




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

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CANADA'S CONTRIBUTION  
TO THE  
DEFENCE AND UNITY  
OF  
THE EMPIRE.



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On October 19th, 1885, a notice was issued from the General Post Office calling for tenders for Mail Services, to commence in February, 1888: weekly to India, and fortnightly to the Straits Settlements and China, *via* Suez; and *also* for a fortnightly service from Vancouver, the terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway, to Yokohama and Hong-Kong and *vice versa*. This action, which was taken by the Postmaster General without any solicitation on the part of the Dominion Government or of the Railway Company, was considered in Canada as the spontaneous recognition by England of the advantages which the new route through Canada promised for speedy conveyance of the mails to and from those countries.

Neither the form, however, in which the latter tender was to be cast, nor the manner in which the service was to be performed, was calculated, in the opinion of the Dominion Government, to secure all the advantages to the Empire or to the Colony which, under a different plan, might readily be obtained; and accordingly Sir John Macdonald, who was in England at the close of 1885, laid the Canadian view very fully before Lord Salisbury in December of that year, explaining the merits and the possibilities of the route, not only as



the quickest possible one for mails and passengers between England and Japan and the Northern ports, if not the whole, of China, but also as, under certain eventualities, a most valuable and safe alternative route to India itself. Lord Salisbury was much impressed with the scheme as then unfolded to him, and did not hesitate to speak warmly of the feeling of security for Imperial interests in the East which would be engendered by the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway and the establishment of a fleet of vessels of the "armed cruiser" type on the Northern Pacific Ocean.

After Sir John Macdonald's return to Canada, the High Commissioner laid before the Government in fuller detail the scheme which the Canadian Pacific Railway Company was prepared to carry out, and a formal tender was sent in to the Post Office on 31st March, 1886.

WHAT THE OFFER WAS.—The Post Office had called for tenders for a Mail Service across the Pacific at the rate of 10½ or 11 knots an hour: Sir John Macdonald pointed out that, by the adoption of so comparatively a low rate of speed and the employment of second-rate steamers, not only would the advantage in speed over the Suez route which this line possessed as regards reaching Yokohama, Shanghai, and even Hong Kong, be minimized or altogether lost, but that the route, though itself considerably shorter, would be at a positive disadvantage as compared with that *via* San Francisco, which is served by vessels sailing under a foreign flag and capable of a higher speed than that proposed for the English line. It was shown, on the contrary, that if the Dominion Government, who have since called for tenders for an Atlantic service at a high rate of speed, and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, who were willing under certain conditions to build first-class vessels for the Pacific service, worked together, a fresh chain of communication between England and the far East would be established, at once exclusively British, admirably efficient, and supplying a more rapid delivery of mails and passengers than is attainable by any other route. In furtherance of this scheme the Company offered—

To carry the Mails fortnightly between Vancouver, Yohohama and Hong Kong at an average speed at sea of 14 knots, the highest speed ever contracted for on an ocean voyage.

To build for this purpose, under Admiralty supervision, vessels of a first class type, capable of steaming 18 knots, and adapted not only for the carriage of troops, but also for conversion at short notice into armed cruisers.

To carry the Japan and China Mails between the Atlantic Port and Vancouver free of charge.

To carry troops on service between the Atlantic Port and Hong Kong at absolute cost.

To carry war materials and Government stores across the continent at absolute cost, and small amounts of the same across the Pacific at a nominal charge.

The subsidy for all these services to be £100,000 a year for 10 years.

## HOW THIS SERVICE WOULD HAVE COMPARED WITH OTHER SUBSIDIZED SERVICES.

1. AS TO TIME.—The English mails are at present despatched to China and to Japan fortnightly, *vid* Brindisi and the P. & O. Steamers, and on alternate weeks *vid* Marseilles and the French Messageries steamers. By the new contract with the former Company, which comes into force in 1888, the speed has been accelerated, but even then it will only be 12.50 knots on the Bombay line, and 11.20 on the Shanghai line, which, with Monsoon allowance, means an average considerably below these figures.

