





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

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ON THE
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PROPOSED CONFEDERATION

OF THE

British North American Provinces.

BY

A NOVA SCOTIAN.

LONDON:

GEORGE BURNS, STEAM PRINTER, 86 & 94 EDGWARE ROAD. W.

1866.

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THE PROPOSED CONFEDERATION,

&c., &c.

THE proposed Union of the North American Provinces, now under the consideration of the Imperial Government, is a subject of such vast importance, not only to those Provinces, but to the interests of the parent countries, that all the parties concerned should possess the most correct and full information regarding it. It is intended to treat of it, in this essay, as plainly, and also concisely as the principal facts and interests involved will fairly admit. There will also be an endeavour to adhere closely to the very just remark recently expressed in one of the London journals, that *facts* are required, and not *theories*. Adopting this right mode of discussion, it is proper that the writer should first offer some information as to his qualifications for treating of the subject. He may say, then, that he is a native of Nova Scotia, and has resided therein, very far the greater part of a protracted life; and in former portions of it, for considerable periods, held rather high popular positions, and important public offices; but is now entirely free of any personal interest, *pecuniary* or *official*, or under any other personally biased view of this union subject, whatever may be the final decision concerning it. And he may further say, that he is as thoroughly acquainted with the people of Nova Scotia, and with their sentiments on this subject, and also with the resources and interests of the Province, as any one of its inhabitants, having repeatedly traversed every portion of it, and mixed with all classes of its people; and has also travelled and sojourned in all the other Provinces, and acquired varied and important information regarding their resources and general condition, especially in the

Western portion of Canada. To commence, then, with this latter and largest Province, first may be noted, that its extreme length, westwardly, is about 1000 miles; but its average width, for four-fifths of that distance, capable of ready agricultural improvement, is not one-fourth of that number of miles. The whole length, southwardly, borders on populous and powerful States of the American Union. The soil, nearly all through the upper section of the Province, extending more than 500 miles, is uncommonly good and fruitful. With such an extensive region, containing a population little short of three millions, or eight persons to every square mile, it cannot be said, that as to territory, it requires the other Provinces, or any portion of them, with reference to an increase of population. The great body of the people in the lower division of the Province are of French origin, and have retained their native language, and primitive manners and habits, and marrying chiefly among themselves. They form, probably, more than *four-fifths* of the population in this division; and nearly all profess the Roman Catholic faith. The upper division of the Province contains a very mixed population, chiefly of Scotch, English, and Irish origin, and their descendants; and many thousands of natives of the United States, and members of their families, or descended from them. The population, generally, belong to the various Protestant bodies, except the Irish, the larger portion of whom are Roman Catholics. The manners and habits of the people are, to a great extent, similar to those of the inhabitants of the adjoining Northern and Eastern States of the American Union. The City of Hamilton, and many other towns and places near the borders of those States, are very much like the towns of the latter, in nearly all usages, modes of living, and various other circumstances. The people very generally, are, doubtless, sincerely loyal, and attached to the Imperial Government, though there is reason to think that very many of United States birth, or descent, are, to say the least, indifferent, as to being under Imperial rule, or that of the adjoining Republic. The long continued, and still enduring bitter political strifes between those two divisions of the Province, are so well known that any special detail of facts, or extended remarks concerning them, cannot be required here. So constant and injurious have such discords and contentions been, that they have frequently paralyzed or suspended the action of the Government, and greatly impeded the general welfare. One of the

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chief public actors in those contentions, has, in a pamphlet, published the fact, that they produced *four* changes of Government within about *two* years. Experience has thus shown that the Union formed several years ago between the two previously separate Provinces, though directly adjoining, was a great political mistake. By the present proposed general Union, it is intended to form Canada into two Provinces, as before. This, of itself, furnishes a strong argument against a general Union; for if the French of Lower Canada, and the British and American population of the Upper region, could not agree together, though immediate neighbours, it is very certain that any Union of the various and very mixed populations of Canada with the British people of Nova Scotia,—each having different laws, customs, and habits, and to a great extent of different occupations, to say nothing of religious differences,—would not, with either party, be satisfactory and harmonious. Further, there is good reason to conclude that large portions of the people of both divisions of Canada are quite indifferent as to the success or failure of the Union project. Few, if any petitions, from the population generally, have from any part of Canada, been presented to their Parliament in favour of it; but very large numbers of the people of the lower division of the Province, have, by their representatives, strenuously opposed it; and petitions are now being extensively circulated there, and doubtless will be numerous signed for presentation to the Imperial Parliament, against any such Union, until after a general election; and a new Provincial Parliament shall have decided on several important previous questions. The persons who originated the scheme in Canada, and are chiefly active in urging its adoption, are the present members of the government there, with other political leaders in the parliament of that Province. Several of the chief and influential members in that parliament, however, have vigorously opposed it. The extravagant and imprudent manner in which the public affairs of that Province have been conducted by its successive governments, during a course of years past, have involved the country in very serious financial and other embarrassments; which, undoubtedly, have formed the chief reason for its present government desiring the general Union, now proposed, as a measure for assisting to remove those embarrassments, and to afford, through the means and resources of the Maritime Provinces, increased securities to the Canadian public creditors.

