Internationalism: Canada and the Soviet Blockade of Berlin, 1948-1949 », dans J.L. Black and Norman Hillmer, dir., *Nearly Neighbours: Canada and the Soviet Union – from Cold War to Détente and Beyond* (Ottawa, 1990), p. 56. Une discussion classique et des plus élégantes de la transformation de la politique étrangère canadienne après la guerre est offerte par John Holmes, dans *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957*, 2 volumes, (Toronto, 1979 et 1982). Pour une plus récente formulation de ce thème, voir Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto, 1993).
10. Hector Mackenzie, « The Cold War and the Limits of "Internationalism" in Canada's Foreign relations, 1945-1949 », York Centre for International and Security Studies, document occasionnel numéro 47, juillet 1997, pp. 6 et 7.
11. Voir par exemple Norman Hillmer et Donald Page, dir., *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*, volume 13 : 1947 (Ottawa, 1993), p. xix; et Hector Mackenzie, *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*, volume 14 : 1948 (Ottawa, 1994), pp. xiv-xxv. Voir également Greg Donaghy, « The Politics of Indecision: Canada and the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission », *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, printemps 1996, pp. 115-131.
12. Voir par exemple Reg Whitaker, « From World War to Cold War », dans Greg Donaghy, dir., *Uncertain Horizons: Canadians and their World in 1945* (Ottawa, 1997), pp. 305-323.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The conference on Canada and the early Cold War which gave rise to this collection of essays was made possible through the generous support of many individuals. Conference sessions were chaired by the Honourable Michel Dupuy, the late John Halstead, Geoffrey Pearson and Jake Warren. These former members of the foreign service, who played an important role in shaping Canada's Cold War diplomacy, enlivened the academic proceedings with their recollections. For their contribution, I am deeply grateful.

Simon Wade and Gaston Barban, directors of the Communications Programs and Outreach Division, were encouraging and provided strong administrative support. John Hilliker, head of the Department's Historical Section, was the source of many wise and practical suggestions. As always, my colleagues in the Historical Section, Paul Anderson, Christopher Cook, Mary Halloran, and Ted Kelly willingly responded to my immoderate requests for help. I am also grateful to Blair Seaborn (Canadian Institute of International Affairs) and Peter Stockdale (United Nations Association of Canada) for their help, and to Norman Hillmer, who provided advice garnered from a lifetime of editing.



REMERCIEMENTS

La conférence consacrée au Canada des premières années de la guerre froide, point de départ de cette série d'essais, a été possible grâce à la générosité de nombreuses personnes. Les diverses séances ont été présidées par l'honorable Michel Dupuy, le regretté John Halstead, Geoffrey Pearson et Jake Warren. Ces anciens membres du service extérieur, qui ont grandement marqué la scène diplomatique canadienne pendant la guerre froide, ont contribué à agrémenter ces séances de leurs souvenirs, et je leur en suis profondément reconnaissant.

Simon Wade et Gaston Barban, directeurs des Programmes des communications et de la Division de la promotion, jamais avares d'encouragements, m'ont assuré un solide appui administratif. John Hilliker, chef de la Section historique du Ministère, m'a gratifié d'une foule de suggestions aussi sages que pratiques. Comme toujours, mes collègues de la Section historique, Paul Anderson, Christopher Cook, Mary Halloran et Ted Kelly, ont répondu sans hésitation à mes demandes d'aide les plus déraisonnables. Je remercie également Blair Seaborn (Institut canadien des affaires internationales) et Peter Stockdale (Association canadienne pour les Nations Unies) de leur aide, ainsi que Norman Hillmer qui, fort de sa longue expérience des milieux de l'édition, nous a prodigué de précieux conseils.

1870

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

THE COLD WAR'S CRADLE: CANADA, THE GREAT POWERS, AND GERMANY, 1943-1948

Angelika Sauer

RÉSUMÉ : *L'article conteste la conception conventionnelle suivant laquelle la vision canadienne de l'Allemagne – tout comme sa politique à l'égard de l'ancien ennemi – s'est modifiée radicalement à un moment quelconque entre la Seconde Guerre mondiale et la guerre froide. L'auteur soutient au contraire qu'il n'y a pas eu de rupture radicale avec le passé et que c'est la continuité, et non le changement, qui caractérisait la politique canadienne. Les décideurs canadiens n'ont jamais considéré le problème allemand isolément, mais en fonction des rapports entre les grandes puissances. À mesure que ceux-ci évoluaient, les perceptions canadiennes du problème allemand et des solutions envisagées évoluaient elles aussi. Nonobstant l'influence grandissante qu'exerçait la guerre froide, il y avait une certaine continuité entre les thèses reconstructionnistes issues des années de planification durant la guerre et la réintégration éventuelle de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest dans l'alliance occidentale. Les mises en garde relativement à la possibilité que l'Allemagne puisse troubler l'ordre mondial représentaient une seconde facette de la politique canadienne à cette époque. C'est ainsi qu'entre 1943 et 1948, la naissance de la guerre froide devait amener les décideurs canadiens non pas à modifier leurs vues de façon radicale, mais plutôt à les ajuster en fonction des circonstances.*

In his most recent book, *The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War*, Canadian historian Robert Bothwell describes the East-West conflict as simply "a succession of episodes, of phases."¹ For almost half a century, an icy kaleidoscope of international relations shifted and changed constantly without breaking its basic parameters, creating a sequence that found a clear and cathartic end in the jubilant celebrations atop the breached Berlin Wall. Historians search in vain for an equally dramatic or even clearly delineated

starting point. It may seem fitting, though admittedly clichéd, to use the Berlin blockade and airlift as an appropriate bracket. This leaves the time between the first sure signs that the Allies would win the war in late 1943 and the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948-49 as an "in-between time," a twilight zone easing the world from one type of hostility into another.

The idea of a transitional period of uncertain peace after a major war is not new. The task of cleaning up after the ravages of warring armies requires unusual measures. So too does the challenge of crafting a peace settlement that satisfies both the morally justifiable as well as the purely opportunistic demands of the victors. Popular attitudes, coarsened by wartime, need some time to be purged and channelled into more genteel peacetime sensibilities. Above all, the notion of a transitional period implies acquiescence in a degree of unpleasantness that would be unacceptable in a period of "normalcy." It explains, for example, why certain types of international behaviour, though clearly repugnant, may be tolerated among allies of a recently concluded war.

In discussing any transitional period, the question of continuity quickly arises. In the Canadian context, it has been posed by Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, who examine the many threads tying together Canadian political history during the Second World War with developments in the 1940s and 1950s.² Their approach is not entirely new. Some historians have argued that Wilsonian universalism fundamentally changed the rules of an international system based on regional balances of power and thereby date the origins of Soviet-American antagonism to the First World War. They conceded long ago that Western countries never fully trusted the Soviet Union, even at the height of their alliance during the Second World War. Similarly, there is increasingly clear evidence that the Soviet Union never abandoned its plans for world revolution, though the focus shifted from class struggle to territorial expansion to suit Stalin's paranoid security needs.³ Thus, it has been demonstrated that the pre-history of the Cold War already contained the basic ingredients of the polarization that came to characterize the postwar world. It remains necessary, however, for historians to explore the question of continuity in individual national policies, especially in those actions that were central to a country's international position.

Despite the historiographical emphasis on atomic energy, the Western alliance, Canadian-American relations, or even the evolving Commonwealth, it is hard to overlook the centrality of the German problem in Canada's for-

eign policy during the mid-1940s. Bothwell reminds us that in 1946 and 1947 the main field of contention between the former allies was defeated Germany. This point is argued even more strongly by American historian Carolyn Eisenberg for whom "the division of Germany was not only the most dramatic embodiment of the collapse of Great Power cooperation; it was also a fundamental cause of global polarization."⁴ Historians generally agree that both sides in the emerging Cold War were haunted by the German ghost of battles past and the lessons learned from two world wars. The German problem shaped the postwar world in more ways than one.

To discuss Canada's view of and policy toward Germany, then, casts light on the country's position in the period of transition that marked the second half of the 1940s. Canadian policy-makers never saw the German problem in isolation but always as a function of the relationship between the Great Powers. As this relationship evolved – both as a cause and as a consequence of events in Germany – Canadian understanding of the German problem and how it could be solved changed. One might suggest that a Cold War lens began to refract the Canadian image of Europe at some point during the postwar years, leading to a redefinition of the problem and a new policy toward the former enemy. Yet was this shift in focus really a radical break with the past? Were universalist hopes of lasting peace under the United Nations (UN) suddenly abandoned for the vision of a Western preponderance of power, with Germany as the keystone in a Western alliance? Was there a clear turning point on the road from war to Cold War or does the Canadian evidence support the notion of a transitional phase dominated by continuities?

This paper argues that there were two strong elements of continuity in Canadian policy toward defeated Germany. A degree of continuity existed between the reconstructionist views of wartime planners in Ottawa and their later decision to support the integration of a reconstructed Germany into the West European economy. Canadian policy was also shaped by a constant chorus of cautionary voices that warned of Germany's potential to disturb world peace. Thus, Canadians (both policy-makers and the attentive public) did not so much radically alter their thinking about Germany as fine-tune it. In the five years from 1943 to 1948, Canadian views evolved in three stages, each providing a different context for definitions, solutions, and practical implications of the German problem. The first stage assumed Great Power cooperation after the war; the second dealt with evidence of Great Power dissension; and the third had to cope with Germany as one of the first open battlegrounds of the Cold War.

During the war years, hopes were high that the grand alliance of great and smaller powers united to defeat Hitler would continue to deal with the world's problems together once peace had been won. One of the most immediate of these problems concerned the fate of post-surrender Germany. Lively discussions within and outside official circles in Canada tried to define the nature of the German problem and the best approach to solving it. In their search for an explanation, Canadians relied on one of three interpretations. For instance, George Glazebrook, a special wartime assistant in the Department of External Affairs, defined the problem as a phenomenon rooted in the inherent aggressiveness of the German character and the logical outcome of the philosophies of Johann Fichte and Johann von Herder with their unabashed espousal of superiority and Germany's right to dominate its neighbours.⁵ A second view, espoused by Escott Reid, a rising second secretary in the department, rejected this static and collectivist view of German national pathology for a left-liberal interpretation based on systemic shortcomings. He argued "that the Germans did not succumb to a peculiarly German disease but to a disease which is endemic in modern society." The Western powers ought to "take steps not only to eradicate the roots of fascism from Germany but also to eradicate them from our own countries."⁶ While the first interpretation equated Germans and Nazis, and the second stressed the difference between progressive forces and fascist leaders, a third perspective (part of the institutional mindset of the Canadian military) defined the culprit as the same Prussian Junker class that had instigated the First World War. Surveys of First World War veterans and non-commissioned soldiers fighting in Europe in 1945 demonstrated the popularity of this thesis, a typical cartoon depicting the scissors of the United Nations cutting the strings of a German soldier puppet led by the hands of the Junker generals.⁷

The application of the lessons of the First World War to the Second was common among the rest of the Canadian public as well: a majority of survey respondents suggested a causal link between the failures of Versailles and the outbreak of the war.⁸ And as the war progressed, Canadians on the whole were increasingly unwilling to draw a distinction between Germans and Nazis, tacitly accepting that aggression was an intrinsic German characteristic unrelated to the form of government.⁹ During the final year of the war, editorials displayed "no leanings towards a 'soft' peace."¹⁰

Demands for justice and retribution, however popular, were generally subordinated in expert opinion to another overarching objective: preventing another major war. Everyone agreed that the treatment of Germany

was a cornerstone in the postwar order. "On the wisdom of Allied policy toward Germany may well depend the peace of Europe after the war," one memorandum stated, while another added that the "hope of lasting peace depends, more than on any other single factor, on the solution of the German problem." How best to approach such a solution was not clear, but proposals tended to include measures to weaken Germany's military potential and to control it permanently with constructive measures such as reeducation (especially of Germany's youth), political reform, and reintegration into the European community of nations.¹¹

The view that Germany represented a continuing threat to European security was reflected in demands for full military occupation, Allied administration, and an international police force under the joint authority of UN representatives. This was considered a long-term commitment as only 28 percent of Canadians believed that Germany could become a good nation within 20 years, while the rest thought that this would never happen or would take much longer than two decades. In September 1945, the Quebec paper, *Le Jour*, summed up the sentiment: "L'Allemagne n'est nullement en voie de réhabilitation. La population ne montre aucun regret des atrocités commises et ne regrette que d'avoir raté la victoire. Ce qui indique une mentalité dangereuse. Il faudra des longues années avant de désintoxiquer, même partiellement, le Reich."

At the same time, it was taken for granted that European reconstruction would depend on the participation of the German economy and that the German people should be allowed, even forced, to play a constructive role in rebuilding the continent. Europe, according to Winnipeg international relations expert Edgar Tarr, needed Germany's industrial capacity. It would be "foolishly shortsighted to reduce her to an agricultural country."¹² US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau's plan to turn Germany into a "pastoral country" was dismissed by many Canadian observers as "extreme," "wild," "devoid of any constructive features," and "clouds of hot air."¹³

Did this emphasis on maintaining an economically strong Germany amount to a move inherently hostile toward the Soviet Union? Were Canadians planning for a Soviet threat when they considered the future of Germany? The evidence suggests that this was not the case. There was, no doubt, a general awareness that the German problem had the potential to cause friction between the allies. The Department of External Affairs' Russian specialists, Dana Wilgress and Arnold Smith, predicted that "a serious clash of views between the Soviet Union and the Western powers is more likely to arise over the German problem than over any other of the

peace problems."¹⁴ Whether the potential for friction was realized would depend, according to historian Arthur Lower "on the estimate formed by English and American Conservatives of the degree to which Russia is to be regarded a threat."¹⁵

Detailed studies have shown that both the British Foreign Office and the United States State Department based their postwar plans mainly "on fears of a resurgence of German aggression" and on the need for long-term cooperation with the Soviet Union. Gladwyn Jebb, a Foreign Office counsellor, called the idea of "building up our enemies to defeat our allies... some kind of suicidal mania." His colleague, the deputy under-secretary of state, Sir Orme Sargent, labelled it "a most disastrous heresy."¹⁶ Similarly, a study of State Department thinking indicates that American proposals were "not based on returning [Germany] to the balance as a possible counter to the Soviets, but rather on a combination of policies that all the major powers could agree on."¹⁷ There was some concern about Poland and the effect of pushing the territory of that country westward at the expense of Germany. George Kennan warned in late 1944 that "the farther the western frontier of Poland is advanced into Germany, the greater will be the dependence of the Poles, economically and militarily, on the Soviet Union... It makes unrealistic the idea of a free and independent Poland."¹⁸ On the whole, however, the United States and Britain were aware that they could not challenge the Soviet Union on the issue of the Polish-German frontier without being willing and able to counter the factual power of the Red Army in Eastern Europe. They hoped instead for continued Great Power cooperation in seeking an overall peace settlement in Europe.

Based on its own observations, the attitude in the Department of External Affairs toward the Soviet factor closely resembled the views adopted in Washington and London. Wilgress predicted in the fall of 1944, two months before Kennan, that incorporating German territory into Poland "would make the Poles still more dependent on the Soviet Union." Moreover, Glazebrook's important memorandum on the future of Germany dismissed any idea of keeping Germany strong as a counterweight to the Soviet Union: "it may be expected to be remembered that Germany has been the aggressor." Wilgress called any thoughts of maintaining Germany as a counterweight potentially "fatal to the whole prospect of cooperation for peace among the three powers." In his judgement, the Soviet Union was "never likely to be so prone to disturb the peace of the world as a hemmed-in Germany." However, Wilgress contin-



An unidentified trooper of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion shakes hands with a Soviet officer at the end of the war in Wismar, Germany. The friendship was short lived.

CHARLES H. RICHER/NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA/PA-150930

ued, a future Soviet-German combination was to be avoided, ideally by maintaining Allied unity. Charles Ritchie, a first secretary in the department, agreed. If there was a common allied policy toward Germany for a period of years, none of the Great Powers would feel the need for unilateral action, denying Germany the room to manoeuvre.¹⁹ For Canada, then, the most important elements in its wartime approach to the German problem were the need for Allied unity and the future containment of Germany. Soviet power in Eastern Europe was a factor to be reckoned with, but not yet to be feared.

In concrete terms, this emphasis on Great Power unity in the treatment of Germany forced Canada to accept less than ideal solutions in erecting the international institutions that would oversee the postwar world order. Most members of the department shared the view that preventing aggression in general and dealing specifically with the German problem were two different issues, but hoped that eventually, after an interim period,

peace enforcement could be integrated into the new UN organization. However, the peace settlement in Europe quickly began to display all the signs of traditional Great Power bargaining, involving calculations of national policy and political advantage. It was, according to the Foreign Office, a way to clear up the past rather than a step into the future. American columnist Walter Lippmann agreed that the future, which carried the promise of a universal society and a reign of law, would have to wait until a rational, power-based settlement was established.²⁰ Article 107 of the UN Charter excluded the peace settlements from the mandate of the United Nations. It stipulated that no provision of the Charter should preclude action taken as a result of the war against former enemy states. When Canada's under-secretary of state for external affairs, Norman Robertson, asked for a clarification of this article at the UN's founding conference in San Francisco, he was told by a member of the American delegation to let sleeping dogs lie, "particularly when they are such very large dogs."²¹

Reconciling idealism with the reality of power politics, the Department of External Affairs came to regard the peace settlement as the necessary period of transition, a step out of the chaos of the war and into the brave new world during which the Great Powers would be acting as trustees for the lesser powers. As Hume Wrong, assistant under-secretary of state for external affairs and the department's consummate realist, told journalist Bruce Hutchison, the Big Three had "to settle the mess of the war" in a way that all Great Powers could agree upon. Once that controversial task was completed "it might be possible to secure a better league agreement."²² The desire to integrate the peace settlement and the UN was expressed in the department's decision to have one division responsible for both. Yet acceptance of a temporary Great Power alliance proved a slippery slope. It implied that if there was a lack of agreement on issues dealing with the German problem, Canada would have to choose sides, supporting one or more of the Great Powers against the other powers. Canada, instead of working for universalist principles of lasting peace, would end up helping the powers pursue their limited national interests in Germany and Central Europe. This became important as the assumption of Great Power cooperation gave way to evidence of Great Power dissension.

The "honeymoon period of collaboration" between the Western powers and the Soviet Union was quickly coming to an end in the smouldering ruins of post-hostilities Germany.²³ In the day-to-day administration of the defeated country during late 1945 and 1946, the incompatibility of

interests and the basic unwillingness of all participants to compromise were shown in a stark light. Ottawa soon drew conclusions about events in Germany which made British policy appear as the only reasonable and logical course. American policy was floundering, drifting between the competing definitions of the national interest in Germany developed by the different government agencies involved. What was worse, it was not yet clear whether the United States was committed to remaining an active participant in European affairs. French policy was forcefully defended by the Canadian representative in Berlin, General Maurice Pope, who believed that it was guided only by security considerations; however, the Department of External Affairs was more aware of the commercial and economic motives behind French proposals for Germany and found them unnecessarily destructive.²⁴ This left British initiatives, and in its broad support for London's policies the Canadian government showed itself clearly as a participant in the emerging division of Germany between East and West.

The worst scenario predicted during the war was a "competition between the Soviet Union and the democracies, each trying to build up an eventual friendly Germany as a possible ally."²⁵ The collapse of allied harmony over the administration of Germany in 1945 and 1946 brought about a constellation that resembled this scenario to a dangerous extent. However, it can be argued that the redefinition of the German problem was not as abrupt and complete as a Cold War interpretation might imply. This becomes obvious in the discussions about reparations and the economic disarmament of Germany.

Although the Soviet government was widely recognized as having a strong moral claim to large indemnities, the United States, Britain, and also Canada were primarily concerned with what was economically practical. The Soviet Union could absorb forced labour and annual deliveries from current production, but the West had to worry about the distortions of the domestic market that would result from such a policy.²⁶ More importantly, these governments feared that they would end up footing the reparations bill by having to carry the burden of relief. Douglas LePan, the economic specialist at the Canadian High Commission in London, made this point after a meeting with British financial experts in Cambridge: "[F]oodstuffs will be funnelled [into Germany] in at one end by the supply countries, chiefly the United States and Canada, and exports will be funnelled out at the other end to Russia as reparations." Canada, a British Treasury representative said bluntly, "will be left holding the bag."²⁷ To prevent this, it was essential that imports for relief were the first charge on all Germany's fixed

assets and its current production.

Therefore, maintaining Germany's industrial capacity at a reasonable level was, first and foremost, a matter of Canadian self-interest, rather than a measure directed against the Soviet Union. During the Paris reparations conference in late 1945, Canada, Britain, and the United States argued against reparations from current production and supported the first-charge principle. The 12 nations opposing this line needed German industrial goods for postwar reconstruction and were not exporters of relief food-stuffs and raw material.²⁸ This was not a Cold War issue but a matter of postwar economics; the fault lines did not coincide with political fissures.

In Ottawa's opinion, the crux of the economic treatment of Germany lay in reconciling the demands for security with the exigent requirements of Europe's peacetime economy. Germany had to be eliminated as a military power without destroying the country as an economic power. Glazebrook called it "a conflict between permitting Germany to prosper and the danger that such freedom of action may be but permission to beat ploughshares into swords."²⁹ An impoverished Germany would radiate economic depression from the centre to adjoining economies, gravely disturbing the prospects for a multilateral trade system. Germany "stripped of her possessions" would become "a charnel-house and centre of infection for the rest of Europe." The restructuring and reorientation of German industry, not its destruction for the sake of security or reparations, seemed to be the right course.³⁰

Canadian economic interests, a suspicion that reparations provided an ineffective way to prevent future German aggression, and a broad definition of security that incorporated the economic pacification of Europe placed Canada in the camp of the advocates of a moderate reparations policy and in direct opposition to Soviet intentions in Germany. A similar line-up occurred at the Paris peace conference which was convened in the summer of 1946. Early on, conference participants revealed a tendency to bloc voting. This phenomenon first emerged during the meeting of the General Assembly where Wrong, detecting Latin American, Arab, and Slav voting blocs, warned that the "outside" world spoke of a Commonwealth bloc as well.³¹ In the *New York Times*, columnist James Reston suggested that loyalty to one of the sponsoring powers would most likely determine the voting behaviour of the smaller powers, including the Dominions: "Despite the vigorous individualism that prevails within the British Commonwealth, we shall probably not see... Canada... vigorously opposing Great Britain on an essential issue."³² Reston's guess turned out to be prophetic. Almost apolo-

getically, the Canadian delegation's conference report admitted that the Commonwealth had voted together as frequently as the Soviet bloc (in fact, on final tally they had voted as a bloc more frequently than the group led by the Soviet Union).³³ More importantly, the Commonwealth had become part of a larger entity: with no Latin Americans and Arabs present, a "Western" bloc was the only counterpart to the so-called "Slav group." The votes at the final plenary were counted out 15 to 6, "with the mechanical regularity of a cash register."³⁴

It can therefore be argued that Canada consciously contributed to the East-West split out of old habits. After all, according to Ritchie, this was "a tussle of power politics" and Canada was "part of an Anglo-Saxon team."³⁵ The Canadian delegation would not dream of voting with the Soviet bloc, no matter what the issue, and as a result, Ottawa had become part of the Anglo-Soviet cold war in the heart of Europe. Canada's observer in Berlin was one of the first to notice the chilling of the atmosphere, reporting a "sensation of grim opposition of conflicting forces, glacier-like one might almost say." A struggle had begun "between the East and the West over the prostrate body of Germany."³⁶

In early May 1946, Reid, now head of the department's division responsible for relations with Europe, argued that the German problem was no longer a question of preventing future German aggression, but "how to get a settlement which will lessen the chances of war between the Soviet world and the Western world." In a memorandum given to Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King in preparation for the 1946 Commonwealth prime ministers' meeting in London, Ritchie was even less sanguine. Where Moscow and the Western countries had once shared a concern for eliminating the German menace, he noted, they now suspected each other of planning to use Germany as part of their respective opposing blocs.³⁷ The British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, spelled out these fears: "Up till recent months we have thought of the German problem solely in Germany itself, our purpose having been to devise the best means of preventing the revival of a strong, aggressive Germany... This can no longer be regarded as our sole purpose, or, indeed, perhaps as our primary one. For the danger of Russia has become certainly as great as, and possibly even greater than, that of a revived Germany."³⁸ In a second memorandum prepared in early June 1946, Ritchie explained that "United Kingdom policy towards Germany is now at the parting of the ways." Handing Ritchie's work to King, Wrong spoke of the "very grave importance of the decisions which must be taken before long."³⁹



Photograph taken during the closing days of the 1946 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in London. L to r: British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and his Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin; Canada's High Commissioner to the UK, Vincent Massey and Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King. On their right stand Walter Nash, Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand, and H.V. Evatt, Australia's Foreign Minister.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA/C-45193

By the end of 1946, Canadian officials conceded the necessity of firmly containing Soviet influence behind the Elbe, but they were less sure in their corresponding attitude toward the role of Germany and the Germans in this new policy. Reid seemed prepared to give them the benefit of the doubt, suggesting an approach that would combine a minimum of control with a maximum of constructive political and economic measures.⁴⁰ Pope, however, repeated time and again that the control of Germany's military potential should remain a priority of Western policy. The general believed most Germans to be "aggressors at heart" who were "either at our throats or at our feet."⁴¹ Ritchie agreed, and cautioned that there was a "danger that in their anxiety about Soviet expansion the United Kingdom Government may underestimate the danger of the revival of German military power." Firm safeguards against future German aggression had to remain a part of any policy in Germany. An all too obvious wooing of the Germans would open the door to political blackmail; any attempt to rebuild the western part as a bulwark against the Soviet Union would render the occupying powers overly dependent on the cooperation of the former enemy.⁴²

In 1947, a further shift in emphasis occurred as officials became increasingly preoccupied with the future of Soviet-American, rather than Soviet-British, relations. Within the new bipolar framework, the question of Germany's role in future world peace still elicited traditional concerns. However, some officials suggested that Germany's aggressive potential was under control and had become, in any case, secondary in importance to the Soviet threat. In this line of reasoning, the German problem had certainly emerged as a function of the East-West conflict and possibly even represented the root cause of it. "Both sides fear that the other wishes to make use of the Germans against them, and as long as this fear exists the only solutions of the German question... are either the splitting of Germany into two or the giving in by Western powers to Soviet desires," Wilgress speculated. The acceptance of a Soviet-dominated united Germany was obviously not an option.⁴³ As Gerry Riddell, head of the department's first political division that was charged with post-hostilities problems, told the Toronto branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the "central problem is no longer that of Germany but of the balance that must now be established amongst the victors."⁴⁴

This view gained more adherents in the spring of 1947 when the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers failed, marking Germany as the epicentre of East-West tension. It was reinforced by the collapse of the London meeting of foreign ministers at the end of the year, a final failure which sealed the fate of that four-power body. The interests of the main players in Germany had now been publicly acknowledged as conflicting and contradictory, too vital to be considered in isolation and the stakes of each of the occupying powers too high to permit an easy compromise. A speedy solution of the German problem was now highly improbable, but without it there would be no peace and security in Europe. From London, Canadian High Commissioner Norman Robertson warned that the "division of Europe and the world has deepened, and the fissure now cuts right across both geographical Germany and the political problem of the German settlement."⁴⁵ The emerging facet of the German problem now was clearly the renewed political importance of Germany and its geostrategic position between the Soviet Union and the West. The occupied and partitioned country had, a departmental memorandum concluded, "a significance greater than its reduced strength would otherwise suggest. As a counterweight and a strategic area in relation to the rival groups of powers, Germany will have an important element in the balance of power long before its internal recovery would

allow it to be as a unit acting alone."⁴⁶

However, the usual element of caution prevailed with respect to Germany's future role. The most immediate lesson of the Second World War and perhaps even the First World War was not forgotten: "As a country... with a long history of aggression, Germany cannot fail to be regarded as a source of a possible future threat to the peace of the world," Glazebrook reminded his colleagues.⁴⁷ Wrong agreed that policy "must be squarely aimed at assuring the safety of the Western democracies from renewed German aggression."⁴⁸ The natural fears of Germany's neighbours had to be taken seriously, and the last war must not be forgotten. The assistant under-secretary of state for external affairs warned that "[t]hose who are attempting to conceive a strong western Germany as a barrier to Communism might do well to remember that western Germany is not a gun with a traverse of 90 degrees only, facing east." The Western powers, Pope admitted, needed the industrial and human potential of West Germany for their safety against the Soviet Union. At the same time it was dangerous to use 50 million Germans as a spearhead pointed at Moscow.⁴⁹

The elements of continuity in Canadian thinking survived even as Germany emerged as one of the first open Cold War battlegrounds by 1948 and the German problem had to be placed in its new context. The main issue, which had crystallized throughout the previous year, was that the lack of progress in the German settlement worked to the advantage of the Soviet Union. A whole range of economic and political problems was growing out of "the unsettled conditions in Germany."⁵⁰ As Robertson complained in April 1948, the Russians "are still calling the tune in Germany and taking every opportunity to create mischief and difficulties."⁵¹

The British government, bolstered by US Secretary of State George Marshall's offer of economic assistance for Europe and heartened by Canadian support, took the initiative to coordinate the economic and political consolidation of the western part of Europe. It took the lead in organizing Europe's response to the Marshall offer and then in announcing its intention to create a Western Union, a system of mutual security. To Canadians, this new emphasis on Western Europe represented the squaring of the circle. The emergence of a British-led West European bloc allowed Canadian policy-makers to integrate two continuous elements in their view of the German problem – the importance of the German economy to European recovery and the danger posed by German militarism – with the new, unsettled context.

This constellation, it was readily acknowledged, cut across the old lines of the 1939-45 belligerency: "Europe has undergone profound changes since the defeat of Germany." However, the Canadian government pointed out, it had always worked on the assumption of the unity of European economic life and recognized "that the general European recovery requires a healthy German economy." This did not mean that, for the sake of economic expediency, Germany's industrial recovery was to be accorded first priority or that the German economy should be allowed to expand in an uncontrolled manner; in fact, "there appears to be the danger that the pendulum may now swing too far from the days of the Morgenthau plan." In Canadian thinking, building a bastion against the Soviet Union with Germany, or parts of it, remained a mistake.⁵²

The element of caution about Germany as a threat to peace also remained a part of Canada's view of the German problem. First, it was assumed that West Germany would remain under indefinite military occupation. More importantly, the Canadian government argued strongly for the creation of West European organs like the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and a consultative council under the Brussels Treaty. These could take on the function of creating a viable West German community and bringing it back into the comity of European nations without the help of a strong German government. The dilemma of having to reconcile German economic reconstruction and German containment "might be avoided if the problem of Western Germany were to be treated consistently as a part of the problem of Western Europe."⁵³

Throughout 1948, even at the height of the Berlin crisis, the Canadian government held steadfast to the view that a restoration of the four-power system of reaching a German settlement was desirable under certain terms and conditions. This hypothetical, perhaps even theoretical, link to the wartime alliance and the structures created at Yalta and Potsdam to deal with Germany demonstrates how much Canadian thinking avoided radical departures and turning points. There was no blind stampede into irreconcilable East-West antagonism and no sudden transformation of a former enemy into a future ally. The descent into the Cold War was not a free fall.

Canada's gradual adjustment of the definition of the German problem to the changing context of Great Power relations showed a surprising degree of continuity and stability, as the key elements of containment and reconstruction assumed new meaning in the emerging postwar order. Canada did not hesitate to take sides: officials had predicted the possibility of a falling out of the Great Powers over Germany and when the division


occurred in 1945–46, Canada followed Britain into acknowledging it and dealing with it. When the Americans entered the fray with the Marshall Plan and schemes to restore Germany's industrial potential, Canada sounded the voice of caution and compromise. The definition of German aggression as a problem *per se* was anchored in Canadian thinking firmly enough to create common ground with Germany's immediate neighbours, especially France. However, this concern was not allowed to rule out the prospect of Germany's eventual reintegration – economically, politically, and even militarily – into Europe and the larger North Atlantic community. That the areas were reduced from Europe to Western Europe and from Germany to Western Germany seemed to make little difference. In the emerging Cold War, Canadian universalist principles for world peace and prosperity had assumed more modest proportions.

NOTES

1. Robert Bothwell, *The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War*, (Toronto, 1997), p. xi.
2. Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957* (Toronto, 1994).
3. John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 13-14, 28-33.
4. Carolyn Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 8.
5. National Archives of Canada (NAC), Records of the Department of External Affairs (DEA), George Glazebrook memorandum, 23 February 1944, file AR405/1/8; Pierre Dupuy to Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) (48), 30 March 1944, file 7-E-2(s).
6. NAC, Escott Reid papers, Vol. 6, file 10, Reid memorandum, 14 September 1943.
7. *Winnipeg Free Press*, "Fate of Germany" series, 3, 5, and 6 January 1945.
8. Wartime Information Board, *Survey*, No. 51, 2 December 1944.
9. Wartime Information Board, *Survey*, No. 37, 20 May 1944.
10. Wartime Information Board, *Survey*, No. 47, 7 October 1944, and No. 57, 10 February 1945.
11. NAC, DEA Records, file AR405/1/8, George Glazebrook, "Policy toward Germany," 20 August 1943 and "The Future of Germany," 23 February 1944. Leslie Bishop, "Fate of Germany," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 26 December 1944.
12. "Fate of Germany," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 2 January 1945.
13. Angelika E. Sauer, "The Respectable Course: Canada's Department of External Affairs, the Great Powers, and the 'German Problem', 1943-1947," (Unpublished PhD thesis: University of Waterloo, 1994), p. 231.
14. John Hilliker, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER), Volume 11: 1944-45, Part II* (Ottawa, 1990), pp. 1924-30.
15. *Winnipeg Free Press*, 1 January 1945.
16. Victor Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947* (London, 1982), pp. 4 and 120.
17. Stephen John Schwark, "The State Department Plans for Peace, 1941-1945," (Unpublished PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1985), pp. 227-29.
18. NAC, DEA file 163(s), Dana Wilgress to SSEA, 25 October 1944; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston, 1967), pp. 213-15.

19. NAC, DEA (CH) file AR405/1/8, George Glazebrook memorandum, 23 February 1944; DEA file 7-E-2(s), Charles Ritchie memorandum, 28 March 1944, Dana Wilgress to SSEA (117), 13 April 1944.
20. Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century* (Boston, 1980), p. 411; Josef Foschepoth, ed., *Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage: Deutschland im Widerstreit der Mächte, 1945-1952* (Göttingen, 1985), p. 72.
21. Escott Reid, *On Duty: A Canadian at the Making of the United Nations, 1945-1946* (Toronto, 1983), p. 47.
22. Queen's University Archives (QUA), Grant Dexter Papers, TC3 file 1944, Hutchison memorandum, 6 October 1944.
23. Hilliker, *DCER, Volume 11*, p. 1966.
24. NAC, DEA file 8376-M-40, Canadian Military Mission (CMM) to SSEA (38), 23 March 1946. DEA file 8508-40, Heads of Divisions meeting, 9 April 1946. For French motivations, see John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Birth of Europe: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community, 1918-1955* (Cambridge, 1991).
25. NAC, DEA file 7-CA-9(s), Arnold Smith to SSEA (250), 26 May 1945.
26. NAC, DEA file 7-H(s), Hume Wrong to Dana Wilgress, 21 April 1944.
27. NAC, DEA file 7-D(s), Douglas LePan to SSEA (A.198), 30 May 1945. See also Douglas V. LePan, *Bright Glass of Memory: A Set of Four Memoirs* (Toronto, 1979), pp. 72-96, 101-01.
28. Wolfgang Krieger, *General Lucius Clay und die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik, 1945-1949* (Stuttgart, 1987), p. 141.
29. NAC, DEA file 7-E-2(s), George Glazebrook memorandum, 20 August 1943.
30. John Hilliker, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 10: 1944-45, Part I* (Ottawa, 1987), pp. 1076-80; NAC, DEA file 7-CA(s), R.B. Bryce to Hume Wrong, 31 October 1945.
31. Donald Page, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 12: 1946* (Ottawa, 1977), pp. 673-80. While "Slav Bloc" was the politically correct term, this memorandum actually used the expression "Soviet voting bloc."
32. NAC, DEA file 7-DE(s), Washington to SSEA, 22 July 1946. See also, James Reston, *Deadline: A Memoir* (New York, 1991).
33. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, pp. 144-48. Bertrand Fox Jarvis, "The Role of the Small Powers in the Development of the Western Bloc at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference: A Study into the Origins of the Cold War," (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Alabama, 1973), p. 220.
34. James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence* (Toronto,

- 1972), p. 180. Canada was part of a core group, along with Great Britain, Australia, South Africa, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Jarvis, "The Role of the Small Powers," pp. 223 and 233.
35. NAC, DEA file 7-DG(s), Charles Ritchie memorandum, 19 March 1946.
 36. NAC, Privy Council Office (PCO) Records, CMM to SSEA (12), 19 February 1946, Vol. 118, file W-22-5-G. Maurice Pope diary, 11 March 1946. NAC DEA file 8376-M-40, CMM to SSEA (38), 23 March 1946.
 37. NAC, DEA file 7-CA-14(s), Escott Reid memorandum, 7 May 1946, Charles Ritchie memorandum, 11 May 1946.
 38. Public Record Office (United Kingdom), CAB129/9, Bevin memorandum, 3 May 1946.
 39. NAC, DEA file 7-CA-14(s), Charles Ritchie memorandum, 6 June 1946 and Hume Wrong note to prime minister, 20 June 1946.
 40. NAC, DEA file 7-CA-14(s), Escott Reid memorandum, 7 May 1946.
 41. NAC, DEA file 8376-M-40, Maurice Pope to Hume Wrong, 24 May 1946, CMM to SSEA (112), 12 June 1946, Maurice Pope to Norman Robertson, 17 July 1946 and 23 July 1946.
 42. NAC, DEA file 7-CA-14(s), Charles Ritchie memoranda, 11 May and 6 June 1946.
 43. Norman Hillmer and Donald Page, eds., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 13: 1947* (Ottawa, 1993), pp. 417-20.
 44. NAC, DEA file 9770-B-40, Gerry Riddell, Address to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 12 May 1947.
 45. Hector Mackenzie, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 14: 1948* (Ottawa, 1994), p. 39.
 46. NAC, DEA file 50130-40, George Glazebrook memorandum, 12 June 1947. See also Don Page and Don Munton, "Canadian Images of the Cold War 1946-7," *International Journal* XXXII, (Summer 1977).
 47. NAC, DEA file 50130-40, George Glazebrook memorandum, 12 June 1947.
 48. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, p. 448.
 49. *Ibid.*, p. 448; NAC, Pearson Papers, Vol. 11, Maurice Pope to Lester Pearson, 31 July 1947; NAC, DEA file 7-CA-14(s), CMM to SSEA (784), 29 July 1947; and NAC, DEA file 8376-M-40, CMM to SSEA (999), 29 August 1947.
 50. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, pp. 32-34.
 51. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, pp. 40-41.
 52. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, pp. 43-46 and 408-10.
 53. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, pp. 34-38.



EYES WEST: CANADA AND THE COLD WAR IN ASIA

Robert Bothwell

RÉSUMÉ : Bien que l'Asie ait été un théâtre décisif de la guerre froide, les décideurs canadiens l'ont abordée avec une grande réticence. Pour le Canada, la guerre froide en Asie s'inscrivait en marge, sans plus, des relations canado-américaines, ou était une conséquence fâcheuse de ses relations avec la Grande-Bretagne. Les Canadiens partageaient la vision occidentale traditionnelle d'une Asie exotique, mystérieuse et riche, mais contrairement aux États-Unis, qui avaient depuis longtemps un regard direct et indépendant sur l'Extrême-Orient, le Canada a gardé une attitude résolument européenne. Son optique nord-atlantique restreinte, combinée à un manque de ressources, a dissuadé Ottawa de participer à la guerre froide asiatique, même si l'objectif du Canada – protéger l'Asie du communisme – était le même que celui de ses alliés occidentaux. L'Inde, où l'Empire avait cédé le pas au Commonwealth, était l'exception, et faisait l'objet d'ardents efforts de la part du Canada pour créer des « liens spéciaux ». Ailleurs, en Corée et en Indochine, la guerre froide est passée au second plan, se heurtant à la réticence canadienne, et demeurant une exclusivité américaine.

When I was asked to prepare a paper on Canada and the Cold War in Asia, I hesitated. Yes, there had definitely been a Cold War in Asia, beginning in 1917 or 1945, according to taste, and indeed Asia had been a crucial theatre of the Cold War, the site of three of its bloodiest conflicts – Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. It was the notion of Canada and the Cold War in Asia that gave me pause. It was true that Canadians had been present at the creation, at least if we accept 1945 as the launch date, as they were at the conclusion, and at points in between. But for Canada, the Cold War in

Asia was rather like “noises off” – a distracting attachment to Canadian-American relations, or the unwelcome aftermath of our imperial connections. The Cold War in Asia belonged to somebody else, usually the Americans, and it was our job to make sure that they did not exaggerate its importance. Canadian policy in Asia was different from American – different in focus, different in importance, and different in commitment.

There were reasons for this, but in exploring the differences we must not lose sight of the similarities. “Asia,” exotic, mysterious, dangerous but above all rich, has haunted Western thoughts since the Middle Ages and Marco Polo. North America is, after all, an accident that happened to the explorers on the way to Asia, all the way down to Lewis and Clark. Asia is more than a storehouse of wealth and opportunity; it is also, in our cultural tradition, a source of danger, equally mysterious but very serious. Sam Huntington’s recent work, not to mention Colin Gray’s, reminds us that this tradition has not yet been exhausted.¹

In an age when Europe dominated Asia, the danger receded somewhat, though there were always prophets and romantics, from Backhouse to Rudyard Kipling to G.A. Henty to Philip Mason to Sax Rohmer, to remind us that the mysterious East might be cowed, but it was never defeated. Canadian library shelves still testify to the fact that even this cultural outpost of empire shared in the vicarious pleasure of empire as well as in its inspirational uplift through such cultural artifacts as A.J. Cronin’s *Keys of the Kingdom* or Pearl Buck’s *The Good Earth*. For the less literate there was always the cinema – *The Good Earth* or *Gunga Din* or *The Lives of the Bengal Lancers*. And across Canada, as throughout the Western world, there were the stories of missionaries told to enthralled church-basement audiences, who would presently give up their pennies and quarters for the missionary enterprise in the mysterious and benighted East. It was an East which for reasons best known to itself dwelt in poverty, which in itself represented a danger. Poor people were discontented people, and discontented people might seek their gospel not in Jesus Christ, but in Karl Marx.

Bolshevism gave a particular spice to oriental danger. The Bolsheviks themselves were aware of this, and held a conference of and for the Asian oppressed in Baku shortly after the Revolution. Scribes such as Nikos Kazantzakis or André Malraux whetted their talents on the dreadful but romantic vision of the oppressed masses of the East rising up.

Canada participated in the cultural phenomenon of the Orient, of Asia East and South, and Canadians shared in the visions of wealth and uplift and danger. Until the Second World War, however, Canadians were

not really required to experience the Orient directly. Culturally, Canadians, like Americans, faced East, not West, to Europe, not Asia. As late as 1940, North America's Pacific Coast was an underpopulated if pleasant backwater, whose inhabitants mimicked the styles not of the temples of Kyoto but of Anne Hathaway's Cottage. Fortunately, the original proprietors of Anne Hathaway's Cottage were taking care of the Orient, admittedly with increasing difficulty as the century wore on. How fortunate, Canadians and Americans (British Columbians and Californians) thought, that their people, like their houses, embodied Europe. Certainly their immigration policy kept them that way. As late as 1951, Canadians of Chinese descent numbered a scant 32,528; those of Japanese origin, 21,663; and other Asians accounted for 18,636 – roughly 73,000 out of a population of 14 million and change – half of one percent of the population.

Canadians were not averse, any more than Europeans or Americans were, to the riches of the Orient. They followed the romance of the clipper ships of the 19th century (some built in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick), the China trade, the opening of China and Japan, the banks and trading firms of the Bund. Canada had, in particular, the Canadian Pacific and its steamships. Yet while prewar trade with the Orient was not entirely insignificant, it was specialized and, in the depressed decade of the 1930s, it hardly signified the fabled riches of the East. In any case, the War put paid to trade.

I have suggested similarities between the backgrounds of Canadians and Americans as they contemplated Asia but there are of course many differences. One is size: as Hemingway said to Fitzgerald or Fitzgerald said to Hemingway, The Rich are different from us – they have more money. The Americans have more money, of course – 12 times more in the 1940s, on the average – but they also have more people and, as a country, they have more history, without having to share it, as Canadians must, with the British Empire. The Americans had a history of their own in the Far East, a history of independent and competitive action, not to mention a peculiarly American policy in the Open Door doctrine. The Americans had gunboats of their own on the Yangtze River, and when they searched for a policy they found the history to justify it. Canadians of the day had no difficulty identifying with the British Empire and using the services and conveniences it provided, but there was an ambiguity in the imperial connection to Asia that was not present where the Americans were concerned. Especially as the British Empire began to wind down and wear away,

Canadians discovered that they were less inheritors of the old family firm than temporary passengers on one of its vehicles, and that it was time to get off.

Recent history also played a part. The Pacific War of 1941 to 1945 was an American war. Circumstance eliminated the European colonial powers as significant combatants in Southeast Asia, while further out in the Pacific, the Americans fought virtually alone. Even where another nation contributed substantially to aspects of the war, as the Australians did in New Guinea, imperious American commanders refused to believe that consultation was a necessary part of cooperation. It was true that the American government of President Franklin D. Roosevelt for some time pinned its hopes on the Guomindang regime of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in China, but by 1944 repeated disappointments persuaded Washington that chaotic China under its corrupt government was not an ally for all seasons. Japan, though an enemy for the duration of the war, might not always be so.²

Canadians were not directly offended by American practice in the Pacific. The war was far from North America, and British Columbia was mostly a dumping ground for unwilling conscripts. As the war drew to a close, Canadians observed that the Americans were keeping postwar Japanese policy very much to themselves, but while this might be theoretically deplorable, it had no direct implications for Canada. But as the war in the Pacific approached its climax, in the bloody battles for Manila and Iwo Jima and Okinawa, it was hard to escape the impression that for Americans, the war, and the world, had a different shape than for Canadians. Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King's special assistant, Jack Pickersgill, accompanying the Canadian leader to the founding conference of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, witnessed the end of the European war while in San Francisco. For Canadians, this was the culmination of six years of peril and sacrifice; but in San Francisco, with troopships steaming outbound under the Golden Gate Bridge, it was nothing special. He was in a very different country, Pickersgill reflected.³

During the war, the Canadian government had to deal with its own version of American unilateralism, in war production, in atomic research, in international institutions. It met the challenge by husbanding its resources for the most important questions, rather than squandering them in a process of universal complaint, and by encouraging in the Americans a sense of shared identity, stressing that its objectives and point of view were similar to those of the United States. After the war, the Canadian gov-

ernment employed the same tactic to encourage the Americans into amiability and alliance, knowing that the American government faced more or less the same problems with the same priorities and the same general sense of limited resources. That said, American resources outweighed Canadian at the usual ratio of twelve to one, meaning that the United States had the capacity to make a real difference on certain issues where Canada could at best temporarily top up other countries' financial sink-holes (as in the British loan of 1946). But in the world of 1945-46, American resources were politically limited even if, economically, they seemed a cornucopia by comparison with anyone else's.

The British, conscious of their limited resources but desirous of maximizing their diplomatic clout, made a few half-hearted efforts to entice the dominions into some kind of common defence arrangement. They succeeded, as far as Canada was concerned, only in awakening restless colonial memories about sending troops to the far corners of the earth – the Bay of Bengal was cited in Canadian memoranda – to defend the Empire.⁴

Japan was, admittedly, less remote than the Bay of Bengal from Canadian thoughts. Nevertheless, American suggestions that Canada join a Far Eastern Advisory Commission received the same reluctant reception as British fantasies of imperial defence. Australia and New Zealand, also named as prospective Commission members, had a "very direct" interest in Far Eastern questions, wrote Norman Robertson, the under-secretary of state for external affairs. He was writing to Mackenzie King, who would have understood and nodded vigorously at the implication that Canada did not have such vital interests.⁵ In another context, a Canadian historian once characterized Canada as a country of limited identities, a phrase which might have appealed to King. He would have added that Canada in the postwar era was a country of limited resources, rigorously husbanded. Those resources were directed toward Europe, where, after an initial false start, they were successfully deployed.

Canada's European diplomacy had the advantage of applying well-tried patterns of behaviour to a situation, the Cold War, that, though novel, featured familiar elements. Fear of communism and distrust of the Soviet Union were not news to anybody in Canada who could remember 1939, while even 1917 was effectively the day before yesterday in the minds of Canadian politicians and officials. To this sense of a familiar enemy could be added the lessons of how to beat such a foe, which showed that wartime allied cooperation and especially solidarity among Canada, Great Britain, and the United States were a prerequisite for victory. During the war,

Canada had not frittered away its strength in distant parts of the globe, but had profitted from the lessons of its resistance to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1921, and its refusal to send troops to Chanak in 1922.

What we might call the creative limitations of Canadian policy were embodied in external affairs minister Louis St. Laurent's statement of Canadian foreign policy, the Gray Lecture of January 1947. St. Laurent paid a great deal of attention to Canada's neighbour, the United States, and to Western Europe. In his analysis, "a threat to the liberty of Western Europe, where our political ideas were nurtured, was a threat to our way of life."⁶ In Europe, Canadians could engage their basic values and beliefs. St. Laurent had much else to say in his address, which was the most coherent public definition of Canadian foreign policy ever presented. Yet among his promises of engagement and justifications for action, he sounded two cautionary notes. First, Canada's national unity must be enhanced, not subverted, by its foreign policy. To an audience that remembered the conscription crises of 1942 and 1944 – and possibly 1917 – his meaning was clear. Second, Canadians must not forget that they were a secondary power. If Canada's policy was to have force, it must carry with it those states "who must carry the burden of whatever action is taken." The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was to be a happy example where Canadian policy meshed with the interests of the burden-bearing states; as with the United States, Canadians knew Europe, appreciated it, and had recent experience in the region. Alliance meant sharing burdens. The problem was that while NATO was geographically restricted, the burdens were not.