The Canadian route to the East would consist of three sections—the Atlantic, the Continental, and the Pacific. The new Atlantic service will be one of at least 15 knots an hour, as tenders have been already asked for 15, 16, 17 and 18-knot services. Across the Continent, the Canadian Pacific Railway being a very well built line, and, with the exception of three short mountain sections, of remarkably easy gradients, and being also under one management throughout, a speed of 25 miles an hour can be easily maintained. Across the Pacific the speed proposed was between 14 and 15 knots per hour.

The Table given in the Appendix shews how the three mail routes compare with each other as to time results.

2. AS TO COST.—The London-Brindisi section of the Suez Mail Route corresponds with the Atlantic Section of the Canadian Route; in each case the cost of the service being additional to that provided for by the subsidy. England pays a very large sum every year for the carriage of all her mails to and from Brindisi, the rates being 16 francs 50 cents per kilo for letters, and 87½ cents for other matters equal to 6s. 6d. and 8d. per lb. respectively. Across the Atlantic the rates are 3s. per lb. for letters, and 3d. per lb. for other matter.

At present the annual subsidy of £360,000 paid to the P. & O. Company for the carriage of the India and China Mails represents a payment of 9s. 3d. for each mile that the mails are carried by the contractor. The reduced subsidy of £265,000 that will commence in 1888 represents 6s. 7d. per mile.

Under the Canadian offer, although for one-third of the distance the mails would have been carried by rail, which is more expensive to operate than water, the rate was 3s. 9d. per mile, and, in addition, the Government would have obtained, without extra cost, the right to charter these vessels for armed cruisers—a right for which they have since adopted in other cases the practice of paying a tonnage retaining fee in time of peace.

The Table given in the Appendix shows the actual and relative cost of the two routes to China.

In making these comparisons between the Suez and the Canadian routes to the East, and in shewing how much the cheaper and the more expeditious the latter would be, it is not intended to depreciate or advocate the giving up of the former. It has always been assumed that it is desirable and was intended to maintain a fortnightly mail to China *via* Suez, and that the Government in offering a subsidy expressly for the Canadian line did so in good faith and intended that the alternate weekly service should be despatched *via* Canada, instead of, as at present, *via* Marseilles. What amount, then, did the Government anticipate would be asked for performing that service? What would they consider a reasonable sum? It has been shown that in subsidizing the Suez line to China, "where there is much competition in the carrying trade," they have decided, that it is necessary and reasonable to pay 6s. 7d. per mile for the carriage of mails alone. Can it, therefore, be said that it would have been unreasonable to pay at least the same amount in order to develop a new route entirely through British territory, to create a fleet of armed cruisers on an ocean where such assistance to the navy is much needed, and to call into "existence the means of postal communication,"\* which cannot be supplied without Government aid? Now, for a fortnightly service between Vancouver, Yokohama and Hong Kong, the subsidy, calculated at the same rate per mile as that which the Post Office have agreed to pay to the Suez route, would amount to about £106,000; and Mr. Holt, tendering for

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\* See Mr. Blackwood's letter of March 17th to Mr. Henniker-Heaton.

this service across the Pacific alone, with vessels of only 11 knots speed, asked for £108,000 *per annum*; and yet, when the offer is made to do the service for £100,000, and, *in addition* to carry the mails more than 3,000 miles each way, by land, the offer is refused.


In 1888 the P. & O. Co. will perform the India and China Services for £95,000 less than they at present receive, and the total saving to the Government on this service will be £107,000 *per annum*. All payments, also, at present made to the French Government and to the Messageries Company, would, if the Canadian tender had been accepted, have been unnecessary; so that actually, while England obtained all the benefits of the Canadian offer, she would have paid for the two British services, with all their contingent advantages, considerably less than she has for ten years past been paying for the one British and one French service without such advantages.