One of the present government delegates for Nova Scotia, and its prime minister, as he styles himself, on the first public discussion of it in this his native Province, stated, that the *necessities* of Canada, formed one of the principal reasons for desiring and effecting the Union. But surely this is not a fair or honest reason for forcing it on Nova Scotia, or any other of the Maritime Provinces, contrary to the judgment and wishes of the great body of the people; thereby annulling their highly prized institutions, their present constitutional right of self-government, and subjecting them to greatly increased taxation and political contentions, and inevitably impairing or destroying, to a great degree, their present universal loyal attachment to the parent government and people. As regards any reason for Union, which may be suggested, in relation to commercial intercourse and interests, it may be answered, that Canada does not want, nor is it likely she ever will want, from Nova Scotia, any products or articles of necessity or importance, except *coal* and *fish*, which can now be obtained as freely and fully as they could be under Union, and also cheaper, as *then* the increased taxation would enhance the price of those articles to the Canadian purchasers. As to manufactures, Canada is very far in advance of Nova Scotia; and it is not probable will ever need from this Province, any manufactured articles of wood or iron, leather, wool, cotton, pottery, paper, or indeed of any other description. Most certainly such an extensive and magnificent agricultural country as Western Canada will never want from Nova Scotia, or any of the other Provinces, any grain, or flour, meal, bread, or potatoes, or meat, butter, cheese, or any other farm products. Why then it may well be asked, do the present Canadian rulers desire, and so urgently strive to have the proposed Union effected? Undoubtedly, for the covetous and unjust reason already mentioned, *that* of having the power to tax these Maritime Provinces, to assist in relieving Canadian financial embarrassments, improve its public credit, enable its rulers to enlarge canals, purchase territory, form military and naval defences, and for other Canadian public purposes, from none of which would the Maritime Provinces derive any benefit whatever.

Attention may now be turned, more particularly, to some of the principal facts on the main subject, as regards Nova Scotia. This Province, which includes the island of Cape Breton, is nearly 400 miles in length, and of the average width of between

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80 and 100 miles. It is larger than Scotland, more than double the extent of Holland, and the like of Belgium, and at least a third larger than Denmark; and is capable of containing and supporting a population of five or six millions; so that it does not require union with Canada, in regard to an increased amount of population, and as to numerical force, being made capable of defence against any hostile attacks. There are few countries in the world of the like extent, having a coast on which there are so many safe and excellent harbours for vessels of all descriptions, and where there are such various and extensive fields of mineral wealth; including coal in such abundance as would supply even the whole American continent for ages; also iron in many places, as well as gold and copper. The soil, though not in general so rich and fertile as that of Western Canada, yet, in many parts, is of a very productive quality. The population at the last census in 1861, was 330,000, and now must be something over 360,000, and of varieties of national origin—chiefly Scotch, Irish, English, American, and German. As to *intelligence*, they are fully equal, or even superior, to the population of any of the other Provinces; and may on that point challenge comparison with the people of any part of the world. They are a high-spirited people, and very *sensitive* as to any attempted violation of their natural and civil rights and interests.

At the first agitation and proposal of this General Confederation the population generally, throughout this Province, were adverse to it—and that *aversion* has ever since been becoming more extended and intense, so much so, that *now* it may confidently be asserted that on the whole *seven-eighths* or more, and in some sections the population to but a *mere fraction* are most keenly opposed to it. In the parliamentary session of 1865, numerous signed petitions were constantly being presented against it from every part of the Province, occasionally half-a-dozen or more on a day. There must have been between 50 and 100 of such petitions during that session, and but a solitary one in favour of the project. The provincial government—the same as now in power—did not dare to take a decisive question upon it, but by the preamble of a resolution on another subject, declared a *General Confederation to be impracticable*. Since the commencement of public discussion on the subject, *three elections* for Members of Parliament have been held, on all of which the proposed Union was the *test question*; and in all,