In his masterful biography of Lester Pearson, who as under-secretary of state for external affairs, foreign minister, and then prime minister was fated to oversee almost two decades of Canadian external policy, John English singles out Asia as an area of relative failure.⁷ In Asia, English observes, Pearson was unprepared, by formation, by temperament, and by focus. Yet time and again, in Korea, in Indochina, and in the nagging question of China, Pearson was forced to confront Asian issues. Like most Canadians, he did not much want to do so, and his efforts, well meant and sometimes well considered, did not do him or his country much good. For Canada's policy toward Asia was constrained by its policy toward Europe, and, above all, its relations with the United States. These constraints – the diplomacy of constraint, one might say – restricted Canada's freedom of manoeuvre even though, in theory, Canada's objective in Asia was the same as that of its allies: preserving Asia from communism.

Up to a point, Canada could do little to intervene in the Chinese civil

war, though it did pursue briefly a quest for commercial connections in the farcical episode of the Ming Sung ships. (Shades of Marco Polo.) Canadian representation in China was not strong, as the dispatches in *Documents on Canadian External Relations* attest. Nor did Canada derive much benefit, in analysis or insight, from the presence of the fabled Dr. Herbert Norman at the right hand of General Douglas MacArthur, the American proconsul in Tokyo. Japan was American territory, where Canada interfered at its peril: naturally, Canada did not interfere.

Canada was not so constrained in those areas where Empire was becoming Commonwealth. India had always attracted a certain amount of Canadian attention and some Canadian diplomats hoped that its British heritage would tell.⁸ India, because of its size, was important, but part of its importance for Canada lay in its history, and in the presumed relevance of a shared inheritance.⁹ As Japan had risen in American eyes after 1944, so India assumed significance for Canada, in both cases in the absence of China where the Americans had given up, and where Canada was ineffective.

Canada's interest in India thus met several of St. Laurent's criteria for Canadian engagement: historically and culturally, there was common ground; economically, India did not draw on Canadian resources, and therefore met the test of proportionality; and strategically, India's sheer size, as the second-largest nation after China in terms of population, made a decent interest advisable. Canadian interest was confirmed a few years later with the Colombo Plan, whose purpose was to offer an explicit alternative to communism, ultimately by drawing in American funds, and with a modest Canadian contribution.¹⁰ In the end, Canada probably gave less in money, at least during this period, than in attention and appreciation. As the deputy under-secretary, Escott Reid, put it in 1949, "We have endeavoured... to let that country know of the importance we place on her strategic position as an active link between the Western point of view and the abnormally active and complex issues that are now emerging in the East."¹¹ Canada's Cold War interest was not absent from Reid's thoughts about India; as was evident then, and later, his objective was to shore up Western interests in the hope, and later the certainty, that Canada could formulate these in a more acceptable way where the Indians were concerned than the United States.¹² Reid, drawing on a terminology usually reserved for Anglo-American or Canadian-American or Australian-American relations, wanted to create and believed he did create, a "special relationship" with India. It was to be a marriage of Canadian strategy with



Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, meets with Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, during a visit to Asia in November 1955.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA/PA-165518

Indian tactics, for there was no question that Canada would or could abandon its commitment to a Cold War. Thus it was, in a restricted sense, what Steven Lee has called a policy for “an Asian Cold War.”¹³

Elsewhere in Asia the Cold War took a back seat to Canadian reluctance and American exclusiveness. Already suspicious of the American tendency to act first and command support later, Canada was a very reluctant participant in the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), so reluctant as almost to split the cabinet at the beginning of 1948.¹⁴ Canada’s representative on the commission, Dr. George Patterson, did not prove a happy follower where the Americans led, stimulating charges from the US military that he was, in Pearson’s words, “a Communist or a fellow traveller.”¹⁵ Canadian participation on UNTCOK certainly did little to encourage a desire for further contact with that country, as an interview between a Korean delegation and acting prime minister St. Laurent showed in October 1948: “Korea was still a long way from Canada,” St. Laurent stated, and while he did not add, “Thank God,” the notion may not have been far from his thoughts.¹⁶

Korea remained a long way from Canada and Canadian priorities in 1949 and early 1950. Interest centred rather more on China and on the

Communist victory in the Chinese civil war, but without any strong sense that vital Canadian interests were engaged. Canada instead followed others in deciding whether or not to recognize the Communist regime; at first, the British and Indians, and later the Americans. By the time that issue was shelved, Korea was an issue again, because of the outbreak of the Korean War and later Chinese intervention in the conflict.

The war, and the unexpected American response, have long since been authoritatively examined. That Canada was surprised at the outbreak of war should not concern us greatly: the Americans, with observers on the ground, were also taken unawares as, of course, was the South Korean government. More interesting is the Canadian astonishment at the American decision to defend Korea – interesting because of the purportedly close relations between senior Canadian diplomats and their counterparts in Washington. But that is a subject for another day.

What should be underlined here is that Canada did not participate in the UN expedition to Korea because of any intrinsic concern for Korea and Koreans, but because of an interest in the UN, first, and in relations with the United States, second. The possibility that Korea was a prelude to a general Communist attack elsewhere on the vast periphery of the Soviet Union was, when reinforced by the serious though temporary American defeat in November 1950, sufficient to bring the Canadian government to the contemplation of war. But it was the prospect of war in Europe that moved them, and not war on the continent of Asia.¹⁷

In 1950 and later, Canadian officials proved highly resistant to the possibility of involvement in the defence of Asia. Conferences on the defence of Southeast Asia might draw Canadians, but only as observers. And when these conferences threatened to bring forth a new defence organization, eventually the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Canadian reaction was negative. While prepared to contemplate some effort in the North Pacific, bureaucrats, officers, and ministers otherwise held firmly to their view that, with large forces committed to NATO, enough was enough. "Militarily," General Charles Foulkes wrote in March 1953, "we have no more interest in South East Asia than we would have in a case of communist aggression in Iran or Pakistan. It appears to me that the Canadian interest in the Pacific will really be directed more to the Northern Pacific than to the area around South East Asia." But having raised the Pacific – meaning Japan – Foulkes quickly drew back. Japan was American turf, and any scheme for a Canada-US-Japan arrangement

would at best create "a certain embarrassment for us for some time to come." After all, Canada's ships were sailing around the North Atlantic, and there were none to spare elsewhere.¹⁸

"What is admirable on the grand scale is monstrous on the small," says a character in a recent German novel. There was a contrast, often painful, between Canada's aspirations for world harmony and the resources it was actually prepared to put behind them. And yet Asia kept interfering in the destiny of Europe. The war in Korea concluded with a stalemate, but the war in Indochina carried on, between Viet Minh insurgents – Communists – and the French. The war drained French resources from Europe, made nonsense of NATO's force goals (already enfeebled), and imperiled the European Defence Community, an improbable confection of mixed motives and mixed armies.

When the French finally confronted defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, Canada's reaction, as far as the French were concerned, resembled relief. On the other hand, there were the Americans, and the Americans showed a disposition, incomprehensible to Canadians, to keep the war going. To patch up matters as best it could, Canada accepted an unsought and unwanted nomination to a tripartite truce supervisory commission in Indochina (really three commissions).¹⁹ There is no doubt the Canadian government thought it was doing good if not doing well, and equally no doubt that it hoped its efforts would amount to a decent veil over an unpalatable surrender to the Communists.

It was, as diplomacy so often is, the application of the Micawber principle: something will turn up, and conflict postponed is better than conflict engaged. And, as we know, something did turn up, in the person of Ngo Dinh Diem, who would be, for nine years, the Asian tail that wagged the American dog in Southeast Asia. But that is another story – the second stage of the Cold War, and the subject of Canadian document books yet to come.


Nevertheless, in that future chapter, the same old story line will be present. Canada and the United States, starting from similar backgrounds and related assumptions, arrived at different conclusions. It was a line well established in the ten years after World War Two; it would play for another twenty.

NOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, 1996); Colin S. Gray, *Explorations in Strategy* (Westport, 1997).
2. See Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations* (New York, 1997), pp. 215-30.
3. Interview with J.W. Pickersgill.
4. Donald Page, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER), Volume 12: 1946* (Ottawa, 1977), pp. 1235-36. Norman Robertson to Vincent Massey, restating the objections of "Canadian public opinion" to the defence of "remote" areas, such as the Bay of Bengal.
5. John F. Hilliker, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 10: 1944-45, Part 1* (Ottawa, 1987), p. 980.
6. Louis St. Laurent, *The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs* (Toronto, 1947), p. 21.
7. John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester B. Pearson, Volume II: 1949-1972* (Toronto, 1992), pp. 31-32.
8. Harry Ferns, *Reading From Left to Right: One Man's Political History* (Toronto, 1983).
9. Donald Page and Norman Hillmer, eds., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 13: 1947* (Ottawa, 1993), pp. 34-41.
10. On the origins of the Canadian contribution to the Colombo Plan, see Greg Donaghy, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 16: 1950* (Ottawa, 1995), pp. 1202-79.
11. Hector Mackenzie, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 15: 1949* (Ottawa, 1995), pp. 1433-37.
12. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 15*, p. 187.
13. Steven Lee, *Outposts for Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954* (Montreal and Kingston, 1995), p. 90.
14. Hector Mackenzie, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 14: 1948* (Ottawa, 1994), pp. 148-51.
15. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, p. 187.
16. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, pp. 1862-63.
17. Donaghy, *DCER, Volume 15*, pp. 1159-62.
18. National Archives of Canada (NAC), Records of the Department of External Affairs, File 50,273-40, Foulkes to Dana Wilgress, under-secretary of state for external affairs, 10 March 1953. On Foulkes' letter,

Wilgress minuted: "This is undoubtedly true."

19. Greg Donaghy, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 20: 1954* (Ottawa, 1997), pp. 1675-97.



"A FINE ROMANCE": CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 1943-1957

John English

RÉSUMÉ : L'auteur examine le rôle joué par le Canada aux Nations Unies au début de la guerre froide, « l'âge d'or de la diplomatie canadienne ». S'appuyant sur des volumes récemment publiés des Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada ainsi que sur de nouvelles études de la politique étrangère canadienne de l'après-guerre, il conteste la thèse habituelle selon laquelle les Canadiens, idéalistes, se seraient courageusement attelés, en 1945, à l'édification d'un monde meilleur et plus coopératif au moyen de leur diplomatie onusienne. La réalité était à la fois plus complexe et plus ambiguë. Certes, le Canada devait souscrire à l'ONU avec enthousiasme, en faisant le pivot de sa politique mondiale, mais ses diplomates étaient de prudents joueurs qui, « fuyant l'idéalisme, optaient pour le raisonnable plutôt que pour le sensationnel ».

Canadians, Stephen Lewis declared, have a "visceral attachment" to multilateralism, an attachment to international institutions that is "ingrained and endemic to the Canadian character." As Canada's ambassador to the United Nations (UN) in the mid-1980s, Lewis contrasted the attitude of Canada's Conservative government under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney with the UN-bashing conservative Republicans in the United States. When there was peace to be kept, Canadians went. When there were dues to be paid, Canadian cheques arrived early. When there were speeches needed, Canadians made them. Public opinion polls from the first years of the United Nations consistently revealed popular support for general UN objectives.¹ Even when things went badly wrong as they did in the Congo in the 1960s or in Somalia and Bosnia in the 1990s, Canadians remained surprisingly eager to engage in peacekeeping. In September 1995, after Somalia and

Bosnia, 62 percent of Canadians thought Canada's peacekeeping efforts should remain the same, while 15 percent thought they should increase. When the United States refused to pay UN dues and looked away from the world organization as an instrument of its international security policy, the government of Canada would not budge from its support for the UN. Elite opinion reflected this attitude. While the 1997 75th anniversary issue of *Foreign Affairs* does not contain a single article dealing with the UN, a recent article in its Canadian counterpart, *International Journal*, refers to Canada's "long-standing support for internationalism and peacekeeping" as part of the country's "defining myth."²

Myths are easy targets for critics. In May 1968, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, a self-proclaimed contrarian, complained about the "helpful fixers" of the 1950s and 1960s, and the current Liberal government has had moments when it too indicated that it no longer wanted to wear the boy scouts' short pants. Yet in both cases retreats came quickly. Trudeau pirouetted and donned the peacemaker's cape before he bade adieu in 1984, and Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's government eagerly put on short pants to sort out Rwanda and Haiti in the mid-1990s. Trudeau's early scepticism about the UN in particular, and multilateralism in general, is absent from *The Canadian Way*, an account of his approach to international relations that he co-authored with his special assistant on foreign policy, Ivan Head:

A country that had been hesitant in the extreme to undertake international responsibilities during the thirties had been transformed into one of the world's international activists in the fifties and sixties. This metamorphosis was partly the result of the maturation experience of the Second World War, and partly the product of the wise policies of Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson. The challenge of positioning Canada advantageously in the international community, while simultaneously building a supportive domestic constituency, was formidable. To have met that double challenge so well was an epic accomplishment.

Perhaps a few years in the prime minister's office makes what once seemed farcical become epochal.³

Whatever the cause, those postwar years, that "golden age," when Canadian diplomats worked UN corridors so wisely and well, glitter more brightly at the 20th century's twilight. Even scholars who cast a cynical eye



From right to left, at their country's desk in the UN's Assembly hall in February 1957: Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, R.A. MacKay, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN, and John Holmes, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

UNITED NATIONS PHOTO/UN-53015

on later times see those hours as Canada's finest. Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein thus declare that Lester B. Pearson, secretary of state for external affairs from 1949 to 1957, "did as much as any Canadian leader to make the best use of his country's positive attributes while minimizing the weaknesses. The Suez crisis of 1956, to cite the example that won him his Nobel Peace Prize, showed Pearson and his country at their best."⁴

The most sustained argument in support of the existence of a Canadian multilateralist instinct that expresses itself in support for multilateral institutions, notably the UN, is presented by Tom Keating in his *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*. Keating's arguments are deeply influenced by those of John Holmes, a former assistant under-secretary of state for external affairs, for whom Canada, in the post-war years, was "the young Lochinvar who came out of the North... to put the world right." It was at the UN where Lochinvar charmed, cajoled, and won the day in the 1940s and 1950s, and Holmes, who had "carried a briefcase to the First General Assembly... in London in 1946," cherished those days and retained the faith. In 1974, when the UN's reputation was at its nadir, he defiantly declared that the UN was "not expiring. It is, in fact, in one of its most creative phases." What is more, he added, "the Canadian contribution is as effective and constructive as ever." Those Canadians who

carped about the international organization missed "the extraordinary if undramatic contributions Ottawa bureaucrats are making to the most important activities of the United Nations family of institutions."⁵

When Holmes wrote in the mid-1970s, the UN family of institutions was headed by Kurt Waldheim and most of those institutions were paralysed by debates over the nature of Zionism and the possibilities of a New International Economic Order. Putting the world right in those times was difficult for a middle-aged Canadian Lochinvar. But there remained memories of youth and of its potency at a time when UN committees mattered and Canadian efforts on them won not only plaudits but even Nobel Prizes. These memories still endure, in politicians' speeches, in UN-day celebrations, and in newspaper editorials. Canada's current foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, attributed his interest in internationalism to a Pearson speech in the early 1960s after which, according to his account, he thought less of young girls and much more about how the world could be changed. The Canada represented by Pearson was one where popular opinion supported an activist foreign policy centred on the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These were institutions through which Canada, under the tutelage of internationalist and talented public servants, made the world a better place. This generation of Canadians shucked off the hesitations and clumsiness of prewar Canadian diplomacy and proved themselves "the glory of their times." They built foundations carefully in a range of international organizations, and when the time came to act, their prestige, knowledge, and imaginativeness were assets of incalculable value. Without the many years of work in the trenches, it would have been impossible for Pearson to go "over the top" during the Suez Crisis of 1956.

Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER) offers much evidence to support this traditional view that the Department of External Affairs had its heyday in the postwar years. As the military atrophied at an astonishing pace and other government departments faced deep cutbacks, "it was accepted by the Civil Service Commission and Treasury Board that large intakes of all ranks would be necessary to enable [External Affairs'] programme of expansion to be carried out. Consequently, little difficulty was experienced when submitting [its] requirements for additional officers." Even though Treasury Board had become querulous and threatened cutbacks in 1949, External Affairs still managed that year to recruit 22 new officers and increase its total staff from "only" 1213 to 1248.⁶ Small wonder other departments grumbled; as they waned, the "mandarins" in External Affairs waxed.

Volume 12 of the *DCER* reveals how the end of the Second World War brought rapid growth rather than curtailment:

YEAR	OFFICERS	OTHERS	POSTS	EXPENDITURES
1943	69	405	23	\$1,547,905.48
1944	72	402	25	\$2,171,531.91
1945	107	495	26	\$2,205,948.71
1946	132	638	26	\$4,904,703.81
1947	162	840	36	\$5,127,915.55 ⁷

The military may have won the war, but the diplomats won the peace. The traditional image of the centrality of the UN to Canadian international politics in the postwar era is also confirmed in the *DCER*:

YEAR	PAGES ON UN	INTERNAT'L ORGS	TOTAL PAGES
1946	555	57	2084
1947	390	187	1628
1950	626*	136	1876
1951	436*	156	1863
1952	526*	97	1606
1953	502*	144	1642
1954	384*	89	1875

*These years include Korean War material. Different categories in 1948 and 1949 make comparison difficult for those years.

The figures, however, do not reveal fully the context.

Reading *DCER* and *Hansard* one quickly realizes the remarkable freedom enjoyed by the secretary of state for external affairs. Members of Parliament were educated in the bipartisan nature of Canadian foreign policy by their participation as members of Canada's delegation to the UN's annual General Assembly. Often they would spend five or six weeks in the autumn at the UN where they would work and socialize with the minister and his diplomats on the East River or the Seine, as they could never do on the Rideau. The mood of Manhattan or Paris remained on their return to Parliament where the debate on Canadian foreign policy took place later in the fall. Angus MacInnis, a member of Parliament for the social democratic Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), spent six weeks at the UN in the summer of 1949, becoming, in his view, fully educated about the Soviet threat. In those six weeks, the Canadian social-

ist declaimed, "never once did [the Soviet Union's ambassador to the UN] Mr. Vishinsky say that he agreed with anything that was proposed unless it was proposed by the Soviet bloc." He praised Paul Martin, minister of national health and welfare, and a delegate to the fourth session of the UN General Assembly, for a vigorous speech in which he "talked to Mr. Vishinsky in the only terms that he understands." The only way to reply to Soviet belligerence was "to become more belligerent," as Martin had. NATO, in MacInnis's view, was a necessary response to Soviet intransigence, one that was completely consistent with Canada's commitment to the UN, especially because of Canada's insistence on the inclusion of Article 2 in the NATO treaty.⁸

If the socialist from British Columbia learned about the Soviet threat in New York, the Liberal member for Provencher who had accompanied MacInnis to the UN gave "a great deal of the credit [for the success of Canadian diplomacy] to the officials of the Department of External Affairs. Most of them are young, hard-working men. As a matter of fact, by the standards of other delegations they are rather underpaid, but they are not just doing a job. They are pursuing a cause, and they are completely devoted to their task." Lacking any of the backbencher's traditional suspicion of the bureaucracy, René Jutras agreed with another CCF member of Parliament, Stanley Knowles, that the House should pay tribute to the extraordinary group of "hard-working and able men" who worked for the Department of External Affairs. Canada's prestige was high, in Jutras's view, because "Canada is expected to and does approach all questions from an objective angle." Canada has convinced most other states that it was "being most sincere" in furthering the aims of the United Nations. "In other words," he concluded, Canadian officials are known everywhere as "people who do their homework before they go into the committee rooms."⁹

When Pearson rose in reply, he thanked members for the "very high level" of non-partisanship and the many generous comments about him and his department. The praise was so unstinting that he thought that Canadians might become too complacent and that they might do well to "cultivate the healing virtue of humility."

But there was little to be humble about as Canadians thrived in the kind of international fora they had avoided so studiously in the 1930s.¹⁰ In their quiet, objective way, they were making the UN work and building the foundations for a new and more cooperative international order. To use the regrettable language of a later day, the key messages were clear. Bruce



Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addresses the UN General Assembly in September 1954.

UNITED NATIONS PHOTO/UN-43945

Hutchison thus wrote after a conversation with Pearson in 1949 that the secretary of state and "his boss [Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent] have talked and agreed... they will sink or swim on total internationalism. No retreat. No appeasement."¹¹

Canadians tend to remember those times as they recall Maurice "Rocket" Richard, Gordie Howe, and the six-team National Hockey League. The purposes were clear, and Canada played the game best. The publication of *Documents on Canadian External Relations* and the opening of postwar archives has made the game seem more complex and the goals more paradoxical. Certainly, the rhetoric then and now about the "golden age" has been confusing. To some later observers, Canada's postwar peacemaking and peacekeeping activities and its "objectivity," to adopt the language used by the member from Provencher, meant that Canada should be neutral and shun military activity in the Gulf War. As historians Jack Granatstein and Norman Hillmer put it, "[b]y participating in a war, even a semi-United Nations war, Canada was perhaps in danger of destroying its reputation and value as a 'disinterested' peacekeeper."¹² Holmes himself

was aware of the danger. In a speech on collective security to Canadian military officers, he pointed out that the formation of NATO "really marked the end of Canadian dedication to the principle of collective security – except confusingly in speeches."¹³ Holmes knew the confusion well and tried to define it as paradox. The *festschrift* his students dedicated to him was entitled, *An Acceptance of Paradox*, and their essays on the Canadian role in the Congo, Vietnam, Rhodesia, and South Africa abundantly illustrated such paradox.¹⁴ Rhetoric, it seemed, often marched far ahead of the reality of Canadian diplomacy. *Documents on Canadian External Relations* and recent studies using the documents and recently opened archives reveal a diplomacy far closer to Max Weber's bureaucratic "boring of boards" than to his notion of charisma.

Canadian diplomats were cautious, careful in their actions, and hewed closer to the approach followed by Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King in the 1930s than they later confessed. What they said about the UN in 1953 was not greatly different from what they said about the League of Nations in 1933.¹⁵ David Johnson, Canada's permanent representative to the UN, summed up the results of the eighth session of the General Assembly in a tone characteristic of Canadian memoranda of the time:

... it is apparent that while the appearances are better, the underlying realities remain the same. Delegates often say "if only the Russians would behave", or "if only we had less propaganda", or "if only the Great Powers would really negotiate", or "if only the small powers would do more and talk less" or "if only there was less of a gap between word and deed". But the fact is that while the Great Powers spar with each other as to where and when and whether to talk to one another, the United Nations remains the one place in which they do talk to one another.¹⁶

This tone resonated poorly for politicians on UN day, but recent research suggests that it echoed through the corridors where Canadian diplomats worked in the postwar years. They used the UN when necessary but did not necessarily turn to the UN.

While not at all diminishing the accomplishment of Canadian diplomacy in international fora between 1943 and 1947, we can say that the Canadian diplomat of those times only rarely resembled Lochinvar coming out of the north to set the world right. Mostly he – and one must say "he"

in speaking of those times — eschewed idealism and opted for the sensible rather than the sensational. In a surprising number of cases, he honoured ambiguity and ingenuity as much as his forebears had. What then do the documents and their recent users tell us?

First, the expansion of the Department of External Affairs and the rhetoric of postwar internationalism responded to forces within the Canadian bureaucracy and the broader society. Popular opinion was uninformed and largely without influence on specific topics, but there was a mood throughout the period, partly derived from the Cold War and partly from the remarkable economic growth of the 1940s and early 1950s, that expressed itself in a short-lived version of Canadian nationalism. Canadians then, as Geoffrey Pearson observed in his invaluable study of the period, "looked to UN diplomacy and to the link with the Indian sub-continent through the Commonwealth as vehicles for the expression of Canadian ideals."¹⁷ The impression that Canadian diplomats skated around obstacles as deftly as Barbara Ann Scott at the Olympic Games was a political currency of enormous value, and one the Liberals spent in every election after 1945 until it lost its worth in 1957.

Second, when one examines most specific issues one finds that Canadian diplomats recognized that Canada was not a "middle power" working its way with other "like-minded" nations through the maze of Great Power diplomacy, finding lacuna to fill and niches to occupy. In her study of Canada and the German peace treaty, Angelika Sauer shuns the use of the term "middle power" because in the case of that most fundamental postwar issue, she found that there were two types of "participation" for Canada: "action within the framework defined by the great powers;... and observation, that is the reception of information with or without internal debate and official comments." The Canadian course, she concludes, was "respectable." Respectability meant that Canada had a place at the table but at that table it "seemed more eager to please, or at least not to embarrass, [the United States and the United Kingdom] than to pursue its own aims."¹⁸

Sauer's argument finds some parallels in Joseph Levitt's study of Pearson and postwar disarmament. Pearson, Levitt argues, did not have his diplomats reflect the rhetoric that he and other politicians uttered. Even when there appeared to be opportunities to further the disarmament cause, Canada hesitated.¹⁹ For example, when the Indians tried in 1953 to push Canada toward the centre of negotiations, Canada waited until it was assured that Britain, France, and the United States thought a

Canadian presence useful.²⁰

Canada's "respectability" deeply offended those countries who thought that a louder voice and more aggressive stance would benefit UN members lacking permanent status on the Security Council. In the organization's early years, Australia's foreign minister, Herbert Evatt, not Canada's, was the champion of those states who had no veto. In this role, Pearson later wrote, "[Evatt] proposed and pursued vigorously amendment after amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks draft of the Charter." In June 1945, Pearson and Norman Robertson met with Evatt during the San Francisco Conference "to ascertain just what object he hopes to achieve by the tactics he is pursuing."²¹ These tactics, Robertson told the prime minister, were dead wrong:

Our view is that it is better to take the Organization that we can get and, having come to that decision, to refrain from further efforts to pry apart the difficult unity which the Great Powers have attained. This means foregoing the luxury of making any more perfectionist speeches either on the voting procedure itself or on the general amendment procedure, which is very closely linked with it. We can continue to oppose the Soviet Union and other Great Powers on such essentially secondary questions as the method of election of the Secretary General, nomination of Deputy Secretaries or the omission of 'expulsion' from the Charter, but we should not insist on forcing decisions on such central questions as veto and amendment to a vote in which our association with the other middle and smaller Powers might well result in the rejection of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.²²

Canada and other delegations, in Pearson's words, tried to save Evatt from "the snares of his courage (or, if you like, from his pig-headedness and vanity)" by undertaking "the unspectacular but essential task of finding compromises." Evatt charged Canada with weakness, but, Pearson wrote, "I think that deep down he knew that our policy of moderation and of reasonable compromise prevented the conference from being wrecked by some of his amendments." Pearson was wrong: Evatt despised moderation and Canada's attitude, and Canadian diplomats in the late 1940s loathed Evatt.²³ The UN, in the words of an Australian scholar, became "the church of his religion."²⁴ While Evatt was evangelical, Canadian diplo-

mats tended toward high church. Not surprisingly, Australia was elected to the Security Council before Canada, and Evatt became the president of the UN General Assembly three years before Pearson. Respectability had its price.

Where Sauer sees respectability, Linda Goldthorp identifies "reluctance" as Canada's characteristic attitude toward the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In another thesis, which has not received the attention its important argument merits, Goldthorp points out that Canada was extremely cautious during the wartime meetings of the Council of Allied Ministers of Education. Constitutional concerns made Canada wary, but, by late 1945, these "earlier constitutional concerns were swept aside in the mad dash to become a joiner." Though Canada joined, as Goldthorp convincingly demonstrates, St. Laurent and Pearson began to search out ways to minimize Canada's role and commitments: "The pattern of reluctant internationalism [was] set. Once a year Canadians delivered pious speeches about ways UNESCO was going wrong, they paid their dues, and they went home."²⁵ Perhaps the best summary of Canada's attitude toward UNESCO came from its most literate diplomat, Charles Ritchie, after a lunch with John Grierson, the filmmaker, at UNESCO's Paris headquarters in 1947:

God preserve me from having anything to do with [UNESCO]. One look at the people at the UNESCO building was enough. How I loathe international secretariats – they are always so provincial – talking shop all the time and having affairs with unattractive secretaries. They think they are "men of good will" and progressive. They make no allowance to themselves for their egotism and love of power. They have no humility. I am sure the League atmosphere at Geneva would have made me a Fascist.²⁶

Mackenzie King would have been pleased.

The concerns about UNESCO reappeared in 1948 when the General Assembly brought forward the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Mackenzie King and the Department of External Affairs did not like the idea of a universal charter. Since responsibility for education lay with the provinces, provincial rights were an obvious concern, but not the only one. Mackenzie King had already rejected a suggestion by Paul Martin and Brooke Claxton, the minister of national defence, that the Liberal Party

might issue its own Charter of Liberalism. Liberalism, King declared, "was rather an expression of attitude toward different problems that might arise. Its principles and policies could not be confined in a charter."²⁷ These same arguments were echoed at the United Nations when Canadian delegates spoke. In committee, Canada joined the Soviet bloc in abstaining on what was otherwise a unanimous affirmative vote. In the plenary, Canada voted for the Declaration but with major qualifications, notably about provincial rights and the sanctity of traditional common law and statute procedures in a parliamentary democracy. That Evatt placed himself and Australia in the forefront of the movement for a Declaration only compounded Canada's embarrassment.

Chris MacLennan's recent doctoral thesis, which makes extensive use of documentation from the departments of External Affairs and Justice, clearly establishes that Canada's hesitations were broadly-based, deeply-felt, and widely-shared within the Canadian bureaucracy. Though Holmes treats the matter only briefly in *The Shaping of Peace* and Pearson omits the subject from his memoirs, MacLennan demonstrates that the Declaration strengthened the movement toward a broader recognition of human rights in Canada itself, first through the courts which were influenced by the UN Declaration and later through parliamentary and constitutional action.²⁸ Still, as the United Nations Association of Canada points out correctly, Canadian public opinion regards Canada as a nation that has been in the forefront of the international struggle for human rights. The work of the Canadian legal scholar, John Humphrey, in drafting part of the declaration is widely recognized. In Holmes's view, however, Humphrey, was "the lone Canadian hero in the human rights struggle."²⁹ Moreover, Humphrey was an international civil servant, and no country argued so strongly in the UN's early years as did Canada that UN civil servants neither represented their nations nor expressed their views. In human rights, the UN tutored Canada's judges.

The United Nations, Tom Keating writes, "was seen as the cornerstone of Canada's postwar multilateralist foreign policy." "Canadian officials," he continues, "demonstrated a firm commitment to making the UN work. Their unqualified support for the organization was a reflection of the strong consensus within the government that the UN could best serve Canada's long-term security and political interests."³⁰ Certainly one can find speeches by Pearson between 1943 and 1957 which support this interpretation, and the department's annual report, *Canada and the United Nations*, offers ample material to footnote such reasoning. However, the



Canadian peacekeepers at work in the Middle East: "less of a call to action than a prayerful and undemanding expression of our idealism..."

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA/PA-122737

publication of the postwar volumes of *Documents on Canadian External Relations* and case studies using these volumes and other archival material compel a reassessment of this view. The more extreme version of this myth, which makes Lester Pearson into Herbert Evatt raging against Great Power dominance and transforms Canada's peacemaking into neutralism or even pacifism, receives no support in the *DCER*. At the recent conference to mark the centenary of Pearson's birth, Ross Campbell, who was a member of the Canadian delegation to the General Assembly during the Suez Crisis in 1956, "deplored the extent to which Pearson the pragmatist has been forgotten by the public and to some extent by successor Canadian governments in their zeal to promote exclusively the image of Pearson the UN protagonist."³¹

Denis Stairs tried to halt this tendency a quarter-century ago when he observed that Pearson was "allergic to empty, futile or otherwise counter-productive gestures."³² Pearson, like many members of his generation, did support resolutions in favour of world federalism and dreamed of a different and better world where swords were battered into ploughshares, and where nationalist passions gave way to an understanding of the oneness of

humanity. Nevertheless, Canada's diplomacy most usually reflected what Pearson himself said in his memoirs about the Canadian public's support for the UN; it was "less of a call to action than a prayerful and undemanding expression of our idealism and our hopes, a kind of satisfying ritual like the automatic repetition of the Lord's Prayer."³³ Far from resembling an evangelist's revival meeting, it bore the flavour of Timothy Eaton Memorial United Church. As the song of the time went, Canada and the UN had "a fine romance" but, in those days, the libidinous Australians did more of the kissing, not the reluctant, respectable Canadians.


NOTES

1. On early polls, see Mildred Schwartz, *Public Opinion and Canadian Identity* (Scarborough, 1967), pp. 77-82. Gallup Poll, 18 September 1995. Lewis is quoted in Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto, 1993), p. 9.
2. James Ferguson and Barbara Levesque, "The best laid plans: Canada's proposal for a United Nations rapid reaction capability," *International Journal LII* (Winter 1996-97): 119.
3. Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau, *The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada's Foreign Policy 1968-1984* (Toronto, 1995), p. 313. See George Ignatieff, *The Making of a Peacemaker: The Memoirs of George Ignatieff* (Markham, 1987). Ignatieff describes how "Mike Pearson told me when we met at The Hague... how deeply hurt he was by this explicit repudiation of the kind of internationalism he had stood for and by the contemptuous "helpful fixer" label which Trudeau had affixed to Canada's role as conciliator and advocate of collective security during the post-war era. He particularly resented the implication that there had been something self-serving about activities which, in his opinion as well as mine, represented nothing more or less than the discharge of our responsibilities as a member of the United Nations and NATO (pp. 248-49)."
4. *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto, 1990), p. 295. The authors describe the UN of the 1970s with characteristic pungency as an institution that had become "the dwelling place of lost illusions... unable to enforce its own rules, or to collect its dues from delinquent members."
5. Keating, *op cit.* John Holmes, *Canada: A Middle-Aged Power* (Toronto, 1996), pp. v, 60-61.
6. Hector M. Mackenzie, ed. *Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER), Volume 15: 1949*, pp. 4-5.
7. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 15*, p. xvii. It should be noted that the number of international conferences and meetings that Canada attended rose from 12 to 102 during this time.
8. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 16 November 1949, pp. 1855-57.
9. *Ibid.*, 17 November 1949, pp. 1915-18.
10. *Ibid.* There were dissenters in the House. R.H. Blackmore, a Social Credit member, complained about the cost of the new diplomacy and

thought the UN was not a worthwhile institution. Tommy Church, the maverick Toronto Conservative, denounced the United Nations as a "modern tower of Babel," for "which Canada and Great Britain should not allow their interests to be the plaything." He urged closer Commonwealth ties and rapid rearmament. *Ibid.*, 24 November 1949, pp. 1918-24.

11. Bruce Hutchison, "Last Ottawa Memo," [1949], Dexter Papers, TC5, file 35. Queen's University Archives. On the general question of getting the key messages across, see Patrick Brennan's excellent study, *Reporting the Nations' Business: Press-Government Relations during the Liberal Years, 1935-1957* (Toronto, 1994).
12. Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s* (Toronto, 1994), p. 321.
13. John Holmes, *Canada: A Middle-Aged Power*, p. 76.
14. Kim Nossal, ed., *An Acceptance of Paradox: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in Honour of John W. Holmes* (Toronto, 1982).
15. Charles Ritchie wrote in 1953: "So far as policy is in question, I see policy as a balance, also a calculated risk, as the tortuous approach to an ill-defined objective. All-out decisions, unqualified statements, irreconcilable antagonism are foreign to my nature and to my training. In these ways I reflect my political masters, the inheritors of Mackenzie King, and I am fitted to work with them." *Diplomatic Passport: More Undiplomatic Diaries* (Toronto, 1981), p. 56.
16. Donald Barry, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 19: 1953* (Ottawa, 1991), p. 433.
17. Geoffrey Pearson, *Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy* (Ottawa, 1993), pp. 165-66. Pearson points to an article for a magazine by Lester Pearson to which the editor gave the title, "Canada's Place in the Sun" as an indication of the role that Canadian diplomats of the time had to play (p. 158).
18. Angelika Sauer, "The Respectable Course: Canada's Department of External Affairs, The Great Powers, and the 'German Problem' 1943-1947" (Unpublished PhD thesis: University of Waterloo, 1994), p. 11.
19. Joseph Levitt, *Pearson and Canada's Role in Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations, 1945-1957* (Montreal and Kingston, 1993).
20. Barry, *DCER, Volume 19*, pp. 450-82. Despite the Indian's inclusion of Canada, Pearson instructed the UN delegation that "we would only want to take part in such talks if that were the wish of the Assembly and the four powers concerned." (p. 464).
21. L.B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson. Volume*

- 1: 1897-1948 (Toronto, 1972), p. 277.
22. John F. Hilliker, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 10: 1944-45*, pp. 787-89.
 23. Pearson, *Mike, Volume I*, p. 277. On Evatt's views of the Canadians and Americans, see Peter Edwards, "Evatt and the Americans," *Historical Studies XVII* (1979): 546-60.
 24. D. Ashenden, "Evatt and the Origins of the Cold War," *Journal of Australian Studies*, 7 (1980): 93. The Canadian distaste for Evatt is especially strong in the early and later comments of John Holmes. See, for example, his letter to Hume Wrong of 1 May 1946 in which he accuses Evatt of using any argument "to secure his end." Donald Page, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 12: 1946*, pp. 1368-71. The attack on Evatt is sustained in Holmes's later writings.
 25. Linda Goldthorp, "Reluctant Internationalism: Canadian Approaches to Unesco, 1946-1987," (Unpublished PhD thesis: University of Toronto, 1991), pp. 332-41.
 26. Charles Ritchie, *Diplomatic Passport*, p. 24.
 27. J.W. Pickersgill and Donald Forster, eds., *The Mackenzie King Record, Volume 4: 1947-1948* (Toronto, 1970), p. 350.
 28. Chris MacLellan, "Canada and the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms," (Unpublished PhD thesis: University of Western Ontario, 1996); and John Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957, Volume I* (Toronto, 1979), pp. 290-93.
 29. Holmes, *ibid.*, p. 293.
 30. Keating, *Canada and World Order*, p. 47.
 31. Ross Campbell, "Observations," Lester Pearson Centennial Symposium, 22 April 1997.
 32. Denis Stairs, "Present in Moderation: Lester Pearson and the Craft of Diplomacy," *International Journal XXIX* (Winter 1973-74): 150.
 33. L.B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2: 1948-1957* (Toronto, 1973), p. 121.



REALISTS AT WORK: CANADIAN POLICY MAKERS AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION FROM HOT WAR TO COLD WAR

Denis Stairs

RÉSUMÉ : L'auteur examine les hypothèses fondamentales qui ont influencé les responsables canadiens dans leurs efforts en vue de mesurer l'équilibre des forces dans le monde durant la transition de la Seconde Guerre mondiale à la guerre froide. Aujourd'hui, on tient souvent pour incertain le rôle de l'État dans les relations politiques internationales, mais au milieu des années 1940, l'État était généralement l'acteur le plus important dans les affaires mondiales. Imprégnés de la tradition réaliste européenne, les politiciens et diplomates du Canada savaient que le pouvoir et la géographie jouent un rôle fondamental dans la politique étrangère des États. Comme le souligne Denis Stairs, la géopolitique se résumait alors à la politique de sécurité. C'est cette analyse classique, renforcée par l'expérience vécue dans les relations avec les grandes puissances durant la guerre, qui devait, au lendemain de celle-ci, inspirer au Canada son attitude pragmatique vis-à-vis de la construction d'un ordre mondial fondé sur le respect de règles acceptées de tous. Les interprétations canadiennes du comportement des Soviétiques et des Américains dans les premiers temps de la guerre froide reposaient aussi sur des considérations géopolitiques conventionnelles. C'est pourquoi, dans l'élaboration d'une stratégie diplomatique efficace dans le contexte de la guerre froide, les agents du service extérieur canadien attachaient une grande importance non pas aux considérations idéologiques mais à un calcul attentif des forces en présence et de l'intérêt national.

INTRODUCTION: THE PREMISES

Canadians now live in an age in which globalization is thought to have generated a form of transnational politics in which sovereign states are in varying degrees subordinate and with which they must constantly curry

favour. This perception is more than academic. Even ministers of foreign affairs make much of "civil society" and construct centres of foreign policy development to encourage and cultivate its input. Attentive publics are engaged by the state in annual fora on policies abroad. Activist organizations are mobilized from the top down, or the bottom up, or both, not merely to pressure the government to engage in good works (or bad) on their behalf, but also to operate in tandem with official state representatives to further common causes overseas. The meaning of the term "security" is broadened to refer to a wide array of threats to human welfare, and the concept of the national interest comes to have a limitless reach. In all this, for good or ill, the locus of real decision-making power and the lines of accountability show signs of becoming murky and blurred, while in the ruggedly self-serving arena of economic affairs, the state plays accomplice to the very forces that on some accounts are weakening its own capacity to act. What all this means – and how it will finally affect the place of the state as an engineer of political, social, and economic conditions both at home and abroad – is not yet clear. In the meantime, practitioners and onlookers alike flounder about in a sea of analytical uncertainty, arguing first from one set of premises, and then from another.

All this is a far cry from the circumstances of 50 years ago, when the analysts in the foreign service routinely pursued their intellectual calculations within the framework of traditional "power politics." For them, the "actors" in world affairs were the sovereign states, and these operated, however unfortunately, in an international environment that was ultimately freewheeling. *All* states had domestic interests to serve and their room for manoeuvre was often limited by political constraints at home. But the weighing and interpretation of interests and constraints alike – particularly on politico-security matters – was assumed in Ottawa, as elsewhere, to be a function of government, and of government alone. Other players were not generally welcome, and were usually regarded as an intrusive inconvenience whenever they appeared.

In the international "polity" thus conceived, the constant danger was that conflict would break out. To prevent this from happening was the most fundamental purpose of a well-intentioned and properly informed foreign policy community. The task could be made easier with the help of clear rules of conduct, sustained by appropriate institutions. When the opportunity arose, therefore, the construction of precisely such institutions was thought to be a first priority of state. Canada was a status quo power of modest capacity. That being so, its interests overall would be

served best by fostering a rule-governed international environment.

Given the underlying character of the international community, however, neither in this endeavour nor in any other could the "power realities" be ignored. That being so, a "realist" calculus could not sanely or safely be eschewed. With this calculus there came a constant attention to the pragmatic task of identifying the available room for manoeuvre; of determining what the state might and might not reasonably try to do, given the relative capabilities and interests of the other players in the game. Since the determination of these matters was an uncertain undertaking conducted in response to hypothetical futures, different analysts could obviously come to different conclusions. In these points of difference were rooted many, although not all, of the disagreements that arose from time to time over what practical policies should be followed. The differences themselves, however, were focused on matters of fact, not on matters of interpretive (or what political scientists like to describe as "theoretical") principle. The ingredients of power might vary from one context to another, and their implications for the conduct of any particular relationship might be subject to a kind of technical debate. The Canadians, with their "middle-power" concepts and their "functional" principles, were particularly inventive in advocating finely-tuned methods of calculation that would operate in their own interest. But whatever the elements of power in any specific context might actually be, everyone knew that they almost always counted most. They were the hard currencies of international politics.

In the special case of politico-security affairs, a further ingredient was added to this very traditional mix. Particularly at the beginning of the Cold War, it was an ingredient that went to the heart of Canadian assessments of the behaviour not only of the United States, but also of the Soviet Union. The conclusions to which it led served on more than one occasion to distinguish the Canadian position from the American. The premise at issue, of course, was the notion that the security calculations of the several sovereign states are a function, not of power alone, but of power conjoined with geography. Security politics were *geopolitics*. To those who were steeped in a liberal education in the humanities, most of it founded more on the European experience than the North American, this hardly needed to be said, and it rarely was. It was nonetheless quietly assumed, and thus became part of the intellectual woodwork that determined the way in which international affairs were understood.

It might be argued that these observations are at once over-stated and

unnecessary; that they go without saying now, just as they went without saying then. However, the transformations of modernity, many of them electronically-driven, have begun to affect not only the ways in which the world actually works, but also the ways in which its various layers of politics are understood and discussed. Although the mandarins who inhabited the Department of External Affairs in the late 1940s and early 1950s would have been shocked to hear this said of them, they were in many respects closer to Metternich than to Axworthy. They were touched, it is true, by the practical norms (if not always the religious faith) of Methodism and its civilizing cohorts in ways that could never be said to have applied to their forebears in the statecraft of Europe.¹ But it was a Methodism informed by an education in the humanities, an education that had been reinforced by exposure to the statist brutalities of two world wars, and by the unstable interlude of rough-and-tumble international politics that had served to separate them. In short, it was a "Methodism restrained" and it was responding to a world whose underlying character was free of the obscurities (although not of the miseries) with which we are now routinely confronted in trying to determine which of the unfolding forces of history *really* accounts for who is doing what to whom. Within the traditional framework of analysis then in vogue, there were uncertainties aplenty. Few, however, doubted the framework itself.

The premises of that framework can be found to be clearly at work through the various evolutions of policy and analysis referred to earlier. To consider this process is the purpose, in part, of what follows.

ALLIED DIPLOMACY IN WARTIME:

REALISM AND THE LESSONS OF REALITY

There is no revelation in the reminder that William Lyon Mackenzie King, prime minister and secretary of state for external affairs during the Second World War, saw little point after the Americans had entered the hostilities in attempting to carve out for Canada a special place of influence in the councils of the great. A visible recognition and acknowledgment of Canada's economic and military contribution, and with it a nurturing of domestic public relations, he certainly required. A share in the responsibility for making significant strategic and political decisions bearing on the conduct of the Allied campaign, he did not. To what extent this was due to an honest belief that Canadian participation "at the top" was an aspiration so futile that it should be abandoned on that account alone, and to

what extent it reflected an inner reluctance to carry the heavy burdens that such participation would have entailed, is not entirely clear. Perhaps it came from a combination of both. But there was never any ambiguity about the position itself.

Before the American entry, to be sure, when useful political hay had been harvested from images of King as interpreter of Britons-at-war to Americans-at-peace and *vice-versa*, there was irritation and embarrassment whenever the ephemerality of the performance was exposed. In August 1941, for example, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and American President F.D. Roosevelt were so unkind as to meet without him (although not without a handsome supply of advisers – suited and uniformed alike – from their respective staffs) on warships off the coast of Newfoundland. From their encounter, there emerged the Atlantic Charter, along with some discreet plottings of the practicalities of war. “[T]he public in Canada,” King complained to the British high commissioner, Malcolm MacDonald, “and certainly some of my colleagues and my own officials will think it extraordinary that Churchill should have brought his own staff to negotiate with the United States staff, and ignored Canada altogether.” He “did not propose to make any difficulties about the matter but... it was on all fours with what has thus far been done between Britain and the States since they have been brought together.” He recognized fully that Britain would have a problem bringing in Canada without also bringing in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and the US would have similar problems in Latin America. As he confessed to his diary, there was no point in protesting, though he had “no doubt at all that the Tory press of Canada [would] now begin to say that neither Churchill nor the President have any confidence in myself, or feel it is necessary to take me into account.”²

The Tory press, if so it had declared itself, might have been right. In any case, as the hostilities wore on, King became more and more resigned to the deleterious impact that the disparity of power had on Canada's influence. On the Western front, certainly, the British and the Americans were going to run the war to their own specifications. On other fronts, they would take, at most, only the Soviet Union into serious account. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Churchill, Roosevelt, and their respective staffs soon arranged to meet again, this time in Washington, to explore the consequences for their collaboration of the American and Japanese involvement in the war. MacDonald was treated once more to a cry of mild lamentation. King was concerned



Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill meeting the world's press during the 1943 Quebec Conference.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA/C-14168

over the meeting between the President and Churchill, with the possibility of not being invited to participate. *Not that I personally was anxious to participate...* I saw the difficulty of Canada being represented with other Dominions not equally represented. On the other hand, he [MacDonald] knew the tactics my opponents were adopting. They would now seek to have it appear that all that had been said about my being a link between the two amounted in reality to nothing.³

An appropriately cosmetic visitation to Washington was accordingly arranged.⁴ Not much more, however, was expected. The pattern had been set, and the pre-eminence of the Great Powers in the politico-strategic management of the war conceded.

Two more demonstrations will suffice. In May 1943, in a Commonwealth meeting at the White House during another of Churchill's visits to the United States, and in the presence of both the British and Canadian chiefs of staff, King, responding to a request from J.L. Ralston, his minister of national defence, commented on "Canada's attitude toward the

use of her forces." He would like, he said, "to make it quite clear once more that we recognized that strategy had to be left in the hands of the British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff, with Churchill and the President giving the ultimate decisions... [W]e wanted it known that we were prepared to have our men serve wherever they could be most helpful in the winning of the war," whether "as one great Army" or "divided up." Churchill clearly approved.⁵

Again, in August of the same year, Roosevelt and Churchill determined that they should meet in Quebec City. The under-secretary of state for external affairs, Norman Robertson, and the British high commissioner were apparently agreed "that it would be a mistake to have the meeting at Quebec unless [King] were more than in the position merely of host to Churchill and Roosevelt in the eyes of the people," and that Churchill should be instructed accordingly. King demurred: "I, myself, felt that to try to get Churchill and Roosevelt to agree to this would be more than could be expected of them. They would wish to take the position that jointly they have supreme direction of the war. *I have conceded them that position.*" It would be sufficient if *appearances* were attended to, so that "the Conference would be *regarded* as between the three, as in fact it would be, in large part, without having the question raised too acutely or defended too sharply."⁶

In a wartime context, the prime minister was thus resigned to his subordination (in large things, at least) to the will of those whose power assets were greater than his own. In the absence of real influence, amiably extended gifts of what we now call "photo-ops" were enough.

