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
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DOCUMENTS RELATIFS AUX
RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES DU CANADA

DOCUMENTS ON CANADIAN
EXTERNAL RELATIONS

1939 - 1941
TOME I / PART I

VOLUME 7

Compilé par / Edited by

David R. Murray

University of Guelph
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TABLE DES MATIÈRES

CONTENTS

	PAGE		PAGE
INTRODUCTION.....	viii	INTRODUCTION.....	ix
LISTE DES PERSONNALITÉS.....	xv	LIST OF PERSONS.....	xv
LISTE DES DOCUMENTS.....	xxvii	LIST OF DOCUMENTS.....	xxvii
Chapitre I		Chapter I	
CONDUITE DES RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES		CONDUCT OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS	
1. Relations avec les pays du Commonwealth.....	1	1. Relations with Common- wealth Countries.....	1
2. Relations diplomatiques avec les gouvernements alliés.....	22	2. Diplomatic Relations with Allied Governments.....	22
3. Relations diplomatiques avec les pays de l'Amérique latine..	45	3. Diplomatic Relations with Latin American Countries.....	45
4. Relations diplomatiques avec la Chine et l'Union soviétique..	89	4. Diplomatic Relations with China and the Soviet Union...	89
5. Nomination d'un ministre canadien au Japon.....	97	5. Appointment of Canadian Minister to Japan.....	97
6. Établissement de consulats.....	105	6. Establishment of Consulates...	105
7. Protection des intérêts cana- diens en territoire ennemi.....	124	7. Protection of Canadian Inter- ests in Enemy Territory.....	124
8. Sort des consuls ennemis.....	141	8. Treatment of Enemy Consuls...	141
9. Relations avec les états baltes	158	9. Relations with Baltic States..	158
Chapitre II		Chapter II	
LA GUERRE EN EUROPE		THE WAR IN EUROPE	
1. Objectifs de guerre.....	167	1. War Aims.....	167
2. Réunions interalliées:		2. Inter-Allied Meetings:	
Juin 1941.....	216	June 1941.....	216
Septembre 1941.....	231	September 1941.....	231
3. Efforts en vue de la paix.....	248	3. Peace Initiatives.....	248
4. Invasion allemande de l'Eu- rope occidentale.....	265	4. German Invasion of Western Europe.....	265
5. Déclaration de guerre à l'Italie	324	5. Declaration of War against Italy.....	324
6. Rupture des relations diplo- matiques avec la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande.....	338	6. Severance of Diplomatic Re- lations with Romania, Hun- gary and Finland.....	338
7. Déclaration de guerre à la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande.....	349	7. Declaration of War Against Romania, Hungary and Fin- land.....	349
Chapitre III		Chapter III	
RELATIONS AU SEIN DU COMMON- WEALTH		COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS	
1. La mission Crerar.....	375	1. The Crerar Mission.....	375

	PAGE		PAGE
2. Conférences impériales de guerre projetées.....	408	2. Proposed Imperial War Conferences.....	408
3. Propositions en vue d'un cabinet impérial de guerre.....	431	3. Proposals for an Imperial War Cabinet.....	431
4. Neutralité de l'Irlande.....	451	4. Neutrality of Ireland.....	451
5. Coopération économique.....	458	5. Economic Co-operation.....	458
6. Évacuation des femmes et des enfants britanniques au Canada.....	514	6. Evacuation of British Women and Children to Canada.....	514
7. Neutralité dans les eaux de l'hémisphère occidental.....	533	7. Neutrality of Western Hemisphere Waters.....	533
Chapitre IV		Chapter IV	
PLAN D'ENTRAÎNEMENT AÉRIEN DU COMMONWEALTH BRITANNIQUE		BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN	
1. Négociation du plan.....	549	1. Negotiation of the Plan.....	549
2. Le plan en vigueur.....	671	2. The Plan in Operation.....	671
Chapitre V		Chapter V	
COOPÉRATION MILITAIRE AU SEIN DU COMMONWEALTH		COMMONWEALTH MILITARY CO-OPERATION	
1. Corps expéditionnaires canadiens:		1. Canadian Expeditionary Forces:	
Grande-Bretagne, France, Islande.....	723	Great Britain, France, Iceland.....	723
Hong-kong.....	807	Hong Kong.....	807
Antilles.....	816	West Indies.....	816
2. Coopération navale.....	838	2. Naval Co-operation.....	838
3. Coopération aérienne.....	855	3. Air Co-operation.....	855
4. Le radar.....	907	4. Radar.....	907
5. Défense de l'Amérique du Nord.....	939	5. Defence of North America.....	939
Chapitre VI		Chapter VI	
LE PROBLÈME DU GROENLAND		THE PROBLEM OF GREENLAND	
1. La cryolithe: défense du Groenland.....	947	1. Cryolite: Defence of Greenland.....	947
2. Base aérienne au Groenland....	1039	2. Greenland Air Base.....	1039
Chapitre VII		Chapter VII	
ORGANISATIONS ET CONFÉRENCES INTERNATIONALES		INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES	
1. Société des Nations.....	1073	1. League of Nations.....	1073
2. Organisation internationale du Travail.....	1097	2. International Labour Organization.....	1097
3. Union panaméricaine.....	1103	3. Pan-American Union.....	1103
4. Conférence internationale sur le blé.....	1111	4. International Wheat Conference.....	1111
ILLUSTRATIONS.....	1127	ILLUSTRATIONS.....	1127
INDEX.....	1129	INDEX.....	1129



INTRODUCTION

Le présent volume de la série intitulée *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* et publiée par le ministère des Affaires extérieures est la première parution sur les années de guerre, la période de 1939 à 1945. Avec un deuxième volume, il couvre la période allant du début de la guerre en Europe au début de la guerre en Asie. Les documents choisis ont été disposés par ordre chronologique et par sujet. Le volume 7 contient des documents qui démontrent l'expansion des missions diplomatiques canadiennes à l'étranger après l'ouverture des hostilités et les répercussions de la guerre en Europe sur la politique étrangère du Canada tout en reflétant les relations du Canada avec ses alliés du Commonwealth, notamment la Grande-Bretagne. Le volume 8 portera sur les relations du Canada avec les États-Unis, la France et les gouvernements alliés en exil pendant cette période ainsi que sur le rôle joué par le Canada dans la crise montante en Extrême-Orient qui devait conduire à l'entrée en guerre du Japon. Des documents mettant en lumière les liens de plus en plus étroits qui se sont noués avec Terre-Neuve pendant la guerre seront publiés à part par le ministère des Affaires extérieures.

Certains changements ont été apportés aux principes régissant la compilation et la préparation des volumes de cette série depuis la parution du premier volume en 1967. L'extrait que nous citons ici des nouveaux principes directeurs que le Ministère a rédigé récemment résume les règles auxquelles l'éditeur du présent volume a été soumis :

Ces volumes constituent le dossier de base de la politique étrangère et des relations internationales du gouvernement canadien. Ils sont conçus, sous réserve de l'espace disponible, de façon à constituer, en puisant notamment dans les archives du ministère des Affaires extérieures, un dossier complet des principales décisions prises par le gouvernement canadien en matière de politique étrangère, des raisons qui ont amené le gouvernement canadien à les prendre ainsi que des grands courants et événements internationaux qui ont touché le Canada. S'il faut obtenir des documents d'autres sources, comme des gouvernements étrangers, d'autres ministères ou de collections particulières, pour mieux comprendre les décisions du gouvernement ou les courants et événements qui ont influé sur le Canada, on s'efforcera d'y avoir accès et d'obtenir la permission de les publier.

Les documents sont choisis afin de donner un aperçu de la façon dont la politique a été élaborée et appliquée dans le domaine des relations internationales. On n'omettra aucun document en vue de vernir ou de dissimuler ce qui, avec le recul dont nous bénéficions, pourrait être considéré comme des politiques erronées ou malencontreuses. L'édition de ces volumes est basée sur les principes de l'objectivité historique et de l'intégrité du texte original. Les documents seront

INTRODUCTION

This volume in the series *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, published by the Department of External Affairs, is the first to appear on the war years 1939-45. With a companion volume, it covers the period from the beginning of the war in Europe to the beginning of the war in Asia. The documents selected have been arranged chronologically by topic. Volume 7 contains documents reflecting the expansion of Canada's diplomatic missions abroad after the outbreak of war, the effects of the war in Europe on Canadian foreign policy and Canadian relations with her Commonwealth allies, particularly Great Britain. Volume 8 will document Canadian relations with the United States, France and allied governments-in-exile during this period and the Canadian role in the growing crisis in the Far East leading to Japan's entry into the war. Documents illustrating Canada's increasing ties with Newfoundland during the war will be published by the Department of External Affairs in a separate volume.

Some changes in the basic guidelines governing the compilation and editing of the volumes in this series have occurred since the publication of Volume 1 in 1967. Recently the Department prepared a revised set of guidelines. The extract from this statement printed below summarizes the guidelines under which the Editor of this volume has worked:

The volumes constitute the basic published record of the foreign policy and international relations of the Government of Canada. They are designed, within the confines of manageable space and size, to provide a comprehensive self-contained record of the major foreign policy decisions taken by the Government of Canada, and of the reasons for taking them, as well as of the major international events and trends affecting Canada, as evidenced mainly in the files of the Department of External Affairs. When records from other sources, e.g. foreign governments, other departments, private collections, are required for a better understanding of the Government's decisions or of events and trends affecting Canada, access thereto and permission to publish will be sought so as to include such material whenever possible.

The documents selected are intended to illustrate the formulation and implementation of Canadian policy in the field of international relations. No documents will be omitted in order to gloss over or conceal what might in perspective be considered to be mistaken or misguided policies. The editing of the volumes is based on the principles of historical objectivity and the integrity of the original text. Documents will be published in the language in which they were sent or

publiés dans la langue où ils ont été envoyés ou reçus par le gouvernement. Tous les textes d'encadrement, y compris les en-têtes et les notes, seront rédigés dans les deux langues. . . .

Sous réserve des restrictions établies par le Premier ministre dans sa déclaration à la Chambre des communes le 1^{er} mai 1969 relativement à l'accès aux dossiers du gouvernement et à leur publication, les éditeurs auront libre accès aux dossiers du Ministère et il leur appartiendra de choisir les documents à publier dans la série. En règle générale, les documents seront publiés intégralement. On ne procédera à des abrégements que lorsque le manque d'espace ou le respect de l'intimité d'un individu le dicteront. . . ."

L'éditeur a pu examiner tous les documents de cette période que le Ministère conserve dans ses archives ou qu'il a déposés aux Archives publiques du Canada. Par les soins des exécuteurs littéraires de W. L. Mackenzie King, l'éditeur a eu accès à tous les documents King des années 1939-1941. Le gros des documents publiés dans ce volume a été puisé dans les archives du Ministère, dans les documents King ou dans les documents du Cabinet du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Cette dernière collection, souvent appelée «les documents Skelton» pour des raisons de commodité, renferme les documents de deux sous-secrétaires d'État aux Affaires extérieures, M. O. D. Skelton (1925-1941) et M. Norman A. Robertson (1941-1946). Certains documents, principalement des procès-verbaux des réunions des comités du Cabinet et notamment ceux du Comité de guerre du Cabinet, ont été tirés des archives du Conseil privé. Plusieurs autres collections de documents ont été examinées, dont celles de M. Ernest Lapointe et de M. J. L. Ralston, qui ont tous deux été secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures par intérim pendant quelque temps lorsque le Premier ministre s'est absenté du Canada, mais aucun de ces documents n'a été retenu pour publication. L'éditeur peut dire avec satisfaction que le Ministère n'a empêché la publication d'aucun des documents choisis.

En raison de l'accroissement phénoménal du nombre de télégrammes, de dépêches et de notes de service reçus et expédiés pendant la guerre, il n'a pas été possible de publier tous les documents pertinents. Le but de la sélection effectuée était de montrer l'élaboration de la politique canadienne et, de ce fait, les documents canadiens ont eu la préférence. Heureusement, tous les documents officiels consultés pour la publication des volumes 7 et 8 sont maintenant accessibles au public sous réserve des restrictions énoncées par le Premier ministre dans sa déclaration à la Chambre des communes le 1^{er} mai 1969. Pour aider les lecteurs à retrouver les documents publiés dans ces volumes, la source de chacun d'entre eux a été indiquée dans le coin supérieur droit. Il s'agit soit d'un numéro de dossier du Ministère, soit du nom de la collection d'où le document a été tiré. Les lecteurs qui désirent étudier de plus près les événements dont il est question dans ces documents sont priés de se reporter au livre de M. C. P. Stacey intitulé *Armes, hommes et gouvernements: Les politiques de guerre du Canada (1939-1945)*, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) et à *The Mackenzie King Record*, vol. 1, 1939-1944, rédigé par M. J. W. Pickersgill (University of Toronto Press, 1960).

received by the government. All the supporting apparatus in each volume, including captions and footnotes, will appear in both official languages. . . .

Subject to the limitations set down in the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons on May 1, 1969, regarding access to and publication of the Government's records, editors will be given freedom of access to departmental records as well as freedom in selecting documents for publication in the series. As a general rule, documents will be published in their entirety. Deletions will be made only where considerations of space or the privacy of an individual dictate. . . .

The Editor has been permitted to see all the documents in this period held by the Department or deposited by the Department in the Public Archives of Canada. Through the courtesy of the Literary Executors of W. L. Mackenzie King, the Editor received access to all the King papers for the years 1939-41. The bulk of the documents published in this volume have been selected from the Departmental files, from the King papers or from the papers of the Office of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. This latter collection, often referred to for convenience as "the Skelton papers", contains the papers of two Under-Secretaries of State for External Affairs, Dr. O. D. Skelton (1925-1941) and Norman A. Robertson (1941-1946). Some documents were selected from the Privy Council records, principally minutes of meetings of Cabinet committees, especially those of the Cabinet War Committee. Several other collections of papers were examined, including those of Ernest Lapointe and J. L. Ralston, both of whom served as Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs for short periods during the Prime Minister's absences from Canada, but no documents were selected for publication from these collections. The Editor can happily state that no document which he selected for publication has been withheld by the Department.

The phenomenal increase in the number of telegrams, despatches and memoranda during the war has meant that not every relevant document could be published. The selection attempts to illustrate the formulation of Canadian policy and preference has been given to Canadian documents. Fortunately, all official papers used in the selection of documents for Volumes 7 and 8 are now open to public examination subject to the restrictions mentioned in the Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons on May 1, 1969. To aid readers in locating the documents published in these volumes, the source of each document has been indicated in the top right-hand corner. These sources are either Departmental file numbers or the name of the collection from which the document was selected. Readers wishing related background information on the events covered by the documents are referred to Professor C. P. Stacey's *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada (1939-1945)*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970) and to *The Mackenzie King Record*, Vol. 1, 1939-1944, by J. W. Pickersgill (University of Toronto Press, 1960).

Le ministère des Affaires extérieures n'existait que depuis trente ans lorsque la guerre a éclaté. Il disposait de sept bureaux situés à l'étranger, un haut commissariat à Londres, des légations aux États-Unis, en France, au Japon, en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas, et une délégation auprès de la Société des Nations. En août 1939, l'effectif du Ministère totalisait 174 personnes à tous les échelons. L'administration centrale ne comptait que dix agents, dont quatre étaient classés comme temporaires. Il était évident qu'il fallait augmenter le personnel pour faire face aux problèmes variés des premières années de la guerre, ce que le Ministère fit en nommant des adjoints spéciaux pour la période de la guerre et en prenant comme commis principaux un certain nombre de femmes très qualifiées, même si le système de recrutement des agents par voie de concours de la fonction publique fut suspendu en 1940, à une seule exception près, pour toute la durée de la guerre. Ce n'est qu'après la guerre que les femmes furent recrutées comme agents sur un pied d'égalité avec les hommes.

La mort de M. Skelton en 1941 marqua la fin d'une époque dans les affaires extérieures du Canada. Il avait occupé sans arrêt, depuis 1925, le poste de sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Pour le remplacer, le Premier ministre Mackenzie King nomma immédiatement M. Norman Robertson sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures par intérim; en juin 1941, M. Robertson fut nommé à ce poste à titre permanent. Cette nomination et le fait que la guerre rendait les relations extérieures de plus en plus complexes entraînèrent la première réorganisation administrative du Ministère depuis sa création. Sous le sous-secrétaire, le personnel fut réparti en quatre directions, soit la Direction diplomatique et commerciale, la Direction du Commonwealth britannique et de l'Europe et la Direction de l'Amérique et de l'Extrême-Orient, à la tête desquelles on plaça trois sous-secrétaires adjoints, et la Direction des affaires juridiques que le conseiller juridique continua de diriger.

Je suis redevable au directeur des Affaires historiques du ministère des Affaires extérieures, M. Arthur Blanchette, et au directeur adjoint, M. G. W. Hilborn, pour les conseils et les encouragements qu'ils m'ont donnés au cours des diverses étapes de la préparation de ce volume. M^{me} Ross Francis, M. W. H. Dowswell et M. Anthony Asrilen m'ont apporté une aide inestimable dans le choix et la préparation des documents. M^{me} Francis a préparé l'index, M^{me} Robert P. Cameron a dressé la liste des documents, M. Robert Ferris a établi la liste des personnes et le manuscrit a été dactylographié par M^{le} Louise Marshall. J'ai aussi eu la chance de pouvoir compter sur les connaissances de M^{le} Elizabeth MacCallum. J'éprouve une très grande reconnaissance envers ces personnes et tous les membres du ministère des Affaires extérieures et des Archives publiques du Canada qui m'ont aidé de multiples façons. Toutefois, en tant qu'éditeur, j'assume la responsabilité finale pour le choix et la préparation de ces documents et pour toute erreur ou omission qui pourrait s'être glissée dans le présent volume.


David R. Murray

The Department of External Affairs was thirty years old when war broke out. It was responsible for seven offices outside Canada, the High Commission in London, Legations in the United States, France, Japan, Belgium and The Netherlands, and the Delegation to the League of Nations. Its total staff in August 1939 numbered 174 people of all ranks. Only ten officers served then in Ottawa, of whom four were classified as temporary. Some expansion of staff clearly was necessary to cope with the varied problems of the early war years. The Department increased its staff by appointing special wartime assistants and engaging a number of highly qualified women as principal clerks, although the pre-war system of recruiting officers through competitive civil service examinations was suspended after 1940, with one exception, for the duration of the war. Not until after the war were women recruited as officers on a basis of equality with men.

Dr. Skelton's death in 1941 meant the end of an era in Canadian external affairs. He had served continuously from 1925 as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Prime Minister Mackenzie King immediately named Norman Robertson as Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to replace Dr. Skelton and, in June 1941, he was given the full title of Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Norman Robertson's appointment and the growing complexity of external relations caused by the war resulted in the first formal reorganization of the Department since its creation. Below the Under-Secretary a fourfold division of the staff occurred under three Assistant Under-Secretaries who were appointed to preside over the following divisions: Diplomatic and Commercial; British Commonwealth and European; and American and Far Eastern, and the Legal Adviser who remained in charge of the Legal Division.

I am indebted to the Director of the Historical Division of the Department of External Affairs, Dr. Arthur Blanchette, and to the Deputy Director, Mr. G. W. Hilborn, for the advice and encouragement they have given me throughout the various stages of the production of this volume. Mrs. Ross Francis, Mr. W. H. Dowswell and Mr. Anthony Asrilen have given invaluable help in the selection and editing of the documents. Mrs. Francis prepared the index, Mrs. Robert P. Cameron drafted the list of Documents, Mr. Robert Ferris drew up the list of Persons and the manuscript was typed by Miss Louise Marshall. I have also been fortunate in being able to rely on the expertise of Dr. Elizabeth MacCallum. I am most grateful to these and to many others in the Department of External Affairs and the Public Archives of Canada who assisted me in countless ways. The final responsibility, however, for the selection and editing of these documents and for any errors or omissions is mine as Editor.

David R. Murray



LISTE DES PERSONNALITÉS¹

LIST OF PERSONS¹

- Alexander (A. V.) premier lord de l'Amirauté (1940-1945). Alexander, A. V., First Lord of the Admiralty, 1940-45.
- Amery (L. S.), secrétaire d'État britannique pour l'Inde et la Birmanie (1940-1945). Amery, L. S., British Secretary of State for India and Burma, 1940-45.
- Anderson (major-général T. V.), chef de l'état-major général (1938-1940); inspecteur général au Canada central (1940-1942). Anderson, Major-General T. V., Chief of the General Staff, 1938-40; Inspector General for Central Canada, 1940-42.
- Athlone (comte d'), Gouverneur général (1940-1946). Athlone, Earl of, Governor General, 1940-46.
- Attlee (Clement R.), Chef britannique de l'opposition (1935-1940); lord du Sceau privé et chef adjoint de la Chambre des Communes (1940-1942). Attlee, Clement R., Leader of British Opposition, 1935-40; Lord Privy Seal and Deputy Leader, House of Commons, 1940-42.
- Avenol (J.), Secrétaire général, Société des Nations (1933-1940). Avenol, J., Secretary General, League of Nations, 1933-40.
- Balfour (capitaine H. H.), sous-secrétaire d'État parlementaire britannique pour l'Air (1938-1944). Balfour, Captain H. H., British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air, 1938-44.
- Baudouin (P.), ministre français des Affaires étrangères (1940); ministre d'État et membre du Conseil des ministres (1940-1941). Baudouin, P., French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1940; Minister of State and Member of the Council of Ministers, 1940-41.
- Beaudry (Laurent), sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (1936-1947). Beaudry, Laurent, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1936-47.
- Benes (Edvard), président du Comité national tchécoslovaque à Londres (1939-1940); président du Gouvernement provisoire tchécoslovaque (1940-1945). Benes, Edvard, President, Czechoslovak National Committee in London, 1939-40; President, Provisional Czechoslovak Government, 1940-45.
- Berle (Adolf A., J'), secrétaire d'État adjoint des États-Unis (1938-1944). Berle, Adolf A., Jr., United States Assistant Secretary of State, 1938-44.

¹ Les notices biographiques se limitent aux seules fonctions remplies durant la période du volume.

¹ The biographical details refer only to positions held during the period of this volume.

- Bevin (Ernest), ministre britannique du Travail et du Service national (1940-1945).
- Bowhill (maréchal en chef de l'air sir Frederick), officier commandant en chef de l'Air britannique, Commandement côtier (1937-1941); Commandant du *Ferry Command* (1941-1943).
- Breadner (maréchal de l'air L. S.), chef de l'état-major de l'Air (1940-1943).
- Brooke-Popham (maréchal en chef de l'air sir Robert), membre de la mission aérienne britannique au Canada (1939); commandant en chef, Extrême-Orient (1940-1941).
- Brun (Eske), gouverneur du Groenland du Nord (1939-1947).
- Burchell (Charles J.), haut commissaire en Australie (1939-1941); haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve (1941-1944).
- Burgin (E. L.), ministre britannique des Approvisionnements (1939-1940).
- Caldecote (vicomte), secrétaire d'État britannique aux Dominions (1939); lord chancelier (1939-1940); secrétaire d'État aux Dominions (1940); président du Tribunal du Banc du roi (1940-1946).
- Campbell (sir Gerald), haut commissaire britannique (1938-1941); ministre aux États-Unis (1941-1945).
- Campbell (W. R.), président de la Commission des approvisionnements de guerre (1939-1940).
- Casey (R. G.), ministre australien des Approvisionnements et du Développement (1939-1940); ministre aux États-Unis (1940-1942).
- Chamberlain (Neville), premier ministre britannique (1937-1940).
- Chang Kai-shek (généralissime), président du Conseil militaire national de Chine (1932-1946); président du *Yuan* exécutif (1939-1945); directeur général du *Kuomintang* (depuis 1938).
- Christie (Loring C.), ministre aux États-Unis (1939-1941).
- Churchill (Winston S.), premier lord de l'Amirauté (1939-1940); premier ministre britannique et ministre de la Défense (1940-1945).
- Bevin, Ernest, British Minister of Labour and National Service, 1940-45.
- Bowhill, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick, British Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Coastal Command, 1937-41; commanded Ferry Command, 1941-43.
- Breadner, Air Marshal L. S., Chief of Air Staff, 1940-43.
- Brooke-Popham, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert, Member, British Air Mission to Canada, 1939; Commander-in-Chief, Far East, 1940-41.
- Brun, Eske, Governor of North Greenland, 1939-47.
- Burchell, Charles J., High Commissioner in Australia, 1939-41; High Commissioner in Newfoundland, 1941-44.
- Burgin, E. L., British Minister of Supply, 1939-40.
- Caldecote, Viscount, British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1939; Lord Chancellor, 1939-40; Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1940; Lord Chief Justice, 1940-46.
- Campbell, Sir Gerald, British High Commissioner, 1938-41; Minister in United States, 1941-45.
- Campbell, W. R., Chairman, War Supply Board, 1939-40.
- Casey, R. G., Australian Minister for Supply and Development, 1939-40; Minister in United States, 1940-42.
- Chamberlain, Neville, British Prime Minister, 1937-40.
- Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President, Chinese National Military Council, 1932-46; President of Executive *Yuan*, 1939-45; Director-General of *Kuomintang* since 1938.
- Christie, Loring C., Minister in United States, 1939-41.
- Churchill, Winston S., First Lord of the Admiralty, 1939-40; British Prime Minister, and Minister of Defence, 1940-45.

- Clark (W. C.), sous-ministre des Finances et secrétaire du Conseil du Trésor (1932-1952).
- Courtney (maréchal de l'air sir Christopher), commandant du commandement de réserve, Aviation royale (1939-1940); membre de la mission aérienne britannique au Canada (1939); représentant de l'Air pour les Approvisionnements et l'Organisation auprès du Conseil de l'aviation britannique (1940-1945).
- Craigavon of Stormont (vicomte), premier ministre d'Irlande du Nord (1921-1940).
- Cranborne (vicomte), Payeur général britannique (1940); secrétaire d'État aux Dominions (1940-1942).
- Crerar (major-général H. D. G.), Officier administrateur du quartier général militaire du Canada, Londres (1939-1940); chef de l'état-major général (1940-1941).
- Crerar (Thomas A.), ministre des Mines et Ressources (1936-1945).
- Cripps (sir Stafford), ambassadeur britannique en Union soviétique (1940-1942).
- Croil (vice-maréchal de l'air G. M.), chef de l'état-major de l'Air (1939-1940); inspecteur général, A.R.C. (1940-1943).
- Cross (Ronald H.), ministre britannique de la Guerre économique (1939-1940); ministre de la Navigation (1940-1941).
- Daladier (Édouard), président du Conseil français et ministre de la Défense nationale (1938-1940); ministre de la Guerre, puis des Affaires étrangères (1940).
- Dandurand (Raoul), ministre d'État, chef du Gouvernement au Sénat (1935-1942).
- Darlan (amiral Jean), amiral de la Flotte de France (1939-1942); vice-président du Conseil, ministre des Affaires étrangères (1941-1942).
- de Bournat (comte G.), administrateur, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (1936-1942).
- de Gaulle (général Charles), président du Comité national français, Londres, et commandant des Forces françaises libres (1940-1943).
- Clark, W. C., Deputy Minister of Finance and Secretary of the Treasury Board, 1932-52.
- Courtney, Air Marshal Sir Christopher, Commanding Officer of the Reserve Command, R.A.F., 1939-40; Member, British Air Mission to Canada, 1939; Air Member for Supply and Organization, British Air Council, 1940-45.
- Craigavon of Stormont, Viscount, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 1921-40.
- Cranborne, Viscount, British Paymaster-General, 1940; Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1940-42.
- Crerar, Major General H.D.G., Senior Combatant Officer, Canadian Military Headquarters, London, 1939-40; Chief of the General Staff, 1940-41.
- Crerar, Thomas A., Minister of Mines and Resources, 1936-45.
- Cripps, Sir Stafford, British Ambassador in Soviet Union, 1940-42.
- Croil, Air Vice-Marshal G. M., Chief of Air Staff, 1939-40; Inspector General, R.C.A.F., 1940-43.
- Cross, Ronald H., British Minister of Economic Warfare, 1939-40; Minister of Shipping, 1940-41.
- Daladier, Édouard, French Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, 1938-40; Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1940.
- Dandurand, Raoul, Minister without Portfolio, Leader of the Government in the Senate, 1935-42.
- Darlan, Admiral Jean, Commander-in-Chief, French Naval Forces, 1939-42; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1941-42.
- de Bournat, Count G., Administrator, St. Pierre and Miquelon, 1936-42.
- de Gaulle, General Charles, President, French National Committee, London, and Commander-in-Chief, Free French Forces, 1940-43.

- Désy (Jean), ministre en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas (1939-1940); ministre au Brésil (1941-1944).
- de Valéra (Éamon), premier ministre d'Irlande et ministre des Affaires extérieures (1937-1948).
- Duff (sir Patrick), haut commissaire adjoint britannique (1941-1944).
- Dupuy (Pierre), premier secrétaire, la légation en France (1938-1940); chargé d'affaires auprès des gouvernements de Belgique, des Pays-Bas et de France (1940-1944).
- Eberts (C. C.), troisième secrétaire, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1940-1941); vice-consul à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (1941-1942).
- Eden (Anthony), secrétaire d'État britannique aux Dominions (1939-1940); secrétaire d'État pour la Guerre (1940); secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères (1940-1945).
- Emerson (L. E.), commissaire de Terre-Neuve pour la Justice et Procureur général (1937-1944); commissaire pour la Défense (1940-1944).
- Euler (William D.), ministre du Commerce (1935-1940); Sénateur (1940-1961).
- Fairbairn (J. V.), ministre australien pour l'Aviation civile (1939-1940); membre de la mission aérienne australienne au Canada (1939).
- Feliú H. (L. E.), consul général chilien (1940-1942).
- Foster (brigadier W. W.), directeur des Services auxiliaires du ministère de la Défense nationale (1939-1940); commandant du District militaire n° 12 (1940); ministre-désigné au Japon (1941).
- Fraser (Peter), ministre néo-zélandais de la Santé, de l'Enseignement et de la Navigation (1935-1940); Premier ministre (1940-1949).
- Gardiner (James G.), ministre de l'Agriculture (1935-1957); ministre des Services nationaux de guerre (1940-1941).
- Groenman (F. E. H.), ministre des Pays-Bas (1939-1943).
- Halifax (vicomte), secrétaire d'État britannique aux Affaires étrangères (1938-1940); chef de la Chambre des Lords (1940); ambassadeur aux États-Unis (1941-1946).
- Désy, Jean, Minister in Belgium and The Netherlands, 1939-40; Minister in Brazil, 1941-44.
- de Valéra, Éamon, Irish Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs, 1937-48.
- Duff, Sir Patrick, British Deputy High Commissioner, 1941-44.
- Dupuy, Pierre, First Secretary, Legation in France, 1938-40; Chargé d'Affaires accredited to Governments of Belgium, The Netherlands, and France, 1940-44.
- Eberts, C. C., Third Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 1940-41; Vice-Consul, St. Pierre and Miquelon, 1941-42.
- Eden, Anthony, British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1939-40; Secretary of State for War, 1940; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1940-45.
- Emerson, L. E., Newfoundland Commissioner for Justice and Attorney-General, 1937-44; Commissioner for Defence, 1940-44.
- Euler, William D., Minister of Trade and Commerce, 1935-40; Senator, 1940-61.
- Fairbairn, J. V., Australian Minister for Civil Aviation, 1939-40; Member of Australian Air Mission to Canada, 1939.
- Feliú H., L. E., Chilean Consul General, 1940-42.
- Foster, Brigadier W. W., Director of Auxiliary Services, Department of National Defence, 1939-40; District Officer Commanding Military District No. 12, 1940; Minister-Designate to Japan, 1941.
- Fraser, Peter, New Zealand Minister of Health, Education and Marine, 1935-40; Prime Minister, 1940-49.
- Gardiner, James G., Minister of Agriculture, 1935-57; Minister of National War Services, 1940-41.
- Groenman, F. E. H., Netherlands Minister, 1939-43.
- Halifax, Viscount, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1938-40; Leader of the House of Lords, 1940; Ambassador in United States, 1941-46.

- Hambro (C. J.), délégué norvégien à la Société des Nations (1926-1946); président de l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations (1939); président de la Commission surveillante (1939-1946).
- Hankinson (W. C.), secrétaire principal au haut commissariat britannique (1939-1941).
- Hearne (J. J.), haut commissaire d'Irlande (1939-1950).
- Heeney (A. D. P.), secrétaire principal au Premier ministre (1938-1940); greffier du Conseil privé et secrétaire au Cabinet (1940-1949).
- Hitler (Adolf), chancelier allemand (1933-1945); *Reichsführer* (1934-1945); commandant en chef des Forces armées (1938-1945).
- Hoare (sir Samuel), lord du Sceau privé britannique (1939-1940); secrétaire d'État pour l'Air (1940); ambassadeur en Espagne (1940-1944).
- Holler (G. B.), consul général danois (1930-1946).
- Howe (C. D.), ministre des Transports (1936-1940); ministre des Munitions et Approvisionnements (1940-1945).
- Hudd (Frederic), délégué commercial principal au haut commissariat en Grande-Bretagne (1934-1941); secrétaire suppléant au haut commissariat (1941-1947).
- Hull (Cordell), secrétaire d'État des États-Unis (1933-1944).
- Jaccard (G.), consul général de Suisse (1934-1946).
- Kauffmann (Henrik), ministre danois aux États-Unis (1939-1947).
- Keenleyside (H. L.), premier secrétaire, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1936-1940); conseiller (1940-1941); sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (1941-1944).
- Kelly (J. H.), haut commissaire en Irlande (1940-1941).
- Key (D. McK.), deuxième secrétaire, la légation des États-Unis (1936-1940).
- King (W. L. Mackenzie), Premier ministre (1935-1948); secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1935-1946).
- Hambro, C. J., Norwegian Delegate to League of Nations, 1926-46; President, League of Nations Assembly, 1939; Chairman, Supervisory Commission, 1939-46.
- Hankinson, W. C., Principal Secretary to the British High Commission, 1939-41.
- Hearne, J. J., Irish High Commissioner, 1939-50.
- Heeney, A. D. P., Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1938-40; Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet, 1940-49.
- Hitler, Adolf, German Chancellor, 1933-45; *Reichsführer*, 1934-45; Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, 1938-45.
- Hoare, Sir Samuel, British Lord Privy Seal, 1939-40; Secretary of State for Air, 1940; Ambassador in Spain, 1940-44.
- Holler, G. B., Danish Consul General, 1930-46.
- Howe, C. D., Minister of Transport, 1936-40; Minister of Munitions and Supply, 1940-45.
- Hudd, Frederic, Chief Trade Commissioner, High Commission in Great Britain, 1934-41; Acting Secretary, High Commission, 1941-47.
- Hull, Cordell, United States Secretary of State, 1933-44.
- Jaccard, G., Swiss Consul General, 1934-46.
- Kauffmann, Henrik, Danish Minister in United States, 1939-47.
- Keenleyside, H. L., First Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 1936-40; Counsellor, 1940-41; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1941-44.
- Kelly, J. H., High Commissioner in Ireland, 1940-41.
- Key, D. McK., Second Secretary, United States Legation, 1936-40.
- King, W. L. Mackenzie, Prime Minister, 1935-48; Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1935-46.

- Kirkwood (K. P.), deuxième secrétaire, la légation aux Pays-Bas (1939-1940); premier secrétaire, la légation aux Pays-Bas (1940); consul au Groenland (1940-1941); premier secrétaire, les légations au Chili (1941) et en Argentine (1941-1946).
- Kirkwood, K. P., Second Secretary, Legation in The Netherlands, 1939-40; First Secretary, Legation in The Netherlands, 1940; Consul in Greenland, 1940-41; First Secretary, Legations in Chile, 1941, and Argentina, 1941-46.
- Kuusamo (G. K.), consul général de Finlande (1941).
- Kuusamo, G. K., Finnish Consul General, 1941.
- Lapointe (Ernest), ministre de la Justice et Procureur général (1935-1941).
- Lapointe, Ernest, Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, 1935-41.
- Laureys (Henry), haut commissaire en Afrique du Sud (1940-1944).
- Laureys, Henry, High Commissioner in South Africa, 1940-44.
- Leith-Ross (sir Frederick), directeur général du ministère britannique de la Guerre économique (1939-1942).
- Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick, Director-General, British Ministry of Economic Warfare, 1939-42.
- Léopold III, roi des Belges (1934-1951).
- Leopold III, King of the Belgians, 1934-51.
- Lester (S.), Secrétaire général adjoint, Société des Nations, (1937-1940) Secrétaire général, Société des Nations (1940-1947).
- Lester, S., Deputy Secretary General, League of Nations, 1937-40; Secretary General, League of Nations, 1940-47.
- Lindsay (sir Ronald), ambassadeur britannique aux États-Unis (1930-1939).
- Lindsay, Sir Ronald, British Ambassador in United States, 1930-39.
- Lothian (marquis de), ambassadeur britannique aux États-Unis (1939-1940).
- Lothian, Marquess of, British Ambassador in United States, 1939-40.
- Macdonald (Angus L.), ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals (1940-1945).
- Macdonald, Angus L., Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, 1940-45.
- Macdonald (J. Scott), premier secrétaire, la légation en France (1939-1940); conseiller, la légation en France (1940); conseiller au ministère des Affaires extérieures (1940-1944).
- Macdonald, J. Scott, First Secretary, Legation in France, 1939-40; Counsellor, Legation in France, 1940; Counsellor, Department of External Affairs, 1940-44.
- MacDonald (Malcolm), secrétaire d'État britannique aux Dominions (1938-1939); secrétaire d'État aux Colonies (1938-1940); ministre de la Santé (1940-1941); haut commissaire au Canada (1941-1946).
- MacDonald, Malcolm, British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1938-39; Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1938-40; Minister of Health, 1940-41; High Commissioner in Canada, 1941-46.
- Mackenzie (Ian), ministre de la Défense nationale (1935-1939); ministre des Pensions et de la Santé nationale (1939-1944).
- Mackenzie, Ian, Minister of National Defence, 1935-39; Minister of Pensions and National Health, 1939-44.
- Mahoney (Merchant M.), conseiller commercial, la légation aux États-Unis (1938-1941); conseiller à la légation (1941-1945).
- Mahoney, Merchant M., Commercial Counsellor, Legation in United States, 1938-41; Counsellor of the Legation, 1941-45.
- Maisky (Yvan), ambassadeur soviétique en Grande-Bretagne (1932-1943).
- Maisky, Ivan, Soviet Ambassador in Great Britain, 1932-43.
- Mason (P.), secrétaire adjoint, haut commissariat britannique (1938-1940).
- Mason, P., Assistant Secretary, British High Commission, 1938-40.

- Massey (Vincent), haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne (1935-1946).
- McCarthy (Leighton), ministre aux États-Unis (1941-1943).
- McGreer (E. D'Arcy), chargé d'affaires, la légation au Japon (1939-1942).
- McIvor (G.), commissaire en chef, la Commission canadienne du blé (1937-1958).
- McNaughton (major-général A. G. L.), général commandant la première division canadienne (1939-1940); lieutenant-général, commandant du septième corps (1940); commandant du corps canadien (1940-1942).
- Meighen (Arthur), sénateur (1932-1942); chef du Parti conservateur (1941-1942).
- Menzies (Robert G.), Premier ministre d'Australie, ministre pour la Coordination de la Défense, (1939-1941).
- Meyer (D. de Waal), représentant accrédité d'Afrique du Sud (1938-1945).
- Moffat (J. Pierrepont), ministre des États-Unis (1940-1943).
- Molotov (V. M.), commissaire soviétique des Affaires étrangères (1939-1949).
- Morgenthau (Henry Jr); secrétaire américain du Trésor (1934-1945).
- Morrison (W. S.), ministre britannique des Aliments (1939-1940); ministre des Postes et Télécommunications (1940-1943).
- Mussolini (Benito), chef du Gouvernement, premier ministre d'Italie et secrétaire d'État (1926-1943); ministre de la Guerre, de l'Aviation et de la Marine (1934-1943); maréchal en chef de l'Empire (1938-1943).
- Nelles (contre-amiral P. W.), chef de l'état-major de la Marine (1934-1944); président du Comité des chefs d'état-major (1940-1944).
- Nicolau (D. M.), consul général de Roumanie (1938-1941).
- Osborne (J. A. C.), représentant de la Trésorerie de la mission aérienne britannique au Canada (1939); représentant de la Trésorerie au Conseil britannique des approvisionnements au Canada et aux États-Unis (1940); représentant de la Trésorerie à la mission technique britannique (1941-1942).
- Massey, Vincent, High Commissioner in Great Britain, 1935-46.
- McCarthy, Leighton, Minister in United States, 1941-43.
- McGreer, E. D'Arcy, Chargé d'Affaires, Legation in Japan, 1939-42.
- McIvor, G., Chief Commissioner, Canadian Wheat Board, 1937-58.
- McNaughton, Major-General A. G. L., General Officer Commanding, First Canadian Division, 1939-40; Lieutenant-General, Commander, Seventh Corps, 1940; Commander, Canadian Corps, 1940-42.
- Meighen, Arthur, Senator, 1932-42; Leader of the Conservative Party, 1941-42.
- Menzies, Robert G., Prime Minister of Australia, Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, 1939-41.
- Meyer, D. de Waal, Accredited Representative of South Africa, 1938-45.
- Moffat, J. Pierrepont, United States Minister, 1940-43.
- Molotov, V. M., Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1939-49.
- Morgenthau, Henry Jr., United States Secretary of the Treasury, 1934-45.
- Morrison, W. S., British Minister of Food, 1939-40; Postmaster-General 1940-43.
- Mussolini, Benito, Head of Government, Premier of Italy and Secretary of State, 1926-43; Minister of War, of Navy and of Air, 1934-43; Chief Marshal of the Empire, 1938-43.
- Nelles, Rear Admiral P. W., Chief of Naval Staff, 1934-44; Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 1940-44.
- Nicolau, D. M., Romanian Consul General, 1938-41.
- Osborne, J. A. C., Treasury Representative, British Air Mission to Canada, 1939; Treasury Representative, British Supply Board in Canada and United States, 1940; Treasury Representative, British Technical Mission, 1941-42.

- Pavlašek (Frantisek), consul général de Tchécoslovaquie (1936-1942).
- Pearson (Lester B.), conseiller, secrétaire officiel au haut commissariat en Grande-Bretagne (1939-1941); sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (1941-1942).
- Pétain (maréchal Henri Philippe), ambassadeur français en Espagne (1939-1940); ministre d'État et vice-président du Conseil (1940); chef de l'État français (1940-1942).
- Phillips (sir Frederick), troisième secrétaire, la Trésorerie britannique (1939); représentant spécial de la Trésorerie britannique aux États-Unis (1940-1943).
- Pierlot (Hubert), premier ministre de Belgique (1939-1945).
- Podoski (Victor), consul général de Pologne (1939-1942).
- Porsild (A. E.), vice-consul au Groenland (1940-1941).
- Power (Charles G.), ministre des Postes et Télécommunications (1939-1940); ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air (1940-1944); ministre associé de la Défense nationale (1940-1944).
- Ralston (J. L.), Ministre des Finances et Receveur-général (1939-1940); ministre de la Défense nationale (1940-1944).
- Read (John E.), conseiller juridique, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1929-1946).
- Reid (Escott), deuxième secrétaire, la légation aux États-Unis (1939-1941); deuxième secrétaire, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1941-1944).
- Reynaud (Paul), ministre français des Finances (1938-1940); président du Conseil, ministre des Affaires extérieures et ministre de la Défense nationale (1940).
- Riddell (W. A.), conseiller, la légation aux États-Unis (1937-1940); haut commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande (1940-1946).
- Ristelhueber (René), ministre de France (1940-1942).
- Ritchie (C. S. A.), troisième secrétaire, le haut commissariat en Grande-Bretagne (1939-1940); deuxième secrétaire, le haut commissariat en Grande-Bretagne (1940-1944).
- Pavlašek, Frantisek, Czechoslovak Consul General, 1936-42.
- Pearson, Lester B., Counsellor, Official Secretary, High Commission in Great Britain, 1939-41; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1941-42.
- Pétain, Marshal Henri Philippe, French Ambassador in Spain, 1939-40; Minister of State and Vice-President of the Council, 1940; Chief of the French State, 1940-42.
- Phillips, Sir Frederick, Third Secretary, British Treasury, 1939; Special Representative of the British Treasury in United States, 1940-43.
- Pierlot, Hubert, Belgian Prime Minister, 1939-45.
- Podoski, Victor, Polish Consul General, 1939-42.
- Porsild, A. E., Vice-Consul in Greenland, 1940-41.
- Power, Charles G., Postmaster-General, 1939-40; Minister of National Defence for Air, 1940-44; Associate Minister of National Defence, 1940-44.
- Ralston, J. L., Minister of Finance and Receiver General, 1939-40; Minister of National Defence, 1940-44.
- Read, John E., Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, 1929-46.
- Reid, Escott, Second Secretary, Legation in United States, 1939-41; Second Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 1941-44.
- Reynaud, Paul, French Minister of Finance, 1938-40; Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of National Defence, 1940.
- Riddell, W. A., Counsellor, Legation in United States, 1937-40; High Commissioner in New Zealand, 1940-46.
- Ristelhueber, René, French Minister, 1940-42.
- Ritchie, C. S. A., Third Secretary, High Commission in Great Britain, 1939-40; Second Secretary, High Commission in Great Britain, 1940-44.

- Riverdale (lord), président de la mission aérienne britannique au Canada (1939).
- Robertson (Norman A.), premier secrétaire, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1935-1940); conseiller (1940-1941); sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures (janvier-juin 1941); sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1941-1946).
- Rogers (Norman McL.), ministre du Travail (1935-1939); ministre de la Défense nationale (1939-1940).
- Roosevelt (Franklin D.), président des États-Unis (1933-1945).
- Rossi Longhi (marchese A.), consul général d'Italie (1937-1940).
- Saunders (capitaine de groupe H. W. L.), chef de l'état-major de l'Air de Nouvelle-Zélande (1939-1941); membre, la mission aérienne néo-zélandaise au Canada (1939).
- Savage (M. J.), premier ministre et ministre des Affaires extérieures de Nouvelle-Zélande (1935-1940).
- Sikorski (général Wladyslaw), premier ministre du Gouvernement polonais en exil; commandant en chef de l'Armée polonaise (1939-1943).
- Silvercruys (baron Robert de), ministre de Belgique (1937-1943).
- Simon (sir John), chancelier de l'Échiquier britannique (1937-1940); lord Chancelier (1940-1945).
- Skelton (O. D.), sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1925-1941).
- Smuts (général Jan Christiaan), premier ministre d'Afrique du Sud, ministre des Affaires extérieures, ministre de la Défense (1939-1948).
- Spaak (Paul-Henri), ministre belge des Affaires étrangères (1939-1946).
- Staline (Joseph V.), membre du Politburo du Parti communiste soviétique (1917-1952); secrétaire général du Comité central du Parti communiste soviétique (1922-1952); commissaire du peuple à la Guerre et commandant en chef (1941-1946).
- Steen (Daniel), consul général de Norvège (1934-1949).
- Svane (Axel), gouverneur du Groenland du Sud (1932-1941).
- Riverdale, Lord, Chairman, British Air Mission to Canada, 1939.
- Robertson, Norman A., First Secretary, Department of External Affairs 1935-40; Counsellor, 1940-41; Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, January-June 1941; Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1941-46.
- Rogers, Norman McL., Minister of Labour, 1935-39; Minister of National Defence, 1939-40.
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., President of the United States, 1933-45.
- Rossi Longhi, Marchese A., Italian Consul General, 1937-40.
- Saunders, Group Captain H. W. L., New Zealand Chief of Air Staff, 1939-41; Member, New Zealand Air Mission to Canada, 1939.
- Savage, M. J., Prime Minister of New Zealand and Minister of External Affairs, 1935-40.
- Sikorski, General Wladyslaw, Prime Minister, Polish Government-in-Exile, Commander-in-Chief, Polish Army, 1939-43.
- Silvercruys, Baron Robert de, Belgian Minister, 1937-43.
- Simon, Sir John, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1937-40; Lord Chancellor, 1940-45.
- Skelton, O. D., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1925-41.
- Smuts, General Jan Christiaan, South African Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs, Minister of Defence, 1939-48.
- Spaak, Paul-Henri, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1939-46.
- Stalin, Joseph V., Member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party, 1917-52; General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, 1922-52; Commissar of Defence and Commander-in-Chief, 1941-46.
- Steen, Daniel, Norwegian Consul General, 1934-49.
- Svane, Axel, Governor of South Greenland, 1932-41.

- Towers (Graham F.), gouverneur de la Banque du Canada (1934-1954); président de la Commission de contrôle du change étranger (1934-1951).
- Towers, Graham F., Governor, Bank of Canada, 1934-54; Chairman, Foreign Exchange Control Board, 1934-51.
- Turgeon (W. F. A.), juge en chef de la Cour suprême du Saskatchewan (1938-1941); ministre en Argentine (1941-1944); ministre au Chili (1941-1942).
- Turgeon, W. F. A., Chief Justice of Saskatchewan, 1938-41; Minister in Argentina, 1941-44; Minister in Chile, 1941-42.
- Tweedsmuir of Elsfield (baron), Gouverneur général (1935-1940).
- Tweedsmuir of Elsfield, Baron, Governor General, 1935-40.
- Vanier (lieutenant-colonel Georges P.), ministre en France (1939-1942) (retourna à Londres, puis au Canada en 1940); membre de la Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense (1940-1943); brigadier, commandant en chef du district militaire n° 5 (1941-1943).
- Vanier, Lieutenant-Colonel George P., Minister in France, 1939-42 (returned to London and then to Ottawa, 1940); Member of Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-43; Brigadier, District Officer Commanding Military District no. 5, 1941-43.
- Walwyn (vice-amiral sir Humphrey), gouverneur de Terre-Neuve (1936-1946).
- Walwyn, Vice-Admiral Sir Humphrey, Governor of Newfoundland, 1936-46.
- Welles (Sumner), sous-secrétaire d'État des États-Unis (1937-1943).
- Welles, Sumner, United States Under-Secretary of State, 1937-43.
- Weygand (général Maxime), commandant en chef des Forces françaises au Levant (1939-1940); chef de l'état-major général et commandant en chef (1940); ministre de la Défense nationale (1940); commandant en chef des Forces françaises outre-mer en Afrique du Nord (1940); Gouverneur d'Algérie et délégué du gouvernement en Afrique du Nord (1941).
- Weygand, General Maxime, Commander-in-Chief, French Forces in the Levant, 1939-40; Chief of the General Staff and Commander-in-Chief, 1940; Minister of National Defence, 1940; Commander-in-Chief of French Forces Overseas in North Africa, 1940; Governor-General of Algeria and Government Delegate in North Africa, 1941.
- Wilgress (L. Dana), directeur du Bureau des renseignements commerciaux, ministère du Commerce (1932-1940); sous-ministre du Commerce (1940-1942).
- Wilgress, L. Dana, Director, Commercial Intelligence Service, Department of Trade and Commerce, 1932-40; Deputy Minister, Department of Trade and Commerce, 1940-42.
- Winant (J. G.), directeur du Bureau international du travail (1939-1941); ambassadeur des États-Unis en Grande-Bretagne (1941-1946).
- Winant, J. G. Director, International Labour Office, 1939-41; United States Ambassador in Great Britain, 1941-46.
- Windels (Erich), consul général d'Allemagne (1937-1939).
- Windels, Erich, German Consul General, 1937-39.
- Winter (Charles), consul général de Hongrie (1928-1941).
- Winter, Charles, Hungarian Consul General, 1928-41.
- Wood (sir Kingsley), secrétaire d'État britannique pour l'Air (1938-1940); lord du Sceau privé (1940); chancelier de l'Échiquier (1940-1943).
- Wood, Sir Kingsley, British Secretary of State for Air, 1938-40; Lord Privy Seal, 1940; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1940-43.
- Wood (S. T.), commissaire, Gendarmerie royale du Canada (1938-1951).
- Wood, S. T., Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1938-51.

Wrong (H. Hume), délégué permanent, Société des Nations (1938-1941); conseiller économique spécial, haut commissariat en Grande-Bretagne (1939-1941); ministre-conseiller, la légation aux États-Unis (1941-1942).

Yoshizawa (S.), chef du Bureau des affaires américaines, ministère japonais des Affaires étrangères (1937-1940); ministre japonais au Canada (1940-1941).

Wrong, H. Hume, Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, 1938-41; Special Economic Adviser, High Commission in Great Britain, 1939-41; Minister-Counsellor, Legation in United States, 1941-42.

Yoshizawa, S., Chief, American Affairs Bureau, Japanese Department of Foreign Affairs, 1937-40; Japanese Minister in Canada, 1940-41.



LISTE DES DOCUMENTS

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

CHAPITRE I

CONDUITE DES RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES

PARTIE I

RELATIONS AVEC LES MEMBRES DU COMMONWEALTH

AUSTRALIE

1939

1. 3 sept. *Le Premier ministre au premier ministre d'Australie.* Suggère qu'il y ait un échange de hauts commissaires..... 1
2. 6 sept. *Le Premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Accepte qu'un échange de hauts commissaires se fasse aussitôt que possible..... 2
3. 11 sept. *Le Premier ministre au premier ministre d'Australie.* Annonce qu'il a l'intention de nommer des hauts commissaires en Australie et dans d'autres Dominions..... 2
4. 11 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Fait part de son intention de nommer des hauts commissaires dans les pays du Commonwealth et de la réponse de l'Australie, qui accepte cet échange..... 2
5. 13 sept. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que le Parlement connaît son intention d'échanger des hauts commissaires..... 3
6. 2 nov. *Décret du Conseil.* Nomme M. C. J. Burchell haut commissaire du Canada en Australie..... 3

CHAPTER I

CONDUCT OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS

PART 1

RELATIONS WITH COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS

AUSTRALIA

1939

1. Sept. 3 *Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia.* Suggests exchange of High Commissioners 1
2. Sept. 6 *Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Agrees to early exchange of High Commissioners 2
3. Sept. 11 *Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia.* Announces intention to appoint High Commissioners to Australia and other Dominions 2
4. Sept. 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Reports intention to appoint High Commissioners to Commonwealth countries and decision of Australia to reciprocate 2
5. Sept. 13 *Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports announcement to Parliament of intended exchange of High Commissioners 3
6. Nov. 2 *Order in Council.* Appoints C. J. Burchell as Canadian High Commissioner in Australia 3

7. 23 déc. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre.* Annonce que sir William Glasgow est nommé haut commissaire d'Australie au Canada.....

7. Dec. 23 *Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister.* Announces appointment of Sir William Glasgow as Australian High Commissioner in Canada

NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE

NEW ZEALAND

1939

1939

8. 6 sept. *Le premier ministre par intérim de Nouvelle-Zélande au Premier ministre.* Accepte en principe qu'il y ait un échange de hauts commissaires.....

8. Sept. 6 *Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister.* Agrees in principle to exchange of High Commissioners

9. 28 déc. *Décret du Conseil.* Nomme M. W. A. Riddell haut commissaire du Canada en Nouvelle-Zélande.....

9. Dec. 28 *Order in Council.* Appoints Dr. W. A. Riddell as Canadian High Commissioner in New Zealand

10. 30 déc. *Le Premier ministre au premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande.* Annonce que M. W. A. Riddell est nommé haut commissaire du Canada en Nouvelle-Zélande.....

10. Dec. 30 *Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand.* Announces appointment of Dr. W. A. Riddell as Canadian High Commissioner

1941

1941

11. 27 juin *Le haut commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part de la décision de la Nouvelle-Zélande de nommer un haut commissaire au Canada.....

11. June 27 *High Commissioner in New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports New Zealand decision to appoint High Commissioner in Canada

12. 4 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Extérieures.* Annonce que le ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande à Washington sera chargé des intérêts de son pays au Canada jusqu'à ce que son gouvernement y nomme un haut commissaire.....

12. Dec. 4 *High Commissioner in New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports that New Zealand Minister in Washington will be responsible for interests in Canada until a New Zealand High Commissioner is appointed

AFRIQUE DU SUD

SOUTH AFRICA

1939

1939

13. 12 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre des Affaires extérieures de l'Afrique du Sud.* Annonce son intention de nommer un haut commissaire en Afrique du Sud....

13. Sept. 12 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister for External Affairs of South Africa.* Announces intention to appoint High Commissioner to South Africa

14. 14 sept. *Le représentant accrédité de l'Afrique du Sud au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Se réjouit du projet de nomination d'un haut commissaire du Canada en Afrique du Sud.....

14. Sept. 14 *Accredited Representative of South Africa to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Welcomes intended appointment of High Commissioner for Canada in South Africa

1940

15. 18 janv. *Décret du Conseil.*
Nomme M. H. Laureys, haut commis-
saire du Canada en Afrique du Sud..... 7

IRLANDE

1939

16. 8 sept. *Le sous-secrétaire*
d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut
commissaire d'Irlande. Annonce la
prochaine nomination d'un haut commis-
saire du Canada en Irlande..... 7

17. 28 déc. *Décret du Conseil.*
Nomme M. J. H. Kelly haut commis-
saire du Canada en Irlande..... 8

18. 29 déc. *Le haut commissariat*
d'Irlande au ministère des Affaires ex-
térieures. Discute le titre et le rang de
leurs représentants respectifs..... 8

19. 30 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État*
aux Affaires extérieures au ministre des
Affaires extérieures d'Irlande. Explique
la position canadienne relativement au
rang et au mode de leur représentation
respective..... 9

1940

20. 1^{er} janv. *Le ministre des Af-*
aires extérieures d'Irlande au secrétaire
d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Accepte
le point de vue canadien concernant le
rang des représentants mais souhaite
qu'on le revise à l'avenir..... 10

TERRE-NEUVE

1941

21. 27 mars *Mémoire d'État du con-*
seiller au sous-secrétaire d'État par
intérim aux Affaires extérieures. Donne
les raisons qui militent en faveur de la
nomination d'un représentant canadien
permanent à Terre-Neuve..... 10

22. 21 avril *Mémoire d'État du con-*
seiller au sous-secrétaire d'État par
intérim aux Affaires extérieures. Traite
de l'accueil favorable que les commis-
saires de Terre-Neuve ont réservé au
projet de nomination d'un représentant
canadien..... 12

1940

15. Jan. 18 *Order in Council.*
Appoints Dr. H. Laureys as Cana-
dian High Commissioner in South
Africa 7

IRELAND

1939

16. Sept. 8 *Under-Secretary*
of State for External Affairs to High
Commissioner of Ireland. Announces
intended appointment of Canadian
High Commissioner in Ireland 7

17. Dec. 28 *Order in Coun-*
cil. Appoints J. H. Kelly as Canadian
High Commissioner in Ireland 8

18. Dec. 29 *High Commis-*
sion of Ireland to Department of Ex-
ternal Affairs. Discusses title and
status of respective representatives 8

19. Dec. 30 *Secretary of*
State for External Affairs to Minister
for External Affairs of Ireland. Ex-
plains Canadian position regarding
status and style of respective repre-
sentatives 9

1940

20. Jan. 1 *Minister for Ex-*
ternal Affairs of Ireland to Secretary
of State for External Affairs. Accepts
Canadian position concerning status
of representatives but hopes for
eventual re-designation 10

NEWFOUNDLAND

1941

21. March 27 *Memorandum*
from Counsellor to Acting Under-
Secretary of State for External
Affairs. Argues case for appoint-
ment of permanent Canadian repre-
sentative in Newfoundland 10

22. April 21 *Memorandum*
from Counsellor to Acting Under-
Secretary of State for External
Affairs. Reports favourable reaction
of Newfoundland Commissioners to
suggested appointment of Canadian
representative 12

23. 15 juill. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier Ministre.* Résume les raisons pour lesquelles un représentant canadien doit être rapidement nommé à Terre-Neuve et soumet les noms de quelques candidats possibles.....

13

24. 19 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve.* Demande son approbation concernant le projet de nomination d'un haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve.....

16

25. 22 juill. *Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Accueille favorablement la demande de nomination d'un haut commissaire du Canada à Terre-Neuve.....

17

26. 23 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve.* Annonce que M. C. J. Burchell est nommé haut commissaire du Canada à Terre-Neuve.....

17

27. 31 juill. *Décret du Conseil.* Établit le poste de haut commissaire du Canada à Terre-Neuve.....

17

28. 31 juill. *Décret du Conseil.* Nomme M. C. J. Burchell haut commissaire du Canada à Terre-Neuve.....

18

INDE

1940

29. 5 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au Premier Ministre.* Explique les raisons de la Grande-Bretagne en faveur d'un échange de hauts commissaires entre le Canada et l'Inde.....

18

1941

30. 20 janv. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Remarque que l'octroi du droit de vote par le Canada aux Indiens devrait précéder l'échange de hauts commissaires avec l'Inde.....

19

23. July 15 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Summarizes reasons for early appointment of Canadian representative in Newfoundland and suggests possible appointees

13

24. July 19 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland.* Requests approval of intention to appoint High Commissioner in Newfoundland

16

25. July 22 *Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Welcomes plan for appointment of Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland

17

26. July 23 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland.* Announces nomination of C. J. Burchell as High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland

17

27. July 31 *Order in Council.* Establishes office of High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland

17

28. July 31 *Order in Council.* Appoints C. J. Burchell as High Commissioner in Newfoundland

18 ..

INDIA

1940

29. Nov. 5 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Explains British reasons for favouring exchange of High Commissioners between Canada and India

18

1941

30. Jan. 20 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Observes that enfranchisement of East Indians in Canada would have to precede exchange of High Commissioners

19

- 31. 5 févr. *Le Premier ministre au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Explique que l'octroi du droit de vote est actuellement inopportun et que l'échange de représentants est par conséquent prématuré..... 20
- 32. 29 mars *Le secrétaire au gouvernement de l'Inde au Gouverneur général.* Communique la proposition de l'Inde de nommer un délégué commercial au Canada..... 21
- 33. 3 avril *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire au gouvernement de l'Inde.* Accepte cette proposition..... 21

- 31. Feb. 5 *Prime Minister to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Explains that enfranchisement of East Indians is not advisable at present and that, therefore, exchange of representatives is untimely 20
- 32. March 29 *Secretary to the Government of India to Governor General.* Communicates Indian proposal to appoint Trade Commissioner in Canada 21
- 33. April 3 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary to the Government of India.* Agrees with proposal to appoint Trade Commissioner in Canada 21

PARTIE 2

RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES AVEC LES GOUVERNEMENTS ALLIÉS

BELGIQUE ET PAYS-BAS

1940

- 34. 10 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre auprès du gouvernement belge à Londres.* Rappelle Désy et Renaud aux fins de consultation et annonce qu'il compte nommer un chargé d'affaires en Belgique, aux Pays-Bas et en France..... 22
- 35. 11 oct. *Le ministre auprès du gouvernement belge à Londres au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande des instructions pour annoncer leur départ aux gouvernements de la Belgique et des Pays-Bas..... 22
- 36. 15 oct. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre suppléant.* Recommande que Pierre Dupuy soit nommé chargé d'affaires auprès des légations de France, de Belgique et des Pays-Bas..... 22
- 37. 21 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre auprès du gouvernement belge à Londres.* Charge Désy d'aviser la Belgique et les Pays-Bas que Dupuy est nommé chargé d'affaires par intérim..... 23

PART 2

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ALLIED GOVERNMENTS

BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS

1940

- 34. Oct. 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister to the Government of Belgium in London.* Recalls Désy and Renaud for consultation and states intention to appoint Chargé d'Affaires for Belgium, The Netherlands and France.... 22
- 35. Oct. 11 *Minister to the Government of Belgium in London to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests instructions about announcing departure to Governments of Belgium and The Netherlands 22
- 36. Oct. 15 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Prime Minister.* Recommends appointment of Pierre Dupuy as Chargé d'Affaires for Legations to France, Belgium and The Netherlands 22
- 37. Oct. 21 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister to the Government of Belgium in London.* Instructs Désy to inform Belgium and The Netherlands of appointment of Dupuy as Chargé d'Affaires a.i. 23

TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE

1939

38. 29 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que la Grande-Bretagne a reconnu le Comité national tchécoslovaque.....

23

1940

39. 10 janv. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Joint la lettre de Benes qui expose la constitution du Comité national tchécoslovaque et demande de coopérer au recrutement d'une armée tchécoslovaque.....

24

40. 28 mars *Le consul général de Tchécoslovaquie au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande au Canada s'il a l'intention de reconnaître le Comité national tchécoslovaque.....

25

41. 24 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet la requête urgente de Benes, demandant au Canada de reconnaître le Comité national tchécoslovaque.....

26

42. 25 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Espère qu'on étudiera bientôt la question de la reconnaissance du gouvernement provisoire tchécoslovaque.....

26

43. 31 mai *Mémoire du conseiller au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Traite de la reconnaissance du gouvernement provisoire tchécoslovaque et de son rapport avec le recrutement au Canada pour l'armée tchécoslovaque en France.....

26

44. 1^{er} juin *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général de Tchécoslovaquie.* Recommande que l'on étudie la question de la reconnaissance du gouvernement provisoire tchécoslovaque.....

28

45. 21 sept. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Joint une note

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1939

38. Dec. 29 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports British recognition of Czechoslovak National Committee

23

1940

39. Jan. 10 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Encloses Benes' letter which outlines constitution of Czechoslovak National Committee and requests cooperation in recruitment of Czechoslovak Army

24

40. March 28 *Consul General of Czechoslovakia to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests information on Canadian recognition of Czechoslovak National Committee

25

41. May 24 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits Benes' urgent request for Canadian recognition of Czechoslovak National Committee

26

42. May 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Offers hope for early consideration of recognition of Czechoslovak Provisional Government

26

43. May 31 *Memorandum from Counsellor to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Discusses recognition of Provisional Czechoslovak Government and relation to it of recruitment in Canada for Czechoslovak Army in France

26

44. June 1 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General of Czechoslovakia.* Suggests discussion concerning recognition of Provisional Czechoslovak Government

28

45. Sept. 21 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* En-

du secrétaire d'État au ministère tchécoslovaque des Affaires étrangères qui expose la constitution du gouvernement provisoire tchécoslovaque et demande la reconnaissance dudit gouvernement..	28	closes note from Secretary of State in Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlining constitution of Provisional Czechoslovak Government and requesting recognition thereof ..	28
46. 12 oct. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général de Tchécoslovaquie.</i> Transmet la reconnaissance par le Canada du gouvernement provisoire tchécoslovaque.....	30	46. Oct. 12 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General of Czechoslovakia.</i> Conveys recognition of Provisional Czechoslovak Government	30
47. 12 oct. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Annonce la décision de reconnaître le gouvernement provisoire tchécoslovaque et le consul général de Tchécoslovaquie au Canada.....	31	47. Oct. 12 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> Communicates decision to recognize Provisional Czechoslovak Government and Czechoslovak Consul General in Canada	31
48. 28 déc. <i>Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Demande de s'entendre sur une formule de reconnaissance du statut des représentants consulaires tchécoslovaques.....	32	48. Dec. 28 <i>Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Requests concurrence in procedure for recognizing status of Czechoslovak consular representatives	32
1941		1941	
49. 30 janv. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.</i> Est d'accord avec la formule suggérée.....	32	49. Jan. 30 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.</i> Agrees with suggested procedure	32
GRÈCE		GREECE	
1941		1941	
50. 18 juin <i>Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Annonce que le gouvernement grec désire établir une mission diplomatique au Canada.....	33	50. June 18 <i>Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Communicates desire of Greek Government to establish Diplomatic Mission in Canada	33
51. 9 août <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.</i> Demande de préciser la position grecque sur la réciprocité de la représentation diplomatique en temps de guerre.....	33	51. Aug. 9 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.</i> Seeks clarification of Greek position on wartime reciprocity in diplomatic representation	33
NORVÈGE		NORWAY	
1940		1940	
52. 2 oct. <i>Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.</i> Traite de l'émigration possible du gouvernement norvégien au Canada et conséquemment de la nomination d'un ministre norvégien..	34	52. Oct. 2 <i>Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.</i> Discusses possibility of migration of Norwegian Government to Canada and consequent appointment of Norwegian Minister	34

1941

53. 16 janv. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part de la proposition norvégienne de nommer un ministre au Canada et de l'appui que le gouvernement britannique accorde à cette idée..... 35
54. 24 janv. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne*. Réaffirme la politique de ne pas étendre le service diplomatique à d'autres pays européens à l'heure actuelle..... 36
55. 29 mars *Le consul général de Norvège au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*. Expose les raisons pour lesquelles la Norvège désire établir une légation au Canada.... 37
56. 29 mars *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Résume les raisons pour lesquelles la Norvège favorise l'établissement d'une légation au Canada durant la guerre..... 38
57. 20 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Demande d'aviser le ministre des Affaires étrangères de Norvège que le Canada accepte sa proposition d'élever le consulat général au rang de légation..... 39

POLOGNE

1941

58. 5 mars *Le consul général de Pologne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande au gouvernement canadien d'élever le consulat général de Pologne au rang de légation..... 39
59. 16 avril *Le consul général de Pologne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*. Déclare que la réciprocité diplomatique n'est pas indispensable à l'heure actuelle..... 40
60. 9 août *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général de Pologne*. Suggère que le Canada pourrait ne pas établir de représentation diplomatique à Londres

1941

53. Jan. 16 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports Norwegian proposal to appoint Minister in Canada and expresses British Government support of idea 35
54. Jan. 24 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission of Great Britain*. Reasserts policy of not extending Diplomatic Service to further European countries at present time..... 36
55. March 29 *Consul General of Norway to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Outlines reasons for Norway's desire to establish Legation in Canada 37
56. March 29 *Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Recapitulates Norwegian argument favouring establishment of Legation in Canada for duration of war 38
57. Nov. 20 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends instructions to inform Norwegian Foreign Minister of Canadian acceptance of proposal to raise status of Norwegian Consulate General to Legation 39

POLAND

1941

58. March 5 *Consul General of Poland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests Canadian Government to raise Polish Consulate General to status of Legation 39
59. April 16 *Consul General of Poland to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States that full diplomatic reciprocity is not essential at present 40
60. Aug. 9 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General of Poland*. Suggests that Canada may not reciprocate in establishing diplomatic representative in

et cherche à s'assurer que l'arrangement proposé sera seulement pour la période des hostilités..... 40

61. 18 oct. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. S'inquiète de la réaction polonaise devant l'hésitation du Canada à augmenter sa représentation diplomatique outre-mer..... 41

62. 20 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Le charge d'expliquer au ministre polonais des Affaires étrangères les raisons pour lesquelles le Canada désire ne pas accorder la réciprocité avant la fin de la guerre.... 41

YUGOSLAVIE

1941

63. 28 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet la demande de la Yougoslavie d'établir une légation à Ottawa sur une base de non-réciprocité..... 43

64. 31 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande des instructions concernant la réponse canadienne à la proposition yougoslave d'établir une légation à Ottawa..... 44

65. 9 août *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Cherche à s'assurer que l'arrangement proposé par la Yougoslavie en matière de représentation diplomatique au Canada sera seulement pour la période des hostilités 44

66. 11 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part de la proposition de nommer M. Isidor Cankar ministre de Yougoslavie au Canada..... 44

PARTIE 3

RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES AVEC LES PAYS DE L'AMÉRIQUE LATINE

ARGENTINE

1940

67. 5 avril *Mémoire du conseiller au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Af-*

London and seeks assurance that proposed arrangement would be only for duration of war 40

61. Oct. 18 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Expresses concern over Poles' reaction to Canada's reluctance to increase its diplomatic representation abroad 41

62. Nov. 20 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends instructions to explain to Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Canada's reasons for wanting to defer reciprocal representation until after the war 41

YUGOSLAVIA

1941

63. May 28 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Transmits Yugoslav request for establishment of Legation in Ottawa on non-reciprocal basis 43

64. July 31 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests instructions concerning Canadian reply to Yugoslav proposal to establish Legation in Ottawa 44

65. Aug. 9 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Seeks assurance that proposed arrangement for Yugoslav diplomatic representation in Canada would be only for duration of war 44

66. Nov. 11 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports proposal to appoint Dr. Isidor Cankar as Yugoslav Minister 44

PART 3

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

ARGENTINA

1940

67. April 5 *Memorandum from Counsellor to Under-Secretary*

- fares extérieures. Traite des propositions de l'Argentine concernant un accord spécial sur le commerce et de la nomination d'un représentant diplomatique au Canada sur une base de non-réciprocité.....* 45
68. 3 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Demande des instructions concernant la réponse à faire à la proposition de l'Argentine d'échanger des missions diplomatiques* 46
69. 24 mai *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Fait part de sa conversation avec l'ambassadeur argentin au sujet de la proposition d'échanger des missions diplomatiques et demande des renseignements sur la position du gouvernement canadien.....* 47
70. 29 mai *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre. Note que l'Argentine souhaite vivement échanger des missions diplomatiques et en signale les difficultés.....* 48
71. 6 août *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Fait part de la demande réitérée de l'ambassadeur argentin au sujet de l'établissement de missions diplomatiques.....* 49
72. 10 août *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre. Traite du degré d'importance de divers pays latino-américains en ce qui concerne le Canada et des nominations possibles en cas d'échanges diplomatiques avec l'Argentine et le Brésil.....* 49
73. 13 août *Mémoire du Premier ministre au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Indique sa préférence pour les échanges d'agents consulaires avec l'Argentine et le Brésil comme préalable aux échanges diplomatiques.....* 50
74. 12 sept. *Extrait du mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre. Explique les raisons pour lesquelles tout échange diplomatique avec l'Amérique latine devrait se faire au niveau des légations.....* 51
- of State for External Affairs. Discusses Argentine proposals for special trade agreement and appointment of diplomatic representative in Canada on non-reciprocal basis* 45
68. May 3 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Requests instructions concerning reply to be made to Argentine proposal to exchange diplomatic missions with Canada* 46
69. May 24 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Reports Argentine Ambassador's conversation about proposal to exchange diplomatic missions and requests information about Canadian Government attitude* 47
70. May 29 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister. Notes strong Argentine wish to exchange diplomatic missions with Canada, and points out difficulties ..* 48
71. Aug. 6 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Reports Argentine Ambassador's renewed enquiry concerning establishment of diplomatic missions* 49
72. Aug. 10 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister. Discusses relative importance to Canada of various Latin American countries and possible appointments in event of diplomatic exchanges with Argentina and Brazil* 49
73. Aug. 13 *Memorandum from Prime Minister to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Indicates preference for exchange of consular representatives with Argentina and Brazil as preliminary to full diplomatic exchange* 50
74. Sept. 12 *Extract from Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister. Explains reasons why any diplomatic exchange with Latin America should be at Legation level* 51

- | | | | |
|---|-----------|--|-----------|
| <p>75. 28 oct. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.</i> Demande que le Roi approuve la proposition d'établir des légations en Argentine et au Brésil sur une base de réciprocité et joint le texte de l'annonce qui sera envoyé aux gouvernements argentin et brésilien.....</p> | <p>52</p> | <p>75. Oct. 28 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.</i> Requests Royal approval of proposal to establish Legations in Argentina and Brazil on reciprocal basis and encloses form of announcement to be sent to Argentine and Brazilian Governments</p> | <p>52</p> |
| <p>76. 28 oct. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Annonce l'intention du gouvernement canadien d'établir des légations en Argentine et au Brésil sur une base de réciprocité....</p> | <p>53</p> | <p>76. Oct. 28 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> Announces intention of Canadian Government to establish Legations in Argentina and Brazil on reciprocal basis</p> | <p>53</p> |
| <p>77. 8 nov. <i>Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Annonce que le Roi a approuvé l'établissement de légations canadiennes en Argentine et au Brésil....</p> | <p>54</p> | <p>77. Nov. 8 <i>Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Reports Royal approval for establishment of Canadian Legations in Argentina and Brazil</p> | <p>54</p> |
| 1941 | | 1941 | |
| <p>78. 10 janv. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.</i> Recommande que le Roi accepte le ministre proposé par l'Argentine.....</p> | <p>54</p> | <p>78. Jan. 10 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.</i> Recommends Royal acceptance of proposed Argentine Minister to Canada</p> | <p>54</p> |
| <p>79. 20 janv. <i>Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Annonce que le Roi a approuvé la nomination du ministre argentin.....</p> | <p>54</p> | <p>79. Jan. 20 <i>High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Reports Royal approval of Argentine appointee</p> | <p>54</p> |
| <p>80. 31 mars <i>L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en Argentine au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Rapporte que l'Argentine s'impatiente du retard du Canada à nommer un ministre.....</p> | <p>55</p> | <p>80. March 31 <i>Ambassador of Great Britain in Argentina to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Reports Argentine impatience with Canadian delay in appointing Minister</p> | <p>55</p> |
| <p>81. 7 avril <i>Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.</i> Fait valoir, afin d'activer l'échange de ministres, que l'Argentine pourrait voir à sauvegarder les intérêts canadiens en territoire ennemi ou occupé par l'ennemi.....</p> | <p>55</p> | <p>81. April 7 <i>Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.</i> Cites possibility of Argentina becoming Protecting Power for Canadian interests in enemy and enemy-occupied territory as reason for expediting exchange of Ministers</p> | <p>55</p> |
| <p>82. 29 juill. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Donne instructions de demander de vive voix au Roi d'approuver la nomination de l'honorable W. F. A. Turgeon à titre de ministre du Canada en Argentine.....</p> | <p>57</p> | <p>82. July 29 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> Sends instructions to make verbal submission requesting Royal approval of appointment of Honourable W. F. A. Turgeon as Canadian Minister in Argentina</p> | <p>57</p> |

83. 31 juill. *Décret du Conseil*. Nomme l'honorable W. F. A. Turgeon ministre du Canada en Argentine..... 57
83. July 31 *Order in Council*. Appoints Honourable W. F. A. Turgeon as Canadian Minister in Argentina 57
84. 6 août *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que le Roi a approuvé la nomination de l'honorable W. F. A. Turgeon à titre de ministre en Argentine..... 57
84. Aug. 6 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports Royal approval of appointment of Honourable W. F. A. Turgeon as Minister in Argentina 57
85. 19 août *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Désire que l'ambassadeur britannique à Buenos Aires demande à l'Argentine si elle accepte la nomination de Turgeon en tant que ministre..... 58
85. Aug. 19 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Asks that British Ambassador in Argentina should request agreement to appointment of Turgeon as Canadian Minister 58
86. 25 août *L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en Argentine au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que le gouvernement argentin a été mis au courant de la nomination de Turgeon et demande s'il sera également accrédité auprès du Chili..... 58
86. Aug. 25 *Ambassador of Great Britain in Argentina to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports that Argentine Government has been informed of nomination of Turgeon and asks if he will also be accredited to Chile 58
87. 27 août *L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en Argentine au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que le gouvernement argentin accorde son agrément..... 58
87. Aug. 27 *Ambassador of Great Britain in Argentina to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports Argentine government agrees to appointment 58

BRÉSIL

BRAZIL

1940

1940

88. 18 juin *Mémoire du major K. H. McCrimmon de la « Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. »* Annonce que le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Brésil désire l'échange de diplomates avec le Canada 59
88. June 18 *Memorandum by Major K. H. McCrimmon of Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd.* Reports desire of Brazilian Foreign Minister to exchange diplomatic representatives with Canada 59
89. 26 nov. *L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne au Brésil au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part de l'accord du Brésil concernant l'établissement d'une légation canadienne et de sa décision d'en faire autant 60
89. Nov. 26 *Ambassador of Great Britain in Brazil to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports Brazilian acceptance of Canadian decision to establish Legation in Brazil on reciprocal basis 60

1941

1941

90. 10 janv. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Fait savoir que le Canada accepte le ministre brésilien proposé et qu'on demande l'approbation royale..... 60
90. Jan. 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Communicates Canadian acceptance of appointment of proposed Brazilian Minister to Canada and requests Royal approval 60

- | | | | |
|---|----|--|----|
| 91. 24 janv. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Demande d'aviser le gouvernement brésilien de l'agrément du Canada au ministre proposé..... | 61 | 91. Jan. 24 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> Requests that Brazilian Government be informed of agrément for proposed Minister in Canada | 61 |
| 92. 24 juin <i>Décret du Conseil.</i> Nomme Jean Désy ministre du Canada au Brésil..... | 61 | 92. June 24 <i>Order in Council.</i> Appoints Jean Désy as Canadian Minister in Brazil | 61 |
| 93. 25 juin <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Le prie d'obtenir l'approbation du Roi à la nomination de Jean Désy en qualité de ministre au Brésil..... | 61 | 93. June 25 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> Sends instructions to submit appointment of Jean Désy as Minister in Brazil for Royal approval | 61 |
| 94. 27 juin <i>Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Annonce que le Roi a officieusement approuvé la nomination de Jean Désy à titre de ministre du Canada au Brésil..... | 62 | 94. June 27 <i>High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Reports informal approval of appointment of Jean Désy as Canadian Minister in Brazil | 62 |
| 95. 28 juin <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.</i> Demande que l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne au Brésil sollicite l'agrément requis pour Jean Désy..... | 62 | 95. June 28 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.</i> Asks that Ambassador of Great Britain in Brazil should request agrément for Jean Désy | 62 |
| 96. 2 juill. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Le prie de s'enquérir des usages relatifs à la présentation des lettres de créance et de rappel dans des circonstances exceptionnelles..... | 62 | 96. July 2 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> Sends instructions to obtain advice concerning customary practice in unusual circumstances of presenting Letters of Recall and Credence | 62 |
| 97. 12 juill. <i>Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Annonce qu'on l'a renseigné au sujet de la présentation des lettres de créance et de rappel..... | 63 | 97. July 12 <i>High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Reports advice given concerning presentation of Letters of Recall and Credence | 63 |
| 98. 17 juill. <i>L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne au Brésil au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Fait part de l'agrément du Brésil à la nomination de Jean Désy comme ministre du Canada..... | 63 | 98. July 17 <i>Ambassador of Great Britain in Brazil to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Reports Brazilian agrément for appointment of Jean Désy as Canadian Minister | 63 |
| CHILI | | CHILE | |
| 1940 | | 1940 | |
| 99. 28 nov. <i>Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.</i> Rapporte que le consul général du Chili a exprimé verbalement le souhait de son gouvernement d'établir une légation au Canada.. | 64 | 99. Nov. 28 <i>Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.</i> Explains oral communication by Consul General of Chilean wish to establish Legation in Canada | 64 |

100. 16 déc. *Le consul général du Chili au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Réaffirme le désir du gouvernement chilien d'échanger des représentants diplomatiques avec le Canada..... 64

1941

101. 20 janv. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Transmet la correspondance du consul général du Chili au sujet des relations canado-chiliennes et rapporte que la presse chilienne a prématurément été mise au courant de la proposition d'établir une légation au Canada..... 65

102. 27 janv. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général du Chili.* Réitère la décision du Canada de ne pas étendre actuellement son service diplomatique en Amérique latine..... 68

103. 4 févr. *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part des démarches de l'ambassadeur chilien aux États-Unis dans l'espoir d'établir des relations diplomatiques entre le Canada et le Chili..... 69

104. 8 févr. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Note que le ministre des États-Unis au Canada a fait part au Premier ministre de l'espoir du gouvernement américain de voir le Canada établir des relations diplomatiques avec le Chili..... 70

105. 15 févr. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Expose les raisons qui incitent les États-Unis à appuyer l'échange de diplomates entre le Chili et le Canada et les raisons sur lesquelles se fondent les objections du Canada..... 70

106. 30 mars *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Décrit la pression croissante exercée sur le Canada pour qu'il accepte une représentation diplomatique chilienne et suggère qu'on réexamine la politique canadienne concernant l'expansion des relations diplomatiques..... 71

100. Dec. 16 *Consul General of Chile to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reaffirms desire of Chilean Government to exchange Legations with Canada 64

1941

101. Jan. 20 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Encloses correspondence from Chilean Consul General about Chilean-Canadian relations and reports premature announcement to Chilean Press of proposal to establish Legation in Canada 65

102. Jan. 27 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General of Chile.* Reiterates Canadian decision not to expand diplomatic service in Latin America at this time 68

103. Feb. 4 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports approach of Chilean Ambassador in United States on possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between Canada and Chile 69

104. Feb. 8 *Memorandum by Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Notes communication by United States Minister in Canada to Prime Minister expressing United States' hope that Canada would exchange diplomatic relations with Chile 70

105. Feb. 15 *Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Outlines basis of United States support of idea of exchange of diplomatic representatives between Chile and Canada and basis of Canadian objections 70

106. Mar. 30 *Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Outlines increasing pressure on Canada to receive Chilean diplomatic representative and suggests re-examination of Canadian policy concerning expansion of diplomatic relations 71

107. 2 avril *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Rapporte le départ du consul général chilien pour les États-Unis après qu'il fut informé que le Canada voulait laisser la question de la représentation diplomatique en suspens pour le moment..... 74
107. Apr. 2 *Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Reports departure of Chilean Consul General for United States after being informed that Canada wanted issue of diplomatic representation left in abeyance for the time being 74
108. 17 juin *Mémorandum du deuxième secrétaire.* Explique pourquoi on préconise l'établissement de relations diplomatiques avec le Chili et indique diverses façons de procéder..... 74
108. June 17 *Memorandum by Second Secretary.* Gives reasons for recommending establishment of diplomatic relations with Chile and outlines alternative procedures for implementation 74
109. 3 juill. *Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que le Chili accepte la double accréditation du ministre du Canada en Argentine et au Chili mais qu'il désire quand même la représentation directe à Ottawa..... 76
109. July 3 *Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports Chilean acceptance of dual accreditation of Canadian Minister in Argentina and Chile while still wanting direct representation in Ottawa 76
110. 25 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Demande que l'on institue une procédure officielle pour établir des relations diplomatiques avec le Chili et recommande que le gouvernement argentin soit invité à accepter l'idée que le même diplomate canadien soit accrédité également auprès du Chili 76
110. July 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Requests that formal procedure be instituted to establish diplomatic relations with Chile and suggests that Argentine Government be asked to agree to dual representation of Canada in Chile and Argentina .. 76
111. 1^{er} août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Conteste le texte du projet de note au gouvernement chilien 77
111. Aug. 1 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Questions wording of draft note for Chilean government 77
112. 5 août *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Recommande que les autorités chiliennes soient mises au courant de la pénurie actuelle de personnel compétent qui est à l'origine du retard du Canada à affecter un chargé d'affaires au Chili..... 78
112. Aug. 5 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Suggests that present difficulty in providing trained staff be explained to Chilean authorities as reason for deferring stationing of Chargé d'Affaires in Chile 78
113. 5 août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que le Roi a approuvé la proposition de nommer un ministre canadien au Chili et rapporte qu'on a chargé l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en Argentine de se renseigner sur les vues du gouvernement concernant la double accréditation..... 79
113. Aug. 5 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Announces Royal approval of proposal to appoint Canadian Minister in Chile and reports instruction to Ambassador of Great Britain in Argentina to ascertain Argentine view on dual accreditation 79

114. 28 août *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Demande quels sont les résultats des démarches entreprises par le *Dominions Office* pour connaître l'opinion de l'Argentine et du Chili à propos de la double accréditation d'un représentant canadien 79
115. 4 sept. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que l'Argentine et le Chili acceptent la nomination de W. F. A. Turgeon à titre de ministre accrédité auprès de leur gouvernement respectif..... 79
116. 4 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Le charge de faire une demande de vive voix pour que le Roi approuve la nomination de W. F. A. Turgeon à titre de ministre du Canada au Chili..... 80
117. 5 sept. *Décret du Conseil.* Nomme l'honorable W. F. A. Turgeon ministre du Canada au Chili..... 80
118. 16 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne au Chili.* Annonce que le Roi a approuvé la nomination de W. F. A. Turgeon à titre de ministre du Canada au Chili et demande de hâter l'octroi de l'agrément..... 81
119. 30 sept. *L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne au Chili au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que le gouvernement chilien accorde son agrément à la nomination de W. F. A. Turgeon à titre de ministre du Canada 81
114. Aug. 28 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Requests information on results of steps taken by *Dominions Office* to ascertain Argentine and Chilean attitudes on dual accreditation of Canadian representative 79
115. Sept. 4 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports agreement of Argentina and Chile to appointment of W. F. A. Turgeon as Canadian Minister with dual accreditation 79
116. Sept. 4 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Gives instructions that oral request be made for Royal approval of appointment of W. F. A. Turgeon as Canadian Minister in Chile 80
117. Sept. 5 *Order in Council.* Appoints Honourable W. F. A. Turgeon as Canadian Minister in Chile 80
118. Sept. 16 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador of Great Britain in Chile.* Announces Royal approval of appointment of W. F. A. Turgeon as Canadian Minister in Chile and requests assistance in expediting agrément 81
119. Sept. 30 *Ambassador of Great Britain in Chile to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Announces agrément of Chilean Government for appointment of W. F. A. Turgeon as Canadian Minister 81

RÉPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE

1941

120. 30 avril *Le ministre de Grande-Bretagne en République dominicaine au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part de la décision de la République dominicaine d'établir une légation à Ottawa..... 81
121. 10 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre de Grande-Bretagne en République dominicaine.* Déclare que le Canada tient au principe de la réciprocité dans les échan-

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1941

120. Apr. 30 *Minister of Great Britain in Dominican Republic to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates decision of Dominican Republic to establish Legation at Ottawa 81
121. May 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister of Great Britain in Dominican Republic.* States that Canadian insistence on obligation to reciprocate in

- ges de diplomates et de ce fait ne peut accepter la proposition dominicaine... 82
- HAÏTI
1940
122. 4 sept. *Le ministre de Grande-Bretagne en Haïti au Gouverneur général.* Fait part du désir du gouvernement haïtien d'envoyer un représentant diplomatique au Canada..... 82
123. 15 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre de Grande-Bretagne en Haïti.* Signale que le gouvernement canadien insiste sur la réciprocité dans l'établissement des relations diplomatiques et qu'il a décidé de limiter la nomination de ministres à l'heure actuelle..... 83
- MEXIQUE
1941
124. 4 janv. *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Expose les raisons avancées par le conseiller mexicain à Washington pour établir des relations diplomatiques avec le Canada et joint le mémorandum de l'ambassadeur mexicain..... 83
125. 8 janv. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Traite de la suggestion mexicaine d'établir des relations diplomatiques et recommande de ne pas y donner suite..... 85
126. 10 janv. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis.* Le prie d'annoncer au conseiller mexicain que le Canada a décidé de remettre à plus tard l'expansion de son service diplomatique 86
127. 17 juin *Mémorandum du deuxième secrétaire.* Recommande que l'on établisse des relations diplomatiques directes avec le Mexique..... 87
- PÉROU
1941
128. 3 avril *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait savoir que le gouvernement péruvien désire échanger des représentants diplomatiques avec le Canada..... 88
- diplomatic exchange makes Dominican proposal unacceptable 82
- HAÏTI
1940
122. Sept. 4 *Minister of Great Britain in Haiti to Governor General.* Communicates Haitian desire to send diplomatic representative to Canada 82
123. Oct. 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister of Great Britain in Haiti.* Draws attention to Canadian insistence on reciprocity in establishment of diplomatic relations and notes Canadian decision to limit appointment of Ministers at present time 83
- MEXICO
1941
124. Jan. 4 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Outlines reasons advanced by Mexican Counsellor in Washington for establishment of diplomatic relations with Canada and encloses Memorandum from Mexican Ambassador 83
125. Jan. 8 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Discusses Mexican suggestion for exchange of diplomatic relations and recommends against accepting it 85
126. Jan. 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in United States.* Gives instructions to inform Mexican Counsellor of Canadian decision to defer expansion of diplomatic service for immediate future 86
127. June 17 *Memorandum by Second Secretary.* Recommends establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Mexico 87
- PERU
1941
128. Apr. 3 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports desire of Peruvian Government to exchange diplomatic representatives with Canada 88

129. 5 sept. *L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne au Chili au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet le message du secrétaire de la mission commerciale du Canada, alors au Chili, qui suggère une double accréditation pour le Pérou et le Chili..... 88

PARTIE 4

RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES
AVEC LA CHINE ET
L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE

CHINE

1941

130. 17 juin *Mémoire* du deuxième secrétaire. Expose les raisons politiques et psychologiques qui militent en faveur de l'établissement de relations diplomatiques avec la Chine..... 89

131. 29 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Demande que le Roi approuve la proposition d'établir une légation du Canada en Chine et que la proposition officielle soit communiquée à la Chine..... 90

132. 31 juill. *Décret du Conseil.* Établit une légation du Canada en Chine 91

133. 11 août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait savoir que le Roi a approuvé la proposition d'établir une légation du Canada en Chine et que la proposition a subséquemment été communiquée au gouvernement chinois..... 91

134. 14 août *L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en Chine au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que la Chine a accepté la proposition du Canada d'établir une légation à Tchong-King..... 91

135. 2 sept. *L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en Chine au Gouverneur général.* Communique l'annonce du ministère chinois des Affaires étrangères au sujet de la proposition du Canada d'établir une légation..... 92

136. 13 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que la Chine

129. Sept. 5 *Ambassador of Great Britain in Chile to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Secretary to Canadian Trade Mission, then in Chile, recommending consideration of double accreditation to Peru and Chile 88

PART 4

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH
CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION

CHINA

1941

130. June 17 *Memorandum by Second Secretary.* Outlines political and psychological reasons for recommending establishment of direct diplomatic relations with China 89

131. July 29 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Requests Royal approval of proposal to establish Canadian Legation in China and communication of formal proposal to China 90

132. July 31 *Order in Council.* Establishes Canadian Legation in China 91

133. Aug. 11 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports Royal approval of proposed establishment of Canadian Legation in China and subsequent communication of proposal to Government of China 91

134. Aug. 14 *Ambassador of Great Britain in China to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Announces acceptance by China of Canadian proposal to establish Legation at Chungking 91

135. Sept. 2 *Ambassador of Great Britain in China to Governor General.* Communicates announcement by Chinese Foreign Office of Canadian proposal to establish Legation 92

136. Sept. 13 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports Chinese

propose Liu Shih Shun à titre de ministre au Canada et demande des instructions concernant l'agrément..... 92

137. 25 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Joint le document de soumission officielle et le charge de demander l'agrément d'usage touchant le ministre chinois proposé au Canada..... 92

138. 20 oct. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que l'on a officiellement approuvé la nomination de Liu Shih Shun à titre de ministre chinois au Canada..... 93

139. 1^{er} nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en Chine.* Le prie d'aviser le gouvernement chinois de l'agrément au sujet du ministre proposé 94

proposal of Dr. Liu Shih Shun as Minister in Canada and requests instruction concerning agrément 92

137. Sept. 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Encloses document of formal submission and sends instructions to request agrément for proposed Chinese Minister to Canada 92

138. Oct. 20 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports formal approval of appointment of Dr. Liu Shih Shun as Chinese Minister in Canada 93

139. Nov. 1 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador of Great Britain in China.* Instructs him to inform Chinese Government of agrément for proposed Minister in Canada 94

UNION SOVIÉTIQUE

1941

140. 17 juill. *Le ministre-conseiller, la légation aux États-Unis, au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Récapitule les raisons données par l'ambassadeur de l'Union soviétique qui militent en faveur de l'établissement d'un certain mode de représentation soviétique au Canada..... 94

141. 15 oct. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part des démarches officielles de l'Union soviétique concernant la possibilité d'établir au Canada des agents consulaires qui accéléreraient les envois destinés à l'U.R.S.S..... 95

142. 13 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Exprime l'avis que si l'Union soviétique acceptait en principe des agents consulaires canadiens, la Grande-Bretagne pourrait négocier plus facilement la réouverture de ses consulats dans l'U.R.S.S..... 95

SOVIET UNION

1941

140. July 17 *Minister-Counselor, Legation in United States, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Recounts reasons given by Soviet Ambassador for recommending the establishment of some form of direct Soviet representation in Canada 94

141. Oct. 15 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports informal Soviet approach concerning possibility of establishment in Canada of consular officials to expedite shipments to the Soviet Union 95

142. Nov. 13 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Suggests possibility that Soviet agreement to principle of accepting Canadian consular officials might be useful to Great Britain in negotiating reopening of British Consulates in Soviet Union 95

PARTIE 5
 NOMINATION
 D'UN MINISTRE CANADIEN
 AU JAPON

PART 5
 APPOINTMENT OF CANADIAN
 MINISTER TO JAPAN

- 1941
143. 4 févr. *Mémoire* du conseiller au sous-secrétaire d'État par par intérim aux Affaires extérieures. Allègue que l'accroissement de la tension avec le Japon rend plus impérieuse la nécessité de nommer au plus tôt un ministre canadien..... 97
144. 20 juill. *Le chargé d'affaires au Japon au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Recommande la nomination immédiate d'un ministre canadien au Japon et en signale les avantages possibles..... 98
145. 21 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires au Japon*. Attire l'attention sur le fait que le haut calibre du ministre désigné indique l'importance que le Canada attache à sa représentation diplomatique au Japon..... 98
146. 29 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Le prie de proposer oralement la nomination du brigadier W. W. Foster au poste de ministre au Japon..... 99
147. 31 juill. *Décret du Conseil*. Recommande la nomination du brigadier W. W. Foster au poste de ministre au Japon..... 99
148. 31 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Demande de s'assurer de l'attitude des autorités britanniques au sujet de la nomination proposée d'un ministre canadien au Japon, à la lumière des graves événements récents..... 100
149. 5 août *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que le secrétaire aux Affaires étrangères britannique préfère différer la nomination d'un ministre canadien au Japon..... 100
150. 5 août *Mémoire* du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre. Signale

- 1941
143. Feb. 4 *Memorandum from Counsellor to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Argues that increasing tension with Japan intensifies need for early appointment of Canadian Minister.... 97
144. July 20 *Chargé d'Affaires in Japan to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Urges immediate appointment of Canadian Minister in Japan and notes possible beneficial results 98
145. July 21 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in Japan*. Points out that high calibre of Minister Designate indicates importance attached by Canada to diplomatic representation in Japan 98
146. July 29 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends instructions to make oral submission of proposed appointment of Brigadier W. W. Foster as Minister in Japan 99
147. July 31 *Order in Council*. Recommends appointment of Brigadier W. W. Foster as Minister in Japan 99
148. July 31 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends instructions to ascertain attitude of British authorities to proposed appointment of Canadian Minister in Japan in view of recent critical events 100
149. Aug. 5 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports that British Foreign Secretary favours postponement of appointment of Canadian Minister in Japan 100
150. Aug. 5 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*.

- que les États-Unis craignent que la nomination d'un ministre canadien au Japon puisse laisser croire à un manque de solidarité entre les États-Unis et les pays du Commonwealth en ce qui touche l'agression japonaise..... 101
151. 5 août *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au brigadier W. W. Foster*. L'avise que sa nomination au poste de ministre au Japon est différée..... 102
152. 30 août *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte la conversation qu'il a eue avec le ministre japonais au sujet de la nomination de ministres canadiens au Japon et en Chine..... 102
153. 26 sept. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au brigadier W. W. Foster*. Explique les motifs qui empêchent l'annonce définitive de sa nomination au poste de ministre canadien au Japon..... 103
154. 3 oct. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Rapporte que les États-Unis sont d'avis que l'annonce de la nomination d'un ministre canadien au Japon est susceptible d'influer sur les négociations nippo-américaines..... 104
155. 28 nov. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au brigadier W. W. Foster*. Avise que l'on a décidé de ne prendre aucune mesure pour combler le poste de la légation à Tokyo..... 104
- Communicates United States fear that appointment of Canadian Minister in Japan would suggest lack of solidarity in United States-Commonwealth opposition to Japanese aggression 101
151. Aug. 5 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Brigadier W. W. Foster*. Communicates postponement of his projected appointment as Canadian Minister in Japan 102
152. Aug. 30 *Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports conversation with Japanese Minister concerning appointment of Canadian Ministers in Japan and China 102
153. Sept. 26 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Brigadier W. W. Foster*. Explains considerations which preclude definitive announcement of appointment of Canadian Minister in Japan 103
154. Oct. 3 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Reports United States view that announcement of appointment of Canadian Minister in Japan might affect outcome of United States-Japanese negotiations 104
155. Nov. 28 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Brigadier W. W. Foster*. Reports decision not to take steps to fill Tokyo Legation 104

PARTIE 6

ÉTABLISSEMENT DE CONSULATS
GROENLAND

1940

156. 14 mai *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique la décision prise par le Cabinet de nommer un consul au Groenland, demande d'étudier la procédure à suivre à cette fin et propose que des agents en poste à

PART 6

ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES
GREENLAND

1940

156. May 14 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates Cabinet decision to appoint Canadian Consul in Greenland, requests consideration of proper procedure in making appoint-

Paris et à Tokyo soient nommés consuls en même temps.....	105	ment and suggests simultaneous appointment of diplomatic officers now in Paris and Tokyo as Consuls	105
157. 21 mai <i>Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général du Danemark.</i> Annonce que le Canada se propose d'établir un consulat provisoire au Groenland et demande qu'on reconnaisse ce consulat provisoire et que la nouvelle soit annoncée aux autorités du Groenland.....	106	157. May 21 <i>Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General of Denmark.</i> Announces proposed temporary establishment of Consulate in Greenland and requests provisional recognition and transmission of announcement to authorities in Greenland	106
158. 21 mai <i>Décret du Conseil.</i> Établit des consulats au Groenland, à Paris et à Tokyo.....	106	158. May 21 <i>Order in Council.</i> Establishes Consulates in Greenland, Paris and Tokyo	106
159. 21 mai <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.</i> Expose le texte des lettres de provision qui seront délivrées au consul et au vice-consul au Groenland.....	107	159. May 21 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.</i> Indicates wording to be used in Assignment Commissions issued to Consul and Vice-Consul in Greenland	107
160. 21 mai <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.</i> Le prie de demander au Roi de sanctionner l'établissement de consulats au Groenland, en France et au Japon.....	107	160. May 21 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.</i> Requests submission for Royal approval of establishment of Canadian Consulates in Greenland, France and Japan	107
161. 22 mai <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Transmet les instructions destinées au consul canadien au Groenland.....	107	161. May 22 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> Sends general instructions for Canadian Consul in Greenland	107
162. 27 mai <i>Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Propose de demander aux autorités locales du Groenland de reconnaître provisoirement le consul canadien en attendant la signature de la lettre de provision.....	109	162. May 27 <i>Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Suggests that local authorities in Greenland be invited to accord provisional recognition to Canadian Consul pending signature of Commission of Appointment	109
163. 27 mai <i>Le consul général du Danemark au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Affirme ne pas avoir le pouvoir de reconnaître l'établissement provisoire d'un consulat canadien au Groenland mais accepte d'en communiquer la requête aux gouvernants du Groenland.....	109	163. May 27 <i>Consul General of Denmark to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> States that he has no authority to recognize provisional establishment of Canadian Consulate in Greenland but agrees to communicate Canadian request for recognition to Governors of Greenland	109
164. 29 mai <i>Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Demande d'approuver la forme du projet de lettre de provision pour le consul au Groenland.....	110	164. May 29 <i>Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Requests approval of form of draft Commission of Appointment of Consul in Greenland	110

165. 30 mai *Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au consul général du Danemark*. Explique la demande relative à l'établissement provisoire d'un consulat au Groenland 111
166. 31 mai *Le consul général du Danemark au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Accuse réception de la lettre proposant d'établir provisoirement un consulat canadien au Groenland et soumet le texte du télégramme qu'il se propose d'envoyer aux autorités du Groenland..... 112
167. 5 juin *Le consul général du Danemark au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que les autorités du Groenland acceptent la proposition du Canada d'y établir temporairement un consulat..... 113
168. 15 juin *Le consul général du Danemark au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande la permission de confirmer à la légation danoise à Stockholm la nomination d'un consul canadien au Groenland..... 113
169. 18 juin *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général du Danemark*. S'oppose à la demande que le Danemark soit avisé de la nomination d'un consul canadien au Groenland..... 114
165. May 30 *Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General of Denmark*. Explains request regarding provisional establishment of Consulate in Greenland 111
166. May 31 *Consul General of Denmark to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Acknowledges receipt of letter communicating proposal for temporary establishment of Canadian Consulate in Greenland and submits text of proposed telegram to Greenland authorities 112
167. June 5 *Consul General of Denmark to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports agreement of Greenland authorities to Canadian proposal for temporary establishment of Consulate 113
168. June 15 *Consul General of Denmark to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests permission to confirm to Danish Legation in Stockholm appointment of Canadian Consul in Greenland 113
169. June 18 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General of Denmark*. Refuses request for permission to inform Denmark of appointment of Canadian Consul in Greenland 114

1941

170. 25 avril *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Propose d'apporter des modifications peu importantes au texte de la lettre de provision qui sera délivrée au consul canadien au Groenland..... 114
170. April 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Suggests minor amendment of text for Assignment Commission to be issued to Canadian Consul in Greenland 114

SAINT-PIERRE-ET-MIQUELON

1940

171. 6 déc. *Le Président par intérim, la Commission de la Marine marchande, au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Recommande la nomination d'un consul canadien à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 115
171. Dec. 6 *Acting Chairman, Canadian Shipping Board to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Recommends appointment of a Canadian Consul in St. Pierre and Miquelon 115

ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON

1940

172. 11 déc. *Le sous-ministre par intérim à la Défense nationale pour les Services navals au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Appuie la proposition de nommer un consul canadien à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon..... 115
173. 13 déc. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Recommande la nomination d'un consul canadien à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon..... 116
- 1941
174. 13 mai *Mémoire du deuxième secrétaire.* Expose les raisons qui motivent la nomination d'un consul canadien à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon.... 116
175. 15 mai *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Fait valoir que le retrait du vice-consul britannique et l'inopportunité de dépendre des États-Unis pour obtenir des renseignements sur Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon rendent nécessaire la nomination d'un consul canadien..... 117
176. 19 août *Décret du Conseil.* Établit un consulat canadien à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon et nomme M. C. C. Eberts consul par intérim..... 118
177. 19 août *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis.* Le charge de demander au département d'État de communiquer au représentant canadien à Vichy la décision de nommer un consul par intérim à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 118
178. 25 août *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures à l'Administrateur, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon.* Annonce la nomination d'un consul par intérim à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon et définit ses fonctions..... 119
179. 29 août *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique les conditions imposées par les autorités de Vichy pour accepter la nomination d'un consul canadien par intérim à
172. Dec. 11 *Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence for Naval Services to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Supports proposal to appoint a Canadian Consul in St. Pierre and Miquelon 115
173. Dec. 13 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Recommends appointment of Canadian Consul in St. Pierre and Miquelon 116
- 1941
174. May 13 *Memorandum by Second Secretary.* Outlines reasons for appointment of Canadian Consul in St. Pierre and Miquelon .. 116
175. May 15 *Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Advises that withdrawal of British Vice-Consul and undesirability of dependence on United States for information about St. Pierre and Miquelon make appointment of Canadian Consul necessary 117
176. Aug. 19 *Order in Council.* Establishes Canadian Consulate in St. Pierre and Miquelon and designates C. C. Eberts as Acting Consul 118
177. Aug. 19 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in United States.* Sends instructions that State Department be asked to communicate to Canadian representative at Vichy decision to appoint Acting Consul in St. Pierre and Miquelon 118
178. Aug. 25 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Administrator, St. Pierre and Miquelon.* Announces appointment and defines role of Acting Canadian Consul in St. Pierre and Miquelon .. 119
179. Aug. 29 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits conditions imposed by Vichy authorities prior to accepting appointment of Acting Canadian Con-

- Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon et la réponse du représentant canadien à Vichy..... 119
180. 16 sept. *L'Administrateur, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait bon accueil à la nomination d'un consul canadien à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon.... 120
181. 24 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Le prie d'aviser le *Dominions Office* des démarches entreprises pour définir le statut du consul canadien par intérim à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon et de faire savoir l'attitude actuelle de Vichy..... 121
- ÉTATS-UNIS
1940
182. 13 juill. *Mémoire du conseiller.* Propose un plan pour établir un réseau de bureaux consulaires aux États-Unis au cas où le Canada exigerait des visas et des passeports des visiteurs américains..... 121
- PARTIE 7
PROTECTION
DES INTÉRÊTS CANADIENS
EN TERRITOIRE ENNEMI
- EUROPE
1939
183. 14 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis.* Le prie d'exprimer la gratitude du gouvernement pour la protection qui sera accordée aux ressortissants canadiens en Allemagne par le représentant des États-Unis..... 124
184. 15 nov. *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait savoir que la demande que doit formuler le Canada pour que l'ambassadeur des États-Unis en Belgique représente les intérêts canadiens dans ce pays doit être adressée directement au *State Department*..... 124
185. 15 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Le prie de demander au gouvernement des États-Unis d'autoriser ses représentants en Belgique et aux
- sul in St. Pierre and Miquelon and response of Canadian representative at Vichy 119
180. Sept. 16 *Administrator, St. Pierre and Miquelon to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Welcomes appointment of Acting Canadian Consul in St. Pierre and Miquelon 120
181. Oct. 24 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Sends instructions to report to Dominions Office steps taken to establish status of Acting Consul in St. Pierre and Miquelon and describe present Vichy attitude 121
- UNITED STATES
1940
182. July 13 *Memorandum by Counsellor.* Proposes plan for establishing system of Consular Offices in United States in event of Canada imposing passport and visa restrictions on United States visitors 121
- PART 7
PROTECTION OF CANADIAN
INTERESTS IN ENEMY
TERRITORY
- EUROPE
1939
183. Sept. 14 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in United States.* Sends instructions to express gratitude that the United States representative will extend protection to Canadian nationals in Germany 124
184. Nov. 15 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States that Canadian request that United States Ambassador in Belgium represent Canadian interests must be made direct to State Department 124
185. Nov. 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Sends instructions to request United States Government to authorize its representatives in

Pays-Bas à sauvegarder les intérêts canadiens en cas d'invasion..... 125

186. 24 nov. *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que le gouvernement américain a enjoint ses représentants en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas d'y assumer la sauvegarde des intérêts canadiens en cas d'invasion..... 125

187. 4 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Le prie de demander au gouvernement des États-Unis d'assumer la sauvegarde des intérêts canadiens en Pologne, Bohême et Moravie, territoires sous occupation allemande..... 126

188. 12 déc. *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État des États-Unis.* Demande que les États-Unis étendent aux ressortissants canadiens la protection qu'ils assurent aux intérêts britanniques en Pologne, Bohême et Moravie, territoires sous occupation allemande..... 126

189. 18 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État des États-Unis au ministre aux États-Unis.* Déclare que le représentant des États-Unis à Berlin a été autorisé à assumer la protection des ressortissants canadiens en Pologne, Bohême et Moravie, territoires sous occupation allemande..... 127

1940

190. 18 avril *Le chargé d'affaires des États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Voudrait que le Canada demande officiellement aux États-Unis de représenter les intérêts canadiens en Norvège, occupée par l'Allemagne..... 127

191. 22 avril *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État des États-Unis.* Demande que les États-Unis étendent aux ressortissants canadiens la protection sollicitée pour les sujets britanniques..... 128

192. 23 avril *Le secrétaire d'État des États-Unis au ministre aux États-Unis.* Rapporte avoir demandé au représentant américain à Copenhague

Belgium and The Netherlands to protect Canadian interests in case of invasion 125

186. Nov. 24 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports that instructions have been issued to United States representatives in Belgium and The Netherlands to assume responsibility for Canadian interests in case of invasion 125

187. Dec. 4 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Sends instructions that United States Government be requested to take charge of Canadian interests in German-occupied Poland and Bohemia and Moravia 126

188. Dec. 12 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State of United States.* Requests that United States protection of British interests in German-occupied Poland and in Bohemia and Moravia be extended to Canadian nationals 126

189. Dec. 18 *Secretary of State of United States to Minister in United States.* States that United States representative in Berlin is being authorized to assume protection of Canadian nationals in German-occupied Poland and in Bohemia and Moravia 127

1940

190. April 18 *Chargé d'Affaires of United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Asks that formal request be made for United States Government to represent Canadian interests in German-occupied Norway 127

191. April 22 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State of United States.* Asks that requested United States protection of British subjects in Denmark be extended to Canadian nationals 128

192. April 23 *Secretary of State of United States to Minister in United States.* Reports that United States representative at Copenhagen

- d'étendre aux ressortissants canadiens la protection qu'il accorde aux intérêts britanniques au Danemark..... 128
193. 26 avril *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires des États-Unis*. Exprime sa satisfaction pour l'aide accordée au délégué commercial canadien à Oslo et demande que les États-Unis représentent les intérêts canadiens en Norvège occupée par l'Allemagne..... 129
194. 15 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*. Le prie de demander si le gouvernement américain assumerait la protection des ressortissants canadiens ainsi que des sujets britanniques dans tout autre pays limitrophe de l'Allemagne en cas d'invasion..... 129
195. 16 mai *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État des États-Unis*. Demande que les États-Unis entreprennent de protéger les ressortissants canadiens de tout autre pays limitrophe de l'Allemagne ou de l'Italie que ces derniers pourraient envahir..... 130
196. 24 mai *Le département d'État des États-Unis au chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis*. Déclare que le gouvernement des États-Unis a ordonné à ses représentants en poste dans les pays limitrophes de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie d'étendre leur protection aux ressortissants canadiens en cas d'invasion..... 130
197. 6 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis*. Le prie de clarifier avec le *State Department* l'étendue de la protection à accorder aux intérêts canadiens dans les pays limitrophes de l'Allemagne ou de l'Italie en cas d'invasion..... 131
198. 10 juin *Le département d'État des États-Unis à la légation aux États-Unis*. Confirme l'accord concernant la protection à accorder aux intérêts canadiens par les représentants des États-Unis dans les pays limitrophes de l'Allemagne ou de l'Italie en cas d'invasion..... 131
- has been requested to extend his protection of British interests in Denmark to Canadian nationals 128
193. April 26 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires of United States*. Expresses appreciation for assistance given to Canadian Trade Commissioner in Oslo and requests that United States represent Canadian interests in German-occupied Norway 129
194. May 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*. Sends instructions to ask if United States Government would be prepared to undertake protection of Canadian nationals along with British subjects in any other country contiguous to Germany, if invaded 129
195. May 16 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State of United States*. Requests that United States undertake to protect Canadian nationals in any other country contiguous to Germany or Italy that may be invaded 130
196. May 24 *Department of State of United States to Chargé d'Affaires in United States*. Reports that United States Government has instructed its representatives in countries contiguous to Germany and Italy to extend their protection to Canadian nationals in case of invasion 130
197. June 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in United States*. Sends instructions to clarify with State Department the extent of protection of Canadian interests in territory contiguous to Germany or Italy in case of invasion 131
198. June 10 *Department of State of United States to Legation in United States*. Confirms agreement concerning protection by United States representatives of Canadian interests in territory contiguous to Germany or Italy in case of invasion 131

1941

199. 15 avril *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État des États-Unis.* L'avise que le gouvernement canadien confirme l'entente selon laquelle les représentants américains assureront la protection des intérêts canadiens et britanniques dans certains cas imprévus..... 132

200. 29 avril *Le secrétaire d'État des États-Unis au ministre aux États-Unis.* S'engage à protéger les intérêts des ressortissants canadiens dans les limites imposées par la guerre moderne et dans la mesure permise par l'Union soviétique..... 132

201. 18 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Demande l'avis des Britanniques sur la désignation d'une autre puissance protectrice au cas où les États-Unis ne pourraient plus assumer ce rôle..... 133

202. 19 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte le refus des États-Unis d'autoriser à ce moment des discussions préliminaires sur la possibilité de confier à la Suisse le rôle de puissance protectrice..... 134

203. 21 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Décrit les moyens de communications possibles, compatibles avec le maintien de l'identité distincte du Canada, dans le cas où la Suisse assumerait le rôle de puissance protectrice des intérêts canadiens dans les territoires ennemis ou occupés par l'ennemi..... 134

204. 24 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait savoir que les Britanniques sont d'avis que les agents consulaires américains qui quittent le pays devraient transférer aux agents consulaires suisses, en collaboration avec les représentants diplomatiques américains, la responsabilité de puissance protectrice dans les territoires ennemis ou occupés par l'ennemi 135

205. 25 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commis-*

1941

199. April 15 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State of United States.* States that Canadian Government confirms understanding that United States representatives will undertake protection of both Canadian and British interests in certain contingencies 132

200. April 29 *Secretary of State of United States to Minister in United States.* Undertakes to protect interests of Canadian nationals within limits imposed by modern warfare and to extent that Soviet Union will permit 132

201. June 18 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Requests British view on designation of another Protecting Power should United States be unable to continue 133

202. June 19 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports United States refusal at present to authorize discussions preliminary to possibility of Switzerland taking over as Protecting Power 134

203. June 21 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Outlines possible channels of communication between Canadian and Swiss Governments, consistent with maintenance of Canadian identity, in event of Switzerland taking over as Protecting Power 134

204. June 24 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports British view that responsibility as Protecting Power in enemy and enemy-occupied territory should be transferred from departing United States consular representatives to Swiss consular representatives acting in co-operation with United States diplomatic representatives 135

205. June 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High*

- saire en Grande-Bretagne. Demande des précisions sur le transfert à la Suisse des responsabilités de protection des intérêts britanniques en Allemagne assumées par les États-Unis.....* 135
206. 26 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Fait savoir que le point de vue officiel des États-Unis est que leurs ambassades à Berlin et à Rome devraient continuer d'assumer la responsabilité de puissance protectrice des intérêts britanniques dans les territoires ennemis ou occupés par l'ennemi et leur rejet de la proposition britannique que des consuls suisses assument cette fonction en province.....* 136
207. 7 juill. *Le secrétaire aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Se demande si le ministre britannique à Berne ne devrait pas faire des démarches auprès du gouvernement suisse au sujet de la possibilité de transférer à ce pays la responsabilité qui incombe actuellement aux États-Unis de protéger les intérêts canadiens en territoires ennemis ou occupés par l'ennemi.....* 138
208. 8 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne. Fait savoir que le Canada a répondu affirmativement au secrétaire aux Dominions.....* 138
209. 19 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Rapporte que le gouvernement de la Suisse a accepté d'assumer la responsabilité de défendre les intérêts canadiens en territoires ennemis et occupés par l'ennemi, dans le cas d'une rupture des relations diplomatiques entre les États-Unis et les puissances de l'Axe.....* 138
- ASIE
1941
210. 18 janv. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Fait savoir que le gouvernement de l'Argentine consent à protéger les intérêts britanniques dans l'empire japonais, y compris en Mandchourie, en cas de guerre entre la Grande-Bretagne et le Japon.....* 139
- Commissioner in Great Britain. Requests clarification of reported transfer of responsibility for protection of British interests in Germany from United States to Switzerland* 135
206. June 26 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Reports official view of United States that its Embassies in Berlin and Rome should continue to protect British interests in enemy and enemy-occupied territory and its rejection of British proposal that Swiss consuls should perform this function in the provinces* 136
207. July 7 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Inquires whether British Minister at Berne should approach Swiss Government about possible transfer to Switzerland of present United States responsibility for protecting Canadian interests in enemy and enemy-occupied territories* 138
208. July 8 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain. States that Canada has replied to the Dominions Secretary in the affirmative* 138
209. Sept. 19 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Reports that Swiss Government has accepted charge of Canadian interests in enemy and enemy-occupied territory in event of breach of diplomatic relations between United States and Axis powers* 138
- ASIA
1941
210. Jan. 18 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Communicates agreement of Argentine Government to protect British interests in Japanese Empire, including Manchoukuo, in event of outbreak of war between Great Britain and Japan* 139

211. 25 janv. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Demande que l'on s'informe auprès du gouvernement de l'Argentine s'il consentirait à protéger les intérêts canadiens dans l'empire japonais, y compris au Mandchoukouo, en cas de guerre entre le Canada et le Japon..... 139
212. 17 févr. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait savoir que le gouvernement de l'Argentine donne son consentement..... 140
213. 5 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Désire que le ministre de la Grande-Bretagne à Berne demande au gouvernement suisse de protéger les intérêts du Canada dans la partie de la Chine occupée par le Japon, à l'exclusion de la Mandchourie, ainsi qu'en Thaïlande, en cas de guerre avec le Japon..... 140
214. 7 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Le prie de confirmer les arrangements avec le gouvernement suisse et de spécifier les moyens de communication à adopter.... 140
215. 7 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en Argentine.* Le prie de confirmer au gouvernement argentin l'entente pour la protection des intérêts canadiens dans l'Empire japonais, à l'exclusion de la partie de la Chine occupée par le Japon et de la Thaïlande..... 141
211. Jan. 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Requests that the Argentine Government be asked to protect Canadian interests in Japanese Empire, including Manchoukuo, in event of outbreak of war between Canada and Japan 139
212. Feb. 17 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates Argentine Government's agreement 140
213. Dec. 5 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Requests that Minister of Great Britain at Berne ask Swiss Government to protect Canadian interests in Japanese-occupied China, excluding Manchuria, and in Thailand in event of war with Japan 140
214. Dec. 7 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Sends instructions to confirm arrangements with Swiss Government and to specify channels of communication to be used 140
215. Dec. 7 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in Argentina.* Sends instructions to confirm with Argentine Government arrangement to protect Canadian interests in Japanese Empire, excluding Japanese-occupied China and Thailand 141

PARTIE 8

SORT DES CONSULS ENNEMIS

ALLEMAGNE

1939

216. 11 sept. *Mémoire au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Traite de la demande britannique de détenir des agents consulaires allemands en vue d'accélérer la libération du personnel britannique en Allemagne..... 141

PART 8

TREATMENT OF ENEMY CONSULS

GERMANY

1939

216. Sept. 11 *Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Discusses British request for detention of German consular officers in Canada to expedite release of British personnel in Germany 141

217. 11 sept. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général de Suisse*. Accepte l'accord proposé prévoyant que la Suisse protégera les intérêts allemands au Canada.... 143

218. 11 sept. *Le consul général de Suisse au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. L'avis de la prise en charge du consulat général d'Allemagne..... 143

219. 11 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Demande des renseignements sur la manière dont le Canada doit traiter les consuls ennemis ainsi que sur la situation actuelle en ce qui concerne les consuls en Grande-Bretagne et en Allemagne..... 144

220. 11 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Annonce la décision du Canada de libérer les consuls allemands et de détenir les employés consulaires jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient fait l'objet d'une enquête individuelle..... 144

221. 12 sept. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général de Suisse*. Transmet une liste des agents consulaires allemands et des membres de leur famille qui ont l'autorisation de quitter le Canada..... 145

222. 13 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que l'Allemagne et la Grande-Bretagne ont conclu une entente réciproque pour la libération des agents consulaires et de leur personnel et demande que le Canada laisse partir tous les employés consulaires de nationalité allemande..... 145

223. 13 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Annonce qu'il accorde la permission à tous les employés consulaires allemands de quitter le Canada.. 146

217. Sept. 11 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General of Switzerland*. Acknowledges arrangement for Switzerland to protect German interests in Canada 143

218. Sept. 11 *Consul General of Switzerland to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports takeover of German Consulate General 143

219. Sept. 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Requests more information on detention of British Consuls in Germany to facilitate Canadian policy decisions on treatment of German Consular Staff 144

220. Sept. 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Announces Canadian decision to release German Consuls and to detain Consular employees pending individual investigation 144

221. Sept. 12 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General of Switzerland*. Lists German Consular Officers and dependents permitted to leave Canada..... 145

222. Sept. 13 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Announces reciprocal agreement between Germany and Great Britain for release of Consular Officers and staff, and requests that Canada permit departure of all Consular employees of German nationality 145

223. Sept. 13 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Announces granting of permission to all German Consular employees to leave Canada 146

ITALIE

1940

224. 17 mai *Le commissaire, Gendarmerie royale du Canada, au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. S'informe de la possibilité de placer sous scellés les consulats italiens de

ITALY

1940

224. May 17 *Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Inquires about possibility of

- Toronto et de Montréal et d'y rechercher tout document non officiel..... 146
225. 18 mai *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au commissaire, Gendarmerie royale du Canada.* Déconseille d'examiner tout document aussi longtemps que l'Italie demeurera en dehors du conflit..... 147
226. 18 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* S'informe de la politique britannique à l'égard des agents diplomatiques et consulaires italiens et de leur personnel..... 148
227. 30 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Décrit la façon dont on pourrait traiter le personnel diplomatique et consulaire italien, incluant la possibilité de recourir à la ségrégation au besoin..... 148
228. 11 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Déclare que le gouvernement japonais prendra soin des intérêts italiens au Canada..... 148
229. 11 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Demande de consulter les Britanniques au sujet de chercher dans les archives des consulats italiens des documents provenant des organisations fascistes au Canada.... 149
230. 12 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique les réserves exprimées par les Britanniques relativement au projet de recherches dans les archives consulaires italiennes au Canada..... 149
231. 13 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Demande son opinion au sujet de la détention possible des agents consulaires italiens au Canada dans le but d'accélérer la libération par l'Allemagne des agents canadiens détenus à Oslo..... 150
232. 14 juin *Le consul général d'Italie au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Proteste contre l'arrestation d'un membre du personnel
- placing Italian Consulates in Toronto and Montreal under seal and checking nature of any non-official documents 146
225. May 18 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.* Advises against any checking of documents while Italy remains non-belligerent 147
226. May 18 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Inquires about British policy regarding Italian diplomatic and consular officers and staff 148
227. May 30 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Describes treatment to be accorded Italian diplomatic and consular personnel, including possible segregation in case of need 148
228. June 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* States that Japanese Government will look after Italian interests in Canada 148
229. June 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Requests consultation of British on plan to search Italian Consulates for records of Fascist activities in Canada .. 149
230. June 12 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates British reservations about proposed search of Italian consular archives in Canada 149
231. June 13 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Requests opinion concerning possible detention of Italian consular representatives in Canada in attempt to expedite release by Germany of Canadian officials held at Oslo 150
232. June 14 *Consul General of Italy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Protests arrest of member of staff of Consulate

du consulat général, à Ottawa, sous prétexte qu'il n'a pas le statut consulaire.....	150	General in Ottawa on alleged grounds of not having consular status	150
233. 14 juin <i>Le consul général d'Italie au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Proteste contre la saisie par la police de documents appartenant au vice-consulat italien à Toronto.....	151	233. June 14 <i>Consul General of Italy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Protests reported seizure by Police of documents belonging to Italian Vice-Consulate at Toronto	151
234. 15 juin <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.</i> Demande ses commentaires sur les chances du projet de faire libérer les Canadiens à Oslo, ainsi que des renseignements au sujet du rapatriement du personnel consulaire italien et britannique.....	151	234. June 15 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.</i> Asks for comment on prospect for exchange of Canadians in Oslo and for information on repatriation of Italian and British consular staff	151
235. 17 juin <i>Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Demande que le Canada libère le personnel consulaire italien afin de ne pas gêner la libération du personnel britannique en Italie.....	151	235. June 17 <i>Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Asks Canada to release Italian consular staff in order not to hamper release of British staff in Italy	151
236. 17 juin <i>Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Communique la volonté de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie de rapatrier leurs consuls sur une base réciproque et demande l'application de mesures similaires dans les autres parties du Commonwealth.....	152	236. June 17 <i>Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Communicates willingness of Great Britain and Italy to repatriate Consuls on reciprocal basis and requests similar action in other parts of Commonwealth	152
237. 18 juin <i>Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au mar-chese A. Rossi-Longhi.</i> Annonce que les documents saisis par la Gendarmerie royale du Canada ont été retournés au vice-consul italien à Toronto.....	152	237. June 18 <i>Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Marchese A. Rossi-Longhi.</i> Announces return to Italian Vice-Consulate in Toronto of documents removed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police	152
238. 18 juin <i>Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au mar-chese A. Rossi-Longhi.</i> Expose un plan d'inspection des archives consulaires italiennes afin d'en retirer les documents non officiels.....	153	238. June 18 <i>Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Marchese A. Rossi-Longhi.</i> Outlines plan to inspect Italian consular archives in order to remove unofficial documents	153
239. 19 juin <i>Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Annonce la décision prise de permettre à tous les agents consulaires italiens de quitter le Canada pour les États-Unis.....	154	239. June 19 <i>Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Records decision to allow all Italian consular officials to leave Canada for United States	154
240. 19 juin <i>Le consul général d'Italie au sous-secrétaire d'État aux</i>		240. June 19 <i>Consul General of Italy to Under-Secretary of State</i>	

Affaires extérieures. Proteste contre l'allégation de conduite incorrecte de certains consulats et refuse de collaborer à l'examen de documents provenant des archives consulaires italiennes 154

241. 19 juin *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au mar- chese A. Rossi-Longhi.* Réaffirme la décision de confisquer les dossiers et documents du Parti fasciste au Canada qui ne tombent pas sous l'immunité diplomatique..... 155

242. 19 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Rapporte que tous les agents consulaires italiens, leur famille et leur personnel ont reçu des laissez-passer pour se rendre aux États-Unis..... 156

243. 20 juin *Le consul général d'Italie au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande de faciliter le départ du Canada de certains agents consulaires dont il précise les noms..... 156

244. 20 juin *Le consul général d'Italie au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Reproche aux autorités canadiennes d'avoir retiré des documents des archives consulaires italiennes..... 157

245. 20 juin *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre des États-Unis.* L'avertit que la présence prolongée aux États-Unis d'anciens employés bien identifiés du consulat d'Italie au Canada constituerait une menace pour le Canada..... 157

PARTIE 9

RELATIONS AVEC LES ÉTATS BALTES

1940

246. 23 août *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet une communication du ministre de Lettonie à Londres qui donne les grandes lignes des arguments pour la non-reconnaissance *de jure* de l'intégration de son pays à l'Union soviétique..... 158

247. 14 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux*

for External Affairs. Protests Canadian allegation of improper conduct by certain Consulates and refuses co-operation in examination of documents in Italian consular archives 154

241. June 19 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Marchese A. Rossi-Longhi.* Reaffirms decision to confiscate records and documents of Fascist Party in Canada which are not considered entitled to diplomatic immunity 155

242. June 19 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Reports passes issued to all Italian consular officials, families and staffs to permit departure for United States 156

243. June 20 *Consul General of Italy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests that departure from Canada of specified consular officials be facilitated 156

244. June 20 *Consul General of Italy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Protests Canadian action in removing documents from Italian consular archives 157

245. June 20 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister of United States.* Warns that continued presence in United States of specified former Italian consular employees in Canada would constitute a threat to Canada 157

PART 9

RELATIONS WITH THE BALTIC STATES

1940

246. Aug. 23 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Forwards communication from Minister of Latvia in London outlining arguments for non-recognition *de jure* of Soviet absorption of Latvia 158

247. Sept. 14 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister*

- États-Unis*. Demande des renseignements sur l'attitude des États-Unis au sujet de la reconnaissance de l'intégration à l'Union soviétique des États baltes et de la Bessarabie..... 160
248. 14 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Demande un rapport sur les mesures prises par la Grande-Bretagne au sujet de la reconnaissance de l'intégration à l'Union soviétique des États baltes et de la Bessarabie..... 161
249. 16 sept. *Mémoire au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Lui suggère de considérer les positions britannique et américaine au sujet de la reconnaissance du contrôle soviétique sur les États baltes et de tenir compte de la demande soviétique pour que le consul général de la Suède prenne en charge les consulats baltes au Canada.... 161
250. 21 sept. *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait savoir que les États-Unis retardent leur reconnaissance *de jure* de l'intégration des États baltes à l'Union soviétique..... 162
251. 25 sept. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait savoir que la Grande-Bretagne s'abstient de reconnaître *de jure* l'intégration des États baltes à l'Union soviétique..... 163
- 1941
252. 26 juin *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. S'informe de l'attitude que la légation doit adopter dans ses rapports avec les représentants de la Finlande et des États baltes aux États-Unis..... 163
253. 3 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*. Avise la légation de ne pas entreprendre de transactions avec les représentants des États baltes sans directive d'Ottawa..... 164
- in United States*. Requests information about United States attitude regarding recognition of Soviet absorption of Baltic States and Bessarabia 160
248. Sept. 14 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Requests report on action taken by Great Britain concerning recognition of Soviet absorption of Baltic States and Bessarabia 161
249. Sept. 16 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Advises consideration of British and United States position regarding recognition of Soviet control over Baltic States in view of Soviet request that Swedish Consul General take charge of Baltic Consulates in Canada 161
250. Sept. 21 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports withholding by United States of *de jure* recognition of Soviet absorption of Baltic States 162
251. Sept. 25 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports that Great Britain is withholding *de jure* recognition of Soviet absorption of Baltic States 163
- 1941
252. June 26 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests instructions as to attitude to be taken by Legation in dealing with representatives in United States of Finland and the Baltic States 163
253. July 3 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*. Instructs Legation not to engage in transactions with representatives of Baltic States without instruction from Ottawa 164

CHAPITRE II

CHAPTER II

LA GUERRE EN EUROPE

THE WAR IN EUROPE

PARTIE I

PART I

OBJECTIFS DE GUERRE

WAR AIMS

1939

1939

254. 29 sept. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique l'opinion du gouvernement britannique selon laquelle les propositions de paix prévues de l'Allemagne seront inacceptables..... 167

254. Sept. 29 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports British Government view that anticipated German peace proposals will be unacceptable 167

255. 6 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet une déclaration d'après laquelle l'étude faite par les Alliés des propositions de paix allemandes aboutirait à leur rejet..... 168

255. Oct. 6 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits statement suggesting that Allied study of German peace proposals will result in rejection 168

256. 6 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Conseille à la Grande-Bretagne et à la France de formuler des propositions de paix constructives dans l'éventualité d'un rejet des propositions de paix allemandes..... 169

256. Oct. 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Suggests formulation of positive peace proposals by Great Britain and France in event of rejection of German peace proposals.. 169

257. 8 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Suggère pour la formulation de propositions de paix constructives de la part de la Grande-Bretagne et de la France, une base qui obtiendrait l'appui des pays neutres..... 170

257. Oct. 8 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Suggests basis for positive peace proposals by Great Britain and France that would enlist support of neutral nations 170

258. 9 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Sollicite des commentaires au sujet du projet de déclaration sur les propositions de paix allemandes..... 171

258. Oct. 9 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests comments on draft statement on German peace proposals 171

259. 9 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet le projet de déclaration annonçant le rejet des propositions de paix allemandes..... 171

259. Oct. 9 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits draft statement rejecting German peace proposals 171

260. 10 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Alloue plus de temps pour commenter la déclaration proposée en réponse aux propositions de paix allemandes..... 175

260. Oct. 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Offers more time for commenting on proposed statement in reply to German peace proposals 175

261. 10 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet les commentaires du Premier ministre au sujet des propositions canadiennes en vue d'un projet de proposition de paix des Alliés..... 176
262. 10 oct. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Signale que le projet de réponse britannique aux propositions de paix allemandes est plus négatif que positif..... 176
263. 10 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Communique l'opinion du Cabinet selon laquelle les objectifs de guerre des Alliés devraient être exposés de façon constructive..... 177
264. 10 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale la révision du projet de déclaration visant les propositions de paix allemandes..... 178
265. 10 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique le deuxième projet de déclaration en insistant que l'Allemagne redresse les torts déjà commis et donne des garanties réelles pour l'avenir..... 178
266. 11 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Précise les suggestions en vue de propositions de paix constructives..... 180
267. 12 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Prend note des suggestions canadiennes et laisse entrevoir d'autres révisions au projet de déclaration..... 181
268. 12 oct. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Exprime ses vues sur le deuxième projet de déclaration britannique portant sur les propositions de paix allemandes..... 181
269. 12 oct. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet le texte du message adressé à Londres et précise que la déclaration sur les propositions de paix allemandes devrait faire état du désir des Alliés de voir appliquer le principe de droit..... 182
261. Oct. 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Transmits comments of Prime Minister on Canadian suggestions for draft Allied peace proposals 176
262. Oct. 10 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Comments that proposed British reply to German peace proposals is negative rather than positive 176
263. Oct. 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Communicates Cabinet opinion that Allied war aims should be stated positively 177
264. Oct. 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports revision of draft statement on German peace proposals 178
265. Oct. 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Forwards second draft of statement insisting that Germany right the wrongs already done and give effective guarantees for the future 178
266. Oct. 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Clarifies suggestions for positive peace proposals 180
267. Oct. 12 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Acknowledges Canadian suggestions and reports further revision of draft statement 181
268. Oct. 12 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Gives views on second draft of British statement on German peace proposal 181
269. Oct. 12 *Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Transmits text of message to London giving view that statement on German peace proposals should embody Allied desire for rule of law 182

270. 12 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre d'Australie*. Fait savoir que le Canada désire une déclaration claire sur les objectifs de guerre et les moyens de parvenir à une paix durable..... 183
271. 12 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Donne les raisons pour lesquelles on n'a pas encore à ce stade précisé les objectifs de guerre..... 183
272. 24 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique les vues du gouvernement français qui est d'avis que les principaux objectifs de guerre des Alliés devraient comporter des réparations et établir des garanties réelles contre l'agression allemande..... 184
273. 25 oct. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Contesté certains aspects des objectifs de guerre définis par la France..... 185
274. 27 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Sollicite des commentaires préliminaires au sujet du projet de réponse adressé au gouvernement français relativement à la question des objectifs de guerre..... 186
275. 29 oct. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Exprime l'avis qu'un vigoureux effort de guerre doit s'accompagner d'une déclaration annonçant une politique d'après-guerre constructive..... 186
276. 2 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre d'Australie*. Envoie une réponse provisoire en attendant l'étude prochaine des propositions françaises concernant les objectifs de guerre..... 187
277. 2 nov. *Mémoire du Premier ministre au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Expose les éléments du projet de déclaration canadienne sur les objectifs de guerre..... 187
278. 3 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Désire discuter avec le
270. Oct. 12 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister of Australia*. Reports Canadian wish for a positive statement of war aims and of procedures to attain stable peace 183
271. Oct. 12 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Lists reasons for not formulating war aims more definitely at this stage 183
272. Oct. 24 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates French Government view that principal Allied war aims should include reparation and establish effective guarantees against German aggression 184
273. Oct. 25 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Takes issue with certain aspects of French war aims 185
274. Oct. 27 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests preliminary comments on draft reply to French Government on question of war aims 186
275. Oct. 29 *Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Outlines view that vigorous war effort should be accompanied by statement of constructive post-war policy 186
276. Nov. 2 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister of Australia*. Sends interim reply pending early consideration of French proposals concerning war aims 187
277. Nov. 2 *Memorandum from Prime Minister to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Outlines elements of proposed Canadian statement on war aims 187
278. Nov. 3 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. States desire to dis-

- Cabinet la position française à l'égard des objectifs de la guerre avant de communiquer les observations du Canada..... 193
279. 8 nov. *Mémoire* du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre. Traite des divers points de vue concernant la déclaration sur les objectifs de guerre..... 193
280. 9 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande son opinion sur le projet provisoire de réponse britannique au gouvernement français au sujet des objectifs de guerre..... 196
281. 9 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique le projet de déclaration en réponse aux propositions du gouvernement français sur les objectifs de guerre..... 196
282. 15 nov. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait connaître la position de l'Australie qui estime que la déclaration sur les objectifs de guerre devrait faire état d'une victoire totale des Alliés et de la coopération internationale pour la paix dans l'après-guerre 198
283. 24 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique les modifications proposées au projet de réponse sur les objectifs de guerre adressé au gouvernement français..... 199
284. 25 nov. *Le premier ministre de l'Afrique du Sud au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait savoir qu'il ne voit aucune objection au projet de réponse britannique révisé sur les objectifs de guerre destiné au gouvernement français..... 200
285. 25 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Critique les propositions françaises et met en garde contre des engagements, à ce stade, que les autres Alliés ne pourraient appuyer..... 200
286. 27 nov. *Mémoire* du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre. Fait valoir que le projet de réponse britannique au gouvernement français semble conçu
- cuss French position on war aims with Cabinet before sending Canadian comments 193
279. Nov. 8 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Discusses various points of view concerning declaration of war aims 193
280. Nov. 9 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests views on draft interim British reply to French Government on war aims 196
281. Nov. 9 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Forwards draft statement in reply to French Government proposals on war aims 196
282. Nov. 15 *Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates Australian view that declaration of war aims should include total Allied victory and post-war international co-operation for peace 198
283. Nov. 24 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates proposed amendments to draft reply to French Government on war aims 199
284. Nov. 25 *Prime Minister of South Africa to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Expresses no objection to revised British draft reply to French Government on war aims 200
285. Nov. 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Criticizes French proposals and warns against commitment at this stage to aims which other Allies cannot support 200
286. Nov. 27 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Comments that draft British reply to French Government apparently is

- de façon à exprimer les vues de tous les membres du Commonwealth et se demande si la Grande-Bretagne devrait répondre au nom du Canada..... 205
287. 28 nov. *Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* L'informe de la réponse envoyée au secrétaire aux Dominions à l'effet qu'il est d'accord avec le projet de réponse britannique au gouvernement français au sujet des objectifs de guerre..... 206
288. 28 nov. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* L'informe de la réponse envoyée au secrétaire aux Dominions à l'effet qu'il est d'accord avec le projet de réponse britannique au gouvernement français au sujet des objectifs de guerre..... 206
289. 28 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait savoir que le Premier ministre est assuré que la position du Canada sera étudiée au cours des prochaines discussions avec le gouvernement français au sujet des objectifs de guerre..... 207
290. 4 déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Indique son intention d'expédier la réponse provisoire modifiée au gouvernement français au sujet des objectifs de guerre..... 207
291. 5 déc. *Mémoire au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Se demande si la réponse britannique à la France engagera ou non le Canada..... 207
292. 6 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Est d'accord pour qu'on expédie la réponse provisoire britannique au gouvernement français concernant les objectifs de guerre..... 208
- 1940
293. 30 janv. *Mémoire au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Commente l'invitation britannique au Canada de se joindre à un projet de déclaration conjointe anglo-française comportant l'engagement de ne pas conclure de paix séparée..... 208
- intended to represent views of all Commonwealth members and questions whether Britain should reply on behalf of Canada 205
287. Nov. 28 *Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates reply to Dominions Secretary indicating general concurrence with British draft reply to French Government on war aims 206
288. Nov. 28 *Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates reply to Dominions Secretary indicating general concurrence with British draft reply to French Government on war aims 206
289. Nov. 28 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Forwards Prime Minister's assurance that Canadian views will be considered in subsequent discussions with French Government on war aims 207
290. Dec. 4 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States intention to despatch amended interim reply to French Government on war aims 207
291. Dec. 5 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Raises issue of whether British reply to French will commit Canada or not 207
292. Dec. 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Agrees to despatch of British interim reply to French Government on war aims 208
- 1940
293. Jan. 30 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Comments on British invitation to Canada to participate in proposed joint Anglo-French declaration engaging not to conclude separate peace 208

294. 1^{er} févr. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Explique que le fait de s'associer à une déclaration conjointe anglo-française contre la conclusion d'une paix séparée pourrait susciter une controverse politique intérieure.... 209
295. 29 févr. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait connaître l'intention de la Grande-Bretagne de négocier avec la France et la Pologne une déclaration condamnant la conduite des Allemands en Pologne..... 210
296. 14 mars *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Propose un plan grâce auquel le projet de déclaration anglo-française contre la conclusion d'une paix séparée ne donnerait pas lieu à des spéculations quant à la solidarité du Commonwealth..... 211
297. 18 mars *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Accepte le projet de lier les déclarations anglo-françaises contre la conclusion d'une paix séparée à certains arrangements actuels anglo-français en vertu desquels les Dominions ne sont pas liés..... 212
298. 20 mars *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. S'oppose à l'incorporation des déclarations proposées par la Pologne à la déclaration anglo-franco-polonaise sur la conduite des Allemands en Pologne..... 213
299. 22 mars *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Souscrit à la position britannique..... 213
300. 25 mars *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Sollicite des commentaires au sujet du projet révisé de déclaration anglo-franco-polonaise concernant la conduite des Allemands en Pologne..... 214
301. 1^{er} avril *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Approuve le projet révisé de déclaration anglo-franco-polonaise concernant la conduite des Allemands en Pologne sans lier le Canada à des garanties spécifiques..... 214
294. Feb. 1 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Explains that association with joint Anglo-French declaration against conclusion of separate peace could arouse domestic political controversy 209
295. Feb. 29 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States British intention to negotiate with France and Poland a declaration condemning German conduct in Poland 210
296. Mar. 14 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Suggests plan whereby proposed Anglo-French declaration against conclusion of separate peace would not arouse speculation about solidarity of Commonwealth 211
297. Mar. 18 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Concurs in plan to link Anglo-French declaration with existing Anglo-French arrangements not binding on Dominions 212
298. Mar. 20 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States objection to incorporating statements proposed by Poland into Anglo-Franco-Polish declaration on German conduct in Poland 213
299. Mar. 22 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Agrees with British position 213
300. Mar. 25 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests comments on revised draft of Anglo-Franco-Polish declaration on German conduct in Poland 214
301. Apr. 1 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Approves revised draft of Anglo-Franco-Polish declaration on German conduct in Poland without binding Canada to specific guarantees 214

302. 11 avril *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le projet révisé de déclaration anglo-franco-polonaise concernant la conduite des Allemands en Pologne et fait état de sa présentation aux gouvernements français et polonais..... 215

303. 17 avril *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le texte de la déclaration anglo-franco-polonaise concernant les atrocités commises par les Allemands en Pologne et fait état de l'assurance obtenue de la Pologne que la déclaration ne lie pas les parties..... 215

PARTIE 2
RÉUNIONS INTERALLIÉES

JUIN 1941

1940

304. 1^{er} nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Sollicite des commentaires au sujet du projet de résolution qui sera étudié lors de la rencontre projetée des représentants des gouvernements alliés à Londres..... 216

305. 2 nov. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Traite du projet de résolution à présenter à la prochaine rencontre des gouvernements alliés à Londres..... 218

306. 5 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Expose les objections du Canada au rétablissement du Conseil suprême de guerre et commente le projet de résolution..... 219

307. 8 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Soumet des révisions visant le projet de résolution et souhaite obtenir l'assentiment et la participation du Canada à la rencontre projetée des représentants des gouvernements alliés..... 222

308. 9 nov. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre.* Expose les raisons qui motivent l'idée d'une rencontre des représentants des gouvernements alliés..... 223

302. Apr. 11 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates revised draft of Anglo-Franco-Polish declaration on German conduct in Poland and reports submission to French and Polish Governments 215

303. Apr. 17 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates text of Anglo-Franco-Polish declaration on German atrocities in Poland and reports Polish assurance that statement is not contractual 215

PART 2
INTER-ALLIED MEETINGS

JUNE 1941

1940

304. Nov. 1 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests comment on draft resolution to be considered at proposed London meeting of representatives of Allied Governments 216

305. Nov. 2 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Discusses draft resolution to be presented to proposed meeting of Allied Governments in London 218

306. Nov. 5 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* States Canadian objections to a revival of Supreme War Council and comments on draft resolution 219

307. Nov. 8 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Submits revisions to draft resolution and expresses hope for Canadian acceptance and participation in proposed meeting of representatives of Allied Governments 222

308. Nov. 9 *Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister.* States reasons for supporting idea of meeting of representatives of Allied Governments 223

309. 10 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Déclare que l'objet de la rencontre projetée des représentants alliés serait de démontrer la solidarité des Alliés et affirme que la rencontre ne constituerait pas un Conseil suprême de guerre..... 224
310. 13 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Souscrit à la convocation de la prochaine rencontre des représentants alliés tout en continuant de rejeter l'implication dans des engagements relatifs à la sécurité militaire dans l'après-guerre..... 224
311. 13 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Dénie que le Canada compte s'absenter de la réunion des Alliés..... 225
312. 13 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Charge Massey de représenter le Canada à la rencontre projetée des représentants alliés si le projet de résolution est amendé et jugé satisfaisant..... 226
313. 15 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Propose la révision du projet de résolution afin de répondre aux objections canadiennes contre des engagements relatifs à la sécurité militaire dans l'après-guerre..... 227
314. 15 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Accepte la révision du projet de résolution qui sera présenté à la rencontre des représentants des gouvernements alliés..... 227
315. 23 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le texte révisé du projet de résolution et fixe la date de la rencontre des représentants alliés..... 228
316. 29 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Explique la raison de l'ajournement de la rencontre des représentants alliés..... 228
309. Nov. 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States that purpose of proposed meeting of Allied representatives would be to demonstrate Allied solidarity and affirms that meeting would not constitute a Supreme War Council 224
310. Nov. 13 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Concurs in calling of proposed meeting of Allied representatives while continuing to reject implication of commitments to post-war military security 224
311. Nov. 13 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Denies that Canada intends to stay away from Allied meeting 225
312. Nov. 13 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Instructs Massey to represent Canada at proposed meeting of Allied representatives if draft resolution is satisfactorily adjusted 226
313. Nov. 15 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Proposes revision of draft resolution to meet Canadian objection to post-war military security commitments 227
314. Nov. 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Accepts revision of draft resolution to be presented at meeting of representatives of Allied Governments 227
315. Nov. 23 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates revised text of proposed resolution and fixes date for meeting of Allied representatives 228
316. Nov. 29 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Explains postponement of meeting of Allied representatives 228

1941

317. 7 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Propose la convocation de la rencontre des représentants alliés et soumet une modification à apporter au texte de la résolution dont on a convenu antérieurement..... 229
318. 10 juin *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Déclare qu'il serait difficile pour le Canada de refuser d'assister à la rencontre projetée des représentants des gouvernements alliés..... 229
319. 10 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Approuve la résolution adoptée lors de la rencontre des représentants des gouvernements alliés et nomme le représentant..... 231

SEPTEMBRE 1941

1941

320. 15 juill. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. S'intéresse aux discussions entre la Grande-Bretagne et les gouvernements en exil sur les ententes économiques d'après-guerre..... 231
321. 16 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Demande des renseignements au sujet des discussions signalées..... 232
322. 31 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part de la décision d'organiser une rencontre des gouvernements alliés afin d'adopter la résolution au sujet des projets économiques d'après-guerre..... 232
323. 31 juill. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Propose l'ordre du jour de la rencontre préparatoire officielle projetée des gouvernements alliés aux fins d'étudier les mesures en vue de fournir des denrées alimentaires et des matières premières aux pays libérés et signale que les États-Unis sont disposés à étudier la question de la coopération en temps opportun..... 232

1941

317. June 7 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Proposes convening of meeting of Allied representatives and submits modification of text of previously agreed resolution 229
318. June 10 *Memorandum du Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. States that it would be difficult for Canada to refuse to attend proposed meeting of representatives of Allied Governments 229
319. June 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Approves resolution to be adopted at meeting of representatives of Allied Governments and names representative 231

SEPTEMBER 1941

1941

320. July 15 *Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Expresses interest in discussions between Great Britain and Governments-in-exile on post-war economic arrangements 231
321. July 16 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Requests information about reported discussions 232
322. July 31 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports decision to hold meeting of Allied Governments to pass resolution on general post-war economic plans 232
323. July 31 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Suggests agenda for proposed formal preparatory meeting of Allied Governments to discuss measures for supply of food and raw materials to liberated countries and reports United States preparedness to consider co-operation at appropriate time 232

324. 31 juill. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Présente les principaux points du projet de résolution sur les programmes économiques d'après-guerre qui seront étudiés lors de la rencontre des gouvernements alliés..... 234
324. July 31 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Submits main points of proposed draft resolution on post-war economic plans to be considered at meeting of Allied Governments 234
325. 8 août *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Suggère que le Canada offre gratuitement du blé aux pays alliés de l'Europe dans l'après-guerre..... 235
325. Aug. 8 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Suggests that Canada should offer free wheat to Allied countries in post-war Europe 235
326. 12 août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. Le prévient d'une déclaration à venir au sujet de la rencontre entre le premier ministre de la Grande-Bretagne et le président des États-Unis ainsi que d'une déclaration conjointe sur les grands principes économiques et politiques..... 237
326. Aug. 12 *Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Announces forthcoming statement on meeting between Prime Minister of Great Britain and President of United States and joint declaration of broad economic and political principles 237
327. 13 août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. Communique le texte de la prochaine déclaration en huit points de l'Angleterre et des États-Unis (Charte de l'Atlantique)..... 237
327. Aug. 13 *Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Communicates text of forthcoming Anglo-United States Eight-Point Declaration (Atlantic Charter) 237
328. 14 août *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Commente les principes généraux contenus dans la Charte de l'Atlantique et devant régir les relations internationales dans l'après-guerre..... 239
328. Aug. 14 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Comments on general principles governing post-war international relations embodied in Atlantic Charter 239
329. 15 août *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Déclare que le Premier ministre assistera à la prochaine conférence des gouvernements alliés..... 239
329. Aug. 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. States that Prime Minister will attend forthcoming Conference of Allied Governments 239
330. 21 août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Désire que les gouvernements alliés représentés à la rencontre projetée soient invités à s'associer à la Charte de l'Atlantique et demande si les gouvernements du Commonwealth ne s'y sentent pas déjà associés du fait que la Grande-Bretagne est partie à la déclaration initiale..... 240
330. Aug. 21 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Suggests desirability of inviting Allied Governments represented at proposed meeting to associate themselves with Atlantic Charter and enquires whether, since Great Britain is a party to original declaration, Commonwealth Governments agree that they are already associated 240

331. 21 août *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au Comité de guerre du Cabinet*. Suggère d'accepter la proposition britannique selon laquelle les membres du Commonwealth sont déjà associés à la Charte de l'Atlantique..... 241
331. Aug. 21 *Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Cabinet War Committee*. Suggests acceptance of British view that Commonwealth members are already associated with Atlantic Charter 241
332. 21 août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Soumet le texte du projet de résolution sur le réapprovisionnement de l'Europe qui sera présenté lors de la rencontre des gouvernements alliés et sollicite des commentaires..... 242
332. Aug. 21 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Submits for comment text of draft resolution on re-provisioning of Europe to be presented at meeting of Allied Governments 242
333. 22 août *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Signale que le Canada est favorable à l'idée de s'associer à la Charte de l'Atlantique et présume que des démarches officielles seront effectuées en ce sens..... 243
333. Aug. 22 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Reports acceptance of idea of Canadian association with Atlantic Charter and states assumption that formal steps will be taken to achieve this 243
334. 22 août *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Rapporte que le Comité de guerre du Cabinet suggère que le Canada soit représenté auprès du bureau mentionné dans le projet de résolution sur le réapprovisionnement de l'Europe..... 243
334. Aug. 22 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Communicates Cabinet War Committee suggestion that Canada be represented on bureau referred to in draft resolution on re-provisioning of Europe 243
335. 25 août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que la rencontre projetée des gouvernements alliés est remise..... 243
335. Aug. 25 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports postponement of proposed meeting of Allied Governments 243
336. 25 août *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Traite de la position du Canada à l'égard de la Charte de l'Atlantique et de l'importance de maintenir une politique commune avec les pays exportateurs de blé en prévision des problèmes de l'après-guerre..... 244
336. Aug. 25 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Discusses relationship of Canada to Atlantic Charter and importance of maintaining common policy with wheat-exporting nations in planning to meet post-war problems 244
337. 18 sept. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Traite de la date proposée pour la rencontre des gouvernements alliés et recommande que des décisions alliées soient prises sur les questions qui y seront discutées..... 245
337. Sept. 18 *Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports provisional date for meeting of Allied Governments and suggests that decisions should be reached on questions to be discussed 245

- | | | | |
|---|----------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| <p>338. 19 sept. <i>Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Communique la date et l'ordre du jour de la rencontre des gouvernements alliés.....</p> <p>339. 20 sept. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Le charge de communiquer au gouvernement britannique l'adhésion du Canada aux principes de la Charte de l'Atlantique....</p> <p>340. 22 sept. <i>Le haut commissariat en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire aux Dominions.</i> Communique l'adhésion du Canada aux principes de la Charte de l'Atlantique.....</p> | <p>246</p> <p>247</p> <p>247</p> | <p>338. Sept. 19 <i>High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Reports date and agenda of meeting of Allied Governments</p> <p>339. Sept. 20 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> Sends instructions to convey to British Government Canada's adherence to principles of Atlantic Charter</p> <p>340. Sept. 22 <i>High Commissioner in Great Britain to Dominions Secretary.</i> Conveys adherence of Canada to principles of Atlantic Charter</p> | <p>246</p> <p>247</p> <p>247</p> |
|---|----------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|

PARTIE 3

EFFORTS EN VUE DE LA PAIX

1939

341. 8 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Promet de consulter les gouvernements du Commonwealth et les alliés avant de donner suite à l'offre de médiation faite par la reine des Pays-Bas et le roi des Belges..
342. 10 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Souhaite que le projet de réponse à la reine des Pays-Bas et au roi des Belges corresponde aux vues des gouvernements du Commonwealth et demande une prompte réponse indiquant son accord au sujet du texte.....
343. 10 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce l'envoi prochain d'un projet de réponse à l'offre de médiation de la reine des Pays-Bas et du roi des Belges et fixe un délai pour signifier son accord.....
344. 10 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le projet de réponse à l'offre de médiation de la reine des Pays-Bas et du roi des Belges.....