SOME IMPERIAL ASPECTS OF THE SCHEME.—That Canada has, in building her Pacific Railway, made an important contribution to the defence and unity of the Empire at large, is now universally admitted; but comparatively few, perhaps, fully realize what the result is. In the first place the railway has opened up for cultivation the finest wheat lands in the world, upon which, when that portion of the supplies which the United Kingdom now draws from India, Russia, South America and Australia, are in time of war cut off or materially reduced, England will depend for most of her food. Secondly, the railway preserves to the British Crown the important Province of British Columbia, to appreciate the value of which it has only to be considered for a moment what the position of England would have been had the entire West Coast of North America belonged to a foreign power. It is the Dominion, of course, that will primarily benefit by the development of the enormous, but hitherto little known, resources of the Pacific Province; but England secures a new foothold of extraordinary value on the Northern Pacific. She secures for the use of her fleets and mercantile marine the extensive coal fields of Nanaimo, producing the only good coal on the Pacific coast. She secures a *place d'armes* from which she can exert influence on China and Japan, from which she can checkmate Russian designs, from which, when European complications render the Suez route unsafe or altogether useless, she can retain touch of her vast Australasian Colonies, and from which in time of need she can throw men and supplies into India. "The effect," said Lord Dufferin, lately,

“upon the native mind of English troops reaching India from the East as well as from the West would be enormous.” To enable her to begin at once to realise these advantages and to occupy the position on the Pacific which she is henceforth able to hold was the meaning of the proposal which Sir John Macdonald laid before the Cabinet, and which Lord Salisbury seems to have recognised as affording a feeling of security for British interests on the Pacific. Imagine, for a moment, that there is not only another “war scare,” but that war has actually and suddenly been declared; that the Suez Canal is blocked; that telegraphic connection with China and Australia—possibly with India—is suspended. What would be the value, at such a moment, of two or three 18-knot cruisers, ready to take in their guns at Vancouver or Hong Kong, and to keep up communication with the Pacific, China, and Australian squadrons, or to carry reinforcements to Hong Kong or India? That England realizes the need of additional naval strength on the Pacific is proved by the fact that, during the last “war scare” there were expended, during six months, on hired vessels in these waters £333,000, irrespective of whatever sum was expended at San Francisco in securing the refusal of vessels that were never taken up. Of all the vessels so engaged not more than one possessed the speed which would qualify it for employment under the recent regulations for armed cruisers, and many of them would have been, in the words of a naval officer recently on one of those stations, “worse than useless.” This shows not only the necessity for cruisers, but the absence, also, of suitable vessels in those waters.

Has not Canada, in putting before Her Majesty's Government her own scheme as preferable to that proposed by the Post Office, some claim for a generous consideration of her wishes? She, the oldest and largest British Colony, is also the only one to and from which the carriage of the Mails has never cost the British Government anything. In the belief that the latter's spontaneous offer of a subsidy for this Pacific Service would be carried out, Canada has herself advertised for tenders for an Atlantic Service at a much higher speed than exists at present. But more than this. The costly policy which she has so long and so steadily pursued of improving the means of communication between the various parts of the Dominion is one in which she has been from time to time encouraged by the British Government, who recognised that in doing so she was really contributing to the defensiveness of the Empire. In constructing, first, the Inter-Colonial Railway,

and in selecting for it that route which the military authorities deemed best capable of affording that safe communication between the two important fortresses of Halifax and Quebec which the "Trent affair" showed to be so necessary, she acted quite as much out of deference to Imperial wants and wishes as to her own political and commercial requirements. In encouraging the acquisition by Canada of Rupert's Land, and the extension of her authority over the vast North-West territories, England further recognised the fact that the expansion of the Dominion from ocean to ocean was a work of more than colonial interest. It was after these events that Canada ventured on the crowning work of the whole policy, the completion of a railroad from the Atlantic to the Pacific through British territory, at a cost to herself—entirely irrespective of capital raised by the Canadian Pacific Company—of some twenty-five millions sterling, and towards this outlay—a very heavy one for less than five millions of people—she has neither asked nor received one penny of assistance from the British taxpayers. It is true that Canada was allowed to raise under an Imperial guarantee a loan towards the construction of the Inter-Colonial Railway, and again for internal defensive purposes; but these were concessions which cost the guarantor nothing, and the outlay, as has been shown, was by no means incurred solely for the benefit of the Colony. England is now asked to make use of the great work which Canada has done—to develop it in the manner that will be most advantageous to the Empire at large. She is offered a passage for her Imperial forces and stores at merely cost price across the continent. She is shown how the power and influence of England can be enormously increased in a district hitherto inaccessible, and in which, unless this offer were accepted, she would remain comparatively weak. She is shown how Canada's great highway can be developed into a safe alternative Imperial route to India, China and Australasia. In brief, a scheme is submitted alike comprehensive, efficient and economical; a scheme which is a development of, and an improvement upon, England's own suggestion of a Pacific Mail Service; a scheme, the adoption of which would not only provide a Mail Service at a far higher rate of speed than the Postmaster-General called for, but would secure to England advantages of which it is difficult to over-estimate the value: all these great results being accomplished for less than is now being paid for a mere mail delivery by other and slower routes.