King's advisers in the professional foreign service, while to some extent sharing in his fatalism, worried more about the long-term implications of his retreat. As early as December 1941, for instance, Robertson found himself reflecting ruefully to the prime minister on the impact on Canada-US relations of the growing American involvement in the hostilities. Canadians had "tended to take it for granted that the United States [would] continue to follow a friendly, cooperative and unassuming policy toward Canada." This assumption was "fundamentally correct," but "we should not be too cavalier in our confidence that the United States will always regard Canadian interests as a close second to their own and appreciably ahead of those of any third country." With the US now directly engaged, and in a leadership role, it was "probably an inevitable consequence... that the President should tend more and more to deal directly with the Great Powers and find less time to spend on the specifically Canadian aspects of American international relations." Quite apart from the particulars of the Canada-US agenda, moreover,

Robertson could "see the United States turning everywhere to more direct and forceful methods of exerting its influence." The Americans were coming to "a new appreciation of the enormous strategic importance and strength of the United States. They [were] showing a new sense of their 'manifest destiny' and a corresponding disposition to take decisions and accept responsibilities." This might be encouraging for the world at large, but it implied "quite an important modification of the special relationship" with Canada.⁷

By the spring of 1942, the accumulating evidence of the American tendency to take Canada for granted was generating not only alarm, but grievance. Hugh Keenleyside, an assistant under-secretary of state, even wrote a memorandum for Robertson on "American Imperialism and Canada." He introduced his litany of "unsatisfactory episodes" with a blunt declaration: "Affected by a not unnatural wartime psychosis and impatient with any restrictions or conventions that would limit even momentarily the carrying out of American plans for the prosecution of the war, the United States Government and its various more or less independent agencies have recently shown a tendency in dealing with foreign countries to act first and seek approval afterwards – if at all."⁸

Things appeared no better on the diplomatic front line in Washington, where the problem was compounded by "the very intimacy, informality and friendliness" of the relationship. According to Lester Pearson, then minister-counsellor at the Canadian Legation, familiarity led the Americans "to consider us not as a foreign nation at all, but as one of themselves." This was "flattering," but it made them "perplexed when we show an impatience at being ignored and an irritation at being treated as something less than an independent State." In practice, American "disregard" of Canadian "susceptibilities" too often forced the legation to complain to the State Department. Among the dangers that resulted was the following: "On instructions from Ottawa, we take a firm stand in Washington in opposition to certain United States demands. But as soon as pressure is exerted by the U.S. Government, either here or in Ottawa, we give in." Pearson, the realist, thought little of such ill-conceived behaviour:

This kind of diplomacy, the strong glove over the velvet hand, has nothing to commend it. We should [he thought] be particularly careful in forcing the issue with the United States on any matter unless we are willing to pursue the matter through to the end; and *unless we have a good chance of emerging success-*

ful. In estimating our chances in this regard, we should never lose sight of the relative position of the two countries. It will therefore be necessary for us to have an unanswerable case, or one in which some really vital Canadian interest is at stake, if we are "to go to the mat" with Washington. Otherwise, the United States will ignore our arguments, bring up their heavy guns, and we will make a virtue of necessity by giving in. In the end, we will be in a much worse position than if we had not taken the "firm stand" originally.⁹

If there was a case, in short, for giving in, as there often was in a context in which the disparity of power was so great, it was better to do it from the start than to wait for the pressure to build. And in determining what to do, there were only two considerations to take into account: (1) the importance of the issue, and (2) the probability of success, keeping in mind the respective positions of the two countries in the international hierarchy.

It was precisely this sort of experience that was to underlie much of the Canadian approach to the construction of the United Nations and other international agencies, both during the war and after it. The indignities that came from Great Power presumption needed to be reined in with the help of international institutions carefully designed to ensure that roles and influence alike would be more broadly distributed. This story has been told often and in detail by historians and "participant-observers" both, and there is no need to repeat it here, even in summary form.¹⁰ It is enough to point out that the Canadian preoccupation was at the heart of the so-called "functional principle," which was first advanced in 1942 in an attempt to win for Canada a seat on the Executive Committee of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, but was thereafter routinely redeployed on almost every other pertinent occasion. As King observed in a March 1943 memorandum to Leighton McCarthy, the minister in Washington, "We cannot accept the idea that our destinies can be entrusted to the four larger Powers, and we have advanced the principle that representation in international bodies should depend on the extent of the contribution which each country would be expected to make to their work. We intend to continue to press for the acceptance of this principle and for Canadian representation on bodies in which we have a special interest."¹¹

This was not a position that was based on the concept of state equality. On the contrary, it was explicitly grounded in the notion that the allocation

of responsibilities in the international community, and more specifically, the distribution of high offices in multilateral institutions, ought to accord in some reasonable measure with the distribution of capacities. Like the associated concept of the "middle power," the functional principle was particularly suited to the Canadian interest, not least of all because in some of the newly emerging fields of international endeavour (the control of civil aviation, and the production and distribution of food supplies, for example) Canada was especially well endowed with pertinent assets. A doctrine that ultimately regarded the hierarchy of power as the principal criterion for the assignment of institutional privilege, and at the same time recognized that the hierarchy itself might vary from one issue area to the next, was an ingenious political instrument for a country with Canada's characteristics. Once it was seriously entertained by other members of the international community, it could be used to establish a claim to special constitutional entitlements in a wide array of contexts. No wonder everyone liked it, including the acerbically hard-headed assistant under-secretary of state, Hume Wrong. As he observed in a memorandum to Robertson in March 1943,

[W]e have hitherto advanced... the principle that representation on international bodies should be determined on a functional basis so as to permit the participation of those countries which have the greatest stake in the particular subject under examination. We have used this principle both to combat the argument that the four largest powers should have a special responsibility in all the fields of planning and organization and to avoid the other extreme which would allow each member of the United Nations to be represented on a basis of nominal equality. I think that we should stick to this functional principle. If we can secure its general acceptance, it would permit the representation of Canada on most of the bodies in which we are deeply interested.¹²

INTERPRETING THE SUPERPOWERS

These intellectual-cum-strategic assessments of what would best serve the Canadian interest in the construction of the postwar order obviously reflected a general interpretation of the way in which the state system worked, and of how its functioning was affected by disparities in the distribution of power among its members. As the foregoing indicates, the analysis had been reinforced not only by exposure to the unhappy course

of world affairs in the period between the wars, but also by the more immediate experience of dealing with Great Power allies – the United States most notably, but the United Kingdom as well – during the conduct of the Second World War itself.

In the final phases of the hostilities, on the other hand, increasing attention was also paid in Ottawa to assessing the interests, and hence the behaviour, of the Soviet Union. Since the Canadian relationship with the United States in the early Cold War context was affected among other things by Canada's interpretation of what really lay behind the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, these endeavours warrant examination here.

Although official ruminations on the subject were not initially very extensive, they are revealing all the same. "With a cynicism unequalled in the history of perfidy," the prime minister declared in a statement following the launching of the German anti-Soviet offensive in June 1941, "Germany entered into a pact with Soviet Russia, in order that Russia might be kept inactive until the continent of Europe, including France, was conquered. That agreement has now been broken with the same cynicism and perfidy with which it was signed." Having been "[b]alked in his effort to break the might of Britain," Hitler was now attempting to subjugate Russia so that the German armies would "have in their possession vast stores of wheat and oil and munitions of war, for use in a final desperate onslaught against Britain and the western world." The conclusion was clear: "Whatever one's opinions may be about the philosophy of the Russian revolution, however strongly some of Russia's international activities may be condemned, the plain fact is today that, as Russia fights Germany, it is not Russia which is a threat to freedom and peace. That threat is Nazi Germany."¹³ Within two days, Escott Reid, then a second secretary in the department of external affairs in Ottawa, was elaborating on this well-placed geostrategic analysis with a commentary on the importance of keeping Russia in the war, irrespective of the fate of the Ukraine and the Caucasus, so that Germany would face on her "eastern front a constant drain on her men and resources."¹⁴

In contrast, according to accounts by Reid and Keenleyside, there was at least one highly placed official in the United States who was far less enthusiastic than the Canadians about the implications of Soviet embroilment. He did not believe the strategic advantage sufficiently substantial to outweigh the inconvenience that resulted in the United States, Latin America, and elsewhere from any Allied association with the Soviet Union, given the unseemly coloration of its politics. Keenleyside thought this

reaction a "trifle jittery," and guessed that it would soon evaporate.¹⁵ The Canadians, clearly, preferred chess to crusades.

The geopolitical pragmatism of the Canadian position on relations with the USSR, and by implication with the United States, became evident once again in the spring of 1942, when the question arose of whether Canada wished to adhere to the formal treaty of alliance that was being negotiated between the Soviet Union and Britain. There were awkward political questions bearing on the implications this would have for the postwar definition of the Soviet Union's borders with Poland, the Baltics, and the other luckless buffer states of Central and Eastern Europe. Robertson was most concerned about the danger of joining in a long-term commitment to help protect the security of the USSR in the absence of American company. "I do not think," he observed in advising the prime minister, "that Canada should, at this stage, assume postwar obligations in other parts of the world which would be different from or go further than those that the United States is prepared to assume."¹⁶

As the war came closer to its end, the volume of commentary flowing to and from Ottawa on the subject of Soviet interests, perceptions, and policies abroad naturally increased. Much of it was supplied by Canada's ambassador in Moscow, Dana Wilgress, and by Leo Malania, a Russian-born graduate of the University of Toronto who had been appointed to the department in April 1943 as a temporary "assistant."¹⁷ Their respective despatches and memoranda have been dissected in considerable detail elsewhere,¹⁸ and the task need not be performed again. From the vantage point of the 1990s, however, it is impossible not to be struck by the emphasis they gave to traditional geopolitical security considerations in their interpretations of Soviet interests, and hence of Soviet intentions, particularly in relation to Central and Eastern Europe. In their view, the most vital of Soviet preoccupations was the desire to ensure that the Soviet Union would never again be subject to Western invasion. This preoccupation would lead Moscow to pursue a regionally protective sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Such an objective need not imply that communist regimes would be established in the East European countries, but it did entail a Soviet paramourcy in *Eastern* Europe that would complement a corresponding British paramourcy in *Western* Europe. In commenting on a May 1943 memorandum from Wilgress to this general effect, Denis Smith has since observed that "[w]hat was especially intriguing in the dispatch was its description, not just of Soviet determination, but of the traditionalist and realist bases for Soviet foreign policy – with the implied suggestion that the Soviet Union might be satisfied in the short run, her suspicions allayed, by

the clear recognition of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Initially Wilgress seemed to be supporting this view – or at least putting it in a sympathetic light. Was it possible that a realist policy of regional spheres and alliances might contribute as effectively to peace as an effort to substitute for it a universal system of collective security?"¹⁹

The answer Wilgress gave to this question was, by implication, negative, but more because of the United States than because of the Soviet Union. The Americans would not be willing to abandon their interest in East European affairs, and the Soviet model, if pursued, would therefore lead to a Soviet-American clash in the Eastern European theatre. That being so, it would be better if the Americans were submerged in a more general system of collective security, which might then help to give their influence a more constructive outlet. As Smith observes, "[i]n a discussion of Russia's international role, Wilgress managed to argue that the primary purpose of a new collective security organization would be to contain the power and ambitions of the United States."²⁰ Collective security was "realist," too.

Even in the relatively early phases of Western assessments of Soviet purposes, this Canadian analysis differed from the American. This was not so much because the latter presumed that the Soviets had any interest in turning their wartime Great Power allies into postwar adversaries, but because Soviet security interests would lead them to take an additional step, namely, to insist that "friendly governments" be established in neighbouring states, where "friendly governments" would be governments dominated by Moscow. The difficulty, given the views of the American people, émigré populations from Eastern Europe prominently among them, was that this would not be acceptable to the United States. That, in turn, would make it harder in practice to sustain the "concert of Great Powers" to which Moscow attached such fundamental importance. Stalin thus needed to be made aware of "the impact of Soviet policy upon foreign public opinion."²¹

Wilgress stuck to his guns,²² but there was a hardening of the view from Moscow after his departure. By April 1945, the second secretary, Arnold Smith, had come to the conclusion that the Soviet government was "intent on creating relatively exclusive zones of influence for itself in Europe and probably elsewhere," that it seemed to be "unwilling to cooperate seriously in international economic planning," and that it was "therefore time for a firm diplomatic line to be taken by the Western powers."²³

In spite of proliferating evidence that East-West accommodation was going to be difficult, if not impossible, to secure, Malania worked hard in Ottawa to counter the Smith position. The concluding paragraphs of

Malania's final memorandum for the department on this subject reflect again the "realist" premise:

To conclude, it would seem that the current Soviet attitude is based upon a realization that the Soviet Union has "arrived" as a world power of first magnitude and upon the fear that an attempt would be made to deprive it of this position. The Soviets probably feel that mere diplomatic recognition and condescending admission to a "select club" of Great Powers is not enough to secure their present position. If the United States can have exclusive bases, the Soviets intend to have them also. If the United Kingdom has colonies, the Soviets intend to have full equality in this respect also. If both of these powers have areas where their influence is predominant, the Soviet Union feels justified in claiming a position of equality with them.

The immediate prospect of relations with the Soviet Union is certainly not bright. The adjustment of any group of powers to a completely changed political situation is never easy and can only be reached through a series of crises, which define the new inter-relationships. But the current trends of public opinion in the democracies and the facts of the situation point to an ultimate re-adjustment through the process of bargaining and concessions to the power which is dominant in those areas where the other powers have no means of effective intervention.²⁴

Here was an analysis that depended entirely on a "structural" conception of the state system, in which both the tactical and strategic manoeuvres of the principal players are assumed to be determined by the positions they hold in the structure of international power relationships. The Soviets were feeling their oats, not their ideology, and, quite understandably, they were butting in. The danger was that their more established rivals would be unwilling to make room for them.

It is tempting to assume that the credibility of arguments of this sort would have collapsed completely in Ottawa once the implications of Igor Gouzenko's revelations of Soviet espionage operations in North America had become generally known and as the differences between East and West over the fate of Eastern Europe intensified over the winter of 1945-46. In

fact, however, the evolution of opinions was more complex than this assumption would imply, and the "power politics" premises of Canadian analysis proved surprisingly resilient. For some, the intrusion of ideologically inspired influences into the thinking of policy-makers in the United States, subject, as it was, to the fickle workings of an excessively populist politics, was a particularly serious source of weakness. In commenting in March 1946 on the reception given to Churchill's "iron curtain" address in Fulton, Missouri, for example, Pearson reported from Washington that the hardening of American opinion against the Soviet Union had become "depressing if not dangerous." "The frankness," he went on, "of comment on Soviet policy that one encounters in official and congressional circles is alarming, even after allowances are made for the usual tendency here towards exaggeration and verbal irresponsibility." One of the difficulties with the stronger line was "the instability and undiscipline of public opinion itself; a tendency to cheer vigorous speech but veer away from its consequences." This made "any firm, fixed policy difficult," a circumstance the Russians could be planning to exploit, "regardless of diplomatic consequences."

It may well be [Pearson went on] that Soviet policy is fundamentally defensive; an effort to exploit a fluid post-war situation for all it is worth in the interests of their own domestic security; of squeezing the last ounce of advantage out of their own relatively strong position. The Soviet authorities may feel that they can now take with impunity steps which would provoke a war if made ten years from now when an international pattern has been re-established. They expect to encounter diplomatic resistance and incur resentment; but nothing more, unless they go beyond a line which has not yet been fixed and the boundaries of which they hope themselves to be largely instrumental in determining. Once determined, however, they will, as realists, not seek to go beyond it. The risk would be too great.²⁵

Dana Wilgress, writing ten days later from Moscow in a much more pessimistic tone than he had adopted earlier, nonetheless still held to a non-ideological interpretation of Soviet foreign policy behaviour. Soviet leaders, he reported, had been alarmed by Churchill's address. From their point of view, in advocating an alliance of the English-speaking powers, the former



Canada's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Dana Wilgress (left), and Montreal businessman, R.A. Davies, stand in front of the Canadian Embassy in Moscow in 1944.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA/C-75254

British prime minister had raised the spectre of “an Anglo-American combination,” and with it the possibility that the Western world would launch a “crusade” against the Soviet Union. They did not “particularly dread the power at present wielded by the United Kingdom,” but they had “a most healthy respect for the power of the United States.” In the circumstances as Wilgress now saw them, this “healthy respect” had a clear implication: an “Anglo-Saxon hegemony over the world outside of the Soviet sphere” was the element that was “essential to the maintenance of peace and security.”

In the Wilgress view, the factor that had served to convert an understandable preoccupation with the geopolitical requirements of Soviet security into a dangerously aggressive orientation was not the Soviet Union's communist ideology, but its autocratic form of government. As he put it, “only political systems responsive to the will of the peoples can remove the threat of wars of aggression. The people of no country, if left to themselves, want to wage aggressive war.” This was certainly true of “the great and lovable Russian people.... But because the Soviet Government is run by a handful of men and is dominated by a strong personality with absolute dictatorial power, without having to pay regard to the will of the people, they cannot refrain from following the dictates of personal ambition which

lead them to seek the exploitation of the advantages to be gained from temporary situations."

Here was a familiar argument from the liberal tradition. It had roots in the 19th century and before, and Wilgress knew very well that it differed from arguments founded on the notion that the Soviets were acting on the basis of Marxist-Leninist recipes. His "interpretation of Soviet policy as opportunist," he conceded, was "at variance with that expressed by those who hold that the Soviet Government are working to a definite plan and know just what they want."²⁶ Even as his position continued to harden in subsequent weeks, partly in response to the fall-out from the Gouzenko affair, it was "the mentality of totalitarian autocracy," which was "much the same whether or not the leaders of that autocracy are Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Argentines or Russians," that was blamed.²⁷

In the meantime, in the department in Ottawa, an assessment of Soviet motives, particularly in relation to North America, could still be written in 1946 in essentially classical terms. Soviet interests were thought to include "(a) The restoration and development of its domestic economy; (b) The maintenance of its political and social institutions; (c) Retention of its relative place as a great power in relation to other states." The conclusion was "that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, while pursued by different methods and sponsored by a government which is foreign in its political institutions and social structure, is nevertheless the normal expression of the interests of that country."²⁸

In March 1947, a Joint Intelligence Committee "Political Estimate of the Possibility of the Soviet Union Precipitating War Against the United States and Canada," attached as an appendix to a "strategic appreciation," was even more explicit about the theoretical underpinnings on which the Committee's conclusions had been based.²⁹ In this case, the ideological factor was taken into account, *but only as an element which, in combination with others, would affect the way in which the Soviets interpreted the behaviour of their adversaries*. It would not provide in itself a recipe for their own actions, but instead would serve to intensify their assessments of the threat posed by the capitalist powers to their own security. As the Committee observed in the introduction to this analysis, it was "not necessary for the purposes of [its] discussion to assume that the government class of the Soviet Union is actively ambitious to dominate the world – that its policy is one of all-out aggression." All it needed to assume was that the Soviets were "anxious to maintain the existing system in the areas now under Soviet political control, and that this involve[d] a desire to expand the *defence* area of that

system." The Soviet "governing class," it went on,

believes that the governing classes of the Western world are afraid that the capitalist system which gives them personal power and privileges would be undermined by the success of Soviet institutions and they might, therefore, launch an armed attack against the Soviet Union before the Soviet system has had a chance to demonstrate to the peoples of the Western world its superiority over the Western system. It is afraid of the penetration of the lands on the border of the Soviet Union (the Soviet defence area) by Western ideas and it therefore resists the Western attempt to introduce Western democratic concepts into those areas.

The Committee emphasized that the "desire on the part of the Soviet governing class to expand the Soviet defence area may be as dangerous to the security of the West as a desire for all-out aggression would be. *By its very nature a desire on the part of a great power to extend its defence area is an illimitable process.* The appetite for security grows with eating." Nonetheless, the "distinctions between the two assumptions" were

of very great importance. If the issue is one of active aggression by the Soviet Union, the responsibility for war is placed entirely on the Soviet side. If, however, the issue is one of a desire to defend themselves against attack from the Western world the responsibility for war, if one should break out, is a joint responsibility and the responsibility for keeping the peace is joint. It is no longer, for example, possible to disregard the possible efficacy of moves and attitudes on the part of the Western world which might minimize the belief on the Soviet side in the necessity of defensive measures; on this assumption provocative actions and attitudes should be avoided.

As the Committee worked its way through the question of the likelihood of a war actually breaking out between the USSR and the United States, there ensued in its memorandum an analysis of the practical workings and weaknesses of the "balance of power" model of international politics that would have warmed the heart even of so hard-headed an academic realist as Hans J. Morgenthau.³⁰ For the purposes of the appreciation

at hand, it "disregarded" the possibility that the US might take the initiative in starting a war, "though the concept of preventive war ha[d] been a subject of discussion in the United States." Its focus instead was on the possibility that such a war might "arise out of a deliberate decision on the part of the Soviet governing class." Two paragraphs written as a preliminary to the substantive "guesstimating" that followed are worth noting in full:

Given the nature of that governing class, it is highly improbable that they would embark on a course which might lead to war with the United States unless, in their opinion, (a) the balance of forces in the world was such that their chances of winning the war were much greater than the chances of defeat or of a stalemate; or (b) even though their chances of victory were no more than even, the balance was constantly tipping more and more against them and they feared that unless they precipitated a preventive war, they would soon be at the mercy of the United States.

...To try to assess the balance of forces at any given time is an extremely difficult task since on either side of the balance there are so many factors which cannot be weighed. It is not only, for example, a question of possession of arms and armaments, strategic positions, and industrial potential, but it is also a question of the willingness of the nations concerned to use their armed forces. Since modern war has to be waged with the total force of a country, it is also essential to take into consideration the unity or disunity of each country in the event of the outbreak of a first-class war and this unity... would depend in part on what people in each of the Western countries felt about the issues at stake and the incidents which had precipitated the hostilities. Thus it is difficult to assess the nature of the balance today and impossible to assess, with any degree of precision, the nature of the balance at any given time within the next ten or twenty-five years.³¹

It should be emphasized that the implication of this interpretation and others like it was *not* that the Western powers could afford to relax their vigilance and soften their resolve. The balancing of power requires the mobilizing of power. As the analysis indicated, however, it did imply a responsibility for avoiding unnecessary provocations and for retaining an

understanding of the other side's sources of insecurity. The adversary might be devilish, but in large measure its foreign policy behaviour could also be interpreted as following rules that angels often follow, too.

Much of this analysis was repeated in the lengthy memorandum assembled in August 1947 by Escott Reid, then assistant under-secretary of state for external affairs, under the title, "The United States and the Soviet Union: A Study of the Possibility of War and Some of the Implications for Canadian Policy."³² This time, however, the United States was not "disregarded" at all. In terms of "international politics," although certainly not in terms of "comparative government," the result was an extraordinarily even-handed treatment. "Each side," Reid argued, "desires to expand its defence area because each side believes that the other constitutes a menace to its way of life. It constitutes a menace because its way of life is so different from the way of life of the other." Hence, "[e]ach side desires to expand its defence area because each side fears the threat to its security which results from the other's expansionist moves." It was "obvious, indeed, that both the Soviet Union and the United States [were] expanding powers." It could "thus be expected that, until conditions in either the Soviet Union or the United States [underwent] a radical change, conflicts between them [would] continue." In these circumstances, the central question was "whether these conflicts [were] likely to lead to war." The ensuing discussion then considered this question in a way that was not dissimilar to the treatment offered earlier in the year by the Joint Intelligence Committee, but at much greater length. The "containment policy" implications were also much the same. From the purely Canadian point of view, it was noted in passing that the "benevolent" Pax Britannica of the 19th century was being replaced in the later 20th century with a similarly benign Pax Americana. "In the event of war," Canada would "have no freedom of action in any matter which the United States considers essential." It would be an "all-out" belligerent from the day the war started. On the other hand, in peacetime its freedom of action would be "limited" but not "non-existent." The fact that Canada was "in the same boat" as the United States meant, indeed, that it would be "wholly proper" for it to tell the Americans "to stop rocking the boat or driving holes in its bottom."

It is not possible here to consider in detail the many responses that resulted in the autumn of 1947 from Reid's request for comments. Four officers – Arnold Smith, and three of the senior francophones, Laurent Beaudry, Marcel Cadieux, and Pierre Dupuy – clearly thought it inappropriate to place the Americans and the Soviets on the same general plain. For them,

the origins of the problem lay not with the United States, but with Soviet aggressiveness and with the ominous institutions and doctrines that were at its root. The objections, expressed by the other commentators, however, had more to do with the fine detail than with the fundamentals of Reid's argument. And some of those commentators, like Charles Ritchie and Hume Wrong, were deeply concerned about the virulence of anti-communist hysteria in the United States, along with the populist political volatility that tended to lead to inconsistencies and imbalances in American policy. There was thus a sense in which their primary concern was whether Washington, given its political and institutional environment, would be capable of conceiving and following the carefully controlled calculations that would be required of an effective strategy in the Cold War context.³³

CONCLUSION

If space were available, it would be possible without much difficulty to carry this analysis of the premises of Canadian policy well into the postwar period, and certainly through to the early 1960s. Canadian calculations at the time of the founding of the North Atlantic alliance,³⁴ in the context of the diplomacy of the Korean War and its antecedent politics, in response to various other episodes in the Far East, in relation to the question of the recognition of the government of the People's Republic of China, in reaction to the crisis over Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, and even on the occasion of the initiation of the Colombo Plan, when Canada first became involved in responding to the notion that the wealthiest powers should take initiatives to kick-start the long-term economic development of countries less fortunate than themselves, all such calculations, directed as they were to interests and tactics alike, were reflections of a consistent "operational code." The canons of diplomacy were, in the end, the statist canons of prudence. For Canadian foreign service officers, as for Bismarck, foreign policy was the "art of the possible." It was not the pursuit of the ideal. The irony is that their realist *praxis* has left them with an idealist reputation.

NOTES

1. The Methodist influence (sometimes it is said to be a Presbyterian influence) in Canadian thinking about international affairs has often been alluded to, usually tongue-in-cheek; but not always. The theme has been developed most fully in John English's fine biography of Lester B. Pearson. See his *Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson - Volume I: 1897-1948* (Toronto, 1989), and *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson - Volume II: 1949-1972* (Toronto, 1992).
2. J.W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record, Volume I - 1939-1944* (Toronto, 1960), p. 234.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 317. My emphasis.
4. As it turned out, there was cause for serious business, too. The crisis over St. Pierre and Miquelon broke out shortly before King's departure from Ottawa, and it proved to be a source of diversion in Washington.
5. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, pp. 503-04.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 527. My emphasis.
7. John F. Hilliker, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER), Volume 9: 1942-1943* (Ottawa, 1980), pp. 1125-31. The memorandum is discussed at somewhat greater length in J.L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-68* (Ottawa, 1981), pp. 117-18. One of Robertson's conclusions was that it might be helpful to upgrade the Legation in Washington to the status of an Embassy.
8. Hilliker, *DCER, Volume 9*, pp. 1136-38.
9. Hilliker, *DCER, Volume 9*, pp. 1138-42. My emphasis. This was a recurrent theme in Pearson's reflections on this issue. In a comment in March 1944, on a memorandum by the first secretary in what was now the Embassy in Washington, R.M. Macdonnell, Pearson was critical of what he thought was a lack of balance in Macdonnell's treatment (entitled "United States Policy Towards Canada," it began with the question, "Is the United States unduly aggressive?") but approved of the even-handedness of his final paragraph. On the special question of "[w]hether we should protest against wrong actions on the part of the United States," he thought this depended, as Macdonnell had indicated, "on whether we are absolutely certain of our case and whether the damage done justifies the relief occasioned by getting the matter off one's chest. We certainly do not want to debase our coinage by too frequent protests, which

- people in the State Department will come to think of as unnecessary and often frivolous... . When we are dealing with such a powerful neighbour, we have to avoid the twin dangers of subservience and truculent touchiness. We succumb to the former when we take everything lying down, and to the latter when we rush to the State Department with a note every time some Congressman makes a stupid statement about Canada, or some documentary movie about the war forgets to mention Canada." Macdonnell's analysis and Pearson's comment are in John F. Hilliker, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 11: 1944-1945* (Ottawa, 1990), pp. 1400-08.
10. Among the most useful accounts of Canadian planning for the post-hostilities environment are James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence* (Toronto, 1972), Ch. 2; John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957 - Volume 1* (Toronto, 1979), passim; and John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume I - The Early Years, 1909-1946* (Montreal and Kingston, 1990), Ch. 11. A perceptive short analysis by a Canadian "participant-observer" appeared not long after the San Francisco conference. See G.P. de T. Glazebrook, "The Middle Powers in the United Nations System," *International Organization* I (June 1947): 307-15. A more detailed recounting can be found in Escott Reid, *On Duty: A Canadian at the Making of the United Nations, 1945-1946* (Toronto, 1983). See also *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, Volume I: 1897-1948* (Toronto, 1972), Ch. 14.
 11. Hilliker, *DCER, Volume 9*, pp. 865-66.
 12. Hilliker, *DCER, Volume 9*, p. 872. Vincent Massey, the high commissioner in London, in commenting on Wrong's memorandum, noted that he was "in entire agreement" with the functional principle. *Ibid.*, p. 876.
 13. David R. Murray, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 8: 1939-1941* (Ottawa, 1976), p. 1101.
 14. Murray, *DCER, Volume 8*, pp. 1002-03.
 15. See their memoranda, Murray, *DCER, Volume 8*, pp. 1103-05.
 16. Hilliker, *DCER, Volume 9*, p. 1858.
 17. See Denis Smith, *Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948* (Toronto, 1988), p. 247, note 34; and John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume I*, p. 372, note 48. Malania left the foreign service in the summer of 1946 for reasons that are discussed in Smith, *ibid.*, pp. 115-16, and p. 254, note 4.
 18. See Smith, *ibid.*, especially pp. 43-71. Some of the documentation upon


which Smith has drawn for his analysis is in Hilliker, *DCER, Volume 11*. See especially Part 15, p. 1924ff.

19. Smith, *ibid.*, p. 45.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.
21. See the Department's memorandum on "Conversations between Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Chief of the Eastern European Division of the State Department and Members of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, November 3, 1944", Hilliker, *DCER, Volume 11*, pp. 1948-53.
22. See, for example, his despatch from Moscow six days after the Bohlen meeting, on November 9, 1944. Hilliker, *DCER, Volume 11*, pp. 1953-61.
23. Smith's analysis is summarized in an April 1945 despatch from the chargé d'affaires, Léon Mayrand, Hilliker, *DCER, Volume 11*, pp. 1962-67.
24. For the full text, see Hilliker, *DCER, Volume 11*, pp. 1985-90. The memorandum is discussed at greater length in Denis Smith, *Diplomacy of Fear*, pp. 113-15. This phase of the developing debate in the department is treated in detail in Chapters 3 and 4 of Smith's study. It should be noted that the memorandum was apparently written in the period immediately following the defection of Igor Gouzenko from the Soviet Embassy. Presumably, however, Malania would have been unaware of this development. It is therefore not clear whether the ensuing revelations of Soviet espionage activity would have affected his analysis.
25. Donald M. Page, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 12: 1946* (Ottawa, 1977), pp. 2043-46.
26. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, pp. 2046-51. Hume Wrong, in commenting at about the same time on Pearson's despatch from Washington, seemed to share the view that the Soviet form of government was at the heart of the problem, arguing that "what is required is a modification, and a very substantial one, of the domestic regime within Russia." On the other hand, the very secretiveness of the Soviet system left him uncertain about their intentions: "The motives of the masters of Russia may be security, Imperialism, world revolution or desire to perpetuate their own dictatorship. They are probably a mixture of all these elements. The point is that they are not stated and that we do not and cannot believe their own explanations of Soviet policy. I doubt that we shall ever be able to believe them as long as profound secrecy surrounds the process whereby that policy is framed." *Ibid.*, pp. 2052-53.
27. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, pp. 2053-55.

28. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, pp. 2060-63. It should be noted that assessments in the department of national defence, heavily influenced by inputs from an American military establishment preoccupied by the desire to reinforce the case for maintaining itself at strength after the war, were less sanguine. The prime minister and the department of external affairs sought in this period to find a balance between their own view that the Soviet Union posed no immediate threat to North American security on the one hand, and the need to accommodate the minimum requirements of military interests in Washington on the other. Their task, in essence, was to engage in as little direct defence of Canadian territory as was compatible with the objective of ensuring that the Americans would not insist on maintaining, for an indefinite period of time, forces of their own on Canadian soil. This tale is told in James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence*, Chapter 6, and Denis Smith, *Diplomacy of Fear*, especially pp. 147ff.
29. These were essentially that there was little danger of an attack by the Soviet Union within the next ten years, but that the peril could increase quite substantially in the 15 years after that.
30. Easily the most influential "power politics" theorist of international relations in the postwar period. His famous text, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York) was first published in 1948, but since then it has gone through many editions, latterly with the assistance of other scholars.
31. Emphases in quotations are mine. The "strategic appreciation" to which the memorandum was appended can be found in Norman Hillmer and Donald Page, eds., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 13: 1947* (Ottawa, 1993), pp. 346-52. The Appendix itself is on pp. 352-62.
32. See Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 367-82. The memorandum and the commentaries that resulted from it are carefully analyzed in Don Page and Don Munton, "Canadian Images of the Cold War 1946-7," *International Journal*, XXXII (Summer 1977) : 577-604, and in Denis Smith, *Diplomacy of Fear*, pp. 198-211. Smith observes in reaction to the Page/Munton article that the Reid paper "was not, by itself, the basis for Canada's decisive actions in the Cold War." (p. 238, note 5) This is clearly true in the sense that the balanced analytical treatment of the sources of Soviet and American behaviour respectively that was contained within it did not lead to an equally "balanced" foreign policy. Canada was very much on the American "side." But given the geopolitical realities and the nature of Canada's fundamental economic and

political interests, it could hardly have been otherwise.

33. This is a grossly oversimplified summary. The various commentaries, undiluted, can be found in Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 385-461.
34. This assertion may give rise to disbelief, since it was Canada that insisted on NATO's Article II, in the belief that the contest with the Soviet Union was as much "civilizational" as military. But Article II was not a defence against Soviet Union's security policy, or even against its foreign policy. It was a defence instead against the Soviet example. It was aimed, that is, at dealing with the danger of emulation, at undermining the potential foundation of a potential radical politics inside the West.



« L'INSTANT KANTIEN » : LA CONTRIBUTION CANADIENNE À LA CRÉATION DE LA « COMMUNAUTÉ NORD-ATLANTIQUE », 1947-1949

Stéphane Roussel

La noble fonction d'un être qui inspire est d'inciter à une création qui ne lui ressemble pas, et qui le dépasse en tous sens.

Georges Limbour
Cesare Feverelli

Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribblers of a few years back.

John Meynard Keynes
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money

*SUMMARY: The concept of a "North Atlantic Community" profoundly shaped Canada's approach to the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty during the late 1940s. Though notions of trans-Atlantic community remained vague and poorly defined, Canadian policy-makers hoped that their efforts would eventually lead to the formation of a supranational entity and a union of the Western democracies. This study argues that this definition of Canada's national interest was influenced primarily by the liberal democratic ideals of Louis St. Laurent, Lester Pearson, and Escott Reid. Moreover, it contends that the logic of North Atlantic community meets the criteria for a "Pacific Federation of Free States" set out by the 18th-century philosopher, Immanuel Kant, in his *Projet de paix perpétuelle*. For the most part, hopes for an alliance based on these criteria were sadly disappointed. However, by introducing the idea of "community" into the debate over the nature of the alliance (an idea which was reflected to some extent in the treaty's Article II),*

Canadian policy-makers indelibly marked the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, establishing reciprocity and consultation as two of its most important governing principles.

INTRODUCTION

Les diplomates canadiens ont joué un rôle considérable dans les discussions visant à établir les bases de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN). Leur apport le plus visible et le mieux connu est l'article II du Traité de Washington (avril 1949), lequel invite les membres de l'Alliance atlantique à renforcer la coopération dans les domaines non militaires¹. Mais dans l'esprit de dirigeants et de diplomates tels que Louis Saint-Laurent (ministre des Affaires extérieures, puis premier ministre), Lester Pearson (sous-secrétaire d'État, puis secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures) et Escott Reid (sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures), l'article II devait être beaucoup plus que ce que les commentateurs en retiennent aujourd'hui. À leurs yeux, il n'était en effet que la première étape d'un projet, original et audacieux, visant la formation d'une « Communauté nord-atlantique ». L'Alliance devait ainsi servir de fondement à une fédération d'États, et donc à une autorité supranationale.

Dès 1950, l'Alliance atlantique a évolué dans un sens différent de celui que souhaitaient Pearson, Saint-Laurent et Reid, et leur projet de Communauté transatlantique, rangé depuis parmi les curiosités de l'Histoire, n'attire à peu près plus l'attention des chercheurs. Cet épisode présente néanmoins un grand intérêt, car il permet de vérifier certaines hypothèses qui font l'objet de débats entre les théoriciens des relations internationales, notamment les « réalistes » et les « constructivistes ».

Les motifs qui ont poussé les dirigeants canadiens à participer aussi activement à la création de l'Alliance atlantique sont bien connus : réaction à la « menace » soviétique, désir de disposer d'une tribune qui permettrait d'exercer une influence internationale, recherche d'un contrepoids à l'attraction américaine². Pour l'essentiel, leur décision peut s'expliquer par des références à l'une ou l'autre des variantes de la théorie réaliste (équilibre de la menace, équilibre des puissances, alignement intra-alliance³). Mais si ces hypothèses peuvent expliquer les motivations du Canada (le « pourquoi »), elles n'ont qu'un faible potentiel heuristique lorsqu'il s'agit d'expliquer les choix du gouvernement canadien quant à la forme et au contenu de l'institution à naître (le « comment⁴ »). D'un point de vue réaliste, aucun argument ne justifie la création d'un « fédération » ou d'une « communauté » là



L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis Hume Wrong signe le traité de l'Alliance atlantique au nom du Canada à Washington, le 4 avril 1949, sous le regard de l'Américain John S. Foley.

ARCHIVES NATIONALES DU CANADA/PA-124427

où une simple alliance suffit.

Aussi, pour comprendre ces choix des dirigeants canadiens, il faut mettre de côté l'approche strictement utilitariste et rationaliste sur laquelle se fonde la conception réaliste. Une autre voie, proposée notamment par les auteurs constructivistes⁵, consiste à insérer une dimension sociologique dans l'analyse, c'est-à-dire à tenir compte de l'environnement socio-historique dans lequel évoluent les acteurs. Ce changement de perspective a plusieurs conséquences. Premièrement, le milieu international est considéré comme un environnement social, constitué notamment d'un ensemble d'institutions (normes, règles et codes de conduite explicites et implicites) qui sont le résultat de pratiques et d'interactions récurrentes entre les acteurs. Deuxièmement, la communauté de valeurs et de normes au sein d'un groupe peut contribuer à faire naître un sentiment d'appartenance, un sens de l'identité, qui contribue à sceller des relations privilégiées et des liens de solidarité entre les acteurs. Troisièmement, les idées, les valeurs et les normes auxquelles se réfèrent ces derniers contribuent, tout autant que les calculs d'intérêt, à structurer leurs perceptions et leurs choix. En marge de la rationalité subsiste donc une zone où peut s'exercer la subjectivité des acteurs. Ces

idées et valeurs proviennent de l'environnement international, mais aussi de l'intérieur des sociétés et des États. Pour comprendre les choix des décideurs, il faut donc cesser de considérer l'État comme un acteur unitaire et montrer comment les idées et les valeurs dominantes au sein de la société déterminent les comportements du gouvernement sur la scène internationale.

L'approche constructiviste prend un sens particulier lorsqu'on la met en relation avec le constat selon lequel les États démocratiques ne se font pas mutuellement la guerre, mais conservent toute leur agressivité dans leurs rapports avec les États non démocratiques. L'hypothèse de la « paix démocratique » s'inscrit dans une tradition intellectuelle très ancienne, soit le *Projet de paix perpétuelle* de Emmanuel Kant (1795). Oubliée tant que les États démocratiques étaient peu nombreux, cette notion est réapparue timidement durant les années 1930 et 1940 et, plus récemment, a été intégrée aux hypothèses de l'école « libérale » des relations internationales⁶.

L'hypothèse kantienne a été affinée par les constructivistes, pour qui le phénomène de la paix démocratique s'explique par l'internationalisation des valeurs et des normes libérales. Les liens privilégiés qu'entretiennent entre eux les États démocratiques se manifesteraient par l'application de normes touchant au règlement pacifique des différends, à la consultation régulière, à la recherche du consensus et à l'égalité des acteurs. En d'autres termes, les dirigeants de ces États appliqueraient, dans leurs relations mutuelles, l'équivalent des normes qui guident leurs actions au niveau interne. Les constructivistes ne se proposent pas seulement d'expliquer l'absence de guerre entre les États démocratiques, mais aussi la dynamique de leurs relations de coopération.

Plusieurs auteurs ont cru discerner, dans la zone euro-atlantique, l'existence d'une communauté d'États. Le jalon le plus important en la matière a été posé en 1957, alors que Karl Deutsch et ses collègues élaboraient la notion de « communauté pluraliste de sécurité » pour désigner l'ensemble des 19 États de la zone euro-atlantique entre lesquels le recours à la guerre semble désormais exclu⁷. Bien que le programme de recherche de Deutsch ait été longtemps négligé⁸, le terme « communauté atlantique » est resté. L'application de l'hypothèse de « la paix par la démocratie » à la Communauté nord-atlantique a été rétablie de façon explicite par Thomas Risse-Kappen⁹. Celui-ci estime que cette hypothèse explique non seulement l'état de paix qui règne entre les membres de l'OTAN, mais aussi l'influence que les États européens parviennent à exercer sur la politique de sécurité des États-Unis. Plus précisément, Risse-Kappen croit que l'explication de ce phénomène tient à l'existence d'un ensemble de normes qui

structurent le processus décisionnel :

[...] the shared values of the democratic security community will be reflected in the rules and decision-making procedures of the institution. Norms of regular consultation, of joint consensus-building and non-hierarchy should legitimize and enable allied influence. These norms serve as key obligations translating the domestic decision-making rules of democracies onto the international arena. The obligation to regularly consult each other can then be regarded as the functional equivalent to domestic norms regulating the publicity of the political process, its constitutionality, and the equality of the participants¹⁰.

Une communauté de sécurité permettant aux plus petits États d'exercer une influence sur les membres plus puissants rejoint bien l'objectif des diplomates canadiens qui, comme Reid, étaient préoccupés par la tendance des États-Unis à agir unilatéralement et à traiter de haut les intérêts de leurs partenaires. En ce sens, les normes et valeurs démocratiques peuvent avoir structuré la façon dont les diplomates canadiens envisageaient le contenu des institutions. On peut donc tracer un parallèle entre les idées exprimées à l'époque et celles de Deutsch et Risse-Kappen.

Ce lien n'a toutefois pas été étudié de façon systématique, bien que certains auteurs aient ouvert la voie. Risse-Kappen mentionne le Canada dans son étude, mais concentre son attention sur les États européens. Roger Epp fait un pas décisif en démontrant que l'analyse de la participation canadienne à l'OTAN ne saurait se limiter aux justifications d'inspiration réaliste et doit aussi englober les valeurs progressistes véhiculées par la notion de communauté, qui s'inscrit dans la tradition libérale kantienne. Un autre jalon important a été posé par Robert Wolfe, qui applique l'approche constructiviste à l'étude du développement de la dimension économique de la Communauté transatlantique¹¹.

Mon intention est d'approfondir la démarche entreprise par Risse-Kappen, Epp et Wolfe en concentrant l'attention sur la période de formation de la Communauté atlantique et en gardant à l'esprit deux objectifs. Le premier consiste à déterminer comment les idées et valeurs libérales ont influencé les choix des diplomates et expliquent qu'il leur soit venu une idée aussi audacieuse que celle de former une « fédération nord-atlantique ». La recherche de l'origine de ce projet est donc au coeur de la pro-

blématique. Il serait difficile de prétendre que le projet envisagé par Reid, Pearson et Saint-Laurent était directement inspiré de la « Fédération républicaine » décrite dans le *Projet de paix perpétuelle*, mais il est tout de même frappant de constater que tous les éléments de la proposition élaborée par Kant se retrouvent, 150 ans plus tard, sous une forme ou une autre, dans celle des Canadiens. Une logique semblable se dégage donc des deux projets, celle du premier permettant de mieux comprendre le second. En ce sens, la préparation du Traité de Washington constitue peut-être l'« instant kantien » par excellence dans l'histoire récente de la politique étrangère canadienne. Le second objectif consiste à examiner comment les dirigeants et diplomates canadiens ont contribué à créer la communauté de sécurité démocratique décrite par Risse-Kappen. Cet apport se concrétise bien entendu dans l'article II, mais on le retrouve aussi dans la mise en place des normes de consultation et de réciprocité.

LE GRAND DESSEIN

Au printemps de 1948, la plupart des États occidentaux évoquent l'idée de créer une alliance en vue de freiner la poussée appréhendée des Soviétiques en Europe occidentale. Les Canadiens se distinguent bientôt, non seulement par l'intensité de leur enthousiasme, mais aussi par une proposition qui dépasse largement ce qu'envisagent leurs futurs partenaires. Pour les représentants des Affaires extérieures, le pacte proposé devait être bien plus qu'une simple alliance servant à contrer la menace soviétique : il devait surtout servir de creuset à une communauté ou fédération nord-atlantique.

La communauté? Quelle communauté?

La plupart des auteurs qui évoquent les idées de Pearson et Reid se contentent de noter que leur projet de communauté est toujours resté très flou, même dans l'esprit de ses partisans ou des observateurs de l'époque¹². Il est vrai qu'il n'a jamais fait l'objet d'une présentation systématique, mais on peut néanmoins déterminer, à partir des échanges entre les diplomates, comment ceux-ci entrevoyaient les choses.

Aux yeux des dirigeants canadiens, le Pacte atlantique devait être plus qu'une alliance au sens classique du terme, c'est-à-dire un engagement d'assistance mutuelle. Non seulement le Pacte devait-il englober les questions de défense, mais il devait aussi s'étendre aux relations économiques et culturelles. Pour les Canadiens, une alliance strictement militaire était insuffisante et devait être complétée par des engagements destinés à accroître la solidarité des alliés. Bien entendu, ces engagements devaient

d'abord permettre à l'Ouest de faire face à la menace militaire proprement dite en créant un réservoir de ressources suffisant pour faire contrepoids à l'Armée rouge. Mais plus encore, ils constituaient un moyen de faire face à la menace politique, c'est-à-dire à l'influence acquise par les partis communistes d'Europe occidentale à la faveur de la guerre, influence qui risquait de s'enraciner encore plus profondément si les gouvernements de l'Ouest se révélaient incapables de satisfaire les besoins économiques et sociaux de leurs citoyens. En ce sens, le projet de communauté apparaît comme le prolongement des efforts entrepris dans le cadre du plan Marshall. Les engagements pris par les alliés visaient en outre à éviter que ceux-ci ne s'affaiblissent en s'entre-déchirant pour des motifs de compétition économique. Dès mars 1948, Reid résume l'idée en ces termes :

Mere force is not enough. There has to be the determination to use the force if necessary and a determination accompanied by a fervent belief in the society which one is trying not only to defend but to make the basis of an eventually united world. The new treaty must therefore be a living document and create a new living international institution¹³.

C'est donc à la lumière de cette logique qu'il convient de se pencher sur les efforts en vue de faire inscrire au Traité de Washington les dispositions sur la coopération non militaire.

Le Pacte devait aussi donner lieu à la création d'un certain nombre d'institutions qui constitueraient le cadre formel dans lequel prend corps la notion de communauté:

The Atlantic Treaty must be more than a mere military alliance [...] it must create new imaginative types of international institutions which will be outward and visible signs of a new inward and spiritual unity and purpose in the Western World [...] They should be given titles symbolic of the ultimate goal of the world order which we have in mind and of which we are building an essential foundation. For this reason we suggest the use of such terms as [...] "Atlantic Community" for the international organization established by the treaty¹⁴.

La réflexion sur le type d'institution qui devait être mis en place évoluera

tout le long de l'année 1948 au gré des négociations avec les autres partenaires. Les alliés s'entendent rapidement sur le principe de la création d'un Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord réunissant les représentants des États membres et agissant comme organe exécutif. Toutefois, certaines des propositions formulées par Pearson et Reid se distinguent par leur audace. Ainsi, au cours de l'automne, ils évoquent une formule inspirée de l'Union de l'Europe occidentale : un conseil des ministres des Affaires étrangères, un conseil des ministres de la Défense, un comité des chefs d'état-major, un comité des approvisionnements et un secrétariat¹⁵. Mais Reid voit encore plus grand :

[...] we should go farther than the Brussels Treaty in setting up revolutionary new political instruments of the alliance. That is why I feel that we should have not only a Board for Collective Self-defence, but a parliament, a president, [...] a chancellor [...] and a chief of staff. [...] This would give the impression that we mean business when we talk about forming a new society of the free nations¹⁶.

Reid cherche également à mettre en place un mécanisme décisionnel fondé sur le principe de la majorité simple afin d'éviter les initiatives unilatérales ou les recours au veto, sans pour autant sombrer dans les complications d'un processus qui exigerait l'unanimité :

We also suggest that an effort be made to make a clean break with the old issues of "veto" and "unanimity" by setting up a system of weighted voting. We have in mind a system under which the largest state, the United States, would have, say, forty votes, the smallest state, Luxembourg, one vote and others in rough proportion. Under such a system of weighted voting it might be possible for all the signatory states to agree to accept decisions made by a two-thirds majority. The United States would in fact have a veto since it would cast more than one-third of the total possible vote, but it would be a logical and defensible veto¹⁷.

Bien que fort éloignée des plans proposés par les autres gouvernements, cette idée restera bien ancrée dans l'esprit de Reid, qui proposera, en vain, de l'appliquer à une éventuelle assemblée délibérante ou

parlement de l'Alliance¹⁸.

Les diplomates canadiens souhaitaient également faire inscrire dans le Traité une disposition stipulant que les différends entre les membres devaient être résolus devant la Cour internationale de justice¹⁹. Le projet fit l'objet d'intenses discussions à la toute fin des négociations, en bonne partie parce qu'il fut repris et porté par la délégation française, avec l'appui des Canadiens²⁰. Devant l'opposition des États-Unis, les participants s'entendirent finalement sur un simple engagement à résoudre pacifiquement les différends (article I).

Enfin – et il s'agit de la dimension la plus audacieuse du projet – le Pacte devait entamer un processus d'unification politique des États membres et n'était donc qu'une étape vers une construction politique beaucoup plus élaborée. Cette idée rejoint le « grand dessein » évoqué par Pearson en 1948:

The proposed North Atlantic Alliance carries out the principle of a pooling of risks, resources, and control over policy. [...] It creates a new international institution which will have within itself possibilities of growth and of adaptation to changing conditions. The North Atlantic Community is today a real commonwealth of nations which share the same democratic and cultural traditions. If a movement towards its political and economic unification can be started this year, no one can forecast the extent of the unity which may exist five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years from now²¹.

Le projet devait donc, pour reprendre les termes de certains proches de Reid et Pearson, mener à la disparition graduelle des attributs de la souveraineté au profit d'une autorité supranationale, laquelle permettrait aux États occidentaux d'agir comme une seule entité intégrée²².