248

248

249

249

PART 3

PEACE INITIATIVES

1939

341. Nov. 8 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Promises consultation with Commonwealth Governments and allies before action is taken on offer of mediation made by Queen of The Netherlands and King of the Belgians
342. Nov. 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States desire that draft reply to Queen of The Netherlands and King of the Belgians represent advice of Commonwealth Governments and urges early reply indicating agreement with text
343. Nov. 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Announces forthcoming despatch of draft reply to offer of mediation by Queen of The Netherlands and King of the Belgians and sets time limit for communication of concurrence
344. Nov. 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Forwards draft reply to offer of mediation by Queen of The Netherlands and King of the Belgians

248

248

249

249

345. 10 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Suggère de réviser le projet de réponse afin de justifier l'intervention des états non européens dans la guerre..... 251
346. 11 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique les modifications apportées au projet de réponse à l'offre de médiation de la reine des Pays-Bas et du roi des Belges.. 251
347. 12 nov. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. L'avise que l'Australie approuve les modifications proposées au projet de réponse..... 252
- 1940
348. 12 juill. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait état de suggestions adressées aux États-Unis en vue d'une contre-offensive concertée face à une offensive de paix allemande possible..... 252
349. 18 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait état de la thèse de l'Afrique du Sud demandant instamment l'élaboration d'un solide plan démocratique en prévision d'une offensive de paix allemande probable.... 253
350. 22 juill. *Mémoire du conseiller*. Traite de la valeur psychologique d'une proclamation bien imaginée des idéaux démocratiques..... 255
351. 5 août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique l'offre de médiation présentée par le roi de Suède..... 258
352. 5 août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique le projet de réponse rejetant l'offre de médiation présentée par le roi de Suède étant donné que l'agression allemande se continue..... 259
353. 6 août *Le premier ministre de l'Afrique du Sud au secrétaire d'État*
345. Nov. 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Suggests revision of draft reply to justify intervention in war by non-European states 251
346. Nov. 11 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates amendments to draft reply to offer of mediation by Queen of The Netherlands and King of the Belgians 251
347. Nov. 12 *Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates Australian agreement with proposed amendments to draft reply 252
- 1940
348. July 12. *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports suggestions put to United States for concerting counter-offensive to possible German peace offensive 252
349. July 18 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of States for External Affairs*. Reports South African argument urging development of strong democratic plan for countering probable German peace offensive 253
350. July 22 *Memorandum by Counsellor*. Discusses psychological value of imaginative proclamation of democratic ideals 255
351. Aug. 5 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates proposal for mediation by King of Sweden 258
352. Aug. 5 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Forwards draft reply rejecting proposal for mediation by King of Sweden in view of continued German aggression 259
353. Aug. 6 *Prime Minister of South Africa to Secretary of State*

- aux Affaires extérieures*. Envoie ses commentaires sur le projet de réponse britannique à l'offre de médiation présentée par le roi de Suède..... 260
354. 7 août *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Commente le projet de réponse britannique à l'offre de médiation présentée par le roi de Suède..... 260
355. 7 août *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Accepte que le Canada soit associé au projet de réponse à l'offre de médiation présentée par le roi de Suède mais suggère des amendements..... 261
356. 13 août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait connaître la teneur de la réponse révisée adressée au roi de Suède..... 262
357. 12 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique les conditions afférentes à l'initiative de paix secrète allemande signalée en Suède et l'avise du rejet britannique..... 263
- for External Affairs*. Forwards comments on draft British reply to proposal for mediation by King of Sweden 260
354. Aug. 7 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Comments on draft British reply to proposal for mediation by King of Sweden 260
355. Aug. 7 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Agrees to inclusion of Canada's name in draft reply to proposal for mediation by King of Sweden but suggests amendments 261
356. Aug. 13 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States terms of revised reply sent to King of Sweden 262
357. Sept. 12 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates terms of reported secret German peace initiative in Sweden and British rejection of these 263

PARTIE 4

INVASION ALLEMANDE
DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE

1940

358. 9 avril *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte l'entrée des troupes allemandes à Copenhague et des navires de guerre allemands dans plusieurs ports norvégiens..... 265
359. 9 avril *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce la capitulation d'Oslo et le départ précipité du gouvernement norvégien..... 265
360. 9 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part des rumeurs selon lesquelles il existe en Allemagne un courant d'opposition à l'invasion de la Norvège..... 265
358. Apr. 9 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports entry of German troops into Copenhagen and of German warships into several Norwegian ports 265
359. Apr. 9 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports capitulation of Oslo and flight of Norwegian Government 265
360. Apr. 9 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates reported opposition in Germany to invasion of Norway 265

PART 4

GERMAN INVASION OF
WESTERN EUROPE

1940

361. 10 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que la situation navale est précaire en Norvège et que le gouvernement norvégien a décidé de négocier avec l'Allemagne.. 266
362. 10 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte qu'il est impossible de bien évaluer la situation diplomatique et stratégique en Norvège..... 266
363. 12 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale les risques d'agression contre les Pays-Bas et la Belgique et l'inquiétude que cause les agissements de l'Italie..... 266
364. 20 avril *Le chargé d'affaires aux Pays-Bas au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que la situation est moins tendue aux Pays-Bas et en Belgique..... 267
365. 27 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale la situation critique des forces armées en Norvège..... 267
366. 8 mai *Le chargé d'affaires aux Pays-Bas au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte qu'on prend aux Pays-Bas des mesures militaires inhabituelles..... 267
367. 8 mai *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que la tension va croissant aux Pays-Bas et en Belgique.. 268
368. 8 mai *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale les rumeurs d'invasion imminente des Pays-Bas et d'une action semblable dans les Balkans..... 268
369. 10 mai *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte qu'on s'attend à une attaque imminente contre la Belgique, le Luxembourg et les Pays-Bas..... 268
361. Apr. 10 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports uncertain naval situation in Norway and decision of Norwegian Government to negotiate with Germany 266
362. Apr. 10 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports that accurate appraisal of diplomatic and strategic situation in Norway is impossible 266
363. Apr. 12 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports possibility of aggression against The Netherlands and Belgium and anxiety about Italian actions 266
364. Apr. 20 *Chargé d'Affaires in The Netherlands to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports relaxation of tension in The Netherlands and Belgium 267
365. Apr. 27 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports critical position of Allied forces in Norway 267
366. May 8 *Chargé d'Affaires in The Netherlands to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports unexpected military precautions in The Netherlands 267
367. May 8 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports increasing tension in The Netherlands and Belgium 268
368. May 8 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports rumours of imminent invasion of The Netherlands and possible concurrent action in Balkans 268
369. May 10 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports Belgians consider offensive against Belgium, Luxembourg and The Netherlands to be imminent 268

370. 10 mai *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte l'invasion de la Belgique, du Luxembourg et des Pays-Bas et l'appel de ces pays à la Grande-Bretagne et à la France..... 269
370. May 10 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg and The Netherlands and appeal by Belgium and The Netherlands to Great Britain and France for assistance 269
371. 10 mai *Le chargé d'affaires aux Pays-Bas au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte la destruction des registres du chiffre..... 269
371. May 10 *Chargé d'Affaires in The Netherlands to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports destruction of cypher books 269
372. 10 mai *Le ministre des Pays-Bas au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale que l'état de guerre existe avec l'Allemagne et l'avise que les gouvernements des territoires d'outremer sont autorisés à poursuivre leur administration..... 269
372. May 10 *Minister of The Netherlands to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports existence of state of war with Germany and makes official declaration that governments of overseas territories are authorized to continue administration therein 269
373. 11 mai *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rend compte des opérations militaires en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas.. 270
373. May 11 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports on military developments in Belgium and The Netherlands 270
374. 11 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale les pertes allemandes aux Pays-Bas et au large de Narvik..... 271
374. May 11 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports German losses in The Netherlands and off Narvik 271
375. 12 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte des victoires britanniques et françaises en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas et signale d'autres débarquements allemands en Norvège..... 271
375. May 12 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports successes by British and French troops in Belgium and The Netherlands and fresh German landings in Norway 271
376. 12 mai *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que la situation est critique en Belgique..... 272
376. May 12 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports situation in Belgium is critical 272
377. 12 mai *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte qu'on a l'intention d'évacuer la mission à Ostende..... 272
377. May 12 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports intention of moving Mission to Ostend on insistence of Foreign Minister 272
378. 13 mai *Le chargé d'affaires aux Pays-Bas au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rend compte de la situation..... 273
378. May 13 *Chargé d'Affaires in The Netherlands to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports on situation 273

379. 14 mai *Le délégué permanent suppléant, la Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que les représentants français et britanniques pourraient être évacués immédiatement et demande des instructions..... 273
380. 14 mai *Le délégué permanent suppléant, la Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce qu'on a détruit certains dossiers de la délégation et demande d'autres instructions..... 273
381. 14 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent suppléant, la Société des Nations.* Ordonne de détruire tous les dossiers et registres du chiffre et de quitter la Suisse..... 274
382. 15 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que l'Italie entrera probablement en guerre et que des réserves de carburants ont été détruites aux Pays-Bas..... 274
383. 16 mai *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet le message de Jean Désy qui décide de rester en Belgique jusqu'à nouvel ordre..... 274
384. 16 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en Belgique.* L'avise de partir pour la France en cas de danger..... 275
385. 17 mai *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce sa décision de partir pour Paris..... 275
386. 17 mai *Le ministre des Pays-Bas au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que son gouvernement est provisoirement établi à Londres et que les territoires non occupés poursuivent la guerre..... 275
387. 17 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce la décision d'envoyer des avions britanniques additionnels en vue de la contre-offensive française..... 276
379. May 14 *Acting Permanent Delegate, League of Nations to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports possibility of immediate evacuation of French and British representatives and requests instructions 273
380. May 14 *Acting Permanent Delegate, League of Nations to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports on destruction of some delegation files and requests further instructions 273
381. May 14 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Permanent Delegate, League of Nations.* Sends instructions to destroy all files and cypher and code books and to evacuate Switzerland 274
382. May 15 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports probability of entry of Italy into war and destruction of oil stores in The Netherlands 274
383. May 16 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Jean Désy reporting decision to remain in Belgium pending further instructions 274
384. May 16 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in Belgium.* Sends instructions to leave for France in case of danger 275
385. May 17 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports decision to depart for Paris 275
386. May 17 *Minister of The Netherlands to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports provisional establishment of Government in London and continuation of war from unoccupied territories 275
387. May 17 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports decision to despatch additional British aircraft to assist in French counter-attack 276

388. 17 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que la situation militaire en France est critique..... 276
388. May 17 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports crucial state of military situation in France 276
389. 18 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce des victoires aériennes de la Grande-Bretagne..... 277
389. May 18 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports British air successes 277
390. 18 mai *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale le transfert de la mission au Havre où le gouvernement belge doit s'établir..... 277
390. May 18 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports transfer of mission to Le Havre where Belgian Government is to be established. 277
391. 19 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait rapport sur la situation en Europe et sur l'importante déclaration des États-Unis au sujet des navires allemands qui menacent les Antilles..... 277
391. May 19 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports developments in European situation and significant United States statement concerning German ships threatening West Indies 277
392. 20 mai *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que les Français ont foi en la victoire..... 278
392. May 20 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports French confidence in victory 278
393. 21 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part des assurances données par le Japon au sujet des Indes orientales néerlandaises et de la possibilité que la Grande-Bretagne évacue la région de Narvik..... 278
393. May 21 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports Japanese assurances respecting Netherlands East Indies and possible British decision to evacuate Narvik area 278
394. 22 mai *Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre*. Propose que chaque premier ministre du Commonwealth fasse appel au président Roosevelt afin d'obtenir immédiatement des avions et des volontaires pour la défense de la Grande-Bretagne..... 279
394. May 22 *Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister*. Proposes appeal by each Commonwealth Prime Minister to President Roosevelt for immediate supply of aircraft and volunteers for defence of Great Britain 279
395. 23 mai *Le premier ministre de l'Afrique du Sud au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique le message adressé au premier ministre britannique, indiquant sa réaction négative à la proposition australienne de faire appel aux États-Unis..... 280
395. May 23 *Prime Minister of South Africa to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates message to British Prime Minister indicating adverse reaction to Australian proposal for appeal to United States 280
396. 23 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte en substance le message à Canberra du représentant australien à Londres, sur
396. May 23 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports contents of message to Canberra from Australian representative in

- lequel le premier ministre australien a fondé sa communication à Churchill... 281
397. 24 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique la réponse du premier ministre britannique au premier ministre australien exprimant sa confiance dans l'efficacité du système de défense britannique et annonçant qu'on a fait appel aux États-Unis..... 283
398. 24 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Affirme que l'appel aux États-Unis pourrait avoir à ce moment un effet défavorable sur le Congrès et l'opinion publique..... 284
399. 24 mai *Le Premier ministre au premier ministre d'Australie*. Est d'accord sur l'importance de l'aide des États-Unis et cite le texte de la réponse au premier ministre britannique..... 285
400. 24 mai *Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au Premier ministre*. Lui communique sa réaction à la proposition australienne de faire directement appel au président Roosevelt pour l'envoi d'avions et de volontaires.. 285
401. 25 mai *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique la nouvelle adresse du ministre auprès du gouvernement belge..... 285
402. 25 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que la situation militaire s'aggrave en France..... 286
403. 26 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. Annonce la décision de retirer le Corps expéditionnaire britannique de France et la possibilité d'une débâcle de la France..... 286
404. 26 mai *Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre*. Transmet le texte de l'appel personnel qu'il a fait au président Roosevelt afin qu'il fournisse des forces aériennes pour défendre la Grande-Bretagne..... 286
- London on which Australian Prime Minister's communication to Churchill was based 281
397. May 24 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates reply of British Prime Minister to Australian Prime Minister expressing confidence in effectiveness of British defence system and stating that appeals have been made to United States 283
398. May 24 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. States that appeals for United States aid at this time would have adverse effect on the formation of public and Congressional opinion favourable to action 284
399. May 24 *Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia*. Expresses agreement on importance of United States aid and quotes text of reply to British Prime Minister 285
400. May 24 *Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister*. Communicates response to Australian proposal of direct appeal to President Roosevelt for aircraft and volunteers 285
401. May 25 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports present location of Minister to Belgium 285
402. May 25 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports deterioration of military situation in France 286
403. May 26 *Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Communicates decision to withdraw British Expeditionary Force from France and reports possibility of collapse of France 286
404. May 26 *Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister*. Transmits text of personal appeal to President Roosevelt for supply of air power for defence of Great Britain 286

405. 27 mai *Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au Premier ministre*. Transmet le texte de l'appel personnel qu'il a fait au président Roosevelt pour lui demander d'accorder tout l'appui possible à la cause des Alliés.... 288
406. 27 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. Communique une évaluation faite par le Cabinet de guerre de ce que pourrait être la situation advenant la défaite de la France et la décision de la Grande-Bretagne de poursuivre seule la guerre..... 288
407. 27 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Envoie à l'intention du chef d'état-major général une analyse faite par l'armée canadienne..... 290
408. 28 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que le Corps expéditionnaire britannique se trouve dans une situation critique à la suite de la reddition du roi des Belges.. 292
409. 28 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que la Grande-Bretagne maintient la reconnaissance du gouvernement légal de Belgique en dépit de la reddition du roi 292
410. 28 mai *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. S'enquiert de la protection des intérêts canadiens en Belgique..... 292
411. 28 mai *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que la Belgique reste solidaire des Alliés..... 293
412. 28 mai *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. S'enquiert de la protection des intérêts canadiens en cas d'évacuation de Paris..... 293
413. 29 mai *La légation de Belgique au ministère des Affaires extérieures*. Annonce la décision du gouvernement belge de mettre l'armée au service de la cause alliée..... 293
414. 31 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux*
405. May 27 *Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister*. Transmits text of personal appeal to President Roosevelt for any possible support of Allied struggle 288
406. May 27 *Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Communicates summary of War Cabinet's appreciation of situation in event of fall of France and conclusion that Great Britain would continue alone 288
407. May 27 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Transmits Canadian military appreciation to Chief of General Staff 290
408. May 28 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States gravity of situation of British Expeditionary Force following capitulation of King of the Belgians 292
409. May 28 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports continued British recognition of legal Belgian Government following capitulation of King 292
410. May 28 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Enquires about protection of Canadian interests in Belgium 292
411. May 28 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports continued solidarity of Belgium with Allies 293
412. . May 28 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Enquires concerning protection of Canadian interests in event of evacuation of Paris 293
413. May 29 *Legation of Belgium to Department of External Affairs*. Reports decision of Belgian Government to commit army to Allied cause 293
414. May 31 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for Ex-*

- Affaires extérieures.* Communique la demande de renfort de la France pour défendre ses lignes sur la Somme..... 294
415. 2 juin *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Traite de l'opposition du ministère à la reddition du roi..... 294
416. 3 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Envoie le memorandum résumant la réunion du Conseil suprême de guerre à Paris..... 295
417. 4 juin *Mémorandum du Premier ministre.* Relate son entretien avec le ministre belge au sujet du message que ce dernier lui a transmis au nom de son gouvernement..... 296
418. 6 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en France.* Fait part de la demande adressée aux États-Unis pour qu'ils protègent les intérêts canadiens dans les territoires occupés par les forces allemandes..... 297
419. 6 juin *Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre.* Annonce qu'on a remis au président Roosevelt une demande touchant la fourniture d'avions à la Grande-Bretagne..... 298
420. 6 juin *Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre.* Communique les vues du président Roosevelt sur la fourniture d'avions à la Grande-Bretagne et sur l'importance vitale de la flotte britannique..... 298
421. 10 juin *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet l'opinion du général Weygand sur la situation militaire et le besoin d'armes..... 299
422. 10 juin *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Signale l'inquiétude de la France au sujet du nombre limité d'avions que la Grande-Bretagne compte lui fournir..... 300
423. 10 juin *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que la légation quittera Paris et qu'on a chargé l'ambassadeur des États-Unis de protéger les intérêts canadiens..... 300
- ternal Affairs.* Communicates French request for reinforcements to defend Somme line 294
415. June 2 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Discusses resistance of Ministry to capitulation of King 294
416. June 3 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Forwards memorandum summarizing meeting of Supreme War Council in Paris 295
417. June 4 *Memorandum by Prime Minister.* Records oral message from Belgian Government delivered by Belgian Minister and discussion thereon 296
418. June 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in France.* Reports request to United States to protect Canadian interests in territories occupied by German forces 297
419. June 6 *Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister.* Reports delivery to President Roosevelt of appeal for aircraft for Great Britain 298
420. June 6 *Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister.* Communicates views of President Roosevelt on supply of aircraft to Great Britain and on vital importance of British fleet 298
421. June 10 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Forwards General Weygand's view of military situation and need for arms 299
422. June 10 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports French concern that Great Britain is willing to release only limited number of aircraft available in Great Britain 300
423. June 10 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Forecasts evacuation of Legation from Paris and handing over of Canadian interests to United States Ambassador 300

424. 11 juin *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique l'opinion du ministre belge des Affaires étrangères au sujet du roi qui reconnaît tacitement que le gouvernement belge en France exerce tous les pouvoirs..... 300
425. 12 juin *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Signale que le ministre des Affaires étrangères de Belgique approuve la décision de faire quitter Poitiers à la majorité du personnel de la Légation..... 301
426. 13 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que la débâcle de la France est imminente et que le gouvernement est divisé au sujet de la capitulation..... 301
427. 13 juin *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que le seul espoir du gouvernement français repose dans une déclaration immédiate du gouvernement des États-Unis..... 302
428. 13 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en Belgique.* Accuse réception des renseignements complémentaires qui clarifient la situation du roi des Belges..... 302
429. 13 juin *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Lui demande d'exprimer son avis sur la situation compte tenu de la chute imminente de la France..... 302
430. 13 juin *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Communique une évaluation en rapport avec la poursuite de la guerre advenant la défaite de la France..... 303
431. 14 juin *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Transmet un memorandum du premier ministre britannique invitant le Canada à faire une déclaration publique pour encourager la France à poursuivre la guerre..... 305
432. 14 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en France.* Envoie un message destiné au gouvernement français, l'assurant que les Américains continueront d'appuyer l'effort de guerre des Alliés..... 307
424. June 11 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports view of Belgian Foreign Minister that King implicitly agrees that Belgian Government in France exercises all executive power 300
425. June 12 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports approval by Belgian Foreign Office of decision to transfer majority of Legation personnel from Poitiers 301
426. June 13 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports danger of collapse of France and division within French Government about capitulation 301
427. June 13 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports French Government belief that only hope lies in immediate declaration by United States Government 302
428. June 13 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in Belgium.* Acknowledges further information which clarifies situation of King of the Belgians 302
429. June 13 *High Commission of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Requests full expression of views on position in view of apparent imminence of fall of France 302
430. June 13 *High Commission of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Communicates appreciation of situation pertaining to continuation of war in event of fall of France 303
431. June 14 *High Commission of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Forwards memorandum from British Prime Minister urging that Canada make public declaration encouraging France to continue war 305
432. June 14 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in France.* Forwards message to French Government expressing confidence in continuity of American aid to Allied war effort 307

433. 14 juin *Le Premier ministre au Président du Conseil de France.* Promet l'aide du Canada jusqu'à la pleine limite de ses forces et de ses ressources, et se dit convaincu que la puissance de l'économie nord-américaine soutiendra la France..... 308
434. 14 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Assure le premier ministre britannique que le Canada continuera d'épauler la Grande-Bretagne... 308
435. 15 juin *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique la nouvelle adresse de la légation en France..... 308
436. 15 juin *Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre.* Transmet le texte d'un nouvel appel au président Roosevelt, lui demandant toute l'aide et la coopération possibles..... 309
437. 15 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Signale la divergence d'opinions au sein du Conseil français sur la ligne de conduite à adopter lorsque la résistance militaire sera vaincue..... 309
438. 15 juin *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que les États-Unis s'attendent à ce que la France capitule bientôt..... 310
439. 16 juin *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que le gouvernement belge a décidé de s'installer en Angleterre..... 311
440. 16 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Déclare que la Grande-Bretagne a retardé l'envoi d'un message qui aurait permis à la France de se renseigner sur les conditions d'un armistice séparé pourvu que la flotte française gagne les ports britanniques..... 311
441. 16 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Communique le message du premier ministre britannique, selon lequel la Grande-Bretagne dispose d'une force
433. June 14 *Prime Minister to Prime Minister of France.* Pledges assistance to full extent of Canadian arms and resources and expresses faith that full power of North American economy will support France 308
434. June 14 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Assures British Prime Minister that Canada will continue to stand at Britain's side 308
435. June 15 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports new location of Legation in France 308
436. June 15 *Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister.* Communicates text of renewed appeal to President Roosevelt for fullest possible measure of co-operation and help 309
437. June 15 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports lack of unity in French Cabinet on course of action to be taken following collapse of military resistance 309
438. June 15 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports United States expectation of early French military capitulation 310
439. June 16 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports decision of Belgian Government to move to England 311
440. June 16 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* States that Great Britain has postponed delivery of message consenting that France enquire about terms of separate armistice provided French fleet is transferred to British harbours 311
441. June 16 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Communicates assessment of British Prime Minister that British air strength and home defence are

- aérienne et d'un système de défense suffisants pour lui permettre de poursuivre la guerre..... 313
442. 16 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que le haut commissaire britannique sera chargé d'un message constituant une déclaration de principe, qui pourrait inciter le gouvernement français à ne pas demander à l'Allemagne les conditions d'un armistice..... 315
443. 16 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*. Transmet la proposition britannique d'établir une Union franco-britannique afin d'éviter un effondrement de la résistance française; fait part de l'intention de la Grande-Bretagne de consentir sous certaines conditions à ce que la France demande un armistice séparé au cas où elle refuserait le projet d'Union.. 315
444. 17 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que la situation est incertaine relativement à l'armistice et donne les raisons pour lesquelles la Grande-Bretagne envisage de publier le projet de déclaration franco-britannique quoiqu'il fut mort-né..... 317
445. 17 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*. Rapporte que le voyage de M. Churchill en France est annulé et que Paul Reynaud a démissionné..... 317
446. 17 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*. Transmet le memorandum annonçant la démission de Paul Reynaud et la décision subséquente de la France de s'enquérir des conditions d'un armistice..... 318
447. 18 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que la France attend les conditions de l'armistice et qu'on s'inquiète du sort de la flotte française..... 319
448. 19 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que le gouvernement britannique ne semble suffisant pour permettre à la France de continuer la guerre..... 313
442. June 16 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports that message to be delivered by British High Commissioner constitutes statement of principle which might induce French Government to reconsider intention to ask Germany for terms of armistice 315
443. June 16 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*. Forwards British proposal to establish Franco-British Union in hope of averting collapse of French resistance, and reports intention to give conditional consent that France request separate armistice terms in event of rejection of proposed Union 315
444. June 17 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports uncertainty of situation regarding armistice and gives reasons for consideration by Great Britain of publishing text of proposed Anglo-French declaration although it was stillborn 317
445. June 17 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*. Reports cancellation of Churchill mission to France and notes resignation of Paul Reynaud .. 317
446. June 17 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*. Transmits memorandum containing report about resignation of Paul Reynaud and subsequent French decision to enquire about armistice terms 318
447. June 18 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports French are awaiting armistice terms and expresses concern over disposition of French fleet 319
448. June 19 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports

- pas s'inquiéter outre-mesure du sort de la flotte française..... 319
449. 20 juin *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet la requête du gouvernement français pour que le Canada incite le gouvernement des États-Unis à agir de façon positive et décisive..... 319
450. 20 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en France*. Promet de nouvelles démarches immédiates auprès du gouvernement des États-Unis..... 320
451. 20 juin *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale que la France demande un cessez-le-feu et qu'elle espère que les gouvernements du Commonwealth encourageront la Grande-Bretagne à accueillir avec sympathie le fait que la France doive s'enquérir des termes d'un armistice..... 320
452. 20 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique les projets de la France au sujet du Cabinet et de la flotte..... 321
453. 20 juin *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce qu'il a quitté la France pour Lisbonne..... 321
454. 21 juin *Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande des instructions étant donné qu'on ignore le lieu où se trouve le gouvernement belge..... 322
455. 22 juin *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que le ministre français des Affaires étrangères lui a communiqué les conditions de l'armistice.... 322
456. 22 juin *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que la France a signé l'armistice et que la légation évacuera le territoire..... 323
457. 23 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*. Transmet le message exposant les mesures prises afin d'empêcher la flotte française de tomber entre les mains des Allemands..... 323
- that British Government not unduly perturbed about French fleet 319
449. June 20 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports French request that Canada make representations to United States Government for positive and decisive action 319
450. June 20 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in France*. Promises immediate further representations to United States Government 320
451. June 20 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports French request for cease-fire and hope that Commonwealth Governments would encourage Great Britain to take sympathetic view of enforced French inquiry about armistice terms 320
452. June 20 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports French plans for Cabinet and Navy 321
453. June 20 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports decision to leave France for Lisbon 321
454. June 21 *Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Asks for instructions in view of lack of information on whereabouts of Belgian Government 322
455. June 22 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports receipt from French Foreign Minister of armistice terms 322
456. June 22 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports signing of Armistice by France and decision to evacuate Legation 323
457. June 23 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*. Transmits message outlining action being taken to prevent French fleet from falling into German hands 323

PARTIE 5

DÉCLARATION DE GUERRE À L'ITALIE

1940

458. 15 mai *Le secrétaire aux Domaines au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Déclare que les gouvernements des colonies ont été avisés de l'adoption des mesures de sécurité prévues à l'égard de l'Italie..... 324

459. 15 mai *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Décrit les mesures qui seront adoptées par la Grande-Bretagne en cas de guerre avec l'Italie et exprime l'espoir que les Dominions vont coopérer..... 324

460. 15 mai *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au commissaire, Gendarmerie royale du Canada.* L'avise que l'entrée en guerre de l'Italie semble imminente..... 326

461. 17 mai *Mémoire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Rapporte la discussion interministérielle portant sur les mesures qui devront être prises à l'égard de la marine marchande de l'Italie au moment de l'entrée en guerre de ce pays..... 327

462. 21 mai *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Précise qu'il est souhaitable que l'on évite d'ébruiter les mesures restreignant l'expédition des marchandises à des ports de pays neutres..... 327

463. 24 mai *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Communique les plans provisoires visant à faire face à la situation qui résulterait de l'entrée en guerre de l'Italie..... 328

464. 25 mai *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Donne un aperçu des mesures qui pourraient être prises par la Grande-Bretagne pour arrêter le commerce maritime à destination et en provenance de l'Italie s'il advenait que la guerre avec ce pays semble inévitable et demande au Canada de prendre des mesures analogues..... 329

PART 5

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST ITALY

1940

458. May 15 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States that Colonial Governments have been informed of full adoption of precautionary stage against Italy 324

459. May 15 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Describes measures to be taken by Britain in case of war with Italy and expresses hope that Dominions will cooperate 324

460. May 15 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.* Advises that early entry of Italy into war is probable 326

461. May 17 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Reports interdepartmental discussion on steps to be taken against Italian shipping on entry of Italy into war 327

462. May 21 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates desirability of avoiding unnecessary publicity about measures restricting shipment of goods to neutral ports 327

463. May 24 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates tentative plans to deal with situation arising in event of entry of Italy into war 328

464. May 25 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Outlines steps which may be taken by Great Britain to detain shipping to and from Italy in event that war with Italy appears inevitable and expresses hope that Canada will take similar action 329

465. 30 mai *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. L'informe du désir britannique de voir le Canada adopter toutes mesures immédiates en vue de retarder l'envoi de marchandises en Italie, sans recourir toutefois à l'interdiction manifeste..... 330
466. 1er juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Expose la politique de la Banque d'Angleterre à l'égard des crédits de l'Italie et demande que les pays du Commonwealth prennent des mesures parallèles..... 330
467. 2 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Le prie de préparer une requête demandant d'autoriser la proclamation de l'état de guerre entre le Canada et l'Italie..... 331
468. 3 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Fait état des mesures prises afin de retarder les transactions financières avec l'Italie..... 331
469. 5 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Indique les mesures qui devront être prises afin d'obtenir du Roi l'autorisation orale de proclamer l'état de guerre entre le Canada et l'Italie..... 332
470. 10 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Demande la confirmation immédiate du communiqué annonçant l'entrée en guerre de l'Italie..... 332
471. 10 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Le prie de ne pas tenir compte de la demande de renseignements concernant l'entrée en guerre de l'Italie..... 332
472. 10 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que selon le gouvernement britannique l'état de guerre avec l'Italie existe sans égard à l'heure stipulée dans la déclaration italienne..... 333
465. May 30 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates British hope that Canada will take immediate measures, short of open prohibition, to delay export of goods to Italy 330
466. June 1 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States policy of Bank of England regarding Italian credits and requests parallel action in Commonwealth countries 330
467. June 2 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends instruction to prepare submission to King to authorize proclamation of state of war between Canada and Italy 331
468. June 3 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Reports measures taken to delay financial transactions with Italy 331
469. June 5 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports steps to be taken to obtain oral approval by King of proclamation of state of war between Canada and Italy 332
470. June 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Requests immediate confirmation of press report of entry of Italy into war 332
471. June 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends instructions to disregard request for information regarding entry of Italy into war 332
472. June 10 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports that British Government considers that state of war with Italy exists regardless of time stipulated in Italian declaration 333

473. 10 juin *Décret du Conseil*. Permet de présenter une requête au Roi en vue d'autoriser la proclamation de l'état de guerre entre le Canada et l'Italie..... 333
474. 10 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Le prie de présenter la requête au Roi..... 334
475. 11 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. L'informe qu'il attend une audience du Roi..... 334
476. 11 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Informe qu'il s'attend d'obtenir sous peu une audience du Roi..... 334
477. 11 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Envoie un message convenu à l'avance pour annoncer le début de la guerre contre l'Italie..... 334
478. 11 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Précise l'heure exacte de l'audience attendue avec le Roi..... 335
479. 11 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Précise l'heure à laquelle le Roi a donné son assentiment de vive voix à la proclamation de l'existence d'un état de guerre entre le Canada et l'Italie..... 335
480. 11 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Envoie un message convenu à l'avance annonçant qu'à compter du 10 juin il existe un état de guerre entre le Canada et l'Italie..... 335
481. 11 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Envoie un message avisant le premier ministre britannique de la proclamation de l'existence d'un état de guerre entre le Canada et l'Italie.. 336
482. 11 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Envoie
473. June 10 *Order in Council*. Authorizes submission to King of advice regarding issue of proclamation of state of war between Canada and Italy 333
474. June 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends instructions to present submission to King 334
475. June 11 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports that he is awaiting audience with King 334
476. June 11 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports expectation of early audience with King 334
477. June 11 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Sends pre-arranged signal announcing outbreak of war with Italy 334
478. June 11 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports exact time of expected audience with King 335
479. June 11 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports time of oral approval by King of proclamation declaring that state of war exists between Canada and Italy 335
480. June 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Sends pre-arranged signal announcing that a state of war exists between Canada and Italy as of June 10 335
481. June 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Sends message informing British Prime Minister of proclamation declaring that state of war exists between Canada and Italy 336
482. June 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*.

une note officielle l'informant de la proclamation de l'existence d'un état de guerre entre le Canada et l'Italie..... 336

483. 14 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet le message du premier ministre exprimant sa satisfaction relativement à l'esprit de solidarité soutenue du Canada à l'égard de la Grande-Bretagne..... 336

484. 28 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Joint à l'intention du Roi une demande écrite d'approuver la proclamation de l'existence d'un état de guerre entre le Canada et l'Italie..... 337

Sends official word of issue of proclamation declaring that state of war exists between Canada and Italy 336

483. June 14 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Prime Minister expressing satisfaction at continued solidarity of Canada with Great Britain 336

484. June 28 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Encloses written submission petitioning King to approve issue of proclamation declaring that state of war exists between Canada and Italy 337

PARTIE 6

RUPTURE DES
RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES
AVEC LA ROUMANIE,
LA HONGRIE ET
LA FINLANDE

ROUMANIE

1941

485. 13 février *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Propose les mesures qui pourraient être prises à l'égard du consul général de Roumanie suite à la rupture des relations diplomatiques entre la Grande-Bretagne et la Roumanie..... 338

486. 14 février *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Fait parvenir la communication reçue du consul général de Roumanie et fait état des mesures prises en vue d'aider à la fermeture du consulat général et à l'évacuation du personnel..... 339

HONGRIE

1941

487. 5 mars *Mémoire du conseiller juridique au Premier ministre.* Traite des mesures prises en vue de faire de la Bulgarie, de la Hongrie et de la Roumanie des territoires proscrits aux termes des Règlements sur le commerce avec l'ennemi et déclare que les

PART 6

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA,
HUNGARY AND FINLAND

ROMANIA

1941

485. Feb. 13 *Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Suggests action to be taken with regard to Romanian Consul General in light of severance of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Romania 338

486. Feb. 14 *Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Forwards communication from Consul General of Romania and reports steps taken to assist in closing Consulate General and in evacuating staff 339

HUNGARY

1941

487. Mar. 5 *Memorandum from Legal Adviser to Prime Minister.* Reports actions taken to make Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania proscribed territory under Trading with the Enemy regulations and

- citoyens bulgares et roumains respectueux des lois ainsi que les personnes d'origine bulgare ou roumaine ne seront pas dérangés..... 340
488. 20 mars *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Fait état d'explications données au consul général de Hongrie relativement à son statut depuis que la Hongrie a été proscrite aux termes des Règlements sur le commerce avec l'ennemi..... 342
489. 8 avril *Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au consul général de Hongrie.* Annonce la décision de révoquer l'autorisation d'établir et de maintenir des consulats hongrois en raison de la rupture des relations diplomatiques et demande qu'on prenne les mesures nécessaires à cet égard..... 343
490. 8 avril *Le consul général de Hongrie au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Accuse réception de cet avis..... 343
- states that law-abiding Bulgarian and Romanian citizens and persons of Bulgarian or Romanian descent will not be disturbed 340
488. Mar. 20 *Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Reports explanation given to Hungarian Consul General about his status since Hungary was proscribed under Trading with Enemy regulations 342
489. Apr. 8 *Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General of Hungary.* Announces decision to revoke authorisation of establishment and maintenance of Hungarian Consulates in view of severance of diplomatic relations and requests that necessary action be taken. 343
490. Apr. 8 *Consul General of Hungary to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Acknowledges that necessary action be taken 343

FINLANDE

1941

491. 22 juin *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Exprime l'avis que la population finlandaise au Canada ne constituera pas une menace à la sécurité advenant l'entrée en guerre de la Finlande contre l'Union soviétique et donne un aperçu des mesures qui pourraient être prises à l'égard des consulats et navires marchands finlandais..... 343
492. 31 juill. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Note que le texte de l'aide-mémoire qui doit être remis au gouvernement de la Finlande laisse aux autorités finlandaises l'initiative de la rupture de leurs relations diplomatiques avec la Grande-Bretagne..... 345
493. 31 juill. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet le texte de l'aide-mémoire adressé au gouvernement de la Finlande en soulignant que
- FINLAND
- 1941
491. June 22 *Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Suggests that Finnish population in Canada will pose no threat to security in event of entry of Finland into war against Soviet Union and outlines possible action to be taken regarding Finnish consulates and shipping 343
492. July 31 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Notes that wording of Aide-Mémoire to be delivered to Finnish Government leaves to Finland initiative concerning severance of diplomatic relations with Great Britain 345
493. July 31 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits text of Aide-Mémoire to Finland pointing out that British actions against Fin-

- les mesures britanniques prises à l'en-
droit du commerce finlandais entrent
dans le cadre des mesures de guerre
contre l'Allemagne et qu'elles ne doivent
pas être considérées comme une raison
de rupture des relations diplomatiques
entre la Finlande et la Grande-
Bretagne..... 345
494. 31 juill. *Le secrétaire aux
Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux
Affaires extérieures.* Demande que l'on
retarde à accorder aux membres du
personnel des consulats finlandais l'au-
torisation de quitter les pays du Com-
monwealth tant que l'Allemagne n'aura
pas précisé son attitude concernant
l'octroi de sauf-conduits au personnel
diplomatique et consulaire britannique
leur permettant de quitter la Finlande.... 346
495. 2 août *Le secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire
aux Dominions.* Lui demande de faire
connaître ses vues concernant les mesu-
res à prendre à l'égard des bureaux et du
personnel consulaire finlandais..... 346
496. 5 août *Le secrétaire aux
Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux
Affaires extérieures.* Suggère que les
consulats finlandais au Canada pour-
raient être fermés à compter de main-
tenant..... 347
497. 5 août *Mémoire du
sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires exté-
rieures au Premier ministre.* Propose
que le Canada demande au consul
général de Finlande de fermer les con-
sulats et de discuter du départ du
personnel..... 347
498. 6 août *Le sous-secrétaire
d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul
général de Finlande.* L'avise de terminer
les activités des bureaux consulaires au
Canada..... 348
499. 6 août *Le consul général de
Finlande au sous-secrétaire d'État aux
Affaires extérieures.* Annonce qu'il se
conforme à la décision du Canada
visant la cessation de l'activité consu-
laire finlandaise..... 348
- nish trade are part of war meas-
ures against Germany and are not
considered a reason to break off
diplomatic relations between Finland
and Great Britain 345
494. July 31 *Dominions Sec-
retary to Secretary of State for
External Affairs.* Requests that per-
mission for Finnish consular staff
to leave Commonwealth countries
be withheld pending clarification of
position concerning granting of safe
conduct by Germany to British diplo-
matic and consular personnel leav-
ing Finland 346
495. Aug. 2 *Secretary of
State for External Affairs to Domin-
ions Secretary.* Requests views con-
cerning policy toward Finnish con-
sular offices and personnel 346
496. Aug. 5 *Dominions Sec-
retary to Secretary of State for
External Affairs.* Suggests Finnish
consulates in Canada might now be
closed 347
497. Aug. 5 *Memorandum
from Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs to Prime Minister.*
Suggests that Canada request Fin-
nish Consul General to close con-
sulates and discuss departure from
Canada 347
498. Aug. 6 *Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs to Con-
sul General of Finland.* Instructs him
to wind up affairs of consular offices
in Canada 348
499. Aug. 6 *Consul General
of Finland to Under-Secretary of
State for External Affairs.* Conveys
compliance with Canadian decision
that Finnish consular functions be
terminated 348

PARTIE 7

**DÉCLARATION DE GUERRE
À LA ROUMANIE, LA HONGRIE
ET LA FINLANDE**

1941

500. 27 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Énumère les raisons pour lesquelles il s'oppose à l'acceptation de la demande soviétique voulant que la Grande-Bretagne déclare la guerre à la Roumanie, à la Hongrie et à la Finlande et demande avis en vue de la nécessité de prendre des mesures identiques pour tous les gouvernements du Commonwealth..... 349
501. 28 oct. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Traite des raisons pour lesquelles il faudrait aviser la Grande-Bretagne du fait que le Canada n'est pas disposé à déclarer la guerre à la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande..... 351
502. 30 oct. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Expose les raisons pour lesquelles il faudrait accepter que la Grande-Bretagne acquiesce à la demande soviétique en déclarant la guerre à la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande..... 352
503. 30 oct. *Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Recommande l'acquiescement à la demande soviétique en déclarant la guerre à la Roumanie et à la Hongrie et en persuadant l'Union soviétique de l'inopportunité de déclarer la guerre à la Finlande..... 353
504. 31 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Expose les raisons motivant l'opposition à la demande soviétique de déclarer la guerre à la Roumanie, à la Hongrie et à la Finlande..... 354
505. 31 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Précise que la déclaration de guerre à la Roumanie, à la Hongrie et à la Finlande par les gouvernements du Commonwealth pourrait retarder l'entrée en guerre des États-Unis..... 355

PART 7

**DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST
ROMANIA, HUNGARY AND FINLAND**

1941

500. Oct. 27 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States reasons against acceding to Soviet request that Britain declare war on Romania, Hungary and Finland and requests opinion in view of necessity of identical action by all Commonwealth Governments 349
501. Oct. 28 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Discusses reasons for advising Great Britain that Canada is not prepared to declare war on Romania, Hungary and Finland 351
502. Oct. 30 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Suggests reasons for meeting Soviet request for declaration of war on Romania, Hungary and Finland 352
503. Oct. 30 *Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Recommends acceding to Soviet request by declaring war on Romania and Hungary and persuading Soviet Union of undesirability of declaring war on Finland 353
504. Oct. 31 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* States reasons for opposing Soviet request for declaration of war on Romania, Hungary and Finland 354
505. Oct. 31 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* States that declaration of war by Commonwealth Governments on Romania, Hungary and Finland might postpone entry of United States into war 355

506. 31 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Souligne les raisons pour lesquelles il s'oppose à ce que le Canada déclare la guerre à la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande et le prie d'informer l'ambassadeur de l'Union soviétique de la décision du Canada de recevoir les consuls soviétiques..... 356.
507. 3 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique les raisons pour lesquelles les États-Unis s'opposent à la déclaration de guerre de la Grande-Bretagne à la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande..... 356
508. 3 nov. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre.* Transmet l'opinion du Cabinet australien selon laquelle le refus d'acquiescer à la demande de l'Union soviétique de déclarer la guerre à la Roumanie, à la Hongrie et à la Finlande pourrait avoir des effets néfastes sur le moral soviétique..... 357
509. 4 nov. *Le premier ministre de l'Afrique du Sud au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Souligne les dangers qui pourraient résulter, durant la période d'après-guerre, de la déclaration de guerre à la Roumanie, à la Hongrie et à la Finlande, mais propose de s'en remettre à la décision finale de la Grande-Bretagne..... 358
510. 6 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait état du message personnel envoyé à Staline et de l'opinion favorable de ce dernier concernant la déclaration de guerre de la Grande-Bretagne à la Roumanie, à la Hongrie et à la Finlande..... 359
511. 21 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique la proposition du Cabinet visant à considérer la possibilité que la Grande-Bretagne et l'Union soviétique offrent la garantie de l'indépendance à la Finlande pour inciter cette dernière à se retirer de la guerre..... 359
512. 25 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait état de
506. Oct. 31 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Outlines reasons for not agreeing that Canada should declare war on Romania, Hungary and Finland and sends instructions to inform Soviet Ambassador of Canadian agreement to receive Soviet consuls 356
507. Nov. 3 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates United States reasons for opposing British declaration of war on Romania, Hungary and Finland 356
508. Nov. 3 *Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister.* States opinion of Australian Cabinet that refusal to accede to Soviet request for declaration of war on Romania, Hungary and Finland would adversely affect Soviet morale 357
509. Nov. 4 *Prime Minister of South Africa to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Points out dangers during post-war period consequent on declaration of war on Romania, Hungary and Finland but suggests that final decision be left to Great Britain 358
510. Nov. 6 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports personal message sent to Stalin and latter's opinion favouring declaration of war by Great Britain on Romania, Hungary and Finland 359
511. Nov. 21 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates Cabinet proposal to explore possibility of giving joint Anglo-Soviet guarantee of Finnish independence as inducement for Finland to withdraw from war 359
512. Nov. 25 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.*

- l'opposition soviétique à la proposition d'une garantie anglo-soviétique de l'indépendance finlandaise et de la déclaration de guerre probable de la Grande-Bretagne à la Finlande..... 360
513. 26 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Espère que l'on approuvera la décision de la Grande-Bretagne de déclarer la guerre si la Finlande ne met pas fin à ses opérations militaires dans un délai déterminé..... 360
514. 27 nov. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Indique les raisons de la décision de la Grande-Bretagne de déclarer la guerre à la Finlande advenant le rejet de la proposition susmentionnée et espère que le Canada sera disposé à approuver ces mesures..... 361
515. 27 nov. *Mémoire au sous-secrétaire d'État aux affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Traite des moyens possibles de protéger les ressortissants finlandais qui travaillent au Canada advenant que le Canada déclare la guerre à la Finlande..... 362
516. 28 nov. *Mémoire au conseiller juridique.* Expose diverses procédures afférentes à la déclaration de guerre à la Finlande..... 362
517. 28 nov. *Le Premier ministre au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Fait savoir que le Canada est disposé à agir de concert avec la Grande-Bretagne en ce qui touche la déclaration de guerre à la Finlande et précise le traitement spécial qui devrait être accordé aux ressortissants finlandais au Canada..... 364
518. 28 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait savoir que les États-Unis consentent à communiquer au gouvernement finlandais l'intention de la Grande-Bretagne de déclarer la guerre à la Finlande si ce pays ne met pas fin à ses opérations militaires à une date déterminée..... 364
519. 28 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait connaître la décision de demander au gouvernement des États-Unis de délivrer la déclaration
- Reports Soviet opposition to proposal for Anglo-Soviet guarantee of Finnish independence and likelihood of British decision to declare war on Finland 360
513. Nov. 26 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Expresses hope for concurrence in British decision to declare war if Finland does not cease military operations within specified time limit 360
514. Nov. 27 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Communicates reasons for British decision to declare war on Finland in event of rejection of latest approach and expresses hope that Canada will be prepared to be associated with action 361
515. Nov. 27 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Discusses possibility of assuring position of Finnish nationals working in Canada in the event of Canada's declaring war on Finland 362
516. Nov. 28 *Memorandum by Legal Adviser.* Discusses procedures relating to commencement of war with Finland 362
517. Nov. 28 *Prime Minister to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates agreement to act in concert with Great Britain in matter of declaration of war on Finland and notes special treatment to be accorded Finnish nationals in Canada 364
518. Nov. 28 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports United States agreement to communicate to Finnish Government British intention to declare war if Finland does not cease military operations by specified date 364
519. Nov. 28 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports decision to ask United States Government to deliver declaration of war to

- de guerre à la Roumanie et à la Hongrie si ces pays ne mettent pas fin à leur participation aux opérations militaires à une date déterminée..... 365
520. 29 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale que l'on a changé la date projetée pour la déclaration de guerre à la Roumanie, à la Hongrie et à la Finlande..... 365
521. 3 déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait état de la remise à plus tard de la déclaration de guerre à la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande en attendant la réponse de la Finlande concernant l'arrêt de ses opérations militaires contre l'Union soviétique..... 366
522. 3 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Annonce la décision du Canada de s'associer à la Grande-Bretagne dans la déclaration de guerre à la Roumanie et à la Hongrie et note qu'un traitement spécial sera accordé aux ressortissants roumains et hongrois au Canada..... 366
523. 5 déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Recommande que les démarches entreprises auprès du gouvernement des États-Unis par les représentants du Commonwealth soient concertées advenant que la déclaration de guerre contre la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande devienne nécessaire..... 367
524. 5 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Indique la marche à suivre en vue d'obtenir l'assentiment oral du Roi concernant le projet de proclamation d'un état de guerre entre le Canada et la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande..... 367
525. 6 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait état des mesures prises afin d'obtenir l'assentiment oral du Roi concernant le projet de proclamation d'état de guerre entre le Canada et la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande..... 368
- Romania and Hungary if participation in military operations is not ended by specified date 365
520. Nov. 29 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports change of date for proposed declaration of war on Romania, Hungary and Finland 365
521. Dec. 3 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports postponement of declaration of war on Romania, Hungary and Finland pending further reply from Finland about cessation of military activity against Soviet Union 366
522. Dec. 3 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. States decision to be associated with Great Britain in declaration of war on Romania and Hungary and notes that special treatment will be accorded Romanian and Hungarian nationals in Canada 366
523. Dec. 5 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Suggests that approaches to United States Government by Commonwealth representatives in Washington be concerted in event that declaration of war on Romania, Hungary and Finland becomes necessary 367
524. Dec. 5 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Outlines procedure to be followed to obtain King's oral approval of proposed proclamation of state of war between Canada and Romania, Hungary and Finland 367
525. Dec. 6 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports arrangements made to secure King's oral approval of proposed proclamation of state of war between Canada and Romania, Hungary and Finland 368

526. 6 déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le texte des instructions envoyées à l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Washington demandant au gouvernement des États-Unis de transmettre la déclaration de guerre aux gouvernement de la Roumanie, de la Hongrie et de la Finlande.. 368
527. 6 déc. *Décret du Conseil.* Donne l'autorisation de demander au Roi son assentiment concernant la promulgation de la proclamation d'un état de guerre entre le Canada et la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande..... 369
528. 6 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Précise la date du début de la guerre entre le Canada et la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande et le prie d'obtenir l'approbation du Roi concernant la proclamation de l'état de guerre..... 370
529. 6 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Le prie de prendre des arrangements pour que les représentants des États-Unis avisent les gouvernements de la Roumanie, de la Hongrie et de la Finlande de la déclaration de guerre par le Canada..... 370
530. 6 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique l'approbation orale du Roi concernant la proclamation d'un état de guerre entre le Canada et la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande..... 371
531. 6 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Communique l'approbation de la proclamation d'un état de guerre entre le Canada et la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande..... 371
532. 6 déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Envoie un message convenu à l'avance annonçant le début de la guerre contre la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande..... 372
533. 6 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Transmet au premier
526. Dec. 6 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates text of instructions to British Ambassador at Washington to ask United States Government to convey declaration of war to Governments of Romania, Hungary and Finland 368
527. Dec. 6 *Order in Council.* Authorizes submission to King asking approval to issue proclamation of state of war between Canada and Romania, Hungary and Finland 369
528. Dec. 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Advises date of commencement of war between Canada and Romania, Hungary and Finland and sends instruction to obtain King's approval of proclamation of state of war 370
529. Dec. 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Sends instructions to make arrangements that Romania, Hungary and Finland be informed by United States representatives of declaration of war by Canada 370
530. Dec. 6 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports oral approval by King of proclamation of state of war between Canada and Romania, Hungary and Finland 371
531. Dec. 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Communicates approval of proclamation of state of war between Canada and Romania, Hungary and Finland 371
532. Dec. 6 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Sends pre-arranged signal announcing outbreak of war with Romania, Hungary and Finland 372
533. Dec. 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits message to

- ministre britannique le message annonçant la proclamation d'un état de guerre entre le Canada et la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande..... 372
534. 6 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Le prie d'informer officiellement le gouvernement britannique de la proclamation d'un état de guerre entre le Canada et la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande 372
535. 7 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Transmet une demande écrite priant le Roi d'approuver la proclamation de l'état de guerre entre le Canada et la Roumanie, la Hongrie et la Finlande..... 373
- British Prime Minister that proclamation of state of war between Canada and Romania, Hungary and Finland has been issued 372
534. Dec. 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Sends instructions to inform British Government officially that proclamation of state of war between Canada and Romania, Hungary and Finland has been issued 372
535. Dec. 7 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Transmits written submission petitioning King's approval of proclamation of state of war between Canada and Romania, Hungary and Finland 373

CHAPITRE III

CHAPTER III

RELATIONS AU SEIN DU
COMMONWEALTH

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

PARTIE I

PART 1

LA MISSION CRERAR

THE CRERAR MISSION

1939

1939

536. 21 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Propose une réunion des premiers ministres du Commonwealth afin de compléter les canaux de communication existants..... 375
537. 4 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Reconnaît qu'il serait souhaitable qu'il y ait consultation sur les problèmes découlant de la guerre et annonce le départ prochain de représentants canadiens..... 377
538. 4 oct. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Déclare que des mesures sont prises en Grande-Bretagne afin d'accroître le caractère consultatif de la réunion des ministres du Commonwealth..... 378
539. 4 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Expose les motifs de la déclaration faite à la presse relativement à une réunion des ministres du Commonwealth..... 379
536. Sept. 21 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Proposes Commonwealth ministerial meeting to supplement communication through existing channels 375
537. Oct. 4 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Concurs in desirability of consultation on problems arising out of war and announces early departure of Canadian representatives 377
538. Oct. 4 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* States steps being taken in Great Britain to emphasize consultative nature of Commonwealth ministerial meeting 378
539. Oct. 4 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Explains reason for statement to press regarding Commonwealth ministerial meeting 379

540. 4 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Fait part d'un communiqué de presse relatif à des projets de consultations entre l'honorable T. A. Crerar, des ministres britanniques et des ministres du Commonwealth sur des questions de guerre, et dément une nouvelle annonçant la création d'un Cabinet impérial de guerre.... 379
540. Oct. 4 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates press release on plans for consultation by Hon. T. A. Crerar with British and Commonwealth Ministers on war questions and denying press report of establishment of Empire War Cabinet 379
541. 1^{er} nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Expose un programme de réunions d'information et les sujets qui feront l'objet de conversations bilatérales ultérieures entre la Mission Crerar et leurs hôtes britanniques..... 380
541. Nov. 1 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Outlines programme of informative meetings and subjects for later bilateral conversations between Crerar mission and British hosts 380
542. 4 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message de l'honorable T. A. Crerar exigeant que Canada House et le Quartier-général militaire à Londres constituent les seuls canaux officiels entre le *Dominions Office* et le *War Office* en ce qui touche l'administration militaire courante..... 381
542. Nov. 4 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Hon. T. A. Crerar urging that Canada House and Army Staff in London be sole channel of communication with Dominions Office and War Office concerning routine military administration 381
543. 7 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message de l'honorable T. A. Crerar selon lequel la question des finances est primordiale, et demande instamment qu'on dépêche M. W. C. Clark ou M. G. F. Towers afin qu'ils entament des discussions avec des représentants de la Trésorerie britannique..... 381
543. Nov. 7 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Hon. T. A. Crerar stating that question of finance is dominant and urging sending W. C. Clark or G. F. Towers for technical discussions with British Treasury officials 381
544. 8 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Transmet à l'honorable T. A. Crerar un message du ministère des Finances soulignant le problème du financement de l'effort de guerre et l'urgence pour la Grande-Bretagne de passer sous peu d'importantes commandes au Canada..... 382
544. Nov. 8 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Transmits message from Department of Finance to Hon. T. A. Crerar emphasizing problem of financing war effort and need for prompt and substantial British purchases in Canada 382
545. 21 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait état d'une discussion avec le ministre de la Guerre économique sur des questions d'un grand intérêt pour le Canada..... 384
545. Nov. 21 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports on bilateral discussion with Minister of Economic Warfare on questions of particular interest to Canada 384

546. 22 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte une réunion entre le ministre des Approvisionnements et des membres de la Mission Crerar portant sur les besoins auxquels pourrait satisfaire la production canadienne..... 392
547. 1^{er} déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part de discussions bilatérales sur des questions générales relatives au blé et au financement de la guerre..... 397
548. 2 déc. *Procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue à la Trésorerie le 1^{er} décembre 1939.* Renferme une discussion sur l'ensemble des relations financières entre le Canada et la Grande-Bretagne en temps de guerre et sur les prix à payer pour le blé canadien..... 398
549. 8 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message du gouverneur de la Banque du Canada au ministre des Finances annonçant le montant que la Grande-Bretagne est disposée à verser pour ses achats au Canada au cours des douze premiers mois de la guerre, et demandant des instructions..... 404
550. 11 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Transmet un message du ministre des Finances au gouverneur de la Banque du Canada demandant des explications sur l'ensemble des accords financiers et sur le prix du blé..... 406
551. 14 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message du gouverneur de la Banque du Canada au ministre des Finances expliquant certains points des accords financiers relatifs à la guerre et au prix du blé..... 407
552. 15 déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Remercie le Canada, au nom du premier ministre britannique, pour sa coopération lors des pourparlers sur les questions financières influant sur l'effort de guerre..... 408
546. Nov. 22 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports on meeting between Minister of Supply and members of Crerar Mission on requirements which could be met from Canadian production 392
547. Dec. 1 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports on bilateral discussions on general questions of war finance and wheat 397
548. Dec. 2 *Minutes of a Meeting held at the Treasury on December 1, 1939.* Records discussion on general war-time financial relations between Great Britain and Canada and price to be paid for Canadian wheat 398
549. Dec. 8 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Governor, Bank of Canada, to Minister of Finance stating amount Great Britain prepared to spend on purchases in Canada during first 12 months of war and requesting instructions 404
550. Dec. 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Transmits message from Minister of Finance to Governor of Bank of Canada requesting clarification of general financial arrangements and price of wheat 406
551. Dec. 14. *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Governor, Bank of Canada, to Minister of Finance clarifying points about war-time financial arrangements and price of wheat 407
552. Dec. 15 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates gratitude of British Prime Minister for Canadian co-operation in talks about financial questions affecting war effort 408

PARTIE 2

CONFÉRENCES IMPÉRIALES
DE GUERRE PROJÉTÉES

1940

553. 22 avril *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet une proposition du premier ministre britannique de tenir une réunion des premiers ministres du Commonwealth afin qu'on y discute de tous les aspects de l'effort de guerre commun et qu'on y étudie les aspects préliminaires des problèmes de la reconstruction dans l'après-guerre.... 408

554. 3 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Transmet au ministre de la Défense nationale un message demandant si l'opposition du Canada à la proposition britannique d'une réunion des premiers ministres du Commonwealth avait été communiquée au premier ministre britannique.... 409

555. 6 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message du ministre de la Défense nationale indiquant que la proposition britannique d'une réunion des premiers ministres du Commonwealth avait été présentée sans connaître l'opposition du Canada..... 410

556. 7 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Transmet au ministre de la Défense nationale un message le priant de communiquer avec le premier ministre britannique afin de lui exposer les motifs de l'opposition du Canada à la tenue d'une conférence des premiers ministres du Commonwealth.. 410

557. 8 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message du ministre de la Défense nationale dans lequel il déclare que le premier ministre britannique est d'avis qu'il est peu probable que soit tenue une conférence hâtive des premiers ministres du Commonwealth..... 411

558. 10 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire*

PART 2

PROPOSED IMPERIAL WAR
CONFERENCES

1940

553. Apr. 22 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits proposal of British Prime Minister for meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers to discuss all aspects of joint war effort and undertake possible preliminary consideration of problems of post-war reconstruction 408

554. May 3 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Transmits message for Minister of National Defence asking whether Canadian opposition to proposed meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers had been communicated to British Prime Minister 409

555. May 6 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Minister of National Defence indicating that British proposal for meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers was made without knowledge of Canadian objection 410

556. May 7 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Transmits message for Minister of National Defence requesting him to see British Prime Minister to explain reasons for Canadian opposition to proposed Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 410

557. May 8 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Minister of National Defence reporting view of British Prime Minister that early Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers was unlikely 411

558. May 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Do-*

- aux Dominions*. Communique au premier ministre britannique les raisons pour lesquelles il n'est pas souhaitable de participer à la conférence projetée des premiers ministres du Commonwealth et se dit confiant en l'efficacité des moyens actuels de consultation..... 412
559. 10 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet un message du premier ministre britannique annonçant la décision de ne pas tenir une conférence hâtive des premiers ministres du Commonwealth..... 414
- 1941
560. 17 avril *Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Signale que l'absence d'information officielle signifie que les rapports de presse faisant état d'une conférence hâtive des premiers ministres du Commonwealth ne sont que de pures hypothèses..... 415
561. 10 mai *Le Premier ministre au premier ministre de Grande-Bretagne*. Décrit les conversations qu'il a eues avec le premier ministre de l'Australie au cours de la visite de ce dernier à Ottawa..... 415
562. 12 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet un message du premier ministre britannique affirmant l'opportunité d'une conférence hâtive des premiers ministres du Commonwealth..... 416
563. 26 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Transmet un message au premier ministre britannique qui exprime son appréhension au sujet du projet d'une conférence des premiers ministres du Commonwealth.. 417
564. 11 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique un rapport selon lequel le Cabinet de guerre britannique a exprimé l'espoir que des conversations hâtives soient tenues avec les premiers ministres du Commonwealth..... 419
- minions Secretary*. Transmits to British Prime Minister reasons why attendance at proposed Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers is inadvisable and expresses confidence in adequacy of present means of consultation 412
559. June 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Transmits message from British Prime Minister communicating decision not to arrange early Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 414
- 1941
560. Apr. 17 *Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Reports that absence of official information indicates that press reports of early Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers are pure conjecture 415
561. May 10 *Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Great Britain*. Describes conversations with Australian Prime Minister during his visit to Ottawa 415
562. May 12 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Transmits message from British Prime Minister stating desirability of arranging early Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 416
563. May 26 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Transmits message for British Prime Minister expressing misgivings about plan for a Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 417
564. June 11 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates report that hope for early conversations with Commonwealth Prime Ministers has been expressed in British War Cabinet 419

565. 11 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message du premier ministre britannique demandant que le Canada reconsidère son attitude envers sa participation à une conférence prochaine des premiers ministres du Commonwealth..... 419
565. June 11 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from British Prime Minister requesting reconsideration of attitude toward attending an early Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 419
566. 13 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Transmet un message du ministre de la Justice demandant que le premier ministre britannique soit prévenu du fait qu'il est d'importance capitale que le Premier ministre ne quitte pas le Canada..... 420
566. June 13 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Transmits message from Minister of Justice requesting that British Prime Minister be advised of vital importance of Prime Minister's continuing presence in Canada 420
567. 14 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Transmet au premier ministre britannique un message dans lequel il souligne que les facteurs influant sur l'effort de guerre du Canada exigent une attention personnelle constante..... 420
567. June 14 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Transmits message to British Prime Minister insisting that factors affecting Canadian war effort demand continuous personal attention 420
568. 14 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Communique des directions pour qu'on explique au premier ministre britannique que des événements dangereux pour l'unité nationale pourraient se produire durant l'absence du Premier ministre..... 424
568. June 14 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Sends instructions to explain to British Prime Minister that situations adversely affecting national unity could arise during absence of Prime Minister from Canada 424
569. 17 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte qu'une prochaine rencontre avec le premier ministre britannique a été demandée..... 425
569. June 17 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports early appointment with British Prime Minister requested 425
570. 18 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait savoir que le premier ministre britannique en est venu à la conclusion que la conférence proposée des premiers ministres du Commonwealth n'est pas réalisable..... 425
570. June 18 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports conclusion of British Prime Minister that proposed Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers is not feasible 425
571. 19 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que des consultations auront certainement lieu avant que le premier ministre britannique ne fasse une déclaration sur la conférence proposée des premiers ministres du Commonwealth..... 426
571. June 19 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports assurance of consultation prior to statement by British Prime Minister on proposed Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 426

572. 21 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet la demande faite par le premier ministre britannique de se mettre d'accord pour annoncer l'impossibilité de tenir la conférence des premiers ministres qui a été proposée..... 426
573. 22 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Transmet au premier ministre britannique des suggestions concernant des points possibles de la déclaration sur l'impossibilité de tenir la conférence proposée des premiers ministres du Commonwealth..... 427
574. 24 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique l'essentiel de la déclaration que fera le premier ministre britannique concernant l'impossibilité de tenir la conférence proposée des premiers ministres du Commonwealth..... 427
575. 24 juin *Le premier ministre de l'Afrique du Sud au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Se dit en accord avec le message du Canada au premier ministre britannique concernant la déclaration qui sera faite sur l'impossibilité de tenir la conférence proposée des premiers ministres du Commonwealth..... 428
576. 26 juill. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message du premier ministre britannique exprimant l'espoir qu'une visite non officielle en Grande-Bretagne puisse être organisée..... 429
577. 31 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Communique au premier ministre britannique l'intention du Premier ministre d'effectuer une brève visite si la situation le permet..... 429
572. June 21 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits request from British Prime Minister for agreement with announcement that proposed Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers is impracticable 426
573. June 22 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits suggestions to British Prime Minister on possible points for statement on impracticability of proposed Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 427
574. June 24 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates gist of statement to be made by British Prime Minister concerning impracticability of proposed Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers ... 427
575. June 24 *Prime Minister of South Africa to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Expresses general agreement with Canadian message to British Prime Minister concerning statement to be made regarding impracticability of proposed Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 428
576. July 26 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from British Prime Minister expressing hope that informal visit to Great Britain might be practicable 429
577. July 31 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Communicates to British Prime Minister plan of Prime Minister to make brief visit if situation permits 429

PARTIE 3

PROPOSITIONS EN VUE
D'UN CABINET IMPÉRIAL
DE GUERRE

1940

578. 22 oct. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État*

PART 3

PROPOSALS FOR AN IMPERIAL
WAR CABINET

1940

578. Oct. 22 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary*

aux Affaires extérieures. Est d'avis que les commentaires de la presse sur l'éventuelle création d'un Cabinet impérial de guerre ne témoignent pas d'un intérêt général..... 431

579. 3 nov. *Mémorandum du Premier ministre au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique un projet de mémorandum exprimant de fortes oppositions à la création d'un Cabinet impérial de guerre..... 433

580. [nov. s.d.] *Mémorandum du conseiller.* Commente le projet de mémorandum du Premier ministre sur la création d'un Cabinet impérial de guerre..... 435

581. 20 nov. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte une discussion entre le ministre de l'Agriculture et des industriels britanniques sur la possibilité de créer un Cabinet impérial de guerre..... 437

582. 6 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Avance qu'il est peu probable que des milieux autorisés exercent des pressions pour la création d'un Cabinet impérial de guerre..... 438

1941

583. 20 fév. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Communique l'essentiel de la déclaration du Premier ministre à la Chambre des communes sur l'actuel système de consultation avec la Grande-Bretagne et la représentation à Londres..... 439

584. 9 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Signale les débats à la Chambre des Lords sur la motion en faveur de la création d'un Cabinet impérial de guerre..... 439

585. 3 juill. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre.* Demande une brève réunion des premiers ministres du Commonwealth à Londres et s'interroge sur l'éventualité d'une représentation efficace du Commonwealth au sein du Cabinet impérial de guerre..... 441

of State for External Affairs. Suggests that press comments on possible formation of Imperial War Cabinet do not indicate widespread interest 431

579. Nov. 3 *Memorandum from Prime Minister to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Forwards draft memorandum expressing strong feelings against formation of Imperial War Cabinet 433

580. [Nov. n.d.] *Memorandum by Counsellor.* Comments on draft memorandum of Prime Minister on formation of Imperial War Cabinet.. 435

581. Nov. 20 *Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Notes discussion of Minister of Agriculture with British industrialists on possibility of Empire War Cabinet 437

582. Dec. 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Comments that pressure from any responsible quarter for formation of Imperial War Cabinet is improbable 438

1941

583. Feb. 20 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates gist of Prime Minister's statement in House of Commons on present system of consultation with Great Britain and representation in London 439

584. Apr. 9 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports on debate in House of Lords on motion in favour of setting up Imperial War Cabinet 439

585. July 3 *Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister.* Urges short London meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and possible evolution of effective Commonwealth representation in British War Cabinet 441

586. 7 juill. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre d'Australie*. Dit qu'en l'absence du Premier ministre on a dû différer la réponse à la proposition d'une réunion des premiers ministres du Commonwealth..... 443
586. July 7 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister of Australia*. Explains absence from Ottawa of Prime Minister has delayed reply to suggestion for meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 443
587. 27 juill. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Commente la suggestion de l'Australie relativement à l'éventuelle représentation du Commonwealth au sein du Cabinet de guerre britannique et suggère une possible évolution en matière de coordination des politiques de guerre..... 444
587. July 27 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Comments on Australian suggestion for possible Commonwealth representation in British War Cabinet and suggests possible future developments regarding co-ordination of war policies 444
588. 2 août *Le Premier ministre au premier ministre d'Australie*. Est d'avis que l'actuel système de consultation et de coordination est efficace et qu'une tentative pour assurer la représentation du Commonwealth au sein du Cabinet de guerre britannique serait mal interprétée..... 445
588. Aug. 2 *Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia*. States opinion that existing machinery for Commonwealth consultation and co-ordination is effective and that attempt to secure Commonwealth representation in British War Cabinet would be misunderstood 445
589. 26 août *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte une déclaration du premier ministre du Canada soulignant la qualité des accords actuels sur la consultation au sein du Commonwealth et est d'avis que la Grande-Bretagne partage désormais cette opinion..... 448
589. Aug. 26 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports statement by Canadian Prime Minister emphasizing satisfactory nature of existing arrangements for Commonwealth consultation and suggests that this view is now generally accepted in Great Britain 448
590. 21 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Commente l'attitude du premier ministre de la Nouvelle-Zélande face à l'idée de créer un Cabinet de guerre pour le Commonwealth..... 450
590. Nov. 21 *High Commissioner in New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Comments on attitude of New Zealand Prime Minister to the idea of Commonwealth War Cabinet 450

PARTIE 4

NEUTRALITÉ DE L'IRLANDE

1940

591. 15 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que la Grande-Bretagne s'inquiète de ce que la susceptibilité dont font montre l'Irlande et l'Irlande du Nord empêche tout préparatif de défense en coopération avec les forces britanniques..... 451

PART 4

NEUTRALITY OF IRELAND

1940

591. June 15 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports British concern that sensitivity in Ireland and Northern Ireland precludes any defensive preparations in co-operation with British forces 451

592. 16 juin *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Demande s'il serait opportun d'exprimer à l'Irlande et à l'Irlande du Nord l'espoir de voir amorcer des discussions sur les préparatifs de défense..... 452
593. 16 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre d'Irlande du Nord*. Exprime l'espoir que l'Irlande et l'Irlande du Nord s'entendent pour organiser une résistance efficace advenant une invasion ou une attaque allemande..... 452
594. 19 juin *Le premier ministre d'Irlande du Nord au Premier ministre*. Explique que l'assistance à la défense de l'Irlande est matière à discussion entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irlande..... 453
595. 8 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Irlande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte la déclaration du premier ministre d'Irlande qui exprime sa détermination de ne pas compromettre la neutralité de l'Irlande en cédant les ports..... 453
596. 13 nov. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Rapporte une discussion avec le haut commissaire d'Irlande sur la politique de neutralité et sur des sujets connexes..... 453
597. 18 nov. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Rapporte une conversation avec le haut commissaire d'Irlande et y joint le mémorandum de ce dernier réaffirmant la politique de neutralité de l'Irlande vis-à-vis de tous les belligérants..... 454
598. 27 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Irlande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale que la Grande-Bretagne envisage la possibilité d'occuper les ports irlandais et suggère qu'une consultation ait lieu entre l'Angleterre et le Canada..... 455
599. 30 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Irlande*. doute que la Grande-Bretagne en vienne à occuper les ports irlandais..... 456
592. June 16 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Enquires about desirability of expressing to Ireland and Northern Ireland hope for discussion on defensive preparations 452
593. June 16 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister of Northern Ireland*. Expresses hope for establishment between Ireland and Northern Ireland of basis for effective resistance in event of German invasion or attack 452
594. June 19 *Prime Minister of Northern Ireland to Prime Minister*. Explains that question of rendering assistance to defend Ireland is matter for consultation between Great Britain and Ireland 453
595. Nov. 8 *High Commissioner in Ireland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports declaration by Irish Prime Minister of determination not to hand over ports in prejudice of Irish neutrality 453
596. Nov. 13 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Reports discussion with High Commissioner of Ireland on neutrality policy and related matters 453
597. Nov. 18 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Reports conversation with High Commissioner of Ireland and encloses his memorandum reaffirming solidarity of Ireland in policy of neutrality towards all belligerents 454
598. Dec. 27 *High Commissioner in Ireland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports possibility that Great Britain is considering question of occupying Irish ports and suggests Anglo-Canadian consultation 455
599. Dec. 30 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Ireland*. Expresses doubt that British will attempt to occupy Irish ports 456

1941

600. 23 mai *Mémoire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Signale une requête du haut commissaire d'Irlande qui désire rencontrer le Premier ministre pour lui faire part des préoccupations de l'Irlande au sujet des conséquences d'une éventuelle extension de la conscription britannique à l'Irlande du Nord..... 456

601. 23 mai *Mémoire d'État au Premier ministre*. Rapporte un entretien avec le haut commissaire d'Irlande et sa propre interprétation des arguments invoqués contre la conscription en Irlande du Nord..... 456

602. 25 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Transmet au premier ministre britannique un message proposant que l'on examine les répercussions que pourrait avoir aux États-Unis et au Canada l'extension de la conscription à l'Irlande du Nord..... 457

PARTIE 5

COOPÉRATION ÉCONOMIQUE

1939

603. 21 sept. *Mémoire d'État du haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Réaffirme la nécessité pour la Grande-Bretagne de n'affecter ses réserves de dollars qu'à l'achat de munitions et de fournitures de guerre essentielles, et énumère des restrictions additionnelles à l'importation..... 458

604. 21 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Réclame des discussions sur les problèmes liés à l'achat et au financement des commandes britanniques au Canada avant que soient annoncées des restrictions à l'importation..... 459

605. 27 sept. *Le Premier ministre au premier ministre suppléant de Nouvelle-Zélande*. Transmet un message du ministre du Commerce confirmant qu'on est disposé à élargir l'accord commercial..... 461

1941

600. May 23 *Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Reports request of High Commissioner of Ireland for meeting with Prime Minister to communicate grave concern felt in Ireland about consequences of possible extension of British conscription to Northern Ireland 456

601. May 23 *Memorandum by Prime Minister*. Records discussion with High Commissioner of Ireland and own private appreciation of arguments against conscription in Northern Ireland 456

602. May 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Transmits message for British Prime Minister suggesting consideration of possible repercussions in United States and Canada if conscription extended to Northern Ireland 457

PART 5

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1939

603. Sept. 21 *Memorandum from High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reiterates need for Great Britain to preserve dollar resources for purchase of munitions and essential war supplies and lists additional import restrictions 458

604. Sept. 21 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Urges discussions on problems connected with purchase and financing of British requirements in Canada prior to final decision or announcement of import restrictions 459

605. Sept. 27 *Prime Minister to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand*. Transmits message from Minister of Trade and Commerce confirming willingness to extend Trade Agreement 461

606. 29 sept. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet aux pays exportateurs de blé les propositions britanniques concernant des achats à long terme de grandes quantités de blé et demande des instructions sur la participation à des discussions pour l'établissement d'un prix raisonnable du blé..... 461
607. 30 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Transmet un message au premier ministre britannique demandant de procéder sous peu à une étude de la politique britannique d'achat de blé au Canada..... 462
608. 6 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message du premier ministre britannique dans lequel il dit que les achats de blé par la Grande-Bretagne dépendent des réserves de dollars disponibles et propose de plus amples discussions avec le président de la Commission canadienne du blé..... 463
609. 10 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Transmet un message au premier ministre britannique dans lequel il développe les arguments en faveur du maintien en temps de guerre d'un pourcentage fixe élevé de blé en provenance de l'Empire..... 464
610. 13 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Explique pourquoi il s'oppose à l'emploi des statistiques d'avant-guerre pour déterminer le niveau des importations britanniques de blé en provenance des pays neutres et du Commonwealth..... 465
611. 16 oct. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que la politique de contrôle des importations de la Trésorerie, tout en protégeant les réserves de dollars, ne tient pas compte des conséquences politiques et économiques qui s'ensuivent pour le Canada..... 466
612. 17 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux*
606. Sept. 29 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports British proposal to wheat-exporting nations on long-term bulk purchases and requests instructions concerning participation in discussions on reasonable price for wheat 461
607. Sept. 30 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits message to British Prime Minister requesting early consideration of British policy regarding purchase of wheat from Canada 462
608. Oct. 6 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from British Prime Minister stating that extent of British purchases of wheat depends on dollar resources available and suggesting further discussions with Chairman of Canadian Wheat Board 463
609. Oct. 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits message to British Prime Minister continuing argument in favour of British wartime purchase of a high fixed percentage of Empire wheat 464
610. Oct. 13 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Explains reasons for opposing use of pre-war statistics as basis for determining level of British wheat imports from neutral and Commonwealth countries 465
611. Oct. 16 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports that Treasury import control policy, though safeguarding Britain's dollar resources, ignores economic and political consequences for Canada 466
612. Oct. 17 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for*

- Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message du premier ministre britannique dans lequel il demande que l'on s'entende sur la proposition de financement des dépenses au Canada et déclare que des arrangements concernant les achats ont été conclus avec le président de la Commission canadienne du blé..... 467
613. 3 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Demande une étude plus approfondie des accords sur le contrôle des importations en provenance des colonies antillaises ainsi que le rétablissement de l'ancienne parité dans le traitement des marchandises canadiennes et de celles du Commonwealth..... 469
614. 28 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Explique pourquoi la limitation des importations canadiennes en provenance des colonies antillaises est nécessaire et exprime sa volonté d'imposer de semblables restrictions aux importations en provenance d'autres pays du Commonwealth.. 470
615. 2 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message de l'honorable T. A. Crerar dans lequel il expose les propositions concernant des ventes de blé présentées au ministre de l'Alimentation et demande l'approbation des politiques avancées..... 471
616. 5 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Transmet à l'honorable T. A. Crerar un message du ministre du Commerce dans lequel ce dernier déclare que les propositions pour la vente du blé sont insuffisantes et suggère de retirer les offres qui ont été faites..... 472
617. 7 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet à l'intention du ministre du Commerce un message de l'honorable T. A. Crerar dans lequel ce dernier rapporte que les Britanniques proposent pour l'achat de blé de nouveaux contrats à court-terme, ou des achats successifs non contractuels..... 473
- External Affairs.* Transmits message from British Prime Minister requesting agreement to proposal for financing expenditures in Canada and stating that purchasing arrangements have been made with Chairman of Canadian Wheat Board 467
613. Nov. 3 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Requests reconsideration of import control arrangements in West Indian Colonies and restoration of previous parity in treatment of Canadian and other Commonwealth goods 469
614. Nov. 28 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Explains why limitation on Canadian imports into West Indian Colonies is necessary and states willingness to impose similar limitations on imports from other Commonwealth countries 470
615. Dec. 2 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Hon. T. A. Crerar outlining proposals for sale of wheat put to Ministry of Food and requesting approval of policies suggested 471
616. Dec. 5 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Transmits message from Minister of Trade and Commerce for Hon. T. A. Crerar stating that proposals for sale of wheat are unsatisfactory and suggesting withdrawal of offers made 472
617. Dec. 7 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message for Minister of Trade and Commerce from Hon. T. A. Crerar reporting British offer of new short-term contract for purchase of wheat or series of purchases without contract 473

618. 8 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Transmet à l'intention de l'honorable T. A. Crerar un message du ministre du Commerce dans lequel ce dernier déclare que le prix proposé pour les achats de blé est inacceptable, et indique sa préférence pour des achats non contractuels..... 475

619. 16 déc. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Souligne que les circonstances empêchent la tenue de négociations en vue d'un nouvel accord commercial entre le Canada et les Antilles et suggère de proposer au gouvernement britannique la continuation de l'accord actuel..... 475

620. 27 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Annonce l'extension de l'accord commercial avec les Antilles et demande des renseignements au sujet de mesures de réciprocité..... 476

621. 30 déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Déclare que les gouvernements des Antilles ont été informés de l'extension de l'accord commercial par le Canada et suppose qu'ils prendront les mesures qui s'imposent..... 477

1940

622. [19] mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Assure le premier ministre britannique qu'il favorisera l'accroissement de la production canadienne de matériel de guerre destiné aux Alliés..... 477

623. 1^{er} juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Exprime la gratitude du premier ministre britannique au sujet de l'acceptation d'accroître la production de matériel de guerre au Canada..... 478

624. 1^{er} juin *Mémoire du conseiller au Premier ministre.* Résume l'apport économique du Canada à l'effort de guerre allié..... 478

618. Dec. 8 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Transmits message from Minister of Trade and Commerce for Hon. T. A. Crerar stating that price proposed for purchase of wheat is unacceptable and indicating preference for purchases without contract 475

619. Dec. 16 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Notes that conditions render impossible negotiation of new Trade Agreement between Canada and West Indies and suggests communication to British Government of proposal for continuation of existing agreement 475

620. Dec. 27 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Reports Canadian action to extend Trade Agreement with West Indies and enquires about reciprocal action 476

621. Dec. 30 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States that West Indian Governments have been informed of extension by Canada of Trade Agreement and presumes that necessary action will be taken by them 477

1940

622. May [19] *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits to British Prime Minister assurance of assistance in development of increased production in Canada of war materials for Allied use 477

623. June 1 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Expresses gratitude of British Prime Minister for willingness to increase production of war materials in Canada 478

624. June 1 *Memorandum from Counsellor to Prime Minister.* Summarizes Canadian economic contribution to Allied war effort 478

625. 8 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Exprime au premier ministre britannique le regret que les autorités britanniques chargées des achats n'aient pas reconnu le potentiel de l'industrie canadienne, et conclut que les actuelles méthodes d'achat ne permettent pas de collaboration efficace. 483
625. June 8 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Expresses to British Prime Minister regret that British purchasing authorities have not recognized potential capacity of Canadian industry and concludes that present purchasing methods do not permit effective co-operation 483
626. 8 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Le prie d'aviser le gouvernement britannique que des représentants de l'Association des manufacturiers canadiens suggèrent des moyens de faire une meilleure utilisation de la capacité de production..... 484
626. June 8 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends instructions to convey to British Government views concerning greater utilization of production capacity set forth by representatives of Canadian Manufacturers Association 484
627. 15 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Demande qu'on envisage d'affecter au Canada partie de l'équipement que la Mission d'achat franco-anglaise cherche à se procurer aux États-Unis..... 486
627. June 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Requests consideration of possibility of diverting to Canadian use some equipment sought by Anglo-French purchasing mission in United States 486
628. 17 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Exprime la gratitude du premier ministre britannique relativement au projet de mobiliser l'industrie canadienne et énumère les besoins les plus pressants..... 487
628. June 17 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Expresses gratitude of British Prime Minister for proposed mobilization of Canadian industry and lists urgent requirements 487
629. 16 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Suggère des moyens d'accroître la production canadienne et de simplifier les méthodes d'achat..... 488
629. June 16 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Suggests possible means of achieving large increase in Canadian production and simplifying purchasing procedures 488
630. 17 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Accepte les suggestions visant à accroître la production de matériel de guerre au Canada et à simplifier les méthodes d'achat..... 490
630. June 17 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Concurs in proposals for increasing war production in Canada and simplifying purchasing procedures 490
631. 19 sept. *Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Propose que l'accord commercial entre le Canada et la Nouvelle-Zélande soit prolongé d'un an..... 491
631. Sept. 19 *Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Suggests that Canadian-New Zealand Trade Agreement be extended for one year 491
632. 23 sept. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Établit le mémorandum d'accord du gouverne-
632. Sept. 23 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Sets out British Government understanding

ment britannique pour l'achat coordonné de sucre..... 491

633. 25 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Fait connaître son assentiment au mémorandum d'accord du gouvernement pour l'achat coordonné de sucre..... 492

1941

634. 19 fév. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Déclare que si l'on tire parti de l'aide prévue en vertu de la Loi du prêt-bail, les intérêts canadiens seront bien servis, et souhaite des échanges de vues plus complets à ce sujet..... 493

635. 27 fév. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Répond que la politique d'approvisionnement en matériel de guerre provenant d'Amérique du Nord devrait se fonder avant tout sur le plein emploi des ressources productives du continent et accepte la proposition d'une discussion préliminaire non officielle..... 494

636. 2 mars *Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Exprime l'espoir que les paiements pourront encore être effectués en livres sterling en attendant les discussions préliminaires entre le Canada, la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis..... 495

637. 4 mars *Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne.* Promet qu'on acceptera les paiements en livres sterling en attendant les résultats des discussions sur la situation financière actuelle entre les représentants du Canada, de la Grande-Bretagne et des États-Unis..... 496

638. 27 mars *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Fait savoir à quelles conditions le Canada est disposé à continuer de supporter le déficit britannique en dollars canadiens..... 496

of Agreement for co-ordinated purchase of sugar 491

633. Sept. 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates concurrence in British Government understanding of Agreement for co-ordinated purchase of sugar 492

1941

634. Feb. 19 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States that in taking advantage of assistance to be provided by Lease-Lend Act there will be concern for Canadian interests and expresses desire for fullest exchange of views 493

635. Feb. 27 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* States in reply that fundamental aim guiding provision of war supplies from North America must be full employment of productive resources of the continent and agrees with suggestion for informal preliminary discussion 494

636. Mar. 2 *Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Expresses hope for continued acceptance of payment in sterling pending proposed preliminary discussions between Canada, Great Britain and United States 495

637. Mar. 4 *Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Promises continued acceptance of payment in sterling pending result of discussion of immediate financial position between representatives of Canada, Great Britain and United States 496

638. Mar. 27 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* States terms on which Canada is prepared to continue to meet British deficit of Canadian dollars 496

639. 10 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Commente les conditions suivant lesquelles le Canada est disposé à supporter le déficit de la Zone sterling 499
640. 8 sept. *Le premier ministre suppléant de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande l'approbation de la prolongation de l'accord commercial entre le Canada et la Nouvelle-Zélande moyennant la présentation d'un préavis de cessation de six mois..... 501
641. 15 sept. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Propose que le Canada essaie de minimiser le tort fait aux relations anglo-américaines à la suite de déclarations sur les problèmes de l'après-guerre que des économistes britanniques ont faites aux États-Unis..... 501
642. 19 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre suppléant de Nouvelle-Zélande*. Accepte que l'accord commercial entre le Canada et la Nouvelle-Zélande demeure en vigueur, tant qu'il ne sera pas dénoncé après un préavis de six mois.... 505
643. 30 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Déclare que l'article 7 du projet d'Accord du prêt-bail proposé par les États-Unis porte atteinte au droit de maintenir les taux préférentiels impériaux et propose qu'on en change la teneur..... 506
644. 30 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet un projet d'Accord du prêt-bail proposé par les États-Unis..... 507
645. [oct. s.d.] *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Discute de certains points du projet d'Accord du prêt-bail pouvant avoir de graves conséquences pour le Canada..... 509
646. 3 oct. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Fait observer que l'amendement proposé à l'article 7 sur
639. May 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Comments on terms on which Canada is prepared to meet deficit of sterling area 499
640. Sept. 8 *Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests concurrence in extension of Canadian-New Zealand Trade Agreement subject to six months' notice of intention to terminate it 501
641. Sept. 15 *Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Suggests Canada should attempt to minimize damage done to Anglo-American relations through statements on post-war problems recently made by visiting British economists 501
642. Sept. 19 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand*. Concurs in suggestion that Canadian-New Zealand Trade Agreement continue in force subject to six months' notice of intention to terminate it 505
643. Sept. 30 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States that Article 7 of draft Lease-Lend Agreement proposed by United States can be held to prejudice right to maintain Imperial preference and proposes alternative wording 506
644. Sept. 30 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Transmits draft of Lease-Lend Agreement proposed by United States 507
645. [Oct. n.d.] *Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Discusses points of serious consequence to Canada raised by draft Lease-Lend Agreement 509
646. Oct. 3 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Observes that proposed amendment

- le tarif préférentiel impérial ne devrait pas être laissé à la seule discrétion des États-Unis et de la Grande-Bretagne... 511
647. 6 oct. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Commente le projet d'Accord du prêt-bail et demande que le Canada soit associé aux négociations qui influent directement sur ses intérêts..... 512
648. 22 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Pense que l'avenir des relations économiques entre la Grande-Bretagne et le Commonwealth doit être discuté avant l'ouverture de pourparlers avec les États-Unis sur les problèmes économiques de l'après-guerre..... 513
- to Article 7 on Imperial preference should not be settled between Great Britain and United States alone 511
647. Oct. 6 *Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Comments on draft Lease-Lend Agreement and urges that Canada should be associated in negotiations which drastically affect her interests 512
648. Nov. 22 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Suggests future economic relations between Great Britain and Commonwealth should be discussed before conversations with United States on post-war economic problems begin 513

PARTIE 6

ÉVACUATION DES FEMMES ET DES ENFANTS BRITANNIQUES AU CANADA

1940

649. 1^{er} juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande des réponses aux questions relatives aux dispositifs que le Canada est prêt à mettre en place pour l'accueil et l'entretien de femmes et d'enfants britanniques et de réfugiés du continent advenant leur évacuation..... 514
650. 7 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande des précisions au sujet d'une déclaration concernant l'accueil des personnes évacuées et la confirmation que le Canada est intéressé à recevoir des enfants choisis dans certaines institutions britanniques..... 515
651. 8 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Répond aux questions concernant les catégories préférées et les arrangements proposés en vue d'accueillir des enfants évacués 516

PART 6

EVACUATION OF BRITISH WOMEN AND CHILDREN TO CANADA

1940

649. June 1 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests answers to questions concerning arrangements Canada is ready to make for reception and maintenance in event of evacuation of British women and children and continental refugees 514
650. June 7 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests information about reported statement dealing with reception of evacuated persons and requests confirmation of Canadian interest in receiving selected children from British institutions 515
651. June 8 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Replies to questions concerning categories preferred and arrangements proposed to receive evacuated children 516

652. 10 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Explique la politique canadienne concernant les enfants évacués au Canada..... 516
652. June 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Clarifies Canadian policy regarding children evacuated to Canada 516
653. 12 juin *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique le texte de la réponse à une question posée à la Chambre des communes britannique relativement au programme d'accueil outre-mer des enfants en provenance de la zone de guerre..... 517
653. June 12 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates text of reply to question in British House of Commons regarding reception scheme overseas for children from war zone 517
654. 12 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Transmet une demande de renseignements sur le programme d'évacuation des enfants et communique une évaluation du nombre de foyers d'accueil actuellement disponibles..... 518
654. June 12 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Transmits request for information about evacuation scheme for children and communicates estimate of number of immediate placements available 518
655. 14 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande qu'on examine s'il serait praticable d'établir en Grande-Bretagne un service qui s'occuperait d'évacuer des enfants et d'instaurer au Canada un organisme qui s'occuperait de leur accueil et de leur placement..... 518
655. June 14 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests consideration of practicability of idea of establishing executive body in Great Britain to deal with child evacuation and national organization in Canada to deal with reception and placement 518
656. 15 juin *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce la date de la publication à Londres du programme proposé d'accueil des enfants outre-mer et demande qu'on communique d'abord les vues du Canada sur les catégories d'âges préférées..... 519
656. June 15 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States time for publication in London of proposed reception scheme overseas for children and requests prior communication of Canadian views on age classes to be considered 519
657. 17 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Répond aux questions concernant les détails du programme d'évacuation des enfants..... 520
657. June 17 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates replies to questions concerning details of scheme to evacuate children 520
658. 17 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Communique les détails du programme de placement et de surveillance des enfants évacués..... 521
658. June 17 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Communicates details of plans for placement and supervision of evacuated children 521
659. 18 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique
659. June 18 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. For-

- un résumé du rapport du Comité interministériel sur l'accueil des enfants outre-mer, rapport qui renferme des recommandations pour la mise à exécution des programmes d'accueil pertinents..... 522
660. 25 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Fournit des précisions additionnelles sur le placement et la surveillance des enfants évacués et recommande qu'un effort soit fait pour faciliter l'appui financier de ceux qui préfèrent ne pas se prévaloir du programme général..... 523
661. 27 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Prévoit le nombre et les dates d'arrivée des enfants évacués..... 524
662. 28 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte la décision de remettre à plus tard le départ des enfants à cause de l'augmentation des risques causés par la divulgation du projet au Canada..... 524
663. 28 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Exprime son regret de la divulgation prématurée..... 525
664. 29 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Recommande que l'on refasse la proposition du Canada visant à adoucir les règlements concernant le cours du change afin de permettre aux parents d'apporter leur aide aux enfants évacués..... 525
665. 29 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Demande conseil au sujet du caractère confessionnel et de la garde légale des enfants évacués..... 526
666. 6 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Demande des renseignements au sujet de l'annonce du prochain départ des enfants qui doivent se rendre aux États-Unis, via le Canada..... 526
- wards summary of report of Interdepartmental Committee on Reception of Children Overseas giving recommendations for operation of Children's Overseas Reception Schemes 522
660. June 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Outlines additional details for placement and supervision of evacuated children and suggests effort be made to facilitate monetary support of those who desire to come outside general scheme 523
661. June 27 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Forecasts numbers and arrival dates of evacuated children 524
662. June 28 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports decision to postpone departure of children owing to enhancement of risks through premature announcement of plan in Canada 524
663. June 28 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Expresses regret over premature release of information 525
664. June 29 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Suggests renewal of Canadian argument that exchange regulations should be eased to enable parents to contribute to support of evacuated children 525
665. June 29 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Requests advice concerning religion and legal guardianship of evacuated children 526
666. July 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Requests information concerning reported early departure via Canada of children destined for United States 526

667. 9 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Explique que la difficulté de trouver des navires d'escorte avait retardé le départ de tous les enfants évacués..... 527
668. 9 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Nie l'annonce d'un prochain départ pour le Canada d'enfants évacués devant se rendre aux États-Unis et expose les motifs de cette annonce..... 527
669. 10 juill. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Déclare que de récents événements d'ordre stratégique ont amené la suspension du Programme d'accueil des enfants outre-mer..... 528
670. 19 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que le transfert de la garde légale d'enfants devant être évacués est impossible et qu'on a demandé aux parents d'accepter les risques à encourir..... 529
671. 22 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande que les autorités de l'immigration canadienne fassent une déclaration afin de corriger l'impression que des immigrants britanniques ont été abandonnés par leurs répondants dès leur arrivée au Canada..... 530
672. 23 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Explique pourquoi certaines personnes évacuées ont été laissées en plan à leur arrivée au Canada et pourquoi on a donné une publicité à cette affaire..... 530
673. 23 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fournit des précisions concernant les plans proposés pour la création de comités non gouvernementaux de volontaires qui s'occuperaient de l'évacuation d'enfants britanniques au Canada, et demande si le gouvernement en approuverait la création et l'activité..... 531
667. July 9 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates information that problem of supplying naval escorts has forced postponement of all sailings of evacuated children 527
668. July 9 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates denial of reported early departure for Canada of evacuated children destined for United States and explains reasons for report 527
669. July 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States that recent strategic developments have forced postponement of Children's Overseas Reception Scheme 528
670. July 19 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports that transfer of legal guardianship of evacuated children is not possible and that parents have been required to accept all risk involved 529
671. July 22 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests that statement be issued by Canadian Immigration authorities to correct impression that British people have been abandoned by their sponsors on arrival in Canada 530
672. July 23 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Explains why some evacuated persons have been stranded on arrival in Canada and why publicity was given to situation 530
673. July 23 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Gives details of plans of proposed voluntary non-Governmental committee to deal with evacuation of British children to Canada and enquires whether Government would approve its formation and operation 531

674. 26 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Communique la décision d'accorder à l'arrivée des enfants évacués à titre privé les mêmes soins que ceux qui sont donnés aux enfants évacués dans le cadre du programme subventionné..... 532

675. 1^{er} oct. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Communique la décision de suspendre temporairement le Programme d'accueil des enfants outre-mer et déclare que des permis de sortie sont disponibles pour les enfants évacués à titre privé..... 532

PARTIE 7

NEUTRALITÉ DANS LES EAUX DE L'HÉMISPHERE OCCIDENTAL

1940

676. 4 janv. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le texte du télégramme dont ont convenu les républiques américaines au sujet de l'incident du *Graf Spee* et des projets en vue d'assurer une protection efficace de la Zone neutre..... 533

677. 4 janv. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Invite les Dominions à s'associer à la réponse que les Britanniques feront aux messages des États américains..... 534

678. 5 janv. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Résume les efforts faits en vue d'obtenir une entente anglo-américaine au sujet de la Zone neutre, et y justifie les opérations britanniques.. 535

679. 5 janv. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Analyse en détail la position britannique au sujet de la Zone de sécurité maritime telle que proposée dans la déclaration de Panama..... 536

680. 8 janv. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Déclare que le télégramme qui suivra contient un projet de réponse provisoire à la protestation

674. July 26 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates decision to extend to children evacuated under private auspices same care after arrival as that extended to children evacuated under assisted scheme 532

675. Oct. 1st *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Communicates decision that Children's Overseas Reception Scheme must be temporarily suspended and states that exit permits are available for children evacuated under private arrangements 532

PART 7.

NEUTRALITY OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE WATERS

1940

676. Jan. 4 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates text of telegram agreed to by American Republics regarding *Graf Spee* incident and plans to make neutral security zone effective 533

677. Jan. 4 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Invites association of Dominions with reply to be made by United Kingdom to messages from American states 534

678. Jan. 5 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Summarizes effort to secure Anglo-United States understanding on neutral zone and defends British actions in zone 535

679. Jan. 5 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Analyzes in detail British position on Maritime Security Zone proposed in Declaration of Panama 536

680. Jan. 8 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States that following telegram contains provisional draft

- panaméricaine et demande des commentaires..... 539
681. 9 janv. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique un projet provisoire des opinions revisées concernant la protestation panaméricaine..... 539
682. 12 janv. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Exprime l'avis qu'il n'y a aucune objection sérieuse au projet de réponse aux républiques américaines et s'interroge à savoir si elle devrait être envoyée au nom de la Grande-Bretagne seulement, ou de l'ensemble du Commonwealth..... 542
683. 12 janv. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande si les gouvernements du Commonwealth s'associeront à une autre révision de la réponse proposée aux républiques américaines..... 544
684. 12 janv. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet le texte révisé de la réponse proposée à l'adresse des républiques américaines..... 544
685. 12 janv. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Déclare que le Canada n'a aucun commentaire particulier à faire au sujet de la réponse révisée concernant la Zone panaméricaine et indique sa préférence pour une réponse de la part de la Grande-Bretagne seulement..... 547
686. 12 janv. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Réaffirme l'opinion qu'il serait plus approprié que la réponse aux républiques américaines soit faite par le gouvernement britannique mais indique qu'il est prêt à reconsidérer sa position si d'autres gouvernements du Commonwealth manifestent le désir de s'y associer..... 548
687. 13 janv. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que la réponse aux républiques américaines est envoyée au nom du gouvernement britannique seulement..... 548
- reply to Pan-American protest and requests comments 539
681. Jan. 9 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates provisional draft of revised views regarding Pan-American protest 539
682. Jan. 12 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Expresses opinion that there is no serious objection to proposed reply to American Republics and discusses whether it should be sent as from Britain alone or in name of Commonwealth as a whole 542
683. Jan. 12 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Asks if Commonwealth Governments will associate themselves with a further revision of proposed reply to American republics 544
684. Jan. 12 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates revised text of proposed reply to American Republics 544
685. Jan. 12 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. States that Canada has no specific comment on revised reply concerning Pan-American Zone and indicates preference for reply by Great Britain alone 547
686. Jan. 12 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Reasserts view that reply to American Republics would more appropriately be made by British Government but indicates readiness to reconsider if there is a general desire for association by other Commonwealth Governments 548
687. Jan. 13 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States that reply to American Republics is being sent in name of British Government alone 548

CHAPITRE IV

CHAPTER IV

PLAN D'ENTRAÎNEMENT AÉRIEN
DU
COMMONWEALTH BRITANNIQUEBRITISH COMMONWEALTH
AIR TRAINING PLAN

PARTIE I

PART 1

NÉGOCIATION DU PLAN

NEGOTIATION OF THE PLAN

1939

1939

688. 26 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet la demande du premier ministre britannique visant à mettre sur pied une organisation ayant pour but d'élargir le programme d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et propose la tenue de discussions mixtes 549
689. 28 sept. *Procès-verbal du conseil d'urgence (comité sur la politique générale) du Cabinet.* Relate la discussion sur le Plan proposé d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 552
690. 28 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Transmet le message au premier ministre britannique acceptant en principe le Plan proposé d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et accueille favorablement la tenue au Canada de discussions mixtes d'experts du Commonwealth..... 556
691. 29 sept. *Memorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Souligne la nécessité d'entreprendre immédiatement une étude sur les dépenses qu'il faudrait engager avant de décider de la mesure dans laquelle le Canada participera au Plan proposé d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 557
692. 29 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part de la satisfaction du premier ministre britannique à l'annonce que le Canada accepte en principe le Plan proposé d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et suggère que la décision canadienne soit communiquée aux autres premiers ministres du Commonwealth..... 559

688. Sept. 26 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits request from British Prime Minister for consideration of plan to organize expanded Commonwealth air training in Canada and suggests joint discussions 549
689. Sept. 28 *Minutes of Emergency Council (Committee on General Policy) of Cabinet.* Records discussion on proposed Commonwealth Air Training Plan 552
690. Sept. 28 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits message to British Prime Minister accepting in principle proposed Commonwealth Air Training Plan, and welcoming joint discussions in Canada among Commonwealth experts 556
691. Sept. 29 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Emphasizes necessity of immediate study of possible expenditures involved prior to deciding extent of participation in proposed Commonwealth Air Training Plan 557
692. Sept. 29 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits appreciation of British Prime Minister for Canadian acceptance in principle of proposed Commonwealth Air Training Plan and suggests that Canadian attitude be communicated to other Commonwealth Prime Ministers 559

693. 30 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Transmet un message au premier ministre britannique dans lequel on souhaite en arriver rapidement à une décision sur l'ampleur de la participation canadienne au Plan proposé d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 560
693. Sept. 30 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits message to British Prime Minister expressing hope of reaching early decision on scale of Canadian co-operation in proposed Commonwealth Air Training Plan 560
694. 30 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Transmet les réponses concernant les installations et le personnel disponibles pour le service dans le cadre du Plan proposé d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 560
694. Sept. 30 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Conveys replies concerning facilities and personnel available for service in proposed Commonwealth Air Training Plan 560
695. 3 oct. *Le premier ministre suppléant de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le texte du télégramme au premier ministre britannique approuvant en principe le projet de rencontre au Canada afin de discuter du Plan proposé d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 561
695. Oct. 3 *Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates text of telegram to British Prime Minister approving in principle suggested meeting in Canada to discuss proposed Commonwealth Air Training Plan 561
696. 4 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet le message du premier ministre britannique dans lequel il est dit que les membres de la délégation du ministère de l'Air seront en mesure de discuter des aspects technique, financier et du personnel relatifs au Plan proposé d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 562
696. Oct. 4 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from British Prime Minister stating that members of Air Mission will be in a position to discuss technical, personnel and financial aspects of proposed Commonwealth Air Training Plan 562
697. 5 oct. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique les détails relatifs au déplacement et à la composition de la délégation du ministère de l'Air qui sera dirigée par Lord Riverdale..... 562
697. Oct. 5 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates details re travel and size of Air Mission headed by Lord Riverdale 562
698. 7 oct. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique les détails qui lui ont été fournis par le ministère de l'Air de Grande-Bretagne concernant les exigences des écoles d'entraînement aérien..... 563
698. Oct. 7 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Conveys particulars about training school requirements supplied by British Air Ministry 563
699. 7 oct. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Demande que le sous-secrétaire d'État parlementaire du ministère de l'Air de Grande-Bretagne puisse participer aux discussions sur le Plan proposé d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth.... 564
699. Oct. 7 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Requests agreement that British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air take part in discussions on proposed Commonwealth Air Training Plan 564

700. 7 oct. *Mémorandum du Premier ministre au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Souligne le besoin d'en venir à une définition précise des responsabilités de chaque gouvernement participant au Plan proposé d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 565
701. 7 oct. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Commente l'annonce britannique projetée de l'envoi de la délégation du ministère de l'Air au Canada..... 566
702. 8 oct. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Précise les vues du Premier ministre concernant l'annonce prochaine par le gouvernement de Grande-Bretagne de l'envoi de la délégation du ministère de l'Air au Canada..... 569
703. 8 oct. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Commente le projet de déclaration britannique concernant les dispositions prises en vue de l'entraînement aérien..... 569
704. 9 oct. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Rapporte une conversation avec le haut commissaire britannique au sujet des points faibles de la publicité proposée concernant le Plan d'entraînement aérien..... 571
705. 9 oct. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Approuve les objectifs du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et entend envoyer une délégation du ministère de l'Air au Canada..... 571
706. 9 oct. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Commente le projet révisé de déclaration britannique sur l'entraînement aérien..... 572
707. 9 oct. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Fait connaître les objections au projet révisé de déclaration britannique au sujet de l'envergure du plan et du degré d'importance qui sera attaché à cet aspect de l'effort de guerre du Canada..... 576
700. Oct. 7 *Memorandum from Prime Minister to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Stresses need for clear definition of exact responsibility of each government participating in proposed Commonwealth Air Training Plan 565
701. Oct. 7 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Comments on proposed British announcement concerning despatch of Air Mission to Canada 566
702. Oct. 8 *Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Records views of Prime Minister on forthcoming British announcement regarding despatch of Air Mission to Canada 569
703. Oct. 8 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Comments on proposed British statement regarding air training arrangements 569
704. Oct. 9 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Reports conversation with British High Commissioner on flaws in proposed publicity about Air Training Plan 571
705. Oct. 9 *Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates approval of aims of Commonwealth Air Training Plan and preparedness to send Air Mission to Canada 571
706. Oct. 9 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Discusses revised draft British statement on air training 572
707. Oct. 9 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates objections to revised draft British statement in relation to scale of plan and degree of importance to be attached to this aspect of Canadian war effort 576

708. 10 oct. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Précise que la déclaration britannique sur l'entraînement aérien a été révisée par suite des objections du Canada..... 577
709. 10 oct. *Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Donne la liste des délégués néo-zélandais aux pourparlers à Ottawa..... 578
710. 11 oct. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique la composition de la délégation australienne..... 578
711. 11 oct. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique la déclaration faite à la Chambre des communes britannique au sujet de la délégation qui assistera aux pourparlers à Ottawa..... 579
712. 13 oct. *Mémoire du chef de la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*. Traite un aperçu des besoins en personnel navigant et de l'organisation de l'entraînement projeté..... 580
713. 17 oct. *Mémoire du conseiller juridique au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Traite des questions juridiques et constitutionnelles relatives au Plan proposé d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth.... 581
714. 30 oct. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Fait état de la discussion avec le chef de la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne concernant les aspects financiers du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 585
715. 31 oct. *Procès-verbal du conseil d'urgence (comité sur la politique générale) du Cabinet*. Relate la discussion avec les membres de la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne au sujet du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 586
716. 1 nov. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Fait état de l'éton-
708. Oct. 10 *Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Notes that British statement on air training has been revised as a result of Canadian objections 577
709. Oct. 10 *Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Lists New Zealand delegates to talks in Ottawa 578
710. Oct. 11 *Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates composition of Australian delegation 578
711. Oct. 11 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates statement in British House of Commons on delegation to attend Ottawa talks 579
712. Oct. 13 *Memorandum from Chairman, Air Mission of Great Britain, to Prime Minister*. Outlines estimated requirements for air personnel and projected training organization 580
713. Oct. 17 *Memorandum from Legal Adviser to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Discusses legal and constitutional questions connected with proposed Commonwealth Air Training Plan .. 581
714. Oct. 30 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Reports discussion with Chairman of British Air Mission on financial aspects of Commonwealth Air Training Plan 585
715. Oct. 31 *Minutes of Emergency Council (Committee on General Policy) of Cabinet*. Records discussion with members of British Air Mission on Commonwealth Air Training Plan 586
716. Nov. 1 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*.

- nement des Britanniques devant certaines expressions utilisées par des Canadiens durant la réunion..... 591
717. 2 nov. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Consigne l'entretien avec le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne et replace dans son contexte la déclaration du Premier ministre qui a été mal interprétée par les membres de la mission aérienne britannique..... 593
718. 3 nov. *Mémorandum du premier secrétaire au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Traite des répercussions que les déclarations concernant le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth seraient susceptibles de produire aux États-Unis et propose des moyens de modifier la publicité à cet égard..... 594
719. 3 nov. *Mémorandum du secrétaire principal au Premier ministre*. Consigne le résumé que le Premier ministre a fait de la discussion au Cabinet de l'effort de guerre du Canada dans le domaine de l'air..... 596
720. 3 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Demande au premier ministre britannique de tenir davantage compte de la situation économique du pays dans son appréciation de la participation du Canada au Plan d'entraînement aérien..... 597
721. 3 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Lui signale le télégramme au premier ministre de Grande-Bretagne relatif à l'entraînement aérien et à son financement..... 599
722. 6 nov. *Procès-verbal du conseil d'urgence (comité sur la politique générale) du Cabinet*. Relate la discussion et la décision concernant l'achat d'avions d'entraînement aux États-Unis ainsi que la discussion d'autres aspects du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 600
723. 7 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique la réponse provisoire du premier ministre britannique au message sur les rapports entre les problèmes économiques du Canada et sa participation au Plan d'entraînement aérien..... 603
- Reports astonishment of British at certain phrases used by Canadians during meeting 591
717. Nov. 2 *Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Records conversation with British High Commissioner pointing out context of statement by Prime Minister misinterpreted by members of British Air Mission..... 593
718. Nov. 3 *Memorandum from First Secretary to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Discusses possible repercussions in United States following announcements concerning Commonwealth Air Training Plan and suggests change of emphasis in publicity 594
719. Nov. 3 *Memorandum by Principal Secretary to Prime Minister*. Records Prime Minister's summary of Cabinet discussion on war effort in the air 596
720. Nov. 3 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Asks British Prime Minister for fuller appreciation of Canadian economic situation in discussing scope of Canadian participation in Air Training Plan 597
721. Nov. 3 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Calls attention to telegram to British Prime Minister concerning air training and finance 599
722. Nov. 6 *Minutes of Emergency Council (Committee on General Policy) of Cabinet*. Records discussion and decision on purchase of training aircraft from United States and of discussion on other aspects of Commonwealth Air Training Plan 600
723. Nov. 7. *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates interim reply from British Prime Minister to message about bearing of economic problems on Canadian participation in Air Training Plan 603

724. 7 nov. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* S'enquiert de l'application possible du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth à Terre-Neuve..... 604
724. Nov. 7 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Enquires whether Commonwealth Air Training Plan could be made applicable to Newfoundland 604
725. 14 nov. *Procès-verbal du conseil d'urgence (comité sur la politique générale) du Cabinet.* Relate la rencontre avec les membres de la mission aérienne britannique au cours de laquelle on a décidé de rédiger un projet de memorandum d'accord sur le Plan d'entraînement aérien à l'intention des gouvernements du Commonwealth..... 604
725. Nov. 14 *Minutes of Emergency Council (Committee on General Policy) of Cabinet.* Records meeting with members of British Air Mission at which it was decided to prepare draft memorandum of agreement on Air Training Plan for consideration of Commonwealth governments 604
726. 18 nov. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Exprime le désir de coopérer à tout arrangement qui permettrait d'inclure du personnel de Terre-Neuve dans le contingent britannique participant au Plan d'entraînement du Commonwealth..... 607
726. Nov. 18 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates wish to co-operate in any arrangements to include Newfoundland personnel in British quota for Commonwealth Air Training Plan 607
727. 22 nov. *Mémoire de la mission aérienne d'Australie à la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne.* Indique que l'Australie ne peut accepter la proposition initiale quant aux effectifs de Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et fait valoir une proposition différente..... 608
727. Nov. 22 *Memorandum from Air Mission of Australia to Air Mission of Great Britain.* States that Australia cannot accept original proposal for Commonwealth Air Training Plan as regards numbers and puts forward modified proposal 608
728. 23 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande au ministre de la Défense nationale des renseignements concernant le progrès des négociations et transmet la demande britannique d'amorcer les travaux préparatoires sans délai..... 609
728. Nov. 23 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests information from Minister of National Defence on progress of negotiations and transmits request that Canada start now on urgent preparatory work 609
729. 25 nov. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Déclare que le gouvernement de Grande-Bretagne a autorisé la signature du memorandum d'accord tout en reportant l'étude des modalités à la fin des pourparlers financiers..... 610
729. Nov. 25 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* States that British Government has authorized initialling of memorandum of agreement, leaving mode of operation to be settled after completion of financial talks.... 610
730. 25 nov. *Mémoire du Premier ministre.* Formule deux exigences à satisfaire avant que le Canada ne soit disposé à parafer le memorandum d'accord..... 612
730. Nov. 25 *Memorandum by Prime Minister.* Elaborates two conditions on which Canada must insist before initialling memorandum of agreement 612
731. 25 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut com-*
731. Nov. 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High*

- missaire en Grande-Bretagne. Fait part au ministre des Mines et des Ressources de l'opinion du Cabinet selon laquelle la conclusion de l'accord relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth dépend de la réponse du gouvernement britannique à deux conditions essentielles.....* 619
732. 27 nov. *Le ministre de la Défense nationale au sous-secrétaire d'État pour l'Air de Grande-Bretagne. Confirme l'interprétation donnée aux recommandations devant être présentées aux gouvernements concernant l'administration et l'organisation du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth.....* 620
733. 27 nov. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État pour l'Air de Grande-Bretagne au ministre de la Défense nationale. Fait part de son intention de présenter au gouvernement britannique les propositions convenues concernant l'administration et l'organisation du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth....* 621
734. 27 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Communique le message du premier ministre britannique concernant les exigences du gouvernement canadien préalables à la signature du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et demande que l'accord soit parafé avant que les missions d'Australie et de Nouvelle-Zélande ne quittent Ottawa.....* 622
735. 27 nov. *Procès-verbal du conseil d'urgence (comité sur la politique générale) du Cabinet. Relate la réunion au cours de laquelle a été rédigée une déclaration à l'effet qu'un accord de principe sur le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth a été conclu, et qu'il est soumis à l'approbation des gouvernements respectifs.....* 623
736. 27 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions. Communique au premier ministre britannique le texte de la déclaration, ajoutant que le Canada ne peut pas encore parafé le projet de mémorandum d'accord.....* 628
737. 28 nov. *Mission aérienne de Nouvelle-Zélande au chef de la mission*
- Commissioner in Great Britain. Communicates to Minister of Mines and Resources Cabinet view that conclusion of agreement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan is dependent on reply of British Government concerning two essential conditions* 619
732. Nov. 27 *Minister of National Defence to Under-Secretary of State for Air of Great Britain. Confirms understanding of recommendations to be made to governments concerning administration and organization of Commonwealth Air Training Plan* 620
733. Nov. 27 *Under-Secretary of State for Air of Great Britain to Minister of National Defence. States intention to submit to British Government agreed proposals concerning administration and organization of Commonwealth Air Training Plan* 621
734. Nov. 27 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Communicates message from British Prime Minister on conditions stipulated by Canadian Government as being prerequisite to initialling of Commonwealth Air Training Plan and asks for initialling before Australian and New Zealand missions leave Ottawa* 622
735. Nov. 27 *Minutes of Emergency Council (Committee on General Policy) of Cabinet. Records meeting at which announcement was drafted that basis of agreement had been reached on Commonwealth Air Training Plan, to be referred to respective governments for decision* 623
736. Nov. 27 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary. Communicates text of announcement to British Prime Minister, with statement that Canada cannot yet initial draft memorandum of agreement* 628
737. Nov. 28 *Air Mission of New Zealand to Chairman, Air*

- aérienne de Grande-Bretagne*. Fait savoir qu'elle est disposée à signer le projet de mémorandum d'accord relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth qu'elle joint à la lettre et à le présenter au gouvernement pour qu'il l'étudie..... 628
738. 28 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Explique davantage au premier ministre britannique les préables du Canada à l'acceptation de l'accord relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 635
739. 30 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Transmet le message du ministre de la Défense nationale au sous-secrétaire d'État parlementaire pour l'Air proposant la révision du texte de la lettre contenant les recommandations aux gouvernements au sujet de l'administration et de l'organisation du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 636
740. 1^{er} déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale que le premier ministre de Grande-Bretagne suggère que l'importance pour le Canada d'avoir des troupes sur le théâtre de guerre soit mentionnée en même temps que la priorité de sa contribution au Plan d'entraînement aérien..... 637
741. 1^{er} déc. *Mémorandum du Premier ministre au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Suggère d'apporter deux modifications au texte proposé par la Grande-Bretagne au sujet de la priorité à accorder au Plan d'entraînement aérien..... 638
742. 3 déc. *Le chef de la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne au ministre des Finances*. Communique l'engagement du gouvernement britannique de fournir, à la demande de l'Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande, les devises canadiennes nécessaires aux termes du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 639
743. 4 déc. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*
- Mission of Great Britain*. States preparedness to initial enclosed draft memorandum of agreement concerning Commonwealth Air Training Plan and to submit it to Government for consideration 628
738. Nov. 28 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Communicates to British Prime Minister further explanation of Canadian conditions for accepting agreement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan 635
739. Nov. 30 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Transmits message from Minister of National Defence to Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air suggesting revision of text of letter containing recommendations to governments on administration and organization of Commonwealth Air Training Plan .. 636
740. Dec. 1 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates suggestion of British Prime Minister that importance of having Canadian troops in war theatre should be mentioned along with the priority to be attributed to Canada's contribution through Air Training Plan 637
741. Dec. 1 *Memorandum from Prime Minister to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Suggests two amendments of proposed British text on priority to be attached to Air Training Scheme 638
742. Dec. 3 *Chairman, Air Mission of Great Britain, to Minister of Finance*. Communicates undertaking of British Government to provide, upon request of Australia and New Zealand, Canadian dollars for payments under Commonwealth Air Training Plan 639
743. Dec. 4 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for*

- au Premier ministre. Rapporte la discussion avec le haut commissaire britannique concernant le texte du projet de déclaration relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et d'autres questions connexes..... 639
744. 5 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Communique au premier ministre britannique l'approbation au projet de déclaration relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth sous réserve de deux amendements..... 640
745. 7 déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet le message du premier ministre britannique approuvant les modifications proposées à la déclaration relative au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 641
746. 8 déc. *Le ministre de la Défense nationale au chef de la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne.* Demande de confirmer l'interprétation donnée à l'extrait traitant du statut des effectifs canadiens en campagne dans le memorandum d'accord relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth.... 641
747. 8 déc. *Le chef de la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne au ministre de la Défense nationale.* Est d'accord sur les moyens de réserver, avec l'interprétation du Canada concernant l'extrait en question..... 642
748. 11 déc. *Mémoire au secrétaire principal au Premier ministre.* Traite des efforts en vue d'un accord sur les moyens d'identifier les effectifs canadiens en campagne..... 642
749. 11 déc. *Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique son intention de signer l'accord relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et donne son approbation aux arrangements concernant l'annonce de celui-ci..... 646
750. 11 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Demande à l'honorable T. A. Crerar d'informer le
- External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Reports discussion with British High Commissioner on text of proposed announcement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan and related matters 639
744. Dec. 5 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Communicates to British Prime Minister concurrence in proposed announcement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan with two amendments 640
745. Dec. 7 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates message from British Prime Minister accepting suggested textual revisions in announcement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan 641
746. Dec. 8 *Minister of National Defence to Chairman, Air Mission of Great Britain.* Requests confirmation of interpretation of passage on status in the field of Canadian personnel in memorandum of agreement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan 641
747. Dec. 8 *Chairman, Air Mission of Great Britain, to Minister of National Defence.* Concurs, with reservations, in Canadian interpretation of passage in question 642
748. Dec. 11 *Memorandum by Principal Secretary to Prime Minister.* Records efforts to secure agreement on means of identification of Canadians in the field 642
749. Dec. 11 *Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Conveys intention to sign and concurrence in arrangements for announcing agreement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan 646
750. Dec. 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Requests Hon. T. A. Crerar to inform

- gouvernement britannique de sa préoccupation concernant le statut en campagne des effectifs de l'air du Canada formés aux termes du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 646
751. 11 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande*. Se dit d'accord avec les arrangements pris par la Nouvelle-Zélande pour signer le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth mais demande que l'accord soit annoncé simultanément..... 646
752. 11 déc. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. S'enquiert des arrangements proposés par la Nouvelle-Zélande concernant la signature du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 647
753. 12 déc. *Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce la remise à plus tard du projet de déclaration concernant l'effort aérien de la Nouvelle-Zélande..... 647
754. 13 déc. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Note les risques inhérents à l'ambiguïté de la proposition du Canada concernant l'organisation en campagne de l'effectif canadien formé dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 648
755. 13 déc. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Relate la discussion avec le haut commissaire britannique au sujet de la réponse anticipée du gouvernement britannique à la proposition touchant l'organisation en campagne de l'effectif canadien formé dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 648
756. 14 déc. *Procès-verbal du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*. Relate la discussion avec la mission aérienne britannique au sujet du projet de combiner du personnel non navigant britannique avec du personnel navigant canadien..... 649
757. 15 déc. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*..... 649
- British Government of strong feeling on matter of status in the field of Canadian air personnel trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan 646
751. Dec. 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister of New Zealand*. Concurs in arrangements made by New Zealand to sign Commonwealth Air Training Plan but asks for simultaneous announcement of agreement.... 646
752. Dec. 11 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Enquires about arrangements proposed by New Zealand for signing Commonwealth Air Training Plan .. 647
753. Dec. 12 *Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States that proposed broadcast concerning New Zealand air effort has been postponed 647
754. Dec. 13 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Notes danger inherent in ambiguity of Canadian proposal concerning organization in the field of Canadian personnel trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan 648
755. Dec. 13 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Reports discussion with British High Commissioner concerning anticipated British reply to proposal concerning organization in the field of Canadian personnel trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan 648
756. Dec. 14 *Minutes of Cabinet War Committee*. Records discussion with British Air Mission of proposed use of British ground crews for Canadian flying units 649
757. Dec. 15 *Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs*..... 649

- Affaires extérieures.* Indique son intention d'annoncer à la presse l'accord entre l'Australie et la Grande-Bretagne concernant le Plan d'entraînement aérien..... 653
758. 15 déc. *Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au Premier ministre.* S'enquiert de la possibilité de publier en même temps la déclaration convenue concernant le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 653
759. 15 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre d'Australie.* Rappelle qu'on croyait qu'il avait été convenu que la publication du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth serait faite simultanément et demande que la déclaration australienne soit différée..... 653
760. 15 déc. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le texte de la déclaration proposée concernant la signature conjointe par l'Australie et la Grande-Bretagne de l'accord relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 654
761. 16 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Transmet à l'intention du premier ministre britannique le message précisant les discussions avec la mission aérienne britannique sur le statut en campagne de l'effectif canadien formé dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et craint que le retard à s'entendre ne compromette le Plan d'entraînement... 656
762. 16 déc. *Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Précise que le communiqué ne concernait que l'entraînement en Australie et se dit prêt à coopérer en vue de la publication simultanée de la déclaration sur le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth lui-même..... 660
763. 16 déc. *Le Premier ministre au premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande.* Explique le retard à paraître l'accord sur le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et fait part de dispositions en vue de la publication simultanée des communiqués de presse..... 660
- External Affairs.* States intention to make press announcement concerning Australian agreement with Britain under Air Training Scheme 653
758. Dec. 15 *Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister.* Enquires about possibility of synchronizing release of agreed statement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan 653
759. Dec. 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister of Australia.* Recalls understanding that announcements of Commonwealth Air Training Plan would be made simultaneously and asks for postponement of Australian statement 653
760. Dec. 15 *Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates text of proposed announcement of Australian signature of agreement with Great Britain as part of Commonwealth Air Training Plan 654
761. Dec. 16 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits message for British Prime Minister outlining discussions with British Air Mission concerning status in the field of Canadian personnel trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan and expressing concern that delay in reaching agreement may imperil plan 656
762. Dec. 16 *Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Explains that press statement concerned only training in Australia and undertakes co-operation in simultaneous release of statement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan itself 660
763. Dec. 16 *Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand.* Explains delay in initialling agreement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan and outlines arrangements for simultaneous press statements 660

764. 16 déc. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Rapporte la nouvelle à l'effet que l'Australie a pris sur elle de remettre un communiqué distinct à la presse..... 661
765. 16 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Exprime au premier ministre britannique son étonnement de ce que Londres ait autorisé la publication du communiqué australien avant l'accord de toutes les parties au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 662
766. 16 déc. *Mémoire du Premier ministre.* Traite de la discussion avec le ministre des Finances et des dernières étapes à franchir en vue d'un accord sur le statut en campagne des effectifs canadiens, devant être annoncé avant le débarquement des troupes canadiennes en Grande-Bretagne..... 662
767. 16 déc. *Le chef de la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne au ministre de la Défense nationale.* Lui annonce l'accord de principe au projet d'intégrer les gradués du Plan d'entraînement aérien aux unités de l'A.R.C. en campagne..... 664
768. 17 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Informe le premier ministre britannique de la signature de l'accord relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 665
769. 17 déc. *Le Premier ministre au premier ministre d'Australie.* Propose un horaire pour la communication à la presse des nouvelles concernant la signature de l'accord relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth.... 665
770. 17 déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet ses félicitations à l'occasion du débarquement des troupes canadiennes et de la signature de l'accord relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth.... 665
771. 18 déc. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Donne la version britannique du malentendu
764. Dec. 16 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates news of separate Australian statement to press 661
765. Dec. 16 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Expresses to British Prime Minister amazement at British concurrence in release of Australian statement prior to agreement among all parties to Commonwealth Air Training Plan 662
766. Dec. 16 *Memorandum by Prime Minister.* Records discussion with Minister of Finance and final stages of effort to secure agreement on status in the field of Canadian personnel, for announcement prior to landing of Canadian troops in Great Britain 662
767. Dec. 16 *Chairman, Air Mission of Great Britain, to Minister of National Defence.* Communicates acceptance in principle of plan to incorporate Canadian graduates of Air Training Scheme in R.C.A.F. units in the field 664
768. Dec. 17 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Informs British Prime Minister of signature of agreement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan 665
769. Dec. 17 *Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia.* Suggests timing of release of agreed press statement on signature of agreement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan 665
770. Dec. 17 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits congratulations on disembarkation of Canadian troops and signature of agreement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan 665
771. Dec. 18 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates British ac-

qui a entraîné la publication prématurée par l'Australie de la déclaration concernant l'entente avec la Grande-Bretagne sur l'entraînement aérien..... 666

772. 21 déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Indique la satisfaction du premier ministre britannique d'apprendre la signature de l'accord relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 667

773. 22 déc. *Mémoire du secrétaire principal au Premier ministre.* Donne un résumé chronologique des dernières négociations qui ont conduit à la signature du mémorandum d'accord relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 667

PARTIE 2

LE PLAN EN VIGUEUR

1940

774. 4 janv. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Demande de confirmer son interprétation du contrôle disciplinaire, de l'administration, etc. de l'effectif britannique à l'entraînement aérien au Canada..... 671

775. 17 janv. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait savoir que Londres est d'accord avec l'interprétation donnée au contrôle disciplinaire de l'effectif britannique qui reçoit un entraînement aérien au Canada 672

776. 18 janv. *Décret du Conseil.* Approuve le mémorandum d'accord relatif au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et des arrangements connexes..... 673

777. 12 févr. *Décret du Conseil.* Décrète que les membres des forces aériennes du Commonwealth postés au Canada dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth seront provisoirement détachés auprès de l'Aviation royale du Canada..... 675

778. 16 fév. *Le haut commissaire en Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique une

count of misunderstanding which led to premature Australian statement on agreement with Great Britain on air training 666

772. Dec. 21 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates satisfaction of British Prime Minister at signature of Commonwealth Air Training Plan 667

773. Dec. 22 *Memorandum by Principal Secretary to Prime Minister.* Records chronological summary of final negotiations leading to signature of memorandum of agreement on Commonwealth Air Training Plan 667

PART 2

THE PLAN IN OPERATION

1940

774. Jan. 4 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Requests confirmation of understanding concerning disciplinary control, administration, etc. of British personnel undergoing air training in Canada 671

775. Jan. 17 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates British agreement with understanding on disciplinary control of British personnel undergoing air training in Canada 672

776. Jan. 18 *Order in Council.* Approves memorandum of agreement with respect to Commonwealth Air Training Plan and accompanying arrangements 673

777. Feb. 12 *Order in Council.* Orders that members of Commonwealth Air Forces posted to Canada for purposes of Commonwealth Air Training Plan be attached temporarily to Royal Canadian Air Force 675

778. Feb. 16 *High Commissioner in Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports

- requête de l'Australie demandant que la portée des sanctions disciplinaires dont les effectifs australiens au Canada pourraient être passibles ne soit pas plus sévère qu'en Australie..... 676
779. 24 fév. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Propose une date et un endroit en vue de discuter des moyens à employer pour identifier avec leurs forces armées respectives les effectifs formés dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth 676
780. 5 mars *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Propose de tenir avec le gouvernement britannique des discussions bilatérales préliminaires concernant l'effectif canadien formé dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth, lesquelles seraient ultérieurement suivies de discussions intergouvernementales à Londres..... 677
781. 18 avril *Le haut commissaire en Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Propose d'amender le décret du Conseil afin de restreindre la portée des sanctions disciplinaires dont les effectifs australiens pourraient être passibles..... 678
782. 3 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Australie.* Communique l'essentiel du décret du Conseil restreignant les sanctions imposables à l'effectif australien détaché auprès de l'Aviation royale du Canada..... 678
783. 19 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Demande si la Grande-Bretagne peut fournir des cadres pour une école additionnelle, et des pilotes qui ont l'expérience du combat en tant qu'instructeurs..... 679
784. 19 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Exprime des doutes quant à ces deux demandes..... 679
785. 23 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique les modifications au programme aérien général
- request that penalties for breach of discipline by Australians should be no more severe than under Australian law 676
779. Feb. 24 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Suggests date and place for discussions of methods by which personnel trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan may be identified with their respective forces 676
780. Mar. 5 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Suggests preliminary bilateral discussions with British Government concerning Canadian personnel trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan to be followed by subsequent inter-governmental discussions in London 677
781. Apr. 18 *High Commissioner in Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Suggests amendment of Order in Council to limit severity of penalties for breaches of discipline by Australian personnel 678
782. May 3 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Australia.* Communicates gist of Order in Council restricting penalties which may be imposed on Australian personnel attached to Royal Canadian Air Force 678
783. May 19 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Asks if Britain can supply key personnel for additional school, and war-experienced pilots as instructors under Plan 679
784. May 19 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Expresses tentative doubt on both these points 679
785. May 23 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates modifications to general air programme

- et au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth nécessitées par la nouvelle phase de la guerre..... 680
786. 1^{er} juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte la réponse négative du ministère de l'Air à la demande de cadres supplémentaires 681
787. 2 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Exprime sa gratitude pour la façon dont le Canada a répondu à l'appel pour des opérationnels..... 681
788. 7 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Autorise la Grande-Bretagne à suspendre la livraison d'avions de combat..... 682
789. 13 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Fait part des mesures prises afin de minimiser les répercussions sur le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth de la suspension momentanée de la fourniture par la Grande-Bretagne d'avions et de moteurs 682
790. 30 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Exprime sa gratitude au Canada pour sa volonté de surmonter les difficultés en vue de maintenir le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et promet de fournir de l'équipement..... 683
791. 4 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Fait part du besoin urgent en pièces d'avion et propose de communiquer avec le représentant du ministère des Munitions et Approvisionnements afin d'éviter le double emploi.. 684
792. 6 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Demande des renseignements au sujet de la date de livraison de pièces de rechange pour les avions et moteurs..... 684
793. 8 juill. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Le renseigne sur les disponibilités et l'envoi d'avions et de moteurs de rechange..... 685
- and Commonwealth Air Training Plan necessitated by new phase of war 680
786. June 1 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports negative reply of Air Ministry to request for additional personnel 681
787. June 2 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates thanks for Canadian response to appeal for operational aircraft 681
788. June 7 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Communicates decision to forego delivery of further operational aircraft by Great Britain 682
789. June 13 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Communicates steps taken to minimize effect on Commonwealth Air Training Plan of interim suspension of British contribution of aircraft and engines 682
790. June 30 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Expresses gratitude for Canadian action to overcome difficulties in carrying on Commonwealth Air Training Plan and promises certain equipment 683
791. July 4 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Communicates urgent additional requirements of aircraft equipment and suggests liaison with representative of Department of Munitions and Supply in order to avoid duplication 684
792. July 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. States need for information on dates for delivery of aircraft and engine spares 684
793. July 8 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates information on availability and shipment of aircraft and spare engines 685

794. 21 août *Le haut commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. S'enquiert des règlements concernant la peine de mort pour l'effectif en formation dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 685
795. 10 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande*. Suggère qu'on envisage d'adopter un décret du Conseil, analogue à celui demandé par l'Australie, en vue de protéger l'effectif néo-zélandais..... 685
796. 19 sept. *Mémoire du conseiller juridique*. Traite des démarches faites par un représentant du gouvernement de l'Inde sur la participation possible de ce pays au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 686
797. 19 oct. *Le haut commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait savoir que le gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zélande approuve la promulgation d'un décret du Conseil restreignant la sévérité des peines à l'endroit de l'effectif de Nouvelle-Zélande provisoirement détaché auprès de l'Aviation royale du Canada..... 688
798. 9 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire, le gouvernement de l'Inde*. Propose un terrain d'entente pour que l'Inde participe au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et suggère que le gouvernement de l'Inde demande officiellement au gouvernement du Canada d'entreprendre des négociations avec les autorités britanniques..... 689
799. 14 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Le prie d'informer les autorités britanniques que le ministre de la Défense nationale a été prié de participer à des discussions bilatérales concernant le statut en campagne de l'effectif canadien formé dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 690
800. 14 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*. Demande au premier
794. Aug. 21 *High Commissioner in New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Enquires concerning regulations on death penalty for New Zealand personnel training under the Commonwealth Air Training Plan 685
795. Sept. 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in New Zealand*. Suggests that an Order in Council similar to that requested by Australia could be provided to protect New Zealand personnel 685
796. Sept. 19 *Memorandum by Legal Adviser*. Records approach made by representative of Government of India concerning possible participation in Commonwealth Air Training Plan 686
797. Oct. 19 *High Commissioner in New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports concurrence of New Zealand Government in issuing of an Order in Council to limit severity of penalties for New Zealand personnel temporarily attached to Royal Canadian Air Force 688
798. Nov. 9 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary, Government of India*. Suggests basis for Indian participation in Commonwealth Air Training Plan and suggests that Government of India formally request Canadian Government to commence negotiations with British authorities 689
799. Nov. 14 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends instructions to inform British authorities that Minister of National Defence has been requested to participate in bilateral discussions concerning status in the field of Canadian personnel trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan.... 690
800. Nov. 14 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*. Communicates en-

ministre britannique s'il juge opportun d'élargir considérablement le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth.... 691

801. 20 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique la réponse du Premier ministre à la demande concernant l'élargissement possible du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 692

802. 9 déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Indique les raisons pour lesquelles il n'est pas souhaitable pour le moment d'élargir le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et suggère la production d'avions d'entraînement au Canada..... 693

803. 12 dec. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Informe le premier ministre britannique qu'on prévoit produire des avions d'entraînement et s'enquiert de la possibilité d'affecter au Canada des moteurs américains..... 694

804. 13 déc. *Procès-verbal de la réunion au ministère de l'Air.* Relate la réunion à laquelle assistait le ministre de la Défense nationale et portant sur le financement des escadrons de l'A.R.C. en Angleterre, la production d'avions au Canada et la livraison en Grande-Bretagne..... 694

805. 15 déc. *Le quartier général de l'Aviation royale du Canada en Grande-Bretagne au chef de l'état-major de l'Air.* Rapporte les discussions du ministre de la Défense nationale à Londres portant sur l'identification et l'emploi des Canadiens formés dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth, et demande des commentaires..... 698

806. 23 déc. *Le quartier général de l'Aviation royale du Canada en Grande-Bretagne au chef de l'état-major de l'Air.* Indique que le ministre de la Défense nationale a parafé le mémorandum d'accord concernant l'identification des canadiens formés dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et en a demandé l'approbation..... 700

quiry to British Prime Minister as to desirability of undertaking substantial expansion of Commonwealth Air Training Plan 691

801. Nov. 20 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates reply of Prime Minister to enquiry concerning possible expansion of Commonwealth Air Training Plan .. 692

802. Dec. 9 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States reason for not expanding Commonwealth Air Training Plan at present and suggests production of training aircraft in Canada 693

803. Dec. 12 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Informs British Prime Minister of expected production of training aircraft and enquires concerning diversion to Canada of engines from United States 694

804. Dec. 13 *Minutes of Meeting at Air Ministry.* Records meeting attended by Minister of National Defence on financing of R.C.A.F. squadrons in England, aircraft production in Canada and delivery to Great Britain 694

805. Dec. 15 *Royal Canadian Air Force Headquarters in Great Britain to Chief of Air Staff.* Reports discussions of Minister of National Defence in London on identification and employment of Canadians trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan and requests comments 698

806. Dec. 23 *Royal Canadian Air Force Headquarters in Great Britain to Chief of Air Staff.* Reports that Minister of National Defence has initialled memorandum of agreement regarding identification of Canadians trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan and requests approval 700

807. 24 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique les observations du ministre de la Défense nationale sur le memorandum d'accord concernant l'identification des Canadiens formés dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth et espère que le Canada approuvera cet accord.....

702

808. 27 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Informe le ministre de la Défense nationale que le Cabinet a ratifié sous condition le memorandum d'accord concernant l'identification des Canadiens formés dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth.....

704

809. 31 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique des précisions relatives à un paragraphe du memorandum d'accord concernant l'identification des Canadiens formés dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth.....

705

1941

810. 2 janv. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Transmet au ministre de la Défense nationale l'autorisation de signer l'accord concernant l'identification des Canadiens formés dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth....

705

811. 7 janv. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte la signature de l'accord concernant l'identification des Canadiens formés dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth.....

706

812. 7 janv. *Extrait du procès-verbal de la réunion au ministère de l'Air.* Traite de la discussion entre le ministre de la Défense nationale et le secrétaire d'État de l'Air de Grande-Bretagne concernant la possibilité que des aviateurs soient entraînés aux États-Unis....

707

813. 8 janv. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État*

807. Dec. 24 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates comments of Minister of National Defence on memorandum of agreement regarding identification of Canadians trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan and expresses hope for Canadian acceptance

702

808. Dec. 27 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Informs Minister of National Defence of conditional Cabinet confirmation of memorandum of agreement regarding identification of Canadians trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan

704

809. Dec. 31 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits clarification of paragraph of memorandum of agreement regarding identification of Canadians trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan

705

1941

810. Jan. 2 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Authorizes Minister of National Defence to sign agreement regarding identification of Canadians trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan

705

811. Jan. 7 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports signature of agreement regarding identification of Canadians trained under Commonwealth Air Training Plan

706

812. Jan. 7 *Extract from Minutes of Meeting in Air Ministry.* Records discussion between Minister of National Defence and British Secretary of State for Air on possibilities of flying training in United States

707

813. Jan. 8 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary*

aux Affaires extérieures. Transmet le message du ministre de la Défense nationale concernant la possibilité de produire des avions d'entraînement au Canada et l'élargissement du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth... 708

814. 9 janv. *Le quartier général de l'Aviation royale du Canada en Grande-Bretagne au chef de l'état-major de l'Air.* Transmet le texte de l'aide-mémoire résumant la position britannique concernant l'élargissement ultérieur du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth 709

815. 30 janv. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Sonde l'attitude du Canada face à la proposition de permettre au personnel non navigant de la R.A.F. au Canada de subir l'entraînement destiné au personnel navigant..... 710

816. 24 fév. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Le prie de discuter de la situation critique dans laquelle se trouve le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth par suite du retard de la Grande-Bretagne à livrer des avions d'entraînement..... 711

817. 1^{er} mars *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait rapport sur la livraison d'avions d'entraînement par la Grande-Bretagne..... 711

818. 4 mars *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne.* Se dit d'accord avec la proposition de permettre au personnel non navigant de la R.A.F. au Canada de subir l'entraînement destiné au personnel navigant..... 712

819. 31 mars *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait état du programme révisé de livraison d'avions d'entraînement par la Grande-Bretagne..... 712

820. 13 avril *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Transmet la demande

of State for External Affairs. Transmits message from Minister of National Defence concerning possible production in Canada of training aircraft and expansion of Commonwealth Air Training Plan 708

814. Jan. 9 *Royal Canadian Air Force Headquarters in Great Britain to Chief of Air Staff.* Transmits text of Aide-Mémoire summarizing British position concerning further expansion of Commonwealth Air Training Plan 709

815. Jan. 30 *High Commission of Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Enquires about Canadian attitude to proposal concerning transfer to air crew training of Royal Air Force ground personnel in Canada 710

816. Feb. 24 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Sends instructions to discuss serious situation concerning operation of Commonwealth Air Training Plan caused by delays in shipment of training aircraft from Great Britain 711

817. Mar. 1 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports on shipment of training aircraft from Great Britain 711

818. Mar. 4 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Agrees with proposal concerning transfer to air crew training of Royal Air Force ground personnel in Canada 712

819. Mar. 31 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports revised programme for shipment from Great Britain of training aircraft 712

820. Apr. 13 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits appeal to

- formulée au premier ministre britannique concernant les avions d'entraînement et les moteurs nécessaires au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 713
821. 6 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le message du premier ministre britannique concernant la livraison des avions d'entraînement et des moteurs promis dans le cadre du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 713
822. 21 juin *Le secrétaire, le gouvernement de l'Inde, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique la réponse britannique à la proposition d'admettre des Indiens dans le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 715
823. 12 sept. *Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique la réaction britannique à la proposition visant à augmenter le nombre d'escadrons canadiens qui seront formés aux termes de l'Article 15 du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 715
824. 23 oct. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande un accord de principe pour la tenue de discussions sur la continuation du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth après mars 1943..... 716
825. 3 nov. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Fait savoir qu'il approuve la tenue de discussions sur la continuation du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth après mars 1943..... 717
826. 7 nov. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique l'accord britannique à la formation d'escadrons de combat supplémentaires de l'Aviation royale du Canada..... 718
827. 13 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Communique le message du ministre de la
- British Prime Minister for training aircraft and engines required for Commonwealth Air Training Plan 713
821. May 6 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates message from British Prime Minister on supply of training aircraft and engines promised under Commonwealth Air Training Plan 713
822. June 21 *Secretary, Government of India, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates British answer to proposal that Indian pilots be admitted to Commonwealth Air Training Plan.... 715
823. Sept. 12 *Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates British reaction to suggested increase in number of Canadian squadrons to be formed under Article 15 of Commonwealth Air Training Plan 715
824. Oct. 23 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests agreement in principle to hold discussions on continuation of Commonwealth Air Training Plan beyond March, 1943 716
825. Nov. 3 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates approval of discussions on continuation of Commonwealth Air Training Plan beyond March, 1943.... 717
826. Nov. 7 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates British agreement to formation of additional Royal Canadian Air Force fighter squadrons 718
827. Nov. 13 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates message from Minister of

Défense nationale au secrétaire d'État à l'Air indiquant les raisons pour lesquelles le succès du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth est dangereusement compromis..... 719

828. 19 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Confirme le désir du gouvernement canadien de former d'autres escadrons de combat de l'Aviation royale du Canada..... 721

829. 20 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait savoir que le secrétaire d'État à l'Air a ouvert une enquête complète sur la question de la livraison d'avions et du matériel nécessaires pour le bon fonctionnement du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 721

National Defence to Secretary of State for Air stating reasons why success of Commonwealth Air Training Plan is gravely endangered 719

828. Nov. 19 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Confirms desire of Canadian Government to form additional Royal Canadian Air Force fighter squadrons 721

829. Nov. 20 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports Secretary of State for Air has begun full enquiry into question of supply of aircraft and equipment for Commonwealth Air Training Plan.... 721

CHAPITRE V

COOPÉRATION MILITAIRE
AU SEIN DU COMMONWEALTH

PARTIE I

CORPS EXPÉDITIONNAIRES CANADIENS

GRANDE-BRETAGNE, FRANCE, ISLANDE

1939

830. 23 sept. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Remercie le gouvernement canadien d'avoir décidé d'équiper des effectifs qui serviraient outre-mer..... 723

831. 23 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Demande que les communications en matière de politique concernant le corps expéditionnaire soient faites par les voies diplomatiques courantes..... 724

832. 29 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Offre de dépêcher des unités techniques qui seront affectées à des formations britanniques sous certaines conditions..... 724

CHAPTER V

COMMONWEALTH MILITARY
CO-OPERATION

PART I

CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ICELAND

1939

830. Sept. 23 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Conveys appreciation for Canadian decision to equip force for possible overseas service 723

831. Sept. 23 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Requests that communications on policy matters relating to Expeditionary Force be made through regular rather than military channels 724

832. Sept. 29 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Offers to despatch technical units for attachment to British formations on certain stated conditions 724

833. 3 oct. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique une requête du War Office concernant la possibilité pour le Canada de réunir des troupes préposées aux chemins de fer et des compagnies forestières qui serviraient outre-mer..... 726
834. 7 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande si le Canada peut réunir des troupes préposées aux chemins de fer et des compagnies forestières..... 726
835. 9 oct. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande où on en est avec la division que le Canada est disposé à établir pour service outre-mer..... 727
836. 20 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Communique l'opinion du ministre de la Défense nationale concernant la suggestion que le Canada forme des compagnies forestières et des troupes préposées aux chemins de fer pour service outre-mer..... 728
837. 20 oct. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Le renseigne sur l'envoi outre-mer d'unités de la 1^{re} Division canadienne..... 728
838. 25 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que le conseil de l'Armée accepte les propositions du gouvernement canadien concernant l'envoi d'unités techniques..... 729
839. 1^{er} nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Annonce que le Canada n'assumera pas d'autres obligations militaires en attendant l'issue des discussions sur le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 730
840. 2 nov. *Décret du Conseil.* Définit les rapports entre les forces britanniques et les forces canadiennes servant en Grande-Bretagne ainsi qu'en Europe..... 731
833. Oct. 3 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates War Office enquiry concerning possibility that Canada might raise railway troop units and forestry companies for service overseas 726
834. Oct. 7 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Enquires whether Canada could assist by raising railway troop units and forestry companies 726
835. Oct. 9 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Enquires concerning despatch of division which Canada is prepared to establish for active service 727
836. Oct. 20 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates Department of National Defence position on suggestion that Canada raise forestry companies and railway troop units for service overseas 728
837. Oct. 20 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates information regarding despatch overseas of units of First Division 728
838. Oct. 25 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates agreement of Army Council to proposals for despatch of technical units offered by Canadian Government 729
839. Nov. 1 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Communicates decision not to assume additional military commitments pending conclusion of discussions on Commonwealth Air Training Plan 730
840. Nov. 2 *Order in Council.* Establishes relationship of Canadian forces serving in Great Britain and on the Continent to British forces 731

841. 18 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique la liste révisée des unités techniques nécessaires et s'enquiert à nouveau des compagnies forestières et des unités du service des transports..... 733
841. Nov. 18 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates revised list of technical units required and renews inquiries about forestry companies and transportation units 733
842. 8 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Insiste pour que la presse canadienne puisse annoncer en priorité le débarquement de la 1^{re} Division..... 734
842. Dec. 8 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Stresses importance of Canadian press priority in announcement of landing of First Division 734
843. 12 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Communique copie du mémorandum du chef d'état-major général sur l'organisation et l'administration des forces canadiennes outre-mer..... 734
843. Dec. 12 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Forwards copy of memorandum from Chief of General Staff on organization and administration of Canadian Forces Overseas 734
844. 14 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part des dispositions pour annoncer le débarquement de la 1^{re} Division..... 736
844. Dec. 14 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates arrangements being made to announce landing of First Division 736
845. 15 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Désire éviter toute discrimination à l'égard de la presse américaine dans l'annonce du débarquement de la 1^{re} Division mais demande de plus amples renseignements concernant l'heure de publication du communiqué..... 736
845. Dec. 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* States wish not to discriminate against American press in announcement of landing of First Division but requests prior information as to time of release 736
846. 18 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Demande s'il serait possible que la nouvelle du débarquement de la 1^{re} Division soit publiée plus tôt en raison des rumeurs qui circulent déjà à ce sujet au Canada.... 737
846. Dec. 18 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Enquires concerning possible early release of announcement of landing of First Division in view of reports already circulating in Canada 737
847. 18 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part de l'arrivée et de l'accueil réservé au premier contingent de la 1^{re} Division..... 737
847. Dec. 18 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports arrival and reception of first contingent of First Division 737
848. 18 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Demande s'il serait possible que le débarquement de la 1^{re} Division soit annoncé plus tôt..... 738
848. Dec. 18 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Enquires concerning possibility of earlier announcement concerning disembarkation of First Division 738

849. 18 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Explique pourquoi il accorde à la presse canadienne la priorité de l'annonce du débarquement de la 1^{re} Division et en indique l'heure de publication..... 738
850. 18 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que le premier lord de l'Amirauté a inopinément radiodiffusé l'arrivée de la 1^{re} Division..... 739
851. 18 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Annonce que la nouvelle du débarquement de la 1^{re} Division a été communiquée à la presse canadienne..... 739
- 1940
852. 9 janv. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que le War Office demande au Canada de réexaminer la question de fournir des compagnies d'arpenteurs-géomètres pour les chemins de fer..... 739
853. 29 janv. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Rappelle les circonstances dans lesquelles le Premier ministre a parlé de l'envoi d'une seconde division outre-mer..... 740
854. 14 fév. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Le prévient de n'avoir, avant l'élection générale, aucune discussion avec le War Office concernant d'autres engagements pour outre-mer..... 740
855. 15 fév. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique la demande du War Office concernant l'envoi de troupes préposées aux chemins de fer..... 741
856. 20 fév. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part des discussions entre les autorités militaires canadiennes outre-mer et le War Office
849. Dec. 18 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Explains reasons for retaining priority for Canadian press in release of announcement of landing of First Division and communicates time of release 738
850. Dec. 18 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports unexpected radio announcement by First Lord of the Admiralty of arrival of First Division 739
851. Dec. 18 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Announces that story of landing of First Division has been released to Canadian press 739
- 1940
852. Jan. 9 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports War Office wish that Canada reconsider possibility of supplying railway survey companies 739
853. Jan. 29 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Explains context of reference by Prime Minister to sending a second division overseas 740
854. Feb. 14 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Warns that prior to general election there should be no discussion with War Office of additional overseas commitments 740
855. Feb. 15 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates War Office enquiry concerning railway troop units 741
856. Feb. 20 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Explains discussions of Canadian military authorities overseas with War

- au sujet des dispositions ultérieures en rapport avec le Corps expéditionnaire canadien prévu..... 742
857. 22 fév. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Résume les engagements canadiens actuels et le met en garde contre toute discussion avec les Britanniques relative à de nouvelles demandes..... 743
858. 23 fév. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Rejette la demande d'envoyer des troupes préposées aux chemins de fer..... 745
859. 27 fév. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Communique les projets pour le départ de la 2^e Division et discute le rôle de la 1^{re} Division et des unités non divisionnaires sur le front..... 745
860. 2 mars *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* S'engage à tenir compte des instructions d'Ottawa dans toute discussion ultérieure avec les autorités britanniques..... 746
861. 3 mars *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Signale la difficulté de garder la responsabilité administrative de toute force canadienne intégrée à un corps d'armée britannique..... 746
862. 16 mars *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande si l'on permettrait aux Britanniques de recruter parmi les employés des chemins de fer canadiens des volontaires qui serviraient dans l'armée britannique..... 749
863. 17 mars *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Déclare que la question de la responsabilité administrative des unités canadiennes sera considérée après les élections..... 749
864. 19 mars *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Demande au premier ministre britannique de ne pas recruter d'arpenteurs-géomètres pour les chemins de fer avant les élections..... 750
- Office on future Canadian Corps arrangements 742
857. Feb. 22 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Summarizes existing Canadian commitments and warns against premature discussion with British of proposals for further contributions .. 743
858. Feb. 23 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Refuses request for railway troop units 745
859. Feb. 27 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates proposals for departure of Second Division and employment at front of First Division and non-divisional units 745
860. Mar. 2 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Undertakes that future discussions with British authorities will be guided by instructions from Ottawa 746
861. Mar. 3 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Points out difficulty of retaining administrative control of any Canadian forces embodied in a British corps 746
862. Mar. 16 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Asks if British would be permitted to recruit volunteers from Canadian railways for service in British Army 749
863. Mar. 17 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* States that question of administrative control of Canadian units will be considered after the election 749
864. Mar. 19 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Communicates request to British Prime Minister urging that no action be taken before election to recruit railway survey personnel 750

865. 21 mars *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le message du premier ministre britannique qui accepte de remettre à plus tard le recrutement des arpenteurs-géomètres.. 750
866. 1^{er} avril *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Communique le plan de recrutement de volontaires pour les unités britanniques d'arpenteurs-géomètres..... 751
867. 5 avril *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Annonce qu'on accepte sous condition que la 1^{re} Division et les unités auxiliaires deviennent une formation autonome relevant du G.Q.G..... 751
868. 16 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que les Britanniques souhaitent que la nouvelle non fondée qui signale la présence de troupes Canadiennes en Norvège ne soit pas niée..... 753
869. 17 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Informe le ministre de la Défense nationale que des troupes canadiennes vont participer à des opérations interarmes en Norvège 753
870. 18 avril *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Communique le message du ministre suppléant de la Défense nationale au général commandant soulignant que des consultations auraient dû précéder la décision d'envoyer des troupes canadiennes en Norvège..... 754
871. 17 avril *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Signale qu'on tient à être préalablement consulté en cas de dérogation aux plans et politiques établis..... 754
872. 18 avril *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.*
865. Mar. 21 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates message from British Prime Minister agreeing to defer plan to recruit railway survey personnel 750
866. Apr. 1 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates plan to obtain volunteers for service with British railway survey units 751
867. Apr. 5 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates conditional agreement that First Division and ancillary units should become a self-contained formation under G.H.Q. 751
868. Apr. 16 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates British hope that unfounded press statements about Canadian troops in Norway will not be denied 753
869. Apr. 17 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates to Minister of National Defence decision that Canadian troops are to participate in combined operation in Norway 753
870. Apr. 17 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates message from Acting Minister of National Defence to General Officer Commanding that consultation should have preceded decision to despatch troops to Norway 754
871. Apr. 17 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Observes that as soon as despatch of Canadians to Norway began to be considered Ottawa should have been informed 754
872. Apr. 18 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.*

- Insiste pour que l'annonce de l'arrivée ou du départ des forces mixtes soit d'abord faite à Ottawa ou en même temps qu'à Londres..... 755
873. 18 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Expose les motifs de la décision prise par le général commandant d'envoyer des troupes canadiennes en Norvège..... 755
874. 19 avril *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Répète qu'on aurait dû aviser le gouvernement canadien avant que ne fut prise la décision d'envoyer des troupes en Norvège..... 756
875. 19 avril *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Communique le message du ministre de la Défense nationale insistant pour qu'on consulte le gouvernement canadien avant de permettre que les forces canadiennes servent à l'extérieur de la Grande-Bretagne..... 756
876. 20 avril *Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Est d'avis qu'on devrait insister auprès des autorités françaises pour qu'elles considèrent les troupes canadiennes faisant partie du Corps expéditionnaire britannique comme les forces armées d'un État souverain..... 757
877. 20 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale la difficulté de s'en tenir aux priorités dans la diffusion des communiqués de presse en cas d'opération combinée..... 758
878. 20 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte qu'aucune troupe canadienne ne s'est embarquée pour la Norvège..... 759
879. 21 avril *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Insiste de nouveau pour qu'on accorde la priorité à la presse canadienne pour la publication de nouvelles concernant la participation canadienne aux opérations interarmes en Norvège..... 759
- Urges that announcements of arrival or departure of combined forces should be made in Ottawa first or simultaneously with British announcements 755
873. Apr. 18 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States background of decision of General Officer Commanding to send troops to serve in Norway 755
874. Apr. 19 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Reiterates opinion that Canadian Government should have been informed before decision was made to send troops to Norway 756
875. Apr. 19 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Communicates message to Minister of National Defence on necessity for reference to Canadian Government before any decision reached on use of Canadian forces outside Great Britain 756
876. Apr. 20 *Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Suggests necessity of ensuring that French authorities recognize Canadian troops incorporated in British Expeditionary Force as armed forces of a sovereign state 757
877. Apr. 20 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Lists difficulties in arranging priorities for news distribution in case of combined operations 758
878. Apr. 20 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports that no Canadian troops have sailed for Norway 759
879. Apr. 21 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Restates desirability of Canadian press having priority in announcements of Canadian participation in combined operation in Norway 759

880. 21 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte au ministre de la Défense nationale qu'on a annulé l'opération à laquelle des canadiens devaient participer en Norvège.... 760
881. 22 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique un message du ministre de la Défense nationale soulignant l'inopportunité de restrictions trop rigides sur les mesures militaires à prendre en cas d'urgence..... 760
882. 23 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que les troupes canadiennes destinées aux opérations interarmes en Norvège ont rallié la 1^{re} Division..... 760
883. 24 avril *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet un memorandum de l'Officier administrateur du quartier général canadien sur la possibilité de former un corps d'armée canadien avec la 1^{re} Division et des unités non divisionnaires ainsi que sur la politique et les méthodes à adopter pour ce faire..... 761
884. 10 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Communique au gouvernement britannique l'offre d'intensifier la coopération et l'aide militaire..... 765
885. 11 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet les remerciements du gouvernement britannique pour l'offre d'aide militaire additionnelle..... 766
886. 12 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet le texte de la réponse officielle britannique acceptant l'offre d'un bataillon d'infanterie pour les Antilles..... 766
887. 19 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique un autre message britannique de remer-
880. Apr. 21 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports to Minister of National Defence cancellation of phase of operation in Norway to which Canadians were assigned 760
881. Apr. 22 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates message from Minister of National Defence on undesirability of limiting military actions too rigidly to meet emergencies 760
882. Apr. 23 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports return to First Division of Canadian troops detached for combined operation in Norway 760
883. Apr. 24 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Transmits memorandum by Senior Officer, Canadian Military Headquarters, on possible incorporation of First Division and non-divisional units into a distinct Canadian formation and policy and procedure for forming a Canadian Corps 761
884. May 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Communicates offer to British Government of additional military assistance and co-operation 765
885. May 11 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Conveys appreciation of British Government for offer of additional military assistance 766
886. May 12 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates text of formal British reply to offer of assistance and acceptance of Infantry Battalion for West Indies 766
887. May 19 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates further British reply to

- ciements pour l'offre d'aide additionnelle et décrit les secteurs où une contribution immédiate serait précieuse..... 767
888. 23 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Fait part des décisions prises par le Canada au sujet de l'aide militaire additionnelle..... 769
889. 23 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part au ministère de la Défense nationale que le général commandant, la brigade d'infanterie canadienne et les effectifs auxiliaires doivent bientôt partir pour Calais..... 770
890. 23 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. L'informe qu'on essayera de réserver à Ottawa la priorité dans l'annonce du départ des troupes canadiennes à destination de la France..... 771
891. 23 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Demande si le Premier ministre peut, sans enfreindre les mesures de sécurité, annoncer dans son prochain message radiodiffusé le départ des troupes canadiennes pour la France..... 771
892. 24 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que les circonstances ne permettent pas d'annoncer le départ des troupes canadiennes pour la France..... 772
893. 24 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Souligne que le secret est impératif en ce qui concerne la participation canadienne aux opérations militaires en France..... 772
894. 24 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que Londres accepte l'offre de recruter des volontaires pour les compagnies d'arpenteurs-géomètres pour les chemins de fer..... 772
- offer of additional military assistance outlining areas where immediate help would be valuable 767
888. May 23 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Communicates decisions reached concerning additional military help to be provided by Canada 769
889. May 23 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports for Department of National Defence movements to Calais of General Officer Commanding and First Canadian Infantry Brigade and attached troops 770
890. May 23 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States intention to try to secure priority for Ottawa in announcement concerning movement of Canadian troops to France 771
891. May 23 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Enquires concerning possibility from security standpoint of announcing movement of Canadian troops to France during proposed broadcast by Prime Minister 771
892. May 24 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports that circumstances render inappropriate announcement of movement of Canadian troops to France 772
893. May 24 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Stresses importance of secrecy concerning Canadian participation in active operations in France 772
894. May 24 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports formal British acceptance of offer to obtain volunteers for railway survey companies 772

895. 29 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en France*. Précise le statut légal des forces canadiennes sous commandement britannique en France..... 773
896. 31 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique au ministère de la Défense nationale en paraphrase la correspondance concernant la décision de ne pas affecter des troupes canadiennes à Dunkerque..... 774
897. 4 juin *Le sous-ministre suppléant de la Défense nationale au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique l'ordre du général commandant enjoignant la 1^{re} Division et les troupes auxiliaires d'agir conjointement avec les forces militaires de la Grande-Bretagne..... 775
898. 4 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. S'enquiert des dispositions envisagées pour appuyer convenablement la brigade d'infanterie offerte par le Canada pour servir en Islande..... 775
899. 6 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet une demande pour que le Canada assume des responsabilités accrues relativement à la défense de l'Islande et énumère les troupes principales et auxiliaires requises..... 776
900. 8 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique les propositions britanniques concernant l'organisation au Canada d'unités préposées aux chemins de fer et la formation possible d'un corps forestier..... 778
901. 11 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique le message du premier ministre britannique à l'occasion du départ de la 1^{re} Division pour la France..... 779
902. 11 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique les dispositions prises en vue d'annoncer le départ de la 1^{re} Division pour la France..... 780
895. May 29 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in France*. Clarifies legal position of Canadian forces under British command in France 773
896. May 31 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates for Department of National Defence paraphrase of correspondence concerning decision not to commit Canadian troops to Dunkirk 774
897. June 4 *Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates order of General Officer Commanding that First Division and ancillary troops are to act in combination with military forces of Great Britain 775
898. June 4 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Enquires about arrangements to provide appropriate support for infantry brigade offered by Canada for service in Iceland 775
899. June 6 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates request that Canada assume increased responsibility for defence of Iceland and lists principal and ancillary troops required .. 776
900. June 8 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates British proposals concerning organization in Canada of railway troop units and possible provision of forestry personnel 778
901. June 11 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates message from British Prime Minister on occasion of departure of First Division for France 779
902. June 11 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates arrangements made for announcement of movement of First Division to France 780

903. 14 juin *Le quartier général de l'armée canadienne au quartier général de la Défense nationale.* Fait part de la décision de ne pas envoyer la 1^{re} Division en France dans les circonstances actuelles..... 780
904. 14 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Souligne l'importance que le *War Office* attache à préserver la situation en Islande et à cet égard demande une réponse concernant la coopération du Canada..... 781
905. 15 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Annonce que le Canada accepte en principe de collaborer à la défense de l'Islande et s'enquiert des besoins..... 781
906. 16 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Annonce la décision de fournir d'autres unités pour les chemins de fer et les services forestiers..... 782
907. 17 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Le prie d'informer les autorités britanniques de l'envoi de troupes en Islande..... 782
908. 17 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* S'enquiert à propos du retour de la 1^{re} Division en Angleterre..... 782
909. 17 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que la majeure partie de la 1^{re} Division a regagné la Grande-Bretagne..... 783
910. 18 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* S'enquiert des rapports constitutionnels et administratifs existant entre les forces britanniques et le gouvernement islandais..... 783
911. 19 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que
903. June 14 *Canadian Military Headquarters to National Defence Headquarters.* Communicates decision not to send First Division to France in existing circumstances 780
904. June 14 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports importance attached by War Office to safeguarding situation in Iceland and requests reply regarding Canadian co-operation 781
905. June 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates approval in principle that Canada should share in defence of Iceland and asks about requirements 781
906. June 16 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates decision to provide further railway and forestry units 782
907. June 17 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Sends instructions to inform British authorities of despatch of troops to Iceland 782
908. June 17 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Enquires concerning return to England of First Division 782
909. June 17 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports return to Great Britain of most of First Division 783
910. June 18 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Enquires concerning constitutional and administrative relations between British forces and Icelandic Government 783
911. June 19 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports

- la 1^{re} Division et la quasi-totalité de son équipement ont évacué la France..... 783
912. 19 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Dit que les effectifs et unités auparavant demandés sont toujours requis pour la défense de l'Islande..... 784
913. 20 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte la suggestion britannique d'affecter la 2^e Division à la défense de l'Islande..... 784
914. 27 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Indique les effectifs requis pour la défense du territoire canadien ainsi que les unités désignées pour la défense de l'Islande et demande si le Royaume-Uni fournira l'appui nécessaire..... 785
915. 27 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. S'enquiert de la nature de l'attaque appréhendée en Islande et de l'appui qu'on fournira au Canada pour la défense éventuelle de l'Islande..... 787
916. 28 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait état des principes qui régissent les relations entre les forces britanniques et les autorités islandaises..... 787
917. 28 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte l'opinion du War Office sur la possibilité d'attaques allemandes en Islande et expose des projets de défense..... 788
918. 29 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce que Londres retire sa demande d'effectifs pour les chemins de fer mais souligne le besoin urgent d'unités forestières..... 789
919. 2 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut com-*
- complete evacuation from France of First Division and most of its equipment 783
912. June 19 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States that all personnel and units previously requested are still required for defence of Iceland 784
913. June 20 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports British suggestion concerning allocation of Second Division for defence of Iceland 784
914. June 27 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. States requirements of Canadian home defence, summarizes units detailed for defence of Iceland and requests information concerning provision of adequate support 785
915. June 27 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Requests information concerning nature of expected attack on Iceland and enquires concerning support on which Canadian co-operation in Iceland is contingent 787
916. June 28 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports principles on which relations between British force and Icelandic authorities are based 787
917. June 28 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports War Office views on possible German attacks on Iceland and proposals for defence 788
918. June 29 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports British cancellation of request for railway units and urgent need for forestry units 789
919. July 2 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High*

missaire en Grande-Bretagne. Accepte les propositions britanniques concernant les unités forestières..... 790

920. 5 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Demande de préciser certains points concernant les troupes et l'équipement destinés à la défense de l'Islande..... 791

921. 8 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Résume les raisons pour lesquelles les Britanniques demandent à nouveau que la 2^e Division soit affectée à l'Islande..... 791

922. 10 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte qu'il est invité à discuter la décision du *War Office* d'établir un nouveau quartier-général de corps d'armée sous le commandement du général McNaughton.... 793

923. 11 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Suggère de concentrer la 2^e Division en Grande-Bretagne et de confier la défense de l'Islande aux forces britanniques..... 794

924. 11 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Fait savoir que le Canada accepte la création d'un nouveau corps d'armée et de son commandement et s'enquiert des besoins en effectifs auxiliaires..... 796

925. 13 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que le *War Office* accepte la proposition d'une garnison en Islande et la concentration de la 2^e Division en Grande-Bretagne..... 796

926. 15 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Fait part du projet d'envoyer en Grande-Bretagne certaines unités de la 2^e Division..... 797

927. 17 oct. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que

Commissioner in Great Britain. Agrees to British proposals concerning forestry units 790

920. July 5 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Requests clarification of details concerning troops and equipment for defence of Iceland 791

921. July 8 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Summarizes British reasons for reiterating request for allocation of Second Division to Iceland 791

922. July 10 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports invitation to discuss War Office decision on forming new Corps Headquarters under command of General McNaughton 793

923. July 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Submits proposal for concentration of Second Division in Great Britain and defence of Iceland by British forces 794

924. July 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates approval of creation and command of new Corps and requests information about ancillary troop requirements..... 796

925. July 13 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates War Office acceptance of proposal for garrisoning Iceland and concentration of Second Division in Great Britain 796

926. July 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates plans for despatch to Great Britain of units of Second Division 797

927. Oct. 17 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports

le remplacement des troupes canadiennes en Islande est imminent.....	798	imminent replacement of Canadian troops in Iceland	798
928. 19 déc. <i>Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Transmet la recommandation du ministre de la Défense britannique en vue de la formation prochaine d'un corps d'armée canadien	799	928. Dec. 19 <i>High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Communicates recommendation of Minister of National Defence for early constitution of Canadian Corps	799
929. 20 déc. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Communique au ministre de la Défense britannique l'approbation de former un corps d'armée canadien.....	800	929. Dec. 20 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> Communicates to Minister of National Defence approval of constitution of Canadian Corps	800

1941

930. 24 juin <i>Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Rapporte qu'on demande au Canada d'autres troupes préposées aux chemins de fer....	800
931. 17 juill. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Déclare que la réponse dépendra en partie des résultats d'une étude de la main-d'œuvre	801
932. 17 juill. <i>Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Transmet la demande britannique de compagnies de forestiers et de scieurs.....	801
933. 7 août <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Dit qu'on ne peut pour l'instant fournir les unités forestières demandées.....	802
934. 11 août <i>Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Signale que Londres attend une réponse définitive au sujet des troupes additionnelles préposées aux chemins de fer.....	803
935. 12 août <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Déclare qu'on ne peut fournir de troupes préposées aux chemins de fer en ce moment	803

1941

930. June 24 <i>High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Reports request for additional Canadian railway troops	800
931. July 17 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> States that reply will depend in part on results of a manpower survey	801
932. July 17 <i>High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Communicates British request for additional forestry companies and sawyers	801
933. Aug. 7 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> States that provision of requested forestry units is not possible at present	802
934. Aug. 11 <i>High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Reports British request for final decision on additional railway troops	803
935. Aug. 12 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> States that provision of railway troops is not possible at present	803

936. 20 août *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique la demande britannique de recruter des forestiers sans délai..... 803
936. Aug. 20 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates British enquiry concerning immediate recruiting of foresters 803
937. 22 août *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Croit que le Premier ministre aimerait discuter la demande de forestiers pendant son séjour en Angleterre..... 804
937. Aug. 22 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Suggests that Prime Minister might wish to discuss request for foresters while in England 804
938. 4 sept. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Partage son avis à l'effet de s'en tenir à la décision prise au sujet des unités de forestiers.... 805
938. Sept. 4 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates concurrence in view that decision concerning forestry units should be maintained for the present 805
939. 9 oct. *Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande à nouveau des compagnies forestières..... 805
939. Oct. 9 *Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reiterates request for forestry companies 805
940. 18 oct. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne.* Communique la décision de fournir un personnel forestier additionnel..... 806
940. Oct. 18 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates decision to supply additional forestry personnel 806

HONG-KONG

1941

941. 19 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que la situation a changé en Extrême-Orient et fait appel à la coopération pour renforcer la garnison de Hong-kong..... 807
941. Sept. 19 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Outlines changed position in Far East and requests co-operation in reinforcement of garrison at Hong Kong 807
942. 27 sept. *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Signale que le ministre de la Défense nationale approuve en principe le projet de renforcer la garnison de Hong-kong..... 808
942. Sept. 27 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates approval in principle by Minister of National Defence of proposal to reinforce Hong Kong garrison 808
943. 29 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Annonce que le gouvernement canadien accepte en principe d'envoyer des renforts à la garnison de Hong-kong..... 808
943. Sept. 29 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Communicates agreement in principle to send reinforcements for Hong Kong garrison 808
944. 1^{er} oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux*
944. Oct. 1 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for Extern-*

- | | | | |
|---|-----|--|-----|
| <i>Affaires extérieures.</i> Exprime sa gratitude pour l'offre d'envoyer des renforts à Hong-kong..... | 808 | <i>al Affairs.</i> Expresses gratitude for Canadian offer of reinforcements for Hong Kong | 808 |
| 945. 9 oct. <i>Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Fait savoir qu'il serait souhaitable d'envoyer au plus tôt des renforts canadiens à Hong-kong.. | 808 | 945. Oct. 9 <i>Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Communicates desirability of early despatch of Canadian reinforcements for Hong Kong | 808 |
| 946. 10 oct. <i>Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Demande si l'envoi de bataillons à Hong-kong sera à la charge du Canada..... | 809 | 946. Oct. 10 <i>Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Asks if Canada will assume financial responsibility for battalions sent to Hong Kong | 809 |
| 947. 28 oct. <i>Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Fait part des mesures envisagées pour régir les relations entre les forces du Canada et les autres à Hong-kong..... | 809 | 947. Oct. 28 <i>Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Communicates proposed procedure for regulating relations between Canadian and other forces in Hong Kong | 809 |
| 948. 30 oct. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.</i> Indique les mesures prises pour régir les relations entre les forces du Canada et les autres à Hong-kong..... | 810 | 948. Oct. 30 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.</i> Communicates action taken to regulate relations between Canadian and other forces in Hong Kong | 810 |
| 949. 7 nov. <i>Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.</i> Communique les dispositions envisagées pour annoncer l'arrivée des unités canadiennes à Hong-kong..... | 810 | 949. Nov. 7 <i>Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.</i> Communicates proposed arrangements for announcing arrival of Canadian units in Hong Kong | 810 |
| 950. 7 nov. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.</i> Le prie d'obtenir l'assentiment au projet de communiqué concernant l'arrivée des unités canadiennes à Hong-kong..... | 811 | 950. Nov. 7 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.</i> Sends instructions to request concurrence in proposed communiqué on arrival of Canadian units in Hong Kong | 811 |
| 951. 11 nov. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.</i> Demande qu'on approuve le texte révisé du projet de communiqué touchant l'arrivée des unités canadiennes à Hong-kong..... | 812 | 951. Nov. 11 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.</i> Requests approval of revised text of proposed communiqué on arrival of Canadian units in Hong Kong | 812 |
| 952. 12 nov. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.</i> Transmet un autre texte révisé du projet de communiqué concernant l'arrivée des unités canadiennes à Hong-kong..... | 813 | 952. Nov. 12 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.</i> Communicates further revision of proposed communiqué on arrival of Canadian units in Hong Kong | 813 |

953. 13 nov. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Approuve le communiqué concernant l'arrivée des unités canadiennes à Hong-kong et fait des suggestions touchant sa publication..... 813
954. 15 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Demande le texte de la dépêche britannique au sujet de la participation canadienne à la défense de l'Extrême-Orient..... 813
955. 16 nov. *L'Officier général commandant, Hong-kong, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce en code l'arrivée des forces canadiennes à Hong-kong..... 814
956. 16 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le texte de la dépêche britannique concernant la participation canadienne à la défense de l'Extrême-Orient..... 814
957. 28 nov. *Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* S'enquiert de la répartition des charges financières concernant les forces canadiennes à Hong-kong..... 815
958. 2 déc. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne.* Envoie une réponse provisoire concernant les obligations financières à assumer pour les forces canadiennes à Hong-kong..... 815
953. Nov. 13 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Concurs in communiqué on arrival of Canadian units in Hong Kong and suggests publication arrangements 813
954. Nov. 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Requests text of British press report concerning Canadian participation in Far Eastern defence 813
955. Nov. 16 *General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits pre-arranged code word announcing arrival of Canadian forces in Hong Kong 814
956. Nov. 16 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates text of British press report concerning Canadian participation in Far Eastern defence 814
957. Nov. 28 *Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Enquires concerning financial responsibility for Canadian forces in Hong Kong 815
958. Dec. 2 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Sends interim reply concerning financial responsibility for Canadian forces in Hong Kong 815

ANTILLES

1940

959. 6 mai. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande de la part de Londres si des troupes canadiennes pourraient tenir garnison à la Jamaïque..... 816
960. 10 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Signale que le gouvernement néerlandais accepte qu'une petite force de sécurité soit envoyée à Curaçao et qu'on apprécierait la coopération des États-Unis..... 816

WEST INDIES

1940

959. May 6 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates British enquiry concerning possibility of Canadian troops assuming garrison duty in Jamaica 816
960. May 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates agreement of Netherlands Government that small security force be despatched to Curaçao and that United States co-operation be sought 816

961. 10 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* S'enquiert officiellement si le Canada est d'accord à fournir un bataillon pour tenir garnison à la Jamaïque..... 817

962. 11 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Transmet un message pour le premier ministre britannique confirmant la décision d'envoyer des troupes canadiennes à la Jamaïque..... 817

963. 11 mai *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Souligne que le Canada doit s'intéresser aux répercussions que la décision britannique d'envoyer des forces de sécurité à Curaçao pourrait produire aux États-Unis et en Amérique latine..... 818

964. 13 mai *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message de gratitude du premier ministre britannique pour l'offre d'envoyer des forces à la Jamaïque..... 818

965. 13 mai *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Note que la réaction des États-Unis à l'envoi de troupes britanniques à Curaçao pourrait influer sur le mouvement des troupes canadiennes destinées à la Jamaïque 819

966. 2 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Le prie de s'occuper de l'application des dispositions du décret du Conseil, définissant les relations entre les forces servant aux Antilles et aux Bermudes..... 819

967. 17 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Demande au Canada de relever au besoin la garnison française d'Aruba... 820

968. 20 juin *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Demande si le Canada pourrait envoyer des troupes de la Jamaïque à Aruba..... 821

961. May 10 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Enquires officially whether Canada will agree to provide battalion for garrison duty in Jamaica 817

962. May 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits message for British Prime Minister confirming decision to despatch Canadian troops to Jamaica 817

963. May 11 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Notes Canadian interest in possible effect in United States and Latin America of British decision to send security forces to Curaçao 818

964. May 13 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates message from British Prime Minister expressing gratitude for offer to despatch Canadian forces to Jamaica 818

965. May 13 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Notes possible effect on movement of Canadian troops to Jamaica of United States reaction to despatch of British troops to Curaçao 819

966. June 2 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Sends instructions to see that action is taken to give effect to provisions of Order in Council establishing relationship between forces serving in West Indies and Bermuda 819

967. June 17 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Requests that Canada undertake to relieve French garrison in Aruba if necessary 820

968. June 20 *High Commission of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Enquires concerning possible despatch of Canadian troops from Jamaica to Aruba 821

969. 22 juin *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. S'enquiert du danger appréhendé à Aruba et si l'on a discuté la situation avec les États-Unis..... 822
970. 25 juin *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. Demande si l'on a reçu un rapport attendu sur l'attitude et la fidélité de la garnison française d'Aruba..... 822
971. 26 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique les réponses au sujet d'Aruba et espère qu'en cas d'urgence on pourrait transférer des troupes sans consulter le Canada à nouveau..... 822
972. 27 juin *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. Annonce que le Canada accepte de fournir des troupes pour Aruba, s'il y a lieu.... 824
973. 27 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis*. Le charge d'expliquer au secrétaire d'État pourquoi la garnison d'Aruba sera renforcée, au besoin..... 824
974. 28 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique le jugement britannique sur l'attitude de l'amiral français à la Martinique et les dispositions prises pour connaître la situation de la garnison française d'Aruba..... 825
975. 29 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Exprime sa gratitude pour la décision relative à la garnison d'Aruba..... 826
976. 29 juin *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. Espère qu'on n'enverra pas de troupes canadiennes de la Jamaïque à Aruba sans en avertir d'abord le gouvernement canadien..... 826
969. June 22 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Enquires concerning danger apprehended in Aruba and whether situation has been discussed with United States 822
970. June 25 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Enquires concerning anticipated report on attitude and reliability of French garrison on Aruba 822
971. June 26 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates replies to enquiries about Aruba and expresses hope that in an emergency troops might be transferred without further reference to Canada 822
972. June 27 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Communicates agreement to supply troops for Aruba if necessary 824
973. June 27 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in United States*. Requests that background of decision to reinforce garrison on Aruba if necessary be explained to Secretary of State 824
974. June 28 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates British assessment of attitude of French admiral at Martinique and arrangements to procure information about French garrison on Aruba 825
975. June 29 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Expresses gratitude for Canadian response concerning garrison for Aruba 826
976. June 29 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Expresses hope that Canadian troops would not be despatched from Jamaica to Aruba without further reference to Canadian Government 826

977. 29 juin *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Indique la réaction probable du secrétaire d'État à l'affectation éventuelle de troupes canadiennes à Aruba..... 827
978. 2 juill. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Remercie le gouvernement canadien de consentir à dépêcher des troupes à Aruba et rend compte de la situation des forces françaises aux Antilles..... 827
979. 3 juill. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale que les Français vont se retirer d'Aruba et demande que les troupes canadiennes à la Jamaïque soient, au besoin, envoyées à Aruba sans autre consultation 828
980. 5 juill. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. Indique que le gouvernement accepte l'envoi éventuel de troupes canadiennes à Aruba et le sens probable de la réponse du département d'État des États-Unis à l'aide-mémoire canadien..... 828
981. 6 juill. *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce qu'il a reçu du département d'État un aide-mémoire en réponse à la communication canadienne touchant l'envoi possible de troupes à Aruba..... 829
982. 6 juill. *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique le texte de l'aide-mémoire reçu du département d'État et décrit l'attitude des États-Unis au sujet de la tournure des événements à Aruba et Curaçao..... 830
983. 8 juill. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique les projets envisagés pour assurer la sécurité d'Aruba dès le départ de la garnison française..... 831
984. 12 juill. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Exprime sa gratitude pour la décision du Canada
977. June 29 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports probable reaction of Secretary of State to possible despatch of Canadian troops to Aruba 827
978. July 2 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates appreciation for Canadian willingness to send troops to Aruba and reports on situation with respect to French forces in West Indies 827
979. July 3 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. States that French are to withdraw from Aruba and requests that Canadian troops in Jamaica be despatched to Aruba if necessary without further reference to Ottawa 828
980. July 5 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Communicates agreement to possible despatch of Canadian troops to Aruba and indicates probable reply of United States Department of State to Canadian aide-mémoire 828
981. July 6 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports receipt of aide-mémoire from Department of State in response to Canadian communication about possible despatch of troops to Aruba 829
982. July 6 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates text of aide-mémoire from Department of State and United States attitude towards developments in in Aruba and Curaçao 830
983. July 8 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates plans to ensure security of Aruba on departure of French garrison 831
984. July 12 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Expresses gratitude for Cana-

- d'envoyer des troupes à Aruba en cas de besoin, et s'attend à un rapport pertinent du commandant britannique..... 831
985. 13 juill. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rend compte des discussions entre l'ambassadeur britannique aux États-Unis et le secrétaire d'État au sujet d'Aruba..... 832
986. 7 août *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part du projet de déplacer des troupes canadiennes de la Jamaïque à Aruba.... 833
987. 10 août *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Explique que les troupes basées à la Jamaïque ne conviennent pas au service à Aruba et demande qu'on considère une autre solution..... 834
988. 18 août *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Espère que le gouvernement canadien va se rallier au projet original d'envoyer des troupes à Aruba..... 835
989. 19 août *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Demande si les États-Unis s'opposeraient à ce que des troupes britanniques tiennent garnison à Aruba 836
990. 21 août *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait connaître l'attitude du département d'État au sujet de l'envoi de troupes britanniques à Aruba..... 837
991. 21 août *Le ministre aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Croit qu'il serait politiquement avantageux que ce soit le Canada qui tienne garnison dans des îles de l'hémisphère occidental..... 837
992. 26 août *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Signale que Londres s'engage à fournir des troupes pour Aruba, et est disposé à considérer l'envoi de garnisons canadiennes aux îles de l'hémisphère occidental..... 838
- dian decision to send troops to Aruba if necessary and anticipates a report from British commander on the need therefor 831
985. July 13 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports discussions of British Ambassador in United States with Secretary of State concerning Aruba 832
986. Aug. 7 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates proposal for transfer of Canadian troops in Jamaica to Aruba 833
987. Aug. 10 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Explains unsuitability of Jamaica-based force for service in Aruba and requests consideration of alternative proposal 834
988. Aug. 18 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Expresses hope that Canadian Government will adhere to original plan to send troops to Aruba 835
989. Aug. 19 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Enquires whether United States has any objection to British troops garrisoning Aruba 836
990. Aug. 21 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports attitude of Department of State to despatch of British troops to Aruba 837
991. Aug. 21 *Minister in United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Suggests advantages of arranging that Canada should garrison islands in Western Hemisphere 837
992. Aug. 26 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Communicates British undertaking to furnish troops for Aruba and undertakes to consider garrisoning by Canada of islands in Western Hemisphere 838

PARTIE 2

COOPÉRATION NAVALE

1939

993. 15 sept. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Envoie le mémorandum exposant les mesures prises en matière de coopération navale de la part du Canada..... 838

994. 30 oct. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* S'enquiert de la possibilité de fournir une liste révisée des installations dont aurait besoin l'aéronavale britannique à Halifax..... 840

995. 17 nov. *Décret du Conseil.* Enjoint la Marine royale du Canada de coopérer avec la Marine royale et toutes les autres forces navales de Sa Majesté.. 842

996. 24 nov. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Communique la réponse du ministère de la Défense nationale au sujet des installations requises par l'aéronavale..... 842

997. 25 nov. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande qu'on étudie d'urgence la question d'installer dans le port d'Halifax un champ de mines télécommandé..... 843

998. 2 déc. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Demande des conseils et des renseignements techniques sur le genre de champ de mines télécommandé qui conviendrait au port d'Halifax..... 844

999. 23 déc. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande qu'on étudie l'installation d'un appareil de détection anti-sous-marine (asdic) pour défendre le port d'Halifax.. 844

1940

1000. 13 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que

PART 2

NAVAL CO-OPERATION

1939

993. Sept. 15 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Forwards memorandum setting forth action taken by Canada on matters in which naval co-operation had been requested 838

994. Oct. 30 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Enquires about possibility of providing amended list of Fleet Air Arm requirements at Halifax 840

995. Nov. 17 *Order in Council.* Orders fullest co-operation of Royal Canadian Navy with Royal Navy and all other Naval forces of His Majesty 842

996. Nov. 24 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates reply of Department of National Defence to request for facilities to be used by Fleet Air Arm 842

997. Nov. 25 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests urgent consideration of question of providing controlled minefield at Halifax 843

998. Dec. 2 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Requests technical advice and information concerning controlled minefield suitable for Halifax Harbour 844

999. Dec. 23 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests consideration of installation of harbour defence asdic at Halifax 844

1940

1000. May 13 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Com-

- Londres accepte l'offre de deux destroyers pour service dans les Antilles..... 845
1001. 23 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique une demande en vue d'obtenir des destroyers canadiens pour appuyer les destroyers britanniques dans les eaux territoriales..... 845
1002. 24 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Annonce que le Canada accepte d'envoyer des destroyers pour appuyer les destroyers britanniques dans les eaux territoriales et suggère des moyens de protéger la côte est du Canada..... 846
1003. 25 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Exprime la gratitude de Grande-Bretagne pour l'assistance navale du Canada et communique un plan pour protéger la côte est du Canada..... 846
1004. 25 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Transmet les regrets de la Marine royale du Canada qui ne peut fournir les obus brisants demandés..... 847
1005. 15 juill. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique la demande urgente de l'Amirauté au sujet de la livraison de dragueurs de mines en voie de construction au Canada..... 847
1006. 26 juill. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne.* Annonce que le Canada refuse de transférer à la Grande-Bretagne les dragueurs de mines dont on doit entreprendre la construction, mais offre de les prêter, avec leur équipage, une fois achevé le programme de construction navale..... 848
1007. 24 sept. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que l'Amirauté demande à nouveau de pouvoir prendre possession des dragueurs de mines avant la fin de 1941..... 849
- Communicates British acceptance of offer of two destroyers for service in West Indies 845
1001. May 23 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates request for Canadian destroyers to reinforce British destroyers in home waters 845
1002. May 24 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates agreement to despatch Canadian destroyers to reinforce British destroyers in home waters and makes suggestion for protection of Canadian East Coast. 846
1003. May 25 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates British gratitude for Canadian naval assistance and plan to provide protection of Canadian East Coast 846
1004. May 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates regret of Royal Canadian Navy at inability to supply high explosive shells requested 847
1005. July 15 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates urgent enquiry concerning delivery to Admiralty of minesweepers from Canadian construction programme 847
1006. July 26 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission of Great Britain.* Communicates refusal to release minesweepers from Canadian construction programme but makes alternative offer to lend ships and crews when programme completed .. 848
1007. Sept. 24 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates renewed Admiralty request for minesweepers for delivery before end of 1941 849

1008. 9 oct. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Communique de nouveaux renseignements sur la possibilité de construire des dragueurs de mines pour l'Amirauté et des propositions concernant le prêt de dragueurs de mines canadiens..... 850

1009. 16 oct. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet la réponse de l'Amirauté qui accepte l'offre canadienne de construire des dragueurs de mines..... 851

1010. 19 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Informe le premier ministre britannique que le Canada propose de construire des navires plus puissants..... 851

1011. 18 déc. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Explique la difficulté pour la Grande-Bretagne de fournir de la machinerie et des experts, et suggère au Canada de construire des destroyers selon des modèles américains 852

1012. 29 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Explique pourquoi la Marine canadienne préfère construire des destroyers conformes au modèle britannique mais accepte la proposition d'examiner une version modifiée d'un modèle américain..... 853

1941

1013. 7 juill. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet les recommandations de l'Amirauté concernant la façon d'utiliser les dragueurs de mines dans les eaux nord-américaines et territoriales..... 853

1014. 24 juill. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne.* Communique le calendrier des livraisons des dragueurs de mines à l'Amirauté..... 854

1008. Oct. 9 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates revised information on possibility of building minesweepers for Admiralty and elaborates proposal for loan of Canadian minesweepers 850

1009. Oct. 16 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates Admiralty's acceptance of Canadian offer to build minesweepers 851

1010. Nov. 19 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Communicates to British Prime Minister proposal for construction of larger vessels in Canada 851

1011. Dec. 18 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Explains difficulty of sparing apparatus and experts from Britain and suggests that Canada build destroyers to United States design 852

1012. Dec. 29 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Explains why Canadian Naval Staff favours building destroyers to British design but offers to consider a modified United States design 853

1941

1013. July 7 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates Admiralty recommendations for disposition of minesweepers in North American and home waters 853

1014. July 24 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission of Great Britain.* Communicates dates for delivery of minesweepers to Admiralty.... 854

PARTIE 3
COOPÉRATION AÉRIENNE

1939

1015. 12 sept. *Le Premier ministre au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Fait part de possibilités de coopération immédiate en matière aérienne..... 855
1016. 18 sept. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Propose que le Canada affecte un escadron de reconnaissance générale à la Jamaïque et suggère les moyens de le faire..... 856
1017. 29 sept. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Explique pourquoi on ne peut affecter un escadron de reconnaissance à la Jamaïque à moins que la Grande-Bretagne ne fournisse des hydravions à coque..... 857
1018. 29 sept. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Signale que le Conseil de l'Air désire qu'on forme bientôt un escadron de l'A.R.C. outre-mer..... 859
1019. 30 sept. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Fait savoir qu'on étudiera le projet de former un escadron de l'A.R.C. outre-mer en même temps que le Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth..... 860
1020. 14 oct. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Présente l'opinion du ministère de la Défense nationale sur la formation d'un escadron de l'A.R.C. outre-mer..... 860
1021. 27 oct. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part de la suggestion de former un escadron de chasse canadien au sein de l'A.R.C... 862
1022. 14 nov. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut*

PART 3
AIR CO-OPERATION

1939

1015. Sept. 12 *Prime Minister to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Suggests immediate possibilities in air co-operation 855
1016. Sept. 18 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Proposes that Canada assign general reconnaissance squadron to Jamaica and suggests means of implementation 856
1017. Sept. 29 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Explains impossibility of assigning requested reconnaissance squadron to Jamaica unless flying boats supplied by Britain 857
1018. Sept. 29 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates desire of Air Council for early formation of R.C.A.F. squadron overseas 859
1019. Sept. 30 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Suggests that formation of R.C.A.F. squadron overseas can be considered simultaneously with proposed Commonwealth Air Training Plan 860
1020. Oct. 14 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates views of Department of National Defence on formation of R.C.A.F. Squadron overseas 860
1021. Oct. 27 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates suggestion that fighter squadron of Canadian personnel be formed within R.A.F. 862
1022. Nov. 14 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to*

<i>commissaire de Grande-Bretagne. Annonce que le ministère de la Défense nationale approuve le projet de former un escadron de chasse canadien au sein de la R.A.F.</i>	863	<i>High Commissioner of Great Britain. Communicates agreement of Department of National Defence to formation of Canadian fighter squadron within R.A.F.</i>	863
1023. 28 nov. <i>Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Fait part au chef de l'état-major de l'Air que le Canada pourrait fournir un escadron de coopération avec l'armée qui servirait avec les forces canadiennes.</i>	863	1023. Nov. 28 <i>High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Communicates to Chief of Air Staff suggestion that Canada might provide Army Co-operation Squadron for service with Canadian forces</i> ..	863
1024. 28 nov. <i>Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Porte sur le remplacement des pertes en hommes et du numérotage de l'escadron canadien au sein de la R.A.F.</i>	864	1024. Nov. 28 <i>High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Discusses replacement of wastage and numbering of Canadian squadron within R.A.F.</i>	864
1025. 11 déc. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne. Fait part du projet d'envoyer un escadron de l'A.R.C. qu'on emploierait, autant que possible, avec la 1^{re} Division canadienne</i>	865	1025. Dec. 11 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain. Communicates proposal for despatch of R.C.A.F. squadron to be employed, if possible, with First Canadian Division</i>	865
1026. 20 déc. <i>Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne. Partage l'avis du ministère de l'Air concernant le numérotage et les effectifs de l'escadron canadien au sein de la R.A.F.</i>	865	1026. Dec. 20 <i>Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain. Concurs in Air Ministry suggestions concerning numbering and manning of Canadian squadron within R.A.F.</i>	865
1940		1940	
1027. 8 janv. <i>Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne. Communique les mesures proposées pour partager les frais de service outre-mer de l'escadron de coopération avec l'armée.</i>	866	1027. Jan. 8 <i>Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain. Communicates arrangements proposed for dividing costs in connection with overseas service of Army Co-operation Squadron</i>	866
1028. 18 janv. <i>Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Rapporte que les Britanniques s'attendaient à ce que ce soit le Canada qui assume les dépenses et demande plus ample information.</i>	866	1028. Jan. 18 <i>High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Reports British had expected Canada to meet expenses and asks for more information</i>	866
1029. 22 janv. <i>Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Demande qu'on étudie la possibilité de fournir des avions de reconnaissance canadiens qui serviraient aux Antilles.</i>	867	1029. Jan. 22 <i>High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Requests consideration of possibility of releasing Canadian reconnaissance aircraft for duties in Caribbean</i>	867

1030. [12] févr. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Expose les vues canadiennes concernant la prise en charge par la Grande-Bretagne du financement de l'escadron de coopération avec l'armée..... 868
1031. 13 févr. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte un entretien officieux avec les autorités britanniques au sujet du financement de l'escadron de coopération avec l'armée..... 869
1032. 19 mars *Le sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. Explique pourquoi les avions canadiens ne peuvent faire de la reconnaissance aux Antilles..... 869
1033. 26 mars *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Expose l'avis britannique sur le financement de l'escadron de coopération avec l'armée et demande sur quel principe se fonde l'opinion canadienne..... 870
1034. 4 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Récapitule les discussions avec la mission aérienne britannique au sujet du financement de l'escadron de coopération avec l'armée. 871
1035. 19 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Indique les moyens suggérés par Londres grâce auxquels le Canada pourrait contribuer à la guerre aérienne..... 872
1036. 20 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part du plan d'urgence en vue de placer l'escadron de coopération avec l'armée à la disposition de la R.A.F..... 873
1037. 21 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Approuve le plan d'urgence pour placer l'escadron de coopération avec l'armée à la disposition de la R.A.F..... 874
1030. Feb. [12] *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Communicates Canadian understanding concerning assumption by Great Britain of financial responsibility for Army Co-operation Squadron 868
1031. Feb. 13 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports informal discussion with British authorities on financial responsibility for Army Co-operation Squadron 869
1032. Mar. 19 *Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Explains why Canadian aircraft cannot undertake air reconnaissance duties in Caribbean.... 869
1033. Mar. 26 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports British view of financial responsibility for Army Co-operation Squadron and requests clarification of basis for Canadian understanding 870
1034. May 4 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Recapitulates discussions with British Air Mission on financial responsibility for Army Co-operation Squadron 871
1035. May 19 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates British suggestions of ways in which Canada could provide assistance in the air war 872
1036. May 20 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports emergency plan to place Army Co-operation Squadron at disposal of R.A.F. 873
1037. May 21 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Approves emergency plan to place Army Co-operation Squadron at disposal of R.A.F. 874

1038. 21 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Communique la décision du Canada à la demande de contribuer à la guerre aérienne..... 874

1039. 26 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis.* Le prie d'appuyer la demande britannique auprès des États-Unis concernant l'entraînement de pilotes dans des écoles d'aviation civiles..... 875

1040. 27 mai *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que les instructions ont été exécutées..... 875

1041. 4 juin *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte la réponse américaine à la demande d'entraînement de pilotes aux États-Unis.... 875

1042. 2 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Demande une décision concernant l'acquisition par le Canada d'avions et de matériels provenant de stocks français aux États-Unis..... 876

1043. 11 juill. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Décrit la situation concernant l'affectation des avions opérationnels et des avions d'entraînement disponibles..... 876

1044. 15 juill. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Rapporte un entretien avec le haut commissaire britannique au sujet du projet de transférer au Canada des écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques..... 878

1045. 19 juill. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Traite de considérations relatives au projet de transférer au Canada des écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques..... 879

1046. 20 juill. *Le ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Expose la position canadienne concernant

1038. May 21 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates Canadian decision on requests for assistance in the air war.... 874

1039. May 26 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in United States.* Sends instructions to support British request to United States concerning pilot training at civilian flying schools 875

1040. May 27 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports compliance with instructions 875

1041. June 4 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports United States' response to request concerning pilot training in United States 875

1042. July 2 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Requests decision concerning acquisition by Canada of aircraft and equipment from French stocks in United States 876

1043. July 11 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Outlines situation regarding allocation of available operational and training aircraft 876

1044. July 15 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Reports discussion with British High Commissioner about proposed transfer to Canada of British Air Training Schools 878

1045. July 19 *Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Discusses considerations related to proposed transfer to Canada of British Air Training Schools 879

1046. July 20 *Minister of National Defence for Air to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates Canadian position

- les installations et l'administration des écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques au Canada..... 879
1047. 27 juill. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air.* Communique la décision concernant le transfert et le fonctionnement au Canada des écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques..... 882
1048. 5 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le message du premier ministre britannique expliquant la nécessité de ralentir provisoirement le transfert au Canada des écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques..... 884
1049. 16 sept. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Expose le point de vue britannique au sujet des obligations financières relatives aux escadrons de l'A.R.C. en Grande-Bretagne..... 884
1050. 9 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet la demande du ministre de la Défense nationale pour qu'on l'autorise à accepter la proposition britannique au sujet des obligations financières relatives aux escadrons de l'A.R.C. en Grande-Bretagne..... 885
- 1941
1051. 10 mars *Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Expose les projets concernant le transport transatlantique des avions américains..... 886
1052. 12 mars *Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Expose la décision britannique d'accepter l'offre des États-Unis de fournir des installations d'entraînement aérien..... 887
1053. 25 mars *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne.* Donne son accord à la création d'une base de transport pour la R.A.F..... 888
- concerning facilities for and administration of proposed British Air Training Schools 879
1047. July 27 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Minister of National Defence for Air.* Communicates decision relating to transfer and operation of British Air Training Schools in Canada 882
1048. Sept. 5 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from British Prime Minister explaining need to slow down temporarily transfer to Canada of British Air Training Schools 884
1049. Sept. 16 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates British views concerning financial responsibilities for R.C.A.F. squadrons in Great Britain 884
1050. Dec. 9 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits request from Minister of National Defence for authority to accept British proposal concerning financial responsibility for R.C.A.F. squadrons in Great Britain 885
- 1941
1051. Mar. 10 *Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Outlines proposals concerning arrangements for ferrying United States aircraft across Atlantic 886
1052. Mar. 12 *Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Outlines British position on acceptance of United States offer to provide flying training facilities 887
1053. Mar. 25 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates concurrence in establishment of R.A.F. ferrying station.... 888

1054. 25 mars *Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne*. Insiste pour qu'on reconnaisse au Canada la capacité d'augmenter ses installations d'entraînement malgré le projet de la R.A.F. d'établir des écoles aux États-Unis..... 890
1054. Mar. 25 *Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Urges recognition of Canadian capacity to expand training facilities despite plan to establish R.A.F. training schools in United States 890
1055. 8 avril *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*. Explique pourquoi on accepte les installations d'entraînement aux États-Unis et promet d'utiliser celles du Canada dans toute la mesure du possible..... 891
1055. Apr. 8 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*. Outlines reasons for accepting training facilities in United States and undertakes to utilize Canadian facilities as fully as possible 891
1056. 10 avril *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce qu'on accepte la proposition d'établir une base de transport pour la R.A.F..... 893
1056. Apr. 10 *High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates concurrence in conditions set for R.A.F. ferrying station 893
1057. 19 avril *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande si l'A.R.C. pourrait accueillir le personnel de la R.A.F. à l'aller et au retour des écoles aux États-Unis..... 893
1057. Apr. 19 *High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Asks if R.C.A.F. would provide facilities for R.A.F. personnel in transit to and from schools in United States 893
1058. 28 avril *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*. Annonce qu'on discute avec les États-Unis l'offre d'entraîner des pilotes et donne des précisions sur les écoles de la R.A.F. au Canada..... 895
1058. Apr. 28 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*. Outlines pilot training offer being discussed with United States and details concerning R.A.F. schools in Canada 895
1059. 10 mai *Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne*. L'informe des arrangements pour accueillir le personnel britannique en transit vers les écoles d'entraînement aux États-Unis..... 897
1059. May 10 *Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission of Great Britain*. Communicates plan for accommodation of British personnel in transit to training schools in United States 897
1060. 13 mai *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*. Transmet les remerciements du gouvernement britannique pour la coopération du Canada en matière des projets d'entraînement aérien aux États-Unis et au Canada..... 898
1060. May 13 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*. Communicates gratitude of British Government for Canadian co-operation in air training projects in United States and Canada 898
1061. 2 juin *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique le message du premier ministre britannique demandant qu'on accepte la pro-
1061. June 2 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Transmits message from British Prime Minister requesting acceptance of United States

- position des États-Unis en vue d'améliorer le transport transatlantique par air..... 898
1062. 3 juin *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande son accord au projet de transférer au Canada des unités additionnelles de la R.A.F..... 900
1063. 9 juin *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce la nomination d'un commandant en chef du *Atlantic Ferry Command* et son projet de voyage à Terre-Neuve, au Canada et aux États-Unis..... 901
1064. 14 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique au ministre des Finances un message du ministre de la Défense nationale acceptant en principe les projets de financement des écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques au Canada..... 902
1065. 20 juill. *Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande qu'on accepte les dispositions en vue d'établir le *Ferry Command* de la R.A.F..... 903
1066. 28 juill. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne*. Fait savoir qu'on accepte les dispositions proposées en vue d'établir le *Ferry Command* de la R.A.F..... 904
1067. 11 août *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. Annonce qu'on approuve en principe le transfert au Canada d'écoles additionnelles d'entraînement de la R.A.F..... 904
1068. 6 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande que le Canada fournisse des avions et prête des unités au *Coastal Command* de la R.A.F..... 905
- proposal designed to improve Atlantic air ferry 898
1062. June 3 *High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests concurrence in proposed transfer to Canada of additional R.A.F. units 900
1063. June 9 *High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Announces appointment of Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Ferry Command and his proposed trip to Newfoundland, Canada and United States 901
1064. July 14 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates message from Minister of National Defence for Air to Minister of Finance conveying British acceptance in principle of proposals for financing British Air Training Schools in Canada 902
1065. July 20 *Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests acceptance of proposed arrangements for establishment of R.A.F. Ferry Command 903
1066. July 28 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Communicates acceptance of proposed arrangements for R.A.F. Ferry Command 904
1067. Aug. 11 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Communicates approval in principle of transfer to Canada of additional R.A.F. Training Schools 904
1068. Sept. 6 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests that Canada supply aircraft and land units to R.A.F. Coastal Command 905

1069. 18 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Fait part de projets en vue de fournir des hydravions à coque dans la guerre aux sous-marins..... 906

PARTIE 4
LE RADAR

1940

1070. 10 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Transmet un mémorandum décrivant les avantages de perfectionner le radar en collaboration avec les États-Unis..... 907

1071. 26 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Lui demande son assistance pour obtenir le personnel civil qualifié en matière de radar..... 908

1072. 5 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Demande combien d'experts en radiotélégraphie sont requis pour les services de radar en Grande-Bretagne..... 909

1073. 22 juill. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Indique combien d'experts en radiotélégraphie sont requis en Grande-Bretagne pour les services de radar..... 909

1074. 4 oct. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Indique le nombre de techniciens en T.S.F. requis pour l'entretien et le fonctionnement de l'équipement de radar et dit que la R.A.F. absorbera l'effectif en excédent..... 910

1075. 16 oct. *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Suggère que des officiers de transmissions des Dominions soient formés en Grande-Bretagne en vue d'agir en qualité d'instructeurs de radar dans les pays du Commonwealth..... 911