members were returned to oppose it. During this year's session of the Parliament, also, a number of petitions against it, from various parts of the Province, were presented; and there would have been many more, but it was generally thought that the project had been abandoned. Various formidable and misleading and persuasive influences, however, there are strong reasons to believe, were being silently employed for promoting it; and at a late period of the session, the resolution from which the present Nova Scotia delegation has arisen, was suddenly introduced; and with *unfair* and *arbitrary haste* on the part of the Government, was forced to adoption by a majority of the same members who had in the previous session declared the project to be *impracticable*. So universal, still, is the public sentiment throughout the Province against any union with Canada, that if a general election were to take place, to say the least, very few indeed of those who voted for it would even venture to offer for re-election. It is notorious, and none will deny it, that they did not express the sentiments either of their electors or the general population. This prevalence of public feeling and opinion against the project must be as well known to the provincial government and the whole of its delegates, as in any other quarter.

In a letter published a short time ago in one of the London journals, under the signature—"One of the Delegates," the writer, in remarking on the number of the signatures to the petitions which have been sent from Nova Scotia to the Imperial Government and Parliament against the Union, has said that according to the number of the whole population, which he has stated at 380,000, the signatures should amount to 92,000, instead of the lesser number mentioned by Mr. Howe, one of the people's delegates, in his able pamphlet recently published. That "delegate" must be very ill-informed, indeed, as to the rule or scale observed in estimating the several portions or members of a whole population. Political writers of authority, in treating of that point, give the estimate of *six* to a family—namely, the male and female parents and *four* children. Adopting this estimate as fairly applying to Nova Scotia, and allowing its population, which at the last census in 1861, was 330,000, to be now 360,000, the proportion of male heads of families would be 60,000. The petitions contain only adult male signatures, and they now amount to about 40,000, and may

probably be raised to nearer 50,000, which, according to the given estimate, will be *more than three-fourths* of the male heads of families. Taking another mode of computation—there are eighteen counties in the Province, and assuming the fair average of 2,500 electors for each county, the whole number of such electors will be 45,000, about the same number as will ultimately be found on the whole of the petitions; and very far the greater proportion of these are entitled to vote at the elections. By either mode of computation it will be seen what a vast proportion of the population is opposed to the projected Union.

A short time ago there appeared in the *Standard* London paper, the report of a speech made by Mr. Tupper, one of the Nova Scotia government delegates, at a public banquet, in which paper he is reported to have said, that "There is the most perfect unanimity of opinion in favour of Union throughout the Provinces, among all classes; and that the religious press, as well as the other papers, universally advocates its adoption." With reference to ordinary *veracity* and *charity*, it must be hoped that on these points at least there is an error in that report, and that Mr. Tupper did not make such *glaringly untrue statements*, knowing, as he does, as perfectly as any individual in Nova Scotia, that the great body of the population of this Province is most determinately opposed to the projected Union, and that one-half of the *secular* papers in Halifax, and all of them in the other parts of the Province, with but two or three exceptions, are decidedly and zealously opposed to it. As to what is called the "religious press" in Nova Scotia, it cannot be considered to express the prevailing opinion on the subject, in any of the denominations, but merely that of the editors of those papers, for it is well-known that in all those denominations there are great differences of opinion concerning it; and that as a whole the vast majority of them, as well as of the rest of the population, are strongly opposed to it. All these facts are perfectly known to Mr. Tupper and all the rest of the Nova Scotia delegates. This great numerical strength of opposition has already been shown by the statement of the very many thousands of signatures of adult males to the petitions forwarded, nearly all being electors for parliamentary members.

In the Quebec scheme, as it is called, for effecting the Union, there is a clause providing that "The Local Government and Legislature of each Province shall be constructed in such manner as the existing Legislature of such Province shall