Les deux premiers éléments du projet sont, en fait, des étapes nécessaires pour accéder au troisième. D'une part, le processus menant à la création de la Communauté transatlantique relève d'une conception fonctionnaliste, dans la mesure où la coopération dans les domaines techniques et fonctionnels devait engendrer un processus à caractère politique. La structure de coopération dans les domaines non militaires – en particulier au plan économique – visait à créer des conditions propices à l'établissement d'un mécanisme de consultation et d'intégration politique. Comme le démontre Robert Wolfe, « there is an economic dimension to the maintenance of the sense of the community on which the security alliance must rest²³ ». D'autre

part, les institutions devaient servir de fondement à la vie politique de l'Alliance. Elles devaient tirer leur légitimité et leur efficacité du processus de dilution des pouvoirs nationaux.

La réalisation du projet de communauté élaboré par Pearson et Reid aurait entraîné des bouleversements majeurs dans les relations entre les parties au Traité, sinon à l'intérieur des États eux-mêmes. On comprend donc pourquoi leur proposition devait susciter de nombreuses oppositions, non seulement chez les éventuels partenaires de l'Alliance, mais au sein même du ministère des Affaires extérieures.

« Nous formons une alliance, pas une fédération »

Au Canada même, le projet de communauté nord-atlantique est loin de faire l'unanimité au-delà du petit cercle des « fédéralistes », dont le cœur était essentiellement composé de Saint-Laurent, Pearson et Reid. Aux Affaires extérieures, l'enthousiasme de certains de leurs collaborateurs n'est guère plus que modéré. C'est en particulier le cas de Hume Wrong, l'ambassadeur canadien à Washington, de Norman Robertson, haut-commissaire à Londres, et de son successeur, Dana Wilgress. Les échanges entre Reid et ses collègues témoignent des profondes divergences qui séparent les « fédéralistes » des « réalistes ». Sceptique devant l'idée de créer une institution très élaborée, qu'il jugeait inefficace, éventuellement inacceptable aux yeux du Congrès américain et difficile à gérer, Wrong préférait que l'alliance se résume à un ensemble de garanties unilatérales offertes par les États-Unis. Comme il le à disait Reid, « we are not establishing a federation but an alliance²⁴ » et s'oppose à tout ce qui pourrait compliquer ou ralentir des négociations visant d'abord, selon lui, à conclure un pacte militaire²⁵. De l'avis de John W. Holmes, ancien diplomate et témoin privilégié de ces événements, « Wrong was a functionalist and he faced every day the realities of American politics which made any supranational conception out of the question²⁶ ». À l'automne de 1948, les rapports entre Wrong et Reid étaient si tendus que ce dernier est allé jusqu'à demander à Pearson et à Saint-Laurent d'avaliser ses propositions, puis de s'assurer l'appui du Cabinet²⁷. Robertson, pour sa part, appuyait chaudement toute initiative visant à accroître les liens économiques entre l'Europe et le Canada, mais ne partageait pas intégralement la vision politique de Reid, dont le langage, disait-il, renfermait les échos d'un livre de prières anglican²⁸.

Tout aussi profond était le scepticisme des représentants des autres ministères, notamment ceux qui, en raison de leur vocation économique, seraient appelés à mettre en oeuvre les dispositions touchant à la coopéra-

tion dans les domaines non militaires. Les représentants du ministère de la Défense étaient également inquiets face aux déclarations de principe portant sur l'esprit du Traité et craignaient que les institutions proposées par Reid n'amènent le gouvernement canadien à prendre des engagements militaires politiquement indéfendables²⁹.

Au niveau international, les Canadiens se sentaient aussi parfois bien seuls, même s'ils recevaient parfois des encouragements de la part de certains collègues européens, notamment du délégué français Robert Schuman, qui fut lui-même, l'année suivante, à l'origine d'une initiative d'intégration. Certains représentants du département d'État américain, dont George Kennan, T.C. Achilles et J.D. Hickerson, manifestaient aussi de l'intérêt envers le projet. À la suite d'une conversation avec Hickerson, Hume Wrong écrivait:

Some in the State Department have visions of much more extensive union [than the Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk], based not only on a defensive alliance, but also on a custom union, perhaps with common citizenship. [...] They do not close their minds to the possibility that the United States and Canada might be included in such a union³⁰.

Dans les faits, ces appuis se traduisaient toutefois par une non-opposition plutôt que par un soutien actif au projet canadien. Comme le soulignait Wrong en février 1949, « we are now the only party to the negotiation that really favours the inclusion of anything in the treaty about social and economic collaboration outside a general reference in the preamble³¹ ». Depuis quelques mois, le projet faisait d'ailleurs face à une opposition de plus en plus vigoureuse. Les Britanniques, avec l'appui de la plupart des États européens, avaient sonné la charge en septembre 1948, jouant un air plus tard prisé par les tenants d'une défense « européenne » plutôt qu'« atlantiste »: l'Alliance ne doit en aucun cas court-circuiter les activités des autres organisations européennes, notamment celles à vocation économique, et elle ne doit donc pas entraîner la création de nouvelles institutions. Surtout soucieux de recevoir des garanties militaires des États-Unis, ils estimaient que la coopération dans les domaines non militaires n'avait qu'une importance secondaire et méritait peu d'attention³². Les opposants reçurent un appui de taille en janvier 1949, lorsque Dean Acheson succéda à George Marshall au poste de secrétaire d'État. Dès l'arrivée d'Acheson au State Department, les Américains commencèrent à chercher des moyens de diluer la portée de tout

engagement à caractère économique ou culturel. Les diplomates canadiens durent investir un capital politique considérable pour convaincre le secrétaire d'État et les membres du Congrès, notamment en menaçant de se retirer des négociations et en exerçant des pressions pour obtenir l'appui des autres participants³³. Preuve supplémentaire du durcissement des positions, la notion de communauté disparaît du vocabulaire des diplomates dans les dernières phases des négociations³⁴. Elle ne réapparaîtra que plus tard.

L'explication réaliste : du double dilemme de sécurité au double équilibre des puissances

Compte tenu du manque d'enthousiasme des futurs alliés, comment expliquer l'acharnement des diplomates canadiens à vouloir créer une communauté transatlantique? On peut examiner cet épisode à travers un prisme réaliste et présenter ce projet comme le résultat d'un calcul stratégique, comme une manoeuvre destinée à promouvoir les intérêts nationaux du Canada. Il serait, de ce point de vue, la suite logique des leçons que les dirigeants canadiens avaient tirées de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et qui s'articulent autour d'un « double équilibre des puissances » destiné à résoudre un « double dilemme de sécurité ».

Le premier de ces enseignements, c'est que la sécurité du Canada est indéfectiblement liée à celle de l'Europe et qu'il y va de son intérêt de contribuer à repousser ou à dissuader d'éventuels agresseurs. Cette logique, qui s'est imposée au cours de l'été de 1940, réapparaît en 1947-1948 alors que surgit la perception d'une menace soviétique. La solution réside dans la formation d'un équilibre des puissances, assuré par une alliance des États occidentaux. Dans ce contexte, la coopération économique, politique et culturelle sert les fins stratégiques de cet équilibre en réduisant les risques de conflit entre les alliés et en renforçant les ressources dont ils disposent pour dissuader les Soviétiques. La seconde leçon tient à la façon dont le Canada peut contribuer à cet équilibre des puissances. Si les dirigeants canadiens veulent bien faire leur part, ils veulent aussi éviter de se retrouver dans une situation comparable à celle où ils ont été placés durant la guerre, alors qu'ils ont souvent été écartés de la prise de décision politique, chassés des grandes puissances. La contradiction entre la nécessité de participer à l'effort de défense commun et le désir de préserver un contrôle intégral sur la forme et l'usage de cet apport constitue le premier dilemme de sécurité du Canada.

La troisième leçon que les dirigeants canadiens tirent de l'expérience vécue au cours de la guerre, c'est que la sécurité du Canada passe non seule-

ment par Paris et Londres, mais surtout par Washington. La coopération touchant à la défense du continent nord-américain établie en temps de guerre était appelée à se poursuivre. Le Canada y trouvait d'ailleurs son compte puisque seuls les États-Unis avaient les ressources suffisantes pour assurer une défense un tant soit peu crédible de cet immense territoire. Le problème, c'est que cette coopération n'était pas sans risque pour la souveraineté canadienne. La tension entre les impératifs de la souveraineté et ceux de la sécurité était au centre du second dilemme de sécurité du Canada.

Ce double dilemme semble trouver sa solution dans une forme d'équilibre des puissances, cette fois appliqué à l'échelle régionale. L'institutionnalisation de la Communauté atlantique offrait une solution au premier dilemme en créant un cadre propice à la participation canadienne. Non seulement allait-elle permettre d'encadrer la prise de décision et de mieux tenir compte des intérêts des petits États, mais elle contribuerait aussi à élargir la notion de sécurité en lui donnant une dimension politique et économique et non plus strictement militaire, soit des domaines où le Canada est le plus qualifié. Par ailleurs, pour maintenir l'équilibre entre la sécurité et la souveraineté, le gouvernement canadien devait tenter de diluer l'influence de Washington dans un ensemble plus large que l'espace nord-américain. La proposition visant à créer une structure permanente au sein de la Communauté atlantique s'inscrivait donc dans une logique qui rappelle celle de l'équilibre des puissances, adaptée aux relations intra-alliances, car une telle institution allait permettre au Canada de trouver en Europe un contrepoids à l'influence des États-Unis :

What has received insufficient emphasis was our belief that the farther the North Atlantic Community moved towards political and economic unification the more protection it would give Canada from the power of the United States. We believed that the more developed the constitutional structure of the Community became the more the power of the United States would be restrained by the influence of its allies, especially Britain and France³⁵.

L'argument du « double équilibre des puissances » peut expliquer, tout au moins en partie, l'empressement des diplomates canadiens à sauter dans le train de l'Alliance atlantique. Toutefois, la faiblesse de cette analyse d'inspiration réaliste réside dans le fait qu'elle ne permet pas de faire la distinction entre

alliance et communauté. Rien ne justifiait la création d'une institution plus élaborée qu'une alliance au sens classique du terme. Celle-ci aurait tout aussi bien permis de dissuader l'Union soviétique tout en instaurant un équilibre des puissances régional. De plus, il existait bien d'autres institutions multilatérales permettant au Canada de renforcer ses liens économiques avec l'Europe, et donc de contribuer aux aspects non militaires de la sécurité. De ce point de vue, les gains obtenus par la création de lourds mécanismes fédératifs restaient bien inférieurs aux coûts qu'elle entraînerait, ne serait-ce que du point de vue des efforts déployés pour convaincre certains alliés sceptiques, jaloux de leur souveraineté ou satisfaits d'une simple alliance. Bref, pourquoi les Canadiens ont-ils compliqué un projet qui pouvait rester beaucoup plus simple? Par ailleurs, l'objectif à long terme – la création d'une entité supranationale – était un défi aux propositions réalistes. C'est, ni plus ni moins, la remise en cause de la souveraineté des États que proposaient Pearson et Reid. Pour expliquer comment les dirigeants canadiens en sont venus à formuler un tel projet, il faut ajouter, aux explications fondées sur les calculs stratégiques et sur des considérations d'intérêt national, des variables touchant au contexte socio-historique, telles que les idées, les valeurs et les normes.

TROIS MUSES : LIPPMANN, MITRANY ET KANT

Les appuis recueillis par les Canadiens, bien que rares, indiquent que leur proposition n'était pas, aux yeux de leurs contemporains, aussi farfelue qu'elle peut le paraître 50 ans plus tard. Au contraire, elle reflète bien le climat intellectuel de l'époque. Pour mieux mesurer l'incidence des idées et des valeurs sur les choix des dirigeants politiques, il convient d'identifier les racines intellectuelles du projet. La revue des « sources d'inspiration » des diplomates canadiens permettra aussi de mieux cerner la logique qui se cache derrière une proposition dont les termes sont toujours restés relativement vagues.

Les concepts de communauté et de fédération internationales faisaient partie depuis longtemps du vocabulaire des diplomates et des penseurs de l'époque. L'ensemble nébuleux des idées mondialistes en vogue à l'époque constituait sans doute une source d'inspiration importante, quoique indirecte. Les origines de la notion d'une communauté atlantique – donc, régionale plutôt que mondiale – sont plus faciles à identifier et peuvent être réparties en trois groupes.

Walter Lippmann : l'inspiration géopolitique

La première source d'inspiration à considérer réside dans les écrits de

Walter Lippmann, chroniqueur au *New York Herald Tribune* et auteur de plusieurs ouvrages sur les relations internationales. Lippmann propose, en 1943-1944, la création d'une communauté atlantique³⁶. Celle-ci s'apparente d'abord à une alliance traditionnelle, puisqu'elle est fondée sur l'axe Londres-Washington, à laquelle viennent se greffer les États du Commonwealth, d'Europe de l'Ouest et d'Amérique latine. Mais l'auteur va plus loin. D'abord, il insiste pour que cette alliance mène à la création d'un système de sécurité intégré et non d'un simple processus de coordination des politiques de défense. Par ailleurs, il juge essentiel que les membres renoncent formellement à la guerre dans leurs relations mutuelles (ce qu'ils font déjà en pratique) et orientent leur défense en fonction de menaces externes. Enfin, il place le respect de la norme de consultation au cœur de la vie politique de la communauté³⁷.

Le projet de Lippmann est une construction géostratégique, puisqu'il repose uniquement sur des considérations inspirées de l'équilibre des puissances. Sa communauté est le produit d'une convergence des intérêts de sécurité de ses membres (l'émergence d'une menace) et c'est celle-ci qui donne un sens au processus d'unification. Ce schéma réserve peu de place aux variables relevant de la communication ou des valeurs.

Il est possible d'établir un lien explicite entre les réflexions de Lippmann et celles des diplomates canadiens. Dans un mémorandum envoyé en avril 1947, Dana Wilgress écrit :

Undoubtedly, the "Truman doctrine" will bring us into still greater dependence upon the United States and to this extent away from the United Kingdom. It is really the coming into being of that "Atlantic Community" envisaged by Walter Lippman in his book *United States War Aims*. The Atlantic Community envisaged by Lippman was one dominated by the United States but in the same benevolent fashion as the world susceptible to sea power used to be dominated by Great Britain. In other words the Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century is to be replaced in the later twentieth century by a Pax Americana³⁸.

S'il est clair que Wilgress a lu le projet de l'auteur américain, il est aussi évident que ses impressions sont mitigées. Reid s'inspirera fortement du mémorandum de Wilgress pour rédiger son propre texte diffusé au sein du Ministère en août de la même année, allant jusqu'à reprendre mot à mot le

passage où Wilgress évoque Lippmann³⁹. Or, c'est justement dans ce document que Reid avance l'idée d'un Pacte atlantique. Il connaissait donc les idées de Lippmann, ou tout au moins en a pris connaissance à cette occasion.

Mais si Lippmann a servi de muse à Pearson, Reid ou Saint-Laurent, c'est de façon plutôt lointaine. Sa contribution se limite peut-être au seul terme « communauté atlantique », car la logique qui se cache derrière sa définition de ce concept s'écarte sensiblement de celle sur laquelle les diplomates canadiens ébauchaient leurs plans. Le mémorandum de Wilgress indique la nature des réserves qu'ont dû entretenir les Canadiens. De façon générale, le ton paternaliste employé par Lippmann n'était guère de nature à les encourager. Le premier ministre W.L. Mackenzie King, s'il a lu les écrits de l'auteur américain, n'a certainement pas dû apprécier les raccourcis utilisés par ce dernier, notamment lorsqu'il présente le Canada comme une simple composante d'un Commonwealth téléguidé depuis Londres. Bref, Lippmann n'a sans doute pas été la principale source d'inspiration des atlantistes canadiens.

David Mitrany : l'inspiration fonctionnaliste

Les idées fonctionnalistes constituent la seconde source d'inspiration probable des diplomates canadiens. Ce courant apparaît au tournant des années 1940, surtout popularisé par les travaux de David Mitrany⁴⁰. Il repose essentiellement sur le raisonnement voulant que les États, du fait qu'ils ne suffisent plus à satisfaire les besoins de l'humanité (bien-être économique et social, développement scientifique, établissement de relations pacifiques durables), devront céder la place à une série d'organisations internationales vouées à des fonctions précises. Cette évolution entraînera, à terme, une intégration « en profondeur » du système international, un dépérissement de l'État-nation et la disparition de la force comme moyen de résoudre les conflits. Le processus s'achèvera par la création d'un organe supranational chapeautant l'ensemble des relations transnationales et pouvant exercer un pouvoir politique réel. Les idées fonctionnalistes sont largement diffusées en Occident et intégrées aux projets de fédération européenne qui se dessinent entre les années 1930 et les années 1950. Elles inspirent le Plan Schuman qui mène à la création, en 1951, de la Communauté Européenne du charbon et de l'acier.

Les dirigeants canadiens n'ont cependant pas attendu les réflexions de Mitrany pour développer leur propre approche fonctionnaliste. Dès le début des années 1920, le premier ministre Arthur Meighen faisait référence au principe de « représentation fonctionnelle ». Le concept, précisé au cours de la guerre, fournira des solutions bien concrètes aux problèmes auxquels se

heurten les dirigeants canadiens, frustrés de se voir continuellement écartés des discussions entre les grandes puissances sur la gestion de l'effort de guerre et sur l'organisation du système économique international qui doit être mis en place après le conflit⁴¹. Selon ce principe, les relations internationales doivent être découpées en « domaines d'action » (issue areas) où l'autorité est confiée aux États qui ont le plus d'intérêt et qui y font les contributions les plus importantes. Par ailleurs, la concentration des activités au sein des organisations internationales, auxquelles le projet de Mitrany donne un rôle central, présente l'avantage d'atténuer les différences entre les grandes puissances et les autres États, permettant à ces derniers d'exercer une influence accrue. En ce sens, le fonctionnalisme permet de défendre et de promouvoir les intérêts internationaux du Canada.

Mais ce n'est pas tant au niveau du contenu et des motifs de cette récupération des idées fonctionnalistes à des fins de défense des intérêts nationaux qu'il faut chercher l'influence de Mitrany sur la notion de communauté, bien que ce processus ait le mérite de montrer que plusieurs membres du gouvernement ont effectivement pris connaissance des idées fonctionnalistes. C'est plutôt la dimension « idéaliste » qui doit retenir l'attention ici. La paix perpétuelle qui devait émerger à long terme répondait certainement aux aspirations de Pearson et de ses collaborateurs. Elle avait, en plus, l'avantage d'être formulée en des termes qui la rendait acceptable aux esprits plus réalistes, la phase finale, marquée par la disparition de la souveraineté, étant repoussée à un avenir indéterminé.

La conception de la paix et des moyens de la maintenir qui se profile dans le projet fonctionnaliste rejoignait celle qui se dessinait parmi les dirigeants canadiens, et qui va au-delà d'un simple équilibre des puissances puisque la paix réside davantage dans la coopération économique et technique que dans des mesures à caractère militaire.

Le projet de Communauté atlantique défendu par Pearson et certains de ses collègues puise certainement à la source fonctionnaliste. Cette inspiration ne concerne pas tant l'objet de la fédération (à l'égard de laquelle Mitrany aurait sans doute émis des critiques⁴²) que les moyens de la réaliser. La référence au fonctionnalisme permet de mieux saisir le rôle que serait appelée à jouer la coopération non militaire – et en particulier la coopération économique – dans le processus de formation de la Communauté atlantique. Elle permet ainsi d'explicitier la logique qui sous-tend l'article II⁴³. Toutefois, cette référence n'est pas suffisante car elle laisse de côté les aspects politiques du projet.

Emmanuel Kant : l'inspiration républicaine

L'un des plus anciens projets destinés à résoudre le problème de la guerre est celui qu'esquisse Emmanuel Kant en 1795 dans un essai intitulé *Projet de paix perpétuelle*. Véritable profession de foi envers le progrès social, politique et moral de l'humanité, ce texte affirme, en substance, que la guerre disparaîtra grâce à un processus d'apprentissage et, surtout, grâce au renforcement de l'aptitude des individus à participer aux décisions politiques grâce aux institutions républicaines (on dirait aujourd'hui « démocratiques »). Trois « articles définitifs » sont essentiels pour instaurer cette paix démocratique.

La constitution civique de chaque État doit être républicaine. Ce type de système politique est le seul qui permette l'expression de la volonté populaire. Puisque les populations sont les premières à faire les frais de la guerre, elles ne sont pas enclines à se lancer dans de telles aventures (ce qui est probablement encore plus vrai depuis l'avènement des armes nucléaires). Cet article vise, en fait, à permettre aux individus de se substituer aux États comme principaux acteurs des relations internationales. L'émergence de la paix perpétuelle est donc liée à l'adoption, par un nombre croissant d'États, d'une constitution démocratique.

Le droit des gens doit être fondé sur un fédéralisme d'États libres. Les républiques, selon Kant, appliquent dans leurs relations mutuelles des règles de droit international qui, par définition, excluent le recours à la guerre. Non seulement ces États vivent-ils en paix, mais ils ont naturellement tendance à s'associer au sein d'une « fédération ». Sans doute par souci de pragmatisme, Kant ne va pas jusqu'à demander la constitution, au niveau supranational, de l'équivalent du pouvoir centralisé de l'État (comme l'étaient les gouvernements européens d'alors). Sa fédération est plutôt un compromis entre le pacte de non-agression et une forme d'union très décentralisée inspirée de celle des États-Unis d'Amérique de l'époque⁴⁴.

Le droit cosmopolite doit se restreindre aux conditions de l'hospitalité universelle. Le droit des gens doit viser uniquement à créer des conditions propices aux échanges pacifiques, et en particulier au commerce. Par cette restriction, Kant cherche à contenir les revendications visant des territoires déjà habités et à empêcher le recours à des arguments de droit pour justifier des conquêtes ou des protectorats. Les échanges ont, par contre, l'avantage de permettre la circulation des idées (et donc de contribuer à l'épanouissement du républicanisme) et l'enrichissement des populations.

Le projet kantien de paix perpétuelle est, depuis une vingtaine d'années, souvent employé pour expliquer la tendance que manifestent les États

démocratiques à ne pas se faire la guerre. Il a aussi inspiré certaines spéculations sur l'évolution de l'ordre international⁴⁵. Mais est-il possible que ces idées aient également joué un rôle normatif et servi de source d'inspiration aux partisans de la création d'une communauté atlantique?

Il ne semble pas y avoir, dans la correspondance des diplomates canadiens, de référence ou citation aux travaux du philosophe allemand. On peut néanmoins établir des liens indirects entre la notion kantienne de fédération démocratique et le projet de Communauté atlantique mis de l'avant par les diplomates canadiens à la fin des années 1940. D'une part, ce dernier était formulé dans un contexte intellectuel, politique et culturel propre à attirer l'attention des décideurs sur les « vertus » des valeurs libérales et sur l'incidence qu'elles ont sur les relations internationales. D'autre part, les traits du projet canadien qu'on peut établir à partir des documents de l'époque présentent de grandes ressemblances avec ceux du projet kantien. Ces similitudes ressortent de façon très nette lorsqu'on examine les deux propositions en parallèle. Ainsi, même si les diplomates canadiens ne se sont pas inspirés des propositions de Kant, ils ont fait appel à la même logique.

Ce n'est pas avant le milieu du XX^e siècle que les réflexions de Kant seront transformées en véritable projet politique susceptible d'être effectivement mis en oeuvre. Au cours des années 1920 et 1930, Sir Alfred Zimmern publie plusieurs d'articles dans lesquels il entrevoit la formation d'une communauté des États occidentaux⁴⁶. Toutefois, la première version contemporaine du projet kantien est probablement celle de Clarence K. Streit, qui, en 1939, est l'un des premiers à noter que les États démocratiques vivent en paix les uns avec les autres depuis plus d'un siècle. Aiguillonné par l'agressivité manifeste du « triangle autocratique » (Allemagne, Italie, Japon), l'auteur recommande la création d'une « fédération des démocraties⁴⁷ ».

Les champs de compétence de cette fédération engloberaient la citoyenneté, la défense, les échanges économiques, la monnaie et les communications. Contrairement à d'autres projets de gouvernement mondial, Streit laisse aux États membres leurs institutions et leur souveraineté, leur confiant le soin de gérer les questions d'intérêt national ou local. Toutefois, il s'agit d'un véritable projet d'intégration politique, dans la mesure où l'union n'est pas un « gouvernement des gouvernements », mais bien un pouvoir qui entretient des liens directs avec les citoyens. L'auteur reprend aussi la logique kantienne lorsqu'il estime qu'une telle union serait inévitablement appelée à s'élargir, grâce à la démocratisation des États totalitaires, et, à terme, à former un véritable gouvernement universel.

À mi-chemin entre les propositions de Lippmann et de Streit se trouve

un autre projet, formulé par l'historien britannique Arnold Toynbee. Celui-ci évoque la possibilité de mettre en place « une forme constitutionnelle quelconque de gouvernement mondial ». L'élément intéressant ici est le terme « constitutionnel », qui fait référence aux expériences des États démocratiques fédérés (dont les États-Unis et le Canada), bien que l'auteur ne définisse pas le contenu de cette constitution démocratique supranationale⁴⁸.

Rien ne montre, dans l'état actuel des recherches, que les diplomates canadiens aient eu connaissance des propositions de Streit. Par contre, il est certain que Pearson a lu Toynbee, car il en cite un passage dans sa correspondance⁴⁹. Et ce qui a visiblement attiré son attention, ce n'est pas tant le projet de gouvernement mondial que l'impact de la transposition des mécanismes décisionnels démocratiques au niveau supranational.

Les plans proposés par Streit et Toynbee entraîneraient des bouleversements tels qu'on perçoit mal comment ils auraient effectivement pu servir de fondement aux politiques des États concernés. Le projet de Streit reçut néanmoins un accueil favorable de la part de certains de ses contemporains, qui le jugeaient autrement réalisable que les entreprises à caractère mondial ou européen⁵⁰. Plus encore, ce projet prend véritablement un sens lorsqu'on le situe dans le contexte de l'époque, puisqu'au bout du compte, il semble n'être que l'aboutissement logique des grands courants politiques du moment.

Au cours de l'entre-deux-guerres, deux facteurs socio-politiques contribuent à attirer l'attention des dirigeants et des analystes sur le rapport entre les valeurs démocratiques et les problèmes de sécurité et de défense. En premier lieu, le système international est, pour la première fois depuis la Révolution française, véritablement hétérogène. Les républiques et les monarchies parlementaires doivent désormais côtoyer des régimes communistes, fascistes ou militaristes. Cette hétérogénéité, mise en relief par les excès du nazisme et du stalinisme, contribue à renforcer le sentiment d'identité commune des États qui partagent des valeurs politiques libérales. Le conflit qui débute en 1939 prend donc un sens différent des précédents, puisqu'il ne s'agit pas seulement de se défendre contre une agression militaire, mais aussi de protéger des valeurs, une façon de vivre, voire une « civilisation ». Cette dimension idéologique teinte aussi le glissement vers la guerre froide de 1947 à 1949.

En second lieu, l'insertion des valeurs socio-politiques et économiques libérales dans la conduite des affaires de sécurité est aussi la conséquence de l'évolution de la nature de la guerre, et en particulier de l'émergence de la

guerre dite « totale ». Contrairement aux États totalitaires, les démocraties ne peuvent utiliser des moyens de coercition pour tirer des forces vives de la nation et mener des luttes de l'ampleur de celles de 1914-1918. Suite à la Grande Guerre et à la dépression des années 1930, la plupart des gouvernements libéraux reconnaissent qu'il faut repenser le contrat social entre l'État et le citoyen : il faut améliorer les conditions de vie de M. Tout-le-Monde afin de le convaincre de la nécessité de se battre pour défendre la démocratie. Ce ne sont donc pas uniquement des conditions économiques qui expliquent l'émergence de l'État-providence et des politiques sociales qui apparaissent dans les années précédant et suivant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale⁵¹.

Ce lien entre la conduite de la guerre et les valeurs libérales devient de plus en plus explicite dans les années 1940. Il trouve son expression la plus frappante dans le message annuel au Congrès que prononce le président Roosevelt le 6 janvier 1941, et qui lie la lutte qui s'annonce contre les États totalitaires à l'avancement des libertés fondamentales associées à la démocratie. Celles-ci serviront de fondement à la Charte de l'Atlantique (août 1941), qui fixe les buts de guerre des démocraties. Ces principes doivent guider les relations non seulement entre l'État et les citoyens, mais aussi entre les États eux-mêmes. La Charte constitue ainsi l'une des premières tentatives en vue d'internationaliser les valeurs démocratiques. Le Traité de Bruxelles (1948), qui scelle l'alliance entre la France, le Royaume-Uni et les membres du Bénélux – et qui servira de marchepied à l'Alliance atlantique l'année suivante –, est un autre document qui témoigne de l'importance de ces valeurs comme fondement des rapports internationaux. Le préambule expose la résolution des signataires « à confirmer et à défendre les principes démocratiques, les libertés civiles et individuelles, les traditions constitutionnelles et le respect de la loi, qui forment le patrimoine commun ».

Le Canada n'échappe pas à ces courants intellectuels et politiques. Au cours du conflit, Mackenzie King et son Cabinet tiennent un discours qui lie la conduite de la guerre aux réformes socio-économiques, estimant que les soldats n'accepteront pas, au retour, de trouver les mêmes conditions que celles qui régnaient en 1939. Les réformes entreprises par le gouvernement englobent non seulement des objectifs de plein emploi, d'amélioration des conditions de vie, d'assurance-santé et de sécurité sociale, mais également des dimensions politiques telle la citoyenneté, le droit de vote et même les premières tentatives de démocratisation de la politique étrangère. Le Canada adhère aussi aux objectifs formulés dans le projet de Déclaration interalliée de 1940 et dans la Charte de l'Atlantique.



Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) :

l'inspiration républicaine

Outre le contexte intellectuel et socio-politique du moment, il est un autre facteur, encore plus profondément enraciné dans la culture canadienne, qui pousse presque naturellement les dirigeants à chercher dans la zone euro-atlantique le fondement d'une éventuelle communauté. Il s'agit des liens identitaires qu'entretenait une bonne partie de la population canadienne avec certains pays d'Europe occidentale⁵². De ce point de vue, « NATO was thus a natural expression of the transatlantic bond that had existed before 1949⁵³ ». Et contrairement au Commonwealth (sans doute le seul autre axe identitaire du Canada de cette époque), la zone euro-atlantique présentait l'avantage d'être plus homogène au plan culturel, d'être concentrée géographiquement et, surtout, de ne pas être entachée d'un rapport de domination centralisateur⁵⁴.

Tous ces éléments forment la toile de fond intellectuelle des décisions et des choix des dirigeants canadiens au cours des années 1940, décisions qui les amèneront à préconiser, sous la pression des événements, la création d'une *communauté de sécurité démocratique dans la zone atlantique*. C'est peut-être la première fois depuis 1795 que s'ouvre une fenêtre d'opportunité pour appliquer les idées de Kant.

DES TROIS ARTICLES DÉFINITIFS À L'ARTICLE II

En filigrane des composantes décrites ci-haut, le concept de communauté

atlantique présente une autre caractéristique bien marquée, qui teinte toutes les dimensions du projet, c'est-à-dire la forte influence des valeurs libérales que partagent les sociétés occidentales.

Les références répétées à la « démocratie » et à la « liberté » sont un élément frappant du discours public et privé des dirigeants et diplomates occidentaux de l'époque. Ces valeurs teintent inévitablement les propos destinés à promouvoir le projet de Communauté nord-atlantique. Du point de vue de Pearson, le caractère démocratique du Pacte devait être explicite, précisément pour éviter qu'il soit assimilé à une alliance au sens traditionnel du terme :

The proposed pact should make as clear as possible the methods which the peoples and governments of the Free World intend to follow to make good their faith in human rights and fundamental freedoms, in the worth and dignity of man and in the principles of parliamentary democracy, personal freedom and political liberty. If it can do this it will underline that this Pact is something far removed from alliances and arrangements of the old kind⁵⁵.

Le risque est, ici, d'assimiler ce discours à un simple enrobage idéologique destiné à masquer une traditionnelle politique d'équilibre des puissances. Ces références n'auraient dès lors qu'une fonction tactique ou cosmétique dans un processus visant à légitimer des décisions et des actions face à un auditoire réticent. Reid ne cache d'ailleurs pas le rôle tactique que jouent ces références, puisqu'il justifie, à de nombreuses reprises, la création de la Communauté par la nécessité de mener une contre-offensive idéologique contre la propagande soviétique⁵⁶. Ce serait cependant une erreur de réduire l'incidence des valeurs libérales à cette seule dimension instrumentale, car le projet de création d'une communauté démocratique comportait aussi des obligations extrêmement lourdes pour les gouvernements, obligations qui allaient bien au-delà des impératifs stratégiques que pourrait dicter une politique d'équilibre.

Un projet « canado-kantien »

Pour mieux faire ressortir le caractère « républicain » du plan proposé par les dirigeants canadiens, il est utile d'en étudier le contenu à partir des trois articles définitifs du projet de Kant.

1. Les États doivent avoir une constitution civile républicaine. L'idée

selon laquelle la démocratie mène à la paix est déjà répandue à la veille de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. La proposition de Clarence Streit en est un exemple. Plusieurs éléments indiquent que les dirigeants canadiens en étaient aussi convaincus. Par exemple, cette analyse formulée par Mackenzie King au tout début de la guerre :

Until a profound transformation has taken place in the social organization and neighbourhood relations of the countries of central and eastern Europe, it may not be possible for them to adopt, even in part, *the peaceful means of adjusting difficulties which have developed among the democratic countries of Western Europe and of North America* nor to look to a general extension of the British Commonwealth experiment of cooperation without compulsion and reliance on faith rather than fear⁵⁷.

Les valeurs et les idéaux libéraux ont largement contribué à l'élaboration de la position canadienne sur l'avenir de l'Allemagne. Ainsi, pour Reid, ces valeurs devaient servir d'antibiotique dans une société empoisonnée par les idées nazies : « It was clear that Reid's aim was to nurture in Germany some semblance of liberalism, a concept he did not define but which he plainly identified as the set of values underpinning Canadian society⁵⁸ ». L'importance des mécanismes démocratiques comme moyen d'éviter la résurgence d'une politique d'agression en Allemagne se reflète dans les « Thèses du Canada touchant le règlement de la paix avec l'Allemagne », exposées par Saint-Laurent devant la Chambre des communes et, surtout, à l'Université de Toronto, en janvier 1947, où il affirme que « the greatest safeguard against the aggressive policies of any government is the freely expressed judgment of its own people⁵⁹ ».

En 1948, Reid propose de s'inspirer du préambule du Traité de Bruxelles pour rédiger celui du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord :

[...] the members of the North Atlantic Alliance should be bound together not merely by their common opposition to totalitarian communism but also by a common belief in the values and virtues of Western civilization, by a common concept of democracy and a positive belief in it and by a determination to make their kind of democracy work for the promotion of mutual welfare and the preservation of peace, for others as well as for themselves. [...] These beliefs should also permeate the

rest of the document⁶⁰.

Le premier article définitif n'est pas seulement une clef pour la paix. Il constitue aussi une invitation faite aux gouvernements à jeter un regard critique sur le système politique de leurs partenaires. En d'autres termes, il faut être capable de distinguer les démocraties des autres États. Lors des négociations sur la création de l'Alliance atlantique, les dirigeants canadiens se sont révélés très fermes à ce sujet, comme le montrent leurs réflexions sur la pertinence d'inviter le Portugal à adhérer au Traité. Tout comme les Britanniques, les diplomates canadiens s'opposent à l'adhésion de l'Espagne, dirigée par un régime fasciste⁶¹; ils estiment cependant que le même principe doit s'appliquer également à tous, et donc au Portugal, encore gouverné par Antonio Salazar, mais pourtant mentionné dans la proposition britannique de janvier 1948⁶². Si les Britanniques et les Américains étaient conscients de cette anomalie, ils l'ont surmontée en invoquant l'importance stratégique des Açores⁶³. Face à ces arguments, Reid propose de faire du Portugal un allié de « seconde classe » (soit un État incapable de remplir toutes les obligations liées au Traité) tant que le gouvernement en place ne se conformera pas aux principes de la démocratie. Il s'agit d'une distinction importante, quoique implicite, que Reid établit entre l'Alliance et la Communauté, le Portugal pouvant se joindre à la première sans être membre de la seconde⁶⁴. Au bout du compte, les Canadiens ont toutefois dû se rallier au vœu de leurs partenaires.

Le premier article de Kant est, enfin, une invitation à tenir compte du respect des institutions démocratiques et de la volonté populaire, ailleurs comme chez soi. Risse-Kappen estime que le recours, dans les négociations ou les discussions entre gouvernements, à des arguments tels que la « pression de l'opinion publique », est plus fréquent dans les relations entre démocraties. Les dirigeants d'une démocratie semblent, en effet, plus sensibles aux difficultés de leurs partenaires soumis à des pressions politiques internes, puisqu'ils sont eux-mêmes exposés à des contraintes similaires⁶⁵.

L'un des arguments invoqués par le gouvernement canadien pour justifier l'insertion de l'article II tenait à la nécessité de convaincre l'opinion publique du fait que le Traité n'était pas une alliance au sens traditionnel. L'opposition se concentrait principalement au sein du CCF (Cooperative Commonwealth Federation⁶⁶) et parmi les francophones⁶⁷, qui cultivaient une profonde méfiance envers les engagements militaires internationaux depuis la Première Guerre mondiale. Soucieux d'éviter toute situation susceptible de diviser la population, le ministre Saint-Laurent entreprendra

d'ailleurs une « croisade » visant à convaincre ses concitoyens du bien-fondé de la participation canadienne. Comme le souligne le rapporteur d'une conférence organisée par l'Institut canadien des affaires internationales en juin 1952, « the policy of the Canadian Government in regard to NATO was considerably ahead of Canadian public opinion in the mass⁶⁸ ».

Si cet épisode est révélateur de l'importance que revêt, aux yeux de Mackenzie King et de Saint-Laurent, l'attitude de l'opinion publique, il l'est aussi de ce phénomène de « compréhension mutuelle » qui se tisse entre États partageant le même système politique. Ainsi, Reid et Wrong ont invoqué à de nombreuses reprises l'attitude de l'opinion publique canadienne pour convaincre Acheson d'accepter le libellé de l'article II, ce en quoi ils ont réussi, puisque les diplomates américains se rendent aux arguments de leurs collègues canadiens⁶⁹. Il faut aussi reconnaître que ce phénomène agit dans les deux sens, puisque l'une des principales contraintes qui pèsent sur les décisions de tous les ambassadeurs chargés de négocier le Traité aura été l'attitude du Congrès des États-Unis, offrant ainsi aux négociateurs américains un argument particulièrement convaincant pour faire valoir leur vues.

2. Le droit international doit être fondé sur un fédéralisme d'États libres. La seconde dimension du projet de Kant, c'est-à-dire la propension naturelle des États démocratiques à se grouper en une Fédération, trouve également un écho dans la proposition canadienne de communauté. La dynamique d'agrandissement de la fédération nord-atlantique proposée par Reid ressemble au processus envisagé par Kant, dans la mesure où le diplomate prévoit que la Communauté devrait naturellement s'élargir pour englober l'ensemble des démocraties :

The conclusion of a North Atlantic treaty would be an important demonstration that effective security arrangements can be worked out under the Charter. It would thus make it easier to conclude other similar arrangements in other areas until all free countries would be brought into one or more defence groups. *This would pave the way to the creation of a union of all the free states of the world in a collective defence agreement under article 51 of the Charter*⁷⁰.

La mise en relation avec le second article définitif de Kant permet de démontrer la logique que sous-entend une telle proposition. L'élément essentiel est lié au processus d'internationalisation des valeurs libérales. D'une part, la référence à une communauté démocratique signifie que les

principes guidant les membres de ce groupe dans leurs relations mutuelles doivent, à tout le moins, être cohérents avec ceux qu'ils appliquent dans leurs affaires internes. Cette dimension trouve son expression dans une citation de Pearson : « It would set forth the principles of Western society which we are trying not only to defend *but to make the basis of an eventually united world*⁷¹ ». Le ministre a fort bien compris l'importance de ce processus de transposition, comme il l'expliquera plus tard :

Les rapports entre les membres d'une coalition sont analogues à ceux qui existent entre les citoyens d'un pays démocratique. [...] Une règle fondamentale veut que toute mesure d'ensemble, que ce soit à l'intérieur d'une démocratie ou dans une coalition de démocraties, repose sur la discussion, la persuasion et l'approbation générale⁷².

En ce sens, la Communauté envisagée par les Canadiens préfigure clairement celle que Risse-Kappen observera 50 ans plus tard.

Mais les Canadiens innovent par rapport à Kant, puisqu'ils proposent de mettre en place un certain nombre d'institutions. Cette proposition constitue un exemple de transposition, au niveau international, de ce qui existe au niveau national. Les institutions envisagées (parlement, cour de justice, organes exécutifs), les processus décisionnels présidant à leur fonctionnement (vote majoritaire, consultation, arbitrage des conflits) et les principes qu'elles sont censées défendre semblent directement inspirés de ceux qui existent déjà dans les pays membres de l'Alliance.

3. Le droit cosmopolite doit être limité aux conditions de l'hospitalité universelle. Le troisième article définitif de Kant trouve son expression de façon plus subtile. Les membres de la Communauté atlantique devaient évidemment renoncer à toute prétention de conquête entre eux. Plus encore, il est clair que la vocation militaire de la communauté était essentiellement défensive. La Communauté atlantique ne devait pas servir à des fins d'agression, ni servir d'engagement que pourraient invoquer les membres pour obtenir de l'aide en vue de conserver leurs empires coloniaux.

Mais on peut également tracer un parallèle avec le projet visant à étendre la coopération dans les domaines non militaires. Si cette initiative s'explique par des motifs tactiques (éviter les divisions entre alliés) ou des considérations d'intérêt national (promouvoir les échanges commerciaux du Canada), il est également possible de l'interpréter d'un point de vue plus global. Ici encore, la perspective kantienne permet d'apprécier une logique

complémentaire qui confère un rôle spécifique à l'article II dans l'édification de la Communauté. Kant, à l'instar de nombreux philosophes et économistes, perçoit le développement du commerce comme un facteur de paix et, par extension, de cohésion entre les membres de la fédération⁷³. Bien que cet argument ne soit guère développé dans les communications consacrées au libellé de l'article II, les diplomates canadiens ont posé ainsi, consciemment ou non, un jalon important dans la formation de la Communauté.

La contribution canadienne à la Communauté

Le projet envisagé par Pearson, Reid et Saint-Laurent ne se matérialisera jamais, puisque l'OTAN n'est pas devenue la fédération démocratique envisagée vers la fin des années 1940. Il n'en reste pas moins qu'il existe bel et bien une « communauté » dans la zone euro-atlantique, comme l'ont discernée des auteurs comme Deutsch ou Risse-Kappen. En quoi les diplomates canadiens ont-ils contribué à l'établissement de cette variante de la Communauté transatlantique? De façon schématique, leur apport le plus important réside dans l'insertion de trois principes qui auront une grande influence sur l'évolution de l'Alliance dans les années qui suivent, c'est-à-dire la coopération non militaire, la consultation et la réciprocité.

L'incidence du principe de la coopération non militaire a été étudiée sous tous les angles. L'impression laissée par la profonde déception éprouvée par Pearson devant la difficulté de mettre en oeuvre l'article II doit certainement être nuancée. D'une part, compte tenu des réticences du Congrès des États-Unis, la formulation de l'article, pourtant bien en deçà des propositions originales, était probablement ce que les Canadiens pouvaient espérer de mieux, comme le reconnaissait Pearson lui-même⁷⁴. Les réflexions de certains de ses contemporains (Karl Deutsch, par exemple), tout comme celles de chercheurs qui bénéficient aujourd'hui du recul du temps, indiquent que, malgré le peu d'enthousiasme soulevé par l'article II, les dispositions consacrées à la coopération non militaire ont joué un rôle essentiel dans la formation de la Communauté. Wolfe a aussi démontré que le lien entre les problèmes de sécurité et les questions économiques trouve sa source dans la communauté de valeurs libérales qui unit les États membres⁷⁵.

Les deux autres principes méritent cependant plus d'attention.

Consultation. Le principe de la consultation est, selon Risse-Kappen, au coeur de la Communauté démocratique de l'Atlantique Nord. Il est peut-être l'expression la plus directe de l'influence de la pensée libérale sur le fonctionnement de l'Alliance. Ce principe, établi par l'article IV, devait à

l'origine s'appliquer non seulement en cas de conflit armé, mais aussi dans les situations d'agression indirecte, comme celle dont fut victime la Tchécoslovaquie en 1948.

Mais, du point de vue canadien, ce principe va bien au-delà d'une simple volonté de gérer les crises le plus efficacement possible. Il s'agit de prendre des dispositions pour que cette gestion soit *conforme aux intérêts canadiens*. L'adoption de ce principe devait, en théorie, éviter la répétition de l'expérience vécue au cours de la guerre, alors que le Canada avait été marginalisé dans la prise de décisions. Le principe de la consultation devait renforcer l'influence du Canada et des États européens, puisqu'il engageait chacun des alliés – et notamment les États-Unis – à informer ses partenaires lorsqu'il entreprenait une action susceptible de se répercuter sur leurs intérêts.

Ce souci d'établir des mécanismes de consultation se reflète dans la position du Canada au cours des discussions concernant la création des institutions de l'Alliance. Dès 1947, les Canadiens expriment leur aversion envers tout mécanisme décisionnel multilatéral qui établit une hiérarchie entre les participants. Aux yeux de Saint-Laurent et de Reid, l'octroi du droit de veto aux membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies représentait la perversion d'un « instrument politique d'essence démocratique », qu'ils citent en exemple de ce qu'il ne fallait pas faire⁷⁶. De ce point de vue, ils avaient tout lieu d'être satisfaits des termes de l'article IX du Traité de Washington, qui consacre la création du Conseil atlantique, lequel fonctionnera (bien que ce soit implicite) sur la base du consensus.

Ce qui est peut-être la contribution la plus significative d'un diplomate canadien ne viendra que plus tard, lorsque Pearson, en tant que membre du « comité des trois sages », propose en 1956 de formaliser le principe de la consultation et de la coopération politique au sein de l'Alliance. Cet apport, qui renforce l'esprit de communauté entre les membres, découle en grande partie du principe établi en 1949.

Réciprocité. Un second objectif poursuivi par les diplomates canadiens au long des négociations consistait à asseoir le principe de la réciprocité dans les engagements prévus par le Traité. Il s'agissait essentiellement d'obtenir un engagement ferme des États-Unis au moyen d'un traité et non d'un simple engagement du président, et ce, pour trois raisons.

Le premier motif relevait de considérations stratégiques : les Canadiens étant bien conscients du fait que l'engagement des Américains était essentiel pour assurer la réciprocité de l'Europe occidentale. La réciprocité allait donner un caractère effectif à l'Alliance en formulant des obligations assez

contraignantes pour que la promesse d'aide des États-Unis ne puisse être court-circuitée par le Congrès.

La deuxième raison touchait plus directement la sécurité du Canada, et en particulier ses rapports avec les États-Unis. Le principe de réciprocité ne visait pas à garantir l'appui des Européens en cas de conflit – par ailleurs hautement improbable – sur le continent américain, mais plutôt à éviter que l'Alliance ne consacre le statut privilégié des États-Unis ou qu'elle ne conduise malgré tout à une régionalisation des problèmes de sécurité, et donc à un dialogue exclusivement bilatéral. Il s'agissait, en d'autres termes, de faire en sorte que le contrepois européen puisse effectivement fonctionner :

[...] if it were a unilateral U.S. guarantee [...] there would be no particular reason why Canada should join in [...]. There would be no reason why Canada should follow the United States in making a unilateral guarantee to Western Europe. The problem would still remain of defence cooperation between Canada and the U.S., and we would then have a defense alliance with the United States rather than an alliance in which Canada and the United States were both members. It is a constant objective of Canadian foreign policy that we shouldn't be left alone with the United States⁷⁷.

Ainsi, lorsque à l'été 1948 les États-Unis offrent une garantie d'aide unilatérale au lieu d'un traité, Reid évoque un raisonnement que Wrong avait utilisé, avec un certain effet, dans ses entretiens avec George Kennan :

One argument which is particularly strong from the Canadian point of view is that it would be far more difficult for Canada to collaborate in planning defence against Soviet aggression on the basis of a unilateral United States assurance than it would be if both countries were parties to an Atlantic treaty. Furthermore, under such a treaty the joint planning of the defence of North America would fall into place as part of a larger whole and the difficulties arising in Canada from the fear of invasion of Canadian sovereignty by the United States would be diminished. If the present state of affairs is maintained or even if there is merely a Presidential or Congressional declaration, the advocates in Canada of a policy of aloofness would be able to strengthen their position. An

Atlantic treaty would go a long way towards lessening the political difficulties of defence planning in Canada by bringing the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada into partnership⁷⁸.

Ceci explique l'aversion des Canadiens pour l'idée, tenace et dangereuse, proposée par Kennan, de fonder l'Alliance sur un double pilier, l'un européen, l'autre nord-américain. Cette proposition risquait de mener directement à ce que les Canadiens voulaient éviter. Comme le rappelle Pearson, « an Atlantic alliance composed of two pillars, groups, or poles – one European, one North American – would have created an unenviable position for Canada in our relations with the United States ». Au contraire, les Canadiens privilégieront toujours une application du concept qui met l'accent sur un partenariat entre États égaux plutôt qu'entre « piliers⁷⁹ ».

Enfin, et surtout, une garantie unilatérale des États-Unis pouvait constituer un obstacle majeur au développement de la Communauté nord-atlantique en réduisant celle-ci à un simple engagement d'assistance militaire. Dans un tel contexte, il deviendrait, en effet, impossible de mettre en oeuvre les dispositions sur la coopération non militaire⁸⁰. Ce dernier argument est peut-être, du point de vue de cette recherche, le plus pertinent. Il ne saurait y avoir de communauté à proprement parler sans un minimum d'égalité entre ceux qui la composent, égalité par ailleurs impossible à réaliser sans réciprocité. Comme le note Steve Weber, la « réciprocité diffuse » apparaît comme l'un des traits fondamentaux du multilatéralisme qui s'est développé au sein de l'Alliance atlantique⁸¹.