1069. Sept. 18 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Communicates arrangements for supplying flying boats for war on submarines 906

PART 4
RADAR

1940

1070. June 10 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Forwards memorandum outlining advantages of developing radar in collaboration with United States 907

1071. June 26 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests assistance in providing qualified civilian personnel for radar development 908

1072. July 5 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Enquires about numbers of wireless experts required for radar work in Great Britain 909

1073. July 22 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States British requirements for wireless experts in radar work 909

1074. Oct. 4 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States requirements for wireless mechanics to maintain and operate radar equipment and undertakes to absorb in R.A.F. those surplus to Canadian requirements 910

1075. Oct. 16 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Suggests training in Britain of signals officers from the Dominions to serve as radar instructors in Commonwealth countries 911

1076. 21 nov. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Annonce que l'on accepte l'offre britannique d'entraîner des officiers de transmissions à l'usage du radar..... 912
- 1941
1077. 6 janv. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Demande que le Canada recrute aux États-Unis des volontaires qualifiés pour les services de radar outre-mer..... 913
1078. 7 janv. *Le quartier général de l'Armée canadienne au quartier général de la Défense nationale.* Transmet un message du ministre de la Défense nationale visant à sonder l'attitude des États-Unis à l'égard du recrutement de volontaires pour le service des radars.... 915
1079. 8 janv. *Mémoire du conseiller juridique au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Recommande de consulter des autorités américaines avant d'y recruter des radiotechniciens pour service en Grande-Bretagne..... 916
1080. 9 janv. *Le Premier ministre au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* L'informe de la difficulté de recruter des volontaires américains pour le service des radars mais offre de coopérer dans la mesure du possible..... 916
1081. 13 janv. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre.* Explique pourquoi on demande l'aide du Canada pour recruter aux États-Unis des techniciens en radar 918
1082. 6 févr. *Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Insiste pour que le Canada commence à recruter aux États-Unis des techniciens en radar pour service en Grande-Bretagne..... 919
1083. 10 févr. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires exté-*
1076. Nov. 21 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates acceptance of British offer to train signals officers in use of radar 912
- 1941
1077. Jan. 6 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Requests that Canada enlist qualified United States volunteers for radar work overseas 913
1078. Jan. 7 *Canadian Military Headquarters to National Defence Headquarters.* Transmits message from Minister of National Defence suggesting importance of learning United States attitude toward enlistment of volunteers for radar work 915
1079. Jan. 8 *Memorandum from Legal Adviser to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Suggests that United States attitude on recruiting radio personnel for service in Great Britain be clarified prior to beginning a recruiting campaign 916
1080. Jan. 9 *Prime Minister to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Discusses difficulties in way of recruitment of United States volunteers for radar work but offers all feasible co-operation 916
1081. Jan 13. *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister.* Explains decision to seek Canadian assistance in recruiting United States personnel for radar work 918
1082. Feb. 6 *Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Urges decision on request that Canada undertake recruiting in United States of personnel for radar work in Great Britain 919
1083. Feb. 10 *Acting Under-Secretary of State for External*

rieures au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne. Fait part des restrictions qui empêchent de recruter ouvertement aux États-Unis mais suggère d'autres moyens..... 920

1084. 14 févr. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Décrit les mesures prises par les autorités britanniques afin que des étudiants universitaires soient formés pour les services de radar militaires et suggère un programme semblable pour le Canada.....* 921

1085. 20 févr. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne. Indique des projets en vue de recruter des techniciens en radar au Canada et aux États-Unis..* 922

1086. 6 mars *Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures. Fournit des renseignements précis sur le nombre de recrues requises pour les services de radar.....* 924

1087. 15 mars *Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne. Communique la décision et les mesures financières prises au sujet du recrutement des techniciens requis pour les services de radar en Grande-Bretagne.....* 925

1088. 17 mars *Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures. Suggère que le personnel recruté pour le service des radars soit en majeure partie affecté à l'A.R.C.....* 927

1089. 19 mars *Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures. Annonce que Londres accepte les dispositions financières relatives au recrutement au Canada et aux États-Unis de techniciens en radar.....* 928

1090. 24 mars *Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux*

Affairs to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain. States limitations which prevent direct recruiting in United States but suggests alternative possibilities 920

1084. Feb. 14 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Describes British arrangements to qualify university students for radar work in armed forces and communicates suggestion for similar programme in Canada.....* 921

1085. Feb. 20 *Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain. Communicates plans for securing additional radar personnel from Canada and United States* 922

1086. Mar. 6 *Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Supplies detailed requirements for personnel to be recruited for radar work* 924

1087. Mar. 15 *Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain. Communicates decision concerning recruiting of personnel for radar work in Great Britain and financial aspects of project* 925

1088. Mar. 17 *Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Suggests that recruits for radar work be enlisted for most part in R.C.A.F.* 927

1089. Mar. 19 *Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Communicates British acceptance of financial arrangements for recruiting radar personnel from Canada and United States* 928

1090. Mar. 24 *Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for*

- Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que Londres désire utiliser à ses fins l'école de radar au Canada et participer à son entretien..... 928
1091. 18 avril *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Propose que soit établi aux États-Unis un corps de techniciens civils pour outre-mer au lieu du projet abandonné à cause de raisons juridiques..... 929
1092. 22 avril *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce que le Cabinet approuve le projet de recruter un Corps de techniciens civils pour outre-mer et demande la coopération du Canada..... 932
1093. 29 avril *Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne.* Fait part des décisions prises concernant le niveau de la participation du Canada au recrutement pour le Corps de techniciens civils pour outre-mer..... 933
1094. 2 mai *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique la décision de recruter des ouvriers qualifiés ainsi que des mécaniciens et suggère d'adopter des règlements spéciaux en vue de régir la discipline du Corps durant son séjour au Canada..... 934
1095. 27 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Propose de mettre à la disposition de l'Armée et de la Marine américaines les installations de l'école de la R.A.F. au Canada pour instruction en matière de radar..... 935
1096. 5 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Annonce qu'on accepte en principe de former du personnel américain à l'école de radar de la R.A.F..... 937
- External Affairs.* Communicates British desire to co-operate in use and maintenance of radar training school in Canada 928
1091. Apr. 18 *High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Outlines proposal to establish Overseas Civilian Technical Corps in United States as alternative to scheme now abandoned on legal grounds 929
1092. Apr. 22 *High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates Cabinet approval of scheme to recruit Overseas Civilian Technical Corps and requests Canadian co-operation 932
1093. Apr. 29 *Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission of Great Britain.* Communicates decisions reached on degree to which Canada can assist in recruitment for Overseas Civilian Technical Corps 933
1094. May 2 *High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates decision to recruit craftsmen as well as mechanics and suggests special regulations for discipline of corps 934
1095. June 27 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Proposes to offer facilities at R.A.F. radar training school in Canada to United States Army and Navy Departments 935
1096. July 5 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates approval in principle of proposal to train United States personnel at R.A.F. radar training school 937

1097. 17 nov. *Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande qu'on accepte d'augmenter l'effectif qui suit dans des universités canadiennes des cours préparatoires en radiotechnique..... 937

1098. 25 nov. *Mémoire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Expose la proposition britannique d'augmenter les admissions aux cours universitaires en radiotechnique..... 938

1097. Nov. 17 *Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests approval of proposed increase in intake of pupils for preliminary training as radio mechanics at Canadian universities 937

1098. Nov. 25 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Outlines British proposal to increase intake of radio pupils for university courses 938

PARTIE 5

PART 5

DÉFENSE DE L'AMÉRIQUE DU NORD

DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA

1941

1941

1099. 2 mars *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Transmet au premier ministre britannique un message sur la défense de l'est du Canada et recommande de renforcer certaines installations..... 939

1099. Mar. 2 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits message for British Prime Minister on defence position in Eastern Canada and suggests need for strengthening inadequate defences 939

1100. 2 mars *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Transmet au premier ministre britannique l'évaluation faite par les chefs d'état-major de la défense du pays..... 941

1100. Mar. 2 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits to British Prime Minister appreciation by Chiefs of Staff of home defence position 941

1101. 24 mars *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message du premier ministre britannique sur les dispositions existantes en vue de maintenir tout le trafic transatlantique.. 943

1101. Mar. 24 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from British Prime Minister explaining present dispositions aimed at maintaining all-important trans-Atlantic traffic 943

1102. 24 mars *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique un exposé du premier ministre britannique sur la défense nécessaire au Canada dans la conjoncture actuelle..... 943

1102. Mar. 24 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Prime Minister commenting on Canada's defence needs in light of actual war situation 943

1103. 10 avril *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Transmet au premier ministre britannique les vues des chefs d'état-major sur l'évaluation militaire britannique et décrit les mesures adoptées pour défendre la côte canadienne contre les sous-marins..... 945

1103. Apr. 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Transmits message for British Prime Minister conveying views of Chiefs of Staff on British military assessment and describing anti-submarine measures undertaken near Canadian coast 945

CHAPITRE VI

LE PROBLÈME DU GROENLAND

PARTIE I

LA CRYOLITHE:
DÉFENSE DU GROENLAND

1940

1104. 9 avril *L' « Aluminum Company of Canada » au ministère des Affaires extérieures.* Le prie de voir sans retard à protéger les mines de cryolithe au Groenland et à en assurer la production pour les Alliés..... 947
1105. 9 avril *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions.* Indique que l'ennemi pourrait nuire à l'approvisionnement en cryolithe des Alliés..... 948
1106. 10 avril *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Traite du statut politique et économique du Groenland ainsi que de la question de son occupation par les Alliés en vue d'empêcher une attaque allemande..... 948
1107. 11 avril *Mémoire du conseiller.* Étudie la possibilité de faire occuper le Groenland par un petit effectif canadien..... 950
1108. 12 avril *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Expose les mesures à prendre au cas où l'on déciderait d'intervenir au Groenland..... 953
1109. 12 avril *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte l'entretien avec le Premier ministre au sujet d'une intervention possible au Groenland..... 954
1110. 12 avril *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Demande aux autorités britanniques leur opinion sur la situation au Groenland et leurs plans d'action en Islande et à l'ouest du territoire..... 955
1111. 13 avril *Le ministère de la Défense nationale au ministère des Af-*

CHAPTER VI

THE PROBLEM OF GREENLAND

PART I

CRYOLITE: DEFENCE OF GREENLAND

1940

1104. Apr. 9 *Aluminum Company of Canada to Department of External Affairs.* Urges immediate action to protect cryolite mines in Greenland and ensure production for Allies 947
1105. Apr. 9 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary.* Reports threat of enemy interference with supply of cryolite to Allies 948
1106. Apr. 10 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Discusses political and economic status of Greenland and question of military occupation by Allies to prevent German attack 948
1107. Apr. 11 *Memorandum by Counsellor.* Discusses possible occupation of Greenland by a small Canadian force 950
1108. Apr. 12 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Outlines steps to be considered in event of decision to intervene in Greenland 953
1109. Apr. 12 *Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Records discussion with Prime Minister on possible intervention in Greenland 954
1110. Apr. 12 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Requests appreciation by British authorities of Greenland situation and British plans for action in and west of Iceland 955
1111. Apr. 13 *Department of National Defence to Department of*

- fares extérieures. Communiqué un projet pour occuper le Groenland et défendre les mines de cryolithe.....* 955
- 1112. 13 avril Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Donne la réaction britannique à l'idée d'une intervention possible du Canada au Groenland.....* 957
- 1113. 13 avril Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Transmet un aide-mémoire américain qui laisse croire que le Groenland tombe sous la doctrine Monroe.....* 958
- 1114. 15 avril Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Rapporte l'approbation officielle des Britanniques à l'égard d'une intervention possible du Canada au Groenland.....* 960
- 1115. 15 avril Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis. Le prie de s'assurer de l'opinion des États-Unis à l'égard d'une intervention possible du Canada au Groenland.....* 961
- 1116. 16 avril Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis. Fournit des renseignements sur l'intervention possible du Canada au Groenland.....* 962
- 1117. 16 avril La légation aux États-Unis au département d'État. Traite des dangers auxquels le Groenland est exposé et de l'intervention possible du Canada.....* 962
- 1118. 16 avril Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Fait part de la réaction des États-Unis à l'idée d'une intervention canadienne au Groenland..* 963
- 1119. 17 avril Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne. Fait part de faits nouveaux à Washington relatifs à l'intervention possible du Canada au Groenland.....* 964
- 1120. 18 avril Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux*
- External Affairs. Forwards tentative plan for occupation of Greenland and defence of cryolite mines* 955
- 1112. Apr. 13 High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Reports tentative British reaction to suggestion for possible Canadian intervention in Greenland* 957
- 1113. Apr. 13 Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Forwards United States aide-mémoire implying that Greenland is subject to Monroe Doctrine* 958
- 1114. Apr. 15 High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Reports official British approval of possible Canadian intervention in Greenland* 960
- 1115. Apr. 15 Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States. Sends instructions to ascertain United States view of possible Canadian intervention in Greenland* 961
- 1116. Apr. 16 Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States. Supplies background information on possible Canadian intervention in Greenland* 962
- 1117. Apr. 16 Legation in United States to Department of State. Discusses dangers to which Greenland is exposed and possible Canadian intervention* 962
- 1118. Apr. 16 Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Reports tentative United States reaction to suggestion for Canadian intervention in Greenland* 963
- 1119. Apr. 17 Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain. Communicates developments in Washington concerning possible Canadian intervention in Greenland* 964
- 1120. Apr. 18 Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minis-*

- États-Unis. Le prie de se renseigner sur le rapport concernant l'établissement d'un Comité du Groenland dirigé par le ministre danois aux États-Unis.....* 965
1121. 18 avril *Extrait du mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre. Rapporte l'attitude des États-Unis à l'égard d'une intervention possible du Canada au Groenland et les représentations du Canada suite à la conférence de presse de l'ambassadeur britannique aux États-Unis.....* 966
1122. 19 avril *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Note que selon le ministre aux États-Unis le département d'État s'inquiète de ce que le Japon pourrait faire un lien entre le cas du Groenland et celui des Indes néerlandaises comme des territoires d'occupation.....* 967
1123. 19 avril *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Rapporte que les États-Unis s'opposent à une intervention du Canada au Groenland.....* 967
1124. 21 avril *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne. Demande l'avis de Londres sur l'intervention possible du Canada au Groenland suite à l'attitude adoptée par les États-Unis.....* 969
1125. 23 avril *Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis. Déclare qu'on réexamine la question d'intervention politique et militaire au Groenland.....* 970
1126. 24 avril *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Rapporte que les États-Unis étudient tous les aspects de la question groenlandaise et qu'ils comprennent l'inquiétude particulière du Canada.....* 971
1127. 24 avril *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Résume la situation concernant le Groenland et émet des suggestions relatives à l'attitude du Canada.....* 971
- ter in United States. Sends instructions to make enquiries concerning reported establishment of a Greenland Committee under direction of Danish Minister* 965
1121. Apr. 18 *Extract from Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister. Reports United States attitude to possible Canadian intervention in Greenland and Canadian representations concerning press interview given by British Ambassador in United States* 966
1122. Apr. 19 *Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Records views of Minister in United States on possible United States concern over analogy which might be drawn by Japan between Greenland and Netherlands East Indies as areas of occupation ..* 967
1123. Apr. 19 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Reports United States objection to Canadian intervention in Greenland* 967
1124. Apr. 21 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain. Requests British views on possible Canadian intervention in Greenland in the light of United States attitude..* 969
1125. Apr. 23 *Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States. States that question of possible political and military action in Greenland is being re-examined* 970
1126. Apr. 24 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs. Reports consideration by United States of all aspects of Greenland question and recognition of Canada's special concern* 971
1127. Apr. 24 *Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Summarizes situation concerning Greenland and makes suggestions about Canadian attitude and possible action* 971

1128. 24 avril *Le ministre aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Apporte un complément d'information sur l'attitude des États-Unis au sujet du Groenland.. 974

1129. 26 avril *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte la conversation avec le ministre danois au sujet du Groenland et suggère d'y envoyer un représentant canadien..... 975

1130. 27 avril *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Communique les suggestions faites au Premier ministre en vue d'une décision dans la question groenlandaise..... 977

1131. 27 avril *L' « Aluminum Company of Canada » au ministère des Affaires extérieures.* Le presse d'agir pour assurer l'approvisionnement en cryolithe des Alliés..... 978

1132. 27 avril *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part de l'intention des États-Unis d'envoyer un consul au Groenland et de leur attitude envers la Commission du Groenland.... 979

1133. 29 avril *Le ministre du Danemark aux États-Unis au ministre aux États-Unis.* Indique le rôle et la composition de la Commission américano-danoise du Groenland..... 980

1134. 30 avril *Mémoire du conseiller au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Suggère des mesures en vue de protéger les intérêts canadiens et alliés au Groenland..... 980

1135. 1^{er} mai *Le ministre aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte un autre entretien avec le département d'État au sujet du Groenland..... 982

1136. 2 mai *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Résume l'entretien du Premier ministre avec le président des États-Unis et le secrétaire d'État sur la question du Groenland..... 983

1128. Apr. 24 *Minister in United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Supplements official report on United States attitude to Greenland question 974

1129. Apr. 26 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports conversation on Greenland with Danish Minister and suggests possibility of sending Canadian representative to Greenland 975

1130. Apr. 27 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Conveys suggestions for Prime Minister for action on Greenland question 977

1131. Apr. 27 *Aluminum Company of Canada to Department of External Affairs.* Urges action to ensure supply of cryolite to Allies 978

1132. Apr. 27 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports United States proposal to send Consul to Greenland and attitude towards Greenland Commission 979

1133. Apr. 29 *Minister of Denmark in United States to Minister in United States.* Announces function and membership of American-Danish Greenland Commission 980

1134. Apr. 30 *Memorandum from Counsellor to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Suggests possible action to protect Canadian and allied interests in Greenland 980

1135. May 1 *Minister in United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports further discussion with State Department on Greenland question 982

1136. May 2 *Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Summarizes discussion of Prime Minister with United States President and Secretary of State on Greenland question 983

1137. 2 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique la réponse britannique au sujet de l'intervention possible du Canada au Groenland..... 985
1137. May 2 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports British reply to questions concerning possible Canadian intervention in Greenland 985
1138. 3 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part de la demande de l'officier commandant d'un navire ravitailleur danois pour que l'on protège les mines de cryolithe d'Ivigut 986
1138. May 3 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports request from officer of Danish supply ship for protection of cryolite mine at Ivigut 986
1139. 3 mai *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce qu'une commission d'experts du Danemark se rendra aux États-Unis afin de protéger les intérêts danois au Groenland..... 987
1139. May 3 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Communicates report of decision to send commission of experts from Denmark to United States to take care of Danish interests in Greenland 987
1140. 4 mai *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*. Transmet et commente des télégrammes du haut commissaire à Londres exposant les vues britanniques sur la façon de traiter la question du Groenland..... 987
1140. May 4 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*. Transmits and comments on telegrams from High Commissioner in London giving British views on dealing with question of Greenland 987
1141. 6 mai *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*. Expose la politique qu'on pourrait suivre pour sortir du dilemme posé par les divergences de vues de la Grande-Bretagne et des États-Unis sur le Groenland..... 988
1141. May 6 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*. Outlines possible policy on Greenland to resolve dilemma posed by divergence in views of Great Britain and United States 988
1142. 8 mai *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que les États-Unis entendent nommer un consul au Groenland..... 993
1142. May 8 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports United States plans to appoint Consul in Greenland 993
1143. 9 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*. Demande quelle serait la réaction des États-Unis à l'idée des mesures pour la défense du port d'Ivigut..... 994
1143. May 9 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*. Enquires concerning probable United States reaction to suggestion concerning local defensive measures at Ivigut Harbour 994
1144. 9 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*. Le charge de sonder les États-Unis au sujet des projets canadiens concernant le Groenland, y compris la nomination éventuelle d'un consul..... 994
1144. May 9 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*. Sends instructions to obtain United States views on tentative Canadian plans concerning Greenland, including a possible consular appointment 994

1145. 10 mai *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communiqué les vues des États-Unis et du ministre danois sur les questions de nommer un consul, de défendre la mine d'Iviglut et de répartir la cryolithe..... 996
1146. 10 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Le prie d'informer le gouvernement britannique des derniers faits concernant le Groenland et des mesures proposées par le Canada..... 996
1147. 12 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Résume les discussions avec le gouvernement des États-Unis et le ministre danois au sujet du Groenland..... 998
1148. 13 mai *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet les suggestions du ministre danois concernant la répartition de la cryolithe..... 999
1149. 15 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Signale la réaction britannique à l'attitude des États-Unis à l'égard du Groenland et la nécessité d'agir sans délai en raison de la vulnérabilité des mines de cryolithe.... 999
1150. 15 mai *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce les projets des États-Unis concernant la protection des mines de cryolithe..... 1001
1151. 15 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur, Groenland du Nord*. Fait savoir qu'on désire coopérer avec les autorités groenlandaises pour promouvoir le bien-être des habitants et assurer la commercialisation de la cryolithe..... 1001
1152. 15 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*. Le prie de préparer un entretien pour discuter de tous les aspects de la question de la cryolithe..... 1002
1145. May 10 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports views of United States and Danish Minister on questions of consular appointment, local defence of mine at Ivigtut and distribution of cryolite 996.
1146. May 10 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends instructions to inform British Government about developments concerning Greenland and measures proposed by Canada 996
1147. May 12 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Summarizes discussions with United States Government and Danish Minister on Greenland 998
1148. May 13 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports suggestions of Danish Minister on distribution of cryolite 999
1149. May 15 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports British views on United States attitude concerning Greenland and need for immediate action in view of vulnerability of cryolite mines 999
1150. May 15 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports intentions of United States concerning protection of cryolite mines 1001
1151. May 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor, North Greenland*. Communicates desire to co-operate with Greenland authorities to promote welfare of inhabitants and to ensure marketing of cryolite 1001
1152. May 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*. Sends instructions to arrange for discussions on all aspects of cryolite situation 1002

1153. 15 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*. Le prie d'informer le département d'État et le ministre danois du message envoyé aux autorités groenlandaises leur offrant la coopération du Canada..... 1002
1154. 16 mai *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part de la réaction du département d'État et du ministre danois aux suggestions du Canada à l'égard de la cryolithe, des approvisionnements, de la défense et des communications..... 1003
1155. 17 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*. Expose l'attitude du Canada concernant le «représentant canadien» à la Commission du Groenland..... 1003
1156. 17 mai *Les gouverneurs, Groenland du Nord et du Sud au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Acceptent l'offre de coopération canadienne et décrivent l'état de la production de cryolithe..... 1004
1157. 18 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Le prie d'informer le gouvernement britannique de la responsabilité limitée du Canada au Groenland et de se renseigner sur les projets concernant le *Julius Thomsen*.... 1004
1158. 20 mai *Mémoire du conseiller*. Relate des discussions sur le Groenland avec le département d'État.. 1005
1159. 22 mai *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Envoie le rapport de discussions sur le Groenland tenues à New York et fait part du désir des États-Unis d'être consultés au sujet de la distribution de la cryolithe..... 1007
1160. 22 mai *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Annonce qu'il a informé le gouvernement britannique de la responsabilité du Canada au Groenland et répond aux questions concernant le *Julius Thomsen*..... 1015
1153. May 15 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*. Sends instructions to inform State Department and Danish Minister of message sent to Greenland authorities offering Canadian co-operation 1002
1154. May 16 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports on reaction of State Department and Danish Minister to Canadian suggestions about cryolite situation, relief supplies, defence and communications 1003
1155. May 17 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*. Communicates Canadian attitude concerning "Canadian representative" on Greenland Commission 1003
1156. May 17 *Governors, North and South Greenland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Accept offer of Canadian co-operation and state situation concerning cryolite production 1004
1157. May 18 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends instructions to inform British Government of limit of Canadian responsibility in Greenland and to secure information concerning plans for *Julius Thomsen* 1004
1158. May 20 *Memorandum by Counsellor*. Records discussions on Greenland at State Department 1005
1159. May 22 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Forwards record of discussions on Greenland held in New York and reports United States desire to be consulted regarding distribution of cryolite 1007
1160. May 22 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports having informed British Government of limits of Canadian responsibility in Greenland and replies to questions concerning *Julius Thomsen* 1015

1161. 3 juin *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que les États-Unis s'inquiètent de la présence d'officiers de marine et de la G.R.C. à bord du *Julius Thomsen* et du *Nascopie* 1016

1162. 3 juin *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Rapporte que les États-Unis craignent que le Canada tente d'occuper le Groenland..... 1016

1163. 4 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis*. Fournit une réponse au gouvernement des États-Unis concernant le personnel à bord du *Julius Thomsen* et du *Nascopie*..... 1019

1164. 4 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis*. Le prie de sonder l'ambassade britannique concernant le service de garde à bord du *Julius Thomsen*..... 1020

1165. 5 juin *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part de la réaction des États-Unis aux informations fournies sur le personnel affecté au Groenland..... 1020

1166. 6 juin *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande des renseignements sur les arrangements canado-américains relatifs à la défense du Groenland..... 1020

1167. 12 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. Donne des renseignements sur la défense du Groenland et demande des précisions à propos de la présence possible de navires étrangers dans les eaux septentrionales..... 1021

1168. 13 juin *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. L'assure qu'on en viendra à un accord sur la répartition équitable de la cryolithe afin de protéger les intérêts de la Grande-Bretagne et de la France..... 1022

1161. June 3 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports United States concern over presence of military and R.C.M.P. personnel on board *Julius Thomsen* and *Nascopie* 1016

1162. June 3 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports United States concern that Canada may be attempting to occupy Greenland 1016

1163. June 4 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in United States*. Provides reply to United States Government concerning personnel on *Julius Thomsen* and *Nascopie* 1019

1164. June 4 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in United States*. Sends instructions to approach British Embassy concerning disposition of guard on *Julius Thomsen* 1020

1165. June 5 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports United States reaction to explanations concerning personnel being sent to Greenland 1020

1166. June 6 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests information concerning Canadian-United States arrangements for defence of Greenland 1020

1167. June 12 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Conveys information on defence of Greenland and requests particulars concerning reported presence of foreign vessels in northern waters 1021

1168. June 13 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends assurance that agreement is being worked out for equitable distribution of cryolite production to preserve interests of Great Britain and France 1022

1169. 15 juin *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique les mesures prises pour rassurer les États-Unis au sujet de la coopération de la Grande-Bretagne au plan canado-américain du défense du Groenland..... 1023
1170. 14 juill. *Le consul au Groenland au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Explique pourquoi les autorités du Groenland ont froidement accueilli le projet du Canada d'y établir une mission consulaire..... 1023
1171. 19 juill. *Mémorandum du conseiller*. Relate les discussions tenues à New York par les parties intéressées au Groenland..... 1026
1172. 29 juill. *Mémorandum*. Relate les discussions tenues à Ottawa par les parties intéressées au Groenland..... 1029
1173. 23 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État des États-Unis au ministre aux États-Unis*. Réitère l'opposition des États-Unis à tout changement dans le statut du Groenland..... 1031
- 1941
1174. 23 janv. *Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande si la défense de la mine de cryolithe d'Iviglut est adéquate 1032
1175. 27 janv. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis*. Le prie de s'enquérir des mesures en vue de défendre la mine de cryolithe d'Iviglut..... 1033
1176. 10 avril *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Résume et commente les dispositions de l'accord relatif à la défense du Groenland, signé par le ministre danois et les États-Unis..... 1033
1177. 26 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*. Le prie de suggérer aux États-Unis de voir à consolider la défense d'Iviglut..... 1035
1169. June 15 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports steps taken to reassure United States concerning British co-operation with Canadian-United States action to defend Greenland 1023
1170. July 14 *Consul in Greenland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Outlines reasons for coolness on part of Greenland authorities concerning establishment of Canadian consular mission 1023
1171. July 19 *Memorandum by Counsellor*. Records discussions on Greenland question by interested parties in New York 1026
1172. July 29 *Memorandum*. Records discussions on Greenland question by interested parties in Ottawa 1029
1173. Sept. 23 *Secretary of State of United States to Minister in United States*. Reiterates United States position concerning any change in status of Greenland 1031
- 1941
1174. Jan. 23 *Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests information on adequacy of defences of cryolite mine at Ivigtut 1032
1175. Jan. 27 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in United States*. Sends instructions to enquire about measures for defence of cryolite mine at Ivigtut 1033
1176. Apr. 10 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Summarizes and comments on provisions of agreement relating to the defence of Greenland signed by Danish Minister and United States 1033
1177. May 26 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*. Sends instructions to suggest immediate strengthening of defences at Ivigtut 1035

1178. 29 mai *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Communique la réponse faite oralement par les États-Unis à la suggestion du Canada concernant la défense du Groenland..... 1036
1179. 6 juin *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part de la satisfaction de Londres aux démarches entreprises par le Canada auprès des États-Unis pour la défense du Groenland..... 1037
1180. 7 juin *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet la réponse des États-Unis à l'aide-mémoire canadien portant sur la vulnérabilité du Groenland ainsi que les renseignements obtenus des départements de l'Armée et de la Marine..... 1037

PARTIE 2

BASE AÉRIENNE AU GROENLAND

1940

1181. 19 août *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande son avis en vue d'établir un aérodrome et une route aérienne via le Groenland..... 1039
1182. 20 août *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*. Le prie de sonder les États-Unis au sujet du projet d'établir un aérodrome, un poste de T.S.F. et une station de météorologie au Groenland 1040
1183. 30 août *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Fait part de la réaction des États-Unis au projet de pourvoir le Groenland d'installations aéronautiques et suggère de s'en remettre à la Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense..... 1041
1184. 4 sept. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*. Résume les résultats des entretiens avec le département d'État concernant le projet d'établir des installations aéronautiques au Groenland..... 1042

1178. May 29 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports United States oral reaction to Canadian suggestion concerning defence of Greenland 1036

1179. June 6 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports British gratification at Canadian approach to United States concerning defence of Greenland 1037

1180. June 7 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Forwards United States reply to Canadian aide-mémoire on vulnerability of Greenland and information received from Army and Navy Departments 1037

PART 2

GREENLAND AIR BASE

1940

1181. Aug. 19 *High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests views on establishment of air route via Greenland and aerodrome survey 1039

1182. Aug. 20 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*. Sends instructions to ascertain probable United States attitude to tentative proposal that an aerodrome, an aircraft wireless station and a meteorological station be established in Greenland 1040

1183. Aug. 30 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Reports United States reaction to tentative proposal that air facilities be established in Greenland and suggests that matter be referred to Permanent Joint Board on Defence 1041

1184. Sept. 4 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*. Summarizes results of discussions with United States on tentative proposal to establish air facilities in Greenland 1042

1185. 17 sept. *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part des levés et des conclusions des États-Unis au sujet de pistes d'atterrissage au Groenland..... 1043
1185. Sept. 17 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports results of United States surveys and conclusions concerning possible establishment of aircraft landing facilities in Greenland 1043
1186. 17 sept. *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fournit d'autres renseignements sur le projet de pistes d'atterrissage au Groenland..... 1044
1186. Sept. 17 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Supplies further information on possible landing grounds in Greenland 1044
1187. 5 nov. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Relate des incidents qui ont entraîné la cessation au Groenland des bulletins météorologiques à destination de l'Allemagne et des pays qu'elle occupe..... 1045
1187. Nov. 5 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Summarizes incidents leading to termination of meteorological reports from Greenland to Germany and German-occupied territories 1045
1188. 18 déc. *Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* S'enquiert d'une nouvelle tentative en vue d'établir une station de T.S.F., un poste de météo et un aérodrome au Groenland..... 1048
1188. Dec. 18 *High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Enquires concerning a fresh attempt to establish a wireless and meteorological station and airport in Greenland 1048
1189. 19 déc. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique un message du ministre de la Défense nationale appuyant le projet britannique de mettre en place des installations aéronautiques au Groenland. 1049
1189. Dec. 19 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates message from Minister of National Defence supporting British proposal for establishment of air facilities in Greenland 1049
1190. 20 déc. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Annonce que l'on examine le projet d'envoyer une expédition au Groenland pour étudier la mise en place d'installations aéronautiques..... 1049
1190. Dec. 20 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* States that proposal for expedition to investigate possibility of establishing air facilities in Greenland is being examined 1049
1191. 28 déc. *Mémoire du conseiller au Premier ministre.* Résume les données d'une proposition priant le Canada d'étudier l'établissement d'installations aéronautiques au Groenland et préconise qu'on discute le projet avec le gouvernement américain. 1050
1191. Dec. 28 *Memorandum from Counsellor to Prime Minister.* Summarizes background of proposal that Canada investigate establishment of air facilities in Greenland and advises discussion with United States 1050
1192. 31 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis.* Le prie de discuter avec les États-Unis la proposition britannique concernant le levé que le Canada doit faire au Groenland..... 1052
1192. Dec. 31 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in United States.* Sends instructions to discuss with United States British proposal concerning a Canadian survey in Greenland 1052

1941

1193. 9 janv. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Transmet d'autres renseignements en vue de discuter avec les États-Unis la nécessité d'installations aéronautiques au Groenland..... 1053

1194. 1^{er} févr. *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Signale que les États-Unis se proposent de patrouiller les eaux groenlandaises et de défendre Ivigtut, et suggère que le gouvernement du Groenland leur demande d'étudier la possibilité d'y établir des installations aéronautiques civiles..... 1053

1195. 3 févr. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne.* Communique la réponse provisoire des États-Unis concernant le projet d'établir des installations aéronautiques au Groenland.... 1057

1196. 5 févr. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Fait part des démarches effectuées pour que le département d'État étudie rapidement le projet d'établir des installations aéronautiques au Groenland et des raisons pour lesquelles on n'en a pas discuté avec l'ambassade britannique.... 1057

1197. 5 févr. *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Expose l'attitude des États-Unis et le plan pour remédier au manque d'installations aéronautiques au Groenland..... 1058

1198. 13 févr. *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Expose la politique américaine concernant le Groenland et le projet du Groenland d'établir des installations aéronautiques; souligne le fait que les États-Unis considèrent le Canada comme « une nation américaine » 1059

1199. 24 févr. *Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux*

1941

1193. Jan. 9 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Communicates further information to support need for establishing air facilities in Greenland for use in discussion with United States 1053

1194. Feb. 1 *Chargé d'affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Outlines proposed United States measures for patrol of Greenland waters and defence of Ivigtut and suggestion that Greenland Government request United States to investigate possibility of establishing civil air facilities in Greenland 1053

1195. Feb. 3 *Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates interim reply of United States to representations on proposed establishment of air facilities in Greenland 1057

1196. Feb. 5 *Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Reports action to attempt to expedite United States consideration of establishment of air facilities in Greenland and reason for not discussing developments with British Embassy 1057

1197. Feb. 5 *Chargé d'affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports United States attitude and proposed action to meet problem of air facilities in Greenland 1058

1198. Feb. 13 *Chargé d'affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Outlines United States policy on Greenland and proposals for establishment by Greenland Administration of air facilities and emphasizes United States view of Canada as an American nation 1059

1199. Feb. 24 *Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for*

- Affaires extérieures.* Signale que le ministère de l'Air attache une importance primordiale au projet d'installations au Groenland..... 1062
1200. 1^{er} mars *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Annonce le prochain départ de la *Southern Greenland Survey Expedition* et exige la plus grande discrétion..... 1062
1201. 17 mars *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte que les États-Unis projettent de construire des installations aéronautiques au Groenland..... 1064
1202. 30 mars *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Signale que Londres est désireux qu'il y ait un poste de radiogoniométrie au Groenland et demande de s'enquérir à ce propos..... 1065
1203. 9 avril *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Annonce que le gouvernement américain accordera une attention particulière à l'établissement d'un poste de radiogoniométrie au Groenland..... 1067
1204. 30 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Fait part des résultats du levé effectué au Groenland par les États-Unis et de la décision d'envoyer une équipe de construction à Julianehaab..... 1069
1205. 4 juin *La légation aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte qu'on a découvert un emplacement pouvant servir d'aérodrome sur la côte est du Groenland..... 1070
1206. 4 août *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Transmet la demande de renseignements des autorités britanniques concernant les installations aéronautiques au Groenland. Le prie de demander officieusement si le *Ferry Command* de la R.A.F. pourra les utiliser..... 1070
- External Affairs.* Communicates urgency attached by Air Ministry to question of proposed establishment of facilities in Greenland 1062
1200. Mar. 1 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports plans for early departure of "Southern Greenland Survey Expedition" and stresses need for secrecy 1062
1201. Mar. 17 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports United States plans for construction of air facilities in Greenland 1064
1202. Mar. 30 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Communicates British anxiety to obtain radio direction finding facilities in Greenland and sends instructions to enquire concerning establishment of a station 1065
1203. Apr. 9 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates United States intention to give special consideration to establishment of radio direction finding station in Greenland 1067
1204. May 30 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates results of United States Greenland survey and the decision to despatch construction party to Julianehaab 1069
1205. June 4 *Legation in United States to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports discovery of possible site for aerodrome on east coast of Greenland 1070
1206. Aug. 4 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Communicates British request for information on facilities to be provided in Greenland and sends instruction to raise informally question of their use by R.A.F. Ferry Command 1070

1207. 1^{er} sept. *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait connaître l'attitude favorable des États-Unis quant à l'usage des aéroports du Groenland pour l'expédition outre-mer des avions..... 1071

1207. Sept. 1 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports favourable United States attitude to use of Greenland bases in ferrying aircraft across North Atlantic 1071

CHAPITRE VII

ORGANISATIONS ET
CONFÉRENCES
INTERNATIONALES

PARTIE I

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

1939

1208. 19 sept. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique les vues britanniques sur la convocation et l'ordre du jour du conseil et de l'assemblée de la SDN..... 1073

1209. 21 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux affaires extérieures au délégué permanent, Société des Nations.* Indique que des mutations de personnel sont à l'étude et demande la date de la reprise de l'assemblée..... 1075

1210. 22 sept. *Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Indique la date probable de l'assemblée et regrette l'absence de travail fructueux.. 1075

1211. 7 oct. *Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part des dates probables et du programme de l'assemblée ainsi que de la remise à plus tard de l'élection des juges à la Cour permanente..... 1075

1212. 24 oct. *Le Secrétaire général, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Indique la date proposée pour la convocation de l'assemblée..... 1076

1213. 27 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent, Société des Nations.* Le prie

CHAPTER VII

INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND
CONFERENCES

PART I

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

1939

1208. Sept. 19 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates British views on convocation and agenda of League of Nations Council and Assembly 1073

1209. Sept. 21 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate, League of Nations.* States that staff changes are being considered and asks for date of adjourned Assembly meeting 1075

1210. Sept. 22 *Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports probable date of Assembly meeting and deplores lack of useful work 1075

1211. Oct. 7 *Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports probable dates and programme for Assembly and probable postponement of Permanent Court election 1075

1212. Oct. 24 *Secretary General, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates date of proposed convocation of Assembly 1076

1213. Oct. 27 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate, League of Nations.*

- d'annoncer au Secrétaire général que le Canada accepte la date proposée pour la convocation de l'assemblée..... 1076
1214. 11 nov. *Le Secrétaire général, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande s'il approuve la réunion du quatrième comité de la dix-neuvième assemblée pour étudier le budget au lieu de convoquer la vingtième assemblée..... 1077
1215. 17 nov. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet le message du délégué permanent auprès de la SDN, qui demande des instructions concernant sa participation à la prochaine réunion du quatrième comité de la dix-neuvième assemblée..... 1077
1216. 19 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Prie le délégué permanent auprès de la SDN de participer à la future réunion du quatrième comité de la dix-neuvième assemblée..... 1077
1217. 19 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent suppléant, Société des Nations.* Le prie d'annoncer au Secrétaire général que le Canada accepte la proposition de convoquer le quatrième comité de la dix-neuvième assemblée 1078
1218. 22 nov. *Le délégué permanent suppléant, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Suggère que la Grande-Bretagne notifie aussi au nom du Canada que ce dernier suspend indéfiniment le traité sur la limitation des armements navals; rapporte qu'on voit également à notifier la suspension des accords navals anglo-soviétique et anglo-polonais..... 1078
1219. 28 nov. *Mémoire du conseiller juridique.* Recommande que la SDN soit avisée que le Canada suspend le traité sur la limitation des armements navals..... 1079
- Sends instructions to convey to Secretary General Canadian concurrence in proposed convocation date 1076
1214. Nov. 11 *Secretary General, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests agreement that instead of convoking Twentieth Assembly the Fourth Committee of Nineteenth Assembly be summoned to consider budget 1077
1215. Nov. 17 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, requesting instructions concerning attendance at proposed meeting of Fourth Committee of Nineteenth Assembly 1077
1216. Nov. 19 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Communicates instructions for Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to attend proposed meeting of Fourth Committee of Nineteenth Assembly 1077
1217. Nov. 19 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Permanent Delegate, League of Nations.* Sends instructions to convey to Secretary General Canadian concurrence in proposal to convoke Fourth Committee of Nineteenth Assembly 1078
1218. Nov. 22 *Acting Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Suggests that notification of suspension of Naval Armament Limitations Treaty by Great Britain be made also on behalf of Canada; reports notification of suspension of Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-Polish Naval Agreements 1078
1219. Nov. 28 *Memorandum by Legal Adviser.* Recommends notification to League of Nations of suspension by Canada of Naval Armament Limitations Treaty 1079

1220. 28 nov. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent, Société des Nations.* Le charge de notifier la SDN que le Canada a suspendu le traité sur la limitation des armements navals..... 1080
1221. 3 déc. *Le Secrétaire général, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Envoie un avis de convocation du conseil et de l'assemblée afin qu'ils étudient l'attaque soviétique contre la Finlande..... 1080
1222. 4 déc. *Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part de ses intentions concernant les prochaines réunions à défaut d'instructions contraires..... 1081
1223. 5 déc. *Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande que des lettres de créance soient émises aux délégués canadiens et d'en communiquer les noms au Secrétaire général..... 1081
1224. 6 déc. *Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Décrit la réaction à l'appel lancé par la Finlande à la SDN et les divers modes d'action possibles..... 1082
1225. 6 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent, Société des Nations.* Demande d'aviser le Secrétaire général qu'en acceptant la clause facultative du statut de la Cour permanente le Canada n'entend pas qu'elle soit étendue aux litiges issus de la guerre actuelle..... 1082
1226. 6 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent, Société des Nations.* Demande d'aviser le Secrétaire général qu'en acceptant l'Acte général le Canada n'entend pas qu'elle soit étendue aux litiges issus de la guerre actuelle..... 1083
1227. 8 déc. *Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Expose
1220. Nov. 28 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate, League of Nations.* Sends instructions concerning notification of suspension by Canada of Naval Armament Limitations Treaty 1080
1221. Dec. 3 *Secretary General, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Conveys notification of convocation of Council and Assembly to consider Soviet attack on Finland 1080
1222. Dec. 4 *Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* States intentions in regard to forthcoming meetings unless contrary instructions are received 1081
1223. Dec. 5 *Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Asks that credentials be issued to Canadian delegates and Secretary General be notified of names 1081
1224. Dec. 6 *Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports reactions to Finnish appeal to League of Nations and possible procedures in dealing with it 1082
1225. Dec. 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate, League of Nations.* Asks notification of Secretary General that Canadian acceptance of Optional Clause of Statute of Permanent Court does not cover disputes arising out of present war 1082
1226. Dec. 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate, League of Nations.* Asks notification of Secretary General that Canadian acceptance of General Act does not cover disputes arising out of present war 1083
1227. Dec. 8 *Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.*

- le cours probable des événements consécutifs à l'appel finnois et discute des répercussions que pourraient entraîner l'expulsion de l'Union soviétique de la SDN..... 1084
1228. 8 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent, Société des Nations.* Donne ses instructions sur la position canadienne à l'égard du conflit russo-finnois et d'autres questions à l'ordre du jour de l'assemblée..... 1084
1229. 10 déc. *Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait rapport de la réunion du conseil et du déroulement prévu à l'assemblée.. 1085
1230. 11 déc. *Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part des élections de l'assemblée, de l'ordre du jour et de l'appel à l'Union soviétique d'accepter la médiation..... 1086
1231. 11 déc. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent, Société des Nations.* Est d'avis qu'il est peu probable que les pays neutres appuient l'expulsion de l'Union soviétique et le prie de voter dans le sens des Britanniques..... 1086
1232. 13 déc. *Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part des mesures envisagées à l'assemblée ou au conseil à l'égard de l'appel finnois..... 1086
1233. 14 déc. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Examine la composition du conseil de la SDN et la possibilité que l'unanimité se fasse à l'assemblée autour de la résolution relative à l'appel de la Finlande.. 1087
1234. 15 déc. *Le délégué permanent suppléant, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Fait part de la participation du Canada au Bureau qui sera habilité à s'occuper des problèmes après l'ajournement de l'assemblée..... 1088
- Outlines probable course of events connected with Finnish appeal and discusses possible consequences of expulsion from the League of Soviet Union 1084
1228. Dec. 8 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate, League of Nations.* Sends instructions on Canadian position in Russo-Finnish dispute and other items on Assembly agenda 1084
1229. Dec. 10 *Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports on Council meeting and forecasts developments in Assembly 1085
1230. Dec. 11 *Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports Assembly elections, agenda and appeal to Soviet Union to accept mediation 1086
1231. Dec. 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate, League of Nations.* Warns of doubt that neutrals will support expulsion of Soviet Union and instructs delegate to vote with British 1086
1232. Dec. 13 *Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports on anticipated action in Assembly or Council on Finnish appeal 1086
1233. Dec. 14 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Analyses composition of League Council and possibility of unanimity when it deals with Assembly resolution on Finnish appeal 1087
1234. Dec. 15 *Acting Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports Canadian membership of Bureau authorized to deal with issues after adjournment of Assembly 1088

1940

1235. 25 juill. *Le Secrétaire général, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Explique les raisons qui ont motivé sa décision de démissionner et décrit les mesures prises pour assurer la continuité du secrétariat..... 1089

1236. 6 août *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Charge le délégué permanent de demander quelles sont les cotisations financières courantes à la SDN..... 1090

1237. 8 août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message du premier ministre britannique soulignant les difficultés que soulève l'invitation d'installer à Princeton les services techniques de la SDN..... 1090

1238. 8 août *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message du premier ministre britannique résumant en détail les arrangements proposés pour le transfert de certains organismes de la SDN, et la direction des finances de la Société..... 1092

1239. 9 août *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet un message du délégué permanent exposant l'état des cotisations à la SDN et suggérant une ligne d'action pour le Canada..... 1093

1240. 14 août *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Le prie d'informer le gouvernement britannique que de l'avis du Canada la Commission de surveillance doit s'en tenir à accepter la démission du Secrétaire général et à établir une date pour une nouvelle réunion..... 1094

1241. 16 août *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Transmet le message du délégué permanent à la

1940

1235. July 25 *Secretary General, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates reasons for decision to resign and outlines measures to ensure continuance of Secretariat 1089

1236. Aug. 6 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Conveys to Permanent Delegate enquiry concerning current financial contributions to League of Nations 1090

1237. Aug. 8 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from British Prime Minister summarizing difficulties in connection with invitation to accommodate at Princeton technical services of League of Nations 1090

1238. Aug. 8 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from British Prime Minister outlining detailed arrangements proposed for relocation of various League bodies and for control of League finances 1092

1239. Aug. 9 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Permanent Delegate outlining situation concerning contributions to League and suggesting Canadian action 1093

1240. Aug. 14 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Conveys instructions to inform British Government of Canadian view that Supervisory Commission should do no more than accept resignation of Secretary General and set date for new meeting 1094

1241. Aug. 16 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Transmits message from Permanent

- SDN indiquant que la réunion ne présentera que des recommandations, et soulignant l'importance de l'appui financier à fournir aux services techniques de la Société et au Bureau international du travail..... 1094
1242. 17 août *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Charge le délégué permanent de faire part au Secrétaire général des vues du Canada sur les priorités budgétaires et le transfert des autres services techniques à Princeton..... 1095
1243. 20 août *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet le message du délégué permanent à la SDN rapportant la chute importante des cotisations..... 1095
1244. 20 août *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Transmet le texte de la réponse au Secrétaire général de la SDN exposant les vues du Canada sur le budget et le transfert des services techniques à Princeton..... 1096
1245. 6 sept. *Le Secrétaire général par intérim, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Souhaite que le Canada apporte son appui au maintien des activités réduites de la SDN..... 1096
1246. 11 sept. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Secrétaire général par intérim, Société des Nations*. Promet que le Canada continuera d'appuyer toute activité utile de la SDN..... 1096
- Delegate to League of Nations stating that meeting will only make recommendations and suggesting importance of financial support for League technical services and International Labour Office 1094
1242. Aug. 17 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Sends instructions to Permanent Delegate to convey to Secretary General Canadian views on budget priorities and transfer to Princeton of additional technical services 1095
1243. Aug. 20 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Transmits message from Permanent Delegate to League of Nations reporting serious drop in contributions to League 1095
1244. Aug. 20 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Transmits text of reply to Secretary General of League of Nations giving Canadian views on budget and transfer of technical services to Princeton 1096
1245. Sept. 6 *Acting Secretary General, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Expresses hope of Canadian support to maintain reduced League activities 1096
1246. Sept. 11 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Secretary General, League of Nations*. Undertakes to continue Canadian support of advisable league activities 1096

PARTIE 2

ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE
DU TRAVAIL

1940

1247. 15 juill. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Exhorte le gouvernement à inviter le Bureau international du travail à s'installer au Canada pendant les hostilités..... 1097

PART 2

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION

1940

1247. July 15 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Urges that Government extend invitation to International Labour Office to move to Canada for duration of war 1097

1248. 19 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.* Annonce qu'on accueille favorablement l'idée d'inviter le Bureau international du travail à s'installer au Canada..... 1098

1249. 25 juill. *Mémoire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Résume l'entretien avec le directeur du Bureau international du travail concernant le transfert provisoire du Bureau au Canada..... 1098

1250. 26 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Communique le texte d'une lettre du directeur du Bureau international du travail acceptant le transfert provisoire au Canada..... 1099

1941

1251. 8 avril *Mémoire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Recommande l'adoption d'un décret du Conseil accordant les privilèges et immunités diplomatiques aux agents du Bureau international du travail..... 1099

1252. 14 août *Décret du Conseil.* Définit le statut au Canada du Bureau international du travail et de son personnel..... 1101

PARTIE 3

UNION PANAMÉRICAINE

1940

1253. 11 juill. *Mémoire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Suggère certains arrangements qui permettraient un observateur canadien d'assister à la prochaine Conférence panaméricaine à La Havane..... 1103

1254. 16 juill. *Mémoire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Porte sur la suggestion de l'Institut canadien des Affaires internationales qui désireait envoyer un observateur à La Havane..... 1104

1248. July 19 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain.* Indicates favourable attitude towards inviting International Labour Office to Canada 1098

1249. July 25 *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Summarizes discussion with Director of International Labour Office on temporary transfer to Canada 1098

1250. July 26 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Communicates text of letter for Director of International Labour Office agreeing to temporary transfer to Canada 1099

1941

1251. Apr. 8 *Memorandum from Legal Adviser to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Recommends adoption of Order in Council granting diplomatic privileges and immunities to officials of International Labour Office 1099

1252. Aug. 14 *Order in Council.* Defines status in Canada of International Labour Office and staff 1101

PART 3

PAN-AMERICAN UNION

1940

1253. July 11 *Memorandum from Counsellor to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Suggests possible arrangement for participation of a Canadian observer in forthcoming Pan-American Conference at Havana 1103

1254. July 16 *Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Records suggestion that Canadian Institute of International Affairs might send observer to Havana Conference 1104

1941

1255. 7 juill. *Mémorandum du deuxième secrétaire*. Traite de la participation du Canada à l'organisation panaméricaine et recommande d'assister à la prochaine Conférence panaméricaine ou à la réunion de ses ministres des Affaires étrangères..... 1105

1256. 21 nov. *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Recommande que le Canada demande son admission à l'Union panaméricaine..... 1108

PARTIE 4

CONFÉRENCE INTERNATIONALE
SUR LE BLÉ

1940

1257. 27 sept. *Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissariat en Grande-Bretagne*. Rapporte que le gouvernement voit peu d'utilité à ce que le Comité consultatif du blé soit maintenu..... 1111

1258. 16 oct. *Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande de préciser le message concernant le Comité consultatif du blé..... 1111

1259. 21 oct. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*. Explique qu'il n'était aucunement dans l'intention du Canada de se retirer du Comité.. 1112

1941

1260. 3 févr. *Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*. Demande son opinion sur le projet de réunir un comité préparatoire du Comité consultatif du blé, qui étudierait les surplus de blé dans le monde..... 1112

1261. 28 mars *Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au*

1941

1255. July 7 *Memorandum by Second Secretary*. Discusses Canadian participation in Pan-American system and recommends that Canada participate in next Pan-American Conference or Meeting of Foreign Ministers 1105

1256. Nov. 21 *Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Recommends that Canada apply for admission to Pan-American Union 1108

PART 4

INTERNATIONAL WHEAT
CONFERENCE

1940

1257. Sept. 27 *Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in Great Britain*. Reports that Government sees little value in continuing Wheat Advisory Committee 1111

1258. Oct. 16 *High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests clarification of communication concerning Wheat Advisory Committee 1111

1259. Oct. 21 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*. Explains that Canada is not giving notice of intention to withdraw from Wheat Advisory Committee 1112

1941

1260. Feb. 3 *Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*. Requests views on proposed meeting of a preparatory committee of Wheat Advisory Committee to consider world wheat surpluses 1112

1261. Mar. 28 *Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to*

- sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Demande de lui faire connaître sous peu son avis sur le projet de réunir un comité préparatoire du Comité consultatif du blé..... 1115
1262. 11 avril *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre.* Suggère qu'on accepte la proposition de réunir un comité préparatoire du Comité consultatif du blé..... 1115
1263. 21 avril *Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.* Annonce que le Canada accepte la suggestion de réunir un comité préparatoire du Comité consultatif du blé..... 1116
1264. 5 mai *Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique le texte des instructions données à l'ambassadeur britannique à Washington concernant le projet de réunir un comité préparatoire du Comité consultatif du blé..... 1117
1265. 8 mai *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Explique pourquoi le message concernant la participation canadienne à la réunion préparatoire a été remis au gouvernement américain par l'entremise de l'ambassadeur britannique..... 1118
1266. 16 mai *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Rapporte l'assurance donnée par les États-Unis que les communications relatives à la réunion proposée seront dorénavant transmises par la voie normale..... 1118
1267. 21 juin *Le ministre des États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures.* Confirme la date des prochaines discussions sur le blé à Washington..... 1119
1268. 27 juin *Le ministre des États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Invite le Canada à la réunion sur le blé mais signale que la date en a été différée..... 1120
- Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Requests early expression of views on proposed meeting of a preparatory committee of Wheat Advisory Committee 1115
1262. Apr. 11 *Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister.* Suggests accepting proposal for meeting of a preparatory committee of Wheat Advisory Committee 1115
1263. Apr. 21 *Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain.* Communicates Canadian agreement to suggested meeting of a preparatory committee of Wheat Advisory Committee 1116
1264. May 5 *High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates instructions sent to British Ambassador in Washington concerning proposed meeting of a preparatory committee of Wheat Advisory Committee 1117
1265. May 8 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Explains why message about Canadian participation in preparatory meetings went to United States Government through British Ambassador 1118
1266. May 16 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports United States assurance that further communications on proposed meeting will be sent through regular channels 1118
1267. June 21 *Minister of United States to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Confirms date of forthcoming wheat discussions in Washington 1119
1268. June 27 *Minister of United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Extends invitation to Canada to attend postponed wheat discussions 1120

1269. 2 juill. *Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Communique l'ordre du jour provisoire de la réunion sur le blé..... 1120
1270. 5 juill. *Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis.* Communique les noms des délégués du Canada aux discussions sur le blé..... 1121
1271. 8 août *Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Soumet un avant-projet d'accord à l'étude du gouvernement avant la reprise des discussions sur le blé..... 1121
1272. 11 sept. *Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures.* Relate l'entretien avec le ministre des États-Unis au sujet de la date de reprise des discussions sur le blé à Washington..... 1123
1273. 8 oct. *La légation aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Indique que la reprise des discussions sur le blé est remise à plus tard..... 1123
1274. 28 oct. *Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.* Dit que l'avant-projet d'accord élaboré par le comité préparatoire du Comité consultatif du blé lui cause des inquiétudes et expose les projets britanniques pour la reprise des discussions..... 1124
1269. July 2 *Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Communicates tentative agenda for wheat discussions 1120
1270. July 5 *Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States.* Sends names of Canadian delegates to wheat discussions 1121
1271. Aug. 8 *Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Forwards provisional draft agreement for consideration by government prior to resumed wheat discussions 1121
1272. Sept. 11 *Memorandum by Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Records discussion with United States Minister on date for reconvening wheat discussions in Washington 1123
1273. Oct. 8 *Legation in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Reports postponement of reopening of wheat discussions 1123
1274. Oct. 28 *Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Expresses concern about provisional draft agreement drawn up by Preparatory Committee of Wheat Advisory Committee and outlines British intentions at resumed discussions 1124

CHAPITRE I/CHAPTER I

CONDUITE DES RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES CONDUCT OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS

PARTIE 1/PART 1

RELATIONS AVEC LES PAYS DU COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS WITH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES AUSTRALIE/AUSTRALIA

1.

763-39

*Le Premier ministre au premier ministre d'Australie¹
Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia¹*

TELEGRAM 7

Ottawa, September 3, 1939

Our telegram No. 2 of the 11th January, 1935.²

1. His Majesty's Government in Canada, anticipating the difficult problems that are likely to face the members of the Commonwealth as a result of the conflict that has now begun, and being desirous of strengthening the means of intercourse and co-operation existing between Canada and Australia, are of the opinion that an exchange of High Commissioners between Ottawa and Canberra would contribute materially to that end. They, therefore, propose, should His Majesty's Government in Australia agree, to designate a High Commissioner to Australia and to have him depart for Canberra at an early date. His Majesty's Government in Canada would be glad to learn whether this proposal meets with your approval and wish it to be known that they would welcome a similar appointment from Australia. As Parliament is to meet in Ottawa on Thursday of this week and as it would be necessary to announce the Government's intention to make an appointment and introduce the necessary estimates immediately after the opening, an early reply to this communication will be greatly appreciated.

2. As you are aware, South Africa and Ireland are already represented in this way at Ottawa³ and the Canadian Government indicated in June of this year that they proposed to ask Parliament to make provision for reciprocal action.

¹ Un télégramme semblable fut expédié au premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande.

² Volume 5, Document 38.

³ Le titre du représentant de l'Afrique du Sud se lisait «Représentant accrédité».

¹ A similar telegram was sent to the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

³ The title of the representative of South Africa was "Accredited Representative".

2.

763-39

*Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Canberra, September 6, 1939

Your telegram of September 3rd, No. 7. His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia is in entire agreement with the view of His Majesty's Government in Canada that an exchange of High Commissioners between Ottawa and Canberra would strengthen materially the means of intercourse and co-operation between the two Dominions in the difficult period ahead. It would therefore welcome cordially the appointment of a High Commissioner for Canada in Canberra at an early date and intends for its part to make a reciprocal appointment of a High Commissioner for Australia to Canada as soon as necessary arrangements can be completed. Announcement of the Government decision will be made by me in the House of Representatives tomorrow, September 7th, to coincide with announcement to be made by His Majesty's Government in Canada, as I understand from your telegram, on the same date.

3.

763-39

*Le Premier ministre au premier ministre d'Australie
Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia*

TELEGRAM 11

Ottawa, September 11, 1939

IMMEDIATE. We are announcing tonight intention to appoint High Commissioners to Australia and other Dominions, but are making no reference to any reciprocal action.

4.

801-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 311

Ottawa, September 11, 1939

Government is announcing tonight intention to appoint High Commissioners to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland. We understand Australia has decided to reciprocate. New Zealand has not yet reached decision on this point.

5. 763-39

*Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Canberra, September 13, 1939

Your telegram September 11th. Announcement of intention of Commonwealth Government to appoint High Commissioner for Australia in Ottawa and your intention to appoint High Commissioners to Australia and the other Dominions was made by me in Parliament yesterday. I am forwarding by post copies of statement made.

6. 763-39

Décret du Conseil

Order in Council

P.C. 3472

November 2, 1939

His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and under The War Appropriation Act, 1939, is pleased to appoint and doth hereby appoint Charles Jost Burchell, Esquire, one of His Majesty's Counsel learned in the law, High Commissioner for Canada in the Commonwealth of Australia, as of and from December first, 1939.¹

7. 1243-39

Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre

Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister

TELEGRAM

Canberra, December 23, 1939

IMMEDIATE. With reference to previous correspondence, I desire to inform you that the Commonwealth Government propose to appoint Major-General the Honourable Sir Thomas William Glasgow, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D., to be High Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Australia in Canada. Sir William Glasgow was a member of the Senate representing State of Queensland from 1920 to 1932. He was Honorary Minister in the Commonwealth Cabinet 1920 to 1926, Minister for Home and Territories 1926-1927 and Minister of Defence 1927-1929. He served in the South African war

¹Le décret C.P. 5/4038 du 8 décembre 1939 recula l'entrée en vigueur de la nomination au 1^{er} novembre 1939.

¹P.C. 5/4038, December 8, 1939, changed the effective date of this appointment to November 1, 1939.

with Queensland Mounted Infantry 1899-1900. Was mentioned in despatches and awarded D.S.O. and Queen's Medal, 5 clasps. He served with Australian Imperial Forces in the Great War from 1914 to 1919 and was awarded Legion of Honour and Croix de Guerre. He is closely associated with pastoral and secondary industries and is Director of several companies. Further details in regard to travel, etc., will be sent to you at an early date. Proposed to make announcement regarding appointment immediately.

NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE/NEW ZEALAND

8.

762-39

*Le premier ministre par intérim de Nouvelle-Zélande au Premier ministre
Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister*

TELEGRAM

Wellington, September 6, 1939

Your telegram 3rd September.¹ His Majesty's Government in New Zealand fully share desire of His Majesty's Government in Canada to strengthen means of intercourse and co-operation existing between Canada and New Zealand. Indeed they are convinced a general improvement of the means of communications and consultation between Dominions *inter se* may well become essential in the period that lies ahead. They fully realize the benefits to be expected from an exchange of High Commissioners such as is suggested, and will be most happy to receive the proposed Canadian representative at any date the Canadian Government so desires. At the same time the Canadian Government will readily understand at this juncture that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are very much pressed with urgent business arising from the outbreak of hostilities and they would wish to have an opportunity for further reflection before committing themselves to making a reciprocal appointment at Ottawa.

FRASER

9.

762-39

*Décret du Conseil
Order in Council*

P.C. 4367

December 28, 1939

His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and under the War Appropriation Act, 1939, is pleased to appoint and doth hereby appoint W. A. Riddell, Esquire, Ph.D., Counsellor in the Canadian legation at Washington, to be High Commissioner for Canada in New Zealand, as of and from February first, 1940.

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

10.

762-39

Le Premier ministre au premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande
Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand

TELEGRAM 24

Ottawa, December 30, 1939

May I refer to my telegram of September 4th¹ and to your reply of September 6th regarding exchange of High Commissioners. We have pleasure in informing you that the Canadian Government are appointing Dr. W. A. Riddell, formerly Canadian Representative at Geneva and now Counsellor in the Canadian Legation at Washington, as High Commissioner to New Zealand. I shall advise you later when Dr. Riddell will sail to take up his duties. I hope that the appointment will help to serve the many interests we have in common.

11.

2177-40

Le haut commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in New Zealand to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 32

Wellington, June 27, 1941

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Informed by Acting Prime Minister that they have decided to appoint High Commissioner to Australia and to Canada at the same time as they appoint Minister to Washington.

12.

1129-40

Le haut commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in New Zealand to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 61

Wellington, December 4, 1941

MOST SECRET. My telegram No. 60 of December 1st² Understand that New Zealand Minister expects to arrive at Washington early in the new year, and that until the appointment of High Commissioner in Canada he will be responsible for New Zealand interests in Canada as well.

¹ Non reproduit. Pour un télégramme semblable, envoyé au premier ministre d'Australie, voir le document 1.

² Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed. For a similar telegram, sent to the Prime Minister of Australia, see Document 1.

² Not printed.

AFRIQUE DU SUD/SOUTH AFRICA

13.

800-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre
des Affaires extérieures de l'Afrique du Sud*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister for External Affairs
of South Africa*

TELEGRAM 7

Ottawa, September 12, 1939

I have received with great satisfaction your telegram¹ informing me of your assumption of office as Prime Minister, Minister for External Affairs and of Defence of the Union. Personally I deeply appreciate the further words of your message at this time, and I can assure you that all of us here fully share and reciprocate the wish you have been good enough to express.

I may add that yesterday I informed Parliament of our intention to send a High Commissioner to the Union. Steps are being taken accordingly, and we hope soon to complete the exchange which has been so satisfactorily initiated by the Union.

14.

800-39

*Le représentant accrédité de l'Afrique du Sud au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Accredited Representative of South Africa to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

REF. 14/4

Ottawa, September 14, 1939

Sir,

With reference to the informal communication to me by Dr. Skelton, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the 8th September, that the Canadian Government intends appointing a High Commissioner to the Union of South Africa in the near future, I have been requested to convey to the Canadian Government the Union Government's sincere appreciation of the action which they propose to take.

The Union Government would welcome the appointment of a High Commissioner for Canada in the Union of South Africa, and feels it will greatly facilitate the intercourse and promote understanding and co-operation between the two countries.

Please accept etc.

D. DE W. MEYER

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

15.

800-39

Décret du Conseil
Order in Council

P.C. 218

January 18, 1940

His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and under the War Appropriation Act, 1939, is pleased to appoint and doth hereby appoint Dr. Henry Laureys, formerly Dean of the School of Higher Commercial Studies in Montreal, to be High Commissioner for Canada in the Union of South Africa, as of and from the first day of February, 1940.

IRLANDE/IRELAND

16.

801-39

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au haut commissaire d'Irlande

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to High Commissioner of Ireland

Ottawa, September 8, 1939

Dear Mr. Hearne,

As I verbally informed you this morning the Canadian Government are including in the special estimates to be submitted to Parliament in a few days an appropriation to provide for the appointment of a High Commissioner to Ireland and also High Commissioners to Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa.

It is hoped to make appointments shortly after the adoption of the estimates.

We are very glad to be able to reciprocate the action taken by your Government in the appointment of yourself as its representative and trust that it will help, as your own appointment has helped, to facilitate the intercourse and increase the understanding and co-operation between our two countries.

I should be obliged if you could advise your Government by cable of the proposal, indicating that it is confidential for the present and that no publicity will be given to it here until the estimates are introduced next week.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

17.

801-39

Décret du Conseil
Order in Council

P.C. 4368

December 28, 1939

His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and under the War Appropriation Act, 1939, is pleased to appoint and doth hereby appoint John Hall Kelly, Esquire, LL.D., to be High Commissioner for Canada in Ireland, as of and from February first, 1940.

18.

801-39

Le haut commissariat d'Irlande au ministère des Affaires extérieures
High Commission of Ireland to Department of External Affairs

[Ottawa,] December 29, 1939

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. The Government of Ireland are deeply grateful for the decision of the Canadian Government to appoint a Canadian representative in Dublin, and they will most gladly welcome Mr. Hall Kelly.

2. The position of Sir John Maffey as British representative in Dublin is completely assimilated to that of Minister Plenipotentiary. His precedence etc. conforms to that principle. The Irish Government desire that the position of the Canadian representative in Dublin should also be assimilated to that of Minister Plenipotentiary on the assumption that a like status would be accorded to the Irish representative in Ottawa.

3. The Irish Government desire to consult the wishes of the Canadian Government as to Mr. Hall Kelly's title. They themselves would wish that his title and that of the Irish representative in Ottawa might be similar (*mutatis mutandis*) to Sir John Maffey's title. Should the Canadian Government, however, prefer to maintain title of "High Commissioner" on both sides, the Irish Government would be quite ready to agree, provided there is complete assimilation of the status of each representative to that of Minister Plenipotentiary in all other respects.

19.

801-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre
des Affaires extérieures d'Irlande*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister
for External Affairs of Ireland*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, December 30, 1939

PERSONAL. Following for Mr. De Valera. Begins.

1. On the occasion of the appointment of Mr. John Hall Kelly to represent Canada in Dublin, may I express the hope that his appointment will serve as Mr. Hearne's appointment here has already served to increase the understanding and goodwill between our two countries and to advance the interests which we share with all people of goodwill in the establishment of peace and justice among the nations.

2. I trust no misunderstanding has developed over the fact that our announcement of the appointment of the High Commissioner followed so shortly after the receipt in the Department of a communication from your Government as to the possibility of designating the new post that of Canadian Representative with the status of Minister Plenipotentiary. Communications had been sent to the persons involved and announcement given to the press regarding appointments to both Ireland and New Zealand before your communication came to my attention. It would in any event clearly have required many weeks of discussion with the various Governments concerned before the status of our representatives in the various members of the Commonwealth could be altered. You will recall that the exchange of correspondence and the public announcements in June referred explicitly to the appointment of a High Commissioner for Ireland in Ottawa and the intention of the Canadian Government to recommend to Parliament the appointment of a High Commissioner for Canada in Ireland. My Recommendation to Parliament in September was for such an appointment and appropriation made by Parliament could not be used otherwise. The Order in Council approved on Thursday of this week was in similar terms. Under these circumstances you will realize that it would not, in any event, have been possible for us to make any appointment at present on any other basis.

3. May I extend to you and your country my best wishes for the New Year. Mackenzie King. Ends.

20.

801-39

*Le ministre des Affaires extérieures d'Irlande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister for External Affairs of Ireland to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1

Dublin, January 1, 1940

Following for Mr. Mackenzie King. Begins.

1. Many thanks for your message. It gives me great pleasure to wish you and your country every blessing and happiness in the New Year. We welcome Mr. Kelly's appointment and I feel quite sure that his good work aided by that of Mr. Hearne will bring our two countries closer together in friendship and mutual understanding.

2. With regard to the position of our representatives, there is no misunderstanding of any kind, but I hope that eventual position will be one of complete co-equality with representatives of Great Britain in Ireland. De Valera. Ends.

TERRE-NEUVE/NEWFOUNDLAND

21.

1793-40

*Mémorandum du conseiller¹ au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim
aux Affaires extérieures²*

*Memorandum from Counsellor¹ to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs²*

[Ottawa,] March 27, 1941

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION IN NEWFOUNDLAND

1. Since the outbreak of war in September 1939 Newfoundland has been playing an increasingly large part in considerations relating to Canadian defence. Members of the Government have visited the Island on two occasions, a number of special emissaries have been sent to St. John's for specific discussions, and a more or less constant intercourse has been maintained through Service channels and by telegraphic communication between the Department of External Affairs and the Newfoundland Commission of Government.

2. Representatives of the Newfoundland Government have visited Ottawa and have attended meetings of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence when Newfoundland matters have been under review.

¹H. L. Keenleyside.

²N. A. Robertson.

3. At the present time there are at least six channels of communication between Canada and Newfoundland. These are as follows:

- (a) External Affairs *to* Governor of Newfoundland;
- (b) National Defence *to* Officer Commanding in Newfoundland *to* Newfoundland authorities;
- (c) National Defence for Naval Services *to* Naval Officer Commanding, St. John's, *to* Newfoundland authorities;
- (d) National Defence for Air *to* Air Force and/or Munitions and Supply or Transport representatives at air bases in Newfoundland *to* Newfoundland authorities;
- (e) External Affairs *to* Dominions Office *to* St. John's;
- (f) Munitions and Supply or Department of Transport *to* officials in charge of construction at Newfoundland air bases *to* Newfoundland authorities.

4. The Canadian Government has now been asked to appoint representatives to meet with Newfoundland officials to work out a solution of certain problems of mutual interest which still require decision.

5. Although it would be inaccurate to say that our relations with Newfoundland have been prejudiced by the diversity of the channels of communication and certain failures on our part to keep the Newfoundland authorities fully apprised of Canadian plans, it would be fair to suggest that certain minor misunderstandings and delays might have been obviated if we had had a representative of the Newfoundland Government stationed in Ottawa and a Canadian representative stationed in St. John's.

6. It is quite clear that rather than decreasing in importance, our relations with Newfoundland during the remainder of this year, and until the end of the war, will be more important than they have been in the past. With Canada taking a very large measure of responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland; with Canadian military, naval and air forces established in, and possibly operating from, Newfoundland bases; with the expenditure of some \$5,000,000,000 [*sic*] by Canadian representatives in the Island immediately in prospect; with United States forces established in Newfoundland bases and with the United States Government maintaining a Consular representative (Consul General) in St. John's; with problems relating to the operation of foreign trawlers off the Newfoundland Banks and to fishing vessels from St. Pierre and Miquelon; with the increasing use of Newfoundland facilities for civil as well as military aircraft; and with a rapid growth in the number of financial, legal, immigration and customs problems which will require settlement by Ottawa and St. John's, it is most desirable that consideration should be given to the advisability of appointing an official representative of the Canadian Government to be stationed permanently, or at least until the end of the war, in St. John's. The value of such an appointment is recognized by officials of the defence Departments and it would do much to simplify and strengthen the contacts between the two Governments.

7. Although Newfoundland is not a Dominion it would perhaps please the people of the Island if the Canadian representative in St. John's were to be designated a "High Commissioner". If for any reason the Government of the United Kingdom should take exception to this designation, the Canadian representative could be described as "Canadian Commissioner" or "Canadian Agent".

8. If it should be decided to select a member of the External Affairs Service for this post, consideration might be given to bringing Kirkwood to St. John's and filling his post in Greenland by either A. E. Porsild or one of the junior officers of the Department, or both. If this should prove impracticable, Mr. H. A. Dyde might profitably be selected. Mr. Dyde has already visited Newfoundland and has been intimately associated with all the recent negotiations between Canada and the Government at St. John's. His personal qualities, moreover, would make him an admirable incumbent for such a post.

9. It is suggested that whoever may be appointed to St. John's should also be accredited as Canadian Consul to St. Pierre and Miquelon.

22.

1793-40

*Mémorandum du conseiller¹ au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Counsellor¹ to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] April 21, 1941

I took advantage of the visit of Mr. Emmerson² and Mr. Price³ to remind them that a year ago Dr. Skelton had mentioned to Mr. Emmerson the possibility that beneficial results might be obtained by an exchange of official representatives between Ottawa and St. John's. I asked Mr. Emmerson if he had given any further thought to this matter. He replied that although at first it had appeared to the Commission of Government as though the appointment of a resident agent in Ottawa would be an unnecessary extravagance he was inclined to think that the proposal might be viewed differently now as it has become apparent that relations between the two countries are becoming more intimate and more extensive. The difficulty from the Newfoundland point of view is now purely financial, but Newfoundland would be glad to receive a Canadian representative even if they find it impossible to finance an agent of their own in Ottawa.

¹ H. L. Keenleyside.

² Commissaire de Terre-Neuve.

³ Président de la Régie des alcools de
Terre-Neuve.

² Newfoundland Commissioner.

³ Chairman of the Newfoundland Board of
Liquor Control.

I told Mr. Emmerson and Mr. Price that we had not come to any definite conclusion with regard to making such an appointment but that further consideration would be given to the matter now that we were sure that Newfoundland would approve. In reply to a question, I said that in my opinion if we decided to send an agent to Newfoundland it would be an official with the rank of the order of a Consul General, but that the question of title would have to be worked out and that I would be glad to have suggestions. Neither Mr. Price nor Mr. Emmerson was able to suggest anything more satisfactory than "Canadian Agent" or "Canadian Commissioner".

There is no doubt, from the way in which the suggestion was received by the Newfoundland representatives, that the appointment of a Canadian Agent to St. John's would be very well received in the Island.

23.

1793-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] July 15, 1941

The question of Canadian representation in Newfoundland is again on the agenda of the War Committee. I am, therefore, summarizing, for your consideration, some of the reasons why the early appointment of a Canadian representative in Newfoundland would appear to be necessary.

(1) As a result of the war, direct Canadian participation in the defence of Newfoundland has developed very rapidly. The R.C.A.F. are in charge of Newfoundland Airport and Botwood and are going ahead with plans for establishing a new base at Torbay. The Canadian Army has two battalions at Newfoundland Airport and Botwood, a third at St. John's and coast defence artillery units at a number of points. The Canadian Navy has been given responsibility for the operation of the convoy escort force to be based on St. John's. The presence of Canadian armed forces in the Island has created a good many points of contact with the civilian authorities. Colonel Gibson's visits have resulted in the satisfactory clearing up of the principal outstanding points of difference, but there are continually questions arising, the settlement of which would undoubtedly be facilitated by the presence in the Island of an official representative of the Canadian Government as distinct from the officers commanding the various service detachments.

(2) The United States has, within the last few months, acquired a leased base at Argentia in Newfoundland, assumed further responsibility for coast defences at St. John's, and for the protection of the Newfoundland Airport. Local relations between the Canadian and American forces sharing in the defences of Newfoundland have been good, and it is important that they

remain so. The major questions of policy defining Canadian-American responsibilities vis-à-vis Newfoundland will have to be settled between Ottawa and Washington, but there is room for useful work to be done in this field by a good Canadian representative on the spot. The recent decision of the United States Government to appoint a new and senior Consul General at St. John's, who will have the confidence of his Government and the local authorities to a greater degree than his predecessor did, is another argument for having Canadian representation in the Island of at least equivalent rank.

(3) The constitutional position of Newfoundland in the Commonwealth is anomalous. It is not a dominion, nor is it a colony. It has, during the last seven or eight years, been to a large extent under direct Dominions Office control. At the same time it is economically, socially and strategically closer to Canada than to any other part of the British Empire. Inevitably Newfoundland's international position is the resultant of a three-way pull—to the United Kingdom, to the United States and to Canada. Any modification of the present precariously balanced position is of direct interest to this country, and it would seem important that Canada be adequately and directly represented in the Island, particularly during the next year or two, which are likely to see important developments in the Island's relations with the three countries with which it is most closely connected.

(4) The internal political situation in Newfoundland is the counterpart of its anomalous constitutional position. Local government has been suspended for seven or eight years, while the administration has been under the control of a mixed Commission nominated from London, consisting half of United Kingdom officials and half of Newfoundlanders. The Commission is probably giving Newfoundland better government than it has had for a long time, and has undoubtedly helped to put its financial house in order. British, Canadian and American spending for war purposes in Newfoundland is already reflected in the Island's income, which, for the first time in years, has provided a surplus over current expenditures. This easing of the budgetary position is likely to strengthen the demand for a return to self government. Any demand for structural changes in the internal government of Newfoundland is likely to be linked with a demand for a new definition of its external relations and thus precipitate the always latent issue of Newfoundland's interest in Confederation.


(5) Our commercial, customs and fishery connections with Newfoundland are chronically unsatisfactory. The reasons for this state of affairs are pretty deep seated, though they have undoubtedly been aggravated by misunderstandings and lack of appreciation of the other country's problems and interests. A Canadian representative in Newfoundland could help to straighten out some of the snarls in which our trade and fishing relations with Newfoundland are now entangled.

(6) Apart from the continuing questions of commercial and fishery policy in which Canadian and Newfoundland interests tend to be at odds, attention might be drawn to a matter now before the Minister of Finance, who is being urged by the Canadian newsprint industry to make representations to the

Newfoundland authorities against the price cutting policies of Newfoundland newsprint producers, which are alleged to be undercutting Canadian export business to the United States. This is an important and difficult question, in which our Government is naturally rather reluctant to move without fuller information than is provided by the *ex parte* statements of the Canadian producers. Clearly, if we had a High Commissioner in St. John's, our first step would be to ask him for a report on the facts, and, if they were found correct, the second step would be to ask him to discuss the whole situation informally with the Newfoundland authorities with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution of the problem. As matters stand, it is not a question which we can very well take up direct with London, and the prospects of reaching an agreement with Newfoundland by cable negotiations are poor.

(7) Under present conditions, the special position of St. Pierre and Miquelon has to be taken into account in any review of Canada's relations with Newfoundland. Newfoundland naturally takes a particular and almost proprietary interest in the future of these Islands, but her interest is not quite the same as that of Canada. On grounds of general security, Newfoundland would be happier if St. Pierre and Miquelon were definitely outside the orbit of Vichy control. At the same time, Newfoundland would like to have the Islands, for both fisheries and customs purposes, assimilated to Newfoundland. In addition to our common interest in the greater security of the approaches to the St. Lawrence, Canada would naturally take a more sympathetic interest than Newfoundland in the importance of St. Pierre and Miquelon as an outpost of Free France. At the same time, we might also be interested in keeping St. Pierre and Miquelon outside the Newfoundland customs and fisheries regime. Conceivably, under Canadian supervision, it might provide Nova Scotia fishermen with the base near the Banks for storing supplies and unloading fish which Newfoundland has hitherto refused to Canadian fishermen.

(8) The foregoing paragraphs indicate the major political questions outstanding or in prospect between Canada and Newfoundland with which a Canadian High Commissioner in St. John's might be expected to deal. Apart from the fact that the presence of a resident Canadian representative in St. John's should make it easier to deal with dispatch with these questions of substantive policy, it may be noted at the present time that communications between the Canadian Government and the Newfoundland Commission of Government are complicated, first by the fact that in dealing with any given subject one is always in some doubt as to whether one should take it up direct by telegram with the Governor or whether one should approach Newfoundland through the intermediary of the United Kingdom Dominions Office. This uncertainty about channels of communication is a reflection of the anomalous political status of the Island Government. It could, I think, be clarified by the designation of a responsible Canadian High Commissioner in the Island, through whom all official communications from Canada to the Newfoundland authorities would pass.



(9) It is clear from an inspection of the files of the Department of External Affairs for the past six months that Canada has more varied, more important and more urgent business with Newfoundland than with all the self-governing Dominions in which we maintain High Commissioners put together. It may be difficult to get a good man to go to St. John's as High Commissioner, but it is clearly a post which requires an able man who is capable of gaining the confidence and friendship of the Newfoundlanders. One man who I think could fill it well is Mr. C. J. Burchell, now High Commissioner in Australia. He is a Maritimer, familiar not only with questions of Dominion-Provincial relations but with Commonwealth constitutional theory and practice—both important qualifications in view of the special problems which Newfoundland relations with Canada present. He is, however, doing a good job in Australia, and has not been there very long. He might feel that translation to Newfoundland was not a promotion, and in any case would probably not be available for two or three months. As a possible alternative nominee, you might wish to consider Mr. J. McGregor Stewart, presently Coal Administrator. Mr. Stewart is also a Maritimer, with a special knowledge of the problems of Dominion-Provincial relations, kept up to date by his experience as Dominion Counsel before the Rowell-Sirois Commission. I do not think he has Mr. Burchell's familiarity with questions of Commonwealth relations. On the other hand, as Coal Administrator, he has shown, in handling the very difficult wages and labour problems of the coal industry, qualities of imagination and sympathy which might stand him in good stead if the Government thought of asking him to go to Newfoundland as High Commissioner.

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

24.

1793-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur
de Terre-Neuve*

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland

TELEGRAM 56

Ottawa, July 19, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Canadian Government have been increasingly aware of inadequacy under war conditions of present contacts between Canada and Newfoundland. We feel that presence of a Canadian High Commissioner in St. John's would facilitate settlement of questions of mutual concern to our Governments and strengthen our collaboration in defence field. In the circumstances we would wish to make an early announcement of our intention to appoint a High Commissioner to Newfoundland, and should be glad to learn, as quickly as possible, that this step would be acceptable to your Government. We shall of course advise you of our nomination for the post before any public announcement is made. A copy of this telegram is being communicated to the Government of the United Kingdom for their information.

25.

1793-40

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 46

St. John's, July 22, 1941

Addressed to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, No. 46, repeated to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, No. 379.

Your telegram of July 19th, No. 56. Government of Newfoundland would welcome the appointment of a High Commissioner in Newfoundland to represent the Government of the Dominion of Canada. It is noted that you will advise us of your nomination for the post before any public announcement is made. A copy of this telegram is being communicated to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

26.

1793-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur
de Terre-Neuve*

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland

TELEGRAM 58

Ottawa, July 23, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 46 of July 22nd. I have pleasure in informing you that Charles J. Burchell, K.C., first High Commissioner for Canada in the Commonwealth of Australia has been appointed as High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland. It is expected that announcement of Mr. Burchell's appointment will be made public in Ottawa within the next day or two. In the meantime it would be appreciated if it could be kept confidential.

27.

1793-40

*Décret du Conseil
Order in Council*

P.C. 5825

July 31, 1941

Whereas the Secretary of State for External Affairs reports that it is expedient, in view of the increasing importance of Canada's relations with Newfoundland, especially since the outbreak of war and the assumption by Canada of a special responsibility for the defence of the Island, that there should be established the office of High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland to represent the Government of Canada in its relations with the Government of Newfoundland;

Therefore His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and under and by virtue of the powers conferred by the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, and The War Appropriation Act, 1939, is pleased to establish and doth hereby establish the office of High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland, the salaries and allowances payable in respect of such office to be fixed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, subject to the approval of Treasury Board.

His Excellency in Council, on the same recommendation, is further pleased to order that the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland shall represent the Government of Canada in its relations with the Government of Newfoundland, and shall report to, and be subject to the instructions of, the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

28.

1793-40

Décret du Conseil
Order in Council

P.C. 5826

July 31, 1941

His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and under and by virtue of the powers conferred by the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, and the War Appropriation Act, 1939, is pleased to appoint and doth hereby appoint Charles J. Burchell, Esquire, one of His Majesty's Counsel learned in the law, and presently High Commissioner for Canada in Australia, High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland.

INDE/INDIA

29.

1617-40

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner in Great Britain to Prime Minister

London, November 5, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

Mr. Amery asked to have a word with me a day or so ago and spoke of a reference which appeared in Canadian Hansard to the possibility of an exchange of representatives between the governments of Canada and India. Apparently a question (which I missed seeing in the record) was asked as to whether an exchange of High Commissioners between the two countries was contemplated, and Mr. Amery gathered from the reply that there was a possibility of Canada being prepared at some time to take part in such an exchange.

Mr. Amery's purpose in speaking to me about the matter was to express the hope that the Canadian government might see their way to taking the initiative in this. He said that in his opinion it would be very helpful if there could be a Canadian High Commissioner in New Delhi and an Indian High Commissioner in Ottawa. He gave two reasons for this view. In the first place such an exchange would demonstrate to the Indian mind the true nature of the modern British Commonwealth of Nations better than the printed or spoken word could ever do, and secondly, he felt that it would be very gratifying to Indian pride to have the greatest of the younger nations of the Commonwealth prepared to exchange representatives with India on parity.* Generally Mr. Amery thought that such a step would make a very useful contribution to the solution of the present day problems with which the government of India is faced. He asked me to communicate his views to you. I should be very glad if in due course you would let me know what I am to say to Mr. Amery on this subject. It may be that you will prefer to write to him direct in which case I should appreciate for my own information some indication of the government of Canada's views in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

VINCENT MASSEY

30.

1617-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] January 20, 1941

EXCHANGE OF HIGH COMMISSIONERS WITH INDIA; MR. MASSEY'S
LETTER OF NOVEMBER 5TH

Such a gesture on our part would be of definite value on the public opinion of India.

There is one preliminary question that would have to be considered. It is quite certain that any such gesture would be thrown away so long as Canada refuses to permit East Indians living in Canada to exercise the franchise. There would not be much use in talking about equality within the British Commonwealth so long as we keep on our books a discrimination against which official and unofficial representatives of Indian opinion, particularly the dominant Congress party, have protested so frequently and so vigorously.

* Note telle que dans l'original:

Wait till Eng[land] has a H[igh] C[ommissioner]. K[ing].

* Note as in original:

The political situation in India at present is far from satisfactory. The British Government (I think Mr. Amery has been more advanced in his opinion than most of his colleagues) have made some progress towards recognizing the Indian demand for self-government. The war offered a fine opportunity for enlisting the cooperation of India on a voluntary basis. The leaders of the people are strongly opposed to fascism and apprehensive of a dominant Japan. Yet India was brought into the war like a Crown Colony by a mere act of the Viceroy, to the great anger of all Indian nationalists. Later, in response to India's demand for complete self-government, they were promised participation in a post-war effort to draw up a constitution giving India Dominion status, subject, however, to what is regarded in Congress circles in India as the old "divide and rule" tactics, i.e., any future arrangements were to be satisfactory to the Princes and the Moslem minority. At present the majority of the leaders of Congress and heads or former heads of the provincial governments are in jail.

If we could take some action on the franchise matter and the right man could be secured, it might be possible to help in this difficult situation.*

O. D. S[KELTON]

31.

1617-40

Le Premier ministre au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne
Prime Minister to High Commissioner in Great Britain

Ottawa, February 5, 1941

My dear Mr. Massey,

In your letter of November 5th, 1940, you passed on to me Mr. Amery's suggestion that the Canadian Government should take the initiative in proposing an exchange of High Commissioners between Canada and India. I have given careful consideration to this proposal and have discussed it with my colleagues. I am fully in sympathy with the view that an exchange of representatives between the two governments should take place at an appropriate time, and I appreciate the reasons which have led Mr. Amery to bring up the matter now.

I feel, however, that it would not be timely for the appointment of High Commissioners to be made at this critical period. Among other factors to be weighed, it must be remembered that such an appointment would be certain to reopen the difficult question of the enfranchisement of the East

* Notes telles que dans l'original:

* Notes as in original:

Let sleeping dogs lie. Don't rouse agitation in B.C. in order to keep down one in India. January 22, 1941, W.L.M.K.

Discussed by War Committee 29-1-41. Committee against appoint[ment] at present.

K.

Indian community in British Columbia. This problem at present is quiescent both in India and in Canada, and I believe that it should be allowed to remain so until we reach calmer waters. A renewal of agitation on this question in India and in British Columbia would tend to defeat the very purposes which Mr. Amery has in mind. If the appointment were not accompanied by action to relieve the East Indians in Canada of their electoral disabilities, their grievances would without doubt be taken up by the Congress party in India. On the other hand, action to enfranchise the East Indians would raise an issue in British Columbia which would be irrelevant to the dominant necessities of the day. The issue, as you know, involves not only the small East Indian community but also the much larger groups of Japanese and Chinese origin.

I should be glad if you would see Mr. Amery and explain the position to him along these lines.

Yours sincerely,

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

32.

1827-40

Le secrétaire au gouvernement de l'Inde au Gouverneur général
Secretary to the Government of India to Governor General

TELEGRAM

New Delhi, March 29, 1941

My Government propose to appoint a Trade Commissioner in Canada with Headquarters at Toronto. Would be grateful if your approval could be accorded to the proposal.

33.

1827-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire
au gouvernement de l'Inde
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary to the
Government of India

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, April 3, 1941

Your telegram March 29th. Canadian Government warmly welcome proposed appointment of Indian Government Trade Commissioner in Canada.

PARTIE 2 / PART 2

RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES AVEC LES GOUVERNEMENTS ALLIÉS

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ALLIED GOVERNMENTS
BELGIQUE ET PAYS-BAS/BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS

34.

1175-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre
auprès du gouvernement belge à Londres*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister to the
Government of Belgium in London*

TELEGRAM 50

Ottawa, October 10, 1940

No final decision has yet been reached as to possibility of further diplomatic employment in your case, but I should like you [Jean Désy] and Mr. Renaud to return to Canada for conference as early as possible. It is our intention to appoint Pierre Dupuy Chargé d'Affaires for Belgium and the Netherlands Legations, as well as the Legation to France. The question of disposition of junior staff now in England will be taken up later.

35.

1175-40

*Le ministre auprès du gouvernement belge à Londres
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister to the Government of Belgium in London
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 92

London, October 11, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 50. Shall report as early as possible as to the date and means of transport. Would you kindly advise me whether I should inform Belgian and Netherlands Governments that I am going on leave, and that during my absence I appoint Pierre Dupuy Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, or do you wish to appoint Dupuy yourself as our representative, and that I should inform both Governments I am recalled definitely from the office as Minister.

36.

1175-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre suppléant¹*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Acting Prime Minister¹*

[Ottawa,] October 15, 1940

You will recall that it was decided last week that Colonel Vanier while continuing to hold his post as Minister to France, would temporarily take

¹ Ernest Lapointe.

a post on the Permanent Joint Defence Board, that Mr. Désy and Mr. Renaud would be asked to return to Canada, and that Pierre Dupuy would be appointed temporary Chargé d'Affaires for the three Legations to France, Belgium and The Netherlands.

As regards the Legation to France, no difficulty arises. All that is necessary is a letter, which is being sent, from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dupuy, stating that in Colonel Vanier's absence he is to act. As regards the Belgian and Netherlands posts, however, as Dupuy is not a member of either Legation, Mr. Beaudry and I think it would be necessary, as a mere formality, to appoint Dupuy to the staffs of those Legations also, whereupon Désy can inform the Government of the Netherlands, which is fully established in London, and the Government of Belgium, which exists in London in a somewhat restricted form, that Dupuy will act as Chargé d'Affaires in his absence.

I enclose a Recommendation to Council which Mr. Beaudry has prepared, and if you approve, it might perhaps be taken up in Council this afternoon.¹

37.

1175-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre
auprès du gouvernement belge à Londres*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister
to the Government of Belgium in London*

TELEGRAM 52

Ottawa, October 21, 1940

Your telegram No. 92. Please inform Belgian and Netherlands Governments that you are going on leave and that, during your absence, Pierre Dupuy, who has been appointed First Secretary of Canadian Legations to Belgium and Netherlands, will be Chargé d'Affaires ad interim. Am advising Dupuy.

TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE/CZECHOSLOVAKIA

38.

1257-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 862

London, December 29, 1939

Dominions Office have forwarded to you correspondence between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Benes regarding the formation of Czechoslovak Committee which has been recognized by the United Kingdom

¹ Cette recommandation fut adoptée par le décret C.P. 5723 du 16 octobre, 1940.

¹ This recommendation was passed as P.C. 5723 of October 16, 1940.

Government as qualified to represent the Czechoslovak peoples. Benes anxious to regulate relations with His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions either through the exchange of letters with these Governments similar to those exchanged with the United Kingdom or by some less formal method. Benes has expressed desire to place himself in touch with me and the other Dominion High Commissioners in London if there is no objection to this course. Would appreciate your cabled observations on this procedure.

MASSEY

39.

1257-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH A.15

London, January 10, 1940

Sir,

Referring to my telegram No. 862 of December 29th I have the honour to inform you that Dr. Benes called on me Monday of this week, January 8th, and left with me a communication, copy of which is attached. This letter is an exact reproduction of the letter sent on December 20th to the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, copy of which I understand you have already received.

2. Dr. Benes also left with me a copy of a letter which he addressed on January 4th to Sir Orme Sargent, of the Foreign Office,¹ in which he indicates the procedure concerning recruitment of Czechoslovak citizens in the United Kingdom, which procedure, he states, has been agreed upon in personal conversations between himself and the Foreign Office.

I have etc.

L. B. PEARSON
for the High Commissioner

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le président du comité national de Tchécoslovaquie au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*The President of the Czechoslovak National Committee
to High Commissioner in Great Britain*

London, January 8, 1940

My dear High Commissioner,

I have been charged to notify your Government that the Czechoslovak National Committee has been formed.

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

2. The members of this Committee, who represent the various elements of the Czechoslovak nation, are: M. E. Benes, General S. Ingr, M. S. Osusky, M. E. Outrata, M. H. Ripka, M. J. Slavik, Mgr. J. Sramek, General R. Viest.

3. This Committee will be qualified to represent the Czechoslovak peoples, and, in particular, in agreement with the Government of Canada, to make such arrangements as may be necessary in the territories under the jurisdiction of the Government of Canada in connection with the reconstitution of the Czechoslovak army in France.

4. In informing you of the constitution of the Committee, I beg to request that the competent authorities of Canada will permit the Committee to proceed with the necessary arrangements in the territories in question, and will afford it all requisite support.

Yours sincerely,

D. EDWARD BENES

40.

1257-39

*Le consul général de Tchécoslovaquie au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Consul General of Czechoslovakia to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

Montreal, March 28, 1940

Dear Dr. Skelton,

I would like to ask you for your kind information about the present state of the proceedings in regard to the recognition of our provisional Government.

When, on December 20th, 1939, His Majesty's Government in Great Britain recognized the Czechoslovak National Committee, headed by Dr. Edward Benes, as qualified to represent the Czechoslovak peoples, Dr. Benes approached the Government of the Dominion of Canada on January 9th, through the Canadian High Commissioner in London, the Honourable Vincent Massey, and asked also for the recognition of the Dominion of Canada.

Such recognition had been previously accorded to the Czechoslovak National Committee by the Government of Republic [sic] in France on November 17th, 1939, and was accorded by the Dominion of New Zealand on February 19th, 1940—and by the Union of South Africa on February 12th, 1940.

Looking forward to your kind advice,

I beg etc.

FRANTISEK PAVLASEK

41.

1257-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 674

London, May 24, 1940

My telegram No. 862, December 29th, Czechoslovak Committee. Benes has asked me to personally bring to your attention urgency of consideration being given recognition of Czechoslovak National Committee by Canadian Government as progress of recruiting Czechoslovaks in Canada for Czechoslovak force in France is impossible until National Committee has been recognized. I promised Benes I would cable you about this.

MASSEY

42.

1257-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 607

Ottawa, May 25, 1940

Your telegram No. 674 of May 24th, Czechoslovak Committee. Importance of solution of question referred to has been kept constantly before the Government by Pavlasek, Czechoslovak Consul General here, and it is regretted that pressure of other business has thus far prevented authorities from giving adequate consideration to it. It is hoped that the position can be cleared up very shortly.

43.

1257-39

*Mémorandum du conseiller¹ au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Counsellor¹ to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] May 31, 1940

QUESTION OF RECOGNITION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL
COMMITTEE

Since our Allies—France, Great Britain, Australia, the Union of South Africa (and doubtless Poland, though on this point no information appears

¹J. S. Macdonald.

to be available here)—have recognized the Czechoslovak National Committee, it would seem desirable in principle and as a gesture of solidarity to accord recognition to the Committee. While it is known that there is a good deal of internal bickering in the Committee, it is carrying on its work fairly effectively and should be of considerable use to the Allied cause in mobilizing Czech resources, human and material, in allied and neutral countries and in keeping alive in Czechoslovakia itself the spirit of resistance to German aggression. For many months past the Committee, through Dr. Benes, has been pressing for recognition and it would seem desirable to dispose of the question without further delay.

The terms and the manner of according recognition require consideration. The principal reason put forward by the Czechoslovaks in asking for recognition is that it would make possible recruiting of Czechs in Canada for the Czechoslovak Force in France. In this they are doubtless thinking in terms of their arrangements with the French Government. We have no specific information on that arrangement but it is known that if able bodied Czechoslovaks resident in France refuse to enlist in the force the French Government steps in and gives them the alternative of a concentration camp. Matters of finance, censorship, release from internment and other questions may also be involved. Due to the considerable number of Czechs in Canada and the proximity of the Czech and Slovak communities in the United States, the question of recognition in Canada may involve rather more aspects than in other Dominions. Accordingly, it would seem desirable, before taking concrete action, to have a talk with the Czechoslovak Consul General with a view to getting further information as to just what practical consequences would be involved in according recognition of the Committee in Canada.

With this information we could then determine the terms of recognition. The United Kingdom Government has recognized the Committee "as qualified to represent the Czechoslovak peoples and, in particular, in agreement with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to make such arrangements as may be necessary in the territories under the jurisdiction of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in connection with the reconstitution of the Czechoslovak army in France. The competent departments of His Majesty's Government will be instructed to concert with the Committee in respect of the arrangements which may be necessary for this purpose in the territories in question, and to afford it all requisite support." Verbal discussions and understandings have doubtless preceded or accompanied this rather ambiguous formula. The South African Government has accorded recognition of the Committee "in any matters affecting the interests of their people which the Committee may wish to bring to the notice of the Government of the Union". The terms of Australia's recognition are not available.

A draft letter to the Czechoslovak Consul General is attached.¹

¹ Non reproduite. Pour le texte final, voir le document 44.

¹ Not printed. For the final text see Document 44.

44.

1257-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général
de Tchécoslovaquie*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General
of Czechoslovakia*

Ottawa, June 1, 1940

Dear Dr. Pavlasek,

With reference to your letter of May 10th¹ and earlier correspondence respecting the question of according recognition to the Czechoslovak National Committee, I may say that we have been giving further consideration to the question and hope to reach a decision shortly. While, I think, the Government is, in principle, inclined to view the question of recognition favourably we are in some doubt as to just what practical consequences would flow from recognition in Canada and are wondering whether it would be convenient for you to come to Ottawa some day next week in order that we might discuss the various aspects of the question informally with you. If you could let me know a date that would be convenient, I would endeavour to make my arrangements accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

45.

1257-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH A.283

London, September 21, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 1574 of September 19th² and to previous correspondence regarding the recognition of the Provisional Czechoslovak Government. I am enclosing herewith copy of a note handed to me by Dr. Hubert Ripka, Secretary of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on this subject.

2. I shall be grateful to receive your instructions in due course as to the reply which should be returned to Dr. Ripka.

I have etc.

L. B. PEARSON
for the High Commissioner

¹ Non reproduite.

² Voir le volume 8, chapitre 4, partie 2.

¹ Not printed.

² See Volume 8, Chapter 4, Part 2.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères du gouvernement provisoire de Tchécoslovaquie au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Czechoslovak Government to High Commissioner in Great Britain

London, September [n.d.] 1940

Your Excellency,

In a letter dated January 8th, 1940,¹ Dr. Edvard Benes, as President of the Czechoslovak National Committee, had the honour to notify to your Government the formation of the Committee in question, a body qualified to represent the Czechoslovak peoples, and in particular, to make, in agreement with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, such arrangements as may be necessary in the territories under the jurisdiction of the said Government for the reconstitution of the Czechoslovak Army.

For several months the Czechoslovak National Committee functioned in accordance with its competence and responsibility. It organised an army which has now been evacuated from France and brought to Great Britain. It fulfilled its duty towards the Czechs and Slovaks at home by organising resistance to our common enemy both at home and abroad, and also by preparing the ground for all further steps which, at the opportune moment, it may be necessary to take for completing the struggle against the occupation of our country by the Germans.

In view of the new situation resulting from the recent events in our country and in Europe as a whole, the National Committee, in agreement with our Army and with all our important political elements abroad, and notably in conformity with the spirit of resistance among the overwhelming majority of the population in our country, has recently decided to constitute a Provisional Czechoslovak Government with all the necessary State mechanism. I have accordingly been charged to notify Your Excellency of this proceeding which marks an important stage in the progress of our efforts for the liberation of our country.

The scheme of this provisional State mechanism is as follows:

I. *President of the Republic*: Edvard Benes, the Second President of Czechoslovakia.

II. *Prime Minister*: Jan Sramek, former Deputy Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Government.

Members of the Cabinet: Jan Becko, L. Feierabend, General S. Ingr, Jan Masaryk, Jaromir Necas, Frantisek Nemecek, Stefan Osusky, Edvard Outrata, Hubert Ripka, Juraj Slavik, General Rudolf Viest.

III. *A National Council* will be created as a Provisional Parliament and will be composed of the representatives of the leading political and

¹ Document 39.

social tendencies in our country. It will function as an advisory and controlling body.

In communicating these facts to Your Excellency, I should first of all like to emphasise that the British Government in a letter addressed by Lord Halifax to President Benes on July 21st, 1940, granted their recognition to this Government, and entered into regular diplomatic relations with it by appointing a new British representative for this purpose. Other Governments—that of Poland, for example,—are taking similar steps. The legal status of the Czechoslovak Legation in London, which continued to function uninterruptedly even after the German seizure of Czechoslovakia on March 15th, 1939, has been duly confirmed by the new Czechoslovak Government.

In constituting the Provisional Czechoslovak Government we continue to maintain our State mechanism on the basis which has been safeguarded by the generous political attitude of His Majesty's Governments in accordance with their spirit of justice and their respect for the rights of nations to freedom and independence.

It is in this spirit that I am conveying to Your Excellency the request that the Government of Canada may adopt towards the Provisional Czechoslovak Government an attitude similar to that of the Government of the United Kingdom.

The Czechoslovak representative in Your Excellency's country has hitherto been Dr. F. Pavlasek, Consul General in Montreal whose services in his previous function the Provisional Government proposes to maintain and thus hopes to enter into regular relations with the Government of Canada.

The Provisional Czechoslovak Government would be grateful to Your Excellency if this request could be communicated to Your Excellency's Government, and would be particularly glad if the procedure indicated above could be accepted as a means for renewing regular relations between our two countries and for recognising our Provisional Government.

Believe me etc.

DR. HUBERT RIPKA

46.

1257-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général
de Tchécoslovaquie¹*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General
of Czechoslovakia¹*

Ottawa, October 12, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government in Canada are happy to recognize and enter into relations with the Provisional Czecho-

¹Cette note fut remise au Dr Pavlasek le 23 octobre 1940.

¹This note was given to Dr. Pavlasek on October 23, 1940.

slovak Government established in the United Kingdom under the distinguished presidency of Dr. Edward Benes. The Canadian Government will be glad to discuss with you, as the representative in Canada of the Provisional Government, all questions arising out of this recognition which may require settlement.

I have etc.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

47.

1257-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

DESPATCH 421

Ottawa, October 12, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 283 of September 21st enclosing a copy of a Note handed to you by Dr. Hubert Ripka, Secretary of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs,¹ relative to the recognition by the Canadian Government of the Provisional Czechoslovak Government, and to enclose, for your information, copy of a Note of today's date addressed to Dr. Pavlasek, Czechoslovak Consul General in Montreal, informing him officially of the Government's decision to recognise the Czechoslovak Provisional Government.

I am also enclosing copy of a letter from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dr. Pavlasek,¹ whose relations with the Department of External Affairs have always been most satisfactory, informing him of our pleasure in learning that he is to continue in his present capacity in Canada as representative of the Czechoslovak Provisional Government.

In acknowledging Dr. Ripka's letter, you could acquaint him with the contents of the Prime Minister's Note, and inform him that the Canadian authorities will be glad to continue to recognize Dr. Pavlasek as Czechoslovak Consul General. I do not think we need go into the question, under present circumstances, of accrediting a Canadian representative to the Czechoslovak Provisional Government.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON

for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

48.

26-CN-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures¹
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs¹

CANADA DESPATCH 179

London, December 28, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to state that, following on the recognition of the Provisional Czechoslovak Government established in London, an enquiry has been received from that Government as to what steps should be taken to regularize the position of their consular representatives in the Dominions.

2. It is thought that it would be advantageous if, both as regards Czechoslovak consular representatives already functioning in the Dominions and officers who may be appointed to the Dominions in future, such appointments could form the subject of an official notification through the diplomatic channel, with a request for formal recognition, which would be referred to the Dominion Government concerned in accordance with the normal procedure in the case of foreign consular officers.

3. I should be glad to learn whether His Majesty's Government in Canada concur in a communication being addressed to the Provisional Czechoslovak Government in this sense, so far as Canada is concerned.

I have etc.

CRANBORNE

49.

26-CN-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

DESPATCH 13

Ottawa, January 30, 1941

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 179 of the 28th December, 1940, concerning an enquiry received from the Provisional Czechoslovak Government established in London as to what steps should be taken to regularize the position of their consular representatives in the Dominions, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government in Canada concur in a communication being addressed to the Provisional Czechoslovak Government in the sense referred to, so far as Canada is concerned.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON
 for the Secretary of State
 for External Affairs

¹ Des dépêches semblables furent expédiées aux gouvernements de l'Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande.

¹ Similar despatches were sent to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand.

GRÈCE/GREECE

50.

10256-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

CANADA DESPATCH 86

London, June 18, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose a copy of a communication addressed by the Greek Minister in London to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, regarding the desire of the Greek Government to establish a Diplomatic Mission in Canada and to enquire what reply His Majesty's Government wish to be returned to Mr. Simopoulos.

I have etc.

CRANBORNE

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Le ministre de Grèce en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire
aux Affaires étrangères

Minister of Greece in Great Britain to Foreign Secretary

London, [n.d.] 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Royal Hellenic Government have come to the decision to proceed to the creation of Diplomatic Missions at Ottawa, Canberra, Pretoria and Wellington, New Zealand. They feel that the bonds which united the Greek and Imperial forces on the battlefield could only be further strengthened by close Diplomatic relations.

I have the honour to request that you may be good enough to approach the respective Governments and convey to them the desire of the Royal Hellenic Government.

I have etc.

CH. SIMOPOULOS

51.

10256-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 158

Ottawa, August 9, 1941

Your despatch No. 86 of 18th June, 1941, and its accompanying copy of communication from Greek Minister in Canada [sic] regarding proposal of Greek Government to establish Diplomatic Mission in Canada. I should be

glad to learn whether it would be agreeable to Greek Government if, in the event of Canadian Government being prepared to accept proposal referred to above, it was understood this arrangement would be for the duration of the war and the question of permanent exchange of Ministers between the two countries would be deferred until after the war. I assume Greek Government do not request, as part of their proposal, that Canadian Government should reciprocate by appointing a Canadian Minister or Chargé d'Affaires at present and understand that His Majesty's Minister accredited to Greek Government would continue to be ordinary channel of communication on matters relating to Canada.

NORVÈGE/NORWAY

52.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] October 2, 1940

Mr. Aubert, who for many years was Norwegian Consul in Montreal and later Minister for Norway [in] Japan and Italy, came to Canada, as you know, some weeks ago on a rather indefinite mission. He finds that between the Consul General in Montreal and General Steffens, who is in charge of their air training, there does not seem to be much for him to do here, and he is accordingly returning to England very shortly. Incidentally, when he was here he referred to the question of the possibility of the Norwegian Royal Family and Government moving to Canada, which had previously been discussed in telegrams between Ottawa and London.¹ Mr. Aubert said that it was his opinion and that of the Norwegian Government that it would not be necessary for this movement to be made as they are confident that the United Kingdom will be able to maintain its defences. However, in view of the possibility that it will be necessary for the Royal Family and Government to cross the ocean, and possibly at a moment's notice, it was felt that it would be desirable to have an understanding here as to the place of refuge in Canada.

Mr. Aubert stated that in London, although the members of the Norwegian Government frequently met members of the United Kingdom Government, all official discussions took place through the Norwegian Minister in that city. He stated that in his opinion a similar arrangement in Ottawa would be the most satisfactory way of handling intercourse between the Canadian and Norwegian Governments should the latter become established here. He would like an expression of the Government's views in regard to the advisability of Norway appointing a Minister for this purpose should the Government migrate to Canada.

¹ Voir le volume 8, chapitre 4, partie 6.

¹ See Volume 8, Chapter 4, Part 6.

Mr. Aubert writes that he would very much appreciate an opportunity of a word with you. I enclose a copy of his letter.¹

O. D. S[KELTON]

53.

26-CD-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

958A/1

SECRET

Ottawa, January 16, 1941

My dear Dr. Skelton,

I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to approach the Canadian authorities informally on the following matter.

The Norwegian Government have approached the United Kingdom Government informally concerning their desire to appoint a Minister in Ottawa having regard to the present importance of their interests in Canada. Lord Cranborne understands that the Norwegian Government have already taken up the matter through the Canadian High Commissioner in London who, while promising to put the suggestion to the Canadian Government, expressed some doubt whether such a proposal would be acceptable even though it was explained by the Norwegian Government that there need be no question of a reciprocal Canadian appointment.

If the proposal were acceptable to the Canadian Government the Norwegian Government have it in mind to appoint as Minister Mr. Steen, their present Consul General in Montreal who was previously Counsellor in London.

The United Kingdom Government much hope that the Canadian Government will feel able to accede to the Norwegian Government's request, both on the general ground of supporting that Government who are loyally carrying on the war with us and because a refusal, which it might be difficult now to keep secret, might have unfortunate reactions on the Norwegian Government's position having regard to the present difficult situation in Norway and the activity of Quisling and the German propaganda there.

Lord Cranborne adds that it would be in accordance with diplomatic precedent for the Canadian Government, if they so desire, to make their agreement conditional on an informal reservation that this did not involve any undertakings on their part to make a reciprocal appointment either now or in the future.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

54.

26-CD-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to
High Commission of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, January 24, 1941

My dear Mr. Hankinson,

With reference to the letter of the 16th January, 1941, from Sir Gerald Campbell, advising that the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs had asked him to approach the Canadian authorities informally on the subject of the Norwegian Government desiring to appoint a Minister in Ottawa, I may say that, on the 17th December last, the Canadian High Commissioner in London advised the Secretary of State for External Affairs as follows:

Norwegian Foreign Minister has approached me with proposal to appoint Norwegian Minister to Canada. If the Canadian Government are willing to receive a Minister, they propose to appoint Daniel Steen, now Consul General in Montreal, a career diplomat. They have indicated that if the Canadian Government should accredit to the Norwegian Government in London a Chargé d'Affaires ad interim already accredited to other Governments (i.e. Dupuy), such an arrangement would be quite satisfactory to the Norwegian Government.

On the 13th January, the Honourable Vincent Massey was informed of the views of the Canadian Government as follows:

Exchange of Ministers with Norway.

On general and on personal grounds we have every sympathy with the proposal for exchange of Missions, but it would be difficult to make arrangements suggested without taking similar action in other directions and our general policy has been not to extend our Diplomatic Service in European countries until after the war.

I may add that, on the 22nd January, the question was raised again in the following telegram from Mr. Massey:

Exchange of Ministers with Norway. Norwegian Government quite appreciate difficulties mentioned in your telegram under reference, and suggest that they might appoint Steen as Norwegian Minister to Canada without a reciprocal appointment of Canadian Minister.

They are particularly anxious to appoint Steen Minister, in view of the existence of the Norwegian Air Mission in Canada. I should be grateful for your instructions.

In view of Sir Gerald's letter and of Mr. Massey's further telegram, the whole matter was reconsidered. While the grounds on which the United Kingdom Government hope that the Canadian Government may feel able to accede to the Norwegian Government's request are appreciated, it is not considered advisable to depart, under existing circumstances, from the decision already conveyed to Mr. Massey. The acceptance of the suggestion now made by the Norwegian Government would certainly give rise to requests for similar action in other directions and it is believed desirable to

await the outcome of developments in Europe before agreeing to receive additional diplomatic representatives from European countries. Mr. Massey has been so advised.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

55.

26-CD-40

*Le consul général de Norvège au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Consul General of Norway to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

PRIVATE

Montreal, March 29, 1941

Dear Mr. Robertson,

In connection with our conversation on Thursday and the message Dr. Koht¹ gave the Prime Minister of the importance of Canada, next to Great Britain, today and the gratitude of our Government for the strong co-operation in our mutual war efforts, I shall feel grateful if your Government would agree to the proposal of our King to make our representation here a Legation, just as in other sovereign countries—Cuba, Mexico, et cetera.

When our Government came to London, the Head of our Shipping Mission, managing 4,000,000 tons of modern ships for our Government, and our Minister in Washington both of their own accord strongly recommended to our Government that I should be appointed Minister here. You will appreciate that it would not be of any benefit for the Canadian Government, if your Representative in Washington, for instance, were a Consul General, with all the dealings you have with the American Government.

I am sure it would be of great advantage to our Government, if they were at liberty to attach to our Legation here a Financial Counsellor, a Press Attaché, a Military and Naval Attaché, as might be required, in the same way as we have done in Washington in order to attend to our different interests and war efforts at the present time. We have our considerable and highly efficient mercantile marine which is of great importance now; we have a great part of our Air Force and Navy training here. There are considerable amounts being spent here today by our Government, and I think it would be of great importance if our Government, as well as the Canadian Government, should not in any way have extra expenses, dictated by formalistic considerations.

If our representation here was made a Legation and I was accredited Minister to Ottawa, we could, in conference with you, decide where it would be most practical for the different members of the Legation to have their permanent residence without involving too much expense. On account of our great

¹Ministre norvégien des Affaires étrangères, de 1935 à février 1941.

¹Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, from 1935 to February 1941.

shipping interests I have always found it of importance that I should be most of the time here and go to Ottawa whenever required. But this is a question which, I hope, can be arranged as we find it necessary.

Dr. Skelton always wished that our representation here also should be a Legation. The two obstacles were that he did not wish a German and Italian Minister here and that it required expense to have a Canadian Legation for the Scandinavian countries. Now both these obstacles have disappeared, as it would not entail extra expense if you should wish to accredit the Secretary of your High Commissioner in London as Chargé d'Affaires to the Norwegian Government, in the same way as other countries have now done.

Yours sincerely,

DANIEL STEEN

56.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires
extérieures au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] March 29, 1941

After Dr. H. Koht and the Norwegian Consul General had seen you on Wednesday afternoon they called at the Department. Dr. Koht had very much appreciated his talk with you and was very grateful generally for the arrangements that had been made in Canada to facilitate the work of the Norwegian Air Training School and of their Shipping Mission. He went on, however, to reopen the question of his Government's desire to appoint a Minister at Ottawa. He said the Norwegian Government quite realized the reasons why the Canadian Government did not wish, under present conditions, to establish new Legations accredited to the Governments in exile, but they were disappointed at our reluctance to receive Mr. Steen as a Minister. His responsibilities in connection with the Norwegian Air Training and Naval Missions were very similar to those of the Belgian and Dutch Ministers in respect to their countries' military missions, and Dr. Koht thought that Mr. Steen could discharge these duties more efficiently and more acceptably if he had the local status of Minister. The Norwegian Government would regard any such arrangement as a temporary war measure and would not expect us, unless we wished, to continue to receive a Norwegian Minister after the war was over. I explained the reasons why we had attached a good deal of importance to formal reciprocity in diplomatic representation and had steadily during the years before the war turned down proposals from the German and Italian Governments to raise their Consulates General in Canada to Legations on the ground that we were not prepared to reciprocate by opening Legations in Berlin and Rome. I also pointed out that Norway was not the only Allied country without diplomatic representation in Canada—that Poland and Czechoslovakia were in the same position and that reception of

a Minister of Norway would certainly reopen the question of the status of the Polish and Czechoslovak representatives here.

I promised Dr. Koht I would bring the conversation to your notice.

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

57.

26-CD-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1845

Ottawa, November 20, 1941

My immediately preceding telegram No. 1844 of November 20th.¹ Proposals from Allied Governments to establish Legations in Canada.

Would be glad if you would advise Norwegian Foreign Minister, informally, that Canadian Government are prepared to accept proposal put forward by Norwegian Government through Consul General here to raise Consulate General to status of Legation and entirely concur in personal suitability of Mr. Steen.

You should add that you will inform him as soon as agreements are reached with other Allied Governments likewise desirous of opening Legations in Canada. Formal action for approval by His Majesty the King will then be taken.

POLOGNE/POLAND

58.

26-EC-40

Le consul général de Pologne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Consul General of Poland to Secretary of State for External Affairs

No. 413-A/2

Ottawa, March 5, 1941

Sir,

Acting upon the instructions received from my Government by cable today, I have the honour to inquire whether the Canadian Government would favour the raising of the Consulate General of Poland in Canada to the status of a Legation.

Should the decision be affirmative, I am directed to inquire whether the filling of the post of Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of Poland by the undersigned be agreeable to the Government of Canada.

I have etc.

VICTOR PODOSKI

¹Document 62.

59.

26-EC-40

*Le consul général de Pologne au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Consul General of Poland to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

No. 413-A/2

Ottawa, April 16, 1941

Dear Mr. Robertson,

Further to my official letter of March 5th, addressed to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and to a reference made by General Sikorski during his conversation with Prime Minister Mackenzie King on April 4th, I would suggest that full reciprocity as regards diplomatic representatives between our two Governments would not, under present circumstances, be considered essential by the Polish Government. I imagine that a high ranking officer of your High Commissioner's Office in London would be acceptable to my Government, or else such a position could be filled by a Canadian diplomatic officer who would be accredited with several Allied Governments—similar to the position held by the United States Ambassador, Mr. Biddle, who represents his country with four Allied Governments.

Yours sincerely,

VICTOR PODOSKI

60.

26-EC-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général
de Pologne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General
of Poland*

Ottawa, August 9, 1941

Dear Mr. Podoski,

With reference to your letters No. 413-a/2 of the 5th March and 16th April, 1941, concerning the proposal of the Polish Government for the establishment of a Legation in Ottawa, and for the appointment of a Canadian Diplomatic Representative in London who would be accredited to the Polish Government, I may say that the Canadian Government would be glad to learn whether it would be agreeable to the Polish Government if, in the event of the Canadian Government being prepared to accept the proposal for the establishment of a Polish Legation in Ottawa, without being prepared to reciprocate in appointing a Canadian Diplomatic Representative as stated above, it was understood this arrangement would be for the duration of the war and the question of permanent exchange of Ministers between the two countries would be deferred until after the war.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

61.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] October 18, 1941

The Polish Consul General called this morning to explain, orally, that the Polish Government did not wish, for the present, to proceed with their proposal for raising their Consulate General here to a Legation.

I gathered from Podoski that his Government inferred, from the conditions attached to our agreement to receive a Legation, viz., that it should be regarded as a wartime arrangement without obligation on Canada to accredit a diplomatic representative to the Polish Government, that the Canadian Government were not particularly anxious to receive a Polish Minister.

I told him I would make a note of the conversation and advise you of it. The Poles are notoriously proud and sensitive, and I am afraid they have taken our reluctance to increase our diplomatic representation abroad rather amiss. Podoski instanced the fact that Dupuy was already accredited to two Allied Governments in London as something that made it hard for the Poles to understand why we would not accredit him, or somebody else on the High Commissioner's staff, as Chargé d'Affaires to the Polish Government.

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

62.

2084-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1844

Ottawa, November 20, 1941

SECRET. For several months past Canadian Government have had under consideration proposals from the Governments of Yugoslavia, Greece, Norway and Poland to establish diplomatic missions in Canada. It was decided to accept the proposals that Legations be established here but to postpone consideration of question of reciprocity by Canada and to enquire, first, whether it would be agreeable to each of Allied Governments concerned that the appointments would be for the duration of the war and question of exchange of Ministers deferred until after the war. Our enquiries on these points were addressed, at the same time, to Yugoslavia, Greece, Norway and Poland through you, the Dominions Office and the Norwegian and Polish Consuls General here, respectively. The position is now clear as to Yugoslavia, as stated in your telegram No. 2090 of 11th November.¹ Norway

¹ Document 66.

has likewise agreed and in immediately following telegram¹ am asking you to see Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs and confirm our acceptance of their proposal. Greece has not yet replied, but is expected to be in accord with our suggestion. Poland, however, has informally and verbally intimated, for reasons to which I shall refer below, that they do not wish further to press their proposal at present.

2. The attitude taken by the Polish Government is delicate in itself and embarrassing generally from the standpoint of the action which it is desired to take soon toward the Yugoslav, Norwegian, and, presumably, Greek proposals.

3. The Polish Government inferred from our enquiries that the Canadian Government were not particularly anxious to receive a Polish Minister and instanced the fact that Dupuy was already accredited to two Allied Governments as a reason why the Polish Government could not understand our reluctance to accredit him as Chargé d'Affaires to them also.

4. The situation has been explained informally to the Polish Consul General who, I believe, now appreciates reasons for our attitude. As reception of Polish Minister here would involve raising Consulate General to Legation, Podoski did not feel he could take any further initiative in the matter, which might be interpreted by his Government as an attempt to promote his personal position.

5. In the circumstances, I think it would be helpful if you could see the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, informally, and make the following points clear to him:

(1) The proposal of Polish Government in March last to raise their Consulate General here to the status of Legation was greatly appreciated by Canadian Government who are prepared to accept it. They also entirely concur in the personal suitability of Mr. Podoski.

(2) We recognize that absence of formal reciprocity may present difficulty but do not feel Dupuy's position need create any awkward criterion for other Allied Governments. Désy's return to Canada would have left a positive breach in representation which already existed and it was essential to avoid such breach. Further, Dupuy's appointment as Chargé d'Affaires to Belgium and Netherlands is in some aspects nominal since bulk of work of mutual interest to Canada and to Belgium or The Netherlands is inevitably, for reasons of practical convenience, handled through these allied countries' representatives in Ottawa. Dupuy's appointment under such circumstances differs from appointment to a new diplomatic post. You might point out that the appointment of Dupuy as Chargé d'Affaires to the Polish Government would involve his being appointed also to other Allied Governments, who have also put forward proposals for exchange of diplomatic missions, and that, for several reasons, we doubt the advisability of taking that course. You

¹ Document 57.

might add that, apart from the very special circumstances which inevitably compelled us to prevent the gap in Canadian representation in the case of Belgium and The Netherlands, we would not have wished to take a step which might be publicly considered a departure from our policy of having our High Commissioner regarded as the sole Representative of Canada in the United Kingdom.

(3) When the proposals for establishment of diplomatic missions in Canada were put forward by Governments of Poland and other Allied countries, we were anxious to deal with them on a comparable basis and at the same time, and thought it advisable to enquire whether they would agree in view of war considerations to waive formal reciprocity for the time being, on the understanding that these arrangements would be reviewed after the war.

(4) These enquiries have now been practically completed and arrangements are being made on this basis for reception of Ministers of other Allied countries and failure to reach similar understanding with Poland might be misconstrued.

(5) Canadian Government trust that Polish Government appreciate our desire to meet their wishes as far as possible and that they will be prepared to reconsider their position with a view to accepting the suggestion that the appointment of a Polish Minister in Canada, without reciprocity by Canada, might be understood to be for the duration of the war and question of permanent exchange of Ministers between the two countries be deferred until after the war.

YUGOSLAVIE/YUGOSLAVIA

63.

10277-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 995

London, May 28, 1941

Yugoslav Minister called on me personally today to ask if the Canadian Government would be willing to receive a Yugoslav Legation in Ottawa. Yugoslav Minister did not expect the Canadian Government to reciprocate by an exchange of missions. Minister emphasized favourable effect on Yugoslav morale which acceptance of proposal would have. In view of your adverse decision regarding proposal for Norwegian Legation, I said nothing to encourage Yugoslav Minister.

For further information regarding Yugoslav Government, see my immediately following cypher telegram.¹

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

64.

10277-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1371

London, July 31, 1941

My telegram No. 995 of May 28th. Yugoslav Minister called again, accompanied by General Simovitch, Yugoslav Prime Minister, to ask if I had received his request from Yugoslav Government to establish Yugoslav Legation in Ottawa.

I should be grateful for a reply to my telegram under reference to enable me to give an answer to Yugoslav Prime Minister.

MASSEY

65.

10277-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1196

Ottawa, August 9, 1941

Your telegrams No. 995 of 28th May and No. 1371 of 31st July, 1941, concerning proposal of Yugoslav Government to establish Legation in Ottawa. I should be glad to learn whether it would be agreeable to the Yugoslav Government if, in the event of Canadian Government being prepared to accept proposal referred to, it was understood this arrangement would be for the duration of the war and the question of permanent exchange of Ministers between the two countries would be deferred until after the war.

66.

26-EK-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2090

London, November 11, 1941

Your telegram No. 1196 of August 9th, Yugoslav Minister to Canada. Yugoslav Government propose to appoint Dr. Isidor Cankar as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Dr. Cankar has graduated in the Faculty of Letters (in aesthetics) and has studied in Vienna and Belgium. He has for a long time been Editor-in-Chief of the leading Slovene newspaper *Slovenac*. In 1923 he was appointed Professor of the History of Art in the University of Ljubljana.

Dr. Cankar is at present Yugoslav Minister in Buenos Aires.

Yugoslav Government agree that (a) arrangement is for the duration of the war only, and the question of permanent exchange to be discussed after the war; (b) appointment is on a non-reciprocal basis.

MASSEY

PARTIE 3/PART 3
RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES AVEC LES PAYS
DE L'AMÉRIQUE LATINE
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

ARGENTINE/ARGENTINA

67.

261-40

*Mémoire du conseiller¹ au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Counsellor¹ to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] April 5, 1940

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINE

While you were away, Señor Irigoyen of Buenos Aires, who is the senior official of the Argentine Department of Finance and of the Argentine Central Bank, was in Ottawa for two or three days. He saw Clark, Wilgress and Towers, and called at the Department. His primary mission was in New York where, I understand, he was attempting to arrange a United States dollar credit for the Argentine Government. While here he raised the question of a special trade agreement between Canada and Argentina under which they would grant us the benefit of the official exchange rate on imports of automobiles now enjoyed by the United Kingdom if we would take sterling in whole or in partial payment. The official exchange rate is 15 pesos to the pound against 17 pesos in the free markets in which currency for the payment of United States automobiles must be purchased. The difficulties in the way of such an arrangement are obvious, but in view of the narrowing of Empire export markets for automobiles, it had attractive aspects which could not be entirely overlooked.

When he came to see me at the Department, he referred to his letter to Towers of last November, copy of which you have seen, in which he said he had been asked by the Foreign Minister to prepare a report on the pros and cons of establishing direct diplomatic relations between Canada and Argentina. His Government were quite interested in such a development and

¹ N. A. Robertson.

he understood that the Foreign Minister had twice within the last few months raised the question informally with the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires. I gave him some indication of the limiting factors which operate to restrict the expansion of Canadian diplomatic representation abroad. He wondered whether the Government here would receive an Argentine Minister even if we were not prepared to reciprocate by establishing a Legation in Buenos Aires right away. He agreed that it would be almost impossible for us to have a Minister in Argentina without also appointing a man to Rio de Janeiro and to Santiago, and recognized that simultaneous appointments to three South American posts might seem a disproportionate expansion of our service. He insisted, however, that his Government was very anxious to establish closer connections with Canada, instancing our common but competing interests in the world wheat market and in the United Kingdom market in particular, as well as the importance for both of us of our relations with the United States.

68.

261-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH A.143

London, May 3, 1940

Sir,

The Argentine Ambassador called upon me today to ask me to convey to the Government of Canada the desire of his Government to establish a diplomatic mission in Ottawa and to receive a Canadian Minister in Buenos Aires. M. Le Breton said that the trade between the two countries, considerable even in peace time, had so grown under war conditions that his Government now held the view that diplomatic missions should be exchanged between them.

2. I asked the Ambassador whether his Government would be prepared, assuming the approval of the Government of Canada, to establish a Legation in Ottawa without a reciprocal step on the part of Canada. In answer to this M. Le Breton said he thought his Government would not be prepared to establish a mission in Ottawa without a corresponding action on the part of Canada at more or less the same time. I gathered that even an undertaking to reciprocate at some future date would not be satisfactory.

3. M. Le Breton asked me to convey the proposal of his Government to you and he also said that if Canada was not prepared at the present time to exchange missions with the Argentine they would be glad to be informed if possible whether the Canadian Government felt that such action might be taken in the future.

4. I should be glad to be informed at your convenience what reply I am to give to the Ambassador.

I have etc.

VINCENT MASSEY

69.

261-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

PRIVATE

Washington, May 24, 1940

Dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to your private letter of February 20th, 1940,¹ addressed to Mr. Christie concerning informal conversations he had with the Argentine Ambassador regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and Argentina, Dr. Espil called on May 22nd to say that he had received a despatch from Buenos Aires informing him that his Government had instructed the Argentine Ambassador in London to make [a] formal approach to the Canadian Government through that channel and to submit a proposal which, as translated from the despatch received by Dr. Espil, reads as follows:

This Chancellery contemplates the necessity of fostering a closer relationship between the Argentine Republic and Canada through the establishment of respective Legations in Ottawa and at Buenos Aires.

The Argentine Chancellery considers, in effect, that Canada is, after the United States and Brazil, our most important buyer and seller in this Continent, providing besides, in view of the identity of its economic problems, a special interest for the Argentine Republic.

The present international circumstances emphasize the solidarity of interests of the American Community within which it is inexplicable that Canada and the Argentine should continue in their reciprocal lack of contact.

This Government would be prepared to proceed at once to create a Legation at Ottawa, provided that the Government of Canada decide to do likewise in Buenos Aires or express its conformity in principle.

Dr. Espil was instructed to inform Mr. Christie accordingly and to emphasize the desire of the Argentine Government to proceed as early as possible with the establishment of a Legation at Ottawa. Dr. Espil added that Mr. Christie had informed him of the difficulties in the way of dealing with the matter at this time. He fully appreciates the situation, but would be pleased to be informed of the attitude of the Government at your convenience.

Yours sincerely,

M. M. MAHONEY

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

70.

261-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] May 29, 1940

Attached is a despatch from Mr. Massey of May 3rd, transmitting a formal suggestion of the Argentine Government that diplomatic missions should be exchanged.

The Argentine Government evidently feels strongly on this as they have made approaches through various directions recently.

In November last the Chairman of the Argentine Central Bank wrote Mr. Towers:¹

Our Foreign Office has asked me to prepare a confidential memorandum on the advantages of our Government establishing diplomatic relations with the Government of the Dominion of Canada. . .

It seems to me that we have some problems in common and that in these uncertain times we of this Western Hemisphere, no matter what ties bind us to the Old World, should stick together and exchange views as to the situation confronting us, and if the occasion arises, move together on the same general line of action.

In February of this year Mr. Christie reported that the Argentine Ambassador, whom he had known for some years, had spoken to him about the suggestion informally. Mr. Christie had replied that personally he shared the wish, though he doubted whether any action on the part of Canada could be expected at this time. He indicated there was a growing interest in Canada in the idea of more contacts with Latin America, but that if there were a question of exchanging Ministers with one of the South American countries, the Canadian Government would probably have to consider their position regarding some of the other countries on that continent; there might also be special considerations connected with war conditions.

In replying to the note from Mr. Christie summarizing this conversation, I referred to correspondence which took place in March 1939 when the Brazilian Government approached us, and which indicated that we were not able at that time to accept the proposal to exchange Ministers.

I enclose a copy of a letter of May 24th from Mahoney, pointing out the special importance which the Argentine Government attach to such an exchange.

There are obvious difficulties in the way of any such expansion at the present time, but there are also definite advantages.

¹Gouverneur de la Banque du Canada.

¹Governor, Bank of Canada.

71.

261-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 187

Washington, August 6, 1940

Argentine Ambassador yesterday enquired respecting formal approach made to Canadian Government concerning establishment of diplomatic relations as mentioned in our letter of May 24th. He said that he had been asked by his Government to make enquiry and spoke as if they were somewhat surprised that they had not yet received a reply.

72.

433-40

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] August 10, 1940

Attached is copy of a telegram from Washington¹ conveying a further enquiry from the Argentine Ambassador as to our attitude in the establishment of diplomatic relations.

I told Mr. Christie that he could tell the Argentine Ambassador that the Canadian Government appreciated the interest which the Government of Argentina had shown, that the question was being very carefully considered and it was hoped shortly to convey an indication of the Canadian Government's position.

On May 24th Mahoney wrote that the Argentine Ambassador had called to say that he had received a despatch from Buenos Aires informing him that his Government had instructed the Argentine Ambassador in London to make formal approach to the Canadian Government through that channel and to submit a proposal which, in translation, read as follows:

This Chancellery contemplates the necessity of fostering a closer relationship between the Argentine Republic and Canada through the establishment of respective Legations in Ottawa and at Buenos Aires.

The Argentine Chancellery considers, in effect, that Canada is, after the United States and Brazil, our most important buyer and seller in this Continent, providing besides, in view of the identity of its economic problems, a special interest for the Argentine Republic.

The present international circumstances emphasize the solidarity of interests of the American Community within which it is inexplicable that Canada and the Argentine should continue in their reciprocal lack of contact.

I enclose, also, a copy of Mr. Massey's despatch of May 3rd transmitting a formal suggestion of the Argentine Government that diplomatic missions should be exchanged.

¹ Document 71.

Evidently the press despatches to South America regarding your statement during the External Affairs Estimates were somewhat more precise than was warranted, to judge from the statement which appeared a day or two later that Cantillo, the Foreign Minister from Argentina, whom you met in Geneva, expressed his great pleasure and indicated that Argentina would be ready to discuss the matter.

The two Latin American countries most important from both the political and economic point of view are Argentina and Brazil. Chile, Mexico and Cuba would come in the next group. Argentina is the leader of the countries whose trade and cultural connections are mainly with Europe. Brazil is the largest of the countries in the northern part of South America which in trade matters, at least, are more closely connected with the United States. It would be difficult to appoint a Minister to either of these two countries without appointing to the other and they are so far apart that I do not think the Brussels-Hague experiment could be worked there satisfactorily.

It would be possible to make a start this year out of the saving that would be effected in representation in Europe. The main difficulty, however, as you have always emphasized in matters of this kind is getting the right men for the job. So far as men from the Service is concerned, you might consider Wrong for Argentina and Désy for Brazil (or Vanier if he was not to be retained in Europe, or brought back to your Office, or sent to one of the Canadian military districts). It might be preferable to appoint a man with experience in public affairs or business to one of the posts.

I intend to see next week whether there would be any junior staff available with knowledge of Spanish and Portuguese respectively.

O. D. S[KELTON]

73.

261-40

*Mémoire du Premier ministre au sous-secrétaire
d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Prime Minister to Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] August 13, 1940

I am inclined to doubt the wisdom of making an appointment at this particular time. South America will be a trouble zone while the war continues.

It will be preferable, I think, to begin with consular representatives, to follow later with diplomatic. If the right persons for the consular positions could be obtained, I would favour having Consulates opened in both Argentina and Brazil, and both countries informed that this was intended as a preliminary to the opening of a Legation at some future date. That ought to come, I think, just as soon as the war is over; possibly before, if it runs longer than another year.

W. L. M[ACKENZIE] K[ING]

74.

King Papers, PAC

*Extrait du mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Extract from Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

...

[Ottawa,] September 12, 1940

The growing importance of Latin America, politically and industrially, and the desirability of closer Canadian contact, are now widely recognized. You have indicated that you do not think it desirable to consider joining the Pan American Union now, particularly as we are a belligerent country, but that you had in mind the possibility of effecting a direct diplomatic exchange with some of the larger countries. Argentina and Brazil have both recently indicated their desire to send a Minister here. It would not be essential that we should reciprocate immediately, but they would like, before they acted, an indication of our intending to reciprocate shortly.

In a recent note you indicated you were considering the possibility of sending a Consul instead of a Minister. The *Ottawa Journal* last month (August 9th) suggested a Trade Commissioner:

The Government is said to be considering diplomatic representatives to South American republics. Wouldn't it be wiser to send the ablest possible trade representatives? Trade representatives might not mean so much to our "status"; they might get us more trade—which is probably more important.

Under the circumstances I think that only the appointment of a Minister would effectively meet the need.

Trade Commissioners perform very useful functions, and our Canadian Service is an excellent one. But they do not represent the Canadian Government and have not access to a foreign government. Their business is to serve as a link between business men here who are seeking trade outlets, and business men in the other country. Years ago that was all that was needed, aside from making an occasional trade agreement or tariff change. Nowadays it is emphatically not enough. In every country in which we seek to do business the State has intervened. It controls trade by quotas, import licences, exchange controls, import monopolies, and every other device designed to restrict and divert trade in the interest of domestic exigencies or political considerations. Trade Commissioners cannot deal with the problems so created. Only a Minister can have access to a foreign government and try to clear away these barriers.

A Consul has more political standing. He represents his government, but represents it locally. He is not accredited to the other government, but acts in co-operation with the Legation of his country. His duties are in part trade promotion, but more concerned with administrative acts—taking custody of estates, registering citizens, issuing passports and visas, certifying trade invoices, administering shipping Acts and clearing vessels, performing notarial services, etc. For most of these functions fees are charged which largely go to maintain the office.

It is true that in Canada, in the absence of diplomatic officers, and with the United Kingdom carrying on our diplomatic work, the practice grew up of recognizing foreign Consuls here as having quasi-diplomatic standing. That is disappearing here with the setting up of Legations, and in any event most foreign countries, particularly the larger Latin American States, do not give any such recognition.

I had a visit yesterday from Major McCrimmon, of "Brazilian".¹ He has been a very strong imperialist, but he said he had become convinced of the necessity of direct Canadian representation in Brazil and Argentine if we were to take our place in the future commercial and political relations of this hemisphere. I asked him if it would not suffice to appoint Consuls. He said he thought absolutely not: they would not have the standing; they could supplement a Minister but they could not take his place.

As to personnel, there would be two possibilities from our own service, Désy and Wrong: if legations were established, probably one post should be filled by a man with public or business experience. The funds for the balance of the year could be met from the vote for "Representation Abroad".

75.

433-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 188

Ottawa, October 28, 1940

IMPORTANT. As you may be aware, some months ago the Argentine Government through their representatives in London and Washington approached the Canadian Government informally on the subject of exchange of Ministers, and the Brazilian Government have made similar approaches through their representative in London and otherwise.

The Canadian Government have come to the conclusion that it is desirable to accept these proposals and to proceed to the establishment of Canadian Legations at Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro on a reciprocal basis.

It is requested that the wishes of the Canadian Government be submitted for His Majesty's approval.

When His Majesty's approval has been received, it is requested that the Argentine and Brazilian Governments be advised as follows: Quote.

His Majesty's Government in Canada have come to the conclusion that it is desirable that the handling of matters at Buenos Aires (at Rio de Janeiro) relating to Canada should be confided to an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary accredited to the Argentine (Brazilian) Government.

Such a Minister would be accredited by His Majesty the King to the President of Argentina (the President of Brazil) and he would be furnished with credentials which would enable him to take charge of all affairs relating to

¹ Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd.

Canada. He would be the ordinary channel of communication with the Argentine Government (Brazilian Government) on these matters. The arrangements proposed would not denote any departure from the principle of the diplomatic unity of the Empire, that is to say, the principle of consultative co-operation amongst all His Majesty's representatives as amongst His Majesty's Governments themselves, in matters of common concern. The methods of dealing with matters which may arise concerning more than one of His Majesty's Governments would therefore be settled by consultation between the representatives of His Majesty's Governments concerned.

In proposing the establishment of a Canadian Legation, His Majesty's Government in Canada trust that it will promote the maintenance and development of cordial relations, not only between Argentina (Brazil) and Canada, but also between Argentina (Brazil) and the whole British Commonwealth of Nations.

End quote.

In view of the proposals made by the Argentine and Brazilian Governments, it would be appreciated if, as soon as His Majesty's approval is given and steps are being taken by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to communicate with the Argentine and Brazilian Governments as referred to above, you would advise me in order that I may request the Canadian Minister at Washington to advise the Argentine Ambassador informally and if you would also at the same time advise the Canadian High Commissioner in London in order that he may inform the Argentine and Brazilian Ambassadors informally.

76.

261-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1693

Ottawa, October 28, 1940

IMPORTANT. With reference to approaches informally made by the Argentine and Brazilian Governments on the subject of exchange of Ministers, I have just cabled Dominions Office stating that Canadian Government have come to the conclusion it is desirable to accept these proposals and to proceed to the establishment of Canadian Legations at Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro on a reciprocal basis, and requesting that the wishes of the Canadian Government be submitted for His Majesty's approval.

I have also requested the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that, as soon as His Majesty's approval is given and steps are being taken by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to communicate with the Argentine and Brazilian Governments officially according to the usual practice, he might advise you in order that you may inform the Argentine and Brazilian Ambassadors informally.

77.

261-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 157

London, November 8, 1940

Your telegram of October 28th, No. 188. His Majesty has approved establishment of Canadian Legations at Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is instructing His Majesty's representatives concerned to communicate with the Argentine and Brazilian Governments as desired. Canadian High Commissioner here is being informed.

78.

26-CJ-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 4

Ottawa, January 10, 1941

IMPORTANT. We have been informed that the Argentine Government propose to appoint Dr. Pablo Santos Muñoz as Minister to Canada. His Majesty's Government in Canada, with the concurrence of His Excellency the Governor General, recommend acceptance of Señor Muñoz as *persona grata* and request that this recommendation may be submitted for His Majesty's approval.

79.

26-CJ-40

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 112

London, January 20, 1941

Your telegram of January 4th, No. 34.¹ I am informed today His Majesty has approved appointment of Señor Pablo Santos Muñoz as Argentine Minister to Canada.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

80.

261-40

*L'Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en Argentine au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador of Great Britain in Argentina to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 12

Buenos Aires, March 31, 1941

My telegram No. 8 of February 19th.¹

Friendly official hinted today that unless Canadian Minister had been designated, and *agrément* secured, proposed sailing of Argentine Minister for Ottawa in April "would be pointless".

OVEY

81.

261-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] April 7, 1941

DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AMERICA

With the worsening of relations between the United States and German Governments, the question of our diplomatic relations with Argentina is becoming rather urgent. As you know, preliminary arrangements were made some time ago between the United Kingdom and Argentina for the latter to take over British interests in enemy and enemy occupied territory in the event that the United States should, for any reason, be unable to continue as the Protecting Power for British interests. If the United States should become involved in the war, or if, as is quite likely, diplomatic relations should be broken off between the United States and Germany, the United States diplomatic and consular services would be unable to continue the protection they have been giving to British and Canadian interests in enemy and enemy occupied countries. Presumably, we should then ask Argentina to take over this responsibility on our behalf and at our expense. This would inevitably lead to much less satisfactory arrangements than those that have been worked out with the United States authorities, largely through our Legation in Washington.

The difficulties of working with the Argentine as Protecting Power would be sufficiently great even if there were an Argentine Legation in Ottawa and a Canadian Legation at Buenos Aires. Should the necessity of asking the Argentine to act as our Protecting Power arise before Legations are established, we might be cut off from communications with our nationals in Europe

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

for several weeks and possibly months. It would be hoped that, if the Argentine became the Protecting Power for Canadian interests, it would be possible for them to handle communications with enemy countries directly from their Legation in Ottawa to their offices in Europe rather than by way of Buenos Aires.

This aspect of the situation gives a quite unexpected urgency, I think, to completing arrangements for the exchange of Ministers as quickly as possible. The Argentine Government, which designated its Minister to Ottawa about two months ago, indicated a few days ago to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires that it seemed "quite pointless" for them to hurry up with their plans for establishing a Legation in Ottawa until they had some word as to when the Canadian Government intended to reciprocate.

I think you have been counting on the possibility that Christie might have been in shape by this time to take over the organization of our Legation at Buenos Aires. Unfortunately this possibility is now out of the question and the question of the appointment of a Minister to Argentina will have to be considered *ab initio*.

Of the present External Affairs Service, the only immediately available man is Colonel Vanier. He has been anxious to retain his status as Minister to France, and in the autumn, when the possibility of his appointment to a South American post was canvassed, there seemed to be some grounds for believing that appointing our Minister to Paris to another post would further prejudice the precarious balance on which our relations with the Vichy Government stood. This factor, I think, has lost some of its weight. In fact, if the occasion arose to appoint a permanent mission to Vichy under present conditions there would, I think, be a lot to be said for naming an English Canadian to it.

There are two complications in the way of appointing Vanier to Buenos Aires—one, that Désy will be going to Rio de Janeiro, the other that Buenos Aires is a notoriously expensive post in which a man without some private means would probably find himself embarrassed.

If, as seems probable, the Minister to Argentina had to be appointed from outside the Service, there might be something to be said for trying to get a man from the prairies with a good understanding of Canadian agricultural problems, which have their close counterpart in Argentina. Wheat is the biggest problem which we share with Argentina and one in which we may require Argentinian collaboration in any new effort to work out an international solution. It is not easy to find the combination of qualifications which we would like our new Minister to have. The salary provided for the post is \$10,000 a year, with allowances of \$12,000 a year, but I am assured that some supplementary private means would be useful if not absolutely indispensable. I am appending a brief note¹ on half a dozen persons, one or other of whom might seem suitable to you.

[N. A. ROBERTSON]

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

82.

1743-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1137

Ottawa, July 29, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL. Canadian Government, with the concurrence of the Governor General, desire to ascertain whether His Majesty would approve the appointment of Honourable W. F. A. Turgeon, at present Chief Justice of Saskatchewan, as His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada in Argentina. Please make verbal submission to His Majesty. Formal submission will be forwarded by air mail within the next few days.

83.

1743-40

*Décret du Conseil
Order in Council*

P.C. 5822

July 31, 1941

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, advise that the Honourable W. F. A. Turgeon be appointed as His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada in the Argentine Republic; that His Majesty the King be humbly moved to approve such appointment and that the usual steps to submit this matter to His Majesty be taken.

84.

1743-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for
External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1404

London, August 6, 1941

Your telegram No. 1137 of July 29th. The King approves the appointment of the Honourable W. F. A. Turgeon as Minister in the Argentine.

MASSEY

85.

1743-40

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures¹
au secrétaire aux Dominions*

Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs¹ to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 168

Ottawa, August 19, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL. His Majesty the King has approved the appointment of the Honourable W. F. A. Turgeon, at present Chief Justice of Saskatchewan, Canada, as His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada in Argentina. I should be grateful, therefore, if His Majesty's Representative at Buenos Aires might be requested to ascertain whether this appointment would be agreeable to the Government of Argentina.

86.

1743-40

*L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en Argentine au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador of Great Britain in Argentina to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Buenos Aires, August 25, 1941

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 573 of August 25th. Repeated to Ottawa and by air mail to Santiago.

Your telegram No. 574 and your telegram No. 522.²

1. Argentine Government informed.

2. Is Canadian Minister also to be accredited to Chile?

Grateful for an early reply.

OVEY

87.

1743-40

*L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en Argentine au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador of Great Britain in Argentina to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Buenos Aires, August 27, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Addressed Foreign Office No. 580 of August 27th, repeated Ottawa and saving Santiago. My telegram No. 573, Argentine Government agree.

OVEY

¹ Ernest Lapointe.

² Non reproduits.

³ Not printed.

BRÉSIL/BRAZIL

88.

King Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du major K. H. McCrimmon de la «Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd.»

Memorandum by Major K. H. McCrimmon of Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd.

[Toronto,] June 18, 1940

RE: REQUEST OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FOR EXCHANGE
OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES WITH CANADA

On the eve of my departure from Brazil, on the 6th instant, I was called twice by the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs who informed me that he was desirous of exchanging diplomatic representatives with Canada, South Africa and possibly with Australia. He stated that negotiations with South Africa toward this end were well advanced and he asserted that preliminary soundings had been made in conversations which had taken place between himself and Sir Geoffrey Knox, the British Ambassador to Brazil. He appeared to think that the attitude of the British Ambassador was not responsive. Dr. Aranha requested that I should make his wishes known to the Canadian Government and based his desire in this connection on the advantages which might conceivably accrue to the Allied cause through such an exchange. He stated that Pan America in general did not recognise the importance of Canada's continental position either politically or economically and was of the opinion that a more intimate association of Canada in Latin American affairs would be of political value not only to Canada itself but also to the United States in its endeavour to hold the South American countries more or less in line with democratic institutions. Dr. Aranha further stated that he would be prepared to send one of Brazil's most accomplished diplomats as Minister to Canada but he could not take any such steps unless he had assurances that Canada would reciprocate, if not at once, at least within a reasonable period of time. I have discussed confidentially Dr. Aranha's suggestion with colleagues and representative Canadians resident in Brazil and they all welcomed the idea. It is desired to emphatically assert that this suggestion does not emanate from the interests with which I am connected as we have always been abundantly satisfied with the treatment which has been accorded to us by the British diplomatic representation in Brazil.

It should be further stated that whatever may be the reservations of some members of the Brazilian Government in connection with the Allied cause these reservations are not applicable to the Brazilian Foreign Minister who is openly militant in his advocacy of the cause of Democracy and the Allies. It is possible that Dr. Aranha's presentation of his point of view in this manner offends normal diplomatic procedure but in any case my personal

relations with him are of a somewhat intimate nature and I am simply passing on a message as it was received. Naturally the Brazilian Foreign Minister expanded on the reasons given, but the above is a synopsis of his representation to me . . .

K. H. McCrimmon

89.

.433-40

*L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne au Brésil au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador of Great Britain in Brazil to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Rio de Janeiro, November 26, 1940

Addressed to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, repeated to Foreign Office, telegram No. 388 of November 23rd.

My telegram of November 15th.¹ Brazilian Government welcome decision to establish Canadian Legation at Rio de Janeiro,² and have decided to set up Brazilian Legation in Canada.

90.

26-CH-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 5

Ottawa, January 10, 1941

We have been informed by the Brazilian Ambassador in London through the Canadian High Commissioner that the Brazilian Government have requested through the Foreign Office His Majesty's *agrément* for the appointment of Senhor João Alberto Lins de Barros as Brazilian Minister to Canada.

His Majesty's Government in Canada, with the concurrence of His Excellency the Governor General, recommend acceptance and request that this recommendation may be submitted for His Majesty's approval.

¹ Non reproduit.

² Voir le document 75.

¹ Not printed.

² See Document 75.

91.

26-CH-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 125

Ottawa, January 24, 1941

Your telegram No. 132¹ of 23rd January. I should be glad if you would advise Brazilian Ambassador that His Majesty The King has been pleased to give approval to appointment of Senhor Barros and you might request at the same time that Brazilian Government be informed accordingly.

92.

1742-40

Décret du Conseil

Order in Council

P.C. 4647

June 24, 1941

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, advise that Jean Désy, Esquire, K.C., who was His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada in Belgium and The Netherlands, be appointed as His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada in Brazil; that His Majesty the King be humbly moved to approve such appointment and that the usual steps to submit this matter to His Majesty be taken.

93.

1742-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 948

Ottawa, June 25, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL. Canadian Government, with the concurrence of the Governor General, desire to ascertain whether His Majesty would approve the appointment of Jean Désy, one of His Majesty's Counsel learned in the law, who was Canadian Minister in Belgium and The Netherlands, as His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada in Brazil. Please make verbal submission to His Majesty. Formal document of submission will be forwarded by air mail within the next few days.

¹ Non reproduit.

² Not printed.

94.

1742-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1177

London, June 27, 1941

Your telegram No. 948 of June 24th. The King is pleased to give informal approval of appointment of Jean Désy as Canadian Minister in Brazil.

95.

1742-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 111

Ottawa, June 28, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL. His Majesty the King has approved the appointment of Jean Désy, one of His Majesty's Counsel learned in the law, who was Canadian Minister in Belgium and The Netherlands, as His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada in Brazil. I should be grateful, therefore, if His Majesty's representative at Rio de Janeiro might be requested to ascertain whether this appointment would be agreeable to the Government of Brazil.

96.

1742-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 989

Ottawa, July 2, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Would appreciate if you could ascertain from the appropriate British authorities, as soon as possible, what is the customary practice on following points:

1. (a) When a Minister is being transferred from one post to another and it is likely that many months or years will intervene before a new Minister will be appointed to the post being vacated, should Letters of Recall be presented to Head of State to which he is at present accredited, before Letter of Credence is presented to Head of State to which he is being accredited;

(b) If answer is in affirmative, who would present Letters of Recall assuming Minister has already taken his departure?

2. To whom should Letters of Recall be addressed in the case of a Minister being withdrawn from Belgium in view of the fact that the King is a prisoner?

97.

1742-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1255

London, July 12, 1941

Your telegram No. 989 of July 2nd. Answer to point (1) is that it is not necessary that a Minister's Letters of Recall from one State should be presented there before he delivers his credentials to another State. Letters of Recall can be left to be presented by his successor when the latter delivers his own Letter of Credence.

As regards point (2) Foreign Office think it would be best for us to consult Belgians, and I shall ask Dupuy to do so. As far as general principle is concerned, you may be interested to know that when His Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen was later sent to be Minister at Reykjavik, he was given credentials signed by His Majesty The King and addressed to His Majesty The King of Iceland and Denmark, although King Christian was not in position to exercise function of sovereignty where Iceland was concerned.

MASSEY

98.

1742-40

*L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne au Brésil au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador of Great Britain in Brazil to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Rio de Janeiro, July 17, 1941

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 323, July 17th, repeated to Ottawa.

Your telegram No. 330.¹ Mr. Désy's appointment is agreeable to the Brazilian Government.

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

CHILI/CHILE

99.

1621-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] November 28, 1940

The new Consul General of Chile, Señor Feliú, is quite a live chap. He has only been in town for ten days and I have already seen more of him officially than of the Consul General of Argentina, who has been here for ten years. Señor Feliú was formerly Consul in New York and recently Consul General in Buenos Aires. He brought a verbal communication from his Government the other day stating they had noted the intention of the Canadian Government to exchange Ministers with Brazil and Argentina, and saying that they would be glad to establish a Legation here under Mr. Feliú with the rank of Chargé d'Affaires. I told him it had been our practice to keep in mind the possibility of reciprocal action in such matters, and while we appreciated the importance of Chile in the Latin American picture, I doubted whether it would be feasible, on financial and other grounds, to establish a third Legation in South America at the present time. Mr. Feliú rather surprised me by saying that he did not think there would be any difficulty in our doing what one or two of the Scandinavian countries have done—appoint a Minister to Buenos Aires, also a Minister to Chile, and arrange for him to pay a visit once or twice a year to Santiago without maintaining any permanent office there. I told him I would bring this matter to your attention.

I told him that you were extremely busy at present with your duties in Parliament, but that I was sure you would be glad to see him some time next week or as soon as the session ended.

[O. D. SKELTON]

100.

1621-40

*Le consul général du Chili au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Consul General of Chile to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

No. 30

Ottawa, December 16, 1940

Sir,

On the 22nd. of November I had the honour of seeing you in regard to the advisability of an exchange of Legations between our countries.

You were good enough to consider my Government's initiative as a very friendly and pleasing one which you would consult with your Government.

I was also to consult mine and find out whether, if need be, the Government of Chile would be satisfied if the prospective Canadian Minister to the Argentine be accredited, at the same time, to Chile, without the necessity of appointing—from the start—a Chargé d'Affaires in Santiago to take the Minister's place during his absences in Buenos Aires.

My Minister of Foreign Relations has instructed me to inform the Right Honourable Prime Minister that it would highly please the Government of Chile to exchange Legations with the Dominion of Canada, on terms similar to those suggested by the Hon. Under-Secretary on November the 22nd.

The Government of the Republic of Chile is prepared to telegraph to the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister his appointment to the writer as soon as I may wire that I have interviewed him and received word of his acceptance of my Minister of Foreign Relations' proposal.

I beg to request the favour of your able assistance and cooperation to the very friendly move of my Government as a second step toward a better and far reaching understanding and comity between our two countries.

Looking forward to the pleasure of presenting my respects to the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister and yourself, at your earliest convenience.

I remain etc.

LUIS E. FELIÚ H.

101.

1621-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] January 20, 1941

Attached is a copy of a letter from the Consul General of Chile referring to a conversation which he had with you. You will note he repeats his arguments for the diplomatic arrangement he had previously urged, particularly emphasizing the possible bad effect of rejection on public opinion in Chile. He does not indicate why the Chilean Foreign Office informed the press of its proposal while the matter was still under consideration here.*

O. D. S[KELTON]

* Note telle que dans l'original:

* Note as in original:

This man wants a position for *himself*. I think it undignified, to say the least, that he should press us as he does. He will have to be told that this "little point" as he calls it is "the whole point" and that we do not intend to expand our diplomatic service in S[outh] America at present beyond the point indicated. 23.1.41 W.L.M.K.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Le consul général du Chili au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Consul General of Chile to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

PERSONAL & MOST INFORMAL

Ottawa, January 15, 1941

My dear Dr. Skelton,

Last week, I had the privilege of a rather long conversation with the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister during a visit that, for me, was very agreeable. In fact, we agreed on everything but the major point.

I thought it best not to make a complete report to my Foreign Minister but to "understand" that such a point was still under consideration.

This, for the simple reason that some days ago I heard that the Ministry informed the press that it had proposed to the Canadian Government to establish a Chilean Legation. The press, with which I am fairly popular in Chile, immediately publicized the project and gave me an enthusiastic write-up.

I wonder what their reaction and my Minister's reaction may be if they ever hear of the little point on which my Rt. Hon. Friend did not agree with the writer.

Thus, I am now taking the liberty of mailing you herewith a Memorandum on which I set my points of view in reference to my pleasant conversation with the Prime Minister. I took special pains in making it shorter than the Rowell-Sirois Report and easier to dispose of.

In case you feel like showing my Memorandum to the Rt. Hon. Gentleman, I wish you to know how pleased I would be, if there is anything in the Memo that you would care to discuss with me—before or after—that you just send me word and I will be at your disposal within a few minutes' notice.

In the meantime and as long as I remain in Canada,

Believe me etc.

LUIS E. FELIÚ H.

[ANNEXE À LA PIÈCE JOINTE/SUB-ENCLOSURE]

Mémorandum du consul général du Chili
Memorandum by Consul General of Chile

Ottawa, January 15, 1941

A MEMORANDUM ON CHILEAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS

1. Since 1926, if not earlier, on the occasion of Deputy Minister of Trade & Commerce, F. T. O'Hara's visit to South America, Chile has been endeavouring to establish closer relations with Canada where Chilean Consuls have been located for many years. No Canadian official has been stationed in Chile.

2. Some time around 1930, the then Consul General of Chile in the United States, (L.E.F.H.) after paying a short visit to Canada, caused a Consul General at large to come over and make a preliminary survey of trade opportunities. Some results were obtained, especially in regard to purchases of Canadian goods by Chile.

3. Around 1932, during the same Official's tenure of the New York Post and at his instance, one of the Chilean Consuls in the U.S.A. was appointed Consul General for Canada and stationed in Montreal. He was directed to negotiate a Commercial Treaty which is yet unfinished.

4. At the outbreak of the Second European War, the Government of Chile took several measures to strengthen its bonds with Canada and decided to establish a permanent Consul General of high standing to reside in Ottawa, that he could be in contact with the Canadian Government.

5. In August 1940, the Chilean Government decided to appoint for Ottawa a Consul General that ranks as a Minister (according to Chilean Legislation) and Luis E. Feliú H. who had championed for years the cause of Chilean-Canadian closer relations, was ordered to Canada, though he had very important work yet unfinished in the Argentine Republic.

6. On being recognized as Consul General by the Canadian Government, he was directed to make immediate proposals for an exchange of Legations in order to make intercourse easier.

7. Aware of Canada's position in war and of its consequences in civil and administrative circles, Chile offered to immediately appoint Luis E. Feliú H. as Chargé d'Affaires in Canada, for the time being, against the assurance that *when* a Diplomatic Representative of Canada be appointed for the Argentine or other neighbour country, he be *also* accredited to Chile.* The Chilean Government would not request his actual residence in Chile nor the appointment of a Chargé d'Affaires in Santiago, though such action would be very much appreciated indeed.

8. This arrangement, Chile thought, would not involve any extra expenses for Canada, nor require the use of extra and much needed personnel. On the other hand, it would mean:

a) Recognition of Chilean long standing efforts to set up closer relations with Canada even *before* founding a reasonable amount of trade.

b) Fair chance to Chile for friendly competition with other neighbouring countries in their endeavours to secure their share of Canadian comity and commerce by giving a similar *entrée* to their respective Representatives.

c) Maintenance of the old A.B.C. Understanding by which Argentina, Brazil and Chile consult each other on important continental policies and do follow parallel lines of international procedure.

*Note telle que dans l'original:

We don't want this, at least until we see how our Minister gets on in Argentina. K.

*Note as in original:

d) For Chile, it means, beside a much desired intercourse with Canada—a high standing Member of the Empire—another way of proving its very deep and traditional appreciation for Great Britain, without making the action too conspicuous, under the present circumstances. Thus, just one of the implications would be shown: the continental necessity for closer friendly relations among the twenty-two countries of the Americas who, different in origin and in many other respects, have, nevertheless, equal craving to maintain their own institutions and to coordinate their defence of such respectable and beloved institutions.

9. There seems to be no need of expressing how sadly the failure to attain the above mentioned points (mainly b & c) would react on Chilean Public Opinion.*

102.

1621-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général du Chili
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General of Chile

PERSONAL AND INFORMAL

Ottawa, January 27, 1941

My dear Mr. Feliú,

With reference to your letter of the 15th January, marked personal and most informal, and its accompanying copy of a memorandum prepared by you, concerning the question of diplomatic representation between Chile and Canada, I may say that I brought your letter and memorandum to the notice of the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

I now wish to inform you that, while the position taken by the Chilean Government and the fact that they would be prepared to appoint you as their diplomatic representative are appreciated, it is not considered advisable to depart at present from the decision conveyed to you by the Right Honourable Mackenzie King. The point he desired to bring to your attention when you saw him is regarded as being sufficiently important, particularly under existing circumstances, to warrant fully the decision that has been taken. It is earnestly hoped that your Government and yourself may readily appreciate the position of the Canadian authorities in this respect. I trust the fact that information was given to the Press may not cause any serious inconvenience.

As regards your memorandum, I only wish to refer to paragraph 7 thereof, suggesting the appointment of a Chilean Chargé d'Affaires at Ottawa and the accrediting to Chile of the Canadian Minister who will be appointed to [the] Argentine without actual residence in Chile and without a Canadian Chargé d'Affaires there. In this connection I may say that, if the Canadian authorities had decided upon the principle of accrediting a representative to Chile at the

*Note telle que dans l'original:

*Note as in original:

I think we can afford to take this chance! K.

present time, they would have found it more convenient first to await the establishment of our Canadian Minister in [the] Argentine before deciding whether they would accredit him also to Chile in order to be able to determine the position as to the practical suitability of such a plan from the Canadian standpoint.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

103.

1621-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 246

Washington, February 4, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that on February 3rd, when I made an official call upon the newly appointed Chilean Ambassador to the United States, Señor Don Rodolfo Michels, he informed me that he had just received a cable from his Government, requesting him to approach you through this Legation on the question of the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between Canada and Chile, at the same time that provisions are made for the establishment of Canadian Legations in the Argentine Republic and Brazil.

2. I discussed the matter with him on the basis of the information you were so good as to furnish me in your Despatch No. 36 of January 10th¹ on the subject of representation between Canada and Mexico. However, the Chilean Ambassador replied that from an internal point of view in his country and perhaps from the point of view of prestige abroad his Government would find it difficult to explain why it had not been possible to arrange representation between Canada and Chile, simultaneously with the Argentine Republic and Brazil. I explained that negotiations between the A-B countries had been under way for a long time and enquired whether his Government had made any previous approach to the Canadian authorities. The Ambassador said that he understood that his Government had instructed the Consul General of Chile for Canada to discuss the situation with you. The Chilean Ambassador indicated that he desired to proceed to Ottawa for the purpose of personal conversations on the subject. I suggested that he defer plans for any such a visit until I had an opportunity to inform you of my conversation with him.

3. I should be grateful if you would let me know what reply it is desired that I should make to Señor Michels, either verbally or in writing.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY

¹ Document 126.

104.

1621-40

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
Memorandum by Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] February 8, 1941

When the United States Minister returned from Washington on February 6th, he communicated to the Prime Minister a message from the United States Secretary of State to the effect that the United States hoped that Canada would give favourable consideration to exchanging diplomatic representatives with Chile when appointing Ministers to Brazil and Argentina. The United States Minister recognized that this was wholly a decision for the Canadian Government to take, and explained his Government's interest in the matter by the importance the United States attached to close cooperation with the Chilean Government, who themselves appeared to be very upset by their exclusion from this extension of Canadian diplomatic representation to South America.

105.

1621-40

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre

Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] February 15, 1941

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHILE

Mr. Moffat had reported to Washington his conversation with you last week about the difficulties in the way of Canada exchanging diplomatic representatives with Chile at the present time, and he has now received a further message from Mr. Sumner Welles, confirming the State Department's first view that, from the point of general "hemispheric defense" considerations, it would be very helpful if Canada could meet Chilean susceptibilities in this matter by including Chile in the projected diplomatic representation in South America. He understood that the Chilean Government would be quite happy if the Minister for Argentina could also be accredited to Santiago and be there from time to time. Mr. Moffat thought such an arrangement might minimize the financial objections to opening a new Legation, which he understood were the principal difficulty in the way of our meeting the Chilean Government's request.

I told him that, apart from the fiscal objections to opening new diplomatic posts under war conditions, there were other personnel problems in connection with the staffing and organization of Latin American posts which would prevent the Government from moving as fast as it otherwise might wish to do in

this matter. He did not know of the informal approaches the Peruvian Government had been making in the same sense, nor of the more active interest which Mexico has been showing recently in establishing diplomatic relations with Canada. My own opinion is that Mexico should come first in any further expansion of Latin American representation.

In leaving, Mr. Moffat enquired whether we had ever considered the possibility of designating one Minister to the three A B C countries of South America. I thought that this suggestion, for what it was worth, had been put forward a little late as we were by now under some obligation to accredit separate representatives to Brazil and to Argentina.

[N. A. ROBERTSON]

106.

1621-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] March 30, 1941

DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION WITH CHILE

1. *United States interest.* The United States Chargé d'Affaires called yesterday morning on telegraphic instructions from Washington to enquire whether "Canada would not be willing to recognize the Chilean Consul General in Canada as Chargé d'Affaires even without reciprocal action on its own part, providing, of course, that the Canadian Government is still disposed to consider an eventual establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries."

Mr. Simmons had been asked by Mr. Sumner Welles to telegraph the Canadian Government's reply to this enquiry. This is the fourth instruction the United States Legation has received from Washington to approach us on behalf of the Chilean Government. It represents a further substantial whittling down of the latter's request. You will recall that they first pressed for a separate exchange of Ministers between Canada and Chile similar to the arrangements made with Brazil and Argentina. When this proposal was turned down, largely on grounds of wartime economy and shortage of personnel, the Chilean Government enquired whether our Minister to Buenos Aires could not also be designated as representative at Santiago, without necessarily maintaining any residence or office there. Now, they have abandoned for the time being the hope of getting Canada to send a Minister to Chile and ask only if we would be willing to receive the Chilean Consul

General in Ottawa as Chargé d'Affaires. In itself this is a modest request which it will be very difficult to refuse.

I went over the ground again with Mr. Simmons explaining to him, as I had to Mr. Moffat in my memorandum of February 15th¹ (an extra copy of which is attached) the difficulties which any extension of diplomatic representation with Chile would introduce into our relations with other South American Governments. I reminded him that the Peruvian Government had informed us of their plans for establishing a Consulate General in Ottawa, to which they proposed to appoint a senior diplomatic official, and that we had learned informally that Peru hoped to raise the post very shortly to the status of a Legation. The Mexican Government had twice in recent weeks raised the question of diplomatic representation with Canada through their Embassy in Washington. We had discouraged them from expecting any immediate response from Canada but undoubtedly they would return to the charge if we agreed to receive the Chilean Consul General as a diplomatic officer.

I told Mr. Simmons that, as matters stood, I could not say any more to him than I had said to Mr. Moffat without getting further instructions on the point from you. Since I last talked with Moffat both the Norwegian and Polish Governments had enquired whether we would receive their representatives in Ottawa as Ministers. We had not agreed to do so, but our refusal would be very hard to justify if we granted a similar request from Chile.

2. *United Kingdom Enquiry.* Shortly after Mr. Simmons' departure, I received an airmail letter from the British Ambassador at Santiago, Chile, a copy of which is attached.² He had been asked by the Chilean Foreign Minister to enquire "whether the Canadian Government might perhaps be prepared to recognize the Chilean Consul General in Canada as Chargé d'Affaires, while abstaining from individual diplomatic representation in Chile, or combine their representation in Chile with the Canadian Legation to be established in Argentina."

3. *Direct Chilean Approach.* Later yesterday afternoon I had a visit from the Chilean Consul General himself who left with me the enclosed translation² of an instruction he had just received from the Foreign Minister. To complete the day's documentation on the question of diplomatic relations with Chile, I am enclosing a photostat copy of a financial editorial² from the *Globe and Mail* of some weeks ago urging Canada to appoint a Minister to Chile. I think you saw this article when it first appeared. The enclosed photostat copy came in yesterday morning's mail without any covering letter. I expect its distribution is due to the Chilean Consul General himself and that he has similarly sent copies to Ministers and Members likely to be interested in Canadian diplomatic representation abroad.

Mr. Feliú, the Consul General, had little to add to his earlier representations, except to stress the modesty of his present request. He said his

¹ Document 105.

² Non reproduite.

³ Not printed.

Government recognized the financial reluctance to increase expenditure for diplomatic representation in wartime and, therefore, deferred their request that we open a legation in Chile. They appreciated your feeling that an aggressive expansion of independent Canadian diplomatic representation at a time like this might be misconstrued in some quarters as a weakening of the tie that united Canada with the other countries of the Commonwealth. He thought no objection could be taken on this score to our receiving a Chilean diplomatic representative in Canada. He rather skilfully picked up the passage in your speech on the Departmental Estimates, in which you explained that increasing governmental trade and exchange controls were making it necessary for Canada to supplement the efforts of Trade Commissioners by direct diplomatic representation which would enjoy closer contacts with governmental authorities than Consuls and Trade Commissioners normally had. Mr. Feliú argued that now that Canada had an elaborate system of import licencing controls, as well as controls of foreign exchange Chile needed diplomatic representation here in order to foster and protect her commercial relations in Canada which her Government wished to expand.

These, however, were all his supporting arguments. The main issue was that Chile counts herself, and apparently is generally recognized, on a parity with Argentina and Brazil as one of the A.B.C. powers. Considerations of national prestige are involved and that is why they attach so much importance to this question of diplomatic representation here.

Intrinsically there is no real objection to receiving the Chilean Consul General as Chargé d'Affaires, or even as Minister. It might be, as regards other Latin American countries, we could take a stand for a time on the A.B.C. principle and refuse to receive diplomatic representatives from other than these three countries. Once, however, we did give diplomatic representation to a Chilean representative, I do not see how we could refuse to accord similar recognition to the representatives of Norway and Poland, possibly even to Czechoslovakia. We would, also, I think be asked to re-examine the position of the Chinese Consul General. I am not, myself, sure that the time is not come for a major modification of policy in this matter. It may be that under war conditions as Germany, Italy and the U.S.S.R. are no longer represented in Canada, the grounds for insisting on "reciprocity" as a method of excluding certain countries from full diplomatic privileges in Canada have lost a good deal of their force. If you think the general question should be gone into thoroughly at this time, I could arrange to have it studied and a report on the pros and cons of modifying our present practice prepared for your consideration.*

[N. A. ROBERTSON]

* Note telle que dans l'original:

P.M. said to hold over everything regarding further diplomatic expansion until after the Session [N. A. Robertson].

* Note as in original:

107.

1621-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] April 2, 1941

Yesterday afternoon, in a telephone conversation with Mr. Feliú, the Chilean Consul General, I told him that I had had an opportunity of discussing with you his Government's proposal to appoint a Chargé d'Affaires in charge of Chilean interests in Canada. I said the Government cordially appreciated and reciprocated his Government's desire to foster closer relations between Canada and Chile, and realized that his Government, in submitting its most recent proposal, had gone far to lessening the difficulties in the way of our receiving a Chilean Minister which the Prime Minister had explained when he had received Mr. Feliú. The question of receiving a diplomatic mission from his country would, however, require some further consideration, particularly in so far as it would affect the position of certain other countries presently without diplomatic representation in Canada. Under the circumstances it was hoped that his Government would appreciate our difficulties in the matter and leave the question in abeyance until the end of the session.

When Mr. Feliú called on Saturday with a note from the Chilean Foreign Minister about his intention to designate him as Chargé d'Affaires, he pressed for an answer before Wednesday, when he said he was planning to leave for the United States. In our conversation yesterday afternoon, he intimated he might be away for some little time and said that if anything of importance arose in the meantime, he could be reached through the Chilean Embassy in Washington. He did not say anything about closing his Consulate General.

This morning a press correspondent, Miss Shaw, representing the *Toronto Star*, telephoned the Department to say she had phoned the Chilean Consulate General to arrange an interview with Mr. Feliú, and was told that he had left for the United States and that "the Chilean Consulate General was closed". It looks therefore as though Mr. Feliú has left in a fit of pique—determined to make some kind of incident over our unwillingness to accept him immediately as Chargé d'Affaires.

108.

1621-40

Mémoire du deuxième secrétaire¹

Memorandum by Second Secretary¹

[Ottawa,] June 17, 1941

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHILE

I. Chile has proposed that its Consulate General in Canada be raised to a Legation, and that its Consul General be appointed Minister to Canada or

¹ Escott Reid.

Chargé d'Affaires. It has not asked for immediate reciprocity, but in the absence of immediate reciprocity it would desire an assurance that the Canadian government is disposed to consider an eventual establishment of a Legation in Chile.

II. Recommended that:

(1) The Argentine Government be asked to consent to the Canadian Minister to Argentina being accredited also to Chile.

(2) In the event that Argentina agrees, Chile be informed that the Canadian government has much pleasure in agreeing to accept a Chilean Minister at Ottawa, and to reciprocate by accrediting to Chile the Canadian Minister to Argentina. A Secretary would be stationed at Santiago who would be Chargé d'Affaires when the Minister is at Buenos Aires. The Department of Trade and Commerce might be requested to appoint a Trade Commissioner at Santiago who would also be Commercial Attaché of the Legation. The Minister would not necessarily reside six months each year in each capital but great care should be taken that no public announcement to this effect is made in Chile, Argentina or Canada since the British Minister to Haiti was informed recently that Canadian policy has been that, when a Minister is accredited to two countries he should reside six months annually in each capital (Telegram of October 15, 1940).¹

(3) In the event that Argentina does not agree to the proposal that the Canadian Minister at Buenos Aires be accredited also to Santiago, Chile be informed that the Canadian government has much pleasure in agreeing to accept either a Chilean Minister or a Chilean Chargé d'Affaires at Ottawa, and to reciprocate by appointing a Chargé d'Affaires at Santiago.

(4) The announcement of the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Chile be accompanied by the public explanation that the reason is that Canada has already agreed to appoint Ministers to Brazil and Argentina and that long-established international practice is to treat the A.B.C. powers as being on an equal level and a level higher than that of other South American states.

III. The grounds for the above recommendations are:

(1) The long-established international practice referred to in the preceding paragraph.

(2) The existence of this practice will enable Canada to refuse to agree to direct diplomatic relations with Peru, Colombia, Cuba, or other Central or South American states, even though the first two have larger populations than Chile.

(3) Refusal to agree to direct diplomatic relations with Chile may seriously offend Chile since it involves a refusal by Canada to accept Chile's claim to equality with the other two A.B.C. powers.

(4) The United States has virtually requested Canada to establish direct diplomatic relations with Chile in the interest of "hemisphere defence". The granting of this request by Canada would be in accord with the spirit of the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park declarations.

¹ Document 123.

109.

1621-40

*Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire
d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of
State for External Affairs*

F958/1

Ottawa July 3, 1941

My dear Mr. Robertson,

The High Commissioner has asked me to pass on to you informally the following information, which has been received in a letter from the Dominions Office.

It concerns the question of Chilean Diplomatic representation in Ottawa, which was raised early in March by the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs with Sir Charles Orde, His Majesty's Minister at Santiago. An approach had, apparently, already been made by the Chilean Government to the Canadian Government, and it was understood that the Canadian Government, while agreeing in principle, had felt unable to adopt the proposal for reasons of economy, presumably because reciprocity would be involved. The Chilean Government then suggested that their Consul General in Ottawa might be recognized as Chargé d'Affaires. The Foreign Office subsequently instructed Sir Charles Orde to report the matter officially to the Canadian Government direct.

You may be interested to know that the Chilean Chargé d'Affaires in London called at the Foreign Office on June 2nd and asked for their help in the matter. He said that the new Canadian Minister to be appointed to Buenos Aires would also be accredited to Santiago, and that his Government, while agreeing with this arrangement, were still anxious for direct representation in Canada both for political and for commercial reasons (Pan American Defence, etc.)

Yours sincerely,

PATRICK DUFF

110.

1621-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 136

Ottawa, July 25, 1941

As you may be aware, the Government of Chile, through their Consul General at Ottawa and His Majesty's Minister at Santiago, approached the Canadian Government informally some time ago on the subject of exchange of Ministers.

The Canadian Government have come to the conclusion that it is desirable to accept this proposal and to proceed to the appointment of a Canadian Minister to Chile on a reciprocal basis. It is proposed that the first Canadian

Minister to the Argentine Republic would also be accredited as the first Canadian Minister to Chile.

It is requested that the wishes of the Canadian Government be submitted for His Majesty's approval.

When His Majesty's approval has been received, it is requested that the Government of Chile be advised as follows: Quote.

His Majesty's Government in Canada have come to the conclusion that it is desirable to appoint an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary accredited to the Government of Chile.

Such a Minister would be accredited by His Majesty the King to the President of Chile and he would be furnished with credentials which would enable him to take charge of all affairs relating to Canada. The arrangements proposed would not denote any departure from the principle of the diplomatic unity of the Empire, that is to say, the principle of consultative cooperation amongst all His Majesty's representatives as amongst His Majesty's Governments themselves, in matters of common concern. The methods of dealing with matters which may arise concerning more than one of His Majesty's Governments would therefore be settled by consultation between the representatives of His Majesty's Governments concerned.

In proposing the appointment of a Canadian Minister, His Majesty's Government in Canada trust that it will promote the maintenance and development of cordial relations not only between Chile and Canada but also between Chile and the whole British Commonwealth of Nations.

It would be contemplated that, for the present, the Canadian Minister to be appointed to Argentina would also serve as Canadian Minister to Chile.

End quote.

The Argentine Minister to Canada, who has been approached informally, believes that his Government would see no objection to our combining our representation in Chile with the Canadian Legation in Argentina. It would be advisable, however, to have this point taken up officially with the Argentine Government before the Government of Chile is advised in the sense referred to above. It might be stated to the Argentine Government that, in view of representations made by the Government of Chile on the subject of exchange of Ministers, the Canadian Government greatly desire to meet the wishes of the Government of Chile and that it would facilitate matters for the time being if our representation in Chile could be combined with the Canadian Legation in Argentina.

111.

1621-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 129

London, August 1, 1941

Your telegram of July 25th, No. 136. It is noticed that the second sentence of paragraph 2 of notes proposed for the Argentine and the Brazilian Governments in your telegram No. 188 of October 28th, 1940,¹ has been omitted from the draft of notes for the Chilean Government. Was this intended?