provide in the Act consenting to the Union." There was common fairness in that arrangement, but that has been abandoned, and the very opposite is now being attempted by the Nova Scotia Government, for by the present plan of procedure, the self-constituted delegates, in conjunction with the Imperial Government, are to frame the whole scheme, as to the Maritime Provinces, and which is to be perfected by an Imperial Act, without any reference or submission concerning any part of it, first or last, either to the people of the Provinces or their legislatures; thereby destroying nearly all their existing civil rights and institutions, without affording either of them, though so deeply interested, the opportunity of deliberating on the subject, and expressing in any manner their sentiments concerning it. Can the government and parliament of an Empire so pre-eminently distinguished for its *justice, magnanimity, and honour*, ever consent to exhibit such a *contrariety* to its own free and equitable laws and institutions, and modes of administering the principles of its just and liberal constitution? It may well be hoped and expected that no such violation of natural and constitutional right will be committed; and that whatever scheme of Union may be framed, *before any further Imperial action thereon, the opportunity will be afforded to the people of Nova Scotia of electing representatives for a parliament*, in which any prepared scheme of Union may be fully considered and decided on. This will be but *common justice*, and in full *accordance with Imperial constitutional principles and precedents*, and is all that is now desired and asked by the loyal people of Nova Scotia. The present illiberal and unjust course of procedure, as regards this Province, if successful, would most assuredly weaken, if not destroy, to a very great extent, that feeling of loyal attachment to the parent government and countries, which has all along, and more especially for many late years, so universally and happily prevailed. It would lay the foundation of *distrust and dissatisfaction*, or even keen resentment, and destroy confidence regarding that Government; and on the passing of any measure by the Union Parliament felt to be unjust, and injurious to the interests of the Province, that first dissatisfaction would soon advance to decided aversion, which if not manifested in open acts of hostility, would produce in the Union, bitter and enduring strifes. Surely the whole people of Nova Scotia, whose liberties and all the civil rights they possess and hold dear, are involved in the plan, are the persons who ought to be consulted

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and have a voice in its decision, rather than a *fractional* band of visionary and speculative politicians, selected from the different Provinces, to say nothing as to selfish pecuniary views or desires, or the promptings of *vanity* or *ambition*. Even the arbitrary and unjust Bismark has, it appears, expressed a willingness to allow the people of North Holstein to declare by a majority of votes whether they will be united to Denmark or Prussia.

With regard to any argument for Union, in relation to commercial intercourse by Nova Scotia, with Canada, the sufficient answer is, that almost the only article which the former requires from the latter is flour; and this is now obtained as freely and conveniently, and also as cheaply, as it would be under Union, or even cheaper, as general taxation would then be higher. The greater part of the flour and articles of bread kind, imported into Nova Scotia, are now obtained and would continue to be procured from the United States.

As to any embarrassments or inconvenience, regarding differences of duties on imports and exports between the Provinces, or concerning differences in currency, these and other minor matters could readily be adjusted and rendered uniform, or equitable and convenient to all, by enactments in the respective legislatures of the Provinces, as well without as under Union.

As regards the proposed inter-colonial railway, by each Province through which it would pass contributing its proportionate and fair share of the expense, the work may as well be accomplished *now*, as if they were united. The arrangement for the purpose made a few years ago, between the Provinces concerned, and considered to be completed, was suddenly terminated by the Canadian rulers abruptly withdrawing from their stipulations. Nova Scotia has already completed a considerable part of her portion of the work, and is at all times ready to fulfil the whole, on Canada agreeing to accomplish her proportion. New Brunswick also has now a line, which would probably be a portion of her division. It seems rather suspicious and strange, that the Canadian Government has so persistently failed to perform its part on the subject, considering its professions of desire for the accomplishment of the work; and also that, manifestly, it would be more for the benefit of Canada than of the other Provinces.

A few general facts and reasons may now be given concerning *Imperial interests*, in relation to the proposed Union. From public dispatches and other sources of information, it seems certain, that the chief reason which may influence the Home Government

to favor the Union, is the defence of the Provinces, in the event of a war with the United States. Many erroneous opinions are entertained on this subject, and in high quarters too. In case of such a war, it is certain that the borders and coasts of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia would be in imminent danger of invasion, though very much less than Canada; and therefore neither of these two lower Provinces would be able to spare any of its Volunteer or Militia force, to assist in defending Canada; nor could Canada spare any such forces to assist the others. Even during the late Fenian troubles, no such reciprocal or mutual assistance could safely have been afforded. Had all the Provinces been united, all the circumstances on that point, would have been precisely the same. Now, suppose a Union effected, and a war with the United States, without doubt Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, would be *simultaneously* attacked, by very far more numerous and dangerous hosts than any which the villainous Fenians can command. In that event, can it be imagined that any Governor-General would think of calling the smallest number of the Militia force of any of these lower Provinces, into Canada, or of sending to them any such Canadian force. It is absolutely certain, that no such force could be spared from any one of the Provinces, to assist another, except, indeed, that Nova Scotia might do it, to some limited extent, for New Brunswick. Each one would require the whole of its military population for its own defence; and moreover, *only* when combined in each quarter, with large numbers of Imperial troops, would there be a sufficient force to resist successfully the numerous and formidable armies of the enemy, which would constantly and fiercely be rushing on various parts of the provincial borders. But, further, it would seem that the Governor-General has *now* the power of calling the Militia of one Province into another, in any case of hostilities and urgent need, or if not, and thought requisite, enactments may at present be made in the parliament of each Province giving him that power.