CONCLUSION

Même si Kant n'a pas servi de source d'inspiration immédiate à Pearson et Reid, l'examen de la notion de Communauté nord-atlantique proposée par ces derniers à la lumière des idées développées par le philosophe allemand permet de dégager un certain nombre de similarités. Cette perspective permet tout d'abord de cerner une logique là où la plupart des observateurs n'ont vu qu'un vague projet. Les points communs entre le *Projet de paix perpétuelle* et le projet de communauté atlantique sont assez nombreux pour autoriser une mise en relation des logiques à la base de ces deux entreprises. En ce sens, le projet canadien cesse dès lors d'être une idée marginale, sinon farfelue ou surréaliste, comme il peut le sembler aux yeux de l'observateur contemporain. Plus encore, il n'est pas surprenant que le projet kantien réapparaisse et soit réactualisé précisément au moment où il l'a été.

Les principes sur lesquels il repose font en effet partie du tissu intellectuel de l'époque, comme en témoignent les réflexions de Streit ou de Toynbee, et trouvent un terreau fertile à une époque où le « capitalisme triomphant », le New Deal et la « défense de la démocratie » teintent le discours.

Ce parallèle avec le projet kantien permet de cerner le cheminement qui amène les diplomates canadiens à proposer la création d'une communauté. Les hypothèses réalistes n'offrent, à cet égard, qu'un éclairage partiel. S'il est possible de justifier de façon rationnelle – souvent a posteriori – plusieurs des décisions prises à l'époque, ces justifications demeurent insuffisantes dans la mesure où certains aspects du projet semblent utopiques (la création d'une autorité supranationale) ou superflus (créer une communauté plutôt qu'une alliance) lorsqu'il sont mis en relation avec la notion d'intérêt national. L'approche constructiviste vient ainsi compléter une explication d'inspiration réaliste en éclairant certaines dimensions autrement laissées dans l'ombre.

L'étude de l'influence des idées et des valeurs libérales sur la formulation de la politique étrangère canadienne mérite probablement plus d'attention qu'elle n'en a reçue jusqu'à présent. En ce qui a trait aux questions de coopération en matière de sécurité, un des cas qu'il vaudrait la peine d'explorer davantage est celui des relations bilatérales canado-américaines, qui représentent l'autre grand axe de la politique du Canada en la matière. Ce n'est pas le contenu formel de l'Accord d'Ogdensburg ou de l'entente sur la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord (pour l'essentiel rédigé en termes purement fonctionnels) qui doit surtout retenir l'attention ici, mais plutôt « l'esprit » qui se dégage de ces relations. L'hypothèse de la coopération entre démocraties pourrait ainsi contribuer à dégager la logique qui structure la dynamique de l'autre communauté de sécurité à laquelle le Canada est parfois associé.

REMERCIEMENTS

L'auteur tient à remercier André-J. Bélanger, Robert Wolfe, David G. Haglund et Michel Fortmann pour leurs commentaires et suggestions.

NOTES

1. Celui-ci énonce que « les parties contribueront au développement de relations internationales pacifiques et amicales en renforçant leurs libres institutions, en assurant une meilleure compréhension des principes sur lesquels ces institutions sont fondées et en développant les conditions propres à assurer la stabilité et le bien-être. Elles s'efforceront d'éliminer toute opposition dans leurs politiques économiques internationales et encourageront la collaboration économique entre chacune d'entre elles ou entre toutes ».
2. Paul Létourneau, « Les motivations originales du Canada lors de la création de l'OTAN (1948-1950) », dans P. Létourneau, *Le Canada et l'OTAN après 40 ans (1949-1989)*, Québec, 1992, p. 49-66. Dans un article publié il y a quelques années (et dont est tiré une partie du matériel employé ici), nous avons cherché à montrer comment, dans l'esprit des dirigeants canadiens, l'OTAN devait servir de contrepoids à l'influence grandissante des États-Unis. Voir Stéphane Roussel, Paul Létourneau et Roch Legault, « Le Canada et la sécurité européenne (1943-1952). À la recherche de l'équilibre des puissances », *Revue canadienne de défense*, vol. 23, no 4, été 1994, p. 23-27; vol. 24, no 1, automne 1994, p. 17-22.
3. Charles A. Kupchan, « NATO and the Persian Gulf : Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior », *International Organization*, vol. 42, no 2, printemps 1988, p. 317-346; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace* (sixième édition), New York, 1985; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, 1987.
4. Cette problématique a notamment été développée, dans un autre contexte, par Steve Weber, « Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power : Multilateralism in NATO », *International Organization*, vol. 46, no 3, été 1992, p. 632-680.
5. *Multilateralism Matters*, textes publiés sous la direction de John G. Ruggie, New York, 1993; Alexander E. Wendt, « Anarchy Is What States Make of It : The Social Construction of Power Politics », *International Organization*, vol. 46, no 2, printemps 1992, p. 391-425; *The Culture of National Security : Norms and Identity in World Politics*, textes publiés sous


- la direction de Peter J. Katzenstein, New York, 1996; Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies : The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*, Princeton, 1995.
6. Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now : A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic*, New York, 1939; Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, Chicago, 1942; Michael W. Doyle, « Liberalism and World Politics », *American Political Science Review*, vol. 80, no 4, décembre 1986; Michael W. Doyle, « Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs », *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12, nos 3 et 4, été et automne 1983, p. 205-235 et 323-353; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace : Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton, 1993.
 7. Karl W. Deutsch et al, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, 1957, p. 10.
 8. Ce n'est que récemment que ce programme a été réactualisé. Voir Emanuel Adler et Michael N. Barnett, « Governing Anarchy : A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities », *Ethics & International Affairs*, vol. 10, 1996, p. 63-98.
 9. Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies*, 1995; Thomas Risse-Kappen, « Collective Identity in a Democratic Community : The Case of NATO », dans *The Culture of National Security*, p. 357-399.
 10. Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies*, p. 34-35.
 11. Roger Epp, « On Justifying the Alliance : Canada, NATO and World Order », dans *North American Perspectives on European Security*, textes publiés sous la direction de Michael K. Hawes et Joel J. Sokolsky, New York, 1990, p. 89-121; Robert Wolfe, « Atlanticism Without the Wall : Transatlantic Co-operation and the Transformation of Europe », *International Journal*, vol. 46, no 1, hiver 1990-1991, p. 137-163; *Transatlantic Identity? Canada, the United Kingdom and International Order*, textes publiés sous la direction de Robert Wolfe, Kingston, 1997; Robert Wolfe « Article 2 Revisited : Canada, Security, and Transatlantic Economic Cooperation », dans *North American Perspectives*, p. 305-335.
 12. Geoffrey Pearson, cité dans Peter Stursberg, *Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma*, Toronto, 1980, p. 57. Pour un exemple de l'incompréhension qui entourait ce projet au Canada, voir B. K. Sandwell, « North Atlantic - Community or Treaty? », *International Journal*, vol. 7, no 3, été 1952.
 13. *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* (ci-après DRREC), publiés sous la direction de Hector Mackenzie, Ottawa, vol. 14, p. 438. Pearson reprend la substance de ce passage dans DDREC, vol. 14, p. 490. Les passages des DRREC cités dans la présente étude sont extraits des

- volumes 7 (1974), 13, 14 (1994) et 15 (1995).
14. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 523.
 15. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 609 et 636.
 16. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 438 et 635.
 17. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 523.
 18. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 660-666. L'Assemblée de l'Atlantique Nord, créée en 1955, est une institution bien différente de ce qu'envisageait Reid, puisqu'il s'agit d'un simple lieu de rencontre pour les parlementaires des États membres.
 19. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 521 et 699.
 20. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 759, 766-767 et 774.
 21. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 610; Lester B. Pearson, *Memoirs. Volume 2 : 1948-57, The International Years*, Toronto, 1973, p. 56.
 22. John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace : Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957, tome 2*, Toronto, 1982, p. 113; G. Pearson, dans Stursberg, *Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma*, p. 57.
 23. Wolfe, « Article 2 Revisited », p. 305.
 24. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 648.
 25. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 671-673 et 685-686; vol. 15, p. 504-505.
 26. John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace, tome 1*, Toronto, 1979, p. 113.
 27. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 658, 664-665 et 678-680; L.B. Pearson, *Memoirs*, p. 47 et 62. Voir aussi la note 38.
 28. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 641; voir aussi Wolfe, « Article 2 Revisited », p. 309-310.
 29. L.B. Pearson, *Memoirs*, p. 43, 56, 61-62 et 64; DRREC, vol. 14, p. 652-653.
 30. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 407.
 31. DRREC, vol. 15, p. 517.
 32. DRREC, vol. 14, p. 590 et 758; DRREC, vol. 15, p. 492; L.B. Pearson, *Memoirs*, p. 51. Voir les commentaires acides de Pearson face à l'attitude des délégations française et belge dans DRREC, vol. 14, p. 548-550, 562 et 564-568.
 33. DRREC, vol. 15, p. 539-540 et 547.
 34. À la veille de la signature du Traité, Reid, sur instruction de Pearson, insistera encore en vain pour que le terme « communauté » soit inclu dans le texte, provoquant ainsi la fureur de Wrong. DRREC, vol. 15, p. 594-596.
 35. Escott Reid, « The Creation of North Atlantic Alliance, 1948-1949 », dans *Canadian Foreign Policy : Historical Readings*, textes publiés sous la direction de Jack L. Granatstein, Toronto, 1986, p. 171; Reid avait pro-

- posé cette solution dès mars 1941; voir Escott Reid, *Radical Mandarin. The Memoirs of Escott Reid*, Toronto, 1989, p. 140.
36. Notamment dans *U.S. Foreign Policy : Shield of the Republic*, Boston, 1943; *U.S. War Aims*, Boston, 1944.
 37. Lippmann, *U.S. War Aims*, p. 76.
 38. *DRREC*, vol. 13, p. 365.
 39. *DRREC*, vol. 13, p. 381.
 40. David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System : An Argumentation for the Fonctionalist Development of International Organisations*, Londres, 1943.
 41. A. J. Miller, « The Functional Principle in Canada's External Relations », *International Journal*, vol. 35, 1980, p. 309-328.
 42. Mitrany avait une attitude critique face aux projets d'intégration appliqués sur une base régionale. Voir David Long, « La "Politique étrangère et de Sécurité Communes" et au-delà : Les conceptions fonctionnalistes et territoriales de la sécurité de l'Union européenne », dans *Tous pour un ou chacun pour soi. Promesses et limites de la coopération régionale en matière de sécurité*, textes publiés sous la direction de Michel Fortmann, S. Neil MacFarlane et Stéphane Roussel, Québec, 1996, p. 115-133.
 43. Miller, « The Functional Principle », p. 309.
 44. André Tosel, *Kant révolutionnaire : droit et politique*, Paris, 1988, p. 99; David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order : From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Stanford, 1995, p. 230.
 45. Voir, par exemple, Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, p. 221-286; W. Andy Knight, « Multilatéralisme ascendant et descendant : deux voies dans la quête d'une gouverne globale », dans *Tous pour un ou chacun pour soi*, p. 43-69.
 46. Voir les références citées par Epp dans « On Justifying the Alliance », p. 96-98.
 47. Streit, *Union Now*.
 48. Arnold J. Toynbee, *La civilisation à l'épreuve*, Paris, 1951, p. 152.
 49. *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 566.
 50. William P. Maddox, « The Political Basis of Federation », *American Political Science Review*, vol. XXXV, no 6, décembre 1941, p. 1124-1126.
 51. L'auteur doit cette idée à Michel Fortmann, de l'Université de Montréal, et Thierry Gongora, de l'Université Laval. Voir aussi Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of State : The Military Foundations of Modern Politics*, New York, 1994, p. 171-173. Dans le même ordre d'idées, Anne-Marie Burley trace un lien entre le New Deal et l'organisation de l'ordre économique international d'après-guerre; voir « Regulating the World : Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the

- New Deal Regulatory State » dans *Multilateralism Matters*, p. 125-156.
52. Kim Richard Nossal, « Un pays européen? L'histoire de l'atlantisme au Canada », dans *La politique étrangère canadienne dans un ordre international en mutation. Une volonté de se démarquer?*, Québec, 1992, p. 134.
53. Paul Buteux, Michel Fortmann et Pierre Martin, « Canada and the Expansion of NATO : A Study in Elite Attitudes and Public Opinion », dans *Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance*, textes publiés sous la direction de David G. Haglund, Kingston, 1996, p. 154.
54. Cette aversion pour tout ce qui rappelle un Commonwealth centralisé explique le peu d'enthousiasme de Mackenzie King lorsqu'il reçut, le 14 janvier 1948, une proposition du ministre britannique des Affaires étrangères, Ernest Bevin, qui allait enclencher le processus menant à la création de l'OTAN. *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 403.
55. *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 432.
56. Voir, par exemple, *DRREC*, vol. 13, p. 368 et 377; *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 508, 520-523 et 634.
57. *DRREC*, vol. 7, publié sous la direction de David R. Murray, Ottawa, 1974, p. 204. C'est nous qui soulignons.
58. Mary Halloran, « Canada and the Origins of the Post-War Commitment », dans *Canada and NATO : Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future*, textes publiés sous la direction de Margaret O. MacMillan et David S. Sorenson, Waterloo, 1990, p. 12. L'auteure prend cependant soin de noter que « not everyone, of course, shared Escott Reid's optimism ».
59. « The Foundation of Canadian Policy in World Affairs », Toronto (Gray Foundation Lectureship), 13 janvier 1947, *Statements and Speeches*, no 47/2; *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 30 janvier 1947, p. 7-12.
60. *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 637.
61. *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 400, 419 et 431.
62. Reid estimait qu'il traduisait fidèlement la pensée de Pearson sur ce point; voir *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 436, 521 et 665-666.
63. *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 443, 459 et 572.
64. *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 615-616. Wrong s'opposera à l'usage du terme « seconde classe »; voir *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 624-625. La distinction entre alliance et communauté est plus évidente lorsque Reid traite du cas de l'Italie; voir *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 638.
65. Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies*, p. 36.
66. Sur l'attitude du CCF face à l'Alliance, voir Greg Donaghy, « Solidarity Forever : The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and its Search for an International Role, 1939-1949 », *International Journal of Canadian*

- Studies*, vol. 5, printemps 1992, p. 106-108.
67. Les éditoriaux publiés dans le quotidien *Le Devoir* inquiétaient tout particulièrement les diplomates; voir *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 710 et 742-744, par. 23 et 30.
 68. Sandwell, « North Atlantic – Community or Treaty? », p. 169.
 69. *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 662-663, 679-80; *DRREC*, vol. 15, p. 523-524. Voir aussi Reid, « The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance », p. 172-174 et L.B. Pearson, *Memoirs*, p. 57.
 70. *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 505 et 525.
 71. L.B. Pearson, *Memoirs*, p. 44; *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 490. L'expression est aussi employée par Reid dans *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 438. C'est nous qui soulignons.
 72. Lester B. Pearson, *Politique mondiale et démocratie*, Paris, 1958. L'ensemble du chapitre d'où est tirée cette citation est consacré au parallèle entre l'application des processus décisionnels démocratiques aux niveaux interne et externe. C'est nous qui soulignons.
 73. Emmanuel Kant, « Premier supplément de la garantie de la paix perpétuelle »; Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, p. 226.
 74. *DRREC*, vol. 15, p. 567 et 571.
 75. Deutsch et coll., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, p. 192-194; Wolfe, « Article 2 Revisited ».
 76. « Text of Address given in Ottawa by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly, September 12, 1947 », *Le Canada et l'ONU, 1947-1949*, Ottawa, 1949, p. 176. Escott Reid a été explicite sur ce point dans son mémorandum du 30 août 1947; voir *DRREC*, vol. 13, p. 367-382.
 77. Reid, cité dans Stursberg, *Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma*, p. 61.
 78. *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 506.
 79. Kim Richard Nossal, « Un pays européen? », p. 137; voir aussi John W. Holmes, « The Dumbbell Won't Do », *Foreign Policy*, no 50, printemps 1983, p. 3-22.
 80. Pearson et Reid s'expriment en termes explicites sur le lien entre le principe de réciprocité et l'établissement de la communauté; voir L.B. Pearson, *Memoirs*, p. 46-50; *DRREC*, vol. 14, p. 508.
 81. Weber, « Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power ».



KANADA-VOTCHINA AMERIKANSKOGO IMPERIALIZMA: CANADA AND CANADIAN COMMUNISTS IN THE SOVIET "COMING WAR" PARADIGM, 1946-1951

J.L. Black

RÉSUMÉ : Cet article met en lumière la forte influence exercée par l'idéologie stalinienne sur le comportement de Moscou aux premiers temps de la guerre froide. L'auteur s'appuie sur des documents d'archives et des sources publiques soviétiques pour examiner l'attitude de l'URSS à l'égard du Canada et montrer que les stratèges soviétiques considéraient le conflit Est-Ouest comme un phénomène naturel et depuis longtemps attendu. D'après J.L. Black, l'idéologie communiste a aidé à définir le rôle du Canada dans ce conflit. Aux yeux des dirigeants soviétiques, le Canada était à la fois le lieu où se transmettrait la puissance impériale de la Grande-Bretagne aux États-Unis et la « plate-forme » d'où serait lancée l'invasion de l'URSS. Aussi l'intérêt des Soviétiques envers le Canada s'est-il accru considérablement après 1945. Les communistes canadiens, qui confirmaient la vision stalinienne du monde, et le mouvement pacifiste canadien reçurent une couverture démesurée dans les médias soviétiques. Alors que se développait le conflit avec les États-Unis, le dernier empire capitaliste, les dirigeants du Canada étaient présentés comme des pions des Américains, la classe ouvrière canadienne comme un allié éventuel du pouvoir soviétique, et le territoire canadien comme le champ de bataille.

A slim volume, entitled *Canada – Fiefdom of American Imperialism*, appeared in Russian bookstalls in October 1951. Written by the USSR's leading "Canadianist," the journalist Sergei Shcherbatykh, and issued in a print run of 25,000 copies, the book was published by Politlit, the important state agency responsible for political literature. The book's title neatly mirrored its contents. Shcherbatykh's views on Canada's relations with the United States were anything but novel. They reflected well-established Soviet beliefs and Stalin's 1946 decision to revive the notion that conflict between

communism and capitalism was inevitable. The Canadian case is a paradigm illustrating the argument that the Cold War was a natural and expected phenomenon in Moscow that Western policy-makers, error-prone and insensitive as they too often were, could do little to avoid.

Obviously, Soviet distrust of Canada in 1946–47 was a minor symptom of the emerging Cold War between the USSR and the United States.¹ Although debate has raged for years over the origins of this conflict, only recently has relevant Soviet archival material come to light, enabling historians to offer new interpretations. Among other things, this new documentation suggests that renewed ideological rigour in the Soviet Union, usually dismissed by Western scholars as unimportant, habitual rhetoric, reflected the Soviet Union's considered evaluation of international affairs. Canada will be used in this article as the "control" vehicle with which to demonstrate Soviet understanding of trends on the world stage.

The impact of the increased postwar ideological rigour was so dramatic, so sweeping and so ruthless that the entire period from 1946 to 1951 came to be identified in the USSR as "Zhdanovshchina," literally, the "time of Zhdanov." As the head of two departments of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee, Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop) and Foreign Policy (later the International Department), Andrei Zhdanov controlled the Sovinformburo, responsible for all public information; the Telegraph Agency (TASS); and publishing houses for foreign literature.² Responsible for institutionalized ideology in the Soviet Union, Zhdanov orchestrated a number of harsh cultural purges for Stalin before his death in 1948.

In the USSR, the immediate postwar period saw a complete reassessment of the CPSU's relationships with foreign communist parties, especially those of East and East Central Europe. Following a lengthy process of reevaluating international communism, party delegations from the USSR, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and France met in the Polish town of Szklarska Poreba in September 1947 to establish the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers Parties, the Cominform.³ Led by Zhdanov, the Soviet delegation came armed with a fully resuscitated Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology, in which Canada played a significant role. Lenin's "two-camp" thesis, which divided the world between two immutably hostile camps of capitalism and socialism, had been resurrected in 1946 after a dozen years of relative dormancy. Stalin himself had affected this resurrection, telling a huge radio audience on 9 February that the Second World War had resulted not from

Hitler's ambitions, but more fundamentally from the "second crisis in capitalism." Citing Lenin's seminal treatise on international affairs, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916), Stalin insisted that war was an inevitable function of imperialism and that it would remain a feature of the international system as long as capitalism existed.⁴

Stalin cemented this ideological shift later that year when he ordered an investigation into a major study published in Moscow in 1946 by Evgenii Varga, the USSR's leading theoretician of the world economy and long-time purveyor of the Marxist-Leninist theory on the deepening crisis of capitalism. Varga argued in his new work, *Izmeneniia v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroi mirovoi voiny*, that the war had inclined governments in capitalist countries toward greater economic regulation, and concluded that capitalism could avoid a fundamental crisis for some years to come. Thus, he asserted, the predicted war with capitalism was not necessarily imminent. Stalin and Zhdanov disagreed. Not surprisingly, they easily prevailed and their view that the "general crisis in world capitalism" was intensifying was to remain de rigueur in the Soviet worldview until the late 1980s.⁵

Canada's place in this scenario was clear. There was a widespread consensus among Soviet observers that the new "Great Game" between the dominant imperialist powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, would be played out on Canadian territory. The idea that a rapidly growing industrial America and a decaying British Empire would compete, and perhaps even go to war, for control of Canada's immense resources was an old one in the Soviet Union. It had been an act of faith in the Communist International (Comintern) during the Great Depression of the 1930s, and had been reiterated as late as 1940 when Soviet ideologues described the Second World War as the "second imperialist war."⁶

Suspensions that Britain and the United States might go to war against each other once Germany and Japan were defeated were deeply rooted in elite CPSU circles. The presumption of continuing intra-imperialist conflict was central to a series of key reports on the postwar world prepared in late 1944 and early 1945 by leading Soviet officials. Ivan Maikii, former Soviet ambassador to Britain; Maxim Litvinov, former Commissar of Foreign Affairs and chair of the Soviet postwar treaties commission; and Andrei Gromyko, ambassador to the United States and Moscow's chief negotiator at the United Nations, independently prepared confidential reports to help Moscow formulate the Soviet approach to peacemaking. While these authors held quite different views on some subjects, all firmly believed that the capitalist camp was still subject to intra-imperialistic

contradictions and that an Anglo-American confrontation was probable. Though it represented the greatest immediate danger to their country, Maiskii and his colleagues also agreed that another possible postwar development, an "Anglo-Saxon" alliance, was highly unlikely. Dividing the postwar world into spheres of influence was the best way, they contended, to delay the inevitable war. It was not yet clear to them in 1944 into whose sphere Canada would eventually fall.⁷

By the time Soviet leaders convened the Cominform meeting in September 1947, they were convinced that the United States was on the brink of winning its intra-imperialist conflict with Britain by virtue of its economic dominance. Ironically, the spectre of an Anglo-American alliance against socialism now haunted an edgy Stalin as well. The initial postwar success enjoyed by the European communist movement, which won the 1946 Czechoslovakian election and emerged as a coalition partner in governments in France, Belgium, and Italy, was beginning to fade. Forced by the United States and Britain to retreat from Iran (Persia) in 1946, Stalin and V.M. Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, concluded that the two Anglo-Saxon powers were ready to cooperate to consolidate their spheres of influence. Washington and London seemed on the verge of realizing former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's appeal at Fulton, Missouri in March 1946 for a "fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples." Within a year of Churchill's remarks, the American president, Harry Truman, declared his determination to defend Greece against communist encroachment. The Truman Doctrine drew Greece and Turkey into the widening sphere of "Anglo-Saxon" influence, transforming it into a predominantly American one. In response, Stalin determined to strengthen his hold on Eastern Europe, the USSR's own, acknowledged sphere of influence. The Cominform provided the necessary ideological and administrative guidelines for a vigorous Stalinist campaign for absolute dominance.

The CPSU's relations with its fraternal parties were quickly restructured. Subjected to close scrutiny by the executive committee of the Comintern until the late 1930s, and then to a lesser extent by the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, the former European sections of the Comintern were compelled to attend the first Cominform meeting in 1947. A reaffirmation of principle was essential. Most communist parties had pursued their own policies during the war and international communism was in a state of disarray by 1945. Some parties were led by communists who had stayed in their countries to fight as partisans, while other parties had leaders sent to them from Moscow. Some were more

revolutionary than Stalin and had to be restrained; others waited to be led. The French, Italian, and Belgian communist parties had even left their government coalitions earlier, in 1947 without consulting Moscow. Initiatives of that kind would no longer be tolerated by Stalin, and Zhdanov was ordered to bring all European communists into ideological line and reestablish Moscow's dominance over the European communist movement. The Cominform's task was to ensure doctrinal uniformity in international communism's approach to world affairs, and to help strengthen the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe as a buffer against American economic encroachment.

The Cominform position was presented to the public in the fall of 1947. An early communiqué, dated 4 October, divided the world into an "imperialist, anti-democratic camp" and an "anti-imperialist, democratic camp." A few days later, an editorial in *Pravda* confirmed the Cominform's purpose as an organizational bastion against an aggressively hostile, American-led, anti-socialist bloc. However, Zhdanov's keynote address to the founding meeting of Cominform presented the "new" ideological position in the greatest detail. The speech took up almost the entire first issue of the Cominform magazine, *Za prochnyi mir, za narodnuiu demokratiyu!* (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*), and was published in several languages as a separate pamphlet.⁸

Zhdanov's effort represented the USSR's clarion call to Cold War. It coincided with a flurry of Soviet initiatives in Eastern Europe which were designed to integrate and isolate an Eastern Bloc in response to US Secretary of State George Marshall's program for European economic reconstruction. In 1947, the new peoples' republics in Eastern Europe were forced into bilateral (joint stock) agreements with the USSR, and in 1949, they were obliged to join the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Zhdanov paved the ideological path for these developments in his Cominform speech, claiming that the victory against fascism had tipped the scales in favour of the socialist world. The Soviet Union was now joined by other socialist "freedom-loving countries," creating a favourable alignment of forces to be maintained at all costs. The old capitalist encirclement theme was fully rehabilitated.

Zhdanov proclaimed that the war had given birth to a new type of state, the "people's republic," now "allies" in a socialist bloc of which the USSR was the unequivocal leader. At the same time, Zhdanov continued, the United States had undermined the British Empire, intensifying the "crisis in world capitalism." To sate its appetite, the United States, the new reigning imperialist power, had become openly expansionist. Communists

were again urged to combat "right-wing socialists," opportunists, or revisionists willing to compromise with capitalists just as they had been in 1928 at the outset of the "class versus class" era. "Imperialist expansionist plans" must be countered, the peace-loving elements in all societies must be attracted to communist causes, and all communist parties must initiate a dynamic propaganda campaign to those ends. In contrast, cautioned Zhdanov, revolution must be discouraged lest it commit communism and the USSR to tasks for which they were not yet prepared.

If calls for revolution were to be stifled, communists needed new priorities. Encouraging popular support for peace movements throughout the world was a far more advantageous policy for the USSR to follow than sponsoring costly revolutionary movements. Peace had an obvious appeal and attracted a broad range of followers in Western society. Moreover, appeals to local patriotism against American economic imperialism found receptive audiences in many countries and could be used to promote local communist parties. Peace movements and local patriotism nurtured an empathy for the Soviet Union in non-Stalinist groups and individuals. Indeed, a new form of "socialist patriotism" quickly evolved within the international communist movement. It drew on the notion of international working-class solidarity – "proletarian internationalism" – to promote love for the "homeland" where the proletariat governed and to rationalize placing the Soviet Union's interests first. These directives had an immediate impact on the Canadian communist movement; though not part of the policy-making process, it was, nonetheless, fully subordinate to the Cominform's ideological wishes.

The Stalinist perception of capitalism and imperialism determined all Soviet writing on foreign states. In 1947, that view was shaped by the following assumptions – some old, some new: (1) government policy in capitalist states is made in the boardrooms of large financial monopolies; (2) US imperialism, a new force in the history of capitalism, is incapable of change and incurably expansionist; (3) coalitions with liberals and social democrats are concessions to "reformism," and dangerously debilitating to the world communist movement; and, finally, (4) the crisis in capitalism is now intensifying to the extent that the competition between the two leading capitalist powers, Britain and the US, is likely to lead to war – sooner rather than later. Initially, this war was to be fought in, and over, Canada. The extent to which this last idea was actually believed is hard to ascertain precisely, but its presence in both public and confidential archival sources makes it an important factor to be considered – albeit one that has been

ignored in Western studies of the origins of Cold War.

Although the "coming war" scenario resurfaced in private diplomatic reporting during the last year of the war, it was left to the philosopher, G.F. Aleksandrov, and the economic historian, A.I. Lemin, to provide its first full postwar public explication. On 4 December 1946, Aleksandrov delivered a keynote speech at the USSR Academy of Sciences entitled "About Soviet Democracy." Advancing the thesis that the US was supplanting Britain as the principal source of capital investment in Canada and was poised to subordinate Britain to its interests, he insisted that the Marxist-Leninist science of society unambiguously informed Soviet observers what this trend meant. Aleksandrov, whose authority rested with his senior post with Agitprop, cited Stalin's February 1946 speech as confirmation of his ideological correctness. Aleksandrov's address was seen as important enough to merit publication in *Pravda* and to be issued as a pamphlet.⁹

Two days later, Lemin told an audience drawn together by the USSR Ministry of Higher Education that, "for England, a war against the United States, taking into consideration the role that American capital plays in Canada, the political connection between the United States and Canada, and also the strategic position of the latter, would mean the loss of Canada and, possibly, other dominions."¹⁰ These two 1946 speeches were delivered with perfect timing, coming just as the Soviet press was beginning to construct an image of Canada as Washington's junior partner, aiding US preparations for war against the USSR via the Arctic.¹¹

The Canadian Communist Party, led by Tim Buck, dutifully picked up Stalin's line. Although parts of Buck's *Europe's Rebirth* diverged from the positions taken by Stalin and Zhdanov by the time it appeared in 1947, his *The Truth about Canada* (1948) was pure Cominform and was soon translated into Russian.¹² Buck's adherence to Stalinism was so unequivocal that in 1948 he accused the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation of campaigning for another world war, in support of the Truman Doctrine, and against the "USSR and the New Democracies."¹³ His perspective conditioned the only impression of Canada available to Soviet and most Cominform readers during the early Cold War.¹⁴ The Soviet press resounded with opinions such as these throughout 1947, emphasizing especially that the United States and Canada were militarizing the Canadian North. Western "progressives" – the American politicians, Claude Pepper and Henry Wallace; the journalist, Walter Lippman; the British parliamentarian, Koni Zilliacus; and Canada's James Endicott, a United Church minister – were cited frequently as representatives of the

masses in the West who wanted closer relations with the USSR.

The magazine, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, was the Cominform's most visible product. Published in Belgrade until June 1948, and thereafter in Bucharest, it carried Moscow's ideologically "correct" analysis of world events. Canada did not feature prominently in its pages, but the magazine included enough articles by and about Canadians for Soviet readers to draw a clear, though one-dimensional, picture of the country. These articles bring the dominant Soviet political and social assumptions of the time sharply into focus. Between 1948 and 1951, Canada was routinely portrayed as a pawn in the struggle between a dynamic, new imperialist power, the United States, and its decaying predecessor, the United Kingdom. In developing this image, peace movements, protest marches, and major strikes in Canada were featured regularly. Canada was ignored as an independent international actor.

The Cominform began to develop its view of Canada in April 1948 with a short description of a congress held in Toronto by the Labor Progressive Party (LPP), the name used by the Communist Party of Canada from 1943 to 1960. Buck was quoted as opposing Washington's growing control of the Canadian economy and supporting improved old-age pensions, price controls, and higher wages for workers. These were not striking statements for the spring of 1948, especially when contrasted with the more stridently anti-American statements issued by European communist party leaders, whose delight in the political coup in Czechoslovakia during February 1948 was boundless. The brief references to communism in Canada seemed to be little more than reminders to readers that there were "progressive" forces somewhere in North America acting as a niggling conscience in a bourgeois society soon to be victimized by the American-generated "crisis of capitalism."¹⁵

The mainstream Soviet media, however, was more interested in Canada during the late 1940s than was the Cominform press. The reverberations from the 1945 defection of Igor Gouzenko, a cypher clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, dominated coverage in 1946, but there were soon more pressing matters to expose. *Trud* (Labour), the trade union newspaper; *Moskovskii Bol'shevik* (Moscow Bolshevik), the Moscow district newspaper; and *Komsomol'skaia pravda* (Communist Youth Truth) all followed *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* in featuring pieces on the "militarization of Canada." The transformation of Canada into an armed camp, these publications argued, was the result of American pressure as the United States was driven to meet the unrelenting requirements of postwar imperialism. The



Ordinary American: "What is going on, General? What is the purpose of such military force in this uninhabited region?"

Eisenhower: "What? Can't you see the forces our enemy have concentrated here? It is from here that the threat to American freedom will come." PRAVDA, 28 JUNE 1947

refusal of young Canadians to enlist in the army, American penetration of Canada's economy and the resettling of Nazi war criminals in Canada as well as the usual collection of items on strikes and trade unions constituted the other, less important, themes commonly found in Soviet reportage on its northern neighbour.¹⁶

During 1947 and 1948, Soviet journalists were increasingly focused on Washington's domination of the Canadian economy and concomitant control of Canadian military policy. Several writers predicted that Canada would soon be annexed by the United States and Soviet readers were told that Canadian "ruling circles," made up of a small clique of bankers and "monopolists," were kept in power by American financiers and militarists. Some heartening signs of change were noted, however. The "mass of Canadian people" was slowly rallying around "progressive forces," winning strike actions and opposing the Truman Doctrine and other symbols of American imperialism.

Some of the new Soviet characterizations of Canadian society were especially strident. The *Novoe vremya* (New Times) monotonously dismissed Canada's prime minister, Louis St. Laurent, and his government as "liars" and sponsors of an "anti-Soviet campaign."¹⁷ Items in the Soviet press frequently suggested that "deep anti-Soviet slander" within Canada resulted from the fact that large numbers of German prisoners-of-war, "prepared in a Goebbels propaganda course," were becoming Canadian citizens; that Canada harboured Polish fascists and a pro-Tito, 30,000-man "Serbian Council of National Defence"; and that Canada forced displaced persons to work in logging camps, treating Ukrainian, Polish, and Yugoslav refugees as "slaves." A story about the "terrible" working conditions provided by a Quebec member of Parliament who hired young Polish girls "directly from a camp in Germany" to work in his fabric plant was reprinted in *Pravda* four months after it appeared in the *New Times*.¹⁸

A 1947 book by I. Sosenskii, *Voina i ekonomika Kanady* (The War and the Canadian Economy), applied the Stalinist interpretation of world affairs as a "deepening crisis in capitalism" specifically to Canada. It opened with a chapter on Canada as a military-economic base for exploitation by the United States and Britain, before proceeding to demonstrate how the Second World War made Canada vulnerable to American domination. Sosenskii claimed that Canada had been drawn into the conflict with Hitler by the Americans who controlled the country's business class. A "war economy" still existed in 1947 in Canada, he continued, and was now part of "military-economic plans" drawn up in Washington. Sosenskii concluded that "all of this increases the vulnerability of Canada to the inexorably impending economic crisis in the capitalist world."¹⁹ The "crisis" was a harbinger of war with the USSR.

An article prepared for the October 1947 issue of the prestigious *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika* (The World Economy and World Politics), the monthly journal of the Institute of World Economy and World Politics, exemplified the new stance. In "Contemporary Canada," A.G. Mileikovskii insisted that Canada had profited from the war while suffering no great losses or destruction. Even so, it was indeed falling victim to the "general crisis of capitalism." Canada, he contended, provided a good illustration of "the law of unequal development of contemporary capitalism." Dependant upon foreign investment for its growth, it remained a colony at the mercy first of British and then of American monopoly capitalism. Mileikovskii ridiculed Canada's self-proclaimed status as a "middle power," arguing that this rank merely earned Canadians the privilege of

carrying out tasks set for them by their masters in Washington. Mileikovskii's attitude resulted in part from the fact that Lenin's work on imperialism in international affairs left no grey areas between exploited and exploiting states, other than what he called "semi-dependent countries" or "the semi-colony." This was the only category applicable to Canada and other countries that mistakenly believed themselves independent of the capitalist Great Powers.²⁰ Mileikovskii's essay was at the same time a clear reflection of the tight reins held over the academic world by the Stalinists. In this essay, Mileikovskii had turned on his own mentor, Varga.

In a longer paper for *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Questions of Economics), a new journal whose purpose was to spread the Stalin-Zhdanov guidelines for economic and international theory, Mileikovskii distanced himself still further from Varga by heaping scorn on social democrats everywhere. In 1947, Mileikovskii had referred to the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) government in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan as a viable socialist "experiment." By 1948, however, his opinion of all such parties had changed dramatically. Canada's prewar "crisis in capitalism," which was marked by a fall in grain prices, mass bankruptcy for farmers, widespread unemployment, and poverty, had led to the creation of new movements like the CCF to free farmers from the "yoke" of capitalism. The CCF, however, was "typically reformist" and "did not pose the slightest threat to capitalism." Indeed, it "drew workers away from the struggle by means of illusions about the possibility of a 'humane' capitalism." Stalin's interpretation was clearly definitive, as the title of the opening article in *Voprosy ekonomiki* made clear: "Lenin and Stalin - Creators of the Political Economy of Socialism."²¹

While the new Stalinist line was hostile toward the CCF, Canadian social democrats still occupied an important place in the Soviet Union's view of Canada. When the CCF stood up to Canada's "ruling circles," especially in support of a Soviet position, its efforts were acknowledged in the USSR. A curious example of this practice is found in the case of a book published in Ottawa in 1947 by Louis Rosenberg, a CCF member writing under the pseudonym Watt Hugh McCollum (said quickly, "What ch'm call'em"). Rosenberg portrayed Canada as a country controlled by a small clique of some 50 "monopoly-capitalists," who sat on the boards of almost every major Canadian corporation, many of which were owned by American interests. *Who Rules Canada*, which corroborated the Soviet view of the country, generated sufficient interest in the USSR to be published in translation in Moscow in the summer of 1948. It was greeted

with glowing reviews in an unusually wide cross-section of Soviet newspapers and magazines.²²

The Stalinist economic perspective on postwar Canada had a corresponding military and strategic view of Canada's international role. An extraordinary essay in a geographic journal aimed at school teachers illustrates this approach. Writing on changes in the economic development of northern Canada, G.A. Agranat concluded in January 1947, that the "reactionary forces of the United States and Canada are attempting to turn northern Canada into a military-strategic platform" from which an invasion of the USSR could be launched.²³ Agranat repeated this statement in 1948 in a more serious academic journal for geographers, insisting that the "reactionary politics of the military circles of both the USA and Canada are turning the North into a military-strategic platform."²⁴

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 provoked a furious response from the Soviet Union's political elite, to whom it seemed that Western military preparations were rapidly increasing. The Soviet media, which had downplayed the Berlin Blockade and other confrontational developments in postwar Europe, labelled the pact a direct violation of the UN Charter and denounced it as a clear act of aggression against the USSR.²⁵ From that time on, Stalin's foreign policy initiatives slowed to a standstill – except in Eastern Europe. Although purges had swept East and East-Central Europe shortly after Tito's Yugoslavia had been expelled from the Cominform in June 1948 for acting too independently, the campaign for ideological conformity was further accelerated with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Far-reaching social and economic changes in regions under Soviet control were introduced. Savage party purges were conducted everywhere in favour of Stalinists. Prominent party figures and leaders lost their influence, their freedom, and even their lives, along with hundreds of others. (The process was perverse and many were later to emerge from prison to become leading figures in their respective communist states.)

As a signatory of the North Atlantic pact, Canada quickly became an arena for the Cominform's counterattack against the alliance. International movements supporting world peace suddenly became central to Soviet overseas strategy, making Endicott a familiar figure to readers of the Cominform press. The stridency of the period was reflected best in a series of articles by Shcherbatykh, whose standard essay, "Canada – an American Military Base," was found in various forms in almost every major national and regional newspaper between 1949 and 1953. Shcherbatykh warned

Soviet readers about everything from plans for full American military annexation of Canada to joint "diabolical" experiments with robots and bacteriological warfare. In the early 1950s, his name appeared frequently in the popular press and in the military press as the expert on Canada's subordination to American military and economic expansionism. Even in a series of travel articles for *Slaviane* (Slav) and *Vokrug sveta* (Around the World), Shcherbatykh emphasized, with drawings and photographs, Washington's domination of Canada's economy and politics, most often reflected in battles between the police and Canadian peace demonstrators. Although he was familiar with Canada, having toured it twice, Shcherbatykh assured his readers in 1950 that "[t]o this day the American flag is waved on all government buildings in Canada." In the nation's capital city of Ottawa, he insisted, there were American soldiers "in the trains, the [government] departments, and in the stores."²⁶ In his 1951 tour de force, *Kanada - votchina amerikanskogo imperializma*, Shcherbatykh introduced the subject:

Canada is an aggressive imperialistic country, actively participating in the preparation of an American-English bloc in a new world war.

American proponents of the war regard Canada as their strategic platform, and also their supplier of cheap resources and cannon fodder. [The United States] has gradually drawn into its hands the natural wealth of Canada and has subordinated the Canadian economy to the imperialistic plans of Wall Street.

In their turn the ruling monopolistic circles in Canada have for a long time subordinated the interests of their country to the expansionist ambitions of the American imperialists.²⁷

There was no more doubt about the relative influence of Washington and London over Ottawa, as the term "votchina" or "fiefdom" was now commonly used to describe Canada's status vis-à-vis the United States.²⁸

All was not lost. Shcherbatykh encouraged Soviet readers with the news that Canada's "progressive camp," led by the LPP, was gathering strength to oppose "plans" for war. He catalogued various peace demonstrations and petitions, paying special attention to the youth groups at McGill University, the University of British Columbia, and Carleton University who petitioned St. Laurent's government to recognize Red China and to withdraw

Canadian forces from the UN contingent defending South Korea from North Korean attack. Buck, and senior LPP members, Leslie Morris and Stanley Ryerson, were lionized for their efforts on behalf of international peace and were congratulated for their perspicacity in acknowledging Stalin as "a great friend and champion of peace, equality and independence of peoples of all countries." Endicott, who received the last Stalin prize for international peace in 1953, was praised by Shcherbatykh for encouraging Ottawa to distance itself from the "American aggression in Korea." The Canadian wisely understood that peace "cannot be left in the hands of the United Nations, rather it must be taken into the hands of the people of the world."

Although Shcherbatykh set the pace and the tone for Stalinist coverage of Canada, other publications and journalists did not lag far behind. M. Petrov, writing for the widely read journal of the writers' union, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, and for the regional paper, *Moskovskii Bol'shevik*, insisted that Canada had fallen prey to "American warmongers." He described a country where American military personnel "masquerad[ed] as tourists" in order to help "American monopolists squeeze their English allies out of Canada. Aided by Canadian monopolists, they exploit the people of Canada." Their plan was to "take over the world."²⁹

In 1950, the Cominform introduced a new twist; it invited Canadian communists to submit their own essays on Canada in order to help corroborate its new emphasis on world peace. Ryerson, then secretary to the LPP, went to considerable lengths to explain that his party was leading the growing worker opposition to Canada's participation in the Korean conflict in an article headlined, "Working People of Canada Fight against Wall Street Intervention in Korea."³⁰ Norman Penner, the general secretary of the National Federation of Labour Youth of Canada, pursued a similar theme when he attacked the war and the "unbearably difficult circumstances" it created for Canada's youth. Writing for *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, Penner argued that young Canadians could look forward only to a "hopeless future of unemployment and poverty." He blamed this on "Canadian imperialists," who profited from the war, manufacturing war hysteria in order to reap further benefits at the expense of the social needs of Canadians.³¹ As a result, the country's youth were reluctant to enlist for service in Korea, preferring to struggle in the international socialist peace movement, their "only hope for peace."

Shcherbatykh reiterated this theme. Young people in Canada were joining "progressive" and "ban-the-bomb" movements "by the thousands," he



Members of the Labor Progressive Party in Quebec take to the streets for peace.

MONTREAL GAZETTE/NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA/C-53635

declared in the Komsomol paper in 1950. They were determined to avoid becoming pawns in Washington's "delirious plans to conquer the world." Soviet leaders and their press adopted extreme interpretations to promote widespread fear in the Soviet Union about American military ambitions for Canada. The addition of Newfoundland to Canada in 1949, for instance, was interpreted in both the Cominform and the Soviet Union's domestic press as an American plot to acquire permanent military bases in Canada.³²

Similarly, in a *Pravda* article in May 1950, American and Canadian scientists were pictured preparing to replace human soldiers with robots and apes. Dr. O.M. Solandt, director general of the Defence Research Board, a branch of the department of national defence, was quoted as saying that robots remained "cool-headed and able to concentrate" when under fire. The inhuman nature of imperialist planning was obvious and frightening. The LPP-led peace movement was all that opposed the mad destructiveness of North American defence scientists. To fuel the impression that Canada was virtually awash in peace movements, the Soviet press regularly exploited the presence in Moscow of small but noticeable groups of Canadian

“peaceniks.” In September 1950, for instance, Gui Caron, a postwar Quebec communist leader, conveyed a delegation of young Canadians to Moscow, where they were interviewed and photographed by *Pravda* reporters. Later that year, Endicott brought a second contingent of Canadians to a peace conference in Moscow, for which he too was featured prominently on the front pages of major Soviet newspapers. He, like Canadian communist leaders, parroted the Soviet view that the Korean War was possibly the first step in a general imperialist war against socialism.³³

Within the Soviet Union, Stalin's postwar ideological rigour led to an accelerated education programme designed to link Marxism-Leninism with Soviet patriotism. In a 1946 handbook, teachers were given unequivocal instructions to develop “patriotic sentiments” in children. They were reminded that to defeat an enemy one must “nurture a burning hatred of him.”³⁴ Surprisingly, such sentiments seemed to raise few questions or doubts among Canadian communists; nor did they care that the USSR was clearly the most militarized country in the world. The importance of such unwavering loyalty to the CPSU's International Department on the part of communists in all industrialized, capitalist countries cannot be overestimated. As general secretary of Canada's communist party, Buck was a regular contributor to *For a Lasting Peace*, which published many of his own party's pronouncements. These coincided almost exactly with Stalinist statements on world political and economic affairs, and they reveal how enormously important ideology was in shaping the Soviet approach to international affairs.

Endicott, who was a frequent presence in both the Cominform and domestic Soviet press, attracted almost as much attention as Buck. In his capacity as founding chairman of the Canadian Peace Conference, which met for the first time in Toronto in May 1949, Endicott was the Canadian most consistently linked to Soviet-sponsored international undertakings – after Tim Buck. The *New Times* listed Endicott as the Canadian delegate to the Permanent Committee of the Soviet-sponsored World Congress for Peace. This connection assumed greater significance after November 1949 when the Cominform adopted a resolution that communist and workers' parties everywhere must make peace their first priority. During the 1950s, Canadians were portrayed in the Soviet press as leading the peace movement in Western developed countries. Speeches by Endicott were often carried *in toto* in Soviet newspapers, usually accompanied by his photograph. “I have seen the Soviet social-economic system in action,” he assured Soviet readers in 1950, and “they now live twice as well as they

used to.”³⁵ He hadn't looked very closely.

Endicott accepted the Cominform position on international affairs without question and was exalted in the Soviet press for doing so. Only a Western “campaign of lies,” he told a Muscovite audience, prevented a general acceptance of international peace agreements. After attending a conference in Moscow in November 1950, Endicott travelled to Poland. *Pravda* featured his Warsaw speech beside that of Boleslaw Bierut, the Polish communist leader who had driven Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, leader of the Polish Peasant Party and head of the Polish government-in-exile during the Second World War, into exile once again in 1947. By linking Endicott with Bierut, the Soviet press sought to bolster the Canadian's stature and inflate his significance. It was a trick Moscow attempted again and again. When the Dean of Canterbury, Hewlett Johnson, joined Endicott at the Second All-Canadian Peace Conference in Toronto in May 1950, Soviet reporters informed their readers that both men opposed the Canadian government's “anti-Soviet” position and credited them with helping the USSR turn the “ban the bomb” movement into a great international force.³⁶

When Endicott accepted the Stalin prize in March 1953, his photograph appeared on the front page of most major Soviet newspapers. *Literaturnaia gazeta* even carried his acceptance speech in full. His denunciation of the Canadian press for defaming the USSR with “falsehoods and lies,” his attack on the United States for its economic control of Canada, and his lavish praise of the Soviet Union as the world's greatest proponent of peace appeared in all the Soviet Union's mainstream newspapers. Accusing Canadian authorities of employing “all kinds of lies, threats, intimidation and... organized hooliganism” to stifle his calls for an end to the Korean War, Endicott told a high-ranking and enthusiastic Soviet audience exactly what they hoped to hear.³⁷ In adhering so closely to the Cominform line and depicting a world divided between two hostile camps – one pure good, the other pure evil – Endicott badly distorted the reality of Canada for Soviet readers. Fully two-thirds of the many articles on Canada in *For a Lasting Peace* during the early 1950s focused on the importance of Canadian peace movements and Endicott's role in them.

Soviet views of Canada and Canadian opinion provide a useful barometer to assess the USSR's general approach to international affairs during the early Cold War. On the whole, these views tend to confirm the importance of Stalinist ideology as a contributing factor to the origins of the Cold War. As early as 1944–45, the USSR's leading diplomats assumed that

renewed intra-imperialistic contradictions and war between capitalism and socialism were inevitable. In order to secure the respite it needed for post-war reconstruction, Moscow hoped for a postwar alliance among the three victorious powers, based on recognized spheres of influence. The surprising Anglo-American combination that seemed to emerge with frightening speed in 1945-46 could only be interpreted by Soviet ideologues as the first step toward a war against resurgent socialism since they had no other way to view such phenomena.

The Cominform was formed in 1947 as the first in a series of defensive measures designed to deflect an apparent American attempt to roll back the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. As a consequence of the Cominform's insistence on ideological conformity, communist governments were forced to undertake a comprehensive restructuring of their societies along Stalinist lines. In Western countries, the popular front and coalition policies that had their origins in the 1930s disappeared and, as Communist parties adopted Moscow's harsh anti-American line, they tended to fall out of the political mainstream — even in France and Italy. In Canada, loyalty to the Cominform's rhetoric ensured that the LPP would slip into political insignificance.

Ironically, Canada itself loomed large in the Soviet vision of world affairs during the early Cold War. It was both a focal point in the shift of imperial power from Britain to the United States, and a "platform" for the "imminent" invasion of the USSR. Interest in Canada rose sharply in the Soviet Union. As a consequence, Canadian communists, who enthusiastically confirmed the Soviet interpretation of events, and the Canadian peace movement were allocated disproportionate attention in the USSR's mass media. In the developing conflict with the last capitalist empire, Canada's rulers were American pawns, its working class potential Soviet allies, and its territory the battleground. The Soviet Union's ideological history and its process of inculcation ensured that the Stalinists would see world events unfolding in no other manner well before the Cold War was underway.