¹ Document 75.

112.

1621-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 151

Ottawa, August 5, 1941

Your telegram No. 129 of August 1st respecting note to Chilean Government.

Modifications in wording of proposed telegram have arisen from fact that we are not yet prepared to establish Legation in Chile in usual sense of the word with Chancery and Minister or Chargé d'Affaires and staff stationed at Santiago. Our intention is that Canadian Minister to Argentina would also be accredited to Chile and would proceed to Santiago to present his Letters of Credence at first convenient opportunity and make only occasional brief visits thereafter.

On further consideration, however, I think it would on the whole be preferable to include the sentence under reference. It might, therefore, be inserted with the following additional words immediately after the last sentence of that proposed telegram in which it is stated that it would be contemplated that, for the present, the Canadian Minister to be appointed to Argentina would also serve as Canadian Minister to Chile, quote,

The Canadian Government wish to enquire at the same time whether it would be agreeable to the Government of Chile if the question of stationing a Chargé d'Affaires at Santiago during the absence of the Canadian Minister could be deferred for the time being.

End of quote.

The proposed telegram as revised in the sense referred to above might be accompanied by an informal statement to the effect that the Canadian Government are experiencing some difficulties under existing circumstances in providing trained diplomatic staff for an additional Legation and, for that reason, while they wish the Canadian Minister to present his Letters of Credence in the not distant future after he has presented his Letters of Credence to Argentina, they would desire to postpone for the present appointment and stationing of a Chargé d'Affaires and Legation staff at Santiago in the absence of the Canadian Minister.

Should any matter arise during the absence of the Canadian Minister requiring action through the diplomatic channel, we could request the Canadian Minister to proceed from Argentina to Chile for the purpose of dealing with such matter.

113.

1621-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 132

London, August 5, 1941

The King has approved of proposal of the Canadian Government to appoint a Canadian Minister for Chile, and His Majesty's Ambassador to the Argentine is being instructed to ascertain views of the Argentine Government on the lines indicated in your telegram, 25th July, No. 136.

114.

1743-40

Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures¹ au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne
Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs¹ to High Commissioner in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1322

Ottawa, August 28, 1941

Following for Robertson from Beaudry. Begins. Canadian Press cable from Buenos Aires published today in *Montreal Gazette* says "Foreign Ministry looks with favour upon Canada's decision to send W. F. A. Turgeon, Chief Justice of Saskatchewan, as the Dominion's first Minister to Argentina".

On August 19th we sent confidential telegram to Dominions Office to take steps towards *Agrément* of Turgeon by Argentina. As you will recall, we also raised question whether there would be any objection by Argentina to Canadian Minister also being accredited to Chile. We have as yet received no reply from Dominions Office.

Similarly no reply yet received as to whether Chile is prepared to receive Canadian Minister on terms indicated.

It would be appreciated if we could be advised as soon as possible of results of steps taken. Ends.

115.

1743-40

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 1593

London, September 4, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram of August 28th, No. 1322. On August 27th His Majesty's representative at Buenos Aires informed the Foreign Office

¹ Ernest Lapointe.

that Argentine Government were agreeable to appointment of Turgeon. I presume he has also informed you of this since.

On August 29th His Majesty's representative at Santiago telegraphed Foreign Office as follows:

In note dated yesterday, Chilean Government cordially welcome the proposal, reciprocating accompanying sentiments, and expressing thanks to the Canadian Government. They hope that when circumstances permit a permanent Canadian representative will be appointed resident in Santiago.

I am not telegraphing to Ottawa but I am forwarding correspondence.

116.

1743-40

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures¹
au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs¹ to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1380

Ottawa, September 4, 1941

With reference to my telegram No. 1137 of 29th July² and your reply No. 1404 of 6th August³ concerning approval of appointment of Hon. W. F. A. Turgeon as Minister in Argentina, Canadian Government, with the concurrence of the Governor General, desires to ascertain whether His Majesty would approve the appointment of Mr. Turgeon as His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada also in Chile. Please make verbal submission to His Majesty. Formal submission will be forwarded by air mail within next few days.

117.

1743-40

Décret du Conseil

Order in Council

P.C. 7023

September 5, 1941

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, advise that the Honourable W. F. A. Turgeon be appointed as His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada in the Republic of Chile; that His Majesty the King be humbly moved to approve such appointment and that the usual steps to submit this matter to His Majesty be taken.

¹ Ernest Lapointe.

² Document 82.

³ Document 84.

118.

1743-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassadeur
de Grande-Bretagne au Chili*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador of Great Britain
in Chile*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, September 16, 1941

His Majesty the King has approved the appointment of Honourable W. F. A. Turgeon, at present Chief Justice of Saskatchewan, as Canadian Minister to Chile and I requested Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs by telegram last night that steps be taken to ascertain through your good offices whether this appointment would be agreeable to Government of Chile. I should be obliged if, as soon as you are advised by London and you take up the question of *Agrément* with Government of Chile, you might state informally that an early reply would be appreciated in view of consequential appointment to be made as soon as possible to replace Chief Justice Turgeon on the Saskatchewan Bench.

119.

1743-40

*L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne au Chili au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador of Great Britain in Chile to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Santiago, September 30, 1941

Your telegram of September 16th. Chilean Government agree.

RÉPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

120.

26-DY-40

*Le ministre de Grande-Bretagne en République dominicaine au secrétaire
d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister of Great Britain in Dominican Republic to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Ciudad Trujillo, April 30, 1941

Addressed to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, repeated to Foreign Office No. 36. Dominican Government inform me that they have decided to establish Legation at Ottawa, and ask whether Dr. Max Henríquez Ureña would be *persona grata* as Minister to Canada. Person named is a former Minister for Foreign Affairs and has been Minister to United Kingdom since 1935, and also to Portugal, where he is now resident since last year.

PATERSON

121.

26-DY-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre de Grande-Bretagne en République dominicaine

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister of Great Britain in Dominican Republic

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, May 10, 1941

Your telegram of April 30th. Canadian Government deeply appreciate desire of Dominican Government to initiate direct diplomatic relations with Canada. Proposed establishment of Dominican Legation here, however, would create a most embarrassing situation. Canadian Government have always refused to receive diplomatic representatives from countries to which Canada was not prepared to send its own diplomatic representatives. Arrangement announced some months ago under which Canada agreed to exchange Legations with Argentina and Brazil has resulted in great pressure from a number of Latin American countries, including Chile and Mexico, for a similar exchange of Legations, or failing that, for reception by us, without obligation of reciprocity, of their representatives here. A number of Allied Governments have also in recent months raised question of their accrediting diplomatic representatives in Ottawa but thus far we have refused to receive in diplomatic capacity representatives of any country to which Canada has not sent its own diplomatic representatives.

Fully appreciate difficulty of your position and susceptibilities of Dominican Government but would be very grateful, in view of foregoing circumstances, if you could arrange to have proposed nomination of Dominican Minister to Canada withdrawn.

HAÏTI/HAITI

122.

211-39

Le ministre de Grande-Bretagne en Haïti au Gouverneur général
Minister of Great Britain in Haiti to Governor General

TELEGRAM

Port-au-Prince, September 4, 1940

President of the Republic of Haiti has informed me of his desire that Republic be represented by a diplomatic representative in Dominion. Report by air mail follows.

123.

211-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre de Grande-Bretagne en Haïti

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister of Great Britain in Haiti

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, October 15, 1940

1. Your telegram 12th October to Governor General and previous correspondence concerning desire of President of Republic of Haiti to be represented diplomatically in Canada. Canadian Government fully appreciate grounds on which President's proposal is put forward.

2. Position generally taken by Canadian authorities in matters of this nature in the past has been that the opening of a Legation at Ottawa should coincide with their having reached the point of being in a position to reciprocate or vice versa. In this connection, I may say it has been decided that, particularly in view of present conditions, number of Canadian Ministers to be appointed in the near future will be very limited. I might mention that, as regards question of the same Minister being accredited at the same time to a second country, our policy has been that in such case the Minister should reside six months annually in each of the two countries.

3. I should be grateful if you would be so good as to state our position to the President, thanking him for courtesy of proposal and adding that when the Canadian Government feel number of Representatives abroad might be enlarged to the extent of their being able to give further consideration to such proposal, I shall not fail to communicate with you in order to take up the matter with the President.

MEXIQUE/MEXICO

124.

1570-40

Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

Washington, January 4, 1941

My dear Dr. Skelton,

On December 27th Dr. Luis Quintanilla, Plenipotentiary, Counsellor of the Mexican Embassy, called upon me to inform me that in the temporary

absence of the Mexican Ambassador, his Embassy had received instructions from the Secretary of Foreign Relations of Mexico to speak to me about the possibility of establishing an exchange of Legations between Canada and Mexico. Dr. Quintanilla said that the Mexican authorities had followed with keen interest the favourable reaction in Canada and in the United States, as well as in the Argentine and Brazil, toward the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and the two South American countries.

The desire of Mexico to make an earlier approach to Canada, through the appropriate channel—that is to say, London—has been handicapped by the absence of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Mexico, brought about by the oil disputes. Dr. Quintanilla asserted that the present Minister of Foreign Relations of Mexico is decidedly pro-British and that it is his understanding that negotiations are either under way or are to be pursued shortly with a view to resumption of full diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Mexico. He advanced the theory that if diplomatic relations could be established collaterally with Canada it would have a psychological effect to the extent that Mexico is in accord with the efforts of Canada and the British Commonwealth to overthrow totalitarianism.

Dr. Quintanilla expressed his own view that perhaps it might be possible to sign a treaty between Canada and Mexico, establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries, and providing for the closer development of economic and trade intercourse between them. At the beginning it would not be necessary to have a large staff, but a Minister and a Secretary, which would then increase as necessity would command.

I enclose a copy of a Memorandum which Dr. Quintanilla furnished in confirmation of his approach to me and of his previous informal conversation with Mr. Allard.

I may say that I consider Dr. Quintanilla one of the able officials in Washington of the Mexican Government. He was born in France, his mother was French, his father Mexican, and he speaks English, French, Spanish and perhaps other languages fluently. His age is about 48, and I suspect he has ambitions toward becoming Mexican Minister to Ottawa.

I told Dr. Quintanilla that I was not aware of any movement at the present time to enlarge our Foreign Service in the Americas; however, I promised that I would inform you of his approach to the Legation and of any reply that you may instruct me to deliver to the Mexican Embassy.

Yours sincerely,

M. M. MAHONEY

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*L'ambassadeur du Mexique aux États-Unis au chargé d'affaires
aux États-Unis**Ambassador of Mexico in United States to Chargé d'Affaires
in United States*

Washington, December 27, 1940

MEMORANDUM

Confirming the conversations between the Honorable Chargé d'Affaires of Canada in Washington and the Minister Plenipotentiary Counsellor of the Mexican Embassy, Dr. Luis Quintanilla; and with reference also to the previous talks on the subject, between Mr. Hector Allard, Second Secretary of the Canadian Legation, and Dr. Quintanilla, the Ambassador of Mexico is happy to reiterate in this memorandum that he has been officially authorized by His Excellency the Secretary of Foreign Relations of Mexico, Dr. Ezequiel Padilla, to contact the Canadian Legation in Washington, in order to study the possibilities of establishing, as soon as possible, Diplomatic Missions of both countries, with the rank of Legation, in our respective capitals.

The Ambassador of Mexico refrains in this memorandum from entering into details, as he understands that the different aspects of this matter have already been discussed during the conversations to which he has just referred; but the Ambassador wishes to reiterate the deep interest with which the Republic of Mexico views the possibility of inaugurating normal diplomatic relations with the Dominion of Canada, a great sister nation on the American Continent.

Finally, the Ambassador of Mexico wishes to express his thanks to the Honourable Chargé d'Affaires of Canada and to the Second Secretary of the Legation, for their very kind welcome granted by them, on this occasion, to the Minister Counsellor of the Mexican Embassy.

125.

1570-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre**Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] January 8, 1941

Attached is a copy of a letter from Mr. Mahoney regarding a Mexican approach for exchange of diplomatic relations. Mexico, I should think, would rank in importance very close to Argentina and Brazil from our standpoint. There is a special complication in Mexico's case, namely, the fact that diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Mexico were partly broken off at the time of the dispute over confiscation of oil wells. I always thought the British action was ill-advised, but probably it would not be well for us

to begin relations until there was a prospect of their quarrel being patched up, as there now seems to be. I enclose a draft reply to Mahoney,¹ prepared on the assumption that you do not wish to accept, immediately at least.

126.

1570-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires
in United States*

DESPATCH 36

Ottawa, January 10, 1941

Sir,

I am in receipt of your letter of January 4th outlining your conversation with the Chargé d'Affaires of the Mexican Embassy at Washington, in which he raised with you informally the question of the possibility of establishing diplomatic representation between Canada and Mexico.

I should be grateful if you would inform Dr. Quintanilla that the Canadian Government has received with much interest the suggestion which he has put forward on behalf of his Government. Progressively, in the course of the past several years, as he may be aware, Canadian Legations have been opened in a number of countries. It is expected that, at the forthcoming session of Parliament, provision will be made for the establishment of Canadian Legations in the Argentine Republic and Brazil, countries with which the question of the exchange of diplomatic representatives has been under discussion for a considerable time. For the immediate future it is felt that the question of establishing further Legations will have to be deferred. It is hoped, however, in the next few years, to open Legations in a number of other countries. Mexico, in view of its situation, its stirring history, its vast mineral and agricultural resources and its general political and economic importance has long held, and continues to occupy, a special place in the minds of Canadians. The establishment of direct diplomatic representation should contribute powerfully to the extension of trade and the development of closer ties between our two democracies, and I am sure that the Canadian Government, when it is in a position to consider the establishment of further Legations abroad, will be glad to examine with the Mexican Government the question of opening a Canadian Legation in Mexico City and of welcoming the establishment of a Mexican Legation in Ottawa. In the meantime I should like to point out to Dr. Quintanilla how greatly we value the close and friendly relations which happily exist between our two countries and to reciprocate most cordially the friendly sentiments he has expressed.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

¹Pour le texte final, voir le document 126. ¹For the final text see Document 126.

127.

1570-40

*Mémoire du deuxième secrétaire¹**Memorandum by Second Secretary¹*

[Ottawa,] June 17, 1941

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MEXICO

I. Mexico has proposed the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Canada.

II. Recommended that:

(1) After consultation with the United Kingdom, Mexico be informed that the Canadian government has much pleasure in agreeing to accept a Mexican Minister at Ottawa and to appoint a Canadian Minister to Mexico City.

(2) The announcement of the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Mexico be accompanied by a public explanation that the reason is that Mexico is an important North American state.

(3) The Trade Commissioner at Mexico City be appointed Commercial Attaché of the Legation.

III. The grounds for the above recommendations are:

(1) Mexico is one of the three important states in North America.

(2) One of the main purposes of the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park declarations was the working out by Canada and the United States of a common plan of defence of the northern half of the western hemisphere. The effectiveness of any such plan is gravely impaired if Mexico does not cooperate. Mexico is at present cooperating with the United States. The chances of Mexico continuing to give real cooperation would be increased if Canada and Mexico entered into direct diplomatic relations.

(3) The British Commonwealth should have a diplomatic representative in Mexico City because of Mexico's importance to the Anglo-American war effort. It would perhaps be easier for Canada to establish diplomatic relations than for Great Britain to re-establish them.

(4) Canada could establish direct diplomatic relations with Mexico without giving any other country reasonable cause to demand equal treatment.²

¹Escott Reid.

²Les relations diplomatiques directes ne furent établies qu'à partir de 1944.

²Direct diplomatic relations were not established until 1944.

PÉROU/PERU

128.

1476-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 848

Washington, April 3, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that during an exchange of official calls with the Peruvian Ambassador he has expressed to me the strong desire of his Government to exchange diplomatic representatives with Canada. He has also suggested the possibility of a Trade Agreement between Canada and Peru, and has pointed out that Peru is an importer of wheat and an exporter of cotton, oil, and sugar among Canada's essential imports.

2. I told the Ambassador that I would bring this matter to your notice and would later discuss it further with him. I added, however, that in present circumstances I felt that the Canadian Government would be unable to accept the suggestion and would desire that the matter should be left over until after the war. I should be glad to hear whether there is any information which I can convey to the Ambassador in reply to his representations.

3. I may mention that the Ambassadors of both Mexico and Chile have raised the same question with me in somewhat emphatic terms. You may recall that the Chilean Ambassador previously discussed the matter with Mr. Mahoney and that Mr. Mahoney reported the conversation in his Despatch No. 246 of February 4th,¹ to which a reply has not yet been received. In the case of Mexico, written representations were forwarded by Mr. Mahoney on January 4th, which were answered in your Despatch No. 36 of January 10th.² I should be glad to learn whether there has been any change in the position since then.

I have etc.

LEIGHTON McCARTHY

129.

1476-40

L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne au Chili au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
Ambassador of Great Britain in Chile to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Santiago, September 5, 1941

Following from Reid,³ Begins:

If reply to Peruvian request for direct diplomatic relations with Canada has not been sent, recommend reply be postponed until you receive my

¹ Document 103.² Document 126.³ Escott Reid, secrétaire à la mission commerciale canadienne, alors au Chili.³ Escott Reid, Secretary to the Canadian Trade Mission, then in Chile.

despatch on Mission's visit to Lima which is being forwarded by diplomatic bag to reach you in about three weeks. It is obvious that Peru, which is larger in area and population than Chile, does not recognize primacy of latter.

Chilean Government has already raised with British Ambassador question of who will be channel of communication with Canada when Canadian Minister is in Buenos Aires.

For obvious reasons it would be unsatisfactory for British Embassy to revert temporarily in Canadian Minister's absence to being channel of communication. Recommend immediate consideration be given to this question.

It seems to me clear that only permanent solution of problem of Canadian diplomatic relations with Peru and Chile is accrediting of one Minister to two countries on six-month basis, with First or Second Secretary at each post. Ends.

ORDE

PARTIE 4 / PART 4

RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES AVEC LA CHINE
ET L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUEDIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA
AND THE SOVIET UNION

CHINE/CHINA

130.

2172-40

*Mémoire du deuxième secrétaire¹**Memorandum by Second Secretary¹*

[Ottawa,] June 17, 1941

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA

I. China has for long hoped that Canada would consent to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations.

II. Recommended that:

(1) China be sounded out as to whether it still desires the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Canada.

(2) If the reply of China is "yes", China be informed that the Canadian government has much pleasure in agreeing to accept a Chinese minister and to appoint a Canadian minister to Chungking.

(3) The announcement of the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with China be accompanied by the public explanation that the reason is that China is a great power and is virtually an ally.

¹ Escott Reid.

III. The grounds for the above recommendations are:

(1) Next to Great Britain and the United States, China is the most effective ally which we have in the war. The appointment of a Canadian minister to Chungking would help to strengthen China's morale. It would fit in with the present efforts of Great Britain and the United States to bolster China's resistance against Japan.

(2) The appointment of a Canadian Minister to Chungking, while desirable in any event, is essential if a Canadian Minister is sent to Japan since otherwise Canada's action might be interpreted by China as indicating a policy of appeasement at China's expense.

(3) China and the U.S.S.R. are the only great powers not at war with Canada which have no diplomatic representation in Canada. Agreement by Canada to direct diplomatic relations with China on the grounds that China is a great power and virtually an ally, cannot therefore be cited by any power other than the U.S.S.R. as a precedent justifying Canada's acceptance of direct diplomatic relations with it, and could be cited by the U.S.S.R. only if it became a virtual ally of Canada in the war.

131.

2172-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 141

Ottawa, July 29, 1941

His Majesty's Government in Canada propose to make arrangements for the establishment of a Canadian Legation in China.

It is requested that the wishes of the Canadian Government be submitted for His Majesty's approval.

When His Majesty's approval has been received, it is requested that the Government of China be advised as follows: Quote:

His Majesty's Government in Canada have come to the conclusion that it is desirable that the handling of matters of Chungking relating to Canada should be confided to an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary accredited to the Government of the Republic of China.

Such a Minister would be accredited by His Majesty the King to the President of the Republic of China and he would be furnished with credentials which would enable him to take charge of all affairs relating to Canada. He would be the ordinary channel of communication with the Chinese Government on these matters. The arrangements proposed would not denote any departure from the principle of the diplomatic unity of the Empire, that is to say, the principle of consultative cooperation amongst all His Majesty's representatives as amongst His Majesty's Governments themselves, in matters of common concern. The methods of dealing with matters which may arise

concerning more than one of His Majesty's Governments would therefore be settled by consultation between the representatives of His Majesty's Governments concerned.

In proposing the establishment of a Canadian Legation, His Majesty's Government in Canada trust that it will promote the maintenance and development of cordial relations, not only between China and Canada, but also between China and the whole British Commonwealth of Nations. End quote.

132.

2172-40

Décret du Conseil
Order in Council

P.C. 5824

July 31, 1941

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 26th July, 1941, from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, submitting that it is expedient, in view of the increasing importance to Canada of events in the Far East, that there should be established a Legation at Chungking to represent His Majesty, in respect of the Dominion of Canada, in his relations with the President of the Republic of China.

The Committee, therefore, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, advise that the establishment of a Canadian Legation in China be submitted for His Majesty's approval.

133.

2172-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 136

London, August 11, 1941

The King has approved of proposal in your telegram of July 29th, No. 141, and His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to approach the Government of China on the lines indicated and to report results to you by telegram.

134.

2172-40

L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en Chine au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
Ambassador of Great Britain in China to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Chungking, August 14, 1941

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 393, August 13th, repeated to Ottawa unnumbered. Your telegram No. 486. Chinese Government welcome proposal. I am acting accordingly.

SIR A. CLARK KERR

135.

2172-40

L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en Chine au Gouverneur général
Ambassador of Great Britain in China to Governor General

TELEGRAM

Chungking, September 2, 1941

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 435, September 1st, repeated to Ottawa.

My telegram No. 393. Without consulting me Wai Chiao Pu¹ have announced proposed establishment of a Canadian Legation.

KERR

136.

26-FX-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 158

London, September 13, 1941

My telegram No. 136 of August 11th. His Majesty's Ambassador at Chungking reports that Chinese Government have now proposed Dr. Liu Shih Shun as Chinese Minister to Canada. He has served in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1927 and has been in charge of European and American affairs since 1931. He is reported to speak good English and if not of any special distinction, to be a man of sterling worth.

Please telegraph whether His Majesty's Government in Canada would wish the King's *Agrément* to be sought for Dr. Liu Shun's appointment.

137.

26-FX-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain

DESPATCH 623

Ottawa, September 25, 1941

Sir,

As you are aware, arrangements were concluded some time ago for the exchange of direct diplomatic missions between Canada and China.

I now enclose a document of formal submission regarding the appointment of Dr. Liu Shih Shun as Chinese Minister to Canada.

It is requested that you might submit this appointment for the approval of His Majesty the King and that you might advise me by telegram when His Majesty has approved.

¹ Ministère des Affaires étrangères.¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I may add that Dr. Liu Shih Shun has served in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1927 and has been in charge of European and American affairs since 1931. He is reported to speak good English and to be a man of sterling worth.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à Sa Majesté le roi
Secretary of State for External Affairs to His Majesty the King

Ottawa, September 25, 1941

The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada presents his humble duty to His Majesty the King.

His Majesty's Government in Canada have been informed that the President of the Republic of China has under consideration the appointment of Dr. Liu Shih Shun as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China to Canada and, to that end, is desirous of ascertaining whether such appointment would be agreeable to His Majesty.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, accordingly, humbly petitions His Majesty to intimate that the appointment by the President of the Republic of China of Dr. Liu Shih Shun, as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China to Canada, would be agreeable to Him.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs remains His Majesty's most faithful and obedient servant.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

138.

26-FX-40

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures

High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 1887

London, October 20, 1941

Your despatch No. 623 of September 25th. His Majesty has been pleased to approve the appointment of Dr. Liu Shih Shun as Chinese Minister to Canada. Submission is being returned to you by bomber today.

MASSEY

139.

26-FX-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassadeur
de Grande-Bretagne en Chine*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador of Great Britain
in China*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, November 1, 1941

Your telegram September 9th, 1941.¹ His Majesty has approved the appointment of Doctor Liu Shih Shun as Chinese Minister to Canada. Will you please inform the Chinese Government that the Government of Canada looks forward to receiving Dr. Liu in Ottawa.

UNION SOVIÉTIQUE/SOVIET UNION

140.

2462-40

*Le ministre-conseiller, la légation aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister-Counsellor, Legation in United States to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Washington,] July 17, 1941

Dear Mr. Robertson,

A Canadian journalist here tells me that in the course of an interview with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Oumansky expressed the personal view that steps ought to be taken for some form of direct Soviet representation in Canada. He pointed to the inconvenience of using the Soviet Embassy in London and the Foreign Office as the official channel of communication from Moscow to Ottawa. My informant thought that Mr. Oumansky might have in mind consular or trade representation rather than diplomatic representation. Mr. Oumansky did not indicate whether he was making a recommendation to his Government on the subject. He is an intelligent and astute man, and I think it likely that he realizes the difficulties.

Yours sincerely,

H. H. WRONG

¹ Non reproduit.² Not printed.

141.

2462-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1861

London, October 15, 1941

Russian Ambassador has approached me informally and asked me to ascertain whether the Canadian Government would be willing to receive one or two Russian Consular officers,¹ with a particular view to dealing with problems arising out of increased shipments from or via Canada to the U.S.S.R.

I should be grateful to know what reply I should return to Monsieur Maisky.²

MASSEY

142.

2462-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH A.454

London, November 13, 1941

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your telegram No. 1684 of October 31st,³ in which you state that the Canadian Government have agreed to receive one or two Russian Consuls in Canada where they are to help in expediting arrangements for moving equipment and supplies towards the U.S.S.R.

2. I have told Mr. Maisky informally of the Canadian Government's decision, at which the Russian Ambassador expressed his gratification.

3. The United Kingdom Government have been experiencing certain difficulties over the question of Consular representation in the U.S.S.R. As you

¹Le Premier ministre nota:

I think this advisable K[ing] 22.10.41.

¹The Prime Minister noted:

²Pour la réponse à ce télégramme, voir le document 506.

²For the reply to this telegram see Document 506.

³Document 506.

will recall, early in 1938 all United Kingdom Consular posts in Soviet territory were closed down at the request of the Soviet Government.

4. After the outbreak of the Soviet-German war it clearly became important for the United Kingdom Government to re-establish Consular posts in Soviet Russia, and in July of this year they suggested to the Soviet Government that British Consulates should be opened in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, however, informed the United Kingdom Government in August that they had decided not to authorise the opening of further foreign Consulates during the war, and the United Kingdom Government felt at that stage that it was not advisable to press the matter in view of Soviet pre-occupation elsewhere. They still attach great importance, however, to the establishment of British Consulates in the Soviet Union, particularly at Vladivostok and Baku.

5. Under the circumstances described above, the Dominions Office recently took up the whole question with the Dominion High Commissioners. They pointed out that the Soviet Ambassador had now approached my New Zealand and South African colleagues and myself regarding the establishment of Soviet Consulates in New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada. The United Kingdom authorities felt that advantage might be taken of Mr. Maisky's approach to the Canadian, South African and New Zealand Governments to endeavour to persuade the Soviet Government to reconsider their attitude regarding the establishment of British Consulates in the U.S.S.R.

6. Having in mind the anxiety of the United Kingdom authorities in the matter of establishing reciprocal Consulates I asked Mr. Maisky in the course of conversation whether, now that Canada had accepted Russian Consular representation, he thought the Soviet authorities would have any objection to the appointment of Canadian Consuls on a reciprocal basis. I emphasised that I knew of no intention on the part of the Canadian Government to make any such appointments, but said that I should be interested to know whether, in principle, the Soviet Government would have any objection to such appointments. Mr. Maisky assured me that there would be no objection. I have passed this information on to the United Kingdom authorities informally in case it may be of assistance to them in their negotiations with the Soviet Union on this subject to know that the Soviet Government would have no objection in principle to the exchange of Consuls with Canada.

I have etc.

VINCENT MASSEY

PARTIE 5/PART 5

NOMINATION D'UN MINISTRE CANADIEN AU JAPON
APPOINTMENT OF CANADIAN MINISTER TO JAPAN

143.

26-CR-40

*Mémoire du conseiller¹ au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim
aux Affaires extérieures²*

*Memorandum from Counsellor¹ to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs²*

[Ottawa,] February 4, 1941

CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN JAPAN

1. The Japanese diplomatic representatives in Ottawa never overlook an opportunity to enquire as to when the Canadian Government intends to fill the "vacancy in Tokyo". On a visit to the Department today, Mr. Yoshizawa, in referring to this subject, asked whether it might not be possible for a Minister to Japan to be named at the same time as Ministers are appointed to Brazil and the Argentine.

2. A prolonged delay on the part of the Government of one country in appointing a Minister to the capital of another country with which diplomatic relations are maintained is almost by definition accepted as a sign of strained or unsatisfactory relations. Our failure to make such an appointment to Tokyo during the last three years has been so interpreted by some at least of the Japanese diplomatic officials, in spite of our repeated explanation that the delay has been due to the difficulty of finding a suitable incumbent in these days when all our best men are needed at home.

3. Conditions in the Far East seem now to be working towards a climax. This would seem to be a time when every possible care should be taken to see that Canada is not responsible for, or does not in any way contribute unnecessarily to, the increasing tension between Japan and the democratic powers. We are cooperating with the United Kingdom, the United States and our allies in placing restrictions upon exports to Japan and may have to take further measures of an economic character. But we do not need to add to these *necessary* measures, the *unnecessary* discourtesy of the ministerial vacancy.

4. Moreover, if there is ever a time when diplomatic ministers should be of particular value it is not when relations are cordial and unstrained but on occasions, as at present, when difficulties and dangers obstruct the normal intercourse of the states.

¹ H. L. Keenleyside.

² N. A. Robertson.

5. The example of Australia is pertinent here. Canberra, although participating in measures designed to place economic and financial restraint upon Japan, is at the same time sending to Tokyo the very best diplomatic representation available. Sir John Latham is the Chief Justice of the Australian Supreme Court and he is being accompanied to Tokyo by Mr. Keith Officer, the ranking member of the Australian diplomatic service below the rank of Minister. Latham is being given leave of absence from his very important position in Australia to undertake this special diplomatic duty *because of the seriousness of the occasion.*

6. It is probably true that it would be impossible to find a first-rate man in business or professional life in Canada who would be willing to go to Japan at the moment—because of the uncertainty of tenure. But we have available members of our Service who could properly and effectively fill the position. (Mr. Désy is an excellent example: Colonel Vanier might also be considered.) Or we could invite Sir George Sansom¹ to represent us temporarily across the Pacific.

144.

26-CR-40

Le chargé d'affaires au Japon² au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Chargé d'Affaires in Japan² to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 119

Tokyo, July 20, 1941

In view of recent developments, I strongly urge immediate announcement of an outstanding Canadian as Minister to Japan. Such an appointment would have far-reaching psychological effects at present time and would be an added encouragement to those elements which would be glad to dissociate this country from Axis.

Please comment immediately since I shall be seeing the new Minister for Foreign Affairs when he receives Heads of Missions.

145.

26-CR-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires au Japon
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in Japan

TELEGRAM 90

Ottawa, July 21, 1941

Your telegram No. 119 of July 20th. When you see new Minister of Foreign Affairs, you may tell him that I have arranged for the immediate

¹ Conseiller commercial 1925-40, Ambassade britannique au Japon.

² E. D. McGreer.

¹ Commercial Counsellor, 1925-40, British Embassy in Japan.

appointment as Minister to Japan of a distinguished Canadian of long public service and outstanding military record. The Minister Designate, whose name is being submitted to His Majesty for approval before it can be communicated to the Japanese Government, is a leading citizen of British Columbia, former head of the Canadian Legion and now Officer Commanding one of the military districts. He has taken a sympathetic and friendly interest in the problems of Japanese Canadians, and I am confident that the Japanese Government will appreciate his appointment as evidence of the importance we attach to Canadian Diplomatic Representation in Japan.

146.

26-CR-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1138

Ottawa, July 29, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL. Canadian Government, with the concurrence of the Governor General, desire to ascertain whether His Majesty would approve of issue of Letter of Recall in respect of the Honourable Robert Randolph Bruce who, they desire to submit, has fulfilled his mission in Japan with entire satisfaction, and the appointment of Brigadier W. W. Foster, D.S.O., V.D.,¹ as His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada in Japan. Please make verbal submission to His Majesty. Formal documents of submission will be forwarded by air mail within the next few days.

147.

26-CR-40

*Décret du Conseil
Order in Council*

P.C. 5821

July 31, 1941

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, advise that Brigadier W. W. Foster, D.S.O., V.D., be appointed as His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada in Japan; that His Majesty the King be humbly moved to approve such appointment and that the usual steps to submit this matter to His Majesty be taken.

¹ Commandant du district militaire n° 12 (Saskatchewan).

¹ District Officer Commanding Military District No. 12 (Saskatchewan).

148.

26-CR-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1153

Ottawa, July 31, 1941

MOST SECRET. Reference my telegram No. 1138 of July 29th.

I would be most grateful in connection with proposed appointment of Brigadier Foster as Canadian Minister to Japan if you could make informal inquiries to learn the attitude of the United Kingdom authorities on the advisability of making such an appointment at the present time.

I may say that the Japanese representatives here have repeatedly made reference to the importance of filling this long vacant post, and that in recent discussions in Tokyo between McGreer and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the latter was highly gratified to learn of the proposed appointment. In considering this appointment the Canadian authorities have taken the view that it would have a useful effect in encouraging anti-Axis elements in Japan and in preventing a further deterioration of our relations with that country.

In view of the critical events of the past week, however, the views of the United Kingdom authorities on the usefulness of such an appointment at the present time would receive thoughtful consideration prior to any final decision here. Any comment which you can forward in this connection in the immediate future will be greatly appreciated.

149.

26-CR-40

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 1398

London, August 5, 1941

MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 1153 of July 31st. Have discussed with Foreign Secretary question of proposed appointment of Canadian Minister to Japan. Mr. Eden fully appreciates views set forth in second paragraph of your telegram under reference, but has asked me to say that after careful consideration he very much hopes that in view of present critical situation the Canadian Government may find it possible to decide to postpone the appointment.

MASSEY

150.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

SECRET AND IMPORTANT

[Ottawa,] August 5, 1941

In conversation with Mr. Moffat last week, I told him exactly what our position was in regard to the various questions outstanding with Japan. In the course of the conversation he enquired about the future of our Legation in Tokyo, and I told him that you had in mind making an early appointment, which you thought would be well received in Canada and which you hoped would help to strengthen what forces there were in Japan opposed to further warlike adventure. I also told him that we had in mind exchanging Ministers with China, and hoped to be able to announce the Government's intention of opening a Legation at Chungking at the same time that the appointment of a new Minister at Tokyo was made public.

This morning Mr. Moffat called to say that he had been instructed by Mr. Hull, to whom he had reported our conversation, to let you know that he hoped very much that you would be able to defer announcing the appointment of a new Minister to Japan until the political situation in the Far East was clarified. The United States Government was very anxious to maintain a parallel policy with the countries of the Commonwealth vis-à-vis Japan during the present crisis, and they feared that a diplomatic initiative such as the appointment of a new Minister by one of the countries cooperating in the freezing policy would be construed by the Japanese either as evidence of divergence of views between Canada and the United States or as an indication that the economic pressure now being mobilized would be relaxed. They felt that the announcement of the appointment at this particular moment might be hailed by the Japanese as a gesture toward "appeasement" and would tend to strengthen rather than deter the aggressive elements in the Japanese Government, which are already inclined to discount Anglo-American warnings against further aggression as mere words.

Mr. Moffat said he hoped we would not take amiss the importance his Government attached to this question of timing. Their only justification for communicating with us on what was, strictly speaking, none of their business was the importance he knew you and the President attached to the frankest exchange of views between our Governments on questions of common concern to both countries.

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

151.

26-CR-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Brigadier W. W. Foster
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Brigadier W. W. Foster

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, August 5, 1941

In view of present critical position it has been found necessary to postpone projected appointment. Writing.

N. A. ROBERTSON

152.

26-CR-40

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures¹
au secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures²

Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs¹
to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs²

[Ottawa,] August 30, 1941

RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

The Japanese Minister called on me this morning to refer to the press announcement of the appointment of Brigadier Foster as Minister to Japan. Mr. Yoshizawa pointed out that this announcement had placed him, and might place his Government, in an awkward position because he had been informed by the Prime Minister that Brigadier Foster was to be appointed and had passed this information on to his Government. Subsequently Mr. King had stated that the appointment would have to be held up because of difficulties that had arisen between the two countries. The Japanese Government had been disappointed by this decision, and they were now likely to be upset by the public announcement of the appointment and the denial that had followed.

I told Mr. Yoshizawa that we had made every effort to find out how the leak about Brigadier Foster had occurred but had so far been unsuccessful. I told him that we regretted the publication of the report. In reply to an enquiry I said that I could give him no assurance as to when the Canadian Government would be prepared to go ahead with an appointment of a Minister to Japan; I added that the difficulties currently being experienced by Mr. McGreer³ would not assist us in coming to an early decision in favour of such an appointment.

Mr. Yoshizawa then referred to the announcement from Chungking that Canada intends to appoint a Minister to China. He said that he hoped that the announcement of an appointment to Japan would precede the announcement of an appointment to Chungking. I told Mr. Yoshizawa that I could give him no assurance on this point; that the possibility of appointing a

¹ H. L. Keenleyside.² Ernest Lapointe.³ Voir le volume 8, chapitre 6, partie 1.³ See Volume 8, Chapter 6, Part 1.

Minister to China had been under discussion on and off for some years, and that it was natural that it should again come under consideration at this time. I added, however, that we had no responsibility for the announcement that had been issued from Chungking and that we had no announcement to make at the present time. He would, of course, appreciate that the Canadian Government is under very strong pressure to perform acts that might be looked upon as favourable to China, and there would be considerable criticism of any step that might be taken at the present time that could be looked upon as being a marked expression of favour towards Japan.

Before the Minister left I again referred to the case of Mr. McGreer and expressed the hope that an early decision might be reached in Tokyo.

153.

26-CR-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Brigadier W. W. Foster
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Brigadier W. W. Foster

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, September 26, 1941

Dear Brigadier Foster,

I am very sorry that I was not able to add an earlier word of explanation to the telegram I sent you on the Tokyo situation before the Prime Minister went to the United Kingdom. The general application by Commonwealth countries and the United States of a freezing policy against Japanese overseas assets and the consequent suspension of Japanese trading relations appreciably tightened the tension in the Pacific, which was created by the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China. In the circumstances the Government felt, after consultation with the other Governments concerned, that the announcement of the appointment of a new Canadian Minister, immediately following on the application of very severe economic sanctions against Japan, might be misconstrued as an indication that Canadian policy in this field was not closely coordinated with that of the United Kingdom and the United States.

As matters stand, the situation in the Far East seems to be somewhat more stable than it was two months ago, and the Prime Minister, in the light of the discussions on the subject which he had in London, feels that the objections to proceeding with the appointment of a new Minister which then prevailed now no longer obtain. There remains, however, the fact that shipping communications between Canada and Japan are in abeyance. There are no direct sailings scheduled from Canadian ports, and I am informed that the first probable sailing of a United States vessel for Japan is tentatively set for December 26th. In these circumstances, it seems advisable to defer definitive decisions and announcements about our Legation in Tokyo for some weeks further. I shall not fail to advise you immediately of any development in the situation.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

154.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] October 3, 1941

Before Mr. Moffat left for the Maritimes, he told me that the United States-Japanese negotiations in Washington had reached a point from which they would either progress pretty rapidly towards a satisfactory conclusion, or break down altogether. Mr. Hull had told him that he thought the next two or three weeks would definitely determine their outcome. He had mentioned to Mr. Hull that we might be proceeding with the appointment of a new Minister to Tokyo, and Mr. Hull had asked him to let you know that he hoped it would not be found necessary during these next two or three critical weeks to make any public announcement about the designation of a new Minister to Tokyo, which might possibly be misconstrued in Japan, and have repercussions on the American-Japanese discussions.

I told Mr. Moffat that you had advised Brigadier Foster that while your intention to proceed with the appointment still stood, it might be, in view of the difficulty of finding direct transportation, that no definite decision or announcement in respect to his appointment would be made before the end of November.

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

155.

26-CR-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Brigadier W. W. Foster
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Brigadier W. W. Foster*

PERSONAL

Ottawa, November 28, 1941

Dear Brigadier Foster,

The Pacific situation is not getting any easier. As matters stand right now, the Government will not take steps to fill the Tokyo Legation. In the circumstances, I think you can quite safely go ahead with your plans for a visit to the Pacific coast next month without paying too much attention to the date of December 26th. I doubt very much whether the sailing schedule for that date still stands.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

PARTIE 6 / PART 6

ÉTABLISSEMENT DE CONSULATS
ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES
GROENLAND/GREENLAND

156.

267-J-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures¹*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs¹*

[Ottawa,] May 14, 1940

GREENLAND

CONSULAR APPOINTMENT

Both the United States and Canada are adopting a policy of co-operation with the local governments in Greenland. The United States has appointed a Consul and Vice-Consul to Greenland. They sailed for Greenland on May 10th on a small U.S. cutter—the *Comanche*.

Council has decided to appoint a Canadian Consul to Greenland. The Prime Minister and Mr. Crerar² are considering the possibility of finding a competent Canadian of Danish or Icelandic descent. We are sending up the Hudson Bay boat, the *Nascopie*, carrying supplies and bringing back a load of cryolite. She will probably sail next Monday or Tuesday. You will see from the telegram attached³ that we have telegraphed London about our intentions. Unless there is any strong contrary reaction there, the appointment will doubtless have to be made soon.

I should be obliged if you could consider the question of the procedure in making the appointment.

I am inclined to think that it would be a good time to appoint simultaneously Dupuy in Paris and McGreer in Tokyo as Consuls. They both hold the rank of First Secretary. I should think "Consul" would be the appropriate corresponding rank.

O. D. S[KELTON]

¹ Laurent Beaudry.

² T. A. Crerar, ministre des Mines et des Ressources.

³ T. A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources.

³ Document 1146.

157.

267-J-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général
du Danemark*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General
of Denmark*

Ottawa, May 21, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that, in view of existing circumstances, the Canadian Government propose temporarily to establish a Consulate in Greenland.

I would appreciate being informed whether the provisional establishment of such an Office would be satisfactory and whether provisional recognition might be given to the Consul to be placed in charge of the Canadian Consulate and to the Vice-Consul who may assist him.

May we assume that you will take the necessary steps to see that this information is brought to the attention of the local authorities in Greenland.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON

158.

267-J-40

*Décret du Conseil
Order in Council*

P.C. 2111

May 21, 1940

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, advise:

- 1—That a Canadian Consulate be established in Greenland;
- 2—That a Canadian Consulate be established in Paris, France;
- 3—That a Canadian Consulate be also established in Tokyo, Japan;
- 4—That, under the authority of External Affairs Vote-Representation Abroad, K. P. Kirkwood, Esquire, of the External Affairs Service, be appointed Consul and A. E. Porsild, Esquire, of the Department of Mines and Resources, be appointed Vice-Consul, in Greenland, and that Pierre Dupuy, Esquire, and E. D. McGreer, Esquire, of the External Affairs Service, be appointed Consuls in Paris and Tokyo respectively;
- 5—That appropriate steps be taken to submit these consular establishments and appointments to His Majesty The King for approval.

159.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 83

Ottawa, May 21, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. With reference to first paragraph of my immediately following telegram No. 84 of today, concerning question of establishing Canadian Consulate and Vice-Consulate in Greenland, I assume it will be in accord with usual procedure to have Assignment Commissions issued by His Majesty in names of Kirkwood and Porsild. It is desired reference therein should not be made to Denmark but to constituted authorities "in Greenland". It is not proposed, however, that any Assignment Commissions be presented to Greenland Authorities. In this connection, I may inform you that United States Consular Officers sent to Greenland have been issued Assignment Commissions in which reference is made to constituted authorities in Greenland but these Commissions will not be presented to Greenland authorities and United States authorities are of opinion question of *Exequatur* does not arise. It is requested Kirkwood[']s] and Porsild's Commissions be forwarded to High Commissioner for Canada in London for delivery to Kirkwood before he leaves.

160.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 84

Ottawa, May 21, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. His Majesty's Government in Canada, in view of existing circumstances, propose to establish Canadian Consulate and Vice-Consulate in Greenland and to appoint K. P. Kirkwood, of the External Affairs Service of Canada, and A. E. Porsild, as Consul and Vice-Consul respectively in Greenland.

His Majesty's Government in Canada also propose to establish Canadian Consulate in France and Canadian Consulate in Japan and to appoint Pierre Dupuy and E. D. McGreer, of the External Affairs Service of Canada, as Consuls in Paris and Tokyo respectively.

It is requested recommendations to that effect be submitted to His Majesty.

161.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne.

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 584

Ottawa, May 22, 1940

Following for Kirkwood, Begins.

1. *Nascopie*, with Major D. L. McKeand in charge of Government Party

and A. E. Porsild, on board, is leaving Sydney tomorrow and is likely to arrive Ivigtut, Greenland, Tuesday, 28th May, where she will await your arrival there on *Julius Thomsen* so as to arrange your transportation to Godthaab, South Greenland, and Godhavn, North Greenland. McKeand will hand you two letters to Governors of North and South Greenland respectively for presentation by you to Governors, also a letter to you stating that you are being appointed Consul. McKeand has also a letter in which he is asked to cooperate with you.

2. Steps have been taken for issue by His Majesty of Assignment Commissions to you and Porsild which will be delivered to you at High Commissioner's Office before you leave to catch *Julius Thomsen* for you to carry to Greenland. These documents, however, should not be presented to constituted authorities in Greenland and no question of *Exequatur* arises.

3. Canadian High Commissioner London has been asked to arrange with Dominions Office so as to provide you with Code or Cypher and a set of British printed Consular Regulations.

4. The following should be regarded by you and Mr. Porsild as your general instructions:

(1) You are charged as Canadian Consul in Greenland with the duty of promoting, protecting and defending interests of Canada. Mr. Porsild as Vice-Consul is to assist you in performance of this duty.

(2) Canadian Government understands that pending restoration of Danish freedom local authorities in North and South Greenland have decided to administer their territories on their own responsibility and to refuse to accept instructions forwarded under compulsion from Copenhagen. On that understanding, Canadian Government are prepared, if so desired, to cooperate with and assist Greenland authorities in promoting welfare of their people and they will be glad to consider suggestions from Greenland authorities as to form in which such cooperation and assistance can best be effected. Above statement speaks for itself as to your duties in this connection. Purpose of sending *Nascopie* with supplies is to facilitate cooperation and assistance.

3. Canada is greatly interested in security of cryolite mines at Ivigtut in Greenland and we hope that ore production this year may be fully maintained. We trust that early consultation with Greenland and United States authorities in regard to production, transportation and marketing of this ore may be arranged and that it may be possible to have *Nascopie* bring back a cargo of cryolite on her present trip. This matter, therefore should engage your close attention in consultation with United States Consular Officers in Greenland and local authorities.

More detailed instructions and indications which may be required will follow as soon as possible. Ends.

162.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 63

London, May 27, 1940

SECRET. Your secret telegram No. 84 of May 21st. Appointment of person named as Consul in Greenland is being submitted to His Majesty for signature, but, in the meantime, it is suggested that the authorities in Greenland should be invited to accord provisional recognition pending definitive appointment. Commission of Appointment, when signed by His Majesty, will be forwarded to you for counter signature and despatch. Vice-Consuls do not receive [appointment] from His Majesty's Commission but Commission for Consul will include authority for him to make such appointments.

Commissions for appointment in Paris and Tokyo are also being submitted for signature. Please telegraph McGreer's full name.

163.

267-J-40

Le consul général du Danemark au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures

Consul General of Denmark to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Montreal, May 27, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 21st May, 1940, informing me that, in view of existing circumstances, the Canadian Government propose temporarily to establish a Consulate in Greenland.

Referring to telephone conversations on the 23rd and the 25th instant with the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, I have the honour to inform you that I have no authority to recognize the provisional establishment of such an office, or to give provisional recognition to the Consul to be placed in charge of the Canadian Consulate and to the Vice-Consul who may assist him.

In your letter of May 21st, 1940, you were kind enough to inform me of the contents of a telegraphic communication addressed to the Governors of North Greenland and South Greenland respectively by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada.¹ As it appears from this letter that the said Governors have informed the Department of External Affairs that they for the present time administer Greenland independently, since they are unable to carry out instructions from Copenhagen, that is, from the Administration of Greenland (Department of the Secretary of State), which, according to Danish laws, is the supreme authority in all matters concerning Greenland,

¹ Document 1151.

I am ready, at the request of Mr. Beaudry, by cable to inform the local authorities in Greenland of the contents of your first mentioned letter.

As the two Governors have established a Central Organization in Godthaab with cable address "Sydfogeden Godthaab", it will be sufficient to cable this Organization.

The proposed cable reads as follows:

Under-Statssekretæren for Udenrigske Anliggender meddeler nu officielt at Canadisk regering paataenker midlertidig oprette konsulat I Gronland anmodet mig indhente oplysning om de indforstaaet midlertidig oprettelse saadant konsulat og villig give Canadisk konsul og vicekonsul foreloebig anerkendelse bedes telegrafere.

(Translation: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs now officially informed me Canadian Government propose temporarily establish Consulate Greenland requested me obtain information whether you agree provisional establishment such Consulate and ready give Canadian Consul and Vice-Consul provisional recognition please wire).

As requested by Mr. Beaudry, this cable will not be despatched before I have been advised that you agree to same.

I have etc.

G. B. HOLLER

164.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 65

London, May 29, 1940

SECRET. My telegram No. 63 of May 27th. Following is the draft Commission of Appointment of Consul in Greenland. Following after the recital of His Majesty's full title, Begins:

To all and singular to whom these present[s] shall come, greetings!

Whereas at the instance of Our Government in Canada We have thought it necessary for encouraging Our subjects' trading to Greenland to appoint a Consul in that territory, to take care of Our said subjects, and to aid and assist them in all their lawful and mercantile concerns. Now know ye that We, reposing special trust and confidence in the discretion and faithfulness of our trusty and well beloved Kenneth Porter Kirkwood Esquire have on advice of Our Government in Canada nominated, constituted and appointed, as We do by these presents nominate, constitute, and appoint him, the said Kenneth Porter Kirkwood to be Our Consul in Greenland as aforesaid, to reside at Ivigtut,¹ hereby giving and granting unto him Full Power and Authority by all lawful means to aid and protect Our merchants and others of Our subjects who may trade with or visit or reside within his Consular District, and also appoint Vice-Consuls at such ports and places within his Consular District as may be necessary for better protection of Our subjects trading with, visiting, or residing at all such ports and places

¹Le consulat fut déménagé plus tard à Godthaab.

¹The Consulate was later transferred to Godthaab.

and to hold said office during Our pleasure with all rights, privileges, and immunities hereunto appertaining.

And We do hereby strictly enjoin and require all Our subjects to take due notice of this Our commission and yield obedience thereto.

Given at Our Court of St. James, et cetera.

Ends.

I should be glad to learn whether His Majesty's Government in Canada concur in above draft. If so it is proposed to adopt similar form for appointments to Paris and Tokyo.

165.

267-J-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures
au consul général du Danemark*

*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Consul General of Denmark*

PRIVATE

Ottawa, May 30, 1940

My dear Mr. Holler,

With reference to our informal conversation over the telephone recently, I may say that I had in mind, and, from my recollection, my request was that you might write to us officially to acknowledge our letter of the 21st May and, without raising any particular points, to add that you were sending a telegram to the Greenland authorities in the sense of our letter of the 21st May. I am sorry if I did not make myself clear to you.

I, therefore, return your letter of the 27th May, and should be glad if you would be so good as to forward Dr. Skelton a substituted official communication which would substantially recite again the first paragraph of your letter of the 27th and the cable which you propose to send, as mentioned in that letter.

The substituted communication would consequently read as follows:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 21st May, 1940, informing me that, in view of existing circumstances, the Canadian Government propose temporarily to establish a Consulate in Greenland.

I propose to send the following cable, in Danish, to Greenland authorities:

Under-Statssekretæren for Udenrigske Anliggender meddeler nu officielt at Canadisk regering paataenker midlertidig oprette konsulat i Gronland anmodet mig indhente oplysning om de indforstaaet midlertidig oprettelse saadant konsulat og villig give Canadisk konsul og vicekonsul foreloebig anerkendelse bedes telegrafere.

(Translation: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs now officially informed me Canadian Government propose temporarily establish consulate Greenland requested me obtain information whether you agree provisional establishment such consulate and ready give Canadian consul and vice-consul provisional recognition please wire.)

Upon receipt of this substituted communication, I shall not fail to communicate with you informally, regarding facilitating the transmission of your proposed cable.

Yours sincerely,

LAURENT BEAUDRY

P.S. We shall be glad, of course, to consider the particular points that you mentioned to me informally over the telephone.

166.

267-J-40

*Le consul général du Danemark au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Consul General of Denmark to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

Montreal, May 31, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 21st May, 1940, informing me that, in view of existing circumstances, the Canadian Government propose temporarily to establish a Consulate in Greenland.

I intend to send the following cable, in Danish, to the Greenland authorities (Sydfogeden Godthaab):

Under-Statssekretaeren for Udenrigske Anliggender meddeler nu officielt at Canadisk regering paataenker midlertidig oprette konsulat i Gronland anmodet mig indhente oplysning om de indforstaaet midlertidig oprettelse saadant konsulat og villig give Canadisk konsul og vicekonsul foreloebig anerkendelse bedes telegrafere.

(Translation: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs now officially informed me Canadian Government propose temporarily establish Consulate Greenland requested me obtain information whether you agree provisional establishment such Consulate and ready give Canadian Consul and Vice-Consul provisional recognition please wire).

I have etc.

G. B. HOLLER

167.

267-J-40

*Le consul général du Danemark au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Consul General of Denmark to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

Montreal, June 5, 1940

Sir,

In continuation of my letter of May 31st regarding the intention of the Canadian Government temporarily to establish a Consulate in Greenland, I have the honour to inform you that, in accordance with the request of the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, I forwarded on Saturday, June 1st, the following telegram to Sydfogeden, Godthaab:

Under-Statssekretæren for Udenrigske Anliggender meddeler nu officielt at Canadisk regering paataenker midlertidig oprette konsulat i Gronland anmodet mig indhente oplysning om de indforstaaet midlertidig oprettelse saadant konsulat og villig give Canadisk konsul og vicekonsul foreloebig anerkendelse bedes telegrafere.

In reply to this telegram I have today received a cable, by which the Governor of South Greenland, Mr. Aksel Svane, and the Governor of North Greenland, Mr. Eske Brun, have requested me to inform the Canadian Government that they appreciate highly the proposed temporary establishment of a Canadian Consulate in Greenland, and they are ready to give provisional recognition to the Canadian Consul and the Vice-Consul.

The two Governors have added to this information that, as already stated through the Danish Minister in Washington, Mr. Kauffmann, it has been found impossible to place residential quarters at the disposal of the Canadian Consul and Vice-Consul, and that it is, therefore, counted on that the necessary materials for such housing are brought along from Canada.

I have etc.

G. B. HOLLER

168.

267-J-40

*Le consul général du Danemark au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Consul General of Denmark to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

Montreal, June 15, 1940

Dear Dr. Skelton,

The Danish Legation in Stockholm has, at the request of the Royal Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, asked me to cable the Legation whether it is correct that the Canadian Government has appointed a Consul to Greenland and dispatched supplies to the said country.

As Prime Minister Mackenzie King's statement to the House of Commons on June 11th has been published in the Canadian newspapers, and as the contents of the statement most likely already have been transmitted to Berlin through the channel of the German Embassy in Washington, I assume that there would be no objection to my giving the Danish Legation the requested information.

However, as I have promised you not to transmit any communications either directly or otherwise to the Danish Government, except with your permission, I should be thankful if you would be kind enough to let me know by return of mail whether there are any objections to my sending the following telegram to the Danish Legation in Stockholm: "Your telegram Greenland yes".

Yours sincerely,

G. B. HOLLER

169.

267-J-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul général
du Danemark*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul General
of Denmark*

Ottawa, June 18, 1940

Dear Mr. Holler,

In reply to your letter of the 15th of June, I am inclined to think that it would be desirable to adhere to the general policy of leaving it to the German and Danish Governments to obtain information from sources which are beyond our control. It is true that information regarding our appointment of a Consul to Greenland has probably been made known to Germany, but I see no reason why Canadian facilities should be used to confirm the information which they may have received.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

170.

267-J-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 67

Ottawa, April 25, 1941

With reference to your telegram of May 29, 1940, No. 65, appointment of Canadian Consuls.

The form suggested is satisfactory except in a minor particular.

We suggest that it is desirable that the Commission should indicate that the Consul is appointed for Canada. This might properly be done by inserting the words "for Canada" after the words "appoint a Consul" and again after the words "to be our Consul".

SAINT-PIERRE-ET-MIQUELON / ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON

171.

1453-40

*Le Président par intérim, la Commission canadienne de la Marine marchande
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting Chairman, Canadian Shipping Board to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

Ottawa, December 6, 1940

Dear Dr. Skelton,

At a meeting of this Board, held yesterday, the question was raised as to whether it would be possible to have a Canadian Consul at St. Pierre, since such an official, especially if chosen with certain qualifications in mind, would be in a position to supply information which would be useful at all times and which, in certain eventualities, might be vital to the security of Canadian and allied shipping.

Dr. Keenleyside stated that your Department would, he felt, be prepared to consider the possibility of such an appointment if the Board thought that such a step were definitely advisable and would make a recommendation to you to that effect.

After consideration, the meeting unanimously agreed that such recommendation be made and communicated to you immediately.

At Dr. Keenleyside's suggestion, I am having a copy of this letter forwarded to the Naval Secretary today, with the request that Naval Services communicate to you their views upon it.

Yours faithfully,

F. E. BAWDEN

172.

1453-40

*Le sous-ministre adjoint par intérim de la Défense nationale pour les
Services navals au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Associate Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence for Naval Services
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, December 11, 1940

Dear Dr. Skelton,

I have received a copy of the Canadian Shipping Board's memorandum dated December 6th recommending the appointment of a Canadian Consul at St. Pierre.

The Naval Service would welcome such an appointment and request that if the appointment were made they be allowed to issue certain books and instructions to the Consul so that he may undertake the duties of a Consular Reporting Officer on behalf of the Naval Intelligence.

Yours very truly,

K. S. MACLACHLAN

173.

King Papers, PAC

*Mé morandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] December 13, 1940

ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON

In connection with Mr. Hanson's letter on St. Pierre and Miquelon,¹ I may observe that the Shipping Board has recently made the suggestion that Canada should appoint a Consul or Vice-Consul to St. Pierre. There is a British Vice-Consul there who has done what he could, but he is a part-time man and an employee of a French company there. I think there is a good deal to be said for such an appointment. It is not a big enough job to put a man of any very great standing in. It might be possible to find some junior with the necessary discretion.

O. D. S[KELTON]

174.

1453-40

*Mé morandum du deuxième secrétaire
Memorandum by Second Secretary*

[Ottawa,] May 13, 1941

APPOINTMENT OF A CANADIAN CONSUL IN ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON

1. The Canadian Shipping Board and the Canadian Naval Service have recommended the appointment of a Canadian Consul in St. Pierre and Miquelon.

2. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police needs either a United Kingdom or a Canadian Consul to report on liquor conditions and smuggling. The recent resignation of the British Vice-Consul makes it necessary for Canada or the United Kingdom or both to appoint a consular representative.

3. St. Pierre and Miquelon, like Newfoundland and Greenland, come within Canada's sphere of interest so far as Canada's relations with the United Kingdom are concerned. Therefore, if only one British Commonwealth Consul is to be appointed to St. Pierre, he should be a Canadian Consul.

4. In the event that the Government of France adopts an actively hostile policy, Canada will try to work out a joint policy with the United States under which Canada and the United States would have equal responsibility and equal authority in St. Pierre and Miquelon. It will be easier to work out this policy if Canada, as well as the United States, has a consul in St. Pierre.

¹ Non reproduite.² Not printed.

5. It is therefore recommended that a Canadian consular representative be accredited to St. Pierre and Miquelon. (The French Minister stated on July 20, 1940, that he would be entirely ready, after consultation with the local authorities, to provide for the admission of a consular agent from Canada).

6. Consideration will have to be given to Dr. Keenleyside's suggestion that the post of Canadian Consul to St. Pierre and Miquelon be held by the proposed Canadian Commissioner to Newfoundland.

7. The attached memorandum¹ summarizes information from the files which bears on the question under discussion.

E[SCOTT] R[EID]

175.

702-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] May 15, 1941

REPRESENTATION AT SAINT PIERRE-MIQUELON

In a conversation the other day with the United States Minister about Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Mr. Moffat was under the impression that the American Consular Agent, stationed in the Islands when they were rum-running headquarters, had been withdrawn. He told me today, however, that the State Department had reopened its Consulate in Saint Pierre and that they would be glad to make its reports on conditions there available to us through the United States Legation in Ottawa. This will help to close the gap in our information about conditions in the Islands which has resulted from the retirement, without replacement, of the British Vice-Consul. It is not, however, I think entirely satisfactory to be dependent upon the good offices of the United States for information about the situation in a foreign colony which is practically located in Canadian territorial waters, nor could we properly initiate enquiries about particular points in Saint Pierre which might be of concern to Canadian Government Departments through United States diplomatic channels.

In the circumstances I think we might still consider the advisability of appointing a Canadian Consular Agent there if a suitable man can be found. In some ways a retired Naval officer or shipping man, with a good knowledge of French, would be, I think, a better appointment than a junior member of our own service.

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

176.

1453-40

*Décret du Conseil**Order in Council*

P.C. 6439

August 19, 1941

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 19th August, 1941, from the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, representing that it is expedient, in view of the increasing importance of Canada's relations with the French Colony of St. Pierre and Miquelon, especially since the outbreak of war and the decision of the French Government to sign an armistice, and in certain respects to collaborate, with Germany and Italy, to establish a consular representative at St. Pierre to report, from time to time, on questions of trade, communications, navigation and shipping, and other subjects that may be of interest to the Canadian Government, or to Departments thereof, and to lend aid and advice to Canadian nationals and other British subjects residing in, trading with or who may be shipwrecked upon the shores of these Islands.

The Committee, therefore, on the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs and under and by virtue of the powers conferred by the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, and The War Appropriation Act, 1939, advise:

1. That there be established a Canadian Consulate in the Colony of St. Pierre and Miquelon;
2. That Christopher Campbell Eberts, presently on the staff of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, be appointed Vice-Consul for Canada in the Colony of St. Pierre and Miquelon, with the local rank of Acting Consul there;
3. That the salaries and allowances payable in respect of such appointment, be fixed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, subject to approval of Treasury Board; and
4. That the Vice-Consul for Canada in the Colony of St. Pierre and Miquelon shall report to, and be subject to the instructions of, the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

177.

1453-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires
in United States*

TELEGRAM 322

Ottawa, August 19, 1941

Would be grateful if you could ask the State Department to cable the following message to the United States Ambassador in Vichy for transmission to Mr. Dupuy, if he is still there. Begins:

In view of growing importance of relations with Colony of St. Pierre and Miquelon it has been decided that it would be desirable to station an Acting Consul at St. Pierre and it is proposed to appoint Mr. C. C. Eberts, presently on the staff of the Department of External Affairs, as Acting Consul. M. Ristelhueber was informed about a week ago and presumably has already cabled his Government on the subject. Assume there will be no objection and that Mr. Eberts will leave to take up his new post at an early date. Ends.

178.

1453-40

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures à l'Administrateur,
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Administrator, St. Pierre
and Miquelon*

Ottawa, le 25 août 1941

Monsieur l'Administrateur,

Vu l'essor qu'ont pris les relations entre le Canada et le Territoire des îles Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, le gouvernement du Canada a jugé opportun d'instituer un consulat à Saint-Pierre et, ayant fait part au Gouvernement métropolitain français de cette intention, a nommé au poste de consul intérimaire le porteur de cette lettre, Monsieur Christopher Campbell Eberts, présentement vice-consul au ministère des Affaires extérieures, à Ottawa.

Il aura pour mission de favoriser et d'encourager les rapports commerciaux et maritimes et, le cas échéant, de prêter secours aux ressortissants canadiens et autres sujets britanniques qui habitent dans ces îles. Aussi servira-t-il de lien de communication entre nos deux administrations.

J'ai confiance que Monsieur Eberts jouira, dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, des honneurs, de l'autorité et des prérogatives attachés à ladite charge, aussi bien que de tous les privilèges consulaires.

Je vous prie etc.

[ERNEST LAPOINTE]

179.

1453-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 366

Washington, August 29, 1941

Your telegram No. 336 of August 27th¹ and previous correspondence concerning appointment of Consul to St. Pierre. State Department have received message from Dupuy, through United States Embassy in Vichy,

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

dated August 28th. Dupuy reports that French authorities would accept Canadian Consul provided:

- (a) He would abstain from propaganda;
- (b) He would be favourable to Pétain;
- (c) He would be French Canadian.

Dupuy replied in the following sense:

- (a) He was sure that any Canadian representative would limit his activities to normal functions of Consul;
- (b) Canadian official representative could not be expected to express opinions favourable to Pétain or the French Government;
- (c) He could not see that appointment of French Canadian would provide any supplementary guarantee.

Paraphrase of telegram to the State Department follows by bag. It contains message on other subjects.

180.

1453-40

*L'Administrateur, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Administrator, St. Pierre and Miquelon to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

No. 108

Saint-Pierre, le 16 septembre 1941

Monsieur le Secrétaire d'État,

Par lettre du 25 Août 1941, vous avez bien voulu m'informer que le Gouvernement du Canada avait jugé opportun d'instituer un Consulat à Saint-Pierre et avait nommé à ce poste M. Christopher Campbell Eberts, vice-consul au Ministère des Affaires extérieures à Ottawa.

En vous remerciant bien vivement pour cette communication, je tiens à vous donner l'assurance que les plus grandes facilités seront accordées dans le Territoire des Îles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon à M. Eberts dans l'exercice de ses fonctions.

Mon administration, d'autre part, fera tout ce qui sera en son pouvoir pour entretenir avec le Représentant du Canada à Saint-Pierre les relations les plus courtoises dans l'intérêt commun de nos deux gouvernements.

Je ne doute pas que cette mesure, qui m'est personnellement très agréable, tende à favoriser les relations entre le Canada et notre Archipel et à resserrer encore les liens nombreux qui unissent déjà nos ressortissants.

Je vous prie etc.

DE BOURNAT

181.

1453-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1645

Ottawa, October 24, 1941

Your despatch No. 563 of October 2, 1941.¹

I shall be obliged if you will inform the Dominions Office of the steps taken to establish the status of Mr. Eberts as Acting Consul at St. Pierre.

As early as July 20, 1940, the French Minister in Ottawa had stated that if our Prime Minister thought it necessary he would be ready after consultation with local authorities to agree to the appointment of a Consular representative from Canada. In August, 1941, we informed the French Minister of our intention to make an appointment and he transmitted this information to his Government. We informed Mr. Dupuy through the State Department and the American Ambassador in Vichy. Agreement was granted by the Vichy Government subject to three conditions, namely, that the Acting Consul should engage in no propaganda, should be favourable to Marshal Pétain and should be a French Canadian. In reply Mr. Dupuy stated that the Acting Consul would not engage in propaganda but that he could not (repeat not) be expected to express opinions in favour of Marshal Pétain and that there would be no supplementary guarantee in his being a French Canadian. This explanation appears to have been tacitly accepted. We are not disposed to press for any further action by the Vichy Government particularly as Mr. Eberts has been well received on the Islands.

ÉTATS-UNIS / UNITED STATES

182.

9323-B-40

Mémoire du conseiller²

Memorandum by Counsellor²

[Ottawa,] July 13, 1940

1. If the Canadian Government decides to accept the advice of the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and impose passport and visa restrictions on United States visitors to Canada from the 1st of October, 1940, it will be necessary for the Department of External Affairs to give early consideration to the establishment of the necessary consular offices in the United States.

2. At the present time the only Canadian Government agencies permanently established in the United States are the Legation in Washington, and

¹ Non reproduite.

² H. L. Keenleyside.

¹ Not printed.

Trade Commissioners' Offices in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles. It is assumed that the cooperation of these agencies can be utilized in the establishment of the essential consular offices should such a policy be initiated.

3. The project below is based on an examination of British consular organization in the United States combined with a consideration of advice received from Mr. Dolan and other officials of the Canadian Travel Bureau in regard to the chief sources and channels of tourist travel to Canada.

4. The organizational arrangement is based on the principle of consular districts each organized under a Consulate General or, in one instance, under an officer of the Legation with the rank of Consul General. The theory underlying this arrangement is that at each Consulate General there will be one member of the service who is competent to handle any passport problem that is likely to arise and to whom the subordinate officers can refer special problems—thus relieving the Legation and the Department of a considerable body of correspondence on passport and immigration matters. In New York, Chicago and Los Angeles the Trade Commissioner's Office can be associated with the Consulate General, thus contributing to their mutual prestige and efficiency.

CONSULAR DISTRICTS

A—*Canadian Consulate General, New York*

This office might be responsible for the handling of problems arising in the States of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and [in] New England.

- 1—Consulate at Boston, with particular jurisdiction over New England, except for Connecticut which will ordinarily be handled directly from New York.
- 2—Vice-Consulate at Portland, Maine. Under supervision of Consulate at Boston.
- 3—Vice-Consulate at Philadelphia.
- 4—Vice-Consulate at Buffalo.

B—*Consul General, Canadian Legation, Washington*

The whole consular service in the United States will, of course, be under the general direction of the Canadian Minister in the United States and will report to him. In addition the Consul General on the staff of the Legation will be responsible for the handling of problems arising in the States of West Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and all States east or south of those named.

- 1—Vice-Consulate at Atlanta.

C—*Canadian Consulate General at Chicago*

This office might be responsible for the handling of problems arising in the following States:

Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota.

- 1—Consulate at Detroit.
- 2—Consulate at Minneapolis.
- 3—Vice-Consulate at St. Louis.
- 4—Vice-Consulate at Cincinnati.
- 5—Vice-Consulate at Cleveland.
- 6—Vice-Consulate at Houston.
- 7—Vice-Consulate at Duluth.
- 8—Vice-Consulate at Bismarck.

D—Canadian Consulate General at Seattle

This office will be responsible for the handling of all problems arising in the States not already covered.

- 1—Consulate at San Francisco.
- 2—Consulate at Los Angeles.
- 3—Vice-Consulate at Helena.
- 4—Vice-Consulate at Spokane.
- 5—Vice-Consulate at Portland.
- 6—Vice-Consulate at Salt Lake City.

6. The Senior Consul General should be at the Canadian Legation in Washington and would, presumably, be Mr. Mahoney, who would add this post to his present position of Counsellor. The four other Consuls General will presumably be selected from the more experienced members of the service, and they should be men who understand and have had some experience with passports, the Immigration and Naturalization Acts, and who are acquainted with the elements of commercial and legal practice. Examples: McGreer, Kirkwood, and Dupuy. Consuls General in most Services rank with, but after, Counsellors.

7. The Consuls and Vice-Consuls might be selected from the more junior ranks of the service and should be given intensive training for a few weeks in Ottawa before taking up their new duties. According to the distribution proposed herein the numbers required would be, Consuls: 5; Vice-Consuls: 14. Consuls usually rank with, but after, First and Second Secretaries (depending upon seniority). Vice-Consuls rank with Third Secretaries.

8. The adjustment of relations with the Canadian Government Trade Commissioners at New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles should not be difficult to work out. Having the two Services working together should be mutually advantageous and should have considerable publicity value for Canada.

9. The attached sketch map gives an idea of the geographical distribution of the proposed consular organization.¹

10. It is important that it should be recognized that it will take some time to effect an organization of the type herein proposed. Offices should be open

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

at least one month before the institution of the new regulations. This means that the offices should be established by the 1st of September. When this is recognized the importance of an early decision on policy becomes readily apparent.

11. As soon as the matter of policy is settled¹ a tentative proposal might be submitted to the Canadian Minister in the United States for his criticism and amendment.

PARTIE 7 / PART 7

PROTECTION DES INTÉRÊTS CANADIENS EN
TERRITOIRE ENNEMIPROTECTION OF CANADIAN INTERESTS IN
ENEMY TERRITORY

EUROPE

183.

728-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires
in United States*

TELEGRAM 112

Ottawa, September 14, 1939

With reference to your despatch No. 1679 of 8th September and its accompanying copy of Note from State Department,² it is requested that you write State Department stating that the Government of Canada are very grateful to learn that United States Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Berlin will extend protection to Canadian nationals in Germany.

184.

728-D-39

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 142

Washington, November 15, 1939

It has been mentioned to me informally at State Department that on November 9th, Canadian Minister to Belgium informed the United States Ambassador there that he would ask him to represent Canadian interests in certain eventualities. State Department would be quite ready to agree, but their practice would require that request be made to them direct by the Canadian Government. If you wish to authorize me to request them to send

¹ Le premier consulat-général aux États-Unis fut créé en 1943.

² Non reproduites.

¹ The first Consulate General in the United States was opened in 1943.

² Not printed.

contingent instructions to their Ambassador so that action could be taken rapidly, they will be glad to do so or to fall in with any procedure to facilitate and expedite purpose which you may desire.

185.

728-D-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

TELEGRAM 140

Ottawa, November 15, 1939

Your telegram No. 142 of November 15th. May say, for your information, that I am advised by Mr. Désy, in case of invasion, Belgian Government will be transferred to another city, and he suggests he be authorized to place Canadian interests in occupied Belgian territory, including present premises of Legation, under the protection of United States representatives. He requests that steps be taken to approach United States Government accordingly and that same course be followed for The Netherlands if need be.

You are authorized to request United States Government to send contingent instructions to their Ambassador in Brussels, as referred to in your telegram under reference. Your request should cover also Canadian interests in The Netherlands.

Please advise when informed of United States Government's reply.

186.

728-D-39

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 2279

Washington, November 24, 1939

Sir,

With reference to your telegram No. 140 of November 15, 1939, authorizing me to request the Government of the United States to send contingent instructions to their representatives in Brussels and in The Netherlands to undertake to protect Canadian persons and interests in occupied territory of either country or both as the case may be, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a note dated November 16, 1939, to the Secretary of State of the United States.¹

2. An acknowledgement of our note has now been received and a copy is herewith attached.¹ It will be noted from the enclosure that the Ambassador of the United States in Belgium and the Minister of the United States in The Netherlands have now been instructed to assume responsibility for Canadian interests in their respective jurisdictions in case of invasion.

I have etc.

LORING C. CHRISTIE

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

187.

728-D-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

DESPATCH 725

Ottawa, December 4, 1939

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 1823 of the 30th September, 1939,¹ and previous correspondence, concerning the protection of Canadian interests in Germany, I have the honour to state that, from my information, the United States Government have agreed to take charge of British interests in German occupied Poland and in the Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia.

It would be appreciated if the United States Government would agree to take charge also of Canadian interests in these territories.

I would ask you to address a communication to the State Department accordingly.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON
 for the Secretary of State
 for External Affairs

188.

728-D-39

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État des États-Unis
Minister in United States to Secretary of State of United States

No. 356

[Washington,] December 12, 1939

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that it is my understanding that the United States Government have agreed to take charge of British interests in German occupied Poland and in the Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia.

As pointed out in my Note of September 2nd, 1939,¹ persons under the protection of His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin ordinarily include nationals of Canada in addition to British subjects from other member states in the British Commonwealth since Canada has no separate diplomatic representation in Germany. The Canadian Government would greatly appreciate if the protection now accorded to British nationals in the areas referred to above could be extended to Canadian nationals in these territories.

I have etc.

LORING C. CHRISTIE

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

189.

728-D-39

Le secrétaire d'État des États-Unis au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State of United States to Minister in United States

[Washington,] December 18, 1939

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note No. 356 of December 12, 1939, stating that you understand that the United States Government has agreed to take charge of British interests in German occupied Poland and in Bohemia and Moravia, and requesting that the protection thus being accorded to British nationals be extended to include Canadian nationals in those areas.

The American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Berlin is being authorized by telegraph to do everything possible for Canadian nationals in the areas mentioned.

Accept etc.

SUMNER WELLES
for the Secretary of State

190.

728-D-39

Le chargé d'affaires des États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
Chargé d'Affaires of United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

No. 48

Ottawa, April 18, 1940

Sir,

In accordance with instructions received from my Government, I have the honor to inform you that, at the written request of the Canadian Trade Commissioner at Oslo, Norway, the American Legation at Oslo sealed his office on April 13, 1940.

Accordingly, I am requested to inquire whether the Canadian Government wishes the American Government to represent its interests in Norway in those areas under German control. If so, my Government would appreciate receiving a formal request to that effect at the earliest possible moment.

Accept etc.

DAVID MCK. KEY

191.

728-D-39

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État des États-Unis
Minister in United States to Secretary of State of United States

No. 117

[Washington,] April 22, 1940

Sir,

I understand that His Majesty's Minister to Denmark, before his departure from Copenhagen, submitted a request to the United States Minister to Denmark to undertake to protect those persons who are usually under the protection of His Majesty's Minister, and of the Consular Staff under his superintendence.

As Canada has no separate diplomatic representation in Denmark, persons under the protection of His Majesty's Minister to Denmark ordinarily include Canadian nationals as well as British subjects from other parts of the British Commonwealth.

I have the honour to inform you that the Canadian Government would therefore appreciate it, should the United States Government accept the undertaking requested by His Majesty's Minister to Denmark, if this protection could be afforded to Canadian nationals.

I have etc.

LORING C. CHRISTIE

192.

728-D-39

Le secrétaire d'État des États-Unis au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State of United States to Minister in United States

[Washington,] April 23, 1940

Sir,

I have received your Note no. 117 of April 22, 1940, in which you support the request made by the British Minister to Denmark, subsequently confirmed by the British Government, that the American Minister at Copenhagen undertake to protect those persons who are usually under the protection of the British Minister at Copenhagen and of the consular staff under his superintendence. You point out that Canada has no separate diplomatic representation in Denmark and that persons under the protection of the British Minister to Denmark ordinarily include Canadian nationals.

The American Minister at Copenhagen has assumed the representation of British interests in Denmark, and the Department has been glad to request him to extend such protection as may be possible to Canadian nationals.

Accept etc.

SUMNER WELLES
for the Secretary of State

193.

728-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires
des États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires
of United States*

No. 42

Ottawa, April 26, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Note of the 18th April, 1940, No. 48, in which you inform me that the United States Legation in Norway, at the written request of the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Oslo, had sealed the latter's office on the 13th of April, 1940. The Canadian Government deeply appreciate the assistance thus given to the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Oslo by the diplomatic representatives of the United States Government in that city.

In reply to the inquiry raised in the second paragraph of your Note under reference the Canadian Government will be most grateful if the Government of the United States will undertake to represent the interests of Canada in those areas of Norway which are under German control.

Accept etc.

O. D. SKELTON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

194.

728-D-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

TELEGRAM 72

Ottawa, May 15, 1940

SECRET. Referring to previous correspondence relating to protection of Canadian interests in countries invaded by Germany, I am advised that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have communicated with the United States Government concerning the question of the United States Government being willing to take charge of British interests in any other country that may be invaded contiguous to Germany and authorizing United States representatives concerned to concert in advance with British representatives in necessary arrangements that might be made. If United States Government accept such undertaking, it would be appreciated if protection could be afforded to Canadian nationals. It is desired, therefore, to learn whether the United States Government would be prepared to undertake the protection of Canadian nationals in any such other country.

195.

728-D-39

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État des États-Unis
Minister in United States to Secretary of State of United States

No. 135

[Washington,] May 16, 1940

Sir,

May I refer to correspondence previously exchanged in regard to the protection of Canadian interests in countries which have been invaded by Germany. I understand that the Government of the United Kingdom have approached the Government of the United States concerning the protection of British interests in any other country that may be invaded contiguous to Germany or Italy.

It is also gathered that should the Government of the United States accept the undertaking referred to above, the United States diplomatic representatives in the countries concerned would be authorized to concert in advance with the British representative in the said countries so that all necessary arrangements might be made.

It would be indeed highly appreciated should the Government of the United States undertake to protect British interests in countries contiguous to Germany or Italy which might be invaded either by Germany or Italy, if this protection could be afforded to Canadian nationals.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY
 for the Minister

196.

728-D-39

Le département d'État des États-Unis au chargé d'affaires
aux États-Unis

Department of State of United States to Chargé d'Affaires
in United States

[Washington,] May 24, 1940

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Canada and acknowledges receipt of the Minister's Note no. 135 of May 16, 1940, expressing the hope of the Canadian Government that if the Government of the United States should undertake, at the request of the Government of the United Kingdom, to look after British interests in additional countries contiguous to Germany or Italy which may be invaded, protection may also be afforded to Canadian nationals in the same manner as if a specific request had been made by the Government of Canada in each instance.

The Department is happy to accede to the request of the Canadian Government and appropriate instructions in that sense have been issued to its representatives in the countries concerned. Every effort will be made to extend to the nationals of Canada such protection as may be possible in the circumstances.

197.

728-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires
in United States*

TELEGRAM 98

Ottawa, June 6, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL. Your Despatches Nos. 940 of May 16th and 1037 of May 27th¹ re protection of Canadian interests in countries contiguous to Germany or Italy.

2. In view of possible ambiguity in your exchange of Notes with State Department, will you please ascertain immediately whether State Department understands, as we do, that the exchange of Notes applies to all countries contiguous to Germany or Italy whether or not there is a Canadian Legation in the particular country involved. Also, is it understood that, in the event of a part of a contiguous country being invaded, the exchange of Notes applies to such part.

3. If our understandings are correct, the advance arrangements (see your Note No. 135 to the State Department) would be made by the British representative in any such country in which there is no Canadian Legation and by the Canadian Minister or Chargé d'Affaires in any such country in which there is a Canadian Legation.

4. Lastly, if our understandings are correct, if a Canadian Legation were situate in such invaded territory, the care of the Legation (in addition to the protection of Canadian nationals) would be entrusted to the United States diplomatic representatives.

5. The Canadian Government would be grateful if the United States Government would undertake the protection of Canadian interests as set out in the exchange of Notes and as interpreted in this telegram.

198.

728-D-39

Le département d'État des États-Unis à la légation aux États-Unis
Department of State of United States to Legation in United States

[Washington,] June 10, 1940

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

With reference to the Canadian Legation's memorandum of June 7, 1940, the understanding of the Department of State in regard to the meaning of the Legation's Note No. 135 of May 16 and of the Department's reply of May 24 is in conformity with the Legation's understandings, namely, that upon the request of the British representative, or Canadian representative

¹ Non reproduites.² Not printed.

where there is such a representative, the Department's representative will take over the protection of Canadian interests in any countries or portions thereof occupied by Germany or Italy.

The instructions already issued to the Department's representatives abroad cover the contingencies and the cases referred to by the Legation.

199.

728-D-39

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État des États-Unis
Minister in United States to Secretary of State of United States

No. 222

[Washington,] April 15, 1941

Sir,

I understand that the British Ambassador at Washington has approached the Government of the United States with a request that they undertake to protect British interests in Turkey, in the event of the invasion of that country by Germany, Italy, or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A request has also been made for the protection of British interests in Hungary, Sweden, Finland, and Iran, in the event of the invasion of these countries by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I also understand that in both cases the United States Government have expressed their willingness to undertake representation of British interests, which would, at the same time, include Canadian interests.

I have been instructed to inform you that the Canadian Government confirms this understanding, and assumes that, should the contingency arise, the United States representatives will take charge of Canadian interests at the same time as British interests in the areas involved.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY
for the Minister

200.

728-D-39

Le secrétaire d'État des États-Unis au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State of United States to Minister in United States

[Washington,] April 29, 1941

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your Note no. 222 of April 15, 1941, concerning the assumption by the United States of America, in certain contingencies, of the representation of Canadian interests in Turkey, Hungary, Sweden, Finland, and Iran.

Upon the basis of the Legation's Note no. 135 of May 16, 1940, and memorandum of June 7, 1940, and the Department's memorandum of June 10, 1940, it is understood that the United States will undertake the representation of Canadian interests simultaneously with British interests in any country partially or completely invaded by Germany or Italy. This understanding is considered extended by your Note of April 15 to cover the contingency of an invasion of Turkey, Hungary, Sweden, Finland, or Iran by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

At the British Government's request, the Department has authorized its representatives in Turkey, Hungary, and Sweden to undertake the representation of British interests in the event of a partial or complete invasion by Germany, Italy, or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has authorized its representatives in Finland and Iran to undertake such representation in the event of a partial or complete invasion by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Department is now authorizing its aforementioned representatives by telegraph to undertake the representation of Canadian interests simultaneously with British interests in the contingencies mentioned.

The circumstances of modern warfare, as the Department has had occasion previously to mention, make it difficult to foresee the extent to which the Department's representatives may be able to exercise the rights and duties conferred upon them by diplomatic usage to protect the foreign interests entrusted to their care. Furthermore, the attitude of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics toward permitting within territory under its control the representation by one government of the interests of another casts further doubt upon the probable effectiveness of such representations. However, the Department's representatives would spare no effort in endeavouring to protect the interests entrusted to them.

Accept etc.

BRECKENRIDGE LONG
for the Secretary of State

201.

1954-E-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 925

Ottawa, June 18, 1941

Please cable immediately present views of United Kingdom authorities on designation of another Protecting Power should the United States be unable to continue. Reports from Washington indicate this possibility imminent. See Dominions Office Circular Despatch No. [B.]55 of 22nd of June, 1939.¹

¹Volume 6, Document 975.

202.

1954-E-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1138

London, June 19, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 925 of June 18th. Swiss Government have been approached to ascertain whether they would take over as Protecting Power should United States be unable to continue. Swiss have replied that they are willing to do so provided other Governments concerned are agreeable when the time comes.

British Ambassador at Washington has informed United States Government of these arrangements. Latter expressed no surprise but were not prepared at present to authorize preliminary discussions between United States and Swiss representatives in Capitals concerned.

The above information was cabled to United Kingdom High Commissioner at 10.00 p.m. June 18th and has thus probably reached you by now.

MASSEY

203.

1954-E-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 944

Ottawa, June 21, 1941

Your telegram No. 1138 of June 19th. Canadian Government would agree to Switzerland taking over as protecting power for Canadian interests, although this will raise serious difficulties of communication as Canada has no representative in Switzerland.

It is not thought probable that communications to the Swiss Government relating to the protection of Canadian interests in enemy and occupied territories could properly be sent through Swiss Consul General at Montreal, who represents the Special Division of the Swiss Foreign Office for the protection of German interests. Further, it is felt that communications from Ottawa, through Canada House, the Foreign Office and the British Minister at Berne would necessarily involve delays in transmission and tend to blur the distinction between Canadian nationals and British subjects generally, which we have endeavoured to maintain at Washington, and which, for example, has resulted in the release of Canadian women from internment. For these reasons, consideration may have to be given to sending a Canadian representative to Berne.

Please cable whether, in the event of Switzerland taking over as protecting power, United Kingdom authorities would direct communications relating to the protection of their interests and nationals in enemy and enemy occupied territory through the British Legation at Berne or to the Swiss Legation in London.

204.

1954-E-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1155

London, June 24, 1941

Your telegram No. 944 of June 21st. United Kingdom Government are considering the situation which will arise regarding protection of British interests upon withdrawal of United States Consuls from Germany, Italy and occupied territories. They consider best arrangement would be that each Consul should hand over to Swiss Consular Officer for his district, but that the United States Embassies and Legations should continue to represent British interests as long as possible, acting in co-operation with Swiss Missions and Consuls.

Now that withdrawal of Consuls is a certainty United Kingdom Government presume that the United States objections to discussions with Switzerland will be less strong. They think advisable that United States and United Kingdom should agree as to lines of communications to be ascribed to Swiss Government, suggesting business of handing over in each Consular district should be undertaken at once. British Ambassador has been instructed to ascertain intentions of the United States Government and convey above United Kingdom Government's views.

With regard to the question raised in last paragraph of your telegram under reference United Kingdom Government have not yet decided which channel they will employ in dealing with Swiss authorities although it seems probable that they may use Swiss Legation in London.

MASSEY

205.

1954-E-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 951

Ottawa, June 25, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Canadian Legation, Washington, reports they have learned confidentially that the Foreign Office, through the United States Embassy in

London, has requested the State Department in spite of withdrawal of United States consular officers from Germany and occupied territories to give a statement to the effect that they are continuing to represent British interests in Germany.

The Legation understands that the Special Division of the State Department is urging immediate transfer of the protection of the British interests to the Swiss Government which has apparently agreed to take over. The Legation reports, however, that high policy might make it expedient for State Department to issue declaration as requested. A full explanation of this report, if correct, is urgently requested here.

The Canadian Government is most anxious to secure the continued protection of Canadian nationals in enemy territory without a break of communications if possible and with the least dislocation of services. The information so far received does not provide an adequate basis for a decision as to action.

The Canadian Government, while wishing to act independently for reasons given in my telegram No. 944 of June 21 is anxious to conform as closely as possible to procedure adopted by United Kingdom.

206.

1954-E-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1171

London, June 26, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 951 of June 25th. Following is Foreign Office's explanation of report which you have received from Canadian Legation at Washington.

On June 20th Brandt, head of Special Division of State Department who have been considering matters in connection with United Kingdom enquiry regarding terms of a public announcement on the subject, informed British Embassy that State Department felt that it would be difficult for them to protect British interests from United States Embassies in Berlin and Rome, and that best course therefore would be for them to hand over to Swiss authorities as soon as practicable. This recommendation was, however, still awaiting endorsement from a higher authority. On June 24th matter was again discussed by British Embassy with Brandt who had just seen Assistant Under-Secretary of State on the subject. The latter took view that protection of these interests was a diplomatic function and had decided that British interests in Germany, Italy and occupied territories should be continued to be admin-

istered from United States Embassies in Berlin and Rome. Instructions in this sense were being sent to these two posts. Brandt thought that this should work satisfactorily if German and Italian authorities were prepared to grant necessary facilities. Italian Government had already agreed to United States Embassy at Rome increasing their staff by detaching persons hitherto serving at United States Consulates, and State Department thought it probable that the German Government would agree to United States Embassy in Berlin doing the same. It would also be necessary for the two Embassies to have facilities to send representatives to various parts of Germany, Italy and occupied territories. State Department thought this might be arranged as German and Italian Embassies at Washington are to be allowed similar facilities.

British Embassy then explained, as outlined in my telegram No. 1155 of June 24th, that United Kingdom Government contemplated an arrangement whereby Swiss Consuls would administer British interests in provinces and occupied territories, but United States Embassy in Berlin and Rome would retain ultimate authority. State Department replied that the United States Government would not favour any such arrangement which they felt would be rejected by the German and Italian Governments. British Embassy enquired whether United States would now be prepared to discuss arrangements with Swiss authorities in view of possibility that they might hand over to the latter at some future date. State Department replied that they were still averse to entering into any such discussions. British Embassy pointed out that if work of protection was to be centralized in Rome and Berlin as proposed, this would involve liquidation of organizations previously set up in provinces and occupied territories for handling British interests, and thus would render the task of handing over more difficult if and when the time came. State Department did not attach much importance to this consideration and thought it would probably be more advantageous to the United Kingdom Government that British interests should continue to be administered, despite handicaps now involved, by United States authorities in view of their experience rather than by Swiss, but added that it was always open to United Kingdom Government to transfer to Swiss if they considered United States arrangements unsatisfactory. State Department, however, thought best course would be to give present United States proposal a trial. They thought this could be worked quite smoothly.

British Ambassador nevertheless had impression that State Department were not entirely happy about their own proposal that British interests should continue to be handled by United States Embassies in Berlin and Rome.

It seems apparent that United States reluctance to adopt United Kingdom plan for handing over to Swiss Consuls is due to their desire not to take what might be considered another (small?) step in the direction of war.

Foreign Office have not yet decided what reply they will return to the State Department but I shall let you know at once when a decision is taken.

MASSEY

207.

1954-E-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.138

London, July 7, 1941

SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. My telegram Circular M.133, paragraph 1.¹ In the approach to the Swiss Government which led up to their agreeing to take over care of our interests in Germany, Italy and occupied territories, in the event of United States Government being obliged to sever relations with the Axis Powers, no reference was made to question of care of Dominion interests, and it seems desirable to take suitable opportunity to make position clear to the Swiss Government in order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding. If it is the wish of Dominion Governments that Swiss Government should be asked to take care of their interests also, we suggest that His Majesty's Minister at Berne should be instructed to take a convenient opportunity to approach the Swiss Government accordingly.

Please let us know if you wish approach on these lines to be made. Ends.

208.

1954-E-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1022

Ottawa, July 8, 1941

SECRET. Reference our telegram No. 944 of June 21 and Dominions Office Circular M.138 of July 7.

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs has been advised today that Canadian Government would be grateful if United Kingdom Minister at Berne could be instructed to approach Swiss Government with a view to the latter agreeing to take over care of Canadian interests in enemy and enemy occupied territories in the event of breach of diplomatic relations between United States and Axis powers.

209.

1954-E-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 161

London, September 19, 1941

MOST SECRET. My telegram 7th July, Circular M.138, and subsequent correspondence. An answer has been received from the Swiss Government accepting charge of Canadian interests in the event of circumstances referred to in my telegram under reference.

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

ASIE / ASIA

210.

1655-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.30

London, January 18, 1941

SECRET. My despatch of June 22nd, 1939, Circular B.55¹ and subsequent correspondence.

In view of the unsettled condition of Far Eastern affairs, and in order to reduce the number of matters on which urgent decisions would have to be taken in the event of the United Kingdom being involved in war with Japan, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have asked the Argentine Government whether they would undertake the charge of United Kingdom interests in Japan, and her outlying territory, in that eventuality.

2. Argentine Government have agreed to do this and in addition, have expressed their readiness to take charge of United Kingdom interests in occupied China, including Manchoukuo, should this be necessary.

3. The United States Government were not requested to undertake this duty since we considered it undesirable to arrange for United Kingdom interests in Japan to be in the hands of a power so directly concerned with developments in the Far East. The United States Government concurred in this view and in the approach made to the Argentine Government.

4. It will be appreciated that the above action is not based on any immediate apprehension as to the situation, but originates as the result of general review of routine arrangements which would be necessary in the circumstances referred to.

211.

1655-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 11

Ottawa, January 25, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram circular D. 30 of 18th January, marked secret. His Majesty's Government in Canada would be grateful if steps might be taken to ask the Argentine Government whether in the event of Canada being involved in war with Japan they would undertake the charge of Canadian interests in Japan and her outlying territory, also in occupied China, including Manchoukuo, should this be necessary.

¹ Volume 6, Document 975.

212.

1655-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 30

London, February 17, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram No. 11 of January 25th. Argentine Government accept.

213.

1954-C-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 248

Ottawa, December 5, 1941

SECRET. Your circular telegram D. 349 of June 16.¹ Canadian Government would be grateful if United Kingdom Minister at Berne could be instructed to approach Swiss Government with a view to their taking over care of Canadian interests in occupied China (excluding Manchuria) and Thailand in the event of war with Japan.

214.

1954-C-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1967

Ottawa, December 7, 1941

On receiving notification that a state of war exists between Canada and Japan please request United Kingdom authorities to instruct their Minister at Berne to confirm arrangement on behalf of Canadian Government whereby Switzerland will undertake protection of Canadian interests in Japanese occupied China (excluding Manchuria) and Thailand.

For the present communications on general matters relating to the protection of Canadian interests in this area will be sent through Canada House for the information of the United Kingdom authorities and for communication to the United Kingdom Minister at Berne.

Communications relating to individual Canadians or on urgent matters will be sent from this Department by radio direct to the British Minister at Berne.

I assume this procedure agreeable to United Kingdom authorities. Further instructions will follow.

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

215.

1655-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en Argentine
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in Argentina

TELEGRAM 24

Ottawa, December 7, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. In January, 1941, the Foreign Office, London at the request of the Canadian Government proposed to the Argentine Embassy that Argentina should take over the protection of Canadian interests in the Japanese Empire in the event of Canada being involved in hostilities with Japan. This proposal was agreed to by the Argentine Government.

Canadian interests in Japanese occupied China (excluding Manchuria) and Thailand will be under the protection of Switzerland as the Argentine representation there is inadequate.

On receipt of notification that a state of hostilities exists between Canada and Japan please call on Argentine authorities confirming arrangements made at London for protection of Canadian interests by Argentina and express gratitude.

The Canadian Legation at Tokyo has discussed with Argentine Legation there local arrangements for handing over which it is presumed will be put into effect immediately.

A further telegram with more detailed instructions will follow.

PARTIE 8 / PART 8

SORT DES CONSULS ENNEMIS
 TREATMENT OF ENEMY CONSULS

ALLEMAGNE/GERMANY

216.

728-B-39

Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

SECRET

Ottawa, September 11, 1939

GERMAN CONSULAR OFFICERS IN CANADA

The normal international practice is to permit enemy Consuls to leave at the outbreak of war. This practice, however, is based on an assumption or assurance from the enemy country that reciprocity, if the case arises, will be granted. In the 1914 war, the process of reciprocating between Great Britain

and Germany became a difficult one and a number of British and German Consuls were interned for quite a while.

As far as the present situation between Canada and Germany is concerned, no reciprocity arises, since there are no Canadian officials in Germany at present.

Great Britain, however, has requested our assistance in securing a satisfactory attitude on the part of the German Government and asked that the consular officers stationed in Canada might not be released pending negotiations with Germany through the United States Embassy. The result of our full concurrence in this request would be to place the group of German consular officers in Canada in the group of German consular officers in Great Britain and other parts of the British Commonwealth for purposes of bargaining by Great Britain with Germany. Attached hereto is a copy of the list of German consular officers and staff in Canada furnished by Mr. Windels.¹

Assuming that consular employees are going to be treated as ordinary enemy aliens (that is the position which Great Britain is taking as far as she is concerned), this aspect may be disregarded for the time being. The German consular officers stationed in Canada who are affected by the present situation are as follows:

Ottawa: Mr. Erich Windels, Mr. H. Schafhausen.

Montreal: Dr. H. Eckner, Dr. A. Wagner.

Toronto: Mr. G. Kropp.

The question, therefore, is whether we are going to cooperate with Great Britain to the extent of interning all these officers until the bargaining process through Great Britain referred to above is going to function. This would probably mean interning them until some reciprocal arrangements are made for their release.

It seems to be of dubious wisdom and hardly desirable to intern a man like Mr. Windels and even the other officers mentioned, unless Great Britain has an overwhelming case to claim our assistance in interning them all at this stage.

Subject to further information to be received from Great Britain on the whole matter, the Canadian Government might wish to adopt a middle course policy and, while detaining anyone who is of military age or suspected of having been engaged in Nazi activities in Canada in the past, would permit such persons as Mr. Windels (and wife), Vice-[Consul] Schafhausen (and wife and daughter) and possibly Dr. Eckner, Dr. Wagner and Mr. Kropp to leave Canada.

As regards the attached list,¹ if it is assumed that consular employees are to be treated as ordinary enemy aliens and, therefore, held under police control or arrested, the question arises whether we should consider consular

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

secretaries and attachés as employees, since these consular secretaries and attachés are not consular officers *de carrière* or honorary Consuls and, strictly speaking, are not considered by us as consular officers, although certain customs courtesies were extended to some of them. Information, however, on the question whether a distinction should be made between ordinary employees and these consular secretaries, etc., may be expected at any moment from London and this information may assist in making a decision.

L[AURENT] B[EAUDRY]

217.

728-B-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul
général de Suisse*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul
General of Switzerland*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, September 11, 1939

In view of a state of war with the German Reich having been proclaimed to have existed in Canada as from the tenth September, Consul General of Germany has advised me he has requested you to take over protection of Germans and safeguarding of German interests in Canada as well as Archives of German consular offices. We are prepared to consider, with fullest co-operation with you, any questions relating to arrangements which should be made under present circumstances. Such arrangements might be greatly facilitated if you could come to Ottawa.

O. D. SKELTON

218.

728-B-39

*Le consul général de Suisse au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Consul General of Switzerland to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Montreal, September 11, 1939

Shall be Château Laurier tonight. Took over German Consulate Montreal this morning.

JACCARD

219.

728-B-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 309

Ottawa, September 11, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. As you are aware there has been exchange of telegrams with Dominions Office concerning enemy Consuls. United Kingdom have requested our assistance in securing satisfactory attitude towards British Consuls on the part of German Government. This would imply holding German consular officers here for the time being. While Canadian position is being considered it is desired you keep us advised as soon as possible of British position as it might affect our own in order that we may take a decision at the earliest possible moment on the subject of enemy Consuls stationed in Canada.

We are very anxious to be advised immediately whether Germany is detaining or has arrested and interned any British Consuls *de carrière*, honorary Consuls, consular secretaries or attachés and employees and if so number of each category and vice versa what United Kingdom has done.

220.

728-B-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 75

Ottawa, September 11, 1939

Your telegram Circular E. 15.¹ We have been giving careful consideration to the position of the few German Consuls in this country, and while recognizing the force of the considerations set forth in your telegram under reference, we have concluded that in view of all the circumstances it would be desirable to arrange at once to have them leave the country, and arrangements are being made accordingly. All Canadian officials in Germany left before outbreak of war. Employees are considered as enemy aliens and their cases are being examined individually.

¹Volume 6, Document 1079.

221.

728-B-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au consul
général de Suisse*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Consul
General of Switzerland*

Ottawa, September 12, 1939

Sir,

With reference to my conversation with you this morning, concerning German consular officers in Canada, I have the honour to state that the following are permitted to leave Canada:

Ottawa

Consul General Erich Windels, and his wife, and the cook, Miss Emma Kohlstrunk;

Vice-Consul Heinrich Schafhausen, and wife and daughter; also Mr. H. M. Schafhausen, son;

Consular Secretary J. Michel, and wife and two children;
Commercial Attaché Anton Wagner.

Montreal

Consul Harry Eckner.

Winnipeg

Acting Consul Otto Janssen.

Special passes will be issued to facilitate their departure from Canada.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON

222.

728-B-39

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 68

London, September 13, 1939

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Your telegram September 10th, No. 72.¹ Your telegram September 11th, No. 75. Action of Canadian Government in having detained German Consuls and staff has been very helpful and is much appreciated. As will be seen from my Circular telegram E.16² of today arrangements which it is hoped will go forward have now been made for reciprocal release.

2. It has been decided to allow to depart all Consular employees of German nationality even in those cases where otherwise they might have been subject to restrictions applied to certain classes of enemy aliens. Unless the Canadian Government see any reason for the contrary it is hoped that con-

¹ Volume 6, Document 1096.

² Non reproduit.

³ Not printed.

sular employees, secretaries, *Attachés de carrière* will also now be allowed to depart since otherwise success of the reciprocal arrangement with the German Government might be imperilled.

223.

728-B-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 77

Ottawa, September 13, 1939

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Your telegrams No. E.16¹ and No. 68 of 13th September. I am glad to learn that satisfactory attitude has been secured from German Government enabling reciprocal release of consular officers and staff as between the United Kingdom and Germany. In accordance with decision of Canadian Government as communicated to you in my telegram No. 75 of 11th September, special passes to leave Canada were issued yesterday to all German consular officers, including consular secretaries, except a German Press representative who had in recent weeks been annexed to Consulate as Press Attaché and whose claim to be regarded as consular officer was considered doubtful. Permission, however, to leave is being granted today to him and all consular employees.

ITALIE/ITALY

224.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le commissaire, Gendarmerie royale du Canada au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures

Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

SECRET

Ottawa, May 17, 1940

Dear Dr. Skelton,

Our Officer at Toronto has reported that the local Italian Consul is very busy destroying papers, and asks to be advised whether it would be possible to place the office under seal and for an examination to be made for any documents which do not strictly come within the classification of diplomatic matters.

2. It is quite evident that the Consul there has definitely abused his position and is not entitled to a great deal of consideration.

3. Do you not think that this action could be taken and a check of the contents of the Office of the Italian Consul be made in the presence of whatever neutral is appointed to handle Italian affairs? The same might apply to the Consul in Montreal.

Yours sincerely,

S. T. WOOD

¹ Non reproduit.² Not printed.

225.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au commissaire,
Gendarmerie royale du Canada*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Commissioner,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police*

SECRET

Ottawa, May 18, 1940

Dear Commissioner Wood,

I have your letter of yesterday, regarding the reported destruction of papers by the Italian Consul at Toronto, and asking whether it would be possible to place the office under seal and examine the documents which do not come strictly within the classification of diplomatic matters.

You suggest that a check of the contents of the office might be made in the presence of whatever neutral representative is appointed to handle Italian affairs.

I quite recognize the usefulness of accession to these papers for the purpose of checking up activities of local Fascist sympathizers. While that is an important consideration, it cannot, however, outweigh the fact that Italy is not yet at war with us and that such action is not warranted in time of peace. I am quite aware that many activities have been carried on by Italian agents in Canada which were still more unwarranted, and there would be no ground in equity for Italian objection. There are, however, other grounds. One is the consideration that while the situation is uncertain, it would not be desirable that the Canadian Government should take the first open and formal hostile step by forcible entry of the office of an Italian representative. A further consideration is the fact that there are British Consuls and other representatives still in Italy, against whom retaliation might be taken.

As to the suggestion of examination in the presence of a neutral representative, I may say that Italy has taken no steps to ask a neutral country to take charge of its interests, and this would not in fact be done until after the outbreak of war.

I gather from your letter that close watch is being kept on the Italian Consulates in Canada, and I hope that this can be continued. We are enquiring of the United Kingdom as to any action they propose to take regarding diplomatic and consular representatives of Italy in the event of an outbreak of war. It may be desired to detain them temporarily at least to ensure the safe departure of the corresponding British representatives from Italy.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

226.

728-B-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 74

Ottawa, May 18, 1940

SECRET. Your Circular D.171 May 11th,¹ treatment of Italian subjects in United Kingdom. I should be obliged if you could advise what policy is contemplated with regard to Italian diplomatic and consular officers and staff.

227.

728-B-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 67

London, May 30, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram May 18th, No. 74. Treatment contemplated with regard to Italian diplomatic and consular officers, in event of war with Italy, is the same as that accorded to the Germans. Diplomats would be given their passports and consular officers and staffs would be repatriated on receipt of an assurance that British consular officers and their staffs would also be released. Details of arrangements set out in my despatch Circular B.71, August 18, 1939.²

For security reasons it is proposed that in the event of war with Italy, measures should be taken to prevent Italian Consuls, consular agents and their staffs of Italian nationality from communicating with anyone. We should also reserve the right to take more drastic action if there was reason to believe that they were attempting to engage in activities connected with sabotage or communication with the enemy.

228.

728-B-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 101

Ottawa, June 11, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram Circular B.115 of 10th June,³ concerning question of Brazilian Government, in the event of war, assuming protection of Italian interests in Great Britain and the Dominions and France. I have been officially advised today by Japanese Minister here Italian Government have approached Japanese Government with a request that they look after Italian interests in Canada and Japanese Government have decided to comply with the request if there are no objections on the part of Canadian Government. I have informed Japanese Minister that there are no objections.

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.² Volume 6, Document 989.³ Non reproduit.³ Not printed.

229.

728-B-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 716

Ottawa, June 11, 1940

IMMEDIATE. The Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has good grounds for believing that the records of the Italian *Fascio* in Canada have been turned over to the consular offices and included in the consular archives. He has urged that a search of the consular documents should be conducted in the presence of properly appointed officials and the Italian Consuls or representatives of the protecting power so that legitimate archives will not be disturbed, but that any evidence of *Fascio* material, if found, would be seized for further examination. This would apply to Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver and Ottawa.

Please consult United Kingdom authorities ascertaining (a) what course is being followed in dealing with Italian Consulates in United Kingdom; (b) whether the adoption of such a course would be embarrassing to United Kingdom Government having in mind the position of British Consulates in Italy.

230.

728-B-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 841

London, June 12, 1940

Your telegram No. 716, June 11th, search of Italian Consular Archives.

(a) The United Kingdom authorities do not propose to take any action of this nature with regard to Italian Consulates in this country;

(b) While they feel that the proposed action by the Canadian Government might provoke reprisals of a similar nature against British Consulates in Italy, they do not consider that such action by Italy would produce any material likely to be embarrassing to the United Kingdom Government.

MASSEY

231.

728-B-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 102

Ottawa, June 13, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Question of issuing special passes to Italian consular officers to leave Canada has to be decided. We have no Canadian representatives in Italy at present, and from the point of view of reciprocity as far as Canada is concerned we now see no reason for not issuing passes to Italian consular officers concerned. It happens, however, that Canadian Trade Commissioner, Mr. Grew, and his Assistant, Mr. Monty, and their families at Oslo, have not been able to leave Norway and may be considered being held by German authorities. We are wondering whether, for the time being, we should hold Italian Consul General and another Italian consular officer and their families here in order to compel Italian Government to bring pressure upon German Government for the purpose of obtaining release of our Trade representatives at Norway. I should be obliged for your views and suggestions on the above situation at your very earliest convenience.

232.

728-B-39

Le consul général d'Italie au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Consul General of Italy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

Ottawa, June 14, 1940

Sir,

In the early afternoon of June 10th, I lodged a firm protest with the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in account of the arrest of Mr. Lorenzo Baiocchi, a member of the Staff of the Italian Consulate General in Ottawa, performed by the Canadian Police.

The matter has later on also been discussed with your Department by the Minister of Japan.

However, as I have not yet been informed that Mr. Baiocchi has been released, I have to renew my strongest protest as well as the request of his release without any other delay, owing to the fact that Mr. Baiocchi, who is an Italian Government Official, bearer of an official passport, has been admitted in this Dominion under such qualification and has been attached to this Consulate General for more than two years.

The objection aroused that having not been notified to the Department of External Affairs, he has no consular stand, seems to be entirely groundless owing to the fact that members of the consular staffs who have not a consular rank have never been the object of such a notification.

I will appreciate to hear from you on the subject as soon as possible.

Accept etc.

A. ROSSI-LONGHI

233.

728-B-39

Le consul général d'Italie au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Consul General of Italy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

Ottawa, June 14, 1940

Sir,

According with a Canadian Press despatch from Toronto dated June 12th, 1940, some documents belonging to the Royal Italian Vice-Consulate in that city have been seized by the Canadian Police in spite of the fierce opposition of the Italian Vice-Consul who had started to burn them.

If such a violation of the international laws and customs has occurred, I protest in the most formal and forceful way asking that all the documents removed be restored without any delay and given in care of the Legation of Japan to which Italian interests have been entrusted.

An answer as soon as possible will be appreciated.

A. ROSSI-LONGHI

234.

728-B-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 108

Ottawa, June 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Our telegram No. 102 of June 13th. We should be obliged if we could have an immediate comment on enquiry as to possibility of exchange arrangements suggested in telegram under reference. If you do not consider this is feasible we shall probably take immediate action to issue passes to Italian consular officers with possible exception of one or two employees. We should also appreciate any information as to the extent to which the United Kingdom has issued passes to Italian consular officers and employees or to any other persons in other categories, also date at which such persons left or are leaving and present position as regards British officials in Italy.

235.

728-B-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 85

London, June 17, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 102, of June 13th. As regards treatment of Italian consular officers generally, please see my telegram Circular D. No. 266. It is feared that the suggestion in your telegram would give rise to considerable difficulties and might be used by the Italian Government as an argument for refusing release of British consular officers generally in Italy. We hope, therefore, that in the circumstances the Canadian Government will be willing to arrange dates of release of all Italian consular staff in Canada.

236.

728-B-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D. 266

London, June 17, 1940

Italian Government have indicated their willingness to facilitate the departure of British Consuls from Italian territory provided that similar action is taken in respect of Italian Consuls in British territory. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have given assurances that, so far as they are concerned, similar facilities will be given on a reciprocal basis.

It would be of great assistance in securing satisfactory attitude on the part of the Italian Government if similar action were taken as regards Italian consular officers in other parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

237.

728-B-39

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au marchese
A. Rossi-Longhi¹
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Marchese
A. Rossi-Longhi¹

Ottawa, June 18, 1940

Dear Sir,

With reference to your communication of June 14th relative to the press reports that certain consular files had been removed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police from the Italian Vice-Consulate in Toronto, I am desired to inform you that investigation of this incident has established that the files in question were removed from the furnace in the basement of the *Casa d'Italia* in Toronto—premises to which, as such, no consular immunity attaches. The police officers were performing their duty in preventing the destruction in peculiar and suspicious circumstances of these documents. Enquiry, however, has established that the documents in question are properly the possession of the Italian Vice-Consulate. They are, therefore, being returned for inclusion in the consular archives, properly so called, before the latter are sealed and turned over to the representative of the protecting power.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

¹ Les lettres envoyées au marchese A. Rossi-Longhi du ministère des Affaires extérieures après le 10 juin 1940 ne lui confèrent plus le titre de consul général d'Italie. Ses propres lettres conservent le titre de consul général.

¹ Letters sent to Marchese A. Rossi-Longhi from the Department of External Affairs after June 10, 1940 no longer addressed him as Consul General of Italy. His own letters still bore the designation of Consul General.

238.

728-B-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au marchese
A. Rossi-Longhi*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Marchese
A. Rossi-Longhi*

Ottawa, June 18, 1940

Dear Sir,

I wish to invite your attention to a question which has arisen with regard to the position of the archives of certain of the Italian Consulates in Canada.

The Canadian Government has received information which satisfies the Government that certain of the Italian Consulates in Canada have been guilty of a gross abuse of their positions as Consulates. There is definite evidence that certain members of the staffs of the Italian Consulates in Canada have been actively engaged in promoting the activities in Canada of the Fascist Party. This organization, membership of which is inconsistent both with the general allegiance due from a British subject and the local allegiance due from an alien within this country, has been engaged in the promotion of principles and conduct involving disloyalty to this country.

There is further definite evidence in the possession of the Canadian Government that local offices of the Fascist Party have turned over their records and documents to Italian consular officers for safekeeping by the Consulates, although such documents cannot possibly be regarded as forming part of the consular archives entitled to immunity and protection under international law.

In view of these circumstances, it is necessary to make provision for a sorting out of the documents embodied in what are styled the archives of the Italian Consulates. It is certain that documents have been placed in the Consulates which do not properly belong there. It is not known whether or not these documents have been destroyed within the last few weeks. It is necessary, therefore, before handing over the sealed archives to the protecting power, to provide for their examination in order to insure that the documents taken over will consist solely of those which can properly be regarded as the archives of the Consulates.

You will doubtless want to satisfy yourself that this examination is conducted fairly and with due regard to the privileges and immunities to which the consular archives proper are certainly entitled to receive. Opportunity will be afforded to you and to local consular officers to be present, if you so desire, during this examination.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

239.

728-B-39

Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] June 19, 1940

ITALIAN CONSULS IN CANADA

Mr. Pierrepont Moffat telephoned me this morning at 8 a.m. that he had received a communication from Mr. Phillips through the State Department at Washington to the effect that all British consular officials in Italy had embarked on the *Conte Rosso* for return to England; that the Italian authorities insisted, however, upon reciprocal action, and that unless assurance was received that all Italian consular officials in Canada would be allowed to depart for the United States, they would be under the necessity of taking five members of the British Consular Service off the *Conte Rosso* and holding them pending further developments. Mr. Moffat added that the vessel was to sail within three or four hours. I informed him that we would give him a reply as soon as possible, which he said he would undertake to have forwarded to Rome through Washington.

After discussion with Mr. Beaudry and Mr. Robertson, the conclusion was reached that we could not take action which would result in the detention of the British Consuls. I therefore telephoned Mr. Simmons of the United States Legation at 9.35 this morning, informing him that he could advise Mr. Phillips that all Italian consular staffs of Italian nationality were being allowed to leave Canada for the United States. I informed Mr. Simmons further we had notified the Italian Consul General and the Japanese Minister yesterday that all persons on a list we furnished would be allowed to depart at once, and added that the case of five or six men was being given further consideration. While we would now be allowing these men to depart, we thought it highly desirable that the United States authorities should keep an eye on them, and that in any event they should not be allowed to attach themselves to any Italian diplomatic or consular post in the United States. Particulars as to these men would be sent this morning.

O. D. S[KELTON]

240.

728-B-39

Le consul général d'Italie au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Consul General of Italy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

Ottawa, June 19, 1940

Dear Sir,

I wish to refer to your letter June 18th by which you state that, in view of the Canadian Government, certain Italian Consulates in Canada have been

“guilty of a gross abuse of their positions as Consulates” because certain members of their staffs would have promoted in Canada the activities of the Fascist Party which is alleged to be “engaged in the promotion of principles and conduct involving disloyalty to this country”.

In this connection I have to point out that the groups which I suppose you have in mind were not in any way conflicting with the Canadian law, that they were never kept secret but they acted always in full light for many years and that never before now I have heard of any objection on this subject by any Canadian authority. Moreover, these cultural and after work groups not only have never promoted, as I read in your letter, principles and conduct involving disloyalty to this country, but they have, instead, always insisted on the rigid respect of the Canadian institutions and laws.

Concerning the intention of the Canadian Government “to make provision for a sorting out of the documents embodied in what are styled the archives of the Italian Consulates”, I am entirely unable to comply with this pretence because such a sorting out would be a clear and most grave violation of those privileges and immunities to which the consular archives are entitled according to the international law.

I trust, therefore, that the Canadian Government will give further consideration to this matter and will not insist in their request which I refuse to meet.

Yours sincerely,

A. ROSSI-LONGHI

241.

728-B-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au marchese A. Rossi-Longhi*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Marchese
A. Rossi-Longhi*

Ottawa, June 19, 1940

Dear Sir,

I have noted the contents of your letter of today's date in reply to mine of June 18th, informing you of the steps which the Canadian Government had decided to take to remove files of the Fascist Party and ancillary organizations from Italian Consulates in which they had been deposited.

As you will have been informed by the Chargé d'Affaires of the Japanese Legation, arrangements have been made for the removal of any records belonging to the *Fascio* or allied organizations which may be found in the office of the Italian Vice-Consul at Montreal this afternoon. A representative of the Japanese Legation and Mr. di Simone have been asked to be present. There will also be in attendance a member of the staff of the Crown Prosecutor of the City of Montreal.

It is not thought that any useful purpose would now be served by attempting to explain the considerations which led the Canadian authorities to refrain from suppressing organizations such as the Fascist Party, which have now been held to be illegal. It is, perhaps, enough to point out that their activities in this country, often under consular auspices, have compromised the position of many persons of Italian origin who came to Canada as *bona fide* immigrants and became citizens of this country of their own free choice.

In these circumstances the Canadian Government have been compelled to take possession of all records and documents of the Fascist Party in Canada and cannot admit for a moment that such records and documents are entitled to any diplomatic immunity whatever.

It is regretted that the action of certain Italian consular officers in accepting for safekeeping or suppression official records of organizations established in Canada and subject to the laws of the country has made it necessary to separate such papers from the consular archives, properly so called, which as I have previously indicated will remain inviolate in accordance with the provisions of international law.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

242.

728-B-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 116

Ottawa, June 19, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your circular D.266 of 17th June concerning departure of Italian consular officers. Canadian authorities are issuing passes to the United States border to all Italian consular officers, their families and staffs throughout Canada. Representative of protecting power here has been advised and also Italian Government through United States Embassy at Rome. The latter had enquired, at request of Italian Government, as to decision of Canadian Government.

243.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le consul général d'Italie au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Consul General of Italy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

Ottawa, June 20, 1940

Dear Sir,

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letters June 18th and 19th by which you informed me that the Canadian Government is willing to facilitate the departure from Canadian territory of the Italian consular officers and their families and staffs in Canada without any exception.

In this connection, I should appreciate if you would be kind enough as to give the necessary instructions in order to enable the Italian consular officers, who have already turned over the consular archives to the Legation of Japan, to leave immediately this country accompanied by their families and staff.

From Ottawa, Dr. Giuseppe Massone and Mr. Franco Fontana with their families, as well as Mr. Lorenzo Baiocchi, are already in position to leave by train at any time.

Yours sincerely,

A. ROSSI-LONGHI

244.

728-B-39

Le consul général d'Italie au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Consul General of Italy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

Ottawa, June 20, 1940

Dear Sir,

I have received your letter June 19th, informing me that the Canadian Government, in spite of my firm opposition expressed to you with my letter on the same date, has operated a sorting out of the archives of the Italian Consulate in Montreal with the purpose to remove those papers, if any, which in their opinion do not belong to the said Consulate but to organizations established in Canada and subject to the laws of this country.

I, therefore, forcibly protest against such an action carried out in open disregard and violation of privileges and immunities which in accordance with the international law have always been recognized by every country to foreign consular archives.

Yours sincerely,

A. ROSSI-LONGHI

245.

728-B-39

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre
des États-Unis

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister of United States

SECRET

Ottawa, June 20, 1940

Dear Mr. Moffat,

In our conversation yesterday morning, in which I gave you an assurance, to be transmitted to the United States Ambassador in Rome, that permission to leave Canada for the United States would be granted to all persons enumerated by the Marchese Rossi-Longhi as members of staff of the Italian consular offices in Canada, I promised to furnish you with some supplementary information about certain persons included in this list about whom the Canadian Government had cause for special misgiving.

You will recall that there were six consular employees, Durigon and Pizzardi, attached to the Italian Vice-Consulate in Montreal, Baiocchi employed in the Consulate General in Ottawa, and Sabino, Mari and Miclet attached to the Vice-Consulate in Toronto, from whom permission to depart had been withheld pending further consideration. These minor consular officials had been particularly identified with the organization of the Fascist Party in the areas in which they were stationed and exercised a considerable, and in our opinion, harmful influence in the Italo-Canadian community. Evidence in our possession which seemed to us conclusive, indicated that the three persons in this category attached to the Toronto Consulate were certainly privy to and probably principals in plans for sabotaging Canadian industry in the event of war with Italy. For various reasons it was not thought desirable to proceed with criminal charges against these men and in the event, as you know, we have agreed to their departing for the United States.

They are, I believe, dangerous and undesirable characters, whose continued presence in the United States under conditions now obtaining would be regarded as a menace to Canada.

Some years ago, your Department of State was good enough to inform our Legation at Washington of a report that the Italian Government proposed to transfer to Ottawa a consular officer whose conduct in Detroit had given the local authorities cause for offence. Under present circumstances, I feel I may take the liberty of hoping that the United States authorities will not permit the attachment of these men to Italian consulates in the United States from which they could continue to direct the execution of the plans they have made for sabotage in Canada.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

PARTIE 9/PART 9

RELATIONS AVEC LES ÉTATS BALTES
RELATIONS WITH THE BALTIC STATES

246.

1076-B-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 492

London, August 23, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a communication which has been received from the Latvian Minister in London, setting forth the argu-

ments for the non-recognition, *de jure*, of the incorporation of Latvia into the U.S.S.R.

2. Monsieur Zarine informs me that he is continuing to exercise his functions as Latvian Minister in London.

I have etc.

VINCENT MASSEY

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Le ministre de Lettonie au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne
Minister of Latvia to High Commissioner in Great Britain

No. 4564

London, August 20, 1940

Dear High Commissioner,

As Consul-General of Latvia for the Dominion of Canada I have the honour to make to you the following state[ment].¹

Since Latvia proclaimed her independence in 1918, one of her chief aims has been to cultivate and maintain good relations with all states, and especially her close neighbours.

With a view to the establishment of good and cordial relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, sever[al] major Treaties were signed, and finally, on October 5th 1939, a Treaty of Mutual Assistance was concluded.

One of the points of agreement in the last-named Tre[aty] reads: "The enforcement of this Pact shall not affect the sovereign rights of the contracting Parties in any... their state structure, economic and social systems, a[nd...] measures." In spite of the fact, however, th[at Latvia] scrupulously adhered to all her promises, th[e Union of Soviet Socialist Republics?] on June 16th last presented new and far-re[aching demands for the?] garrison of troops on Latvian territory, ... Government and practically occupied the w[hole territory of Latvia?]

On July 14th and 15th, elections w[ere held for?] Parliament, but only the Communist Party... was able to prepare. T... in the presence of a... supervision of ...

The Parliament thus elected under foreign duress resolved, on July 21st, that Latvia should join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, although power to take such a step is explicitly withheld from Parliament by the Latvian Constitution of 1920, on the basis of which the elections purported to be held.

The Latvian people had fought hard and gallantly for their independence—and against Soviet Russian troops. The spirit of the War of Independence was always alive, and every impartial observer will therefore know how

¹La première page de ce document fut très endommagée.

¹The first page of this document was badly damaged.

impossible it is that the Latvians, of their own free will, would sacrifice their hard-won and dearly cherished independence.

Reviewing the course of recent events, I come, therefore, to the following conclusions;

- (1) Latvia has become the victim of an unwarranted act of aggression.
- (2) Soviet Russia has broken pledges undertaken in its Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Latvia concluded on October 5th, 1939.
- (3) The U.S.S.R. and its high Government officials have transgressed against the sovereignty of Latvia.
- (4) The Government established in Latvia following the demands of the U.S.S.R. on June 16th 1940, cannot be regarded as representing the nation.
- (5) The elections for parliament carried out on July 14th and 15th must be regarded as enacted under duress, in the presence of foreign armed forces and supervised by foreign high officials.
- (6) The resolution taken by this parliament on July 21st, asking for the incorporation of Latvia in the U.S.S.R. is unconstitutional.

I have had the honour to lay these facts before His Majesty's Government, who still regard me as accredited Minister and will continue to do so as long as they do not recognize, *de jure*, the incorporation of Latvia into the U.S.S.R. I therefore beg leave to inform you that I am continuing to exercise my functions as Minister.

I am etc.

CH. ZARINE

247.

1076-B-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

DESPATCH 621

Ottawa, September 14, 1940

Sir,

The Latvian Minister in London, who is also nominally Consul General of Latvia for Canada, has requested, through the High Commissioner in London, that the Canadian Government should defer *de jure* recognition of the absorption of Latvia by Russia. He has also asked the United Kingdom Government to continue to regard him as the accredited Minister for Latvia.

I should be grateful if you would ascertain from the State Department whether any definite attitude is being taken by the United States Government with regard to either the *de facto* or the *de jure* recognition of the Russian absorption of Latvia and the other Baltic States, and also Bessarabia.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON
 for the Secretary of State
 for External Affairs

248.

1076-B-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1440

Ottawa, September 14, 1940

Your despatch No. 492 of August 23, 1940, concerning absorption of Latvia by Russia.

Please report at the first convenient opportunity on action taken by the United Kingdom with regard to *de facto* or *de jure* recognition of Russian absorption of Latvia and other Baltic States and also Bessarabia.

249.

1076-B-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] September 16, 1940

Mr. Lowenhard, Swedish Consul General, called today. He said he had been instructed by his Government to advise the Canadian Government informally that the Government of the U.S.S.R. had asked the Swedish Government to accept charge of the Consulates of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in Canada when handed over by those now in charge. The Swedish Government had agreed to transmit this information. The Consul General said he understood he was not called on to take any further action at present. I informed him that we had had no communication from the Consular representatives of any of these three Baltic States on the subject. We would consider whether circumstances called for any action on the part of the Canadian Government and whether in that event we should ask for a more formal communication.

Mr. Lowenhard made very clear his personal regret at the swallowing up of these three small States, which he said have been making a fine though difficult struggle, and deserved a better fate than being swallowed up by a Russia which was a harder taskmaster than the Russia of the Czarist days. He referred incidentally to the difficulty Sweden was meeting in the face of pressure from both Germany and Russia. They were apprehensive about the Finnish situation. They had furnished Finland with material to the value of 500 or 600 million crowns and many thousands of volunteers, though they had not been able to intervene formally in the Russo-Finnish struggle.

The Consul General referred to the fact that trade from and to Sweden was almost completely blocked. He said his mail took months to arrive. He had on Saturday received official mail posted from Sweden in March.

It would appear advisable to examine the present position as regards recognition of U.S.S.R. control over these Baltic States in the United Kingdom and the United States.

O. D. S[KELTON]

250.

1076-B-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 1937

Washington, September 21, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 621 dated September 14, 1940, in which you request the Legation to ascertain from the Department of State whether any definite attitude is being taken by the United States Government with regard to the *de facto* or *de jure* recognition of the Russian absorption of Latvia, the other Baltic States, and Bessarabia.

2. In reply I have the honour to enclose herewith three copies of a statement to the press made on July 23, 1940, by the Acting Secretary of State, the Honourable Sumner Welles.¹ It will be noted from the enclosed statement that the attitude of the United States was that of non-recognition of the absorption.

3. At the time this statement was released, the Acting Secretary of State, in reply to a question put by a member from the press, stated:

The Government of the United States will continue to recognize the Ministers of the Baltic Republics as the Ministers of a sovereign government now under duress.

It is taken in the Department of State that this applies to the Consular officers as well as to the diplomatic officers.

4. On the other hand, all diplomatic and Consular officers of the United States, at the request of Moscow, withdrew from the Baltic States. The request was made for their withdrawal before September 1, 1940, and on September 5, 1940 all these offices were closed, and everything pertaining to these States will now have to be handled through the United States Embassy and Consular officers in Moscow.

5. In the case of Bessarabia, it has apparently not affected any United States Consular office, and the attitude expressed by the Acting Secretary of State in issuing the statement in regard to the Baltic States would apply.

6. In the circumstances, *de jure* recognition of the Russian absorption of Latvia and the other Baltic States is definitely not entertained by the United

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

States. As regards *de facto* recognition, the United States Government had to withdraw its representatives from the Baltic States, but have stated their definite intention of continuing to recognize the accredited diplomatic and Consular representatives of the said States in the United States.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY
for the Minister

251.

1076-B-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 1604

London, September 25, 1940

Your telegram of September 14th, No. 1440. Foreign Office state that Soviet absorption of Baltic States and Bessarabia has not been recognized *de jure* or *de facto*, though in case of Baltic States the Soviet Government have been offered an arrangement concerning property claims which would involve *de facto* recognition. Unlikely this arrangement will be accepted, however. No reply has been returned either to the notes from Baltic Ministers requesting non recognition of Soviet sovereignty, nor from the Soviet Government requesting such recognition. Names of the Baltic Ministry and staffs remain on diplomatic list. Foreign Office state that it is probable, failing some unforeseen developments, *de jure* recognition will not be given at all during the war. This applies also to Bessarabia. Baltic citizens in the United Kingdom continue to be treated as though nothing had happened in their countries.

MASSEY

252.

1076-B-40

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 1835

Washington, June 26, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the Legation's despatch No. 1937 of September 21, 1940, submitting a report on the attitude of the United States Government with regard to the recognition of the Russian absorption of Latvia, the other Baltic states, and Bessarabia. It was stated in this despatch that the various Baltic diplomatic missions in Washington were considered as the representatives of governments under duress. So far there has been

no statement from the United States authorities indicating any alteration in their position vis-à-vis these countries. The events of the last few days have brought new factors into the situation as far as Canada is concerned, and our attitude towards Finland and the remaining representatives of the Baltic Republics is no doubt under consideration. Finland now seems to be at war with Russia, and has therefore become an ally of Germany in this field of operations at least. The revolts reported to be stirring in the Baltic Republics depend for their support on German arms.

2. Yesterday the Latvian Minister sent to the Secretary of State of the United States a statement¹ (copies attached) of the attitude of the "legal Government of Latvia" in the present crisis. The Minister states that

The change from the monstrous terroristic military occupation by Soviet Russia—to military occupation by German troops apparently taking place at the present moment in Latvia will not bring freedom and full independence to Latvia and its inhabitants.

He further states:

I have the honour to declare solemnly in the name of the Latvian nation that Latvia will continue to struggle for her complete and unconditional independence,

and requests the continued good-will and support of the United States of America in the present difficult situation of Latvia.

3. In the circumstances, it would be appreciated if the Legation could, in due course, be instructed as to what attitude should be taken in its dealings with the Minister of Finland, and the missions in the United States of the Baltic Republics.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG
for the Minister

253.

1076-B-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

DESPATCH 905

Ottawa, July 3, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 1835, dated June 26, 1941, with regard to the special position of the Baltic states and their diplomatic missions in Washington.

The Canadian Government has not taken any action, of any sort, with regard to the position of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were absorbed by Soviet Russia a year ago. Bessarabia is in a somewhat different position,

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

in that it was merely a part of Roumania, and no occasion has arisen which would require any special attitude to be taken with regard to that province.


Finland has not presented any difficulties up to the present time, but the action of the Finnish Government in co-operating with Germany in the present war against Russia, creates a situation which cannot permanently be overlooked.

It is possible that some action may need to be taken with regard to the special position of Finland, because of the maintenance in this country of a Finnish Consulate. In the somewhat similar cases of Roumania and Hungary, it became necessary to provide for the withdrawal of the Consulates. There are, however, special considerations in the case of Finland, including the fact that Parliament is not sitting, that have led to a delay in reaching a decision as to whether anything would need to be done with regard to the position of their Consulate.

In the circumstances, the Legation should not, without instructions from Ottawa, engage in any actual transactions with the representatives of Finland or of the other Baltic republics. On the other hand, they should not be treated in the same manner as German or Italian diplomatic representatives. In so far as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are concerned, care should be taken to avoid any course of action that would be inconsistent with the present position in which Soviet Russia is actively engaged in war against a common enemy. In the case of Finland, while it is impossible entirely to forget the past, it is equally impossible to overlook the present and great care should be taken to avoid any suggestion of approval of the course of action which is presently being followed by the Finnish Government.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs



CHAPITRE II/CHAPTER II
LA GUERRE EN EUROPE
THE WAR IN EUROPE

PARTIE 1 / PART 1
OBJECTIFS DE GUERRE¹
WAR AIMS¹

254.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux
Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for
External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 442

London, September 29, 1939

SECRET. MOST CONFIDENTIAL. PERSONAL. I think you will be interested in the impressions I gained from a conversation which I had last night with Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Halifax and one or two other Ministers. The talk turned largely on the subject of the situation which will be created by the peace proposals which are now announced as imminent. The Government here expect that Italy will not be directly associated with these but will probably act as a channel of communication. It is not felt that there is any hope of the peace proposals representing terms which could be accepted, and that acceptance of proposals such as are almost certain to be offered would not only leave unchanged, but would increase the old German aggression, to remove which the War is being fought. Apart from this all-important consideration, the War commenced over the German attack on Poland, and while Polish territory is occupied by Germany peace, it was pointed out, was not possible. It is the view however that any peace proposals made must at least be examined, put to obvious test and answered. It is Chamberlain's unshakable view that Hitler can never be trusted again. He expressed this with deep conviction and he and his colleagues feel that even in the most unlikely event of any proposals Hitler makes being acceptable in their terms the practical guarantees which would have to be demanded, such as partial unilateral disarmament, would have to be so drastic as to be insurmountable to him or to the Nazi regime.

¹Voir aussi la partie 3, «Efforts en vue de la paix», pages 248 à 264.

¹See also Part 3, "Peace Initiatives", pages 248-264.

The Government here are aware of the danger of the misinterpretation by Hitler and his exploitation among his own people of the reply which must be made to the sort of peace proposals which he will make, as he will, of course, charge the Democracies with aggressive intentions. The reply obviously will call for a careful statement of war aims, and the Government here feel it important for them to make abundantly clear on this occasion what our war aims actually are. These have already been stated in general terms but I gathered from the Prime Minister that it was likely that in his next speech in the House of Commons he would enlarge on things which have already been said with regard to British objectives in the war.

As regards the new situation created by the intervention of Russia these developments are not thought here to be as menacing as they appear to some. The Prime Minister draws a distinction between German and Russian aggression and does not regard the latter as having the same far-reaching possibilities of danger. If the present agreement involves military cooperation he will of course be proved to have been wrong.

With regard to Russo-German Agreement announced today, the Foreign Office view is firstly that the Germans probably asked for more than the agreement to consult which they are promised. Secondly that it is easy to exaggerate the importance of the trade arrangements in the agreement as they involve only the exchange up to the amount under previous trade treaties.

MASSEY

255.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR C.91

London, October 6, 1939

The following statement is being issued here. Begins.

Herr Hitler's *Reichstag* speech in its full text was only available in London in the course of the afternoon and it has therefore not been possible to give it more than a preliminary examination. The speech is divided into two parts. The first, which is mainly a survey of past events, abounds in perversions of the truth which will be readily recognized by the people of this country and indeed of the whole world. Thus the claim that humane methods of warfare have been employed in Poland has been refuted by statements in Parliament and by the report of the United States Ambassador in Warsaw. The world has already formed its own judgment about the alleged request of the Czechs to be incorporated in the Reich, while Herr Hitler's statement that he has never broken his promise only shows that words have for him a meaning totally different from that which commonly attaches to them. Herr Hitler says that in the year 1598 an Englishman spoke of the cruelty and moral licentiousness of the Poles and claims that recent events show that the Polish

State was lacking in any national historic, cultural, or moral foundation. This was not Herr Hitler's view when he said in his *Reichstag* Speech of May 21, 1935, "We recognize the Polish State as the home of a great patriotic nation with the understanding and cordial friendship of true nationalists."

In a further passage Herr Hitler complains, that for many years aims have been attributed to German foreign policy which at best might have been expected from the imagination of a schoolboy. If misapprehension there has been it can only be attributed to Herr Hitler's open aspirations for world domination in *Mein Kampf*, to his utterances since he came into power and still more to his acts.

Finally the repeated suggestions that Great Britain is responsible for the war have no foundation in fact. On the contrary the efforts of His Majesty's Government to preserve peace during the successive crises brought about during the last two years are well known and recognized by the whole world.

The second half of the speech contains what Herr Hitler describes as a few more proposals for peace. In their present form these proposals are in many respects vague and obscure but it is noted that they contain no suggestion of reparation for the wrongs done by Germany to other peoples. Nevertheless they will, as has been declared by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, be subjected to careful examination in consultation with the Governments of the Dominions and the French Republic but it is necessary to remember two things. First, that no peace proposals are likely to be found acceptable which do not effectively free Europe from the menace of aggression and second, that assurances given by the German Government in the past have, on so many occasions, proved worthless that something more than words will be required today to establish the confidence which must be the essential basis of peace. Ends.

256.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, October 6, 1939

IMPORTANT. SECRET. PERSONAL. Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister. Begins.

1. Personal. I note the press reports that the Government of the United Kingdom have stated tonight their intention to subject Hitler's peace proposals to careful examination in consultation with the Governments of the Dominions and the French Republic.

2. I would like to suggest for the consideration of yourself and colleagues that in the event of a decision being reached to reject Hitler's proposals for ending the war, the United Kingdom and France should put forward their

own positive programme of the basis upon which the war could be terminated, framed in such broad terms as to win the support of the United States and other neutral countries. If that could be done and the war went on the responsibility for the continuance of the conflict with all its consequences instead of being as would inevitably be alleged, due to the rejection of peace proposals by Hitler, would be definitely and clearly placed upon Germany. Ends.

257.

1269-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, October 8, 1939

SECRET. PERSONAL. Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister. Begins.

1. May I refer to my telegram of October 6th suggesting that in the event of a decision being reached to reject Hitler's proposals for ending the war the United Kingdom and France should put forward their own positive programme of the basis upon which the war could be terminated?

2. I realize the difficulty of finding a basis which will take account both of the principles of freedom and self-determination upon which the Allied resistance to Nazi aggression has been founded and of the actual situation which has been brought about by the fact that the effort to prevent war by alliances and guarantees in Eastern Europe has unfortunately not proved successful and that Russian intervention following upon German attack has resulted not merely in a German control of part of Poland which would be reversed after Allied victory in the west but a Communist domination of East Poland and the Baltic states which might require another war to upset. I have not therefore ventured to make any suggestions as to the content of any alternative proposals, but I should like to outline a procedure which I believe would if accepted make possible peace on a more stable basis and if rejected by Germany would still more definitely place upon her the onus of continuing the war and still more clearly expose the fallacy of her pretended desire for peace.

3. The procedure I suggest as a basis for consideration is as follows:

(a) Investigation and report on methods of adjusting the European situation by a committee of neutral powers.

(b) This Committee for investigation and report to consist if possible of the President of the United States, the King of Italy and the King of the Belgians, or such other personages as might appear preferable.

(c) The reference to this Committee to be based upon the situation as it existed on September 1, or the situation at the time of the Munich pact, or, if found possible, preceding that agreement, without prejudice to the claims of the various parties concerned.

(d) The report of the Committee to be conveyed to the powers concerned for acceptance, rejection or modification after conference.

(e) An unconditional truce to be arranged pending investigation report and conference.

4. I recognize the objections which can be brought to this or any other procedure under the present circumstances, but I wish to bring it to your attention because I realize how deeply you desire both to build up assurances against aggression and tension in the future and to avoid if humanly possible the destruction of life and European civilization which prolonged war may bring. Ends.

258.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.32

London, October 9, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My immediately following telegram, Circular D.33, contains a draft text of the statement which the Prime Minister proposes to make in reply to Herr Hitler's peace offer contained in his speech on October 6th. The present intention is, that if practicable, statement should be made in Parliament here on Wednesday, October 11th at about 3.45 p.m.

Should be grateful if any comments on this draft could be telegraphed at the earliest possible moment. We are in consultation with the French Government also.

259.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.33

London, October 9, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Part I.¹ Following is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram Circular D. 32. Begins.

Last week, in speaking of announcement about Russo-German Pact, I observed that it contained a suggestion that some peace proposals were likely to be put forward, and I said that if such proved to be the case we should examine them in consultation with the Governments of the Dominions and of the French Republic in the light of certain relevant considerations. Before I inform the House of results of that examination I must ask Honourable Members to recall for a few moments the background against which these proposals appear.

¹ Ce télégramme fut envoyé en cinq parties. Les parties 3, 4, et 5 furent envoyées le 10 octobre 1939.

¹ This telegram was sent in five parts. Parts 3, 4 and 5 were sent on October 10, 1939.

2. At the end of August His Majesty's Government were actively engaged in correspondence with the German Government on the subject of Poland. It was evident that situation was dangerous but we believed that it should be possible to arrive at a peaceful solution if passions were not deliberately stimulated and we felt quite certain that the German Government could, if they desired, influence their friends in Danzig in such a way as to bring about a relaxation of tension and so create conditions favourable to calm and sober negotiation. It will be remembered that in denouncement of this correspondence the German Chancellor expressed his wish for improved relations between our two countries as soon as Polish question was settled, to which His Majesty's Government replied that they fully shared the wish but that everything turned on nature and method of settlement with Poland. We pointed out that a forcible solution would inevitably involve fulfilment of our obligations to Poland and we begged him to enter into direct discussions with the Polish Government in which latter Government had already expressed its willingness to take part.

Part II. 3. As everyone knows these efforts on the part of His Majesty's Government to avoid war and use of force were in vain. In August last the President of the United States made an appeal to Herr Hitler to come to conference in order to prevent war breaking out in Europe and thereafter The King of the Belgians, The Queen of Holland, His Holiness The Pope and from time to time Mussolini, all tendered their good offices in vain. It is evident now that Hitler was determined to make war on Poland, and whatever sincerity there may have been in his wish to come to understanding with Great Britain it was not strong enough to induce him to postpone an attack upon his neighbour. On September 1st Herr Hitler violated the Polish frontier and invaded Poland, beating down by force of arms and machinery the resistance of the Polish nation and army. Polish towns and villages were bombed and shelled into ruins and soldiers and civilians alike were slaughtered wholesale and in contravention, at any rate in later stages, of all undertakings of which Hitler now speaks with pride as though he had fulfilled them.

4. It is then, after this wanton act of aggression which has cost so many Polish and German lives, sacrificed to satisfy his own insistence on use of force, that Hitler now puts forward his proposals.

5. If there existed any expectation that these proposals would include some reparation for this latest crime against humanity, following so soon upon violation of rights of the Czechoslovak nation, it has been doomed to disappointment. The Polish State and its leaders are covered with abuse. What fate of that part of Poland, which he describes as German sphere of interest, is to be does not clearly emerge from Hitler's speech, but it is evident that he regards it as a matter for consideration of Germany alone and to be settled solely in accordance with her interests. The final shaping of this territory and question of the restoration of a Polish State are in Herr

Hitler's view problems which cannot be settled by war in the West but exclusively by Russia on the one side and Germany on the other.

6. We must take it then that the proposals which Herr Hitler puts forward for establishment of what he calls "the certainty of European security" are to be based on recognition of his conquests and his right to do what he pleases with the conquered.

It would be impossible for Great Britain to accept any such basis without forfeiting her honour and abandoning her claim that international disputes should be settled by discussion and not by force.

Part III. 7. The passages in speech designed to give fresh assurances to Herr Hitler's neighbours I pass over, since they will know what value should be attached to them by reference to similar assurances he has given to us in the past. He objects strongly, he tells us, when a foreign Statesman charges him with breaking his word. But who was it said in November 1935—"Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude *Anschluss*"?

Who was it in May 1936 who said—"The lie goes forth again that Germany tomorrow or the day after will fall upon Austria or Czechoslovakia. I ask myself always: Who can these elements be who will have no peace, who incite continually, who must now distrust, and want no understanding"?

These are words of Herr Hitler himself. Yet in last March 1938 German troops without warning marched into Austria.

Who in September 1938 said—"The Sudetenland is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe . . . I have assured Mr. Chamberlain, and I emphasize it now, that when this problem is solved Germany has no more territorial problems in Europe"?

And who said—"We have assured all of our immediate neighbours of the integrity of their territory as far as Germany is concerned. That is no hollow phrase; it is our sacred will"?

As before, these are Herr Hitler's very words. Yet it is the same Herr Hitler who complains if others doubt his good faith.

8. But not less disturbing than these examples of failure to adhere to his pledged intentions are the radical departures by Herr Hitler from long professed fundamental principles of his policy and creed.

The first of these principles forbade the inclusion of non-Germans within the Reich. On September 26th, 1938, Herr Hitler said—"We are not interested in suppressing other nations. We do not want to see other nations among us". And on September 28th he repeated with great earnestness to me that he had no wish to include in the Reich people of other than German race.

Yet within less than a year Germany has in effect included in the Reich eight or nine million Czechs, and now claims the right to dispose of the fate of many more millions of Poles.

9. A further feature which may be said to have dominated Herr Hitler's policy was his abhorrence of the Soviet Bolshevist system.

In 1936 Herr Hitler said—"We see in Bolshevism a bestial mad doctrine which is a threat to us. I cannot make a pact with a regime whose first act is not the liberation of workmen but of inmates of gaols."

In 1937, he said—"We look upon Bolshevism as upon an intolerable danger to the world; we shall try to keep the danger away from the German people by every means at our command . . . We should avoid all contacts with these poisonous (word corrupt) . . . Any treaty links between Germany and the present-day Bolshevist Russia would be without any value whatsoever".

As late as the end of April 1939 (barely four months before he made his pact with the Soviets) he said—"If sub-human forces of Bolshevism had proved victorious in Spain, they might easily have spread across the whole of Europe".

By August, turn of the wheel had come full circle and we find him saying—"The Pact of Friendship between Germany and Soviet Russia will not only render possible peace but a happy and permanent cooperation".

Part IV. 10. This repeated disregard of his word and these sudden reversions of policy bring me to the fundamental difficulty in dealing with widened proposals in Herr Hitler's speech. The plain truth is, and everybody knows it, that in the light of past experience it is no longer possible to have faith in the word of the present German Government and therefore no reliance can be placed on any Agreement to which they put their name.

11. I am certain that all peoples of Europe, including the people of Germany, long for peace, a peace which will enable them to live their lives without fear and to devote their energies and their gifts to the development of their culture, the pursuit of their ideals and the improvement of their material prosperity. What a contrast between such a peace and the horrors of war on which Herr Hitler has dilated at such length in his speech. But what stands in the way of such a peace? It is Germany and Germany alone which by her repeated acts of aggression has robbed all Europe of tranquillity and implanted in the hearts of all her neighbours an abiding sense of insecurity and fear.

12. Many are the Pacts and Conventions which Germany has signed in the past dealing with the limitation of the use of arms and weapons of warfare. But they have not sufficed to prevent her using any of these weapons when it suited her purpose, and something much more solid than Pacts and Conventions are wanted now to give back to the world confidence which has been shattered. Do we then want to crush Germany as Herr Hitler maintains? By no means. It is not and never has been part of our policy to exclude a Germany which will live in amity and confidence with us from her rightful place in Europe. But peace which we are determined to secure must be a real and settled peace not an uneasy truce interrupted by constant alarms and repeated threats and mobilizations. Peace cannot be settled or real if it is to be achieved by dictation.

13. His Majesty's Government do not in this war seek material profit for themselves—they know all too well that in modern war between Great Powers victor and vanquished suffer cruel loss alike. But surrender to wrong-doing spells the extinction of all hope and annihilation of all those values of life which have through the centuries been the inspiration of human progress.

Believing this the British people are resolved to make every effort in their power to win for themselves as for others liberty through respect for law and to establish the right of all peoples freed from the dark shadows of fear to decide their own lives and destinies.

14. The conclusions of His Majesty's Government are therefore as follows:

Part V. Herr Hitler rejected all suggestions for peace until he had overwhelmed Poland as he had previously overthrown Czechoslovakia. Peace conditions cannot be acceptable which begin by condoning aggression.

The so-called peace proposals in Herr Hitler's speech are vague and uncertain, and they contain no suggestion of reparation for wrongs done to Czechoslovakia and to Poland.

Even if his proposals were more closely defined and contained suggestions for reparation for these wrongs it would be useless to discuss them until a preliminary condition had been satisfied. Germany must first convince the world that her aggressions will cease and that her pledges will be kept. Acts not words alone must be forthcoming before the Allies would be justified in ceasing to wage war to the utmost of their strength.

There can be no new and better world order of the kind that all nations want until this preliminary condition has been fulfilled: only so would the way be opened for discussion and ultimately for settlement.

The issue is therefore plain. Either Germany must give convincing proof of sincerity of her desire for peace by definite acts and by provision of effective guarantees of her intention to fulfill her undertakings or we must persevere in our duty to the end. It is for Germany to make her choice. Ends.

260.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.34

London, October 10, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins. My telegram Circular D.32. I am anxious to give you more time for consideration of draft of my statement in reply to Herr Hitler contained in my telegram Circular D.33. I have accordingly arranged to postpone making this statement until 3.45 p.m. on Thursday, October 12th. Ends.

261.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

London, October 10, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

Many thanks for personal messages in your unnumbered telegrams of October 6th and October 8th. You will know I fully sympathise with your anxiety for a peaceful settlement before the horrors of war are fully upon us and no one would be readier than I to seize any opportunity which I thought would in practice conduce to a real and settled peace. But we must remember that all evidence before us goes to show that Hitler's present move is merely a tactical one couched in vague and unsatisfactory terms and intended to weaken our position.

We have nevertheless considered most carefully the suggestions put forward in your telegram of October 8th for which we are most grateful. As you will see, our proposed reply (see telegrams Circular D. 32 and D. 33) is by no means a simple rejection of Hitler's proposals. It is intended to achieve the object which you have in mind of placing upon the German Government the onus of rejecting a peaceful solution.

As regards details of procedure suggested in paragraph 3 of your telegram, we fully appreciate the importance of considering whether neutral countries could usefully be brought to participate in any eventual settlement. But we have felt there would be little prospect at this stage that a Neutral Committee of Investigation, such as you suggest, would be acceptable either to neutral countries themselves or to other belligerents. Ends.

262.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] October 10, 1939

Mr. Chamberlain's reply to Hitler follows on the expected lines. It is negative rather than positive. It is easy to say what we are "against"; every body is against Hitler; the difficulty comes when people try to say what they are "for". The immediate Anglo-French objective in the war was the territorial integrity of Poland. In view of the collapse of Eastern Europe and the uncertainty following the emergence of Russia, the United Kingdom Government has refrained from reiterating that demand in positive and unequivocal

terms. Rather, the speech takes the line of a strong and effective condemnation of Hitler, Hitler's disregard of his word and sudden reversals of policy.

It might appear from Section 10 that one demand is for a new German Government, since "no reliance can be placed on any agreement to which the present German Government put its name". When, however, it comes to the conclusions in Section 14, this demand is not repeated. The nearest approach to a specific statement is (1) that some reparation should be given for wrongs done to Czechoslovakia and to Poland, and (2) that Germany must show her desire for peace "by definite acts and by provision of effective guarantees of her intention to fulfil her undertakings". What those acts or guarantees should be is not indicated. The door is not closed, but the responsibility for coming through is placed on Hitler.

There will be many who consider that a more positive statement of war aims should be made, and that the fact that this is difficult merely indicates that the Government has not been able to make up its mind what its objectives are. The United Kingdom has, however, already rejected the suggestion that it should make such a positive statement or adopt a procedure of investigation and report.

263.

1269-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, October 10, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. My colleagues and I appreciate the opportunity which has been afforded us of commenting upon the draft of the reply you propose to make to Hitler's "peace offer." We have examined the draft as carefully as time permitted and have been impressed by the force of the analysis of Hitler's want of veracity and consistency. At the same time I must add that the general feeling of my colleagues and myself is that the final section setting out the Government's conclusions might well be revised in order to give a more positive statement of war aims and of the conditions or procedure upon which the Government of the United Kingdom consider that the war might now be terminated, so phrased as to appeal both to the neutral powers which are becoming more and more apprehensive of the disastrous results to themselves of a long conflict and to the German people as contrasted with the German Government. Ends.

264.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.35

London, October 10, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My telegram Circular D.34. Text of latter part of draft statement is now being redrafted and paragraphs as revised will be telegraphed to you as soon as possible.

265.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.36

London, October 10, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My telegram Circular D.35. As a result of further consideration today's draft statement set out in my telegram Circular D.33 has been revised. Paragraphs one to six stand subject to small verbal changes. Remainder of the draft replacing former paragraphs seven to fourteen is as follows. Begins.

7. The passages in the speech designed to give fresh assurances to Herr Hitler's neighbours I pass over since they will know what value should be attached to them by reference to similar assurances he has given in the past.

8. But it would be easy to quote sentences from his speeches in 1935, 1936, and 1938 stating in the most definite terms his determination not to annex Austria or conclude an *Anschluss* with her, not to fall upon Czechoslovakia and not to make any further territorial claims in Europe after the Sudetenland question had been settled in September, 1938.

9. Nor can we pass over Herr Hitler's radical departure from long professed principles of his policy and Creed as instanced by the inclusion in the Reich of many millions of Poles and Czechs and the Pact with the Soviet Union concluded after his repeated and violent denunciations of Bolshevism.

10. This repeated disregard of his word and these sudden reversals of policy bring me to the fundamental difficulty in dealing with the wider proposals in the German Chancellor's speech. The plain truth is that, after our past experience, it is no longer possible to rely upon the unsupported word of the present German Government.

11. It is no part of our policy to exclude from her rightful place in Europe, a Germany which will live in amity and confidence with other nations. On the contrary we believe that no effective remedy can be found for the world's ills that does not take account of just claims and needs of all

countries, and whenever the time may come to draw the lines of a new peace settlement, His Majesty's Government would feel the future would hold little hope unless such settlement could be reached through the method of negotiation and agreement.

12. It was not therefore with any vindictive purpose that they embarked on war. Whatever may be the issue of the present struggle, and in whatever way it may be brought to a conclusion, the world will not be the same world that we have known before. Deep changes will inevitably leave their marks on every field of men's thought and action, and if humanity is to guide aright the new forces that will be in operation all nations will have their part to play.

13. His Majesty's Government know all too well that in modern war between Great Powers, victors and vanquished must alike suffer cruel loss. But surrender to wrong-doing would spell the extinction of all hope and the annihilation of those values of life which have, through the centuries, been at once the mark and inspiration of human progress.

14. I am certain that all the peoples of Europe, including the people of Germany, long for peace, a peace which will enable them to live their lives without fear of aggression and to devote their energies and their gifts to the development of their culture, the pursuit of their ideals and the improvement of their material prosperity. The peace which we are determined to secure, however, must be a real and settled peace, not an uneasy truce interrupted by constant alarms and repeated threats. [What stands in the way of such a peace?] It is the German Government and the German Government alone, for it is they who by repeated acts of aggression have robbed all Europe of tranquillity and implanted in the hearts of all their neighbours an ever-present sense of insecurity and fear.

15. I would therefore sum up the attitude of His Majesty's Government as follows:

Herr Hitler rejected all suggestions for peace until he had overwhelmed Poland as he had previously overthrown Czechoslovakia. Peace conditions cannot be acceptable which begin by condoning aggression.

The proposals in the German Chancellor's speech are perplexing and uncertain, and contain no suggestion for righting the wrongs done to Czechoslovakia and to Poland. Even if Herr Hitler's proposals were more closely defined and contained suggestions to right these wrongs it would still be necessary to ask by what practical means the German Government intend to convince the world that aggression will cease and that pledges will be kept. Past experience has shown that no reliance can be placed upon the promises of the present German Government. Accordingly, acts—not words alone—must be forthcoming before the Allies would be justified in ceasing to wage war to the utmost of their strength. Only when world confidence is restored will it be possible to find a solution of those vital questions of disarmament and restoration of trade which are essential to the well-being of peoples.

There is thus a primary condition to be satisfied. Only the German Government can fulfil it. If they will not, there can as yet be no new or better world order of the kind for which all nations yearn.

The issue is therefore plain. Either the German Government must give convincing proof of the sincerity of their desire for peace by definite acts and by the provision of effective guarantees of their intention to fulfil their undertakings or we must persevere in our duty to the end. It is for Germany to make her choice. Ends.

266.

1269-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, October 11, 1939

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. MOST IMMEDIATE. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. Many thanks for your reply to my personal messages in unnumbered personal telegrams of October 6th and 8th.¹ I much appreciate the consideration given their suggestions.

2. To avoid possible misunderstanding of meaning "unconditional truce" in sub-paragraph E of Paragraph 3, Telegram October 8th, I should like to make clear that word "unconditional" was intended to refer to terms in the nature of *sine qua non* conditions of ultimate settlement; for example, re-establishment of Poland as independent state. The intention was not to imply that very definite terms would not have to govern any truce itself, as, for example, the disposition to be made meanwhile of enemy forces in manner which would afford absolute security to allied countries against period of negotiations being used by Germany to consolidate her gains or strengthen her position. This, of course, would be wholly imperative.

3. My thought in desiring to enlist neutral countries in negotiations looking to peace was not merely to ensure the sympathies of their peoples with Great Britain and France, and against Germany should Germany reject the suggested procedure, but, also, to bring home to them a sense of their responsibility for the continuance of the war should they be unwilling to join, with Britain and France, in negotiations aimed at an immediate termination of hostilities and ultimate security effected by pacific means.

¹ Documents 256, 257.

267.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 93

London, October 12, 1939

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. I am most grateful to you for valuable comments and suggestions contained in your telegram unnumbered October 10th. We had your telegram before us at War Cabinet yesterday when we examined further draft statement. As you will have seen from my telegram Circular D.36 draft had already (word omitted) since your further revision, and I feel sure you will agree that this went some way to meet your views.

Since receipt of your telegram, the text has been further amended in a sense which I think you will feel is in harmony with some of ideas which you have in mind, and this latest text will be finally considered at today's War Cabinet. It seems unlikely that final text will be ready very materially in advance of time for its delivery, but I will see that it is telegraphed to you *en clair* at the earliest possible moment.¹ Ends.

268.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] October 12, 1939

The United Kingdom second draft seems to be an improvement over the first draft in so far as it omits a good deal of denunciatory rhetoric and emphasizes the necessity and value of peace. It is, however, still lacking in any indication of the positive terms or procedure which the United Kingdom would consider conducive to peace at the present time, and vague as to the nature of the acts and guarantees they would require from Germany. While it does not greatly further, it does not absolutely reject the possibility of peace discussions. Conceivably the third draft to which reference is made, may be more explicit.

¹Le premier ministre Chamberlain fit la nouvelle déclaration à la Chambre des Communes de Grande-Bretagne le 12 octobre 1939.

¹Prime Minister Chamberlain delivered the revised statement to the British House of Commons on October 12, 1939.

*Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Canberra, October 12, 1939

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following telegram has been sent to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Begins. No. 133. Most Secret. Complete draft of Mr. Chamberlain's speech received. I have consulted my colleagues of the War Cabinet and now venture to make the following observations:

We think that the speech, while an admirable and dispassionate statement, needs strengthening in two parts if it is to have the maximum effect on the spirit of the British people and neutral public opinion.

In the first place we think that the issue in the war should be brought out clearly by emphasizing that we are in danger because what is involved is not only the peaceful existence of small nations in Europe but also the peaceful existence of Great Britain, France, the Dominions and all freedom-loving countries. In a word, this is a defensive and not an offensive war. The triumph of brutality in middle Europe must inevitably be succeeded by a similarly attempted triumph in a westerly direction. Our interests to defend middle European security are therefore identical with our interests to defend our own.

In the second place we think that there is at this moment a great opportunity for some simple presentation of our war aim in order to counter German propaganda and make our own position quite clear to the world. As we see it we are aiming at victory for the great principle of the rule of law. We propose to make no territorial claims, we aim at no punishment or humiliation for ordinary German people, we do not blindly adhere to the *status quo* on Versailles Treaty basis, but there must be real independence for the Polish people, the Czechs, Slovaks and in short, all non-Germanic people in Europe. We stand for a system of international justice on an effective collective system of which all European Powers would be members and with machinery for constant and unprejudiced revision of treaties and an all round reduction of armaments.

In a word we should emphasize that while we are fighting for our lives and freedom and the lives and freedom of other people and for that purpose we intend to defeat a German Government whose philosophy is dishonest and dangerous, we are not aiming really at victory but rather looking beyond it to the laying of the foundation of a better international system which will mean that war is not to be inevitably the lot of every succeeding generation.

I suggest all these matters to you for your earnest consideration. Ends.

MENZIES

270.

1269-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre d'Australie
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister of Australia

TELEGRAM 16

Ottawa, October 12, 1939

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. I am much obliged by your telegram of this date transmitting telegram sent to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs regarding Mr. Chamberlain's speech.

We telegraphed Mr. Chamberlain on October 10th regarding the draft reply which had been furnished us, indicating that in our opinion it was desirable that the section setting out the United Kingdom Government's conclusion be revised to give a more positive statement of the war aims and of the conditions or the procedure upon which the United Kingdom itself considered the war might be terminated, so phrased as to appeal to neutral powers and to the German people as contrasted with the German Government.

271.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

London, October 12, 1939

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. My telegram Circular C.92.¹ Following for your Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

Please accept my sincere thanks for your telegram of the 11th October, Most Secret and Personal. I have warmly welcomed the opportunity of consultation between us. We have carefully considered whether it was desirable at this stage to formulate our war aims in more definite terms, and more especially whether we should be wise to put forward a definite statement of conditions upon which we should be prepared to negotiate with Germany. After most careful examination and in the light of all the information in our possession from a variety of sources, we are convinced it would not only be unwise but even dangerous at this stage to go further than we have in defining our position.

Our desire, and we are sure yours also, is to bring about general peaceful negotiation if there is any possibility of this being realized upon acceptable terms. In our view the chances of success in this respect are greater if we do not ourselves define precisely in advance the exact conditions required of the German Chancellor but make it possible to get him to put forward his own proposals, if he so desires, in response to our own general statement of our position.

It may be, of course, that German Government have already made up their minds and have no intention of negotiating upon any basis which world opinion would regard as acceptable. If this be so, no statement of ours can

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

have any effect upon their attitude. If on the other hand, as we believe may well be the case, German Chancellor is hesitant, then we believe form of words that we have chosen, which do not too precisely define our terms, gives him the best possible opportunity for taking the next step.

In other words, if Herr Hitler wants to negotiate we have given him chance to do so.

At the same time we have very carefully so phrased our statement as to show world opinion the moderation of our own attitude. In this respect we have, as you will observe, considerably modified our original text in the light of the views that you have expressed.

There is a further consideration the significance of which we feel sure that you will appreciate. It is imperative that we should keep in close step with French Government at this time. M. Daladier has already made the attitude of his Government unmistakably plain. If we were now to attempt to insert any new provisions which gave our statement a different emphasis from his, the effect upon Anglo-French solidarity would be very serious.

If, as we believe may be the fact, the German Government have not yet closed their minds to the possibility of negotiation, Herr Hitler may be expected to make a reply to our statement. That will be the moment when in our judgment we should consider whether we can usefully and profitably carry definition of our war aims a stage further, bearing in mind views that you have expressed.

May I conclude by again expressing our deep appreciation of the thought which you have given to our draft at necessarily very short notice and our gratitude for the help which your views have afforded us? Ends.

272.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.52.

London, October 24, 1939

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. The following is a summary of the memorandum communicated on instructions to the French Ambassador on October 23rd.

2. French Government suggest that an early exchange of views is desirable with His Majesty's Government on the problem of Allied war aims.

3. They consider it essential that Allied war aim should be, together with reparation for the violated rights and aggressions committed, to render it impossible for Germany to imperil again the peace of Europe by threats or the use of force. A change of Government or a repudiation of Hitlerian methods would not be sufficient; European security can no longer depend on the goodwill of Germany. Our principal war aim should be to establish effective material guarantees against any offensive return of German imperialism and

Germany's violation of engagements imposed on her. We must be careful in the present carrying out of the objectives lest we reunite Germans behind Hitler by threatening the unity or integrity of the Reich or by calling in the question of the very existence of the regime. At the same time the French Government are convinced that a frank exchange of views in secret in the first place as to the system of guarantees to be ultimately imposed on Germany should enable us to find a solution by mutual agreement.

273.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

MOST SECRET

[Ottawa,] October 25, 1939

FRENCH WAR AIMS

This telegram¹ is one of the most important and significant we have received for some time. It helps to explain why neither the British nor the French were in a position to state publicly their war aims. At the same time it makes doubly clear the advisability of the course you took in urging London to state its aims. In your telegrams on this subject a fortnight ago, you emphasized the desirability of stating positive war aims in order to win the support of neutrals and divide the German people from their present Government. This telegram indicates that a statement, or at least an understanding, on war aims is just as essential from the standpoint, for example, of Canada; we certainly cannot permit France to fill up a blank cheque, and before this war has fairly started, commit us to taking part in fresh wars for the rest of the century.

The French indicate that "our principal war aim" should be to establish effective material guarantees against return of German imperialism or violation of engagements imposed on Germany. Evidently those now in authority in France have learned nothing and forgotten everything. They apparently desire to revive the Versailles tactics in the most stringent form. Whether the material guarantees should take the form of a breakup of Germany or armed occupation or one-sided disarmament, no indication is given. All three methods found favour with France after the last war. Another curious instance of this obsession is that not a word is said about Russia. The assumption is that the only danger to Europe comes from German power.

I doubt if the British Government will commit itself to such a programme, though the last sentence of the telegram indicates that France expects that Great Britain will concur at least in some measure.

O. D. S[KELTON]

¹ Document 272. Le Premier ministre lut le télégramme et ce mémorandum au Cabinet le 26 octobre 1939.

¹ Document 272. The Prime Minister read the telegram and this memorandum to the Cabinet on October 26, 1939.

274.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.54

London, October 27, 1939

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. My telegram Circular D.52. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

We are at present considering question of reply to be returned to the French Government in response to their approach on the subject of war aims. As soon as a draft has been prepared we will communicate it to you so as to afford opportunity for you to make any observations you may think desirable.

In the meantime I should welcome any preliminary expression of views on the matter which you may care to make. We and the French Government are agreed in thinking that if correspondence should result in some public declaration, such declaration should be in quite general terms. Ends.

275.

1269-39

Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Canberra, October 29, 1939

MOST SECRET. Approach by the French Government in relation to the subject of War Aims seems to me to provide opportunity for expression by all Dominions of an effective view on the question.

In my opinion the immediate object is to win the war and to win it in no uncertain way since patched up and premature peace would inevitably expose us to a future series of events similar to those of the past few years. But what comes after victory? I greatly fear that there will be many people who will want to secure peace by suppressing and even dismembering Germany or imposing burden upon her which will be almost insupportable.

Personally, I feel no doubt that such a policy would render future war inevitable since the Germans are much too great and powerful a people to be kept in subjection, and desire for revenge would inevitably produce attempts to take it.

The alternative is to follow victory by a general and genuine gesture of generosity and of justice with territorial units founded not upon the idea of spoils to the victors but upon real racial and social considerations with unprejudiced approach to problems of Colonies and raw materials with a new and more practical attempt at some system of collective security. In any suggested settlement whole idea would be that Germany would be expected to play her part as a great nation on a footing of freedom and equality. In brief, I think that the only sound condition for law-abiding international civilization is kindness, equality and self-respect and mutual tolerance which character-

izes our domestic civilizations. A post-war period which involved maintenance of huge repressive armaments is intolerable to a world which desires social and industrial progress, and I see no hope for disarmament if doctrine of suppression is to prevail. I think that any public statement at this stage should be made with great care, for in the present state of affairs in Europe nothing would be more fatal than to create impression that we had a defeatist attitude or that we were not resolutely determined to win. It can do nothing but good if we accompany a vigorous prosecution of war by a fair minded statement regarding kind of world in which we hope to live when war has ended in victory.

Moreover, those who advocate not merely defeat but destruction of Germany pay far too little attention to problems which are and will be presented by Russia, Italy and Japan.

I would be grateful to you if you could let me know your own views because I feel even a cabled consultation between Governments at this stage may well prove a great service to the United Kingdom Government and to the world.

MENZIES

276.

1269-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre d'Australie
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister of Australia

TELEGRAM 17

Ottawa, November 2, 1939

MOST SECRET. I duly received your telegram regarding the French suggestions on the subject of war aims. I greatly appreciate your informing me of your views which have been noted with much interest. I also gave the question immediate consideration and had hoped to take it up with my colleagues in Council today but other questions requiring immediate determination made it necessary to defer its consideration. I shall telegraph you again immediately when such consideration has been given.

277.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du Premier ministre au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures

Memorandum from Prime Minister to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] November 2, 1939

RE WAR AIMS

In setting forth Canada's point of view re statements of what we are fighting for, I think it should, above all else, be made a distinctly Canadian

point of view. In other words, Canada has been drawn into this war because of certain well known conditions which have occasioned it, all of which are confined to the continent of Europe.

On the continent of North America, there is not even a remote thought of war as between the United States and ourselves, or, indeed, as between any other countries on this continent. And, it might be added, the United States which is as much concerned in the preservation of democracy as Canada is, is not in this war, though Canada is, notwithstanding the fact that as regards Germany, the United States has probably occasioned that country more cause for offence than Canada has in anything she has said or done. These outstanding facts should afford a key to the aims which we in this country should assert as those we are hoping to have effected as a result of Canada's participation in the war.

Quite clearly dictatorship is the primary cause of the present war. Behind dictatorship, and making it possible, lies the suppression of free institutions and the methods taken to prevent their development. In other words, what is most needed is an understanding of the conditions which account for the rise of Naziism. These, of course, would include the menace of Communism.

Force, leading to aggression, is the instrument of dictatorship. It will be necessary as a first step to destroy the instrument. Where a mad man is rushing around a community with a shot-gun or a sword the first step is to relieve him of the weapons he carries and then to deal with the man himself. If the man himself is mad, he will have to be incarcerated, or dealt with in some even more effective manner. Obviously the overthrow of the regime which has organized the war and perpetrated the acts of aggression which have led to war, is the next step. Insofar as Canada is concerned, it will have to be made clear to the German people that we cannot begin to talk to them so long as they continue to place their reliance on Force and allow the administration which has deprived them of their own liberties to be the ones to dictate the conditions which would govern an abiding peace.

The means whereby British freedom has been secured and maintained will be found in outstanding charters of liberty which form a part of the British Constitution. These charters did not, at the time they were signed, purport to establish some order that was entirely new. They rather asserted the existence of certain rights which those who presented them for signature claimed had already belonged to the people, and which they were determined to have recognized. In a similar way our war aims should assert rights which we believe to be fundamental to the preservation of liberty.

The United States Declaration of Independence in which certain fundamental rights are put forth is a parallel to the British Petition of Rights and Bill of Rights. Among British charters of liberty in which fundamental rights of a free people are set forth, in addition to the Petition of Rights and the Bill of Rights, are, of course, the Magna Carta, Habeas Corpus Act, and other acts establishing freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of worship, etc.

As far as I am concerned, and I believe I can speak for the Canadian people in this, the reason I was prepared to invite Parliament to come to the side of Britain and France in the present war, at the certain sacrifice of Canadian lives and other resources is that I believed that liberties which had been secured through years of British struggle, and which are part of the common heritage of the nations of the British Commonwealth would be threatened, imperilled, if not destroyed, by the triumph of Naziism, and the further belief that so long as Naziism was permitted to continue its sway in Germany, we would all not only continue to live under the threat of its power and methods, but would be driven to adopt methods of self-defence which, of themselves, could not do other than work a change in our existing institutions. In other words, in order to successfully oppose force and dictatorship, we would inevitably be drawn more and more in that direction ourselves.

I feel this should be made very clear in any statement presented to the world. It is the one really effective wedge that can be driven between the present regime in Germany and the German people themselves. It should be put forward just as soon as possible. It would make clear that what we really desire is freedom. That we believe that the freedom of one nation is bound up with the freedom of another, just as we believe that standards prevailing in one country if brutal, immoral or menacing in other respects tend to undermine standards in other nations that are seeking to save their people from evils of the kind.

The basis of all Liberal doctrines is trust in the people. Personally, I am prepared to trust the German people quite as much as those of some other countries provided they are given the right and the power freely to express their own wishes and desires. I agree with Hitler that no peoples desire war themselves, and if their rulers are averse to war, they will never themselves initiate it. This can be made plain to Germany out of the lips of her own present day leaders.

The next thing which I feel should form a part of any representations by Canada is a very clear statement of our reliance upon public opinion to destroy existing dangers, and to preserve freedom, and a clear assertion in this connection that the rights of neutrals are as entitled to respect and to have their wishes known and felt, as those of the belligerents themselves. In other words, as I expressed it in a report to the Government at the time of dealing with coal strikes in Southern Alberta which led to the people on the Prairies burning their hay and their vegetables for fuel, private rights cease when they become public wrongs. A quarrel between two peoples, two parties or two countries may be permitted so long as the rights of third parties and third countries are not affected thereby. Whatever is done in seeking to end the present European war must have, as a basis, the effecting of some arrangement which will protect the rights of neutral nations, keep them free of fears by avoiding the possibility of constantly recurring wars.

This means that some machinery will have to be devised which will work toward that end. The machinery of the League of Nations was aimed at this

purpose, but it placed its reliance upon the very instrument which it was trying to destroy, namely coercion and force. Blindly to return to that sort of a remedy is simply to hasten the day for another situation such as the present. If the League of Nations had not placed its reliance upon force, in other words, sought to identify collective security with coercion, sanctions, etc., I am persuaded there would have been no war in Europe, civil or otherwise, from the close of the last war to the present. In the first place, the United States would have been a member of the League. It was the provision in the Covenant which would have committed the United States, as it has committed other countries in advance, at some time unknown to go to war, in some part of the world at the time unknown, and for causes at the time also completely unknown, which really caused the United States not entering the League. Similar reasons were the occasion of the withdrawal of other great powers from the League, Germany, Japan, and Italy.

There was, however, a worse consequence than this. Collective security based upon coercion and force had the effect of making that which otherwise would have been local wars, into world wars, but what is even worse than that, actually creating the conditions for world wars by making powerful, individual nations which wished to right what, in their mind, were national wrongs, and prepare to take on all the membership nations of the League in any war in which they might become engaged. Germany's gigantic military developments have been due to the belief, first, that existing wrongs could not be righted except by the threat or display and the existence of force, and, secondly, by the belief that, as a consequence of the obligations of the League of Nations Covenant, in seeking to remedy a national wrong, Germany must be prepared to fight all League countries at the same time.

If Geneva had been a forum for the formation of world opinion instead of becoming as, in fact, it did a sort of international war office all countries would have continued to be represented at Geneva and there would have been opportunity for conference between representative men of all nations.

The present war has come about through inability to hold a conference. Had Italians, Germans, etc. been mixing freely with representatives of the British Commonwealth, United States, etc., at Geneva, once a year, discussing their grievances and publicly proclaiming them to the world from that particular forum, means would have been found, short of war, to bring about adjustments.

What, therefore, must be aimed at, above all else, is making provision for the formation of an intelligent world opinion; above all else, means of impartial investigation of existing wrongs must be provided, and provisions made adequate to insuring this investigation prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In the cases of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and Poland, there was not opportunity for adequate investigation. There was no opportunity given neutral nations to form their own opinion on the merits of the dispute. Had there existed, as between the nations involved, machinery such as is provided, to avoid strikes and lock-outs, in the Canadian Industrial Disputes

Investigation Act, or to avoid international conflict as is provided by the International Joint Commission to investigate disputes between the United States and Canada, not one of the acts of aggression which have occasioned the present war would have taken place. If they had taken place, every nation interested in preserving peaceful methods of the adjustment of international differences would have been against the aggressor, and on the side of the nation ruthlessly attacked, and this not merely because of a wrong done one of the belligerent nations but because every neutral nation would have had its peace threatened and as this present war already has made sufficiently clear, would have had its whole economic life threatened if not greatly circumscribed.

There are certain evils in the cure of which publicity is much more effective than penalty. Light will destroy germs that darkness helps to propagate. Machinery for letting in the light to the nations concerned and to all nations with respect to existing grievances is what more than all else is needed if the world is to be saved further wars. This machinery obviously will provide that the parties immediately affected are given representation on any tribunal of investigation. The tribunal however should have third parties equally represented upon it.

A carefully prepared statement of aims making clear to the German people that this is the kind of thing Great Britain and the British Commonwealth wished to see the basis of any peace, will soon make its appeal to them as it will immediately to all neutral nations, and will carry with it from the beginning the kind of power of opinion which will be needed to give it enduring effect.

Any statement should make clear the fundamental Christian truth that no man liveth unto himself, and that no nation liveth unto itself, that we are all our brothers' keepers.

Another aim, therefore, which must be specifically and very clearly stated is that economic nationalism and economic imperialism must end. That, in other words, there must be freedom of communication and commercial intercourse between nations. To this end, the two things in particular that would serve to poison the springs of opinion at the source must immediately cease. Firstly, the exclusion of opinion from without the country as, for example the prevention of the admission of information either by means of the printed or spoken word, unless either be defamatory in character; and secondly, which is the reverse side of the same coin, complete cessation of propaganda both within a country and in word going abroad over the radio, etc. of a character that would prejudice another country, and inflame passions both at home and abroad.

Along with this, of course, should be the strong assertion of the rights of people everywhere to speak their mind freely, to worship freely, and, above all, to have free representative assemblies. I think a condition should be imposed upon Germany—that a plebiscite of her own people must be taken before those in authority shall have the right to invade another country

or to declare war. Until a declaration is so made by whoever may be representing the German people at the time of effecting a truce or a peace, there would be no bickering with them. In other words, those who continue to rely upon the sword must perish by the sword.

I regard this matter of the statement of peace terms as even more important than the declaration of war itself in that they afford the reasons underlying Canada's action in deciding to participate in the war. I, therefore, feel that it is better any statement on this subject to the British Government should be delayed a few days, that the Cabinet should have an opportunity to deliberate upon it, and that nothing (except possibly word that we are preparing a statement) should go forward which may require to be supplemented later. I should like to have Lapointe present in the Cabinet when this statement is being finally discussed. He will himself desire that, and, without him, I might encounter difficulties which I should like to avoid in getting a statement of this kind off at this stage. It must be remembered that in sending forward any statement, we will be held responsible later on by the British Government for having "forced" the hand of the British Government to issue something of the kind.

Quite frankly, I regarded the French statement as a very slipshod and superficial affair. I do not think much of Menzies' statement. You will agree with much that is in it. It strikes one rather as a hurriedly expressed personal point of view than as the product of mature deliberation by the government of a country.

I should like our statement to be of a character that will have to be reckoned with from now on until the terms of peace are finally signed, and beyond that, to the days when work will have to begin upon a new order of things. Canada is in a strong position to make her voice heard and her views, if sound, prevail. We have gone into this war voluntarily. We are in it at great cost while our powerful neighbour is out of it at great material advantage, though I regret to say at equally great loss of moral power and influence.

It is almost certain to be the last war in Europe that any outlying nation of the Commonwealth will enter, short of being obliged so to do wholly in its own self-defence. We should make the terms of settlement of a character which will avoid that necessity ever arising, and, in so doing, make possible the preservation of the British Commonwealth of Nations itself. If the allied powers in the ultimate settlement fall short of this, the British Empire itself will fall asunder. If we remain true to the freedom which underlies our institutions, as shaped by centuries of struggle for freedom in the British Isles themselves, we must be able to pass on something of that heritage beyond the British Commonwealth of Nations, to a much larger portion of the family of nations,—to which the peoples of all countries belong.

"If I lose myself, I save myself."

It is in this spirit that Canada has been prepared to incur all the risks of war—an attitude quite different than that of Ireland and South Africa in the

British Commonwealth, and quite different from that of the United States, an attitude, however, which I believe not only to be infinitely more chivalrous but also fundamentally more sound.

This war will be won for future generations and also, I believe, for our own only to the extent that we are able to save others even more than ourselves.

P.S. Do not forget, in any statement of war aims, to bring in the appeal made by Canada to Italy, Germany and Poland before war actually took place. It was an appeal for the application of peaceful methods, and represented this country's view as to how international differences should be adjusted.

278.