This obnoxious Union project, if forced upon the people of Nova Scotia, without their being constitutionally and fairly consulted upon it, as is now attempted by the government delegates, would greatly diminish the means of resisting and repelling any invasion from the neighbouring Republic. Such a compulsory measure would *create* and *perpetuate* such a deep feeling of discontent, and even *alienation*, as regarded the *supreme rulers*, and the country that had used their power to accomplish the wrong,

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that it may well be feared, in the event of any such invasion, very many of the provincial population, would, if not favouring, fail to oppose it; hoping to get rid of the Canadian connection, rendered *odious* by their having been forced into it. There are no resentments so bitter and durable, as those which are produced by real or supposed *unrighteous* or *oppressive* conduct, where confidence and attachment had previously existed. The deep feelings of resentment, originated by the belief of arbitrary conduct and injustice towards former American Provinces, have, to a great extent, been transmitted through succeeding generations to the present time. The Union would not bring a man, or any other means of defence into the Provinces, but would greatly diminish those means, for thousands would quit them through dissatisfaction and resentment, and to avoid increased taxation. Possibly the Imperial Government may be inclined to favour the proposed Union, under the supposition that it will simplify, or render more easy and convenient, in the Colonial office, the management and control of the public affairs of the Provinces, by having to transact and adjust them with *one* General Government, rather than as *now*, having political communication with the *five* Provinces. But any such opinion is altogether *delusive*, for as, according to the Union scheme, Canada is to be divided into two Provinces; and as each of the confederated Provinces is to have a *local legislature* and *government*, there would be *six* of these; and with the General Government and parliament, *seven* governments and parliaments in all, instead of *five* for the Imperial Government to deal with, directly or indirectly. The *jealousies*, *antagonisms* and *contentions*, which inevitably would, from time to time arise, either between some of those provincial authorities and the General Government and Parliament, or among the confederated Provinces, would cause far more annoyance and trouble to the Imperial Government, than it now experiences with the separate Provinces; besides the risk of dissatisfactions and alienations, in reference to that government itself, from supposed injustice, or partiality, or favour, as to any one or more of the members of the Union.

With reference to the inter-colonial railway, as needful for the speedy conveyance of military forces from one Province to another, it has already been stated and shown that the consent and action of Canada are alone required, in order to have it carried forward to completion, as speedily without Union, as under it. But further, on that military point, during a time of war with the American States,—as the line of railway for a long distance

would pass through a wilderness, not far from the border of one of those States,—bands of the enemy's forces could in the course of a few hours, destroy large portions of it, and thus delay or prevent the conveyance of our forces; or take possession of a portion of it, with such a powerful force, as could not be readily overcome and dislodged. A whole regiment, or battalion, would scarcely be sufficient for the constant protection of that exposed part; and that through a tract of wilderness of very great extent. In the event of such a war, it would be quite reasonable that each of the Provinces should contribute a *fair proportion* of the *expense* of the *Imperial forces* employed in their defence; and there is no doubt but *Nova Scotia would readily do it much rather than enter into the proposed Union.*

As regards commercial intercourse between Nova Scotia and the United Kingdom, it is far more for the interest of the latter, that the Union should not take place; for if effected, as the duties on goods imported from thence into this Province, as well as into the other Maritime Provinces, would be so greatly advanced beyond the present rates; and as the general taxation in these Provinces would also be so much increased, the present amount of such importations would be greatly reduced; and their mercantile communities would be obliged to seek, and would procure, from other quarters, large portions of those articles, which *now* they almost entirely obtain from the United Kingdom.