NOTES

1. For the earlier Soviet opinion of Canada, see my "Canada and the Soviet Union in 1945: The View from Moscow," in *Uncertain Horizons: Canadians and their World in 1945*, ed., Greg Donaghy (Ottawa, 1997), pp. 285-304.
2. On the Zhdanov empire, see A.S. Stykalin, "Propaganda SSSR na zarubezhnuiu auditoriiu i obshchestvennoe mnenie stran zapada v pervye poslevoennye gody (po dokumentam rossiiskikh arkhivov)" [USSR Propaganda for Foreign Audiences and Public Opinion of Western Countries in the Early Postwar Years. From Russian Archival Documents], *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta*, No. 1 (1997): 57-70; and Vladislav Zubok and Constantin Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War. From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA, 1997), p. 119f.
3. For an overview of the Soviet published image of Canada during the postwar era, see my "The Stalinist Image of Canada: the Cominform and Soviet Press, 1947-1955," *Labour/Le Travail* 21 (Spring 1988): 153-71. For Cominform proceedings, see the thousand-page work edited by Guiliano Procacci, *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Milan, 1997).
4. "Rech' tovarishcha I.V. Stalina" [Speech of Comrade J.V. Stalin], *Pravda* (10 Feb. 1946), *Bolshevik*, No. 3 (March 1946): 1-11. The speech was delivered on radio on 9 February and was printed in full in English by the *New York Times* the very next day.
For Lenin's, "Imperializm, kak vysshaia stadiia kapitalizma" [Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism], see Lenin, *Sochineniia* [Works], 4th ed. Vol. 22 (Ogiz, 1948): 173-290.
5. See, for example, *Vtoraia mirovaia voina. Kratkaia istoriia* [The Second World War: A Short History], (Moscow, 1985). "The main source of war was and remains imperialism with its inherent contradictions, which are intensified in conditions of a deepening general crisis of capitalism" (p. 461).
Varga's book, *Izmeneniia v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroi mirovoi voiny* [Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War] (Moscow, 1946) was the subject of a public debate, in which the author was forced to defend his work before leading economists and party theoreticians. Varga was forced to yield and was removed from his various prestigious posts.
6. See, for example, Varga, "Anglo-Amerikanskie protivorechiia vo vtoroi

- imperialisticheskoi voine" [Anglo-American Contradictions in the Second Imperialistic War], *Pravda* (5 January 1940). It appeared as well in English, in *Communist International* 17 (1) (January 1940): 56-64; Tim Buck, head of the Communist Party of Canada repeated this message even later, in "Imperialisticheskaia voina i Kanada" [The Imperialist War and Canada], *Kommunisticheskii internatsional*, No. 3 (1941): 87-96. For the earlier version, see John Porter [Leslie Morris], "Canada and the Anglo-American Conflict," *Communist International* 6 (16) (1929): 623-29.
7. See Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three After World War II. New Documents on Soviet Thinking About Post War Relations with the United States and Great Britain," *Cold War International History Project. Working Paper No. 13* (July 1995). The memoranda and reports referred to here can be found in the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), Fond 6, opis' 6, delo, 147, ll. 14, 1-40; delo 149, l. 54; delo 603, ll. 1-34; opis' 7, delo 173, l. 47, 60.
 8. See A.A. Zhdanov on the International Situation. Report made at the Conference of the Nine Communist Parties held in Poland, September, 1947 (London, 1947), and Zhdanov, "The International Situation," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, No. 1 (10 November 1947): 2-4 (Hereafter, FLP/FPD). For the CPSU's glowing announcement of the Cominform magazine and its content, see *Pravda* (18 November 1947).
 9. G.F. Aleksandrov, "O sovetskoi demokratii" [About Soviet Democracy], *Pravda* (5, 6 December 1946). The pamphlet version was published by the State Publishing House for Political Literature, dated 6 January 1947.
 10. I.M. Lemin, *Anglo-Amerikanskii blok i anglo-amerikanskii protivorechiia* [The Anglo-American Bloc and Anglo-American Contradiction], (6 December 1946), p. 9. 85,000 copies were printed in a 31-page pamphlet by *Pravda* in 1947.
 11. See, for example, "Anglo-amerikanskoe aviatsionnoe sotrudnichestvo" [Anglo-American Aviation Cooperation], *Pravda* (13 January 1947) or "Kanadskaia gazeta o voennykh meropriiatiakh SShA i Kanady na Severe" [Canadian Papers about Military Measures of the USA and Canada in the North], *Izvestiia* and *Pravda* (18 January 1947).
 12. Tim Buck, *The Truth about Canada* (Toronto, 1948), translated as *Pravda o Kanade* (Moscow, 1950). *Europe's Rebirth* was one of the few Buck volumes not to be translated into Russian.
 13. Buck, *The Communist Viewpoint* (Toronto, 1948), pp. 16-17.
 14. It was characteristic in the late 1940s and early 1950s that the harshest condemnations of Canada to be found in the USSR, in Russian, were

- written by or translated from Canadians themselves. In addition to members of the Communist Party of Canada executive, articles and speeches by Dyson and Charlotte Carter, Frank and Libbie Park, and James Endicott were the most prominent of these.
15. "Congress of the Canadian Progressive Workers' Party," FLP/FPD (15 April 1948), p. 3. For a list of all the articles on Canada carried by *For a Lasting Peace*, see J.L. Black, compiler, *Soviet Perception of Canada, 1917-1987, An Annotated Bibliographic Guide - Volume 1*, (Kingston, 1988), Chapter 2.
 16. For a list of dozens of newspaper articles on these topics, see *Soviet Perception of Canada, 1917-1987 - Volume 2*.
 17. The *New Times* was established during the war as *War and the Working Class* (Voina i rabochii klass). It was renamed in 1945 and was published in a number of languages to carry the Soviet Marxist-Leninist interpretation to the widest possible circle of international readers. For a list of articles about Canada in the *New Times*, see *Soviet Perception of Canada, 1917-1987 - Volume 1*, Chapter 3.
 18. "The Canadian Slave Market," *New Times*, No. 24 (June 1947): 25-26; "Rabskii trud pol'skikh devushek v Kanade" [Slave Labour of Polish Girls in Canada], *Pravda* (6 October 1947); Iurii Korol'kov, "V lageriakh peremeshchennykh lits" [In the Camps for "Displaced Persons"], *Pravda* (22 July 1947); "Kanadskoe ekho" [Canadian Echo (on Yugoslav army)], *Izvestiia* (21 June 1947); "Srodstvo dush" [Soul Brothers (On Germans)], *Izvestiia* (18 August 1946).
 19. Sosenskii, *Voina i ekonomika Kanady* (Ogiz, 1947), pp. 24-32; 102-03. The book was printed in a run of 10,000 copies.
 20. Lenin, *Imperializm*, pp. 210-11, note 4. Mileikovskii, "Sovremennaia Kanada," *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*, No. 9 (1947): 96-109.
 21. G. Kozlov, "Lenin i Stalin - sozdateli politicheskoi ekonomii sotsializma," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 1 (January 1948): 5-23; Mileikovskii, "Reaktsionnaia politika leiboristskoi partii v angliiskikh dominionakh" [Reactionary Policy of Labour Parties in the English Dominions], *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 7 (1948): 105-121.
 22. Uott Kh'iu Mak-Kollam, *Kto vladeet Kanadoi* [Who Rules Canada]. Translated from the English by O.A. Nekrasov. Introduction by V.V. Mordvinov (Moscow, 1948), pp. 3-4. For reviews, "Kto khoziai kanady?" [Who Rules Canada?], *Trud* (15 July 1948); V. Azov, O. Nekrasov, "Uncrowned Kings of Canada," *New Times*, No. 48 (November 1948): 29-31; and A. Bobrovskii, "Kritika i bibliografiia:

- 'Kto vladeet Kanadoi?'" [Criticism and Bibliography: "Who Rules Canada?"], *Pravda* (2 July 1949).
23. Agranat, "Sdvigi v razvitiu khoziaistva severnoi Kanady" [Changes in the Economic Development of Northern Canada], *Geografiia i shkola*, No. 1 (1947): 37-40. The North was also said to be useful mainly as a source of uranium for American atom bombs.
 24. Agranat, "Kanadskii Sever" [The Canadian North], *Voprosy geografii*, No. 8 (1948): 147-73.
 25. *Izvestiia* (20 March; 31 March 1949).
 26. To name but a few by Shcherbatykh: "Kanada segodnia" [Canada Today], *Vokrug sveta*, 12 (1950): 23-29; "N'iufaulndlend – novaia provintsiiia Kanady" [Newfoundland – a New Canadian province], *Vokrug sveta*, 5 (1951): 17-20; "V doline reki Sv. Lavrentiia" [Along the St. Lawrence River], *Vokrug sveta*, 5 (1954): 13-16; "Kanadskii narod v bor'be za mir" [The Canadian People in the Struggle for Peace], *Izvestiia* (16 May 1950); "Voenno-morskoi flot Kanady v aggressivnykh planakh SShA" [The Canadian Fleet in the Aggressive Plans of the USA], *Krasnyi flot* (10 September 1950); "Kanada – voennaia baza SShA" [Canada – American Military Base], *Krasnaia zvezda* (11 October 1950); – and to show that he did not change: "Kanada v aggressivnykh planakh SShA" [Canada in the Aggressive Plans of the USA], *Krasnaia zvezda* (9 April 1954), and so on.
 27. Shcherbatykh, *Kanada – Votchina*, p. 3.
 28. Boris Lavrentov wrote in 1949 that Canadian customs officials, "well-fed, to a gloss, thugs, with faces the colour of boiled ham," refused entry to 1,000 copies of a Soviet history text "proving" that Canada was a "fiefdom" of Wall Street, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 57 (16 July 1949): 4. See also, M. Marinin, "Zakon dzhunglei" [Law of the Jungle], *Pravda* (25 June 1951), where it was said that Canada's participation in a conference of British Empire defence ministers "assured the USA presence" because the US "directs Canada precisely like its own votchina."
 29. Petrov, "Chto vlechet 'turistov' iz SShA v Kanadu?" [What Attracts "Tourists" from the USA to Canada?], *Moskovskii Bol'shevik* (24 September 1949). Petrov's two-part piece, "Pakt podzhigatelei voiny" [Pact of the Warmongers], *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 24 (6 April 1949): 4; No. 30 (13 April 1949): 4, was a very harsh assault on the founders of NATO.
 30. FLP/FPD (18 August 1950), p. 2. See also, essays by Endicott in *Literaturnaia gazeta* (15 March, 23 November 1950), and *Pravda* (24 November 1950).
 31. Norman Penner, "Kak zhivet kanadskaia molodezh': pis'mo iz Ottavy"

- [How Canadian Youth Live: A Letter from Ottawa], *Komsomol'skaia pravda* (2 February 1950).
32. See, for example, "K voprosu o N'iufaundlende" [On the Question of Newfoundland], *Krasnyi flot* (Red Fleet) (11 February 1949); I.M. Lemin, "Tsentrobezhnye sily v britanskikh dominionakh" [Centrifugal Forces in the British Dominions], *Trud* (21 May 1949); Tim Buck, "Canada in the Aggressive Plans of American Imperialism," *FLP/FPD* (12 May 1950), p. 2.
 33. B. Krotkov, "V odnom stroiu" [In One Service], *Komsomol'skaia pravda* (13 September 1950), where Gui Caron is interviewed in Moscow. Shcherbatykh, "Kanadskaia molodezh' ne khochet voiny" [Canada's Young People Do Not Want War], *Komsomol'skaia pravda* (7 June 1950). He quoted James Endicott and Jenny Little at length. See also "K voprosu o N'iufaundlende" [On the Question of Newfoundland], *Krasnyi flot* (Red Fleet) (11 February 1949); I.M. Lemin, "Tsentrobezhnye sily v britanskikh dominionakh" [Centrifugal Forces in the British Dominions], *Trud* (21 May 1949), and Tim Buck, "Canada in the Aggressive Plans of American Imperialism," *FLP/FPD* (12 May 1950), p. 2. On Solandt, V. Borovskii, "Nazad k obez'iane!" [Back to the Ape!], *Pravda* (6 May 1950).
 34. See V.P. Yesipov, N.K. Goncharov, *Pedagogika* [Pedagogy], (Moscow, 1946). A.F. Elisevoi, *Vospitanie sovetskogo patriotizma i sovetskoi natsionalnoi gordosti* [Upbringing in Soviet Patriotism and Soviet National Pride], (Moscow, 1952), p. 29.
 35. See, for example, "Oni boiatsia mira. Beseda s predsedelem Komiteta storonnikov mira Kanady Dzheimsom Endikottom" [They Are Afraid of Peace. Conversation with James Endicott, Representative of the Canadian Committee in Support of Peace], *Literaturnaia gazeta* (15 March 1950); Endikott, Dzh [James Endicott], "Put' k spaseniiu" [Path to Salvation], *Literaturnaia gazeta* (23 November 1950); "Rech Dzheimsa Endikotta" [Speech of James Endicott], *Pravda* (24 November 1950); Endicott, "Pochemu kanadskomu narodu neobkhdim mir?" [Why is Peace Necessary to the Canadian People?], *Izvestiia* (4 April 1953).
 36. "Mnogotysiachnyi miting v Toronto" [Thousands Attend Meeting in Toronto], *Pravda* (10 May 1950); S. Shcherbatykh, "Kanadskii narod v bor'be za mir" [The Canadian People in the Struggle for Peace], *Izvestiia* (16 May 1950). See also, *Komsomol'skaia pravda* (12 April 1950), for joint praise of Endicott and Johnson.
 37. Endikott, "Nastroeniia v kanade. Posle Venskogo kongressa narodov z zashchitu mira" [The Sentiments in Canada. After the Vienna Congress of People in Defense of Peace], *Literaturnaia gazeta* (31 March 1953).

THE COLD WAR, CANADA, AND THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD¹

Dominique Marshall

RÉSUMÉ : Cet article analyse les liens entre la guerre froide, l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les débats entourant la rédaction d'une nouvelle Déclaration des droits de l'enfant. Dominique Marshall montre en quoi les droits des enfants, qui avaient bénéficié d'un appui considérable à la Société des Nations en 1924, faisaient face, à la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, à des circonstances différentes. En dépit de la montée de professions et de bureaucraties déterminées à élargir les droits des enfants, l'élaboration d'une charte renouvelée s'est rapidement révélée difficile. Pour plusieurs, la Déclaration universelle des Droits de l'Homme, adoptée en 1948, rendait inutile toute déclaration distincte au sujet des enfants. Les tensions suscitées par la guerre froide, particulièrement lourdes après 1950, allaient déterminer l'issue des discussions. Jusqu'à la fin des années 50, le conflit bipolaire allait paralyser tout progrès vers la conclusion d'accords internationaux sur les droits de l'homme, mais ceux qui, au sein de la Commission des Droits de l'Homme de l'ONU, étaient à la recherche d'un terrain d'entente entre l'Est et l'Ouest, se servirent à cette fin des droits des enfants. Cependant leur décision de faire porter l'attention de l'assemblée générale sur les enfants n'était pas fortuite. Ils pouvaient compter sur l'acceptation de la notion de droit des enfants au sein d'une large portion de la sphère publique internationale.

When the United Nations (UN) was established in 1945, replacing the defunct League of Nations, the new international forum showed little interest in endorsing the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which the League of Nations had adopted in 1924. Unlike the League's Covenant, the UN Charter included clauses designed to encourage "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all," language

which many observers thought made a specific declaration for children superfluous. Moreover, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), set up in 1946 to aid children left destitute by the Second World War, seemed to address the widespread sense of urgency and indignation that had helped secure the passage of the Geneva Declaration in 1924.

Even so, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1959. Drafted and discussed during the late 1950s by the Human Rights Commission, a branch of the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the 1959 declaration extended children's rights to new spheres. It added rights to social security and a secure family environment to the list of rights outlined in the Geneva Declaration, which had guaranteed children a name, a nationality, an education, decent work, and priority for relief. The UN proclamation placed a heavier emphasis on measures against discrimination and it explicitly designated the agencies responsible for ensuring children's prerogatives.

Although one historian of children's rights has argued that an easing of Cold War tensions in the late 1950s created a favourable climate for the 1959 declaration, it remains unclear how children's rights became, to use his words, "a political priority."² The reasons advanced by UN officials for inaction in the mid-1940s remained valid 10 years later. For example, John Humphrey, secretary of the Human Rights Commission and a Canadian legal scholar, wondered about the relevance of a specific agreement on children's rights. Worried that a children's declaration might undermine the authority of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, he "doubted whether the purpose it would serve could possibly justify the time and effort the United Nations was devoting to it. There were certainly other more important matters that needed attention."³ The Canadian also thought "that there was something wrong with our priorities... . It was easier to draft a declaration on the rights of children than to devise practical measures for the protection of human rights."⁴ Nevertheless, Humphrey understood that children's rights provided an issue on which most UN members could agree: "I suspected a stopgap which was being used to give the impression that the Human Rights Commission was doing something."⁵

This paper examines the events which led to the Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1959. It argues that an emphasis on children's rights provided the UN's Human Rights Commission with a quick way around the state of paralysis within the commission created by the Cold

War. Children's rights represented an issue for which governments from both sides of the conflict could muster popular support in their respective countries. However, the Declaration of the Rights of the Child was not simply a product of the search by East and West for Cold War advantage. The process was more complicated. The postwar task of organizing a complex international bureaucracy had important consequences for the evolution of the Children's Declaration and the role played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this field.

In addition, by examining the evolution of Canadian policy toward the UN's efforts to define human and children's rights, this paper illustrates how the egalitarian demands for social security and changing conceptions of child welfare among citizens in the richer nations gave rise to commitments in New York and Geneva. A different set of pressures accompanied the appearance at the UN in the 1950s of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa, a development which also played an important role in defining the eventual shape of the Children's Declaration.⁶ Finally, this discussion tries to illuminate the current debate on children's rights by clarifying the meaning of the 10 principles of the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of Children and their relationship to the Cold War.

Children's Rights during the Transition from the League of Nations to the United Nations

The League of Nations adopted its Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1924 with remarkable speed. The process was simple and straightforward. The British delegation presented a declaration drafted by Save the Children Fund International (SCFI), an NGO founded in 1920, and the League's Assembly voted quickly and unanimously in favour of the project. Britain's Labour prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, used his personal prestige to push through this project, the brainchild of Lord Noel Buxton, a friend and fellow member of Parliament closely associated with the SCFI.⁷

The process in 1945 was a good deal more complex. The London-based Save the Children Fund (SCF), the main affiliated branch of the SCFI, attempted to have the Geneva Declaration adopted by the new UN General Assembly. It met a barrage of stifling kindness from politicians and civil servants in the British Foreign and Home Offices, but no action. All supported children's rights, but no one who could command the General Assembly's attention thought that children's rights were

worth much time or effort. Hope flickered briefly in 1946 when Edward Fuller, secretary of the SCF and a member of the SCFI's executive committee, secured a promise from Philip J. Noel-Baker, Britain's minister of state with special responsibility for the UN, to "bring the Declaration of Geneva... to the notice of the General Assembly." In the end, however, Noel-Baker claimed that he was unable to find the time to interest the General Assembly.⁸

Fuller did not enjoy the kind of influential allies that the SCFI was able to marshal in 1924.⁹ During the interwar decades, the state's interest in international child welfare activities had increased substantially, pushing aside private charities. British officials suspected that the SCF was "not very important but struggling to keep itself in the public eye" rather than actively contributing "to the immediate and pressing needs of the world."¹⁰

Like their British counterparts, Canadian delegates to early UN meetings spent much of their time trying to reduce the status of voluntary agencies associated with the League of Nations. This reflected broader developments in the evolution of Canadian government. The central figure in Canada's international social activities was George F. Davidson. Although he served as head of the Canadian Council of Child Welfare, he was not drawn from the volunteer community. Instead, as deputy minister of health and welfare, Davidson represented the interests and attitudes of the Canadian government.

Unable to adopt the strategy followed in 1924, Fuller and the SCFI were forced to follow the more usual and less privileged course of bringing the Geneva Declaration "before the appropriate Commission of the United Nations with a view [to] its being adopted as the United Nations' formal expression of their responsibility in regards to the interests of children."¹¹ Fuller sought advice from British officials on how to approach the UN. Children's welfare had not vanished from the world organization's purview, though the new structures for international social and economic cooperation did not provide for an agency devoted solely to children. On the creation of the UN, children's welfare and all other social activities were turned over to ECOSOC, which functioned as a large overseeing body. British officials thought that Fuller should bring his declaration on children's rights to ECOSOC's Social Commission, since it "covers the questions raised by the Declaration... such as welfare for children and adolescents, especially those deprived of normal family life; protection against neglect and

cruelty; treatment of juvenile offenders; protection of minors, etc." The Human Rights Commission, they thought, would be less interested in the project since it would "naturally tend to regard all rights as being equally applicable to children."¹²

In the Social Commission, Fuller's scheme was given short shrift. Sidney Harris of the Home Office, formerly a British delegate to the League's Child Welfare Committee, was now the United Kingdom representative on the Social Commission and its vice chairman. In a report on the "activities of the League in the social field" for its first session in April and May 1946, he reiterated the importance of the Geneva Declaration and its meaning for the postwar era:

the United Nations not only should concern itself with this important matter [the development of interest in child welfare], but must also make a bolder approach to it as part of a general social policy. This subject is of vital interest to every country. The welfare of children, physically, mentally, spiritually, must be the first concern of every nation, particularly having regard to the ravages of the two world wars. The terms of the Declaration of Geneva should be as binding on the people of the world to-day as they were in 1924.¹³

This was a backhanded acknowledgement, since Harris believed that the Declaration was "harmless enough but rather a nuisance." He saw "little value in general resolutions of this kind." On his return from the UN meetings, he attempted to convince Fuller that it was enough that the Social Commission had taken note of the 1924 Declaration. He advised him against bothering a busy General Assembly with the matter.¹⁴

Fuller found no support during 1946 and 1947 for his efforts to persuade British representatives to move a resolution in favour of the Geneva Declaration during the discussion of the Social Commission's report to the General Assembly. The Human Rights Commission was busy drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,¹⁵ and like Humphrey, the Foreign Office considered this declaration "broad enough in its terms to make further declarations in favour of particular sections of the community unnecessary."¹⁶ By then, as the Foreign Office also pointed out, the debate had moved in entirely new directions. ECOSOC's Social Commission was already exploring the possibility of "a new and better Declaration [on children's rights]."

ECOSOC, Children's Rights and the Changing Conceptions of International Child Welfare, 1946-50

Although it abandoned the idea of adopting the 1924 Geneva Declaration, the Social Commission welcomed the idea of drafting a declaration on the rights of children that would take into account recent developments in child welfare. At its session in 1946, it proposed broadening the Geneva Declaration by adding an article on "[r]espect of the family as an entity," together with a provision on "race, nationality or creed," a concern that rose directly from the atrocities of the Second World War. It pressed ahead with this project and in September 1947, at its second session, it asked for documentation on the Geneva Declaration and possible modifications.¹⁷ The Social Commission presented its work as a continuation of the League of Nations' efforts in this field. In so doing, it paid little attention to pressure from the International Union of Child Welfare (IUCW), the SCFI's successor.¹⁸ In addition the Commission insisted on the need to resume action on child welfare, activities which had been interrupted by the war: "[d]uring the later years of the war... child welfare matters resumed the place of importance from which they had been expelled by the disruption of international relationships and war catastrophes." It was time for the UN to coordinate the "intensive, excellent... activity by several bodies in respect of child relief and child welfare in general."¹⁹

In the spring of 1947, the Social Commission decided to give priority to child welfare. The Commission's 14 members were anxious to press ahead with a "United Nations Charter of the Rights of the Child." In the autumn of 1948, the UN issued a preparatory statement to governments as well as interested NGOs and other UN agencies, drawing parallels between the 1924 Geneva Declaration and drafts of possible new charters.

Encouraged by the Social Commission's work at the United Nations, the IUCW changed its strategy and began to consider how to revise the Geneva Declaration. In the summer of 1948, it held an information conference on the declaration at its main office in Geneva and a meeting of its General Council in Stockholm to begin elaborating a new text.²⁰ Members expressed a greater need to explain why children needed a special charter to be able to benefit from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The international NGO also wished to incorporate greater commitments toward social security in any declaration. In October 1948, the chairman of the IUCW, Mrs. Gordon Morier, visited Lake Success where the UN Secretariat was at work.²¹ Early the next year, the UN established a committee to draft a declaration on children's rights. The IUCW's initial

response to this development was hostile. Its jealous executive insisted that any changes to the Geneva Declaration could not be adopted by the UN without its consent. However, as the UN widened its circle of consultation and the ICUW saw "a new impetus to child welfare in all parts of the world," it abandoned its leadership ambitions.²²

The Social Commission's interest in children's rights reflected the considerable popular support children's causes enjoyed in most Western societies throughout the postwar period. Indeed, the IUCW continually argued that the UN's approval of a declaration on children's rights "would have a useful effect on public opinion," since in many countries the 1924 Declaration had led directly to legislative action benefiting children.²³ The IUCW stressed how important a simple and straightforward declaration would be as an educational tool and as a point of reference for the general population. After all, they argued, "the Declaration was intended for ordinary people."²⁴ H.W. Harris of the Home Office was equally sure of the popularity of the "Declaration of Geneva," even if he took less comfort in the phenomenon.²⁵ In the British Foreign Office view, the Social Commission's desire to expand the declaration's range came from the pressures of "organisations such as the 'Save the Children Fund'" which had become "[t]oo strong for the Social Commission to resist."²⁶ Foreign Office officials regretted having "to please crank opinion and waste endless time and worry over inanities and duplication," but they were conscious of being a minority in the Social Commission.²⁷ Moreover, they were aware that "certain sections of public opinion in this country are most vociferous on the subject. This is just the sort of thing that excites Parliamentary interest far beyond its actual merits."²⁸

In July 1950, after two years of research and discussion, the UN Secretariat forwarded *A Concept Declaration of the Rights of the Child* to ECOSOC.²⁹ It argued that the Declaration of 1924 "ne reflétait pas l'évolution considérable qui s'est produite depuis 1924 dans le domaine de la protection de l'enfance."³⁰ Since the Second World War, the submission argued, states had assumed new social obligations toward children, including the need to stop discrimination, and to help children deal with propaganda. A declaration would also have to help children understand their right to personal security, to a name and a nationality, and to health and education.³¹ ECOSOC adopted the "concept declaration," which contained a preamble and 10 specific principles, without examining its content in detail. It asked the Human Rights Commission to study the draft and report back in a year.³²

Despite popular support, the "concept declaration" was soon shelved and remained so for the rest of the decade, a casualty of the larger tensions over human rights brought about by the Cold War struggle between the Western liberal democracies and totalitarian communism.³³ By the early 1950s, many Western democracies, led by the United States, were becoming increasingly opposed to the idea of making human rights an "enforceable treaty obligation" and were unwilling to permit an international agency to supervise their domestic policies. The approach adopted by the Soviet bloc was equally unhelpful. Led by the Soviet Union, its members adopted and ratified various declarations on human rights, dismissing domestic and international efforts to assess their implementation.³⁴ Worried lest it become "an overtly political organ," the Human Rights Commission responded to this situation by engaging in increasingly technical exercises, a kind of "apolitical functionalism":

Despite the significant human rights dimension of the Cold War, the decolonization debate and many other matters being brought before the Assembly and the Security Council, the Commission managed to confine its efforts to standard-setting with a variety of other technical pursuits thrown in for good measure.³⁵

Canadian delegates to ECOSOC did little to stop this trend. Committed to the notion of a neutral and efficient civil service, an idea that had assisted them in their ascent in the Canadian polity since the 1920s, they stressed the need for "adequate [social and economic] expertise in the Secretariat," likening the agency to a "Board of Directors... [of a] whole economic and social machine."³⁶ They favoured a pragmatic approach, which they opposed to methods adopted by more "impractical and visionary members."³⁷ In order to enhance Canada's status and to contain Great Power efforts to control the agency, officials actively addressed the administrative and budgetary problems associated with establishing the new organization. Drawing on the expert resources of the departments of Finance and National Health and Welfare, they worked at erecting an efficient, technical, and non-partisan bureaucracy.

Though hardly dramatic, this approach paid a handsome dividend. Already in 1946, Canadian delegations were proudly reporting that they "had considerable personal authority in the Council and its Committees and... they enjoyed the respect of all sides on controversial issues."³⁸ By

the end of its first term on ECOSOC in 1948, Canada had earned a reputation for "being one of the nations which had contributed most to the development of the Council's work since its inception."³⁹

Popular Pressures, Decolonization, and the Declaration of Human Rights, 1948-54
In Canada, as in the United States, politicians harboured reservations about human rights long before the acute Cold War divisions of the 1950s took hold. By the end of the Second World War, Western leaders were already retreating from their promises for new measures toward social justice at home made in the name of wartime reconstruction. This retreat was slowed, however, as politicians were forced to respond to progressive demands for social justice in the final stages of the Second World War.⁴⁰ Similarly, Western diplomats mobilized human rights in order to undercut international support for the Soviet Union and its communist allies at the UN.

However, supporting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 was not without its problems for the Canadian government. Early drafts of the Universal Declaration included clauses on the right to social security, reflecting an understanding of human rights that was broader than Canada's liberal government could accept. Initially, Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King's cabinet instructed the Canadian delegation to ECOSOC to support "the elimination, as far as possible, of articles such as those on social security, which give a detailed definition of governmental responsibilities... these articles have no place in a declaration of human rights."⁴¹ The continuing socialist emphasis on social and economic rights was among the factors that prompted Canada to abstain in the first vote on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in October 1948.⁴²

In an overall sense, however, Ottawa had good reasons for supporting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. During UN discussion of the Declaration, Canadian officials were aware that a projected national Bill of Rights had produced "considerable agitation" in Canada.⁴³ They observed that the very engagement of the Canadian government in UN agencies was helping to develop a commitment toward human rights at home, even if the work of UN social and economic agencies "seldom made the headline."⁴⁴ Canadian representatives actively sought to command influence in ECOSOC, but popular understanding of the promises of the UN imposed limits on their personal and national ambitions. Mackenzie King and his successor, Louis Saint-Laurent, for instance, thought that Canada's participation in ECOSOC's Human Rights Commission was unwarranted. They worried that "it would be difficult to... explain to the public our position,

on the matters which may come before the Commission."⁴⁵ In 1951, when an ECOSOC committee of experts recommended a program for full employment, the secretary of state for external affairs, Lester B. Pearson, feared the reaction of the Canadian public.⁴⁶ In 1947-48, in response to a UN request, a Special Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, chaired by Minister of Justice J.L. Ilsley, held public hearings on the draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is probably because of the work of the Committee that senior officials of the Department of External Affairs, once divided about the idea of a universal declaration, believed by the end of 1947 that "there [was] a great value in defining by international agreement as precisely as we possibly can the basic freedom which the individual should enjoy within society."⁴⁷

Canada's support for the adoption of a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man also came from the desire of politicians and senior officials to check the USSR's claim to be the champion of "small nations and... coloured and colonial peoples." For Escott Reid, head of the Department of External Affairs' Second Political Division in 1946, the Universal



Canadian delegates to the UN General Assembly in September 1946.

From l to r: B.M. Williams, Delegation Secretary, George F. Davidson, Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare, Paul Martin, Minister of Health and Welfare, C.H.L. Sharman, W.A. MacKintosh, and R.G. Riddell. Davidson typified Canada's commitment to a technical and bureaucratic approach to social questions at the UN.

CHRIS LUND/NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA/PA-129002

Declaration of Human Rights provided a weapon in the struggle for the allegiance of citizens:

One source of the strength of the Soviet Union is that it has allies within our gates — people who still think that Moscow is the Mecca of the disenchanting and disinherited of the whole world. We must try to persuade these people that they are misguided. One way to do this would be to demonstrate that the states of the Western world are willing to implement a declaration of the rights of man which will give both political and economic freedoms while the Soviet Union is unable or unwilling to implement such a declaration.⁴⁸

The foreign ministry believed that an international assertion of the political and civil freedoms of citizens would provide the West with a tool to attack Communist states at “their weakest point, their refusal to concede to their citizens the ordinary freedoms of speech, of the press and of worship and their inability to give their citizens freedom from want and from fear.”⁴⁹

Afro-Asian and Latin American states made the West pay for their support in this Cold War battle by extracting commitments to human rights from the more developed countries. Their demands, especially those articulated by Latin America (a Western-oriented bloc that constituted the largest group of emerging states at this time), generated “amendments substantially calculated to lay down an obligation to respect human rights.”⁵⁰ Even as early as 1951, when Canadian delegates to ECOSOC reported that the Afro-Asian bloc was beginning to align itself more readily with the Soviet Union and its satellites, Ottawa worried about the danger of divisions among the non-communist world.⁵¹

Once the UN adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the Human Rights Commission turned its attention to the problem of devising methods to protect and encourage these rights. In this search, Canadian diplomats found themselves driven by domestic pressures to further pursue the struggle for human rights, but at the same time unable to collaborate with the USSR on the means to protect them. Senior Canadian officials had long been divided over the question of the value of a UN human rights declaration without any means of enforcement. For some, setting goals was enough. Others, who thought declarations had little value on their own, wished to rely on “traditional legal methods of promoting human rights.”⁵² The Department of External Affairs was

sceptical of the value of human rights covenants. These novel international legal devices, designed to protect economic and social rights, were especially difficult to work out between nations:

civil and political rights... involve limitations on the powers of governments and legislatures to interfere with the rights of the individual. Economic, social and cultural rights, on the other hand, are not so much individual rights as responsibilities of the state in the field of economic policy and social welfare which usually require for their implementation detailed social legislation and the creation of appropriate administrative machinery. There is thus a fundamental difference in the nature of the two categories of rights.⁵³

Canadian suspicions about human rights covenants, which the Human Rights Commission began to draft after 1948, were reinforced by political fears about the "[c]onsiderable public interest" in the matter. "Our adherence to the covenant," Pearson warned cabinet, "might result in increased public pressure for a domestic Bill of Rights." In the end, when a draft covenant was discussed in the General Assembly, it was the polarization of positions on human rights brought about by the Cold War that forced Canada's cautious approval. The projected covenant had come to divide East and West, and Canadian officials were conscious that a decision "to vote against the covenant would likely result in putting ourselves in this matter in a camp consisting largely of the Soviet Union and its satellites." Seen from this perspective, supporting the covenant would be a means of waging "psychological warfare against the Soviet world."⁵⁴

Thus, by 1951, Canadian delegates to ECOSOC were ready to adopt a covenant as long as it was largely devoid of social, cultural, and economic rights. Despite American backing, this kind of limited covenant failed to attract majority support at the UN.⁵⁵ As a result, the Human Rights Commission decided to divide the covenant into two. The first part, which addressed civil and political rights, was designed to appeal to Western preoccupations; a second covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights met the major Soviet concerns. The commission's work on these two covenants was completed in 1954, when the debate moved to the General Assembly.⁵⁶ In the UN's principal forum, Canada continued to oppose the two covenants, insisting that "[m]any of the articles... contained provisions which implied for their implementation a degree of interference by states which was

incompatible with the concept of the role of government in society which underlies the governmental system of parliamentary democracy such as Canada."⁵⁷ Consideration of the two covenants stretched out for almost three years in a series of lengthy, inconclusive debates on the right to self-determination, the status of federal states, and the means of protecting human rights.⁵⁸ By 1957, Canadian observers noted, the international community was "growing impatient with the slow rate of progress."⁵⁹

The Rights of the Child Between 1950 and 1959

The Human Rights Commission's efforts to develop enforcement mechanisms through its two covenants meant that the question of children's rights was largely ignored. However, in March 1956, after five years of neglect, it reappeared on the Commission's agenda. In a series of meetings in the spring and fall of 1957, the Human Rights Commission and ECOSOC pressed forward with a proposed declaration on the rights of children, circulating a draft to governments for comments. By December 1957, it had secured responses from 21 states.⁶⁰

ECOSOC attributed its renewed interest in children's rights mainly to a desire to address an item "of very great importance" after a long period of inactivity.⁶¹ A UN press communiqué added, by way of explanation, that work on the children's declaration had been suspended while the international organization tried to adopt its two broader covenants.⁶² The *New York Times* thought that there were more important "impulses" at work. It explained the new attention being accorded children's rights by commenting in an editorial that "[a]lmost every society cherishes its children."⁶³ In addition, as the Indian delegate to the 1959 Human Rights Commission meeting expressed it, heightened concern for children came from the acute sense of danger brought on by the possibility of a nuclear conflict:

Mankind was at a decisive stage in its history. The achievements of science had made available unprecedented power for good and evil. If the leaders of the world were to use that power for good, their aim must be to ensure that man's moral evolution kept pace with the advance of science. In order to achieve that aim, a beginning must be made with the education of children.⁶⁴

This kind of popular concern for the fate of children played an important role in shaping Canadian policy, as the government's efforts to wrestle

with the fate of UNICEF demonstrate. Although Canadian officials had not shown much enthusiasm for promoting children's rights after 1945, Canadian citizens donated considerable amounts of time and money to UNICEF. Nevertheless, when the question of its future was raised at the UN in 1950, Ottawa quickly withdrew its support.⁶⁵ Though the government recognized the "continuing needs of children," it thought that any commitment for the future should be made with caution. UNICEF appeared to be just one more in a series of "impractical proposals for ambitious welfare schemes."⁶⁶ Pearson favoured dividing responsibilities between existing agencies. The Canadian delegation to ECOSOC deplored the "irresponsibility" of "under-developed countries" who used their many votes to dictate spending, while the countries who financed the fund had little say in its operation. American pressures for an agency devoted specifically to the welfare of children, as well as a concern that other agencies, whose main preoccupations were elsewhere, might "neglect the problems which are of concern to children," eventually helped the Canadian government to change its mind.

Equally important, officials and politicians in Ottawa were aware that "[t]here has been considerable interest in Canada in the activities of UNICEF and the Government might well be subject to serious criticism from the Canadian public if the Delegation to the Assembly were to oppose a resolution on aid to children."⁶⁷ Thus, significantly and reluctantly, international child welfare questions had become a legitimate matter of cabinet concern.⁶⁸

In the autumn of 1959, the General Assembly's Third Committee worked on the proposal for a declaration on the rights of children with alacrity. According to the IUCW delegate in New York, who met the acting director of the Human Rights Commission in September 1959, the committee "had not been productive of late and may be very pleased to deal with an item which can produce results at this session. (Outlook on the Human Rights Commission is dim). Therefore they are likely to see in the Declaration a chance to come up with some accomplishment." Indeed, when the committee met

some of the long-standing members of the Committee, who have lived through the years of struggle to complete a Covenant, or Covenants, of Human Rights and were frustrated by the inability to achieve this, saw in the Declaration an opportunity for the quick accomplishment of a piece of work that

might increase the Committee's diminished prestige and achieve a status comparable to that of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁶⁹

There remained a fear that the USSR would be able to forestall discussions within this body of 82 members. By 1959, however, the Soviet Union's growing interest in "peaceful co-existence" and more normal relations with the West created an atmosphere which enabled delegates to finish their work.⁷⁰ The Committee devoted 23 meetings to the project in the autumn of 1959, before the General Assembly unanimously adopted the document on November 20.

The Meaning of the 10 Principles of Children's Rights

Despite Cold War tensions, the new Declaration reflected some measure of international agreement on general transformations in the realm of child welfare. The IUCW played an important role in this development. If it had retreated from the idea of a UN declaration by 1948, the NGO had not stopped its work on children's rights. On the contrary, the Cold War, by postponing interstate negotiations, enhanced the IUCW's status. The NGO felt that an organization like itself was not stuck in one "national situation." "[I]t seems evident," wrote one Union employee, "that the world cannot wait for delays, fumbling and failures in the struggle to raise the standards of life and welfare for the masses of its people."⁷¹ By the mid-1950s, the organization saw itself as an international committee of experts. Its legitimacy came primarily from the very "[e]xtent of [the] needs" that children faced. The association was also able to exploit its freedom to act without regard to political concerns, and its ability to relate directly with lower levels of national administration to carve out a role for itself. It was assisted by the absence of a public organization concerned with all aspects of children's lives.⁷² National organizations were also consulted by their respective governments on UN projects for children's rights. In 1958, the IUCW circulated its own proposal for a declaration to put pressure on governments, with special regard to countries who had a member on the Human Rights Commission.⁷³ With countries eager to avoid lengthy debates, the IUCW accomplished a lot of the necessary work of negotiation and compromise between the two sessions of the Human Rights Commission devoted to the Declaration in 1957 and 1959.⁷⁴

The new text's first pronouncement aimed at justifying specific rights for children. It recalled the UN Charter's commitment to "promote social

progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" and the universal nature of the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. Unlike the 1924 Geneva Declaration, the 1959 text proposed that a child's "physical and mental immaturity" warranted "special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth." The formulation on immaturity, which the IUCW developed in 1948, represented an acknowledgment of the role of NGOs.⁷⁵ Legal arguments were also used to demonstrate the legitimacy of a special declaration for children. Finally, UNICEF, which owed its continued existence to popular support, established a precedent for the existence of separate children's causes.⁷⁶ The declaration thus tied the text more firmly to the UN than the Geneva Declaration had been associated with the League of Nations. Instead of reflecting the views of "men and women of all nations," the 1959 declaration was a proclamation of the UN General Assembly.

Reflecting some of the concerns expressed by national governments during the Human Rights Commission's consultations, the 1959 proclamation underlined the centrality of the problem of discrimination. Relegated to the preamble in the 1924 Geneva Declaration, this question was treated in the first principle in the 1959 declaration at the suggestion of the IUCW. The children's welfare organization had learned from experience that a principle had more impact than a preamble.⁷⁷ Race, according to children's historian Philip Veerman, "received prime importance after the beastly slaughtering of children on racist grounds during the Second World War."⁷⁸ Moreover, discrimination was defined more broadly, adding to "race, nationality and creed" criteria of "color, sex, language,... political or other opinion,... social origin, property, birth or other status." The preeminence accorded discrimination was supported by both West and East.

The declaration emphasized the relationship between mother and child, reflecting the results of the UN Secretariat's research and contemporary findings in child psychology.⁷⁹ "Some members [of the Third Committee of the General Assembly] saw the Declaration, issued with the prestige of UN sponsorship, as a possible aid to the development of standards for child welfare."⁸⁰ The Declaration of 1959 added the need for "full opportunity for play and recreation."⁸¹ The principle of the paramountcy of the "interest of the child" was similarly adopted unanimously. This may have come from concern for children of divorced parents, an idea expressed by the Danish delegation.⁸²

While some issues easily attracted support from both the Soviet bloc



The April 1952 session of UNICEF's Executive Board was chaired by Mrs. Adelaide B. Sinclair of Canada, seen here talking to Maurice Pate, Executive Director of UNICEF. Widespread support among Canadians for the international agency helped make children's issues a matter of cabinet concern.

UNITED NATIONS PHOTO/UN-36781

and the West, Cold War differences left a significant impact on a number of the principles adopted in 1959. In contrast to the 1924 Geneva Declaration, which only stated "that mankind owes to the child the best it has to give" and handed responsibility to "men and women of all nations," the declaration invested special institutions with responsibilities for the rights of the child. Whatever advantages children may have secured by this effort to define who was responsible for protecting their rights were largely lost by the length and scope of a list which included "parents, ... men and women as individuals, and ... voluntary organizations, local authorities and national governments."⁸³

This vagueness was the result of debates on the role of the state which divided East and West. Soviet representatives insisted that the state should provide free schooling, protect young mothers, and exempt children from dangerous work to ensure that children were given the opportunity to reach their full potential.⁸⁴ Western countries wished to avoid the kind of compulsion and intrusion they associated with communist regimes. The Soviet

Union's delegate even accused them of "wanting to undermine the recognition of the rights of the child in practice and to enable governments to shift their responsibilities on to others."⁸⁵ The IUCW's delegate in New York observed: "the subject matter of the Declaration represent[ed] a battleground of ideology on which each group with a 'cause' to promote [saw] an opportunity to gain ground for its own purposes."⁸⁶

A similar debate resulted over providing children with proper health care. Western opposition forced the Human Rights Commission to remove language calling for "free medical services" from the draft circulating for comment between 1957 and 1959.⁸⁷ The declaration's fourth principle, which dealt with the problem of health care, represented a compromise: "The child shall enjoy the benefits of social security," including health for child and mother, nutrition, housing, and recreation. This broadly defined right reflected the UN Secretariat's determination, which had grown since it had first explored the question of children's rights in 1945-46, to expand the changing minima of welfare. "[C]hild welfare [had become for many] an integral part of any general social security system."⁸⁸ The idea reflected the Social Commission's own mandate; during consultations in 1957-59 on the possibility of adopting the 1924 Geneva Declaration, the inclusion of a right to social security figured prominently.

Other principles underlined the evolving nature of childhood. While the 1924 text promised a child the means to develop and the means to earn a livelihood, the authors of the 1959 statement on children's rights tried to provide a right to an "education, which shall be free and compulsory, at least in the elementary stages."⁸⁹ Similarly, the declaration included a new principle on the worth of the family:

The child, for the full and harmonious development of his personality, needs love and understanding. He shall, whenever possible, grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, and, in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security; a child of tender years shall not, save in exceptional circumstances, be separated from his mother.⁹⁰

This article apparently addressed Western criticism of communist child-rearing, echoed in the remarks of the National Chinese delegate to the Third Committee: "It was sad indeed to see families being broken up under the commune system on the mainland of China and children there

treated as state property."⁹¹

It is important to note that in addition to Cold War pressures, there were other, older influences brought to bear on the 1959 declaration. Some recalled the conflicts between Catholics and Protestants which occupied a prominent place in the work of the League of Nations' Child Welfare Committee. Catholic associations and countries were already uneasy with any discussion of rights since Pope Pius XII proclaimed in 1948 that mankind should not presume to pronounce on something that existed above and beyond himself.⁹² Catholic representatives insisted on distinguishing legitimate children from illegitimate ones, arguing that equality for the latter "would... undermine the family structures which were the very bedrock of the rights of the child."⁹³ They were also concerned by the rights of children before birth. Catholic insistence on the rights of unborn children was counterbalanced by fears of overpopulation in the developing world.⁹⁴

There were divisions between rich and poor which reflected the fear among developing nations that they might be burdened with expensive commitments to their children that they would not be able to meet. India, for instance, opposed a Moscow-sponsored clause calling on the state (and other institutions) to assist parents in raising large families.⁹⁵ The Laotian delegate remarked perceptively that these types of commitments were "within the capacity only of some Western and Anglo-Saxon countries."⁹⁶ Ghana's representative to the UN General Assembly added: "It would be interesting to see to what extent the colonial powers found it possible to implement the principle [of free and compulsory education] in their dependent territories." In order to respond to these concerns, the preamble of the 1959 Declaration urged states to "recognize these rights and strive for their observance progressively."

Conclusion: Children's Rights and Peace

Commenting on the power the UN Charter allocated to the Security Council over the economic and social agencies, and over human rights and fundamental freedoms, a former League of Nations official argued against separating the UN's "technical work" from its collective security functions. He believed that "the best hope for reducing the military preoccupation of the Council... is to increase the volume of constructive co-operation for which the whole Organization will be responsible."⁹⁷ Canadian diplomats also claimed that "security and economic well-being are two sides of the same coin" and "a valid basis for world peace can only be found in an

extension of co-operation between all nations in their economic and social relations with one another." They argued that their work in ECOSOC "justified to a greater extent than any other United Nations agency, our continued faith in international co-operation."⁹⁸

This was only partly true. Cold War tensions emphasized how dangerous it was to make UN human rights functions dependent on its collective security functions. During the early Cold War, the promotion of human rights, in form and pace, was profoundly shaped by international diplomatic tensions. And yet, the faith of Canada's diplomats was perhaps justified. Children's rights provided ground on which nations otherwise unable to agree could converse. As a lever for domestic electorates to seek more social security and as a diplomatic instrument in the Cold War struggle to win allies in the developing world, children's rights had become by the 1950s an important measure of the growing scope of the public world.