1269-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, November 3, 1939

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Your telegrams Circular D.52 and D.54. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

I have been considering with much interest the questions dealt with in these telegrams, but there has not been an opportunity for discussion with my colleagues. In view of the importance of the issues concerned I wish to take up the matter in Council when all my colleagues will be present. It may therefore be another week before I will be in a position to reply. Ends.

279.

King Papers, PAC

Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] November 8, 1939

RE WAR AIMS

In the discussion which has arisen as to the desirability of stating Allied war aims, it is necessary to distinguish between the two quite different occasions for stating war terms which those participating in the discussion have in mind. The two aspects are of course very closely related, but there is a distinction which it seems worth making.

In one case, the question is as to the nature and advisability of (1) the terms upon which peace could be secured now, before serious fighting in the west begins. In the other case, the question is as to (2) the terms, whether they be repressive or constructive, which could be imposed after several years of fighting and a complete victory over Germany which would enable the Allies

to impose such terms as they thought best. In the course of the lively and free discussion which has been going on in England, in both the daily and the weekly press, the *Economist*, which has for the past two years been the most intelligent and unremitting foe of Hitlerism and of any appeasement policy, has clearly stated this distinction. (October 21, 1939):

War aims may mean different things according to the end in view. For example, there is a certain set of conditions upon which the Allies would agree to call off their Armies now, leaving a Germany which, even if it ceased to be Hitlerian, would certainly be armed and ambitious. Mr. Chamberlain stated those terms last week; they comprise the evacuation of Poland and Czechoslovakia and the giving of "guarantees" (which, though the Prime Minister did not specifically say so last Thursday, would hardly be trustworthy so long as Hitler is in absolute control of Germany). But the majority of people, when they speak of "war aims", do not mean these minimum terms for an immediate compromise. They mean the principles on which we shall treat Germany and reorganise Europe if we are given another chance like that of 1919 of doing more or less what we choose. And, in between these two extreme definitions of "war aims", there is presumably a third set of conditions which would be accepted if after, say, two years' fighting, a more moderate Government were to emerge in a still undefeated Germany.

To put it otherwise, the first question is the one raised by the peace proposals of the Belgian and Netherlands sovereigns; the second is the one which the French and British Governments have been discussing and on which they have asked for the Canadian Government's views.

As to this *first* question—the advisability of discussing peace terms *now*—it is argued:

(a) *Pro:*

1. The absence of any serious air or land operations in the West has given a breathing space, a second chance to Europe; negotiations now would be merely carrying out of the policy of being ready to discuss peace which was avowed during the summer.
2. The whole situation has been changed by the entry of Russia into the picture; a war continuing now will be an entirely different war from that contemplated in August. A war begun to "stop Hitler" has proved a war that "started Stalin". The Poland of yesterday can never be set up again.
3. The longer the war lasts, the greater the success of Russia and communism, and the greater the number of small decent states that will be overrun or taken into the Nazi or Bolshevist camp, with France and Britain unable to save them.
4. A reasonable and enduring peace can more easily be secured now than in three years time when Europe is a waste and men's tempers and heritage from the past and social institutions they have built up may be greatly impaired.

(b) *Con:*

1. Peace now could only come on Hitler's terms: he and Stalin would retain most of Poland; and Czechoslovakia and Austria would remain Ger-

man territory. Granted it may never be possible to restore these countries; at least it would be easier to admit that fact in 1942 than in 1939.

2. If peace came now, Hitler and the Nazis would remain in control in Germany with their grip strengthened.

3. Peace now would only be temporary; an undefeated Germany would strike again later and what certainty would there be of effecting an alliance against her then?

The pros and cons may be summed up in the words of a *Times* correspondent:

We have to pass between the Scylla of a surrender to Nazi ambitions which would only be a peace in name, and the Charybdis of an angry and bloody victory that would leave exhausted and ruined Europe an anarchical desert.

At present the preference seems to be for a course set in the general direction of Charybdis.

As to the *second* question, the advisability of considering peace terms which could be imposed at the end of a victorious war, in two or three years time, it is argued:

(a) *Pro:*

It is necessary to state the Allied aims clearly

1. To convince and hearten *the people of the Allied countries* who will be disturbed by the memory of one peace that failed and confused by the initial failure of Britain and France to do anything to support the guarantees to Poland.

2. To consolidate neutral and particularly European opinion.

3. To divide the German people from the Nazi regime by showing them it is not Germany we want to smash but the methods of the gangsters who have seized control in Germany.

(b) *Con:*

It is not possible or expedient to state terms now because

1. It may not be possible to secure agreement between France and the United Kingdom: open division would be disastrous.

2. We are not in a position to forecast now what the position and relative strengths will be, say, in 1942, or what kind of peace it would then be possible to impose.

3. Definite statements now might commit us to impossible goals, e.g., restoration of Poland to its old boundaries.

The difficulties in the way of stating terms are real and serious. It would seem possible to draft terms sufficiently reassuring of Allied objectives without constituting rigid commitments, but whether such a draft would be acceptable to all is another question. It is easier to lay down conditions before going into an alliance than after.

280.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.67

London, November 9, 1939

MOST SECRET. Following for Prime Minister. Begins. My telegram October 27th, Circular D.54, War Aims. My immediately following telegram contains draft of proposed communication to the French Government which received preliminary consideration by War Cabinet today. Object of a reply in this sense, dealing with general principles only, would be to correlate points of view of French and ourselves and to prevent risk of either Government making any public statement of its war aims inconsistent with that of the other. Such a reply would be of an interim nature only and it is suggested oral and private discussions should take place thereafter between French and United Kingdom Ministers with a view to fuller examination of war aims. Views which the Dominion Governments have expressed or may express on the matter would be fully taken into account in connection with these proposed further discussions with the French Ministers.

Should be grateful for your views on proposed interim reply. Ends.

281.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.68

London, November 9, 1939

MOST SECRET. My telegram of today, Circular D.67. Draft statement begins.

Before receiving memorandum of French Government, His Majesty's Government had already given some preliminary consideration to the question of war aims. They had been prompted to consider this matter not only in order that some guidance might be given at a suitable opportunity to certain sections of British public opinion, but in order that the cause, in whose defence His Majesty's Government stood united with the French Government, might gain a wider and more intelligent support.

2. The cause for which the Allied Governments of France and Great Britain have taken up arms is to stop acts of aggression on the part of the German Government in the present and to ensure against their repetition in the future. Two wars imposed on Britain and France in a single generation by the action of German Governments, differing in outward complexion but inspired by the same aggressive and dominating spirit, are a solemn warning that this spirit, if it be not extinguished and laid to rest by the Germans themselves, must be rendered harmless by those whom it threatens.

3. His Majesty's Government are therefore in agreement with the French Government in desiring to find the surest and most enduring guarantees

against any further repetition of German aggression. They are convinced that such guarantees can only be based on close and continued cooperation between the French Government and His Majesty's Government during the period which will follow after defeat of Germany. That cooperation, which during the war will have covered economic as well as military and political problems, should be extended after the war has ended and should, as His Majesty's Government would hope, be inspired by a common purpose and outlook on the machinery required to enable the nations of Europe to regain or maintain their liberties and to strengthen their political, social, and economic structures.

4. To achieve this common purpose His Majesty's Government and the French Government must, unless a German Government can be found which is willing and able voluntarily to accept their terms, secure the defeat of Germany, and this, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government constitutes the primary war aim of the two Governments. It is only in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time when their object is achieved that the lines of any territorial settlement can be profitably considered. It would therefore be premature to enter into detailed discussion of territorial questions. For this reason His Majesty's Government have been careful not to define in precise terms what they imply by the restoration of independence to Poland and Czechoslovakia, and to limit themselves to referring in general terms to recovery by the Polish, Czech and Slovak peoples of their liberties. His Majesty's Government trust the French Government will adopt a similar attitude. It should, however, be pointed out that, while it is hoped to secure independence for all European peoples, one weakness of the post-war settlement was the establishment of a number of small national states which were "viable" neither in the military nor economic sense. The settlement was therefore highly unstable, and proved an ineffective barrier to the expansionist ambitions of great powers either in the West or in the East. Accordingly it may be necessary to contemplate some form of close association, at least a system of financial and economic cooperation in Central and South Eastern Europe.

5. For this purpose His Majesty's Government suggest it would be wise to encourage at once closer cooperation between Balkan States and closer cooperation between the various refugee groups of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and Austrians.

6. As regards the future of the German Reich, His Majesty's Government agree that removal of Herr Hitler and his entourage may not be a sufficient remedy against the re-emergence of German militarism and expansionist ideas, but it is not at present possible to tell in what conditions the defeat or surrender of Germany will take place, and any suggestion that it was the intention of His Majesty's Government and the French Government to seek the political dismemberment of Germany or to disrupt German unity would have the immediate effect of rallying the German people behind their present leaders. His Majesty's Government, therefore, consider it wiser to watch the

course of events and to arrange for further consultation as soon as it is possible more closely to forecast the course of internal political developments in Germany.

7. As regards material guarantees, the first must evidently be that Germany shall never again be allowed to build up a preponderance of armed force in relation to the United Kingdom and France. The methods of establishing this guarantee may perhaps be left for further consideration. In view of what has been said above it would seem premature to make any public statement of war aims in precise terms. His Majesty's Government would prefer that the two governments in agreement should limit their public declarations to general principles on which their common policy is and will continue to be based, and that, while protecting the world, so far as is humanly possible, from a recurrence of war, they should emphasize their common desire to secure a post-war settlement which would be satisfactory not only to themselves but to all other peoples whose collaboration will be essential in the work of reconstruction.

8. These are preliminary comments of His Majesty's Government on the approach made by the French Government. His Majesty's Government will welcome a further exchange of views with the French Government and will gladly consider any proposals which the French Government have to make both in regard to the terms on which peace should be concluded with Germany and the wider European settlement which might follow the termination of hostilities. Ends.

282.

1269-39

Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Canberra, November 15, 1939

MOST SECRET. I have sent the following to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Begins. No. 165. With reference to your telegram Circular D.68.

Australian Government does not desire to make mere verbal criticisms. We feel that there are two underlying matters of great importance:

The first is that we should do nothing to impair our complete unity with France, and that consequently in any statement the greatest emphasis must be placed upon the view that our first war aim is to win completely and not to become involved in a patched up compromise. From this point of view we dislike reference in paragraph 4 to possibility of finding a German Government which is willing and able voluntarily to accept our terms. If this contemplates a revolutionary movement in Germany we think it over-optimistic; if it contemplates some form of Puppet Government we think [it] dangerous.

Our second war aim is to establish after victory a more secure Europe and therefore a more secure world, and this will involve territorial, economic

and political settlements of a kind designed to encourage disarmament, a stimulation of international trade—if possible by revival of international investments, and territorial settlements which are based not upon the status quo, but upon the giving of real independence to peoples who are by race and tradition outside the German State.

We are profoundly apprehensive of incorrect suggestion that peace of Europe or of the world is to be secured by political dismemberment of Germany or any artificial attempt to disrupt German unity, for we feel that such a suggestion would not only have present effect of rallying German people behind Hitler, but would have the ultimate effect of laying the foundation for a future nationalistic movement of an aggressive kind which would inevitably produce another war.

In brief, we think that there is everything to be gained by stating, in conjunction with France, our irrevocable determination to pursue this war to victory, while at the same time announcing for the benefit of the whole world that when war has been won we are not looking for a peace which has to be indefinitely maintained by force, but that we are genuinely anxious to establish international conditions which will be conducive to freedom and prosperity, not only for ourselves and the smaller European States whose existence has been destroyed or threatened, but for Germany herself.

Ends.

MENZIES

283.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.100

London, November 24, 1939

MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. My telegram Circular D.67, November 9th, War Aims. Draft of proposed communication to the French Government has been further considered in the light of the views expressed by His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and the matter has also been discussed with Dominions Ministers now in England. It is now proposed that the following amendments should be made to the proposed communication:

Paragraph 6. For "may not be a sufficient remedy" substitute "will not of itself be a sufficient remedy."

Paragraph 6. After "to disrupt German unity" insert "whatever arguments may be adduced on one side or the other in any discussions of these matters."

With regard to the views expressed by His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia as to paragraph 4 it should be explained that the phrase "unless a German Government can be found which is willing and able to voluntarily accept our terms" was inserted with the specific object of indicating that a change of Government in Germany might make it easier

to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion without fighting it out to the bitter end. It is felt that we could hardly maintain the position that we should refuse to treat if a new Government with an entirely different outlook came into power in Germany as a result of an internal revolution.

It will of course be appreciated that communication with French Government is intended to be secret and that it is not proposed to issue it as a public statement of policy.

It is accordingly now proposed to send reply to French Government amended as indicated above, and I should be glad to learn as soon as possible whether you concur.

As indicated in my telegram Circular D.67 reply to French Government is of a nature only with a view to subsequent oral and private discussion with French Minister. I should like to repeat here that views which Dominion Governments have expressed on general question of war aims and which have been amplified by Dominions Ministers in London will of course be fully borne in mind in any such discussions. Ends.

284.

1269-39

*Le premier ministre de l'Afrique du Sud au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Prime Minister of South Africa to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 6

Pretoria, November 25, 1939

Following telegram has been sent to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Begins.

No. 13. Most Secret. Your telegram Circular D.100, November 24th. I have no objection to amendments proposed to statement of war aims. It is, of course, understood that statement intended to serve as a basis of discussion between French and the United Kingdom Government. A final statement of war aims would call for much more rigorous definition.

285.

1269-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 115

Ottawa, November 25, 1939

IMPORTANT. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Your telegrams Circular D.52 and D.54. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. We have noted with much interest your telegrams informing us that the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of France are now discussing allied war aims, and that your government would shortly communicate a draft statement. In the meantime we gave consideration as requested to the summary of the proposals of the French Government contained in your telegram No. [D.] 52. In this telegram we are making some preliminary comments on these proposals and in addition setting forth some of the objectives which in our opinion should be considered in determining allied war aims.

2. It was found difficult to comment on these proposals in view of their brevity and consequent lack of definiteness. We understand the proposals contemplate:

First, requiring reparation for aggression. It is not indicated whether this means restoration of former frontiers or imposition of financial indemnity. Second, establishing effective material guarantees which will make it impossible for Germany again to imperil the peace of Europe by threats or use of force. The nature of the guarantees is not stated, but it is indicated that the overthrow of the present government, or a repudiation of Hitlerism would not be considered sufficient. It is not clear whether the reference to the necessity of taking care not to rally Germany behind Hitler by threatening the unity or integrity of the Reich means there is no intention to end this unity or merely that it would not be desirable to make such an intention known at present. In essence the view of the Government of France appears to be that in addition to certain reparations, Germany, whatever her future government may be, must by the adoption of material guarantees be rendered incapable of resort to aggression. In unofficial discussions there have been references to guarantees taking the form of breaking Germany proper into small units, or occupying part of her territory, or insisting on unilateral disarmament, possibly along with the organization of a hard and fast military alliance against Germany. The information available does not indicate whether any of these guarantees is contemplated by the Government of France, or if not, what are the alternative material guarantees in contemplation.

3. We realize that distrust and apprehension of Germany must be greatest in the countries most directly exposed to her aggression, but if a policy such as is referred to above as being urged unofficially were put forward, it would not, in our opinion, appear calculated either to win this war or to preserve the ensuing peace.

4. It would, we believe, be the general view that an announcement of Allied war aims in such terms would rally the German people in support of the Nazi regime, and alienate neutral countries or at least the United States by foreshadowing a peace much more rigorous than Versailles.

5. As regards the maintenance of peace in the future, the experience of the past twenty years gives little ground for believing that if a policy of continuous repression were proposed, it could either be maintained for any length of time or prove successful if maintained. The immediate Allied task is to

defeat German aggression. When that is achieved, an endeavour must surely be made ultimately to bring Germany back on an equal footing into the community of free nations, or the war will have achieved no enduring betterment.

6. In any event, the proposal which has been put forward by the Government of France seems to be occupied too exclusively with Germany. I have no doubt that the Government of France and all the other Governments concerned will keep the Soviet Union as well as other totalitarian powers constantly in mind, alike as potential sources of disturbance and as permanent forces in the European equation. Nor can the possibility be overlooked that a defeated Germany might prefer to adopt Communism rather than accept continuing Allied control.

7. It is easier to indicate some of the difficulties that would be involved in a policy of continuous repression, if such a policy were proposed, than to suggest a positive basis of European reconstruction. In any case that task, we consider, is primarily one for the peoples of Europe themselves. So far as Canada is concerned, our immediate aim in entering the war was to assist Britain and France in repelling German aggression, and to prevent for the future resort to force instead of pacific means in the settlement of international disputes. We sought also to avert the hazard to our own liberties which must exist so long as dictatorship and conflict or arming for conflict dominate great and influential areas of the world. At the same time we are necessarily concerned as to the positive aims of the Allied effort, the nature and conditions of the victory that is sought and the character of the European order that will follow it.

8. On the assumption that the war will continue for a long period, it would apparently not be possible or desirable at this stage, in view of the uncertainty as to who are eventually to be allies or enemies or what may be the outcome of the pressures now being exerted in Eastern Europe, to put forward specific aims as to the boundaries to be drawn or the political organization to be established some years hence. It would further appear that the possibility of dealing effectively with the wider phases of political relationships will depend in considerable measure on whether or not some at least of the neutral Great Powers take part in any peace conference. It may be necessary also to have in mind the distinction between minimum and maximum terms, between the conditions without which an end to the conflict could not be accepted, and the objectives which should be sought and established if the outcome of the conflict permitted.

9. In my statement in the House of Commons here on September 8th of this year: I observed:

The peoples of continental Europe must find in some way, through federal relationships or economic partnerships or rebirth of democratic institutions and the spirit of liberty, the art of learning to live together.

It is of course clear that the form which that way of living together would

take and the means by which it would be maintained must be developed primarily by the peoples that will have to work out the post-war settlement in the relations and transactions of every day, with all that will be involved in economic rearrangements and mental readjustments. In indicating in the paragraphs which follow some of the objectives which we consider would be desirable it is recognized that the fortunes of the war and the will of the peoples of Europe themselves will be the determining factors in the shaping of the future.

10. It is clear there can be little hope of enduring peace without changes both in the relations of individual citizens to the state in many countries and in the relations of states one with another. Freedom of the individual, freedom of speech and assembly, of communication and intercourse, have been proved by the bitter experience of recent years to be not outworn platitudes but the essential foundation of political stability and friendly understanding of other peoples. But individual freedom and political democracy will not bring security so long as the multiplicity of small states and the intensity of racial and nationalist rivalry create instability, tempt aggressors, and prevent the attainment of the broad basis necessary for adequate economic development. Some growth of federalism or regional collaboration appears as essential for international stability as the growth of freedom is essential for internal stability. Neither development can be imposed from without; it must come by growth from within, and all that other countries can do is to assist in establishing conditions and safeguards that will aid rather than hinder such development.

11. Experience has shown the necessity of more effective means of settling international differences and facilitating agreed revision of treaties or modification of the status quo. Change must come, adjustments must be made to new conditions. But change should not be made by force nor can it long be prevented by force. All the countries which may suffer the repercussions of an open conflict have an interest in peaceful settlement of such differences. In industrial disputes private rights cease when they become public wrongs, and in the wider field national rights must be restrained when they become international wrongs. In this connection it may be suggested that in considering future European organization more weight should be given than in the past to the procedure of investigation and report. I am convinced that in international as in industrial disputes the most effective means of providing for the legitimate third party interest and ensuring peaceful adjustment is the adoption of the flexible procedure of investigation and report, supported by the powerful sanction of informed public opinion. In the long run this procedure while less theoretically imposing, may be more practically effective than the processes of compulsory acceptance of arbitral awards in labour disputes or the imposition of sanctions in international disputes.

12. If enduring peace is to be established, it is clear that economic nationalism and competitive armament must both be checked, and that all countries concerned will have to make economic concessions and accept some measure of restriction and supervision of armaments.

13. It may be that in some measure undertakings in advance to impose a solution or prevent recourse to force may be considered necessary. In that case, experience indicates the desirability of placing such obligations upon a regional basis. The attempt made in the working of the League of Nations to give such obligations a world basis failed. It diverted the League from the attainable objectives of conciliation and the shaping of world opinion to the unattainable and inconsistent objective of serving as an international war office. The assumption of the readiness of all League countries to use economic or military force in any dispute that might arise at any place and at any time proved to have little basis in reality, and so far as it had any basis it tended to intensify the scale of preparations by potential aggressors and to convert local wars into world wars. In considering how far a general obligation to use force may be relied upon in any plan of international cooperation, it will be all important also to keep in mind the strain upon the unity of the British Commonwealth which would attend any scheme of indefinite commitments to intervene in future European conflicts. The terms of settlement should be such as will avoid that dangerous issue ever again arising.

14. Until a profound transformation has taken place in the social organization and neighbourhood relations of the countries of central and eastern Europe, it may not be possible for them to adopt, even in part, the peaceful means of adjusting difficulties which have developed among the democratic countries of Western Europe and of North America nor to look to a general extension of the British Commonwealth experiment of cooperation without compulsion and reliance on faith rather than fear. If the countries concerned are not able to work toward such a relationship, it may be that the only feasible immediate alternative for them will be an uneasy balance between German and Russian power.

15. When we are furnished with an explicit statement of the measures the Government of France has in mind and the reasons brought forward in their support, we shall, as I have already indicated, in the light of this information and of the views of the government of the United Kingdom, be glad to give the question at once the further consideration its importance warrants. We recognize that in public declarations of war aims at the present time it is desirable to avoid the appearance of marked divergence in view. Neither would it be desirable that any of the countries engaged in the common task of defeating German aggression should be committed tacitly or otherwise to aims which it is not able upon full consideration to approve. Ends.

286.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémemorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] November 27, 1939

WAR AIMS

As I informed you Saturday our telegram on this subject was not sent until Saturday. (Copy attached, No. 115 of November 25th).

In the meantime the United Kingdom had been giving further consideration to a draft of a reply they were going to make to France as set out in telegrams D.67 and D.68. A further telegram dated November 24th has come indicating changes they proposed to make in the draft and commenting on a reply from Australia on November 15th. We have also received a telegram from South Africa. (Copies of all these enclosed.)

It will be noted, particularly in their last telegram that the United Kingdom ask whether we concur in sending a reply in the terms of their draft as amended.

Apparently the United Kingdom would wish the reply to be considered as representing the position of all the members of the Commonwealth. They buttress this position by indicating that they have considered "the views expressed by His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions". The only Dominion which, so far as we are informed, they had heard from directly was Australia, but presumably they had some word from New Zealand also. The last telegram states "the matter has also been discussed with Dominion Ministers now in England". There has been no intimation to this effect from Mr. Crerar or Mr. Massey.

In favour of assenting to the procedure suggested, it might be said that there is no substantial divergence in the general approach of the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments, though there are points in each that are not covered in the other's statement.

On the other hand, it might be considered that both the United Kingdom and Canada have prepared statements of their war or peace aims and neither should be submerged in the other. So far as we are aware, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand have not prepared independent statements but have made brief comments on the United Kingdom draft.

It might be possible, therefore, to reply either (1) that there is no objection to their draft reply going forward as a preliminary statement of the Commonwealth governments, or (2) to thank them for the telegraphic statement of the preliminary representations which the Government of the United Kingdom is making to France on the subject of war aims; we have read the statement and communications which we have received from Australia and South Africa with much interest and note with satisfaction the substantial concur-

rence on many points of the Canadian statement of war aims as indicated in our telegram No. 115 of November 25th with the United Kingdom statement as contained in D.68 and D.100.

O. D. S[KELTON]

287.

1269-39

*Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Wellington, November 28, 1939

MOST SECRET. Following message has been sent to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Begins.

No. 224. Most Secret. With reference to your telegrams Nos. Circular D.68 of November 9th and Circular D.100 of November 24th. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand concur in general with the views on war aims which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom propose shortly to express to the French Government. They wish, however, to suggest certain verbal alterations in your telegram D.68 as follows:

Paragraph 4. For "willing and able voluntarily to accept their terms" they suggest substitution of "willing and able voluntarily to negotiate terms".

Paragraph 7. It is suggested that in place of "never again be allowed to build up a preponderance of armed force in relation to the United Kingdom and France" this sentence should be altered to read "never again be allowed to build up a preponderance of armed force to menace the peace of European nations and of the world".

Copies sent to Canada, Australia and South Africa. [Ends.]

288.

1269-39

*Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Canberra, November 28, 1939

MOST SECRET. Following telegram has been sent to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Begins.

Most Secret. No. 177. Your telegram November 24th regarding communication to the French Government on the subject of war aims: understanding that its views previously expressed will be borne in mind, His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia concur in general.

His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia agree with verbal alteration suggested by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. Ends.

289.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 114

London, November 28, 1939

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. We are most grateful for your telegram No. 115, November 25th, and cordially appreciate very full expression of your views on subject of war aims. As you will since have seen from telegram Circular D.100, November 24th, it is proposed to send interim reply to French Government, subject to certain amendments, with a view to subsequent discussion with French Minister. Views conveyed in your telegram will be carefully studied and will be fully borne in mind in any discussions with the French Government on general question of war aims. Ends.

290.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.113

London, December 4, 1939

MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. Interim reply to French Government on war aims. We feel that amendment to paragraph 7, suggested in New Zealand telegram No. 224 of the 28th November, is an improvement and we propose to adopt it. It seems to us, however, that amendment to paragraph 4 would affect the sense and that the word "voluntarily" sufficiently implies the idea of negotiation. We think preferable therefore to retain the original wording. In the absence of further comments we propose to despatch the reply as amended to the French Government on Friday next, December 8th. Ends.

291.

King Papers, PAC

Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] December 5, 1939

WAR AIMS

You will recall that we have sent no reply to the United Kingdom telegram setting forth the interim answer they were proposing to make to the French Government, nor to the comments on that answer made by Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. We have received from the United Kingdom an

acknowledgment of our own long telegram on war aims. In a previous memorandum (November 27, attached) I raised the question whether we should assume that the British reply was to be on our behalf and therefore say whether or not we would accept their draft or whether we should simply stand on our own statement.

A telegram D.113 of 4th December, which has just been received, indicates that the British Government propose to despatch a reply to the French Government on Friday, December 8th.

[Telegram] 114 of November 28 [is] attached.

S[KELTON]

292.

1269-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 126

Ottawa, December 6, 1939

MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

I wish to thank you for your telegram No. 114 of November 28th regarding our telegram No. 115 on the subject of war aims. We were glad to note the wide measure of concurrence in the approach made to the question by all the Commonwealth countries. We see no objection whatever to your Government sending its statement to the French Government as proposed. When the discussion of war aims becomes more definite we may desire to refer to some of the special points dealt with in our telegram No. 115 or to new points which may arise from changing circumstances. Ends.

293.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] January 30, 1940

Attached is a duplicate of D[ominions] O[ffice] telegram Circular D.18 of January 12th, regarding a declaration on separate peace, together with a draft reply.¹ We have had a reminder requesting an early answer.

Apparently both the British and French Governments wish such a declaration. The main difficulty is that it means giving a blank cheque, not only as to the duration but as to the objectives of the war.

¹ Non reproduit. La réponse se trouve au document 294.

¹ Not printed. For the text of the reply see Document 294.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.18

London January 12, 1940

MOST SECRET. Following for Prime Minister. Begins.

Consideration has recently been given to the desirability of issuing, on some suitable occasion, a joint Anglo-French Declaration engaging not to conclude a separate peace. It has been ascertained that the French Government are in favour of this proposal which it is thought would be of value primarily from psychological point of view and for countering German propaganda designed to drive a wedge between the Allies.

2. A draft Declaration has been prepared in the following form. Begins.

The undersigned duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments hereby declare as follows:

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the French Republic mutually undertake that during the present war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an Armistice or Treaty of Peace except by mutual agreement.

Ends.

3. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be glad to learn whether His Majesty's Government in Canada would wish to be associated with such a Declaration. In that event it is suggested that the following wording should be substituted at the beginning of the second sentence. Begins.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa and the Government of the French Republic.

Ends.

4. It will be observed that the draft set out in paragraph 2 above does not exclude the possibility of separate Agreements being concluded by each of the Dominion Governments, but it is unnecessary to emphasize the enhanced effect of the solidarity which would result from joint signature by five of His Majesty's Governments.

5. The Government of India are being consulted as to whether they would also wish to be included. Ends.

294.

1269-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 20

Ottawa, February 1, 1940

MOST SECRET. Your telegram Circular D.18 of January 12th. Following for Prime Minister. Begins.

1. Your telegram regarding the advisability of issuing a joint declaration against the conclusion of a separate peace has been given full consideration.

2. I should like to make it clear that there has been no discussion in Canada by the public and no discussion or consideration by the Government as to the possibility of a separate peace being made by any of the countries now resisting German aggression before every possible effort had been made to attain their common ends. There has, however, been wide public interest and some difference of view regarding the complementary subject of war objectives, and the terms on which peace could be made by the Allied countries. Controversy would inevitably arise on these matters if Canada were associated with an explicit declaration on the question of a separate peace which has not been raised here, and if the Canadian Government did not at the same time make some explicit declaration on the question of war aims which has been raised.

3. The fact that Parliament has been dissolved and a general election is shortly to be held of course accentuates this difficulty. No question is likely to be raised if the United Kingdom and France make a joint declaration but participation in such a declaration by Canada would be almost certain to inject into the campaign a dividing issue, not on the question of a separate peace but on the question of war aims. The Canadian Government has considered the latter question with care and has indicated its views in the telegrams exchanged last October and November. It is, however, realized that it would be difficult to state those views in an election campaign without raising questions as to whether a similar position was taken by the Government of the United Kingdom and by the Government of France, which so far as we are aware has not yet replied to the communication on the subject of war aims, indicated in your telegram D.113 of December 4th. Our Parliament has been united on the subject of participation in the war and we are anxious to avoid raising any question in the course of the campaign which might occasion additional controversy.

4. I shall send copies of this telegram to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa if that is thought desirable. Ends.

295.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR B.44

London, February 29, 1940

SECRET. The Polish Government recently proposed that a Joint Declaration should be made by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the French Government and the Polish Government condemning the conduct of the German authorities and forces of occupation in Poland. It was agreed with the French Government that there would be advantage in making such a Declaration, provided it did not contain any threats of punishment of individuals which it might not be possible or desirable to fulfil.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris has accordingly been instructed to negotiate the terms of such a Declaration with the French and Polish representatives and to submit the text to His Majesty's Government for their consideration.

3. The Declaration would start by saying the three Governments have been profoundly shocked at the reports of German crimes against persons and property in Poland. After reciting the chief counts in the indictment (including tax on the civil population, illegally established territory, executions, deportations, confiscations, destruction of historic monuments, closing of churches and persecution of religion) which reveal a deliberate policy aiming at complete destruction of the Polish nation, the Declaration would conclude with a formal and public protest by the three Governments to the conscientious world against the action of the German Government, whom they must hold responsible for these crimes against humanity and civilization.

296.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.84

London, March 14, 1940

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. My telegram Circular D.18, January 12th. Following for Prime Minister, Begins.

We have been considering further, in the light of replies received to telegram Circular D.18, question of issue of joint Anglo-French declaration engaging not to conclude a separate peace. It is clear from replies received from His Majesty's Governments in Canada and in the Union of South Africa that they would regard their participation in such a declaration as impracticable at the present time, and in the circumstances any such declaration would have to be limited to United Kingdom and France. On the other hand, if a declaration in the name of the United Kingdom and France alone were issued, it seems to us that there might be some risk that this fact would provoke speculation and enquiry as to His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and so afford material for enemy propaganda.

We have consulted His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris who has expressed himself as strongly in favour of declaration from point of view of Anglo-French relations. He considers that it would impose a solemn and binding obligation upon all future French Governments who, whatever their political complexion, would find it virtually impossible publicly to repudiate an engagement of this kind. Moreover, if made at an early date, he feels that declaration would weaken the position of such elements in France as may be working to undermine (?) primarily with a view to forming a Government more inclined to seek an early peace with Germany.

He has suggested however that proposed text of declaration might be expanded so as to give some contractual form to continuance of Anglo-French economic and military collaboration after the end of the war, and he feels that in addition to good effect of such a further declaration upon the outside world, it would be of immense encouragement to French and would assist Anglo-French relations when the time comes to arrange terms of peace.

It occurs to us also that to link up declaration with Anglo-French Financial Agreement of December 4th last, and economic arrangements now in force between the two countries, to which the Dominions are not parties, might afford a reasonable ground which could be used in public to explain the non-participation of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions in the declarations.

We are considering, therefore, the issue of a declaration on lines set out in paragraph 2 of telegram Circular D.18, with the addition of the following sentence:

The two Governments further declare their intention to continue the closest cooperation in their financial economic and defence policies after the conclusion of peace.

On examining draft declaration it has also occurred to us that strength of declaration would be improved by the addition, after the words: "French Republic" of the following:

Being equally determined to carry on the war with the utmost vigour until purposes for which it was undertaken are obtained.

Before these suggestions are discussed further with the French Government, we should be glad to be in possession of the views of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions. An early reply would be appreciated in view of desire of the French Government for a very early decision regarding suggested declarations. Ends.

297.

1269-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 34

Ottawa, March 18, 1940

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Your telegram Circular D.84 March 14, 1940, my telegram No. 20 February 1st, 1940. Following for Prime Minister. Begins.

We have considered your plan which involves the issuing of a joint declaration by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France linked with proposals for Anglo-French post-war economic and defence co-operation and think that all circumstances considered it is the wisest course to follow. Ends.

298.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.88

London, March 20, 1940

SECRET. My telegram Circular B.44 of 29th February.

The Polish Government desire to add at the end of the proposed Anglo-Franco-Polish Declaration on German conduct in Poland, two passages to the effect:

- (1) That these German crimes cannot remain unpunished, and
- (2) That all wrongs thus inflicted by Germany in violation of International Law must be integrally righted.

2. The Polish argument is that these passages will (a) encourage the Polish population in Poland; (b) deter German authorities from further excesses; (c) demonstrate Allied solidarity at a moment when new drive for a patched-up peace seems imminent.

3. The French Government are willing to accept the Polish suggestions, which they regard as general assertions of principle rather than juridical obligations undertaken by the Allied Governments.

4. We see serious objection to the acceptance of either passage since it seems undesirable to commit ourselves in a formal international instrument to statements which are manifestly open to interpretation as binding us

- (1) to eventual pursuit of war criminals involving all the difficulties experienced after the last war; and,
- (2) to restore the *status quo ante* in Poland in respect of all German misdeeds enumerated in the manifesto.

By so doing, we should almost inevitably lay up trouble for ourselves in the future and we should also be enlarging to a degree that seems to us undesirable at the present stage upon statements which we have already made about our war and peace aims. We should also be giving a handle to German propagandist contention that the aim of the Allies is the destruction of Germany.

5. Before making any further communication to the Polish and French Governments we should be glad to learn whether His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions are disposed to share our views.

299.

1269-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 39

Ottawa, March 22, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram Circular D.88, March 20, 1940 concerning proposed Anglo-Franco-Polish Declaration on German conduct in Poland, the Canadian Government would be disposed to agree with the views of your Government as set forth in paragraph four.

300.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.90

London, March 25, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. My telegram Circular D.88, March 20th.

Polish Government have now explained that they never intended that declaration should have character of an undertaking, but simply that it should prevent further persecution by Germans and encourage Polish population.

2. This was the purpose of the final words in the Polish draft, but if we wish to make alterations the Polish Government would be grateful for suggestions.

3. In view of the strength of the Polish Government feelings on this subject and of qualified support which they are receiving from the French Government, we have given further consideration to the matter and we have devised a draft of the last paragraph of the declaration which we think meets the objections mentioned in my telegram under reference. Following is text:

This conduct of German authorities and forces of occupation is in flagrant violation of the laws of war, and in particular of the Hague Convention concerning laws and customs of war on land; and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the French Government and the Polish Government desire to make a formal and public protest to the conscience of the world against the crimes committed by the German Government and their agents against the Polish population. They must hold the German Government responsible for these crimes, and they reaffirm their determination to right the wrongs inflicted on the Polish people.

5. We are anxious to dispose of this question and we should be glad to know as soon as possible whether His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions see any objection to our putting the foregoing proposal to the Polish Government.

301.

1269-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 41

Ottawa, April 1, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram Circular D.90, March 25, 1940, concerning proposed Anglo-Franco-Polish Declaration.

In view of your Government's conclusion that the new draft meets the objections which they had previously indicated, the Canadian Government sees no objection to the proposal in question being put to the Polish Government. The Canadian Government, while sharing the desire to right the wrongs inflicted on the Polish people, wish at the same time to make it clear that this reply does not imply any undertaking to restore the former territorial limits of Poland or to enforce the other objectives referred to in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 88 of March 20.

302.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.110

London, April 11, 1940

SECRET. My telegram Circular D.90 of March 25th. Declaration on German conduct in Poland. In accordance with suggestions made by His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions, final sentence of last paragraph of the proposed Declaration has now been revised as follows. Begins.

They reaffirm responsibility of German Government for these crimes and their determination to right the wrongs thus inflicted on the Polish people.

Ends.

Text has been communicated to the Polish Ambassador who was informed it was still subject to final approval by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, but was asked to submit it to the Polish Government without delay. A copy of the revised draft has also been communicated to the French Government who have been asked, if they concur in it, so to inform the Polish Government.

303.

1269-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.131

London, April 17, 1940

SECRET. My Circular D.110 of April 10 [sic]. Text of Declaration on German atrocities in Poland has now been agreed upon with French and Polish Governments and Declaration will be published tomorrow April 18th in the following form. Begins.

1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the French Government and the Polish Government have been profoundly shocked at reports that they received of crimes against person and property committed by the German authorities and the forces of occupation in Poland.

2. These reports leave no doubt that the German Government, which opened war on September 1st, 1939, by the brutal attack upon the civilian population of Poland in defiance of accepted principles of International Law, are now bent on destroying not only lives and property, but also cultural and religious existence of defenceless Polish population at present under their control.

3. Further, in violation of Fourth International Convention of The Hague, Germany has gone so far as to incorporate in the Reich territories of Polish Republic, although the war between Germany and the three Allied Powers is still continuing.

4. Wholesale executions, deportations in circumstances most ruthless and barbarous of the Polish population who have been driven from their homes by the German population in Polish territory, the transfer, contrary to all legality, of property belonging to the Poles to these Germans coming from abroad, the confiscation of state and private property, the destruction and pillage of historical and artistic monuments, the deportation to forced labour in Germany of young Polish men and women, the closing of churches, and persecution of religion, clearly revealed a policy deliberately aiming at destruction of the Polish nation.

In addition to persecution of Poles there is the atrocious treatment inflicted on members of Jewish community.

5. This conduct of German authorities and forces in occupation is in flagrant violation of laws of war, and, in particular, of The Hague Convention concerning laws and customs of war on land; and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the French Government and the Polish Government, desire to make a formal and public protest to the conscience of the world against action of German Government and of its agents. They reaffirm responsibility of Germany for these crimes and their determination to right the wrongs thus inflicted on Polish people. Ends.

Polish Government are communicating a formal assurance (which will not of course be made public) to the effect that they regard last sentence of Declaration as a statement of principle and not as a contractual one and that they will not base any claim upon it vis-à-vis United Kingdom Government or French Government in the future.

PARTIE 2/PART 2

RÉUNIONS INTERALLIÉES INTER-ALLIED MEETINGS

JUIN 1941
JUNE 1941

304.

2295-A-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.553

London, November 1, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET: We are considering holding, during the course of the next ten days, a meeting in London of representatives of the Allied Governments which could be described as a revival of the Supreme War Council.

2. The Governments of Poland, Norway, The Netherlands and Belgium, and the Provisional Czechoslovak Government, would be represented by their Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers. Greece would be represented by the Greek Minister; the Free French forces by an observer. We hope that the Dominion Governments would agree to be represented at such a meeting; it would appear to us that the High Commissioners in London could appropriately do this if so authorized by these Governments.

3. It is proposed that agenda should consist of a statement by the Prime Minister, any questions raised by a representative arising out of Prime Minister's statement, and adoption of a resolution and a press *communiqué*. The meeting would not be called upon to take decisions, but to provide a manifestation of Allied solidarity. Military plans and operations would not be discussed and meeting would have an informal character.

4. The resolution, which it is proposed would be adopted, is as follows, and subject to any comments which the Dominion Governments may wish to make, would be submitted to the Allied representatives for their agreement. Resolution begins.

The representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa, Belgium, Greece, The Netherlands, Norway and Poland and of the Czechoslovakian Provisional Government, allied together in the fight against aggression, are resolved:

(1) That they will continue the struggle to liberate Europe from German and Italian aggression until victory is won, and will mutually assist each other in this struggle to the utmost of their respective capacities.

(2) That there can be no settled peace and prosperity so long as free people are coerced by violence into submission to German or Italian domination or live under threat of such coercion.

(3) That the only true basis for a new order in Europe is willing cooperation of free peoples in a system of military, economic, and social security, and that it is their intention to work together, both in war and peace, to this end.

Resolution ends.

5. This draft resolution has been compiled with the following considerations in mind. In the first place, we have to take account of the fact that none of the Allied Governments, except Greece, is at war with Italy, and that Greece is not at war with Germany. Secondly, account has to be taken of the position of overseas possessions of Belgium and The Netherlands, and for this reason, the resolution has not been limited entirely to Europe. Thirdly, an endeavour has been made to steer a course between a resolution drafted in precise terms and involving substantial commitments which might give rise to difficulties in securing agreement, and a resolution of too general and vague a character which might afford an opening for enemy propaganda.

We should be grateful for a very early expression of the views of the Dominion Governments.

305.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] November 2, 1940

The Dominions Office telegram D.553 regarding a meeting of Allied Governments in London is very interesting.

It is probably helpful to the Commonwealth Cause to have it appear to the world that we have some allies. More important, if Hitler's power in Europe is to be broken down, it cannot be done by British tanks and American planes alone. It is essential to encourage and stiffen resistance in the conquered countries in the hope that they may assist when the time comes. If they are to resist they will have to be persuaded both that Britain and her Allies have the military strength to break down Italy and Germany and that after the war they will have a better prospect of peace and freedom than they will have in a German controlled Europe.

The telegram states that an endeavour has been made to steer a middle course between firm commitments and vague generalities. That of course is the difficulty. At a hurried glance, I am a little doubtful whether this aim has been fully attained. Paragraph 3 in the proposed resolution refers to a new order in Europe and a system of military, economic and social security, which implies that we in Canada and Australia and New Zealand are going to work to this end in war and in peace. Whatever pledges of military cooperation after the war are made they clearly cannot be confined to pledges by the Dominions to Europe. We can never go back to the anarchy of scores of small individual countries who rely for their protection on neutrality or the goodwill of someone else. Neither, if we can judge by the actualities of the past two years, is there the slightest possibility of the establishment of collective security on the extreme League of Nations basis, that is, every country in the world promising to fight for every other country if attacked by any power at any time. If any undertakings are to be given in the future they will be between countries definitely associated by special political or close geographical ties. Canada's first problem will be [to] work out not only its commitments to the two groups to which it will belong, the British Commonwealth and the Americas, but to seek to harmonize those commitments. How far we can at the present time undertake one-way after-war commitments on the continent of Europe might seem doubtful except to the *Winnipeg Free Press* and the League of Nations Society in Canada.

Whether there will ever again be a complete[ly] independent Poland or Belgium or Czechoslovakia, or whether they will have to seek strength in larger Federations, is one of the questions for the future. At present the trend is certainly against the possibility of Humpty-Dumpty being set up again precisely as before.

O. D. S[KELTON]

306.

2295-A-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 197

Ottawa, November 5, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Your telegram Circular D.553.

1. We have given careful consideration to your telegram suggesting the holding of a meeting in London of representatives of Allied Governments constituting a revived Supreme War Council.

2. We recognize the desirability of encouraging the people of the countries in Europe which have been overrun by the enemy to maintain their hope of eventual freedom. We doubt, however, if the establishment of a Council such as proposed would be an effective means to this end or desirable on other grounds.

3. The constitution of such a Supreme War Council might be advocated for (a) its effect on world opinion including the opinion of the countries which have been overrun, (b) its possible value in directing Allied war effort and (c) its possible value in framing and announcing post-war policy.

4. As to the first point, the effect on world opinion, it does not seem that a Council composed largely of governments in exile which no longer control their own countries, would carry authority or impress the world with the strength of the forces resisting the Axis powers. Such an organization would have little claim to the high importance and decisive power which the term Supreme War Council implies. To set up a facade of such doubtful impressiveness might in fact lessen the effect of the great and substantial effort now being put forth by the United Kingdom and supported by the Dominions. The omission of France from the group of countries seeking to regain their freedom would have serious repercussions, though on the basis of a council of exile governments it would not be possible to include France or Denmark.

5. As to the second point, the possible value of the Council as a means of directing the Allied war effort, it seems clear the direction of that effort must remain in the hands of the governments of the several countries which are actively engaged in the struggle and throwing the whole of their military and economic resources into the struggle. We recognize the moral value of the aid given by the continued resistance of the European governments now established in London, including the measure of military support they are able to provide, as well as the significance of the overseas possessions of Belgium and The Netherlands. These considerations do not, however, make it appear that their representation in a Supreme War Council would give added unity or responsibility or effectiveness to the efforts of the members of the British Commonwealth which are the determining factor. The increasing and possibly decisive aid to come from the United States could not come within the operations of such a body.

6. It is realized that your telegram suggests that the meeting next week would not be called upon to take decisions and that military plans would not be discussed. It would, however, be difficult to set up a Council which would meet only once. Such a procedure would appear to offset any value its establishment would have as a demonstration to the world of continuing Allied solidarity. If it continued, consideration of the national and personal interests which would inevitably operate makes it doubtful if the role of silent partner would be acceptable for long.

7. As to (c), the possible value of the Council in framing and announcing post-war policies, it does not appear that this could be effectively met by a body so constituted or by any body operating at the present stage of the war with all the uncertainty as to the trend and shape of future events and even as to who will be our friends and our foes before the war ends. As your telegram indicates, it is difficult to frame now a post-war policy which will avoid both too precise commitments and too vague generalities.

8. The resolution which it is suggested it would be the chief work of the Council to adopt, is brief and has undoubtedly been framed with care and skill. Even so, it does not appear to us to have surmounted the inherent difficulties.

9. The first clause promises to carry on the fight for the liberation of Europe until victory is won. We hope this can and will be done, but any gain arising from encouraging the peoples of the Continent may be more than offset by the effect on opinion in the United States as well as in the Commonwealth of making this the primary objective of our struggle. In the United States the defence of Britain is coming to be considered the first line of defence of America, but defence of the Continent of Europe would undoubtedly be regarded as entanglement to be avoided. In Canada as in the other Dominions there is strong and rising determination to give all aid to Britain for its sake and our own, but with every sympathy particularly for some of the countries overrun, it would not be easy to make the restoration of all Europe as vital and compelling an objective as the relief of Britain or be certain of readiness to sacrifice to that end. Post-war guarantees to Poland and Rumania might prove as unfortunate as the pre-war guarantees.

10. To the second clause no objection can be taken, but the third raises very definite difficulties. It is a pledge that all the countries represented in the Council will work in war and peace for a new order in Europe based on the willing cooperation of free peoples in a system of military, economic and social security. The objective is a fine one and well stated. We trust Europe will be able to work toward and attain that goal. We could not, however, consider that such a declaration correctly or adequately represents the objectives which Canada will have in mind. We realize that the Continent of Europe and its policies will continue to be a dominant factor in the fortunes of all countries and Canadians will undoubtedly be prepared to consider any feasible cooperation in its efforts. Few Canadians, however, would consider that their primary task in the future will be to give a continuing and

one-way guarantee for the military security of Europe. We look forward to continuing partnership in the British Commonwealth and to continuing cooperation with the United States. To take our part in finding a basis for that partnership and that cooperation, to carry out the obligations each relationship involves and to harmonize and unify both relationships will be a great task, and a task that is ours, a task we cannot forego or subordinate to guaranteeing the performance of the task which faces the countries of Europe.

11. In the discussion which took place last year, we indicated, particularly in our telegram No. 115 of November 28 [*sic*],¹ the general view of the Canadian Government on war aims and peace conditions. Later developments might modify these views in some respects, but in general confirm them. This is particularly the case as regards the doubt expressed as to the possibility of finding a firm basis for the future either in the continuance of a large number of small and completely independent states or in plans of worldwide collective security involving pledges to aid any country at any time, and the belief indicated that regional or associated grouping and alliance in various forms would appear to be the probable and practical compromise.

12. We doubt the necessity or effectiveness of setting up any central body for determining war policy. The present means of consultation between the several governments of the Commonwealth, by direct telegram and through the several High Commissioners, and by visits of Ministers from time to time, have proved their adequacy. Consultation with the United States is constant and increasingly effective. Government representatives of four of the overrun countries are established in London and can readily be consulted. It does not appear necessary at present to go into the question of the possibility or effectiveness of Dominion representation on a War Council in London.

13. A temporary Allied Conference would be free from some of the difficulties attaching to a Supreme War Council. In so far, however, as its purpose would be to pass a resolution on war and post-war objectives, the necessity would remain of determining in advance whether an acceptable and realistic declaration could be found.

14. While not overlooking the desirability of encouraging the Allied Governments in their difficult position, we believe that the most effective means of restoring faith and hope to their peoples lies in the fresh courage and confidence which are being given all freedom-loving peoples by the magnificent stand of the people of Britain, backed by the full determination of the Dominions. If to that resistance there can be added victory over the Axis attacks in the Near East, all Europe will read and digest the lesson. If that resistance and that victory were to fail, no resolutions or promises would maintain confidence.

15. We are repeating this telegram to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

¹ Document 285.

307.

2295-A-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 156

London, November 8, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram November 5th, No. 197.

We are grateful for full statement of your views in regard to proposed meeting with representatives of Allied Governments.

2. May I say first of all that I fear reference in opening paragraph of my telegram Circular D.553 to a revival of Supreme War Council may have misled you. We had certainly not contemplated setting up anything in the nature of a permanent organization for such purposes as those outlined under (b) and (c) of paragraph 3 of my telegram. We fully share your view that the main direction of the war must certainly be in the hands of the Governments of those countries which are able to throw their full resources into the struggle, and while we appreciate your argument that there are difficulties in a gathering which would meet only once, it is not our intention that the present meeting, even if succeeded by others, should develop into a body authorized to take decisions and discuss military plans. What we had in mind, therefore, was a gathering on an informal basis, such as is referred to in paragraph 13 of your telegram, presided over by Mr. Churchill, which would pass a resolution, the terms of which had been agreed to beforehand. It seems to us that such a meeting, concluding with issue of a suitable resolution, will afford a valuable demonstration of Allied solidarity, and will serve to encourage not only the Allied Governments but also their people in Allied countries now lying under enemy yoke.

3. I hope that the above will serve to allay any doubts which you feel as to the nature of the meeting which we had proposed.

4. As regards the terms of the draft of the resolution itself, we fully appreciate the importance of considerations set out in paragraphs 9 and 10 of your telegram, and we hope to possibly meet these views by redrafting the proposed text.

We are entirely in accord as to the importance of effect on United States opinion, and recognize difficulties inherent in commitments to Continental Europe. I should like to add how deeply we appreciate warmth of Canada's renewed assurance to give all aid to Britain.

5. With object of meeting considerations above, we suggest draft resolution should be amended by omitting reference "liberation of Europe" in clause (1) and "new order in Europe" in clause (3), and revising those clauses to read as follows:

(1) That they will continue the struggle against German and Italian oppression until victory is won, and will mutually assist each other in this struggle to the utmost of their respective capacities.

(3) That only true basis of enduring peace is willingness to cooperate with free peoples in a system of military, economic and social security, and that it is their intention to work together, both in war and peace, to this end.

6. The Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand have indicated their willingness to be represented by their High Commissioners at proposed meeting, and to accept a resolution on lines suggested in my telegram Circular D.553. Union Government has also agreed, observing that they welcome discussion of general form of resolution and avoidance of any specific commitment which might prove embarrassing in the future.

7. We hope very much that in the light of the above the Canadian Government will feel able to be represented at the meeting, and to accept a resolution amended on lines set out above.

8. This telegram is being repeated to the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 433, New Zealand, No. 356, and Union of South Africa, No. 57. Message ends.

308.

2295-A-40

*Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre
Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister*

TELEGRAM 5

Canberra, November 9, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following telegram has been sent to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, No. 579, repeated to the Prime Minister of New Zealand, No. 61, the Prime Minister of Canada, No. 5, the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, No. 21. Begins.

Reference your telegram Circular D.553, and telegram to you from the Prime Minister of Canada. I feel too much has been read into projected resolution, which seems to me to go far enough but not too far. He raises in paragraph 12 a question of great importance to us in Australia. We freely recognize value of consultation through High Commissioners and Foreign Office, and are not unconscious of practical difficulties of creating a standing Empire War Cabinet at this time. But nevertheless we feel strongly that some personal consultation between the Empire countries, in the near future, is essential if Empire military plan to be concerted and our common strategic ideas to be brought up to date. For example, Australia has special interests in the Middle East in relation to dispositions and use of manpower and equipment, and has vital interest in Singapore and Western Pacific problems, including Japan, Netherlands East Indies, Thailand and other Pacific countries.

There would be great satisfaction in Australia if such matters could be jointly discussed as soon as possible, and as Prime Minister I would be willing to go to London or any other nominated place to attend the necessary conference. Ends.

309.

2295-A-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 159

London, November 10, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. PERSONAL. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

Personal. Your telegram No. 197. I suggested to the cabinet a meeting of Allied Governments now in England, with a view to emphasizing the fact that we are not fighting for any selfish or insular cause, but that we have with us men who hold title deeds of all captive nations of Europe. The German occupation lies heavy on these peoples and if they can see that their cause is still alive they will resist many temptations and pressures to participate in Hitler's so called "New Order of Europe" which is, after all, only medieval barbarism emphasized by modern science for the profit of the Nazi party. Quite apart from all pledges we have given to these conquered countries, I am anxious for our own sake that we should appear to be marching forward in a good company of nations, both Dominions and Foreign States, and that the war should not appear to be narrowed to a conflict between Britain and Germany.

2. It was specially decided by the cabinet that the words "Supreme War Council" should not be used, and that the meeting should instead be called a Conference of Allied Representatives. The first paragraph of our No. [D.] 553 was wrongly drafted owing to some misunderstanding and pressure of business in the departments. This mistake is much regretted, and I can readily see how it misled you. I hope however, that now it is explained, you will like the broad and liberal conceptions which animate the policy to which we are now committed. It would certainly lead to world-wide comment if Canada was the sole absentee.

310.

2295-A-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 200

Ottawa, November 13, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. 1. Your telegram No. 156, November 8th, proposed meeting of representatives of Allied Governments.

2. We are glad to learn that it is not proposed to establish a Supreme War Council. As our telegram No. 197 indicated, we would concur in the calling of a conference of Allied representatives. We understand that there is no undertaking to set up a permanent body and that the question of holding any similar conferences in the future would be discussed by the Commonwealth Governments concerned.

3. As regards the draft resolution, we would be prepared to accept the suggested revision of the first clause. We have previously indicated our concurrence in the second clause.

4. The third clause as revised, however, appears to us still open to most serious objection. We do not think it is either necessary or desirable to give undertakings to enter, after the war, into a system of military guarantees. Under the suggested revision the commitment, it is true, is no longer limited to Europe but it would still include Europe as well as an indefinitely wider area. In the discussions of recent years the phrase "a system of military security" has been taken to imply a pledge of definite and automatic military assistance. For the reasons indicated in our previous telegram and in the light of the experience of the present war and the years preceding it we do not consider it possible or advisable to make such a sweeping commitment at this time. It would not be acceptable in Canada and as we have indicated we believe it would deter rather than encourage the cooperation of the people of the United States. The present phase of the task is we feel to encourage and stimulate resistance in the occupied areas and fortify the distraught peoples against succumbing to the threats and cajolery of the enemy rather than to give specific pledges for post-war organization.

5. We would therefore suggest some such wording for the third clause as the following. Begins.

That believing the only sound foundation for human freedom and enduring peace lies in the defeat of the aggressors who have treacherously attacked and occupied country after country; in the restoration and expansion of national individual and cultural liberty and free access to the food-stuffs and raw materials of the world which will follow such defeat; and in the final and permanent removal of the menace which has darkened the lives of millions of decent folk for more than a generation, and in the firm faith and confidence inspired by the halting of the Fascist onslaught and the assurance of powerful and continuing assistance from the countries that still are free, it is our resolve to work together both in war and in peace to achieve this great end. Ends.

We are of course not wedded to the precise terms of the suggested amendment and would be prepared to accept an alternative proposal provided it definitely avoided post-war military security commitments.

311.

2295-A-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 201

Ottawa, November 13, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister. Begins.

1. Your telegram No. 159. I entirely concur in your view of the importance of securing the goodwill and co-operation of the peoples of the countries

which have been overrun. My colleagues and I have not, however, considered that this end would be effectively attained by the establishment of a Supreme War Council or the making of commitments which we do not believe could be carried out.

2. I am glad to learn of the proposal that the term "Supreme War Council" should not be used and that the meeting should instead be called a conference of Allied representatives. As has been indicated in my telegram No. 200 of today to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, we would concur and participate in a special conference of this character if the undertaking to set up a system of post-war military security can be adequately revised in advance. We have suggested in that telegram a possible revision of the concluding clause of resolution.

3. I am at some loss to understand the last sentence in the telegram under reference which states that "it would lead to world-wide comment if Canada were the sole absentee". It has been as you are aware our endeavour to have Canada take its full part in the organization and conduct of the war. Our previous telegram regarding the Supreme War Council proposal did not state or imply that if a temporary Allied Conference were held and a resolution agreed to which would be free from the serious objections indicated, Canada would not be represented.

4. In our telegram of November 5th we expressed the view that the most effective means of restoring faith and hope to the people of Europe lay in the magnificent resistance of the people of Britain and in victory over Axis attacks in the Near East. We have just received the glorious news of the successful attack of the fleet air arm on the Italian naval base at Taranto. I can conceive of nothing that will more effectively revive hope and confidence among all peoples who have the will to be free.

5. I should be obliged if a copy of this telegram as well as my telegram No. 200 could be furnished the High Commissioner for Canada with whom we are communicating direct. Ends.

312.

2295-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1792

Ottawa, November 13, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. 1. Allied Conference. Please see telegrams D.553 of November 1 and 156 of November 8 from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, and our telegrams 197 of November 6 [5] and 200 of this date as well as my personal telegram of this date which I have asked to be transmitted to you.

2. If the proposed resolution is satisfactorily adjusted we will be glad to participate in the proposed Conference and will wish you to act as Canadian representative.

313.

2295-A-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 161

London, November 15, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram November 13th, No. 200. We appreciate force of argument in paragraph 4 of your telegram regarding third clause of proposed resolution, and would certainly be ready to amend the clause in order to meet this point.

We feel, however, that it would facilitate acceptance of proposal by other Governments concerned if this were achieved by some modification of draft as communicated in my telegram No. 156 of November 8th rather than by extensive redrafting on lines suggested in paragraph 5 of your telegram under reference. We feel, too, that that draft might appear rather long in comparison with the other two clauses of proposed resolution.

In the circumstances, we suggest a revised third clause to read as follows:

3. That the only true basis for enduring peace is the willing cooperation of the free peoples in a world [in] which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security; and that it is their intention to work together both in war and peace to this end.

We hope that in the light of final paragraph of your telegram that you will agree that this meets the points which you have in mind.

We are anxious to communicate a final draft to all those concerned at the earliest possible date. We propose, therefore, unless we hear from you to the contrary before Monday next, to communicate draft resolution, revised as shown, to those concerned on Monday.

314.

2295-A-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 205

Ottawa, November 15, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 161, November 15th. Allied Conference. We are pleased to learn that the Government of the United Kingdom concur in the desirability of amending third clause of resolution to meet difficulties we have indicated. We are entirely prepared to accept the revision you now suggest.

315.

2295-A-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.581

London, November 23, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. My telegram Circular D.553¹ and connected correspondence.

As a result of further consultation with His Majesty's Government in Canada, third clause of proposed resolution has been again revised. Certain further amendments have also been made to meet the suggestions received from various quarters.

2. Text of resolution as now proposed reads as follows: Begins.

The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Government of Belgium, the Czechoslovak Provisional Government, the Governments of The Netherlands, Norway and Poland,

Engaged together in the fight against aggression

Are resolved:

(1) That they will continue the struggle against German or Italian oppression until victory is won, and will mutually assist each other in this struggle to the utmost of their respective capacities;

(2) That there can be no settled peace and prosperity so long as free peoples are coerced by violence into submission to domination by Germany or her associates or live under a threat of such coercion;

(3) That the only true basis for enduring peace is the willing co-operation of the free peoples in a world [in] which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security; and that it is their intention to work together with other free peoples, both in war and peace, to this end.

Ends.

3. Meeting has now been fixed for Monday next, November 25th.

4. It is not yet certain whether the Greek Government will be represented at the meeting.

316.

2295-A-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.593

London, November 29, 1940

SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

My telegram Circular D.583.² Postponement of meeting of Allied representatives has been due to the reluctance of the Greek Government to participate, and to associate themselves with the resolution.

¹ Document 304.

² Non reproduit.

³ Not printed.

2. The chief reason for their reluctance is that they do not wish to do anything which would provide Germany with a pretext for taking action against Greece.

3. We should not like the Greek Government to feel that for the sake of what is primarily a demonstration of Allied solidarity, we had pressed them to do something which might be cited by Germany as a justification for action against Greece. We are waiting therefore for the Greek situation to define itself more clearly, and we hope that this ought not to take more than a fortnight or so. Ends.

317.

2295-A-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.335

London, June 7, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. My telegram Circular D.581 of November 23rd, and connected correspondence.

Arising out of a suggestion made by two Allied Governments, it is now proposed to hold meeting with representatives of Allied Governments on Thursday, June 12th.

2. We feel that moment is opportune for a declaration of Allied solidarity in view of present German peace propaganda offensive. We hope that Dominion Governments will agree, and will arrange for their representatives at meeting.

3. Text of resolution to be adopted would be as previously agreed (see my telegram Circular D.581 of November 23rd) subject to following modifications:

- (a) In preamble, list of Governments would be amended to include Greece, Luxemburg (before Netherlands) and Yugoslavia (at the end);
- (b) Paragraph (2), transfer of words "by Germany and her associates" to follow "submission to domination".

4. Grateful for very early reply.

318.

King Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre

Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] June 10, 1941

PROPOSED MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS
On November 13th, 1940, while objecting to the establishment of any

Supreme War Council, we concurred in a United Kingdom proposal to call a conference of Allied representatives in London on the understanding

- (1) that there was no undertaking to set up any permanent body; and
- (2) that the question of holding any similar conferences in the future would be discussed by the Commonwealth governments concerned.

There was a good deal of cabled consultation on the terms of a resolution that might be adopted by the conference.

Eventually the following text was agreed on:

The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Government of Belgium, the Czechoslovak Provisional Government, the Governments of (Greece, Luxemburg,) The Netherlands, Norway, Poland (and Yugoslavia,)

Engaged together in the fight against aggression

Are resolved:

- (1) That they will continue the struggle against German or Italian oppression until victory is won, and will mutually assist each other in this struggle to the utmost of their respective capacities;
- (2) That there can be no settled peace and prosperity so long as free peoples are coerced by violence by Germany or her associates into submission to domination or live under a threat of such coercion;
- (3) That the only true basis for enduring peace is the willing co-operation of the free peoples in a world [in] which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security; and that it is their intention to work together with other free peoples, both in war and peace, to this end.

The meeting referred to above was not held last autumn due to the reluctance of the Greek Government to participate, as they thought that such participation would provide Germany with a pretext for taking action against Greece.

It is now proposed, by Circular D.335 of June 7th, that the meeting should be held on Thursday, June 12th. It is hoped that the Dominion Governments will agree, and arrange for their representation at this meeting.

The only changes suggested to the resolution quoted above are (a) in the preamble the list of Governments would be amended to include Greece, Luxemburg, and Yugoslavia; and (b) a verbal change in paragraph 2 by which the phrases "by Germany or her associates" and "submission to domination" are transposed.¹

We should cable the name of our representative at once if we are to be present. It would be difficult to refuse because first, we accepted the invitation to attend the similar meeting last November, and second, Canada's absence would be noted.

¹ La résolution, après ces amendements, fut adoptée à l'unanimité lors de la réunion du 12 juin 1941.

¹ The resolution, with these amendments, was unanimously adopted at the meeting held on June 12, 1941.

319.

2295-A-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 98

Ottawa, June 10, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your Circular D.335 of June 7th. Canadian Government approves of resolution to be adopted at meeting of representatives of Allied Governments on Thursday, June 12th, and will be represented at this meeting by the High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom.

SEPTEMBRE 1941

SEPTEMBER 1941

320.

2295-F-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures¹
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs¹
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Washington,] July 15, 1941

TELEGRAM

[Begins.] In conversation last evening I ascertained that recent discussions have taken place between the United Kingdom on the one hand and Greece, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia (not Belgium) on the other, with regard to post-war economic arrangements. On behalf of the United Kingdom, Leith-Ross² presented proposal under which the post-war requirements as to raw materials and foodstuffs for these countries would be assumed as an obligation and "implemented by appropriate allocations of shipping". These obligations are to be covered "to the fullest extent of the treaty-making power".

In view of the fact that the United States Government has been informed of these conversations should not we, who are likely to be much more seriously affected, be apprised directly of what is going on and not left to obtain our information as a result of our close relation with the Department of State?

Details as to my source of information which, in any case, should not be passed on to London will be reported on my return. [Ends.]

¹ H. L. Keenleyside communiqua le texte de Washington par téléphone.

² Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, président du comité interallié pour les besoins de l'après-guerre, 1941-43.

¹ H. L. Keenleyside telephoned the text from Washington.

² Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chairman of Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Committee, 1941-43.

321.

2295-F-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1057

Ottawa, July 16, 1941

We should be glad to be kept informed of progress of discussions which it is understood are proceeding in London between United Kingdom Government and a number of the governments in exile regarding general post-war economic arrangements including post-armistice provision of raw materials and foodstuffs for countries now under enemy occupation.

322.

2295-F-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1373

London, July 31, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram of July 16th. There has been nothing to report on this subject until now when it has been decided to hold meeting of Allied Governments to pass resolution on general post-war economic plans. Dominions Office is sending you tonight several telegrams giving full account of arrangements for meeting and asking for Canadian representation.

MASSEY

323.

2295-F-40

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D. 467

London, July 31, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. 1. As the Dominion Governments are aware, the United Kingdom Government have announced their intention to promote measures for the supply of food and raw materials to countries of Europe as soon as these countries have fully regained their freedom from German domination.

It is clear that this policy can only be achieved with the cooperation of all countries concerned, and it is accordingly proposed that a formal preparatory meeting with the Allied Governments concerned should take place in London as soon as possible for the furtherance of this common aim. This

meeting would follow on very well from meeting of Allied Governments held in London in June, and would be in accordance with general policy outlined in recent public speeches by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

2. Certain preliminary consideration has already been given here to this question in connection with problems arising in regard to export surpluses. This has covered:

- (a) Immediate action where necessary to assist economically producing countries whose market had been closed by blockade; and
- (b) Plans for supply of Europe's post-war needs.

3. It is suggested that the proposed meeting should be opened by an explanation of policy of the United Kingdom Government and of action which they have already set on foot to give effect to that policy; the representatives of other governments concerned would then be invited to state their views, and finally there would be submitted for approval a general resolution covering main points indicated in my immediately following telegram. We appreciate that at the present stage it is difficult to formulate concrete propositions, and resolution therefore must be directed in the main to organize preparation of preparatory work. The post-war needs of the Allied Governments will necessarily vary in accordance with economic position of their respective countries, and each Government would naturally be primarily responsible for requirements of its own people. At the same time these different requirements will need to be coordinated and an order of priority established as between various supplies wanted. The United Kingdom Government would be ready to offer any assistance which they could give in this task of coordination, and they suggest:

(a) That each of the Allied Governments should draw up estimates on comparable lines of commodities required for its people, indicating order of importance attached to each item;

(b) That there should be collaboration, to which the United Kingdom Government attaches much importance, in allocation of shipping resources available;

(c) That a central bureau should be established to carry forward the exchange of views and to coordinate their results. In due course other questions, such as distribution of stocks they allocate to particular needs and any financial arrangements, will have to be examined.

4. We very much hope that these proposals will commend themselves to Dominion Governments, and that they will be willing to participate in the conference. It is proposed that invitations should be extended to all those Governments (including Free French) who took part in meeting of Allied Governments in London in June, and also to the U.S.S.R. We have been consulting the United States Government informally, through United States Ambassador here, and have now learned that they share our view that meeting would be very useful. In view of bearing of any arrangements for post-war supplies to oppressed countries of Europe on general questions:

- (1) Surpluses;
- (2) The British and American defence effort;
- (3) Commercial policies and list of available ships;

(4) Post-war economic and political arrangements and also on question of re-provisioning of Europe as a whole, including enemy countries, the United States Government have asked to be kept fully informed of course of discussions and of work of proposed bureau. They have further authorized us to make a statement at the meeting on their behalf, indicating their interest, and saying that they stand ready at the appropriate time to consider in what respects they can cooperate in accomplishing the aims in view.

5. If His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions agree, we would now propose to address a note to the various Governments concerned in general sense of the foregoing, inviting them to nominate representatives to attend the meeting. We are anxious to press forward with the meeting as quickly as possible, and it would be appreciated if a very early reply could be sent to this telegram indicating whether your Government would be willing, for their part, to join in the meeting and, if so, the names of representatives whom they would wish to appoint to attend the meeting on their behalf.

6. The full text of the proposed draft of the resolution to be put to the conference would be telegraphed to you later.

324.

2295-F-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.468

London, July 31, 1941

SECRET. My immediately preceding telegram. Following are main points which would be covered by proposed draft resolution:

(1) It is the common aim of the Allied Governments to secure that supplies of food and raw materials should be made available to post-war needs of their countries as soon as they are fully liberated from German domination;

(2) While each of the Allied Governments will be primarily responsible for making provision for economic needs of its own people, their respective plan[s] should be coordinated in a spirit of collaboration for the successful achievement of the common aim;

(3) Participating Governments welcome preparatory measures which have already been undertaken by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for this purpose, and express their readiness to collaborate to the fullest extent of their power in pursuing action required;

(4) Accordingly each Government concerned should prepare estimates of kinds and amounts of foodstuffs and raw materials required for reprovisioning

of their countries, and order of priority in which they would desire supplies to be delivered as soon as blockade can be lifted;

(5) Re provisioning of Europe as a whole should have an urgent claim on shipping resources of each Government, and thus on Allied shipping resources as a whole, and method of giving effect to this itself should be worked out between the appropriate representatives of the participating Governments;

(6) A bureau should be established by the Government of the United Kingdom under the direction of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross which the Allied Governments could consult in framing estimates of their requirements, and which would collate and coordinate these estimates.

325.

2295-F-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] August 8, 1941

You will have seen from Dominions Office telegrams Circular D.467 and D.468 of July 31st (additional copies of which are attached) that plans are in hand for an early meeting of Allied Governments in London to consider measures for the supply of food and raw materials to the countries of Europe as soon as those countries have fully regained their freedom from German control. The meeting will be directed in the main to the organization of the necessary preparatory work, linking up schemes which the overseas countries have been considering for the liquidation of accumulating export surpluses with the need for the immediate and orderly provisioning of the emancipated countries.

2. Canada has a primary interest in these plans as a major belligerent and as the greatest wheat supplier.

3. Discussions of the international wheat problem have been taking place in Washington during the past few weeks on the initiative of the United States Government.¹ Preliminary plans for the preparation of a new international wheat agreement have been drawn up and are now being considered by the participating countries (Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Argentina). These plans contemplate the provision, free of charge, by the big overseas wheat producers, of wheat for relief distribution in war areas immediately on the termination of hostilities. The amount they have in mind for such distribution is to be at least 150,000,000 bushels plus at least another 100,000,000 bushels to be provided by the United Kingdom and such other countries as may wish to contribute, including possible further contributions by the major overseas producers.

¹ Documents 1257-1274.

4. I think these plans for the immediate free distribution of a staple food-stuff like wheat are sound, both politically and economically. At the same time I do not think they can best be put forward as an appendage of an international marketing scheme designed, primarily, to liquidate oppressive surpluses and to lay a firm foundation for the resumption of international trade in wheat in the post-war period. Nor should they, in the first instance, be put forward under the mixed sponsorship of a Committee, half neutral and half belligerent.

5. The convergence at this time of plans for the orderly liquidation of wheat surpluses and plans for the relief of the hungry countries under enemy control gives us a great opportunity to combine the proposals in a political gesture which might well have an important effect on the conduct and outcome of the war. I think Canadian leadership in this question at this time would be entirely appropriate, and that the coming conference of Allied Governments would provide an obvious opportunity for it. If the Canadian spokesman at that conference were authorized to say that Canada would make available, for the peoples of the Allied countries, say 50,000,000 bushels of wheat for free distribution in accordance with their needs, we would by this one move achieve the following useful results:

(1) The whole "V for Victory" campaign would be given a new momentum and content, which would bring it home concretely to all the populations of the enemy occupied countries. The offer could be plugged by radio, pamphlet and through the press of the neutral countries as a promise of direct and personal participation in the victory of the Allies.

(2) The Allied Governments in exile would be heartened and strengthened in their war effort and their prestige in the minds of their peoples at home would be increased proportionately.

(3) The general programme for revictualing Europe would be given a much more positive and substantial content than the present plans for the Allied conference envisage. Undoubtedly the other overseas wheat exporting countries would wish to participate in the job as a joint effort, and their cooperation could be worked out later through such a cooperative scheme as the draft wheat agreement contemplates. Other countries with other surpluses of which Europe is in need might be prepared to consider similar action.

(4) In putting the normally importing countries of Europe under a sense of obligation to the overseas wheat producers, we would be in a better position to secure from them, later, their cooperation, which will be essential in restoring the international trade in wheat.

If this general approach to the question meets with your approval, I should like to discuss its implications, informally, with the Cabinet Wheat Committee, which is meeting tomorrow morning.

326.

King Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne
Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR Z.257

London, August 12, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Please give following message to Prime Minister for his most personal and secret information. With reference to my telegram [Circular] Z.256.¹ Begins.

Prime Minister and President have met. Prime Minister has telegraphed that satisfactory discussion took place on several matters. (Further information as to these will be sent as soon as possible.) Prime Minister adds President wishes to issue, at the same time as general release of a statement as to meeting, a joint declaration signed by himself and Prime Minister on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, of broad principles which animate United States and Great Britain both in political and economic sphere. In a passage dealing with economic co-operation care is being taken to safeguard United Kingdom obligations contracted at Ottawa Conference and so as not to prejudice future of Imperial Preference.

Prime Minister reports President has stressed the extreme importance of issuing proposed statement simultaneously with announcement of meeting. Prime Minister shares this view and has pointed out that if no joint statement could then be issued grave and vital interests might be affected.

Cabinet have accordingly considered matter as a question of highest urgency and have telegraphed their concurrence in principle. We should of course have wished to consult Dominion Governments before settling terms of proposed declaration but extreme urgency of situation has unfortunately not allowed of this. We are confident you will agree that issue of such a declaration is of utmost value to us all. Final text will be telegraphed as soon as received. [Ends.]

327.

King Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne
Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR Z.259

London, August 13, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST URGENT. Following for the most secret and personal information of the Prime Minister, with reference to my telegram Circular Z. 257 of the 12th August. Begins. We have now heard from the Prime Minister that he and the President have agreed that the following statement should be issued some time on Thursday the 14th August (you will see this concludes final text of joint declaration referred to in my telegram under reference). Statement begins.

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have met at sea. They have been accompanied by officials of their Governments including high ranking officers of their military, naval and air services. The whole problem of supply of munitions of war, as provided by the Lease-Lend Act, for the armed forces of the United States and for those of countries engaged in resisting aggression has been further examined.

Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Supply of the British Government, has joined in these Conferences. He is going to proceed to Washington to discuss further details with the officials of the United States Government. These conferences will also cover the supply problem of the Soviet Union.

The President and the Prime Minister have had several conferences. They have considered the dangers to the world civilization arising from the policy of military domination by conquest upon which the Hitlerite Government of Germany and other Governments associated therewith have embarked, and have made clear the steps which their countries are respectively taking for their safety in facing these dangers.

They have agreed upon the following joint declaration.

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known that [*sic*] certain common principles in national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hope for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other.

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victorious or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security.

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries and which will afford the assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.

Eighth, they believe that all the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armament continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential.

They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace loving peoples, the crushing burden of armament.

Statement ends.

Assume you will wish to arrange for simultaneous publication of above statement. I will telegraph as soon as possible the precise hour of issue. Ends.

328.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] August 14, 1941

While there is nothing very new or spectacular in the joint Declaration of Principle¹ made public today, it is clearly well worth while at this particular juncture having an authoritative restatement of the general principles of international relations which will have to govern any tolerable post-war world. As a statement of peace aims and war propaganda it is, I think, a pretty good document. Its emphasis on "Nazi tyranny" and "Hitlerite" Germany is well placed, particularly after the "black record" debates in the United Kingdom. In the same way its promise of equal participation, for victors and vanquished, in the economic and social benefits of international cooperation should give the demoralized opposition to Naziism within Germany a better basis for political action than it has ever had hitherto.

To my mind its most serious defect is the reservation in Point 4, under cover of the phrase "with due respect for existing obligations", of the whole system of Imperial Preference. This must weaken the force and scope of the promise of free access for all countries to markets and materials, and makes it difficult to say much about the free trade implications of the Declaration.

329.

2295-F-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 165

Ottawa, August 15, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram Circular D.467 of July 31. Canadian Government will be represented by Prime Minister at forthcoming Conference in London of Allied Governments to prepare plans for postwar relief of countries now under enemy domination.

¹ La Charte de l'Atlantique.

¹ The Atlantic Charter.

330.

3014-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.511

London, August 21, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. My telegrams Circular D.467 and Circular D.468. Date of proposed meeting with Allied Governments is now fixed for August 27th.

We think it might be a good plan to use the occasion of this meeting to invite the Allied Governments represented to associate themselves formally with Anglo-United States eight point declaration. A draft resolution has been prepared for this purpose and we are consulting the Allied Governments concerned as to their readiness to adopt it. The draft of proposed resolution is as follows. Begins.

The Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia, representatives of General de Gaulle, Leader of Free Frenchmen, having taken note of declaration recently drawn up by the President of the United States and by the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, now make known their adherence to common principles of policy set forth in that declaration and their intention to cooperate to the best of their ability in giving effect to them.

Ends.

As an original party to the eight-point declaration the United Kingdom Government would naturally not appear as a party to the resolution, and we feel sure that the Dominion Governments would think it inappropriate that they should be parties with foreign Governments to the resolution adopting this declaration and would prefer to be treated as being already associated with the United Kingdom Government in the declaration. It would make the position clear if the Dominion Governments would agree that the United Kingdom spokesman in introducing resolution were to mention reason why adoption of the resolution was confined to the Allied Governments, viz. that the United Kingdom is a party to the original declaration and that His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions have already associated themselves with it.

We should be glad to know as soon as possible whether your Government agree to procedure proposed. Very early reply would be appreciated. This telegram is being shown to Mr. Mackenzie King¹ and Mr. Fraser.

¹ Le Premier ministre était alors à Londres.

¹ The Prime Minister was then in London.

331.

3014-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures¹
au Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs¹
to Cabinet War Committee*

Ottawa, August 21, 1941

A telegram has been received from London² (a copy of which has been sent to the Prime Minister there) which states that at the proposed meeting of Allied Governments for August 27th a resolution will be submitted by which those Governments will associate themselves formally with the Anglo-United States Eight-Point Declaration.

This brings up the question of Dominion association with that Declaration. It will be recalled that when issued it covered only the United States and the United Kingdom. The Dominions were not consulted concerning it nor were they at the time included in its terms.

Such inclusion now becomes necessary if all the Allied Foreign Governments accept it.

The United Kingdom suggest that it would be inappropriate to associate Canada and the other Dominions with the exclusively foreign Governments who will be covered by the resolution on August 27th. They feel that the Dominions might prefer to be treated as being already associated with the United Kingdom Government in the Declaration in question. For this purpose, they propose that the United Kingdom spokesman, in introducing the resolution at the meeting in question, should mention the reason why the adoption of the resolution was confined to Allied Governments, viz., that the United Kingdom is already a party to the original Declaration and His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions have already associated themselves with it.

The above procedure is clumsy and not very satisfactory. The alternative, however,—the inclusion of Canada with Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia and Free France,—would also be unsatisfactory and would undoubtedly cause comment. It is suggested, therefore, that the suggestion made by the United Kingdom will have to be accepted.

So far as the resolutions themselves are concerned, the fourth one reads "They will endeavour with due respect for their existing obligations to further the enjoyment by all States of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world, which are needed for their economic prosperity". The words underlined are designed to safeguard United Kingdom obligations contracted at the Ottawa Conference, so as not to prejudice the future of Imperial preference.

¹ L. B. Pearson.

² Document 330.

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.512

London, August 21, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. My telegram Circular D.468 of July 31st.¹ Following is text of draft resolution now communicated to Allied Governments with a view to adoption at meeting to be held on August 27th. Begins.

The Governments of United Kingdom of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia and representatives of General de Gaulle, Leader of Free Frenchmen, agree:

(1) That it is their common aim to secure that supplies of food and raw materials should be made available for post-war needs of countries liberated from Nazi oppression;

(2) That while each of the Allied Governments and authorities will be primarily responsible for making provision for economic needs of its own peoples, their respective plans should be co-ordinated, in a spirit of collaboration, for successful achievement of the common aim;

(3) That they welcome preparatory measures which have already been undertaken for this purpose and express their readiness to collaborate to the fullest extent of their power in pursuing action made;

(4) That accordingly each of the Allied Governments and authorities should prepare estimates of kinds and amounts of foodstuffs and raw materials required, and order of priority in which it would desire supplies to be delivered as soon as the circumstances permit;

(5) That re-provisioning of Europe will require most efficient employment after the war of shipping resources controlled by each Government, and of Allied resources as a whole, as well as of those belonging to other European countries, and that plans to this end should be worked out as soon as possible between the Allied Governments and authorities in consultation as and when appropriate with other Governments concerned.

(6) That a bureau shall be established by the Government of United Kingdom, under the direction of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, which they could consult in framing estimates of their requirements, and which would collate and co-ordinate these estimates. Ends.

If the Dominion Governments have any observations on terms of draft resolution we should be glad to receive them by August 23rd.

¹ Document 324.

333.

3014-40

Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures¹ au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs¹ to High Commissioner in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1277

Ottawa, August 22, 1941

SECRET. Following for Prime Minister. Begins. War Committee have considered Dominions Office Circular D.511 of August 21st regarding Canadian association with Anglo-United States Eight-Point Declaration. They feel that though procedure outlined is a somewhat clumsy one, yet in the circumstances it might be accepted, subject to your approval, as there seems to be no satisfactory alternative. If you agree to above course, it is assumed that prior to the August 27th meeting formal steps will be taken in some appropriate way to associate Canada with the Eight-Point Declaration. Ends.

334.

2295-F-40

Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1278

Ottawa, August 22, 1941

SECRET. Following for Prime Minister. Begins. War Committee have considered Dominions Office Circular D.512 of August 21st on forthcoming meeting to discuss supply of food and raw materials to Europe. They have no observations to make on terms of draft resolution, except to suggest that Canada might be represented on Bureau referred to in Paragraph 6. Ends.

335.

2295-F-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.519

London, August 25, 1941

IMPORTANT. SECRET. My telegrams of August 21st, Circulars D.511 and D.512. The Russian and Netherlands Governments have asked for further time to consider draft resolutions. The meeting with Allied Governments which it had been proposed to hold on August 27th has therefore been postponed. It is hoped that the postponement will be only for a short time.

Mr. Mackenzie King has been informed.

¹ Ernest Lapointe.

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[London,] August 25, 1941

I understand from the Dominions Office that Lord Cranborne was to arrange with you over the weekend for a preliminary meeting of Empire representatives before the Allied Conference on Wednesday.

There are two points requiring consideration:

1. The relationship of Canada, (and the other Dominions), to the Atlantic Charter, which the Allies will formally endorse at the meeting. Nobody is very happy about the formula proposed as an explanation of the fact that the Dominions will not be parties to the resolution approving the Atlantic Charter, viz: "They have been closely associated with the United Kingdom" in its framing. Ottawa suggested that between now and Wednesday it might be best to work out some formal declaration of adhesion which would differentiate between our position and that of the European Allies. I do not see how this can be done in view of the short time available and of the fact that Australia and South Africa are in the same position as we are. In the circumstances, it would perhaps be best to follow the procedure proposed by the United Kingdom Government. You could then read into the record, as a formal declaration of Canadian policy, the statement you gave the press on the day the text of the eight-point Charter was made public.

2. The other question arising out of the business of the Conference is whether or not Canada should try to make any definite contribution at this time to the discussion of plans for the post-war provisioning of Europe. I had thought it would be an appropriate occasion to say something fairly concrete about our readiness to help the occupied countries by a gift of wheat and flour the moment they were free of the invader. The members of the Wheat Committee in Ottawa and their advisers are, however, afraid that a statement along these lines would be premature and perhaps prejudice the negotiations which are to be resumed in Washington in about three weeks' time for the conclusion of a new international wheat agreement which will provide, *inter alia*, for a co-operative plan in which all the overseas wheat producers will share in the gift of wheat to the devastated countries.

It would be useful if we could add a little substance to the rather jejune resolution which the Conference proposes to adopt for the organisation of relief plans for the immediate post-war period, but this consideration should probably not be allowed to outweigh the importance, from the Canadian point of view, of maintaining a common policy with the United States and the other great wheat exporters in planning to meet the post-war problems.

N. A. [ROBERTSON]

337.

2295-F-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures¹
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs¹
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] September 18, 1941

The meeting of Allied Governments in London is now provisionally fixed for Wednesday, September 24th.

A Canadian representative should be appointed and London notified.

The meeting is expected to last for only one day and two questions, it is hoped, will be disposed of—

1. Association of Allied Governments with the Anglo-United States Eight-Point Declaration.

So far as Canada is concerned, we have accepted the somewhat clumsy United Kingdom suggestion that at the meeting next Wednesday the United Kingdom representative will declare that as the Dominions have already associated themselves with the United Kingdom Government in the declaration, they will not require to be included in the resolution of association which is to be adopted by the other Allied Governments.

There remains to be decided whether we should take any formal steps prior to the meeting to ratify the association to be announced by the United Kingdom.

2. The second resolution indicates the preparatory measures to be taken for feeding Europe once the war has ended.

There are most important and immediate political propaganda implications in the resolution and equally important but less immediate economic implications.

A decision should be reached as to the terms in which the Canadian representative should announce Canada's support for the resolution. If it were to be debated, I think we should take a leading part and the whole question should be carefully studied and reported on, possibly by the economic committee. The relationship of the deliberations in London to those concerning wheat in Washington should, for instance, be examined.

¹ L. B. Pearson.

If, however, the resolution is merely to be moved and accepted without any real discussion, then all we need do is support it, probably without anything but a merely formal statement.

I feel, however, there is much to be said for the suggestion that Canada should be represented, as one of the countries most directly and substantially concerned, in the Bureau which the resolution proposes to set up in the United Kingdom. This Bureau, under Leith-Ross, is to be the clearing house for the reception, collation and co-ordination of information as to what will be required for the re-provisioning of Europe after the war.

338.

2295-F-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1700

London, September 19, 1941

Postponed meeting of Allied Governments is to take place Wednesday, September 24th. Draft resolutions, of which you have copy, have not been altered.

Eden will make two speeches, one on resolution giving adherence to the Atlantic Declaration, and the other will be a longer one introducing economic resolution and will take form of an expansion of points enumerated in that resolution.

It is not the intention of any of the Dominion representatives present to speak.

I had intended to be present, but date of meeting happens to clash with two important public engagements in an official tour in northern England and Scotland planned some time ago, one of which is in connection with launching of the first of our two destroyers now under construction. I assume that you will approve, in the circumstances, that Hudd¹ should represent the Canadian Government on this occasion, accompanied by Ritchie.²

MASSEY

¹ Frederic Hudd, secrétaire officiel par intérim, haut commissariat en Grande-Bretagne.

² C. S. A. Ritchie, deuxième secrétaire, haut commissariat en Grande-Bretagne.

¹ Frederic Hudd, Acting Official Secretary, High Commission in Great Britain.

² C. S. A. Ritchie, Second Secretary, High Commission in Great Britain.

339.

2295-F-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1460

Ottawa, September 20, 1941

Your telegram No. 1700. Agree your suggestion that in circumstances Hudd, accompanied by Ritchie, should represent Canadian Government at Allied Meeting, September 24th. No statement from Canadian representative seems necessary. War Committee of Cabinet have formally approved adherence of Canada to the principles of policy set forth in Anglo-United States Eight-Point Declaration and affirmed Canada's intention to co-operate to the best of its ability by giving effect to them. Please convey this adherence in above terms to the United Kingdom Government prior to the forthcoming meeting.

340.

3014-40

*Le haut commissariat en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire aux Dominions
High Commission in Great Britain to Dominions Secretary*

London, September 22, 1941

Sir,

In the absence of the High Commissioner I am instructed to inform you that in regard to the Meeting of Allied Governments to take place on September 24th, no statement on the part of Canada would appear to be necessary, as the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet have formally approved of the adherence of Canada to the principles of the policy set forth in the Anglo-United States Eight-Point Declaration and affirm Canada's intention to co-operate to the best of its ability to give effect to them.¹

2. I am directed to convey this adherence to the Government of the United Kingdom prior to the forthcoming meeting at which, in the absence of the High Commissioner, the Canadian Government will be represented by Mr. C. S. A. Ritchie and myself.

I am etc.

FREDERIC HUDD
Acting Official Secretary

¹ Voir *Canada, Recueil des Traités*, 1942, n° 1.

¹ See *Canada, Treaty Series*, 1942, No. 1.

PARTIE 3/PART 3

EFFORTS EN VUE DE LA PAIX¹
PEACE INITIATIVES¹

341.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.66

London, November 8, 1939

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Brussels that German troops have been massing on the frontier, that Germans have deliberately made reconnaissance flights over Belgium and that the German press was threatening Belgium and Holland. He added that the Netherlands Government were even more disturbed and that the visit of the King of the Belgians to Holland had been on the invitation of the Queen of Holland; it was on the invitation of the Netherlands Government that it had been agreed to submit to the belligerent powers an offer of mediation. This offer was an attempt to save the situation by increasing the odium on Germany who might hesitate to attack two countries which had offered their good offices.

Mr. Chamberlain proposes to refer in his speech at Mansion House tomorrow to the offer of mediation which Their Majesties the Queen of The Netherlands and the King of the Belgians have addressed to His Majesty. He proposes to use words to the effect that the telegram received from the two sovereigns will receive the careful consideration of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in order that they may advise the King as to the terms of His Majesty's reply. The Prime Minister would add that clearly before that advice can be given it will be necessary to consult with the Dominions and with our allies, but that in general the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has been made clear in several statements which have already been made. Ends.

342.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.73

London, November 10, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. My telegram Circular D.66, November 8. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

In view of threatening situation on German-Dutch frontier, question of His Majesty's reply to communication from The Queen of Holland and

¹ Voir aussi la partie 1, «Objectifs de guerre», pages 167 à 216.

¹ See also Part 1, "War Aims", pages 167-216.

The King of the Belgians is becoming matter of urgency. Draft reply is being considered by War Cabinet this morning. Reply will, of course, indicate that it is sent on Ministerial advice and we naturally attach much importance to it being possibly stated that Ministerial advice is that of His Majesty's Governments overseas as well as that of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In the hope that this course will generally be acceptable, the draft reply will be framed so as to indicate this and we should be grateful if it were possible for you to telegraph at the earliest possible moment after receipt of draft that you agree to procedure proposed, on November 11th that you are in agreement with text of draft reply [sic].

It would facilitate consultation if you would repeat your reply to this telegram to the other three overseas Prime Ministers. Ends.

343.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.75

London, November 10, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My telegram of today, Circular D.73. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

Text of draft reply follows in my immediately following telegram. Please reply not later than by 6.00 p.m. London time tomorrow, Saturday November 11th, whether you concur in text of draft and procedure outlined in my telegram referred to above.

Text of draft reply is also being communicated to the French Government and to the Polish Government. Ends.

344.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.76

London, November 10, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is text of draft reply to The Queen of The Netherlands. Reply to The King of the Belgians would be in corresponding tones. Begins.

1. I have carefully examined, with my Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, the appeal which Your Majesty and The King of the Belgians addressed to me on November 7th.

2. I recall appeal made by His Majesty The King of the Belgians on August 23rd in the name of Heads of States of Oslo group of States, in which His Majesty pleaded for submission of disputes and claims to open negotiation carried out in spirit of brotherly cooperation. My Government in the United Kingdom, as well as the French Government, sent favourable replies to this appeal.

3. I recall also joint offer of good offices made by Your Majesty and His Majesty The King of the Belgians to my Government in the United Kingdom and to the French, German, Italian and Polish Governments on August 28th. This offer was welcomed by my Government and by the French, Italian and Polish Governments. A few days later the German Government launched an unprovoked attack on Poland, which has been over-run with every circumstance of brutality.

4. My Governments deeply appreciate spirit of Your Majesty's offer and they would always be willing to examine a reasonable assured basis for an equitable peace. It is, as it has always been, my desire that the war should not last one day longer than is absolutely necessary, and I can therefore at once reply to that part of Your Majesty's appeal in which you state your willingness to facilitate exploration of elements of an agreement to be reached.

5. The essential conditions upon which we are determined that an honourable peace must be secured have already been plainly stated. The documents which have been published since the beginning of the war clearly summarize its origin and establish responsibility for its outbreak. My peoples took up arms only after every effort had been made to save peace.

6. The immediate occasion of desirability of entry into war was violence of German aggression against Poland. But this aggression was only a fresh instance of German policy towards her neighbours, and larger purpose for which my peoples are now fighting is to secure that Europe may be redeemed "from perpetually recurring fear of German aggression so as to enable the peoples of Europe to preserve their independence and their liberties". These words of the Prime Minister have been amplified and enlarged on a number of occasions, in particular by him on October 12th in the House of Commons and by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords on November 2nd.

7. The elements, which in the opinion of my Governments must form part of any settlement, emerge clearly and distinctly from these declarations of policy. Should Your Majesty be able to communicate to me any proposals from Germany of such a character as to afford real prospect of achieving the purpose I have described above, I can say at once that my Governments would give them their most earnest consideration. Ends.

345.

1269-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 112

Ottawa, November 10, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your circular telegrams D.73, D.75, D.76 regarding proposed reply to Netherlands and Belgian appeal. Begins.

1. His Majesty's Government in Canada concur in suggested procedure of a reply by His Majesty on advice of His Ministers in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa as well as His Ministers in the United Kingdom.

2. As regards substance of the draft reply, we concur except as to paragraph 6 which we consider should be revised somewhat as follows: Begins.

The immediate occasion of the decision to enter into war was German aggression against Poland. But this aggression was only a fresh instance of German policy toward her neighbours. The larger purposes for which my peoples are now fighting are to secure that Europe may be redeemed "from perpetually recurring fear of German aggression so as to enable the peoples of Europe to preserve their independence and their liberties", and to prevent for the future resort to force instead of to pacific means in the settlement of international disputes. These aims have been amplified and enlarged on a number of occasions, including the statements made by my Prime Minister in the United Kingdom in the House of Commons on October 12 and by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords on November 2.

Ends.

3. The reason for the suggested revision as regards substance is that the aims indicated appear to be too exclusively confined to Europe and might be held to justify states outside that continent refraining from intervention in the present war. They do not adequately set forth the reason for the intervention of Canada and presumably other Dominions. Further, the paragraph as drafted is confined wholly to statements made by His Majesty's Ministers in the United Kingdom.

4. Copies of this telegram are being sent immediately to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Ends.

346.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.82

London, November 11, 1939

SECRET. My telegram Circular D.76. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. War Cabinet have now considered further draft of His Majesty's reply to The Queen of Holland and The King of the Belgians and reply will

be despatched tomorrow morning Sunday in the form set out in my telegram, subject to the following amendments:

(1) At the end of paragraph 3 words "which has been overrun with every circumstance of brutality" have been omitted.

(2) Paragraph 6 has been revised in the form suggested by His Majesty's Government in Canada with the following additional amendments:

(a) For "the immediate occasion of the decision" substitute "the immediate occasion leading to our decision".

(b) The insertion before the quotation of "in words of my Prime Minister in the United Kingdom".

(c) Last sentence—for "on a number of occasions, including the statements" substitute "on a number of occasions, in particular in the statements".

Message will be published at 12 noon Greenwich Mean Time Sunday November 12. Ends.

347.

254-36

Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Canberra, November 12, 1939

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following telegram has been sent to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Begins.

No. 163. Most Secret. Your telegram of November 10.¹ His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia agree with Canadian alteration and with those contained in your telegram Circular D.82. Ends.²

348.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.340

London, July 12, 1940

MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

Germany. We have been considering the possibility that Herr Hitler may shortly launch plan for a European if not world conference, a move which would not necessarily interfere with any military operations which he has in view. He would no doubt represent himself as founding a new European economic system which would sweep away customs barriers, quotas, currency restrictions, wastefulness and inefficiency of an anachronistic capitalistic

¹ Document 344.

² Le secrétaire aux Dominions reçut aussi de Nouvelle-Zélande et de l'Afrique du Sud des télégrammes acquiesçant à la réponse proposée.

² The Dominions Secretary also received telegrams from New Zealand and South Africa agreeing to the proposed reply.

system and all other obstacles which have opposed efficiency of European economic coordination. He would promise this economic unit once established, that all would share in the wealth and resources of Europe as a whole within the framework, of course, of an all-embracing and benign totalitarian system.

It is obvious that he could make great play with all this among most neutrals and some belligerents, particularly in South America and in overseas possessions of France, Belgium and Holland, who are longing to get back to normal peace-time regime. Moreover, it would be easy for him to represent that the sole barrier to his new economic paradise was the obstinate and selfish Great Britain who not merely refused to cooperate, but by her continuance of the war, particularly by her blockade, was demonstrably bent on reducing the greater part of the world to ruin.

We are putting these considerations to the United States Government suggesting the advisability of concerting with them anticipatory counter offensive. For example, we might discuss the likelihood of Herr Hitler dressing up German and Nazi Fascist domination in the guise of an economic paradise.

We could show that it is merely a device to harness all European wealth and production to the Nazi chariot—a subdivision of German "autarky" for military aggrandisement of "superior" German race and for suppression of freedom generally. We could demonstrate that German economic domination invariably means German political domination.

To these somewhat negative arguments it would be necessary to add something more positive, defining the advantages of international economic structure which the United States and we wish to emerge as part of peace settlement. It is in this particular direction that we are inviting suggestions from the United States President and Secretary of State. We would hope, with them, to make clear that our aim is to break down the artificial barriers to trade which impede any general rise in the standard of living and that we are convinced that this can only be achieved by free peoples, freely negotiating on an equal basis and animated neither by ideological calibre nor political ambition.

Our idea would be that speeches might be made by leading politicians on both sides of the Atlantic embodying the foregoing arguments and any others which the United States Secretary of State may care to suggest. Ends.

349.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1166

London, July 18, 1940

MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins. South African High Commissioner here received yesterday the following telegram, in which

I think you will be interested, from his Prime Minister, for transmission to United Kingdom Prime Minister:

Circular D.340, July 12th, raises a very important point which has troubled me for some time. It is most probable that Hitler will start a peace offensive at an early date. This may be either for a conference or some other form of peace propaganda. It may come before or after an attack on the Allies. Personally I am inclined to be doubtful about such an attack, at any rate for the present. With the British naval supremacy unimpaired it would be the wildest gamble. If the German Air Force could do no more than it did in the supreme effort at Dunkirk I do not see how far the more formidable enterprise of Germany's invasion against British air and naval defence could succeed. Hitler's advisers must know this.

It is, therefore, quite possible that an alternative plan is being contemplated. That is an attempt for the further encirclement of Britain by capturing the Faroe Islands and Iceland on the right flank and Spain, Portugal and Gibraltar on the left. The Germans will then have isolated Britain from Europe especially if surrender of Gibraltar means also retirement of British Navy from the Mediterranean and the loss of the Middle East. With practically the whole of Europe in Hitler's hands and Russia and the Balkans in his pocket, before winter comes he may then think that the auspicious moment has come to launch his peace offensive. He will pose as regenerator of an effete European system and will propose a United States of Europe participating in so-called freedom of States between whom tariff walls and economic barriers will have been abolished and only some such Schacht currency plan will exist. Being, in fact, master of Europe, Hitler can afford to restore semblance of freedom to his victims. America will be plausibly reminded of own Monroe Doctrine. In fact, however, Continent will become a closed German market from which Britain and America will be largely excluded.

Some such scheme could be clothed in such plausible appearances as to make a formidable appeal to world public opinion already sickened of the horrible destruction of war and the spectre of coming European famine. If, in addition, Hitler is big enough to renounce annexations and indemnities, its appeal may become irresistible and make Europe accept a peace which will be a moral and political disaster of the first water.

The problem is how to meet such a peace offensive if and when it comes. I think that the suggestion for American consultation and agreement on a positive alternative naturally will be essential. A warning note in advance in the press and on the platform in both countries would also help to prepare public opinion against this peace manoeuvre. Advance ridicule may take much sting out of it.

The problem is, however, a very serious one and I would advise that, in addition, it be submitted to special committees of first rate minds in both countries for their careful exploration in all its dangerous aspects. We have been surprised at every stage of the war and should now take every precaution not to be surprised into a fatal peace.

Let brain trusts be set going to work out an alternative democratic plan for countering a peace movement which is certain to come sooner or later and should find us prepared with the answer.

Ends.

MASSEY

350.

254-36

Mémoire du conseiller¹
Memorandum by Counsellor¹

SECRET

[Ottawa,] July 22, 1940

D.340 AND GENERAL SMUTS' PROPOSAL

I. These messages indicate a quickening appreciation of the fact that this war is more than a simple conflict of military and economic power. In the end it will be decided by psychological conditions which in turn will be the result of moral convictions. To suggest that after twenty or thirty months on the defensive Great Britain, either alone or with American assistance, can organize a military offensive on the continent of Europe and thus ultimately, and by this means alone, defeat the German Reich is, *pace* Mr. Churchill, to talk nonsense.

II. It has not been sufficiently recognized that Nazism—and to a lesser degree the same is true of Italian Fascism—is the political manifestation of a true revolutionary movement and that it has succeeded because it has convinced the vast majority of the people of Germany that it has something to offer that is better than anything they could obtain under the existing or any prospective alternative system. As long as this belief persists it will probably be impossible to defeat Germany by military and economic pressure. It was the absence of any fundamental conviction of this kind that was responsible, in large part at least, for the moral and the physical weakness of Poland, France, and the lesser countries that have been over-run, and that has dangerously imperilled Britain itself. If the people of the democratic states had been convinced that their political and economic system offered the only real hope for their individual personal happiness and welfare they would have prepared for their own defence more adequately and in the event would have defended themselves with greater determination. But the fact was that the lower classes in even the most advanced of the Democracies were leading lives of economic insecurity and social indigence. (The argument that economic conditions in the totalitarian states were as bad or worse was no great consolation even among those who were convinced that it was a fact, and the British and French proletariat lacked the religious fervor which, as a result of brilliant propaganda and unlimited promises which were at least partially fulfilled, actuated the average citizen of Germany or Italy. The people of Britain and France, moreover, were immunized against the preachings of Imperialistic glory and the promises of national regeneration as the result of military triumphs which did so much to provide psychological stimulus to their prospective opponents. The Englishman and the Frenchman knew from experience that external conquests did little to improve the lot of the average man; the German and the Italian had still this lesson to learn.) The upper classes in both France and Great Britain were so afraid that political democracy would ultimately result in the destruction of their

¹H. L. Keenleyside.

social and economic privileges, that they were dubious of the value of the system of which they were in fact the chief beneficiaries. In many cases they became secretly or even openly sympathetic to the totalitarian scheme. It was only when the common people of the democratic states came to realize that life under Nazism or Fascism would be definitely less satisfactory than the life they already knew and when the upper classes began to appreciate that even in an authoritarian state their prerogatives would not be safe, and when both classes were frightened and angered by the obvious danger to their national heritage, that they became convinced that they must fight. But they fought and are fighting not because of any very vivid enthusiasm for their own system but because of their fear and detestation of all that is involved in the alternative that military defeat will unquestionably entail.

III. Strong as these motives are, something more stimulating still is needed if victory is to be won. Fortunately the opportunity to arouse the essential passion is at hand.

IV. The Nazi and Fascist revolutions have now placed in power a new privileged class in their respective countries. The revolutionaries are rapidly becoming the beneficiaries of a new fabric of vested interests. The persistent antagonism of a small part of their populations is undoubtedly finding some support from the growing numbers of the disillusioned and this movement may be expected to expand as the penalties of war—even of victorious war—become more clearly apparent. What the Allies need in order to take advantage of this condition is clear. A social, economic and political programme must be found which will revitalize the mass of the people in the democratic states and offer real promise to the people of the totalitarian enemies and neutrals. Such a policy must be dynamic in conception and dramatic in its appeal. It must offer reasonable and clear evidence of its practicability. It should be in line with the general movement of European thought during the post-Renaissance era. It must point in the direction and move within the general premises to which the Western mind had become attuned. In other words it must promise all that the most advanced occidental states have been able to achieve and in addition foreshadow, through the construction of a reasonable programme, further advances in liberty, equality, security and in not only the pursuit, but the achievement, of happiness.

V. The formulation of a creative programme of this kind might well be considered the task of a generation but if this war is to be won it must be accomplished, in plausible draft at least, in a period of months if not of weeks. Fortunately the main lines are reasonably clear. In the external relations of states they comprise provision for—

The maintenance of national independence.

The just adjudication of disputes.

Equality of economic opportunity, particularly in the matter of access to raw materials and the removal of trade restrictions.

The enforcement of international decisions by international agencies.

The existence of a just international system, however, is of less vital im-

portance than the amelioration of conditions within national boundaries. The people of Germany will not revolt against the Nazis if a return to the social and economic conditions of the Weimar republic is the alternative offered; the people of France will not fight again if the major result is to restore the full power of the Two Hundred Families; the people of Central and South-Eastern Europe will not be eager to join the Allies if an Allied victory promises no more than they received from Trianon and Versailles; the United States will continue to look askance at what is now the British cause if the defeat of Hitler is the only war aim that is consistently advanced; and the common people of Britain itself—not to mention the politically conscious mass of India—will fight with better spirit if they know that victory over Hitler will *not* mean the buttressing of an archaic system of social stratification, the maintenance of a policy of economic favouritism and a political democracy that is corrupted by class and other prejudices. In other words the people of Europe will not join Britain in a revolt against their German masters if one result of such a revolt will be to restore or strengthen the social and economic prerogatives of the very class that made Hitler, Mussolini—and Lenin—inevitable.

VI. To provide a new faith for the people of Europe—a faith that will wean away large numbers of the followers of the currently accepted Messiahs—it will be necessary to show that in addition to a more just international society it is the intention of a victorious Britain to assist in the establishment of greater social justice within the national boundaries and that this reform will start in Britain itself. While the details of such a new programme will require the prolonged and determined efforts of economists, political scientists, sociologists and others, its broad outlines can be compressed in the terms personal liberty, political democracy, economic security, equality before the law, social justice, equality of educational and economic opportunity, religious and racial freedom.

These terms have been used so often in the past and their promise has been so consistently perverted in practice that their mere enunciation as general objectives will arouse little enthusiasm. But vitalized by some precise specifications and made public by promises so definite as to defy evasion they may well form the basis of a new crusade that, combined with British military and economic power, will bring victory to the Allied cause. Something of the sort is imperative if defeat, or at best a peace of exhaustion and stalemate, is to be avoided.

VII. The opening that has been provided by General Smuts should be seized at once and his tentative proposals should be emphasized, expanded and pressed upon the governments concerned until concrete action is obtained.

VIII. The effect of an imaginative and honest exploitation of this theme upon opinion in the United States constitutes one of the most compelling arguments in its favour. The way in which it would be exploited to Allied advantage by President Roosevelt will be evident to all who know his temper in these matters.

351.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.402.

London, August 5, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.
The King of Sweden on August 2nd addressed to His Majesty The King the following appeal. Begins.

As head of one of the few neutral States in Europe remaining outside the present conflict, I consider it my duty at this moment to offer my *Bona Officia* to the Heads of States of Great Britain and Germany to enable contact to be made if these Powers should wish to establish such contact in order to examine the possibilities of making peace.

I would request to be informed whether you accept my offer.

I am today addressing a similar communication to the German Chancellor.

If an affirmative reply is received from both sides, I shall communicate the fact. If not, my offer must be regarded as having lapsed, and I shall regard it as my duty to maintain strict secrecy regarding what has taken place.

In forwarding this appeal the Swedish Legation here explained as follows.

Begins.

The King has taken this step solely on his own initiative, uninfluenced by any other consideration but that of wishing, if possible, to try to stop further bloodshed in Europe. As complete secrecy will be maintained regarding this initiative, unless both parties accept the offer, His Majesty has felt that there could on neither side be any objection to this attempt. If belligerent parties should agree to explore the possibilities, a secret meeting might be arranged in Sweden for this purpose. I have further been asked to request that in the event of a negative answer His Majesty's proposal should be regarded as strictly confidential. The same request has been made to Berlin.

Ends.

My immediately following telegram contains draft of a reply which is to be considered by the War Cabinet on Thursday morning. We naturally hope that it will be possible to state in this reply that Ministerial advice to His Majesty The King is that of His Majesty's Governments overseas as well as that of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. We trust that this course will prove generally acceptable, and as you will see draft reply has been framed on this basis. We should be grateful if you would telegraph as soon as possible any comments you may have to make on the proposed reply and would indicate whether you agree to procedure proposed, on the assumption of course that you agree in general with text of the draft. It would be appreciated if you would repeat your reply to this telegram to the other three Dominion Prime Ministers. Ends.

352.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.403

London, August 5, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My immediately preceding telegram. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

Following is text of proposed reply. Begins. I have carefully examined with my Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, the communication which Your Majesty addressed to me on August 2nd.

Your Majesty will recollect that my Government in the United Kingdom defined at length their position towards German peace offers in maturely considered statement made by the then Prime Minister Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons on October 12th, 1939. In that statement my Government made it plain that it was no part of British policy to exclude from her rightful place in Europe a Germany which would live in amity and confidence with other nations, but that peace on which my Government were determined must be a real peace, by which freedom and independence of nations was secured.

Since then a number of new crimes have been committed by Nazi Germany against smaller States on her borders. Norway has been overrun and is now occupied by a German invading army. Denmark has been seized and pillaged. Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg, in spite of assurances given each of them by the German Government that their neutrality would be respected, have been conquered and subjugated. In Holland particularly, acts of long prepared treachery and brutality culminated in the massacre of Rotterdam, where many thousands of Dutch civilians of both sexes were slaughtered and an important part of the city destroyed.

These horrible events have darkened the pages of European history with an indelible stain. But my Government see in them not the slightest cause to recede in any way from their principles and resolves as set forth last October. On the contrary the intention of my peoples to prosecute the war until their purposes have been achieved has been strengthened to such a point that they would rather all perish in common ruin than fail or falter in their duty. They firmly believe, however, that with the help of God they will not lack means to discharge their task.

It therefore lies with the German Government alone to make proposals by which wrongs that Germany has inflicted upon other nations may be redressed. Moreover, as my Government indicated on October 12th, it would be necessary, before any such proposals could be considered, that effective guarantees by deeds, not words, should be forthcoming from Germany which would ensure in a general peace the restoration of freedom to France and to

other countries which have been deprived of it, as well as effectual security of Great Britain and the British Empire.

Your Majesty will realize that so long as conditions above-mentioned are not satisfied, no useful purpose would be served by a meeting such as Your Majesty contemplates between representatives of Great Britain and Germany. Ends.

353.

254-36

*Le premier ministre de l'Afrique du Sud au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Prime Minister of South Africa to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 3

Pretoria, August 6, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Following from my Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. Following telegram has been sent to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs with reference to Circular D.402 and 403. Repeated to Prime Ministers Canberra and Wellington. Begins.

My colleagues and I approve draft reply to Swedish proposal. In order, however, to avoid even appearance of pessimistic spirit, we would suggest for consideration omission of statement "would rather all perish in common ruin than fail or falter in our duty". That and following sentence will then read as follows:

On the contrary the intention of my peoples to prosecute the war until their purposes have been achieved has been strengthened, and they firmly believe that with the help of God they will not lack means to discharge their task.

354.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] August 7, 1940

SWEDISH PROPOSAL

Replies have just been received from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa concurring in the main reply except for a suggestion from South Africa for a revision of one sentence.

I should like to make three suggestions for consideration.

1. The sentence on page 2 of the British reply beginning "on the contrary . . ." is not only pessimistic, as the South Africans say, but rather high falutin rhetoric and would not be cheerful reading for the neutral countries

which would share the "common ruin". The South African suggestion seems satisfactory,—combining the last two sentences to read as follows: "On the contrary the intention of my peoples to prosecute the war until their purposes have been achieved has been strengthened and they firmly believe that with the help of God they will not lack means to discharge their task."

2. The draft reply begins by a good statement of Germany's crimes against small countries and then goes on to assert the British determination to resist and concludes by saying it is up to Germany to right wrongs before peace can be considered. It strikes me there is a point lacking in the development of this position. Some day, and it may not be very far in the future, these telegrams will be published or leak out. Perhaps by that time Europe will be weltering in famine and anarchy. To justify, in the eyes of outsiders, our rejection of a peace offer, it would seem necessary to add a sentence or two showing that there isn't the slightest possibility of Germany agreeing to a decent peace now. A paragraph might be inserted before the paragraph which begins with "It further lies with the German Government . . ." as follows:

There has been nothing either in the words or in the deeds of the present rulers of Germany to warrant the belief that they are prepared to accept or observe a peace recognizing the right of other people to life and freedom. They have enslaved a great part of the continent of Europe and are openly striving to bring the rest of the world under the same tyrannical control. To Germany peace means domination.

3. There is a good deal of confusion between "my government in the United Kingdom" and "my governments in United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, etc."

In the second paragraph on the first page, the phrase "my government made it plain" should read "it was made plain."

In the first line on page 2, instead of "my government" insert "my governments" and in line 2, instead of "their principles" say "the principles".

In the middle of page omit words "as my government indicated on October 12th." This phrase is open to two objections, it assumes that The King has only one government, and it states that on October 12th, the United Kingdom indicated that freedom should be restored to France, which it certainly did not do.

355.

254-36

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 144

Ottawa, August 7, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your telegrams Circular D.402 and D.403. Communication from King of Sweden.

Canadian Government are in full agreement with general policy set forth in draft reply and concur in His Majesty's Government in Canada being included as tendering Ministerial advice to the King.

We would suggest the following points:

(a) We believe it desirable on many grounds to omit phrase regarding "perishing in common ruin" and would concur in South African proposal for amendment which has been telegraphed to us.

(b) Draft reply lists Germany's crimes against small countries, then asserts Britain's determination to resist and concludes by declaring that Germany must right wrongs before peace can be considered. It appears to us desirable, particularly with a view to future developments, to supplement this argument by sentences indicating that there is no possibility of Germany now agreeing to decent peace terms and that responsibility for failure of Swedish or other well-meaning attempts lies wholly on Germany. For this purpose we would suggest inclusion of new paragraph following the words "discharge their task". Begins.

There has been nothing either in the words or in the deeds of the present rulers of Germany to warrant the belief that they are yet prepared to accept or observe a peace recognizing the right of other people to life and freedom. They have enslaved a great part of the Continent of Europe and are openly striving to bring the rest of the world under the same tyrannic control. To Germany peace means domination.

Ends.

(c) In view of telegram being sent in the names of His Majesty's Governments in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, as well as United Kingdom, it would appear desirable as a matter of form to modify some of the later references to "my Government", as follows: Second paragraph, sentence beginning "in that statement" instead of "my Government made it plain" read "it was made plain", and for "my Government" later in same sentence read "we".

Fourth paragraph, sentence beginning "But my Government" read "my Governments" and for "their principles" read "the principles".

In next paragraph omit phrase "as my Government indicated on October 12th" for same reason and also because statement was not applicable to France.

I have communicated copies of this telegram to Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

356.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.416

London, August 13, 1940

MOST SECRET. My telegrams Circular D.402 and Circular D.403. Following for Prime Minister. Begins. His Majesty The King has now approved text of reply to King of Sweden as contained in my telegram Circular D.403 with the following amendments:

Paragraph two, first sentence. For "made by then Prime Minister Mr. Chamberlain" substitute "made by Mr. Chamberlain, then Prime Minister".

Second sentence to read as follows:

In that statement it was made plain that in accordance with views of all my Governments that it was no part of British policy to exclude from her rightful place in Europe a Germany which would live in amity and confidence with other nations, but that peace on which my Governments were determined must be a real peace, by which freedom and independence of nations was secured.

Paragraph three, second sentence. For "my Government" substitute "my Governments" and for "their principles" substitute "the principles".

Paragraph four; last two sentences to read as follows: "On the contrary the intention of my peoples to prosecute the war until their purposes have been achieved, has been strengthened. They will not falter in their duty and they firmly believe with the help of God they will not lack the means to discharge their task."

After paragraph four; insert a new paragraph (5) as follows:

There has been nothing, either in words or in deeds of the present rulers of Germany, to warrant the belief that they are yet prepared to accept or observe general peace, recognizing the right of other people to life and freedom. They have enslaved a great part of the continent of Europe and are openly striving to bring the rest of the world under the same tyrannical control.

Former paragraph five (now six): first sentence, omit "alone" after "German Government".

Second sentence, omit "as my Government indicated on October 12th".

Reply was communicated to Swedish Minister in London August 12th for transmission to The King of Sweden.

We are most grateful for your helpful suggestions and you will see that the reply has been amended in accordance with your views. It was however thought desirable to omit sentence "to Germany, peace means domination" as this did not seem altogether consistent with the following paragraph. Ends.

357.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.61

London, September 12, 1940

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. His Majesty's Minister at Stockholm has been approached by President of the High Court of Appeal of Sweden on behalf of Dr. Ludwig Weissauer, a

Berlin barrister, who desired a meeting with His Majesty's Minister in order to have purely unofficial non-committal talk on subject of peace of a strictly secret character. Weissauer is understood to be a direct secret emissary of Hitler, and President of High Court is convinced that he is acting at Hitler's personal instigation. It is said that only two men in Germany know of his mission. Main points of proposal which he would put forward are stated to be as follows:

(1) World to be divided into 2 economic spheres, one continental organized by Germany, the other maritime and colonial organized by the British Empire.

(2) Political independence of European countries now occupied by Germany to be restored, including "a Polish State" but excluding Czechoslovakia. *Economic* division of Europe must, however, be brought to an end.

(3) British Empire to retain all Colonies and such mandates as are needed for its political and military interests. Germany possibly to receive some compensation elsewhere.

(4) Questions concerning the Mediterranean, Egypt and French, Belgian and Dutch Colonies to be open to discussion.

President of High Court said that this was last chance, and that alternative of peace was continuance of war on an intensified scale. He specially mentioned loss to Great Britain of Egypt, the Middle East and ultimately India.

His Majesty's Minister has been instructed not to meet Weissauer himself but to give the following reply to the President of the High Court.

His Majesty's Government did not enter this war for selfish aims, but for large and general purposes affecting freedom and independence of many States in Europe. Their position was defined at length towards German peace offers in maturely-considered statement made by Mr. Chamberlain, then Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on October 12th, 1939. Nothing that has happened since then has led the United Kingdom Government to recede in any way from the principles and resolves which were then so clearly set forth. On the contrary the intention of all peoples of the British Empire to prosecute the war has been strengthened by many horrible crimes committed by the rulers of Nazi Germany against the smaller States on her borders, and by indiscriminate bombing of London without the slightest relation to military objectives.

His Majesty's Government do not wish to prolong the war for a day longer than is necessary. It therefore lies with the German Government to make proposals by which wrongs that Germany has inflicted upon other nations might be redressed. Moreover it would be necessary before any such proposals could be considered, that effective guarantees by deeds not words should be forthcoming from Germany which would ensure in a general peace the restoration of freedom to France, and to other countries which have been deprived of it, as well as the security of Great Britain and the British Empire.

Ends.

PARTIE 4/PART 4

INVASION ALLEMANDE DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE
 GERMAN INVASION OF WESTERN EUROPE

358.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.101

London, April 9, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. German troops reported to have crossed Danish frontier early this morning and are known to have entered Copenhagen at 5.05 a.m.

At 2.35 a.m. five large German warships entered Oslo Fjord and were engaged by shore defences. They were later reported at anchor at Tönsberg. At 4.07 a.m. two German warships entered Trondheim. Reports of German ships entering Stavanger and Bergen have not yet been confirmed. [Ends.]

359.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.104

London, April 9, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. His Majesty's Minister in Norway reported at 4.25 p.m. that Oslo had capitulated, that the Norwegian Government were at Hamar and that he was 15 kilometres north of that place. He added that it was reported that Tönsberg, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik had been occupied. Ends.

360.

254-36

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 414

London, April 9, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. German transport sunk yesterday had left German port before it was known that Allied mine fields were to be laid in Norwegian waters. British Minister at Oslo reports that he is burning Legation cyphers and archives. United States Minister at Copenhagen reports that he has learned from sources hitherto reliable that it was Hitler's personal decision to send expeditionary force to Norway and that this was opposed by both military authorities and moderate elements.

361.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 416

London, April 10, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Very little definite information this morning regarding situation in Scandinavia. Nothing is known as yet about main naval engagement in progress yesterday. It is regarded as normal that warships while engaged in such operations would not communicate with the Admiralty. No definite reports as to result of British air attacks on German forces in Scandinavian ports except that one attack carried out by fleet air arm has been reported as most successful. Admiralty reports that one German cruiser of "K" class torpedoed in Norwegian harbour. Most disquieting news is that the Norwegian Government has decided to negotiate with Germany.

Shall telegraph later today when information is available.

MASSEY

362.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 422

London, April 10, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Still no news of naval action referred to in my telegram No. 416 of this morning. German operation has been described by high authority here as tactically brilliant but strategically an error. This seems to be prevailing view in official circles. There now appears to be some doubt as to whether the Norwegian Government is prepared to negotiate with Germany. Accurate appraisal of diplomatic and strategical situation created by German operations as yet impossible.

363.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 436

London, April 12, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Reports received here through diplomatic channels from many European Capitals point to increased German activity on Belgian-Dutch frontier and the strong possibility of aggressive action in the

very near future. There is equally disquieting news regarding Italian preparations and intentions. Apart from Mussolini's increasing hostility to the Allies, there are reports from many sources of active preparations in Italy. The significance of these latter however is as yet hard to appraise.

364.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le chargé d'affaires aux Pays-Bas au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*
*Chargé d'Affaires in The Netherlands to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM 18

The Hague, April 20, 1940

General situation here is calm. Extension of state of siege to the whole country was announced yesterday in Prime Minister's broadcast and in Royal Decree. This is considered primarily precaution against internal National Socialist element.

Relief in tension is confirmed by Canadian Minister in Brussels after an interview with Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs today and preceding day.

365.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*
*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 509

London, April 27, 1940

MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins. It is clear that position of Allied forces in Norway, excepting those at Narvik, has become extremely critical. Ends.

MASSEY

366.

254-36

*Le chargé d'affaires aux Pays-Bas au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*
*Chargé d'Affaires in The Netherlands to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM 20

The Hague, May 8, 1940

Additional military precautions, including cancellation of leave and recall from furlough for army, navy and air defence services, were unexpectedly taken by the Netherlands Government yesterday. No reliable information is as yet available in official or diplomatic circles as to the immediate reasons for this step. Semi-officially, the explanation given is a precautionary measure in view of the increased uncertainty as to the international situation.

367.

254-36

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 30

Brussels, May 8, 1940

State of nervousness exists in Holland and Belgium resulting from certain military movements at Dutch border but nothing tangible seems to justify, at this moment, any serious alarm. Military precautions taken as in previous cases. Cabinet meeting is being held.

368.

254-36

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 32

Brussels, May 8, 1940

Following addition to my telegram No. 30 of even date. After its meeting Belgian Government issued *communiqué* stating merely that international situation had been (word omitted). It was rumoured this morning that an isolated invasion of Holland was imminent. Impossible to obtain any information these rumours. It is felt here that an isolated invasion of Holland is not likely and that an attack, if launched, will cover Belgium as well. Rumours emanating from various quarters, especially Italy and the Balkans, would lead to think that situation might evolve rapidly. It is felt action in the Balkans might coincide with an offensive on Western Front.

369.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 33

Brussels, May 10, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Was spending evening May 9th with Foreign Minister when at about 11.30 he was called back in great haste to Foreign Office. At midnight he informed me and British Ambassador by telephone that he had just received reports of general movements of German troops along the frontier of Belgium and Holland and Luxemburg. He considers situation as most critical, and an offensive being possible at any moment.

The above information is being telegraphed to London and The Hague by the British Embassy here.

I telephoned at once to our Chargé d'Affaires at The Hague but found that no information was as yet available either from Dutch authorities or British Legation. I instructed him to keep in touch with the British Minister

and members of our staff; and to take necessary measures and eventual evacuation. In this connection he is to consult with me if consultation remains possible and if not to act according to his best judgment and advise British Legation.

I am just now informed that Belgian officials in Luxemburg regard invasion as imminent.

370.

254-36

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 34

Brussels, May 10, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Early this morning Foreign Office informed me Luxemburg, Belgium and Holland were invaded. Belgium and Holland have appealed to Great Britain and France for assistance.

371.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le chargé d'affaires aux Pays-Bas au secrétaire d'État aux
Affaires extérieures
Chargé d'Affaires in The Netherlands to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

The Hague, May 10, 1940

In concert with British Legation I am destroying by fire Dominions Cypher and Decypher immediately.

372.

254-36

Le ministre des Pays-Bas au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister of The Netherlands to Secretary of State for External Affairs

Montreal, May 10, 1940

Sir,

I am directed by Her Majesty's Government to inform you that a state of war with Germany has arisen and to add to this the official declaration that, whatever the fate of the Kingdom in Europe may be, the Governor General of Netherlands India and the Governors of Surinam (Netherlands Guiana) and Curaçao are fully authorized to continue the administration in these territories and wholly capable of maintaining public order both internally and externally. In connection therefore with its overseas dominion the Netherlands Government repudiates whatever intervention may be undertaken from without.

I am further instructed to request that no special restrictions may be placed on commercial and financial intercourse with those parts of the Kingdom which are not occupied by Germany, including Netherlands India, Surinam and Curaçao. These three territories, together with the Kingdom in Europe, are according to our constitution separate parts of the Kingdom, so that the occupation of a greater or smaller area of one of these parts has no legal effect on the position of the other parts. I am authorized to assure you that in our overseas territories steps have been taken to forbid commercial and financial intercourse with that part of the Kingdom in Europe which Germany has occupied. A law has been enacted and is now in force which makes it possible for Netherlands limited liability companies to remove their seat of office to other Netherlands territories. I am to express the expectation of Her Majesty's Government that this will be taken into account by all authorities including the law courts.

Lastly, I have the honour to inform you that everywhere except in Germany and German held foreign territory Netherlands Legations and Consulates will continue to function normally, even if the whole of the Kingdom in Europe were occupied. The Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curaçao are now authorized in connection with those territories to give their instructions direct to the Netherlands Ministers and Consuls.

I have etc.

F. E. H. GROENMAN

373.

254-36

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM 39

Brussels, May 11, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Telephone communication received from The Hague stating freedom of communications and movements restricted due to suspect[ed] agents in the city. Staff well.

Military situation in The Netherlands reported more satisfactory tonight. Five thousand German parachutists who landed Delft in Dutch uniforms and marched on The Hague have been stopped.

Situation in Belgium tonight seems critical. Germans have already reached Tirlemont. Belgians have given up the Albert Canal and are retreating to their second line Malines—Louvain—Namur. German advance due principally to the fact that two of main bridges were not destroyed in time. It is feared that Germans may reach Louvain very shortly.

Belgian aviation sustained heavy losses.

374.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 586

London, May 11, 1940

MOST SECRET. Personal for Prime Minister. Begins. Difficult to present clear picture of situation in The Netherlands which is confused and in some respects still obscure. Information received today gives impression that developments of yesterday are more encouraging than Circular D.W. 247¹ would suggest. Dutch report that number of prisoners taken so large as to be embarrassing. Germans have now lost control of all Dutch aerodromes except Rotterdam, bombing of which by Royal Air Force last night was reported as having been most successful. Enemy losses yesterday of fighter planes many times those lost by the Royal Air Force.

German transport has been sunk off Norwegian coast near Narvik. German troops are reported to have landed by parachute at Vardo in north eastern Finnmark, no news of operations at Narvik itself.

Efforts have been made from several important sources to persuade the Pope to make a formal public denunciation of German aggression. It is unlikely that he will do so as yet. Ends.

MASSEY

375.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 590

London, May 12, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins. Movement of British troops into Belgium has proceeded satisfactorily and has encountered little enemy interference from the air. British motor transport has stood the strain remarkably well.

French troops have landed at Flushing and have taken up position near Breda.

It is reported by French that they have succeeded in demolishing bridge near Maestricht over which enemy forces had succeeded in passing in large

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

numbers. This important bridge was not demolished along with others owing to local Belgian Commander becoming early casualty. German forces between Tongra and Maestricht under heavy bombardment today. This apparently only area in which Belgian line has been forced by the enemy.

Germans have made fresh landings of troops on Norwegian coast near Mosjøen. These are now proceeding along road northward. Ends.

MASSEY

376.

King Papers, PAC

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM 40

Brussels, May 12, 1940

IMMEDIATE. 1 p.m. Situation in Belgium, although not desperate, is extremely critical. There is still hope that with substantial help from British Air Force British and Belgian troops will maintain themselves on second line of defence. Help is reported to have started efficiently. Brussels relatively calm except for air warnings and anti-aircraft fire. A small number of parachutists reported to have mixed with civilian population. A group of 250 which landed in Brussels during the night was exterminated.

Lamontagne and Miss Gagnon evacuated at 5.00 a.m. arrived safe on the coast. The former will enter France this afternoon with wives and children previously evacuated.

Conversation with Kirkwood at 6.00 a.m. today. Nothing to add to previous reports regarding Holland. The Hague under strict military regime.

377.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 41

Brussels, May 12, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Foreign Minister insists that Diplomatic Missions transfer themselves at once to Ostend where Government services including Protocol are to be transferred. Every Mission shall evacuate with its own means, Government will follow as soon as deemed necessary. Leaving this afternoon with Renaud, Belanger, Roy and Doughty after consultation with British and American Embassies. Will take one code and cypher and decypher. Will cable address later.

378.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le chargé d'affaires aux Pays-Bas au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*
*Chargé d'Affaires in The Netherlands to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 29

The Hague, May 13, 1940

We are all well at The Hague though personal freedom of movement is much restricted. Situation in Rotterdam is still (word omitted) though improvement is reported this morning. Hard struggle continues on frontiers.

379.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le délégué permanent suppléant, la Société des Nations¹
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*
*Acting Permanent Delegate, League of Nations¹ to Secretary
of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Geneva, May 14, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Immediate evacuation of French and British under consideration. Please instruct.

380.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le délégué permanent suppléant, la Société des Nations
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*
*Acting Permanent Delegate, League of Nations to Secretary
of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Geneva, May 14, 1940

Unnumbered message. At the request of the British Consul, I have returned to him four Recyphering Tables not in use Nos. 5, 8.

I have destroyed quantity of secret communications dated prior to 1939 and two obsolete Dominions Cyphers 1930 and 1935, leaving in safe only amount easy to burn.

With reference to confidential files, may I destroy some and send by Colonel Sharman to Canadian Minister, Paris, others not in current use such as Italian-Ethiopian dispute?

¹ Alfred Rive.

381.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent suppléant,
la Société des Nations*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Permanent Delegate,
League of Nations*

TELEGRAM 63

Ottawa, May 14, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Your two telegrams this date received. You should evacuate Switzerland and proceed to France at your discretion but not later than British and French representatives. Inter-departmental cypher and de-cypher, together with Current Table and Government Code, should be destroyed by you. Please advise me when this has been done. Destroy all secret and confidential files.

382.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 608

London, May 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. From reports from diplomatic sources received by Foreign Office today, it appears probable that it is only a question of time, possibly a matter of only a few days, before Mussolini will enter the war against us.

It is reported today that five-sixths of very large stores of oil at Amsterdam and Rotterdam (460,000 tons in all) were successfully destroyed before the Germans took possession. The Dutch report remaining one-sixth was rendered unfit for use.

MASSEY

383.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 80

Paris, May 16, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Following from Désy. Begins.

We were very severely bombed last night. No possible shelter. For reasons of security most diplomats, Ambassadors and Ministers have left for Paris after conference with Belgian Minister of Colonies representing the Belgian Government, who stated the Belgian Government would see no objection

to their leaving for France and awaiting further news from the Belgian Government through the Belgian Embassy at Paris.

Under the circumstances South African Minister and myself have decided not to leave Belgian territory and to remain for present at Coxyde at disposal of the Belgian Government until further developments or until instructed to the contrary by the Canadian Government. Present address as follows: Coxyde. As communications very precarious please send telegrams in duplicate, one direct, the other via Paris. Ends.

384.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en Belgique
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in Belgium

TELEGRAM 31

Ottawa, May 16, 1940

IMMEDIATE. If in your opinion there is danger in remaining you should leave for France immediately.

385.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Coxyde, May 17, 1940

Hoping to reach Paris tonight or tomorrow.

JEAN DÉSY

386.

254-36

Le ministre des Pays-Bas au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister of The Netherlands to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

No. 707

Ottawa, May 17, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that Her Majesty the Queen and The Netherlands Government are provisionally in London. Although arms have been laid down in the greater part of Holland, The Netherlands including the Kingdom in Europe, Netherlands East Indies, Surinam and Curaçao, remain at war with Germany.

It follows therefore that the struggle is continued by our naval forces and all other armed forces outside the area where arms have been laid down.

I have etc.

F. E. H. GROENMAN

387.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.25

London, May 17, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following for Prime Minister. Begins. My telegram Circular D.W. 259,¹ paragraph 2. Position has deteriorated in consequence of continued breaks through of German mechanized forces, followed by large infantry forces. Prime Minister with General Dill decided to fly to Paris this afternoon. He has reported situation is grave, and has recommended War Cabinet to approve despatch from this country of additional air strength, both fighters and bombers, in order to give the French army chance to show its strength and to mass its large forces for counter attack. Two or three days may be required for this. War Cabinet have approved Prime Minister's recommendations. Prime Minister is returning early this morning. Ends.

388.

254-36

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 625

London, May 17, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. PERSONAL. Following for the Prime Minister. Begins. Personal. Perusal of text of Prime Minister's telegram sent last night from France to War Cabinet leaves no doubt as to gravity of present position of French Army. The new form of tanks used by German armoured divisions in penetration of French lines has been found impervious to certain anti-tank weapons and possesses flame throwing apparatus. Its use in conjunction with diver bombing tactics used by German aircraft has seriously affected morale of French forces in immediate contact. Confidence of French political leaders yesterday was severely shaken. Churchill, however, did much to restore their morale and certain measures taken which have been already reported to you in telegrams sent through Dominions Office have greatly heartened them. French High Command appear to be facing situation with calm and reasonable confidence. Competent authorities here regard today as particularly crucial but it is clear that for several days the fate of the French Army will hang in the balance. Ends.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

389.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 631

London, May 18, 1940

MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins. Impression here is that military situation in France is no worse today than yesterday and probably rather better, although still, of course, most critical.

Royal Air Force distinguished themselves yesterday by their successes against German fighters. Enemy losses 37 aircraft, British losses 7 fighters of which some may still be safe. Eleven Blenheim bombers were lost in encounter with Messerschmidts.

Enemy oil stores successfully attacked in night operations by Royal Air Force. Ends.

MASSEY

390.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Paris, May 18, 1940

Renaud, Bélanger and myself reached Paris at noon.

Proceeding to Havre where the Belgian Embassy informs me Belgian Government is to be established and I shall be accompanied by Renaud, Bélanger, Gagnon, Doughty.

DÉSY

391.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 635

London, May 19, 1940

MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister.

Churchill's view is that military situation in France is more hopeful today than three days ago.

Lothian reports from Washington that the President told him that the United States would look after German warships threatening the West Indies. Difficult

to interpret this statement precisely but authorities here regard it as being most significant.

Churchill has received an answer to his recent direct communication to Mussolini. Reply is very bad-tempered and truculent in tone but there is little light on Italy's immediate intentions.

Sir Samuel Hoare is to go on a special Mission to Spain and Portugal.

Sir Stafford Cripps, accompanied by Ashton-Gwatkin of the Foreign Office, is proceeding shortly to Moscow on an exploratory Mission in connection with Anglo-Soviet trade.

MASSEY

392.

254-36

Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 86

Paris, May 20, 1940

To Marshal Pétain, whom I met yesterday, I expressed the admiration and confidence of Canada. It is a privilege to be in Paris during these dark days when France once again rises to meet the invader. The soul of France remains the same, brave, serene, hopeful. All Paris, headed by Prime Minister, prayed yesterday in Notre-Dame Cathedral for triumph of all Christian causes. Strong in spirit and in arms, fortified by prayer, France with help is confident of victory.

393.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 656

London, May 21, 1940

Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins. Although the position in France remains confused and very critical authorities here feel slightly more hope than yesterday which proved a very black day indeed.

Satisfactory telegram has been received by Foreign Office from Craigie in Tokyo to the effect Japanese have given assurances that they will not molest the Dutch East Indies as long as *status quo* is preserved.

It is clear that the complete defeat of the Germans in the Narvik area will take some weeks to accomplish. I gather that there is some doubt whether the advantages which would accrue from occupation there would justify further military effort. I should not be surprised if it were decided to withdraw the British forces from this region. Ends.

MASSEY

394.

254-36

*Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre
Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister*

TELEGRAM

Canberra, May 22, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. I have tonight despatched the following telegram to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. Begins.

We are in close consultation with Bruce¹ and conclusions reached in this telegram are founded on his appreciation which is based on information at his disposal.

We are following present position with tense anxiety and are fully conscious that if present German drive northwards from Amiens and Abbéville continues, it will not only give command of all the Channel ports to Germany but gravely jeopardize the whole British and Belgian armies.

We have no clear appreciation of the reasons for unaccountable collapse of French Seventh and Ninth Armies but assume that the Allies have had no counter ground measures to combination of bombers and tanks. Further we assume that the only effective counter is bombing aeroplane.

It also appears to us that the Allies are suffering from a mechanical disadvantage in numerical inferiority in the air. Thus we are forced to the conclusion that immediate expansion of air arm is most vital necessity of the moment.

This necessity will become paramount if enemy occupies Channel ports or embarks on large scale air operations against Britain. It will be obvious that in initial stages such operations will be directed against our main centres of war material production, especially air, which will necessarily affect the output at the most critical time.

In view of these possible contingencies and of general position so far as it affects countries of civilized world not yet under domination of Naziism, we think that an immediate personal appeal should be made to President Roosevelt for release of every available aircraft, not only drawing upon those now in use by the United States Army and Fleet Air Arm but those immediately due for delivery.

Further, we should appeal for volunteers of American airmen along similar lines to assistance rendered to Spain by Germany and Italian military volunteers during Spanish revolution.

¹ Stanley Melbourne Bruce, le haut commissaire d'Australie en Grande-Bretagne, 1933-1945.

¹ Stanley Melbourne Bruce, High Commissioner of Australia in Great Britain, 1933-45.

In this appeal all dangers and consequences to America as well as to the British Empire, not only of present grave difficulties, but of the possibility of Allied submission to Germany and loss of British Fleet should be stressed.

At the same time it should be emphasized that we are not requesting direct American participation in a step we gather American people are not yet prepared to take, and also it should be emphasized that we are fully confident of our ability to bring about defeat of Germany provided there is liberal cooperation in the immediate supply of aircraft.

I am sending copy of this telegram to Smuts, Fraser and Mackenzie King and suggesting that if their thoughts run along parallel lines, they communicate with you immediately with a view to appeal to Roosevelt being not jointly but a several one, but so far as possible simultaneously, and indicative of a united and spontaneous feeling that the whole civilized world is looking to him for all assistance he can conceivably render. Message ends.

MENZIES

395.

254-36

*Le premier ministre de l'Afrique du Sud au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Prime Minister of South Africa to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Pretoria, May 23, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Following telegram has been sent to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. Begins.

I have seen Menzies' message to you regarding appeal to Roosevelt. I await your advice as to my making independent representations to Roosevelt. Meanwhile my reactions are as follows:

Information at my disposal does not make it clear that there is real danger of immediate occupation of Channel ports or of French collapse. Roosevelt is possibly in the same difficulty. He may think we are exaggerating or panicky, or simply trying to inveigle him into taking action in a parade where necessity is not clear to him or to his people. There is risk that he may decline or play for time until desperateness of situation is clearer than now. It is therefore for you to judge whether such an appeal is opportune or perhaps still premature. However I await your advice.

This telegram repeated to Australia, Canada and New Zealand. [Ends.]

396.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 669

London, May 23, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Personal to the Prime Minister. Begins. I understand that Menzies has sent you copy of telegram from him to Churchill based on Bruce's appreciation of situation. Bruce's telegram giving that appreciation was substantially as follows:

As occupation by Germans of Channel ports is definite possibility, it is necessary to consider position which would face us in such event.

It will almost certainly be followed by an intensive air offensive against United Kingdom which may result in destruction of factories and general slowing up of production and serious reduction of output of aeroplanes. This most serious as our reply to German air offensive must be prompt retaliation by sustained air offensive. Supplies of bombers and fighters to meet German attacks on United Kingdom cannot be maintained; impossible to forecast what position might develop here. Only source from which these supplies can be obtained with sufficient rapidity is from America and then only by the United States handing over planes already delivered and those ready in the near future for their own air force.

In view of prospect of Germans at Channel ports not inconceivable that possibility of French collapse under further successful pressure by Germans it seems that time has come when possibilities in their naked hideousness will have to be put to Roosevelt.

Bruce understands that Churchill has been in personal communication with Roosevelt but gathers that to date has not convinced him of vital necessity of immediate United States assistance even to the point of drawing on their own defence equipment. Bruce suggests that urgency of position might be brought home to Roosevelt if Dominion Prime Ministers added their support to the efforts Churchill is already making. There is no doubt young democratic Dominions have an appeal of their own both to Roosevelt and the American people.

The following are some of the points Bruce suggests would have to be put to Roosevelt:

That French may be militarily defeated.

That in such event our power to resist and eventually defeat the enemy will depend on continued exercise of sea power and our ability to prevent air domination of United Kingdom by Germany.

Our capacity to do these things is dependent on our having adequate air strength. (En bloc?) with numerical inferiority that strength might [be] so reduced by attrition and interference with our production and capacity to

replace as to render us incapable of either exercising our sea power successfully or preventing the air domination of United Kingdom by Germany.

In such an event the possibility of our either

(1) having to move the seat of Government from London and ceasing to base British Fleet on United Kingdom, or

(2) having to come to terms with the Germans cannot be ignored.

An examination of (1) reveals grave problems with regard to British Fleet apart from difficulties of adequate bases for maintaining, refitting, etc. The primary value of the Fleet is to deny to the enemy vital and necessary supplies by its control of the seas. With the whole of Europe under German domination the only vital supplies we could deny her would be food and oil. With regard to the former, a serious blockade would probably mean starvation not for the Germans but for the unfortunate countries she has invaded. With regard to the latter, all her needs could be met by over-running Iran and Iraq, an operation, notwithstanding the possibility of opposition by Russia and/or Turkey, she would probably be in a position successfully to undertake. It is therefore difficult to see how continuance of the struggle by the removal of the seat of the Government and of British Fleet would be advantageous to the United Kingdom. It would preserve the rest of the Empire but at a hideous cost to the United Kingdom.

On the other hand the prevention of the British Fleet from falling into German hands is of vital importance to the United States of America.

It therefore seems that the position should be put to Roosevelt without any toning down of its darker shades and he should be made to realize that unless assistance is given immediately with aeroplanes there is grave danger of the position so developing that the British Government will be compelled to come to terms with the Germans who would demand as the basis of any agreement the surrender of the British Fleet and the handing over of the West Indian Islands.

On the other hand the picture should be drawn of our capacity to meet all attacks against the United Kingdom, to the undermined morale of the German people and to the infliction of such material damage, particularly on oil supplies and oil production plant, by continuous air offensives as to bring about the defeat of the enemy provided the United States is prepared to supply the additional aeroplanes required.

In Bruce's view of handling the United States of America it will be necessary to make clear our preparedness, while safeguarding the future against further aggression, to face the problems of social and economic reconstruction in a spirit of liberal and generous cooperation.

The suggestions above as to possible future peace developments are of course not a forecast of what Bruce believes will happen but are only appreciations of possibilities which we would be unwise to ignore. Bruce's message ends.

Waterson¹ has also forwarded to his Government copy of Bruce's telegram and has concurred in the views expressed therein. You will have received Smuts' reply to Churchill following receipt of Waterson's message. My own views are that the situation is almost if not quite as serious as Bruce suggests. You, of course, if I may say so, have a peculiarly important position vis-à-vis Washington and Roosevelt and, should you feel that the situation warranted an approach, a message from you naturally would have very particular and special value. I feel that if it is possible you should be in a position to see in advance draft of any such appeal from Churchill as is proposed, as the terms of that appeal and the manner of approach would be of vital importance. For instance, if I may give my own view, there should obviously be no suggestion that we are "handling United States of America" as Bruce unfortunately phrases it. It is obvious to us in Canada but not possibly as obvious to London or Canberra that by far the best way of approach would be to lean backwards in disciplining any desire to suggest in any way what the policy of the United States should be; I would suggest that, without any direct appeal for aid, the facts in all their naked gravity if put forward on arrival speak for themselves, especially the facts relating to air power, and the fullest implications drawn from those facts in the message would drive the lesson home. The United States can be trusted to make the necessary deductions and having done so it is, of course, their responsibility what action they should take in the circumstances. [Ends.]

MASSEY

397.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.29

London, May 24, 1940

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following from Mr. Churchill for Mr. Menzies, in reply to his telegram of May 23rd [*sic*-22nd]. Repeated to Mr. Mackenzie King, Mr. Fraser and General Smuts. Begins.

Most Secret, Private and Personal. Your appreciation is concurred in, and in addition, we must expect early heavy attack on these islands. For this we are preparing the United Kingdom and we hope that our naval defence will be effective against large bodies, and that our land defence will deal with any sea-borne survivors after some rough work. Evidently final result will depend on the ability of our Air Force to make head against superior numbers, and help destroy air-borne descents. Our Air Force will be far more effective in this country, for many technical reasons which I cannot give, than operating overseas. United Kingdom Government believe we are capable of limiting daylight raids on ports and factories to manageable proportions on account of

¹ Sidney Frank Waterson, haut commissaire de l'Afrique du Sud en Grande-Bretagne, 1939-42.

¹ Sidney Frank Waterson, High Commissioner of South Africa in Great Britain, 1939-42.

number of casualties we shall inflict on German aviation being out of all proportion to our own air losses. Night raids far less dangerous to precise targets. Anyhow everyone here resolved to fight it out.

Every form of intimate personal appeal and most cogent arguments have already been sent to Roosevelt and we have demanded all aids you mention except volunteers of American airmen. This last could not be asked for except in a public appeal, which is of course, out of the question at this moment. Roosevelt is doing his best but must carry out Congress and public opinion, still much diverted by impending Presidential election. If you and other Prime Ministers feel able to follow up our appeal by a personal appeal from yourselves, this would be very welcome to us. You will understand that we have been acting in France under General Gamelin's orders and conforming to French plans. I saw Weygand yesterday, who is attempting to execute important operations in entire accord with us. Weygand made an excellent impression upon us and has control. Winston Churchill. Ends.

398.

254-36

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 87

Ottawa, May 24, 1940

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. I have received Mr. Menzies' telegram and share his appreciation of the gravity of the situation and the emphasis he has placed on the importance of immediate supplies of aircraft which could only be sought in any large numbers in the United States. I was about to reply when I received your telegram of today. I entirely concur in your views as to the situation in Washington. Public opinion in the United States has been profoundly changed in the past few weeks and the latest events will undoubtedly result in further modification. The action of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate this week in rejecting by a vote of twelve to one a proposal to make army planes available to the Allies, indicates, however, the difficulties in translating this opinion into Congressional action. Any change of policy in the United States will have to result from conviction that a change is necessary in their own interest. I feel strongly that at the present moment any public appeal by outside governments would arrest rather than assist the formation of public and Congressional opinion favourable to action, and consider it would be equally embarrassing if information were to reach the public in any way as to personal appeals or discussions being made.

2. As to making known the gravity and needs of the situation, particularly regarding the air, I have been for some time in direct and personal touch and am continuing to give close and direct attention to this aspect of the situation.

3. I am repeating this telegram to Mr. Menzies, Mr. Fraser and Mr. Smuts. Ends.

399.

254-36

*Le Premier ministre au premier ministre d'Australie**Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia*

TELEGRAM 5

Ottawa, May 24, 1940

MOST SECRET. I have read with much interest your telegram of May 22nd. I concur in your view as to the gravity of the situation and the importance of any aid that can be secured from the United States. I was about to reply when I received a copy of Mr. Churchill's telegram to you. I have just sent Mr. Churchill a reply which indicates that I concur in his view of the situation. I appreciate the full exposition of your views and shall be glad at any time to discuss the most effective means of advancing the common cause in this difficult hour. My reply to Mr. Churchill follows: Begins . . . Ends.

400.

254-36

*Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au Premier ministre**Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister*

TELEGRAM 189

Wellington, May 24, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following is a copy of a message despatched by me yesterday to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Begins.

Most Secret. Following for the Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have this morning considered the text of Mr. Menzies' personal telegram to you of May 22nd.

Our first reflection is that the step proposed by Mr. Menzies might conceivably be construed by wavering neutrals as an admission of extremity of our position and in second place, if taken without prior consultation with the Government of the United States, might perhaps antagonise that administration, who might well look upon it as inconsistent with neutrality.

On the whole we feel at present that we should support proposal if, (a) the military situation requires such a step (b) previous informal enquiries at Washington have made it clear that such a request would not be unwelcome to the administration and would in their opinion be likely to lead to useful results.

This message has been repeated to Australia. Ends.

401.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures**Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 97

Paris, May 25, 1940

Canadian Minister at Brussels with family and staff now close to Poitiers where Belgian Government has moved.

402.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 699

London, May 25, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins.

Through further enemy advances in coastal area and inability of French to make progress north of River Somme against German left flank, military situation in France has further deteriorated and position of B.E.F. is now one of utmost gravity. Ends.

MASSEY

403.

King Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne
Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR Z.76

London, May 26, 1940

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. DECYPHER YOURSELF. Vital importance of maintaining strictest secrecy as to contents of this telegram cannot be over-emphasized.

Please give following message personally to the Prime Minister for his most secret information.

Discussion with French Prime Minister took place in London today. In consequence of inability of French to make any effective attack an unsupported all-British attack by the British Expeditionary Force from the north would be useless. Decision has therefore been taken that British Expeditionary Force should be withdrawn forthwith to this country and move of units north of Somme is now beginning.

We have to face possibility that French are not going to carry on. Question of our position on this hypothesis is being considered and I hope to be able to telegraph fully War Cabinet's preliminary views in course of tomorrow.

404.

254-36

*Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre
Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister*

TELEGRAM

Canberra, May 26, 1940

MOST SECRET. I desire to thank you for your telegram. Tonight I have despatched a message in the following terms to Mr. Casey, our Australian Minister at Washington. Begins.

I shall be glad if you will arrange for immediate personal presentation to President Roosevelt on behalf of myself the following message. Begins.

In this hour of great emergency, not only for Great Britain and for France, but also Australia and other British Dominions, I desire to put before you certain considerations.

Though we are determined to win and are by no means anticipating defeat, it is still obviously possible that France may be defeated and that in such an event Great Britain's power to resist Germany will depend on her navy and her ability to resist or prevent air attacks.

This would mean that air strength would become vital and I do not need to point out to you that Germany has air numerical preponderance. Successful attacks upon British factories interrupting production might be decisive.

I hope you will not find me unduly unconventional if I say to you, as head of the greatest but most friendly neutral power, that prevention of British Fleet falling into German hands in consequence of a defeat any such happening must be of vital importance to the United States [*sic*].

I cannot believe that the United States can view with anything but acute anxiety a Europe completely dominated by Germany and a victorious exercising of undisputed power in eastern Atlantic and its adjoining seas.

One must also remember that on a defeat of Great Britain, the handing over of West Indian Islands would undoubtedly be demanded by Germany.

I believe that your great country has it in its power to make decisive contribution without itself actually participating. The one country that can rapidly and substantially increase British air power is the United States, and even if this means despatch to Great Britain of machines already in commission or designed for your own air force, I would most earnestly urge you to follow that course and am quite confident of British capacity to meet all attacks against the United Kingdom and in turn to inflict such damage upon Germany as to produce her defeat, provided United States can supply additional aeroplanes which are required. But quite plainly—and I know that you would wish me to speak plainly—without most prompt material assistance from the United States there must be a grave danger of a state of affairs rapidly developing in which the power of Great Britain to defend liberty and free institutions is destroyed and in which we, your English-speaking neighbors on the Pacific, must find our own independence immediately imperilled.

There is in Australia a great belief in your friendliness and goodwill. We feel that we are fighting for immortal things which you value as we do.

On behalf of my own people I beg for your earnest consideration and swift action. R. G. Menzies. Ends.

MENZIES

405.

254-36

Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au Premier ministre
Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister

TELEGRAM

Wellington, May 27, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. I have seen the message despatched by Mr. Menzies for transmission to President Roosevelt and I have today asked Mr. Menzies to be kind enough to request Mr. Casey, at Washington, to convey the following message from me to President Roosevelt. Begins.

Most Secret. I thank you for your telegram of May 27th and would be grateful if you could see your way to ask Mr. Casey to deliver to President Roosevelt the following message from me. Begins.

In view of the very critical situation that has developed on the Western Front, I have felt that I might be justified in addressing you, Mr. President, directly and personally. The people of New Zealand look upon the United States of America as the one great and powerful nation not engaged in the present struggle which is still a bulwark of freedom, justice and democracy, all of which are today in such deadly peril. It is far from my thoughts to endeavour to persuade you or the American people to a course which is not entirely consonant with American interests and American policy, but we feel that you as well as ourselves are vitally concerned that democracy shall not perish from the earth, and we should like you to know how greatly at this juncture we should welcome any support which the United States of America might think it possible to extend to help the British Commonwealth and its Allies in the desperate fight we are waging. P. Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand. Ends. Message ends.

406.

King Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne
Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR Z.77

London, May 27, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. DECPHYER YOURSELF. Please give following message personally to the Prime Minister for his most secret information. [Begins.]

My telegram Circular Z.76 last paragraph but one. War Cabinet this morning gave preliminary consideration to the position in the event of the French deciding not to carry on. Following is summarized appreciation of situation which was before Cabinet.

One. If we can hold out for some time, there are a good many factors which may produce a state of affairs where the enemy cannot carry on the war e.g. effects of our blockade of Germany on economic position there

particularly as regards foodstuffs and oils, dissatisfaction and loss of morale in Germany (*largely wishful than certain*¹)—There are many indications of this—possible aid in increasing quantity from the United States and Dominions, growing fears of German domination by Italy, Russia and Balkan States (?) and consequent unwillingness to supply Germany with her needs et cetera. (*All these dictators are in league to destroy British power.*)

Two. Question is: can we hold out? What we have chiefly to fear is invasion, mainly seaborne but supplemented by airborne. As regards former, if enemy were to succeed in landing in force tanks and other equipment such as that employed by them in north France, it would be a formidable threat to our security.

Protection against random attack is navy, but navy cannot operate in narrow seas without serious loss unless adequate protection by air. Air is therefore vital point.

Three. As regards air, Germany has considerable numerical superiority. This is provisionally estimated at approximately two and a half to one (*U.S. estimate 5 to 1*) as regards both first line and reserve machines, but this estimate is under further close and immediate examination. Numerical superiority is not however conclusive; man counts for a great deal besides machine and recent air operations in France have shown marked superiority of British over German pilots as well as machines. On the other hand in view of short range, enemy can now send over this country bombers accompanied by fighters who engage our own fighters and so leave bombers unmolested. Again our own recent night raids on military objectives in Germany have had serious effects on German morale, as well as achieving material results. Our losses have been small and our forces have encountered little opposition. Question is whether German night raids would be similarly successful here. Would it be possible for enemy to bring our production to a standstill both by destruction and by lowering morale of our workers, and so gradually to achieve control of the air over this country? It is not possible to answer this question with certainty until night bombing by Germany has been tried out, but in any case it is thought that a considerable time would have to elapse before Germany could hope to gain air superiority sufficient to justify invasion. (?)

Four. Important factor in assessing our ability to carry on is whether we could rely upon full economic and financial support of United States. It is assumed for the purpose of this appreciation that this would be forthcoming. (*? in time ?*)

War Cabinet's preliminary consideration of position resulted in the view that there could be no question at this stage, with navy undefeated and a formidable Air Force in being, of our giving up the contest in the event

¹ Le Premier ministre fit des annotations en marge du texte, annotations reproduites ici en italiques et entre parenthèses.

² The italicized comments in parentheses were marginal annotations made by the Prime Minister.

of the French deciding not to carry on. (*most significant note thus far—have never heard this expressed from Britain before.*) This view is of course without prejudice to consideration of any proposals that might hereafter be put forward for a cessation of hostilities and subject to developments in the military situation which is now liable to change from hour to hour. It should be emphasized that though this appreciation is based on the hypothesis that the French do not continue fight, they have not said that they will not, and we hope to persuade them to maintain allied front intact. Ends.

407.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 701

London, May 27, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following from Senior Officer to Chief of the General Staff. Begins.

1. In Massey to External telegram No. 622, November 7th,¹ I submitted my appreciation of military situation as it appeared to exist at that time. The events of the past fortnight indicate that it might be useful to forward a further appreciation of situation which now apparently faces the British Empire and France.

2. So far as decisive front in western Europe is concerned the result previously stated as to be feared has in fact been accomplished by the enemy. By his great superiority in the air and armoured forces, and through an inferior resistance on the part of French divisions facing him on the Meuse, he has ruptured the frontier defences on a wide front and through that gap has thrust very important numbers of armoured and mechanized formations. The northern front of bulk of French armies is now lines of Rivers Aisne and Somme, while disorganization of remains of two French armies with British Expeditionary Force and Belgian Army are now pocketed in northern France and Belgium, most inadequately based because of maintenance of munitions, supplies and men, on small and constantly bombed ports of Dunkirk and Ostend.

3. However courageously British Expeditionary Force with other Allied armies defend encircled position, it seems evident that in face of superior and armoured enemy forces, and with their own dwindling supplies, such defence can but be of comparatively limited duration. Nor can a break-

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

through to the south on the part of these armies be preserved as a practical alternative. Such action would but give the enemy further advantages in view of his superiority in the air and on the ground.

Until the last 24 hours there appeared some possibility that French Seventh Army facing Somme and attempting to cross it and press northward to close gap on Allied front might succeed in its object and do so within time limit allowed. From the latest information available, however, it would be over sanguine now to count upon a sufficient success attending this operation to have a decisive effect upon battle in which northern Allied armies are now engaged.

4. The military probabilities therefore (which are based upon the assumption that the Allies refuse to accept defeat) are that it will be necessary to extricate the Allies in the near future by sea transport from their encircled position as high a proportion as may be possible of the Allied forces now based upon ports of Dunkirk and Ostend. It is obvious that this evacuation will in the main be restricted to personnel and that armament and munitions of these forces will need to be abandoned, although it is hoped also in the main in a non-serviceable condition. Should these anticipated actions take place it might be assumed that future Allied strategy would be to hold hard to a defensive land position in France marked on the north by comparatively strong lines of Aisne and Somme, at the same time to continue to deny Germany access to the open sea. Should this be decided, it follows that the United Kingdom will become main military base from which economic attack on Germany will be developed through control of the seas by Empire naval and air forces, and that these islands will necessarily become next territory which Hitler must somehow attempt to conquer.

5. Providing that Franco-British Empire alliance now holds firm and it proves possible, since it is the almost certain attempt of Hitler to secure his future world ambitions by obtaining in the near future acceptance of terms of peace which would in effect prove to be but an armistice, and providing also that all Allies strive and combine in maximum degree and minimum time to obtain military predominance over Germany, ultimate conclusion cannot be in doubt. Italy in a war of some duration will prove a vital weakness to Germany. An extension of war to other theatres, providing that Allied forces immediately concerned hold firm and fight hard, can only result in the course of time [in] a fatal dissipation of German and Italian resources which are undoubtedly limited. The military situation may well appear much worse and unquestionably become much better but from information and knowledge obtained I believe that surmounting of our present awe-inspiring military difficulties is mainly a question of moral courage and determined action. Message ends.

MASSEY

408.

254-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR C.32

London, May 28, 1940

CLEAR THE LINE. MOST IMMEDIATE. King of the Belgians capitulated last night with his army. Belgian Government in France are understood to have repudiated the King's action and will shortly announce attitude they propose to adopt.

Situation of Allied armies in general and of B.E.F. in particular has consequently become considerably more grave.

409.

King Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR C.34

London, May 28, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Following capitulation of King Leopold, Belgian Minister of Finance, as member of only legal Belgian Government, today informed us on behalf of the Belgian Prime Minister that the Belgian Government would fight to the finish. We will continue to treat the Government of Monsieur Pierlot as the only legal Government of Belgium.

410.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 44

Poitiers, May 28, 1940

Belgian Ministers at Poitiers held a first Cabinet Meeting this afternoon. This meeting coincides with the arrival in the United Kingdom of the Prime Minister and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, National Defence and Interior.

For the first time since my departure from Belgium I was able today Monday to resume contact with British Embassy which is provisionally fixed at Angers. No news is reported of Ambassador Sir Lancelot Oliphant who left Bruges in an automobile on May 21st.

I am informed that the United States Ambassador at Brussels has been requested by the German authorities to leave the country. Please enquire whether protection of Canadian interests in Belgium has been turned over to United States Embassy, Berlin, and whether it is intention of United States to maintain their Consulate in Brussels.

411.

254-36

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 45

Poitiers, May 28, 1940

IMMEDIATE. News received this morning at Poitiers of capitulation of King Leopold and Belgian Army has created among the French population, as well as the Belgian refugees, deep consternation. This sentiment, however, was modified by statement of Pierlot to the effect that The King had acted contrary to the advice of the Ministers and that his act could not bind the nation. Belgium continues to fight with the Allies. Under these circumstances I presume that I still represent the Canadian Government to the Belgian Government in France.

412.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Ministry in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 107

Paris, May 28, 1940

SECRET. Experience last fortnight shows every possibility should be provided for. In the event of evacuation of Paris, please inform me to what diplomatic representative I should hand over protection of Canadian nationals and official and private property.

413.

254-36

La légation de Belgique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
Legation of Belgium to Department of External Affairs

Ottawa, le 29 mai 1940

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

D'après informations transmises à la Légation de Belgique par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, le Souverain se trouvant actuellement sous le pouvoir de l'ennemi et n'étant plus en situation de gouverner, les pouvoirs du Roi sont actuellement exercés,—en vertu de la constitution,—au nom du peuple belge, par les Ministres réunis en Conseil et sous leur responsabilité.

Le Gouvernement belge est décidé à défendre jusqu'au bout et en communauté avec ses alliés l'indépendance de la Belgique. Il mettra au service de la cause commune la totalité des forces disponibles.

414.

King Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.33

London, May 31, 1940

MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. French morale has, on the whole, recovered surprisingly well from the shock of Belgian defection (though recovery is slower among peasants than industrial workers). A healthy outburst of angry feeling has raised morale higher than it has been during the last fortnight. This has largely been aided by the fact that French have now been able to find scapegoat outside their own country.

2. At the same time we have been warned from influential quarters in France that serious loss of French troops in the north, coupled with loss of a large part of France's industrial region and consequent dwindling of French effectives, is bound to have depressing effect.

3. French are not too confident of their public opinion in the event of a breach being made in Aisne-Somme line and of Paris being taken or threatened, and are urging that we send as many troops as we can as soon as possible to aid in the defence of Somme line. Ends.

415.

254-36

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 48

Poitiers, June 2, 1940

Had long interview today (Saturday) with Mr. Spaak at Poitiers. It is decided that seat of the Belgian Government will remain at Poitiers and that Cabinet meetings will take place in that city every week. I am invited to maintain with him frequent personal contacts. He has authorized me to tell you that, in the course of last interview that he and the Belgian Prime Minister had with King Leopold, he reached the conclusion that The King had become mentally abnormal or even, as Mr. Spaak described it, insane. When the Belgian Ministers were informed of The King's intention to capitulate, they refused to approve and [countersign] the act of The King. They insisted that The King should leave territory and preserve his independence as head of the State. He refused alleging that the Belgian Army should, in view of its imminent defeat, cease to combat, that it should not retreat further and fight outside of Belgium. He declined all responsibility vis-à-vis France and Great Britain, and wished to re-enter Brussels and resume his functions as head of the State surrounded by his Cabinet Ministers under German Protection. Mr. Pierlot refused to sanction this move and to remain with The King. He said: "I do not want my children and grandchildren to bear a name of shame." The King became livid and stubbornly

maintained his attitude, which, in Mr. Spaak's opinion, was dictated [by] his private adviser, General Van Overstraeten, who had poisoned his mind to the extent that Leopold was convinced that within a week France and Britain would be defeated and that war would come to a close. Thereupon the Ministers took leave of The King, drove to Dunkirk and crossed to England in motor torpedo boats.

The Foreign Minister expresses the hope that the Canadian public do not hold the Belgian people responsible for act of treason of one man who has been condemned both by the Belgian Government and the nation.

416.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

950H/113

Ottawa, June 3, 1940

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

My dear Prime Minister,

I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to convey to you for your most secret and personal information the message contained in the enclosed Memorandum regarding the meeting of the Supreme War Council held in Paris on the 31st May.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

London, June 3, 1940

MEMORANDUM

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

A meeting of the Supreme War Council was held in Paris on May 31st. The Prime Minister accompanied by Mr. Attlee met M. Reynaud, M. Daladier, Marshal Pétain and General Weygand. The following is a summary of the main conclusions:

1. The evacuation of the Allied troops from the Dunkirk area was reviewed. Complete agreement was reached as to the measures necessary for its completion.

2. A discussion took place as to further British assistance to France, and the United Kingdom Government without making any definite promise undertook to consider immediately (a) what reinforcements could be sent to France with particular reference to the impending battle on the Somme and the Aisne and how soon they could be made available; (b) what air support could be afforded to this battle; and to communicate the results of this consideration to the French Government at the earliest possible moment.

3. The measures to be taken in the event of Italian intervention in the War were discussed and agreed.

Mémorandum du Premier ministre
Memorandum by Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] June 4, 1940

The Belgian Minister (Baron Silvercruys) telephoned to the Office today to say that he had an important message which he wished to deliver to me from the Government of Belgium. I had no opportunity to see him during the afternoon, but on reaching Laurier House sent word to the Legation to say that I would call at his residence during the evening. I called at 8.30 p.m.

After exchanging a few words of greeting, the Minister said that he had received from his Government a communication which made clear what had taken place, and which set out the present position which he was asked to convey to me. I told him that I also had had a communication from Mr. Désy concerning a conversation which Mr. Spaak had had with him.

He said that from the 24th of May a divergence of view began to assert itself between the King and his ministers. This had continued until the 28th. The King felt that the army was his and that he should stay with the army. That he believed there was no hope of saving the army or the country. The ministers were all opposed to him, but he became increasingly difficult to deal with. He claimed that, as Commander [in] Chief of the forces, he had the right to decide what they should do. The Cabinet were unanimous in their opposition to his stand, and to his actions with respect to capitulation. The present position was this:

The Belgian Constitution makes provision for three possible contingencies as respects the Crown:

In the first place, when a sovereign dies his successor does not become king until he has taken the Oath of Allegiance. In the interval, the ministry carries on by decree—what would be equivalent to our Order in Council.

In the second place, should there be no successor, for example, a sovereign dying without heirs, then the ministry carries on until a regency can be arranged, the Prime Minister being the head of the ministry and undertaking the duties of a sovereign.

Third, in the event of the King becoming incapacitated and unable to act (the provision was originally framed having reference to the possibility of insanity, but never thought of in connection with a situation such as has developed) the Government would be carried on by the Ministry.

At the time of capitulation the Belgian Ministry were all in Paris; the King was with the army in the portion of Belgium which was invaded. His ministers had previously tried to have him leave Belgium, but it was in this connection that he had said it was his duty to stay with the army.

After capitulation Leopold had come under the control of Germany, i.e. was a prisoner of war, and though he was in Belgium he was separated from his ministry and, therefore, totally unable to perform the functions of

King. The ministers, therefore, constituted the entire Government. They were unanimous in their determination to continue the fight with the Allies. The position of Leopold was that he was still sovereign, but unable to perform any of the functions of sovereignty.

Baron Silvercruys spoke quite freely about the distressing character of the whole episode. Was most emphatic in stating that the Belgian Ministry wished Canada to know that they were the Government of Belgium, and were solidly with the Allied powers.

When the Baron finished his official statement, we exchanged views in a personal and private way. I said to him I thought that being possessed of the rather fine and rather sensitive nature which Leopold had, it might have been that he had probably been so stung by the brutality and scale of the German attack that he had more or less temporarily lost his balance. Silvercruys said he thought one of the worst features of the situation was that the refugees were swarming everywhere which made action of the army very difficult, while the German army was crushing the civil population as well as the military regardless, and that this must have seemed to the King as a massacre which he wished to prevent.

I asked who Baron van Overstraeten was, and if he knew him. I said I gathered, reading between the lines of what Mr. Spaak had said to Désy—that his influence upon the King would seem to have been very strong, and might have had its effect against the Ministry. He said Baron van Overstraeten was a military adviser (or confidential aide). He also said that, in a way, the King had come to exercise functions much more general than those that were strictly constitutional. That relations with his Government were so friendly and that he was regarded so helpful in foreign affairs that he was frequently allowed to discuss many matters without the Foreign Minister being present. That he had come to take powers and did things more on his own in this way than would have been possible under a strictly constitutional way. I said I thought it was a mistake for any sovereign to be also commander in chief. That this function should be exercised like all others under a responsible ministry. Silvercruys said he felt the same way. This, of course, was a personal aside of our own.

After expressing anew my sympathy for himself personally and for the people of Belgium the interview concluded.

418.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en France

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in France

TELEGRAM 111

Ottawa, June 6, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 107 of 28th May. We have instructed Canadian Legation, Washington, to approach United States authorities and enquire whether they would agree to undertake protection of Canadian nationals and

legations in countries (or parts thereof), contiguous to Germany, which are or may be occupied by German Forces.¹ As soon as reply is received, I shall advise you in order that you might concert with United States Ambassador.

419.

254-36

Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre
Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister

TELEGRAM

Canberra, June 6, 1940

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Australian Minister at Washington personally delivered my message to the President on the lines of my telegram of May 22nd. My immediately following telegram contains record of his conversation with the President as conveyed to me by the Minister.

MENZIES

420.

254-36

Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre
Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister

TELEGRAM

Canberra, June 6, 1940

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. President had fully understood and appreciated your message and views. He has up to date appreciation of the European situation and fully realizes the grave possibilities that it holds. As regards the supply of aircraft from here he will do everything in his power, although he told me that this did not amount to very much because since the war started he has foregone taking supplies of new aircraft in order that the Allies could get maximum supply.

Figures which were quoted to me show that the numbers of existing aircraft here of any value for fighting or bombing are small.

He went on to envisage the situation that might emerge if the worst were by evil chance to come about and British resistance by land and air be broken. He believes it possible that in this event Hitler will probably make some proposal to the general effect that he will stay his hand and leave Britain an autonomous State provided that the Fleet and Overseas Fleet bases are handed over. He emphasized that at all costs the British Fleet and the Fleet bases, if possible, should be kept in being. While the Fleet existed, the position might well be retrieved. It was far from impossible that some incident directly affecting the interests or honour of this country might occur at any time and that this country might come in with us.

He repeated several times that no alternative was worse in the end than the surrender or destruction of the British Fleet.

¹ Voir les documents 194-8.

¹ See Documents 194-8.

421.

254-36

Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 135

Paris, June 10, 1940

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Military Attaché has asked me to send the following message. Begins.

I was received by General Weygand late last night at his G.H.Q. Colonel Horace H. Fuller, United States Military Attaché at Paris accompanied me.

General Weygand stated:

(1) Present situation very critical and not hopeful;
(2) Enemy have great numerical superiority in men including fresh divisions;

(3) French have inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, men and war material, but French have suffered heavy losses;

(4) French will continue fighting as long as the men have arms; this statement made twice in the course of conversation. As heavy casualties occur on both sides Germany will still have considerable strength when France completely exhausted;

(5) French have no reserve war material having put all available men and armaments into the fight. French and British armies lost great quantities of equipment of all kinds in northern France. His only hope was to obtain equipment already promised from the United States. He mentioned 75 calibre field guns particularly, but there is also question of planes and other articles. French Armament Bureau, War Ministry informs me only 6 tanks and 12 field pieces available as replacements;

(6) Four divisions are expected to land in France from the British Isles during entire course of the present month. General Weygand expects First Canadian Division in France within two or three days;

(7) General Weygand satisfied that the British are sending as many reinforcements as warranted by available stocks of armaments. Would be necessary French supply guns to some British divisions but have no spare guns;

(8) No greater efforts could possibly be asked of French armies; General Weygand had nothing but admiration for his men who are fighting without hope of having any rest;

(9) Long resistance impossible unless the United States declares war immediately. Germany would then reconsider her position and such action on the part of the United States would make Allied victory possible;

(10) Doumenc, Chief of Staff to General Weygand, repeated that the French armies will fight as long as arms available.

General Weygand's remarks can be summed up in one way only: Those who can help must do so now. Ends.

422.

254-36

Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 136

Paris, June 10, 1940

MOST SECRET. There is a certain amount of feeling in French Government circles because United Kingdom Government does not wish to release more than a limited number, approximately one quarter, of pursuit planes which are available at the present time in the United Kingdom. Charles Roux, Secretary General Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mentioned the matter to me unofficially yesterday but strictly in confidence. The American Ambassador, much concerned, spoke to me this morning regarding the same question. South African Minister has shown me copy of cable which General Smuts has sent to Mr. Churchill urging the release of more planes. I am sending you the above information in the event of your considering it possible and desirable to take some action.

423.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 137

Paris, June 10, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. My telegram No. 107 of the 28th May. French Foreign Affairs today quite suddenly invited Diplomatic Corps to leave Paris. The Dean who is Papal Nuncio has gone already. British Ambassador leaving at 8 tonight. I shall go during the night or tomorrow morning. Some of my staff are on the way now. (Word omitted) to Château de L'Hérissaudière, Pernay, near Tours, Indre-et-Loire. Telegraphic address STADACONA, TOURS. I handed over today to American Ambassador protection of Canadian nationals and official and private property.

424.

254-36

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 52

Poitiers, June 11, 1940

Conversation yesterday, Monday, with Mr. Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister. According to information that he received lately from Belgium the Minister believes Leopold considers himself a prisoner and has so far shown no intention of forming a new Government in Belgium, thus seeming to accept the principle embodied in Article 82 of the Belgian Constitution. In such a case it may be considered that he implicitly agrees that he is no longer in a position to reign and that the Government now in France exercises all executive powers.

The Pierlot Government continues in office in spite of political manoeuvring by some Parliamentary members who would wish a reshuffling of that Government and the establishment of a Regency.

425.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Poitiers, June 12, 1940

Unnumbered message. Owing to ever increasing number of refugees, the scarcity of gasoline and the danger of being shortly faced with shortage of food supplies, I have decided to move tomorrow (Thursday), with family, Pierre Dupuy and my personnel to Lascombes, and to settle down there until the present situation clarified. Belgian Foreign Minister and Foreign Office officials, with whom I have discussed the matter, entirely approve of this move. I have made arrangements with them to remain in close contact by telephone, telegraph, and also to see them personally whenever required. My legation near Poitiers remains open in charge of local mayor and a stenographer. Instructions have been given to receive and put up Canadian refugees, as we have done in the course of the last three days. Telegrams should be forwarded, until further notice, direct to the Château Lascombes, Margaux, Gironde, via Bordeaux.

426.

254-36

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 851

London, June 13, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins.

Mr. Churchill and Lord Halifax have gone to Tours today at the request of Monsieur Reynaud. The military situation in France is so serious that it is possible that French collapse may be imminent. It was understood between Mr. Churchill and Monsieur Reynaud that the British Government would be warned of any important decision contemplated by the French Government. Although Reynaud himself is determined to carry on the struggle even after the German occupation of Paris, other members of his Government are not so staunch. It is reported Marshal Pétain, in particular, has given indications that he would not be unwilling to come to terms with Germany. Churchill's last visit to France is reported to have had a tonic effect on French resistance and it is possible that he may bring back better news this evening than many persons in high quarters here fear. Ends.

MASSEY

427.

254-36

Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 139

Pernay, June 13, 1940

SECRET. Have just seen Charles Roux, Secretary General of Foreign Affairs, who considers that the situation is critical. The Germans have still twenty fresh divisions which they can throw into the battle. The French have none. Charles Roux says that the French Government believe that the only hope now lies in an immediate declaration by the United States Government, and he asks me to cable this opinion to you at once, in the event, presumably, of your being able to influence the President of the United States in view of the well-known friendship which exists between you.

428.

254-36

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en Belgique
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in Belgium

TELEGRAM 38

Ottawa, June 13, 1940

Your telegram No. 48 of 2nd June concerning your conversation with Belgian Foreign Minister about King Leopold. I am grateful to Mr. Spaak for his information and views conveyed through you on this subject. This, together with interesting information on the same lines conveyed to me by Belgian Minister here, throws much light on the whole situation.

As regards last paragraph of your telegram you can assure Foreign Minister of our continued esteem and admiration for the Belgian people, particularly in these tragic days of suffering and striving.

429.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commission of Great Britain to Prime Minister

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

[Ottawa,] June 13, 1940

The messages conveyed in the High Commissioner's letter of the 13th June¹ and in the memorandum left with the Prime Minister on the 28th May² give the appreciation of the position as we see it. A further appreciation is in preparation and will be sent in a few hours time. It seems clear that at any moment we may be faced by French collapse and the consequent necessity for taking grave and far reaching decisions. In these circumstances we are very anxious to have full expression of Dominion Government's views on the position as they see it at present so that all factors may be before us. We should be grateful if you could telegraph at earliest possible moment after receipt of further appreciation referred to.

¹ Non reproduite.² Probablement le document 406.¹ Not printed.² Presumably Document 406.

430.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commission of Great Britain to Prime Minister

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL [Ottawa,] June 13, 1940

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

DATED 13TH JUNE¹

We have recently reviewed the situation which might arise if French resistance were to collapse and we were compelled to fight on without them. You will appreciate the vital importance of maintaining absolute secrecy on this subject. Moreover at this stage any review as a whole of the situation can only be provisional.

2. The review is framed on the basis that we continue to fight with or without United States assistance but we estimate that without the full economic and financial assistance of the whole American continent our chances of defeating Germany would be remote.

3. In the situation envisaged the first problem would be to ensure the security of the United Kingdom against concentrated German attack. This attack might take the following forms:

- (a) breaking public morale by unrestricted air attack;
- (b) starvation of the country by attack on shipping and ports;
- (c) occupation by invasion.

4. We must expect severe air bombardment, considerable dislocation of industry and communications and heavy casualties. Chances of Germany achieving success depend mainly on our ability to maintain in being our air forces and their sources of supply and the fleet and its bases. It will be of extreme importance to obtain quantities of aircraft and destroyers from America and to keep our sea routes open.

5. We estimate that we would be able to maintain a proportion of our sea-borne trade, but we should have to restrict imports even more drastically than at present and we should probably have to depend mainly upon west coast ports. Some measure of evacuation of women and children to the Empire and the United States of America would be necessary.

¹ Il s'agit de l'évaluation dont il est question au document 429. Ce texte fut télégraphié le 13 juin par le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne avec instruction de le remettre en main propre au Premier ministre. Le texte, écrit à la main, fut remis au Premier ministre à 11 h. 30 le 14 juin par un agent supérieur du haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne.

¹ This is the text of the British appreciation referred to in Document 429. It was sent by telegram on June 13 from the Dominions Secretary to the High Commissioner of Great Britain for personal delivery to the Prime Minister. The handwritten text was delivered to the Prime Minister at 11.30 a.m. on June 14 by a senior officer of the High Commission of Great Britain.

6. Provided that we can prevent the enemy gaining high degree of air superiority we think that we should be able to prevent large scale invasion of the United Kingdom. Our shortage of destroyers, however, gives us grave anxiety. We consider that the enemy would attempt invasion assisted by large scale air borne raids. There is no shortage of manpower to meet this threat but certain items of important equipment are deficient.

7. We should endeavour to hold our position overseas but French collapse might mean the loss of effective naval control in the western Mediterranean though we should continue to control the western approaches to the Mediterranean. We intend to hold Egypt and to this end we will retain a capital ship fleet based on Alexandria as long as possible. This fleet will also exercise a stabilizing influence on Turkey and the Middle East.