Statement shewing present time—1887—from SHANGHAI and YOKOHAMA to London  
P & O. Co. Also time between same ports via CANADA, if Canadian service were e

PENINSULAR AND					ORD
SERVICE.	MAILS <i>via</i> BRINDISI.				From
	From SHANGHAI.		From YOKOHAMA.		N.E.
	N.E.	S.W.	N.E.	S.W.	M
	Monsoon.		Monsoon.		
Leave Shanghai and Yokohama .. ..	April 7	June 11	April 2	June 5	April
Arrive, London .. .. .	May 17	July 25	May 17	July 25	May
Number of days, 1887 .. .. .	40	44	45	50	48
Time under 1888 Contract .. .. .	38.15.30	42.15.30	43.12	48.12	46.15.

S U M M A

	From SHANGHAI.		
	Mails.	Passengers.	M
P. and O. Co. .. .. Days	40 to 44	48 to 52	45
Under New Contract, { Home ,,	38.15.30 to 42.15.30	46.12 to 50.12.0	43.12
1888 .. .. . { Out ,,	37.13.45 to 39.13.45	45.12 to 47.12.0	42.12
Canadian Pacific R. Co. { Home ,,	32	32	
Out ,,			
Gain by Canadian route in 1888 ..	5½ to 10½	13½ to 18½	15½

Mail Rates between London and Brindisi, 6s. 6d. per post  
" " " England and Canada 3s. "


YOKOHAMA to LONDON, for Mails and Passengers according to published schedule, n service were established.

ORIENTAL COMPANY.		CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.					
PASSENGERS <i>via</i> GIBRALTAR.				MAILS AND PASSENGERS.			
From SHANGHAI.		From YOKOHAMA.		From SHANGHAI.		From YOKOHAMA.	
N.E.	S.W.	N.E.	S.W.	All Seasons.		All Seasons.	
Monsoon.		Monsoon.					
April 7	June 11	April 2	June 5	April 7	June 11	April 12	June 16
May 25	Aug. 2	May 25	Aug. 2	May 9	July 13	May 9	July 13
50	48	52	53	58	32	32	27
48.12	46.15.30	50.15.30	51.12	56.12	32	32	27

S U M M A R Y .


From YOKOHAMA.		Subsidy.	Mileage Rate.
Mails.	Passengers.		
45 to 50	53 to 58	£177,176*	9s. 3d.
43.12 to 48.12	51.12 to 56.12	126,500*	6s. 7d.†
42.12 ,, 44.12	50.12 ,, 52.12	£100,000	3s. 9d.
27	27		
15½ to 21½	23½ to 29½	* Proportion of Indian and China contract. † If Bombay Steamer conveys China Mails between Brindisi and Aden, as suggested in new Contract, rate per mile will be 7s. 2½d.	

6s. 6d. per pound, letters. 8d. per pound, other matter.  
 3s. " " 3d. " " "




	Miles.
Vancouver to Yokohama ..	4700
Yokohama " Vancouver ..	4500
" " Shanghai ..	1000
" " Hong Kong ..	1800
Hong Kong " Singapore ..	1480
Singapore " Calcutta ..	1600
Vancouver to Brisbane ..	6510
" " Sydney ..	6980
" " Auckland ..	6220
" " Honolulu ..	9420

A GENERAL CHART OF  
**THE WORLD**  
 ILLUSTRATING  
 THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY



Standard's Geogr. Estab., London.



CANADA'S CONTRIBUTION  
TO THE  
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