NOTES

1. This paper, part of a larger project on the history of Canada's role in the Child Welfare Committee of the League of Nations, has received funding from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Carleton University, and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies (ICS) of the University of London. I would like to thank the assistant administrative officer of the Archives d'État de Genève, Mme Maryse Brunner, and her colleagues, the archivist of the Save the Children Fund, Rodney Breen, and Paulette Dozois, an archivist at the National Archives of Canada, for their generous help; Greg Donaghy for suggesting that I write this paper, and Norman Hillmer, Lorna Lloyd, and Larry Black for their support and their interest. I would also like to thank the ICS for its hospitality.
2. Philip E. Veerman, *The Rights of the Child and the Changing Image of Childhood* (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1991), p. 163.
3. John Humphrey, *Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure* (Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1984), p. 231.
4. Humphrey, *Human Rights and the United Nations*, pp. 255-56. Veerman, *The Rights of the Child*, reports the Canadian opposition as well as the opposition of the Chilean delegate (p. 162). This was also the position of the Dutch government in 1959. UN, HRC, E/CN.4/780/Add. 2, 19 March 1959, Archives de l'Union internationale de protection de l'enfance, Archives d'Etat de Genève (AUIPE), M.4.3., pp. 1-2. These record numbers are temporary.
5. Humphrey, *Human Rights and the United Nations*, p. 231.
6. ECOSOC was made up of 18 members elected on a three-year term system. Canada was one of the organization's first members, serving from 1946 and 1948 and again from 1950 to 1952, and 1956 to 1958.
7. Edward Fuller to M. Bouscharain, Division of Social Activities, United Nations, 6 August 1948, Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 371, Volume 72761. These events are also chronicled in the *Bulletin de l'Union internationale de secours aux enfants* (1921 to 1925) which was followed by the *Revue internationale de l'enfant* (see especially the issues of 30 October 1922 and 10 October 1924), and in *The World's Children*, the periodical of the London-based Save the Children Fund, founded in 1919.
8. Edward Fuller to P.J. Noel-Baker, 22 January 1946, P.J. Noel-Baker

- to Edward Fuller, 31 January 1946, and Memorandum of Edward Fuller to Mr. Hampshire, not dated, all in the PRO, FO 371, Volume 57329 (U5289); Fuller to M. Bouscharain, Division of Social Activities, United Nations, 6 August 1948, PRO, FO 371, Volume 72761.
9. Declan O'Donovan, "The Economic and Social Council" in Philip Alston, ed., *The United Nations and Human Rights. A Critical Appraisal* (Oxford, 1992), p. 110. ECOSOC granted consultative status B to the International Union of Child Welfare (IUCW), the new name of the Save the Children Fund International after 1946. It had official relations with the OMS and acted as a consultative body for UNICEF (UIPE, *La déclaration des droits de l'enfant en 38 langues*, Genève, 1952, p. 2).
 10. S.W. Harris to Howard Smith, 2 April 1947 and Howard Smith for P.H. Gore-Booth to Miss Wall, 19 March 1947, PRO, FO 371, Volume 67486.
 11. Memorandum for the Right Hon. Philip Noel-Baker, M.P., Minister of State, 5 March 1946, PRO, FO 371, Volume 57329 (U5289).
 12. Hampshire to Fuller, 5 April 1946, PRO, FO 371, Volume 57329 (U5289).
 13. UN, E/41, 21 May 1946, Paragraph 14, quoted in Fuller to Hampshire, 10 May 1946, PRO, FO 371, Volume 57329 (U5289). See also Veerman, p. 219. Fuller to Hampshire, 10 May 1946, and 11 July 1946, PRO, FO 371, Volume 57329 (U5289). References to the meeting are also to be found in the proceedings in UN, E/41, 21 May 1946, Paragraph 14, and the report of Harris forms Appendix B; and in the Journal of ECOSOC, No. 25, p. 367, (e) (ii), p. 382. According to Fuller, Harris was the main author of the report of the TSC (Edward Fuller to M. Bouscharain, Division of Social Activities, United Nations, 6 August 1948, PRO, FO 371, Volume 72761). The Declaration also received attention in the report of the Nuclear Commission (S.W. Harris to Howard Smith, 2 April 1947, FO 371, Volume 67486).
 14. Minutes, 16 July 1946, PRO, FO 371, Volume 57329(U4626). See also, Manuscript notes of Harris, PRO, FO 371, Volume 57329 (U5289) where Harris refers to the Journal of ECOSOC, No. 25, pp. 367, 382. Fuller to Hampshire, 11 July 1946, PRO, FO 371, Volume 57329 (U5289). Howard Smith for P.H. Gore-Booth to

- Miss Wall, 19 March 1947, PRO, FO 371, Volume 67486. S.W. Harris to Howard Smith, 2 April 1947, PRO, FO 371, Volume 67486.
15. Roberts to Mr. Beards, Prime Minister's Office, PRO, FO 371, Volume 72888. In 1947, the chairman of the SCF also began to press Prime Minister Attlee to sign the Declaration.
 16. Minutes, H.K. Matthews, 14 October 1948 and Minute of Miss B. Salt, 14 October 1948, PRO, FO 371, Volume 72888. To this, they added a resolution adopted in 1945 by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on the protection of children and young workers.
 17. Veerman, *The Rights of the Child*, pp. 159-62; IUCW, "The Declaration of Geneva and the United Nations (Summary of the information Conference held at IUCW office on June 30, 1948)," and IUCW, "Notes on the adoption of a charter of the rights of the child by the United Nations," January 1949, 3p. (referring to E/779, paragraph 76), both in AUIPE, M.3.2.
 18. Edward Fuller to M. Bouscharain, Division of Social Activities, UN, 6 August 1948, PRO, FO 371, Volume 72761; Memorandum by Dr. Piacentini Re. Study of Statutes and Functioning of the IUCI, 30 September 1950, and IUCW, "The Declaration of Geneva and the United Nations (Summary of the information Conference held at IUCW office on June 30, 1948)," both in AUIPE, M.3.2.
 19. The report of the Social Commission mentioned the 1942 Inter-allied Conference of Educational Experts in London, England, the 1942 Eighth Pan-American Child Congress in Washington, the efforts of the United States Children's Bureau on behalf of children in wartime, all of which had adopted children's charters, and the ILO resolution on the protection of children and young workers. "Documentation Relating to the 'Declaration of Geneva', Including Declarations and Charters Concerning Children's Rights Adopted by Various Bodies Subsequent to 1924," PRO, FO 371, Volume 72888, pp. 1-6. (The memorandum seems to have been prepared by the Home Office, PRO, FO 371, Volume 72761.)
 20. UISE, "The Déclaration générale and the United Nations," AUIPE, M.3.2.; IUCW, "Notes on the adoption of a charter of the rights of the child by the United Nations," January 1949, 3p., AUIPE, M.3.2.
 21. UIPE, lettre circulaire, undated, AUIPE, M.3.2.; IUCW, "The Declaration of Geneva and the United Nations (Summary of the information Conference held at IUCW office on June 30, 1948),

- AUIPE, M.3.2. The IUCW asked for the support of many organizations. Mildred Fairchild to George Thélin, 20 October 1948, and "Déclaration des droits de l'enfant. M. Thélin. Documents concernant la révision de celle de 1924 (dite de Genève 1948) et documents aboutissant à celle des Nations Unies 1949-1951," both in AUIPE, M.3.2. The IUCW was present at the meeting of the World Health Organization (WHO) discussing the Declaration, on November 1st 1948 ("Notes sur la discussion concernant la 'Déclaration de Genève'," Manuscript, 2 November 1948, 1p., AUIPE, M.3.2.).
22. IUCW, "Notes on the adoption of a charter of the rights of the child by the United Nations," January 1949, AUIPE, M.3.2. Manuscript notes, 26 October 1948, AUIPE, M.3.2. Circular letter, undated, AUIPE, M.3.2.
 23. Minutes, 16 July 1946, PRO, FO 371, Volume 57329(U4626). See also, manuscript notes by Harris, PRO, FO 371, Volume 57329 (U5289) where Harris refers to the Journal of ECOSOC, No. 25, pp. 367, 382; Fuller to Hampshire, 11 July 1946, PRO, FO 371, Volume 57329 (U5289); Howard Smith for P.H. Gore-Booth to Miss Wall, 19 March 1947, PRO, FO 371, Volume 67486.
 24. Lady Petrie, UK delegate, UN, General Assembly, 14th session, Official Records, Third Committee, 907th Meeting, 27 September 1959, A/C.3/Sr. 907, p. 7.
 25. "If the declaration were brought up it would no doubt be passed with acclamation even by countries who had little concern for child welfare." S.W. Harris to Howard Smith, 2 April 1947, FO 371, Volume 67486.
 26. Minutes, H.K. Matthews, 14 October 1948, PRO, FO 371, Volume 72888.
 27. Minute by B. Salt, 14 October 1948, PRO, FO 371, Volume 72888.
 28. Minute by F.B.A. Rundall, 18 October 1948, PRO, FO 371, Volume 72888.
 29. Veerman, *The Rights of the Child*, p. 162; *Canada and the United Nations, 1959*, pp. 34-35.
 30. ECOSOC, Supplement #8, pp. 31-33.
 31. "Projet de déclaration des droits de l'enfant," Memorandum du Secrétariat général, UN, ECOSOC, E/1849, #309 c(xi), p. 39, AUIPE, M.4.1., p. 4.
 32. "Projet de déclaration des droits de l'enfant," Memorandum du

- Secrétariat général, UN, ECOSOC, E/1849, #309 c(xi), p. 39, AUIPE, M.4.1. The vote was 13 against 0 with three abstentions (UN, E/CN.4/512, dans AUIPE, M.4.1.); see also, E/AC.7/SR.125 to 128 and E/SR.387, in E/CN.4/512, p. 5, deposited in AUIPE, M.4.1.
33. At its 1951 session, the HRC did not consider the Declaration, allegedly because of the pressure of work. See Veerman, *The Rights of the Child*, pp. 162-63; UN, CHR, Report of the Twelfth Session, 5-29 March 1956, Supplement No. 3, New York, in AUIPE, M.4.1.
 34. Philip Alston, "The Commission on Human Rights," in his edited collection, *The Best Interest of the Child* (Oxford, 1994), p. 132.
 35. Alston, "The Commission on Human Rights," p. 129.
 36. Greg Donaghy, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER), Volume 16: 1950* (Ottawa, 1995), p. 561. On the values of Canadian civil servants, see Barry Ferguson and Doug Owram, "Social Scientists and Public Policy from the 1920s Through World War II," in J.L. Granatstein et al. eds., *Twentieth Century Canada: A Reader* (Toronto, 1986), pp. 324-352 and Allan Irving, "Canadian Fabians: The Work and Thought of Harry Cassidy and Leonard Marsh," *Canadian Journal of Social Work Education*, Volume 7, No. 1 (1981), pp. 7-28.
 37. Donaghy, *DCER, Volume 16*, p. 566. To participate in the work of the UN's various committees, Canada wanted experts acting as individuals. In contrast, the USSR wanted experts to serve as government representatives. In the end, experts were endorsed by governments, as a compromise with the USSR. See Don Page, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 12: 1946* (Ottawa, 1977), pp. 891-92 and Norman Hillmer and Don Page, eds., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 13: 1947* (Ottawa, 1993), p. 725.
 38. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, pp. 891-92 and pp. 902-06 respectively.
 39. Hector Mackenzie ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 14: 1948* (Ottawa, 1994), pp. 337-39 and Hector Mackenzie ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 15: 1949*, pp. 400-02. Technical assistance in economic development was another favoured sector of original activity.
 40. I have discussed these promises in "Reconstruction Politics, the Canadian Welfare State and the Ambiguity of Children's Rights, 1940-50," in Greg Donaghy, ed. *Uncertain Horizons: Canadians and*


- Their World in 1945* (Ottawa, 1996), pp. 26-283, reprinted in Ed Montigny and Lori Chambers, eds., *Family Matters: Papers in Post-Confederation Family History* (Toronto, 1998), pp. 135-56.
41. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, p. 350. On this point, the department had the approval of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
 42. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, pp. 351-52. See also John Humphrey, "The Magna Carta of the World," in Clyde Sanger, ed., *Canadians and the United Nations* (Ottawa, 1988), pp. 19, 23. Canadians also cited the problems such a declaration would create in a federation where jurisdiction over matters of human rights did not belong to the central government exclusively (especially in social and economic matters), the length of the document, and the problems of implementing it. See *DCER, Volume 14*, p. 359. In the end, Canada voted for the Declaration, anxious not to be part of the group of abstainers, which included South Africa, Honduras, Saudi Arabia, and the Soviet bloc. In voting for the Declaration, it reserved the rights of the provinces.
 43. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, p. 910.
 44. *Canada and the United Nations, 1954-55*, p. 35.
 45. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, pp. 936-37. The same apprehension imposed limits on sending experts to New York: too many would give the impression that the government had too much money. *Ibid.*, p. 913. Similarly, ECOSOC's idea of establishing "information groups or local human rights committees" was received with little enthusiasm. See Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 722-23.
 46. Donaghy, *DCER, Volume 16*, p. 564.
 47. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, p. 712.
 48. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, p. 888. However, as his marginal notes indicate, Hume Wrong, the associate under-secretary of state for external affairs, did not wish to oppose the USSR so visibly in ECOSOC.
 49. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, p. 887.
 50. Antonio Casese, "The General Assembly: Historical Perspectives, 1945-1989," in Alston, ed., *The United Nations and Human Rights*, pp. 32, 26.
 51. Greg Donaghy, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 17: 1951* (Ottawa, 1997), p. 402.
 52. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, p. 887, 910. Their disagreement extended to debates on the obligatory nature of the law according to British


- legal traditions.
53. Donaghy, *DCER, Volume 17*, p. 391.
 54. Donaghy, *DCER, Volume 17*, pp. 386-87.
 55. Donaghy, *DCER, Volume 17*, p. 406.
 56. *Canada and the United Nations, 1954-55*, pp. 46-48.
 57. *Canada and the United Nations, 1956-57*, pp. 66-69.
 58. *Canada and the United Nations, 1954-55*, p. 51.
 59. *Canada and the United Nations, 1957*, pp. 41-42.
 60. UN, ECOSOC, E/CN.4/746, 10 April 1957; see also, Comments of Governments, UN, HRC, E/CN.4/780, 12 January 1959, 22 p.
 61. UN, CHR, *Report of the Twelfth Session*, 5-29 March 1956, Supplement No. 3, New York, p. 16.
 62. UN, Press Services, SOC/2591, 30 March 1959, in AUIPE, M.4.3.
 63. "For the World's Children," *New York Times*, 18 October 1959, found in AUIPE, M.4.5.
 64. UN, HRC, E/CN.4/SR. 636, 6 April 1959, morning, p. 9.
 65. Interestingly, Cold War tensions surrounding the aims of the World Health Organization led to the creation of UNICEF. See Maggie Black, *The Children and the Nations: The Story of UNICEF* (New York, 1986).
 66. Donaghy, *DCER, Volume 16*, pp. 552-53.
 67. Donaghy, *DCER, Volume 16*, p. 567, 574-75, 592-93 and 601-02. By 1953, the "Canadian public" had contributed \$1,500,000 to the "popular" fund. See Donald Barry, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 19: 1953* (Ottawa, 1991), p. 516.
 68. Donaghy, *DCER, Volume 16*, p. 564. In 1950, the General Assembly adopted a long-term plan for children at the "instigation of the social commission." (Mildred Fairchild Woodbury, "The Needs of Children in the World," *RICWR*, Vol. X, No. 2 (1956): 70-71). The mandate of the organization was extended until 1953, when UNICEF was made a permanent UN agency.
 69. Frieda Miller to Miss Moser, 2 September 1959, AUIPE, M.4.4. Miller had also talked with the USSR's woman delegate to the Social Committee of the General Assembly. F. Miller, Report of the work of the committee III on the Declaration of the rights of the child, 5 November 1959, AUIPE, M.4.5.
 70. Romanian delegate, UN, General Assembly, 14th Session, Official Records, Third Committee, 909th Meeting, 28 September 1959, A/C.3/Sr. 909, pp. 15-18.

71. Mildred Fairchild Woodbury, "The Needs of Children in the World," *RICWR*, Vol. X, No. 2 (1956): 72. [AUIPE] For a while, after the creation of UNICEF, the reasons for the existence of a private international organization such as the IUCW were questioned ("Rôle de l'UIPE," 2 pages, undated, AUIPE, M.3.1., "UISE. Déclaration des Droits de l'enfant").
72. UISE, "La Déclaration des droits de Genève et les Nations Unies," 5p., AUIPE, M.3.2.
73. UIPE, 27e session du Conseil exécutif, Commission du programme, 10-11 juillet 1958, La Haye, pp. 3, AUIPE, M.4.2., "Déclaration des droits de l'enfant des Nations Unies. Correspondance avec les organisations membres et avec les Nations Unies en 1958, 59. Documents divers"; Mrs. J.-M. Small, Deputy General Secretary, to Mr. John Humphrey, 13 August 1958; the efforts of the Peruvian, Belgium, Finnish, Portuguese, Danish, Swedish, Greek, Spanish, and Japanese branches of the IUCW are all recorded in AUIPE, M.4.2.
74. "Conversation of J.-M. Small with Miss Henderson," 8 August 1958, typed, 3 pages, AUIPE, M.4.2.
75. This is also true of the division into physical, emotional, and educational features proposed by the IUCW, and found in principles five, six, and seven of the 1959 Declaration. See Mrs. J.-M. Small, Deputy General Secretary, to Mr. John Humphrey, 13 August 1958, AUIPE, M.4.2.
76. See, for instance, the French position in UN, HRC, *Provisional Summary Record*, 13th Session, 9 April 1957, Morning Session, pp. 8-9.
77. Mrs. J.-M. Small, Deputy General Secretary, to Mr. John Humphrey, 13 August 1958, AUIPE, M.4.2.
78. Veerman, *The Rights of the Child*, p. 171.
79. Principle six warned against separating mother and child; principle four insisted on maternal prenatal and postnatal care, concerns absent from the 1924 Declaration. See also the French delegate, UN, HRC, E/CN.4/SR. 634, 3 April 1959, morning, p. 12.
80. F. Miller, Report of the work of the committee III on the Declaration of the rights of the child, 5 November 1959, AUIPE, M.4.5.
81. Principle seven. See also, the recommendation of UNESCO in 1950 evoked by the Romanian delegate in UN, General Assembly, 14th Session, Official Records, Third Committee, 922th Meeting, 12 October 1959, A/C.3/Sr. 922, pp. 79.

82. UN, General Assembly, 14th session, Official Records, Third Committee, 918th Meeting, 7 October 1959, A/C.3/Sr. 918, pp. 57 and after.
83. Quoted in Lawrence J. LeBlanc, *The Convention on the Rights of the Child* (Lincoln, 1995), p. 290. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 itself was first addressed to "peoples of the united nations." It may be that by 1959, the language surrounding the state had become more polarized.
84. See, for instance, Mr. Mikhalilenko, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, in UN, HRC, *Provisional Summary Record*, 13th Session, 8 April 1957, Morning Session, roneotyped, p. 5; Mrs. Wasilowska, Poland, 9 April 1957, morning, p. 6; see also the comments of the USSR government in Comments of Governments, UN, HRC, E/CN.4/780/Add.1, 29 January 1959, AUIPE, M.4.3. Indeed, communist governments repeatedly deplored the fact that the document could not be a convention.
85. UN, HRC, E/CN.4/SR 634, 3 April 1959, morning, p. 8.
86. F. Miller, Report of the work of the committee III on the Declaration of the rights of the child, 5 November 1959, AUIPE, M.4.5. Similarly, one member of the French government wrote to an IUCW official of his country that "par-dessus la tête des enfants, dont on déclare qu'on veut les protéger, se déroulent en réalité des combats politiques où certains se servent des enfants. C'est pourquoi je porte beaucoup d'intérêt et d'attention à ceux qui comme vous... donnent leur temps à la protection de l'enfance pour elle-même." René Cassin, Vice-président du Conseil d'État, à Jean Chazal, Union internationale de protection de l'enfance, 9 octobre 1958, AUIPE, M.4.2.
87. On the United States, see Frieda S. Miller to Mr. Dan Mulock Houwer, 27 January 1959, AUIPE, M.4.2; on Australia, Greece, Portugal, see Comments of Governments, UN, HRC, E/CN.4/780, 12 January 1959, AUIPE, "Déclaration des droits de l'enfant des Nations Unies. 15e, 16e session de la Commission des droits de l'homme, 1959, 1960, Ecosoc, juillet 1959," M.4.3. On the Dutch government, see UN, HRC, E/CN.4/780/Add. 2, 19 March 1959, AUIPE, M.4.3., pp. 1-2. On the Canadian government, see Arlene Holt, UN, General Assembly, 14th Session, Official Records, Third Committee, 918th Meeting, 7 October 1959, A/C.3/Sr. 918, pp. 57 and after.

88. "Documentation Relating to the 'Declaration of Geneva', Including Declarations and Charters Concerning Children's Rights Adopted by Various Bodies Subsequent to 1924," PRO, FO 371, Volume 72888, p. 4. The Secretariat referred to the ILO, not only for social security, but as a necessity for the eradication of child labour.
89. Principle seven.
90. Principle six.
91. UN, General Assembly, 14th Session, Official Records, Third Committee, 909th Meeting, 28 September 1959, A/C.3/Sr. 909, pp. 15-18.
92. *Osservatore Romano*, 31 October 1948, quoted by ECOSOC, CHR, 13th Session, Communication from the International Catholic Child Bureau, E/CN.4/NGO/72, p. 3.
93. UN, HRC, 8 April 1957, 13th Session, Provisional Summary Record, Afternoon, roneotypes, pp. 5-6.
94. F. Miller, Report of the work of the committee III on the Declaration of the rights of the child, 5 November 1959, AUIPE, M.4.5. UN, General Assembly, 14th Session, Official Records, Third Committee, 911th Meeting, 30 September 1959, A/C.3/Sr. 911. The Canadian delegates intervened on matters of abortion to support a compromise proposed by the Philippines. Detailed documentation on the Canadian position is available in the Records of the Department of External Affairs, Record Group 25, National Archives of Canada. UN, General Assembly, 14th Session, Official Records, Third Committee, 916th Meeting, 6 October 1959, A/C.3/Sr. 916, pp. 45 and after.
95. UN, General Assembly, 14th Session, Official Records, Third Committee, 919th Meeting, 8 October 1959, A/C.3/Sr. 919, pp. 63 and after. See also Principle six of the 1959 Declaration.
96. Laos, 28 August 1957, Comments of Governments, UN, HRC, E/CN.4/780, 12 January 1959, AUIPE, M.4.3. See also, the comments of Pakistan, 7 October 1958, in the same document. Mrs. Addison of Ghana, UN, General Assembly, 14th Session, Official Records, Third Committee, 921th Meeting, 9 October 1959, A/C.3/Sr. 921.
97. Gilbert Murray, *From the League to the United Nations* (Oxford, 1948), p. 163.
98. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, p. 713.





THE ABCs OF CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1945-1951

Hector Mackenzie

RÉSUMÉ : En septembre 1949, des représentants américains, britanniques et canadiens se rencontraient pour discuter des relations économiques internationales et des échanges entre la zone sterling et la zone du dollar. La participation du Canada à ces entretiens soulignait l'importance de la place qu'il occupait dans les enceintes financières et commerciales, ainsi que celle de sa contribution économique et politique à la reprise britannique et européenne après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Comme le montre cette étude, toutefois, ces discussions avaient lieu au moment même où l'aide financière du Canada à la Grande-Bretagne touchait à son terme. Ainsi prenait fin une période des relations économiques anglo-canadiennes qui avait été entamée dix ans plus tôt, alors que le gouvernement du Canada avait entrepris ce qui allait devenir le programme d'aide financière le plus ambitieux de l'histoire du pays, à la fois pour aider à gagner la guerre et pour renforcer les échanges commerciaux du Canada après le conflit. Les leaders canadiens étaient forcés de réévaluer leurs options et politiques, mais les entretiens « ABC » marquèrent la dissolution plutôt que la réalisation d'un « triangle nord-atlantique » qui devait être le pivot des relations économiques extérieures du Canada.

The most momentous "ABC" talks during the Cold War were the secret preliminary discussions in March 1948 involving American, British, and Canadian representatives which ultimately led, via broader negotiations, to the North Atlantic Treaty.¹ That close relationship in questions of defence and foreign policy, as well as other aspects of the international relations of the three countries, fostered the image, described by J.B. Brebner in 1945, of a "North Atlantic triangle" – a peculiar geometric form apparently visible from only one of its vertices.² However, the approach of the govern-

ments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada to external economic questions arguably provided a more comprehensive and more equilateral articulation of that image. Though the "ABC" talks on finance and trade in September 1949 tended to confirm Canadian anxieties about the unfavourable drift and likely negative impact of British policy, Canada's participation in those discussions was an important manifestation of its significant role in sterling-dollar trade as well as a recognition of the economic and political contribution that Canada had made to British and European recovery. Those deliberations, however, took place as Canada's financial aid to Britain neared its end, thus concluding a phase in Anglo-Canadian economic relations that had begun ten years before, when the Canadian government had embarked tentatively on what became the most ambitious program of financial assistance in Canada's history, both to help win the war and to secure Canada's postwar trade.

For Canada, the persistent and ultimately decisive problem that defined its approach to external economic relations before, during, and after the Second World War was its chronic trading deficit with the United States. Before the war, that had been offset by Canada's surplus of exports over imports in its trade with the United Kingdom. During the 1930s, Canadian exports to Britain had risen steadily, with Britain importing over 40 percent of Canada's exports from 1934 to 1938, while about 35 percent flowed to the United States. Income from Canada's favourable balance of merchandise trade with Britain helped to cover the loss in trade with the United States, from which Canada increasingly obtained its imports (more than 62 percent by 1938, compared to less than 18 percent from the United Kingdom). The demands of the wartime alliance, and the measures taken by Canada and the United States to remove "the dollar sign" from the vital flow of goods across the North Atlantic, dealt with immediate needs but did not reverse the unfavourable longer-term trend in Canada's exchange position.³

The sense of interdependence and mutual interest within the North Atlantic economic triangle, not surprisingly, was perceived most acutely in Canada, which had the greatest proportionate stake in trilateral harmony and consequently the most to lose from a breakdown in relations between dollar and sterling economies.⁴ Such a rupture was feared immediately after the war, not only for its economic consequences but also because of its implications for the developing confrontation in a bi-polar world, the Cold War. But an examination of Canadian policy in this period demonstrates that while the Cold War provided the context (and occasionally the rhetorical justifi-

cation for economic initiatives to overcome the difficulties of the postwar transition to a peacetime economy), it was usually not the principal cause or reason for such actions. There are spectacular exceptions to this rule, but even these are more qualified when seen from a Canadian perspective. Canada's postwar commitments displayed more continuity than change from its wartime plans and practices.⁵

The Cold War in 1945 did not fundamentally alter Canada's approach to finance and trade, which was still dominated by its principal bilateral relationships, though the bi-polar division of the world had proscribed some limits to potential partnerships in a time of political as well as economic uncertainty. Moreover, the avowedly disinterested "internationalism," which has been depicted as characterizing Canada's international relations after the Second World War, and which had been fostered by the declarations and agreements made within the victorious grand alliance, did not involve an unambiguous and unqualified affirmation of faith in a "multilateralist" creed. On the contrary, immediately after the Second World War, the predominant preoccupations for Canadian policy-makers were often familiar worries about markets for exports; the chosen instruments for reassurance were frequently bilateral measures or understandings to deal with actual and anticipated threats to Canada's sometimes precarious balance of payments.

With the objectives of prosperity and economic security transcending other aims, there was no sharp doctrinal schism in Ottawa between adherents of "multilateralism" and "bilateralism" but an opportunistic or pragmatic approach exploring both strategies. Markets for Canada's exports had to be assured by whatever means were available. Even when wholeheartedly supporting ambitious and innovative multilateral schemes for international economic cooperation, Canadian policy-makers viewed such plans and commitments for the future (the "longer term" so revered by economists and economic planners) through the lens of Canada's past and present finance and trade arrangements with the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus Ottawa's reappraisal of its economic relationship with the rest of the world during the early years of the Cold War was prompted not by an appreciation of Moscow's intentions and actions but by apprehension about the implications of the courses charted in Washington and London. Even the nexus between Canada's concerns for collective defence and economic cooperation, Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, was valued by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King as much for its potential impact on Canada's economic options as for its reinforcement

ments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada to external economic questions arguably provided a more comprehensive and more equilateral articulation of that image. Though the "ABC" talks on finance and trade in September 1949 tended to confirm Canadian anxieties about the unfavourable drift and likely negative impact of British policy, Canada's participation in those discussions was an important manifestation of its significant role in sterling-dollar trade as well as a recognition of the economic and political contribution that Canada had made to British and European recovery. Those deliberations, however, took place as Canada's financial aid to Britain neared its end, thus concluding a phase in Anglo-Canadian economic relations that had begun ten years before, when the Canadian government had embarked tentatively on what became the most ambitious program of financial assistance in Canada's history, both to help win the war and to secure Canada's postwar trade.

For Canada, the persistent and ultimately decisive problem that defined its approach to external economic relations before, during, and after the Second World War was its chronic trading deficit with the United States. Before the war, that had been offset by Canada's surplus of exports over imports in its trade with the United Kingdom. During the 1930s, Canadian exports to Britain had risen steadily, with Britain importing over 40 percent of Canada's exports from 1934 to 1938, while about 35 percent flowed to the United States. Income from Canada's favourable balance of merchandise trade with Britain helped to cover the loss in trade with the United States, from which Canada increasingly obtained its imports (more than 62 percent by 1938, compared to less than 18 percent from the United Kingdom). The demands of the wartime alliance, and the measures taken by Canada and the United States to remove "the dollar sign" from the vital flow of goods across the North Atlantic, dealt with immediate needs but did not reverse the unfavourable longer-term trend in Canada's exchange position.³

The sense of interdependence and mutual interest within the North Atlantic economic triangle, not surprisingly, was perceived most acutely in Canada, which had the greatest proportionate stake in trilateral harmony and consequently the most to lose from a breakdown in relations between dollar and sterling economies.⁴ Such a rupture was feared immediately after the war, not only for its economic consequences but also because of its implications for the developing confrontation in a bi-polar world, the Cold War. But an examination of Canadian policy in this period demonstrates that while the Cold War provided the context (and occasionally the rhetorical justifi-

cation for economic initiatives to overcome the difficulties of the postwar transition to a peacetime economy), it was usually not the principal cause or reason for such actions. There are spectacular exceptions to this rule, but even these are more qualified when seen from a Canadian perspective. Canada's postwar commitments displayed more continuity than change from its wartime plans and practices.⁵

The Cold War in 1945 did not fundamentally alter Canada's approach to finance and trade, which was still dominated by its principal bilateral relationships, though the bi-polar division of the world had proscribed some limits to potential partnerships in a time of political as well as economic uncertainty. Moreover, the avowedly disinterested "internationalism," which has been depicted as characterizing Canada's international relations after the Second World War, and which had been fostered by the declarations and agreements made within the victorious grand alliance, did not involve an unambiguous and unqualified affirmation of faith in a "multilateralist" creed. On the contrary, immediately after the Second World War, the predominant preoccupations for Canadian policy-makers were often familiar worries about markets for exports; the chosen instruments for reassurance were frequently bilateral measures or understandings to deal with actual and anticipated threats to Canada's sometimes precarious balance of payments.

With the objectives of prosperity and economic security transcending other aims, there was no sharp doctrinal schism in Ottawa between adherents of "multilateralism" and "bilateralism" but an opportunistic or pragmatic approach exploring both strategies. Markets for Canada's exports had to be assured by whatever means were available. Even when wholeheartedly supporting ambitious and innovative multilateral schemes for international economic cooperation, Canadian policy-makers viewed such plans and commitments for the future (the "longer term" so revered by economists and economic planners) through the lens of Canada's past and present finance and trade arrangements with the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus Ottawa's reappraisal of its economic relationship with the rest of the world during the early years of the Cold War was prompted not by an appreciation of Moscow's intentions and actions but by apprehension about the implications of the courses charted in Washington and London. Even the nexus between Canada's concerns for collective defence and economic cooperation, Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, was valued by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King as much for its potential impact on Canada's economic options as for its reinforcement

and enhancement of the military alliance.⁶

When military, economic, and political planners first contemplated the five years following the end of the Second World War, that period had been anticipated as a time of transition from war to peace, a "phase" or "stage" of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and readjustment.⁷ The dissolution of the wartime alliance and the development of a global confrontation were not then part of the reckoning. Planning for the postwar, like the prosecution of the war itself, was dominated by the partnership developed between the United Kingdom and the United States, with Canada in a privileged but subordinate position. The professed aims of the wartime allies, particularly in the realm of external economic policy, were declared first by the senior partners, then elaborated in bilateral "discussions" which the Canadians followed closely and which they sometimes influenced considerably.⁸ Before the war was over, those pronouncements and plans had become agreements or drafts of agreements. The package dealing with monetary policy, which was negotiated at Bretton Woods, included the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or World Bank. As for commercial policy, that was the subject of Anglo-American "Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Employment" which eventually led to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but not to a more comprehensive International Trade Organization (ITO), which had been the wartime aim. There were also accords covering various other subjects, including military relief and civil aviation, many eventually linked to the nascent United Nations.⁹

Whether as negotiators or as confidants of the principals, Canadian officials emphatically supported these initiatives to introduce order and stability into international economic affairs. That stance was an application of enlightened self-interest, with the "multilateral" purposes of the agreements upheld not only for their merits but also as a way of overcoming Canada's triangular imbalance.¹⁰ As the deputy minister of finance, Clifford Clark, put it, Canada was "the extreme case of the effects of the repercussions of U.K. and U.S. relations."¹¹ Though progress toward the goal was uncertain and its benefits not immediate, a multilateral system still appeared to represent "the greatest assurance of continuing prosperity, and harmony with both the United States and the Commonwealth."¹² Understandably, Canadian policy-makers did not rely solely on promises for the future. During the war, Canada had made a remarkable economic contribution to the allied cause, with a disproportionate share of its pro-



Lester B. Pearson, Ambassador to the United States, signing the Bretton Woods Agreement, December 28, 1945.

INTERNATIONAL NEWS PHOTO/NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA/C-20129

duction of the "sinews of war" provided to its allies and with much of that output financed by Canada through a combination of debt repayment, grants, loans, "mutual aid," and other forms of assistance. That magnificent performance had been made necessary by the financial predicament of the United Kingdom and made possible by mutually advantageous arrangements with the United States, which dealt with Canada's own American dollar problem. As one consequence, Canada's postwar commerce was not burdened by war debt.¹³

With wartime experience as a precedent and its worries about British and other markets for Canadian goods in peacetime as an incentive, the Canadian government inaugurated an ambitious program of lending to facilitate the recovery of allied and neutral nations and to finance Canada's exports. "As we approach, and later enter, the post-war period," the minister of trade and commerce, J.A. MacKinnon, explained to the House of Commons, "Canada is bound to experience a fall in exports of those kinds of goods that represent purely war-time trade, and every effort must be made, without delay, to see that the volume of our commercial exports

increases as rapidly as possible." Under the *Export Credits Insurance Act* of 1944, Canada eventually advanced more than \$500 million, nearly half of which went to France. The other principal beneficiaries were the Netherlands (\$118.9 million), Belgium (\$68 million), and China (\$51 million), with smaller sums for Norway, Indonesia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. In fact, a much larger loan to the Soviet Union had been contemplated near the end of the war, but negotiations floundered on non-financial stipulations.¹⁴ Most of the drawings under the *Export Credits Insurance Act* took place in 1946 and 1947, when European needs for food and other agricultural products were especially acute.¹⁵

However, the greatest single measure by Canada to nurture reconstruction and to underwrite its exports was the \$1.25 billion loan to Britain in early 1946. That extraordinary act underlined the significance of international trade for Canadian prosperity and especially the importance to Canada of the British market. "It is not in any sense an act of charity," the minister of finance, J.L. Ilsley, told the House of Commons. "It is an investment in the future of Canadian trade."¹⁶ In fact, the loan was a remarkable wager on British economic recovery and on Britain's commitment and capacity to trade with Canada. In its terms and provisions, it followed precisely the precedent set by the negotiation of the American loan of \$3.75 billion to the United Kingdom.¹⁷ Not only was the Canadian loan exceptional in proportion to the American example, but also the allocation, especially when added to the other credits, was a huge expenditure in relation to the size of Canada's economy.¹⁸ Ilsley justifiably depicted the *United Kingdom Financial Act* of 1946 as "the keystone in the financial measures" undertaken by Canada "for international trade and reconstruction."¹⁹

The vital importance of the British market to Canada's postwar trade was highlighted as well by a series of long-term contracts to supply the United Kingdom with food and raw materials. Once again, this continued a practice developed during the war. Without alternative sources of supply, the British government had been anxious to secure essential requirements from Canada, so much so that imports of Canadian foodstuffs in wartime and after soared well above former peaks. Controls by the Wartime Prices and Trade Board and by government departments on domestic production, civilian consumption, and exports combined to ensure Canadian agricultural and other supplies for Britain's needs. "During 1944," F.H. Soward has observed, "Canada was responsible for 10 per cent of the United Kingdom egg supply, 25 per cent of its cheese, 35

per cent of its canned fish, 52 per cent of its wheat, and 72 per cent of its bacon ration." The British ministry of food not only requested a continuation of these supplies but also "whatever more beef and bacon could be made available."²⁰ Though Canadian beef could be sold in the United States, there was no alternative market for bacon and eggs, both of which had been developed as agricultural exports at British request. In December 1944, the link between finance and postwar trade was confirmed in Ottawa when a delegation led by Lord Keynes committed the United Kingdom to import Canadian bacon and beef, "subject to satisfactory financial arrangements to be concluded at a later date."²¹

The most prominent, and ultimately the most controversial, of those deals was the Anglo-Canadian wheat agreement, concluded in June 1946, but not announced until after Congress had approved the American loan to Britain one month later.²² In the House of Commons, the wheat contract was defended as a mutually advantageous bargain. The negotiation of that accord was testimony to the determination of the minister of agriculture, Jimmy Gardiner, to advance his reputation and enhance his political stature by guaranteeing a market for Canadian wheat farmers. Unfortunately for Gardiner and his colleagues, neither the stipulated prices nor the vague assurance of compensation for disadvantageous international trends provided much evidence of negotiating skill. Critics of the deal within the Canadian government blushed at the disclosure of such a conspicuous contradiction of Ottawa's multilateralist rhetoric, especially as an international wheat agreement was then under consideration. More galling still, they soon found that Canada was effectively subsidizing the sale of wheat and flour to the United Kingdom at prices well below world-market levels. For several years, British and Canadian ministers and officials disagreed fundamentally and acrimoniously over the meaning of three little words – "have regard to" – which had been meant to introduce an element of fairness to the terms of a pact signed at a time of transition and uncertainty. Needless to say, Canada's wheat farmers were also unimpressed by the foregone income.²³

As A.F.W. Plumptre later commented, Canadian policy-makers "had put a great many eggs in the basket of British and European recovery."²⁴ Most of these commitments had been described or anticipated in a white paper drafted principally by W.A. Mackintosh and issued by the King government in April 1945. Together they comprised an extraordinary effort by Canada to protect its own economic prospects and to facilitate reconstruction in Britain, Europe, and Asia. The means to these ends had involved the



Britain's High Commissioner to Canada, Malcolm MacDonald, signing the 1946 Anglo-Canadian loan agreement under the watchful gaze of (from l. to r.) W.C. Clark, Deputy Minister of Finance, Gordon Munro, British Treasury, J.L. Ilsley, Minister of Finance and Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King.

NATIONAL FILM BOARD/NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA/PA-112297

generous exercise of Canada's unaccustomed responsibilities as an international creditor and the pragmatic employment of bilateral and multilateral pacts to assure markets abroad for Canadian goods.²⁵ Less than two years after the loan to Britain, however, an unfavourable combination of international circumstances undermined this elaborate framework, so much so that Canadian policy-makers contemplated, and discussed with their American counterparts, a fundamental reorientation of Canada's international trade policy.

Various factors worsened the outlook for trade with Britain and other recipients of Canadian and American financial assistance, thereby contradicting the assumptions and undermining the calculations upon which that aid had been given. The negative influences, from Britain's perspective, included: a sharp rise in American prices, which boosted the cost of imports from the United States for both Canada and Britain, thus reducing the value of the dollar loans to the United Kingdom and pushing

world prices up generally; slower than anticipated recovery in a politically divided Europe, which furthered dependence in Britain and Western Europe on the Western hemisphere and hard currency sources of supply; the fact that the United Kingdom alone in Europe, under the terms of its loan from the United States, had been obliged to attempt full convertibility of currencies in the summer of 1947; for Europe generally, an unfavourable shift in the terms of trade, particularly with higher costs for food and raw materials; higher British overseas military expenditures than before the war, though less than expected when the American and Canadian loans had been negotiated; loss of income for the United Kingdom from overseas investments owing to disinvestment to help pay for the war; harsh weather in Europe, which increased fuel consumption and reduced Britain's export earnings; and, finally, less than "masterful administration" by the British government of its fuel supplies and its exchange reserves.²⁶ To compound these difficulties, British firms found that there were greater profits and less competition in soft currency markets. As a result, the apparent initial success of Britain's export drive in 1948 did not augment dollar earnings as much as predicted.²⁷

Meanwhile, Canada's reserves of gold and American dollars were also rapidly depleted as Canadian imports from the United States rose steeply in response to consumer demand and the reconversion of industry from war production to meet civilian requirements. Those influences were aggravated by the restoration of parity between the Canadian and American dollars in July 1946.²⁸ With such a large proportion of Canada's exports funded by Ottawa and the more rapid than expected use of the Canadian credit by Britain, the high level of imports from the United States meant that Canada's exchange position became increasingly precarious. As early as April 1947, Canadian officials were warning their American counterparts of the possibility of import and travel restrictions to reduce Canada's US dollar expenditures.²⁹ When he met with American President Harry Truman in Washington later that month, King acknowledged Canada's "growing exchange difficulties, saying that the Canadian Government would be most reluctant to impose any import restrictions to meet exchange problems, but that they might be compelled to do so unless the drain on our United States dollar resources could be reduced fairly soon."³⁰ By late August, with no improvement in the situation, Clifford Clark, deputy minister of finance, was also emphasizing the need to explore "some approach to a customs union with the United States" as other options, including the multilateral schemes and the prospective

American financial aid for European recovery, would not offer enough assistance soon enough.³¹

That observation added poignancy and purpose to frequent pilgrimages to Washington by Canadian economic officials in the summer and autumn of 1947. In August, the governor of the Bank of Canada, Graham Towers, "made the first tentative soundings in the matter of a U.S. loan" to bolster Canada's reserves. Towers suggested "informally and off the record" to the chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States that Canada would soon seek a credit of \$500 to \$750 million as part of a package of measures to staunch the outflow of American dollars and gold. However, he was informed that a loan on that scale would simply not be available.³² Not least of the problems for the pilgrims was to convince Americans that Canada, with "full employment, high prosperity, everybody eating juicy steaks and living on a high North American standard," needed any financial help from the United States. That problem of perception prompted Clark to remind officials in Washington "that our restrictive action would hit some particularly sensitive spots in the United States," such as tourist destinations and fruit and vegetable producers.³³

For the Americans, these preliminary talks were informative, but they also reinforced the "impression" that the Canadians "have been drifting from bad to worse while wishfully thinking that when the time came we would step in and rescue them by means of a loan or procurement devices or ITO or the Marshall plans." In other words, it appeared that the Canadians were looking for "a magic cure" in Washington which was not to be found. Moreover, Clark's vague suggestion that, in the absence of American help, Canada "would solve her problem by other means" was not credible, whether or not it was intended as "a threat."³⁴ Justifiably, then, Clark became convinced by these discussions "that we will have to impose severe restrictions before the Americans will believe that there is anything in our problem or that it means anything to them."³⁵ That tactical appreciation eventually led the Canadian government to propose two options in late October: a "tough programme" of import curbs accompanied by a loan of \$350 million or a "moderate programme" with a loan of \$500 million.³⁶ Ultimately, consultations in Washington resulted in "ostensibly non-discriminatory" restrictions on imports and tourist expenditures and a stand-by credit of \$300 million. The announcement of these measures by the minister of finance, Douglas Abbott, immediately followed a broadcast by King from London celebrating the conclusion of the initial round of GATT negotiations at Geneva.³⁷ Perhaps appropriately, these

contradictory policies were juxtaposed.

As Clark had anticipated, the exchange crisis also inspired Canadian and American officials to investigate the possibility of a free-trade arrangement between the two countries. While in Washington in late October, the chairman of Canada's tariff board, H.B. McKinnon, told American officials that "the Canadian Cabinet had authorized him to explore with the United States officials the possibility of concluding a comprehensive agreement involving, wherever possible, the complete elimination of duties." McKinnon anticipated that the Canadian government "would be willing to enter into an agreement even if it necessitated a major readjustment and reorientation of Canada's international economic relations."³⁸ From Ottawa, the American embassy reported that "Canada today more than ever before appears ready to accept virtual economic union with the United States as a necessary substitute for the multilateralism of the Atlantic triangle now believed to have disappeared for an indefinite time to come, if not permanently, and as a desirable corollary to American-Canadian cooperation in other fields."³⁹ In mid-January 1948, King agreed to "a discussion going ahead on the official level on complete reciprocity" between Canada and the United States. Within two months, Abbott informed the prime minister that "the U.S. are prepared to make an agreement, if need be, for 25 years, abolishing all tariffs between Canada and the U.S."⁴⁰ That process was well underway before King idiosyncratically but emphatically balked at its obvious political implications.⁴¹ By then, the economic necessity also seemed to be less dire.

Of course, the impact of the worldwide shortage of dollars was even greater on the United Kingdom, which endeavoured to switch the bulk of its imports – and those of the sterling countries for which it was the banker – away from dollar countries so as to conserve hard currency and to prolong the life of the North American loans. This redirection became especially critical in July and August 1947, when exceptionally large British drawings on the American credit combined with the requirement for convertibility of sterling to dollars and the unimpressive performance of the British government in defending its policies in Parliament to produce a crisis of confidence in the pound. At its peak, the consequent outflow of gold and dollars reached \$237 million in one week alone. After barely more than a month of full convertibility of current and capital transactions, the Bank of England and the British treasury calculated that the "drain" of dollars was so pronounced that what was left of the American loan would only last "about two weeks." The political as well as economic implications for

Britain and Europe of "a break in sterling" were so great that the United Kingdom sought and received permission from the United States to suspend convertibility.⁴²

To limit future losses from Britain's reserves, there were successive revisions of its import program, with ministers scrutinizing ways to reduce imports of food and raw materials from hard currency countries. In this context, the long-term contracts with Canada, other than those for wheat and cheese, were conspicuous targets for cuts. Consequently the scene was set for difficult negotiations in Ottawa, with a British delegation instructed to break those deals that favoured Canadian suppliers, to continue those for which no cheaper or non-dollar source could be substituted, and to secure some assurance of additional drawings on the Canadian credit.⁴³ Across the table, Canadian negotiators had been reminded pointedly by Gardiner "that he must have a balanced agricultural program and this would be impossible if selected commodities were being sold under contract at specially negotiated prices while other agricultural products were being sold freely on the open market." The deputy minister of agriculture, Dr. G.S.H. Barton, had noted that the contract for bacon "was probably the one which it was most important to defend," not only because there was no alternative market but also because "the British market was one which had been built up over a period of years and was of great value in inducing confidence within the industry." If necessary, some amounts of beef and cheese and some live hogs could be sold south of the border. But there was little disposition in Ottawa to be conciliatory. If the British delegates "were to suggest contract revisions which would involve us in immediate losses," the deputy minister of trade and commerce, Max Mackenzie, contended, "it might be appropriate for us to suggest revisions which would tend to recoup these losses," possibly by diverting wheat to other markets. Thus, the initial Canadian position on the continuation of long-term contracts was effectively "all or nothing." As for drawings on the credit, Canada's own loss of exchange reserves made it hesitant to make financial concessions to Britain.⁴⁴

From the perspective of Britain's chancellor of the exchequer, "it was of cardinal importance for us to maintain the wheat contract," but a fortnight of talks without progress persuaded Sir Stafford Cripps that the leader of the British mission, Sir Percivale Liesching, should be recalled to London for consultations on how to overcome this impasse.⁴⁵ At the last moment, Liesching's departure was postponed as the result of an unusual intervention from an unlikely quarter. The resolution of this problem provided a rare

example of the direct impact of the Cold War on Canada's external economic arrangements and an even rarer instance of pressure from the Canadian prime minister for more generous treatment of Britain by Canada. Though worried about Canada's financial position, King insisted that "wider political considerations must prevail." Thus, an agreement was reached to continue the principal food contracts and extend the bilateral financial arrangements for three months. By the end of that period, it was presumed, the political and financial context would both be clarified. That settlement owed a great deal to King's anxiety, inspired in part by a recent warning to him by the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, that a third world war was looming. King was determined to avoid a fissure between two Western allies at such a critical juncture, particularly as it would likely be exploited "by our illwishers abroad." As the under-secretary of state for external affairs, Lester Pearson, advised the Canadian high commissioner in London, Norman Robertson, King had returned from Britain "in a very pessimistic frame of mind about political developments in Europe, and that was to him the governing consideration in this case." For his part, Liesching was convinced that "we shall not get a better deal [from] Canada than this." That sentiment was echoed by the British high commissioner, Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, who emphasized that the settlement had only been "reached on personal decision of Prime Minister against entire body of financial opinion from Abbott downwards." Those testimonials enabled Cripps to persuade his colleagues to accept the offer.⁴⁶

Another economic measure closely associated with the onset of the Cold War helped to ease Canada's US dollar problem as a deliberate side-effect of funding European reconstruction. Ever since Secretary of State George Marshall's speech at Harvard University in June 1947, the potential direct and indirect beneficiaries of American largesse had awaited with interest and apprehension the elaboration, approval and implementation of the European Recovery Program (ERP, or "Marshall Plan"). From Canada's perspective, that scheme promised not only to strengthen the economies of key trading partners but also to ease Canada's difficulty through American funding of European "off-shore" purchases in Canada and elsewhere.⁴⁷ In that context, to justify such a benefit to Canada, ministers and officials in Ottawa compiled a comprehensive inventory of the methods and amounts of aid from Canada to Europe. Aware that American policy-makers sought evidence of present as well as past generosity, the Canadians cited British drawings on the reconstruction loan, to which was added the amount deemed to be the subsidy to the United Kingdom as a

result of selling Canadian wheat at prices significantly below world levels.⁴⁸ In other words, the bad deal of 1946 had been transformed by imaginative accounting and careful phrasing into a seemingly conscious and generous form of aid to Britain. That contention blithely ignored the awkward fact that the Canadian government was still seeking higher prices in the later years of the contract under the "have regard to" clause to compensate for the poor receipts in the early years.