8. In the unlikely event of Japan, in spite of the restraining influence of the United States of America, taking the opportunity to alter the status quo in the Far East we should be faced with a far less favourable situation in which, without the assistance of France, we should not have sufficient forces to meet combined (? German omitted) and Italian navies in European waters and Japanese fleet in the Far East. In the circumstances envisaged it is most improbable that we could send adequate reinforcements to the Far East. We should therefore have to rely on the United States of America to safeguard our interests there.

9. Our ability still to defeat Germany and Italy would depend mainly on our being able to control at the source Europe's essential oversea supplies though it would still be necessary to retain certain key strategical positions from which we could exert virtually a blockade of Europe. Despite immediate gains from conquest Germany would still be very short of food, natural fibres, tin, rubber, nickel and cobalt. Above all she would still have insufficient oil. Given full Pan-American co-operation we should control all deficient commodities at the sources and by the winter of 1940/41 many European industrial areas, including parts of Germany, would experience widespread shortages; a large part of industrial plant of Europe would then be at a standstill. At the same period shortage of oil would force Germany to weaken her military control in Europe. By the summer of 1941 it would be difficult for Germany to maintain her military forces. Air attacks on Germany's oil centres would contribute to her defeat and reduce her air offensive but until additional resources from Dominions and America could be made available in Great Britain these attacks would be on a limited, and probably diminishing, scale. By this economic pressure, by a combination of air attack on economic objectives in Germany and its resultant effect on German morale and by creation of widespread revolt in her conquered territories, it would still be possible for the ultimate defeat of Germany to be achieved by the British Empire provided the United Kingdom could withstand form of attack outlined in paragraph 3 above, which we believe it could, and that we have full economic and financial support of the Americas.

10. We are examining separately the more direct consequences of probable French withdrawal from the war and the steps which might be taken to deal with various aspects of such a situation and hope to telegraph to you further as to this very shortly. We also hope to telegraph to you a more detailed review of the economic factors involved which is in preparation.

431.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commission of Great Britain to Prime Minister

950H/130

Ottawa, June 14, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

Dear Prime Minister,

A telegram has been received from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking that the enclosed most secret and personal message from Mr. Churchill may be conveyed to you immediately.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Mémorandum du premier ministre de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
Memorandum from Prime Minister of Great Britain to Prime Minister

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL London, June 14, 1940

The Foreign Secretary and I saw Reynaud this afternoon (Thursday) at Tours. Reynaud said French armies were at last gasp and Weygand said that he felt it would very soon be necessary to plead for an armistice in order to save soil and structure unchallenged. If France was to continue it was imperative to have proof that the United States of America would come in with sufficient speed. Reynaud then referred to the message he sent to Roosevelt on June 10th (you will have seen this in the press: it was published at Roosevelt's suggestion and . . . (corrupt group) . . . in Roosevelt's speech of that day was not in fact an answer to it). Reynaud thought Roosevelt's speech June 10th was encouraging and he said that he proposed to send a further appeal to Roosevelt saying that Allied cause lay in America's hands. Reynaud added that he felt he could not carry his government with him in continuing the struggle unless Roosevelt's reply to this appeal conveyed a firm assurance of immediate aid, though he did not mean by this an expeditionary force. He said French Council of Ministers had instructed him to enquire what our attitude would be should the worst . . . (corrupt group) . . . and he therefore asked me

whether we would admit that France having done all she could, might enter into a separate peace.

I said it was still our one thought to destroy Hitlerism. There would be still reproaches but we could not consent to France making a separate peace. The first thing was for Reynaud to put the position squarely to Roosevelt and then await his answer.

I returned to London this evening (Thursday). Meanwhile Reynaud made the appeal to Roosevelt which he contemplated (you will have heard his broadcast). This was crossed by a very remarkable message from Roosevelt, the terms of which are as follows:

Your message of June 10th has moved me very deeply. As I have already stated to you and to Mr. Churchill, this Government is doing everything in its power to make available to Allied governments the material they so urgently require and our efforts to do still more are being redoubled. This is so because of our faith in and our support of, ideals for which allies are fighting.

The magnificent resistance of French and British armies has profoundly impressed the American people.

I am personally particularly impressed by your declaration that France will continue to fight on behalf of democracy even if it means slow withdrawal, even to North Africa and the Atlantic. It is most important to remember that French and British fleets continue mastery of Atlantic and other oceans; also to remember that vital materials from outside world are necessary to maintain all armies.

I am also greatly heartened by what Prime Minister Churchill said a few days ago about continued resistance of British Empire and that the determination would seem to apply equally to great French Empire all over the world. Naval power in world affairs still carries lessons of history, as Admiral Darlan well knows.

We read this as an invitation to France to continue. Roosevelt of course is not able to declare war without the assent of Congress but his message goes to the very edge of such a step and seems to me to give the assurance which Reynaud required. We are accordingly sending a message to Reynaud in the following terms:

In this solemn hour for British and French nations and the cause of freedom and democracy to which they have vowed themselves, His Majesty's Government desire to pay to the Government of the French Republic the tribute which is due to the heroic fortitude and constancy of the French armies in battle against enormous odds. Their effort is worthy of the most glorious traditions of France and has inflicted deep and long-lasting injury upon the enemy's strength. Great Britain will continue to give the utmost aid in her power. We take this opportunity of proclaiming the indissoluble union of our two peoples and of our Empires. We cannot measure the various forms of tribulation which will fall upon our peoples in the near future. We are sure that the ordeal by fire will only fuse them together into one unconquerable whole. We renew to the French Republic our pledge and resolve to continue the struggle at all costs in France, in this island, upon the oceans and in the air, wherever it may lead us, using all our resources to the utmost limits and sharing together the burden of repairing the ravages of war. We shall never turn from the conflict until France stands safe and erect in all her

grandeur, until wronged and enslaved states and peoples have been liberated and until civilisation is freed from the nightmare of Nazidom. That this day will dawn we are more sure than ever. It may dawn sooner than we now have the right to expect.

I hope Reynaud will now be prepared to carry out intention which he expressed to us.

We are confident you will be in full agreement with the tenour of our assurances in our above message to Reynaud, more than ever now that Roosevelt has committed himself, as we think he has, in his reply to Reynaud quoted above. If you feel as we do, we earnestly hope that you will feel able to make a public declaration to the French Government on the lines of our message set out above at the earliest possible moment and issue it to the press as soon as our message is published. We regard this as a matter of very great urgency and importance.

I may add that we are urging publication of Roosevelt's message, which in any case stands on record, but that we have not yet received his consent.

432.

254-36

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en France
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in France

TELEGRAM 118

Ottawa, June 14, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 139.

1. We have been following with closest attention and concern the situation in France, and have for some time been aware of the urgent and fateful character of the approaching crisis. As regards the United States you may inform the French Government that I have been in close personal touch with the President and Secretary of State on repeated occasions and have taken every opportunity to impress the necessity of all the immediate aid that can be given. The Administration have already done much and I am confident will do everything further that can be done.

2. In a statement in the House of Commons today I made the following statement:

If I know the heart of the American people as I believe I do, and as I am certain I know the heart of the Canadian people, I believe I can say to Premier Reynaud, in this hour of the agony of France, that the resources of the whole of the North American continent will be thrown into the struggle for liberty at the side of the European democracies ere this continent will see democracy itself trodden under the iron heel of Naziism.

3. I have also sent to Premier Reynaud the telegram set forth in my succeeding telegram in clear.

433.

254-36

Le Premier ministre au Président du Conseil de France
Prime Minister to Prime Minister of France

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, June 14, 1940

CLEAR THE LINE. IMMEDIATE. C'est avec une émotion profonde que le peuple du Canada a entendu jour après jour vos paroles pleines de vaillance. Nous avons suivi avec l'orgueil du sang les actions héroïques de vos soldats indomptables. Chaque mot de l'éloge fait hier par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni dans le message qu'il adressait au Président de la République française exprime avec éloquence les sentiments et la foi qui animent nos cœurs. Le Canada jure à la France, comme il l'a juré à la Grande-Bretagne, son aide résolue jusqu'à la pleine limite de ses forces et de ses ressources.

J'ai lu votre appel aux États-Unis. Vous pouvez être sûr que les peuples de l'Amérique du Nord réalisent intensément les besoins de l'heure. J'ai foi que la puissance matérielle et économique de ce continent sera lancée sans délai à l'aide de la République française dans la cause auguste qu'elle défend. Comme jamais auparavant, les sacrifices et le dévouement de la France sont l'inspiration des hommes libres dans le monde entier.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

434.

254-36

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 106

Ottawa, June 14, 1940

SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

The telegram I sent today to Premier Reynaud and the statement I subsequently made in our House of Commons, this afternoon, and which was enthusiastically received, may be taken as expressing the determination of the government and people of Canada, come what may, to stand at the side of Britain and France so long as the two countries, or either one of them, continues its defence of freedom against Nazi tyranny and aggression. We shall continue to do our utmost by way of co-operation to meet each new situation as it may arise in the manner which as the result of constant consultation between our governments and those of other parts of the British Commonwealth, may appear to be the most helpful to pursue. Ends.

435.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Margaux, June 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Following from Vanier. Begins. Legation in France now established Cantenac Gironde via Bordeaux. Désy, Ministre Canada, Margaux Gironde. Ends.

436.

1021-B-39

*Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre
Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister*

TELEGRAM

Canberra, June 15, 1940

Following telegram has been sent by me to the Australian Minister at Washington for presentation to the President of the United States. Begins.

I recently had the honour to communicate with you on the subject of possible United States assistance to the Allied arms. Since then the position has become rapidly and progressively worse and I do not exaggerate when I say that as a British and democratic country we are forced to contemplate the possibility of a beaten France, a Great Britain in danger of being overwhelmed not by superior courage or by a good cause but by a villainous combination of international lawlessness and a long-prepared mechanical superiority.

In certain events we in Australia may have to fight for our own lives and I want to tell you that with all the defects of our equipment we will fight for them to the end.

At this moment the eyes of the whole liberty loving world are turned to you and your great people.

I believe that even now if the United States by a magnificent gesture could make available to the Allies the whole of her financial and material resources, Germany could be defeated. Effect on the spirit of France would be transfiguring while the whole English-speaking peoples of the world would by one stroke be welded into a brotherhood for world salvation.

On behalf of the people of Australia and the future of this land I appeal to you for the fullest possible measures of co-operation and help. Ends.

Repeated to London and the Dominions. End of message.

MENZIES

437.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 867

London, June 15, 1940

MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister.

French Army has now all but lost its power of organized resistance. Decision was taken early this morning to withdraw B.E.F. including, as you know already, from telegram to National Defence, that part of First Canadian

Division which had already arrived in France. It is feared that it will be impossible to withdraw a considerable number still in France, most of them on lines of communication.

It is possible that General Weygand may now ask for an Armistice at any time. Darlan, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy, has communicated with the Admiralty here asking what he should do with his ships. He has received advice asked for. It is, of course, vital that French Fleet should be kept from falling into German hands. Although the Commander-in-Chief himself is loyal to the Allied cause, nothing will be certain until French ships are safe in British harbours.

Greatest danger at the moment is possibility of Reynaud's replacement by a politician prepared to accept German terms. French Cabinet is apparently far from a unit on course of action to be taken following the collapse of French military resistance. The best we can hope for is capitulation on Dutch model with French Fleet and Air Force intact on removal from French waters and territory respectively, and a Government of France carrying on the war and preserving Allied operations from North Africa. The situation however may be much less satisfactory than this.

MASSEY

438.

254-36

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

SECRET

Washington, June 15, 1940

Dear Dr. Skelton,

This morning an official in the Department of State told me that he had just been discussing the military situation in France with the officer in the War Department who makes daily reports to the State Department on this subject. I know that you will have full information on this matter, but I thought you might be interested in learning directly the appreciation of the situation which the War Department here has.

The officer reported this morning that it would be possible for the French Army to fall back on a position south of the Loire. This would, however, be the longest line on which they have yet been fighting, and even if they attempted to hold this line they would probably have to capitulate within three weeks. He therefore expects that there will be a military capitulation in France shortly.

Yours sincerely,

M. M. MAHONEY

439.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 53

Margaux, June 16, 1940

This morning Saturday Mr. (word omitted) telephoned advising me not to return, under any circumstances, to Poitiers. Tonight Saturday he telephoned again to inform me secretly that the Belgian Government were preparing their immediate transfer to England with restricted personnel. This notice should be considered as final as he might not be able to communicate with me tomorrow.

I shall have, as in the past, to provide for my own transportation. Under these circumstances I consider it advisable to leave French territory at once by best available route. Shall telegraph future address.

440.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Ottawa, June 16, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to communicate to you immediately for your most secret and personal information the enclosed message regarding the decisions arrived at by the United Kingdom Cabinet this morning.

I have also received a further telegram stating that since the meeting of the Cabinet was held, fresh developments have taken place and that His Majesty's Ambassador accredited to France has been instructed to investigate the question before making the communication set out in the enclosed message. This second telegram stated that the Cabinet was then sitting and that Lord Caldecote would telegraph further as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne
Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

London, June 16, 1940

We were informed by telegram by His Majesty's Ambassador in France this morning that the French Council of Ministers last night came to the

conclusion that the departure of the French Government from France, thus abandoning the peoples to intense suffering, would cause reaction of public opinion unless it could be shown that the peace conditions imposed by the Axis powers were unacceptable as contrary to the honour and vital interests of France. The Council therefore wished to have the United Kingdom Government's authority to enquire through the United States Government what armistice conditions would be offered. The Council authorised the President of the Council to declare to the United Kingdom Government that the surrender of the French fleet to Germany would be considered an unacceptable condition. The British Ambassador added that if the United Kingdom Government withheld consent, it seemed probable that Monsieur Reynaud would have no alternative but to resign.

A further message from the British Ambassador subsequently received, stated that the line which the Council approved was that taken by the majority of the Council and that Monsieur Reynaud had put up a good fight but was overborne by a majority. The British Ambassador said that if the United Kingdom Government withheld their consent to inquiry by the French Government as to the possible terms of armistice, Monsieur Reynaud would resign and that Monsieur Reynaud could not guarantee that his successor would agree with the view that surrender of the fleet would be considered an unacceptable condition. The British Ambassador said that General Weygand exercised great pressure on the Council of Ministers, saying that the Army might break up at any moment, and that Monsieur Reynaud urged the United Kingdom Government to send reply "Yes" or "No" at the earliest possible moment this Sunday morning, if possible by telephone.

The United Kingdom Government consent which the French Government are asking is required by the terms of the joint declaration between the United Kingdom and French Governments on the 28th of March.

In a matter of such grave importance, we should, of course, have wished to ascertain the views of the Dominion Governments before returning a reply to the French Government, but the extreme and critical urgency of the request unfortunately precluded this and we have now replied to the French Government in the following sense. Begins.

Our agreement forbidding separate negotiations, whether for an armistice or a peace, was made with the French Republic and not with any particular French administration or statesmen. It therefore involves the honour of France. Nevertheless provided, but only provided, that the French fleet is sailed forthwith for British harbours pending negotiations, the United Kingdom Government give their full consent to the inquiry by the French Government to ascertain the terms of an armistice for France. The United Kingdom Government, being resolved to continue the war, wholly exclude themselves from all part in the above-mentioned inquiry concerning an armistice.

Ends.

441.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

Ottawa, June 16, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

Here is a further communication which has been sent to me for your most secret and personal information.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne
Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

London, June 16, 1940

Mr. Churchill asks that the following personal message from him should be given from him to the Canadian Prime Minister:

You may like to know how I myself see the position.

I do not regard the situation as having passed beyond our strength. It is by no means certain that the French will not fight on in Africa and at sea, but whatever they do, Hitler will have to break us in this island or lose the war. Our principal danger is his concentrated air attack by bombing coupled with parachute and air-borne landings and attempts to run an invading force across the sea. This danger has faced us since the beginning of the war and the French could never have saved us from it as he could always switch on to us. Undoubtedly it is aggravated by the conquests Hitler has made upon the European coast close to our shores. Nevertheless in principle the danger is the same. I do not see why we should not be able to meet it. The Navy has never pretended to prevent a raid of five or ten thousand men but we do not see how a force of say eighty to a hundred thousand could be transported across the sea and still less maintained in the teeth of superior sea-power. As long as our air force is in being, it provides a powerful aid to the fleet in preventing sea-borne landings and will take a very heavy toll of air-borne landings. Although we have suffered heavy losses by assisting the French and during the Dunkirk evacuation, we have managed to husband our air fighter strength in spite of poignant appeals from France to throw it improvidently into the great land battle which it could not have turned decisively. I am happy to tell you that it is now as strong as it has ever been and that the flow of machines is coming forward far more rapidly than ever before, in fact pilots have now become the limiting factor at the moment. Our fighter aircraft have been wont to inflict a loss of two or two and a half to one even when fighting under the adverse

conditions in France. During the evacuation of Dunkirk which was a sort of no-man's land we have inflicted a loss of three or four to one and often saw German remnants turned away from a quarter of their numbers of our planes. But all air authorities agree that the advantage in defending this country against an overseas air attack will be greater because first we shall know pretty well by our various devices where they are coming and because our squadrons lie close enough together to enable us to concentrate against attackers and provide enough to attack both bombers and protect fighters at the same time. All their shot down machines will be total losses, many of ours and their pilots will fight again. Therefore I do not think it by any means impossible that we may so maul them that they will find daylight attacks too expensive. The major danger will be from night attack of our aircraft factories but this again is far less accurate than daylight attack and we have many plans for minimising its effect. Of course, their numbers are much greater than ours, but not so much greater as to deprive us of a good and reasonable prospect of wearing them out after some weeks or even months of air struggle. Meanwhile, of course, our bomber force will be striking continually at their key points, especially oil and oil refineries and air factories and at their congested and centralised war industry in the Ruhr. We hope our people will stand up to this bombardment as well as the enemy. It will on both sides be on an unprecedented scale. All our information goes to show that the Germans have not liked what they have got so far.

It must be remembered that now that the British Expeditionary Force is home and largely re-armed or re-arming if not upon a continental scale at any rate good enough for home defence, we have far stronger military forces in this island than we have ever had in the late war or in this war. Therefore we hope that such numbers of the enemy as may be landed from the air or by sea-borne raid will be destroyed and be an example to those who try to follow. No doubt we must expect novel forms of attack and attempts to bring tanks across the sea. We are preparing ourselves to deal with these as far as we can foresee them. No one can predict or guarantee the course of a life and death struggle of this character but we shall certainly enter upon it in good heart.

I have given you this full explanation to show you that there are solid reasons behind our resolve not to allow the fate of France whatever it may be to deter us from going on to the end. I personally believe that the spectacle of fierce struggle and carnage in our island will draw the United States into the war and even if we should be beaten down through superior numbers of enemy's air force it will always be possible as I indicated in the House of Commons in my last speech to send our fleets across the oceans where they will protect the Empire and enable it to continue to war and blockade, I trust in conjunction with the United States, until the Hitler regime breaks under the strain. We shall let you know at every stage how you can help being assured that you will do all in human power as we for our part are entirely resolved to do.

442.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 870

London, June 16, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins.

United Kingdom High Commissioner will shortly receive in telegram No. Z.116 an account for transmission to you of a step taken this afternoon which may induce the French Government to reconsider their intention to ask Germans for terms of an armistice. The actual document involved is inevitably vague in places and not easy to interpret in constitutional terms, but as a statement of principle the Government here hope it will meet with acceptance by the French. It may well be, however, that Reynaud's approval will not be shared by his colleagues. Ends.

MASSEY

443.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

Ottawa, June 16, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

I enclose another communication which has just come in. The reference (Z.114) is to the enclosure in the last letter which I sent to you this afternoon.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne
Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

London, June 16, 1940

At this afternoon's meeting the Cabinet were informed by General de Gaulle, French Under-Secretary of State for War, that a "psychological stroke" alone would restrain Monsieur Reynaud from asking for an armistice.

A document was produced which had been prepared in London today by General de Gaulle in consultation with certain British and French officials with this object in view. This document was considered by the Cabinet and substantially amended by them. In its amended version it was read over the telephone by General de Gaulle to Monsieur Reynaud who is understood to have indicated that it met with his approval.

The text of the document as revised by the Cabinet is as follows. Begins.

At this most fateful moment in the history of the modern world, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the French Republic make this declaration of indissoluble union and unyielding resolution in their common defence of justice and freedom against subjection to a system which reduced mankind to robots and slaves. The two Governments declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations but one Franco-British Union.

The constitutional Union will provide joint organs of defence, foreign, financial and economic policies. Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every British subject will become a citizen of France.

Both countries will share responsibility for repair of the devastation of the war wherever it occurs in their territories and resources of both shall be equally and as one applied to that purpose.

During the war there shall be a single War Cabinet and all forces of Britain and France whether on land or sea or in the air, will be placed under its direction. It will govern from wherever it best can. The two Parliaments will be formally associated.

The nations of the British Empire are already forming new armies. France will keep her available forces in the field on the sea and in the air. The Union appeals to the United States to fortify the economic resources of the Allies and to bring her powerful material aid to the common cause.

The Union will concentrate its whole energy against the power of the enemy no matter where the battle may be.

And thus we shall conquer.

Ends.

The Prime Minister and other Ministers are leaving for France tonight in order to ascertain whether the adoption of this document by the British and French Governments and its immediate publication would secure the abandonment by the French Government of their proposal to enquire as to the conditions under which the Axis powers would grant France an armistice. If the document does not have this effect, the reply to the French Government set out at the end of my telegram Circular Z.114 which has meanwhile been suspended would apply.

Nothing but extremity of the situation and in the hope that adoption of this document may avert the collapse of French resistance would have led His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to take this course without the fullest prior consultation with the Dominion Governments, but events have left us no option. We can, therefore, only take this earliest opportunity of informing you of the basis on which the Prime Minister's discussions in France tomorrow will take place.

444.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 884

London, June 17, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins.

No information from official sources has reached here from France during the day. The burning question relates to the present position of the French. Certain relatively unimportant French naval units are in Alexandria in British hands but of the movements of the main French naval forces there is no knowledge. Nor is there any word here as to the terms of armistice. It is possible that France has laid down arms unconditionally.

It may be decided here to publish immediately the text of the proposed joint Anglo-French declaration which I referred to in my telegram No. 870.¹ This document was of course stillborn but its publication would, it is thought, accomplish three purposes. It would serve as a rallying point for those elements in France who are loyal to their Allies and wish the defeat of Hitlerism. It would also serve as a refutation of charges which may be made, however unjust, that France was deserted by her Allies. Thirdly, it might have useful effect in the French North African colonies and amongst French forces in the Mediterranean area. Ends.

MASSEY

445.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre

High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Ottawa, June 17, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

With reference to the last letter which I sent you yesterday, I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to let you know that shortly before Mr. Churchill was due to leave for France last night, a message was received from the French Government that the meeting should be cancelled and that an explanation would follow. The party accordingly did not sail.

You will have seen from the Press that Monsieur Reynaud has resigned and that Marshal Pétain has succeeded him. Lord Caldecote says that a further telegram will be sent as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

¹ Document 442.

446.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

Ottawa, June 17, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

With reference to my letter of this morning, I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to give you, for your most secret and personal information, the message in the enclosed Memorandum.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne
Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

London, June 17, 1940

His Majesty's Ambassador at Bordeaux has reported that Monsieur Reynaud was much heartened by the document regarding the Franco-British union but that the forces in favour of ascertaining terms of armistice had become too strong for him and that he had been forced to resign.

Monsieur Badouin, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the newly formed Government, subsequently informed His Majesty's Ambassador as follows:

Decision to ask for armistice conditions had been inspired solely by the fact that the French armies surrounded and broken up were no longer able to stand up to the enemy. France was militarily broken and it was only a matter of very few days before the German armies would have become masters of the whole country. Sufferings of the civil population also were appalling. No Government could have left France at this moment under appearance of abandoning the people to their fate. The new Government had therefore felt compelled to ask through the Spanish Government (this choice being due to Marshal Pétain's friendship with General Franco) for cessation of hostilities and to be informed on what conditions armistice would be granted. If conditions were such that their acceptance would be a strain on the honour of France they would be refused. But the people would then know that their sufferings could not have been avoided. Among such conditions most dishonouring would be surrender of the fleet and he was authorised to give us the Government's formal assurance that, although they expected this to be one condition, it would in no circumstances be accepted. Appointment of Admiral Darlan as Minister of Marine should afford us additional guarantee if it were needed. Change of Government implied no change of heart towards us.

His Majesty's Ambassador has since reported that Admiral Darlan has told him that so long as he can issue orders to the fleet we have nothing to fear as regards the French Navy.

447.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 896

London, June 18, 1940

MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins. The French are still waiting for the terms of the armistice for which they asked. It seems quite possible that no terms will be offered but that they will be told that they must lay down their arms unconditionally, obey orders, and keep quiet while Germany deals with Great Britain. The fact that the existing French Government failed to observe the solemn undertaking of their predecessors, which was binding on them as well, not to ask for an armistice without having first placed the fleet in British hands, is most disquieting. Every possible effort is being made here to deal with this situation. Ends.

MASSEY

448.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 909

London, June 19, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Still no news that definite armistice terms have been presented to the French. British Ambassador has been unable yet to obtain any definite satisfaction as to future of French fleet but British Government apparently does not feel unduly perturbed at situation. Some units of Navy have now arrived at British ports from Atlantic bases.

MASSEY

449.

254-36

Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 400

Margaux, June 20, 1940

SECRET. General Secretary of Foreign Affairs informed me this morning that the French Government would be very grateful for any representations which the Canadian Government might find it possible to make to the Government of the United States with the view of obtaining some more positive and decisive action which might be a stimulus to public opinion in France and deterrent to Germany and Italy.

My staff having taken files of telegrams with them, am numbering telegrams starting with No. 400.

450.

254-36

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en France
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in France

TELEGRAM 122

Ottawa, June 20, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 400. We have been pressing this matter upon Government of United States and are taking steps at once to make further representations.

451.

254-36

Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Bordeaux, June 20, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Was received this morning with South African Minister by Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs who informed us (several words missing) through the press. He stated that because of critical military situation last night new Government at 01.00 hours this morning requested Spanish Ambassador to ask General Franco to communicate with the German Government in order to obtain a cessation of hostilities and to ask about peace terms. In any case he added that there would soon be a cessation of hostilities because of the position and condition of the French Army.

It was necessary for the French Government to ask regarding possible peace terms in order to satisfy public opinion. If terms were too drastic the French might reject them and thus the Government's hands (words missing) strength. He said that the Government would not accept terms which were incompatible with French honour. Unconfirmed. Handing over of the fleet to Germans would be unacceptable to the French Government. They of course wish to maintain the most friendly and cordial relations with the United Kingdom and had no intention of turning against the United Kingdom. They hoped on the contrary that statement made by Mr. Toli at Tours would be respected by both partners to the effect that if one of the partners fell he would be helped to his feet by the other and after the war restored to his former position. He agreed with my suggestion that composition of new Government indicated that there was a desire to prevent disorder in the army and to keep in hand the extreme Left elements of the population. At the end of the interview he asked us on behalf of the French Government to telegraph our respective Governments urging that they use their good offices in endeavouring to make the United Kingdom Government take a generous and sympathetic view of the *démarche* which the French Government had been forced to make to the German Government.

452.

254-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 922

London, June 20, 1940

MOST SECRET. British Ambassador at Bordeaux has telegraphed today to the effect that yesterday French Cabinet decided that on the approach of enemy the Presidents of the two Houses of the French Parliament and three or four Ministers nominated by the President would proceed overseas, probably accompanied by General Weygand.

Campbell also reports that delegates en route to discuss terms with the Germans have not been appointed plenipotentiaries but will report to the existing French Government for the latter's decision.

First Lord of the Admiralty has returned from Bordeaux and reports Darlan, Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy, unwilling to withdraw ships while there is still fighting. If, when the time comes, it should be regarded by the French as impossible to hand over the fleet to the British Navy, it would appear likely that vessels would be scuttled.

MASSEY

453.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 57

Lisbon, June 20, 1940

Reference my previous telegram regarding my movements.¹ On Monday morning when I tried to communicate with the Belgian Foreign Office and with Canadian Minister to France, I was informed that telephone and telegraph communications were suspended all over France. I was unable to obtain any information whatever as to plans and movement of Belgian Government except contradictory rumours.

When news was broadcast of France's intention to negotiate with Germany, I decided to leave France for Spain immediately for the following reasons:

(a) In the event of France alone or France and Belgium entering into a Peace Agreement, I was exposed in a country outside of my jurisdiction to becoming nothing more than a private citizen of a country at war with Germany and could not be assured of immunity or privileges for myself and staff;

¹ Document 439.

(b) I was running risk by staying too long of finding frontiers closed as in fact they were 2 hours after we crossed.

(c) I cannot secure any precise information regarding possible sailings from Bordeaux.

After crossing into Spain by automobile, I decided to proceed as far as Lisbon because as you are aware, anti-British sentiment is widespread in Spain and is now openly manifested.

The British Ambassador and Belgian Minister to Portugal were unable to give me, today, any information on present whereabouts or intentions of Belgian Government regarding present peace negotiations. In these circumstances I shall remain here with Renaud until further advice from you.

DÉSY

454.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre en Belgique au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Minister in Belgium to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 58

Estoril, June 21, 1940

IMMEDIATE. My telegram No. 57, June 20th. I exhausted in France, Spain and Portugal every means to find out where the Belgian Government are at present. All I was able to discover is that some members of Parliament, and some Ministers, including the Prime Minister, had crossed, or endeavoured to cross, the Spanish frontier. Under these circumstances three courses seem to be open to me:

(a) Remain here for a few days in the hope that general situation will clarify and that it will be known where the Belgian Government are located;

(b) Proceed to England to re-establish contact with the Dutch Government;

(c) Return to Canada to consult you.

I should appreciate your views on the above.

JEAN DÉSY

455.

254-36

Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 405

Bordeaux, June 22, 1940

At three hours this morning British Ambassador, South African Minister and I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs when Armistice terms were communicated to us. I know you will be fully informed of these negotiations through London. I do not wish to duplicate, and in any case lack of cyphering facilities and personnel makes the position difficult. Later for records I will forward report.

456.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Bordeaux, June 22, 1940

Armistice terms signed. Am evacuating Canadian Legation, embarking with British and South African Ministers.

457.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

Ottawa, June 23, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

I enclose herein a message which has reached me for communication to you for your most secret and personal information.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne
Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

London, June 23, 1940

Armistice now reported to have been signed but no further information yet available as to details of terms. Our immediate anxiety is to prevent French capital ships, especially the two newest and most powerful, from falling into German hands. The two newest ships have probably by this time reached the African ports respectively to which they were ordered by the French authorities yesterday.

A message was received from the French naval authorities yesterday that instructions had been received from Admiral Darlan that the two large ships at present operating from this country should proceed to Dakar and that smaller ships should leave with them and if unable to proceed as far as Dakar should proceed to Bayonne. The War Cabinet have decided that departure of these ships shall for the present be delayed in view of the signing of the armistice. We should hope that Admiral Darlan is concentrating the fleet with a view to preventing it from falling into German hands but he cannot in his present circumstances be relied upon. Action is therefore being taken forthwith to get hold of (? following) ships not at present in British ports if possible by persuading French commanding officers to take their ships into British ports. If this approach does not succeed further measures will be taken.

PARTIE 5/PART 5

DÉCLARATION DE GUERRE À L'ITALIE
DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST ITALY

458.

578-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.184

London, May 15, 1940

SECRET. My telegram September 1st, Circular C.30.¹ Colonial Governments have been informed that precautionary stage against Italy which was instituted last September and has never been formally withdrawn, should now be fully adopted.

459.

578-40

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures

High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

950/H/96

Ottawa, May 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that in view of the possibility that Italy might decide to join Germany as a belligerent against the Allies, it has become necessary to consider in detail the arrangements which would be required for notifying the Dominion Governments of the measures to be taken in the United Kingdom in that event and of the corresponding steps which it is hoped they would take themselves.

Many of the measures dealt with in the Government War Book apply irrespective of the enemy or enemies against whom we are engaged, e.g. the control of movements of the British Mercantile Marine and in addition the precautionary stage must be regarded as already being in effect in relation to Italy. It might, however, still be necessary for certain of the pre-arranged messages included in the War Book to be sent, among these being of course the "war" telegram itself. I have been asked to explain the position to the Canadian authorities informally in order to ensure that in the event of its becoming necessary to despatch any of the telegrams in the form set out in Appendix I to O.D.C. 699-M they are regarded on receipt as conveying the meaning detailed in that memorandum in respect of the country named.

¹ Volume 6, Document 1038.

In general it is hoped that Dominion Governments would be prepared, in the absence of any request to the contrary, to take in relation to Italy's interests all the measures which are in force as regards Germany on receipt of the "war" telegram and that that message would be regarded as a request to that effect in addition to the meaning indicated in the above memorandum. At the same time, I have been asked to explain that the United Kingdom Government have taken into account certain special considerations which would arise in the circumstances of a war against Italy with particular reference to the economic aspect. United Kingdom measures would include:

(a) The detention of all neutral ships bound for ports in the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea, Portuguese and Spanish Atlantic ports. If the Master of the ship chose to discharge at once the cargo destined for any of the ports referred to above, it is suggested that ships should be allowed to proceed on any route other than the Mediterranean route. Alternatively, the ships might be allowed to proceed with the cargo provided that the Master undertook to call at some intermediate British or Allied port on its route, e.g. ships in Far East Colonial ports might proceed on their voyage provided that they did not go as far west along the coast of Asia as Aden or further north on the East African coast than Mombasa. It is suggested that a similar limitation should be placed on the movements of ships in Australian and New Zealand ports and that ships in the ports of the Union of South Africa might proceed on their voyage provided that they did not go further up the west African coast than Freetown or further up the east African coast than Mombasa. Similarly it is suggested that ships in British ports in America might proceed to other ports on the American continent. It will be appreciated that instructions under this heading might be modified soon after the outbreak of war when the situation had become clearer so as to permit ships to proceed, e.g. to Portugal, the above limitations being designed with the object of keeping the Mediterranean clear for the time being of merchant ships which might otherwise require protection. The United Kingdom Government hope that Dominion Governments would report by telegraph the names and flags of the neutral ships in question and brief particulars of the cargoes and their destination.

(b) The detention of all exports of Italian origin or interest. Neutral ships might be allowed to proceed as soon as any enemy exports of Italian or German origin and any uncertificated cargo had been discharged provided that they were not proceeding to Italian territory or to the ports named in the first sentence of sub-paragraph (a) above. The draft of a United Kingdom Order in Council extending the Reprisal Order in Council to other enemies will be communicated to Dominion Governments as soon as possible. Any action taken by Dominion Governments under this head would, it is hoped, be reported through the same channels and in the same way as is already done in the case of German ships or German cargo.

(c) The refusal of export licences until further notice and the suspension or cancellation of export licences already granted for the following countries,

in addition to Italy herself: Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Spain, Spanish owned Morocco, Tangier, Portugal.

(d) The possible diversion by the naval authorities of neutral ships which had called at Italian ports or had been destined for Italian ports at the moment of diversion, to ports in the British Empire for examination for contraband or enemy exports in which case the authorities in the ports to which the ships were diverted would report the action taken and the results of the examination.

I have been asked to make it clear that the "war" telegram if sent in respect of Italy is to be regarded as also meaning that the United Kingdom Government are taking the measures detailed in paragraph 3, and that they hope that the Dominion Governments will co-operate in them.

Canadian authorities will no doubt wish to consider in advance whether any amendments to their existing emergency legislation would be required to deal with the new situation.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

460.

254-36

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au commissaire,
Gendarmerie royale du Canada*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Commissioner,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police*

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, May 15, 1940

My Dear Commissioner Wood,

ATTITUDE OF ITALY

I wish to advise you of our latest information regarding the possibility of war with Italy.

A telegram of this date was received from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, indicating that Italy might well enter the war at an early date. Mussolini's decision, however, might depend on the outcome of the fighting in France and Belgium, and the most recent conversations seem to indicate that the decision might possibly be postponed for some weeks pending a clear outcome of the fighting now going on in Belgium and Northern France.

The High Commissioner in London advises us today that it is probably only a question of a few days before Mussolini enters the war against the Allies.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

461.

578-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*
*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] May 17, 1940

RE ITALY

In an interdepartmental discussion on preventive measures yesterday, the Naval authorities enquired whether they would be warranted in instructing Canadian vessels to take action against any Italian vessels immediately upon receipt of a Flash from the Admiralty that the United Kingdom is at war with Italy. In September no such authorization was given. National Revenue had undertaken to detain any German ships that might be in Canadian ports. There were no German ships. The situation now may be somewhat different, particularly as regards certain Italian trawlers near the Grand Banks, though I am informed today by Captain Murray¹ that a Canadian destroyer sent to this area automatically comes under control of the British Commander-in-Chief at Bermuda. We said this matter would be brought to your attention, but it was your rule that matters of this kind should be brought to Council by the Minister concerned. I have no doubt that it will be brought to the attention of the Minister or Acting Minister at once.

462.

578-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

950H/96

Ottawa, May 21, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to my letter of the 15th May (950H/96), I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to explain to the Dominion Government that action under (c) of paragraph 3 of that letter would require a public order in the United Kingdom and that, in order to avoid misunderstanding of our motives in the neutral countries concerned to which immediate publication of such an order might give rise, its issue would be delayed for a few days. In the meantime, all exports would be held up by executive action and a public notice would be issued in the United Kingdom in the following terms:

In view of the uncertain situation in the Mediterranean area arising from hostilities with Italy, shippers of goods for Mediterranean and Black Sea ports:

¹ Le capitaine L. W. Murray, M.R.C., chef adjoint de l'état-major naval.

¹ Captain L. W. Murray, R.C.N., Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff.

and for Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic ports are urgently advised not to forward goods for these destinations to ports of loading in the United Kingdom before ascertaining that shipping facilities will be available.

It is understood that all exports from Canada to the countries concerned are already subject to license and the issue of new regulations would, therefore, be unnecessary. I have, however, been asked to invite the attention of the Canadian authorities to the desirability of avoiding any unnecessary publicity for measures taken by them during the first few days.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

463.

578-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

Ottawa, May 24, 1940

Dear Sir,

May I refer to your letter, dated the 15th May, 1940, and to your letter dated the 21st May of the same year, both dealing with the measures that would be adopted in the event that Italy decided to join Germany as a belligerent against the Allies.

The revision of the measures that would be adopted for the control of enemy exports, as indicated in the second letter, has been noted and will be taken into account in dealing with corresponding action in this country.

Upon receipt of your earlier letter, tentative plans were prepared to deal with a possible emergency. These were studied and expanded by an inter-departmental committee, and I am enclosing for your information two copies of the Committee's Report.¹

This Report has not been confirmed in all respects by the Government or by the Ministers concerned. It does, however, set forth a tentative program, and you would be justified in assuming that it sets forth in substance the measures that would be adopted.

In the event that you transmit a copy of this to your Government for information, I assume that you will explain the nature of the Report and its tentative character. I shall keep you advised as to any revisions that may be made from time to time.

You will observe that the Report contemplates the carrying out by the Canadian Government of measures that would in fact cover both the points

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

dealt with in the War Telegram and the additional points dealt with in your letter of the 15th May.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

464.

578-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

950H/96

Ottawa, May 25, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to the High Commissioner's letter of the 15th May (950H/96), Sir Gerald Campbell has received a further telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that in the event of the stage being reached when war with Italy appears inevitable, the following steps may be taken by the United Kingdom Government forthwith:

- (a) The detention by administrative methods of all Italian Government shipping, inward and outward bound;
- (b) The detention by similar methods of all neutral ships carrying cargoes to or from Italy, or Italian possessions, including Albania;
- (c) request to the Egyptian and Turkish Governments to take similar action.

The decision to take this action will depend upon circumstances and will not be automatic.

It is hoped that the Canadian Government will be prepared to take action similar to that indicated under (a) and (b) above, but *only* upon receipt of advice by her that the United Kingdom Government have acted. The High Commissioner understands that if a situation arose in which the United Kingdom Government found it necessary to take the action foreshadowed above, a message to the effect that action was being taken by the United Kingdom Government would be sent to him, in which event he would pass it on immediately to the Canadian authorities.

If the above message has not been sent prior to the despatch of the "WAR" telegram itself, the above ships and cargoes will, of course, then be automatically detained pending decision as to seizure or the grant of days of grace.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

465.

578-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

950H/108

Ottawa, May 30, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to my letter of the 25th May (950H/96), the High Commissioner has received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking him to inform the Dominion Government that the United Kingdom Government would be glad if immediate steps could be taken to delay exports of any commodities to Italian destinations in so far as this can be done by procrastination. It is *not* desired that any open prohibition of exports to Italy should be imposed. The High Commissioner has been asked to suggest that the maximum administrative delay short of open prohibition should from the receipt of this letter govern the grant of export permits and of the clearance of goods by the customs.

Sir Gerald Campbell has been asked to make it clear to the Canadian authorities that this immediate action is distinct from the measures contemplated in my letter of the 25th May referred to above, the scheme suggested in which still stands and is still to be regarded as contingent upon the further communication foreshadowed therein.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

466.

578-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.220

London, June 1, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Bank of England has been asked to take the following action regarding Italian credits.

- (1) All term credits to be refused.
- (2) Sight credits to be allowed when beneficiary is in the British Empire or Allied territory and when shipment has already taken place.
- (3) All other sight credits to be held up at present on some pretext or other.

It is hoped that parallel action will be taken in the Dominions.

467.

578-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 657

Ottawa, June 2, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. 1. In view of possibility of war with Italy, please commence preparation of written submission to the King to authorize Proclamation of state of war between Canada and Italy.

2. Follow form of submission regarding Germany, (my despatch No. 494 of December 12, 1939),¹ substituting "Italy" for "the German Reich" and leaving dates blank.

3. In the event of commencement of war between United Kingdom and Italy, the Senate and House of Commons will be asked to approve, by resolution, Canada's entry. Order in Council will then be made authorizing presentation of submission to the King. I shall then telegraph in code the following form:

My telegram No. . . . Italy. Present submission. Date of commencement
of war June Date of submission June

4. On receipt of that telegram, you will complete the submission and present it to the King at earliest moment. Before leaving to present it, please advise approximate time you expect the King's approval will be given. Please inform the King that His Majesty's Government in Canada desires that His Majesty's approval be communicated immediately by telegram, either directly or through you, for publication in Canada by Proclamation in His Majesty's name in the *Canada Gazette*. I will send a formal submission in writing by mail.

5. When approval is given, please telegraph exact time and place.

6. I would suggest that you now make tentative arrangements to be received by the King for the above-mentioned purpose in the event that it becomes necessary.

7. Please acknowledge receipt of this telegram.

468.

578-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 91

Ottawa, June 3, 1940

SECRET. Your circular D.220 of June 1st. For past fortnight we have been delaying action on applications for payments to Italy and have held up permits for exports of securities deposited in various institutions here by Italian or Swiss residents.

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

469.

578-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 773

London, June 5, 1940

Your secret telegram No. 657, June 2nd. Saw the King's Private Secretary this morning who will arrange audience whenever requested. Private Secretary however does not wish written submission presented on this occasion as such documents without the signature of a Minister of the Crown [have] no validity. I am therefore to make a verbal request on your behalf asking His Majesty's approval of the action contemplated by the Government. According to your instructions, before leaving for the Palace I shall be advised approximate time I expect the King's verbal approval will be given and will inform His Majesty that the Canadian Government request His approval to be communicated immediately. When approval is given I will telegraph time and place. The only written submission would thus be formal document signed by yourself referred to in your telegram under reference.

MASSEY

470.

578-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 707

Ottawa, June 10, 1940

CLEAR THE LINE. MOST IMMEDIATE. Canadian Press has announced Italy's entry into the war. We are awaiting definite statement from London before taking necessary action. Please advise immediately.

471.

578-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, June 10, 1940

CLEAR THE LINE. MOST IMMEDIATE. Please disregard my telegram No. 707 which has now been repeated to Dominions Office.

472.

578-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 819

London, June 10, 1940

CLEAR THE LINE. MOST IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 707. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed British Ambassador at 4.45 p.m. today that The King of Italy would consider himself in a State of War with the United Kingdom as from one minute after midnight tonight. A similar statement was made to the French Government. United Kingdom Government consider themselves to be *now* at war with Italy without awaiting expiration of this time limit.

MASSEY

473.

578-40

*Décret du Conseil
Order in Council*

P.C. 2506

June 10, 1940

The Committee of the Privy Council have had under consideration a report, dated June 10th, 1940, from the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister, representing that:

Whereas Italy has declared her intention to enter the war on the side of Germany and against the Allied Powers;

Whereas a state of war now exists between the United Kingdom and France on the one hand and Italy on the other; and

Whereas at the outbreak of war the Parliament of Canada decided to stand at the side of the United Kingdom and France in their determined effort to resist aggression and to preserve freedom; and

Whereas the Houses of Parliament have expressed their approval of the entry of Canada into a state of war with Italy, and it is expedient that a Proclamation should issue declaring the existence of a state of war between Canada and Italy;

The Prime Minister therefore recommends that the advice of the King's Privy Council for Canada should be submitted to His Majesty the King with a view to the authorization by him of the issue of a Proclamation forthwith, to be published in the *Canada Gazette*, to the following effect:

Declaring that a state of war with Italy exists and has existed in Canada as and from June the tenth, 1940.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendation and submit the same for Your Excellency's approval.

474.

578-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 709.

Ottawa, June 10, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. My telegram No. 657, June 2nd, 1940. Italy. Present submission. Date of commencement of war June 10th, date of submission June 10th.

475.

578-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 824

London, June 11, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 709 received 11.50 p.m. [June 10]. I am now awaiting word as to whether I may be received by His Majesty tonight.

MASSEY

476.

578-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 825.

London, June 11, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. It is, I now find, impossible for me to be received by His Majesty tonight, shall hold myself in readiness for audience tomorrow morning.

MASSEY

477.

578-40

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR C.39

London, June 11, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Defence. War has broken out with Italy.

478.

578-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 826

London, June 11, 1940

CLEAR THE LINE. MOST IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 709 of June 10th. In accordance with your instructions I am being received by His Majesty at 10.45 a.m. this morning, British Summer Time, at Buckingham Palace, at which time I expect to receive His Majesty's verbal assent to the Proclamation declaring that a State of War exists between Canada and Italy.

MASSEY

479.

578-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 827

London, June 11, 1940

CLEAR THE LINE. MOST IMMEDIATE. Your telegram 709 of June 10th. His Majesty gave His verbal approval to Proclamation declaring that a State of War exists between Canada and Italy at 10.55 a.m., British Summer Time, this morning at Buckingham Palace.

I have informed His Majesty that I am communicating His approval to you immediately.

MASSEY

480.

578-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, June 11, 1940

IMMEDIATE. JUNE TENTH MARS.

481.

578-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 100

Ottawa, June 11, 1940

Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

I desire to inform you personally that a Proclamation by His Majesty on the advice of His Privy Council for Canada has been issued at this moment in Ottawa declaring and proclaiming that a state of war with Italy exists and has existed in Canada as and from the tenth day of June.

482.

578-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne
Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 715

Ottawa, June 11, 1940

A proclamation by His Majesty the King acting on the advice of his Privy Council for Canada has been issued in Ottawa today declaring that a state of war with Italy exists and has existed in Canada as from the tenth day of June.¹

483.

578-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 81

London, June 14, 1940

Your telegram 11th June, No. 100. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

I thank you for your telegram informing me personally that a Proclamation by His Majesty on the advice of His Privy Council for Canada has been issued in Ottawa declaring that a state of war exists between Canada and Italy as from June 10th.

May I, on behalf of my colleagues and myself, express our profound satisfaction at this further demonstration of Canada's complete solidarity with ourselves in the critical struggle in which we are engaged. Ends.

¹ Des télégrammes identiques furent envoyés aux hauts commissaires en Australie, Nouvelle-Zélande, Irlande et Afrique du Sud, ainsi qu'aux ministres en France, Belgique (Poitiers), aux États-Unis et au Japon.

¹ Identical telegrams were sent to the High Commissioners in Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and South Africa, and to the Ministers in France, Belgium (Poitiers), the United States and Japan.

484.

578-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

DESPATCH 245

Ottawa, June 28, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 657 of June 2nd and your telegram No. 773 of June 5th regarding the commencement of war between Canada and Italy.

I enclose the Submission, signed by the Prime Minister, advising His Majesty the King to approve the issuing of the Proclamation of war.

The original document, with the King's approval endorsed, should be returned to me in order that it may be placed in the permanent records of the Canadian Government.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le Premier ministre à Sa Majesté le roi
Prime Minister to His Majesty the King*

Ottawa, June 10, 1940

The Prime Minister of Canada presents his humble duty to His Majesty the King.

It is expedient that a Proclamation should be issued in the name of His Majesty, in Canada, declaring that a state of war with Italy has existed in Canada as and from June tenth.

The Prime Minister of Canada, accordingly, humbly submits to His Majesty the petition of The King's Privy Council for Canada that His Majesty may approve the issuing of such a Proclamation in His name.

The Prime Minister of Canada remains His Majesty's most faithful and obedient servant.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

PARTIE 6 / PART 6

RUPTURE DES RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES
AVEC LA ROUMANIE, LA HONGRIE ET LA FINLANDESEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH ROMANIA, HUNGARY AND FINLAND

ROUMANIE/ROMANIA

485.

1662-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] February 13, 1941

The Roumanian Consul General, Mr. Nicolau, called this morning, by appointment, to enquire about the status of his Consulate General in the light of the rupture of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Roumania. He has had no instructions of any kind from Bucharest for weeks, and feels himself completely out of touch and sympathy with his Government. In fact he told me in the greatest confidence that if, as he expected, the Roumanian consular officers were to be withdrawn from Canada, he intended to resign from his Government's service.

Mr. Nicolau, who appeared to be very badly broken up by events in his country in recent months, asked whether, if the Roumanian Consulate General were closed, he could be allowed to remain in Canada as a private individual. His wife, he said, was born in Canada, the friends he had made here were all he had left, and his own personal sympathies and loyalties were entirely on the side of the Allies in the present war.

The position shaping up in Roumania is closely analogous to that of Denmark under enemy occupation. As you know, the Danish Consul General has continued to remain in Canada and has severed connections with his Government. Danes resident in Canada are not treated as enemy aliens, though Danish property, of course, is subject to the General Proscription Order and Danish shipping in Canadian ports was all requisitioned.

Mr. Nicolau was very anxious to learn, as soon as possible, what the attitude of the Canadian Government would be toward a Roumanian consular representation in this country and to know how the Government would regard his private request for permission to stay here in the event that relations were broken off. With your approval, I am inclined to tell him that we will probably have to wait for a few days to see how the general situation develops and that, in the meantime, we will have to suspend the immunity from censor-

ship currently enjoyed by his office. Any information he can secure about the position of the Roumanian Legations in Washington and London would be of interest to us in deciding the position of his office here.

As regards Mr. Nicolau's personal request, I should think it could be granted.

486.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim
aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] February 14, 1941

The Roumanian Consul General, Mr. Nicolau, called at the Department this morning in accordance with instructions he had received from his Government to close the Consulate General and evacuate its staff. He left the enclosed communication addressed to yourself and asked me to tell you how badly he felt about the wretched plight in which his country found itself, and to assure you how grateful he had been for every attention and courtesy he had received in Canada. He is a very badly shaken man, and obviously on the edge of a nervous breakdown. He now thinks he should withdraw his request made yesterday to be allowed to remain in Canada as a private citizen and plans to proceed to the United States with his wife as soon as he has cleared up his personal and office business in Montreal, which should take about a week.

In view of the circumstances of his departure and of his integrity and personal sympathy with the Allied cause, I felt that we should not do anything to make his leavetaking more painful than necessary and have, accordingly, requested the Foreign Exchange Control Board and the Custodian to permit him to withdraw and convert into United States funds the sums outstanding in his personal and Consular accounts. For the same reasons, I have told the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that they need not take any steps to restrict his movements during the few days he remains in Montreal after the Consulate is closed, nor need they sever his house telephone as was properly done at the time of the closing of the Italian Consulates.

The Postal and Cable Censorship authorities have been informed that the privileges accorded the Consulate General terminate immediately from the date of its official closing.

N. A. [ROBERTSON]

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le consul général de Roumanie au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

Consul General of Romania to Secretary of State for External Affairs

No. 237

Montreal, February 14, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that a communication has just been received from the Roumanian Government to the effect that, following the decision arrived at by the British Government to recall His Majesty King George VI's Minister at Bucharest as well as the Consular Officials in Roumania, my Government has deemed it necessary to recall the personnel of our Legation at London and of our Consulates within the British Empire. It is, therefore, my duty to inform you that this Consulate General will cease to function and my mission will terminate as of the 15th. instant.

It is with great regret that I find myself assigned the painful duty of communicating to you this unfortunate interruption, brought about by International events, of the very friendly relations that have always existed between Great Britain, this Dominion and Roumania. Indeed, since my appointment as Consul General, nearly three years ago, I have constantly striven to strengthen the bond of friendship existing between your great Dominion and my country.

And, may I take this opportunity to express, especially to the Federal and Provincial Governments, as well as to the Administrative Authorities with whom I have had the happy privilege of collaborating, my most sincere thanks for the kind assistance that has been rendered me on all occasions—always with so appreciable a courteousness—in the fulfilment of my mission in Canada.

I have etc.

DEMETRE M. NICOLAU

HONGRIE / HUNGARY

487.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémemorandum du conseiller juridique au Premier ministre
Memorandum from Legal Adviser to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] March 5, 1941

CANADIAN ACTION WITH REGARD TO BULGARIA, HUNGARY AND ROUMANIA

1. Acting upon instructions from the Government of the United Kingdom, His Majesty's Minister at Sofia has broken off diplomatic relations with

Bulgaria today. There is no Canadian diplomatic mission in Bulgaria and there are no Bulgarian diplomatic or consular representatives in this country. There was, therefore, no occasion for any action by the Canadian Government with regard to the severance of diplomatic relations.

2. The breaking off of diplomatic relations does not necessarily bring about a state of war. On the other hand, in breaking off diplomatic relations the United Kingdom felt it could not overlook the action of the Bulgarian Government in aligning Bulgaria with the Axis Powers and in permitting German forces to enter Bulgaria and to use that country as a base from which to conduct hostile operations.

3. Action has been taken and is being taken by the Canadian Government to protect Canadian interests during the period that may intervene between the breaking off of diplomatic relations and actual hostilities should such take place. Action has already been taken by Order in Council¹ making Bulgaria proscribed territory which means that all transactions with Bulgaria will be subjected to the regime of the Trading with the Enemy Regulations. In this manner it is made unlawful to conduct any transactions involving, directly or indirectly, economic aid to the enemy. Precautionary action is being undertaken to prevent any transactions that might result in assistance to the enemy.

4. Police action that is necessary to preserve the security of the state is, of course, being undertaken. While this is so, Bulgarian nationals and persons of Bulgarian descent will not be disturbed so long as they show by their conduct that they are rendering loyal obedience to the laws and institutions of this country.

5. The action taken to make Bulgaria proscribed territory extends also to Hungary. Hungary is a country with which diplomatic relations are maintained by the United Kingdom. On the other hand, it is not possible entirely to overlook the fact that Hungary is contiguous to territory under German domination, and Hungary's alignment with the Axis, and the according by Hungary to the enemy of privileges which are not consistent with neutrality. Hungary maintains a Consulate General in Montreal and a Consulate in Winnipeg. The action taken in making Hungary proscribed territory has subjected transactions with that country to the regime of the Trading with the Enemy Regulations and makes it possible to prevent transactions that might be of advantage to the enemy. The measures taken are precautionary and consistent with the continuation of existing relations.

6. Diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Roumania were broken off on the 10th of February of this year. Subsequently the Consul General of Roumania in Canada received instructions from his Government to close the Consulate General in Montreal, and this action was taken on the 15th February of this year. The Consul General and his staff have withdrawn. Roumania was made proscribed territory and other precautionary

¹ C.P. 1561, le 4 mars 1941.

¹ P.C. 1561, March 4, 1941.

measures were undertaken similar to those which are being adopted with regard to Bulgaria. In the case of Roumanian nationals, and persons of Roumanian descent, the same position is maintained as in the case of Bulgarians. They will not be disturbed so long as their conduct conforms to our laws, and is consistent with the allegiance which, under the laws of Canada, is due from all residents, irrespective of their national status or racial origin.

488.

1861-40

*Mé morandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] March 20, 1941

The Hungarian Consul General, Dr. Charles Winter, called at the Department on March 18th to enquire whether, and if so how, his status of Consul General was affected by the Order in Council proscribing Hungary under the trading with the enemy regulations. He also wished to know whether the position of Hungarian nationals resident in this country would be affected by that Order.

I told him that the proscription order was a protective and preventive measure made necessary by increasing enemy control of Hungary. It would prevent any transfer of funds from persons in Canada to persons in Hungary, but did not affect either his position as Consul General or the arrangement by which representatives of other governments were granted certain privileges under the Foreign Exchange Control Order. He said that all the expenses of Hungarian Consular offices in this country were met by official transfer of United States funds which were sold to authorized dealers in the prescribed manner.

I referred him to your statement in *Hansard*, March 5th, page 1374, and assured him that Hungarian nationals resident in Canada, as Roumanian and Bulgarian nationals, would "not be disturbed so long as their conduct conforms to our laws, and is consistent with the allegiance which, under the laws of Canada, is due from all residents, irrespective of their national status or racial origin".

489.

1861-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au consul général de Hongrie*

*Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Consul General of Hungary*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, April 8, 1941

Prime Minister is making a statement in the House of Commons today to the effect that in view of the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Hungary and of the action of your Government in enabling Hungarian territory to be used as a base of operations for unprovoked aggression against Yugoslavia it has become necessary to take action with a view to revoking the authorization of the establishment and maintenance of your Consulate General in Montreal and the Consulate in Winnipeg. It would be appreciated therefore if you would take action as is necessary with a view to winding up your affairs and turning over your archives to an appropriate custodian. I assume that you will give necessary instructions to your Consulate in Winnipeg but if not please let me know and I shall communicate directly with the Consul there.

490.

1861-40

*Le consul général de Hongrie au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Consul General of Hungary to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Montreal, April 8, 1941

Acknowledge receipt of telegram informing about decision to revoke the authorization of the establishment and maintenance of this Consulate General and our Consulate in Winnipeg whom I have instructed accordingly.

FINLANDE/FINLAND

491.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] June 22, 1941

RELATIONS WITH FINLAND

We have not yet had official confirmation of radio reports that Finnish troops are advancing in concert with Germans and Roumanians in today's

onslaught on Russia. The large concentration of German troops in Finland in recent weeks makes it clear, however, that the Nazis are using Finland as a base for operations and it is probable that the Finnish Government will itself be at war with the U.S.S.R. Mr. Churchill's radio statement this afternoon that the United Kingdom would aid any country attacked by the Nazis and regard as an enemy any country which fought as an ally of Germany should force a speedy clarification of the Finnish position. The United Kingdom and the United States have made great efforts in these last days to persuade Finland to remain neutral. Her isolated and dependent position, coupled with her very natural desire for revenge for last year's Russian aggression, appear to have been factors too strong for British and American diplomacy to contend with. Whatever the outcome of the Russo-German war, Finland must be its first and most regretted casualty.

Canada has a large Finnish population, mostly employed in the mines and lumber camps in Northern Ontario and British Columbia, in which the Communist influence has always been strong though lessened by the Russo-Finnish war. It will be further torn and confused by today's developments. Whatever formal legal action will have to be taken in respect to the Finnish Government and Finnish representation here, I think we can safely count on the loyalty of the great bulk of the Finnish population. The Russophil Finns, who have hitherto been the trouble makers, may be expected to cease their troubling. The Finnish nationalists, who are strongly anti-Russian, will remember Germany's connivance in the Russian attack on Finland last year, and from the perspective of this side of the ocean are not likely to take Germany's new found interest in the emancipation of Finland very seriously.

Finland maintains a Consulate General in Montreal, in addition to Consular Offices at Copper Cliff, Port Arthur, St. John, Toronto and Vancouver. The new Consul General just arrived from Finland, Kuusamo, had arranged to call at the Department tomorrow afternoon to pay his first official visit. We might wait until we hear what he has to say for his Government before taking any action in regard to Finnish Consulates in Canada. I think, however, we should be prepared to insist on their immediate closing and the withdrawal of Finnish Consular officers. This would parallel the action taken in respect of the Hungarian and Roumanian Consuls.

The other field in which official action will have to be taken is with regard to Finnish ships. One boat arrived at Halifax yesterday and is being held pending clarification of the situation. The only other Finnish vessel in Canadian waters is presently on her way from Quebec to Sydney, N.S., where she will be detained.

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

492.

2298-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.465

London, July 31, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Finland.

1. My immediately following telegram Circular D.466 contains text of reply to Finnish Aide-Mémoire summarized in my telegram Circular D.457,¹ which is being handed to Finnish Minister this afternoon.

His Majesty's Minister at Helsingfors is being instructed to transmit a copy to the Finnish Government.

2. It will be observed that our Aide-Mémoire does not constitute actual notice of withdrawal of our Legation. Our intention is to leave it to the Finns to take initiative at each stage.

493.

2298-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.466

London, July 31, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Finland. My immediately preceding telegram Circular D.465. Following is text of Aide-Mémoire. Begins.

1. His Majesty's Government have received with regret Aide-Mémoire of the Finnish Government, July 28th, announcing that the Finnish Government have come to the conclusion that the Finnish Legation in the United Kingdom should suspend its functions for the time being, as normal diplomatic intercourse between the two countries can hardly be maintained without complications.

2. Far from this opinion being shared by His Majesty's Government as stated in Aide-Mémoire, the latter, as recently as July 22nd last, announced in the House of Lords that while decision to continue diplomatic relations might at any time be reversed in the light of events, they had decided at present to maintain diplomatic relations with Finland, notwithstanding the fact that Finland was engaged in hostilities against our Ally, the Soviet Union, side by side with German troops, large bodies of whom were stationed on and operating from Finnish soil.

3. Action recently taken against Finnish trade with trans-oceanic countries referred to in Aide-Mémoire was taken by His Majesty's Government as result of establishment in Finland of large bodies of German troops, and

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

consequent use of that country as a base for military operations. In these circumstances it was clearly impossible for His Majesty's Government to continue to allow goods to pass through the blockade and reach territory which must be considered largely under enemy control. This measure was necessitated by German action and constituted an integral part of our war measures against Germany. Since it was not aimed at the Finnish people, His Majesty's Government did not consider that it need render impossible normal diplomatic intercourse between the Finnish Government and His Majesty's Government.

4. If the Finnish Government now carry out the intention expressed in their Aide-Mémoire and withdraw the Finnish Legation from London it follows that His Majesty's Government will have no choice but to withdraw His Majesty's Legation from Helsingfors. Ends.

See my telegram Circular G.11 which follows at once.

494.

2298-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR G.11

London, July 31, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. My telegram Circular D.466 and my telegram No. 698 to Newfoundland. My telegram No. 425 to Southern Rhodesia. Finland.

There may be difficulties in arranging for German safe conduct to this country from Finland of the members of His Majesty's Legation and Consulates. We should be grateful, therefore, if for the moment permission to leave the Dominions could be withheld from the members of the Finnish Consular staff, at least until the position is clarified.

495.

2298-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 149

Ottawa, August 2, 1941

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Your telegram Circular G.11, July 31, Finland.

The Finnish Consul General in Montreal is a career officer and Finnish national. Other consular officers are honorary, three being Finnish nationals.

I should be grateful for an early expression of the views of the United Kingdom Government on whether the Consulate General and consulates should be required to close.

Also, is it desired that the postal and cable censorship exemptions of the Consul General should be terminated even in advance of the Consulate General being required to close?

The request in your telegram will of course be acceded to, but so far Consul General has said nothing about leaving.

496.

2298-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 131

London, August 5, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram No. 149 crossed my telegram Circular G.16¹ in which you were informed of our decision in regard to termination of functions of Finnish Consular Officers in this country. We should suggest His Majesty's Government in Canada might now take similar action in regard to Finnish Consulate General and Consulates in Canada, in which case point in second paragraph of your telegram will not arise as in paragraph 3 of your telegram. We are most grateful for your co-operation in this matter.

497.

King Papers, PAC

Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] August 5, 1941

RE QUESTION OF CLOSING FINNISH CONSULATES IN CANADA

The Finnish Government is recalling the Finnish Legation in London. The United Kingdom Government has, therefore, decided to withdraw its Legation and Consulates from Finland, and has closed the Finnish Consulates in the United Kingdom.

I think that it would be appropriate for Canada to do the same immediately. If you approve, it is proposed to send a telegram today² to the Consul General of Finland in Montreal requiring him to close the Consulate General and also the honorary Consulates and Vice-Consulates throughout Canada. Eventually the Consul General and the few officials of Finnish nationality will be required to leave Canada. However, the United Kingdom Government would like us to withhold permission for their departure until satisfactory

¹ Non reproduit.² Document 498.¹ Not printed.

arrangements have been made for the withdrawal of British officials from Finland. I have asked the Finnish Consul General to call on me and propose to obtain his promise not to attempt to leave Canada without the permission of the Department of External Affairs. In the meantime, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have been asked to establish an unobtrusive surveillance over the Consul General's office and residence. I do not think that there is any necessity actually to restrict the Consul General's movements, at least until he has called to see me.

It is proposed to issue tomorrow, Wednesday, a brief notice to the Press of the closing of the Finnish Consulates.

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

498.

2298-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au consul général de Finlande*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Consul General of Finland*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, August 6, 1941

In view of the share which Finland is now taking in the war on the side of the enemy, and the withdrawal of the Finnish Legation in London, it has become necessary to revoke the authorization of the establishment and maintenance of your Consulate General in Montreal and the honorary Consulates and Vice-Consulates throughout Canada. It would be appreciated, therefore, if you would take immediate action towards the winding up of the affairs of the Consulate General and the Consulates and Vice-Consulates, and the handing over of the Archives to an appropriate Custodian. I assume that you will give the necessary instructions to the honorary Consulates and Vice-Consulates, but, if not, please let me know and I shall do so.

I should be obliged if you would call on me as soon as possible to discuss questions arising out of our decision. Please telegraph when I may expect you.

499.

2298-40

*Le consul général de Finlande au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Consul General of Finland to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Montreal, August 6, 1941

Referring to your telegram just received, I am proceeding immediately to wind up the affairs of all Finnish Consulates in Canada and shall communicate with you upon receipt of instructions from my Government.

G. KAARLO KUUSAMO

PARTIE 7/PART 7

DÉCLARATION DE GUERRE À LA ROUMANIE, LA HONGRIE
ET LA FINLANDEDECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST ROMANIA,
HUNGARY AND FINLAND

500.

2859-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.341

London, October 27, 1941

IMPORTANT. MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

We have recently been considering our relations with Finland, Hungary and Roumania. In a message to Stalin, delivered by Sir Stafford Cripps on September 6th, the Prime Minister said "We are willing to put any pressure upon Finland in our power, including immediate intimation that we will declare war upon them if they continue beyond old frontiers." In reporting on his interview with Stalin after delivery of this message, Sir Stafford Cripps said Stalin would, of course, like us to declare war on Finland at once.

2. On October 17th Soviet Ambassador delivered to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a message from M. Molotov to the effect that the Soviet Government would appreciate it if we could see our way to declare war on Finland, Roumania and Hungary. He repeated this message with great emphasis on October 21st, and pressed very urgently for a favourable reply.

3. It is clear that the Soviet Government attach very great importance to our acceding to this request, and we naturally are anxious not to rebuff or discourage them when, at this critical juncture, they ask us to make a gesture of this kind. A refusal might arouse their latent suspicions as to our motives. There are, however, certain practical considerations which must be taken into account. These can be summarized as follows:

4. As regards all three countries, a British Declaration of War would make it easier for Germany, if she so desires at a later stage, to force those countries to allow their troops to be used in operations against the British forces. Moreover, as we have taken all practical measures that are taken on Declaration of War except for internment of Finns, Hungarians and Roumanians in this country, a Declaration of War would have no practical effect of a beneficial nature.

FINLAND

5. (a) A Declaration of War might well drive the Finns, including those who dislike the Germans and do not want open conflict with us, further into German arms. The threat contained in our recent message (see my telegram Circular D.582, September 25th¹) to "treat Finland as an open enemy, not

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

only while the war lasts but also when peace comes to be made" is only effective while it remains a threat.

(b) Certain difficulties would arise in regard to shipping, viz.

(1) We should forfeit our chances of getting 27 ships now in North and South American waters for the North Atlantic, which we are attempting to have taken over by Sweden who would charter them to us. If we declare war we could only expect that after long delays these ships might be employed in trade useful to Americans;

(2) We might cause some dislocation to United States trade, for we have been shepherding these ships into this trade by arrangement with United States Maritime Commission;

(3) We should lose some Finnish crews.

(c) We anticipate that a Declaration of War would be distasteful to that body of American opinion which is favourable to the Finns. Moreover, we should be diverging from American policy of attempting to exploit the difference of opinion which the United States Government believe exists in Finland in regard to continuing aggressive action on Soviet territory (see my telegram of October 9th, Circular D.609).¹

HUNGARY

6. A Declaration of War on Hungary would please the Yugoslav Government, since Hungary has invaded Yugoslav territory, and it might cause pleasure in Czechoslovak quarters. On the other hand it might be less welcome to Poland who attaches importance to her relations with Hungary after the war.

ROUMANIA

7. Roumania and Hungary must be considered together so that no favouritism is shown to one or the other's claim to Transylvania. Yugoslavs attach importance to reconstruction of a strong Roumania and would probably prefer us not to go to war with her. Nor would Declaration of War be welcome to Greece or Turkey.

Furthermore, if war were declared on Roumania and Hungary, the Greek and Yugoslav Governments would press for similar action in regard to Bulgaria who has seized portions of their territory and is massacring Greek subjects. Unless pressed by Soviet Government to declare war on Bulgaria (and they have not made this request), His Majesty's Government would not wish to do so, principally because it would probably cause Turkish Government some displeasure. Such a request by Greek and Yugoslav Governments would therefore be refused. The question of Bulgaria need not therefore influence decision regarding a Declaration of War on Roumania and Hungary.

8. Identical action by all British Commonwealth Governments is clearly necessary, and we should therefore be glad for the views of your Government at the earliest possible moment. We are also obtaining the views of the United States Government. Ends.

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

501.

2859-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

MOST SECRET

[Ottawa,] October 28, 1941

REFERENCE DOMINIONS OFFICE TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.341
OF OCTOBER 27TH

The United Kingdom Government have asked for our views as to the reply that should be returned to the Russian request for a declaration of war against Finland, Hungary and Roumania, all of which are allied with Germany in the invasion of Russia. Similar enquiries have been addressed to the other Commonwealth Governments and to the United States, and an answer was requested as soon as possible.

The United Kingdom telegram sets forth very cogently why it appears inadvisable to issue a formal declaration of war with Finland, Roumania and Hungary. All the prudential considerations are against issuing a declaration of war. On the other side of the ledger must be counted the urgency and importance which the Russians appear to attach to this action and to the fact that Churchill, on September 6th, sent a message to Stalin saying:

We are willing to put any pressure upon Finland in our power, including immediate intimation that we will declare war upon them if they continue beyond their old frontiers.

As I read the United Kingdom telegram, with its emphasis on the considerations arguing against a declaration of war and its insistence on the necessity of "identical action" by all British Commonwealth Governments, they are probably hoping that one or other of the Commonwealth Governments, which were not consulted before Churchill's promise to Stalin was given, will object to declaring war and that in doing so it will furnish the United Kingdom with an honourable reason for refusing to declare war itself.

As a matter of fact, there seem to me to be two very important arguments against a declaration of war which are not mentioned in the United Kingdom telegram:

(1) A declaration of war at this juncture against Hungary, Finland and Roumania because they are attacking Russia would prejudice the decision which remains to be taken by the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth Governments as to whether or not they would declare war on Japan if Japan attacked Russia. This is a very grave and important decision, which should be taken in relation to probable consequences and not in accordance with a formal precedent created by similar action against the smaller German satellite states.

(2) There are a great many Finns and a good many Hungarians engaged in essential industries in Canada—probably many more in this

country than in the rest of the Empire put together. A good deal of weight should be given to the probable effects of a formal declaration of war by Canada on the position and attitude of these people. The present situation, though confused, is not unsatisfactory.

I am inclined to think that these two considerations, added to those outlined in the United Kingdom telegram, would warrant our advising the United Kingdom that the Canadian Government is not, at present, prepared to declare war on Finland, Hungary and Roumania. It would then be open to the United Kingdom, if it still felt that identical action by all Commonwealth Governments was necessary, to explain to Russia that it could not proceed with a formal declaration of war itself. Whether or not it would do so would depend, in the last analysis, on the United Kingdom appreciation of the effect of their refusal to declare war on the Russian will to resist.

502.

2859-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2000

London, October 30, 1941

MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins. Dominions Office telegram Circular M.341 of October 27th. May I venture to offer some observations on this telegram. I cannot help thinking that the reasons against making proposed Declaration of War are unimpressive except for point regarding America. This would appear to be the most important consideration. Should the United States react unfavourably to suggestion of a Declaration of War against Finland, as they may do because of special place Finland has always had in American sympathies, then that of course might be sufficient reason to refuse Russian request.

Declaration of War against the three countries named would obviously be of no material advantage to the Russians in the present issue, but the fact that they attach importance to it would seem to be of great significance. We can hardly refuse to do anything within reason to hearten the Russians at present. Telegrams from the British Ambassador in Russia stress importance of our doing everything in our power to keep the Soviet people in heart and to prevent growth of any suspicion that we are not fully with them. Our present alliance with the Russians has after all been effected against a background of twenty-five years of mutual distrust between the Soviet Government and all Governments of the British Commonwealth. I suggest that refusal to meet their wishes in this instance might well give rise in their minds to suspicion, however unfounded, that we were holding our hands free to influence after the war settlements in a manner which might be prejudicial to Russian interests. Ends.

MASSEY

503.

2859-40

*Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 11

Wellington, October 30, 1941

IMPORTANT. MOST SECRET. Addressed to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, No. 451, repeated to Prime Minister of Canada, No. 11, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, No. 13, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 337.

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have given careful consideration to questions raised in your telegram Circular M.341 of October 27th.

2. They attach the utmost importance to our taking, at this time, any action within our power which might have the effect of encouraging the Soviet Government, and they would regard it as extremely undesirable, in words of your telegram, "to rebuff or discourage them when at this critical juncture they ask us to make a gesture of this kind." They feel, therefore, that the Governments of the British Commonwealth should as far as possible accede to Russian requests, particularly having regard to the fact that our inability to relieve, by armed intervention, the present heavy pressure on the Soviet [Union] has necessarily created disappointment and, indeed, some misgiving, both in Russia and in the British Commonwealth itself.

3. Hungary and Roumania, in the opinion of the New Zealand Government, are definitely in the enemy camp and will be used by the Germans against us if, when, and to the extent that circumstances seem to them propitious for such a course. To all intents and purposes they are at war with us, and the New Zealand Government do not feel that a declaration on our part that we are at war with them is likely to alter the position materially or detrimentally to affect our cause. They consider therefore that it would be both possible and proper to accede to Russian request so far as these two countries are concerned.

4. Finland, it seems to them, is in a different category. Quite apart from the considerations set out in paragraph 5 of telegram under reply (many of which, and particularly the effect upon United States opinion, are of great force) they feel attempt by Finns to recover territory lost by them to the Russians last year when sympathies of practically the whole world, including the British Commonwealth, were with the Finns, should not in itself lead us into war with Finland even though we are at present allied to Russia. If the information (set out in paragraph 8 of your Circular telegram D.647 of October 27th¹) that Finnish objective is now to be limited is in consonance

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

with facts, then a Declaration of War against Finland by British Commonwealth Governments may well lead to renewed activities by the Finns and thus be in fact detrimental to the Russian cause in most direct sense. Again, an early Declaration of War by the British Commonwealth against Hungary and Roumania might in itself strengthen any Finnish intention to take no further offensive action against Russia. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand it is not desirable at present juncture to declare war against Finland, and an endeavour should be made to persuade the Russian Government that this course would at present be undesirable. Should the Russians, however, attach primary importance to this action and persist in their request, then the New Zealand Government feel that the matter should again be considered.

5. The New Zealand Government agree that to declare war against Hungary and Roumania and not against Bulgaria would be logically inconsistent, but as action at present contemplated is the result of a request by the Soviet Government, who have made no such suggestion concerning Bulgaria, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand agree [with the] comment in paragraph 7 of telegram Circular M.341 that "the question of Bulgaria need not therefore influence decision regarding a Declaration of War on Roumania and Hungary" and feel that this question should be left for decision as and when need for a decision arises.

6. Finally, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand agree with necessity for British Commonwealth Governments taking identical action in this matter, and will be grateful to be informed in due course of views of other British Governments and also of the Government of the United States of America.

504.

2859-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 225

Ottawa, October 31, 1941

IMPORTANT. MOST SECRET. Your telegram Circular M. 341 of October 27. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

The Canadian Government feel that your telegram under reference indicates very plainly the great difficulties involved in meeting the Russian request for a declaration of war against Finland, Hungary and Rumania. Over and above the sum of the particular considerations cited in your telegram which in our view make a declaration of war at this juncture against any of these countries inadvisable, we feel that a good deal of weight should be given to

the probability that a declaration of war against these countries because they are attacking Russia would prejudice the decision, which yet remains to be taken by the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth Governments, as to whether or not they will declare war on Japan if Japan attacks Russia. This will be a very serious decision which should be taken in relation to all the probable consequences and not in accordance with a formal precedent created by similar action against the smaller German satellite States.

A subsidiary consideration which is perhaps of greater local importance in Canada than in other parts of the Commonwealth, is the probable effect of a formal declaration of war on the loyalties and state of mind of nationals of these countries resident in British countries. There are a great many Finns and a good number of Hungarians usefully employed in essential industries. They are puzzled and confused by recent developments in Europe, but for the most part are pulling their weight well. We would be reluctant to take any action likely to shift them from support of the general war effort into an attitude of mistrust and opposition.

We recognize the difficulty in present circumstances of refusing Russia such comfort as she could derive from a new gesture of solidarity on the part of her Allies. As matters stand, however, it is not clear that it would be any real aid or advantage to Russia to have all the nations of the British Commonwealth go through the motions of a formal declaration of war which could not affect the present military situation in any way, but would undoubtedly create a series of new and difficult problems for her Allies. Ends.

505.

2859-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 226

Ottawa, October 31, 1941

IMPORTANT. MOST SECRET. With further reference to your telegram Circular M.341 and our telegram No. 225, I might add that in our opinion a declaration of war at this juncture by the countries of the British Commonwealth against Finland, Hungary and Roumania might have a definite bearing upon the entry of the United States into the war. Over and above the allowance which has to be made for the effect of such action on the substantial body of American opinion which preserves a good deal of sympathy for Finland, we have to remember that there are very considerable numbers of Finns, Hungarians and Roumanians in the United States. If a declaration of war against Germany could be held to involve a similar declaration against Finland, Hungary and Roumania, such an argument might further postpone and obstruct the entry of the United States into the war.

506.

2859-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1684

Ottawa, October 31, 1941

MOST SECRET. Personal for High Commissioner. Begins. Your telegram No. 2000 of October 30. I fully share your sense of the urgency and importance of giving Russia assistance and encouragement, but I do not see what advantage she could gain from our declaration of war against Finland, Hungary and Roumania which would outweigh the practical difficulties of a domestic and diplomatic order which such action would involve. You will see from my telegram of today to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that we do not think it advisable to proceed with declaration of war for reasons given in his telegram [Circular] M.341 reinforced (1) by probability that such action would completely prejudice position which would arise if Japan and Russia became involved in hostilities, and (2) by disturbing effect to be anticipated from a declaration of war on Finns and Hungarians who are absolutely and relatively a more numerous and important labour group in Canada than in any other part of the Empire.

When you see Maisky you may tell him that Government have agreed to receive one or two Russian Consuls in Canada where they should be helpful in expediting arrangements for moving equipment and supplies towards U.S.S.R.¹ Ends.

507.

2859-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.346

London, November 3, 1941

MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. My telegram Circular M.341 of October 27th. On October 31st Mr. Hull spoke to Lord Halifax about question of declaring war on Finland, Hungary and Roumania. He said that the United States Government were reluctant to advise in matters

¹ Voir les documents 141, 142.

¹ See Documents 141, 142.

of this sort, as they thought they could exert more influence on large issues by standing a little bit further off.

Mr. Hull showed Lord Halifax a note prepared by the State Department constituting a catalogue of reasons against declaration of war on Finland, Hungary or Roumania. Note included the following points: that Russia had not herself declared war against Hungary; that declaration of war by us would unite opinion in countries concerned, at present much divided; would make it easier for the Germans to increase pressure for help; that Roman Catholics' reaction would be bad. Lord Halifax derived impression that the United States Government did not feel strongly either way, but on balance deprecated declaration of war. [Ends.]

508.

2859-40

Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre
Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister

TELEGRAM 12

Canberra, November 3, 1941

MOST SECRET. Addressed to Prime Minister of New Zealand, No. 449, repeated to Prime Minister of Canada, No. 12, and Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, No. 83.

Your telegram of October 30th, No. 337.¹ Following telegram has been sent to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Begins.

No. 708. Most Secret. Commonwealth War Cabinet has carefully considered Circular M.341. Its views are in brief that disadvantages set out in paragraphs 4 to 7 do not to our mind offset possible effect of refusal on Russia and Russian morale. Further the reasoning of telegram Circular M.341 seems to us unconvincing, and could not be justified publicly. These views as to Russian position are naturally influenced by latest information as to Russian military situation.

2. In short, the Government is of the opinion and it is supported by representatives of all parties in Advisory War Council, that a refusal to accede to the request of Russia to declare war on Finland, Roumania and Hungary may well be disastrous to Russian morale and be dangerous to our own.

3. Subject to any pronounced American reaction our view is that all considerations should be put up frankly to Stalin, who is a realist, and our decision governed by his attitude. [Ends.]

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

*Le premier ministre de l'Afrique du Sud au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

Prime Minister of South Africa to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 3

Pretoria, November 4, 1941

MOST SECRET. Addressed to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, repeated to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia No. 86, the Prime Minister of Canada No. 3, the Prime Minister of New Zealand No. 4.

Union Government are well content to leave decision of this knotty question to the United Kingdom Government in consultation with the United States Government.

We desire to add the following general observations:

1. Practice of undeclared war in cases of complicating and conflicting considerations is becoming common in international practice, and we do not see why the Soviet Government should force a declaration on us in cases of Finland, Hungary and Roumania. Finland especially has many sympathisers as the Russians started trouble by attacking Finland in collusion with Germany.

2. Apart from present practical considerations set forth in this circular note, question is important for its possible bearing on future peace. If we declare war on these countries Russia will in our eventual victory insist on their being treated as declared enemies, and may claim their absorption in part or in whole as she has already dealt with Finland and other Baltic States. The embarrassment for us in making of peace will thus be largely increased. We assume for the sake of a future peaceful Europe principle of nationality will have to be followed at the peace to the fullest extent practicable and Russian claims of absorption may have to be strongly resisted. Future grouping of nations in Europe should follow economic interests and not involve annexations.

3. Even larger questions arise in regard to the future solution of our allied victory. Russia will emerge as a Great Power in Europe with Japan and Germany possibly down and out. We may then have to favour a re-constituted Germany as a counter weight to Russian predominance. This again would raise issues of enormous difficulty and importance. We may have to oppose Russian claims not only upon principle of nationality, but also for the sake of future world peace and our own security. And this may very much increase already difficult question of peace-making.

Our feeling therefore inclines towards temporizing with Russian demands and making use of United States Government for that purpose. We recognize, however, paramount importance of maintaining Russian good feeling especially at the present critical phase of the war, and we leave decision to the United Kingdom Government who have fuller grasp of the whole situation both as regards the present and future.

510.

2859-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.352

London, November 6, 1941

MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

My telegram of October 27th, Circular M.341. We are grateful for views of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions which have been carefully considered by the Cabinet, together with those of the United States Government summarized in my telegram of November 3rd, Circular M.346. Cabinet felt best course would be to explain our difficulties frankly to Stalin. Personal message in this sense has accordingly been sent by the Prime Minister to Stalin setting out our position and asking him whether he considers it is really good business that we should declare war on those countries at this moment. Message offers to consider matter again. Stalin thinks declaration would be real help to Russia. Further telegram will be sent as soon as possible. Ends.

511.

2859-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.372

London, November 21, 1941

MOST SECRET. My telegram M.352. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

War Cabinet have had under further consideration question of declaration of war against Finland, Hungary and Roumania.

2. In view of Finnish desire for guarantee as made clear in their recent note to the United States Government, War Cabinet feel that the best means of getting Finland out of the war would be to give her a guarantee. Since the United States have not felt able to give this guarantee, War Cabinet felt that the possibility of giving joint Anglo-Soviet guarantee should be explored. It would not be possible to give any precise indication of Finland's boundaries, but it is felt that we could guarantee existence of an independent Finland.

3. It was, therefore, agreed that Foreign Secretary should make a tentative approach to Monsieur Maisky on these lines.

4. Consideration of declaration of war against Hungary and Roumania would depend on subsequent developments in the case of Finland. We will continue to keep you informed of developments. Ends.

512.

2859-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2218

London, November 25, 1941

SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins. Foreign Secretary has seen Soviet Ambassador regarding proposal for Anglo-Russian guarantee of Finnish independence, about which you were informed in recent Dominions Office telegram. Maisky did not favour proposed action, and expressed his view that it would be impossible to induce the Finns to withdraw from present war. Eden decided not to press suggestion further.

If Finland signs Anti-Comintern Pact, as press reports indicate she may do, this is quite likely, as far as I can read present Government's attitude here, to tip scales in favour of declaration of war against Finland. [Ends.]

MASSEY

513.

2859-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.390.

London, November 26, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. My telegram Circular M.384.¹ We have given further consideration to question of declaration of war on Finland. The latest message received from the Soviet Government makes clear the importance which they still attach to cessation of military operations and *de facto* exit of Finland from the war. They have stated that if Finland refuses to proceed accordingly within a short period, they would regard declaration of war by us as necessary. In the light of this message we have come to the conclusion that our only course is now to declare war on Finland if she does not cease hostilities within a definite time limit. We propose accordingly to invite the United States authorities to communicate to the Finnish Government a message from us in this sense. Text of instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington are set out in my immediately succeeding telegram.¹

In the situation, as it has now developed, we hope very much that you will concur in the course proposed. Ends.

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

514.

2859-40

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

950H/282

[Ottawa,] November 27, 1941

MOST SECRET. MOST IMMEDIATE

My dear Prime Minister,

I have just received a most immediate telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on the subject of Finland. This telegram refers to the Secretary of State's Circular telegrams, M. Nos. 390 and 391¹ to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada, of which I have not yet seen copies.

I am asked to let you know that the United Kingdom Government have fully weighed the important considerations set out in your telegrams Nos. 225 and 226 of the 31st October. In particular they recognise the special aspects in regard to Canada to which you referred. But the continued pressure from Stalin and the attitude of the Finns themselves both towards Great Britain and towards the United States Government's approach have, in their view, left them no alternative. They point out, moreover, that the United States' attitude towards Finland has clearly stiffened since the date of your telegrams.

The United Kingdom Government see the force of the argument that action in the case of Finland might have a bearing on the position if Japan should attack Russia, but they are not prepared to regard their action with respect to Finland necessarily as a precedent for Japan. That must be considered on its merits if and when the time comes.

The United Kingdom Government hope very much, therefore, that you will approve their conclusion and that if the Finnish Government reject their latest approach, the Canadian Government will be prepared to associate themselves with the United Kingdom Government in the action to be taken.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

515.

2859-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] November 27, 1941

Mr. Malcolm MacDonald's letter to you of today's date regarding relations with Finland makes clear what was left uncertain in Dominions Office telegram M.390, which you read to the War Committee yesterday, namely, that the United Kingdom hope that the Canadian Government will be prepared to associate themselves with the United Kingdom's declaration of war on Finland unless by December 3rd the Finnish Government ceases military operations and in practice withdraws from all active participation in hostilities.

I have asked the Legal Adviser for a note on the constitutional aspects of a declaration of war without the concurrence of Parliament.

If circumstances make a declaration of war on Finland advisable, I am not satisfied that we should allow ourselves to be jockeyed, by the conventions of international law, into treating all Finnish nationals resident in this country automatically as enemy aliens. There seems to me a good deal to be said for distinguishing between the Finnish people and their puppet Government which, under Nazi pressure, has been forced into a false and humiliating position. If we can work out a formula for domestic application which recognizes this distinction, we might be able to safeguard the considerations which argued in the first instance against declaring war on Finland, and, at the same time, give the Soviet Union the diplomatic support to which, as an Ally, it is entitled.

516.

Source Book, External Affairs Legal Division

*Mémoire du conseiller juridique
Memorandum by Legal Adviser*

[Ottawa,] November 28, 1941

MEMORANDUM ON THE PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE EVENT
OF IT BEING NECESSARY TO DECLARE WAR AGAINST FINLAND

1. In the event of war with Finland, two special questions arise:
In the first place, the question arises as to whether it would be necessary to await a meeting of Parliament, or whether joint action could be taken with the British, without waiting for Parliament.

In the second place, the question arises as to whether there could be a clear-cut distinction between the Finnish people and their puppet government which, under Nazi pressure, has been forced into a false and humiliating position.

2. There can be no doubt that it would be possible to provide for a declaration of war even while Parliament was not sitting. Indeed, we have the documents prepared on that basis, and all that would be needed would be to strike out the word "Japan" and to include Finland. It is possible, however, that the Government may be unwilling to follow this course.

3. It is equally clear that it would be possible to provide for the commencement of active and effective military action, without formal declaration of war, the commencement to coincide in date with the British action. Assuming that the Government decides upon this course, the following things would need to be done:

(a) An Order in Council giving the approval of the Government to the steps that would need to be taken;

(b) A telegram to the King (through the High Commissioner) informing him of the course that would be followed by the Canadian Government in this matter, and explaining that formal declaration of war would be deferred until Parliament had acted;

(c) Instructions by the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of National Defence for Air and the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, to the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, to commence immediate operations against Finland, including the bringing in from the high seas of any Finnish ships that may be afloat;

(d) Instructions to Canadian Customs and Police authorities to take any action that may be necessary to detain, or otherwise to deal, with Finnish ships or property;

(e) Instructions to the Custodian of Enemy Property and to the Foreign Exchange Control Board that Finland is to be regarded as enemy territory for all purposes.

4. The other question arises independently of the procedure that would be followed in commencing the war. Whether or not formal declaration is observed until after parliamentary action, it would be necessary to provide by a special Order in Council, that Finns in Canada, including both Finnish nationals and recently naturalized Finns, would be exempt from the operation of those of the Defence of Canada Regulations which deal with enemy aliens. The instances in which Finns were really dangerous could then be dealt with as special cases under Defence of Canada Regulation No. 21. This limitation upon the general operation of war measures would cover the case and, if any special difficulties arose as a result of unforeseen circumstances, they could be dealt with by special Orders in Council from time to time.

517.

2859-40

Le Premier ministre au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne
Prime Minister to High Commissioner of Great Britain

MOST SECRET AND IMMEDIATE

Ottawa, November 28, 1941

My dear High Commissioner,

My colleagues and I have been giving consideration to your letter of November 27th regarding relations with Finland. They hope that the Finnish Government will recognize the force and reasonableness of the communication which your Government has sent to them through the United States Minister in Helsinki, and will cease military operations against Russia, before December 3rd. The Canadian Government do not disagree with the conclusion, reached by your Government, that, if the Finns do not respond to this last approach, the United Kingdom will be compelled to declare war against Finland, and, in that event, our Government will be ready to associate itself with yours in the action to be taken.

In view of the considerations set forth in my telegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, No. 225 of the 31st October, the Canadian Government would not propose, in making provision for war with Finland, to treat Finnish nationals in Canada as enemy aliens within the meaning of the Defence of Canada Regulations. To my mind, it is important to draw a sharp distinction between the Finnish people and their puppet Government which, under Nazi pressure, has been forced into a false and untenable position. This distinction will make it possible to safeguard the considerations which were put forward, in the first instance, against the policy of declaring war against Finland and, at the same time, it will enable the Canadian Government to give to Russia the diplomatic support to which it is entitled as an Ally in the common cause.

Yours sincerely,

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

518.

2859-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.395

London, November 28, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. My telegrams Circular M.390 and Circular M.391¹ regarding question of Declaration of War on Finland. His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has now reported that the United States Government are willing to act.

Separate telegram will be sent as soon as possible as regards Hungary and Roumania. Ends.

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

519.

2859-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.399

London, November 28, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My telegram of November 28th, Circular M.395. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

We have now considered also position in relation to Hungary and Roumania, and have reached the conclusion that appropriate course is to arrange for simultaneous Declaration of War as with Finland on December 3rd. We are therefore asking the United States Government to arrange for message to be delivered, through the United States Ministers at Budapest and Bucharest as soon as possible, to the Hungarian and Roumanian Governments in the following terms: Message begins.

The Hungarian (Roumanian) Government have for many months been pursuing aggressive military operations on territory of the U.S.S.R., the Ally of Great Britain, in closest collaboration with Germany, thus participating in general European war and making a substantial contribution to the German war effort. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom find it necessary to inform Hungarian (Roumanian) Government that unless by December 3rd the Hungarian (Roumanian) Government have ceased military operations and have in practice withdrawn from all active participation in hostilities, His Majesty's Government will have no choice but to declare the existence of a State of War between the two countries. Message ends.

We are confident that you will concur in action proposed and trust if Hungarian and Roumanian Governments fail to fulfil conditions laid down in our note, His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions will associate themselves with us in action which we shall then take. Ends.

520.

2859-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.401

London, November 29, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

My telegrams Circular M.395 and 399. It is now proposed that Declaration of War against Finland, Hungary and Roumania should be made on the 5th (repeat 5th) of December instead of the 3rd. Ends.

521.

2859-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.416

London, December 3, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.
 My telegram M.390 and connected telegrams.

War Cabinet have given further consideration to position as regards
 Declaration of War against Finland.

As Stalin has himself made clear to us the main object is to secure that
 Finland should cease military operations against Russia. There are certain
 indications that there may still be some prospect of attaining this object. No
 reply has yet been received from the Finnish Government. It may not take
 the form of yes or no but one of many possible intermediary forms which
 might require further reference to Stalin. In the circumstances it may be
 necessary to consider answer further when received and possibly consult
 Stalin again.

We feel therefore that it would be inadvisable to commit ourselves now
 to Declaration of War against Finland on December 5th pending considera-
 tion of Finnish reply, and we propose to re-examine matter on that date in
 the light of position then obtaining.

We propose also to allow question of declaring war against Hungary and
 Roumania to stand over pending a decision as regards Finland. Ends.

522.

2859-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 244

Ottawa, December 3, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram Circular M.399 of November 28th. Following for
 Prime Minister. Begins.

The Canadian Government will associate itself in the declaration of war
 against Hungary and Roumania which will be made if the Hungarian and
 Roumanian Governments fail to fulfil the conditions laid down in the note
 referred to in Circular M.399 mentioned above.

The Canadian Government propose in this case to adopt the same policy
 to Roumanian and Hungarian nationals in Canada as that which has been
 outlined to your High Commissioner here to cover Finnish nationals. Ends.

523.

2859-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.425

London, December 5, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

My telegram Circular M.416. No reply has so far been received to communication addressed to the Finns, and if none is received in the course of the day, question may arise tonight of our instructing His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington to request the United States Government to inform the Finnish Government that we shall consider ourselves at war with them. In that event you would be informed simultaneously that such instructions are being sent to Lord Halifax.

We assume that in that case you would send similar instructions to your Minister at Washington. It might be helpful, if time permits, that his approach to the United States Government should be concerted with Lord Halifax's and with other Dominion Ministers. We are asking the New Zealand Government whether they would wish Lord Halifax to act at the same time on their behalf.

The above applies also to our proposed Declaration of War against Hungary and Roumania. No replies have yet been received from either Government, and we propose therefore to ask the United States Government at the same time to address similar communication to the Hungarian and Roumanian Governments. Ends.

524.

2859-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1954

Ottawa, December 5, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. It is probable that an Order in Council will be made December sixth authorizing a submission to the King asking the King to approve the issuing of a Proclamation of a state of war between Canada and Roumania, Hungary and Finland.

2. As in the case of Italy, the procedure will be that you will, when authorized in the manner set out in paragraph 4 of this telegram, obtain the King's oral approval of the proposed Proclamation without presenting any written submission. The written submission will be sent later for the King's signature, and will bear the date of the oral approval.

3. I would suggest that you now make tentative arrangements to be received by His Majesty.

4. The action described in paragraph 2 is to be taken immediately after you receive from me a code telegram in the following form:

Roumania, Hungary and Finland. Please obtain the King's approval.
Date of commencement of war, December sixth.

5. Before leaving to obtain the King's approval, please telegraph the approximate time you expect that it may be given.

6. Please inform the King that His Majesty's Government in Canada desires that his approval may be communicated by telegram through you. Please state in that telegram the exact time and place of the approval.

7. Please acknowledge receipt of this telegram.

525.

2859-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2299

London, December 6, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 1954 of December 5th. Arrangements made with Buckingham Palace to secure The King's oral approval immediately on receipt of your telegram. At the suggestion of The King's Private Secretary, as His Majesty is away from London and audience therefore very difficult, intimation of The King's approval will be transmitted to me by telephone.

MASSEY

526.

2859-40

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR M.432

London, December 6, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. My immediately preceding telegram. Declaration of War against Finland, Hungary and Roumania. Following is text of instructions which are being sent forthwith to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington. Begins.

1. Please ask the United States Government to instruct the United States Minister[s] at Helsingfors, Budapest and Bucharest, to convey following message to Finnish, Hungarian and Roumanian Governments.

2. Message begins.

On (Finland only November 28th; remainder November 29th) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom conveyed to Finnish (Hungarian, Roumanian) Government, through the United States Minister at Helsingfors (Budapest, Bucharest) a message to the effect that unless by December 5th the Finnish (Hungarian, Roumanian) Government had ceased military operations and had in practice withdrawn from all active participation in hostilities against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Majesty's Government would have no choice but to declare the existence of a State of War between the two countries. (Finland only). Since reply of the Finnish Government makes it clear they have not complied with the above conditions and do not intend immediately to do so, a State of War will exist between the two countries as from 12.01 a.m. (repeat 12.01 a.m.) Greenwich Mean Time on December 7th. (Hungary and Roumania only). Since Hungarian (Roumanian) Government have returned no reply to this communication, and since information at the disposal of His Majesty's Government affords no indication that they intend to comply with the above conditions, a State of War will exist between the two countries as from 12.01 a.m. (repeat 12.01 a.m.) Greenwich Mean Time on December 7th.

Message ends.

3. It is essential that these messages should be delivered before the time specified above, and I should be grateful if the time of delivery could be reported.

4. Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa have been informed of these instructions. You will be informed if the New Zealand Government wish you to request the United States Government to inform the Finnish, Hungarian and Roumanian Governments and [*sic*] that a State of War will similarly exist between New Zealand and those countries. Canadian and Australian Ministers may receive instructions to concert action with you if time permits, but you should not on this account delay your action on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. So far as the Union Government is concerned, we understand that owing to necessary preliminaries concerted action will not be possible. Ends.

527.

2859-40

*Décret du Conseil**Order in Council*

P.C. 9542

December 6, 1941

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 6th December, 1941, from the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, representing:

That the United Kingdom has declared war against Roumania, Hungary and Finland by reason of the persistence of those countries in fighting on the side of Germany and against countries allied with Great Britain in the present war;

That the actions of Roumania, Hungary and Finland in thus assisting the Axis powers are helping to jeopardize the defence of all the nations of the British Commonwealth and the freedom of all countries;

That the Government of Canada, in accordance with the decision of the Parliament of Canada for effective co-operation by Canada at the side of Britain to resist aggression, has associated itself with this declaration; and

That it is expedient that a Proclamation should be issued declaring the existence of a state of war between Canada and Roumania, Hungary and Finland.

The Prime Minister, therefore, recommends that the advice of the King's Privy Council for Canada be submitted to the King, with a view to the authorization by His Majesty of the issuing of a Proclamation forthwith, to be published in the *Canada Gazette*, to the following effect:

Declaring that a state of war with Roumania, Hungary and Finland exists and has existed in Canada as and from the seventh day of December, 1941.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendation and submit the same for approval.

528.

2859-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1960

Ottawa, December 6, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. My telegram No. 1954, Roumania, Hungary and Finland. Please obtain the King's approval. Date of commencement of war December 7th (repeat December 7th), 1941.

529.

2859-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*

TELEGRAM 503

Ottawa, December 6, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. Council has authorized the issuing of a declaration of the existence of a state of war with Roumania, Hungary and Finland as and from the seventh day of December, 1941. The action has been submitted to His

Majesty the King for approval and, upon receipt of such approval, it will be necessary to take action with a view to informing the Governments of the three countries concerned.

It is desired that you should make arrangements with the State Department requesting them to ask their representatives in Roumania, Hungary and Finland to inform the Governments of those three countries that the Government of Canada considers that a state of war has existed between Canada and Roumania, Hungary and Finland as and from the seventh day of December, 1941.

While formal action cannot be taken until word has been received from the King, you can doubtless make preliminary arrangements facilitating ultimate action.

When word has been received from the King, the following telegram will be sent to you *en clair*.

Declaration of war Roumania, Hungary and Finland approved as and from December 7, 1941.

530.

2859-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2305

London, December 6, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. King's oral approval given to Proclamation of a State of War between Canada and Roumania, Hungary and Finland, at 10.00 p.m. today, December 6th, at Windsor Castle.

MASSEY

531.

2859-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*

TELEGRAM 506

Ottawa, December 6, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Declaration of war Roumania, Hungary and Finland approved as and from December 7, 1941.

532.

2859-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR C.12

London, December 6, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. Defence. War has broken out with Finland, Hungary and Roumania.

533.

2859-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 252

Ottawa, December 6, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

I desire to inform you personally that a Proclamation by His Majesty on the advice of His Privy Council for Canada has been issued at this moment¹ in Ottawa declaring and proclaiming that a state of war with Roumania, Hungary and Finland exists and has existed in Canada as and from the 7th day of December. Ends.

534.

2859-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne
Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1962

Ottawa, December 6, 1941

IMPORTANT. A Proclamation by His Majesty the King acting on the advice of His Privy Council for Canada has been issued in Ottawa today declaring that a state of war with Roumania, Hungary and Finland exists and has existed in Canada as from the 7th day of December. Please officially inform the Government.²

¹La proclamation porte la date du 7 décembre 1941.

²Des télégrammes identiques furent envoyés aux hauts commissaires en Australie, Nouvelle-Zélande, Irlande, Afrique du Sud et Terre-Neuve, aux ministres aux États-Unis, au Japon, Brésil et en Argentine, et aux consuls au Groenland et à St-Pierre-et-Miquelon.

¹The proclamation was dated December 7, 1941.

²Identical telegrams were sent to the High Commissioners in Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, South Africa and Newfoundland, the Ministers in the United States, Japan, Brazil and Argentina, and the Consuls in Greenland and St. Pierre and Miquelon.

535.

2859-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

DESPATCH 810

Ottawa, December 7, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 1960 and your telegram No. 2305 regarding the commencement of war between Canada and Roumania, Hungary and Finland.

I enclose the Submission, signed by the Prime Minister, advising His Majesty the King to approve the issuing of the Proclamation of war.

The original document, with the King's approval endorsed, should be returned to me in order that it may be placed in the permanent records of the Canadian Government.

Enclosed are five copies of the Proclamation. I should be obliged if you would send copies to the United Kingdom Government.

I have etc.

J. E. READ
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le Premier ministre à Sa Majesté le roi
Prime Minister to His Majesty the King*

Ottawa, December 6, 1941

The Prime Minister of Canada presents his humble duty to His Majesty the King.

It is expedient that a Proclamation should be issued in the name of His Majesty, in Canada, declaring that a state of war with Finland, Hungary and Roumania exists in Canada as and from December 7th.

The Prime Minister of Canada, accordingly, humbly submits to His Majesty the petition of The King's Privy Council for Canada that His Majesty may approve the issuing of such a Proclamation in His name.

The Prime Minister of Canada remains His Majesty's most faithful and obedient servant.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

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CHAPITRE III/CHAPTER III

RELATIONS AU SEIN DU COMMONWEALTH
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

PARTIE 1/PART 1

LA MISSION CRERAR
THE CRERAR MISSION

536.

951-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.19

London, September 21, 1939

MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. In view of great range and complexity of problems confronting us all at this time we have been reviewing recently in the War Cabinet the existing system of collaboration between Governments of the British Commonwealth and considering how far it meets the needs of the present situation and whether improvements could be suggested.

2. We are, as you know, making the fullest use possible of channels already available:

- (a) By direct communication between Governments;
- (b) By interchange of information through the High Commissioners both in London and in the Dominion capitals;
- (c) Through the agency of political and service officers serving under your High Commissioner here who are engaged in dealing with particular subjects.

3. The question is therefore one of supplementing the existing agencies of collaboration in view of the immensity of the joint effort which we are called upon to make if a successful issue is to be assured.

4. At this stage when you yourself must be faced with innumerable pressing problems which cannot be delegated and when we do not know the full extent of the risk of dislocation of business here through enemy attack I should not feel justified in suggesting a personal meeting between Prime Ministers in London. But in my judgment considerable advantage would be gained by early personal contact on ministerial plane if this could possibly be arranged.

5. Indeed it appears to me that unless some arrangements for such contact can be made at an early date we shall not easily reach a clear picture or a full understanding of the nature and of the extent of our common task and of the special difficulties confronting each of us, or be able to co-ordinate to the best advantage the contribution which each can make.

6. On the assumption that you would be in general agreement with these views I should like to enquire whether it would be possible for you to designate one of your Cabinet colleagues to make a brief visit to London at an early date in order to discuss the position in all its bearings with us and if possible with Ministers from other Dominions also. I feel confident we here should benefit greatly from the fuller knowledge which we should thus gain of your problems and plans. I should hope too that you would be assisted by the first-hand impressions which a ministerial representative would form while he was here and by the full report which he would be able to bring back with him.

7. A complementary extension of liaison arrangements on service matters would, I think, be a natural corollary. In naval matters we are inclined to think that the present arrangements are sufficient but on the evidence available it looks to us as though, having regard to rapid expansion, further liaison as regards both military and air matters might be helpful and we should like to suggest, as regards these matters, that it might be advisable for the visiting minister to be accompanied by military and air officers of the status generally corresponding to that of Deputy Chiefs of Staff here. These officers might perhaps remain in London for day to day discussions with their service colleagues here after the minister had left.

8. Similarly in relation to equipment, munitions and supply including food and raw materials in any cases where it is found arrangements do not at present exist on a sufficient scale, the appointment of special Dominion Liaison Officers to supplement existing contacts with the civil departments concerned in this country might also deserve consideration. In the meantime we are endeavouring to arrange that these departments should maintain best possible touch with your High Commissioner and his staff.

9. I should be grateful if you would consider above suggestions and let me know as soon as you can whether these commend themselves to you as an immediate step to further closer collaboration which would be so valuable to us all.

10. Similar telegrams sent to other Prime Ministers. Ends.

537.

951-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 88

Ottawa, October 4, 1939

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your Circular D.19. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. We are in full agreement as to the desirability of examining from time to time whether existing channels and contacts are adequate to meet increasing needs for consultation between the Governments of the British Commonwealth on problems arising out of the war.

2. We concur in the view that it would be desirable to provide for an early meeting of a member of the Canadian Government with your Ministers, and I have asked my colleague, the Honourable T. A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources, to proceed to London as soon as he can make the necessary arrangements, in order to bring back to us his firsthand report of the problems you are facing and the efforts which are being made to meet them, as well as to indicate our own situation and plans. While we recognize that it would be helpful to discuss common questions also with Ministers from other parts of Commonwealth who might be in London, we do not consider, in view of difficulty of arranging for simultaneous presence in London of Ministers from all the various parts of Commonwealth and of necessity of making Mr. Crerar's visit brief, that it would be desirable to make this an essential condition of the arrangement. In this connection we have, as you are aware, recently decided to appoint High Commissioners to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland. The latter two countries have already reciprocated and Australia plans to send a High Commissioner to Canada shortly.¹

3. We shall seek to have senior military and air officers accompany Mr. Crerar, but we are doubtful whether arrangements could be made for their remaining indefinitely in London.

4. As regards arrangements for the interchange of views and information on questions of supply and economic defence generally, the necessity of increased facilities for intergovernmental communication is already recognized here. We consider it desirable, in order to ensure effective coordination of effort, that officers assigned to particular aspects of such work should act under the general supervision of the High Commissioner. We consider it would be possible to utilize increasingly for consultation with civil departments and with various agencies of commodity control the services of representatives of Departments of Trade and Commerce and Agriculture now in England who are familiar with the general background of commercial relations between our countries. As regards questions of economic defence gen-

¹ Voir les documents 1-20.

¹ See Documents 1-20.

erally, including problems arising out of blockade enforcement, coordination of export controls, and shipping matters of concern to both Governments, we have in mind making special provision by attaching a senior officer to the High Commissioner's staff who will be available as liaison between appropriate United Kingdom departments and corresponding Canadian Government services. Ends.

538.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

868/9

Ottawa, October 4, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Prime Minister,

As a result of the conversation which we held yesterday at the time when I handed you the statement which it was proposed to make in London today relative to the visit of one of your colleagues to London to confer with Ministers of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and with Ministers from the other Dominions, I thought it well to acquaint the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs with your views and to lay emphasis upon your desire that it should be clearly understood that the meetings to be held should be solely for the purpose of consultation, co-ordination and co-operation. I reiterated your opposition to any suggestion that anything in the shape of an Imperial War Council was being set up and I asked that, if possible, I might be furnished with a reassuring message to this effect which I might give to you.

This morning I received a telegraphic communication outlining the method being adopted to prevent the press describing the meetings as similar to an Imperial War Cabinet or Council on the lines set up in 1917, and I am told that the press is being informed that the meetings between Ministers of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and Ministers representing His Majesty's Governments in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa are "for the purpose of consultation, co-ordination and co-operation. There is and can be no question of departing from the well-recognised principle that executive responsibility remains with the several Governments individually". "This principle", the communication to the press adds, "has been made abundantly clear by constitutional developments during the last fifteen years and by the passing of the Statute of Westminster. But the fact that this is the position only emphasises the need for constant consultation by all practicable methods, especially when vital issues are at stake and when member nations of the British Commonwealth are concentrating all their energies on a common task".

In a further telegram I am informed that arrangements have also been made for a question to be asked in the House of Commons and an answer to be made thereto to meet the point raised by you in our conversation yesterday, and I am instructed to let you know that this is being done.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

539.

951-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 385

Ottawa, October 4, 1939

IMMEDIATE. We were advised yesterday of statement to be made in London today regarding consultation between Ministers of Commonwealth Governments and press here was given the statement simultaneously. In view of London press misconception of the nature of the consultation, the statement which follows in my immediately succeeding telegram *en clair* was given to the press this morning.

540.

951-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, October 4, 1939

IMMEDIATE. Following statement was issued to the press here today: Begins.

1. Commenting upon the announcement made in London and Ottawa today that arrangements were being made for further personal consultation on questions arising out of the war, the Prime Minister stated that the Honourable T. A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources, will proceed to London shortly for this purpose. Mr. Crerar will consult on specific matters with members of the Government of the United Kingdom, with a view to ensuring the most effective coordination of war effort, and will return as soon as possible in order to report on the situation to his colleagues. Mr.

Crerar will also confer on the situation with the members of any other Commonwealth Governments who may be in London at the same time.

2. The Prime Minister stated that the press report that an Empire War Cabinet or Conference was being set up is without foundation. No suggestion for setting up such a body has been made. Ends.

541.

951-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 596

London, November 1, 1939

MOST SECRET. Conversations and meetings arranged for visiting Dominion Ministers commence today with a meeting on foreign policy and the general situation, at 10 Downing Street. Tomorrow the general strategic position will be explained and Friday will be devoted to an account of the United Kingdom financial policy at the Treasury.

On Monday of next week a meeting will be held on the subject of strategic questions and Dominion militarization programmes and on Tuesday on United Kingdom civil defence.

These are the only meetings in the programme, the other days being devoted to visits to units of the fighting services and a short visit to France. The above meetings will be purely informative in character for the purpose of transmitting information through the visiting Ministers to the Governments represented.

The programme finishes on Wednesday November 15th, after which I am arranging for bilateral conversations between Crerar and members of his mission with corresponding United Kingdom Ministers and officials on such subjects as the following: 1. Wheat. 2. Bacon, cheese and other agricultural produce. 3. Financial questions. 4. Shipping. 5. Supply questions.

While of course at these conversations no attempt will be made to arrive at any decisions they will offer a useful opportunity for the visiting Ministers to express the Canadian Government's point of view to the Cabinet Ministers here. Crerar and I both feel that as problems of finance bulk very large in all the questions under consideration it would have been of great value if our special problems under the head of finance could have been expressed by a member privately representing the Department of Finance at Ottawa or the Bank of Canada. The United Kingdom Treasury will certainly be represented in all such conversations here.

MASSEY

542.

951-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 610

London, November 4, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL. Following for Prime Minister from Crerar. Begins. I have become impressed with urgency of utilizing Canada House and Brigadier Crerar as sole channel of communication for messages between the Department of National Defence and Department of External Affairs in Ottawa and Dominions Office and War Office here, on all matters concerning reception, quartering, training and general administration of Canadian troops for overseas service. At present certain communications on above subjects continue to pass through External Affairs Department direct to Dominions Office and hence to the War Office. Copies of these communications are only received at Canada House after some delay. Difficulties have already arisen in this connection and this might on occasion in war time be serious. Above suggestion would not of course prejudice in any way existing system of direct communication between Governments in examination of prospective military policies but consider that when implementation of agreed policy is decided upon it is most important that Canada House and Army Staff here should be sole agency through which action is obtained. Ends.

MASSEY

543.

951-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 619

London, November 7, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following for the Prime Minister from Crerar. Begins. Secret. At general meeting Friday evening, November 3rd, at Treasury, Chancellor of the Exchequer outlined Britain's financial war effort, and laid heavy emphasis on United States and Canadian dollar exchange difficulties which would require the United Kingdom Government to exclude imports from the United States and Canada other than those essential to winning the war. Pointed out available methods open for securing dollar exchange, among them mentioning borrowing in Canada. Chancellor explained that dollar exchange to pay for North American exports to Australia was (word omitted).

I spoke of difficulties we in Canada were facing; that we had made a close calculation of what we could take from national income for war effort in addition to ordinary expenditures; that what we could do to meet United Kingdom requests depended [to] considerable extent on price and rapidity

at which they purchased from us essential requirements such as foodstuffs. This covered line of argument outlined your telegram to Prime Minister here November 3rd¹ which should be most helpful.

The more we study whole matter of supply as related to finance in war effort the more impressed we are that at the present time and for some time to come this question of finance is and will be the dominant one. Frankly think Treasury here in its attitude is taking too narrow and unimaginative view and that it will be difficult to move them in this regard. Secondly Government Departments here are working with too little coordination between them. For instance, efforts of Food Ministry to drive trade bargains in case of some commodities such as bacon are not related to the large expenditures which service Departments are asking us to make. Moreover handling of wheat purchases reflects considerable confusion between the various controls operating on this side.

Am impressed by need of someone here qualified to discuss these more or less technical exchange matters with British Treasury officials on their own ground. Feel strongly that if Clark² or Towers³ could come clothed with some power to discuss, real progress could be made towards clearing up many of these difficulties. Would therefore strongly urge either Towers or Clark should come here earliest possible moment.

Would be glad to have reply if possible by Wednesday. Ends.

544.

951-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 519

Ottawa, November 8, 1939

IMPORTANT. Following for Mr. Crerar from Finance. Begins. We have been giving more detailed consideration to calculations of total governmental expenditures as a percentage of national income and have found it necessary to revise some of the figures used on pages four to six of the secret financial memorandum⁴ given you before you left Ottawa. Please make the following changes.

Canada's national income for 1938 should be reduced to \$3,575 million. (This is the carefully compiled estimate of the experts of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations who have shown that former estimates of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics are substantially too high.) Even assuming as much as a 15 per cent increase as a result of our military ex-

¹ Document 720.

² W. C. Clark, sous-ministre des Finances.

³ Graham Towers, gouverneur, Banque du Canada.

⁴ Non reproduit.

² W. C. Clark, Deputy Minister of Finance.

³ Graham Towers, Governor, Bank of Canada.

⁴ Not printed

penditures and substantial British orders in the first year the estimate would be increased to \$4,111 million for first year of war.

Estimate of municipal expenditures should be increased to \$300 million and an amount of \$40 million should be included in our own government's outlays to cover active loans excluding loans to provinces. This brings grand total of expenditures for war and other governmental purposes up to \$1,490 million or 36.3 per cent of estimated national income for first year of war.

If we assume that Canadian Governments could take as much as 42 per cent of the estimated national income this would mean \$1,727 million and would have a margin of only \$237 million to cover financial assistance for British purchases in Canada and for the special air training program. It is obviously optimistic to assume that our Governments can divert so large a percentage of the national income during the first year of war and the margin of \$237 million can only be made available on the assumption of prompt and substantial British purchases here and on the further assumption of drastic economies in our peace-time expenditures and probable early imposition of rationing programs. It should be emphasized that the calculations used above do not take account of possible further losses to Dominion Treasury on wheat if prices paid are unsatisfactory nor of the further fact that failure of United Kingdom to make substantial purchases will use up Dominion credit on account of the guaranteed bank loans to Canadian Wheat Board and at the same time tie up bank resources in these wheat loans.

We have also revised comparative figures for United Kingdom. Making certain deductions from Colin Clark's estimates, we arrive at an estimate of £5,200 million for the net national income in 1938 which with an assumed 15 per cent increase would mean £5,750 million for the first year of war. Net municipal expenditures should be reduced to not in excess of £500 million. We have however added a further £500 million for additional war expenditures later in this year. This would mean aggregate war and other governmental expenditures of £2,933 million or 51 per cent of the national income as estimated above. However in the case of United Kingdom part of the cost of the war can and will be met by the transfer of capital assets (foreign securities and gold) to other countries, say £200 million and a further amount, say, at least £50 million will be met by countries in sterling area allowing their sterling balances to accumulate in London which process is equivalent to the raising of a foreign loan by the United Kingdom. If we allow for these two factors, we reduce the percentage which the United Kingdom must take out of current production to under 47 per cent. If this is maximum percentage which United Kingdom can take during first year of war after two or three years of preparatory effort, it only serves to emphasize how difficult a task it will be for Canada to take as much as 42 per cent without the benefit of any momentum such as that attained by the United Kingdom in these active preparatory years and bearing in mind also the vastly different situation in Canada as mentioned at top of page two of the secret financial memorandum. Ends.

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH A.300

London, November 21, 1939

Sir,

With my secret despatch No. A.274 of November 6th, 1939,¹ I forwarded copies of the Draft Minutes of a Joint Meeting between the visiting Ministers from the Dominions and the Minister of Economic Warfare. I then mentioned that arrangements were being made for a bilateral discussion of questions concerning economic warfare which were of particular interest to Canada. In preparation for this discussion the following subjects were suggested as being questions on which further information would be welcome:

- (1) United States trade with neutrals in relation to Contraband Control.
- (2) Position with respect to transactions with suspect traders in the United States.
- (3) Situation respecting certain commodities of which Canada is a large exporter such as nickel, aluminium, asbestos, certain other metals and minerals, and certain foodstuffs.
- (4) Means of co-operation between Canada and the United Kingdom in the issue of export licences in order to mitigate seizure or delay by the Contraband Control.
- (5) Progress of negotiations with Neutrals for the conclusion of war trade agreements and nature of such agreements.
- (6) Position with respect to enemy export trade.

This discussion took place on November 17th, and copies of the draft minutes are attached hereto. The draft minutes contain a condensed report of a long and interesting meeting, and it may be of interest if I supplement these in certain particulars.

In connection with United States trade with Neutrals, there was some discussion, which is not referred to in these minutes, of the effects of the Neutrality Act. This will prevent United States vessels from entering European ports south of Bergen and north of Spain, and the Ministry has noted that certain United States ship owners have expressed the intention of increasing the services to Bergen. If this intention is carried out, it will present a difficult problem in contraband control, since in order to examine ships bound for Bergen it is necessary to take them into a control base inside the combat zone proclaimed by the President—a course which would give rise to resentment in the United States. It was also mentioned that up to the

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

present only one United States vessel has been detained by the British Contraband Control Committee for adjudication in the Prize Court. The minutes refer to the expectation that the navicert system would soon be instituted for the United States; Mr. Cross mentioned the date of December 1st in this connection.

In connection with the second subject relating to suspect traders in the United States, it was emphasized by the representatives of the Ministry that they would welcome as full information as possible concerning all cases in which Canadian materials valuable to Germany, such as cobalt and asbestos, were being purchased by doubtful consignees in the United States. A reference appears on Page 2 to unusually large consignments of motor tires recently sent to Switzerland from the Firestone plant in Canada. The Ministry are very anxious to prevent rubber in all its forms from reaching Germany, but they realize that, if the Canadian authorities were to intervene to restrict such shipments, the result would merely be to switch orders to the parent plants in the United States. They have been discussing with some large American corporations voluntary agreements to limit their exports to neutral European countries of goods which they particularly wish to deny to Germany. Arrangements have been completed or almost completed with General Motors, Standard Oil of New Jersey and the Texas Oil Company, and they hope that further arrangements will soon be made. As yet there have been no discussions with the rubber companies in the United States.

More time was devoted at the meeting to the discussion of the third point, relating to the situation of certain commodities of which Canada is a large exporter, than to any other question. The report given on Pages 2-5 of the minutes needs to be supplemented in some respects. It was agreed that no serious problems were likely to arise in preventing Canadian copper, zinc and lead from reaching Germany, because of the purchases of these metals by the United Kingdom and the concentration of production in a few companies in Canada. Similarly with nickel the chief need was to ensure full co-operation between the Governments of Canada and the United Kingdom. The regulation of aluminium, asbestos, cobalt, cadmium and perhaps one or two other items presents greater difficulties. The Ministry have not advanced very far in their studies of asbestos and aluminium. Asbestos is considered to be of highest importance from the contraband point of view, but aluminium is not so important because Germany can secure bauxite from continental sources. Wood pulp is in much the same position as aluminium. The situation of the Falconbridge Nickel Company in Norway, which was mentioned at this meeting, is dealt with in a separate despatch which is going forward by this mail.

Not much attention was paid to the fourth question, since suggested means of co-ordinating export control have been taken up with the Canadian Government since the list of questions was prepared (See Dominion[s] Office Telegram No. 78 of November 11th.¹) Discussion at the meeting was confined

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

to the most effective means of pooling information secured by Canadian Trade Commissioners in investigating orders in neutral countries with that obtained by British Consuls in the same connection.

With regard to the negotiations with Neutrals for the conclusion of war trade agreements, Mr. Cross gave at the meeting more exact information than is recorded in the minutes. The agreement with Sweden has been concluded except for one or two minor but difficult points which are still under discussion. The negotiations with Holland, Belgium and Denmark are well advanced. It had been left to the French to conduct the negotiations with Switzerland, but the French Government advanced proposals which were so unacceptable to the Swiss that the discussions have been broken off. They are being resumed in Paris and at the same time the Board of Trade is discussing with the Swiss an extension of the Anglo-Swiss Trade Agreement which would take factors of economic warfare into account. It is not intended at present to seek to negotiate a war trade agreement with Italy, but a general trade agreement is being concluded within the limits of which it will be possible to deal with questions of economic warfare. The war trade negotiations with Norway have been complicated by the parallel negotiations covering the chartering of Norwegian tankers which have now been initialled. In the Balkan States their exports with Germany could not be regulated by means of war trade agreements. The intention is to deny Balkan goods to Germany by taking on behalf of the Allies as large a volume as possible of the products in question, in return for Allied goods which the Balkans need to satisfy their own import requirements. Both the British and Germans are finding at present that the prices demanded in Roumania are too high, and each in their own interests are bringing pressure to bear on the Roumanian Government to reduce their export prices.

Little need be added to the report on Pages 7 and 8 of the discussion on Germany's export trade. I have heard it suggested that the recent action of Germany in laying mines indiscriminately may be considered a sufficiently flagrant illegality to warrant the stopping of German overseas exports as a reprisal. This question will soon be examined by the War Cabinet.

I think that you are now in possession of sufficient information to make clear the principles and methods of action of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. The "Handbook of Economic Warfare" has been supplemented by despatches and telegrams from the Dominions Office,¹ notably by circular despatch No. 58 of October 31st, on War Trade Lists, and by circular telegrams No. 78 of November 11th, on co-ordination of export control and No. 90 of November 16th, on bunker control. Additional information has been furnished in my despatches A.253 of October 24th, A.266 of November 1st, and A.274 of November 6th.

I have etc.

VINCENT MASSEY

¹ Non reproduits.

¹ Not printed.

P.S. It has been announced by Mr. Chamberlain since this despatch was finished that an Order in Council would shortly be issued subjecting exports of German origin or ownership to seizure on the high seas, in retaliation for illegalities committed by the German Navy.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Projet de procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue au ministère de la
Guerre économique*

*Draft Minutes of a Meeting held at the
Ministry of Economic Warfare*

SECRET

[London,] November 17, 1939

PRESENT

Mr. R. H. Cross, M.P.,
Minister of Economic Warfare (In the Chair).

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Frederick Leith-Ross,
G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Director-
General, Ministry of
Economic Warfare.
Mr. W. J. Garnett, M.B.E.,
Dominions Office.
Mr. J. W. Nicholls,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.
Mr. C. N. Stirling,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.
Mr. A. D. Marris,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.
Lieut.-Col. V. Dykes,
C.B.E., R.E.,
Secretary.

CANADA

The Hon. T. A. Crerar, M.P.,
Minister of Mines and Resources.
The Hon. Vincent Massey,
High Commissioner in London.
Mr. Hume Wrong,
Representative to the League of
Nations.
Mr. L. D. Wilgress,
Director of Commercial
Intelligence,
Department of Trade and
Commerce.
Mr. L. Mayrand,
Office of the High Commissioner
in London.

United States Trade with Neutrals. MR. CROSS said that the sea-borne trade of the United States was being subjected to our contraband control in exactly the same way as that of other neutrals. United States shipments were not easy to deal with as a rule because, unlike the bulk cargoes from South American States, they were for the most part mixed cargoes, each item of which had to be considered in detail. The Ministry of Economic Warfare had concentrated their attention primarily on the deficiency commodities of Germany. They were trying to obtain guarantees from consignees that shipments would not be re-exported, and in this way they were gradually building up Black Lists. No Black List had yet been started for the United States, as our Ambassador had urged its postponement at least until the Neutrality Legislation had been modified in our favour. Now that this had

been achieved, the question of a Black List for the United States would be considered. There was evidence that considerable consignments of contraband were being shipped from America, particularly cotton, the exports of which to Holland, Denmark and Sweden had very greatly increased since the outbreak of hostilities. It was hoped soon to institute the Navicert system for America.

Suspect Traders in the United States. MR. WILGRESS said that the Canadian Government were concerned about the possibility of leakage through intermediaries in the United States. Several new purchasers in the United States had come into the market for certain Canadian metals, and the status of some of these traders was open to suspicion.

MR. CROSS said that the assistance of Canada in the investigation of the credentials of such traders would be most welcome. It was, of course, undesirable to refuse export permits unnecessarily, as trade must be kept going. As he had already explained, no Black List had been drawn up for the United States yet, but the Ministry of Economic Warfare had accumulated a certain amount of intelligence before the war concerning suspect traders. As additional information came in it would be possible to build up a United States Black List. It would almost certainly be found necessary in the near future.

MR. STIRLING observed that abnormally large consignments to Switzerland of motor tyres from the Firestone factory in Canada had recently been reported.

MR. CRERAR thought that the most important exports from Canada which would come within the scope of our Contraband Control were the base metals. The Companies concerned had expressed themselves as ready to give their fullest co-operation in preventing their products reaching Germany, and could be relied on to give all the help they could. He had been told that the export of nickel was being closely controlled by International Nickel.

Control of Canadian Nickel Exports. MR. CROSS expressed his appreciation of the steps which had been taken in Canada to control the export of metals. Canada was almost the sole exporter of nickel and control might best be exercised by a system of agreed quotas, such as he had suggested at the Joint Meeting held on the 3rd November, 1939. These quotas might perhaps be most conveniently worked out in London. The Ministry already had rough statistics of neutral consumption, but would welcome any further information which could be made available.

MR. MASSEY said that Canada would be able to give a great deal of information on this subject. Mond Nickel had already applied to him for advice regarding shipments of nickel to Russia. He felt sure they would be ready to assist in any way desired.

SIR FREDERICK LEITH-ROSS said that the Company naturally did not wish to cut off all supplies to some of their previous customers, and although the

United Kingdom Government would have preferred to have stopped shipments to Russia and Japan, they had agreed to let these countries have at least a proportion of their requirements.

MR. WRONG pointed out that the fulfilment of neutral demands for nickel would present some complications, since part of these requirements might be drawn from stocks in the United Kingdom and part from Canada. Careful co-ordination between Canada and the United Kingdom would be necessary.

It was agreed:

(i) That in view of Canada's predominant position as an exporter of nickel, control of this commodity would be best achieved by a system of quotas for neutral countries, such quotas to be discussed in London by representatives of the Canadian Government and the Ministry of Economic Warfare in collaboration with the Mond Nickel Company, and to be submitted to the Canadian Government for approval.

(ii) That pending the institution of such a quota system, all neutral demands for nickel should be examined in London.

Cobalt, Aluminium and Asbestos. The discussion then turned on other minerals exported from Canada such as cobalt, aluminium and asbestos.

MR. CROSS said that, as regards aluminium and asbestos, the Ministry of Economic Warfare had insufficient information of normal world consumption figures. Any assistance which could be given by the Canadian Government would be most welcome. A quota system might be appropriate for these commodities also, but the other Commonwealth Countries would have to be consulted in fixing them.

MR. STIRLING emphasised the importance of cobalt and asbestos, neither of which Germany could obtain easily from sources not under our control in one way or another. She had access to supplies of bauxite.

MR. WILGRESS said that the Canadian Government would be able to supply some statistics of normal consumption of these minerals. As regards asbestos, continental Europe depended very largely on Canada for its supplies. There were, however, a large number of intermediaries in the asbestos trade, which made it difficult to police the exports of this material. The smaller neutral countries adjacent to Germany were causing some anxiety. New customers for asbestos had recently appeared in these countries, but on the whole they seemed to be genuine traders.

Intelligence regarding Neutral Traders. MR. NICHOLLS suggested that the credentials of these traders might be investigated by British Consuls.

MR. STIRLING pointed out the value of requiring any doubtful traders to sign declarations guaranteeing that they would not re-export to Germany. These declarations had to be made before a British Consul and the fear that traders might be black-listed if they infringed their guarantees was a very useful deterrent.

MR. WILGRESS said that Canadian Trade Commissioners investigated

the status of traders wherever possible, but in some countries there was no Trade Commissioner.

It was agreed:

That reports by Canadian Trade Commissioners on the credentials and activities of importers in neutral countries should be passed to the nearest British Consul so that their information could be pooled and new facts reported to London.

Other Base Metals. The restriction of exports of other metals such as cadmium, ferro-silicon and ferro-alloys generally, was then discussed. All these metals were stated to be high in order of importance, except ferro-manganese which might be available to Germany from Russia.

MR. CRERAR said that it would be very helpful for the Canadian Government to be given full information so that the position could be explained to the various base metal companies, who would then be more ready to fall in with our requirements of their own free will. They would like to be able to discuss these questions with the companies before any quotas were finally fixed.

It was agreed:

That the Ministry of Economic Warfare should furnish the Canadian Government with a list arranged in order of priority of importance of the metals and minerals on the Export Licence List of Canada, and should suggest any additional commodities which should be added to the list.

MR. WILGRESS enquired whether it was important to restrict the export of wood pulp. The demands of Italy for this commodity had recently shown signs of increasing.

MR. STIRLING said that wood pulp could not be considered of high importance. It was hoped to bring pressure to bear on S.N.I.A. to restrict exports of rayon to Germany.

Co-operation in the Issue of Export Licences in order to avoid delay or Seizure of Cargoes. MR. CROSS suggested that no further discussion was necessary on the measures of co-operation between the United Kingdom and Canada in the issue of export licences in order to avoid delay or seizure of cargoes by the Contraband Control. A full explanatory telegram had already been sent on this subject to all Dominions. No doubt the Canadian Government would raise any questions in this connection on which they wished further discussion or guidance.

Progress of Negotiations with Neutrals for the Conclusion of War Trade Agreements. MR. CROSS said that he realised the desirability of Dominions being kept fully informed of the progress of negotiations with neutrals for the conclusion of War Trade Agreements. He was asking for authority to send out to Dominion Governments each week a periodical report on the activities of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, such as was now submitted to the War Cabinet in London. He proceeded to give the meeting some infor-

mation as to the progress of negotiations with various neutral countries, and on the possibility of restricting German imports of oil from Rumania. Italy was proving quite amenable, and there seemed to be no stiffening in the attitude of the smaller adjacent neutrals as a result of German pressure. A War Trade Agreement with Japan was probably impracticable, though we might obtain some restriction of supplies to Germany from Manchukuo (especially of soya beans) in return for assurances as to supplies of raw materials from British sources.

MR. MASSEY enquired whether it would be possible to obtain the voluntary co-operation of some of the larger industrial concerns in the United States.

MR. MARRIS said that negotiations were already on foot with some of the engineering and oil companies. Nothing had yet been done about rubber in this way. The case of cotton was a particularly difficult one.

Control of Enemy Export Trade. MR. CROSS said that we should naturally like to stop the export trade of the enemy. Germany's gold reserves were small, and she was largely dependent on her exports to overseas countries to finance her imports. She was making strenuous efforts to keep her export trade going for this reason. Acting against an enemy's export trade, however, involved considerable legal difficulties. In International Law it could only be initiated as a reprisal for illegal acts on the part of the enemy. So far Germany had committed several breaches of International Law, but these illegal acts, though in nature appropriate, in extent were as yet insufficient to give us a really strong case for reprisals. It was in one way unfortunate that we had made so light of our losses at sea since the beginning of the war. If we had been able widely to advertise heavy losses of shipping, involving inhumanity to the crews of the vessels we should now have better justification for retaliation. The whole question was shortly to be considered by the War Cabinet. It was naturally important to choose a suitable moment for initiating this form of pressure. For example, a German invasion of Holland would provide an excellent occasion. No doubt even now we could make a good case which would satisfy the man in the street even in neutral countries, but this might not satisfy an international lawyer.

MR. CRERAR doubted whether there would be any serious opposition from the United States.

MR. CROSS, referring to the channels of German export trade, said that this was mainly carried out through Rotterdam, Trieste and Genoa, though the trade through Rotterdam had decreased considerably since the war. Last year Germany's export trade amounted to R.M.1,200,000,000 but even without direct action on our part it would certainly be considerably curtailed now. Direct attack on German exports would present formidable difficulties. No doubt numerous dummy companies would be set up in adjacent neutral countries, particularly Holland, and it would be difficult to prove the ownership of cargoes. It would probably be necessary, by delaying their shipping, to make things so uncomfortable for neutral countries as to induce them to

prevent the establishment of these dummy companies. If German export trade was to be attacked, certain parts of the machinery of the Ministry of Economic Warfare would have to be approximately doubled, and there would inevitably be further serious delays in shipping. These delays would be to our disadvantage from the point of view of fulfilling our own import requirements. He emphasised that the whole question of the possibility of attacking the German export trade was at the present time a highly confidential matter. It was important not to give the enemy any inkling that we were contemplating this form of pressure; otherwise they would be particularly careful to refrain from giving us any excuse for reprisals.

MR. MASSEY expressed his appreciation of the very interesting discussion which had been held. In the light of the information which the Canadian representatives had received, closer co-operation in the exercise of economic pressure on Germany would undoubtedly be facilitated.

546.

951-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH A.302

London, November 22, 1939

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose copies of a record of a meeting between the Minister of Supply and Mr. Crerar and Canadian officials which took place on November 21st. Mr. Burgin was accompanied at this meeting by Lord Weir and a number of other heads of the branches of his Ministry. The chief purpose of the meeting was to secure from the Ministry of Supply a general review of their requirements of metals, timber, other raw materials, explosives and chemicals, Tanks and munitions which they hoped to meet from Canadian production.

The enclosure gives a straightforward account of the proceedings which it seems necessary to supplement only at two points. First, with respect to timber Mr. Burgin used emphatic language in depicting the urgent need of imports. He said that there was a serious risk of a timber famine in the United Kingdom and that they were at present ransacking the world for supplies. The almost complete closing of the Baltic was primarily responsible for the shortage. Timber was being bought in Portugal, Yugoslavia and France, and they would want everything that they could get from Canada. He expressed the hope that the Canadian producers would be able to provide timber better prepared for United Kingdom requirements than had been the case in the past.

The second point relates to Sir Harold Brown's explanation of the situation with respect to munition orders. He pointed out that new capital expenditures of about £1,500,000 were included in a total of £7,040,000 given on

Page 6, and Mr. Burgin said that the Ministry were trying to confine to Canada the placing of orders which involved new capital expenditures and hoped to limit their purchases of munitions in the United States to orders which could be currently filled "off the rack."

I have etc.

VINCENT MASSEY

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Notes d'une réunion avec la délégation canadienne

Notes of Meeting with the Canadian Delegation

[London,] November 21, 1939

The matters discussed are sufficiently shown by the under-mentioned notes:

1. METALS

U.K. Government purchases made of and under negotiation for Metals from Canada so far include the following quantities:

Copper	188,000 tons
Lead	110,000 "
Zinc	138,500 "
Aluminium	48,000 "

The purchases have generally been made at a price which compared with the present world level of prices, is very satisfactory from the U.K. Government point of view. The Contracts cover the whole of Canada's exportable surplus of Copper, Zinc, and Aluminium, and the purchase of Lead represents a substantial increase on normal purchases.

It is understood that the Copper producers are a little perturbed at the possibility that if the war continues the U.K. might in the second year buy a larger proportion of its needs of Copper from Rhodesia or other sterling areas, to avoid finding dollars. Subject to the Exchange position, if the war continues it is hoped to obtain requirements of Copper and other metals from within the Empire in roughly the present proportions.

Canada has only been able to supply 48,000 tons of Aluminium out of a total estimated production of 84,000 tons, of which only between 5,000 and 10,000 tons are needed for Canadian home requirements. This is due to their having had large forward sales. U.K. requirements will increase steeply and it is hoped to obtain more from Canada in future years. It is hoped the Canadian Government will give their co-operation in any proposals made for developing further production of Aluminium in Canada.

In addition to the foregoing, the Iron and Steel Control have arranged for purchases by the Steel industry of some 200,000 tons per year of Steel and Ferro Alloys from the Dominion Steel Corporation. This represents practically the whole exportable surplus of the Canadian industry, and includes ingots for which the Canadian producers are increasing their plant.

The Mond Nickel Company continue to import Nickel Matte.

No difficulties arise on these arrangements apart from shipping.

2. TIMBER

In peace a large part of U.K. supplies of Timber (apart from hardwoods) came from the Baltic and Russia. This source is now largely curtailed and it is, therefore, necessary to obtain more of U.K. requirements of softwood from Canada, particularly from the Western Coast. Up to November 4th the following purchases have been made by the Timber Control (now the sole purchasing agency):

Softwoods	215,000 Standards
Hardwoods	748,000 c. ft.
Pitwood	544,000 loads
Plywood	20,000,000 sq. ft.

If shipping were available, large additional purchases would be made. Owing to shortage of tonnage only a small part of the Timber purchased has been lifted. There is still 120,000 Standards in Western Canada and 36,000 Standards in Eastern Canada which will be ready by the end of the year but for which no shipping is at present available. The position is so serious that U.K. are considering carrying Timber by rail across Canada to the East Coast for shipment.

All purchases of Canadian Timber by the Timber Control have been made through Shippers' Agents in this country. The Controller has been in touch with the Timber Commissioner for Eastern Canada and has obtained useful information from him.

To centralise the purchase of Pitwood from Newfoundland and Eastern Canada, the principal Agents have formed a Limited Company and three representatives have gone to Canada to explore the position.

Mr. Crerar emphasized the necessity of an early decision if substantial pit-prop cutting in the Maritimes was required for next year's sales.

Mr. Crerar further mentioned the possibility of white spruce being sent to Port Churchill for shipment during free navigation period.

Mr. Crerar felt that if there were to be a substantial increase in winter cutting, it might be necessary to give some reassurance that when the timber had been cut, this would not be left on the lumber-men's hands.

Mr. Crerar also asked for particulars as to box-board requirements for packing case purposes, and with regard to timber generally, suggested that if there were special sizes which the U.K. Government were likely to require, particulars of these should be given at an early date with a view to the Canadian lumber-men being called together to hear of them.

3. RAW MATERIALS

There are a number of materials and manufactured articles which are coming to the U.K. from Canada in the ordinary way of trade and for which it is important that the supply should be maintained. No difficulty about these supplies is at present foreseen, but if difficulty does arise it might be necessary to ask the help of the Canadian Government. Outstanding examples of articles for which it is important that supplies should be maintained are: Manufactured Abrasives (i.e. Carborundum and Aluminium Abrasives) and Hosiery Latch Needles.

Asbestos. Last year the U.K. purchased 22,000 tons out of a total of 50,000 tons. Future estimated requirements are in excess of 30,000 tons.

Hides, Leather, etc. The Leather Controller does not propose to buy from Canada at present. Certain leathers for civilian use are being imported from Canada through ordinary channels.

Paper and paper-making materials. The U.K. has not yet begun to increase purchases of wood pulp from Canada. The Paper Controller has been in contact with the Pulp Association of Canada to ascertain what supplies might be available if needed but has not yet received this information.

4. EXPLOSIVES AND CHEMICALS

Lord Weir explained the position generally as follows:

(a) *T. N. T. production.* Canadian Industries Ltd. have contracts from us absorbing their entire existing facilities, and negotiations are proceeding with this firm for an expansion of their plant.

(b) *Acetone.* Arrangements have been made to purchase 1,500 short tons per year of Acetone from the Shawinigan Company. Consideration is being given to an increase of their plant to enable them to produce 5,000 tons per year.

(c) *Cordite.* Lord Weir explained that for 1941 the deficit was so great that it would look as if, apart from purchases from the United States which were necessary for the 1940 programme, it might be necessary to incur capital expenditure on a scale in Canada to the extent of 3 or 4 million pounds. It was felt that any such expenditure should be by the U.K. for the U.K. Government account and U.K. Government ownership, with possibly a Canadian contribution in respect of any proportion of the finished product which Canada might desire to use.

(d) *Chlorine and its derivatives.* Lord Weir explained the possibility of a useful collaboration between Canadian Industries Ltd., and the Shawinigan Company, and as to the best method by which a chlorine derivative could be shipped across the Atlantic.

5. TANKS AND TRANSPORT

Brigadier J. S. Crawford explained the position.

Machine Gun Carriers. Canada has an order for 100 Carriers from the U.K. Government, to which they have added 25 for themselves. They have asked if the U.K. will increase their order to 200, and this has been provisionally agreed subject to approval of dollar expenditure. Further orders can be placed if Canada's production is satisfactory. All details have been agreed between technical staffs.

Tank production. The Vickers Infantry Tank, Mk. III, Valentine, has been offered to Canada for production. 25 was suggested as an educational order, but since the war this has been increased to 100. The Valentine Tank is thought most suitable on account of its simplicity. It has been suggested that Canada produce the entire Tank except the engine, which will be supplied

from England. Armour plate should be purchased by them from America where suitable production capacity exists. None of these Tanks will be produced until 1941.

It was explained that the most suitable capacity for the manufacture of these Tanks would be railway shops, and Lord Weir suggested that Sir Edward Beatty might be approached on the matter. It was suggested further that transmission gear might have to be obtained from the U.S.A., as it was heavier than normal Canadian manufacture.

6. MUNITIONS

Engineer Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Brown explained the position with regard to purchases from Canada as follows:

- (1) Orders placed in Canada prior to the war on which production has not begun or been completed:

ITEM	QUANTITY	APPROXIMATE VALUE
<i>Artillery equipment</i>		
25 pdr. equipments	100	£300,000
" " carriages (additional)	200	300,000
<i>Small Arms</i>		
Bren machine guns	5,000	500,000
<i>Shell bodies</i>		
4.5"	100,000	230,000
3.7" (forgings only)	50,000	35,000
25 pdr.	150,000	190,000
		<hr/>
		£1,555,000

- (2) Orders which the British Mission have definitely been asked to place in Canada:

ITEM	QUANTITY	APPROXIMATE VALUE
<i>Artillery equipment</i>		
3.7" Gun liners	300	£240,000
40 mm. Gun barrels	500	100,000
2 pdr. Gun carriages	400	400,000
<i>Gun ammunition</i>		
3.7" Shell bodies, cartridge cases, fuzes, etc.	350,000	1,000,000
6" Shell bodies, fuzes, etc.	100,000	625,000
9.2" Shell bodies, fuzes, etc.	50,000	650,000
40 mm. Shell bodies, cartridge cases, etc.	500,000	625,000
25 pdr. Cartridge cases.	350,000	175,000
Small Arms ammunition n/c filled	25 millions	125,000
		<hr/>
		£3,940,000

(3) Other orders placed in Canada (on Government Arsenal, etc.)		
Small Arms ammunition (Cordite filled)	25 millions	£125,000
Plant for expanding shell production		260,000
		<hr/> £385,000
(4) Estimated capital expenditure in respect of (1) and (2) above.		<hr/> £1,160,000
TOTAL VALUE OF ORDERS PLACED OR IN PROCESS OF BEING PLACED AND OF ESTIMATED CAPITAL EXPENDITURE INVOLVED		<hr/> £7,040,000

As regards possible further orders on the assumption that war continues, these will, of course, depend on requirements and on the question whether capacity can be readily located or created in Canada over and above that required to meet the orders already placed. Subject to these provisos, there are possibilities of:

- (i) additional orders for gun barrels and for gun ammunition and components, some of which might be placed at an early date;
- (ii) continuation orders for items already placed, subject to progress on existing orders which in most cases are expected to run over the next 12-18 months.
- (iii) orders on Canadian Government Arsenal for 18 pdr. and 4.5" Howitzer ammunition according to spare capacity available.

A further point was raised at the conclusion of the meeting as to whether the U.K. Government would be prepared to purchase part of the output of a plant in Canada for activated charcoal for respirators. It was explained that the output of the smallest economic plant would be 10 tons per week, the charcoal to be made from cocoanut shell on the Sutcliffe patent.

The Director of Raw Materials promised to investigate the position, and to let Mr. Crerar have a note in due course.

The Meeting concluded at 4.15 p.m.

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951-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 731

London, December 1, 1939

Meeting took place at Treasury this afternoon at which Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretary of State for Air, Minister of Food, Minister of Supply, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and senior officials of Treasury were

present. Discussion was divided between general questions of war finance and wheat (see my telegram No. 732¹). Mr. Crerar emphasized once again that extent of Canada's participation in war depended on her success in getting her economy functioning satisfactorily.

Towers then gave a review of Canadian war financial background pointing out that Canada was anxious to establish as accurately as possible what her maximum effort could be; that they were willing to accept material sacrifices to make effort possible. He then pointed out estimates already reached visualized a deficiency in payments between the two countries of from ten to twenty-seven million pounds after repatriation.

In discussion yesterday with Phillips of Treasury, Towers had gone over this question and found no disposition to quarrel with above figures. Phillips also expressed opinion that problem was not a serious one although in this conversation as well as at meeting this afternoon the United Kingdom representatives avoided making definite statement to the effect that deficiencies would be met by cash. We shall have to ask for a definite statement in this respect shortly but feel that before committing themselves Government here is anxious to know exactly where they stand on wheat question.

MASSEY

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*Procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue à la Trésorerie
le 1^{er} décembre 1939*

*Minutes of a Meeting held at the Treasury
on December 1, 1939*

SECRET

[London,] December 2, 1939

PRESENT:

The Rt. Hon. Sir John Simon, G.C.S.I., G.C.V.O., O.B.E., K.C., M.P.
Chancellor of the Exchequer (In the Chair).

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. Sir Kingsley Wood, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Air.

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

The Rt. Hon. W. S. Morrison, M.C., K.C., M.P.,
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister of Food.

The Rt. Hon. Leslie Burgin, M.P.,
Minister of Supply.

Sir Horace Wilson, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.B.E.,
Permanent Secretary, Treasury.

¹ Document 615.

Sir Eric Machtig, K.C.M.G., O.B.E.,
 Permanent Under Secretary of State, Dominions Office.
 Sir Arthur Street, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., M.C.,
 Permanent Under Secretary of State, Air Ministry.
 Sir Henry L. French, K.B.E., C.B.,
 Secretary, Ministry of Food.
 Sir Arthur Robinson, G.C.B., C.B.E.,
 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Supply.
 Sir Frederick Phillips, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
 Third Secretary, Treasury.
 Mr. P. Liesching, C.M.G.,
 Assistant Under Secretary of State, Dominions Office.
 Mr. W. D. Wilkinson, D.S.O., M.C. }
 Mr. G. N. Fleming } Secretaries

CANADA

The Hon. T. A. Crerar, M.P.,
 Minister of Mines and Resources.
 The Hon. Vincent Massey,
 High Commissioner in London.
 Mr. Graham Towers,
 Governor of the Bank of Canada.
 Mr. Hume Wrong,
 Permanent Delegate of Canada to the League of Nations.
 Mr. L. D. Wilgress,
 Director of Commercial Intelligence, Department of Trade and Commerce.
 Mr. L. B. Pearson, O.B.E.,
 Official Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner in London.

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND CANADA DURING THE WAR

The matters to be discussed fell under two main heads:

(a) the general war-time financial relations between the United Kingdom and Canada; and

(b) the price to be paid by the United Kingdom for Canadian wheat on a 12 months contract. It was agreed to discuss the general financial problem first.

SIR JOHN SIMON said that the Canadian Ministers had heard a good deal during their visit about the financial position of the United Kingdom. It was very desirable that United Kingdom Ministers, for their part, should understand the financial and economic background to Canada's participation in the war.

MR. CRERAR said that he would like to make it clear that, so far as Canada was concerned, this was an "all-in" war. Canada would not approach any war-time problems in a bargaining spirit.

MR. TOWERS said that the Canadian Government had already indicated 200 million dollars as the amount which, in their judgment, they would be able to provide during the first year of the war to help the United Kingdom Government to meet their war expenditure in Canadian currency. The question might be asked "Does this figure represent the maximum effort which Canada can make *with comfort*; or is it a maximum which will entail *considerable sacrifices* by the people of Canada?" Mr. Mackenzie King had asked him to make it plain that Canada's contribution was going to be of the latter kind. After a definite period of time, the offer which they had made would, in actual fact, involve considerable sacrifices.

The reason why they had not estimated in figures their contributions for the second and succeeding years was that the position might alter out of recognition. The Canadian Government liked to fulfil their promises literally. Their figure for the first year was based on budgetary estimates. They reckoned that in this period the up-keep and expansion of their own military forces would cost them some 320 million dollars. Over and above this they had calculated that they could make an additional effort in the common cause represented by an expenditure of some 175 million dollars. They had made this calculation before they had been consulted about the Dominion Air Training Scheme. When it was realized that after deducting the Canadian share of the first year's cost of the Air Training Scheme, the amount available for United Kingdom purchases in Canada would be reduced to some 138 million dollars, it had been decided that some way must be found to provide a larger sum. They were determined not to be niggardly, and they had reached the conclusion that they must, by additional sacrifices, write up their additional war effort for the first year to 237 million dollars, i.e. a figure which, after deduction of 37 million dollars as their share of the Air Training Scheme, would leave a total of 200 million dollars free. This was intended to be a generous, rather than a prudent, estimate.

Since that time there had been certain modifications in the Air Training Scheme, with the result that Canada's share in the first year was now put at 46 million dollars.

SIR JOHN SIMON hoped that Mr. Crerar would not misunderstand him when he said that he had experienced a natural disappointment when he had found that the Canadian Government intended to deduct from their financial assistance the whole of their own expenditure under the Air Training Scheme, amounting under the revised proposals to 313 million dollars in three years. He had fully thought, before this information reached him, that the expenditure on the Training Scheme was intended to be something quite additional. Mr. Crerar, he knew, would forgive his anxiety. It was his duty as Chancellor of the Exchequer to conserve, in the face of heavy demands from all quarters, both British and foreign, this country's foreign exchange resources. These resources were our war chest in the present struggle. Every draft upon those resources brought nearer the day when we could no longer continue to fight a great war.

MR. TOWERS pointed out that the estimate of 237 million dollars was not intended to be a "stationary" figure i.e. that it was subject to revision in subsequent years or might even be revised at a later date in the present twelve months' period if the Canadian Government found that unexpectedly favourable conditions made such action possible. In this connection he had a further message from Mr. Mackenzie King and Colonel Ralston. They had asked him to tell the United Kingdom authorities that it was definitely in the mind of the Canadian Government that the putting forth by Canada of her maximum war effort would imply a curtailment of imports and a reduction of consumption.

SIR JOHN SIMON said that he had greatly appreciated Mr. Towers' exposition. He would advise the United Kingdom Government to accept gratefully the Canadian Government's offer, which he understood to be in the first year 237 million dollars less 46 million dollars, viz. 191 million dollars.

In the course of the above discussion, references were made to estimates of the United Kingdom's war-time expenditure in Canada. Mr. Towers said that his estimate of the amount of exchange left to be found by the United Kingdom in the first year, after taking account of the above offer was the equivalent of something between £10 million and £27 million. In framing this estimate he had taken account of the estimates supplied to him by Mr. Osborne of United Kingdom purchases of food and raw materials.

MR. TOWERS said that he could not sufficiently emphasize the fact that Canada would consider all these problems as the United Kingdom's partner in a great enterprise, and not in any narrow mercantile spirit. Once it was appreciated that Canada intended to make her partnership a real thing, there need be no misunderstandings or difficulties—all the pieces of the puzzle would fall into place. The next step would be to consider the question of priorities.

CANADIAN WHEAT

SIR JOHN SIMON thought that all the United Kingdom Ministers present had seen Mr. Crerar's letter of 24th November to Mr. Morrison. In that letter the offer was made of a contract over a twelve months period beginning 1st December to supply Canadian wheat at a price of 93½ cents per bushel. An alternative price of 1 dollar a bushel was quoted for a larger quantity spread over the period to July, 1941.

It was agreed that Mr. Crerar's letter might be taken as read.

SIR JOHN SIMON said that it would be of great assistance in elucidating the points in dispute if Mr. Crerar could indicate, without going into technicalities, what were the components included in the figure of 93½ cents which raised it so much above the present market price.

MR. CRERAR said that comparable wheat prices for the May future were now 78 or 79 cents per bushel. Spot wheat at Winnipeg was about 73 cents per bushel. The proposed price of 93½ cents per bushel was a Fort William

price, which embodied a number of charges which had in any case to be met after the wheat left the producer. For example, interest payments on the money invested in the wheat, storage and insurance.

SIR JOHN SIMON inquired whether it would be open to the United Kingdom Government to take delivery of wheat in Winnipeg at some such price as 73 cents, making their own arrangements for bringing it here.

MR. CRERAR said that the answer was in the negative. In quoting a figure of 93½ cents he had had in mind the grave depression now existing in the wheat producing Provinces. 73 cents was not a price at which a farmer could make a living. It was an altogether abnormal price.

It must not be supposed that the present low prices were steady. It was, indeed, altogether likely that wheat prices would tend to rise, and it was quite out of the question to consider a long term contract on the basis of the present values. His information was that prices had in fact increased by 3½ cents in the last three days. He was referring to sales both to the United Kingdom and to neutral countries.

In his judgment 93½ cents was the lowest figure which they could justify to their public opinion. Even that figure might be severely criticised when the Canadian Parliament met next January, by the Members for the Prairie Provinces.

It had also to be remembered that wheat prices had an important influence on Canada's economic prosperity. If 73 cents was to be the wheat price over the next twelve months the Canadian Treasury would be naturally affected. Its ability to contribute to the war effort would be impaired.

MR. TOWERS pointed out that the United Kingdom had for the last nine years, except possibly for brief periods, been enjoying the advantages of buying their food cheaply, while the Canadian producer had been suffering from the results of the low prices which he received for his produce. It would be quite impossible to convince the Canadian farmer that he was unreasonable in asking for better prices now.

SIR JOHN SIMON said that he fully appreciated the difficulties with which the Canadian Government were faced, but the result of the United Kingdom Government purchasing wheat above the world price would be that the price of the loaf in this country would go up. We had to face some inevitable increases in the cost of living, and the people were being taxed as heavily as was possible, and he found it very difficult to see how he could justify such a policy to the people of this country at a time when there was a bumper crop of wheat throughout the world.

MR. CRERAR replied that there was no world price in the ordinary sense of the term at the present moment. The Argentine might be willing to sell their wheat at very low prices, for fear that shipping difficulties might prevent them from selling it at all later on, but that was no reason why Canadian prices should be depressed. After deducting 7 or 8 cents for storage and 20

cents for freight and elevator charges, etc., the proposed price of 93½ cents represented a return to the farmer at his farm of some 65 to 66 cents per bushel. This was just sufficient to remunerate the farmer, who at present had to be subsidised by the Federal Treasury. The farmers did not expect to make profits out of the war difficulties of the United Kingdom, but they did hope to be able to make a living without subsidies. It was true that there was at present a world surplus of wheat, but this was very largely in Canada. If the war went on this might turn out to be a very fortunate circumstance. French production, for example, would probably fall heavily as a result of the mobilisation of so much of France's manpower. In this connection he made reference to the situation in the concluding years of the last war when there was much anxiety over the supply of food.

MR. MORRISON pointed out that, even if it were likely that prices would rise in the long run, the offer of wheat at 93½ cents related only to the present year's crop. If the Winnipeg Exchange were closed, at what price would wheat be sold to neutrals, and what would be the seaboard price as compared with the price at 93½ cents at Fort William?

MR. CRERAR said that they would probably ask the same price from neutrals, and that they would expect to sell at that price to countries such as Scandinavia which had always taken considerable quantities of Canadian wheat. There was no immediate reason why the cost of transport from Fort William to the seaboard should rise.

MR. TOWERS explained that, if it were desired to compare the proposed price with the present spot price, the proper basis was to compare 73 cents and 86 cents, i.e., to omit the figure for storage charges. In response to a question, he stated that storage charges were at present being borne by the Canadian Government, at least in respect of wheat in the hands of the Canadian Wheat Board. MR. CRERAR pointed out that prices for delayed delivery always reflected the carrying costs. MR. TOWERS suggested that—having in mind that the contract under discussion was a long term one—the price named was reasonable in the light of the protection which it afforded against a rise in wheat markets. He thought that if such a contract were arranged, neither side would find it entirely satisfactory, but the alternative would be the closure of the markets and a dispute that could only have bad results for both sides.

MR. CRERAR said that there would in any case probably be a strong demand for the closing of the Winnipeg Market, as the producers would not be willing to be left at the mercy of one strong buyer, namely, the United Kingdom Government. The wheat would then all come into the hands of the Canadian Wheat Board which would be subject to very strong political pressure to sell at a high price.

MR. MORRISON pointed out that if the loaf sold in this country were to be made entirely from Canadian wheat (and, though this would not be the case, we should probably be using a higher proportion than usual) an increase of

10 cents in the price of Canadian wheat would represent an increase of a halfpenny in the price of a 4 lb. loaf. The price of that loaf was now 9d, which was the highest figure at which it had been allowed to go in the last war, and the addition of 30 cents which would follow if the price of Canadian wheat rose from 70 cents to a dollar a bushel would mean a 10½d. loaf. Such an increase in the cost of living would have a very serious effect, not only on the spirit of the workers of this country, but on the whole capacity of the country to exert its maximum war effort.

MR. TOWERS thought that the principal causes of the increased cost of living in this country were the increase in freight rates, and the depreciation of sterling. Freight payments, however, were made mainly to British shipping and the depreciation of sterling was an act of deliberate policy, which brought indirect advantages to this country. The rise in prices was therefore primarily a matter of the internal distribution of payments, and it was not reasonable to try to counteract it at the cost of the external producer of raw materials. It ought further to be noted, in order to put matters in their right proportion, that, though the price of wheat was a matter of vital principle to the Canadian Government the total sum involved in the first year in the transaction that they were considering was only 20 million dollars.

SIR JOHN SIMON said that he was very grateful to Mr. Crerar and Mr. Towers for the information which they had given on this very difficult issue. He was afraid, however, that it had not removed the difficulties which he would have to face from the point of view of this country's policy, if he were to accept the suggestion put forward by the Canadian Government. The question of the cost of living was a critical point in the Home Front. He suggested that the meeting should be adjourned and that each side should think over what had been said by the other, with a view to further discussion.

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951-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 775

London, December 8, 1939

Following from Towers to Ralston. Begins.

1. Sir Frederick Phillips stated that the United Kingdom Government were willing to proceed along the line suggested by us at Meeting in Treasury last

Friday. In other words, they will be prepared, if necessary to use equivalent of pounds 10/27 millions in gold or United States dollars in connection with purchases in Canada during the first twelve months of the war. It will be recalled that these figures represent estimates which may be subject to changes in either direction. Phillips' latest estimate of this character is 16 millions.

2. I have suggested and they are ready to agree that the procedure should be as follows:

(a) They should use approximately \$100 million now owned by Control.

(b) The next \$45 million required should be provided by them through sale of gold or U.S.A. dollars.

(c) Subsequently we should provide \$65 million by means of repatriation or temporary accumulation of sterling balances pending repatriation.

3. The significance of item (c) is that the United Kingdom will be assured of obtaining Canadian dollars when supply mentioned in (a) and (b) gives out, whether or not repatriation of a sterling loan happens to be convenient at that moment.

4. The question of whether further gold or foreign exchange should be used by the United Kingdom as the next step or whether further repatriation should then take place within the limits of our total commitments is left for later discussion in the light of conditions at the time. It is to be understood that that respectively (?) includes sale of securities in Canada and other transactions of a like character. I have advised that if market conditions were appropriate we would be glad to see some dollars provided by the sale of securities held by their residents, in order to obtain diversification and lessen the amount of Canadian Government's financing. It is understood however that for the time being we expect to maintain our ban on outright sale of non-resident securities in Canadian market.

5. I raised the question of an exchange guarantee if we accumulated sterling balances in connection with item No. 2 (c) above and referred to Phillips' cables to Osborne¹ of the 13th and 19th October. Their view is that we are not justified in asking for a guarantee of exchange rates in view of the fact that a smaller amount is involved and that the balance would only be held temporarily until it was convenient for us to undertake a repatriation operation. I agree.

6. Will you please let me know whether I can advise Treasury and Bank of England that we are willing to proceed on the basis outlined above. Ends.

¹J. A. C. Osborne, représentant de la Trésorerie au Conseil britannique des approvisionnements; sous-gouverneur de la Banque du Canada, 1934-1938.

¹J. A. C. Osborne, Treasury representative, British Supply Board; Deputy Governor of Bank of Canada, 1934-38.

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951-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 646

Ottawa, December 11, 1939

SECRET. Following from Ralston to Towers. Begins.

1. Arrangement outlined in your code telegram No. 775 appears to be generally satisfactory but there are a few points on which I would like further clarification.

2. May I assume that your reference to limits of our total commitments in your paragraph (4) refers to the amount of \$237,000,000 less the cost of our share of air training scheme during first war year.

3. In estimating your £10,000,000 to £27,000,000 as the amount to be provided in gold or United States dollars have you included provision of Canadian dollars to cover shares of Australia and New Zealand in cost of air training scheme? This raises more general question of how net debit balances of other countries in sterling area (Australia, New Zealand, British West Indies, etc.) whose surplus imports from Canada will probably be cleared in sterling can be settled. Have you given consideration to this problem in connection with the general financial arrangement with the United Kingdom? I would appreciate your views on this matter and I realize that it may be inadvisable to raise this question with British authorities at the present time. You will remember that Foreign Exchange Control Board is allowing Canadian exporters to export to other Empire countries in terms of either Canadian dollars or sterling.

4. Can you advise me whether there is or is likely to be any disposition to minimize amount of purchases here in order to leave available for financing by either cash or gold only the smaller of the two amounts which you estimate will have to be financed in this way?

5. One aspect of the general question on which you were to report was the willingness of British authorities to make satisfactory price arrangements in connection with their purchases here, particularly wheat. I would like very much to get your impressions or rather your definite views on this point. Have you been keeping in touch with the wheat discussions and have you any advice to give me in that connection?

6. Prior to your departure from New York I phoned you in regard to the general problem of methods of purchasing and acquiring supplies in the United Kingdom needed for our services here and also for Canadian Forces in England and France. Probably Brigadier Crerar has made a study of the whole matter and it would be useful if you would ascertain from him and from Hodgins, the Treasury Officer, and also from any other helpful sources of information just what arrangements would seem to be best adapted to handling these matters throughout the war in a businesslike way from the point of view

of efficient purchasing, financial control, and the fitting of these purchases into our general financial arrangement. Ends.

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951-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 797

London, December 14, 1939

SECRET. Following from Towers to Ralston. Begins.

1. It was clearly understood that total commitment was 237 million dollars less our share of Air Training Scheme.

2. In my estimate mentioned your paragraph 3 there is no provision to cover air training costs or net debit balance of other Empire countries in sterling area. Authorities here understand that this is additional to amount which they will be called upon to finance in gold or United States dollars. While estimates are very difficult to make, amount involved on trade account probably not of major importance, say 15 million dollars, according to our Research Department.

3. In various discussions we have emphasized that curtailment of purchases would impair our ability to assist. I know that Treasury here would say that there was no disposition to minimise amount of purchases in order to reduce their United States dollars or gold requirements to the smaller of two amounts mentioned in my telegram. In other words, they accept our case as we have put it. On the other hand they are hardly in a position to guarantee a certain minimum as estimates are always subject to change. In these circumstances I think that our proper course is to await developments and it was partly for this reason that I suggested that second step in financing should be provision of 45 million dollars through sale of gold or United States dollars.

4. I have been in close touch with wheat discussions and believe there are two schools of thought. The first, including Rank, feel that satisfactory results can be obtained in open market. The second regret that it was not possible to make long term contract but are reluctant to accept responsibility for such a contract at price distinctly above market and therefore have not exerted themselves strongly to overcome opposing views. While re-opening of negotiations would probably be taken to indicate weakness on our part, a bulk sale is even now not impossible but I think they would stick to their decision not to go much beyond present market prices. In discussion at Treasury I spoke almost too plainly and said that if it were not found possible to arrange a long term contract acceptable to both sides they would pay dearly if conditions went against them while we would have to accept possibility that a short war or an improvement in shipping conditions would impair our trading position. There can therefore be no misunderstandings in regard to implications of present situation.

5. Will reply later to your paragraph 6. Ends.

552.

951-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 123

London, December 15, 1939

SECRET. Following from the Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. Mr. Crerar is leaving London today and I should like to let you know on behalf of my colleagues and myself how grateful we are to you for your kindness in sparing him to come here. His visit has made possible during the past six weeks an exchange of views over a wide range of subjects with results which I am confident will have contributed greatly to the effectiveness of our war effort. The assistance of the official staff which accompanied Mr. Crerar has been most valuable in connection with the discussions which have taken place. We appreciate very much the visit of Mr. Graham Towers at a time when it must have been so difficult for him to be absent from Canada. Our discussions on questions have afforded us a fresh opportunity of studying the factors affecting the financial situation in Canada, and we acknowledge with gratitude the assistance which Canada is giving and has expressed her readiness to give to the limits of her capacity in the future. Our talks with Mr. Crerar and Mr. Towers on these matters have been uniformly helpful and encouraging. Ends.

PARTIE 2/PART 2

CONFÉRENCES IMPÉRIALES DE GUERRE PROJÉTÉES
 PROPOSED IMPERIAL WAR CONFERENCES

553.

65-B(s)

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.145

London, April 22, 1940

MOST SECRET. Following from my Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. We have been considering further system of collaboration between Governments of the British Commonwealth with the object of examining whether any suggestions can be put forward for securing the closest possible contact and cooperation.

2. We have been much impressed by value of meetings with Dominion Ministers in London last autumn, which took place following upon suggestion conveyed in telegram Circular D.19 of September 21st.¹

¹ Document 536.

3. The problems confronting us are of such importance and need for our being completely satisfied that we fully understand and can meet each other's point of view is so important, that I feel that time has now come when best course is to arrange for a meeting of Prime Ministers. In the present circumstances such a conference, to obtain the greatest advantages, should be near the seat of war, and I would therefore suggest that it be held in London. I appreciate difficulties which Dominion Prime Ministers might well feel in leaving their own countries in the present circumstances, but, notwithstanding these difficulties, the advantages to be derived from such a meeting are so great that I trust that you will find it practicable to arrange to attend. I should be glad to arrange a time most convenient to you and other Prime Ministers; subject to your views, I should be inclined to suggest that July or early in August of this year might be most suitable.

4. I should be glad to learn from you at your early convenience whether you agree in general with proposal for holding of such a conference, and if so, whether you would be able to come to London at the time. I should not contemplate that anything in the nature of a detailed agenda need be prepared. The subject for discussion would clearly be joint war effort in all its aspects, and an opportunity might be afforded for, at any rate, the preliminary consideration of problems of post-war reconstruction. But if there are any particular problems which you would wish to see raised, you would no doubt let me know.

5. If it is decided to hold such a conference, it would I think, be desirable that every precaution should be taken on security grounds to keep intention secret as long as possible. Ends.

554.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, May 3, 1940

SECRET. Personal. Following for Mr. Rogers. Begins. Secret. You will recall my anticipation that Mr. Chamberlain might propose an early conference in London of Prime Ministers and my suggestion that you should take an opportunity of indicating my definite judgment that such an arrangement would be inadvisable at the present time. A telegram of April 22 from Mr. Chamberlain arrived in my absence suggesting such a conference. I have consulted colleagues and shall reply to Mr. Chamberlain shortly indicating the reasons which would seem to render it most inadvisable as well as next to impossible to accept the proposal at the present time. In the meantime I should be glad to learn whether you had an opportunity of discussing the question with Mr. Chamberlain and if so, the tenor of the conversation. Can you indicate yet probable date of your return? Ends.

555.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

London, May 6, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. PERSONAL. Following for Prime Minister from Mr. Rogers. Begins. Secret. Your telegram regarding conference in London of Prime Ministers. Your telegram from Mr. Chamberlain was sent before my only interview with him on April 24th and he did not speak of it during our brief talk. When I learned from Mr. Massey that copy of telegram from Mr. Chamberlain had been received at this office showing that proposal had been made, I felt that it had passed into official channels and Mr. Chamberlain would expect reply direct from you. I informed Mr. Massey that in my opinion it was improbable that you could attend such a conference. My present intention is to sail for Montreal on the ninth, this being first sailing after third. Had hoped to conclude business here before earlier date but this was not possible owing to preoccupation of Ministers with Norwegian affairs or without omission of brief visit to France which seemed important in view of probable trend of discussion in Parliament. It might be possible to arrive on earlier date by Air Clipper but departures have been very irregular and am informed that Odlum and Elkins could not accompany me in view of their military rank. If advisable to arrive at Ottawa before the 16th can apply for reservation on the Clipper for the 12th. Have had strenuous programme here but we have made definite progress in some of our negotiations, while Canadian defence discussions and exchange of information have been most useful. Am sure it will be of great assistance during the session. Have numerous personal messages to convey to you on my return. Ends.

MASSEY

556.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 500

Ottawa, May 7, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. The following for Rogers. Quote. Arriving here by sixteenth quite satisfactory. I strongly recommend carrying out your present intention to sail for Montreal on date mentioned and against attempting return by air clipper. Glad to know discussions so useful.

Am cabling Chamberlain direct tomorrow regarding his recent request. If at all possible, I wish you could see him personally to explain how all-impor-

tant it is for me not to be obliged to leave Canada for any conference for at least some time to come. I would like you to tell him how very strongly I feel it to be in the interest of allied powers for me to be at seat of government here to deal with situations, both domestic and foreign, as they arise. Believe I can be infinitely more helpful by using my influence with colleagues in Council at Ottawa to have right course taken and desired decisions reached, with world situation changing and continuing to change, than I could possibly be to British government by being in London. In coping with unforeseen situations which may arise, you might explain need there is certain to be to keep Canadian war effort at maximum and Canada itself united. Also I can think of nothing more important than to keep relations between the United Kingdom and United States as cordial as possible. I firmly believe my presence at Ottawa might serve a more useful purpose to British government, in helping to meet some critical situation in Canada or such as may develop between the United States and the United Kingdom, than would be possible for me to render in any other way. I also feel very strongly that such travelling and speaking as I may be able to undertake, once parliamentary session over, should be done in different parts of Canada and that my influence with Canadian people would be greatly prejudiced if, instead, I were obliged to be absent from Canada for any length of time and, particularly, to be speaking or broadcasting from Britain. You understand what the problem is. Please stress also fact that I am Secretary of State for External Affairs and President of Council as well as Prime Minister and that especially in dealing with matters vis-à-vis the United States and Japan, and questions for example such as those concerning Greenland, Jamaica, which have come up in past few days, my presence here is all but imperative. Please explain to Mr. Chamberlain delay in reply his message due to my absence from Canada at time of its receipt and also desire for full conference with colleagues before sending reply. I think I may say entire Cabinet are of my point of view.

If unable to see Chamberlain personally, please explain situation fully to Massey, so that he may be able to supplement my message to Chamberlain later on, should that be necessary. Kindly cable if you have interview.

All good wishes. Safe return. [Unquote.]

557.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 557

London, May 8, 1940

Following from Mr. Rogers for the Prime Minister. Begins. Have just returned from interview with Mr. Chamberlain after House rose this afternoon. I placed before him the views expressed in your message to me explaining a cablegram from you would follow shortly. He appeared to understand

force of arguments presented and said certain difficulties had also arisen from local circumstances in other Dominions. If situation remained unchanged he doubted if it would be feasible to hold Conference this summer. I emphasized that your arguments were advanced solely from consideration of what was best to promote and sustain our common effort in the war. He seemed to appreciate fully this fact and I think the way is prepared for your own message. If situation should alter here he will doubtless advance any further argument which might support calling of a Conference at some future date. Am sailing tomorrow to arrive about 16th. Ends.

MASSEY

558.

65-B(s)

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 68

Ottawa, May 10, 1940

MOST SECRET. Following from our Prime Minister to your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. I have given very careful thought to your telegram of April the 22nd, in which you invite consideration of the advisability of holding a conference of Prime Ministers in London at a convenient time in the near future, possibly July or early in August. I have regarded the matter of such importance that I have felt I should discuss it very fully with my colleagues in the Cabinet before presenting for your further consideration some aspects of the proposal which I regard as most important.

2. Your telegram indicates that you appreciate that there would be difficulties if Dominion Prime Ministers were to leave their own countries in the present circumstances, but that in your opinion the advantages to be derived from a conference of Prime Ministers in London would be such as to outweigh the disadvantages occasioned. I can see, of course, certain advantages to be derived from a conference of Prime Ministers in London. Whether, however, in the circumstances now existing, or as they are likely to develop in the course of the next few months, the interests of the British Commonwealth as a whole would be best served by such a conference is, I think, extremely problematical. The proposed meeting would mean that in a time of probably intensified crisis, the Prime Ministers of the several Dominions would be absent from their own countries for some weeks, if not months. In these observations and those which follow, I, of course, can speak only for the situation as I see it in Canada.

3. The war policy of the present Administration, as you are aware, has just received a strong endorsement from our people. The world situation is, however, liable to change from week to week, if not from day to day. A united war effort of a united Canada, continuously maintained to the end of the war,

constitutes, I believe, the greatest service which our country can render to the allied powers. This war effort and the country's continued unity, would, I believe, be best maintained by Prime Minister being as continuously as possible at the seat of government in his own country.

4. In Canada, the Prime Minister holds also the office of Secretary of State for External Affairs. In order that new situations, both domestic and international, can be fully examined and dealt with effectively as they arise, it is essential that there be opportunity for immediate and personal conference by the Prime Minister with his colleagues. Present conditions make it more than ever necessary that, if speedy decisions are to be made, the essential elements of collective Cabinet responsibility should be maintained. It is as you are aware against my own conviction and Canadian practice to decide important matters of policy without prior consultation with my colleagues. The following additional fact adds cogency to this observation. The task of Canada in the present war presents problems far more varied and difficult than those which arose in the previous world war. Our internal organization is directed not only to the supply of manpower, but also far more than before to the mobilization of industrial, agricultural and financial resources.

5. It is, I think, also of the utmost importance to the interests of the Commonwealth as a whole, that, at this particular time, the position of Canada vis-à-vis the United States should be fully appreciated. You are aware of the peculiar advantages of Canada's situation in this regard. Our relationship with the United States of America involves not only constant consideration of problems arising out of the neutrality of the United States, but also of means of helpful co-operation which, notwithstanding its neutrality, the United States may be able continuously to afford. The situation in the Orient and its possibilities, potential developments in connection with the Atlantic coast and islands in the North American Ocean are instances of the kinds of questions which require constant attention. If seen or unforeseen difficulties are to be speedily met, they will require the immediate joint consideration of both governments. I believe that the continued use of the open channels of friendly communication with Washington, which have been established and confirmed, is a most important contribution to allied success.

6. As the European situation alters, every important change brings to the fore some new Canadian problem. Apart from the undoubted fact that the impending intensity of hostilities and the possible effect on public morale here and elsewhere provide an added argument for the personal presence of the Prime Minister amongst his own people, there are a number of further factors peculiar to Canada which should be taken into serious account. There is not a European country whose people are not here represented in smaller or greater numbers. There is hardly a changed condition arising in Europe which does not involve fresh economic problems in one part of Canada or another. To maintain the unity of Canada and a continuous vigorous war effort in the face of disruptive influences and factors will require the utmost vigilance on the part of my colleagues and myself.

7. The first session of the new Parliament opens on the 16th instant. How long the session may last, I am not able to say. It will certainly continue for some months.

8. I might add that the means of consultation with yourself and the other members of the Commonwealth afforded by direct communication appear thus far to have been most satisfactory, supplemented as they have been by direct communication to and from the Secretary of State for the Dominions and by the immediate and personal consultation maintained through the High Commissioners in London and in Ottawa. These established arrangements for intimate and regular communication have recently been supplemented by sending representatives to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland and by the presence in our Capital of representatives from South Africa, Ireland and Australia. These means of communication and conference were in large part non-existent in the last war. Combined as they have been up to the present with visits of ministers, other than the Prime Minister, to London, they may, I believe, without involving the risks which a prolonged absence of Prime Ministers from their own countries would involve, be relied upon with confidence to further effectively the desired collaboration between the governments of the British Commonwealth, which is the purpose of the proposed conference of Prime Ministers as set forth in your message. If, at any time, altered circumstances or special emergencies were to render these methods of co-ordination, co-operation and consultation inadequate for the most effective joint war effort in all its aspects, and a conference of Prime Ministers thereby become imperative, that would of course necessitate an immediate review of the respective merits of the alternative considerations herein set forth.

559.

65-B(s)

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.245

London, June 10, 1940

MOST SECRET. My telegram Circular D.145 of April 22nd. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. In view of recent events we have come to the conclusion that there is little prospect of arranging for a meeting here of the Prime Ministers this summer. But we will continue to keep in mind the possibility of such a meeting hereafter, if situation should so develop as to afford occasion for the reopening of the question. In the meantime I look forward, of course, to the closest contact and cooperation with you and other Prime Ministers through the existing machinery. Ends.

560.

65-A(s)

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre¹*

Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister¹

Ottawa, April 17, 1941

Dear Mr. King,

You may have noted the Canadian Press cables yesterday and today attributing to "high quarters" in London the report that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers have been invited to meet in conference in London in the near future. We have had no official communication of any kind on this subject and I think we can assume that the press reports are purely conjecture, prompted by the announcement that Prime Minister Menzies has postponed his plans for leaving for this Continent. As matters stand, the last official word on this question from the United Kingdom was Lord Cranborne's answer to an enquiry in the House of Lords on April 2nd, when he said that no such development was in contemplation. I enclose copies of press despatches² from the *Montreal Gazette* and the *Toronto Star*.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

561.

65-A(s)

Le Premier ministre au premier ministre de Grande-Bretagne

Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Great Britain

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, May 10, 1941

PERSONAL AND PRIVATE. You will be interested in knowing that we were all greatly pleased with the recent visit of Mr. Menzies to Ottawa. Though duration of visit unfortunately curtailed by loss of a day en route, Menzies managed to deliver two or three splendid addresses; one to a large Canadian Club audience, which was broadcast to all parts of Canada; another, from

¹ Le Premier ministre était alors à Washington.

² Non reproduites.

¹ The Prime Minister was then in Washington.

² Not printed.

the floor of the House of Commons to Members of Parliament. It was carried in full by the press, and, by resolution of the House, recorded in Hansard. Menzies also spoke at a dinner given by the Government at which the Governor General, the Chief Justice of Canada, all members of the Government, Chiefs of Staff, and others, were present. After dinner, he gave us a private view of many interesting pictures taken in the course of his tour, among others, several we were pleased to see of yourself. Most of the afternoon was given over to a meeting with the war committee of the cabinet when we discussed at length the pros and cons of Dominion representation in a war cabinet or council of Prime Ministers in London. I had also the pleasure of several brief personal conversations with Menzies. Before leaving, he said to me that he recognized each Dominion had its own special problems to be considered in relation to the maintenance of its national unity, and to the war effort of the Commonwealth as a whole. He said to me quite frankly that he realized anything in the nature of an Imperial Council or War Cabinet, which would require the presence of Prime Ministers of the Dominions at either frequent or long intervals could not be considered; that consultation as complete as possible between the different governments was advisable, but that the simultaneous presence of Dominion Prime Ministers in London would necessarily have to be confined to some special occasion when some definite practical question might necessitate joint consideration. His interviews with the press were helpful, and his visit altogether has left a very good impression. Kindest regards.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

562.