There is one general view which should be taken of this subject, comprehending a number of particulars; and which is well worthy of the deep consideration of each and all of the great parties concerned. Let it be supposed that a scheme of confederation is framed by the present delegates, and sanctioned by the Imperial Government; and that at the first session of the parliament it is confirmed by an Act, without any opportunity having been afforded to the people of Nova Scotia, of choosing representatives for deliberating and expressing an opinion on the subject; and without the scheme having been submitted to any of the other provincial Parliaments, for the like purpose. What are the further measures, and the consequences which will inevitably follow? Lower Canada will be extremely dissatisfied, that a new parliament had not been called, and questions concerning schools, and other important subjects, been previously settled. The like dissatisfaction, for similar reasons, will also prevail to a considerable extent in the Upper Province. In Nova Scotia there will be *almost universal discontent*, and even *indignation*, because the *just claim* and *petitions of its people* for the

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opportunity of expressing their opinions on the subject, by the choice of representatives to consider it, had been disregarded and set aside. A very large number of the people of New Brunswick will also be displeased and complain, because the scheme had been thus completed and forced upon them, without its having been submitted to their legislature, and thereby giving the people an opportunity of instructing their representatives concerning it. In Prince Edward Island there will be still greater discontent, and louder complaints because it was effected contrary to *twice recorded parliamentary decisions*, against that Island being included in any such Union.

In the midst of these various *agitations* and *discontents* throughout the Provinces, elections would be held in all of them, for the General Parliament. As regards the two Canadas, it is quite improbable that all the members now belonging to the Lower House, who are in the present ministry, will be chosen for that parliament; probably none of them who are on the present delegation. As to Nova Scotia, it is perfectly certain, that but very few, indeed, if any of those members who voted for the Union; and most probably none of them, who are on the delegation, will be chosen for that parliament. The people whose *rights* and *interests* and repeated *urgent desires* they so *unfaithfully disregarded*, will choose other and *faithful* men to represent them. Prince Edward Island will also choose men in whom they can place confidence, to assist in restraining, if possible, Canadian influence and extravagance.

That Union parliament will not feel itself bound by any pledges or promises, *financial* or *monetary*, or of any other description, made by the delegates. Lower Canada, with its 68 members, and the Maritime Provinces, with their 47, will not be willing to impose taxes, to erect an extended line of fortifications, form and maintain an army and navy, purchase northern and western territory and enlarge canals, with other great works—chiefly or almost exclusively for the benefit of Upper Canada. These subjects will open a wide field for constant agitation, and sharp and even bitter controversy. That Parliament, of course, would not feel bound by the promise or consent of the Nova Scotia and New Brunswick delegates, to allow 800,000 dollars to Prince Edward Island, if she will consent to enter the Union;—a huge *bribing offer*, as in various quarters it has been *publicly* called. It is not probable that the insulting offer will be accepted by the islanders, who have already shown their independent and spirited sentiments on the Union subject;

but if, in an evil hour, these authorities should accept that unauthorised offer, there would be little prospect of their obtaining the money from that Union parliament.

Viewing the facts and circumstances as here exhibited, and as would surely occur, no *benefit*, whatever would accrue to any of the real parties concerned, but only *evil*. There would be perpetual discontent and strife throughout the provinces. *Disunion* instead of *union*. The whole causes of dislike and contention between the two Canadas, would continue, or rather be enlarged. Nova Scotia would remain indignant, and struggling in every way to get rid of the *hated connection*. New Brunswick would soon find causes of dissatisfaction, and likewise wish and strive for separation. Prince Edward Island even more so, if forced into the Union. Instead of increased power against foreign aggression or hostile attacks, it would be greatly diminished by thousands leaving the Provinces from *discontent, heavy taxation*, and other causes.

As to the Imperial Government, there would be *disappointment* and increased and constant trouble, and most likely *additional expense* also; for the Union parliament and government, considering the financial condition of the Provinces, *could not and would not* impose the heavy taxation requisite for the defensive purposes mentioned; and Imperial money drawn from the people of the kingdom, would, after all, be applied to effect them—or they would remain unaccomplished. In this way, and in other modes, the views and intentions of the Imperial government as to any increased means of defence, in the event of war, and on other points of policy, would be defeated, and the means of retaining the Provinces *weakened*, instead of *increased*. Most if not all, of these perplexing and evil consequences would inevitably result from any such *compulsory Union*. Surely the Imperial Government has long had perplexity and trouble enough with one *distasteful Union*, without adding *another*.

Other and important facts and reasons might here be urged against the proposed Union, but they may be omitted, and confidence be reposed in the *justice and equity* of the Imperial government and parliament, that they will not give a final sanction and authority to any scheme of the kind, without affording to the loyal people of Nova Scotia that *constitutional and just opportunity* which the sister Province of New Brunswick has had — of choosing, for a *new House of Commons*, representatives charged more especially with the consideration of this subject, so important both to provincial and Imperial interests.

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