Appropriations for the Marshall Plan eased the worldwide dollar shortage, but they did not end Britain's external economic problems. Capital flows, investment patterns, the treatment of the balances held by members of the sterling area, and the failure to raise British industrial productivity all worsened the "export capacity" of the United Kingdom. For sympathetic but critical observers in Ottawa, those tendencies did not augur well for the future of Anglo-Canadian trade. British expectations for the period after the end of ERP – which was supposed to last for four years – seemed "gloomy" and unfavourable for Canada. Though Canada's immediate American dollar problem had been relieved by a combination of factors, including ERP funding of off-shore purchases and American direct investment in Canada, British efforts to cope with chronic problems in their own balance of payments and to reduce dollar expenditures called into question key elements in Canada's plans and commitments for Anglo-Canadian trade. There was also increasing anxiety in Ottawa that the eventual outcome of the "transition" in the British and European economies would not favour trans-Atlantic trade.⁴⁹

Even as collective defence links between North America and Western Europe were being forged in the negotiations leading to the North Atlantic Treaty, trans-Atlantic economic bonds were deteriorating. Britain was failing to meet its economic targets, particularly for exports to dollar countries (a situation aggravated by the American economic slump in late 1948 and early 1949).⁵⁰ As well, there were ominous signs that Canada's position was vulnerable. Discussions in the summer of 1948 with a senior official of the British treasury had convinced Canadian officials that there was little likelihood of a revival of Canadian exports of food (other than wheat) and raw materials to Britain and none whatever for manufactured goods. "Canada would have to undertake a reorientation in its external economic relationships" which would be difficult, but not impossible. That process, Sir Henry Wilson Smith conceded, "could produce 'economic and political strain' in relations between Canada and the United Kingdom." In Ottawa, that encounter "encour-

aged that line of official thinking which feels that [Canada] should press forward as quickly and as far as possible in strengthening and broadening our trade relations with the United States."⁵¹

Apparently, ministers were also "very worried indeed about the trade prospects ahead and wondering if there is much likelihood of the United Kingdom being in a position, at the end of the Marshall Plan, to put its trade with Canada on a satisfactory basis." According to Pearson, the new Liberal Party leader and next prime minister, Louis St. Laurent, had concluded "that if fundamental changes to our trading and economic relationships will be required two or three years from now, shouldn't we begin to make arrangements to that end immediately? This means turning south as soon as the elections there have taken place."⁵² That was certainly the advice which St. Laurent had received from Pearson. "It seems to me," Pearson commented after the discussions with Wilson Smith, "that the lesson to be drawn from these talks – if that lesson is confirmed by Sir Stafford Cripps when he visits Ottawa, which I suspect will be the case – is that we should consider more seriously the possibility of some pretty far reaching trade arrangement with our neighbour to the south. Indeed it may become in the future not a matter of choice but a matter of dire necessity."⁵³

In effect, Canadian ministers and officials now confronted a possibility that their financial program and trade commitments had been devised to forestall – the division of the world into sterling and dollar trading blocs, with a balance between them more likely achieved by constriction rather than expansion of trade. British and Western European long-term plans under the ERP foresaw significant cuts in imports from the Western hemisphere. Thus far, Canada had attempted to restore its prewar export markets as part of an effort to foster multilateral trade and payments. "Now our approach might have to be modified," the cabinet committee on external trade policy observed, "since the policy of the European countries was to endeavour to become less dependent on the dollar areas." That strategy would be especially harmful to Canada's agricultural exports. When Cripps visited Ottawa in September 1948, he confirmed that Britain's plans for the next few years meant that "Canadian hopes for a return to multilateralism in trade and payments would not be realized" though he contended that the longer-term situation would be better than that feared by the Canadians.⁵⁴

For Abbott, the forecasts for imports from Canada under the United Kingdom's "Long Term Programme" represented a poor return for

Canada's "substantial investment" in the British economy through financial aid. "The prospects for Canadian sales in UK markets after 1952 appeared dubious in view of the planned curtailments of purchases in the dollar area," Abbott grumbled. "It would be regrettable if the United Kingdom should embark on a programme which involved continued and substantial purchases of primary products and raw materials in other and more costly markets." What especially worried St. Laurent and Gardiner was the "great vulnerability of the Canadian economy" after ERP ended and particularly the difficult readjustment for Canadian agriculture necessitated by the British and Western European pursuit of "self-reliance." Cripps asserted that "both for reasons of friendship and economic self-interest, the UK government had no desire to embark on a course that would result in the exclusion of Canada from British markets. Any features in the present programme that appeared temporarily to interfere with Canada's exports should be regarded as short-term emergency measures which would disappear gradually as general economic conditions permitted."⁵⁵ His Canadian audience could be forgiven for fearing that the future which Cripps foretold would come to pass sometime, never. A consultative committee set up in the wake of this visit to avoid further misunderstandings in Anglo-Canadian economic relations instead became a forum in which Canadian doubts about the implications for Canada of British policy were confirmed.

When the Canadian prime minister met with the American president five months later in Washington, it was clear that St. Laurent expected an even closer economic relationship with the United States. On the eve of this summit, Pearson, by then secretary of state for external affairs, had advised St. Laurent "that the prospects of returning to the pre-war pattern of trade between Canada and the United Kingdom are growing dimmer and dimmer." To Pearson, the "moral of this is obvious. We should turn south; indeed we may eventually have to."⁵⁶ According to Dean Acheson, the American secretary of state, St. Laurent told Truman "that in the economic field Canada's former position, of selling largely in Europe and buying largely in the United States probably could not be recovered." Instead, Canada would have to "balance its payments with the United States by producing more of the goods which it could sell" in the American market. With that in mind, St. Laurent informed Truman that "Canada hoped for closer trade relations with the United States." To ease this realignment, and to avoid "a disastrous effect on the Western provinces," economically and politically, Canada still expected the Marshall Plan, directly or indirectly, to

finance British purchases of wheat and other products from Canada. The imminence of a general election in Canada and the possibility of other ways to overcome exchange difficulties prompted a cautious approach to "a general suggestion for reduction of trade barriers," such as officials had examined a year before. Apparently, St. Laurent, Truman and Acheson agreed "that we had to proceed slowly to avoid raising fears on both sides of the border."⁵⁷ Whatever the pace, the course of Canada's external economic relations seemed clear. Though its plans and commitments had been devised to reach a different objective, the Canadian government was now obliged to reassess its position. Whether there would be an alternative to a closer continental relationship now appeared to be problematic.

This unwelcome readjustment for Canadian policy-makers lent even greater significance to frequent informal consultations with British and American counterparts as well as to the series of bilateral and trilateral meetings which took place in 1949 as a prelude to the devaluation of the British pound and the Canadian dollar. In March 1949, Cripps had publicly underlined the implications of British and European policies for Canada. "It is quite unrealistic," he warned, "to imagine that we can in the foreseeable future earn enough Canadian dollars with which to buy supplies from Canada on a wartime scale." British plans for imports from Canada had been brought "more into line with our ability to pay for them." Though purchases of food bore the brunt of these reductions, other products, such as timber, were also affected.⁵⁸ A month later, the British treasury pleaded for understanding of its plight by the Canadian minister of trade and commerce, C.D. Howe. "We are all anxious to get back to a world of convertibility, a world in which the channels of trade have been readjusted in such a way as to make free convertibility possible," the treasury asserted. "But by whatever way such a world is arrived at it will clearly be impossible for Canada to run surpluses of the present dimensions with the rest of the world for the purpose of meeting a U.S. dollar deficit." With the rest of the world "impooverished," the prewar arrangement was untenable.⁵⁹

Despite assistance from North America, British gold and dollar reserves declined sharply in the second quarter of 1949, from \$1,912 million to \$1,651 million.⁶⁰ British and sterling area imports from the dollar area increased during the summer, while dollar earnings from exports from the United Kingdom and British colonies slumped. For example, British sales in the United States fell from \$25 million per month to \$15 million per month in mid-1949. British analyses attributed these poor results principally to "a falling off in demand resulting from the decline in economic

activity in the US."⁶¹ But that did not explain why "many Brit[ish] exports that have declined so sharply are goods the Amer[ican] demand for which has not fallen," such as automobiles.⁶² In fact, there was a growing differential between British and American prices which made British products uncompetitive. That price gap lent credence to the belief that the pound was overvalued in relation to the American dollar. Consequently, the unfavourable trend in sterling-dollar trade was aggravated by currency speculation. The expectation that sterling would be devalued prompted importers to accelerate deliveries and exporters to delay processing receipts. According to an analysis prepared for Acheson, the situation was made worse by the tendency of the British government to direct its fiscal and monetary policies toward the improvement of living standards in the United Kingdom, without paying sufficient attention to their impact on Britain's competitive position internationally. In its exploration of remedies, this same study ruled out further financial assistance from the United States, though changes in American habits and policies with respect to investment and imports might offer some relief. But American policy-makers clearly expected the remedy to be provided by a combination of British financial measures and a sufficient devaluation of the pound to restore confidence in the currency.⁶³

Meanwhile, Canada's own current account surplus continued a downward slide, reversing the gains made in 1948. That simply underlined the vulnerability of the Canadian economy to fluctuations in external demand for Canada's natural resources, particularly the relatively few staples which dominated its exports. Over the years, a substantial surplus in merchandise trade with the United Kingdom had replaced one formerly enjoyed with continental Europe in helping to offset the chronic deficit in balance of payments with the United States. The prospect of yet another rebalancing of Canada's international trade was a daunting one, especially as the American market for Canadian goods did not seem to be as lucrative as the vanishing options. To strike two bilateral balances, which circumstances might require, ran the considerable risk that these would be achieved at lower rather than higher levels of economic activity. "Our economy was built on the principle of the international division of labour," a briefing note prepared for Abbott and Pearson observed, "and our welfare is therefore vitally dependent on the existence of an international economic system conducive to a large volume of international trade." But such a favourable outcome, whether secured by bilateral, trilateral or multilateral means, seemed increasingly elusive for Canadian policy-makers.⁶⁴

In mid-June 1949, the sterling area's worsening dollar deficit prompted the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, to express his "grave concern" about that situation to St. Laurent and to invite Abbott and other Commonwealth finance ministers to meet in London one month later. With the visit to Europe of the American secretary of the treasury, John Snyder, and an assistant secretary, William Martin, rescheduled for early July, the stage appeared to be set for a comprehensive review of sterling-dollar relations. When Clark, Robertson, and Louis Rasminsky of the Bank of Canada set sail from New York at the end of June, however, it was still unclear in Ottawa and London whether Abbott and his advisers had been invited to bilateral or trilateral informal talks preceding the formal Commonwealth gathering. Though this uncertainty was resolved in favour of Canadian participation in tripartite discussions, Snyder's attitude throughout made it obvious that he was not prepared to take decisions on this occasion but instead "merely to discuss the situation generally," so that the tripartite sessions were more important symbolically than practically as an indication of the common interest in dealing with a persistent problem.

As Snyder informed Acheson, the talks in London "confirmed" the impression formed by the American ambassador in Britain, Lewis Douglas, "that we now seemed to be facing squarely a fundamental difference between US and UK in approach to problem of economic recovery and stability," with Cripps veering toward "what is essentially international state planning in a positive manner as a method of coping with recurrent dollar crisis of UK." That gulf in attitudes was papered over in the press release issued after the meeting, but Snyder carefully avoided any commitment by the American government "implicitly or explicitly to approach which apparently motivates Cripps' proposals or to any specific solution." The communiqué stated that the conferees reaffirmed their faith in the pillars of multilateralism, the IMF, and the ITO, that they rejected further financial assistance from North America as a remedy, and that they pledged to meet again for "technical and fact finding discussions" in Washington in September. Devaluation of sterling against the dollar was specifically ruled out. Privately, Cripps had given Abbott a "tentative outline" of additional cuts in imports to save "about \$400 million in 1949-50," with Canada's exports of "base metals, wood products and foodstuffs" particularly affected. In fact, the Canadian participants believed that their most important contribution had been to discourage the British tendency to blame the economy and policies of the United States for their difficulty.⁶⁵

During the summer, British estimates of the dollar drain for 1948-49

were revised drastically upwards, mainly because of more pessimistic projections for British and sterling area exports to dollar countries. To counteract that threat to Britain's gold and dollar reserves, the British treasury imposed further restrictions on imports. On the eve of the renewed but more formal tripartite sessions, British and sterling area programs for imports from dollar countries for 1949-50 were slashed by 25 percent.⁶⁶ With rampant speculation about devaluation of the pound and worrying indications as well about Canada's reserves, the agenda for those discussions focused on ways to reach "a satisfactory equilibrium between the sterling and dollar areas by the time exceptional dollar aid comes to an end."⁶⁷ After inconclusive meetings of officials, the foreign and finance ministers of the United States, Britain, and Canada met in Washington in early September 1949.

From the outset, the ministerial talks emphasized the facts of the situation, since the British ministers could not make commitments and their American counterparts had been instructed to skirt awkward issues without a lead from the British. "The attitude of the Americans would be sympathetic and helpful," Acheson privately assured the British ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, "but the extent of the help they could give would turn on what we [the British] had to say." Thus, the clear statement by Cripps and the frank discussion of devaluation and associated measures that followed set a positive tone for the gathering. Cripps believed that the principal achievement of the sessions was not "the precise and detailed matters agreed upon" but the recognition by the United States and Canada that "the dollar-sterling problem was their problem as well as ours" and that this meant that there must be common solutions. The required readjustments included greater foreign investment by the United States, reduced tariffs and customs barriers to non-dollar imports, and the removal of other direct and indirect impediments to trade, such as American shipping policy. "It is this new friendly and co-operative atmosphere," Cripps advised his colleagues on his return, "that augurs well for the future."⁶⁸

That impression was confirmed by another participant who assiduously scribbled notes, the Canadian ambassador in Washington, Hume Wrong. "Throughout," Wrong reported, "the discussions in the central group were very frank and there was a manifest desire on the part of all concerned to achieve substantial results." With brief exceptions, the mood had been "cordial" and, "as a rule, statements of fact or policy were accepted without question by all present." Though British accounts heralded the triumph of the chancellor of the exchequer, Wrong "thought



Douglas Abbott, Minister of Finance

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA/

PA-12196

that Sir Stafford was not quite as persuasive as I had expected him to be, probably because of the poor state of his health." On the other hand, Bevin had been "a great success at this conference," particularly in reminding others of the political and strategic implications of the economic questions. For Ottawa, the most important practical consequence of the deliberations was that there would be no "gap" between British requirements from Canada and the value of what would be eligible for assistance under the Marshall Plan.⁶⁹

The communiqué afterward claimed that "a real contribution to the solution of the sterling-dollar difficulties" had been made, particularly by encouraging British and sterling area exports to North America. It also explicitly referred to the assumption that North American financial assistance, whether through the Marshall Plan or drawings on the credits, would end by mid-1952.⁷⁰ Certainly the atmosphere was positive, which eased some of the American and Canadian doubts about the British commitment to eventual convertibility and to the avoidance of trading blocs.

In this context, the devaluations of the pound and the Canadian dollar were seen as positive steps to correct a problem. On Sunday night, 18 September 1949, Cripps announced that the pound, previously fixed at \$4.03, would henceforth be worth \$2.80. Compared to the 30 percent drop in the value of sterling, the 9.1 percent downward revision of the Canadian dollar against American currency, which Abbott disclosed the following night, was certainly less dramatic, though it was also seen as part of an essential rebalancing of international exchange.⁷¹

Within weeks, however, the sense of achievement and harmony had dissipated. Critical stories in the British press unfairly blamed imports from Canada for Britain's exchange woes. Clark remarked bitterly to Clutterbuck in early November that the British did not factor the positive impact of devaluation on their export earnings into their reckoning of what Britain and the sterling area could afford to import from the Western hemisphere. As Clark put it, the British seemed to act as if "the Washington talks had never taken place." Though the "ABC" talks had emphasized continued consultation, the British "sense of partnership was apparently only to operate when it suited [them]." In fact, the economic policy committee of the British cabinet had concluded in late October "that Canada would eventually be forced to choose between a closer economic relation with the United States or a closer economic relation with the sterling area. There was little prospect that the old triangular pattern of trade could be restored in the foreseeable future."⁷² By mid-November, the prospects for mutually satisfactory arrangements were so bleak that Abbott, with strong support from St. Laurent, declined an invitation from Cripps to discuss bilateral economic questions in London. Abbott and his advisers sensed, with some justification, that such a visit would lead only to a futile discussion of the possibility that Canada would accept payments in inconvertible sterling.⁷³

There was a more favourable trend generally in 1950, buttressed by British recovery, including a successful export drive to Canada, and the immediate economic effect of the Korean War. In the circumstances, the deputy minister of finance believed that the British treasury should make some concessions to Canada, particularly on the vexatious "have regard to" clause of the wheat agreement.⁷⁴ However, the Canadian cabinet did not accept Clark's advice to encourage the British in that direction by suspending British drawings on the \$90 million which remained in the Canadian credit, though it was unable to agree on an alternative. The uncertain impact of rearmament was seen as justifying Britain's reluctance

to relax import restrictions and exchange controls.⁷⁵ One year later, that caution seemed to have been vindicated. A "formidable drain" of dollars imperilled the British objective of remaining "independent of general economic assistance from the United States" as the projected date for the end of North American financial aid loomed.⁷⁶

By early 1951, the British government had agreed to forego further drawings on the Canadian credit, of which only \$65 million remained (and which the British did not intend to use in any event). The Canadian government could then apply that sum "to cover at least part of a final payment" to Canadian wheat farmers. By then, the elaboration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had proceeded further. "We are at the beginning of a new era of joint effort," Pearson explained to the British high commissioner, "when a mutual assistance programme of very large dimensions would have to be worked out," so that it would be mutually advantageous to clear the slate "of this old score upon which feelings ran high." For the Canadian government, according to Pearson, "a solution was of the greatest urgency." Failure to solve this irritant, he insisted, "would affect in some measure the unity of our NATO effort."⁷⁷ Privately, prime ministerial adviser Jack Pickersgill had suggested that such a negative outcome might have an even more direct impact on the electoral prospects of the Liberal Party in Western Canada. Pickersgill's interpretation was supported by Liberal members of Parliament from the region.⁷⁸ Whatever the decisive factor, on 2 March 1951, St. Laurent announced that settlement in the House of Commons, thus bringing to an end the rather peculiar history of the Anglo-Canadian Wheat Agreement of 1946, as well as formally terminating the drawings on the reconstruction loan.⁷⁹

Perhaps it was appropriate that these two pillars of Canada's postwar external economic policy should be removed at the same time. Though not formally linked, their histories had been intertwined, especially after December 1947, and both had represented substantial commitments to the future of a British market for Canadian goods. Though there had been doubts about the wisdom of the wheat deal from the beginning, both measures had been envisaged as necessary instruments in a transitional phase that would not be required thereafter. In effect, both these expedients were prolonged and the transition itself was extended by the implementation of the European Recovery Program by the United States. By the time the Marshall Plan came to an end, Canadian policy-makers had adjusted to vastly different circumstances from those foreseen in 1945. As anticipated, international trade and investment were vital to Canada's prosperity. But

the British market was no longer as critical as before. Canadian exports had flowed to the United Kingdom in the early postwar years, sustained at artificially high levels, as in wartime, by financial arrangements and long-term contracts which Canada could not afford to continue indefinitely. When the main props of Anglo-Canadian trade were dislodged, however, the impact on the Canadian economy was not as calamitous as once feared. Though still second in value to Canada – a standing not surrendered to Japan until 1973 – the British market was considerably less important in Ottawa's reckoning compared to the American market by 1951. Trade statistics simply confirmed what Canadian ministers and officials had heard from their British counterparts in bilateral and trilateral talks, including those in Washington and London in 1949.

After the war, Canadian exports to Britain peaked at about 27 percent of total exports when British drawings on the Canadian credit were also at their peak and before the convertibility crisis of 1947 impelled the British government to curb dollar imports further. By 1950, Canadian exports to the United Kingdom had slumped in absolute and proportionate terms to only 15 percent of the total. Though there was a limited and brief recovery in the early 1950s, the share was still only 17 percent by the end of 1954. By contrast, Canadian exports to the United States rose absolutely and proportionately, so that by 1954, 60 percent of Canada's exports went south of the border. British exports to Canada grew during Britain's postwar export drive, peaking at under 13 percent of Canada's imports in the wake of the devaluation of the pound, then settling below 10 percent most years thereafter. Meanwhile, imports from the United States surged in absolute terms, checked only by import restrictions in 1947, then again briefly in the late 1950s. Immediately after the war, American products accounted for more than three-quarters of merchandise imports by Canada. Even with occasional unfavourable influences, the proportion remained above two-thirds throughout the postwar years.⁸⁰ Certainly there was a transition in Canada's international trade, but it was not that for which plans had been devised in 1945. As the documents demonstrate, the Cold War was the occasion, but not the cause, of that change in Canada's economic relationship with the rest of the world.

NOTES

1. Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949* (Toronto, 1977), pp. 70-73; James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied* (Toronto, 1980), pp. 68-78; Hector Mackenzie, "Canada, the Cold War and the Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty," in *Diplomatic Documents and Their Users*, eds., John Hilliker and Mary Halloran, (Ottawa, 1995), pp. 145-73.
2. J.B. Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle: the interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain* (New Haven, 1945); Edgar McInnis, *The Atlantic Triangle and the Cold War* (Toronto, 1959), especially Chapter IV.
3. M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley, eds., *Historical Statistics of Canada* (Toronto, 1965), pp. 181-183, Series F334-56; F.H. Leacy, ed., *Historical Statistics of Canada, Second Edition* (Ottawa, 1983), Series G401-414. J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945* (Toronto, 1975), pp. 132-45, 307-16.
4. R.S. Sayers described Canada's prewar financial and trading arrangements, for whose restoration Canadian policy-makers hankered, as "bilateral unbalance within a balanced 'North Atlantic Triangle'." *Financial Policy 1939-45* (London, 1956), pp. 322-23.
5. Hector Mackenzie, "The Cold War and the Limits of 'Internationalism' in Canada's Foreign Relations, 1945-1949," York University Centre for International and Security Studies Occasional Paper No. 47, Canadian Defence and International Security Policy Special Issue No. 4.
6. Mackenzie, "Canada, the Cold War and the Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty," p. 164.
7. Allied planners identified the period until the defeat of Germany as Stage I ("Phase I" in American usage), the war against Japan alone as Stage II, and the transition to a peacetime economy as Stage III. Most arrangements for the postwar (for example, those for the IMF) presumed that Stage III would last five years, though the package of measures associated with the Anglo-American Loan Agreement implicitly abbreviated the "transition" to three years or less for the United Kingdom.
8. The principal statements of economic cooperation were Clause 4 of the Atlantic Charter and Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreements.

For a discussion of these instruments, see: Richard N. Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American collaboration in the reconstruction of multilateral trade* (Oxford, 1956), Chapters III and IV; A.F.W. Plumptre, *Three Decades of Decision: Canada and the World Monetary System, 1944-75* (Toronto, 1977), Chapters 1 and 2.

9. Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy*, *passim.*; John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957, Volume 1* (Toronto, 1979), pp. 22-73; Michael Hart, ed., *Also Present at the Creation: Dana Wilgress and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment at Havana* (Ottawa, [1995]), pp. 25-34.
10. Robert Bothwell and John English, "Canadian Trade Policy in the Age of American Dominance and British Decline, 1943-1947," *Canadian Review of American Studies* VIII, 1 (Spring 1977), pp. 54-65.
11. National Archives of Canada (NAC), Records of the Department of Finance (DF), Vol. 3939, file T-2-9-2/1: Clark to Robertson, 27 May 1942; (Unsigned) Memorandum, 26 May 1942.
12. John F. Hilliker, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER), Volume 11: 1944-45, Part II* (Ottawa, 1990), pp. 78-82.
13. The exception to the generalization about war debt was the continuation of the remainder of the \$700 million loan made to Britain in 1942. Hector Mackenzie, "The Path to Temptation: The Negotiation of Canada's Reconstruction Loan to Britain in 1946," *Historical Papers/Communications historiques* (Ottawa, 1982), pp. 196-220; J.L. Granatstein, "Settling the Accounts: Anglo-Canadian War Finance, 1943-45," *Queen's Quarterly* 83 (1976): 234-49; Hector Mackenzie, "'Little Lend-Lease': The American Impact on Canada's Mutual Aid Program," in *1943: The Beginning of The End*, ed., Paul Dickson, (Waterloo, 1995), pp. 83-106.
14. F.H. Soward, *Canada in World Affairs (CIWA), From Normandy to Paris, 1944-1946* (Toronto, 1950), pp. 98-106; Robert A. Spencer, *Canada in World Affairs, From UN to NATO 1946-1949* (Toronto, 1959), pp. 197-202; Plumptre, *Three Decades*, pp. 72-74. House of Commons, *Debates*, July 28, 1944, p. 5518. On the attempt to negotiate a credit with the Soviet Union, see: Hilliker, *DCER, Volume 11*, pp. 123-58.
15. Spencer, *CIWA 1946-1949*, pp. 198-99. A proportion of the cost of imports (as much as half by the end of the term of the credits) was expected to be financed by the recipient in Canadian dollars or equivalent.
16. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, April 11, 1946, p. 772.

17. Hector Mackenzie, "Justice Denied: The Anglo-American Loan Negotiations of 1945," *Canadian Review of American Studies* XXVI, 1 (Winter 1996): 79-110.
18. Mackenzie, "Path to Temptation," pp. 196-220; L.S. Pressnell, *External Economic Policy Since the War, Volume I, The Post-War Financial Settlement* (London, 1987), Chapter 11; Donald M. Page, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 12: 1946* (Ottawa, 1977), pp. 1387-1417; Roger Bullen and M.E. Pelly, eds., *Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO), Series I, Volume IV, Britain and America: Atomic Energy, Bases and Food, 12 December 1945 - 31 July 1946* (London, 1987), pp. 135-37.
19. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, April 11, 1946, p. 763.
20. Soward, *CIWA 1944-1946*, p. 64; C.C. Lingard and R.G. Trotter, *Canada in World Affairs: September 1941 to May 1944* (Toronto, 1950), pp. 193-97; R.J. Hammond, *Food, Volume I, The Growth of Policy* (London, 1951), Table VI, p. 395. In the last two full years of the war, foodstuffs and farm products represented about 21 percent by value of British imports from Canada, whether paid out of Mutual Aid or from British cash expenditures. H. Duncan Hall, *North American Supply* (London, 1955), Table 4, p. 242.
21. Mackenzie, "Path to Temptation," p. 197. John F. Hilliker, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 10: 1944-1945, Part I* (Ottawa, 1987), pp. 625-36. See also the comparison of prewar and postwar British imports of foodstuffs from Canada in Soward, *CIWA 1944-1946*, pp. 120-21.
22. Charles F. Wilson, *A Century of Canadian Grain: Government Policy to 1951* (Saskatoon, 1978), pp. 846-87. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, pp. 1420-45; *DBPO*, I, IV, pp. 217-23, 364-67, 392-96. NAC, W.L.M. King Papers, King Diary: 19-20 June 1946; 16-17 July 1946.
23. Holmes, *Shaping of Peace, Volume 1*, pp. 89-90. Robertson, Mackenzie, and Pearson were especially critical of the contract. Page, *DCER, Volume 12*, pp. 1430-36. Gardiner was able to push the wheat deal through the cabinet simply because his opponents could offer "no viable alternative forms of market assurance." Wilson, *Canadian Grain*, p. 1048. Gardiner was convinced that wheat prices would fall after the war. That prospect was cited by MacKinnon in justifying the provisions of the contract to the House of Commons. *Debates*, July 25, 1946, pp. 3835-3836. C.D. Howe, who as minister of trade and commerce later dealt with the issue, rejected Gardiner's

- contention that the British were obliged to compensate Canadian wheat farmers under the vaguely worded agreement. Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, *C.D. Howe, a biography* (Toronto, 1979), pp. 230-34.
24. Plumptre, *Three Decades of Decision*, p. 98.
 25. Bothwell and Kilbourn, *Howe*, pp. 192-96; Hector Mackenzie, "The White Paper on Reconstruction and Canada's Postwar Trade Policy," in *Uncertain Horizons: Canadians and Their World in 1945*, ed., Greg Donaghy, (Ottawa, 1997), pp. 167-88.
 26. Alec Cairncross, *Years of Recovery: British economic policy 1945-1951* (London, 1985), pp. 121-64. In his thorough analysis of the British situation, Cairncross notes that the actual British drain of dollars and gold in early 1947 was greater than that calculated by British authorities at the time. Norman Hillmer and Donald Page, eds., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 13: 1947* (Ottawa, 1993), pp. 1309-11, 1318-21. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1947, Volume III: The British Commonwealth; Europe* (Washington, 1972), pp. 14-15, 17-24. The British treasury contended that the favourable results in 1946 had been deceptive, partly owing to depletion of stocks and to exceptional exports in a sellers' market. Problems associated with inadequate stocks, under-maintenance of equipment, fuel, and transportation difficulties combined to cost Britain about \$800 million in exports in 1947, by their reckoning. In 1949, a Canadian analysis of the changes in the balance of payments of Britain and the sterling area from 1938 to 1948 noted that the excess in increase of prices for imports over exports (that is, the shift in the terms of trade) had had a much greater impact on the postwar deficit than the oft-cited decrease in British overseas investment income. NAC/Records of the Privy Council Office (PCO)/18/Vol.108/ "Proposed Memoranda for Use of Officials within the Canadian Delegation to Tripartite Financial Talks in Washington 1949" (binder): 2(1), "Balance of Payments - UK and Sterling Area," [25 August 1949].
 27. As J.L. Granatstein has noted, the success of the British export drive was further undermined by the peculiar unsuitability of British products for the North American market. *How Britain's weakness forced Canada into the arms of the United States* (Toronto, 1989), p. 55.
 28. Plumptre, *Three Decades of Decision*, pp. 95-97; Granatstein, *Britain's weakness*, pp. 47-48. When Ilsley announced the move in the House

- of Commons on 5 July 1946, he defended the upward adjustment of the value of the Canadian dollar as a way to combat "inflationary pressure" in the economy. Neither the IMF nor the US were forewarned about the revaluation. Previously, one American dollar had been worth \$1.10 in Canadian funds. The change immediately reduced the value of Canada's gold and US dollar reserves by over 9 percent.
29. National Archives of the United States (USNA), Records of the Department of State (USDS), 842.5151/4-2547: Harrington to Foster, 25 April 1947 (reporting conversation with Clifford Clark); USDS, 842.5151/6-2347: USSS to USA(UK), No. 2691, 23 June 1947 (reporting conversation with Wrong and Graham Towers and Louis Rasminsky of the Bank of Canada); USDS, 842.5151/6-2547: Hickerson to Acheson, 25 June 1947. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 1407-18. B.W. Muirhead, *The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy: The Failure of the Anglo-European Option* (Montreal and Kingston, 1992), pp. 18-19.
 30. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 1403-04. King Papers, Notes and Memoranda (J4), Vol. 240, file 2412: Wrong, Memorandum for Prime Minister, 21 April 1947; Wrong, "Note on Exchange Position," 22 April 1947.
 31. "It may be," Clark wrote to R.B. Bryce, who was in London for talks with British officials, "that we must now be highly sceptical of the possibilities of the multilateral solution being achieved in time but if we are very pessimistic in this direction I think the only alternative is the one that Norman [Robertson] and I have discussed on several occasions, namely some approach to a customs union with the United States." Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 1309-11.
 32. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, p. 1421.
 33. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 1422-26.
 34. USDS/842.5151/9-1847: Foster, Memorandum of conversation, 18 September 1947.
 35. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 1426-27.
 36. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 1435-40.
 37. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 1442-44. Spencer, *CIWA 1946-1949*, pp. 220-21; Granatstein, *Britain's weakness*, pp. 50-51. This unfortunate coincidence had been anticipated and regretted at meetings between Canadian and American officials in late October.

- USDS/842-5151/11-147, 11-1447, 11-2047: Foster, Memorandum for Files, 1 November 1947; Wood to Lovett, 14 November 1947; Harrington to Foster, 20 November 1947.
38. USDS, 611.4231/10-2947: Note of meeting, 29 October 1947. McKinnon was accompanied by John Deutsch (Director, Economic Relations Division, Department of Finance). The American officials present were all from the Department of State. The Canadian record of this and associated discussions refers more vaguely to "the ideas put forward by McKinnon and Deutsch on seeking a special agreement with Canada which would go far beyond the Geneva Agreement and the scope of the authority granted to the [American] Administration under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act." Subsequent discussion in the Canadian cabinet simply alluded to "certain positive measures" which the United States could take, including the possibility "that they could go beyond the Geneva Agreement in further bilateral tariff arrangements which would have made it possible for Canadian exports to the United States to be increased." Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 1435-44. There is no record therein of the prior authority of the cabinet for McKinnon's initiative. On the Canadian-American negotiations generally, see: R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, *American Dollars - Canadian Prosperity: Canadian-American Economic Relations 1945-1950* (Toronto, 1978), pp. 64-82.
39. USDS, 611.4231/10-2947: United States Ambassador in Canada to United States Secretary of State, No. 5596, 29 October 1947.
40. Hector Mackenzie, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 14: 1948* (Ottawa, 1994), pp. 1032-33, 1036-37. Abbott conveyed the impression to King that the initiative had come from the Americans. A note from Wrong to Deutsch on 7 January 1948 similarly referred to "their suggestion for a new trade arrangement" (emphasis added). *Ibid.*, pp. 1030-31.
41. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, pp. 1045-72. The American magazine, *Life*, had provoked some controversy with an editorial on 15 March 1948 entitled "Customs Union with Canada: Canada Needs Us and We Need Canada in a Violently Contracting World." King later asked Pearson for a summary of editorial reaction in Canada to *Life's* editorial, which confirmed his earlier impression that the measure would be difficult to defend. King Papers/J4/vol. 240: Pearson, Memorandum, 14 April 1948 (with enclosure). J.L. Granatstein,

- Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Toronto, 1996), pp. 91-93.
42. *FRUS*, 1947, III, pp. 43-49, 56-68. One casualty of the convertibility crisis was an agreement reached in June 1947 to cover half of Britain's deficit with Canada from drawings on the Canadian loan, with the other half met by British transfers of gold or dollars (the so-called "50-50" arrangement). The early demise of that accord raised questions in Ottawa about the sincerity of Britain's commitment. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 1287-1301. In the same volume (pp. 1306-08), there is an analysis of the British financial crisis by D.V. LePan of the Canadian high commission in London, based in part on disclosures by Owen Williams of the British treasury. Within a week, R.B. Bryce of the finance department supplemented that information in a discussion with Sir Wilfrid Eady in London. *Ibid.*, pp. 1312-15. Cairncross, *Years of Recovery*, pp. 121-64.
43. Public Records Office, London (PRO, Cabinet Records, Economic Policy Committee (EPC) (Cab 134)/Vol. 215: EPC(47)2, Secretary [to the EPC], "Balance of Payments Situation: Recommendations of the Economic Planning Board," 17 October 1947 (with annexes); EPC(47)13, Minister for Economic Affairs (Cripps), "Negotiations with Canada," 7 November 1947 (with annex); Ministry of Food, "Canadian Negotiations," n.d.; Ministry of Supply, "Imports from Canada," n.d.; Board of Trade, "Canadian Softwood Contracts," n.d.; EPC(47)7th Mtg, Minutes of EPC, 11 November 1947. PRO, Cabinet Documents (Cab 129)/Vol. 21: CP(47)289, Minister of Food, "The Food Import Programme 1947/48 from Hard Currency Countries," 17 October 1947 (with attachment). Cab 129/22. Minister of Food, "Dollar Programme in 1948," 17 October 1947 (with annex). PRO, Cabinet Minutes (Cab 128)/Vol. 10: CM81(47)3, Cabinet Minutes, 20 October 1947; CM82(47)4, Cabinet Minutes, 23 October 1947. Muirhead, *Postwar Canadian Trade Policy*, pp. 23-24.
44. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 1329-34, 1337-39.
45. Until recently, Cripps had been minister of economic affairs. He replaced Hugh Dalton as chancellor after the latter resigned over inappropriate disclosure of budget measures. Cab 134/215: EPC, 10(47)1, 1 December 1947. PRO/Prime Minister's Office, Clement Attlee (PREM 8), Vol. 978: Secretary of State for Commonwealth

Relations (SSCR) to British High Commissioner in Canada (UKHC(C)), No. 1135, 11 December 1947. The telegram includes a draft message from Cripps to Abbott or alternatively from Attlee to King suggesting that "Liesching should come back at the first convenient opportunity." Liesching was authorized to discuss this proposal with Pearson. These files contain the messages to and from the Liesching Mission.

46. King Diary: 24-25 November 1947. Hillmer and Page, *DCER, Volume 13*, pp. 1345-53. Prem 8/978: UKHC(C) to SSCR, No. 1241, 13 December 1947; UKHC(C) to SSCR, No. 1242, 15 December 1947; UKHC(C) to SSCR, No. 1243, 15 December 1947. Cab 134/215: Cripps, Memorandum, 15 December 1947; EPC, Minutes, 16 December 1947. Cab 128/10: Cabinet, Minutes, 18 December 1947. Liesching described the negotiations at a meeting of the Overseas Negotiations Committee on 31 December 1947 (Cab 134/46). Muirhead, *Postwar Canadian Trade*, pp. 23-25. King also did not want to suggest a shift of Canada's external affairs away from Britain to the United States, which might provoke domestic opposition.
47. On Canada's relationship with the Marshall Plan, and especially the importance of off-shore purchases to the Canadian economy, see: Cuff and Granatstein, *American Dollars*, pp. 83-139.
48. In one meeting with American officials, Deutsch claimed that Canadian sales of wheat below world prices represented assistance worth \$200-225 million in 1948 alone. USDS/611.4231/12-3147: Note of meeting, 31 December 1947.
49. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, pp. 1090-98.
50. The best account of the exchange crisis of 1949 and the consequent devaluation of the pound is in Cairncross, *Years of Recovery*, pp. 165-211.
51. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, pp. 1090-98.
52. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, p. 1099.
53. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, pp. 1098-99.
54. PCO/18/61/C-10-13-M(1947-49): Cabinet Committee on External Trade Policy (CCETP), Minutes, 17 September 1948.
55. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 14*, pp. 1126-39. The "Long Term Programme" was a four-year plan approved by the British cabinet and prepared for the Committee on European Economic Co-operation in association with ERP. The version of the paper circulated to the British cabinet on 6 September 1948 was provided by Cripps

- to the CCETP at his first meeting with it on 21 September 1948. An assessment of British policy by the American embassy in London in May 1949 depicted Cripps and the British treasury lurching from one crisis to the next, with neither a consistent plan nor a firm basis for projections of future trends. Seen in that light, there was considerable doubt about the reliability of the contents of the "Long Term Programme," let alone predictions of what would follow it. That also lent uncertainty to judgments about the likely impact of devaluation. *FRUS*, 1949, IV, pp. 391-94.
56. Hector Mackenzie, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 15*, (Ottawa, 1995), pp. 883-84. Pearson's pessimism about Canada's trade with Britain and Europe was reinforced by reports of the first meetings (in late January) of the United Kingdom Canada Continuing Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. For the minutes of the four meetings (25-28 January 1949), see: PCO/18, Vol. 193, file T-50-U-M. A summary and surrounding documentation are reprinted in Mackenzie, *ibid*, pp. 1045-51.
 57. USDS/611.421/2-1349: Acheson, Memorandum of conversation (Truman, Acheson, St. Laurent), 12 February 1949. Acheson gave a copy of this memorandum personally to Hume Wrong, who forwarded it to Pearson. Both it and Wrong's more detailed account of the discussion (at which he and the American ambassador to Canada, L.A. Steinhardt, were present) are reproduced in Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 15*, pp. 1462-69. The issue of free trade subsequently was left dormant, though it was revived briefly four years later when St. Laurent met with Truman's successor as president, Dwight Eisenhower, at the White House. On that occasion, the possibility was raised by the American secretary of defense, Charles Wilson. Don Barry, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 19: 1953* (Ottawa, 1991), pp. 1006-10.
 58. *Financial Post*, 19 March 1949. Cited in Spencer, *CIWA 1946-1949*, pp. 299-300.
 59. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 15*, pp. 1058-62. Muirhead, *Postwar Canadian Trade Policy*, pp. 30-34.
 60. Spencer, *CIWA 1946-1949*, p. 116.
 61. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 15*, pp. 951-53.
 62. *FRUS*, 1949, *Volume IV, Western Europe* (Washington, 1975), pp. 416-18.
 63. USNA, RG43, Records on US/UK/Cdn Financial Talks,

- September 7-12, 1949, Box 1, WGB D-2/12: Thorp, Memorandum, 15 August 1949 (with accompanying Note by Secretary, 16 August 1949). *FRUS*, 1949, IV, pp. 806-30.
64. PCO/18/Vol. 108/U-10-15 (binder): "Balance of Payments - Canada," [25 August 1949]. This was one of a series of memoranda prepared by J.E. Coyne, J.J. Deutsch, C.M. Isbister, and A.F.W. Plumtre, under the direction of the interdepartmental committee on external trade policy for use by Canadian ministers and officials in the tripartite talks in Washington.
65. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 15*, pp. 950-68. Snyder had intended to visit Europe in late July. He changed his plans in response to a plea from Bevin conveyed by Acheson. "Unless firm action is taken," Bevin wrote, "I fear that much of our work on Western Union and the Atlantic Pact will be undermined, and our progress in the cold war will be halted." For that reason, Bevin requested that Snyder be accompanied by political as well as economic advisers. Bevin also favoured the participation of the Canadians in tripartite talks. *FRUS*, 1949, IV, pp. 790-91; 799-802. Muirhead, *Postwar Canadian Trade Policy*, pp. 34-37.
66. As noted above, the steady improvement in the overall British exchange position in 1948 was reversed in the second quarter of 1949 (though some of those losses were recoverable, as they represented deferred payments or purchases on speculative grounds). In May 1949, before allowance for the import cuts and without taking into account ERP funds, the British treasury's estimate of the dollar drain for 1948-49 was \$1,114 million. That figure was revised to \$1,518 million in July. In effect, the treasury then projected the quarterly trend (April to June 1949) for another 12 months to justify major restrictions on imports by the sterling area from dollar countries in 1949-50. Yet the export figures would likely improve as the previously deferred payments were made and even more so if the pound were devalued, so that Canadian financial experts questioned the continuing emphasis on diversion of imports away from dollar sources. However, the decline in ERP funding was a factor that the treasury did have to take into account in reckoning what it could afford in the future. PCO/18/vol. 108/U-10-15 (binder): 2(1), "Balance of Payments - UK and Sterling Area," [25 August 1949].
67. The quotation is from the communiqué issued on 12 September 1949 after the tripartite meetings in Washington. For the text, see:

- FRUS, 1949, IV, pp. 833-39.
68. PRO, Cabinet Documents (CAB 129), Vol. 36, part II: CP(49)191. Chancellor of the Exchequer, "The Washington Discussions, 7th-12th September, 1949," 20 September 1949. See also, the statement by the chancellor of the exchequer (7 September 1949), the report by the British ambassador (19 September 1949) and the report by Sir Henry Wilson Smith of the British treasury (19 September 1949), all of which are appended to the cabinet paper. "If we can keep the momentum going," Wilson Smith cautioned, "the possibilities are better than I ever imagined, but we have a long way to go and much responsibility still rests on us."
 69. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 15*, pp. 1015-26. The historians of the state department were unable to locate any records of the meetings in the files of their department or the American treasury. *FRUS*, 1949, IV, p. 833. There is a memoir by one of the American participants, Dean Acheson [*Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1969)], who recalls the "first few days of the meeting" as "a complete waste of time with rising exasperation among the conferees" (p. 324). According to Acheson, the situation was salvaged by Bevin. British pessimism on the eve of the talks is described in Muirhead, *Postwar Canadian Trade Policy*, pp. 38-40.
 70. That fact was particularly noted by the Canadian cabinet. Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 15*, pp. 1014-15.
 71. *FRUS*, 1949, IV, pp. 833-39. Plumptre, *Three Decades of Decision*, pp. 103-09, 142-48; W.E.C. Harrison, *Canada in World Affairs, 1949 to 1950* (Toronto, 1957), pp. 131-38. One year later, the Canadian government allowed the value of the dollar to be established by a "clean float" (that is, without substantial intervention by the central bank to control the rate of exchange and without a target value set by the government). By then, the currency reserves were large enough that the minister of finance was also able to dispense with the import restrictions remaining from those which had been imposed in November 1947. By late January 1952, the Canadian dollar had returned to par with American currency. For most of the rest of the decade, it traded at a slight premium over the American dollar.
 72. Cab 134/220: EPC (39(49)2), 21 October 1949.
 73. Cab 134/223: EPC(49)138, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, "Financial and Economic Relations with Canada," 14 November 1949 (with annexes); EPC(49)144, Chancellor of the

- Exchequer, "Financial and Economic Relations with Canada," 17 November 1949 (with annex). Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 15*, pp. 1100-1105, 1107-1110.
74. Greg Donaghy, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 16: 1950* (Ottawa, 1996), pp. 1303-1309.
75. Donaghy, *DCER, Volume 16*, pp. 1311-17. On the impact of rearmament in Britain, see Cairncross, *Years of Recovery*, pp. 212-33.
76. PRO, Records of the Foreign Office (FO371), Vol. 91998, file UEE165/40: Gaitskell to Franks, 30 July 1951. Cab 129/47: CP(51)242, Chancellor of Exchequer [Gaitskell], "The Balance of Payments Position," 3 September 1951. On the rapid reversal in Britain's balance of payments, see Cairncross, *Years of Recovery*, pp. 224-29.
77. Greg Donaghy, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 17: 1951* (Ottawa, 1996), pp. 1189-91.
78. Donaghy, *DCER, Volume 17*, pp. 1186-89.
79. Donaghy, *DCER, Volume 17*, pp. 1191-92. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 2 March 1951, p. 833. Wilson, *Canadian Grain*, pp. 1027-43.
80. Later, under John Diefenbaker, diversion of commerce to encourage Anglo-Canadian trade proved to be a futile policy. Granatstein, *Britain's weakness*, pp. 56-59.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

LARRY BLACK is Professor of History and Director of the Centre for Research on Canadian-Russian Relations at Carleton University. He is a co-editor of *Beyond the Monolith: Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia* (1997) and the author of *Canada in the Soviet Mirror: Ideology and Perception in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-91* (1998).

ROBERT BOTHWELL is Professor of History and Director of the International Relations Program at the University of Toronto. Among his many publications are *The Politics of Partnership: Canada and the United States* (1992) and *The Big Chill: A History of Canada and the Cold War* (1997). He is currently working on a book on Canada and the Vietnam War.

DONALD W. CAMPBELL is Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

GREG DONAGHY is an Historian with the Historical Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He is the editor of *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 16* (1996), *Volume 17* (1996) and *Volume 20* (1997).

JOHN ENGLISH is Professor of History and Political Science at the University of Waterloo. He has published several books, notably *The Decline of Politics* and *Kitchener: An Illustrated History*. He has also written an award-winning two-volume biography of Lester B. Pearson, *Shadow of Heaven* (1990) and *The Worldly Years* (1992).

HECTOR MACKENZIE is the Senior Departmental Historian, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He is the editor of *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 14* (1994) and *Volume 15* (1995).

NOTES SUR LES COLLABORATEURS

LARRY BLACK est professeur d'histoire et directeur du Center for Research on Canadian-Russian Relations à l'Université Carleton. Il a dirigé la préparation de l'ouvrage *Beyond the Monolith: Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia* (1997) et rédigé *Canada in the Soviet Mirror: Ideology and Perception in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-91* (1998).

ROBERT BOTHWELL est professeur d'histoire et directeur du programme de relations internationales à l'Université de Toronto. On remarque parmi ses publications *The Politics of Partnership: Canada and the United States* (1992) et *The Big Chill: A History of Canada and the Cold War* (1997). Il prépare actuellement un livre sur le Canada et la guerre du Vietnam.

DONALD W. CAMPBELL est sous-ministre des Affaires étrangères, ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international.

GREG DONAGHY est historien au ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international. Il a dirigé la publication de *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*, volume 16 (1995), volume 17 (1996) et volume 20 (1997).

JOHN ENGLISH est professeur d'histoire et de sciences politiques à l'Université de Waterloo. Il a publié plusieurs ouvrages, dont *The Decline of Politics* et *Kitchener: An Illustrated History*. Il a également écrit une biographie primée en deux volumes de Lester B. Pearson, *Shadow of Heaven* (1990) et *The Worldly Years* (1992).

HECTOR MACKENZIE est l'historien principal du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international. Il a dirigé la publication de *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*, volume 14 (1994) et volume 15 (1995).

☒ NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

DOMINIQUE MARSHALL is Associate Professor of History at Carleton University. She recently published *Aux origines sociales de l'État providence: Les familles québécoises et les politiques sociales touchant les enfants entre 1940 et 1960* (1997).

STÉPHANE ROUSSEL is currently pursuing his PhD at the Université de Montréal, where he is also employed as Assistant to the Director, Groupe d'étude et de recherche sur la sécurité internationale. He is the co-author of *Environnement stratégique et modèles de défense: Une perspective québécoise* (1996), and co-editor of *Intérêt national et responsabilités internationales: Six États face au conflit en ex-Yougoslavie, 1991-1995* (1996) and *Tous pour un ou chacun pour soi: Promesses et limites de la coopération régionale en matière de sécurité* (1995).

ANGELIKA SAUER is the Chair in German-Canadian Studies and Assistant Professor of History at The University of Winnipeg. Her book, *A Chorus of Different Voices: German-Canadian Identities*, co-edited with Matthias Zimmer, was published in the summer 1998.

DENIS STAIRS is McCulloch Professor in Political Science at Dalhousie University. His publications include *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States* (1974) as well as many other works on Canadian foreign affairs.

DOMINIQUE MARSHALL est professeur agrégé d'histoire à l'Université Carleton. Le livre de Mme Marshall, *Aux origines sociales de l'État providence : Les familles québécoises et les politiques sociales touchant les enfants entre 1940 et 1960*, a été publié en 1997.

STÉPHANE ROUSSEL travaille actuellement à son doctorat, à l'Université de Montréal, où il est aussi adjoint au directeur, Groupe d'étude et de recherche sur la sécurité internationale. Il est coauteur de *Environnement stratégique et modèles de défense : Une perspective québécoise* (1996) et a codirigé *Intérêt national et responsabilités internationales : Six États face au conflit en ex-Yougoslavie, 1991-1995* (1996) et *Tous pour un ou chacun pour soi : Promesses et limites de la coopération régionale en matière de sécurité* (1995).

ANGELIKA SAUER occupe la chaire des études germano-canadiennes et est professeur adjoint d'histoire à l'Université de Winnipeg. Son livre, *A Chorus of Different Voices: German-Canadian Identities*, qu'elle a codirigé avec Matthias Zimmer, a paru dans l'été de 1998.

DENIS STAIRS occupe la chaire McCulloch en sciences politiques de l'Université Dalhousie. Notons, parmi ses publications, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States* (1974), et il a à son actif de nombreux travaux sur la politique étrangère du Canada.

LIBRARY E A / BIBLIOTHÈQUE A E



3 5036 01001974 6

DOCS
CA1 EA 98C12 EXF
Canada and the early Cold War,
1943-1957
55753640

Contributors/Collaborateurs

J.L. Black

John English

Dominique Marshall

Angelika Sauer

Robert Bothwell

Hector Mackenzie

Stéphane Roussel

Denis Stairs



These papers, prepared by some of Canada's leading foreign policy scholars, draw on the published and unpublished diplomatic record to explore aspects of Canadian foreign policy during the first stages of the Cold War. They were originally presented at a colloquium held in November 1997 to mark the 30th anniversary of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*.

Ce recueil regroupe une série d'écrits d'éminents spécialistes canadiens de la politique étrangère qui, à partir de documents diplomatiques publiés et non publiés, ont exploré certains aspects de la politique étrangère du Canada aux premiers temps de la guerre froide. Ces écrits ont été présentés pour la première fois en novembre 1997, à un colloque marquant le 30^e anniversaire des *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*.

Canada



Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade

Ministère des Affaires étrangères
et du Commerce international