65-A(s)

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

London, May 12, 1941

PRIVATE AND SECRET. Following for Mr. Mackenzie King from Prime Minister. Begins. I am delighted to hear that Mr. Menzies' visit was so successful. He was with us here through times of peculiar stress and we found him a staunch comrade. A meeting of the Imperial Conference about July or August for a month or 6 weeks would be most desirable if it could be arranged. I hope we shall give a good account of ourselves in the Middle East. It will not be for want of trying. Every good wish. It is splendid the way you have carried Canada forward in such perfect unity. Winston Churchill. Ends.

563.

King Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, May 26, 1941

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND PERSONAL. Would you kindly give the following to Mr. Churchill personally, in the form of a strictly private and personal communication from me. Should your own views differ in any particular, I would be glad to have them for consideration before the communication is delivered.

Strictly private and personal. Following for Mr. Churchill from Mr. Mackenzie King. Begins. I thank you warmly for your communication of May twelfth in reply to mine regarding Menzies' visit. As you say in your communication that an imperial conference in July or August might be desirable if it could be arranged, I feel I ought to point out at once some considerations of which the fullest account should be taken before any decision is reached to have the Prime Ministers of the different Dominions absent themselves from their several countries for a month or six weeks, such as attendance at an imperial conference in London would, as you say, necessarily involve.

I can and would wish, of course, to speak only in respect of Canada.

I believe that the preservation of unity in our war effort is the essential foundation of every important contribution we can make. If I believed I could leave Canada for a month or longer without the possibility of situations arising which would threaten that unity, I would naturally greatly welcome the opportunity of meeting with yourself and colleagues in the United Kingdom and from other parts of the Empire to confer on matters of common concern.

My presence at an imperial conference, if decisions were to be made on matters of strategy and policy generally, would necessitate the presence also in London of military advisers and other high officials. I question the wisdom of having public servants holding high positions leave Canada for conference purposes in London when their presence here is necessary in the daily promotion of Canada's war effort.

With the outcome of the battle of the Atlantic becoming increasingly a major factor in the war, I feel it is most important that I should be closely watching developments as seen, and as they may arise, from this side of the Atlantic.

With the possibility of the United States entering the war, situations are already arising which demand my constant personal attention. The moment the United States entered the war, these would be greatly increased. With the possibility of Japan also declaring war, new situations to which I would have to give the closest attention would arise in British Columbia, as well as in other parts of the Dominion.

My primary duty, as I see it, is to avoid cleavages arising, first of all, within the government itself, and that not only on policies concerned with Canada's immediate war effort, but as well on policies which affect the war effort of the Commonwealth as a whole. That service, one of preventing the possibility of cleavages arising, I can perform much more effectively by being in daily touch with members of my own cabinet than by being separated from them by the Atlantic at a time of war. I am, however, less concerned about divisions in the cabinet than about divisions in the country.

Unless it were absolutely necessary to reach, by conference, decisions which could not be as effectively reached by exchange of views under existing methods of communication, I would feel it would be perilous to risk throwing away the vital and very real advantages to all concerned of present relationships for the appearance of something which might well prove to be less real and substantial.

I have all along felt so strongly the necessity of closely watching each day's significant events that I have not permitted myself to leave the seat of government except to address a meeting or two during the general election campaign last year, and for the two visits I have made to the United States to spend a day or two with the President. The time has now come when I feel I should, if at all possible, visit personally all parts of Canada, to make direct appeals concerning our war effort and the issues at stake in the war. The only time I can hope to do this is between sessions of parliament. When parliament is in session, it is imperative I should be at Ottawa.

I know all this will be clear to you, and equally in your mind. I am anxious, however, to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding of my position arising either in the United Kingdom or in Canada, or unnecessary embarrassments being created therefrom. Such most certainly would be the result of uninformed discussion or debate on the need for an imperial conference, unless that need were absolutely imperative and the occasion for a conference so apparent as to leave no doubt as to the necessity as well as the wisdom of holding it. If I believed that a conference would improve the present effective cooperative effort of all parts of the Empire, I would, as I said in our parliament, not wait to be invited to attend, but would be the first to ask that one might be called.

The time may come when the holding of an imperial conference is desirable, not for purposes of general and indefinite discussion, or for the sake of appearances, or from other motives, but because of some definite, concrete situation which, obviously, requires its solution conference between governments of the United Kingdom and the Dominions. It would be as well, however, not to prejudice the presence of all at such a conference by the calling of others in advance, for which the need was not wholly apparent.

An imperial conference necessitating the presence of Dominion premiers in London for weeks at a time, except for the most obvious reasons, would, it seems to me, come to be viewed in the public mind, both in the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and abroad, as an expression of some want of

confidence on the part of one or more of the governments of the Commonwealth in itself, or in the government of the United Kingdom, or other of the Commonwealth governments, rather than as evidence of the unity of the Commonwealth in its aims and policies.

I greatly hope, for these and other reasons, that the utmost care will be taken to avoid the calling of any conference until it is quite clear that the good resulting therefrom will outweigh the possible risks involved. Ends.

564.

65-A(s)

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1093

London, June 11, 1941

MOST SECRET. PERSONAL. Personal for the Prime Minister. Begins. As requested in your recent letter,¹ have conveyed to appropriate persons here your views on the subject of possible meeting in London of Dominion Prime Ministers. Your views have also been transmitted by Malcolm MacDonald. Subject of possible meeting was, I am informed, under discussion at last meeting of War Cabinet when apparently hope was expressed that it might be possible to hold conversations with Dominion Prime Ministers here before summer is over, either individually or together. I do not know how far this idea will develop but I believe that Churchill is sending you a personal telegram on the subject. Ends.

MASSEY

565.

65-A(s)

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 99

London, June 11, 1941

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following for your Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

I am most grateful to you for your communication with regard to proposed meeting of the Dominion Prime Ministers. Let me assure you that I realize fully difficulties which a Prime Minister must find in leaving his country in time of war, in view of the many problems which constantly crop up. The last thing I want to do is to cause embarrassment to you or Prime Ministers of the other Dominions. On the other hand, there are powerful reasons in favour of such a meeting at an early date. The war has now been in progress

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

for nearly two years, and it would be a great help to me to have your combined minds on many strategic and other problems that we have to face. I am, therefore, reluctant to abandon the project, which I believe to be of considerable importance from the Empire's point of view. I should be most grateful if you could consider the matter again in the light of this telegram. I hope that on further reflection, you may feel it possible to come to this country, at any rate for a limited period of time. I would suggest, as a date, end of July. This should be convenient to Mr. Fraser who is shortly due here and would, I hope, be able to arrange to stay on over period of meeting. Should your reply be favourable, I would then get into immediate touch with the other Prime Ministers. Ends.

566.

65-A(s)

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, June 13, 1941

PERSONAL. SECRET. Following for High Commissioner from Minister of Justice. Begins. Heartiest congratulations on well deserved honour.¹ Concerning renewed suggestion that King go to England, please convey my views to Churchill that King is one national leader who cannot must not leave own country. Canada now united. Some politicians here who dislike unity are behind suggestion that King leave Canada for England. He is only link between sections and groups. Is as necessary here as Churchill is in Britain. As far as Quebec concerned King is the leader whom they will trust exclusive of all others. I beseech British friends not suggest even short absence from Canada as the suggestion rather weakens the Canadian front. Lapointe. Ends.

567.

65-A(s)

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 903

Ottawa, June 14, 1941

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Would you kindly give to Mr. Churchill personally, in the form of a most secret and personal message from me, the following communication.

¹M. Massey avait été nommé au Conseil privé.

¹Mr. Massey had been made a Privy Councillor.

Most secret and personal. Following for Mr. Churchill from Mackenzie King. Begins. Your telegram No. 99 just received has given me the greatest possible concern. I would be the last not to be prepared to give every possible help to you in any situation. It is entirely a question of how that help can be most effectively given.

You will, I know, agree that Canadian unity is more essential to Canada's war effort than all else. Already, my colleagues and I are beginning to be greatly embarrassed by efforts which are being made to undermine confidence in the present Administration and to compel, by organized effort the adoption of policies which it is well known the present Administration cannot and will not support. I cite conscription for overseas service as one example. We have, as you are aware, as respects Canada itself, compulsory military service. We believe we can raise, through voluntary enlistment, the men required for overseas service. The conscription issue in 1917 raised heated passions of which the most unhappy memories still survive. So long as there is any possibility of conscription again becoming an issue, it will be absolutely necessary for me to remain in Canada. I know that advantage would be immediately taken of my absence to force this issue. It is a responsibility too great to risk.

The labour situation is another immediate problem with which the Administration is faced. In the opinion of the manufacturers, it gravely threatens our war production. It is not without its association with movements and conditions in the United States. My relations with both Labour and Capital for forty years past have been such as to lead me to hope that I can be of some service in helping my colleagues to meet this situation. They frankly acknowledge they would be deeply concerned were I to be obliged to be away from Canada with the possibilities in this direction as critical as they may at any time become.

The present delicate state of relations with the Vichy Government, and the possibility that the position of continental France may still further deteriorate, introduces another factor of the utmost gravity of which, in the interests of the unity of Canada, we should at any time have to take the fullest account.

There is, of course, the possibility of the United States becoming at any moment involved in war. Already, situations arising out of that eventuality are demanding my constant personal attention. These would be increased the moment the United States entered the war. With the possibility of Japan also declaring war, new situations to which I would have to give the closest possible attention would arise in British Columbia as well as in other parts of the Dominion. My relations with the President and Mr. Hull being what they are, I firmly believe I can render infinitely more effective service in the common cause, and to yourself in particular, by doing all in my power to see that the efforts of the two countries are kept on the co-operative basis on which they are at present than I could possibly render by any counsel or advice which I might be able to give to yourself in London.

Already, as you are aware, questions of the first magnitude are arising with respect to joint action in the defence of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

In the opinion of our military advisers and also that of my colleagues in the government, my presence here is imperative in order to settle some of these matters by direct conference with the President.

The President of the United States, as you are aware, attaches, because of war necessity, the utmost importance to bringing into effect, at as early a date as possible, the agreement negotiated between Canada and the United States with respect to the development of power and navigation on the St. Lawrence. The agreement is at present before Congress for approval. Instead of pro-roguing Parliament for some months, I have undertaken to adjourn its proceedings on the understanding that I would see that Members were brought together to consider the St. Lawrence waterway agreement just as soon as it has been approved by Congress. That may be at any time during July, August, or September. I myself will have to pilot this particular international agreement through the House of Commons. I have also undertaken to have Parliament resume its sittings in the event of the war taking a turn which might occasion special concern to our country. I do not see how I could possibly fulfil the obligations I have assumed in these directions were I to be absent from Canada at a time when either of them would require immediate fulfilment.

Perhaps I should add that, having been Chairman of the War Committee of the Cabinet since the beginning of the war, and Secretary of State for External Affairs, as well as Prime Minister, for some years past, I have a knowledge of some of the situations affecting Canada's war effort which is not possessed by any other member of the government. Neither is it fully possessed by the present senior officers of our External Affairs Department which, as you will be aware, has within the present year suffered the loss of Skelton and Christie, its two most experienced officers. For this reason, an absence from Canada at this particular time, when so many possibilities have to be faced, would prove most embarrassing to my colleagues and would occasion great concern to myself.

May I mention a further consideration of importance. Since the beginning of the war, and indeed for some time before, I have felt so strongly the necessity of watching closely each day's significant events that I have not permitted myself to leave the seat of government except to address a few meetings during the general election campaign of last year, and the visits I have made to the United States to spend a day or two with the President. The time has now come when I feel I should, as far as may be possible, visit personally all parts of Canada, to make direct appeals concerning our war effort and the issues at stake in the war. This can only be done at intervals of time when Parliament is not in session. It can be done and the other situations watched so long as I am in Canada itself. If it is not done this summer, I greatly fear that the national situation may get much out of hand in more directions than one.

You have frequently referred in most generous terms to the unity with which Canada's war effort has been carried forward. If I felt that I could

leave Canada for even a few weeks without the now virtual certainty of situations arising which would threaten our national unity, I would naturally, greatly welcome the opportunity of meeting with you and if possible the Prime Ministers of other Dominions.

I have been trying to weigh in my own mind the considerations I have mentioned against the advantages which might reasonably be expected to follow from a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London. For my own part I should like nothing better than to spend some weeks with you and your colleagues in London, and share at first hand the adventures and adversities of the front line. I agree that the simultaneous presence in London of the Prime Ministers of the Empire at an hour like the present would be a spectacular demonstration of solidarity, if any new proof were needed. What I am more doubtful about is whether, in terms of hard fact, there is anything that we could accomplish in conference together in London that we cannot do more effectively and much more expeditiously by continuous exchange of views between our several posts of duty. Useful consideration of strategic problems and determination of major policies require close consultation with colleagues and with advisers. It would not be easy at the present time to justify the joint absence from Canada of the senior military advisers and ranking Government officials whose advice and support would be essential in any serious study of war policy. On balance I am forced to the conclusion that the advantages which might accrue from the meeting you propose cannot outweigh the considerations which since the outbreak of the war have compelled me to stick to my post here. It is, I think, the best job I can do for Canada and for the Commonwealth in these difficult days.

If it were deemed necessary and advisable to have another of my colleagues visit Great Britain for purposes of personal conference with your colleagues or yourself, I should be glad to seek to arrange and to authorize a visit to England by one or the other of the Ministers for Defence who have not thus far visited London—Air or Navy,—at whatever time might be deemed most advantageous. Both have spoken to me of their desire to go over at some time, but up to the present the rapid expansion of these two departments has required their closest possible attention. With developments what they are likely to be, they can ill be spared. I would notwithstanding arrange to have one or the other leave if the presence of another Canadian Minister in London were deemed necessary and advisable for conference purposes. As both Mr. Power, the Air Minister, and Mr. Macdonald, the Minister of Naval Services, are members of the War Committee of the Cabinet, and as each is fully informed on the work of all defence departments and that of the Ministry of Munitions and Supply, either, I should feel, would have a more detailed knowledge of some of these aspects of our war effort, and of some matters of strategy requiring consideration, than I could possibly have myself.

If the unity of the whole is to be maintained, my job is clearly that of keeping all Ministers working together here in closest co-operation and preventing cleavages. Ends.

568.

65-A(s)

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 904

Ottawa, June 14, 1941

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following from Prime Minister. Begins. With reference to my immediately preceding communication No. 903, there is a situation which you will understand and which I wish you would personally explain to Mr. Churchill at the earliest moment. It is one which, in addition to the considerations mentioned in my previous telegram, would render it quite impossible for me to so much as think of leaving Canada this summer, if at any cost that step can be avoided.

Were I to go overseas I would be obliged to invite Mr. Lapointe to be Acting Prime Minister in my absence. Should he accept the position and any further deterioration of the relations between France and Britain occur, or should conscription for overseas service become more of an issue than it already is, or should any question of a racial or religious nature arise, the whole province of Quebec would immediately be centred out for attack by extreme elements in the other provinces, and Lapointe himself would be made the main target of abuse. This would certainly mean a complete change in the present wholehearted cooperative attitude of the entire province of Quebec in Canada's war effort. Were such a disaster to occur, I cannot say to what lengths internal strife might be developed in Canada. Hitler's game could not be as effectively played by any other means.

Lapointe told me today that when the question of my going overseas was first raised he had himself written you of this aspect of the matter. In case his letter may not already have reached you he is communicating to you by cable through External Affairs today.¹

Were I to pass over Lapointe and select some other colleague to act during my absence this would immediately create offence in the Province of Quebec and would be considered by other provinces in Canada as a reflection upon Quebec. Moreover I doubt if any other colleague could keep in hand the situation as it might develop at any moment in the Cabinet. Indeed it is only by the two of us working so closely together that Canada's national unity has remained up to the present time what it is.

I know that the presence of premiers of several Dominions in London would be spectacular and might be assumed to represent a more intimate kind of conference than is possible through communication by cable. Apart altogether from the effect upon Canada's war effort of my leaving to attend a conference of Prime Ministers, such a step would, I believe, be sacrificing stern and grave realities to mere appearances. I cannot counsel Mr. Churchill too strongly against seeking to effect a course which might have advantages

¹ Document 566.

for the moment, but which I believe would in the long run be sure to spell disaster in one or other of the Dominions.

As the war grows in intensity, and especially as its perils come nearer the shores of the different Dominions, the people, unless I am greatly mistaken, will wish to have their Prime Ministers in their own countries. Especially will this be true of Canada.

I understand the pressure being put on Mr. Churchill to bring premiers of the Dominions together in London, but I can assure him that the stand he has taken up to the present in resisting that pressure has met with real approval in this country. With the situation changing as rapidly as it has continued to do from day to day, I am sure the present position in this country has only to be understood by Mr. Churchill to have him realize how grave, as respects possible cleavages both within the Cabinet and throughout the country, might be the consequences of my being in England instead of in Canada for however short a time.

You I think will fully appreciate the truth of what I am saying and will be able better than anyone else to explain the force of it to Mr. Churchill.

569.

65-A(s)

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1123

London, June 17, 1941

SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following for the Prime Minister. Begins. Fully understand the considerations mentioned in your telegram No. 904 of June 14th. These I conveyed to the appropriate person. On the receipt of your telegram No. 903 of June 14th, which arrived with No. 904, sent Churchill the personal message it contained and asked to see him as soon as possible. Appointment will be either for today or tomorrow. Ends.

MASSEY

570.

65-A(s)

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1126

London, June 18, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following for the Prime Minister. Begins. I saw Churchill this morning. He told me that he had received

telegram from Smuts to the effect that he could not come to London this summer for proposed meeting of Prime Ministers. Churchill asked me to let you know that he wishes to take first appropriate opportunity to say that it would not be feasible to hold proposed meeting at present, and that circumstances make it impossible for either you or Smuts to come to London this summer. Fraser I believe is returning to New Zealand some time in July. I got impression that Churchill still had it in mind that it might be possible to hold such a meeting later on, perhaps in the winter. Ends.

MASSEY

571.

65-A(s)

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1130

London, June 19, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following for Prime Minister. Begins. My telegram No. 1126, June 18th. I am assured that you will be consulted before proposed statement is made. Ends.

MASSEY

572.

65-A(s)

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 105

London, June 21, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. Many thanks for your most secret and personal telegram of June 16th¹ [sic] received through Mr. Massey. I am grateful to you for setting out so fully considerations in favour of your remaining in Canada at present time. As I told Mr. Massey for your information I have heard from Smuts also that it will not be possible for him to visit London at present time, and idea of a conference must accordingly stand over for time being.

In view of very great public interest here, I am likely to be pressed in the House for information as to possibility of holding an Imperial Conference in the near future. I therefore propose to state, possibly early next week, that I have made enquiries but fear it is impracticable to arrange such a meeting in the near future, mentioning that you and Smuts would not be able to come at present time.

May I take it that you will see no difficulty in my making an announcement in due course, so far as you are concerned. Ends.

¹ Document 567.

573.

65-A(s)

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 107

Ottawa, June 22, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following from Mr. Mackenzie King for Mr. Churchill. Begins. I thank you for your telegram No. 105 of June 21. In any statement you may make concerning impracticability of holding Imperial Conference for some time, it would help in avoiding misunderstanding of my position here, and also that of General Smuts, if emphasis were placed on the facts which govern our actions, namely, that in the Dominions and in the British Isles, apart from existing domestic problems, rapidly changing aspects of the war are constantly giving rise to fresh problems and new situations, which, to be promptly and effectively dealt with, require the presence of a Prime Minister in his own country. Today, for example, Germany's declaration of war against Russia raises fresh questions in religious and industrial circles in Canada as to assistance Russia is to receive from British Commonwealth. These questions are certain to prove embarrassing, particularly in the Province of Quebec. With this in mind I have today issued a statement of Government policy which I hope will be helpful. Were Mr. Lapointe acting in my absence, the situation would become doubly difficult for him to cope with. It might be pointed out that, at least in opinion of some of the Prime Ministers, in these and other matters co-operation between all parts can be made more effective through consultation with Prime Ministers where latter are immediately in touch with their colleagues in the Dominion.

It might, in this connection, be pointed out that Commonwealth position is entirely different in present war from that in war of 1914-18; first, in that in last war actual theatre of war was confined almost exclusively to Europe, whereas with war spreading rapidly to all parts of the world, it is daily being brought nearer to the shores of the Dominions themselves; secondly, that today there are means of immediate and effective communication and consultation between the British government and the governments of the several Dominions which did not exist a quarter of a century ago. I hope that, beyond mention that matter can only be decided in light of developments, it may not be found necessary to raise expectations as to conference in London later on.¹ Ends.

574.

65-A(s)

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 106

London, June 24, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your

¹ Le 23 juin, un télégramme semblable fut envoyé au premier ministre de l'Afrique du Sud.

¹ A similar telegram was sent to the Prime Minister of South Africa on June 23.

most secret and personal telegram to him No. 107, June 23rd, [sic] on Imperial Conference question. In view of interest obtained in this matter here, it is necessary to dispose of matter quickly, and an opportunity has now arisen in connection with a statement on general situation which the Prime Minister is making in the House this morning. In the circumstances, Prime Minister proposes to speak on the following lines on this issue. Begins.

I was asked to give information about the policy of His Majesty's Government in relation to an Imperial War Conference. As I told the House, I very much desire such a Conference, and we had hoped that the end of July or beginning of August might be a suitable occasion. I have now received replies to enquiries I made. Both General Smuts and Mr. Mackenzie King regret that exigencies of their work in their respective countries make it impossible for them to come here in the near future. Mr. Menzies has only just returned to Australia, though I hope we shall see him here again before long. Mr. Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand, arrived last Saturday and is sitting constantly in our counsels. The House will readily understand that these Prime Ministers of important and powerful Governments, with legislatures and whole war effort of their peoples to guide, find great difficulty in meeting here simultaneously. I hope these difficulties may be resolved at some time in the future, but for the present I fear it is impossible to fix a date.

Ends.

Prime Minister has asked me [to] give you a personal message from him that he very clearly understands your position and difficulties. If, however, he had elaborated this aspect more fully than is done above, a position of considerable embarrassment would have [been] bound to result. There is undoubtedly strong pressure here for a Conference, and Prime Minister would not himself feel able to argue against it, apart from practical difficulties involved. Moreover, there is the position of Menzies, who, as you know, has strongly advocated this course. Prime Minister has not therefore felt able to avoid all reference to a possible future meeting, though he hopes wording which he proposes to adopt is sufficiently indefinite to prevent further agitation here for an early Conference. Ends.

575.

65-A(s)

*Le premier ministre de l'Afrique du Sud au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Prime Minister of South Africa to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1

Pretoria, June 24, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. Your telegram No. 1.¹ I am in general

¹ Non reproduit. Voir la note au document 573.

¹ Not printed. See footnote to Document 573.

agreement with your message to Churchill. I have simply authorized him to say in general terms that circumstances at present do not permit of my going to London. A visit later in the year may become possible when a confidential meeting of Prime Ministers in London may be imperatively called for. At present I consider very ample means of communication sufficient. You will, of course, understand my position in the Union of South Africa is unlike that of our other Prime Ministers. It will hearten the people in the United Kingdom very much if you for instance could afford to pay London a brief visit at a time convenient to you.

All good wishes to you in your great work. Ends.

576.

65-A(s)

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 123

London, July 26, 1941

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following from the Prime Minister. Begins. I agree with you that it is not practicable to hold a formal Imperial War Conference in the near future. Nor am I entirely convinced of its necessity. I would of course defer to Dominion wishes. A telegram from Malcolm¹ leads me to hope perhaps you might be willing to pay a short informal visit here, and nothing would give us greater pleasure. You would be able to see for yourself the temper of the people and judge their ordeal. A great reception would await you, and you would, of course, take part in all our Cabinet proceedings. But I understand fully all your difficulties, and do not suppose for a moment that I am pressing you against your better judgment. Kindest regards. Winston Churchill. Ends.

577.

65-A(s)

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 146

Ottawa, July 31, 1941

MOST SECRET. PERSONAL. Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister. Begins. I thank you warmly for your telegram (No. 123). I am

¹Malcolm MacDonald, haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.

¹Malcolm MacDonald, High Commissioner of Great Britain.

pleased to have the word it contains concerning the unlikelihood of a formal Imperial War Conference in the near future.

What has occurred since the exchange of correspondence between us on this subject in June last has clearly disclosed the dangers I foresaw at the time. Had I, in planning to go to England, been obliged to forego the tour of Western Canada which I recently made, I should have returned to find the country in the throes of a conscription campaign, which would not only have considerably frustrated the Government's voluntary recruiting efforts, but would have served to develop the most serious political issue which could be raised in Canada at this time. It is most fortunate I was here to consider with my colleagues and to take without hesitation or delay the action necessary to meet the situations demanded by Russia's entry into the war. It has been equally fortunate that I have been similarly circumstanced in meeting the present situation which has arisen out of the attitude and action of Japan.

Within the past week the most critical of the industrial situations thus far encountered in the prosecution of Canada's war effort have arisen. They have demanded my constant attention and personal intervention.

You will recall that the forcing of the issue of conscription for overseas service, the Japanese threat, and industrial unrest were among the reasons which at the time of your enquiry led me to express the hope that an Imperial Conference in the immediate future might not be necessary. Other matters referred to still make a prolonged absence from Canada on my part most inadvisable.

I have all along hoped that it might become possible for me to pay a brief visit to Britain. I should particularly welcome the opportunity of association with yourself for a few days at this time, and also of meeting and conferring with your colleagues. I should also greatly welcome the opportunity which a visit, however brief, would afford of giving, if that were possible, additional expression in Britain to the admiration felt by Canada of the indomitable spirit of the British people, and to Canada's determination to be to the very end at the side of Britain, with all the resources and power at her command. I should like to pay such a visit some time during the month of August. Whether or not this will be possible, will largely depend on how matters continue to shape themselves.

I shall keep Massey in touch with the situation here. Meanwhile, I shall continue to plan to leave within the next fortnight, if that is at all possible. I might mention that my colleague, Mr. Angus Macdonald, Minister of Defence for Naval Services, expects to be in London for about a fortnight, leaving Canada by plane on or about August 7th. May I add how grateful I am for the cordiality and warmth of your invitation. Kindest regards. Mackenzie King. Ends.

PARTIE 3/PART 3

PROPOSITIONS EN VUE D'UN CABINET IMPÉRIAL DE GUERRE
PROPOSALS FOR AN IMPERIAL WAR CABINET

578.

572-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 607

London, October 22, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to refer briefly to certain comments which have appeared in the Press on the possibility of the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet.

2. The political correspondent for the *Sunday Times* for instance, in his weekly review of Parliamentary news, stated on October 20th that "there is a good deal of talk among Members about an Imperial War Cabinet." He admitted, however, that the idea had not been officially sponsored. Indeed, it would appear that the idea has been put forward in order to test official reaction and to draw the Government into a statement on the subject.

3. The political correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, October 15th, considering the question in some detail, explained that "while in some quarters the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet is advocated, no such idea has been put forward from responsible quarters in any of the Dominions." He went on to say that "when the opportunity is found for a debate in Parliament on the Imperial war effort, Lord Cranborne, the Dominions Secretary, will be able to assure the country that effective machinery is now in use for constant and speedy consultation with all the Dominions."

4. Attention was also drawn by the political correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* to "certain important constitutional conditions" arising out of the Statute of Westminster, which would be involved, if the Dominions were to participate in a War Cabinet. For instance, it was said that "well informed quarters here believed that if decisions of an Imperial War Cabinet were to bind the Governments of the Dominions, it would be essential that the Prime Minister of each Dominion should be a Member." On the other hand, it is fully realised here that a Prime Minister of the Dominion would find it difficult to be absent from the direction of Home Affairs for any length of

time, and if he were to act as a delegate, he would tend to lose touch with Parliamentary and public opinion in his own country.

5. It is realised that the present system of consultation and co-operation between the Dominions and the United Kingdom Government would, to quote the words of the leading article in the *Daily Telegraph* on the 16th October, "hardly be improved by the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet;" for at present "the Secretary for the Dominions meets the Dominions High Commissioners daily and the High Commissioners have weekly conferences of their own to corroborate the policies of their own countries. The Prime Minister also keeps in touch with the Prime Ministers of the Dominions and they with one another."

6. Moreover, in addition to the regular methods employed in maintaining contact between the United Kingdom and the Dominions Governments, attention has been drawn to the fact that, when special problems arise, it is common for the appropriate Minister for the Dominions to go to London, and the visit of Mr. Gardiner has been cited as an example of this procedure.

7. A meeting of the Imperial Conference in the near future is declared by the *Daily Telegraph* of October 15th "as not regarded in Whitehall as likely."

8. In general, it is admitted that the present system permits of close and effective Commonwealth co-operation. The Commonwealth Training Scheme was cited by the *Daily Telegraph* leading article of October 16th as "one of the conspicuous examples of the co-operation of the British Empire" and the paper goes on to say that as "the chief link between us and the Western Hemisphere, Canada has been of the greatest assistance in working out Empire policy." "With such proof of a United war effort, there seems little reason to desire an Imperial War Cabinet."

9. "But it is psychologically that the question might become important" states the political correspondent of the *Sunday Times* on October 20th, who then suggests that the initiative should best come from the Home Government. The difficulties which the setting up of an Imperial War Cabinet would involve, on the other hand, would be for the Dominion Governments themselves to judge, and, as the correspondent admits, "an Imperial War Cabinet is not the only way . . . until the defection of France there was a Supreme War Council and nobody dreamed of a constitutional objection to that."

10. On the whole I would say that the observations which have appeared in the press on this subject do not indicate that any widespread interest has been aroused in this question.

I have etc.

L. B. PEARSON
for High Commissioner

579.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du Premier ministre au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Prime Minister to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] November 3, 1940

I have dictated the attached outline on a phase of the Imperial Conference idea, concerning which I feel very strongly. It is only an off-hand dictated draft, and has not been revised, but might serve for the basis of a careful study by one or more of the officials of External Affairs.

I am thinking of anticipating discussion on an Imperial Council by using this material in a condensed and more exact form in what I may say on the Address. If I do not use it then, I shall probably use it when we come to a discussion of External Affairs matters.

W. L. M. K[ING]

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Mémoire du Premier ministre

Memorandum by Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] November 3, 1940

RE IMPERIAL WAR CABINET

There are always those who prefer, so long as it is imposing, something that looks like effective organization, though it may be sadly deficient in its most essential features, to something less imposing though infinitely better suited to the essential purpose. An Imperial War Council composed of the Premiers of the several Dominions sitting at a table in London in company with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom with the latter presiding would be an imposing body and one to which any Prime Minister might be proud indeed to belong. It would suggest opportunities for the most intimate kind of conference for the shaping of war policy in a war in which all the Dominions as well as the United Kingdom are vitally concerned and deeply involved.

Far less imposing, indeed not imposing at all, because impossible of grouping in the manner described, is the actual existing council of the nations of the British Commonwealth functioning, to all intents and purposes as such, from day to day at the present time, but doing so in immediate relation to the governments of the several Dominions as well as that of the United Kingdom, and under the system of responsible government which exists in the Dominions as well as in the United Kingdom, functioning also in relation to their several parliaments.

The matters of high policy which, in the Imperial War Cabinet in the last war were considered in conference around the council table by the heads of the several governments of the British Empire, are today discussed by cable communication conducted under cypher code. The means and agencies of communication alike have been materially improved. The cable has been supplemented by the wireless and the trans-atlantic telephone. Each Dominion has today its Department of External Affairs efficiently organized and in a position instantly to supplement the information essential as a background to the discussion of any problem. Not only is each government represented in London by its own special agent—a High Commissioner—but the British Government is also represented by a High Commissioner in each of the Dominions. There are thus, so to speak, three sending and three receiving sources, through each of which special classes of communications are sent and received:

from Prime Minister to Prime Minister direct—those which relate to matters of high policy;

through the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Secretary of State for External Affairs and vice versa—matters more general in character and relating more particularly to information in detail on operations, progress of the war;

and finally, special communications supplementing those from the sources mentioned from High Commissioner to Prime Minister, or to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The all-important and most vital factor made possible by these arrangements is the opportunity which is afforded the Prime Minister of immediately discussing all aspects of any question raised with his own colleagues in the Cabinet. His expression of view, when given, is not that of himself alone—it is the expression of view of the Cabinet of which he is the head. It is an expression of view given by the Cabinet in the light of its responsibility to Parliament. It is, moreover, an expression of view given in the atmosphere not of London but of the consulted dominion itself.

Most decisions in war time have to be quickly reached. Where they are taken in the manner described, unless a Prime Minister sitting in London is to consider himself as divorced from his own colleagues and so informed himself as not to regard it as necessary to communicate in the first instance with them, it permits a decision to be reached and given much more quickly than would be possible where consultation would have to take place back and forth between the Prime Minister and his colleagues before the view of the Dominion in any matter could be authoritatively and finally expressed.

In the present war there are further advantages in continuing the present arrangement to adopting something more formal and imposing. One obvious fact is that the seat of government in London itself has been, and is likely to be, under attack of the enemy for the remainder of the war. The Government itself, at any moment, may have to leave the seat of government and conceivably lose, through sudden disaster, papers and records most essential

to discussion. Many of the latter today are duplicated in the departments of the governments in the Dominions.

There is, however, the more important obvious fact that situations are continually arising which affect, in different ways, different parts of the British Commonwealth to meet which the presence of the Prime Minister with his own colleagues in any Dominion is highly important. Such a situation was that occasioned for Canada by the sudden collapse of France. The possibility of immediate personal contact between the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States in critical situations affecting the Western Hemisphere may easily be more important to the cause than any service which a Prime Minister of Canada could render at the council table in London.

Unity with respect to its war effort within each Dominion will continue to be more important than all else. That unity in days and weeks of constantly changing conditions and consideration is better maintained by the presence of the Prime Minister at the council table of his own Dominion than by his presence at the council table in London.

When the defeat of the enemy has been accomplished, at the time of armistice or peace, a round table conference at the heart of the Empire may well serve a highly necessary and useful purpose. In accomplishing the defeat of the enemy himself, under conditions of war, the purpose is likely to be served infinitely better by conference as at present conducted.

W. L. M. K[ING]

580.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Mé morandum du conseiller
Memorandum by Counsellor

[Ottawa, November n.d., 1940]

While I think the Prime Minister's feeling against the summoning of an Imperial War Cabinet is eminently sound, the reasons set forth in his draft memorandum may be vulnerable to criticism.

1. His first point is that means of communication have materially improved since the last war enabling subjects to be discussed by cable which previously were discussed in the Imperial War Cabinet.

It is doubtful if the means of communication have improved to any considerable extent. The cable was in constant use in the last war for communication between the two Governments and secret codes and cyphers were used then as now. Wireless telegraphy and the trans-Atlantic telephone have been developed since the last war. However they are neither as safe nor as convenient as the cable system and, in practice, are not in use at all.

Canada already had a High Commissioner in London in the last war though at that time of course, Britain did not have a High Commissioner in Ottawa. High Commissioners, however being merely servants and not mem-

bers of the Government are of no real value for the purpose of an Imperial War Cabinet. They cannot take decisions.

2. The second point is that subjects discussed at the Imperial War Cabinet in the last war are now discussed by cable messages in secret code. In this connection it is to be noted that the Imperial War Cabinet discussions fell into two main categories. The first related to military, naval and political moves *before they were made*. While there are a good many cable messages giving accounts of what has been done, *after it has been done*, so far as I am aware there is very little discussion about plans of action or of military or diplomatic moves before they are made. Action was taken after reviewing all the information and reports available and after full discussion. Policy was formulated and its execution supervised. The Imperial War Cabinet was an executive organ. Work of this kind cannot be done effectively by cable. The second group of questions discussed at the Imperial War Cabinet was that dealing with possible peace terms and post-war problems of reconstruction. These latter subjects have not yet become sufficiently topical to make their discussion worthwhile.

3. The third point is that London itself has been and is likely to be under the attack of the enemy for the remainder of the war. It might not be desirable to insist on this point since it would be contended that, if the British Government is able to carry on its work in London, the Dominion representatives should be equally able to do so. Moreover, if the bombing becomes more intense arrangements have been made to move the seat of Government to a less exposed place in the Provinces.

4. Fourth point is that an Imperial War Cabinet would necessitate the presence of Dominion Prime Ministers.

In the last war General Smuts represented South Africa for most of the meetings. At various times other members of Dominion Governments took the place of their Prime Ministers. However, as decisions taken by an Imperial War Cabinet would necessarily be of the highest moment any Minister selected would have to be one of the most outstanding in the Cabinet and would have to be given wide discretionary powers. He would, also, have to reside more or less constantly in London. In the last war the Imperial War Cabinet met March 20th to May 2nd, 1917, June 11th to August 2nd, 1918, and August 13th to December 31, 1918.

Two remaining points put forward in the memorandum under reference are well taken and extremely important, namely, the advantage of the present arrangement which assures that views given represent the considered opinion of the whole Cabinet and in the case of Canada, the possibility of immediate personal contact with the President of the United States, should an emergency arise.

It may be noted that two chief reasons which led to the setting up of an Imperial War Cabinet in the last war no longer operate. Sir Robert Borden was prepared, at great inconvenience, to proceed to London to take part in the Cabinet's discussions and Sir Wilfrid Laurier was prepared to encour-

age him and to concur in arrangements respecting Parliament that would facilitate his attendance because both considered it highly desirable that the Canadian Government should be represented. At that time Canada, and the Dominions generally, strongly desired to have a voice in the Empire's foreign policy. The conception was still that of a single Empire policy, laid down and carried out by the United Kingdom, to which the Dominions contributed. The feeling of the various Dominions was that their contributions entitled them to be consulted in the formation of that policy and to have a voice in determining how it was carried out. The feeling of the United Kingdom was, in the words of Mr. Lloyd George, that "joint control means joint responsibility and when the burden of Empire becomes so vast it is well that we should have the shoulders of these young giants under the burden to help us along." Collaborating in the formation, and supervising the execution, of British Foreign Policy, the Dominion representatives in the last war had to work in London. Now that each Dominion determines its own policy the place to make it is at home. All that is necessary now, is that they keep each other informed and co-ordinate their efforts. This is adequately done by cable, supplemented from time to time by visits of Ministers dealing with particular military, naval, air or economic problems. Constitutionally, the summoning of an Imperial War Cabinet would be a backward step.

The other reason for the summoning of an Imperial War Cabinet in 1917 grew out of British domestic politics. The High Command had friends in all the Departments and it was difficult for the British War Cabinet to control them. The addition of Dominion representatives, Mr. Lloyd George considered, would make the matter somewhat easier.

It may be added that to summon an Imperial War Cabinet now would only emphasize the lack of unity which exists in the Commonwealth in regard to the prosecution of the war, the Free State being neutral, South African participation being only nominal and India using Britain's extremity to press for wider autonomy.

J. S. M[ACDONALD]

581.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] November 20, 1940

EMPIRE WAR CABINET

Mr. King referred to Menzies' suggestion for an Empire War Cabinet. He said he saw no reason why, if Mr. Menzies wished to discuss Pacific questions in London, he should not go there by himself just as Mr. Crerar, Mr. Gardiner, and now Mr. Ralston, had done from Canada. So far as he was aware, no Australian Minister had gone to London since the outbreak of war.

Mr. Gardiner said he had had an interesting discussion on this subject with Sir Andrew Duncan. Sir Andrew said it would be impossible in the future for the United Kingdom to maintain the whole British fleet. It would be necessary for Australia, Canada, etc. to each build and maintain a unit of the fleet. This would make it necessary to have some joint control through a permanent Imperial Council or Cabinet, on which the Dominions would be represented. Further, it would be necessary to regulate industrial production, particularly the production of steel as between the several parts of the Empire, and a War Cabinet would be useful for this purpose. Mr. Gardiner said Lithgow, who was associated with Duncan in the steel combine in England, also emphasized the necessity of some arrangement for rationalizing the British Empire production of steel. Mr. Gardiner asked if this meant in his opinion an Empire War Council was necessary, as Duncan had suggested. Lithgow said "No, it would not be necessary; if the steel industry agreed, the politicians would have to fall in line."

Mr. Gardiner said he had pointed out the objections which would be taken in Canada to such an Empire Cabinet proposal.

582.

572-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

DESPATCH 490

Ottawa, December 6, 1940

Sir,

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 607 of October 22nd reporting certain comments which have appeared in the British Press on the possibility of the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet.

I note that the general opinion appears to be that the present machinery for speedy and continuous consultation could hardly be improved upon. I note, also, your view that the observations which have appeared in the Press on the subject do not indicate that any widespread interest has been aroused in it.

It scarcely seems probable that with the present highly developed system for communication between the various governments and the difficulty Prime Ministers would experience in having to absent themselves from the direction of affairs in their respective Dominions, there would be a disposition in any responsible quarter to press for the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet or that such an idea, if advanced, would have much likelihood of proving acceptable. The visit from time to time of Ministers dealing with specially important aspects of co-ordination of effort, supplementing the regular system of information and consultation, would appear to be fully adequate.

I have etc.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

583.

572-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 258

Ottawa, February 20, 1941

The Prime Minister in review of External Affairs policy this week, after enumerating a number of practical and political objections to suggestion that Imperial War Cabinet might be set up, went on to examine suggestion that a resident Minister might be appointed in London in immediate charge of all Canadian war activities overseas.¹ He thought in view of splendid work which you and your staff have been doing, that there were no grounds for any change in present arrangements. You were already a member of the Canadian Privy Council and membership in the Cabinet would add little to your authority. He pointed out that membership in the Cabinet might prove embarrassing both to the Canadian Government representative in London and to the Government itself in view of divided responsibilities and uncertain jurisdiction which could hardly fail to have unfortunate results. Canadian interests in London and cooperation with the United Kingdom were better served by the present system of consultation between Governments and by the arrangement of having a High Commissioner permanently resident in London, with occasional visits from Cabinet Ministers from Ottawa. Concluding, he spoke of the close cooperation and wholehearted goodwill which has characterized the relations between Canadian civil and military authorities in London and between the Canadian and British authorities there. With reference to the work which you and your staff have been doing the Prime Minister said: "Their devotion in difficult and often dangerous circumstances is beyond praise. Mr. Massey himself has discharged his manifold and exacting duties with quite exceptional skill, discretion and patience. He is a representative of whom all Canadians have reason to be proud".

584.

572-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH A.201

London, April 9, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of Hansard relating to a Debate which took place in the House of Lords on April 2nd, as a result of Lord Elibank's motion in favour of the setting up of an Imperial War Cabinet

¹ *Débats, Chambre des Communes*, 1941, Volume I, p. 840.

² *Debates, House of Commons*, 1941, Volume I, p. 813.

to consist of the Prime Ministers of the Dominions or their representatives, together with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, a representative of India and a representative of the Colonies and Protectorates. You will already have received copies of Hansard of this date, but I am sending forward another copy under cover of this despatch in view of the importance of the Debate. Lord Elibank opened with a long and somewhat badly expressed and ill-informed speech, in which he advocated the creation of an Imperial War Council to sit at regular intervals in London to consider the major questions of Imperial policy arising out of the war and in the settlement of the peace. He began by paying tribute to the contributions of the various Dominions to the war effort and he went on to say that, while he fully appreciated the value of the present channels of contact between the Dominions' and the United Kingdom Governments, he felt that they did not go far enough. He said "they" (i.e. the present channels of communication) "do not and cannot achieve the unity of purpose and decision or the results which would be secured by a regularised body of Empire statesmen sitting and acting together under directly responsible conditions." He went on to say that the fact that the Secretary of State for the Dominions was not a member of the War Cabinet was an obvious disability. The information received from him by the High Commissioners must sometimes be third hand and not even second hand. Lord Elibank considered that an Imperial War Council would be perfectly consonant with the position of the Dominions under the Statute of Westminster. "It" (i.e., the Imperial War Council) "would be the act of free Governments coming and acting together for a common and vital cause, and such a Council could be as freely dissolved, when it had served its purpose, as it has been freely formed." He then suggested that the United States should nominate a representative to the Imperial War Council.

2. Lord Crewe, who spoke next, in a brief and sensible speech said that he had serious doubts as to whether the existence of such a Council would lead to those rapid decisions which were so necessary in securing a victory. "It seems to me", he said, "that the creation of such a body, holding periodical meetings and carrying on prolonged argumentative discussion, could hardly tend to speedier solutions of the difficult problems of the moment."

3. Lord Davies, who supported Lord Elibank's motion, criticised the Government for ambiguity in their attitude towards the question and wanted to know whether, from the point of view of the United Kingdom Government, they wished that such a body should be constituted as part of the administrative machinery for the conduct of the war and preparation for the peace. He quoted from your own speech in the House of Commons, but in such a way as to give good grounds for Lord Cranborne's subsequent remark that he did it in such a way as to give rather the impression that you were in favour of an Imperial War Council at the present time. (Lord Cranborne, in his speech, drew attention to the false impression thus created and made effective use of your own speech in clarifying the position).

4. Lord Davies said that in his view the present arrangements for co-ordination did not take the place of an Imperial War Council. He maintained that in these days of new facilities for rapid travel it would be possible for Dominion Prime Ministers to reach London very rapidly, and he implied that this weakened the argument that the proper place for a Prime Minister is at home where he can be in touch with his own Cabinet. Lastly, he emphasised the psychological factor. He believed that an imposing body of this sort would make an appeal to every citizen in the British Commonwealth.

5. Lord Elibank's and Lord Davies' arguments were well dealt with by Lord Cranborne in the concluding speech of the Debate. The Secretary of State for the Dominions stressed the importance of the three existing channels of communication between the United Kingdom Government and the Dominions. He laid great emphasis on the usefulness of his meetings with the Dominions' High Commissioners and he explained that while he himself was not a member of the War Cabinet he attended the meetings so as to be in a position to give the fullest possible information to the Dominions. He then went on to say that the visits of Cabinet Ministers from the Dominions to this country had served a most valuable purpose. He mentioned Mr. Gardiner's, Colonel Ralston's and Mr. Howe's visits, and also the present visit of Mr. Menzies, and he confirmed the point which had previously been mentioned by Lord Gifford in the course of the Debate, that if each Dominion seconded for duty in London an important Minister from their Cabinet, he still would not be able to take decisions over the head of his own Government, and every decision would have to be referred home. Thus, in fact, the Council "would be an Imperial War Council only in name". Moreover, he thought that the Dominion representatives might be apt to get out of touch with affairs in their own countries and to that extent their value would be minimised. In closing his speech, Lord Cranborne said that the time might come when an Imperial Conference would not only be important but essential. Meanwhile he was perfectly satisfied that the present system was working admirably and he had had no communication from any Dominion Government implying that a change was desirable.

6. I think you will agree with me that Lord Cranborne's speech met the situation fully.

I have etc.

VINCENT MASSEY

585.

66(s)

Le premier ministre d'Australie au Premier ministre
Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister

TELEGRAM 2

Canberra, July 3, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. I have been much exercised about relations of the Dominions to important matters of central control over war policy.

We all have the greatest admiration for the genius, personality and work of Churchill, but I was greatly struck in London by following facts:

(1) Churchill carries far too great an individual burden, and this has obvious dangers in a long war;

(2) Constitution of War Cabinet is such that members of it have much departmental work involving heavy preoccupation with detail. For example, Beaverbrook has the far-reaching portfolio of Supply, Bevin the complex problems of the Labour Department and Kingsley Wood the Exchequer. This inevitably means that such Ministers have little time for perusal of major reports, access to heads of the fighting services, and those studies and reflections which are necessary to see the war and world as a whole.

(3) Under the existing system, I frankly think that there is inadequate consideration of long range policy in relation to winning of the war, an insufficiently comprehensive view of how the productive capacity of the Empire and the United States can be marshalled for best results, and an unsatisfactory direction of foreign policy, which can at a time like this no longer be left to one Minister, but should represent joint wisdom and decision of an authoritative Cabinet.

(4) Apart from an occasional visit by a Dominions Prime Minister, there has been absence of effective consultation with the Dominions to elicit their point of view in regard to major questions of policy. This is in no sense intentional, but results naturally from the fact that the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs is not a member of the War Cabinet or the Defence Committee, and is therefore little more than a channel of communication.

(5) Churchill being absorbed for long hours every day in the supremely important tasks of strategy and leading and stimulating of the public mind, financial and economic questions which are of vast importance, not only now but in post-war period, tend to slip into the background and to have somewhat spasmodic attention.

I am strongly of the opinion that there should be a War Cabinet in the real sense, meeting daily, thinking out and discussing large matters and in which Churchill would have the constructive criticism of colleagues who, being free of minor activities, would be able to give him the support and advice which even the greatest man must have if he is to reach his highest effectiveness.

In such a Cabinet I believe that a Dominions Prime Minister should, if one is available, have a place. In the absence of such an arrangement we will find ourselves conferring by cable with all attendant delays and ambiguities about matters which require constant consideration and prompt decision.

You will, I am sure, share my feeling that these matters are of first importance if we are to avoid from time to time a state of affairs which may

create real difficulties, particularly of public opinion in various Empire countries. I frankly recognise the complexities of the problem.

I well remember our discussion on these matters when I had the honour of seeing you at Ottawa, and I know your own problems and point of view. Nevertheless, I feel that if we could all be in London at one time for a short meeting of Dominions Prime Ministers we could jointly exercise a powerful influence in re-shaping of machinery of central control and, out of such a conference, we might be able to evolve not some practical impossibility like an Imperial War Cabinet but effective Dominions representation in a British War Cabinet, reduced in size and so constituted as to bring about the results of which I have written above.

Please do not think that in making these suggestions I am in any way proposing something which would be calculated to weaken position or authority of the leader. On the contrary I feel that he is so outstanding and important to all of us that he must be given the greatest possible help in such a way as to secure maximum united effort on the part of all British countries.

There is some reason to believe that Fraser could be induced to remain in London until the end of August. My own political difficulties are considerable since I have a practically non-existent majority, but I would be prepared to take any political risk at home if by going to London for suggested conference I could contribute to what I feel is an essential change.

I would be glad to have quite confidentially to myself your own impressions on these matters.

Kindest regards. Ends.

I have communicated in similar manner with Smuts.

MENZIES

586.

66(s)

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
d'Australie*

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister of Australia

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, July 7, 1941

PERSONAL. MOST SECRET. Your most secret and personal telegram No. 2 of July 3. Prime Minister is at present on recruiting tour in Western Canada, returning to Ottawa within week. He will send reply to your cable as soon after his return as possible.

N. A. ROBERTSON

587.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] July 27, 1941

I am attaching a draft telegram¹ to Prime Minister Menzies of Australia about which I am not very happy. You have covered the ground very thoroughly in your exchanges of telegrams with Churchill, who, from his latest message (telegram No. 123 of July 26),² appears to recognize that it is not practicable to hold an Imperial War Conference in the near future. The arguments against an Imperial War Conference apply *a fortiori* to an Imperial War Cabinet. Churchill might be quite glad to have the former come and go but I am sure would have very grave misgivings himself about Menzies' suggestion for a political commissar from overseas whose job it would be primarily to keep the United Kingdom Government up to the mark.

With increasing integration of the United States in the common war effort, there is quite likely to arise a feeling that there should be some common clearing house for the political direction of the general war effort. With the war extending to the Far East, Washington would seem to be bound to become the strategic as well as the geographic centre of our resistance to the Axis Powers. The gradual dispersion in recent months of the British War Cabinet, Halifax in Washington, Lyttleton in Cairo, and now Duff Cooper in Singapore, reflects in part at least the difficulty of exercising effective central control from London of all these far-flung operations.

If there is likely to be need in the next few months for closer co-ordination of war policies it will not necessarily be closer collaboration between the Commonwealth countries *per se* but between the Commonwealth countries and the United States, which when its belligerency is overt may take the initiative in proposing a central War Council which would achieve some of the results Menzies hopes for from an Imperial War Cabinet.*

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

¹ Non reproduit. Révisé puis expédié le 2 août, ce télégramme portait le numéro 2.

² Not printed. A revised draft was sent on August 2 as Telegram 2.

³ Document 576.

* Note telle que dans l'original:

* Note as in original:

I agree. W. L. M. K[ING].

588.

66(s)

Le Premier ministre au premier ministre d'Australie
Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia

TELEGRAM 2

Ottawa, August 2, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. I trust you will forgive me for not having sooner replied to your telegram (No. 2) of July 3. It was received during my absence on a tour of western Canada. Since my return and up to the present, I have found it impossible to say that there was any likelihood of my being able to visit England for a meeting of Dominion Prime Ministers before the summer was over. I am hoping there may be a chance for me to be in London some time this month, but that possibility will necessarily depend on how matters continue to shape themselves. I so advised Churchill in a message sent to him last night.¹ If I should be able to get away, I shall be obliged to return not later than the first of September. You will doubtless have noticed that my colleagues: Mr. Power, the Minister of Defence for Air, and Mr. Mackenzie, the Minister of Pensions and National Health, visited England during July. Mr. Macdonald, the Minister for Naval Services, expects to leave by plane on the 7th of this month, returning on the 17th.

The recent worsening of the position in the Pacific, with its direct implications for the Commonwealth countries which border it, will no doubt have its effect upon your own freedom of movement. The possibility of the United States, as well as Canada, being confronted with war on the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, has made it particularly necessary for me to remain in constant and direct touch with my own colleagues and to be as largely as possible in Canada itself, where my most useful work can be done. Apart from all else, these considerations rule out any question of my participation in a protracted conference and would make membership in any kind of an Imperial War Cabinet impossible. I notice that you yourself feel that an Imperial War Cabinet is a practical impossibility.

I have been giving most careful thought to the broad questions of policy raised in your telegram. This is a further reason why my reply to your message has been so long delayed. I agree that Mr. Churchill's individual burden is far too great and that this has its obvious dangers. It is, however, a burden which he carries as Prime Minister of Great Britain and which, for that reason, is one, it seems to me, that can only be relieved, or altered, by Mr. Churchill himself, or by the British Government, Parliament, or people.

Mr. Churchill's burden and responsibility may vary in degree, but it does not differ in kind from that of the Prime Ministers of each of the Dominions. They, like Churchill, have to meet situations which arise or change from day to day. Their responsibility, like Churchill's, is to their own parliaments and peoples.

¹ Document 577.

Churchill can no more be relieved of his burdens or responsibilities except by the action of those to whom he is responsible, which, in the last analysis, means the British electorate, than the Prime Ministers of the several Dominions can hope to escape responsibility for their political acts and the policies of their respective governments, because of some action or policy of the government of the United Kingdom, or of the governments of the other Dominions. The same of course is true of each of the Prime Ministers of the Dominions vis-à-vis their own electorates.

This being the case, close, constant and continuous consultation between the several governments of the British Commonwealth is imperative, in order that there should not be any conflict of policies and that the war efforts of the several governments should be as co-operative as possible, and the collective effort as effective as it can be made. Where the existing machinery for consultation is inadequate to effect this result, every effort should be made to improve it. By what means or agency this can best be brought about is something which each of the governments of the Commonwealth in relation to the others can best decide for itself.

My own impression is, and it is shared by every member of the government, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to improve upon the existing machinery for Commonwealth consultation. I think it is working more smoothly and swiftly than anybody could have expected it to work in the middle of a great war. It is a fact, I think, that difficulties in reaching agreed decisions cannot be attributed, in any significant degree, to delays or misunderstandings resulting from any inadequacy of the various channels of communications now available to all of us. Indeed, in my opinion, the avoidance of difficulty and delay in reaching decisions and the probability of arriving at sound and satisfactory conclusions are many times enhanced by having each government take up individually with the other government or governments concerned such questions of possible difference as are likely to arise, or may actually have arisen between them.

Similarly, I feel that the problem of coordination of Commonwealth war policies is being met in the most effective manner possible, by the method at present existing, (the efficacy of which has been fully tested over the past two years), whereby the Prime Minister of each government, when he speaks in the name of his government, does so only after consultation with his colleagues on the subject matter under discussion. Personally, I believe, as I am sure you do, that undertakings should not be given or decisions made, in time of war, on matters of major concern, by any member of a government, the Prime Minister not excepted, without the undertaking or the decision being that of the group which is collectively responsible, namely, the Cabinet itself. Obviously, that result is better effected by a Prime Minister being in immediate personal contact with his colleagues in his own country than by an exchange of views with them carried on, as otherwise would be necessary, by cypher telegram.

An Imperial War Cabinet, in which Dominion Prime Ministers would take their place, might, to appearances, be an imposing body. To my mind, such a

body would be sacrificing reality to appearances. Moreover, the absence of a Prime Minister from his own country, either continuously or for longer or shorter periods of time, which his presence as a member of an Imperial War Cabinet, sitting in London, would involve, would almost certainly prejudice the war effort of his own country and the business of his country generally, through the obvious difficulties of colleagues taking up with him by cypher telegram important questions as they are certain to arise from day to day. In a war, like the present, it is impossible to say with what very critical situation any one of the governments of the Commonwealth may not be confronted at a moment's notice, and how very serious to the effective cooperation of all, to say nothing of the dangers to the government itself, absence of a Prime Minister from his own country, at such a moment, might prove to be.

While all this would not apply to all Prime Ministers of the Dominions under a plan whereby representation of all the Dominions in the British Cabinet was effected by the presence of only one or two of the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, it would certainly apply to the one or more Prime Ministers to whom this task of representation of the Dominions in the British Cabinet might be assigned.

Apart from the immediate and obvious practical disadvantages of separating the responsible leader of a government from his cabinet colleagues and the parliament to which he is accountable, I feel as already indicated that there are grave political and constitutional objections to including in any British Cabinet responsible to the Parliament at Westminster members of Dominion governments who would be simultaneously responsible to their several parliaments. These objections would be even more serious if the proposal were that the Prime Minister of one Dominion should in some way undertake to represent the collective interests of the Dominions in an Imperial Cabinet.

Attempt at any such representation of all the Dominions to give effect to a Dominions' point of view, or for any other reason, would be open to great misgivings and objection. In the first place, I do not think there can be said to be "a Dominions'", as opposed to a "United Kingdom", point of view or interest, which could be expressed in any collective way. Each Dominion has its own particular problems, which, in so far as they affect other nations of the Commonwealth, can only be satisfactorily met by its own Ministers, in consultation by cable or personally with the Ministers of the other government or governments concerned. The electors of Australia might be willing to accept the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom as their representative in the government of the United Kingdom on some matter that might be of concern to all the governments of the Commonwealth, but I am certain they would never accept as their representative in a British Cabinet in London the Prime Minister of either New Zealand, South Africa, or Canada. This, I fear, would be equally true of the people of the other Dominions as respects representation of their Dominion in a British Cabinet by the Prime Minister of Australia, no matter how complete the confidence of their governments might be in the qualities he might possess for such an office. Apart from this, however, I cannot see how under any theory of representative

responsible government there can be in any Cabinet of the United Kingdom, unless he were chosen from the House of Lords, any Minister other than one who would be obliged to qualify for membership in the British House of Commons under the electoral laws of the United Kingdom, and whose representation would necessarily be that of the people of the United Kingdom only. The same, so far as representation of any Dominion is concerned, would of course apply equally, if not in greater measure, to any Member of a British Cabinet who might be chosen from the House of Lords.

As respects Canada, I should perhaps add that my colleagues and I have not been conscious of any lack of effective consultation between the government of the United Kingdom and ourselves, nor of any difficulty in making our point of view in relation to major questions of policy fully known and felt. While all you say about the limitations of the British Cabinet in many respects may be perfectly true, the situation is one, it seems to me, which the British Cabinet, parliament and people must remedy themselves. If a remedy cannot be found in that way, I doubt if it can be found at all. An attempt on the part of Dominions Ministers to alter either the personnel or procedure of the British Cabinet, or to reshape the machinery of central control so as to secure Dominions representation in a British War Cabinet, as suggested by you for consideration, apart from accomplishing little or nothing in the long run would, I believe, be misunderstood and strongly resented. It would almost certainly be regarded as interference by some of the Commonwealth governments in what we would be told were the responsibilities of the British Cabinet. As you frankly recognize, the problem is full of complexities. All circumstances considered, I believe it is better "to suffer the ills we have than to fly to others we know not of". I much appreciate your confidence in communicating with me as you have done and inviting such comment as your suggestions might occasion. I have tried to give you with equal frankness my own reaction to them. My kindest personal regards to you.

MACKENZIE KING

589.

572-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État suppléant
aux Affaires extérieures*¹

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Acting Secretary of State
for External Affairs*¹

DESPATCH A.394

London, August 26, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. A.391 of August 18th.² The principal event of the past week, from the Canadian point of view, has,

¹ Ernest Lapointe.

² Non reproduite.

³ Not printed.

of course, been the arrival of the Prime Minister on a visit to this country. A full collection of press clippings relating to the Prime Minister's visit are being compiled here and will be sent forward in due course. They reflect the extremely warm and enthusiastic welcome which Mr. King has met with in this country.

2. The Prime Minister, in the course of the press conference shortly after his arrival, made an important statement relating to the proposal that an Imperial War Cabinet should be set up here. Mr. Mackenzie King's explicit statement emphasised the thoroughly satisfactory nature of the existing arrangements for communications between the British and Dominion Governments and exposed the inherent impracticability of an Imperial War Cabinet. As a result, it may be hoped that this proposal will now be dropped, at any rate by its more responsible supporters. I am enclosing herewith an interesting leading article¹ which appeared in *The Times* of August 25th, in which the idea of an Imperial War Cabinet is definitely discouraged. *The Times* published some weeks ago a long article by their Special Correspondent in Australia containing arguments in favour of either an Imperial War Cabinet or the despatch of some alternate to each of the Dominion Prime Ministers to act as Minister Plenipotentiary in London, and their comment on this article at the time was not entirely unfavourable. In the article which I enclose, however, *The Times* suggestions are restricted to two. The first is that each Dominion Prime Minister should, *ex officio*, sit in the War Cabinet in London whenever his duties at home give him time to attend it. And secondly, that the Secretary of State for the Dominions should be a member of the War Cabinet.

3. The political controversy which has arisen in Australia over the return of Mr. Menzies to London as a member of the War Cabinet certainly cannot strengthen any contributions which the Australian Prime Minister might be able to make to the deliberations of the War Cabinet should he eventually return to this country, as they must necessarily reveal him as being not entirely representative of Australian opinion. However, if Mr. Menzies comes to this country as Prime Minister of Australia he will, of course, participate in the deliberations of the War Cabinet, though it remains to be seen—in view of the political situation in Australia—how long he would remain Prime Minister. If, on the other hand, the Australian Government should decide to despatch a Cabinet Minister to represent Australia at the meetings of the War Cabinet, the United Kingdom Government presumably would enquire whether or not he possessed plenary powers to take decisions on behalf of the Australian Government. There seems no likelihood that any Australian Prime Minister would be willing to grant such powers and it would therefore be difficult to see in what way the position of such a Minister would be an improvement on the regular representative of the Australian Government here. A request on the part of the United Kingdom Government for a decision as to whether or not the Minister would be endowed with plenary powers

¹ Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.

might therefore give the Australian Government cause to reconsider such a proposal and might provide a way out of an embarrassing situation.

4. The proposal for an Imperial War Cabinet has originated in this country, partly from a sincere desire to make the war effort more effective, and partly from a wish on the part of certain groups and individuals to strengthen the Government and, above all, to see the Government less under the personal direction of the Prime Minister and containing more men of a calibre to "stand up to Mr. Churchill". Some of these critics no doubt consider, perhaps rather optimistically, that they themselves are fitted to fill such a role. As a well informed English journalist said to me the other day, they hope to use the suggestion for an Imperial War Cabinet as a 'can-opener' to pry the way open for further Cabinet changes. It is to be hoped that the backers of this proposal now realise, in view of Mr. Mackenzie King's statement, that to persist in their campaign for an Imperial War Cabinet is not only useless but actually dangerous, in that it raises a false issue which can only have unfortunate repercussions in the Dominions. It is interesting to note that one of the original supporters of the proposal for an Imperial War Cabinet has today, in a letter to *The Times* withdrawn his advocacy of the proposal. There is no reason to suppose that there is anything which could possibly be described as a national demand in this country for an Imperial War Cabinet, and any agitation which gives the impression that such a demand exists must have a disturbing effect in the Dominions. The majority of Englishmen are quite content to accept the view put forward both by their own Prime Minister and by Mr. Mackenzie King that the present system is working quite satisfactorily.

I have etc.

VINCENT MASSEY

590.

572-40

*Le haut commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in New Zealand to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 346

Wellington, November 21, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the attitude of the New Zealand Prime Minister to the formation of a Commonwealth War Cabinet sitting in London seems not to have changed at all since he made his statement in Ottawa on the subject. In a conversation the other day he said such a Cabinet was out of the question, that he thought it would be "silly" and that Mr. Menzies so far as he knew had been the only Dominion Prime Minister who had given it his staunch support. He would, he said, be prepared to attend a meeting in London from time to time; if necessary it might be possible

to attend meetings for a few days every six months. But the idea of the Prime Minister of a Dominion leaving his capital for any length of time was foolish.

2. Mr. Fraser was also entirely opposed to Mr. Menzies' proposal that the representative of one Dominion might represent the others, considering it absurd that any Prime Minister, who must of necessity have very little intimate knowledge of conditions in another Dominion, should think he was competent to speak for that Dominion. He felt that he had gone about as far as he could in his statement in Ottawa by pointing out that it would be impossible for a Prime Minister to be absent from his country for any lengthy period as he would lose touch.

I have etc.

W. A. RIDDELL

PARTIE 4/PART 4

NEUTRALITÉ DE L'IRLANDE
NEUTRALITY OF IRELAND

591.

822-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 868

London, June 15, 1940

MOST SECRET. Personal for the Prime Minister. Problem of Ireland in the light of the present crisis is giving authorities here great concern. Should German forces succeed in landing on Irish soil and gaining a foothold there, they could easily establish air bases from which they could gravely threaten western ports of Great Britain. De Valera is morbidly sensitive as to his neutrality and will not hear of any steps being taken by British forces to defend Ireland until invasion is imminent. When this is actually threatened it may well be too late. His essential preoccupation is partition of Ireland preferably but on the other hand Lord Craigavon representing Ulster is equally preoccupied with local Irish problem and is unwilling to make any concession that might ease the situation and make possible common action in defence of Ireland. Every effort is being made to impress on both leaders with [sic] gravity of the situation and both have been asked to come to London for consultation. At present it does not seem likely that either will come. It is profoundly to be hoped that before it is too late both will realize that presence of a Nazi *Gauleiter* in Ireland would extinguish the ideal for which both Ulster and Eire stand.

MASSEY

592.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] June 16, 1940

MR. MASSEY'S TELEGRAM NO. 868 OF JUNE 15TH REGARDING IRELAND

Do you think it would be desirable to send telegrams to de Valera and Craigavon expressing the hope that in the shadow of the impending danger which threatens the individual liberties as well as the political attachments and aspirations of the people of Ireland, as well as of all other free peoples, they may find it possible to meet and discuss a basis upon which resistance could be offered to the common foe? Both de Valera and Craigavon are honest and patriotic men but both are stubborn, and it may take time, too much time, for old prejudices and by-gone loyalties to dissolve.*

593.

822-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
d'Irlande du Nord*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
of Northern Ireland*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, June 16, 1940

SECRET. 1. In this fateful hour when the totalitarian hordes are crushing every people who stand in their path, I venture to assure you of the deep and friendly concern of the people of Canada for what the unbounded ambitions of Nazi leaders may shortly hold for the people of Ireland as for all other free peoples. Their ruthless fury will now be concentrated upon the islands which have given a great part of the world their passion for liberty and their Christian civilization.

2. There is little doubt that their forces will shortly be directed against Ireland, because of its tempting value as a prize in itself and as a base for immediate operations against Great Britain. If that attack succeeds, it will mean that the individual liberties, the national aspirations, and the deep loyalties of all Irishmen, whatever differences may have divided them in the past, will be in equal and deadly jeopardy. The people of Canada who owe so great a debt to the men and women of Ireland, north and south alike who have shared in the building of our country, would feel that fate their own.

* Note telle que dans l'original:

* Note as in original:

3. May I therefore be permitted to express the hope that you and Mr. de Valera may find it possible to meet and work out a basis upon which united and effective resistance could be offered in the event of invasion or attack. We have every confidence that whatever the months immediately ahead may hold, the free peoples will maintain their freedom. In that struggle we will do all in our power.

4. I am communicating with Mr. de Valera to the same effect.

MACKENZIE KING

594.

822-39

Le premier ministre d'Irlande du Nord au Premier ministre
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland to Prime Minister

TELEGRAM

Belfast, June 19, 1940

I very greatly appreciate your cable. Constitutional position is that Ulster is a constituent part of the United Kingdom at war with Germany and Italy. Eire, on the other hand, has declared its neutrality. Consequently, any question of rendering assistance to Mr. De Valera to guard against enemy invasion is one for His Majesty's Government in United Kingdom in consultation with Mr. De Valera.

May I congratulate you personally, and all Canadians on the magnitude of your war activities. Between us all we will win through to victory.

CRAIGAVON

595.

822-39

Le haut commissaire en Irlande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in Ireland to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 32

Dublin, November 8, 1940

In *Dail* yesterday De Valera declared "There can be no question of handing over of ports so long as Ireland remains neutral. There can be no question of leasing them. Any attempt to bring pressure to bear on us by any of the belligerents—by Britain—could only result in bloodshed".

596.

822-39

Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] November 13, 1940

IRISH BASES

Mr. Hearne said today that he had met you last night after the debate and the question raised by Mr. Hanson and others as to the Irish situation came up. He said that you had indicated you understood Mr. De Valera's

position which had been set forth clearly in his November 7th speech; and that you did not wish to put the question forward formally if that would prove embarrassing and if it was evident it could not be entertained. As the question had been asked in the House of Commons, however, he thought it should be brought to the Irish Government's attention. Mr. Hearne said that he had accordingly sent a telegram on the above lines and had added that he believed you would like to be able to say, if it were brought up in the House, that you had got in touch with the Government.

I told Mr. Hearne it might have been better to say "had been in touch", as you might wish to refer to your telegrams of the summer.

Mr. Hearne went on to say that the refusal to permit the occupancy of the ports would not be decided according to whom they liked or did not like. That was not the question at all. It applied to all belligerents, as a necessary incident of the policy of neutrality, on which all parties in the country agreed.

Mr. Hearne said he was considerably disturbed by the exaggerations in many Canadian papers. Mr. De Valera had made it clear that the allegation as to Ireland having been made a base for German submarines was a lie. As a matter of fact, (I am not sure whether this has been made public), Mr. De Valera had asked Sir John Maffey, the British representative in Ireland, to make any investigation he pleased on the west coast with the aid of police and military forces. No trace whatever was found of any use or attempt at use of the coast by enemy forces.

As regards the telegrams referred to above, I think if it became necessary, it would be quite possible to indicate that you had on your own initiative communicated on the question of the war situation as it affected Ireland some time ago, with both Mr. De Valera and Lord Craigavon, though it would not be possible to give any particulars of the discussions.

597.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] November 18, 1940

IRISH SITUATION

Mr. Hearne brought this morning a memorandum embodying a telegram he had received from Dublin over the weekend in response to an enquiry he had sent. (Attached).

Mr. Hearne said it did not seem necessary to elaborate the answer in view of the full exposition given by Mr. de Valera in his speech of November 7th. He could only repeat that the policy of neutrality was one that was accepted by all parties. Recently Mr. Cosgrave, in replying to a statement that Mr. de Valera had kept the country out of war, asked who

wanted to get the country into war, and said that the decision was not Mr. de Valera's but the decision of the nation. Rightly or wrongly, the people have concluded that in their comparatively defenceless position they are more likely to suffer by becoming a belligerent than to take their chance by remaining neutral. The attitude on the ports is not based on any question of hostility to the United Kingdom. The attitude to England is increasingly friendly. There is absolutely no pro-Nazi sentiment, though there is an I.R.A. faction which demands that the traditional policy of 'England's danger is Ireland's opportunity' should be followed by attacking England. This I.R.A. group of course is violently opposed to de Valera, who has obtained drastic powers from Parliament to suppress it.

The policy regarding the ports is an incident of the policy of neutrality. It would bar handing over the ports to any belligerent regardless of how friendly the feeling to that belligerent might be, simply because such a gesture in each and every case would mean the end of neutrality.

O. D. S[KELTON]

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémorandum du haut commissaire d'Irlande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from High Commissioner of Ireland to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

[Ottawa, November 18, 1940]

It would be extremely awkward if the Prime Minister said he was in touch with the *Taoiseach*.

The *Taoiseach* is most friendly to Canada and to the Prime Minister and does not wish to say anything likely to hurt, but, if the position were reversed, and if a similar question were asked here relating to Canada, the *Taoiseach* would consider it unfair to Canada and an infringement of her neutral position even to raise the issue.

Our attitude to England is also friendly.

Neutrality imposes the same essential attitude regarding the ports towards all the belligerents.

598.

822-39

*Le haut commissaire en Irlande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in Ireland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 37

Dublin, December 27, 1940

From recent conversation with British representative, I believe I am justified in inferring that consideration may be given by Britain to question of occupying Irish ports. I consider such action would be ill-advised, and suggest that Canada be consulted before any decision is taken.

599.

822-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Irlande
Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Ireland

TELEGRAM 32

Ottawa, December 30, 1940

Your telegram No. 37. I doubt if at present at least any pressure that may be applied will take the form you suggest.

600.

822-39

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre

Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] May 23, 1941

Mr. John Hearne, the Irish High Commissioner, has this morning received instructions from his Government to communicate to you a message from Mr. de Valera. Mr. Hearne would, therefore, be grateful if you would arrange to see him for a few minutes later in the afternoon.

Mr. de Valera's message is prompted by Mr. Churchill's statement in Westminster this week about the possibility of conscription in Northern Ireland. De Valera foresees the gravest political consequences from the extension of conscription to the six counties. He fears that it would destroy all basis of cooperation between Eire and the United Kingdom.

601.

822-39

Mémorandum du Premier ministre

Memorandum by Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] May 23, 1941

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW WITH HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR IRELAND

At five o'clock, the Irish High Commissioner, Mr. Hearne, called. He said he had received from Mr. de Valera, this morning, a message for me which he read over and which after asking if I would like to have the message itself, he left with me.

It was as follows:

Aide-Mémoire

There is reason to apprehend that the threat of conscription in Northern Ireland is immediate and serious.

If the threat were to be carried out, it would bring about a situation the end of which no one can see. The friendly feeling and sympathy for Great Britain which now exists in Ireland would be destroyed.

The Irish people feel that it would be an outrage against democracy to force the Nationalist population to fight for a freedom which they have not themselves been permitted to enjoy. Nothing could be more calculated to disturb profoundly the feelings of the Irish people and to cause endless bitterness, and, perhaps, violence.

The situation which has now arisen shows the essential evil and odiousness of partition.

Personal to Prime Minister

Irish Government has done and is doing a great many things to help the British in a very real way.

After receiving the communication, I asked him to explain the distinction between Eire and Ireland as he had spoken of the people of Northern Ireland as being citizens of Ireland. I said: does that mean citizens of Eire? He said: Yes. That Eire was a phrase used for purposes of propaganda but agreement with Britain made all the people of Ireland citizens of the Irish Free State; really forcing Irish citizens to fight for freedom which they, themselves, did not possess.

He did not say that Mr. de Valera had asked for any message from me but took a pad and pencil and asked if I had anything I would wish to say to Mr. de Valera. I said to say that I thanked him for giving me the information which he had, and that I would be glad to have in mind any matter which might be of mutual interest and concern.

I then said to Hearne privately that Mr. de Valera had not made any request and I did not wish to make any commitment with respect to what he had said. I thought I could read between the lines of his communication and he, doubtless, would read between the lines of mine. I told Hearne that I thought when it suited Germany's purpose, the fact that Ireland had remained neutral would make little difference to the action that Germany would herself take in the end. He stressed very strongly the forcing of conscription [on] any of the Irish people would mean a very serious condition arising.

Though I did not say so, I agree with him and further feel that it would have repercussions in Canada which would be unfortunate.

602.

51(s)

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 86

Ottawa, May 25, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. I understand you will be considering with colleagues of the War Cabinet representations recently made regarding conscription in Northern Ireland. I naturally do not wish to interfere in any matter which might be regarded as exclusively one for the Government of the United Kingdom. I am

sure, however, you will not misunderstand my motive if I suggest that, in case the step has not already been taken, it would be well to seek from the Ambassador at Washington an expression of his views as to the possible effect, especially at this very critical moment, upon Irish-American opinion and attitude in the United States of a decision by the British Government to enforce conscription in any part of Ireland. My colleagues and I would be grateful, if possible repercussions which such a step might have upon public opinion in Canada might also be considered. We are at the moment engaged in a recruiting campaign for further voluntary enlistments in Canada's armed forces for overseas service. The more it is possible to avoid the conscription issue becoming a matter of acute controversy the less difficult I feel sure will be the task of maintaining Canadian unity. Ends.

PARTIE 5/PART 5

COOPÉRATION ÉCONOMIQUE
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

603.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from High Commission of Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

SECRET AND IMMEDIATE

[Ottawa,] September 21, 1939

The Canadian Government are already aware from communications which have been made to them in recent months from the High Commissioner's office in pursuance of instructions from the United Kingdom Government, of the vital need for the United Kingdom of preserving so far as possible the at present limited dollar resources at their disposal.

At a meeting of the War Cabinet held on the 20th September there came under consideration the question of the necessity of restricting imports from the United States and Canada as far as possible in order to enable the available United Kingdom dollar resources to be concentrated on the purchase of commodities essential for the prosecution of the war. The restrictions under consideration were additional to those already specified (in connection with which reference is invited to the telegram from the United Kingdom Government Circular C.63 of the 6th September¹ and to connected correspondence on this subject) and the imports affecting Canada which were considered were tobacco and fruit, fresh and tinned apples and pears.

¹ Volume 6, Document 202.

The War Cabinet came to the conclusion that, as regards tobacco, it would be necessary to arrange that no further purchases from Canada would be permitted except where contractual arrangements made it impracticable to cancel transactions. The same course would apply in the case of the United States. As regards fruit the War Cabinet felt that it would be necessary to restrict imports from both Canada and the United States to the minimum requirements of the United Kingdom, which are likely this year to be very small owing to a large home crop. It was contemplated that this restriction could be subject to the possibility of giving some preference as regards the degree of restriction to Canadian apples over apples from the United States.

It was agreed by the War Cabinet that no action on these matters would be taken in respect of Canada for forty-eight hours in order that the Canadian Government might first have an opportunity of expressing their views.

The United Kingdom Government feel sure that it will be realised that their action, as indicated above, is dictated solely by the imperative necessity of having regard to the state of their dollar resources. The Canadian Government is already aware that the United Kingdom Government proposes to place a very large order in Canada in respect of their munitions programme and of other essential supplies. It is inevitable, therefore, that it should be necessary for the United Kingdom Government to restrict their purchases of less essential items.

The United Kingdom Government realise to the full the difficulties, political and otherwise, which their proposed action must cause to the Canadian Government, and they are anxious that it should be realised with what great regret they have found themselves compelled to reach these conclusions. They wish to give a definite assurance that they will take all necessary steps to ensure that this restriction of imports from Canada which, as already stated, is forced upon them by the exigencies of the war will not be used to alter the permanent channels of trade. On the contrary the United Kingdom intend, in present circumstances, to limit their total consumption of the commodities in question. It is also their intention to return, as soon as possible, to their normal peace-time commercial policy as enshrined in their agreements with Canada and the United States.

604.

1893-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 82

Ottawa, September 21, 1939

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Canadian Government are seriously disturbed by economic and financial problems presented by certain aspects of United Kingdom plans for wartime purchases from Canada. They fully appreciate importance your Government attaches to conserving dollar exchange and recognize this may require some restriction on less essential imports from Canada.

Our ability to cooperate with your Government in meeting these problems depends, in part, on degree to which war costs can be equitably distributed between different parts of Canadian economy and on the maintenance of public confidence that primary producers in Canada will receive equal opportunities to sell and prices as fair as may be negotiated with any other Empire or foreign suppliers.

2. As you are aware, we have been endeavouring to work out the most effective means of cooperation with the United Kingdom in the economic as well as in the military field. We feel certain that your Government fully shares our view of the importance of such close cooperation and in shaping your programme as to purchases of supplies full consideration will be given to the broader aspects of policy involved.

3. Clearly our ability to assist in financing of expanded United Kingdom purchases in Canadian market will be affected by the terms and extent of United Kingdom purchases of apples, tobacco, wheat, cheese, bacon and other agricultural products. Curtailment of such purchases would compel the Government to finance domestic holding and distribution of those products for which alternative markets are not available.

4. We feel transfer and credit problem presented by anticipated expansion of United Kingdom purchases must be viewed as a whole, and are worried by apparent tendency of various United Kingdom supply organizations to suggest arrangements on widely different terms of payment with different Canadian interests, e.g., proposals for purchase of base metals at a guaranteed sterling exchange rate must embarrass consideration of proposals to purchase farm products without insurance against effect of fluctuating exchanges. Similarly proposals for financial purchase of certain products by partial blocking of sterling proceeds appears to us to complicate unnecessarily the general dollar-sterling exchange position.

5. What we urgently require, and what we have been endeavouring to secure, is knowledge of your plans in respect of purchase of all primary products and also war supplies from Canada. We would then be in a position to discuss credit facilities in various forms on a substantial scale. In the circumstances suggest immediate advisability of United Kingdom arranging for a representative or representatives to discuss with Canadian Government the whole range of problems connected with the purchase and finance of United Kingdom requirements in Canada including the question of shipping.

6. With particular reference to the message transmitted today by the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, we strongly urge that until there has been opportunity for direct negotiations on the wider problem, a final decision should not be reached nor any public announcement made in regard to imports of tobacco and fruit.

605.

5909-40

Le Premier ministre au premier ministre suppléant de Nouvelle-Zélande
Prime Minister to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand

TELEGRAM 9

Ottawa, September 27, 1939

IMMEDIATE. Following from Mr. Euler Begins. Reference to your telegram of September 25.¹ Wish to confirm Canadian Government agreeable to extension Trade Agreement for further year under same terms as previously and to express appreciation concurrence your Government in withdrawal concession floor rugs Ex Item No. 572. It is proposed to publish necessary Order in Council Thursday September 28.² Ends.

606.

413-F-36

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 439

London, September 29, 1939

There have recently been informal discussions here between Ministry of Food and representatives of the Argentine, Australia, Canada, and the United States on the subject of long-term bulk purchases of wheat. In these discussions Lloyd, Assistant Director in the Ministry and Sir Alan Anderson, Chairman of the Cereal Control Board, outlined the Ministry's desire as follows:

(a) to maintain contact with and in so far as possible negotiate with representatives of overseas countries collectively, as well as individually, so as to avoid any suspicion of one country playing off against another;

(b) to purchase at fixed prices reasonable to buyers and sellers alike the annual wheat and food grain requirements of the United Kingdom, and to co-operate with France, Ireland and certain European neutrals in the purchase of their requirements;

(c) to examine in their mutual interest every possibility of overcoming the difficult problem of obtaining necessary dollars and other foreign exchange;

(d) to furnish at periodic intervals information about the exigencies of shipping, etc.;

(e) to avoid using the Ministry's monopoly powers to the disadvantage of any suppliers;

(f) to postpone action on the question of prohibiting the use of wheat for animal feeding and on the suggested increase of milling extraction ratio.

The Ministry also express the hope that pending negotiation of long-term bulk purchase contracts envisaged there would be no temporary holding back of supplies in any position.

¹ Non reproduit.

² Le C.P.2900 du 27 septembre 1939.

¹ Not printed.

² P.C. 2900, September 27, 1939.

In connection with points (a) and (b) above, would appreciate authorization or otherwise to participate in suggested discussions on a reasonable price for wheat purchases. If so authorized, would appreciate your views as to what constitutes reasonable price. Understand Ministry's views are that a price somewhere between immediate pre-war price and that accepted by overseas exporters in their August discussions would be acceptable. Argentine and United States representatives at meeting indicated their readiness to carry on discussions but Australia and Canada merely stated they would ask for instructions.

MASSEY

607.

413-F-36

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 85

Ottawa, September 30, 1939

SECRET. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

1. My colleagues and I are seriously concerned by the situation which is developing between Canada and the United Kingdom in respect of wheat.

2. No purchases have been made on United Kingdom Government account since commencement of the war. We understand that United Kingdom mills have been instructed greatly to reduce their use of Canadian wheat and the surface indications all point to efforts to secure or utilize other varieties with the probable result that Canadian shipments during the present season of navigation on the St. Lawrence may be seriously curtailed. If this should be the case, the bulk of our crop will remain in storage at points distant from the seaboard, and the later movement overseas would involve not only a greater expense for carriage but also some dislocation of our rail transport arrangements, with resultant prejudice of movements of other war materials and munitions.

3. It may be that the United Kingdom authority dealing with wheat purchases has understood our attitude in respect of continuance of the open market in Winnipeg, and has the impression that this implies merely a desire to obtain higher prices. Whether or not the British Cereals Control Board has this impression, the fact remains that the policy being pursued has all the aspects of a commercial struggle between opposing interests. Our people in the West are already commencing to sense this situation.

4. I cannot over-emphasize the painful impression that would be produced in this country if it is thought that our relationships with the United Kingdom are developing on the basis referred to above. Unity of purpose and consequently successful prosecution of our war effort would be seriously prejudiced.

5. The present impasse threatens to produce a situation which, both from an economic and psychological point of view will weaken our ability to render assistance. As time is of the essence, very early consideration would be appreciated. Ends.

608.

413-F-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 86

London, October 6, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram of the 30th September, No. 85. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. I have given, in conjunction with my colleagues directly concerned, the most careful consideration to your representations regarding wheat situation and am glad to have this opportunity of removing any misunderstanding which may exist in the minds of the Canadian Government as to our attitude on this question.

We fully appreciate position of your Government as explained in your message and I should like to assure you at once that we are anxious to cooperate to the fullest extent in our power in removing or lessening difficulties which you feel. The Ministry of Food desires, if finance can be arranged, to buy wheat, flour, maize and barley from Canada. But the extent of the purchases which will be possible depends on dollar resources available to us. Final decision had, therefore, to be deferred until financial position has been discussed with Osborne.¹ In the meantime everything possible has been done to establish contacts in relation to wheat in particular. Earlier this year the Food Ministry had most valuable discussions in London with McIvor, Chairman of Canadian Wheat Board, full details of which were doubtless made available by him to the Canadian authorities.

Our understanding of position, as left by these conversations, was that McIvor would communicate further with United Kingdom authorities after consultation with Canadian Ministers as to coordinated plan for sales of wheat in the event of war. Food Ministry had understood from him that the Canadian Government would probably close Winnipeg Grain Exchange in time of war and establish one single organization for negotiating sales. Impression here is that present unsettled condition of Canadian market has to some extent resulted from absence of some such arrangement.

The whole question has, I understand, been the subject of recent informal discussions between officials of the Ministry of Food and Exporting Countries Sub-Committee of Wheat Advisory Committee in London, and Canadian representative will no doubt have reported to his Department the desire expressed by Ministry of Food that matter should be dealt with on basis of coordinated arrangements rather than of deals on a purely commercial basis between various importing and exporting countries.

¹J. A. C. Osborne, représentant de la Trésorerie au conseil britannique des approvisionnements; sous-gouverneur de la Banque du Canada, 1934-1938.

¹J. A. C. Osborne, Treasury representative, British Supply Board; Deputy Governor of Bank of Canada, 1934-38.

It would be of great assistance to Ministry of Food in the circumstances if it were possible for McIvor to return to this country at an early date in order to continue discussions with a view to concluding long-term contract for wheat as soon as position in regard to finance is clearer. I very much hope this can be arranged. Ends.

609.

413-F-36

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 91

Ottawa, October 10, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram of sixth October, No. 86. Following from Prime Minister to your Prime Minister. [Begins.]

1. My colleagues and I appreciate the consideration you have given our representations in regard to wheat and share your anxiety to remove all difficulties standing in the way of full cooperation. We also appreciate the willingness of your Government to purchase wheat, flour, barley and other cereal products from Canada to the extent of the dollar resources available to you.

2. Since Mr. Osborne's arrival we have had the opportunity of discussing with him the whole range of problems connected with financing purchases of your Government in this country. We have acquainted him with the plans we have in mind for the immediate future. We are advised that he has communicated these plans to the Treasury and we believe that your Government should now understand that exchange or financial factors should not now constitute a barrier to immediate and substantial purchases here.

3. At the same time we have explained to Mr. Osborne our objections to arrangements suggested by various United Kingdom agencies for purchase of various Canadian products on a basis which would involve our producers accepting either the risk of fluctuations in sterling or a part of their sales proceeds in the form of blocked sterling. We believe that our objections to such arrangements are based on cogent arguments and we trust that now that they have been communicated through Mr. Osborne your Treasury will see and accept their validity.

4. We are aware of the conversations which took place between the Food Ministry and Mr. McIvor last summer but would point out that on September fifth the Cereals Control Board was informed by Mr. McIvor of the Canadian Government's decision to keep the Winnipeg Grain Exchange open for the time being at least. For your information we still believe that there is virtue, from the point of view of your Government as well as our own, in keeping the Exchange open for some further period in order that price may be determined by the open market without placing the onus on *both* Governments for such price determination. The Cereals Control Board has apparently been

impressed with the difficulty of buying a substantial quantity of wheat in open market but Mr. McIvor has previously and again today cabled suggestions as to methods by which such purchases could in our opinion be effected at a fair and reasonable price to the United Kingdom.

5. May I be permitted to emphasize again the painful impression that may be created in this country and the adverse effect on our national unity and our war effort by the present policy which has all the aspects of a commercial struggle between two opposing interests. Indeed there is already evidence that our fears in this respect are justified as the public begins to understand that the British Control authorities have purchased no wheat from Canada since the outbreak of war although substantial purchases are continually being made from neutral countries. Unsettlement in Canadian market to which you refer is due primarily to absence of any buying by the United Kingdom.

6. In this connection we cannot see the justification for or the practicability of the suggestions referred to in your second last paragraph made at the recent informal conferences between officials of the Food Ministry and Exporting Countries Sub-Committee of the Wheat Advisory Committee in London. With due deference we regard such proposals as overlooking the realities of the situation resulting from the fact that the Empire is at war and we suggest that the obligations which the Dominions are assuming warrant some preferential treatment in purchases of wheat and the acceptance of a high fixed percentage of Empire wheat in the United Kingdom grist during the continuance of the war.

7. In regard to your last suggestion, my Government would be glad to send Mr. McIvor to London if this were felt necessary to a complete meeting of minds on this difficult question. However the Canadian Wheat Board has already a European Commissioner in London, Mr. R. V. Biddulph, who has been acting as liaison officer with Cereals Control Board. In view of this fact, we had hoped that it would not be necessary to send over Mr. McIvor who is much needed here at this time. [Ends.]

610.

413-F-36

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 430

Ottawa, October 13, 1939

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Reference your telegram No. 439 of the 29th of September.

1. In view of urgency of concluding early and satisfactory arrangements for sales of Canadian wheat to United Kingdom Ministry of Food, prospect

of subordinating our direct negotiations now under way to time-consuming procedures of Wheat Advisory Committee for allocation of quotas and establishment of prices is quite unacceptable.

2. In light of general political and financial considerations put forward in Prime Minister's messages to Prime Minister of United Kingdom (see our telegrams to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No. 85 of September 30th and No. 91 of October 10th), United Kingdom authorities should appreciate difficulties of present wheat position which would be seriously aggravated if United Kingdom persist in plans for allocating purchases between neutral and Empire suppliers on basis of statistics of pre-war trade.

3. Desiderata of Ministry of Food set forth in your telegram do not appear to recognize special problems of supply and finance with which Governments at war are compelled to deal nor do they afford a useful basis for further discussions between United Kingdom and overseas wheat producers.

4. Having in mind

- (1) the stocks of wheat available for export in Canada;
- (2) the relatively greater accessibility of Canadian wheat compared with other overseas wheats, in terms of time and shipping;
- (3) the importance to this country's economy and political unity of a substantial export of wheat on a reasonable price basis having regard to all the circumstances; and
- (4) the repeated readiness of the Canadian Government to cooperate in overcoming alleged exchange difficulties;

we feel justified in rejecting proposals for mathematical allocation of imports between exporting countries and in urging a reasonable and sympathetic priority in considering Canadian needs.

611.

1893-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 509

London, October 16, 1939

Enquiries being received show Treasury policy affecting United Kingdom Exchange Control is causing increasing difficulty to Canadian trade. Treasury is understood to estimate adverse balance with Canada including invisible items will probably reach hundred million pounds in year and is supervising imports control in order to preserve Canadian Exchange for essential purchases. You are, of course, familiar with effect on Government purchases of wheat. Many products are involved. Thus licences are being granted for entry of restricted commodities coming from countries with whom exchange

relations are easiest and refused in other cases, for example, import licences are being issued for Australian honey and Hong Kong rubber footwear and are being refused for these products from Canada. The same consideration may affect purchase of unrestricted commodities such as tobacco and canned salmon with the result that neutral and other Empire suppliers may be preferred to Canadian. Current Treasury policy is determined purely on official grounds and appears to ignore economic and political consequences which may result.

2. Import licences are being refused for luxury goods from all countries even when suppliers are prepared to accept payment in blocked sterling. Canadian exporters of such goods may thus lose the United Kingdom market for the duration of the war.

3. Doubtless these aspects of war finance are being discussed with the Officials of the Treasury and the Bank of England now in Ottawa. I shall be glad to receive any information you can furnish.

MASSEY

612.

413-F-36

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 95

London, October 17, 1939

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram October 11th [sic], No. 91. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins. We have given the most urgent and careful consideration to various points of special difficulty to which you draw attention once more affecting wheat situation, and are sparing no effort to seek a very early solution which will have regard to position of both Governments and of producers and consumers. In so doing we have not lost sight of the fact that considerations other than those of a purely commercial character are involved.

2. To take the first question of finance, we are very appreciative of your Government's decision to repatriate \$137,000,000 Dominion loan, and I should like to take this opportunity of adding an expression of my own appreciation to that already conveyed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Minister of Finance. But the hard fact remains that according to such provisional estimates as we have been able to make at this stage, we are likely to be spending in Canada in the first year of the war, if general financial arrangements and price question can be satisfactorily settled, not very far short of £100,000,000 more than Canada will be spending in the United Kingdom, and financing of this expenditure must necessarily give rise to difficult problems.

3. It will therefore help us very greatly if your Government can agree to proposal which Mr. Osborne will no doubt have communicated to you by now, that transactions between the two countries should be canalized in the hands of the two central banks and that we should be permitted to pay for balance of our net expenditure in Canada, after all financial set-offs which we can arrange have been deducted by putting sterling to the credit of the Bank of Canada in London, with a United Kingdom Government exchange guarantee of such sterling, so that no loss can accrue to Canada when it is eventually converted into dollars.

4. Mr. Osborne will doubtless have explained that we are quite prepared to settle the point mentioned in the third paragraph of your telegram on lines advocated by Canadian authorities.

5. Apart from general question of method of financing our payments, you will appreciate that we must bear in mind considerations both of cost of living in this country and of very heavy tax burden which the public of the United Kingdom is bearing and will be called upon to bear. We could not defend the purchases at prices which were demonstrably out of line with world price. We equally wish with you wish to avoid creating an impression such as you mention, of hard bargaining between two parts of the Commonwealth with resultant criticism that it would create in both countries.

6. The precise methods and conditions of purchase of wheat as of other commodities can best, as you will agree, be left to discussion between our respective experts, subject of course to guidance on matters of policy. Such discussions have in fact already occurred and I am informed that purchasing arrangements for immediate and future have been agreed with Chairman of Canadian Wheat Board. The Purchasing Branch Ministry of Food will buy from day to day such wheat as is offered through ordinary channels and the Chairman of Canadian Wheat Board will do his best to prevent such purchases from causing a sharp rise in the market price. In addition to such purchases, I am informed that the Ministry of Food intends to buy considerable quantities of wheat at seaboard for cash.

7. I am confident that under these arrangements we shall buy in the immediate future through normal channels Canadian wheat to make up a substantial proportion of our grist. Nevertheless the Ministry of Food, through its Purchasing Branch, is ready to consider any proposals for larger purchases when you are ready to offer wheat.

8. I need hardly assure you that as a general policy we greatly prefer to purchase wheat and other commodities from the Empire rather than from Foreign sources. I very much hope therefore that action by the Ministry of Food to which I have referred above will, as a matter of fact establish appropriate conditions leading to co-operation which will be mutually satisfactory. You may be assured that I shall continue to use my best endeavours to this end. Ends.

613.

164-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 107

Ottawa, November 3, 1939

SECRET. 1. Introduction of discriminatory system of import controls in West Indian Colonies, under which special permits are required for importations from Canada, Hong Kong and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, while like goods are admitted freely and without restriction from other parts of the British Empire, has made bad impression in this country. Notices of imposition of new import requirements on imports from Canada have been received in same mail as pleas from West Indian Colonies for special assurances that supplies of Canadian staples will be reserved for their necessities and with requests for relaxation of direct shipment requirements to permit continued exportations to Canada despite shipping difficulties.

2. Steady balance of trade in favour of Colonies, created by tariff preferences accorded by Canada and carried largely in shipping services subsidized at heavy cost by Canadian Government, make decision to discriminate against Canadian exports hard to understand and to explain to exporting interests who fear their business connections with West Indies built up over years will be destroyed.

3. At present juncture, when Canada has agreed to take all sugar requirements for current crop year from Empire (largely Colonial) suppliers at what is understood to be a reasonably remunerative price to producers, and has under consideration proposals for continuing sugar purchase arrangements for duration of the war, and for some time thereafter, coincident curtailment of our normal exports to sugar Colonies is bound to prejudice recognition of sugar agreement.

4. Canadian Government have in mind proposing continuation of West Indies Agreement from January 1st, 1940, subject to six months notice of termination by either party. This course, which we believe to be only sensible one in present circumstances in which desired revision is probably impracticable, will be very difficult to defend in Parliament and in the country if special import restrictions continue to apply against Canadian goods.

5. Possible diversion of trade from Canada that could be effected by manipulation of import permit system in West Indian Colonies is not likely to amount to half-a-million pounds a year, a sum of minor importance in terms of aggregate exchange adjustments between Canada and so-called sterling areas, and surely not worth the irritation, both political and commercial which its saving will cost.

6. In circumstances, Canadian Government hope that your Government can reconsider, as quickly as possible, import control arrangements in force in West Indian Colonies and restore previous parity in treatment of Canadian and other Empire goods.

614.

164-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 113

London, November 28, 1939

SECRET. Your telegram No. 107 of November 3rd. We have now examined carefully various considerations regarding import restrictions in West Indian Colonies to which you drew attention in your telegram and have had advantage of discussing them with Mr. Wilgress and Mr. Wrong.

There is, we fear, no alternative to a licensing system being put into force both in order to economise the purchasing power of West Indies which has been prejudicially affected by the war and to ensure that it is not dissipated on luxuries and non-essentials, and also as a safeguard against any undue drain on our resources of non-sterling currencies. The former consideration would not, we think, be generally applicable to any noticeable proportion of commodities normally imported from Canada and insofar as this is the case, we feel sure that the Canadian Government recognise the grounds for its application. Economies in dollar expenditures of non-essential imports from Canada are not, of course, desired for their own sake, but in order that such dollars may be used for those expanded purchases of essential commodities from Canada which are necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.

We appreciate, on the other hand, that while any restriction of purchases of non-essentials, even though scale may be unimportant, would be off-set by expanded purchases of essentials, this re-direction of purchases must necessarily cause West Indian import restrictions to be regarded critically by Canadian interests affected. Recognising, as we do, the special relations between Canada and the West Indies as reflected in the Trade Agreement, we accept your view that import licensing system should be non-discriminatory between Canada and other Empire countries in its general form and that its administration should to the fullest extent of compatible exigencies of exchange position be conducted with due regard to various considerations affecting Canadian interests and opinions to which attention is drawn in your telegram.

Since for reasons set out in above some limitation on Canadian imports is necessary, non-discrimination can only be achieved by imposing similar limitations on imports from other Empire countries. This we are prepared to arrange. We have under immediate consideration the instructions to be sent to the West Indian Colonies with regard to both these points. We trust as a result, although some inevitable dislocation of normal trade exchange may in the condition now existing still be noticeable, both dislocation itself and other grounds for criticism to which you have referred will be minimized.

615.

413-F-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 732

London, December 2, 1939

SECRET. Following from Mr. Crerar for the Prime Minister. Begins. The Minister of Food some days ago brought up the question of long-term contract for wheat. After considering and discussing the matter here I later informed him that I would be prepared to recommend that the Canadian Government, who had as yet no knowledge of this proposal, should undertake through Wheat Board the sale of between 250 and 300 million bushels of wheat and/or flour at a price of one dollar per bushel, basis number 1 northern in store Fort William, delivery of which is to be taken between now and July 31st, 1941; other grades to apply at price equivalents mutually agreed upon. Canadian Wheat Board will undertake that the wheat and the flour would be forwarded to such positions as required for loading at sea board, costs of such forwarding and all other charges involved to be for United Kingdom account. Interest, insurance and storage charges on wheat and flour in North America to be borne by Canada on condition that three-twentieths of total amount of wheat and flour purchases shall be shipped in each three month period and in event of any stocks of that proportion not being cleared within the three month period additional to cost of carrying of such balance until shipped shall be for account of United Kingdom Government.

2. As alternative proposal to above I would be prepared to recommend to the Canadian Government sale of 150 to 180 million bushels covering the twelve months supply commencing on December 1st, 1939, at a price of 93½ cents per bushel basis number 1 northern in store Fort William and on the other terms and conditions mentioned in proposal above for longer period with the understanding that one-fourth of total quantity would be shipped each three months.

3. My alternative proposal given above was discussed at some length at meeting today mentioned in telegram No. 731.¹ Discussion centred round contention of British Ministers that price was much too high in view of

- (i) prevailing market price and volume of visible supplies, and
- (ii) effect on cost of living in the United Kingdom.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of Food emphasized particularly the political and economic difficulties resulting from purchases at suggested price and involving rise in price of bread. I pointed out

¹ Document 547.

- (1) current prices were abnormally low and substantial increase was not unlikely;
- (2) no effective world price existed, and
- (3) long-term contract at prevailing prices was politically and economically impossible on our side.

I added that the Winnipeg market might have to close in any event and control of selling centralized in Canada in which case some bargain would have to be struck between solely Canadian seller and solely United Kingdom buyer. (In this connection I may say Rank is now one of strongest supporters of keeping the Grain Exchange open). I explained that price suggested was based on minimum fair return to farmers without Government subsidy. Towers pointed out that current rise in cost of living here was caused mainly by domestic factors particularly depreciation of sterling and freight rates which should not be charged against Canadian wheat growers.

4. Meeting ended without any visible approach to agreement, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer saying that he felt conversations had been enlightening but difficulties at his end remained unsolved. I expect further meeting to take place early next week. I should be glad to learn by then whether the Government approve my proposal in paragraphs one and two above. In my judgment this would mean closing of Winnipeg market but in view of attitude of pools this may in any case have to be considered. The Chairman of the Wheat Board approves proposals but wishes matter to be referred to his colleagues for their opinions. It is very important to keep it entirely secret. Any cables signed by his colleagues Winnipeg should be directed through you at Ottawa. Ends.

MASSEY

616.

413-F-36

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 623

Ottawa, December 5, 1939

Following from Mr. Euler for Mr. Crerar. Begins. At meeting here today attended by Ralston, Gardiner, Howe, Euler, Smith and Murray opinion unanimous that both proposals your cable number 732 December 2nd unsatisfactory. Folliott agreeing. Proposal Number one would net less than ninety cents for one northern in store Fort William after we pay carrying

charges. It would be a grave mistake to sell nearly two years supply at this price. Any sale at such a price covering a period during which two new crops grow and mature in North America is too much of a gamble. Proposal number two would net only an average of about eighty-seven and one half cents one northern in store Fort William after we pay carrying charges. The period covered is objectionable but to a lesser degree than number one because it attempts to discount the future too far ahead in another crop year. The price would be all right for a proportionate quantity for the period up to July 31st, 1940. The only really attractive feature of both proposals is the quantity suggested, because it equals about seventy-five percent of British import requirements. We feel strongly all offers should be withdrawn as they also obviously unacceptable to British. We are curious to know whether my cable to you through High Commissioner, Number 517 of November eighth¹ was received by you and suggestions made to British as you have never commented on same. We feel that further efforts should be concentrated on securing commitment that not less than seventy-five percent British imports be Canadian. Suggest initiative on further negotiations should come from British. Ends.

617.

413-F-36

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 771

London, December 7, 1939

Following for Mr. Euler from Mr. Crerar. Begins. Have just received the following letter from the Minister of Food:

My letter quoted at end of my telegram No. 762 of December 6th.¹ After introductory paragraph it reads:

I should like to preface my remarks with the general observation that the price paid by this country for its wheat imports is a major element in its economy, in cost of living, and consequently in its capacity to continue the war to a successful conclusion. Already this Department is losing money on the present price of flour and, indeed, losing it heavily, and we are confronting the necessity of increasing the price of bread by, say, 1d per 4 lb. loaf. A further increase in the cost of wheat over recent figures would mean another increase in the price of bread, and we calculate that an increase of

¹Non reproduit.

¹Not printed.

ten cents in the cost of wheat necessitates an increase of something between $\frac{1}{4}$ d and $\frac{3}{4}$ d in the price per loaf in this country.

During the last war it was found necessary to stabilize the price of the 4 lb. loaf at 9d over a period lasting from September, 1917, to December, 1920, and ultimately the cost to the taxpayers was 162½ million pounds. On recent replacement costs alone we are faced with a 9d loaf, so that you can easily understand how serious a matter further increase based on increased wheat price will be to the United Kingdom consumers and taxpayers and also to the industrialists from wages point of view.

We have not overlooked the considerations which are in your mind and in the mind of your Government and I realize that the price which has prevailed until the last few days in the Winnipeg market, 70 cents or thereabouts, is only sufficient to cover guarantee to the Canadian producer by your Government. Your letter of December 6th invites me to propose some new arrangement and my colleagues and I have therefore considered carefully what is the best course to adopt in the circumstances. The conclusion which we suggest is that it may be wisest from both our points of view not to attempt to settle a price over so long a period as 12 months. We propose, however, that we should agree to purchase a quantity (say 1,500,000 tons) over a period up to April next.

As regards prices, we think that it may fairly be assumed that a dispassionate review of present Winnipeg prices—made in the light of the wheat position generally—would show that there is, in today's quotations, a temporary element due to various causes (some speculation; some optimism). Some difference of opinion may well exist as to what deduction should be made to arrive at a true price: it may well be more than 2½ cents, it could not justifiably be thought to be less. As regards movement of prices between now and April, there is of course ample room for argument; we are disposed to think that there will be a fall, the Canadian view is that prices will rise. Having regard to the circumstances which you have so carefully explained to us, we would wish to make allowance for Canadian views. We are therefore prepared to make an offer to pay an average price of 82½ cents for purchases totalling not less than one million five hundred thousand (1,500,000) tons between now and April 30th next in store at Fort William as in the 8th paragraph of your letter to me of November 24th, this paragraph embodying conditions referred to in paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 732 of December 1st [*sic*].¹ In the light of the wheat position generally this is the best price that the United Kingdom Government would feel justified in offering, having regard to conditions here, the effect on the cost of living, wages and so on. The position would, of course, come up for review again in April in the light of the market movement in the meantime. A possible alternative would be to agree not to have a contract now but to proceed as at present, making our purchases from time to time.

¹ Document 615.

618.

413-F-36

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 639

Ottawa, December 8, 1939

Following for Crerar from Euler. Begins.

1. Letter from Ministry of Food naturally presents point of view of consumer and while we appreciate considerations mentioned it cannot be overlooked that one of the factors entering into the cost of bread in the United Kingdom is the bonus paid by the United Kingdom Government to United Kingdom producers.

2. Minister of Food will appreciate that we here have to consider the producer and from this point of view we do not feel that price mentioned is acceptable under present conditions.

3. In view of the intimation of the United Kingdom Government that the price mentioned is the best which they feel justified in offering the only course would appear to be the alternative suggested at the end of letter from Minister of Food namely not to have a contract now but to proceed as at present with United Kingdom making purchases from time to time.

4. Gardiner, Howe, Ralston and Smith concur in above. [Ends.]

619.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] December 16, 1939

TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE BRITISH WEST INDIES

In a telegram of the 23rd of November, 1938, to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, the Canadian Government gave formal notice of their intention to terminate the Canada-British West Indies Trade Agreement on December 31st, 1939. In that telegram it was made clear that it was the desire of the Canadian Government "that before the expiration of the existing Agreement, a new Trade Agreement should be negotiated, to come into force on January 1st, 1940". With this end in view, it was suggested that discussions should take place between representatives of the Governments concerned in the latter half of 1939.

In a telegram of the 11th of January, 1939, the United Kingdom Government informed us that they had notified the Governments of the West Indian Colonies of our intention to terminate the Agreement, and indicated that they

"heartily welcomed the proposal of His Majesty's Government in Canada that, before the expiration of the existing Agreement, a new Trade Agreement should be negotiated, to come into force on January 1st, 1940".

With a view to preparing the way for these negotiations, the Government referred the entire Sugar Schedule to the Tariff Board, instructing it to make recommendations for its revision which could be put in force when the restrictions on our freedom of action, fixed in the West Indian, South African and Australian Trade Agreements, were modified.

The way things have turned out, it has been quite impossible for the Tariff Board to complete its sugar report and for the Government Departments concerned to carry out the preparatory work involved in a comprehensive revision of these Trade Agreements. Apart from the very formidable practical difficulties which stand in the way of attempting revision of Empire trade agreements under war conditions, the arrangements, which have been entered into with the United Kingdom Sugar Control for the purchase of Empire sugars for the duration of the War, in effect postpone the thoroughgoing revision of which our sugar tariff stands in need, and in which the negotiation of a new Agreement with the West Indies was to be the first step.

In these circumstances, the Canadian Government informed the United Kingdom Government, in a telegram of November 3rd, 1939, that they "have in mind proposing continuation of West Indies Agreement from January 1st, 1940, subject to six months' notice of termination by either party".

It is suggested that this proposal should be definitely communicated to the United Kingdom Government, and that a statement might be issued to the Press, explaining that the present arrangements will have to be continued until a suitable opportunity for amending them presents itself. It would probably be unwise in such a statement to refer to the arrangements with the United Kingdom Sugar Control for using purchases of foreign sugar from San Domingo, etc., to secure additional markets for salt fish. These plans are still too far from realization to justify any public reference to them.

620.

164-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 131

Ottawa, December 27, 1939

SECRET. My telegram of the 3rd November, 1939, No. 107. West Indies Trade Agreement. The Canadian Government today [*sic*] passed an Order in Council¹ continuing the present Agreement in effect on and after the 1st January, 1940, subject to the right of either party to terminate the Agreement by giving six months notice. We shall be glad to be informed what reciprocal action will be taken and at what date.

¹ Le C.P. 4366 du 28 décembre 1939.

¹ P.C. 4366, December 28, 1939.

621.

164-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 130

London, December 30, 1939

SECRET. Your telegram No. 131, December 27th. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome action taken by the Canadian Government as to extension of Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement which they feel sure will be greatly appreciated by Colonies concerned. As regards last sentence of your telegram, immediate communication is being sent to West Indian Governments and any necessary steps will no doubt be taken by them at once.

622.

577-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

Ottawa, May [19], 1940

SECRET. Following from Prime Minister to your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. The War Committee of the Cabinet have been giving further special consideration to methods by which Canada, at this critical time, can assist most effectively in the common cause.

2. In the light of the report of the Minister of National Defence who just returned yesterday from the United Kingdom, and with particular reference to the problem of ensuring a continuous supply of adequate mechanized equipment and munitions, we feel the government of the United Kingdom may wish to make fuller use of the resources of Canadian industry.

3. On various occasions prior to the outbreak of war, and since that time, the attention of the government of the United Kingdom has been drawn to the productive capacity of Canadian plants as an alternative source of supply, relatively free from the danger of enemy action. We understand that the United Kingdom Purchasing Mission in Canada, in connection with their purchases here, have made a survey of possibilities for further production of war materials.

4. It may be of some service to you, in the midst of the serious problems you are facing, to be reassured that our government is willing to do everything possible to encourage and assist in the development of increased production in Canada for Allied purposes, and that Canadian manufacturers are ready to undertake, to the limit of their capacity, production of such supplies as can be manufactured in this country. Ends.

623.

577-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 68

London, June 1, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 75 of May 19th. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

I am most grateful for the assurances in your message that the Canadian Government is willing to encourage and assist in every way the development of increased production of war materials in Canada for Allied purposes. The matter is under close examination here in the light of our recent discussions with the Minister of National Defence, and I can assure you that we have very much in mind both the invaluable assistance which Canada is already giving in this field and the possibility of further help. We are again reviewing the situation in the light of your helpful message. Ends.

624.

King Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du conseiller¹ au Premier ministre
Memorandum from Counsellor¹ to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] June 1, 1940

CANADIAN ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION

On the 3rd of September the Prime Minister of Canada telegraphed to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom² stating that the Canadian Government would like to have the latter's "appreciation of the nature and extent of British and Allied requirements as regards supplies and particularly the relative urgency of the needs for various commodities which Canadian producers could furnish". He added that the Canadian Government is considering "what general measures of economic organization and control will be required in this country".

In replying on the 6th of September³ the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, after stating that the United Kingdom would necessarily be making largely increased purchases of various raw materials, food and war equipment from Canada during the war, added:

In the circumstances perhaps the most valuable immediate assistance which Canada could give in this field would be any steps which are possible to assist us in the financing of desired purchases.

On the 8th of September the Prime Minister, speaking in the House of Commons, made the following statement:

¹ H. L. Keenleyside.

² Volume 6, Document 1054.

³ Volume 6, Document 1072.

The British Government has indicated that Canada would be of the most assistance at once by facilitating the purchase by the United Kingdom of essential supplies in this country. This will involve immediately the 'gearing up' of Canadian industry to meet the heavy demands for finding some way whereby Canadian dollars may be made available to the British Government to purchase the needed supplies in this country. In the first instance this will probably involve the repatriation of Canadian securities held in London and at a later stage the granting of credits.

On the 13th of October Sir Frederick Phillips estimated that the United Kingdom's adverse balance with Canada in the first year of the war would run from 334 to 414 million dollars and intimated that Canada should finance all or a very large part of this. Four days later Mr. Chamberlain cabled to the Prime Minister of Canada raising this estimate to 445 million.

On the 3rd of November Mr. King cabled to Mr. Chamberlain¹ in part as follows:

When we speak of financial requirements we do not imply any thought on the part of the Government or the people of Canada of stinting or sparing efforts or resources. We are determined to throw ourselves into the war to the utmost capacity. We must, however, consider the extent of that capacity in order to determine how the national effort can be directed most effectively. Assumptions of tasks beyond that capacity would lead inevitably to failure and serious prejudice to the common cause.

In terms of financing to be done that capacity can best be assessed by relating it to the national income. . .

In estimating the national income we have made allowances for purchases by the United Kingdom on approximately the scale indicated by your treasury authorities. . . We have endeavoured to make clear. . . the possible margin available for financing British purchases here and the manner in which the measure of our aggregate contribution will be expanded or reduced by the volume and character of the British orders and the promptness with which they are placed. . . It is not apparent that. . . we have been able to convey a full understanding to your Government and particularly to its various agencies concerned with the purchase of Canadian products or with making arrangements in regard to the various aspects of our military contribution. . . While the British Air Mission are pressing us in regard to their Air Training proposals. . . we on our part have for many weeks been pressing without satisfactory result for a decision in regard to wheat purchases which is the biggest single item in our whole economic programme. . . In our opinion the questions of military and economic participation in the war effort are inextricably entwined and cannot be dealt with separately.

On this same point the Honourable Mr. Crerar (who was then in London) cabled to the Prime Minister of Canada on the 7th November² in part as follows:

The more we study the whole matter of supply as related to finance in our war effort the more impressed we are that at the present time and for some time to come this question of finance is and will be the dominant one.

He went on to suggest that either Mr. Towers or Mr. Clark should proceed to England with a view to assisting in reaching a satisfactory understanding in regard to this matter.

¹ Document 720.

² Document 543.

On the 23rd of December General McNaughton telegraphed to National Defence that the United Kingdom was finding great difficulty in obtaining anti-aircraft and anti-tank equipment for the Division although the Canadians were being given preferential treatment. He also pointed out that the C.M.A. delegation which had been in England had stated, some time before, that all this equipment could be manufactured in Canada. He also stated that the United Kingdom was very short of small arms ammunition and would like to place orders in Canada up to 25,000,000 rounds per month.

In spite of the representations outlined above the total amount of United Kingdom purchases in Canada has remained relatively small. On munitions and direct war supplies the total is probably not over \$90,000,000.

The following notes bring the record up-to-date in respect of the principal commodities which the United Kingdom is purchasing from Canada. Arrangements for the purchase of the commodities included in this list have been made by the appropriate United Kingdom Ministries either direct with the producers concerned or, in the case of most agricultural products, with the Canadian Government through the channel of the High Commissioner's Office in London. None of the purchases under this heading are included in the estimate of contracts placed by the British Supply Board in Canada. They represent, however, in aggregate an outlay over the year on Canadian goods of several times the value of the direct contracts for manufactured goods placed through the British Supply Board, and they have, of course, to be taken into consideration in any general appreciation of orders placed by the United Kingdom in Canada and of the scale of Canadian supplies to the United Kingdom.

Wheat. From November, through May, the United Kingdom Cereals Board have bought wheat in Canada at market prices and in substantial quantities. Actual exports to the United Kingdom under the system of open trading were not much different from what they would have been had the bulk purchase proposals under consideration in November been adopted. Last week the United Kingdom contracted to take 50,000,000 bushels of wheat during the summer at 82½¢ for October futures—a price substantially above the open market. Arrangements for the supply of wheat to the United Kingdom which were extremely unsatisfactory in September and October have been working quite well in recent months, and the recently concluded deal between the Canadian Wheat Board and the United Kingdom Cereals Board should in all the circumstances be regarded as favourable from every Canadian viewpoint.

Cheese. The proposals in October last for bulk purchase of cheese by the United Kingdom Ministry of Food were abandoned because of inability to agree on price. When the United Kingdom decided that all imports of food-stuffs had to be brought under licensing control, new negotiations were started for the purchase of cheese from Canada, and the Ministry of Food has now undertaken to buy our exportable cheese surplus from now to the end of November—approximately 35,000 tons, at a basic price of 14¢ F.O.B. Cana-

dian ports. The value of cheese exports under this arrangement will be about \$11,000,000, and the price paid by the United Kingdom is considerably in excess of average export prices in 1938 and 1939.

Bacon and hams. Under an agreement concluded in December last the United Kingdom contracted to take an average of 50,000 cwt. a week of Canadian bacon at a price of \$20.67 per long hundredweight. The rate of exportation is greatly in excess of past shipments and the price is a remunerative one. In fact the major embarrassment of our bacon industry is due to the fact that Canadian bacon is selling, for export to the United Kingdom, at a price far above the comparable United States price for hogs—hence the necessity for emergency restrictions on imports of pork and pork products to the United States. The value of bacon exports is likely to be between \$50,000,000 and \$60,000,000 a year, compared with exports in the fiscal year of 1938 of \$32,600,000, and in 1939 of \$29,440,000.

Copper. The United Kingdom Ministry of Supply is buying 210,000 tons of electrolytic copper from Canadian producers at a price of slightly over 10¢ a pound. These contracts involve an outlay for copper in the year of over \$40,000,000, and take about 80% of the output of copper producers in eastern and central Canada. It is understood that the Ministry has cabled Canadian producers if they can increase their output next year. We have asked the High Commissioner in London to ascertain whether the United Kingdom expects to need more copper from Canada. If it does the position of the British Columbia producers now outside the Agreement will have to be reviewed.

Nickel. Arrangements for the purchase of nickel are made directly between the Ministry of Supply and the Mond Nickel Company, the United Kingdom representative of International Nickel. The United Kingdom requirements have prior claim on nickel output. They have been buying up to the limit of their needs and fabricating capacity and in quantities well in excess of past years.

Lead. The only important producer in Canada is the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Trail, which has a contract with the United Kingdom Ministry of Supply for 123,000 tons, approximately 60 per cent of its output, at a price in line with pre-war prices.

Zinc. The United Kingdom Ministry of Supply contracted with the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company and the Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Company for their entire output of zinc, less Canadian domestic requirements. Prices of both lead and zinc were fixed by negotiation between the United Kingdom Ministry and the companies concerned, and are believed by both parties to be fair. It is understood that discussions are proceeding for expanding zinc production at Flin Flon in order to meet United Kingdom and French requirements. As a higher price will be paid for such supplementary deliveries to amortize the cost of additional equipment required, the United Kingdom is really helping to finance the expansion of this industry.

Aluminum. The United Kingdom Ministry of Supply contracted with the Aluminum Company of Canada at the outbreak of the war to take all available aluminum, i.e., production less domestic requirements and firm pre-war export contracts. They have since invested \$40,000,000 to increase production capacity at Arvida by 72,000 tons per annum. By next year Canada will be supplying four-fifths of the Empire production of aluminum.

The Air Ministry has also put up all of the capital and contracted for all of the output of the aluminum fabricating plant being erected at Kingston.

Lumber. The United Kingdom Ministry of Supply have contracted for very considerable quantities of lumber both in eastern and western Canada, and under war conditions is endeavouring to secure a good many kinds of lumber, including pit props and boxshooks, from Canada that were formerly imported from Scandinavia and northern Europe.

From British Columbia, where the shipping shortage has been most felt, lumber has been going forward to the United Kingdom at the rate of about 70 million feet a month, approximately 70 per cent of the movement last year. From eastern Canada exports of lumber, however, have increased very considerably. 450,000 cords of pit props have been purchased by the United Kingdom and greatly increased takings of birch logs are reported.

Newsprint. As a result of the cessation of Scandinavian supplies the United Kingdom, though drastically curtailing its total consumption of newsprint, has had to arrange to secure considerably more from Canada than before. Negotiations have been handled between the United Kingdom Newsprint Control and the Canadian newsprint producers, and the Government have been kept informed of arrangements. It is understood that the United Kingdom will require 325,000 tons of newsprint from Canada and Newfoundland and that the former will supply 200,000 tons.

Sugar.* Canada and the United Kingdom have arranged for very close cooperation between their Sugar Controls in order to secure stable prices of Empire sugar at steady prices. The United Kingdom Sugar Control buys for the Canadian Sugar Administrator and re-sells to Canada at the price paid to the Empire producers. As a result of an arrangement supplementary to the Sugar Agreement, Canada has been credited with a sufficient proportion of United Kingdom purchases of foreign sugar to enable her to secure a satisfactory Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic which has now agreed to lower its duties on imported fish and accord Canada most-favoured-nation treatment in tariff matters.

On the 8th of December Canada agreed to provide up to 65 million dollars in credit for the United Kingdom, under certain circumstances, even though at the time advantage was taken of this offer it might not be convenient to cover it by the repatriation of a Canadian loan.

* The statement on the sugar position is inserted for purposes of record because a note on the sugar position was included in an earlier analysis of the United Kingdom purchases from Canada. In fact, of course, both Canada and the United Kingdom are purchasers of sugar.

On the 18th of May, 1940, when critical developments were taking place on the Continent of Europe, the Prime Minister of Canada cabled as follows (in part) to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom:

The War Committee of the Cabinet have been giving further special consideration to methods by which Canada at this critical time can assist most effectively in the [common] cause. . . .

With particular reference to the problem of ensuring a continuous supply of adequate mechanized equipment and munitions we feel the Government of the United Kingdom may wish to make fuller use of the resources of Canadian industry. On various occasions prior to the outbreak of war and since that time the attention of the Government of the United Kingdom has been drawn to the productive capacity of Canadian plants as an alternative source of supply relatively free from the danger of enemy action. . . .

It may be of some service to you in the midst of the serious problems you are facing to be reassured that our Government is willing to do everything possible to encourage and assist in the development of increased production in Canada for Allied purposes and that Canadian manufacturers are ready to undertake to the limit of their capacity the production of such supplies as can be manufactured in this country.

On the 1st of June the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom replied in part as follows:

I am most grateful for the assurances in your message that the Canadian Government is willing to encourage and assist in every way the development of increased production of war materials in Canada for Allied purposes. The matter is under close examination here in the light of our recent discussions with the Minister of National Defence. . . . We are again reviewing the situation in the light of your helpful message.

625.

577-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 97

Ottawa, June 8, 1940

SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. My colleagues and I greatly appreciate the assurance conveyed in your telegram No. 68 of June 1 that the Government of the United Kingdom are reviewing the possibility of increased utilization of Canadian munitions resources. I feel, however, that I must express to you the sincere regret that is felt not less by the Canadian people than by my colleagues and myself that the resources and industry of Canada are not being afforded an opportunity to make anything like their full contribution to Britain's war programme, and that the authorities responsible for British purchases have not recognized the potential capacity of our industry to produce munitions. Methods for United Kingdom purchases in Canada have been slow and cumbersome and are entirely inconsistent with conditions of today.

2. If our Department of Munitions and Supply could be given a reasonably free hand to meet British requirements immediately your requisitions

are received we will undertake that prices will include only the minimum of profit to the manufacturer. The methods now in force for purchase of British supplies call for long and involved bargaining procedure which our experience shows is unnecessary and harmful to our efforts to mobilize our industry for the common war effort.

3. Canadian requirements and present limited orders for British purposes are taking up only a small fraction of total Canadian capacity. We would like to concentrate on war work and curtail production in other directions. We have reluctantly reached the conclusion that, in the emergency that faces us, the present procedure does not permit of effective cooperation in this essential field. [Ends.]

626.

577-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 706

Ottawa, June 8, 1940

SECRET. 1. On Friday June the 6th, our Government received a large delegation from the Canadian Manufacturers Association to discuss the situation with respect to the manufacture in Canada of munitions and supplies for the United Kingdom and Allied Governments.

2. The delegation expressed great concern that Canadian manufacturing capacity continued to be used to such a small degree in the supply of essential war materials for the Allied Governments, despite the willingness of Canadian manufacturers to utilize to the full the resources of their plants for this purpose.

3. As you know, the Government, both prior to and since the outbreak of war, have on many occasions both directly and through yourself, drawn the attention of the United Kingdom Government to the availability of Canadian industrial resources, and recently in a telegram to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom I drew Mr. Churchill's personal attention to Canadian resources in this respect.

4. At my suggestion that they prepare a memorandum as to what points they felt should be emphasized in representations to the United Kingdom Government, the delegation from the Canadian Manufacturers Association have sent me on June 6th the communication which follows.

5.

Dear Mr. King: On behalf of the members of the Canadian Manufacturers Association, I beg to thank you and your colleagues for receiving their delegation today.

We realize fully the burdens which Members of the Cabinet are bearing and the many demands on their time and only the vital importance of war produc-

tion would have caused us to seek an interview with you at this critical time. We are very grateful to you and your colleagues for the patient hearing which was given to us and also for the extremely interesting and valuable information that we received.

You were kind enough to offer to cable immediately to the Hon. Vincent Massey, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, to ask him to take up with the British Government the matters we discussed with you. You suggested that we prepare some notes which might be of some assistance in the drafting of your cable and we are glad to take advantage of the opportunity which you have kindly given us, and beg to set forth the following suggestions:

At the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Manufacturers Association in Winnipeg, May 29, 30 and 31, manufacturers from all parts of Canada expressed themselves very strongly in favor of mobilizing immediately the intelligence, skill, equipment and capacity of Canadian industry. They offered every possible co-operation to the Canadian, British and French Governments in this terrible emergency. They expressed surprise and disappointment that, following the visit of their Mission to England last summer and the presentation of Canadian industrial capacity, which was so well received in England, and the prompt appointment of a British Mission to Canada, Canadian industry is being used so little up to date.

Today, a representative group of leading Canadian manufacturers met the Prime Minister and eleven other members of the Cabinet in Ottawa and had a very helpful conference.

Will you kindly discuss with the British Government the following points which were made by the representatives of the Canadian Manufacturers Association today:

(1) Canadian manufacturers made war supplies to the value of \$1,200,000,000 for the Imperial Munitions Board during the last war. This fact proves the capacity of Canadian industry. Canadian industrial expansion since then has made possible vastly increased manufacturing facilities, and a wider range of products, involving greatly improved technique. Full particulars were presented to the service departments of the British Government by the Association's Mission to England last summer. This is in your possession.

(2) Canadian industry again extends every possible co-operation to the British, French and Canadian Governments.

(3) There is available in Canada a great amount of industrial capacity, especially in the engineering, machinery and metal working trades with highly skilled technical staffs. Over a year ago, a survey of one hundred plants showed that these had available 3,000,000 square feet of floor space. Very little of this is in use now.

(4) There is a great deal of machinery, equipment and tools used in peace time manufacturing, that can be adapted quickly to war manufacturing with good results in a general mobilization of industrial resources.

(5) The time for placing small experimental orders is past. The British and French Governments should advise immediately what they want in large quantities, and give Canadian manufacturers an opportunity to learn what is expected of them. On receipt of this information Canadian manufacturers will make their plans accordingly so as to use their plants to the best advantage.

Permit me to assure you that the members of the delegation who met you today keenly appreciate your kind offer to cable Mr. Massey asking him to take up our suggestions with the British Government.

Thanking you etc.

HAROLD CRABTREE
President,
Canadian Manufacturers Association.

6. The Government continue to be of the opinion that Canadian plants might be utilized to a far greater extent as a source of supply for the Allied Governments, relatively free from the danger of hostile action, and you are accordingly directed to bring this matter once more to the attention of the appropriate authorities in the United Kingdom, setting out in particular the representations of the Canadian Manufacturers Association as quoted in paragraph five of this telegram. I shall be obliged if in so doing you will inform the Government of the United Kingdom and the head department concerned that our Government concurs in the views expressed [by] the Association and repeat the assurance of our willingness and readiness to do everything possible to assist in the development of increased production in this country to meet essential war needs.

627.

577-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 110

Ottawa, June 15, 1940

SECRET. 1. As you know we have expected that we would procure major portion of unit equipment for Canadian overseas units from United Kingdom sources subject to replacement as produced in Canada. There are also on order from United Kingdom large quantities of equipment for coast defence, navy, air and Canadian defence forces generally.

2. In view of situation we have been reviewing possibilities of receiving this equipment and obviously only alternative source for that which cannot be immediately produced here is United States. Inquiries there indicate that there are available large quantities of materials, such as for example Vickers and other machine-guns, Lewis guns, field guns and trench mortars, but intimation is that Anglo-French Purchasing Mission is already making inquiries and has been furnished with information regarding quantities on hand and availability of same.

3. Naturally we do not want to prejudice in any way your procuring of any requirements necessary for present acute situation but we are extremely anxious to make plans for possible future developments of the war and it occurs to us there may be some of these articles regarding which you would want to consider whether common cause could not be better served by having requirements here met since these would be small in proportion to yours.

4. In meantime we are asking Anglo-French Purchasing Mission that these articles be earmarked for us in case after you have considered the matter you decide that it is possible to release comparatively small portion which [we] would require.

5. Regarding small arms ammunition as you know we have heavily depleted our reserves in order to comply with your urgent requests and since

in view of the emergency we are raising additional bodies of troops for Canadian defence we have on a review of the situation today felt it necessary that our immediate supplies should be substantially augmented, and at the same time we felt that our reserve of rifles should be increased as well.

6. On inquiry from the United States we find that in respect of ammunition and rifles the Anglo-French Purchasing Mission were also recently furnished with information regarding available stocks of rifles mark II in the United States and small arms ammunition 3030 and 303 in the United States.

7. We are asking that the Anglo-French Purchasing Mission earmark for us in case you consider it possible to spare them seventy-five thousand Enfield mark II rifles fifty million rounds of 3030 ammunition appropriate for these rifles and also fifty million rounds of 303. We understand now from Mission that these rifles can be released but of course they are of no use without the appropriate ammunition.

8. Consideration might be given to best possible utilization of French planes now at Halifax awaiting shipment in case change in situation may make such consideration necessary. As you know we are sending you fighter planes of our Royal Canadian Air Force very much needed here for Canadian defence and also diverting to you fighter planes which are being produced here for our use which make it urgently desirable that these be replaced from some source quickly.

628.

577-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 83

London, June 17, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. My telegram No. 68 of June 1st and your telegram No. 97 of June 8th. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins. I have given most careful attention to constructive criticism you make of existing procedure for obtaining war supplies from Canada. We are deeply grateful for assurance you send us of Canada's desire to mobilize all industry with maximum effect on present grave crisis. It is our desire too that this should be accomplished and all needless barriers swept aside. We wish to point out that our most urgent requirements are for aircraft, aircraft parts and similar highly finished types of war equipment. Large orders for aircraft materials have already been placed in Canada but deliveries are necessarily slow.

Our examination of the position has been carried to the point where we can now present you with our considered views and these will reach you in a separate telegram today.¹ Ends.

¹ Document 629.

629.

577-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 84

London, June 16, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. We have been giving close attention to the methods by which we can best avail ourselves of the comprehensive offer of assistance in the sphere of munitions production and supplies conveyed in Mr. Mackenzie King's message of May 19th. We have reviewed the position in the light of the further messages which have reached us, both direct from the Canadian Government and through the High Commissioner for Canada, which express the view that our present purchasing machinery in Canada is, in the emergency which now faces us, not calculated to make the most effective use of Canadian productive capacity.

The new phase on which the war entered last month has necessitated the immediate concentration of all effort on results which can be obtained within a short period. The prospect of having to face a long war, which has hitherto governed the rate of our expenditure, must be subordinated to the needs of the immediate future. The methods applied during the first months of the war were directed to the execution of the longer term policy. The British Supply Board has placed orders and created capacity for munitions to a total cost of approximately \$100,000,000. With Admiralty, aircraft, raw material and food orders, a total commitment in dollars was incurred in the first year to a total of approximately \$500,000,000. The Board, with the valued co-operation first of the Canadian War Supplies Board and subsequently of the Department of Munitions and Supply, performed its functions within the programme prescribed for it to our satisfaction. You now suggest, and we are inclined to agree, that in the changed circumstances better results are likely to be obtained by an adaptation of methods and machinery.

A similar problem presents itself in the United States, where, as in Canada, everything points to an increase in the volume of orders coupled with an acceleration of deliveries. We have decided conditions in the two countries are such as now to necessitate the separation of the supply organizations operating in Ottawa and New York respectively. It is clear from our consultations with Colonel Greenly that a large increase in the production of Canadian industry cannot be secured without the creation of further potentialities. There is clearly no time now to embark on long-term schemes but we are ready to give all possible assistance towards the creation of potentialities which can give effective production in the near future. Whatever changes are made in the machinery of supply and purchase, the major practical difficulty now, as in the past, in increasing production is likely to

be found in the supply of machine tools. Our needs for factories in this country are such that we cannot divert to Canada present British orders in the United States. The French Government have very large orders for machine tools there and it seems likely that in the present circumstances in France they might be willing to make available to Canada machine tools from their orders. We are exploring this possibility. We are also ready to consider urgent proposals for increasing the capacity of certain Canadian machine tool manufacturers if such assistance would produce results within the time available.

We come now to changes in the British Supply Board in Ottawa, which as already explained will cease to supervise the British Purchasing Commission in New York. We note the suggestion that Department of Munitions and Supply should be given a reasonably free hand and that, if this were accepted, prices would include only minimum profits to manufacturers. We are very ready to cooperate with the Canadian Government in applying a simplified procedure through the agency of the Department and in continuing to make available to the Department, as we assume would be your wish, the services of United Kingdom technicians and inspectional staffs on such a scale as may be desirable to assist in interpreting specifications etc., and in inspecting output.

The general procedure which we have in mind would be that orders and enquiries, other than those for aircraft, should be dealt with by direct communication between the supply department concerned in this country and the Department of Munitions and Supply. In order to comply with the principles governing our public finance and parliamentary practice in that respect it will not be possible for Departments here to divest themselves of all responsibility in regard to price, but we have no doubt that you will be able on the production of orders to give provisional quotations which can be subject to rapid decisions here. If, as we hope, you will agree to our retaining in Ottawa a small liaison staff to keep in touch with financial matters, such an arrangement would, in our opinion, facilitate the rapidity of decisions.

We should be glad to receive an early expression of the views of the Canadian Government on the foregoing proposals. It will be realized that if changes of this character are to be made in the functions of the personnel of the present British Supply Board, we must give urgent consideration to our arrangements for transition. Questions will arise as to the winding up or handing over of various matters now in hand and the disposal of such of staff as become surplus to requirements in Ottawa.

The arrangements contemplated above do not apply to aircraft purchases in Canada which will be handled by Mr. Morris Wilson as direct representative of the Minister of Aircraft Production.

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 112

Ottawa, June 17, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 84, June 16. Munitions. Your proposal to deal direct with Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply will, in our opinion, assist greatly in meeting the present situation. Your decision to separate supply organizations operating in Ottawa and New York respectively will, in our opinion, be beneficial, although we would like to continue the close liaison with your New York office now being maintained through our representative there. We would at the same time welcome the location of a representative of your New York office in Ottawa.

2. We have endeavoured to anticipate your future orders by purchasing large stocks of machine tools of Canadian and United States manufacture, these to be installed in Canadian plants as delivered. We would at the same time welcome diversion of any machine tools on order by French Government such as would permit early production here. Our factories have little war work and we feel that large capacity can be organized here on short notice.

3. While we appreciate your viewpoint on price, we urge that this consideration be not allowed to delay production but that we be permitted wherever possible to use our own judgment subject always to the undertaking which we hereby give to absorb any excess over what may be found after consultation to be a fair price under the circumstances.

4. We are glad to note that you intend to make available to the Department the services of United Kingdom technicians and inspection staff on such a scale as may be desirable to assist in interpreting specifications and inspecting output, also a small liaison staff to keep in touch with financial matters, and we agree that such an agreement would assist the rapidity of decisions.

5. The Ministry of Munitions and Supply would be glad to cooperate in every possible way in making necessary adjustments.

6. We note that aircraft purchases in Canada will be handled by Mr. Morris Wilson as direct representative of the Minister of Aircraft Production. We have already arranged to work closely with Mr. Morris Wilson on aircraft matters.

631.

5909-40

*Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Wellington, September 19, 1940

Canadian-New Zealand Trade Agreement expires at end of this month. My Government suggests that it be extended until September 30th, 1941, under the same terms as previous, and shall be glad to learn whether your Government concurs, in which case notification of extension would be published here on evening of Thursday, September 26th. An early reply would be appreciated.¹

632.

413-E-36

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

No. 42

Ottawa, September 23, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I have been instructed by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to set out the understanding of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the Agreement which has been reached with the Canadian authorities for the co-ordinated purchase of sugar in view of existing circumstances.

2. In accordance with this agreement His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and in Canada have accepted a plan for co-ordinated purchases of sugar for the duration of the war, and for such period thereafter as may be considered necessary by the two Governments in order to permit, when the time comes, of the return to normal conditions of sugar purchases and imports.

3. Under this arrangement all purchases of both countries will be made through the Sugar Control Organization set up by the Government of the United Kingdom, which is at present the Sugar Division of the Ministry of Food, and shall be subject to agreement from year to year between the two Governments as to purchase price.

4. The price basis for the quantities allocated to Canada under the arrangement will be the actual cost at which the purchases have been

¹Le 1^{er} octobre 1940, l'accord fut renouvelé pour un an en vertu du C.P. 5190 du 26 septembre 1940.

¹The Agreement was renewed for one year from October 1, 1940 by P.C. 5190, September 26, 1940.

effected, with the addition, in respect of sugar produced within the Empire, of the duty preference applicable in Canada to such Empire sugar, as agreed between the two Governments from year to year.

5. The Government of the United Kingdom will place at the disposal of the Canadian Government the proportion of purchases required by Canada, the arrangement to continue on this basis subject to such modifications as may from time to time be mutually agreed upon to meet the exigencies of the situation.

6. Purchases will be made as far as possible within the Empire, but as the Government of the United Kingdom will need to import in each year a limited quantity of foreign sugar to cover certain export requirements the Government of the United Kingdom undertake that a quantity of 50,000 tons in each year of such foreign purchases, if available at acceptable prices, will be utilized for the purpose of obtaining or continuing in force concessions respecting Canadian fish or other products imported into the foreign country or countries from which the above quantity of sugar has been purchased.

7. In the event of purchases of foreign sugar being made over and above the United Kingdom requirements for purposes of re-export, such foreign purchases shall be allocated as between the United Kingdom and Canada in the proportion established in pursuance of paragraph 5, unless for special reasons satisfactory both to the Canadian and the United Kingdom Governments an exception to this arrangement is made in one direction or the other.

I have etc.

GERALD CAMPBELL

633.

413-E-36

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

No. 34

Ottawa, September 25, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your Note No. 42 of September 23rd, setting forth the understanding of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the Agreement which has been reached between Canada and the United Kingdom for the co-ordinated purchase of sugar in view of existing circumstances, and to inform you that the Canadian Government share your Government's understanding of the terms of that Agreement.

I have etc.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

634.

1893-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 31

London, February 19, 1941

SECRET. We have been following the progress of the Lease-Loan Bill at Washington with the closest interest. Though many uncertainties remain as to its application and scope, and there is much that has still to be made clear, present indications suggest "Defence Articles" will be given a wide interpretation in terms of commodities. Some time will no doubt elapse before we shall know what commodities are covered by the Bill, to what extent they will be available, and conditions which will be attached to their supply as regards repayment or replacement. Procedure proposed by United States Administration with regard to governmental purchase will also raise problems of a different kind.

It is, however, clear not only that the Bill will provide us with much needed assistance for the prosecution of the war in armaments, raw materials and food, but that in taking advantage of this assistance there are numerous points at which interests of our partners in the British Commonwealth will be involved both as consumers and suppliers.

Canada is a consumer of raw materials and components from the United States, which are required for the execution of orders placed by us in the Dominion, and it will naturally be of interest to us to know whether the Canadian Government regard it as being in the interests of Canada and of our joint war effort that they should avail themselves of such supplies under the terms of the Bill.

Canadian Government, for their part, will no doubt have a special interest in the use to be made by the United Kingdom Government of the financial facilities afforded by the Bill, and in the distribution of our purchases between Canada and United States, at a time when exchange and shipping difficulties are among the most serious problems confronting us in the prosecution of the war.

Interests of Canada are very much in our minds, and even at this early stage when so much remains to be clarified, I should like you to be assured that it will be our constant aim to proceed in the closest and most harmonious co-operation with the Canadian Government. I may say that in communicating with the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union within the last few days with a view to the co-ordination of estimates of their requirements under Lease-Loan Bill, I made special mention of the fact that Canada's position as a member of the Commonwealth and an active participant in our war effort requires special consideration to ensure that her economic staying power shall not be damaged as a result of diversion of orders to United States, and that, for our part, we do not contemplate that our programme of purchases in Canada should be appreciably modified.

Extent to which we can realize our hopes will inevitably depend on gold and dollars which we have from time to time available, and amount of financial assistance which it proves possible for Canada to extend to us. We shall be glad, especially as regards foodstuffs, to consider jointly with Canada any representations that we may receive from United States Government that we should make certain purchases from United States.

It will, I am sure, be the desire of the Canadian Government, as it is ours, that there should be the fullest exchange of views between us, both on the general situation as it develops, and on those particular questions which will arise from time to time.

635.

1893-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 34

Ottawa, February 27, 1941

Your telegram No. 31 of February 19th. We have also been following the course of the Lease Loan Bill at Washington with the deepest interest and are grateful for this timely expression of your views. We have hitherto refrained from raising questions about the possible effects of the Bill on the Canadian war effort, since we wished to do nothing which might impede or deflect its progress through Congress and since we were confident that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom did not intend to employ the new facilities afforded by the measure in a manner which would be in any way detrimental to the Canadian contribution to the war. We are glad to receive your assurance on this score.

2. Since the Bill was first proposed, it has been apparent that close cooperation would be essential between the governments of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States in order to ensure that the Canadian facilities for the production of munitions and other essential supplies, including the expanded capacity to which we are committed, are used to the full. The probable interpretation of the scope of the Bill so as to include food stuffs and raw materials increases the need for urgent examination of the situation as a whole. We welcome your statement that it will be the constant aim of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to proceed in the closest and most harmonious cooperation with the Canadian Government, and your proposal to consider jointly any representations which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom may receive from the United States Government that certain purchases should be made in the United States.

3. The productive capacity of Canada for war purposes is now in process of great expansion in accordance with the arrangements arrived at last July and August between London and Ottawa. These arrangements were based on the understanding that existing plants and those in course of construction should be employed throughout the war to their fullest capacity. This understanding underlies our whole programme, under which Canada is undertaking the very difficult task of taking for all governmental purposes in 1941 more than half

the entire national income, after allowance has been made for the substantial expansion of national income that is expected to result from the war purchases in Canada of the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments.

4. We start from the basic assumption that the fundamental aim guiding the provision of war supplies from North America must be the full employment of the productive resources of the continent whether these are situated in the United States or in Canada. It would be inexcusably wasteful if Canadian plants equipped for the production of munitions were not used to the full because of the construction of new plants in the United States with capacity great enough to supply the needs of both the United Kingdom and United States. I need not emphasize the depressing effects, political as well as economic, on Canadian war effort if this were to come about. I am glad to learn from your telegram that this is not at all likely to occur.

5. All the questions mentioned in your telegram are receiving urgent consideration and I shall later inform you of our views in greater detail. I may mention particularly the question of the use of the facilities of the Bill to secure supplies from the United States which are required for the execution of United Kingdom orders in Canada, and also the most effective procedure to be followed after the passage of the Bill in order to ensure the fulfilment of our common purpose—the maximum contribution towards defeating the enemy. At suggestion of Sir Frederick Phillips we are arranging for an informal preliminary discussion of some of these problems to take place in Washington this week.

636.

1893-40

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 2, 1941

My dear Mr. Robertson,

I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to inform you, with reference to the Canadian Government's telegram No. 34 of the 27th February, that the United Kingdom Government are very grateful to the Canadian Government for arranging that Dr. Clark should visit Washington. They understand that preliminary discussion will take place on Monday, March 3rd, between Mr. Morgenthau, Dr. Clark and Sir Frederick Phillips and they feel that this should prove most useful.

The United Kingdom Government trust that, pending the discussions, the Canadian Government will continue to accept payments in sterling and they would be most grateful to have this confirmed at once as their Canadian dollar position will again become acute in two or three days' time.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

637.

1893-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne

Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain

SECRET

Ottawa, March 4, 1941

My dear Mr. Hankinson,

With reference to your secret letter of March 2nd relative to the Canadian dollar position of the United Kingdom Government, I wish to confirm the message I telephoned to you last night that the Canadian Government will continue to accumulate sterling for the time being, pending the result of the discussions of the immediate financial position which are now taking place in Washington between representatives of the Canadian, United Kingdom and United States Governments.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

638.

1749-B-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 46

Ottawa, March 27, 1941

Reference to your telegram No. 31 of February 19, our telegram No. 34 of February 27th.

1. We have now had the benefit of several conferences in Washington with Sir Frederick Phillips and representatives of the United States Government. These conferences have served to emphasize rather than to weaken the fundamental points raised in my telegram under reference, the force of which we believe is generally recognized, namely:

(a) the closest cooperation between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States is necessary to plan the most effective utilization of the productive facilities of North America for the purposes of the joint cause;

(b) to use the provisions of the Lease-Lend Act to divert from Canada to the United States orders either for munitions or agricultural products or raw materials would disorganize Canada's industrial war effort, weaken our country's economic power and inevitably lessen the contribution which Canada can make to the war; and

(c) it would be inexcusably wasteful if Canadian plants already built or being built for the production of munitions were not used to the full

because of the construction of duplicate new plants in the United States with capacity great enough to supply the needs of both the United Kingdom and the United States.

2. In my telegram No. 34 I expressed our appreciation of your assurance that the United Kingdom Government did not intend to employ the new facilities afforded by the lease-lend measure in any manner which would be in any way detrimental to Canada's war effort. I would assume that the limitations imposed by the United States Appropriation Act have only served to reinforce in your mind the wisdom of this attitude.

3. My colleagues and I duly noted your statement that while the United Kingdom Government did not contemplate any appreciable modification of their programme of purchases in Canada, yet the extent to which they could realize their hopes would inevitably depend on the gold and dollars which the United Kingdom Government had available from time to time and on the amount of financial assistance which Canada could render. We therefore caused to be made an exhaustive examination of the probable balance of payments between the United Kingdom and Canada and between Canada and the United States during the next twelve months, as well as of our probable national income and of our total governmental expenditures including direct and indirect war expenditures. These studies have been completed and have been considered with representatives of the United Kingdom Treasury and of the United States Treasury.

4. Briefly they show that during the next twelve months the United Kingdom's deficit with Canada will approximate \$1,152 million, that Canada's deficit with the United States will be \$478 million, that the gross national income of Canada (including transfer payments and adding back indirect taxes, etc.) may reach \$5,950 million, and that the total burden on the economy for war and other governmental purposes will exceed 56 percent of the national income. From the outbreak of war to February 28th last the United Kingdom's cash deficit with Canada amounted to \$737 millions. Of this deficit Canada provided 45 percent by repatriation of securities and 21 percent by accumulation of sterling balances, while only 34 per cent (or \$249.8 million) was met by the transfer of gold. During the same period Canada's cash deficit with the United States was \$417 millions (U.S.) of which \$227 million (U.S.) was met by the gold received from the United Kingdom. This amount of gold would appear to represent approximately the United States content of British purchases in Canada during the period. As you know, since the first of December the total United Kingdom deficit with Canada, less \$5 millions, has been met by the accumulation of sterling. Incidentally recent articles in the London press, and particularly the *Economist*, seem to indicate that these facts are not fully understood in London, although I am glad to note that a later article in the *Economist* should help to correct the damage done by earlier articles.

5. Our discussions in Washington with representatives of the United Kingdom Treasury and of the United States Treasury have made us aware

not only of the United Kingdom's difficulties in meeting their commitments in the United States during the next few months but also of the reluctance of the United States authorities at the present moment to allow the United Kingdom to use any considerable portion of their gold or United States dollars to meet their deficit with Canada. For various reasons we believe that there will be a far more appropriate opportunity at a later date to negotiate with the United States on this question and we are content for the moment to defer further representations to the United States Treasury. We have however made clear the magnitude of Canada's own exchange problem with the United States and the extent to which the Canadian shortage of United States dollars is created by the purchase of components and materials in the United States for the production of British war supplies in Canada and we are hopeful that the United States will take cognizance of this problem at a more opportune moment.

6. We fully recognize the tremendous financial burdens the United Kingdom Government have shouldered and your imperative need of Canadian dollars to finance your planned purchases from this country. So that Canada's position may be clearly understood, I would say that in accordance with the understanding set out hereunder, we are prepared to use our best endeavours to continue meeting the United Kingdom's full deficit with Canada:

(a) In order to provide the necessary Canadian dollars Canada will continue to repatriate securities at such times and in such amounts as may appear practicable and in so far as the proceeds of such repatriation do not suffice Canada will accumulate sterling balances;

(b) The Canadian Government reserve the right to take up with the United States at a more appropriate time the amount of gold or United States dollars which they would be agreeable to the United Kingdom transferring to Canada in partial settlement of the United Kingdom deficit with Canada and/or the extent to which they would be prepared to lease-lend to the United Kingdom the United States component of British war orders in Canada;

(c) The Canadian Government would be consulted about projects or additions of any importance to the programme of purchases for British account in Canada, which would have a direct bearing on their financial arrangements;

(d) It would be understood that there would be no diversion of British orders from Canadian to United States sources either in respect of munitions of war, or agricultural products, or raw materials. In respect of munitions, this would mean that the United Kingdom would continue to give orders to make the maximum possible use of the plant capacity which has been built or is being built in Canada and would not ask the United States to duplicate plant facilities in order to be able to purchase the products thereof under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act rather than in Canada. In respect of foodstuffs the arrangement would mean that of the types of foodstuffs that are produced in Canada the United Kingdom would

procure from Canada as large a proportion of its requirements as Canada can supply.

7. In view of the magnitude of the sterling balances which over a period of time it will probably be necessary to accumulate we think it appropriate to adopt the arrangement originally suggested by the United Kingdom Treasury in October, 1939, and submitted to us through Mr. Osborne, namely, that the sterling accumulated by Canada should bear an exchange guarantee at the rate ruling on the day the sterling was transferred.

8. In view of the necessity for the closest cooperation in the working out of these arrangements we welcome your assurance that the United Kingdom Government would be agreeable, especially as regards foodstuffs, to consider jointly with Canada any representations that may be received from the United States Government that the United Kingdom should make certain purchases of agricultural products from the United States. We propose to send representatives of governmental departments concerned to Washington to discuss these matters with the British Food Mission and with the representatives of the British Supply Council in North America.

9. A copy of this telegram is being made available to Sir Frederick Phillips.

639.

1894-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 79

London, May 10, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram No. 46. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are deeply grateful for the extreme generosity and helpful spirit in which His Majesty's Government in Canada have dealt with the question of financial assistance. Their offer to meet on certain understandings full deficit of sterling area is of cardinal importance to our joint war effort and relieves us of great difficulties and anxieties.

2. We have carefully studied the various points dealt with in your telegram, and have the following comments on certain paragraphs.

3. Paragraph 4. We will arrange to keep you informed of our own estimates, from time to time, of probable deficit of sterling area towards Canada.

4. Paragraph 6 (a). We recognize the great significance resulting in your discussions with President Roosevelt on coordination of productive capacities of Canada and the United States, and on the method of meeting the greater part of Canada's adverse balance with the United States. We have learnt with much satisfaction of arrangements concluded.

5. Paragraph 6 (b). We note that the Canadian Government reserve the right to take up with the United States amount of gold or United States

dollars which the United States would be agreeable to the United Kingdom transferring to Canada in partial settlement of sterling area's deficit with Canada. We have no doubt that the Canadian Government have not failed to realize our own position. We have extensive commitments in different parts of the world to be met in gold and dollars, and we have to reconstitute an adequate working balance. We have, for many months to come, to meet very onerous commitments on contracts placed before the Lease-Lend Act came into operation, and unless there is some marked change in the United States attitude, and a willingness on their part to relieve us of greater part of these commitments, we shall for a long time ahead not have enough for our own primary necessities and no surplus available to send gold or United States dollars to Canada.

6. Paragraph 6 (c). We readily accept the position that the Canadian Government would be consulted about projects or additions of any importance to the programme of purchases for British account in Canada, which would have a direct bearing on their financial arrangements.

7. Paragraph 6 (d). We confirm assurances already given about diversion of our orders from Canadian to United States sources, which means, in respect of munitions, that we should within the limit of our exchange give orders to make the maximum possible use of plant capacity which has been or is being built in Canada, and would not ask the United States to duplicate plant facilities in order to be able to purchase products thereof under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act rather than in Canada.

8. Paragraph 6 (d) and paragraph 8. As regards foodstuffs, we find that the formula proposed in the last sentence of paragraph 6 (d) of your telegram No. 46 goes further than assurances already given in my telegram No. 31. We do not think that we can reasonably be asked to enter into so comprehensive a commitment, and we do not want to use words that are capable of future misunderstanding; but we are, of course, most anxious to protect Canadian interests, and we feel convinced that the Canadian position will, in practice, be adequately safeguarded by instructions which we are giving to our Food Mission in Washington to keep in closest touch with the Canadian Government representatives there. Food Mission assure us that they have already established very close relations with Canadian Legation, and they believe Legation are satisfied that Canadian interests will be fully protected under the present procedure. It will, of course, be understood that purchases will continue to be subject to agreement in regard to price, and that price factor is more than ever important to us in view of policy of stabilizing cost of living, dealt with by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his recent budget speech.

9. Paragraph 7. We shall be very glad for questions raised in this paragraph to be discussed between United Kingdom High Commissioner and the Canadian Government. In special circumstances of Canadian economy, we quite understand that the Canadian Government are anxious to have some protection of their sterling assets against depreciation in terms of their

own currency, but we feel that the magnitude of the sums which would be involved makes it difficult to deal with this problem by way of a unilateral exchange guarantee attaching to specific balance. Could we not perhaps consider a more comprehensive and bilateral arrangement by which the two (countries?) should agree not to alter existing rate of exchange between Canadian dollar and sterling without previous consultation?

10. We should like in conclusion again to express our appreciation of the generous and farsighted treatment which the Canadian Government have given these most important issues.

640.

5909-40

*Le premier ministre suppléant de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 8

Wellington, September 8, 1941

Canada-New Zealand Trade Agreement expires at the end of this month. Proposal made during discussions at Ottawa on June 13th between the Honourable J. A. MacKinnon and the Honourable F. Langton that it would be advantageous to extend agreement for longer period than customary year has been fully considered by my Government, who now suggest that it continue in force until the expiration of 6 months from the date on which either Government shall have given to the other notice in writing of its intention to terminate it. Shall be glad to hear whether your Government concur, in which case notification of extension would be published here on Thursday September 25th. An immediate reply would be appreciated.

641.

31(s)

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures¹
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs¹
to Prime Minister*

MOST SECRET

[Ottawa,] September 15, 1941

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

1. During a recent visit of some ten days in the United States I had several opportunities for intimate and unhurried discussion with friends occupying positions of importance in, or in relation to, the White House, the State Department and the Treasury. I cannot be more specific as in each case I was asked to avoid direct reference to the source of the information which was

¹H. L. Keenleyside.

thus obtained. I believe, however, that the substance of what I learned in these discussions was of such importance, the sources from which it was obtained were so impressive, and their views so consistent, that I am justified in asking your consideration of the material set out in the following paragraphs.

2. I found that my informants were all seriously depressed by recent developments in the realm of Anglo-American economic relationships. They had been provoked to a state of indignation and even alarm by the views which had been expressed in Washington and elsewhere by recent official (Keynes, Salter, Phillips) and semi-official (Crowther and others) economist visitors from the United Kingdom.

3. As you are aware, and as my informants pointed out, there is a growing clash of economic opinions in the United States which is likely to increase in vigour as the exponents of the conflicting views continue their efforts in the one case to retain, and in the other to gain, Administration support for their respective programmes. For convenience these two groups may be identified as the Freer Traders and the Autarchists.

4. The Freer Trade group at present enjoys Administration support. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who is the most prominent of the exponents of this policy, believes that most of the domestic and international ills from which the nations of the world presently suffer can, after the war, be cured or, at worst, very greatly modified by an enlightened policy of freer world trade. He and those who support him (including the President) recognize that at the conclusion of the war it will be necessary for the United States to continue to contribute to the support of Britain and the democratic powers, and to assist in the rehabilitation of central Europe. They believe that this can best be done by assisting those crippled powers to gain easy access to sources of raw material and achieve relative prosperity by a tremendous expansion of international trade. They recognize that this will involve a momentous reduction in the United States tariff rates and for this they are prepared to fight the dissidents within their own ranks and within the United States generally. They believe that they can succeed.

5. The Autarchical policy is advocated by a numerically weak but a determined and persistent nucleus of civil servants who receive the support of an influential and probably growing body of opinion throughout the country. The exponents of this theory argue:

- A. that the trade and exchange controls which have everywhere been established during the war will inevitably remain a part of governmental technique in all countries after the war;
- B. that it is therefore hardly worth while to bother trying to re-establish any very large volume of general trade with Europe or Asia;
- C. that, in any case, North and South America can become almost completely self-sufficient, and
- D. that, as the wave of the future is surging in this direction it is the part of wisdom for the United States to prepare itself for this kind of a world.

6. Between these two views there is a considerable body of American opinion which would prefer to believe that Mr. Hull's theory will work but is afraid that it will not. Those who are in this state of hope but doubt would, for the most part, be willing to see the Freer Trade policy tried but would be prepared to accept the other alternative if the liberal course should fail.

7. Up to and at the present time the Administration is determined that the Freer Trade policy shall be adopted and is prepared to fight its domestic opponents and assist all foreign nations that are willing to agree on such a policy. But the President and his advisers are under severe and growing pressure from those who want the United States to adopt "self-sufficiency" as the national watchword.

8. It was into this American scene that Keynes, Crowther and others have tossed their economic bombs. And they apparently exploded their grenades not as men performing a grievous but essential task, but rather as though they enjoyed the devastation that they caused.

9. The Keynes-Crowther forecast and argument may be summarized as follows:

- A. At the end of the war Great Britain will be a "rubbish pile", its factories devastated, its cities destroyed, its ships sunk, its trade ruined, its financial reserves and gold supply dissipated. In addition it will be in debt to the United States for Lease-Lend advances. Other European countries will be in a similar, or worse, plight.
- B. Under these circumstances the proper course for Britain to follow will be to maintain all her war-time controls, unite the sterling bloc as closely as possible, and engage in trade with other areas only to the extent that bilateral arrangements can be made on advantageous terms. This will mean a bitter struggle for trade supremacy in neutral areas; and *a minimum of cooperation and a maximum of competition between Great Britain and the United States.*
- C. For Canada this will mean that Great Britain will buy from Canada only goods equivalent to the amount of Canadian purchases from the United Kingdom. (If there should be in any year a small favourable surplus in British trade with other parts of the Dollar area, London might consider allocating part of this surplus to the purchase of Canadian commodities; but neither the surplus itself nor its allocation to purchases from Canada should be confidently anticipated.)

10. In justifying this policy Keynes used the argument that New Deal America in part is, theoretically should become, and inevitably will operate as, a planned economy. It is useless therefore to think of America cooperating in freer trade. As Keynes looks upon himself as the "Father of the New Deal" he was not prepared to listen patiently to those practising New Dealers who refused to accept his argument and who insisted that America after the war will be prepared, if necessary, to continue some variation of the Lease-Lend programme, to make loans, to utilize its gold stocks to the general benefit, and to take all other practicable steps to see that freer trade

does materialize. So intolerant of American argument did Keynes become and so bitterly did the discussion develop that the President was forced to intervene. Mr. Roosevelt told Keynes that American policy is wholly predicated on the idea that freedom of trade and its essential corollaries will provide the solution of post-war problems. He stated that the American Government will do everything it can to facilitate reconstruction on this foundation and that he expected present beneficiaries of American policy to cooperate and not to sabotage his efforts. Keynes is reported to have taken this lecture without reply but to have left unconvinced, only regretful that the pupil had declared his independence of the teaching of the old master.

11. Geoffrey Crowther in lectures in the United States and in Canada has expounded similar views.

12. It is not difficult to imagine the response that such tactics as those of Keynes and Crowther have produced in Washington. The New Dealers who are, in general, the chief supporters of the President's policy of all-out aid to Britain and the democracies, feel that they have been slapped in the face by those who should be their firmest English collaborators at the very moment when the Administration is doing everything it can to strengthen the ties of friendship between America and Britain. The President's practice of the "Good Neighbour" policy which has exposed him to criticism at home has now been repaid by the English "New Dealers" with a threat of all-out economic warfare as soon as the military war is ended.

13. Even if the forecasts of Keynes, in regard to conditions in the United States and elsewhere at the end of the war, are accurate it is the worst possible procedure to expatiate on the certainty of such results, and to give such evidence of relish in their contemplation, at this particular time. The British policy today should be to say to the United States that Britain hopes that the present American policies can be continued after the war as a means of contributing to the solution of the inevitably grave problems of that period. Even if they do not believe it to be feasible, British officials and publicists should say that they *hope* it will be possible to bring about recovery by a great expansion of the traditional British policy of freedom of trade; that they recognize the great difficulty of the task because of the impoverishment of Britain and other European states, but that London will do everything possible to make such a policy work so long as the British people can be assured of strong and consistent American cooperation. They might *then*, but not until then, properly refer to the regrettable alternative which it might be necessary to envisage if Anglo-American efforts at collaboration in the attempt to free international trade from its pre-war and war-grown shackles should fail. The bitter competition which Keynes and others now complacently forecast should be depicted as the sad result of the failure of a better policy, not as a natural and inevitable development.

14. Perhaps the worst feature of this Keynes-Crowther *gaucherie* is the fact that it weakens the position of the Administration, in its defence of its policy

of international cooperation, against the attack of internal foes. The Keynes-Crowther views have inevitably become known and have already caused secret jubilation among the foes of the President. Crowther has been denounced in Congress, and it is no secret that it was knowledge of Keynes' arguments that led Lindbergh to say in his speech in Oklahoma City that in supporting Britain the people of the United States were laying themselves open to the possibility of having the "English turn against them as they have already turned against Finland and France".

15. The danger for the future if such ideas become widely accepted in the United States is incalculable. It is not by any means impossible that a reactionary movement may, within the next two years, become a real menace to all the Roosevelt policies. The election of, say, a Dewey-Lindbergh ticket, complete with control of Congress, in 1944 is not at all impossible. That such a development would be a major world tragedy should be apparent even to English economists. Yet the activities of Mr. Keynes and the others mentioned above are calculated to contribute directly and materially to just such a result.

16. What steps, if any, Canada can take to minimize the damage that has been done, or that may yet be done, should the Keynes policy be adopted by the Government of the United Kingdom is a matter which would seem to justify careful consideration. Economic war between the United Kingdom and the United States would be a tragedy for themselves, for the world, and perhaps above all for Canada. The political and economic consequences that would face this country in the event of such a conflict might well surpass anything yet experienced by the Canadian Government and the Canadian people.

17. If Ottawa can do anything to lessen the possibility of such a development as that foreshadowed above it should certainly be done—and done quickly. Possibly as a first step consideration might be given to the advisability of letting the Government of the United Kingdom know what we have learned of the situation in the United States and of the regret with which we have received this knowledge. Subsequent steps could be planned in the light of the British reply.

642.

5909-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre suppléant
de Nouvelle-Zélande*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Prime Minister
of New Zealand*

TELEGRAM 2

Ottawa, September 19, 1941

Your telegram No. 8, September 8th. Canadian Government concurs in your suggestion that the Canada-New Zealand Trade Agreement continue in

force until the expiration of six months from the date on which either Government gives to the other notice in writing of its intention to terminate it. Appropriate administrative steps to extend Agreement at this end will now be taken.¹

643.

1749-E-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.591

London, September 30, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My telegram Circular D.316 of May 30th² Lease Lend Act.

1. On June 13th, when President Roosevelt made his first report to Congress on working of Act, proposals as to the "consideration" which should be asked of us in respect of aid received, were not sufficiently advanced to justify any indication of form which they would take. On this question therefore, the President's statement was confined to the following:

Work has started on Agreements to fix terms and conditions under section 3(b) upon which foreign Governments receive aid.

2. Since that date conversations have been proceeding in Washington as a result of which, on instructions given respectively by the President and the Prime Minister, it was agreed that no attempt should be made to determine in detail at this stage what form the "consideration" should take. The President agreed that we should be given a measure of protection at once by exclusion of anything in the nature of war debts or delivery either of cash or of goods which had a merely economic significance. The President asked in return that we should enter into some commitment as to character of our post war international economic policy.

3. The eventual outcome of these conversations was presentation by State Department of a Draft Agreement which is understood to have received general approval of the President, although he is not finally committed to it. Full text of draft is contained in my immediately following telegram.

4. We therefore regard preamble and first six articles as acceptable. (It may be noted in passing that Article 5 implies a corresponding obligation on the part of the Dominion Governments to whom Leased-Lent defence articles have been transferred).

5. Article 7, however, raises a substantial issue. The first part is entirely satisfactory, but the words from "they shall provide" onwards presents great

¹ Le décret du Conseil C.P. 7520 du 25 septembre 1941 prolongea l'accord commercial.

² Non reproduit.

¹ Order in Council P.C. 7520 of September 25, 1941 extended the duration of the Trade Agreement.

² Not printed.

difficulties from our point of view. While anxious to go as far as possible in meeting the President's wishes, it is not possible for us to enter into a commitment which is ambiguous in its phraseology and which can be held to prejudice our right to maintain an Imperial preferential system. Nor at a time when future conditions are unknown can we be committed without qualification to abandonment of such measures as exchange and import restrictions which may still be necessitated by circumstances not under our control.

6. We are proposing therefore early next week to suggest the following alternative wording for Article 7. Begins.

The terms and conditions upon which the Government of the United Kingdom receives defence aid from the Government of the United States of America and benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor, as finally determined, shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them; they shall provide for joint and agreed action by the United States and the United Kingdom, each working within the limits of their governing economic conditions directed to securing as part of a general plan the progressive attainment of balanced international economies, the avoidance of harmful discriminations, and generally economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made by the President of United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on August 12th, 1941.

And furthermore it is agreed that at an early convenient date conversations should be begun between the two Governments with a view to discussing best means of attaining the above objects and generally better ordering of economic intercourse between nations in the future conditions of settled peace.

Ends.

644.

1749-E-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.592

London, September 30, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following is text of Draft Agreement referred to in paragraph 4 of my immediately preceding telegram. Begins.

Whereas the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declare that, with self-restraint and sober purpose, they are engaged in a co-operative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the basis of a just and enduring world peace, securing order under the law to themselves and all nations;

And whereas the President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to Act of Congress of March 11th, 1941, that defence of the United Kingdom against aggression is vital to the defence of the United States of America;

And whereas the United States of America has extended defence or is to extend to the United Kingdom aid in resisting aggression;

And whereas final determination of terms and conditions upon which the United Kingdom receives such aid and of benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor, should be deferred until extent of defence aid is known and until progress of events makes clearer the final terms and volume and benefits which will be in the mutual interests of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace;

And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are mutually desirous of concluding now a preliminary agreement in regard to providing of defence aid and in regard to certain considerations which shall be taken into account in determining such terms and conditions, and making of such an agreement has been in all respects duly authorized, and all acts, conditions and formalities which it may have been necessary to perform, fulfil or execute prior to making of such an agreement in conformity with the laws either of the United States of America or of the United Kingdom have been performed, fulfilled or executed as required;

The undersigned, being duly authorized for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

Article I The United States of America will continue to supply the United Kingdom with such defence articles, defence services, and defence information as the President shall authorize to be transferred or provided.

Article II The United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the defence of the United States of America and strengthening thereof and, should circumstances arise in which the United States of America in its own defence or defence of the Americas may require articles, services, or information, will provide such articles, services, or information as it may be in a position to supply.

Article III The Government of the United Kingdom will not without the consent of the President transfer title to, or possession of, any defence article or defence information transferred to it under the Act or permit use thereof by anyone not an officer, employee or agent of the Government of the United Kingdom.

Article IV If, as a result of transfer to the Government of the U.K. [of] any defence article or defence information, it becomes necessary for that Government to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defence article or information, the Government of the United Kingdom will take such action or make such payment when requested to do so by the President.

Article V The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by

the President, such defence articles transferred under this Agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed, and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in defence of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.

Article VI In the final determination of benefits to be provided to the United States of America full cognizance shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to March 11th, 1941, and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America.

Article VII The terms and conditions upon which the United Kingdom receives defence aid from the United States of America and the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor, as finally determined, shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and betterment of world wide economic relations; they shall provide against discrimination in either the United States of America or the United Kingdom against importation of any produce originating in the other country; and they shall provide for formulation of measures for achievement of these ends.

Article VIII This agreement shall continue in force from date on which it is signed until a date agreed upon by the two Governments.

Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this _____ day of _____, 1941.

On behalf of the United States of America:
(TITLE)

On behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
(TITLE)

Ends.

645.

1749-E-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa, October, n.d., 1941]

ANGLO-U.S. TRADE CONDITIONS AGREEMENT

D.O. [Circular] 591 and 592 of September 30th deal with very serious matters for Canada—trade policy after the war and, in particular, Imperial

preference. The U.S.A. is apparently improving the existing situation by preparing the way for the removal of this preference. Such removal would certainly dislocate our economy. Discussions concerning it, however, appear to have been proceeding in Washington since August. Have we known of these discussions, participated in them, or been consulted about them?

The upshot of them is the draft agreement embodied in D.O. [Circular] 592. The principle behind this agreement is, bluntly, that the U.S.A. have been supplying help to Britain and now are to be paid for it. The acceptance of this same principle after the last war poisoned relations between the two countries during the war debts controversy. Now it is recognised again in the preamble to the agreement which talks about the "terms and conditions" of U.S. help. The validity of this whole concept is, however, denied in another part of the same preamble which quotes the Congressional Act of March, 1941, that, "defence of the U.K. against aggression is vital to the defence of the U.S.A." Why talk about "terms and conditions" for your own defence?

All this, however, may now seem academic. Not so academic are the following points:

(1) Is Canada to be included in the proposed agreement or left out of it? If the former, it would have to be by the old familiar method of accession after the event because the agreement as now drafted is between the "Governments of the U.S.A. and U.K."

(2) If it had not been for the British doubts about Art. 7, we would once again have been put in the unhappy position *either* of accepting an agreement which would operate to our disadvantage while excluding us from its terms *or* rejecting an agreement which the U.S.A. and the U.K. had already accepted. The latter, in existing circumstances, we could hardly do.

(3) Does U.K. and U.S. acceptance of the first 6 articles mean we cannot suggest amendments to them?

(4) So far as Art. 7 is concerned, with its implications of such vital importance for us, I agree that the British draft is a vast improvement over the American. But even this draft condemns "harmful discriminations". No one can object to this in theory, but there is no doubt that Washington will argue that one of the "harmful discriminations" which the British are to be pledged to avoid is "Imperial preference".

(5) Finally, and most important, neither the U.K. or U.S. apparently expect us to participate in the conversations proposed between "the two governments" in the last paragraph of D.O. [Circular] 591.

L. B. P[EARSON]

646.

1749-E-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] October 3, 1941

Attached are copies of Dominions Office secret telegrams Circular D.591 and Circular D.592 of September 30th regarding the "consideration" which the United States is to receive from the United Kingdom for aid extended under Lease-Lend procedure. These telegrams, as received, were corrupt in three or four important parts, and I have deferred distribution until the correct text has been established in consultation with London.

The United States Government has submitted to the United Kingdom Government a draft Agreement, the crux of which lies in the proposal, in Article 7, that the United Kingdom and the United States shall "provide against discrimination in either country against importation of any produce originating in the other country". The United Kingdom do not feel that they can enter into such a commitment, which they regard as ambiguous in its wording and possibly prejudging their right to accord tariff preferences to other parts of the Empire. They have, therefore, proposed an alternative wording for Article 7, contemplating joint and agreed action by both Governments in the international economic field "within the limits of their governing economic conditions" to achieve the economic objectives set forth in the Atlantic Charter.

The United Kingdom suggest that "at an early, convenient date conversations should be begun between the two Governments with a view to discussing the best means of attaining these objects".

The British counter-proposal is expected to go forward to Washington early next week.

In return for the assistance now extended under Lease-Lend, the United States is really pressing for payment, not at the expense of the United Kingdom but at the expense of the other parts of the Empire which enjoy a preferred position in the British market. We spent months in Washington in 1938 convincing the United States Government that, when the United Kingdom reduced its duties on United States wheat, apples and lumber, it was not the United Kingdom but Canada that was really making an economic concession in favour of United States export interests. It looks as if the old argument will have to be renewed again. It is certainly not an argument which solely concerns the United Kingdom and the United States.

I think we should tell the United Kingdom Government that we share their misgivings about Article 7 of the American draft and that, as an interim formula, the wording which they have suggested in its place is, from our point of view, much more acceptable. At the same time, I think that we should point

out that the question at issue is not one that can be settled between the United Kingdom and the United States. To this extent, their counter proposal for early conversations between the *two* Governments with a view to discussing the best means of attaining generally desirable objectives is itself inadequate.

647.

1749-E-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] October 6, 1941

D.O. CIRCULARS 591 AND 592

1. I agree with the general considerations covered in your memorandum and in that prepared by Mr. Pearson. There are, however, a few points that might perhaps be mentioned again.

2. With reference to Mr. Pearson's comments on "repayment" I do not see how the United States administration could go any further than President Roosevelt has already gone when he agreed that the United Kingdom should be protected "by the exclusion of anything in the nature of war debts or delivery either of cash or of goods which had a merely economic significance". Mr. Pearson's argument is logically and morally justifiable but it is not, in my opinion, politically practicable.

3. The most significant note in the whole exchange is the President's request that the United Kingdom "should enter into some commitment as to the character of (that country's) post-war economic policy". This is obviously an effort to persuade London to renounce the Keynes-Crowther-Phillips theory of an all-out trade and currency war at the conclusion of the present military conflict. Here I am wholly sympathetic to the President's views. In my opinion the alternative would have disastrous consequences, above all, for Canada.

4. It is difficult to be enthusiastic over either the British or the American draft of Article 7. Why, for example, should London omit the words "betterment of world-wide economic relations"? At worst they could do no harm; at best they might mean something. And why bring in "the progressive attainment of balanced international economies" when "balanced" is open to so many unfavourable interpretations? The American drive against Imperial preferences is regrettable but we may as well recognize that we are going to have to face it, lease-lend or no lease-lend.

5. With the suggestion that Canada should be associated with these negotiations I am, of course, in complete agreement. The sooner we make it apparent that we expect to be consulted and to participate in any negotiations which so directly and drastically affect our interests, the better.

H. L. K[REENLEYSIDE]

648.

1749-E-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.701

London, November 22, 1941

We are, as you know, committed by preliminary discussions which we have had with the United States about "consideration" for lend lease to entering conversations with them on post-war economic problems at an early convenient date. These conversations cannot be satisfactorily conducted without prior consideration of future economic relations between the United Kingdom on the one hand, and the Dominions and India on the other hand. These relations will need discussion between the Governments of the British Commonwealth, more particularly from the point of view of not prejudicing right [of?] members of that Commonwealth to accord preferential treatment to each other.

2. While we have not yet formulated our own views of major questions of purely economic policy arising, we are impressed with probable exchange difficulties on our part owing to increased need for imports for reconstruction and diminished receipts from overseas investments and shipping, and possible lasting loss of markets to which we have at present to curtail supplies. As we see it, the problem will be to reconcile

(1) a general desire for increasing international trade and freeing it from restrictions, and

(2) need to preserve a balance of payments both

(a) between sterling area and the rest of the world and

(b) between the United Kingdom and the rest of sterling area.

Special consideration will, of course, be necessary in the case of Canada and other parts of the Empire not on sterling.

3. We intend to send you a further communication on the subject at an early date. Meanwhile we hope that in any preliminary consideration of these matters full weight will be given by the Governments of the Dominions to (b) in preceding paragraph.

4. It remains to be seen what contribution could be made to solution of problems mentioned in paragraph 2 above by trade agreements with the United States on lines now under discussion in Washington. We are anxious that these explorations of tariff questions should proceed in order that Governments concerned may decide in consultation with each other as may be necessary whether, when viewed as a whole, the proposals would represent a fair bargain. We assume that nothing will be done which would commit any of the Empire Governments concerned until each of them has had ample opportunity of studying the complete picture and of considering it in relation to the wider problems mentioned above.

PARTIE 6/PART 6

ÉVACUATION DES FEMMES ET DES ENFANTS BRITANNIQUES
AU CANADA

EVACUATION OF BRITISH WOMEN AND CHILDREN TO CANADA

649.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 757

London, June 1, 1940

Following for Minister of Mines and Resources. Begins. Meeting took place yesterday between representatives of this office and United Kingdom Government Departments concerned, to discuss question of continental refugees and British evacuees for Canada in the light of telegrams received from Ottawa on this subject recently.

So far as British children are concerned the United Kingdom officials were not optimistic that many parents would send them to Canada except in gravest emergency, basing their views on reluctance shown by parents to send children to evacuation areas in the United Kingdom. The problem of evacuation of very small children has proved particularly difficult and has been easiest in cases of unaccompanied children between the ages of 11 and 16.

Under Emergency Powers Act May 22nd no Exit Permits are being granted to British subjects between 16 and 60, apart from returning Dominion nationals and infirm persons, in order that this country would not be deprived of the services of any useful person. We were assured, however, that women accompanying children evacuated overseas would be granted such permits. Treasury have been very strict in forbidding transfer of funds on behalf of women and children moving overseas, but it was stated that consideration would be given to the question of transfer to Canada of contributions now made by parents to the evacuation scheme here, if children were moved to Canada. At present the parents, if they can afford any contribution, pay from 1 shilling to 6 shillings per child per week, and balance is paid by the Government, constituting a weekly billeting allowance ranging from 15 shillings to 18 shillings.

While no serious consideration has yet been given by the Government here for any scheme for evacuating women or children to the Dominions, we were requested to secure, if possible, answers from Ottawa to the following questions which would assist in such considerations:

1. How many unaccompanied children and children accompanied by mothers were the Canadian Government prepared to accept;

2. Is there preference for any age group in the selection of children;
3. What arrangements would be made for the reception of children in Canada? Would they be billeted in private homes or in institutions? Would any special provision be made for children under 5 years;
4. How would the children be maintained;
5. Who would bear transportation charges;
6. In waiving medical examination prior to embarkation, would Canadian medical authorities reject children for reasons of health on arrival at port of entry in Canada? It is felt that this should be avoided at all costs and that possibly to that end the children might be subjected to preliminary medical examination here through the health authorities in the United Kingdom working in cooperation with Canadian Immigration and Medical officials;
7. What arrangements would be feasible in connection with the education of these children?

So far as the continental refugees are concerned, it is pointed out that this problem, as well as of internees in the United Kingdom, was more immediate and pressing than that of evacuating British children, though here again reluctance of parents to be parted from children might prove a difficulty. Arrangements are being made for a house to house canvass of refugee billets to supply detailed information of numbers and categories of refugees.

It seems likely that from Canadian point of view, as well as experience of United Kingdom evacuation scheme, most desirable categories would be unaccompanied children between 11 and 16. Ends.

MASSEY

650.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 805

London, June 7, 1940

Following for Minister of Mines and Resources. Begins. My telegram No. 757 of June 1st. Reports appearing in today's *Times* and other papers indicate that you have made a statement on this subject, apparently dealing with questions raised in my telegram under reference. Would be grateful to receive reply to my telegram at your earliest convenience.

Presume that in this connection the Canadian Government would be interested in evacuation of British institutional children to Canada, if carefully selected by Immigration and Medical authorities here. Please confirm. Ends.

MASSEY

651.

622-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 704

Ottawa, June 8, 1940

Replying No. 757 June 1st. Answers to questions are:

1. Openings here are almost wholly for unaccompanied children approximately seventy-five percent British and about same proportion non-Roman Catholic. Doubtful whether any number of free homes can be found for children accompanied by mothers.

2. Preference most Provinces is for children of ten or over, some Provinces would take younger children if legal adoption possible.

3 and 4. Dominion will look after everything up to Provincial distribution centres where children will be temporarily housed by Provinces in shelters, private schools and other places available until they can be located in private homes without maintenance costs to Dominion or Provinces. Some children may require temporary periods of paid care in shelters from time to time. Plans so far make no provision for handling children under five although anticipate offers to legally adopt such children if available.

5. Dominion will provide transportation to Provincial centres where Provinces and Welfare organizations will take over.

6. It is intended to arrange medical examination before sailing.

7. No difficulty is anticipated in having these children attend local schools in districts where placed. London Canadian Press cable fifth instant says that ships reaching Channel ports all carry groups of Dutch, Belgian, French and even German exiles. This suggests that refugee problem described your 719 of 28th *ultimo*¹ may now be materially changed. Would appreciate any further information you can give on this point.

652.

622-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 708

Ottawa, June 10, 1940

Following from Minister of Mines and Resources. Begins. Replying your cable eight nought five reports in London papers you refer to doubtless came

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

from statement given press here covering meeting held week ago with representatives from provinces regarding placement of refugees who may come to Canada. Regarding second part of your cable the proposal which makes greatest appeal here is a movement of children to be given shelter in private homes for duration of war and later return to their parents. Institutional children who would be coming for permanent residence make no such appeal and the movement is not one we can approve other than by increasing the number of such children who may come under their regular agencies already established in Canada. Crerar. Ends.

653.

622-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975H/7

Ottawa, June 12, 1940

Dear Dr. Skelton,

The High Commissioner thinks that you may be interested to see the following text of a reply which is being made today by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to a question in the House of Commons at Westminster regarding a reception scheme overseas for children from the war zone:

An Interdepartmental Committee has been appointed under my chairmanship. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, the Parliamentary Secretary of the Board of Education and the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Health are also members of this committee. The committee's terms of reference are "to consider the offer received from overseas to house and care for children, accompanied or unaccompanied, from the European war zone, who are residing in Great Britain, including children orphaned by war, and to make recommendations thereon". The committee has already held two meetings. We are in touch with the Dominion Governments and are urgently examining the scope and the nature of a scheme of this character.

We have received a number of enquiries from parents in this country, but I should like to point out that a scheme of this nature raises a large number of difficult problems on which the closest consultation with the Dominions will be necessary. As soon as a practical scheme can be devised an announcement will be made giving the address to which applications or enquiries can be sent.

I should like to take this opportunity of expressing the thanks of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for this further demonstration of co-operation by the countries of the British Commonwealth in our war effort by offering to receive and care for a number of children for the duration of the war in homes remote from the war zone. His Majesty's Government hope it may be possible to take advantage of these generous offers by devising a practical scheme urgently.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

654.

622-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 725

Ottawa, June 12, 1940

Following from the Minister of Mines and Resources. [Begins.] Regarding possible movement of British children from United Kingdom to Canada leaving out of consideration for present institutional children can you give us definite information following points:

1. To what extent do British authorities wish to move children between five and sixteen years? Children under five could be received for adoption but not many otherwise.

2. Does movement depend upon voluntary co-operation of parents or guardians?

3. To what extent is it desired that parents one or both accompany children?

4. Is it desired to seek safety for others than those mentioned previous paragraphs?

5. Is it desired move Dutch, Belgian or French refugee children up to age sixteen years now in United Kingdom and if so in what numbers? From present indications think could get excellent co-operation from Canadian homes for maintenance children which would increase if war situation becomes worse and Britain is directly attacked. While we do not propose paying for keep of children placed in private homes thousands of which we believe would be available suggest British authorities should bear part of cost where maintenance has to be paid for others as is done in Britain now in the case of evacuees to safer places. Important we get as much information on foregoing as can be made available early as possible so we can effectively plan ahead and determine how far we can go. In reply your number eight two one¹ think could place almost immediately ten thousand in satisfactory private homes for duration of war and probably many thousands more if available of type described by cable eighth instant. Ends.

655.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 858

London, June 14, 1940

Your telegram No. 725 of June 12th. The United Kingdom Government informs me that they are considering setting up a body to deal with child

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

evacuation. The administration of the scheme would not be handled by an existing Government Department but by a small executive body composed of prominent individuals likely to command general confidence, assisted by an organizing staff with a nucleus of civil servants and a paid secretary. In addition, in order to tap available experience, they propose to set up an Advisory Body to assist the executive.

Applications would be received by the executive body through the local educational authorities, so far as children in state-aided schools are concerned, and by direct application from other people.

The United Kingdom Government feels it would be difficult to sponsor such a scheme unless it could look to an all-embracing organization in Canada, national in scope, to deal with the reception of the children for allotment to individual homes. Such a body would have to function not only at the beginning of the scheme but during its continuance.

The United Kingdom Government have not yet worked out the details of their own organization but would be glad to know whether the Canadian Government consider if a scheme along the lines suggested above would be practicable.

MASSEY

656.

622-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975H/8

Ottawa, June 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE

Dear Dr. Skelton,

The High Commissioner has received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that the Interdepartmental Committee which has been set up in the United Kingdom to go into the question of a reception scheme overseas for children has had under consideration the question of what age classes of school children would be considered suitable for selection under the scheme upon their parents' application.

The following three different possibilities have been suggested: that the eligible ages should be—

- (1) Over 5 and under 16;
- (2) Over 10 and under 16 without any exception;
- (3) Over 10 and under 16 with permission for:

- (a) a child over 5 and under 10 of the same family to accompany an older brother or sister; and/or
- (b) a child over 5 and under 10 to go alone if nominated for reception by a particular family in a Dominion.

Of these proposals the United Kingdom authorities would much prefer the first, and the second possibility would be the least attractive to them. It is their view, however, that if the first possibility were adopted few parents of children under ten years of age would be willing to be separated from their children and that such parents would, therefore, not apply under the scheme.

It is expected that the outline of the scheme which the Committee will propose will be announced to the press in London on Tuesday next, the 18th June, at 5.00 p.m., and Sir Gerald Campbell has been asked to approach the Canadian Government urgently and to ascertain if possible their views on the above proposals. Lord Caldecote has stated that he is most anxious to receive a reply from Ottawa before the outline of the scheme is published next Tuesday.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

657.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 875

London, June 17, 1940

Your telegram No. 725, June 12th. Following for Minister of Mines and Resources. Begins. Answer[s] to your questions are as follows:

1. Age categories 5 to 15 inclusive.
2. Yes.
3. Not at all under the present scheme, though it is contemplated that special arrangements might be practicable later on as regards war widows with children; this however does not arise at present.
4. No; adults will be required as escorts, but these, if not Canadian, would presumably return to this country after any particular voyage had been completed.
5. Yes, but numbers are likely to be very small; see our telegram No. 852 of June 14th.¹

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

The United Kingdom Government contemplate a flat rate contribution to appropriate Canadian authorities of 5 shillings per week per child, irrespective of parent's actual contributions. Parents would be asked to contribute according to their means, but experience here suggests that weekly sums recovered would average less than 5 shillings. Owing to difficulties of dollar exchange it would not be possible to permit any direct financial transaction between sending and receiving households. In addition to 5 shillings mentioned, the United Kingdom contemplate a small payment for outfit on arrival to equip the child for the different conditions prevailing in Canada.

Impossible at the moment to give estimate of number of children involved, as this will depend on response made by parents, which will in turn depend to a large extent on the security of the situation here. Steps are being taken immediately to circularise the local authorities on the scheme, in order that they may begin to receive applications from parents all over the country. It is hoped that very shortly we will have some idea of immediate numbers likely to be forthcoming. [Ends.]

MASSEY

658.

622-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 762

Ottawa, June 17, 1940

Following from Minister of Mines and Resources. Begins. Your telegram 858 of June 14th. All placement of children will be done by Provincial Governments through existing experienced agencies under their control. Provinces have all expressed desire co-operate with Federal Government in fullest possible way to find good homes for these children. Homes receiving children will be inspected as to suitability prior to children being placed and children will be visited later. Federal Government would undertake to ensure that this inspection is properly done. Desire to again emphasize that our plan means placing children in private homes where there is willingness to assume cost of food and lodging, the children to rejoin their parents either here or in United Kingdom when happier days come. We do not care to comment on steps that United Kingdom Government think necessary to make children available beyond saying we would require medical inspection before sailing to ensure freedom from communicable diseases and would like children to arrive early as possible since reception and arrangements for temporary care much easier in summer. Ends.

659.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 891

London, June 18, 1940

Your telegram No. 762 of June 17th. Evacuation of British children. Following is summary of report of United Kingdom Interdepartmental Committee on Reception of Children Overseas:

1. Offers from overseas and United States of America gratefully acknowledged, and schemes should be agreed for receiving children from Great Britain in these countries.

2. Schemes should be known as Children's Overseas Reception Schemes.

3. Administration.

(a) In the United Kingdom. Small executive bodies to be set up immediately, called Children's Overseas Reception Boards, assisted by adequate secretarial staffs which would carry out the day-to-day work involved. Chairman to be a Minister who would have advisory Council composed of representatives of appropriate organizations and of qualified individuals.

(b) In receiving country. It is understood that central organizations are to be set up in each receiving country to administer the schemes and secure the welfare of the children. The United Kingdom High Commissioner in each receiving Dominion is to keep in close touch with this body and for this purpose a suitable person from this country is being specially appointed to his staff.

4. Scope of the Schemes.

To cover children from five to fifteen. Younger children may only be included in exceptional circumstances.

Children will not be accompanied by parents, with possible exception later on of war widows with children.

Institutions will only be considered in respect of individually suitable children.

A system of nomination should be included in the scheme, and reception body should, where possible, meet the wishes of parents who may wish to evacuate their children to homes of persons they know.

5. Selection of children. Applications from parents of children attending grant-aided schools to be made through local educational authorities. Applications from parents of children attending other schools to be made direct to the boards.

Medical tests would be made in this country under arrangements agreed with the overseas authorities, in order to ensure that the children should not be returned on medical grounds on arrival.

6. Qualified and experienced persons will be selected by the boards as escorts.

7. Arrangements should be made by the receiving bodies to supply the children on arrival with any extra clothes necessary for local conditions. The boards should make a suitable per capita grant to meet this charge.

8. Shipping arrangements to be made by the United Kingdom.

9. Parents should contribute to expenses, as in case of evacuated children in this country, or more if circumstances permit. United Kingdom will pay the cost of sea transport.

10. Scheme should also apply in a similar manner so far as overseas Governments agree to Allied refugee children.

Parents who are in a position to do so may arrange privately for evacuation of their children overseas, but must obtain permission of the Board before they are allowed to leave the country, in order that a proper cross section of child population would be evacuated.

At meeting this morning Australia and New Zealand agreed to receive respectively 5,000 and 2,500 children at once. South Africa still waiting to hear from Government.

MASSEY

660.

622-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 823

Ottawa, June 25, 1940

Following from Crerar. Begins. Reference your telegram No. 891 of the 18th June. We are proceeding on assumption that United Kingdom will carry out recommendations of inter-departmental committee as set out in your cable. Our telegram of the 17th June, No. 762, outlined our plans for placement and supervision. Let me repeat that it is not intended to pay for keep of such of these children as may be placed in selected private homes. We believe from reports received from Provinces that thousands of these homes will be available. Any announcement in British House or elsewhere that some contribution has been offered toward maintenance in homes would we fear disrupt our free private home placement plans now far advanced. Provision should be made for expenses of unforeseen character such as medical care, hospitalization. Also, as may well happen, movement may be larger than capacity of private homes to absorb and arrangements therefore may be necessary to provide maintenance for children for whom private homes are not available. For this reason suggest contributions by United Kingdom Government as per your No. 875 be paid for general welfare of children to be used for above purposes. Before whole enterprise wound up either by

repatriation to Britain or by permanent settlement in Canada further questions of financial character may arise and we desire it agreed in principle by British Government that all such questions remain open for settlement between the two countries. We are setting up Dominion-wide supervisory council to ensure welfare of children and we will spare no effort to find homes where children may be happy and can make normal progress. In view of our arrangements for placing children every care should be taken to send only types which may be satisfactorily placed. Placing authorities request completion questionnaire form sent Little by Blair in letter 10th instant and further that identification disc carry number as well as name to guarantee identification. This answers your 935¹ so far as Canadian set-up is concerned.

Further we are receiving from Canadian residents many applications for admission of children and some mothers who are able to pay their own maintenance and thus should be outside general evacuated children scheme. Same comment applies to private schools desiring to come to Canada. We are informed these cannot move because unable to transfer funds for own support here. In view of our cooperation in receiving the thousands of evacuated children as per our cable No. 725, suggest you support strongly effort to have sterling exchange released for monetary support of those who desire to come on their own. Ends.

661.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 976

London, June 27, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Child Evacuation Movement. Anticipate 3,000 will arrive approximately middle of July, and a further 750 each five days from then up to July 25th. Will send details as soon as possible.

MASSEY

662.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 995

London, June 28, 1940

Authorities here disturbed at statement reported to have been made in the House of Commons yesterday by Minister of Mines and Resources that 3,000 children will reach Canada in mid-July and additional groups at five-day intervals until July 25th. Our telegram on this matter was in secret cypher. First sailing of children has now been postponed.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

663.

622-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 839

Ottawa, June 28, 1940

Your telegram No. 995, June 28th. Following from Minister of Mines and Resources. Begins. There has been criticism here blaming Canadian Government for delay in children's arriving. Your telegram reached me just before entering House yesterday afternoon to make prepared statement giving general outline. Much regret mention numbers and sailings even though information was what public desirous of getting. Assure you will not happen again. Suggest if not inadvisable announcement of postponement be made from your side. We will make no announcement here. Ends.

664.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1013

London, June 29, 1940

Your telegram No. 823 of June 25th from Mr. Crerar. Evacuation of children. Made strong representation suggested in last sentence and have been given informal reply that no easing of exchange regulations possible. Feel that we should not accept the United Kingdom decision and would be glad to be armed with as strong argument as possible by Canadian Government with view to securing reversal of it. Difficulty of Government here seems to be largely political as they are apprehensive that relaxation of Treasury Regulations as proposed would appear to give privilege to well-to-do classes. The best chance of getting the Treasury Regulations modified along the line suggested would appear to be in my being able to convey forceful representation from the Canadian Government. As it stands the Canadian public has willingly assumed heavy responsibilities as hosts for evacuated children. It is only fair that where English parents are able and willing to lighten this burden by making funds available they should be permitted to do so. If your instructions to me can make the most of this argument it would help.

MASSEY

665.

622-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 855

Ottawa, June 29, 1940

Following from Crerar. [Begins.] Your telegram No. 976 of 27th June. Will appreciate earliest advice about approximate number Catholics and non-Catholics in movement of children in order to make satisfactory Provincial distribution. The home offers are about seventy-five percent for non-Catholics and we have agreed to place children in homes of their own faith. Have parents transferred to Crown legal guardianship migrating children for duration or has Crown acquired this under recent emergency legislation? It will be necessary to transfer some form of temporary guardianship to Crown here covering all children coming under assisted movement and continuing during their stay in Canada. Matters of hospitalization, removal from foster homes and other problems require such transfer. [Ends.]

666.

622-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 906

Ottawa, July 6, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Following from Mr. Crerar. Begins. We had a meeting yesterday with a co-ordinating committee which has been set up in the United States to deal with the admission of evacuated British children to that country. The delegation was accompanied by a liaison officer from the British Embassy in Washington. The committee reported that two thousand children are sailing within a few days destined to a Canadian port for temporary care and later distribution to States. This if correct creates serious situation for us because Canadian residents are anxiously inquiring about arrival of children for distribution Canada and impossible satisfactorily explain delay in arrival children for Canada if children arrive at Canadian port destined to United States. Can you cable when first United States movement will sail and whether at least half of group cannot be assigned to Canada to meet some of the demand here? Reported course would have disastrous effect on Canadian opinion. [Ends.]

667.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1081

London, July 9, 1940

Following for Crerar from Massey. Begins. Your telegram No. 906, July 6th. For your confidential information the Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs informs me that all sailings of British children under Government scheme [have] been postponed for the time being owing to difficulties in sparing naval escorts to accompany ships.

Here insert text of my immediately following telegram. Ends.

668.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1082

London, July 9, 1940

With regard to the report which you mention, I have seen the Chairman of the Children's Overseas Reception Board who tells me that it is not the case that 2000 children are sailing to Canada en route to the United States. His denial is confirmed by the United States Embassy.

The position is that controversy is going on with Washington as to whether these children can be admitted as visitors under United States immigration laws or whether they must qualify as immigrants. If they must go as immigrants, no more than 2000 a month could be given immigrant visas in London, whereas, if they go as visitors, Embassy could handle 6500 a month. It has been suggested, and this is doubtless origin of the report which has reached you, that the children should go first to Canada and secure immigration visas through the United States Consul there. This might involve their staying in Canada some time. Such a procedure would, of course, require the concurrence of the Canadian Government, and the United States Embassy have not approached me on this subject. Ends.

669.

622-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.332

London, July 10, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. The Cabinet today considered the Children's Overseas Reception Scheme in the light of recent developments. It will be appreciated that strategical considerations during the last few weeks have profoundly affected operation of the Scheme. When generous offers were made and accepted the military situation was quite different from that existing today. In particular, the collapse of the French army, the occupation of France by the enemy, and finally, the difficulties arising over the position of the French fleet are all factors which have necessitated review of the Scheme.

The Cabinet were faced with two inescapable conclusions:

(1) They were not prepared to allow children under the auspices of the Government Scheme and sent at Government expense to proceed overseas unescorted by naval units; and

(2) All naval vessels are needed for essential purposes of national security at the present time, for protection of this country against invasion, for security of British territories overseas and for maintenance of essential flow of trade.

In the circumstances the Cabinet felt that there was no alternative but to postpone operation of the Scheme for the present and they propose to announce this forthwith by an arranged question and answer in the House. Text of these will be telegraphed to you as soon as settled. Answer will indicate how far the Government here are prepared to go in explaining the difficulties which have made it necessary to postpone the operation of the Scheme and they hope that more than this will not be said in any Government statement or explanation given in the Dominions. For security reasons it is most undesirable to indicate publicly how the strategical situation has altered during the last few weeks.

I need not assure you how deeply the Government deplore this postponement from all points of view, and particularly the inconvenience it will cause in the Dominions. We most keenly appreciate the very generous and hospitable offers which have been made from the Dominions for reception of the children and greatly regret the inevitable disappointment which the postponement will cause, particularly as reception arrangements are so far advanced. We had made all the necessary arrangements at this end and looked forward to the Scheme not only as a contribution to our security problem here, but also as a means of forming another binding link between the members of the British Commonwealth. It is only the hard facts mentioned above which have reluctantly led the Government here to their decision. The situation will be constantly kept under review and when the strategical position improves we hope to take the Scheme up again on the lines originally proposed.

670.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1167

London, July 19, 1940

Your telegram No. 855 of June 29th. With regard to questions raised concerning transfer of legal guardianship of evacuated children to Crown, no such transfer has been made by parents to the United Kingdom Government, nor would it be possible under English Laws for a legal transfer of this character to be made either to the United Kingdom Government or to the Canadian Government. The United Kingdom Government have informed the parents that while they will take all possible care of children they will go to Canada at their parents' risk.

Following is text of relevant paragraph of consent signed by parents of evacuated children. Begins.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will do their best to arrange for the transport of the child to country named above, for securing the care, maintenance and education of the child after reaching that country, and for the child's return to this country as soon as is practicable after the war, but His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will not be responsible or liable for any injury or damage which may be suffered by the child or by any other person as direct or indirect result of child being taken from the United Kingdom, nor will any officer, servant or agent of the Government, who is engaged in carrying out the scheme, be responsible or liable for any such injury or damage unless it is due to his wilful default or misconduct.

Ends.

United Kingdom Government suggest that once children are in Canada, agreement would be made between United Kingdom and Canadian Governments, the latter assuming the care of children, as indicated in quotation above, from date of their arrival in Canada, although as you will observe no actual legal responsibility would be assumed by the Canadian Government.

Please confirm if an arrangement of this sort would be satisfactory to you.

MASSEY

671.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1188

London, July 22, 1940

With reference to my telegram No. 1180, July 20th.¹ The following report appears in this morning's *Times* from this newspaper's correspondent at Ottawa:

Mr. F. C. Blair, Canadian Director of Immigration, has issued a statement to the press asserting that several hundred persons, including some children unaccompanied by adults, were stranded in Canada because relatives who had promised to receive them in their home were not fulfilling their obligations. Well-meaning Canadians, he said, had telegraphed their relatives and friends in the United Kingdom or elsewhere asking them to come to Canada and promising to be responsible for their welfare, but now that they realized how heavy the financial responsibility for their upkeep would be, they were abandoning them to their fate.

If these unfortunate persons were all unaccompanied children, Mr. Blair added, they could be placed immediately in good homes, but it was impossible to place whole families. Some of the difficulties were caused by the inability to secure funds from abroad. The Immigration Department [*sic*] would have to take steps to safeguard the interests of persons who wanted to migrate as well as the interests of Canadians.

This statement as published cast a reflection on the good faith of the Canadian hosts and for that reason is prejudicial to the good name of Canada here. I urgently request that a statement should be issued forthwith by the Department of Immigration [*sic*] correcting the unfortunate impression which will be created by this report.

MASSEY

672.

622-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1007

Ottawa, July 23, 1940

Replying your 1180 of the 20th instant,¹ the situation correctly stated by Blair is that there are now estimated to be between 200 and 300 recently arrived persons mainly mothers with children temporarily stranded. Think estimates correct that ninety-five percent of arrivals are being taken care of by those who invited them. Those in trouble belong to three groups. First, those who moved on invitation of relatives or friends who failed to imple-

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

ment their promises. Second, those who came thinking funds could be sent from Britain for their support. Third, those whose friends in Canada expected that their own meagre resources might be supplemented by sums to be brought by the evacuees but who now find that their guests cannot obtain their money from the United Kingdom. There is no problem in placing children unaccompanied or who can be placed separate from mothers but it is usually impossible to place mothers with children. Our purpose in giving publicity to situation was to warn Canadians they must discontinue inviting those they are unable or unwilling to support. Believe solution will be found here for children of residential schools who have already arrived.

673.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1203

London, July 23, 1940

My telegram No. 1135, July 16th.¹ Steps have been taken to form voluntary non-Governmental committee here composed chiefly of Canadians for the purpose of dealing with evacuation of British children to Canada for the duration of the war. It is thought that low rate can be arranged for transport in regular liners and that funds can be raised to meet the costs of a certain number unable to pay the fare. No attempts would be made to evacuate under this plan more than 5,000 children. Shipping is apparently available for this number. The plan would have nothing to do with either the United Kingdom or Canadian Governments. It would, however, be necessary to make use of the machinery already set up in Canada in connection with the United Kingdom evacuation scheme for the reception, dispersion and placement of children. It is proposed to send children between their sixth and fifteenth birthdays. No adults would be sent but children would be escorted on the voyage as was planned under Government scheme.

The purpose of this telegram is to enquire on behalf of members of proposed committee whether the Canadian Government would approve its formation and operation along above lines, and secondly, whether it would receive cooperation of Governmental agencies and private organizations already set up in connection with United Kingdom evacuation scheme. Committee consists at present of Sir Edward Peacock, Dr. Donald Paterson, the eminent Canadian children's specialist, Sir Evelyn Wrench of the Overseas League and Mrs. Vincent Massey; others would be added. In its general scope and functions, Committee would resemble American Committee in London referred to in my previous telegram.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

674.

622-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1137

Ottawa, July 26, 1940

With reference to your telegrams 1203 and 1204¹ of 23rd July. Mr. Crerar has decided in view of need for protection of children moving under private auspices to extend to them through the Provinces the same care after arrival in Canada as will be given to assisted movement. Government here will not supply transportation but will probably supply some escort from ports arrival, will ensure proper placement and aftercare in private homes and provide hospitalization and medical care where this not paid for by foster homes. All this movement will come under general oversight of the National Committee being set up here just as in the case of the Government assisted movement. To carry out this arrangement it will be necessary to receive cable advice about numbers, identity and provincial destination of private[ly?] moved children. Minister concurs in usefulness of proposed Canadian committee and welcomes their co-operation.

675.

622-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*

975H/94

[Ottawa,] October 1, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

My dear Prime Minister,

In a telegram which I have today received from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, I am informed that the United Kingdom War Cabinet has after due consideration reached the conclusion that in present circumstances the Children's Overseas Reception scheme must be temporarily suspended.

The Cabinet greatly regret the necessity for this decision which they realise will be a serious disappointment to the Dominions, but in the existing naval situation they fear that there is no alternative. They are convinced there would be grave danger in sending children overseas in wintry conditions. If in such circumstances a ship is torpedoed the launching of boats is very difficult and the chance of survival in bitter cold is small. Experience in the case of the *City of Benares* bears this out.

As you are aware, sinkings of merchant ships have increased in recent weeks, though no public reference to this should, of course, be made. Of

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

3,000 children already sent under this scheme, over 400 have been torpedoed within a very short period.

The United Kingdom Government would like to take this opportunity of once again expressing their deep appreciation and gratitude for open hearted hospitality which has been given and offered in the Dominions to the children from the United Kingdom under the Scheme.

It is contemplated that a public announcement should be made in the United Kingdom on Thursday morning, the 3rd October. I understand that a separate telegram is being sent to me regarding the terms of the announcement and in the meantime, the United Kingdom Government would appreciate it if the decision were not given to the newspapers though it is suggested that it might be well if the press and public opinion were prepared unofficially.

I might add that it is not intended that exit permits should be refused to citizens who wish to send their children overseas under private arrangements.

In view of the fact that the public announcement is to be made on Thursday, I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to the Minister of Mines and Resources for his information.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

PARTIE 7 / PART 7

NEUTRALITÉ DANS LES EAUX DE L'HÉMISPÈRE OCCIDENTAL
NEUTRALITY OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE WATERS

676.

831-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.1

London, January 4, 1940

Following is text of telegram addressed by the Acting President of Panama to His Majesty The King in connection with *Graf von Spee* incident on December 23rd. Begins.

I have the honour to transmit to Your Majesty the following communication agreed to unanimously by the 21 American Republics as a result of mutual consultations carried out in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Panama Declaration of October 3rd last, already transmitted to Your Majesty by the late President Arosemena by his message of October 4th:

The American Governments are officially informed of naval encounters which took place on December 13th off North [East?] coast of Uruguay between certain British men-of-war and German vessel *Graf von Spee* which according to reliable reports attempted to overtake the French merchant vessel *Formose* between Brazil

and the port of Montevideo after having sunk other ships. They have also been informed of entry and sinking of German warship in waters of River Plate at expiry of term which, in accordance with rules of International Law, had been granted to it by the Government of the Republic of Uruguay. On the other hand, the sinking or detention of the German merchant vessel by British ships in American waters is a fact publicly recognized as certain, as is proved by recent case of the *Düsseldorf*, *Ussukuma* and others. All these facts which affect neutrality of American waters, imperil proposals for protection of continents which inspired Panama Declaration of October 3rd, 1939, the first paragraph of which provides:

As a measure of continental protection, the American Republics, so long as they maintain their neutrality, have the indisputable right to preserve free of all hostile action on the part of any belligerent non-American nation, those waters adjoining the American continent which they consider as of primary interest and direct usefulness for their relations whether by land, sea or air.

Consequently, in accordance with methods laid down in that Instrument, and with a view to avoiding repetition of other actions of the kind referred to above, the American nations resolved to formulate their protest to belligerent nations and to inaugurate the necessary consultations with the object of strengthening system of common protection through the adoption of suitable measures, including prevention of belligerent ships supplying themselves and repairing damage in American ports when those ships have committed warlike acts within the security zone established by the Declaration of Panama.

In transmitting this communication to Your Majesty, I beg you to accept the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration. Augusto S. Boyd, Acting President of Panama. Ends.

I shall communicate with you further in the matter as soon as possible.

677.

831-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.2

London, January 4, 1940

MOST SECRET. My two immediately following telegrams contain general views and observations of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom with regard to:

(1) Declaration of Panama of October 3rd, 1939, see my despatch of October 27th, Circular D.56,¹ and

(2) The Pan-American protest in connection with *Graf Spee* incident, see my telegram Circular D.1 of January 4th.

We should be glad to receive as soon as possible any comments which His Majesty's Government in Canada may wish to offer and to learn whether they concur in general line taken as affording a possible basis for replies.

Both communications were addressed to His Majesty, who would, of course, in replies make it clear that he is acting on Ministerial advice. It

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

would clearly seem desirable that if practicable such replies should indicate that they are based on advice not only from His Majesty's Ministers in the United Kingdom, but in His Majesty's Dominions overseas. It is proposed, therefore, after receipt of your observations and those of other Governments concerned, to communicate to you text of suggested replies in the hope that procedure indicated above will prove acceptable.

678.

831-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.3

London, January 5, 1940

MOST SECRET. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is an outline of developments regarding maritime security zone proposals contained in the Declaration of Panama of October 3, 1939, and protest regarding *Graf Spee* incident so far as we are concerned. Begins.

The Declaration was formally notified by the President of Panama on behalf of other American States to The King on October 5th, and its receipt was formally acknowledged by His Majesty on October 7th. Similar notifications were made simultaneously to the French and German Governments also and have been formally acknowledged by them.

This notification asked for no reply but we contemplated that it would be desirable to eventually send an official reply defining our attitude towards zone after consultation and agreement with His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and the French and Polish Governments.

In the meantime, however, as foreshadowed in my telegram Circular D.62,¹ His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has on instructions held a number of conversations with the United States Under-Secretary of State with a view to reaching in the first instance an Anglo-United States understanding regarding zone. The assumption underlying these conversations has been that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were willing to respect the zone subject to certain conditions but no formal undertaking to that effect has been given to the United States Government.

By the end of November last these conversations had reached a point at which it seemed possible to consult His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and Allies with suggestion that a sufficient measure of Anglo-United States agreement now existed to render possible the conclusion of a preliminary informal understanding with the United States Government regarding zone. The United States Government proposed to obtain assent also of other Pan-American States to such an understanding and it was contemplated that thereafter a formal statement would be sent to the President of Panama on

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

the lines agreed upon of conditions on which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be ready to recognize zone.

At this stage there occurred *Graf Spee* incident which has prevented temporarily at any rate further progress on above lines. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom still hope however that it may be possible for an understanding to be reached as between them, His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and French and Polish Governments on the one hand, and American Governments on the other, on the subject of the zone.

The communication by the Acting President of Panama embodying text of Pan-American protest in connection with *Graf Spee* incident was received by The King on December 24th and formally acknowledged by His Majesty on December 27th. It is contemplated that in due course a reply should be sent to this communication also as in that of Declaration of Panama after consultation with His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and the French and Polish Governments. Our view is that suggestion contained in the protest that His Majesty's Ships have been directly responsible for the sinking of German vessels in the zone is devoid of foundation even though they were fully entitled to do so in the exercise of belligerent rights. The only German vessels sunk in zone have been those which have been scuttled by themselves, though such vessels may in some cases subsequently have been finally sunk by gun fire from His Majesty's ships in order that wrecks might not become a danger to navigation. Ends.

General attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom towards zone proposals is contained in my immediately following telegram.

679.

831-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.4

London, January 5, 1940

MOST SECRET. My immediately preceding telegrams. Following is outline of attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom towards the Maritime Security Zone proposal. Begins.

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully understand the desire of the American Republics to keep the war away from the shores of the American continent. They indeed share that aspiration both because of their natural consideration for the wishes and interests of those countries and because its fulfilment would lighten the heavy burden now being borne by the Royal Navy. It was therefore not merely with interest but with sympathy that they learned of the Maritime Security Zone proposal even though the proposal itself actually infringes a number of established principles of International Law, since it contemplates abandonment or surrender by belligerents, without counterpart, of their perfectly legitimate belligerent rights while

its practical application would seem likely to present a number of very serious difficulties.

3. The Declaration of Panama expressly stated that an effort would be made to secure from belligerents observance of the provisions it contained, and this has constituted a further reason for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to give the possibility of accepting it the most careful consideration. As a result of this examination His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are in fact ready to contemplate definite if temporary surrender exercised by them of certain of their legitimate belligerent rights which acceptance and observance of the zone would involve in return for strict adherence to certain conditions and for obtaining of certain safeguarding for the main conditions of such acceptance and observance by other than belligerents and adequate assurances from the American Republics themselves concerning effective application of the zone. These and other desiderata are discussed in more detail below.

4. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would hope to come to some understanding on these points by negotiation with Powers concerned which framers of Declaration of Panama themselves seemed to contemplate. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not believe that those Powers would attempt to enforce observance of zone unilaterally since this would be contrary to principle of solving international difficulties by mutual discussion which has always been upheld by the American Republics.

5. As regards the more detailed questions, the acceptance [by] His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of proposals such as that contained in Panama Declaration could only be on an *ad hoc* basis, that is to say, that it would be for the duration of hostilities only and could not be regarded as establishing a precedent for acceptance of any similar zone that it might be desired to establish subsequently, whether in waters adjacent to the American continent or elsewhere. A further *sine qua non* of zone would be that Germany also should not only accept it but respect it. So far as His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are aware only indication given by Germany of her attitude in this matter has been activities of German vessels including the *Graf Spee* which was about to overtake and plunder a French vessel of its supplies at the time when His Majesty's ships appeared. Experience does not suggest that the German Government would be likely to attach any undue solemnity to any promise which it might give to respect the zone and any failure on the part of Germany to keep such a promise would inevitably be regarded as absolving His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom from any undertaking they also might have given not to exercise to the full their legitimate belligerent rights within the area. Moreover even in presence of a German promise the acquiescence of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would necessarily depend on their being convinced that adequate steps would be taken by Powers responsible for proposal [to ensure] that it should be effective to applicants.

6. A further condition of the acceptance by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom [is] that means should be devised to prevent German merchant vessels now sheltered in American ports from escaping from consequences of hostilities. Not only is it conceivable that such vessels might act as raiders or as supply ships to German men-of-war engaged on depredations on merchant vessels conveying exports and imports to and from all American countries to Europe or elsewhere, but it would be possible for them by trading between American ports within zone to earn foreign exchange for Germany in a way which would help to prolong the war and to which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be bound to take exception. It is also felt that a further result, if German merchant vessels now sheltered in American ports were able to escape consequences of hostilities, might be that they would earn much foreign exchange which German Government could employ in Latin America for sabotage and other subversive purposes.

7. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom could only regret any decision that supply and repair facilities should be denied by American Republics to any vessel deemed guilty of committing warlike acts within zone, particularly if it were also decided to enforce such a sanction unilaterally. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom emphatically repudiate the suggestion that in the exercise of their belligerent rights, which are fully recognized in International Law, they have committed or will be committed to any illegality which would justify an attempt by any Power or Powers to impose upon them any sanctions or other form of compulsory action which have no bases in any rule, convention or custom of International Law, and would cause them serious prejudice in their conduct of the war according to their unquestioned rights as belligerent. If American States proceed to impose these sanctions they will be hindering our efforts and in effect exercising benevolent neutrality in Germany's favour.

8. From political point of view a most serious situation would arise if American Republics began to take sanctions against British ships for exercising such rights and such action on the part of those Republics would inevitably destroy all chance of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom being able to accept zone as they are anxious to do if they can.

9. Finally in the present war in which they are fighting in defense of conceptions of law and of a way of life which they believe are dear also to the peoples and Governments of America, the peoples and the Governments combined are fighting also for their very existence. The difficulties of their acquiescence in any proposals which would clearly place them at a disadvantage in fighting Nazism are enormous without the safeguards mentioned above. The zone proposal presents such difficulties, as would also any attempt to enforce it by *ex post facto* sanctions. It is not fair of the American States to expose His Majesty's Government to such difficulties since success of the Royal Navy is in reality the most effective method of keeping war away from their shores. As a result of recent naval action in the South Atlantic that maritime area is now clear and may perhaps so continue. This

should be a source of satisfaction to all the American Republics whose trade was hampered by the activities of the raider and whose ports were used for his convenience, ships and information centres. In point of fact His Majesty's Government have rescued all of this vast area from war disturbance. Much of the world duty is today borne by His Majesty's ships and if the burden of civil authority proves too heavy American Republics would soon have many more serious causes for anxiety than the sound of one distant seaward cannonade. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are in fact fighting the battle of the American Republics and it is surely in the interest of the latter to make the task of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as easy as possible. Ends.

680.

831-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.12

London, January 8, 1940

IMPORTANT. MOST SECRET. My telegrams Circular D.2, D.3, and D.4 of January 5th. Views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom with regard to Panama Declaration and Pan-American protest in connection with *Graf Spee* incident have been revised after consultation with His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Buenos Aires. My immediately following telegram contains provisional draft of revised text on which it is proposed that reply to Pan-American protest should be based. The question of procedure as to reply is being examined here and a further telegram as to this will be sent as soon as possible. It is hoped to present the reply to the Pan-American Governments before the meeting of the Neutrality Commission at Rio on January 15, and we should therefore be glad to receive at a very early date any observations of your Government as to the substance of the reply.

681.

831-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.13

London, January 9, 1940

IMPORTANT. MOST SECRET. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is provisional draft of the revised views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regarding Pan-American protest. Begins.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have devoted most careful consideration to communication agreed upon unanimously by twenty-one American Republics, the text of which was telegraphed to His Majesty

The King by the Acting President of Panama on December 23rd last. In that communication reference was made, amongst other matters, to the recent naval action between British and German warships in the South Atlantic and to the maritime security zone described in the Declaration of Panama of October 3rd, 1939.

His Majesty's Government, who themselves so long strove to prevent war, fully appreciate the desire of the American Republics to keep war away from the shores of the American continent. It was therefore not merely with interest but with understanding that His Majesty's Government learned of the maritime security zone proposal. His Majesty's Government were especially pleased to note from the Declaration of Panama itself that attempt would be made to base the observance of its provisions upon the consent of the belligerents. This fresh expression of adherence to the idea that solving international difficulties by mutual discussion, which has always been upheld by the American Republics, confirmed by His Majesty's Governments the belief that these powers would not attempt to enforce the observance of zone by unilateral action and encourage their hope that it would be possible to give effect by means of negotiation to intentions which inspired it.

It was in this spirit that His Majesty's Government were examining the proposal of the conference of Panama at the time when communication of December 23rd was received. In view of this communication, His Majesty's Government desire to draw the attention of American Republics to following observations:

It will be apparent, in the first place, that proposal, involving as it does the abandonment by belligerents of certain legitimate belligerent rights, is not one which on any basis of International Law can be imposed upon them by unilateral action, and that its adoption requires their specific assent.

The acceptance of the proposal by His Majesty's Government must obviously be dependent on their being satisfied that its adoption would not provide German warships and supply ships with a vast sanctuary from which they could emerge to attack Allied and Neutral shipping and to which they could return to avoid being brought to action. It would also be necessary to ensure that German warships and supply ships would not be enabled to pass with impunity from one ocean to another, or German merchant ships to take part in inter-American trade and earn foreign exchange with which to promote subversion and sabotage in American States and to procure supplies for prolongation of the war, thus depriving the Allies of the fruits of their superiority at sea.

Unless these points are adequately safeguarded the zone proposals might only lead to friction between, on one hand the Allies pursuing their legitimate belligerent activities, and on the other the Pan-American Republics, endeavouring to make this new policy prevail.

The risk of such friction, which His Majesty's Government would be the first to deplore, would be increased if sanctions were to be employed against warships which committed belligerent acts within the zone. His Majesty's

Government must emphatically repudiate any suggestion that His Majesty's ships have acted, or would act, in any way that would justify adoption by neutrals of punitive measures which do not spring from accepted canons, neutral rights and obligations. If, therefore, the American States were to adopt a scheme of sanctions for enforcement of the zone proposal, they would, in effect, be offering a sanctuary to German warships within which His Majesty's ships would be confronted with invidious choice of having either to refrain from engaging their enemy or lay themselves open to penalties in American ports and waters.

Nor can His Majesty's Government overlook the possibility that other powers might attempt to apply the principle of zone at some later stage to Africa, Europe or the Far East, with consequences, the full implication of which cannot be foreseen.

Up to the present it does not appear that means have been found by which the disadvantage of the zone could be eliminated. That this is the case was shown by the operations in the zone of the warship *Admiral Graf Spee* and the supply ship *Tacoma*. With regard to the specific incidents of which mention is made in the communication under reply, His Majesty's Government must observe that the legitimate activities of His Majesty's ships can in no way imperil, but must rather contribute to, the security of the American continent, the protection of which was the object of the framers of the Declaration of Panama. His Majesty's Government cannot admit that there is any foundation for a claim that such activities have in any way exposed them to justifiable reproach, seeing that the zone proposal has not been made effective and belligerent assent has not yet been given to its operations.

In view of the difficulties described above, it appears to His Majesty's Government that the only effective method of preventing Germany from using the zone as a base of supplies, as well as of operations, would be to ensure that the German Government would send no more warships into the zone and would lay up, under Pan-American control for the duration of the war, their merchant vessels now in American harbours. This would involve that the Allies would forego the opportunity of capturing any of these vessels.

In the view of His Majesty's Government it would only be by means such as those indicated that the wish of the Pan-American Governments to keep war away from their coasts could be realized in a truly effective and equitable manner. Until His Majesty's Government are able to feel assured that the scheme will operate in the manner suggested they must, anxious as they are for the fulfilment of American hopes, necessarily reserve their full belligerent rights in order to fight the menace presented by German action and policy and to defend that conception of law and that way of life which they believe to be as dear to the peoples and the Governments of America as they are to the peoples and the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Ends.

682.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

URGENT

[Ottawa,] January 12, 1940

THE PAN-AMERICAN 300 MILE ZONE

It is desired to send today an answer to the United Kingdom request for comments on the proposed reply to the Acting President of Panama. Mr. Beaudry, Mr. Read, Mr. Robertson and myself have been discussing the question this morning.

So far as the substance of the United Kingdom reply is concerned, it does not appear to be open to serious objection.

It is true that it is quite natural that the twenty-one American Republics should desire to keep the war from their shores and to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as faced the Government of Uruguay last month. To set up such a neutral zone is something new to international law and can be supported by the twenty-one Republics not as a question of right but a question of interest, as they interpret their interest. There have been, however, a good many new precedents set recently in the field of international law, and this project might be said to be a natural complement to the action of the United States in abandoning the right that it always claimed as a neutral country to trade freely with enemy countries. In other words, the United States is abandoning a great many of its neutral rights on the other side of the ocean and in combat areas and at the same time it and the Latin American states are endeavouring to increase neutral rights in territory adjoining themselves. It is not likely that their claim will be accepted by the belligerents at present, but it is conceivable that the declaration of Panama may become the starting point of a revision of international law and practice in the future.

On the other hand, the Pan-American proposal is rather vague in formulation and difficult in administration. It is quite properly contended by the United Kingdom that it would be unfair to establish such a rule unless it was followed by both countries, and it may be reasonably argued further that there is no guarantee that it would be observed by Germany unless the Pan-American states enforced the rule by policing the 300 mile zone and not merely by the negative action of refusing to admit to their ports belligerent vessels which had violated it. They may also argue with somewhat less force that the adoption of the project, even if enforced, would permit German merchant vessels to carry on between ports in the zone and make money for their country, thus depriving the allies of the benefits of their superiority at sea. So far as Canada specifically is concerned, it might be considered that the zone as drawn would hamper defensive action off the coast of Nova

Scotia. (See pages 616, 617 and 618 of bulletin "Pan American Union, November, 1939", attached).¹

The revised draft (D.13) seems on the whole an improvement over the first draft. The only point that may be open to question is in the second-last paragraph where it is suggested the Pan-American states should take steps to prevent German warships or merchant vessels operating in the zone while allowing British vessels to operate; the latter would abstain from belligerent action, simply because there would be no German vessels to fight or capture.

If it is considered that no objection of substance can be made to the United Kingdom reply, the next question is whether it should be sent by the United Kingdom Government alone or by the United Kingdom and the Dominion Governments concerned.

In favour of the United Kingdom making its own reply, it may be said that this conforms to the realities of the naval situation, since it is the United Kingdom alone that is supplying the naval power in question, aside from Canadian operations in the northern part of the zone; that the United Kingdom carried on the preliminary discussions on the subject without special consultation with the Dominions, and that it was only the accident of the telegram being, contrary to established practice, addressed to the King rather than to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that raised the possibility of a joint reply being sought. Incidentally, the State Department in giving out the statement on Dec. 23, said it was being "transmitted to the *Governments* of France, Great Britain and Germany". It may also be pointed out that while the appeal from the Sovereigns of Belgium and The Netherlands in favour of peace negotiations was accepted in the name of all the King's Governments, there is apparently no suggestion that the recent appeal of the King of Norway to the King of England, regarding the preservation of the neutrality not of the 300 mile zone but of the 4 mile belt, should be accepted by the Canadian or New Zealand Governments, which have had nothing to do with the originating of the proposal.

In favour of the telegram being sent in the names of all the Dominions, it may be said that it is a matter of general interest, that Canada has a special interest in the northern area and that criticism would arise if some of the other Dominions participated in the reply and Canada did not.

If you could indicate your wishes in this matter a short telegram could go this afternoon.*

O. D. S[KELTON]

¹ Non reproduit.

* Note telle que dans l'original:

¹ Not printed.

* Note as in original:

Discussed on phone. I agree with Br. reply. Wd. think it should go direct from U.K.—It was to the King as King of Grt. Br. etc. that it was sent—If intended for Canada we should have had a copy [of] it before *any* reply published. 12-1-40 [W. L. Mackenzie King].

683.

831-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.19

London, January 12, 1940

MOST SECRET. My Circular D.12 and 13 of January 8th. Proposed reply to Pan-American Governments has been further revised and text is contained in my immediately following telegram.

On further reflection it is felt here that it would not be altogether appropriate that detailed reply should be sent from His Majesty in view of the fact that the question may give rise to controversy. It is therefore now proposed that the reply should be in Governmental form and, if His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions concur, that all five Governments should be associated in the message. In that event, it is proposed they should be mentioned by name at the beginning of the message and that subsequent references to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom should be amended to read His Majesty's Governments.

It is hoped to send reply to the Government of Panama as soon as possible and in any case before opening of Rio Conference on January 15th. Should therefore be most grateful if His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions would indicate urgently whether they concur in procedure suggested above. It would facilitate consultation if the reply to this telegram could be repeated to the other Dominion Governments.

684.

831-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.20

London, January 12, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is text. Begins.

1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have devoted most careful consideration to communication agreed upon unanimously by 21 American Republics the text of which was telegraphed to His Majesty the King by the Acting President of Panama on December 23rd last. In that communication reference was made amongst other matters, to the recent naval action between British and German warships in the South Atlantic and to the maritime security zone described in the Declaration of Panama of October 23rd, 1939.

2. His Majesty's Government, who themselves so long strove to prevent war, fully appreciate the desire of the American Republics to keep war away from the shores of the American continent. It was therefore not merely with interest but with understanding that His Majesty's Government learned of the maritime security zone proposal. His Majesty's Government noted with satisfaction from the Declaration of Panama itself that attempt would be made to base the observance of its provisions upon the consent of the belligerents. This fresh expression of adherence to the idea of solving international difficulties by mutual discussion, which has always been upheld by the American Republics, confirmed His Majesty's Government's belief that these powers would not attempt to enforce the observance of the zone by unilateral action and encouraged their hope that it would be possible to give effect by means of negotiation to intentions which inspired it.

3. It was in this spirit that His Majesty's Government were examining the proposal of the Conference of Panama at the time when the communication of December 23rd was received. In view of this communication, His Majesty's Government desire to draw the attention of the American Republics to the following considerations:

4. It will be apparent, in the first place, that the proposal, involving as it does the abandonment by belligerents of certain legitimate belligerent rights, is not one which on any basis of International Law can be imposed upon them by unilateral action, and that its adoption requires their specific assent.

5. The acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the suggestion that belligerents should forego their rights in the zone must clearly be dependent upon their being satisfied that the adoption of the zone proposal would not provide German warships and supply ships with a vast sanctuary from which they could emerge to attack Allied and Neutral shipping and to which they could return to avoid being brought to action. It would also be necessary to ensure that German warships and supply ships would not be enabled to pass with impunity from one ocean to another through the zone, or German merchant ships to take part in inter-American trade and earn foreign exchange which might be used in attempts to promote subversion and sabotage abroad and to procure supplies for the prolongation of the war, thus depriving the Allies of the fruits of their superiority at sea.

6. Moreover the acceptance of the zone proposals would have to be on the basis that it should not constitute a precedent for a far reaching alteration in the existing laws of maritime neutrality. His Majesty's Government cannot overlook the possibility that otherwise an attempt might be made to apply the principle of zone at some later stage to Africa, Europe or the Far East, with consequences, the full implications of which cannot be foreseen.

7. Unless these points are adequately safeguarded the zone proposals might only lead to accumulation of belligerent ships in the zone. This in turn might well bring the risk of war nearer to the American States and lead to friction between, on one hand the Allies pursuing their legitimate belligerent

activities, and on the other hand the Pan-American Republics endeavouring to make this new policy prevail.

8. The risk of such friction, which His Majesty's Government would be first to deplore, would be increased by the application of sanctions. His Majesty's Government must emphatically repudiate any suggestion that His Majesty's ships have acted, or would act, in any way that would justify the adoption by neutrals of punitive measures which do not spring from accepted canons, neutral rights and obligations. If, therefore, the American states were to adopt a scheme of sanctions for the enforcement of the zone proposal, they would, in effect, be offering a sanctuary to German warships within which His Majesty's ships would be confronted with the invidious choice of having either to refrain from engaging their enemy or laying themselves open to penalties in American ports and waters.

9. Up to the present it does not appear that means have been allowed by which the disadvantages of the zone proposal could be eliminated. That this is the case was shown by operations in the zone of the warship *Admiral Graf Spee* and the supply ship *Tacoma*. With regard to the specific incidents of which mention is made in the communication under reply, His Majesty's Government must observe that the legitimate activities of His Majesty's ships can in no way imperil, but must rather contribute to the security of the American continent, the protection of which was the object of the framers of the Declaration of Panama. His Majesty's Government cannot admit that there is any foundation for a claim that such activities have in any way exposed them to justifiable reproach, seeing that the zone proposal has not been made effective and belligerent assent has not yet been given to its operation.

10. In view of the difficulties described above, it appears to His Majesty's Government that the only effective method of achieving the American object of preventing belligerent acts within the zone would be first to ensure that the German Government would send no warships into it. Secondly there are obvious difficulties in applying the zone proposal at this stage of the war when so much German shipping has already taken refuge in American waters. If the Allies are to be asked to forego the opportunity of capturing these vessels it would also seem to be necessary that they should be laid up under Pan-American control for the duration of the war.

11. In the view of His Majesty's Government, it would only be by means such as those indicated, that the wish of the Pan-American Governments to keep war away from their coasts could be realized in a truly effective and equitable manner. Until His Majesty's Government are able to feel assured that the scheme will operate satisfactorily, they must, anxious as they are for fulfilment of the American hope, necessarily reserve their full belligerent rights in order to fight the menace presented by German action and policy and to defend that conception of law and that way of life which they believe to be as dear to the peoples and Governments of America as they are to the peoples and Governments of [the] British Commonwealth of Nations. Ends.

685.

831-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 6

Ottawa, January 12, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your telegram Circular D.13, Pan American Zone.

1. The Canadian Government have no specific comment to make on the revised reply to the Acting President of Panama and see no objection to it being transmitted. The desire of the American Republics to establish a widened neutral zone to keep belligerent action from their shores at the same time that some of these States and notably the United States are abandoning many of the traditional neutral rights and practices in combat areas, can readily be understood. In view, however, of the vagueness of the proposals, the complications that might result from adoption of similar zones in other continents, the difficulty of securing impartial observance and enforcement and the restrictive effect which the scheme might have upon the exercise of the predominant Allied power at sea, unilateral acceptance by the United Kingdom of the Panama proposal would appear out of the question.

2. We note that in Circular D.2 of January 4 the suggestion was made that in view of the fact that the Panama communication was addressed to His Majesty, the reply should indicate that it is based on advice not only from His Majesty's Ministers in the United Kingdom but on advice from His Majesty's Ministers overseas. In Circular D.12 it was indicated that a further telegram on the question of procedure would be sent later, but this has not yet been received. As the preliminary discussions on this question were carried on entirely by the Government of the United Kingdom and as the communication from the Acting President of Panama was clearly meant for its consideration, we doubt if it would be appropriate for the Canadian Government to intervene at the present stage. In issuing the statement in Washington on December 23rd the United States State Department declared that it was being "transmitted to the Governments of Great Britain, France and Germany". It does not appear that the question of participation by various of His Majesty's Governments in any negotiations should depend on the accident of the form of address. While recognizing therefore the interest which Canada has in this important issue, we consider it would be sufficient if the reply were made by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. If others of His Majesty's Governments have indicated a desire to be included, however, we shall be glad to consider the matter further.

686.

831-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 7

Ottawa, January 12, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your telegram D.19 of January 12th, Question of procedure was dealt with in my telegram No. 6 of this date. The suggestion in telegram D.19 that the reply should be in governmental form associating all five of His Majesty's Governments does not affect the view expressed in our telegram No. 6 that the reply would more appropriately be made by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. In accordance with your suggestion we are telegraphing immediately to the other governments concerned, indicating (1) that we saw no objection to the draft reply being sent, (2) that in our opinion it would be more appropriate that it should come from the Government of the United Kingdom, but (3) that we were prepared to consider the matter further if there was a general desire to have all five governments associated in the message.

687.

831-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.21

London, January 13, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My telegram Circular D.19. Reply to Pan-American Governments. Deference to views expressed by the Canadian Government and having regard to the fact that it is now proposed that reply should be sent in Governmental form and not in the name of His Majesty, we consider best course would be that reply should be sent in [name of ?] His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom alone. We are therefore proceeding accordingly.

CHAPITRE IV/CHAPTER IV
PLAN D'ENTRAÎNEMENT AÉRIEN DU
COMMONWEALTH BRITANNIQUE
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN

PARTIE 1/PART 1
NÉGOCIATION DU PLAN
NEGOTIATION OF THE PLAN

688.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

London, September 26, 1939

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

I am sure that you will agree that the scheme outlined in the following message is of first importance. For this reason, and because it invites cooperation with Canada to a very special degree, I want to make a special personal appeal to you about it. I feel that so far reaching a project will strike your imagination particularly as it concerns an all important field of war activity in which Canada has already made so striking and gallant an individual contribution. May I therefore ask that the matter should receive very urgent attention?

1. During the last few days the War Cabinet have been considering the whole problem of future requirements in air strength and the nature of the effort likely to be required. The conclusion reached is that the problem is one of vital importance especially in the light of the success obtained by the German air force in helping to achieve the rapid subjugation of Poland. It is now abundantly clear that an overwhelming air force will be needed in order to counter German air strength and, in combination with other military measures and economic pressure, to bring ultimate victory.

2. With this in view the War Cabinet have sanctioned immediate measures here directed to further expansion of aircraft production and training. Objective is to build up gradually and maintain in continuous operation a greatly enlarged air force. In view of the unfortunate fact that wastage

rate of air force when engaged in continuous heavy operations is exceedingly high it is expected that there would be required not less than 20,000 pilots and 30,000 personnel of air crews annually for maintenance of this enlarged force. To provide for these, it is estimated that about 90 elementary and advanced flying training schools with some subsidiary air crew and ground schools would be necessary.

3. In this respect we find ourselves under a grave disability in that the training organization now required is more than twice the entire training capacity available in the United Kingdom, having regard to limited space, operational restrictions and vulnerability to air attack.

4. It seems to us that this is a problem in the solution of which the overseas parts of the Empire may well be able to play a decisive part. If about one half of this vast training organization, say fifty flying training schools (of which twenty-five would be for advanced training) with some subsidiary schools could be built up elsewhere than the United Kingdom, it would be, in our judgment, of inestimable value to the common cause. We have therefore been thinking over lines on which such an effort might be realized and venture to put forward for the consideration of your Government a scheme of which the following is an outline.

5. Schools for elementary training would be established in each Dominion according to its capacity. Whilst all Dominions enjoy equal immunity from the risk of enemy interference, Canada has special advantages of nearness to the United Kingdom, greater potentialities for manufacture of service type of aircraft and proximity to the vast resources of the United States of America. For this reason the conception of the scheme involves general agreement on the part of all Governments concerned that advanced training for trainees from elementary training schools should be centred in Canada. There would be a continuous flow of trained personnel from elementary training schools in Canada to theatres of operations. It would also be our intention that a number of those who have completed elementary training in the United Kingdom should receive their advanced training in Canada.

6. We appreciate that any such scheme of nationalized training must depend on adequate provisions for training types and advanced service types of aircraft. It is our hope that existing resources of the Dominions for production of trainers and their engines will be fully utilized and expanded to meet the requirements of elementary schools as determined by the extent to which each Dominion may decide to participate in the general scheme of training. It would not be the intention to retard or interfere in any way with projects already embarked on for Dominion production of service types. We are working out numbers and types of aircraft, both training and advanced, that we think would be required and we should be in a position to let you have particulars at an early date.

7. We should wish to do everything in our power as for example by the loan of personnel, to help in the building up of the organization outlined above.

8. It is of course contemplated that the first call on Dominion personnel who had received their training in schools under scheme would be for such air force units of Dominions as the participating Dominion Governments might be prepared to provide and maintain.

9. If a scheme on the above lines is acceptable in principle to your Government we suggest as a first step joint discussions between experts. We think that these discussions might most conveniently take place in Canada. We ourselves are ready at very short notice to send to Canada a mission of high standing specially qualified for this particular purpose and we hope that it might be possible for it to discuss questions of fact with similar missions from other Governments concerned.

10. We hope that you will agree as to the immense influence which the development and realization of such a great project as that outlined in this telegram may have upon the whole course of the war; it might even prove decisive. We trust therefore that this co-operative method of approach to the problem will appeal to your Government. The knowledge that a vast air potential was being built up in the Dominions where no German air activity could interfere with expansion, might well have a psychological effect on the Germans equal to that produced by the intervention of the United States in the last war with its vast resources.

11. It would be most helpful if you could let me know at the earliest possible moment whether your Government approved the suggested scheme in principle and whether they are agreeable to joint discussions in Canada in order that immediate arrangements may be made to that end.

12. I have conveyed the substance of the above scheme to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand also. Ends.

Part 2.¹ I have been requested by technical authorities here to bring to your attention certain questions of detail upon which it is thought the Canadian Government might be good enough to provide information pending their decision on the larger issues involved. It is felt that if information could be secured at once on these questions and the other similar ones which may later be submitted, much valuable time would be saved if the Canadian Government accepts the programme suggested.

The points which I have been asked to bring to your attention, and on some of which information may be already available, are:

(1) How many civil aerodromes in Canada already exist suitable for service training, bearing in mind civil traffic requirements? Could any aerodromes not now suitable be made so by improvements and extensions and, if so, at what cost?

¹ La deuxième partie de ce télégramme fut expédiée par le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.

¹ Part 2 of this telegram was sent by the High Commissioner in Great Britain.

(2) Could a survey be made of existing service training and operational aerodromes to see whether these could take further training units in their present state? If not, what improvements or extensions are necessary and at what cost?

(3) Could provisional sites already earmarked in Canada as aerodromes for future use be investigated, and where possible, could preliminary steps be taken for the acquisition of land and laying it out before winter arrives?

(4) If the above steps do not produce an adequate number of aerodromes for the 25 advanced schools suggested and such of the elementary schools as Canada is likely to require, could further survey be made for the purpose of selecting new sites?

(5) Could an industrial survey be made of material available for quick hangars and technical accommodation and housing for personnel after a decision has been reached as to the form construction should take, with due regard to need for economy and speed? It is suggested that there should be a standard station layout in order that building work, supervision and purchasing should be centralized and standardized as far as possible.

(6) Could a survey be made of personnel to see to what extent instructors outside the Royal Canadian Air Force were available? Is there a roster of such instructors with a view of their undertaking instruction work when required?

(7) Could a survey of available ground personnel be made? Are there ground engineers who could be diverted from civil aviation, always having regard to present and future calls of aircraft construction on skilled personnel?

(8) Could a census be made of aircraft mechanics who served in the last war and who are at present otherwise employed with a view as to earmarking those likely to be useful as mechanics after a refresher training?

689.

Privy Council Records, PAC

*Procès-verbal du conseil d'urgence (comité sur la politique générale)
du Cabinet*

*Minutes of Emergency Council (Committee on General Policy)
of Cabinet*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, September 28, 1939

A meeting of this special Cabinet Sub-Committee, with certain additional Ministers named by the Prime Minister, was held in the Prime Minister's Office in the East Block, at 10.30 a.m., today. There were present the

following Members of the Cabinet: The Prime Minister, Senator Dandurand, Mr. Lapointe, Mr. Crerar, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Power, Mr. Ralston.

There were also present the following heads of Services: Chief of the General Staff (Military Branches) Major General T.V. Anderson; Chief of the Naval Staff (Naval Branch) Rear-Admiral P. W. Nelles; Senior Air Officer (Air Force Branch) Air Vice-Marshal G. M. Croil. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister were also present.

1. The Prime Minister read to the meeting the long Secret telegram of September the 26th, which he had received from the Prime Minister of Great Britain, outlining a proposal for a greatly increased air training scheme, in which Canada, as well as the other Dominions, would play a large part. The scheme envisaged the training of not less than 20,000 pilots and 30,000 personnel of air crews, annually, to provide for which it was estimated that about ninety elementary and advanced training schools, with some subsidiary air crew and ground schools would be necessary. It was contemplated that about one-half of this training organization should be built up outside of the United Kingdom, particularly in Canada. It was asked by the Prime Minister of Great Britain whether the Canadian Government would approve the scheme in principle and be agreeable to joint discussions in Canada with a view to making immediate arrangements for its being put into operation.

2. The Prime Minister stated that he had called the Chiefs of Staff before the Sub-Committee in order to discuss the scheme with them, in general terms, and to hear their comments upon it from the technical point of view.

Mr. King said that the attitude which the Canadian Government would adopt in relation to an air training scheme, of the magnitude of that proposed, would have an important bearing upon the decision to be taken with respect to Canadian Expeditionary Forces. Any announcement to be made to the public, in the latter respect, would require to be considered in the light of the decision reached upon the scheme under discussion.

3. Mr. Ralston agreed that the greatly increased emphasis upon the air arm, evident from Mr. Chamberlain's cable, and the part that Canada might be called upon to play in that sphere, might result in considerable modifications of the Canadian war programme in other respects.

4. Mr. Crerar felt that the Canadian reply should be affirmative and that our co-operation might be made most effective in the matter of air forces for which we have the natural facilities.

5. Mr. Power enquired of the Senior Air Officer whether the present Canadian training programme could be accelerated if we were able to obtain additional training personnel from the United Kingdom.

6. Air Vice-Marshal Croil, in replying to Mr. Power's question, stated that the Canadian programme of training could be enlarged and accelerated if additional training personnel were obtained, provided that we could obtain

the additional aircraft which would be required. Canadian manufactured planes were only of the elementary type; planes for advanced training would have to be imported from the United Kingdom or the United States. Another element was the necessity of training adequate ground crews.

Air Vice-Marshal Croil described the present position with respect to Canada's own programme, based on the provision of 450 pilots annually. He said that two training schools were now approximately two-thirds completed. The R.C.A.F. now had as many recruits for pilots and airmen as could be handled by existing facilities. The expansion of the programme depended primarily upon two factors:

(a) the availability of additional training personnel, and

(b) the availability of additional planes, particularly for advanced training. He stated that so far as aerodromes were concerned, he felt that it would be necessary to take over those operated by the Trans-Canada Air Lines, and mentioned the possibility of developing the partially finished landing fields which were in existence.

7. The Chief of the General Staff said that, in his opinion, the Canadian public would not be satisfied by Canadian participation if it were confined to air activity, even on a greatly enlarged scale. The public, he felt, thought in terms of ground troops and it was important that the military programme should not be interrupted.

8. Senator Dandurand felt that in this respect public opinion might be guided by being informed that what the United Kingdom wished us to provide, namely assistance in the air, would constitute our best contribution. Mr. Lapointe agreed that if the undertaking of the air training scheme were the most effective contribution which Canada could make, the public should be so informed, just as soon as possible.

The Prime Minister agreed that the effect of the announcement of any such large scheme as that contemplated would be very great, both in the United Kingdom and in Canada, and that the announcement should be made as soon as agreement in principle had been reached.

9. The Prime Minister then read a telegram dated September the 26th from the Canadian High Commissioner in Great Britain,¹ setting out specific enquiries concerning facilities in Canada in relation to the development of the proposed scheme.

Air Vice-Marshal Croil undertook to confer with the experts in his department, and the War Supply Board, and prepare, as soon as possible, the reply to the specific enquiries contained in Mr. Massey's telegram.

10. The Prime Minister said that he felt that he could express the opinion that the scheme outlined in Mr. Chamberlain's telegram should be accepted in principle, on three conditions:

¹Voir la deuxième partie du document 688 et la note.

¹See Part 2 of Document 688 and footnote.

- (a) That the United Kingdom could provide us with the necessary additional planes;
- (b) That the United Kingdom could provide us with the necessary additional training personnel, and
- (c) That satisfactory arrangements could be made with respect to financing the cost of the scheme.

11. It was agreed that the reply to the United Kingdom proposals should give as much information as possible as to the present Canadian position, welcome the suggestion that experts proceed to Canada at once for the purpose of consultation and outline the three conditions of acceptance, as stated by the Prime Minister.

12. With respect to the provision of additional aircraft for the training scheme, it was suggested that a whole factory and personnel might be brought over from the United Kingdom.

At the Prime Minister's request, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the War Supply Board, Mr. W. R. Campbell and Mr. R. C. Vaughan, were invited to join the meeting.

13. The Prime Minister explained to Messrs. Campbell and Vaughan, the scheme proposed in Mr. Chamberlain's telegram, and invited their comments, particularly with regard to the possibility of increasing Canadian production to meet increased requirements for aircraft and equipment.

Mr. Vaughan said that the principal difficulty was that of production of aircraft engines; that it would take from one to two years for a plant to be put into operation in Canada to manufacture modern engines. The suggestion of bringing out a whole plant and personnel from the United Kingdom was feasible.

14. Mr. Campbell agreed that the transfer of an entire plant and personnel was feasible and thought that production of engines from such a plant might begin after a lapse of, perhaps, nine months. Otherwise it would take from 1½ to 2 years for a Canadian plant to be constructed and reach production.

A rough estimate of the number of planes required for Canadian participation in the scheme, was thought to be some 4,400 annually, with additional aerodromes and hangars, and equipment.

15. The Prime Minister directed that the reply to be prepared to Mr. Chamberlain's telegram should mention specifically the matter of engines. He directed Dr. Skelton and Mr. Heeney to draft a reply along the lines set out in paragraph 10, above, after consulting with the War Supply Board and the Senior Air Officer.

At 1 p.m. the meeting adjourned.

A. D. P. H[EEENEY]

690.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, September 28, 1939

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Unnumbered message of September 26th. Most secret and personal. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. I have received and discussed with colleagues the situation outlined in your telegram under reference.

2. We have noted the conclusion of the War Cabinet that a greatly enlarged air force, in combination with other military measures and economic pressure, has become of vital importance. We have therefore given immediate consideration to the scheme outlined in your telegram and in particular to the part Canada could play in recruiting and training pilots and other personnel on the co-operative plan proposed.

3. I can say at once that our Government fully agree that Canadian cooperation in this field would be particularly appropriate and probably the most effective in the military sphere which Canada could furnish. We would therefore be prepared to accept the scheme in principle.

4. There are necessarily certain important points which would have to be considered in determining what on our part may be possible.

5. The first requirement to ensure maximum effectiveness is the provision of sufficient planes to permit training the large numbers contemplated. Canadian aircraft production is only just beginning to expand and cannot hope to provide the aircraft necessary for home defence and the initial supply of intermediate and advanced training aircraft in time for the scheme to develop quickly. Therefore these initial aircraft for this scheme must come from Britain or the United States. Canadian production could probably look after subsequent replacement aircraft. Canada can provide a surplus of elementary trainers which would be available for other Dominions. Engines are not available in Canada at present and must be supplied from Britain or the United States. Canadian manufacture of engines, if started now, could hardly produce useful results in less than eighteen or twenty months. It would be desirable to consider whether it would be possible to expand Canadian production by the transfer of some United Kingdom plant to Canada.

As regards the United States, it is unlikely to provide either airframes or engines in large quantities for quick delivery, except by diversion to Canada of aircraft now ordered by Britain. In the event of the repeal of the arms embargo, United States plants will still be engaged far ahead with domestic and foreign orders, including orders from neutral countries. Some recent quotations indicate eighteen months as the minimum time for delivery of new orders, though we believe this could be speeded up.

The views of the United Kingdom Government on all the above points would be very helpful.

6. As to instructors available here, full details will be sent very shortly. It is however plain that the number at present available is far below what would be necessary for rapid and effective execution of the project, and that the loan of personnel from the United Kingdom at the outset would be essential in ensuring the training of maximum numbers in minimum time. Particulars on this point would therefore be of great assistance. The facts as to existing and potential aerodromes and training stations are being collected and will be furnished shortly.

7. A third point of importance is the financial aspect. In order to decide the possible extent of our participation in the proposed air-training plan, and in the light thereof to review the plans already made for military and economic co-operation, it will be necessary to be informed in general terms what your government has in mind as to the distribution of costs of the air-training scheme among the several co-operating governments. I should perhaps mention that the question of financing British purchases in this market, to which reference was made in our telegram No. 82 of September 21st,¹ is still unsettled, though we hope that Treasury representatives will be able to discuss it with us in the course of the next few days.

8. We are entirely in agreement as to the desirability of joint discussions in Canada between experts at the earliest possible date and would be pleased to receive the mission from the United Kingdom suggested in your telegram, and also similar missions from other members of the Commonwealth. Ends.

691.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] September 29, 1939

AIR TRAINING SCHEME

The Canadian Government have indicated acceptance of the United Kingdom scheme in principle. We have pointed out the difficulty in obtaining at an early date an adequate number of training craft and instructors, and have stated that in order to decide the possible extent of our participation in the proposed air training plan, we should like information as to distribution of costs of the air training scheme.

The question arises how far we can inform the British Government of our definite acceptance even in principle or have any statement made to the

¹ Document 604.

public, before there has been further consideration as to its feasibility. There is no doubt that one of Canada's most effective and decisive contributions can be made in the air—whether in recruiting airmen, training them, or maintaining an air force at the front. But in deciding upon the present British scheme it is necessary to consider:

1. Is the *size* of the British training project, namely, the training of "not less than 20,000 pilots and 30,000 personnel of air crews annually", a fixed and essential feature, the *minimum* which the British Government considers is required for achieving victory over Germany?

2. If this is the British view, the next question arising is the general one of war objectives and war policy. The same British authorities planned six months ago to stop Hitler by forming an East Europe coalition against him. There was no doubt about the desirability of stopping Hitler; there was grave doubt as to their wisdom in trying to stop him in Poland. Their efforts completely failed; a European war was made more rather than less certain and in the event of war coming it was clear there was no certainty of any effective anti-German action from the Eastward. The events since the war have made the failure plain and even more complete than could have been forecast. Now it is admitted France and Britain are not equal to Germany in the air. They have not and are not likely to have that overwhelming strength on land necessary for a successful offensive in the existing circumstances. Fortunately they have overwhelming strength at sea. They have much greater economic staying power. They have the moral sympathy of most free countries. Now they call on the Dominions to take the place of the United States in the last war and of Poland, Russia, Rumania, Greece, Turkey etc., etc., in the present war, by sharing in a colossal air attack. Should not there be consultation on objectives and policy, and not merely instructions as to how to help them in a policy they have formed?

3. *Time factor.* What would be the minimum time, with most advantageous conditions as to provision of aircraft and instructors, in which a scheme such as is envisaged could be carried out?

4. *Money factor.* What would be the total training cost? Cost of providing aerodomes and ground equipment? Cost of training planes? Cost of maintenance and instruction? etc. What would be the cost involved under most favourable conditions in, say, the first six months, the first year, the second year? It will clearly be huge; 4000 or 5000 training planes alone would run well over a billion dollars, I would guess. Of course a great part of this total cost will be borne by the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. The total cost and the distribution cannot be known until a reply is received from Britain and perhaps not till after the missions arrive and go into it, but if any statement is to be made *before* they leave, it is clearly essential to have some rough idea of how many hundred millions are involved. It is also necessary to bear in mind that if Britain needs Canadian credits for buying wheat, she will ask for credits for her air expenditures here: some offset could be

secured from purchase of equipment and Canadian force expenditures in England.

Again, it is not merely an air training scheme. It is an expeditionary air force scheme on a colossal scale.* It would be difficult to train tens of thousands of Canadians as pilots and gunners, etc., and then restrict ourselves to sending over a dozen squadrons. Australia is sending 6 squadrons in three months. We would be faced with trying to maintain in France a tremendous Canadian Air Force. What would be the cost of this?

The purpose of this note is merely to emphasize what is undoubtedly in the Government's mind—the necessity of an immediate study by National Defence and the War Supply Board and possibly Finance, of the expenditures involved, so that there would be some approximate idea of what acceptance of the plan would mean before a definite commitment or announcement was made.**

692.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

London, September 29, 1939

MOST SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister. Begins. We deeply appreciate speedy and sympathetic consideration which you and your colleagues have given to proposals set out in my telegram of September 26th, and are very gratified to learn that they are acceptable in principle.

We will examine at once detailed questions raised and will communicate as soon as possible with you on these points and also on question of date for arrival of suggested Mission.

In the meantime, it would be most helpful if other Prime Ministers concerned could be informed of attitude which Canadian Government are adopting. Would you prefer to do this yourself or would you like me to do so? Ends.

Notes telles que dans l'original:

Footnotes as in original:

* See paragraph 8 of Dominions Office telegram:

It is of course contemplated that the first call on Dominion personnel who had received their training in schools under the scheme would be for such air force units of Dominions as the participating Dominion Governments might be prepared to provide and maintain.

** Read to Council—Defence & Finance & War Supply to confer & report.
W. L. M. K. Sept. 29/39.

693.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, September 30, 1939

MOST SECRET. Following from Prime Minister to your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. I wish to thank you for your message of appreciation regarding our telegram of September 28th. I note that the detailed questions raised are being examined and that you will shortly communicate with us further. We are continuing to make a similar examination here and when all the information is available, hope to be in a position to decide promptly on what scale we could cooperate in any joint plan that might be agreed upon.

2. We had already in mind the desirability of communicating with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand and have today informed them of the substance of my telegram of September 28th. Ends.

694.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, September 30, 1939

SECRET. Your telegram unnumbered September 26th.¹ The questions submitted by United Kingdom technical authorities have been considered by Department of National Defence. The replies hereunder are numbered to correspond with the queries raised.

(1) Bearing in mind civil traffic requirements, available civil aerodromes may require some further development to be suitable for service training. In explanation, it is stated that requirements have been judged to be runways of 4,000 feet with clear approaches.

Canadian aerodromes are normally developed only to provide 3,000 foot runways. At least fifteen such aerodromes, presently lacking accommodation and services, are judged to be available, the aerodrome surfaces of which could be extended and improved at an average cost of \$210,000 per aerodrome, buildings and services extra. No estimate can be given of the cost of providing for an air firing and bombing range adjacent to these aerodromes, but in most cases cost of land will not be large.

(2) A survey of existing service training and operational aerodromes indicates that none could take further training units in their present state. Only

¹ Document 688, Part 2.

one could be improved and extended at a cost of \$250,000 plus buildings. Accommodation available consists of one hangar only, size 75' x 225'. Further accommodation would have to be provided.

(3) Yes. Certain provisional sites could be investigated, laid out and acquired provided requirements are known at an early date.

(4) Yes, but survey would be restricted by the arrival of winter conditions.

(5) A general industrial survey of material available can be undertaken. A standard station layout has been drafted and costed on a basis of temporary frame construction and has been estimated to cost an average of \$998,000 per service training aerodrome for accommodation.

(6) A survey of instructors outside the Royal Canadian Air Force has been completed and a roster is maintained. Practically all are qualified for elementary instruction only. Very few are unemployed. Those employed, generally speaking, are either instructors with Flying Clubs or commercial schools, or are occupying positions with the Department of Transport or with Trans Canada Airways. Those unemployed, for the most part, lack recent instructional experience.

(7) A complete list of all licenced air engineers in Canada is maintained. In round figures these total 700 of whom approximately 100 might be expected to be available for service.

(8) A census of aircraft mechanics who served in the last war and who are at present otherwise employed will be compiled by advertising and calling on them to report by letter or in person and indicating their availability for service. The number is not believed to be substantial.

695.

72-T-38

*Le premier ministre suppléant de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Wellington, October 3, 1939

SECRET AND PERSONAL. Your telegram unnumbered September 30th.¹ Training of air personnel. Following telegram has been despatched today to Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Begins.

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand approve in principle the suggestion that experts from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand should meet in Canada to discuss the proposals outlined in your most Secret and Personal telegram of September 26th. The representatives from New Zealand can leave on October 16th by the S.S. *Monterey* and will

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

be available in Canada about November 4th. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are prepared to cooperate in any scheme ultimately decided upon but suggest that a scheme must inevitably take some time before it can be fully implemented. In the meantime His Majesty's Government in New Zealand intend to push on the expansion of existing training scheme already indicated to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. This organization can at a later date be modified without difficulty to fit in with any plan decided on as a result of the conference in Canada. Copies of this reply have been forwarded to the Prime Ministers of Canada and Australia. Ends.

FRASER

696.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

London, October 4, 1939

MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins. Thank you for your telegram of September 30th. With reference to your message of September 28th as to the air training scheme, we appreciate importance of points to which you refer as to provision of aircraft and instructors necessary for the successful working of the scheme. Preliminary survey of these questions, which has been made here suggests, that in respect of aircraft requirements and of requirements in flying instructional personnel, it should be possible [to supply?] substantial assistance from United Kingdom resources, though in other respects the situation here seems to leave no alternative but to look to Dominion resources and other possible channels of supply. The Air Mission which is leaving this week will have full details of requirements in aircraft, instructors, ground personnel and aerodromes to be anticipated as the scheme develops and will be in a position to discuss the whole question. They will also be in a position to discuss financial aspect referred to in paragraph 7 of your message. Ends.

697.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

516X/88

Ottawa, October 5, 1939

SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

May I invite your reference to the correspondence which has recently been exchanged between the Canadian Government and the United Kingdom Government regarding the establishment in Canada of an air training scheme on a very wide basis?

I would refer in particular to the Canadian Government's telegram of the 28th September, in paragraph 8 of which it is stated that the visit of the proposed Mission from the United Kingdom on this subject would be welcomed.

I should now inform you that I learn that it is contemplated that this Mission should leave for Canada on October 6th or October 7th. I am informed that it will be headed by Lord Riverdale and that it will consist of about fourteen persons.

I am requesting further information from London about the probable date and port of landing in Canada and also about the names of the members of the Mission other than Lord Riverdale. I shall hope to communicate these details to you shortly with a request that the party may receive facilities similar to those so courteously accorded to the United Kingdom Purchasing Mission headed by Colonel Greenly and Sir James Rae.

I have at present no information whether it is contemplated that any public statement should be made in the United Kingdom at an appropriate moment about the Mission's departure for Canada but I am enquiring about this point also.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

698.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 476

London, October 7, 1939

Your telegram unnumbered September 30th, air training questions. Air Ministry have supplied following brief particulars with regard to aerodrome, etc. requirements.

1. An aerodrome of 1,000 yards square is considered sufficient for intensive flying training at advanced training schools or elementary training schools. It is preferable not to have runways so as to allow a larger front to be worked on. There is however no objection to runways if nature of soil necessitates them.

2. Hangar floor space required at each advanced training school is 225,000 square feet. Hangar floor space required at each elementary flying training school is 90,000 square feet. Doors of hangars should not be less than 20 feet high and 80 feet wide. In order to allow flexibility and interchangeability among stations so that each station is capable of housing the biggest operational aircraft it would be advisable to have door openings 120 feet wide.

3. Total accommodation required at each advanced training school is for 150 officers and 800 men; at each elementary school 115 officers and 620 men. These figures include trainees, instructors and maintenance personnel.

4. To enable this large number of personnel to be trained in minimum time, the Air Ministry provide in addition to parent aerodrome two relief landing grounds for each advanced training school and one relief landing ground for each elementary school. These relief landing grounds may be slightly smaller if necessary than the parent aerodrome and require no buildings. The relief landing ground should not be closer than five miles from the parent station so as to avoid air congestion. As to runways confident that 3,000 feet adequate length.

MASSEY

699.

72-T-38

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

516X/89

[Ottawa,] October 7, 1939

SECRET AND PERSONAL

My dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked to inform you that the Secretary of State for Air is anxious to arrange that Captain Harold Balfour, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air, should pay a short visit to Canada in the near future. Captain Balfour has special experience of air training and production problems and it is considered that it would be of great value that he should be able, if possible, to take part in the discussions which will be taking place between the members of the Air Ministry Mission headed by Lord Riverdale and the Canadian authorities concerned, as well as the corresponding Missions from Australia and New Zealand, on the subject of the establishment in Canada of an air training scheme on a very wide basis.

I should be very grateful if you would be good enough to let me know at the earliest possible moment whether such a visit by Captain Balfour would be welcomed by the Canadian Government and, if so, whether he could be given all appropriate facilities in connection therewith.

I may say that in that event it would be proposed that Captain Balfour should leave for Canada by the next available ship, probably some time next week.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

700.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du Premier ministre au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Prime Minister to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

Ottawa, October 7, 1939

RE TRAINING SCHEME AND MISSION

It will be necessary before the Air Mission arrives for Council carefully to consider the constitutional questions likely to arise in connection therewith. Ministerial responsibility will have to be carefully defined as between the several governments concerned.

In Sir Gerald Campbell's letter of October the 4th,¹ regarding the conference of Ministers in London, Sir Gerald says:

...There is and can be no question of departing from the well-recognised principle that executive responsibility remains with the several Governments individually.

...This principle has been made abundantly clear by constitutional developments during the last fifteen years and by the passing of the Statute of Westminster. But the fact that this is the position only emphasises the need for constant consultation by all practicable methods, especially when vital issues are at stake and when member nations of the British Commonwealth are concentrating all their energies on a common task.

This quotation is from a communication being given to the press by the British Government. It might well, I think, be made a basis for clearer definition of exact responsibility upon United Kingdom, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Governments as it may arise in connection with the Air Training Scheme. Before the Mission arrives I think a definite formula should be worked out and approved by the Cabinet which could be presented to and considered by the Mission the moment it arrives.

Speaking generally, I feel that the Canadian Government will have to assume primary responsibility for whatever is done in Canada. By that I do not mean that we become immediately responsible but will have to assume responsibility for powers either delegated or not delegated. I should think that the obligation of each government would have to be clearly defined and agreed to by all concerned. Within the sphere of obligations thus set forth each government would be expected to operate. Shortcomings therein would be the fault of the government concerned—not of the government of Canada.

This matter should receive the careful consideration of Council on Tuesday.

W. L. M. K[ING]

¹ Document 538.

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

PERSONAL

[Ottawa,] October 7, 1939

Sir Gerald Campbell has just brought in the attached communication regarding an air training announcement.

You will note that it is proposed to make an announcement on Tuesday, October 10th, as part of the Air Ministry's review of activities.

Sir Gerald said that his own view was that it lumped the Dominions too much together and did not give sufficient recognition to the much greater contribution which Canada would make under the plan.

At first glance three points present themselves:

1. No consideration has been given to the suggestion which Sir Gerald, I assume, passed on after the discussion which he had with you and also with myself on Thursday evening as to the necessity of making clear that air cooperation was definitely the most effective form of military cooperation.

2. The statement assumes that a plan on the great scale suggested is going to be carried out. While a scheme of greatly increased training has been accepted in principle by Canada and New Zealand (also Australia apparently, though we have had no direct word), the whole question of its feasibility as regards financial obligations involved remains to be determined. It implies that the task of the Mission was merely to discuss details of the execution of the plan which has already been accepted. It looks very much as if the Air Ministry is endeavouring to rush the public acceptance of the plan involving "the taking on of airmen amounting to many thousands each month."

3. The announcement on Tuesday will in all probability precede a statement as to peace and war aims. (Sir Gerald said, incidentally, that he assumed it was their intention to get this out before the reply was made to Hitler.) Such a procedure is definitely open to the objection, to which I referred the other day, that it would be made to appear that "the Dominions" were taking the initiative in rejecting consideration of peace possibilities by putting forward a colossal air scheme at this particular moment.

If an announcement has to be made before the British Air Mission arrives here, there is no reason why it could not be deferred until after a reply on the peace terms has been made and be made much briefer and less committal than this typical Air Ministry production.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516X/89

Ottawa, October 7, 1939

SECRET AND IMMEDIATE

Dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to my letter of yesterday and previous correspondence on the subject of the despatch of the Air Ministry Mission to Canada, I have now been informed by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that it is desired to make an announcement on the subject in the House of Commons at Westminster on Tuesday, the 10th October, at about 4 o'clock p.m. British summer time.

The text of the proposed statement is given in the enclosed memorandum and I am instructed to ask that I may be informed at the earliest possible moment whether the Canadian Government desire to make any comments upon it.

I may say for your own personal information and that of the Prime Minister that it is expected that the statement will be made by the Secretary of State for Air as part of a general review of air activities similar to that made by the First Lord of the Admiralty a few days ago.

I should add in conclusion that the United Kingdom Government would of course see no objection whatever to a simultaneous statement on similar lines being made in Canada if that is desired.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

[ANNEXE À LA PIÈCE JOINTE/SUB-ENCLOSURE]

*Mémemorandum**Memorandum*

[London, October 7, 1939]

I am glad to be able to announce today a development of great importance which I can confidently say is destined to make a most effective contribution to the successful prosecution of the war.

His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand have agreed on arrangements for rapid expansion on a co-operative basis of training organisation for pilots, observers and air gunners required first for considering the enlargement and then for the maintenance on the enlarged basis of the Air Forces of the res-

pective countries. This will be combined with an expansive production of aircraft in the Dominions concerned.

By this agreement the many facilities and the great natural advantages for the training of the pilots and the other personnel and the production of aircraft which the Dominions offer in the areas free from any risk of enemy interference will be utilised to the fullest extent and to the best advantage.

Training schools will be established and maintained in each of these Dominions. The more comprehensive and technical facilities required for the advancement of training apart from those available and to be made available here will in the main be concentrated in Canada. Personnel from elementary training schools in Australia and New Zealand as well as a substantial proportion of young men passing out of similar establishments in this country will proceed to Canada to receive there with similar personnel from schools in Canada the advanced training which will fit them all for service in the line. The young men so trained will join either the Air Force squadrons maintained by the respective Dominion Governments in the theatre of operations or our own Royal Air Force units; while those from this country who get their final training in Canada will of course come back to join the Royal Air Force squadrons in the field.

The House will form some impression of the magnitude of the plan when I say that as it develops the number of training schools, already large, will be more than doubled and we shall achieve an increased output of first line pilots, observers and air gunners to be counted not in hundreds but in many thousands each month as the war goes on. The aim, in short, is to achieve Empire Air Forces of overwhelming strength.

A Mission from this country—headed by Lord Riverdale, who will be aided by a specially selected technical staff—is already on its way to Canada to meet there corresponding Missions from Australia and New Zealand. These Missions will discuss with the Canadian authorities all further steps that are to be taken for the rapid execution of the plan, including provision of the necessary aircraft instructors, ground personnel and aerodromes.

I need not dwell upon the great significance and far-reaching effect of this development in an all-important field of war activity in which the Dominions have already made individual contributions of a gallant and striking character. It is a notable illustration of the manner in which free and equal members of the British Commonwealth can by discussion and collaboration bring to bear in concert the full weight and might of their individual resources to secure achievement of a common purpose and the success of a common cause.

I am sure that the House will like to join the Government in paying a tribute to the vision and imagination of the Dominion statesmen who have done so much to help in realizing this great conception and who will, I am confident, contribute notably to its achievement. We are most grateful too to the Dominion High Commissioners in London for their helpful co-operation.

702.

King Papers, PAC

Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] October 8, 1939

AIR TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT

The Prime Minister telephoned from Kingsmere this afternoon that he thought we should try to get a reply to Sir Gerald Campbell's letter today. Sir Gerald and the Governor General were both going out to Kingsmere this afternoon.

On going over the memorandum, the Prime Minister thought we should indicate:

(1) The historical approach, setting out the actual facts, e.g. the British Government being of the opinion that air training cooperation was definitely the most effective form of military cooperation, and had communicated with Canada, Australia, etc., as to their willingness to take part in a joint effort.

(2) Without going into detail as to the scale, we should say that a scheme of greatly increased training had been accepted in principle, with the advanced training taking place in Canada.

(3) A Mission was at present on its way to work out a plan.

(4) Let them thank the Dominions for their wisdom and vision if they insisted.

As to my suggestion that the statement should be postponed until after Mr. Chamberlain had spoken on peace terms, Mr. King thought it as well to accept the date. It would show that we had agreed in principle before the present trouble. If we declined to let them make a statement on Tuesday, we might have to take the responsibility later for what retaliatory action Hitler might take. He would therefore not like to prevent them making the statement provided the statement were in accordance with the true fact that we had agreed to the scheme in principle before Hitler's speech.

703.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain

SECRET. IMMEDIATE

Ottawa, October 8, 1939

Dear Sir Gerald,

I desire to acknowledge your letter of October 7th (your file 516X/89) stating that it is proposed to make an announcement regarding air training arrangements, on the lines of the memorandum enclosed in your letter, in

the House of Commons at Westminster on the afternoon of Tuesday, October 10th.

Your letter and memorandum were at once brought to the attention of the Prime Minister.

I am instructed to state that in the view of the Canadian Government it would be desirable that any statement made should indicate the actual sequence of the discussions on the air training scheme, and should also emphasize the fact that this activity constitutes, in the opinion of the Government of the United Kingdom, the most essential and effective method of military cooperation open to Canada.

It is also considered desirable that it be made clear that no decision has yet been reached or could, under the circumstances, have been reached, as to the scale of the air recruiting and training which will be found feasible. The Canadian Government are convinced that a greatly increased measure of such training is practicable and desirable, and are determined to join to the fullest extent of their ability in a cooperative plan for carrying on intermediate and advanced training in Canada. It has, however, been indicated in the Prime Minister's telegrams of September 26th [*sic*-28th] and September 30th that the question of the scale upon which this plan could be carried out would depend upon the examination of the technical conditions as to air stations, instructors and training planes, and upon conclusions as to costs and their distribution, which would require consideration in the light of the estimate of other expenditures and of credits in the supply fields to which reference was made. Mr. Chamberlain stated in his reply of October 4th that the Air Mission would be in a position to discuss both the technical and the financial conditions of the scheme. The proposed statement, however, particularly in paragraph 7, appears to assume that agreement has already been reached not only on principle but on the scale suggested in the initial telegram of September 26th. It is therefore the view of the Canadian Government that any statement made should include the following points:

1. Reference to the fact that the proposal was put forward by the Government of the United Kingdom, in September, in the belief that this activity constituted the most necessary and decisive effort which Canada could put forth in the field of military cooperation, and that it has been accepted in principle by Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

2. Outline of the plan of local elementary training in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and advanced training in Canada, indicating that it would involve a great and rapid expansion of air training, (without indicating, until after the Missions have reported and the Commonwealth Governments concerned have reached agreement, the probable scale of the scheme to be adopted).

3. Reference to the coming to Canada of Missions from the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand to examine the detailed requirements.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

704.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] October 9, 1939

Sir Gerald Campbell stated this morning that he had cabled last night the contents of our letter regarding air training, together with some points you had made in conversation with him yesterday.

He stated that on his own initiative he had cabled some comments on Saturday night and had received a reply late last night. It was indicated in the reply that the background of the Air Ministry's statement was that with the collapse of Poland enemy aircraft might next turn to attacks upon British airplane factories and training fields. It is not even certain yet whether Russian aircraft might not join. It was, therefore, decided it was necessary to impress both the enemy and neutral countries by a statement implying that an air training scheme on a colossal scale was already under way. The effect would be spoiled if it were indicated that the scheme were still to be worked out.

I said to Sir Gerald that we were quite aware of the probability of German attacks such as he mentioned. Those attacks if they did come would come in the next two or three months. The Germans knew quite as well as we did that no new training scheme could come into operation for a year at least. The announcement of a big scheme is just as likely to spur them on to get their bombing in first as it is to deter them. If they could be deterred by an announcement now, that could be done by referring to a "very largely increased training" scheme without trying, incidentally, to tie us down to an acceptance of the precise figures contained in the first London telegram on the subject.

Sir Gerald referred to the emphasis you had laid on the actual historical sequence, namely, that the United Kingdom had initiated these proposals and that they had been set out as the most important contribution Canada could give. He added that the Air Ministry had apparently preferred to pay a tribute to the far-sighted wisdom of Dominion statesmen. I told him that so far as Canada was concerned we preferred facts to soft soap.

O. D. S[KELTON]

705.

72-T-38

*Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Canberra, October 9, 1939

SECRET AND PERSONAL. I received your telegram of September 30th¹ and my Government has been considering the question of possibility of participation in large expansion training of air personnel.

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

We approve aims of air training scheme and would be prepared to send air mission to Canada.

We are grateful for your cooperation and for facilities your country offers.

At present we are not in a position to speak with certainty as to the numbers which could be partly trained and sent away for further training but we may have a shortage of instructors and have a serious shortage of training machines.

On each of these matters we would require assistance, though we are taking immediate steps to examine the possibilities of building certain elementary types in Australia and possibly making purchases from America in the event of neutrality embargo being modified.

We have received an advance copy of a statement which will be made in the House of Commons on October 10th and I propose to make a simultaneous statement on similar lines.

The Australian personnel will be decided in the course of the next few days and as soon as it is available I will communicate it to you. Ends.

706.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] October 9, 1939

Enclosed is a copy of a letter and memorandum which Sir Gerald Campbell has just brought in, with a note covering a revised Air Ministry announcement regarding air training.

As regards paragraph 3 of the announcement, Sir Gerald said they had endeavoured to meet your point by putting in the word "comparatively" before the words "free of any risk of enemy interference", though their own judgment was the freedom under present circumstances was more than comparative.

In paragraphs 2 and 3 it will be noted they have met the historical sequence suggestion by indicating that the scheme was put forward by the Government of the United Kingdom, and that the Dominion Governments have agreed in principle to these arrangements.

In the last paragraph they had reluctantly omitted the tribute to "the vision and imagination of the Dominion statesmen", and will be quite ready to put it back.

I told Sir Gerald that on hurried reading, these points seemed adequately covered, but that there were two matters on which our suggestions had not in any way been met. The first one was the desirability from our standpoint of

including a statement to the effect that this was the most effective form of military cooperation. I reminded him that this had several times been brought to their attention, and that it was the understanding on which the Government had agreed to this scheme in principle. He enquired whether I thought this was met by the first sentence in paragraph 6. I said I thought that was all right as far as it went, but that it did not cover the point, with which he frankly agreed. I suggested that it might be met if after the words "all phases of war effort" they should add "and which in the opinion of the Government of the United Kingdom would constitute the most essential and decisive effort that Canada could put forth in the field of military cooperation".

Next, I pointed out that in paragraph 5, they had made no alteration whatever in their statement of the scale of the scheme, in spite of our lengthy analysis of the situation in this regard. Sir Gerald said they undoubtedly wished to make the statement as striking as possible. I said we quite recognized and sympathized with that desire, but that they must give some consideration not only to the enemy but to their allies. We had definitely made it clear from the beginning that while we approved a plan of greatly enlarged air training, we could not reach any conclusion on the scale to which we could commit ourselves until we had some careful and expert report on the technical feasibility of a scheme on the scale they had suggested, and particularly as to the financial commitments which had to be considered as part of the whole financial and credit arrangement on which we had been endeavouring for some time to get a complete picture. Further, it was apparent in the telegram from Australia just received this afternoon, that they did not feel they could commit themselves to these huge numbers. It was better from that standpoint not to commit ourselves to an objective which a brief period would show was quite impossible of attainment. If later it appeared that the scheme could be operated on this scale, that could be stated equally effectively when the Missions had made their report.

I did not suggest to Sir Gerald any alteration of this paragraph, but it might perhaps be varied somewhat as follows:

The House will form some impression of the magnitude of the plan when I say that its development would result in a very great and rapid increase in the number of training schools, already large, and achieve an increased output of first line pilots, observers and air gunners to be counted not in hundreds but in many thousands as the war goes on. The aim, in short, is to achieve Empire air forces of overwhelming strength.

There is a further minor point in paragraph 2, line 2, as to whether it is sufficient to say "recently put forward", or whether we should say "put forward last month".

Sir Gerald stated he would like to get a telegram off this evening. Perhaps it might be possible for you to telephone me when you have had time to examine the memorandum.

P.S. It must be borne in mind that if we agree to an objective that we can later not attain, that will enable Senator Meighen to say that if the Government had accepted his recommendations last year and had started air

training schools on a huge scale, we would now have been able to meet the United Kingdom demands. It must further be considered that while there are hundreds and thousands of young men in Canada who would make competent pilots and who are willing to volunteer for that purpose, the supply is not unlimited, and presumably it is not desired to introduce conscription for an air force any more than for a military force.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516X/93

Ottawa, October 9, 1939

SECRET AND IMMEDIATE

Dear Dr. Skelton,

As I said in my earlier letter of today,¹ I took the earliest opportunity of conveying to the Government of the United Kingdom the observations which, as stated in your letter of the 8th October, the Canadian Government desired to offer upon the draft statement which it is contemplated that the Secretary of State for Air will make on the 10th October, in the course of a general statement on air activity, regarding the Empire air training scheme now under consideration.

These observations have received the fullest and most sympathetic consideration of the United Kingdom Government, and I am now instructed to convey to you the enclosed copy of a redraft of the statement in question, which may be regarded as replacing the draft contained in my letter of the 7th October (516X/89), and which the United Kingdom Government earnestly hope will commend itself to the Canadian Government.

In communicating to me the amendments which have now been incorporated in the revised draft of the statement, the United Kingdom Government enquire whether the Canadian Government contemplate making a similar statement simultaneously, and I should be very grateful to learn as soon as possible what may be intended in this respect.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

[ANNEXE À LA PIÈCE JOINTE/SUB-ENCLOSURE]

Mémemorandum

Memorandum

[London,] October 9, 1939

1. I am glad to be able to announce today a development of great importance which I can confidently say is destined to make a most effective contribution to the successful prosecution of the war.

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland recently put forward for the consideration of His Majesty's Government in Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand an outline of arrangements for rapid expansion on a cooperative basis of training organisation for pilots, observers and air gunners required first for considering the enlargement and then for the maintenance on the enlarged basis of the Air Forces of the respective countries. This will be combined with an expansive production of aircraft in the Dominions concerned.

3. The Dominion Governments concerned have signified their ready agreement in principle to these arrangements and as a result they and we have ensured that the many facilities and the great natural advantages for the training of the pilots and the other personnel and the production of aircraft which the Dominions offer in areas comparatively free from any risk of enemy interference will be utilised to the fullest extent and to the best advantage.

4. Training schools will be established and maintained in each of these Dominions. The more comprehensive and technical facilities required for the advancement of training apart from those available and to be made available here will in the main be concentrated in Canada. Personnel from elementary training schools in Australia and New Zealand as well as a substantial proportion of young men passing out of similar establishments in this country will proceed to Canada to receive there with similar personnel from schools in Canada the advanced training which will fit them all for service in the line. The young men so trained will join either the Air Force squadrons maintained by the respective Dominion Governments in the theatre of operations or our own Royal Air Force units; while those from this country who get their final training in Canada will of course come back to join the Royal Air Force squadrons in the field.

5. The House will form some impression of the magnitude of the plan when I say that as it develops the number of training schools, already large, will be approximately trebled and we shall achieve an increased output of first line pilots, observers and air gunners to be counted not in hundreds but in many thousands each month as the war goes on. The aim, in short, is to achieve Empire Air Forces of overwhelming strength.

6. It will be seen that the special part to be taken by Canada will call from her for a contribution of a high order in line with that which she is making in all phases of war effort. A Mission from this country—headed by Lord Riverdale, who will be aided by a specially selected technical staff—is already on its way to Canada to meet there corresponding Missions from Australia and New Zealand. These Missions will discuss with the Canadian authorities all further steps that are to be taken for the rapid execution of the plan, including provision of the necessary aircraft instructors, ground personnel and aerodromes.

7. I need not dwell upon the great significance and far-reaching effect of this development in an all-important field of war activity in which the Dominions have already made individual contributions of a gallant and striking character. It is a notable illustration of the manner in which free and equal members of the British Commonwealth can by discussion and collaboration bring to bear in concert the full weight and might of their individual resources to secure achievement of a common purpose and the success of a common cause.

8. I am sure that the House will like to join the Government in paying tribute to the Dominion statesmen who have done so much to help in realising this great conception and who will, I am confident, contribute notably to its achievement. We are most grateful too to the Dominion High Commissioners in London for their helpful co-operation.

707.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain

SECRET

Ottawa, October 9, 1939

My dear Sir Gerald,

I brought to the Prime Minister's attention your letter and memorandum of today, regarding air training, and am instructed to make the following comments on the memorandum:

Paragraph 1. No comment.

Paragraph 2, line 2. It might be considered advisable, instead of "recently put forward" to use the phrase "put forward last month". It is considered the last sentence beginning "this will be combined" should form part of the preceding sentence and read "this to be combined" etc.

Paragraph 3. No comment.

Paragraph 4. No comment.

Paragraph 5. Definite objection is taken to this paragraph. It has been clearly indicated that while the Canadian Government has accepted in principle cooperation in a greatly enlarged scheme of air training, it has not committed, and cannot at the present stage, commit itself to acceptance of the scale or the details of the scheme as first outlined. It is suggested this paragraph might read: "The House will form some impression of the magnitude of the plan when I say that its development would result in a very great and rapid increase in the number of training schools, already large, and achieve an increased output of first line pilots, observers and air gunners to be counted not in hundreds but in many thousands as the war goes on. The aim, in short, is to achieve by cooperative effort air forces of overwhelming strength".

Paragraph 6. It is not considered that the first sentence of this paragraph or the statement as a whole meets the point which has been indicated on several occasions and which was an essential factor in the decision of the Canadian Government to agree in principle to a scheme of greatly enlarged air training. It is suggested that instead of the first sentence in paragraph 6, the following might be substituted:

It will be seen that the scheme involves a concentration of air training largely in Canada. With the facilities which Canada possesses, this would, in the opinion of the Government of the United Kingdom, constitute the most essential and decisive effort that Canada could put forward in the field of military cooperation.

Paragraph 7. No comment.

Paragraph 8. No objection if desired to insert the words "vision and imagination", but it is desired that the third line should read "who so promptly recognized the importance of this great conception" etc.

The Canadian Government will give to the Press a somewhat similar statement at the same hour (that is 10 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, corresponding to 4 p.m. British Summer Time.)

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

708.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] October 10, 1939

AIR TRAINING STATEMENT

7.30 a.m. Sir Gerald Campbell telephoned this morning that he had been in communication with London by telephone regarding the two paragraphs in the air training statement on which the Prime Minister had said he was adamant.

As regards Paragraph 5 on the great increase in output in pilots, they have found it desirable to tone it down further to read as follows:

The undertaking is one of great magnitude. Its development would result in a great and rapid increase in the number of training schools, already large, and achieve an increased output of first line pilots, observers and air gunners, which combined with our home effort, will ensure that the greatly increased requirements in trained personnel are fully met. The aim, in short, is to achieve by co-operative effort air forces of overwhelming strength.

Regarding Paragraph 6, the first sentence stands. The second sentence it is suggested should read as follows:

With the facilities that Canada possesses, this effort by Canada may in the opinion of the United Kingdom Government prove to be a contribution of the most essential and decisive character.

Sir Gerald said that he assumed that they did not wish to indicate to the Germans that our overseas military forces would be in any way less than our air contribution.

Sir Gerald added that if the Prime Minister could not agree to this change, they would propose to postpone the statement.

The above conversation was brought to the attention of the Prime Minister, who concurred in the amendments in Paragraph 5, and also in the revision of Paragraph 6 with the following changes:

For "this effort by Canada" read "this cooperative effort", and for "prove to be a contribution of the most essential", etc., read "prove to be of the most essential", etc.

Sir Gerald was informed accordingly and said he would at once telephone London.

10.20 a.m. Sir Gerald Campbell telephoned that he had been informed that the United Kingdom Government accepted the variations of Paragraphs 5 and 6 of their statement as telephoned this morning, also the minor proposals re Paragraphs 2 and 8 telephoned last night. The Secretary, it was indicated, was making his statement about 4 p.m., so that he would evidently be speaking now.

O. D. S[KELTON]

709.

72-T-38

*Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Wellington, October 10, 1939

MOST SECRET. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand advise that New Zealand's representatives to confer at Ottawa are: Group Captain H.W.I. Saunders, Chief of the Air Staff and Mr. T.A. Barrow, Air Secretary, who will leave Auckland by S.S. *Monterey* on October 16, arriving in Ottawa about the 2nd November. This information has been forwarded to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

710.

72-T-38

Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Canberra, October 11, 1939

My telegram 9th October, Secret. Commonwealth Delegation will comprise the following:

Honourable J. V. Fairbairn, Minister for Civil Aviation, accompanied by Wing Commander George Jones, Air Adviser, and Minister's Private Secretary, Richard Elford.

They will leave by *Monterey* disembarking at Los Angeles travelling by air to New York and thence to Ottawa. Australian Counsellor at Washington making arrangements for travel across America. Details of travel are being kept secret.

711.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516X/99

Ottawa, October 11, 1939

IMMEDIATE

Dear Dr. Skelton,

The High Commissioner requests me to inform you that he has just received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, stating that the Secretary of State for Air was to be questioned in Parliament at Westminster this afternoon as to whether he could give details of the composition of the Mission which is proceeding to Canada in connection with air training.

Sir Kingsley Wood's answer was to have been as follows:

The composition of the Mission to which the Honourable Member refers is as follows: The leader is Lord Riverdale and the other two members are Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and Mr. F. T. Hearle, the Managing Director of the De Havilland Aircraft Company. The Mission is accompanied by technical and other advisers.

I have also arranged for my Honourable and Gallant Friend, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air, to proceed to Canada at an early date to assist in framing arrangements to be made between the Canadian authorities and the Missions from Australia and New Zealand and this country. The Canadian Government have indicated that they would welcome his participation.

It is understood that Captain Balfour and Mr. Hearle will be sailing by the S.S. *Duchess of York* which will probably leave for Montreal on Friday the 13th October, and that Sir Robert Brooke-Popham will not be coming until a still later date, until when Sir Christopher Courtney will act for him. The other members of the party, given in the High Commissioner's letter of the 6th October (516X/88),¹ will also be coming as already announced in an advisory capacity.

Yours sincerely,

PAUL MASON

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

712.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du chef de la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne¹
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Chairman, Air Mission of Great Britain,¹
to Prime Minister*

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, October 13, 1939

DOMINION TRAINING SCHEME

1. It is estimated that the Imperial air effort will eventually require some 20,000 pilots and 30,000 air crews per year.

2. Four-ninths of these numbers can, it is hoped, be trained in the United Kingdom ultimately, but the limitations imposed by operations, the size of the country, and considerations of security make it necessary to look to the Dominions for the training of the remaining five-ninths. This proportion involves the production of trained personnel every four weeks as follows: 850 pilots, 510 air observers, 870 air gunners.

3. The tentative proposal is that Canada, Australia and New Zealand should endeavour to recruit these men in the proportion of 48%, 40% and 12% respectively, that the *elementary* training of pilots should be carried out in the three Dominions and that the *Service* training of pilots and all air crew training should be done in Canada.

4. The numbers to be recruited every four weeks would be:

	Pilots	Air Observers	Air Gunners	Total
Canada	576	302	518	1,396
Australia	480	252	432	1,164
New Zealand	144	76	130	350
	<hr/> 1,200	<hr/> 630	<hr/> 1,080	<hr/> 2,910

The total numbers could perhaps be reduced by about 10% to allow for the absorption as air observers and air gunners respectively of a proportion of those who failed to qualify as pilots and air observers. Also, to the extent that the Dominions found themselves unable to recruit the required numbers of the necessary standard, the balance would have to be found in the United Kingdom.

5. If a scheme on these general lines were accepted, the following training organisation would be required in Canada:

(a) *For pilot training*: 12 Elementary Flying Training Schools, each producing 40 pupils per four weeks; 25 Service Flying Training Schools, each producing 34 pupils per four weeks;

(b) *For air crew training*: 1 Wireless School, producing 900 pupils per four weeks, and instructors and maintenance personnel; 15 Observer

¹ Lord Riverdale.

Schools, each producing 36 pupils per four weeks; 15 Bombing and Gunnery Schools, each producing 93 pupils per four weeks; 3 Air Navigation Schools, each producing 175 pupils per four weeks, and instructors; 1 Armament School, producing instructors and maintenance personnel.

(c) *For maintenance purposes:* Repair Depots (or equivalent capacity in industry); Equipment Depots; Aircraft Storage Units; Recruit Depots; Schools of Technical Training; School of Aeronautical Engineering; Equipment and Accountant School; School of Administration; Record Office, etc.

6. Training and Maintenance Units already in existence or projected for the Royal Canadian Air Force will, of course, go towards the complete scheme, since it is contemplated that the proposed training organisation in Canada should be part of the Royal Canadian Air Force, which would itself have first call on the Canadians trained under the scheme.

7. Though it is essential that the whole organisation should be completed as early as possible, it is of course appreciated that time will be required for the construction of additional aerodromes, for the production of the necessary aircraft and for the training of instructors and maintenance personnel.

8. Appendices¹ are attached showing the system of training which it is suggested should be adopted and giving estimates of aircraft and personnel required.

713.

72-T-38

*Mémorandum du conseiller juridique au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Legal Adviser to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

Ottawa, October 17, 1939

PROJECT FOR TRAINING AIR SERVICES OF MEMBERS OF COMMONWEALTH
IN CANADA
(First Revision)

Legal and Constitutional Questions

1. The project involves the following elements:

(a) *Elementary Training.* This will be conducted by each member within its own borders. Canadian responsibility will present no legal or constitutional problems. The only problems involved are those which are inherent in the rapid expansion of this aspect of Air Force work.

(b) *Advanced training.* This will, for the most part, be concentrated in Canada. Personnel from Elementary Training Schools in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand will receive their advanced training in Canada.

¹ Non reproduits.

¹ Not printed.

2. Disregarding elementary training (which presents no legal and constitutional problems), the Project for Advanced Training presents two important aspects which require special consideration:

- (a) Legal Position of the Schools and Command;
- (b) Equipment and Financial Arrangements.

3. *The First Aspect, Position of the Schools and Command*, will be considered first.

The Schools (and, by this term, all elements in the Advanced Training Project are being included for the purpose of this note) may be on either of two legal bases.

The Schools may be made an integral part of the R.C.A.F., subject to the presidency of the Minister of National Defence.

In the alternative, the Schools may be an integral part of the R.A.F., operating as a "visiting force" present in Canada with the consent of the Canadian Government.

4. Assuming that the Schools are to be a part of the R.C.A.F., they will be organized by the Minister of National Defence (through the Chief of the Air Staff), financed by the Department of National Defence (subject to the financial control of the Minister of Finance), and equipped by the Canadian War Supply Board (or Canadian Ministry of Munitions, if such a ministry is formed).

Personnel from the R.A.F., R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F., would include two groups, Instructional Staffs, and Cadets (young men undergoing training).

The first group, Instructional Staffs, might include administrative officers and technicians lent to the project from these other forces to help to make the scheme effective. They, therefore, might well include officers and airmen who were doing work that was not directly instructional.

The instructional staffs and cadets (from the R.A.F., R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F.) would both be in the same legal position under existing legislation.

While they were in Canada, personnel lent to the Project or sent for instruction would be subject to Section 6 of The Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act 1933 (references to the Act, unless otherwise specified, will be references to this Act). They would need to be attached, temporarily, to the R.C.A.F. by an Order of the Governor-in-Council. They would then be subject to the provisions of Section 6(3) of the Act, which reads:

Whilst a member of another force is by virtue of this section attached temporarily to a home force, he shall be subject to the law relating to the Naval Service, the Militia, or the Air Force, as the case may be, in like manner as if he were a member of the home force, and shall be treated and have powers of command and punishment over members of the home force to which he is attached as if he were a member of that force of relative rank.

Provided that the Governor-in-Council may direct that in relation to members of a force of any part of the Commonwealth specified the statutes relating to the home forces shall apply with such exceptions and subject to such adaptations and modifications as may be so specified.

5. If the Schools are to be a part of the R.A.F., (and, in such an event, all Canadian Advanced Training would be conducted in the R.A.F. Schools) they will be organized and administered by the Secretary of State for Air. They will be financed by the United Kingdom Treasury, and equipped by the United Kingdom Ministry of Supply. Special problems would then arise with regard to property and finance, which will be discussed later. The Schools organized upon such a basis would be subject to and controlled by United Kingdom Law.

The Schools would be "visiting forces" under ss. 3 and 4 of the Act. They would be armed with statutory powers, privileges and immunities, corresponding to those which are now enjoyed by the Royal Canadian Air Force. Provision is made, by Section 4 of the Act, to enable the Governor-in-Council to authorize the exercise, for the benefit of the Schools, of the ordinary civil powers, in aid, to the same extent as if the R.A.F. Schools were actually R.C.A.F. commands.

It should, however, be noted that the "Visiting Forces Statutes" (in Canada, the United Kingdom etc.) make no provision for certain contingencies that would arise in the event of the establishment of R.A.F. Schools in Canada. Adequate provisions are available to cover the functioning of R.A.F. Schools as such, and the position of R.A.F. personnel, whether "Instructional" or "Cadet". There are, however, no adequate provisions to cover the cases of Canadian, Australian or New Zealand personnel attached to such Schools. To take a concrete case, a visiting Cadet from Australia could be attached to [an] R.C.A.F. School in Canada (it is a "Home Force" within the meaning of the Act). [He] could be attached to [an] R.A.F. School in England (where it would be a "Home Force"). There is no provision for attaching a *visiting* cadet to a *visiting* force. Similarly, there is no provision for attaching a *home force* personnel to a *visiting* force. Concurrent legislation by the Parliaments of Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, would be necessary. (In Canada it could be accomplished by an Order-in-Council under the War Measures Act.)

6. *The Second Aspect of the Problem, Equipment and Financial Arrangements*, may now be given a somewhat cursory, preliminary consideration. It must be considered in relation to the basic decision as to whether this is to be a Canadian or a United Kingdom project.

7. Upon the assumption that this is to be [an] R.A.F. project, no serious problems arise. The responsibility for housing, feeding, equipping, instruction, etc., will all be upon the United Kingdom Government.

Canadian interest should include the following matters:

- (a) Adequate check upon costs and apportionment of the Canadian share thereof;
- (b) Financial and legal arrangements for constructing Airforce stations and leasing them to the R.A.F. and for leasing existing stations;
- (c) Financial and legal arrangements for use of equipment, parts, repairs, technical advice, incidental administration and loan of instructional staff.

8. Upon the assumption that this is to be a Canadian project, a series of important problems arise. The responsibility for housing, equipment, instruction, etc., would then be upon the Canadian Government. The following tentative suggestions are submitted with a view to indicating the sort of problems that would require consideration:

- (a) *Permanent Equipment* (e.g. R.C.A.F. stations, practice ranges, etc.):
- (i) Existing Plant—This might be upon a straight rental basis.
 - (ii) Capital Extensions and new Construction and Purchase—Rental upon “x-months purchase basis”. (This would be a matter for negotiation. Probably a short term of months with a provision to credit the main account with the amount realized upon the disposition of property remaining over at the conclusion of hostilities, would afford a satisfactory solution. This could be coupled with provisions enabling the Canadian Government to take over at a valuation, crediting the account.)
- (b) *Renewable Equipment* (e.g. Air Craft):
- (i) Existing equipment—Straight rental basis.
 - (ii) New Purchases—rental upon [an] “x-months purchase basis” (See note in brackets above).
- (c) *Consumable Equipment* (e.g. gas, ammunitions, etc.) Cost plus basis.
- (d) *Instructional Staff*—Actual pay and allowances and travelling expenses two ways would be charged to the Project by all co-operating governments.
- (e) *Pay and Maintenance of Personnel*. Special problems relating to exchange and the need for avoiding serious discrepancies in pay of personnel from different services would require special consideration.
- (f) *Independent Audit or Joint Board of Finance*. In view of the interest of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in the financial aspects, there might be a need for an independent audit, or for the establishment of a joint Board of Finance.
- (g) An estimate might be made and each Government might pay monthly (or quarterly) a tentative rate per cadet per month, subject to semi-annual or annual accounting when the actual cost upon a cadet per month basis would be established. Adjustments could then be made and the tentative rate revised. Those adjustments would take into account credits from loans of instructional staffs or equipment, e.g. if the United Kingdom had 1,000 cadets for six months, at \$500 per month, the United Kingdom account would be debited with \$3,000,000. If the United Kingdom had loaned 10 instructors at \$500 per month and 100 planes at \$50,000 each the United Kingdom account would be credited with:

Instructors	\$ 30,000
Rental of planes for 6 months (say 30% of \$5,000,000)	\$1,500,000
Total Credit	\$1,530,000

(N.B. The foregoing suggestions are submitted, not as recommendations, but as points requiring discussion. Undoubtedly, further study will add many items to the list and may well indicate that there are preferable solutions for those already included).

9. SUMMARY

(a) It is possible to establish the project as an R.A.F. Command. This would be the easier course and would impose all responsibility upon the United Kingdom. It would, however, involve the need for changes in the legislation in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

(b) It is equally possible to establish the project as an R.C.A.F. Command. This would impose all responsibility upon the Minister of National Defence (subject to Cabinet and Parliament). It would avoid possible difficulties that might arise from the functioning of the United Kingdom Military Courts, administering justice and meting out sentences to Canadian Cadets on Canadian soil as well as in other matters. Also, it would avoid the legal complication which would arise, with respect to R.C.A.F., R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F. serving in Canada in an R.A.F. establishment, for which the Visiting Forces Acts make no provision.

(c) In the event that Council decides to adopt a Canadian Project, there are ample precedents for working out a scheme involving apportionment of costs along the lines followed in the United Kingdom over the last twenty years.

(d) In such an event, financial arrangements should be carefully negotiated so that the net cost to Canada would be equivalent to the net cost of giving advanced training to Canadian Cadets.

(e) There would be no difficulty in arranging for the attachment of the United Kingdom and other instructors.

714.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] October 30, 1939

In making a call this morning Lord Riverdale, whom I met for the first time, seemed at pains to emphasize the very reasonable character of their financial proposals regarding the air training scheme. He emphasized particularly the fact that, while we would be meeting the cost of air training, the United Kingdom would be meeting the much heavier cost of maintaining the pilots so trained at the front—a cost which at the peak might run to one thousand million dollars a year. I told him that my recollection was that the United Kingdom in their telegraphed proposals had left it open whether the United Kingdom or the Dominions were to maintain the men at the front. He said the United Kingdom would be quite prepared to maintain them. I told him this might well be the understanding now, but we must face the fact that there would be great pressure in Canada for maintaining a big Royal

Canadian Air Force at the front, not merely four or five squadrons, once we had the men trained, and that we might therefore find that we had committed ourselves now to the bigger end of the training and later to the very big end of the maintenance at the front.

O.D.S.[KELTON]

715.

Privy Council Records, PAC

*Procès-verbal du conseil d'urgence (comité sur la politique générale)
du Cabinet*

*Minutes of Emergency Council (Committee on General Policy)
of Cabinet*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, October 31, 1939

A meeting of this Special Sub-Committee, with certain additional Ministers, named by the Prime Minister, was held in the Prime Minister's Office in the East Block at eleven o'clock today. There were present the following Members of the Cabinet Sub-Committee: the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Government in the Senate (Senator Dandurand), the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Rogers), the Minister of Finance (Mr. Ralston).

There were also present the following Ministers: the Minister of Pensions and National Health (Mr. Mackenzie), the Minister of Transport (Mr. Howe).

There were also present: the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Dr. Skelton), the Deputy Minister of Finance (Dr. Clark), the Acting Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence (Colonel Maclachlan), the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Vice Marshal Croil), Air Member of Engineering and Supply, Department of National Defence, Air Commodore E. W. Stedman, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister (Mr. Heeney).

1. THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the purpose of the meeting was to receive the United Kingdom Air Mission, who would present their proposals regarding the Air Training Scheme, discussed at the last meeting of the "War Committee" of the Cabinet, held on September the 28th. He emphasized the fact that the Air Training Scheme was a proposal emanating from the United Kingdom War Cabinet, and read passages from the long Secret telegram of September the 26th, from the Prime Minister of Great Britain, in which the Scheme was first broached. He pointed out that the Canadian government had accepted the Scheme in principle, and had welcomed to Canada the British Air Mission, the members of which had been engaged in discussions with Canadian officials, since the Mission's arrival in Canada. Mr. King also read his telegram in reply to that of Mr. Chamberlain, which had been sent following the last meeting of this Committee.

2. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE expressed concern as to the financing of an Air Training Scheme of the magnitude of that contemplated by the government of the United Kingdom. He said that officers of his department had

been engaged, in the past month, in calculating the financial outlay which would be involved, and possible Canadian contribution thereto.

Before arriving at any estimate of what might reasonably constitute Canada's contribution, it would be necessary to know what would be asked by Great Britain in other fields, particularly that of credits for munitions and supplies. An attempt had been made to arrive at a figure, representative of the total maximum effort which Canada was capable of making. What proportion of this total should be utilized for the Air Training Scheme was a matter for discussion with the United Kingdom government. Mr. Ralston suggested that the proper procedure was to hear the proposals put forward by the United Kingdom Air Mission, submit them to a careful study by the government, to be followed by joint discussions with the United Kingdom Mission as to the working out of a common plan.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER said that it had been suggested that Canada should be concerned only with the financing of the training programme and that the cost of equipping and maintenance of the squadrons on active service should be borne by the United Kingdom government. He thought that popular opinion would press for Canadian maintenance of Canadian units.

MR. RALSTON said that he had discussed with the United Kingdom Mission the possibility of their government undertaking payment of our flying forces at the front for Canadian government account, such payments to be offset against credits provided for United Kingdom purchases in Canada.

4. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE pointed out that the Air Training Scheme had no reference to the provision of Canadian Air Force units in the field. The Canadian programme now called for only three army co-operation squadrons which would be insufficient to satisfy public sentiment as to Canada's active participation.

At eleven-thirty a.m., the following members of the United Kingdom Air Mission entered the meeting: Captain Harold H. Balfour, M.P., United Kingdom Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Air; Lord Riverdale, Chairman of the United Kingdom Air Mission; Air Marshal Sir Christopher L. Courtney, Royal Air Force Member of the Mission; J. B. Abraham, Esq., Permanent Assistant Secretary, Air Ministry; J. A. C. Osborne, Esq., Treasury Representative on the Mission.

There was also present: Sir Gerald Campbell, High Commissioner for the United Kingdom.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER welcomed the Mission and said that it had been thought best to hear, first of all, Lord Riverdale's conception of the whole Air Training Scheme, which, he pointed out, had first been proposed by the United Kingdom government in the British Prime Minister's telegram of September the 26th. He emphasized the fact that the Scheme had originated with the War Cabinet in Great Britain and by Mr. Chamberlain's telegram had been submitted to the Canadian Government for consideration. Mr. King wished to correct any impression that the proposal was, in any sense, "our Scheme".

6. LORD RIVERDALE, speaking for the United Kingdom Air Mission, stated that his government considered an Air Training Scheme, on a vastly increased scale, to be a necessity for the successful prosecution of the war. He expressed appreciation of the co-operation which had been received by the Mission from Canadian Ministers and officials, and, in particular, the Chief of the Air Staff and those associated with him.

Lord Riverdale produced two statements prepared by the Mission, setting out their calculations of the cost of the proposed Scheme and proposals for the incidence of this cost, over a three-year period (Document A "Cost of proposed Training Scheme" and Document B "Estimated Cost of proposed Training Scheme", copies attached).¹ He also produced a statement, Document C, "Navy, Army and Air Force Expenditure of Great Britain, 1934-1939" (copy attached).¹

He proposed that of the total cost of the Scheme, after the deduction of the "free contribution" by Great Britain of the initial equipment, reckoned at \$140,000,000, [half] should be borne by Canada and half by Australia and New Zealand.

THE MINISTER OF FINANCE interjected with the enquiry whether any commitments had been made as yet as to the proportions in which the several co-operating governments should assume liability for the cost of the Scheme, or whether any figures, so far, had been mentioned as to the financial contributions which might be made by each? So far as he was aware, this was the first mention of any proposals concerning the allocation of liability.

LORD RIVERDALE replied to Mr. Ralston's questions, in the negative. He said the proportions of liability and figures he mentioned, were merely for purposes of discussion.

7. LORD RIVERDALE said that the new Scheme envisaged one hundred new squadrons at the front. The United Kingdom was now spending about 50% of its national income for war purposes.

8. LORD RIVERDALE, further explaining the Mission's proposals, said that Canadian factories and production would be expanded rapidly to meet the requirements for planes and equipment. The United Kingdom government were prepared to assist by lending technical personnel required in such expansion.

He referred again to the United Kingdom offer to provide "free" all initial equipment required for the Scheme—the value of this was estimated at approximately \$140,000,000.

He gave details as to the aircraft required for the Scheme's operation. It was expected in the event of the repeal of the present embargo, that large quantities of planes could be obtained from the United States. He mentioned specifically the purchase of Harvards to a total cost of some \$15,000,000. Fleet and Moth trainers would, it was contemplated, be manufactured in Canada.

¹ Non reproduites.

¹ Not printed.

He concluded his statement by referring to the fact that the time element was all-important in order that an Air Force of great strength should be put into action with the least possible delay. He felt that the Scheme contemplated would represent a gigantic effort of utmost importance in the common cause.

9. CAPTAIN BALFOUR referred to the Air programme now under way in the United Kingdom which, in its third successive expansion, aimed at the production of 2,500 to 3,000 planes per month, together with the appropriate air and ground personnel.

He said that when the present air programme came into full operation, it would mean an annual expenditure of £400,000,000 to £500,000,000, to meet technical and mechanical requirements which, with the addition of the cost of training and maintenance, would eventually reach the figure of over £1,000,000,000 in the third year. This huge programme was felt by the United Kingdom government to be a necessary strategic effort in a war which would be long and ruthless and which would last for at least three years. How these large expenditures could be financed, he could not say, but was content to leave that problem to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

10. THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Canadian government had the same appreciation that had been expressed by Lord Riverdale of the vital importance of the matters under discussion, from the point of view of time and in human lives. Prior to this huge and new Scheme which had been put forward by the United Kingdom government, the Canadian government had proceeded rapidly in the carrying out of its own war programme, and it had been evident from the speed with which the Special Session of Parliament had acted, and from Measures taken since, that the government were fully aware of the importance of avoiding delay.

Mr. King said that so far as the Air Training Scheme was concerned, the essential co-operation would not be advanced by the suggestion that this was a Canadian Scheme and that we were responsible for its going forward. The proposal had emanated from the United Kingdom War Cabinet, and with so many considerations involved, nothing was to be gained by attempting to crowd the Canadian government into a decision. Furthermore Australia and New Zealand would require to be consulted.

The Prime Minister said that Canada, in her war effort, could not go beyond her resources, and would proceed under the advice of the Minister of Finance. Unlike Captain Balfour, he was unable to ignore the problem of where the money was to be found. The Canadian government before committing itself to a vast Scheme such as that under discussion, must be in a position to know that it could finance what it agreed to undertake. It was prepared to go just as far as it was financially possible in co-operation at the side of Britain and France. The position with regard to finances, however, had far better be clear from the start.

Lord Riverdale had mentioned a "free contribution" offered by the United Kingdom government in the way of equipment for the Air Training Scheme.

Mr. King pointed out that all Canadian contributions were free contributions to the common cause. Any contributions which Canada might make with respect to air training would be a free contribution to a common scheme.

Mr. King said that the essential financial problem would require to be discussed in detail with the Minister of Finance and the Minister of National Defence. He said that the Scheme appealed greatly to the Canadian government, which had accepted it in principle, but Canadian participation in it must of necessity be limited by our financial capacity.

Mr. King also drew attention to the fact that the Scheme made no mention of the maintenance of Canadian squadrons in the field. He felt that national feeling would require that certain distinctly Canadian Forces be maintained Overseas and this would have some bearing on contribution to a larger Scheme.

11. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE said that he desired to make it quite clear that Canada wishes to pull her full weight and more, in the conflict. From the financial point of view, however, it was not possible to come "within shooting distance" of the figures which were suggested by the Mission. Until today, when they had been "blandly assessed" by Lord Riverdale, nothing had been said as to the proportion of liability, for the Scheme, which might be assumed by the several co-operating governments.

The Training Scheme was essentially one for the provision of re-enforcements for the British Air Force. It was not a Canadian Scheme. Canada had simply been chosen as the logical site for its undertaking, upon geographical and strategical considerations.

The proposal that after the deduction of the \$140,000,000 for initial equipment to be provided by the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand should bear the full cost of the Training Scheme was inextricably bound up with other financial considerations. The United Kingdom had war requirements of a financial nature, relating principally to munitions and supplies, for which they expected credits to be provided by the Canadian government. Before the Canadian government could commit itself as to what share of responsibility it might take for the Training Scheme, it would have to know the total financial requirements and what further contributions in this and other fields we would be called upon to make. It was essential to have the long point of view, and although he had no desire to put a damper upon the Scheme, as proposed, he felt that the financial considerations were basic.

12. LORD RIVERDALE said that the figures mentioned in his proposals were not intended to be final, but simply for purposes of discussion.

13. SENATOR DANDURAND agreed that the extent to which Canada could participate in the Training Scheme must be limited by financial considerations.

14. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE noted that there had been no reference in the proposals put forward, to the maintenance of R.C.A.F. squadrons in the field. The training and provision of such squadrons would

be over and above any share which Canada might undertake in the proposed Scheme.

15. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM agreed with the Prime Minister that the most effective procedure would be for the members of the United Kingdom Air Mission to consult with the Minister of Finance, the Minister of National Defence and any other Ministers directly concerned in the working out of the Training Scheme.

16. LORD RIVERDALE, in expressing his thanks to the Prime Minister and his colleagues, for the reception of the Mission, referred with gratitude, and admiration, to the miraculous speed with which the officers of the Air Staff and others had cooperated in undertaking financial calculations, and other technical details relating to the Scheme.

The members of the United Kingdom Air Mission, the United Kingdom High Commissioner, and the members of the Canadian public service present, withdrew at 12.30 p.m., following which there was a brief meeting of the members of the government who had been present at the meeting.

A. D. P. H[EENEY]

716.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] November 1, 1939

AIR TRAINING DISCUSSION

Sir Gerald Campbell at noon today, when calling on another subject, referred to the discussion with the Cabinet committee yesterday on air training.

He said that he and all the members of the Mission had felt blue and depressed as the result of the discussion and the observations of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance. They had planned to take up matters of detail and expense with the individual Ministers, and it was only when it was indicated that it was the Prime Minister's wish that there should be a discussion with the full committee that they had taken steps to make their presentation definite by getting further instructions from London. They had pared down the original proposals in costs, and were surprised to learn that they were not considered within "shooting distance". Lord Riverdale had prepared his statements in the condensed form in which a business man would, and had been quite prepared to explain them in an appropriate fashion, but had been rather knocked off his base by Colonel Ralston's interjection about this being the first time there had been any suggestion of

the proportion into which the costs were to be divided, and had not recovered himself. Sir Gerald said he thought this was the explanation of his somewhat unfortunate phrase "free gift from Britain"; what he obviously meant was Great Britain's contribution to the co-operative effort.

I told Sir Gerald I had not been in close touch with the discussions since our exchange of letters on the occasion of the Air Minister's speech, but I believed it was clear that any difficulty that existed had arisen as the result of a change by the United Kingdom representatives in the programmes put forward by the United Kingdom the end of September, and which the Canadian Government had accepted in principle, and also from some indiscreet statements to the press. I understood the Government had in mind that the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Transport would meet the members of the Mission to go into details, and doubtless a clear understanding as to what each had in mind could then be attained.

Sir Gerald said there were two points he felt it desirable to mention.

First was the remark of the Prime Minister "This is not our war", which had been a matter of great surprise to all the United Kingdom members present, who had individually commented upon it after leaving the meeting. He believed a reference to this statement had been included in the report which had been sent to London, and he did not know what they would think of it there, or just what it meant. One of the members of the Mission had wondered whether the Prime Minister intended to make a similar statement in the House. I said to Sir Gerald that I had no knowledge other than was open to him or anyone else as to the meaning of the phrase, but I should have thought it was perfectly obvious. It certainly was not Canada's war in the sense that the war did not originate in any German threat against Canada or in any Canadian pledge in Eastern Europe. This of course did not mean that Canada had not made Great Britain's and France's cause her own. Every member of the Cabinet had backed Canada going into the war and would favour carrying it on to the fullest extent possible. As regards any statement in Parliament, that might safely be left to the Prime Minister.

The further point was as to whether Colonel Ralston, in speaking of various additions made from time to time to the Canadian military programme, had in mind undertaking to maintain the Canadian trained flyers at the front. If so, that would very greatly alter the financial picture. I said that was not my understanding. Colonel Ralston had referred to the fact that after an extended programme of military effort had been drawn up by the Canadian Government following consultation with the United Kingdom, and one which it was thought would strain our financial resources, there had come continuous supplementary requests from the United Kingdom—an air squadron for the West Indies, railway and other units, etc., crowned by this tremendous air training scheme. I did not understand that Colonel Ralston had indicated any intention on the part of the Canadian Government to maintain at the front all the Canadian pilots trained under the new scheme. On the contrary,

my recollection was that he had picked up and approved Lord Riverdale's statement that the United Kingdom would have to undertake the cost, which would be heavy, of maintaining the trained men at the front. The Prime Minister, incidentally, speaking on the same subject, had referred to the necessity of keeping in mind before any final commitments on air training were made, the possibility that public opinion might force us to maintain as an independent Canadian force a considerable proportion of the new pilots. Mr. Rogers had pointed out that as this had been under consideration three Canadian squadrons were maintained by Canada at the front, the cost of that would be in addition to the figures set out by Lord Riverdale. This, however, was a matter that would be gone into by the Cabinet committee and doubtless a definite understanding would be reached on it later.

717.

King Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] November 2, 1939

AIR TRAINING DISCUSSION OF OCTOBER 31ST

Following my report to the Prime Minister yesterday of Sir Gerald Campbell's remarks on some phases of the above discussion, I spoke to Sir Gerald again today. I said that when he referred to the comments of various members of the British Mission on a phrase of the Prime Minister's—"This is not our war"—I did not at the moment recall the context of the phrase as it had not seemed at the time to have any special significance. I had mentioned the matter to the Prime Minister, who had, I might say, expressed great surprise at the significance which had been attached to the phrase and at the obvious misinterpretation which had taken place. Mr. King at once pointed out the context in which the phrase was used. In replying to Lord Riverdale, he had quoted the latter's sentence that the United Kingdom was making "a free gift to you" of certain equipment. Mr. King replied "It is not a gift to Canada. It is not our war"—that all Canadian contributions were free contributions to the common cause and any contribution which Canada might make with respect to our air training would be a free contribution to a common scheme.

Sir Gerald recognized that it was essential to consider any such phrase in its context and said that he would explain the matter to the members of the Mission who had spoken to him. I told him it was hardly an explanation—it was simply pointing out what should have been obvious to anyone present.

O.D.S.[KELTON]

*Mémoire du premier secrétaire¹ au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from First Secretary¹ to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] November 3, 1939

An aspect of the air training scheme which would appear to merit some thought is its possible repercussion on opinion in the United States. Although so far, announcements of the scheme do not seem to have given rise to any important adverse criticism, there is a potential danger that the idea of the creation of an overwhelming air force—particularly an overwhelming Imperial Air Force—in Canada, might be seized upon by certain groups of opinion in the United States to promote their interests or their views in such a way as to damage seriously good relations between the two countries. This danger may not be imminent but I feel that it exists and the steps which could be immediately taken with a view to averting it appear so comparatively simple that the whole matter is worth bearing in mind, particularly during the period of the inception of the scheme.

There are two principal groups of opinion in the United States to which such an idea might be anticipated as being particularly repugnant:

(a) the definitely anti-British. The fanatical elements of this group have not a large following but what they lack in supporters they make up in volubility. The views of Senator Lundeen and Senator Clark, however, must be those of a considerable number of people in the west and are based on the sort of hysteria that can grow into a monster overnight if properly fed. The anti-British feelings of what might be called the right wing of this group are based on somewhat more rational grounds and though they are not so hysterically expressed, go perhaps deeper than those of the fanatics;

(b) the biggest army, biggest navy, biggest air force group. The roots of this group go deep and draw sustenance from widely divergent groups of opinion. For present purposes one should take account of, first, the isolationists who believe in backing up their policies with strong armed forces, second, the anti-British of various degrees of opinion from (a) above, and third the "we must guard the Americas" group. All of these groups are strong and to all of them opposition, and what is perhaps more important, rivals are repugnant.

¹T. A. Stone.

If the opinions briefly analysed above are as widespread as they appear to be, it is not difficult to imagine the seriousness, insofar as relations between Canada and the United States are concerned, of the possible reactions to the establishment of an overwhelming air force in Canada, to the idea that all the vast air strength of the Empire is to be concentrated in Canada and that Canada will eventually become an air power second to none. These are implications that the press can and will emphasize very easily as the development of the scheme proceeds.

In taking steps to modify the emphasis in all publicity regarding the air training scheme there are, of course, two problems to be considered:

1. it is necessary that the scheme be presented in such a way that the Canadian people will realize and appreciate the very real contribution which it can make to the allied cause;

2. it is necessary to take into account the possible effect on enemy morale of such a comprehensive plan for the mobilization of the resources and manpower of the Empire in one cooperative effort to create a powerful air arm.

Two steps suggest themselves, however, as being possible without jeopardizing the effectiveness of the scheme as regards either of the above considerations:

1. the laying of particular emphasis on the word "training". In all statements and press releases, it would appear to be worthwhile to refer always to the scheme as an "air training scheme" and to insist that it is an air "school" and not an air "force" which is being established in Canada. The former conjures up in the public mind a few out of date planes, some gliders and an equipment of ground flying machines—all of which the United States air forces used to great effect in their earlier propaganda. The latter conjures up great fleets of bombers and fighting planes, the whole air forces of the Empire which could be so easily presented by the anti-British press in the United States as an armed Imperial threat to United States neutrality and to the Monroe Doctrine at one and the same time. Insofar as it is tactically possible therefore phrases such as "the concentration of Imperial Air Forces", "the creation of an overwhelming air force" and any references to Canada as a future "air power" should be avoided. Mischievously used such ideas are liable to have a most regrettable repercussion on public opinion in the United States and manifestly to increase the difficulties of proceeding with the advancement of the air training scheme insofar as this requires goodwill and cooperation from the other side of the border;

2. The second course of action which suggests itself has to do with our policy vis-à-vis the United States military and naval people. It would appear advisable that they should be kept as fully informed as possible of all progress and possible future developments of the scheme. The United States navy and army departments in this way could be furnished with a fair answer to any questions raised by anti-British or alarmist elements in the country.

719.

King Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du secrétaire principal au Premier ministre
Memorandum by Principal Secretary to Prime Minister

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa,] November 3, 1939

AIR TRAINING SCHEME

After Council today, the Prime Minister summarized to Dr. Skelton and myself the discussion in the Cabinet upon this subject.

Mr. King said that three courses had been discussed as feasible programmes for Canada's war effort in the air:

- (1) To send and maintain in the field R.C.A.F. units—in this case five squadrons were considered to be the maximum possible.
- (2) To send a larger number of squadrons to the front to be maintained and supplied by the United Kingdom, as distinctively Canadian units attached to the R.A.F. for command—in this case a maximum of fifteen squadrons was considered possible;
- (3) To effect some combination of 1 and 2, i.e. to send and maintain certain R.C.A.F. squadrons and to send others, to be attached to the R.A.F.

The Prime Minister said that Council were inclined to favour the first possible course in principle, but were agreed that in the event of Canada's air effort being confined to such a programme, the Canadian people would not be satisfied, and that from this point of view, the second course might be more satisfactory. Council felt that Canada might be able to contribute to the air training scheme aerodromes, hangars, and ground equipment, the United Kingdom to provide aircraft and other equipment to the value of \$140,000,000, as suggested by the United Kingdom Air Mission, also instructional personnel.

Various suggestions as to the basis for distribution, and the cost of the scheme, were discussed, such as on a basis of population to be protected or men trained.

As to procedure, it was agreed that the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Transport would now confer with the United Kingdom air men. It was felt, however, that the responsibility for the scheme should clearly continue to rest with the United Kingdom Mission, who should also confer with the Australian and New Zealand Missions, and, at a subsequent meeting with representatives of the Canadian Government, report the views of these other Dominions.

The Cabinet reviewed the "Robb Scheme" for air training, of some time ago, and it was pointed out that Canada had proceeded on the basis therein set out, and that she would continue in that respect what had already been done and follow the same line of development, unless and until modified by common agreement on the new scheme under discussion with the United Kingdom, and other Dominions.

A.D.P.H[EENEY]

720.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, November 3, 1939

SECRET. PERSONAL. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. My colleagues and I believe it desirable to bring to the attention of your Government some questions which are causing difficulty and which we believe should be given early consideration to ensure full effectiveness and the promptest action in our joint war efforts.

2. The immediate question has to do with the air training proposals. Since their arrival on October 14, the members of the United Kingdom Air Training Mission have been actively at work in consultation with our technical experts in examining the detailed basis of a cooperative training scheme. Discussions this week between the heads of the Mission with your High Commissioner and a committee of our Cabinet have however indicated what we consider a fundamental misunderstanding as to the basis of and responsibility for the project.

3. Your telegram of September 26th indicated that the War Cabinet of the United Kingdom in planning a rapidly expanding air force had found that because of limitations of space and vulnerability to attack, it would be impossible to carry on in the United Kingdom the full training organisation required. The Government of the United Kingdom therefore proposed that a large part of the training should be transferred to Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the advanced training to be given in Canada to men who would have received their elementary training in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The Canadian Government replied that it believed cooperation in such a plan was a most effective form of war effort, and accepted it in principle, subject to examination of the scale upon which such a project could be fitted into our war programme.

4. The proposals put forward by the United Kingdom Mission this week, however, appeared to imply that a United Kingdom project for reinforcing the Royal Air Force had become a Canadian plan, with corresponding assumption by Canada of the major provision of recruits and major proportion of the cost which detailed study now indicates would be of huge magnitude. It was immediately apparent that the share suggested for Canada, when added to existing commitments and plans, indicated expenditures and financing quite beyond our financial resources.

5. As we set forth in our reply of September 28th, the extent of our participation in an air-training plan would depend on the total cost and its allocation among the several cooperating governments, the extent of our other

war commitments, and the total of the financial undertakings required, including provision for financing British purchases in this market. It is not possible to reach a conclusion on the scope of our air-training participation without relating it to our whole national war programme and its financial implications. When we speak of financial requirements, we do not imply any thought on the part of the Government or the people of Canada of stinting or sparing efforts or resources. We are determined to throw ourselves into the war to our utmost capacity. We must, however, consider the extent of that capacity in order to determine how the national effort can be directed most effectively. Assumption of tasks beyond that capacity would lead inevitably to failure and serious prejudice to the common cause.

In terms of the financing to be done that capacity can best be assessed by relating it to the national income, which has recently been carefully computed in other connections. Our people, like those of other countries, realize and admire the courage and devotion which the people of the United Kingdom have shown in providing such tremendous sums for carrying on the war. Without comparing our limited war programme to that great effort we may yet point out that it is probably not generally recognized in the United Kingdom or elsewhere how great a proportion of Canada's national income is being devoted to public purposes for peace and war. In this country of vast area, small population and federal structure, governments have found it necessary, in order to provide the basis for a common national life, to assume and carry on widespread activities which are less essential in older lands. Taking into account the existing federal, provincial and municipal peacetime commitments, less any possible wartime savings, and adding the provision for the military programme previously planned for the first year of the war, it is clear that it would not be possible to provide both for the air-training addition and the credits for the United Kingdom which it has been indicated will be required, without raising the percentage of the national current income taken from the people in the first year of the war to a level probably higher than that of the United Kingdom itself. You will of course realize that the fundamentally different conditions obtaining as between the United Kingdom and Canada would make it quite impossible for Canada to divert to war and other governmental expenditure at all as large a proportion of its national income.

6. In estimating the national income we have made allowances for purchases by the United Kingdom on approximately the scale indicated by your Treasury authorities, but we must add that unless this whole subject of supplies dealt with in my telegram No. 91 of October 10th¹ and other communications can be approached with more appreciation of the Canadian situation, our reduced national income and increased governmental burdens may seriously jeopardize our present commitments and plans.

7. Our discussions in connection with the air training programme have emphasized the need for a fuller appreciation of the Canadian situation, and

¹ Document 609.

the urgent necessity of a speedy and definite settlement of the various aspects of the financial problem. We have endeavoured to make clear to Mr. Osborne the facts in regard to our financial capacity, the measure of the financial burden involved in our existing commitments, the possible margin available for financing British purchases here (which margin will, of course, be reduced by the extent of any direct contribution to the air training program), and the manner in which the measure of our aggregate contribution will be expanded or reduced by the volume and character of British orders and the promptness with which they are placed. I believe that Mr. Osborne has an appreciation of these various factors as well as of the needs and difficulties of the United Kingdom but it is not apparent that either through our discussions with him or by our direct communications we have been able to convey a full understanding to your Government and particularly to its various agencies concerned with the purchase of Canadian products or with making arrangements in regard to the various aspects of our military contribution. I may instance the fact that while the British Air Mission are pressing us in regard to their air training proposals which would involve a substantial increase in Canada's direct military expenditures, we on our part have for many weeks been pressing without satisfactory result for a decision in regard to wheat purchases which is the biggest single item in our whole economic program and the most far-reaching in its public consequences. In our opinion the questions of military and economic participation in the war effort are inextricably intertwined and cannot be dealt with separately. Until some understanding evolves from the discussions either here or in London, I frankly cannot see how a decision can be arrived at in regard to the proposals for the special air training program, although, of course, the discussions are proceeding meanwhile with the United Kingdom Air Mission. We are most anxious, as you are, that speedy decisions on all these matters should be reached and would greatly appreciate anything you can do or any suggestions which you can make to bring about a prompt determination of these problems. [Ends.]

721.

72-T-38

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, November 3, 1939

PERSONAL. I should like you and Mr. Crerar to note particularly personal telegram I have sent Prime Minister today regarding air-training and finance.

722.

Privy Council Records, PAC

*Procès-verbal du conseil d'urgence (comité sur la politique générale)
du Cabinet*

*Minutes of Emergency Council (Committee on General Policy)
of Cabinet*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, November 6, 1939

A meeting of this Special Sub-Committee, with certain additional Ministers, named by the Prime Minister, was held in the Prime Minister's Office, in the East Block, at 4.45 o'clock today. There were present, the following Members of the Cabinet Sub-Committee: the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Government in the Senate (Senator Dandurand), the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Rogers), the Minister of Finance (Mr. Ralston).

There were also present the following Ministers: the Minister of Pensions and National Health (Mr. Mackenzie), the Minister of Transport (Mr. Howe).

There were also present: the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Dr. Skelton), the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister (Mr. Heeney).

1. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE stated that, in connection with the Air Training Scheme, a question of urgency had arisen regarding the purchase of aircraft in the United States, now that the embargo had been repealed by Congress. An immediate decision was required as to the placing of an order with North American Aviation, Incorporated, for Harvard aircraft for advanced training.

Mr. Ralston said that North American Aviation, Inc., were prepared to accept an immediate order for 600 of these planes, in priority to existing orders on the part of other countries, provided that such order[s] were given by midnight, tonight, accompanied by a deposit of \$4,500,000, and provided that an undertaking be given to absorb surplus production over a period of three years.

These proposals had been discussed with the United Kingdom Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Air (Captain Balfour), and the U.K. Air Mission. They had been informed that the Canadian government could not make any such commitment at present, or until agreement had been reached as to responsibility for the Air Training Scheme. Captain Balfour had then suggested that the Canadian government advance to the U.K. government, the \$4,500,000 required for immediate deposit with the order to North American Aviation, Inc., on the understanding that this transaction would be regarded as completely outside the Scheme, and that settlement be made by the U.K. government within three or four weeks.

Captain Balfour had made this suggestion because he felt it essential that advantage be taken of the opportunity to obtain the planes in question, and because of the delays which he felt would necessarily be encountered in obtaining a decision and funds from London.

Mr. Ralston pointed out that the Canadian government had authority to make such an advance, under the War Appropriation Act. If it were decided to do so, the advance might be made from the unallotted \$20,000,000 provided in the National Defence Vote. Payment could be made to the manufacturer, by the Canadian government as agent for the U.K. government, under the provisions of the Section of the War Appropriation Act providing for the Canadian government acting as agent for Allied governments.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER, in answer to an enquiry by the Minister of National Defence, expressed the opinion that the payment in question could not properly be authorized by Governor General's Warrant.

3. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE stated that he had impressed upon Captain Balfour his view that it was desirable, in the circumstances, that Captain Balfour communicate with his own government. Captain Balfour feared it would not be possible to convey to the U.K. government, by cable, an explanation of the urgency of the matter, sufficient to result in favourable action within the time available. Captain Balfour would much prefer an opportunity to put the question before his government in detail, by letter.

In the circumstances Mr. Ralston felt that if the order were not made, and assurance with respect to the 20% deposit given to the manufacturer within the time limit set, the Canadian government (although without justification) might be blamed for the failure to obtain the planes in question. He, therefore, recommended that the Canadian government accede to Captain Balfour's request, stating that he felt that although it was asking a good deal, the Canadian government had hardly any option in the circumstances. He suggested that Captain Balfour be invited to the meeting, so that, as a member of the Ministry in the United Kingdom, he might, himself, explain the position to the Members of the Committee.

4. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, speaking of the discussions which had taken place with the U.K. Air Mission, since the last meeting of the Committee, said that he felt that the Mission were beginning to have a better appreciation of Canadian problems, in relation to participation in the Air Training Scheme.

5. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE, in the same connection, said that the members of the U.K. Air Mission, since the last meeting of the Committee, had been studying the working out of the Air Training Scheme, on quite different conditions than those suggested to the Committee by Lord Riverdale, at the last meeting. They were now considering figures which Mr. Ralston had presented to them, and had examined an alternative proposal made by the Minister of Transport for the development of a scheme on a scale 50% of that first suggested. It had been calculated that such a reduced scheme would produce almost as many pilots at the end of two years, as would be available under the first scheme, though substantially fewer at the end of a three year period. The U.K. Mission were very anxious, however, that there should be no diminution in the volume of pilots to be trained, being of the opinion that

only by a scheme on the larger scale could parity with the enemy powers be attained.

Mr. Ralston said that the Minister of National Defence had suggested the possibility of fifteen R.C.A.F. Squadrons being maintained in the field, and Canada to assume 15/100th of the cost of the Scheme. Under this proposal, Canada would provide for expenditures in connection with Canadian Squadrons, and the United Kingdom and other Dominions would pay their proportions similarly calculated.

The U.K. Air Mission had made the suggestion that an alteration in Canada's other commitments with regard to credits, would permit of greater participation by Canada in the financing of the Scheme.

At this point, the following officers of the Department of National Defence entered the meeting: the Acting Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence (Colonel Maclachlan), the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Vice Marshal Croil), the Air Member for Aeronautical and Engineering Supplies (Air Commodore E. W. Stedman).

6. THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF, in answer to the Committee's enquiry as to whether the Harvard planes, under discussion, were necessary for the Air Training Scheme, replied that no English-made planes were now available, for the same essential purposes. It would be seven months before the Scheme could be sufficiently advanced to make use of the Harvards, and there were three other U.S.-made types which could be used and which, in his opinion, would be equally satisfactory for the purpose. These other types were the same as were at present in use by the U.S. flying services.

7. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE stated that North American Aviation, Inc., could undertake to deliver 235 Harvards by August, and 70 per month thereafter, making a total of over 500 planes to be delivered by the end of 1940. He enquired as to the effect such an order would have upon the employment of the Canadian aircraft industry, and whether, if the planes were ordered from Canadian manufacturers any substantial delivery could be expected in 1940.

Air Vice Marshal Croil replied that this order would not affect the Canadian industry, which was not yet in a position to produce these advanced types. Even if an order were placed now, he did not anticipate that Canadian manufacturers would be able to make any appreciable deliveries in 1940.

8. THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF, in reply to a question by the Minister of National Defence concerning the eventual destination of Canadian pilots, stated that in his view Canadian pilots should be in the field in Canadian Squadrons, that is R.C.A.F. units. The end of the last war had seen the beginning of a distinctively Canadian Air Force, in answer to public demand. The same had been true of Australia. It might be possible to have R.C.A.F. Squadrons maintained by the United Kingdom, rather than have Canadians serve with the R.A.F.

At this point, Captain Balfour entered the meeting and the officials retired.

Captain Balfour remained with the Committee for some time.

After Captain Balfour had left, the Deputy Minister of Finance was called to attend the meeting.

The Committee adjourned at 6.15 p.m., after which the Minister of Finance and the Minister of National Defence informed Mr. Heeney that, following the discussion with Captain Balfour, it had been agreed, with him, that—

(1) Lt. Col. Greenly should, forthwith, on behalf of the U.K. government, place the order with North American Aviation, Inc., for 600 Harvard planes.

(2) That the Canadian government would advance to the U.K. government the \$4,500,000, to enable the necessary deposit to be made with the order.

(3) That this transaction would be regarded as completely outside the Air Training Scheme, and

(4) That the U.K. government would, within four weeks, make payment or settlement of the money so advanced, on its account, by the Canadian Government.

It was understood that a letter would be written by Captain Balfour, covering the terms of this agreement.

A. D. P. H[EENEY]

723.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

London, November 7, 1939

SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following for your Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

Your personal and secret telegram of November 3rd regarding air-training scheme and other financial and economic questions is under urgent consideration and in accordance with a message received through Mr. Massey, I have made a copy available to Mr. Crerar.

Mr. Crerar was present at a meeting last week with the Chancellor of the Exchequer when many aspects of our own war finances, some of them directly relevant to Canadian situation, were under review. The questions dealt with in your telegram will be discussed fully with Mr. Crerar as soon as possible after his return from visit to British Expeditionary Force next week, and I am hopeful that this will contribute to a clarification of the issues with which we are both faced.

I am glad to note from the last paragraph of your telegram that in the meantime discussions at Ottawa on air-training scheme are proceeding. Ends.

724.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516X/122

Ottawa, November 7, 1939

SECRET AND IMPORTANT

Dear Dr. Skelton,

Would you be good enough to refer to the correspondence exchanged between us in recent weeks on the subject of the Empire Air Training Scheme at present under negotiation here?

I write to say that I have been informed by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that the Government of Newfoundland have enquired whether the Empire Air Training Scheme could be made applicable to Newfoundland.

This matter is, no doubt, one on which the competent authorities of the Canadian Government would wish to express their views. When informing them that the question of Newfoundland's participation in the scheme has been raised, I should be grateful if you would explain that, according to the information which has been sent to me, it is uneconomical to provide facilities for elementary training in that country, since not only would they be unusable for part of the year, but they would not be backed by any repair and maintenance organisation. It is, therefore, suggested that Newfoundland's participation should be on the basis that personnel from Newfoundland would receive the whole of their training in Canada and would count as a part of the United Kingdom quota. I may add that the United Kingdom authorities are investigating the method of selecting such personnel and providing them with the requisite medical examination.

I shall be very much obliged if you will be good enough to inform me as soon as possible of the views which the Canadian authorities may hold on the matters raised in this letter.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

725.

Privy Council Records, PAC

*Procès-verbal du conseil d'urgence (comité sur la politique générale)
du Cabinet*

*Minutes of Emergency Council (Committee on General Policy)
of Cabinet*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, November 14, 1939

A meeting of this Special Sub-Committee, with certain additional Ministers, named by the Prime Minister, was held in the Prime Minister's Office, in

the East Block, at 5.30 o'clock today. There were present, the following Members of the Cabinet Sub-Committee: the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe), the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Rogers), the Minister of Finance (Mr. Ralston).

There were also present the following Ministers: the Minister of Pensions and National Health (Mr. Mackenzie), the Minister of Transport (Mr. Howe).

There were also present: the Chairman of the U.K. Air Mission (Lord Riverdale), the Under-Secretary for Air in the United Kingdom (Captain H. H. Balfour), the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister (Mr. Heeney).

1. THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he had been informed by the Ministers principally concerned, that, as a result of discussions with the U.K. Air Mission, a basis of agreement had been reached for the amendment of the financial conditions of U.K. proposals with respect to the Air Training Scheme. It was now the intention of the U.K. Mission to cable the proposed conditions of agreement to their government, for consideration and reply.

2. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE pointed out that the proposed agreement was subject to the satisfactory outcome of conversations to be conducted in London, with the U.K. authorities, by the Governor of the Bank of Canada, on the general financial and economic problems arising from the relationship between the United Kingdom and Canada, as a result of the war.

3. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE stated that the proposed agreement was subject to a second condition, namely, that the U.K. government could and would state their opinion that Canadian participation in the Air Training Scheme, as contemplated should take priority, or preference, over all other Canadian commitments not already entered into.

4. THE U.K. UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR and the CHAIRMAN OF THE U.K. AIR MISSION agreed that the amended proposals for agreement, between the two governments, regarding the Air Training Scheme, would be subject to the two conditions mentioned by Mr. Ralston and Mr. Rogers.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the view that it was advisable that an immediate announcement to the press be made to the effect that satisfactory progress was being made in the negotiations between the representatives of the governments concerned.

It was agreed that this should be done, and a form of announcement prepared by Mr. Heeney was approved. It read as follows:

Lord Riverdale, Chairman of the United Kingdom Air Mission, accompanied by Captain Harold Balfour, Under-Secretary of State for Air in the United Kingdom, this afternoon conferred with the Prime Minister and members of the government. Following the meeting all parties expressed themselves as entirely satisfied with the progress being made.

6. THE U.K. UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR said that it was proposed that the Mission should cable immediately for the approval, by the U.K. War Cabinet, of the proposed conditions of agreement. It was altogether desirable that the Canadian government should approve the statement of the

essential conditions of the proposed agreement to be described in the cable in order that there might be no possibility of misunderstanding. It was important that the figures set out in the cable should be agreed by both parties before it was sent.

7. THE PRIME MINISTER agreed with Captain Balfour and it was arranged that the Deputy Minister of Finance and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister should confer with Captain Balfour and members of the U.K. Mission as to the statement of the conditions of the proposed agreement to be set out, and the figures to be included in this respect, in the cable to go forward to the U.K. War Cabinet.

The Deputy Minister of Finance, at this point, was called into the meeting.

8. THE PRIME MINISTER stated that it had been suggested that a memorandum should be drafted setting out the proposed agreement between the U.K. and Canadian governments, with respect to participation in the Air Training Scheme. Such a memorandum, which could be initialed by both parties, would provide a suitable record of the terms and conditions of agreement.

9. It was agreed that such a memorandum would be prepared by members of the U.K. Mission, in consultation with the Canadian government departments concerned, the memorandum to be ready to be initialed at a meeting of the War Committee of the Cabinet, with the U.K. Mission, to be held on Thursday, November the 16th.

The Prime Minister fixed the meeting of the War Committee of the Cabinet with the U.K. Air Mission for eleven o'clock, November the 16th, and suggested that members of the Australian and New Zealand Missions should be asked to attend at eleven-thirty a.m. This was agreed.

10. The question of the issue of a general statement concerning agreement between the co-operating governments as to the Air Training Scheme was discussed. It was agreed that no such statement could be issued until approval of the proposals had been received from the United Kingdom, Australian and New Zealand governments. However when agreement had been reached, it was regarded as appropriate that a suitable statement should be drafted, to be issued simultaneously by all of the governments concerned.

11. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE expressed the view that when a statement was made concerning agreement on the Air Training Scheme, it would be correct to make reference to the acceptance of proposals made by the U.K. government; the original proposals of the U.K. Mission having been amended in the light of information received and discussions had, since their arrival in Canada.

Captain Balfour agreed that the statement to be issued should properly make such reference.

The meeting adjourned at 6.30 p.m.

A. D. P. H[ENEY]

Note—Subsequently (at about 11.45 p.m.) Dr. Clark and Mr. Heeney were consulted by Lord Riverdale, Captain Balfour and members of the U.K. Mission as to the phrasing of certain parts of the cable, being prepared for despatch by the U.K. Mission to their government. Lord Riverdale read to Dr. Clark and Mr. Heeney, three passages from the draft cable dealing with the following subjects:

(1) The condition that the proposed agreement should be subject to the satisfactory outcome of discussions in London, on general financial and economic problems (See paragraph 2 of the above minutes).

(2) The condition that prior to consent to the proposed agreement by the Canadian government, the U.K. government would express their opinion that Canadian participation in the Air Training Scheme, on the lines proposed, should take preference over all other commitments not already entered into. (Such an expression of opinion was desired because the Canadian government wished to be assured that Canada's participation in the Scheme would be the most effective contribution which Canada could make in the military sphere). (See paragraph 3 of the above minutes).

(3) The figures for proposed contribution by the four governments to the cost of the Scheme.

Dr. Clark and Mr. Heeney agreed that the passages from the draft cable, read by Lord Riverdale, properly described the Canadian government's interpretation of the two conditions of the agreement referred to, and (with some minor alterations which were made) Dr. Clark agreed that the figures as to the proposed sharing of cost were as understood by the Canadian government.

A. D. P. H[EENEY]

726.

72-T-38

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain

SECRET. IMPORTANT

Ottawa, November 18, 1939

Dear Sir Gerald,

May I refer to your letter, dated the 7th November, 1939, with regard to the application to Newfoundland of the Empire Air-Training Scheme.

The Canadian Government will be very glad to co-operate in any arrangement that the United Kingdom authorities may formulate, concerning the inclusion of personnel from Newfoundland, in their quota for the Empire Training Scheme.

It is assumed that the responsibility for their emoluments, effective and non-effective, including disability pensions, etc., will be the responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom, under the same procedure as will be arranged for the pupils from the British Isles.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

727.

King Papers, PAC

Mémoire de la mission aérienne d'Australie à la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne¹

Memorandum from Air Mission of Australia to Air Mission of Great Britain¹

SECRET

Ottawa, November 22, 1939

In the original proposal for an Empire Air Training plan to train annually 20,000 pilots and 30,000 aircrew personnel, it was proposed by the United Kingdom that four-ninths of the personnel should be trained in the United Kingdom by the United Kingdom, and the remaining five-ninths of the personnel should receive its service training in Canada. The Canadian Government should undertake to produce 48% of the personnel and bear 48% of the residuary cost of the scheme after allowing for contributions by the United Kingdom; that Australia should similarly undertake to produce 40% of the personnel and bear 40% of the residual cost; and that New Zealand should undertake to produce 12% of the personnel and bear 12% of the residual cost. This allotted to Australia and New Zealand a considerably greater proportion than their share on a population basis. On behalf of the Australian Government I pointed this out immediately to the United Kingdom Mission, but said that Australia would examine the position carefully and see if it was physically possible for it to undertake this high proportion of the scheme. The Australian Government has now reviewed the position and has decided that it is not possible for Australia to produce more than its population proportion of the pilots and aircrews that the United Kingdom has suggested that the three Dominions should produce and train: but although the task of raising in three years from a small community of seven millions even its proportion computed on a population basis, namely 26,000 personnel of the high standard required is a colossal one, Australia is prepared to attempt it.

To lessen the dollar exchange difficulty and to reduce somewhat Canada's problem of producing ground personnel and for various other reasons, Australia has decided that of the share it is prepared to bear, it will undertake to completely train seven-ninths in Australia, sending two-ninths to Canada

¹Le Cabinet canadien étudia ce mémorandum le 23 novembre 1939.

¹The Canadian Cabinet considered this memorandum on November 23, 1939.

for service training. In effect Australia will undertake to set up nine elementary pilot training schools and seven service pilot training schools in Australia, and a similar proportion of schools for observers and air gunners and will send the personnel for two service training schools to Canada, and a corresponding number of observers and air gunners. Australia is prepared to undertake this proportion of pilot and aircrew training in Canada on the general terms and conditions set out in a draft memorandum that was submitted by the United Kingdom Mission after arriving at more or less agreement with the Canadian Cabinet on the share Canada could do, with the exception that Australia contends that the cost of transport of Australian and New Zealand personnel to Canada be included in the costs of Canadian training which are to be borne by the respective Governments in proportion approximately to numbers trained.

The Australian Government wishes as far as possible for Australian personnel to retain its Australian identity on joining the Royal Air Force; to bear the name of "Australia", and also to wear some indication on their uniforms of their Australian identity. Also as far as is practicable Australian regular officers will, on exchange with Royal Air Force Officers, command Australian units. Although Australia wishes this to be done to the greatest extent practicable, it will not insist on anything that makes organization difficult.

Australia undertakes the financial burden of the Canadian training on the assumption that the United Kingdom will help it to overcome the dollar exchange problem, as owing to Australia's adverse trade balance with Canada and the United States, it is impossible for Australia to produce any Canadian dollars.

Australia will undertake the proportion of training suggested above in Australia on the assumption that the United Kingdom will give to Australia all the assistance in aircraft equipment and instructor personnel, that it has agreed to provide for the Canadian training scheme in the same proportions.

If the above proposal by the Australian Government does not fit itself in with the ideas of the United Kingdom, Canadian and New Zealand Governments, Australia will attempt the whole of its population proportion of the training in Australia.

728.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 689

London, November 23, 1939

Following from Crerar to Rogers. Begins.

Please cable fully as soon as possible present position of negotiations on Air Training Scheme. Have been asked to urge our Government proceed

immediately with preparatory work considered urgent pending initialling of agreement reached as any avoidable delay in getting on with such work may have serious results. When is agreement likely to be initialled? Ends.

MASSEY

729.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

SECRET AND IMMEDIATE

Ottawa, November 25, 1939

My dear Prime Minister,

The negotiations on the subject of the Empire Air Training Scheme have now reached the stage where the United Kingdom representatives have felt it desirable to seek final instructions from the Government of the United Kingdom who have throughout been kept fully apprised of the progress made.

2. The United Kingdom representatives have taken into full consideration the desirability on all grounds of an agreement being reached, at any rate in principle, upon the main outlines of the Scheme, with all possible speed, and they have also had regard to the importance of an early public pronouncement upon the subject.

3. The United Kingdom representatives have felt justified in submitting the position, as now reached, to the United Kingdom Government with a recommendation that the progress now made is such as to justify receiving their agreement in principle.

4. At the same time the United Kingdom representatives have been careful to keep before the mind of the United Kingdom Government the fact that, at the meeting of the United Kingdom delegates with the representatives of the Canadian Government on the 14th November, the Canadian Government's agreement to a basis for the elaboration of an Empire Air Training Scheme was stated to be dependent on the two following considerations

- (a) that the Canadian Government should receive an assurance, which they would be at liberty to announce if they so wished, that in the opinion of the United Kingdom War Cabinet the Empire Air Training Scheme had preference over any other commitments in Canada's war effort, other than those already entered into:
- (b) that the financial discussions now taking place in London with Mr. Crerar, who is to be joined by the Governor of the Bank of Canada, on the question of economic war time relations should lead to a mutually and reasonably satisfying agreement.

5. Bearing in mind all these matters the United Kingdom representatives were in further consultation with the United Kingdom Government on the

24th November. As the result of this consultation I am now able to say that the United Kingdom representatives have been authorised to initial a memorandum of agreement covering the broad outlines of an Empire Training Scheme.

6. The United Kingdom representatives have also received the instructions of the United Kingdom Government upon the two matters reserved by the Canadian Government and referred to in paragraph 4 above.

7. As regards point (a) the United Kingdom representatives are authorised to propose, for the consideration of the Canadian Government, that, at the time of initialling the memorandum of agreement, a letter should be addressed to the Canadian Government on their behalf, stating that the operation of the agreement is subject to consideration by the Canadian Government and by the United Kingdom War Cabinet, and to subsequent agreement thereon between the two Governments. In such further consideration the views expressed by the Canadian Government would naturally be given the fullest possible weight.

8. As regards point (b) the United Kingdom representatives are authorized to propose that a similar letter should be simultaneously addressed to the Canadian Government stating that the operation of the agreement is subject to the settlement between the two Governments of comprehensive financial questions, including that arising from the purchase of wheat from Canada, adding that these matters are at present under discussion in London with the Canadian Minister of Mines and Resources who is shortly to be joined by the Governor of the Bank of Canada.

9. The United Kingdom representatives earnestly hope that the proposals outlined in the present letter will commend themselves to the Canadian Government.

10. In that event the question of some form of publicity will naturally arise. The United Kingdom Government feel sure that the Canadian Government will agree that no details of any agreement reached between the Governments concerned should be published until after the matters referred to in paragraph 4 above have been arranged between the Canadian Government and the United Kingdom Government.

11. The United Kingdom Government would, however, be entirely agreeable to an announcement being made, at the time of initialling the memorandum of agreement, to the effect that an agreement had been reached, initialled, and referred to the respective Governments for final approval. The details and synchronisation of such an announcement could be settled separately.

12. I shall be grateful to learn the views of the Canadian Government on the foregoing matters at the earliest possible moment.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

Mémoire du Premier ministre
Memorandum by Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa,] November 25, 1939

RE: AIR TRAINING SCHEME

At 11.30 this morning, Sir Gerald Campbell came to see me by appointment at Kingsmere. He went over verbally what appears in the attached communication,¹ a copy of which was left with Dr. Skelton this morning and the original of which he gave me in the course of the interview.

Having outlined the contents of the communication, he went on to express regret that Towers had not found it possible to reach England before this; that it was not Towers' fault; there had been difficulties over the plane, but that this made it impossible for any settlement on financial matters to be reached at once. That the British Government were most anxious to have an agreement initialled before Australians and New Zealanders left; that their leaving without this being done might create an impression that there had been differences of views which were responsible for their leaving so soon. He went on to say that Balfour and Riverdale had succeeded in having Fairbairn remain over till Monday night. They had succeeded in this by offering him some reservations already made by the British in a plane that was to go on Wednesday, but he wanted to leave Monday night so as to be sure to be in plenty of time for the plane on Wednesday.

Sir Gerald went on to say that Saunders too had received word from his government to hurry along. That he would be leaving probably on Tuesday. He followed this up by saying that he, Sir Gerald, had been talking the matter over with Balfour and thought Balfour should go on a plane on Wednesday so as to discuss the matters with the British Government. That he would be in a position to take up the questions, with them, that were outstanding and help to reach a settlement. That Lord Riverdale would remain.

In the course of his remarks, Sir Gerald also said that he thought Australians had been a little put out that I had not invited them and New Zealanders to discuss matters with the British Mission and our government, sooner than we did, which meant following after a further conference regarding details, with the British Mission.

I took up each of these points in turn in replying to Sir Gerald. First, as to the members of the different Missions leaving, I said on our part, we were somewhat surprised that more consideration had not been shown Canada by

¹ Document 729.

the other Missions in helping them meet the difficulties of the situation with which she was faced, by leaving in the manner in which he was indicating they were about to leave. In the first place, neither Australians nor New Zealanders nor any member of the British Mission that I knew of, had asked us whether it would inconvenience us or prove embarrassing to us, if any members of the Mission left before the agreements were initialled. That I thought Australia and New Zealand would do whatever the British Government wished in the matter of delaying a day or two, and that, of course, Captain Balfour could regulate his own actions. That I was amazed, last night, when listening to Fairbairn's broadcast, to hear him say that Australia had agreed to do all that was suggested at the outset, and even to go further and indicate that they were doing something over and above that, whereas he, Sir Gerald, knew the whole negotiations had had to be revised twice because of the objections raised by Australia, and that what these [objections] involved in the way of additional obligations to Canada had not apparently been considered, or, if considered, any attention paid to consideration.

I said that so far as any of the different Missions leaving before any initialling of the agreement took place, I thought all of that could be avoided by the British Government itself agreeing at once to the conditions set forth, and which had been recommended to them by their own Mission. They had had the situation before them now for many weeks. They understood it and could as well determine the matter at once as some weeks later if they really intended to meet it in the end. If they did not intend to meet the conditions in the end, I did not feel we could defend our position before Parliament and the Canadian people in making vast financial commitments without regard to the means by which they were subsequently to be met.

As to Towers, I said I thought it was most unfair for Sir Gerald or members of the British Mission or the British Government to suggest for a moment that the matter could not be settled because of his delay in getting across. That, as a matter of fact, it did not require Towers' presence at all in England to have the matter settled. It was really to oblige the British Mission in helping to impress upon the financial authorities of the British Government the truth of Canada's position as the Mission itself here had seen it; that, at great sacrifice to all of us and to himself we had asked Towers to take on this effort of helping to explain Canada's financial position to the British authorities. That Towers, going at this time, placed an increasing burden upon Ralston, as Minister of Finance, who already was heavily burdened with questions on which he would wish to counsel with Towers. That it placed a heavy burden on officials of the Bank of Canada, who, as he knew, had heavy exchange problems to cope with and, above all, added heavily to Towers' own duties and obligations at a moment when, if anything, he was entitled to some respite from them.

I pointed out that the British Government had the word of our Department of Finance as to what we could and could not do, and what we need to have done in order to assume additional obligations, which we were only too willing to undertake if we could see our way thereto. That Crerar was there to help to make our position clear. That Massey, our High Commissioner, had presented the same, and that the real purpose of Towers going was really to have the financial authorities realize that, if they could not accept the representations of the government through the Finance Department, through Crerar, as representing the Cabinet, and through Massey, as High Commissioner, that perhaps they would accept the view of the Governor of the Bank of Canada. I added that this was in addition to accepting the view of their own Mission as its members had confessed they had come to see them and realized what they were.

I said to Sir Gerald that if the British Government, in the matter of the conditions set forth, were not prepared to accept the views of our Government, they might perhaps be prepared to accept the recommendation of their own Mission. That I understood from him, and from his letter, that the Mission itself had recommended that the course suggested should be followed.

Sir Gerald spoke about the acceptance in principle of an agreement. I told him that we had accepted the principle of a training agreement before the Missions had left for Canada; that the whole purpose of their being here was the working out of the terms. I then asked what he understood by principle of the agreement to be further decided. He said that they would include questions of numbers, financial conditions, etc. I said, precisely, financial conditions—that is the one thing we are trying to settle so that we can initial an agreement; that I did not see how we could initial any agreement until we had this point settled.

I said to Sir Gerald that he knew very well that I had taken strong exception to the view that the Cabinet's decision depended upon the wish or the view of any one man. That I had always decried the idea of a one-man government. That I had an immediate loyalty to my colleagues, and an equal loyalty to the Canadian people in regard to all obligations we were placing upon them and that I did not intend to betray that loyalty. I said I might say to him quite frankly that the Cabinet had considered this matter very fully at its meeting on Thursday and that it had been there agreed that we would use all expedition in getting messages across but that we must have direct understanding between the British Government and ourselves on the two conditions mentioned before we could sign any agreement. That that was simply carrying out the undertaking reached in my office several days ago, when part of the Cabinet met Lord Riverdale, Capt. Balfour, and himself. I said I might tell him frankly that the entire Cabinet were dismayed when they learned about the possible immediate departure of Fairbairn and of the additional demands which appeared to be coming up anew prior to any final settlement being reached.

I said it was quite openly stated that the mistake we had made was not in going ahead with our own training scheme ourselves, rather than to have ours placed in to a false position both as regards delays, contributions, etc., through the way in which matters appeared to be developing at this particular time. I said I doubted very much whether the British Government or the British Mission had appreciated what an extra load had been imposed upon our ministers, in particular the Ministers of Finance, Defence, and Transport, and upon the Public Service immediately concerned by the time and attention we had all been giving to the work of the Mission, which was over and above all the work they had to assume responsibility for in connection with Canada's own war effort at this time. That I thought the ministers and the officials had been brought almost to the breaking point by the efforts they had put forward to assist the Missions, but, apparently, the only thanks they were now receiving was that pressure was being put on in the way it was to have some agreement initialled before its terms were finally agreed upon.

In reply to what Sir Gerald Campbell had said as to the Australians being put out at not being invited sooner to meet my colleagues and myself, along with the British Mission, I said there could not be any ground for any feeling of slight or occasion for disappointment in that regard. That I had, the minute I saw Fairbairn after his arrival, and later Saunders, said to each of them that I regretted, in order to get matters under way, we had found it necessary to go ahead and meet the British Mission and get under way with our agreement with them before they, the Australians and New Zealanders, had arrived. We had mentioned, however, the matter to the British Mission before the Australians and New Zealanders arrived, and we were agreed that the British Mission would wish to meet with the Australians and with the New Zealanders before we met with them and take up with them, as they had taken up with us, the matter of the terms of the agreements to be worked out. That once preliminaries had been worked out between the different governments and the British Government, it had been understood that all Missions would meet together for the purpose, so to speak, of confirming the arrangement as each had understood it separately and as all were prepared to confirm it collectively. That, as he would recall, the only reason it was suggested there should be a meeting with the British delegates again prior to the meeting of all Missions combined was that we wished to be sure, before all meeting together, that there was no misunderstanding as between the British Government and ours as to our particular understanding and terms, just as we knew they would wish to have no misunderstanding between themselves and the British Mission at the time we might all be meeting together.

As to initialling any agreement at this time, I said we were ready to initial today, tomorrow, or any day, once we received word from the British Government that they were prepared to accept the recommendation of the British Mission as understood many days ago, but that all we asked was to be in the same position as Australia and New Zealand.

Apparently, from what Fairbairn had said over the radio, there was a complete understanding between the British Government and the Australian as to what they were agreed to do. I gathered from Sir Gerald himself that there had been no misunderstanding at any time between the New Zealand government and the British government as to what their mutual obligations were; that all we wished was to be in the same position as New Zealand and Australia before we initialled any agreement.

I said to Sir Gerald that we knew in addition that the British government were prepared to stand behind the New Zealand government financially to enable them to perform their part, and we understood the same might be the case with regard to the Australian government. We were not asking the British government to stand behind us in meeting our part of the undertaking. On the other hand, we felt we could not give that undertaking until we were in a position ourselves [to know] how we were going to be able to meet it, and that the British government had known from the beginning that that would not be possible until the terms we had spoken of were met.

I said that he, Sir Gerald, had said to me he was sorry the British government could not get matters settled and understand our position over there. That Lord Riverdale had said the same; that he was being embarrassed. That Balfour had said the same to me. That Greenly had said the same. That they were all admitting to us here that they could not understand why the British Government should not settle definitely these matters of credit, contract, etc., on which we could base our undertaking. Sir Gerald said that of course they had many problems there and great difficulties. I said that we equally had great problems here and difficulties. He said he thought it was a matter of their several departments. I said I regarded it as a matter of Cabinet policy; that all that was necessary was for the War Cabinet to authorize, between now and Monday, agreement to these two clauses, and we would then be in a position to set forth the terms of agreement on which we were ready to go ahead. I said a good many of us felt, not only surprised, but hurt; that, in the endeavour to do all we could to help the British Government in this great scheme matters should be so construed at this stage as to try and throw on to us the onus for delays, which we had done everything possible to avoid, and for which we were not responsible, and to leave us before our own Parliament and the country in the position where we would be justly liable to censure, if we incurred obligations without seeing how we were going to find it possible to meet them.

I said to Sir Gerald that Fairbairn's statement last night, about having matters settled so far as Australia was concerned, and what Sir Gerald had told me about New Zealand having the same belief, made the matter of initialling of any joint agreement, from our point of view, quite secondary. That, evidently, there was the equivalent to an initialling and an understanding between the British Government, Australia, and New Zealand, and that all we asked was a like degree of confirmation of agreement between ourselves and the British Government. I added that our Parliament would be meeting

now in a few weeks and that I could not afford the risk of being asked about the agreement when Parliament met and not being in a position to state the basis or the terms on which it had been made. That if the British Government intended to meet our conditions, which now had become the recommendation of their own Mission, they could do so at any meeting of the War Cabinet as well as at some months hence. That we were ready to agree to initial an agreement the moment these matters were settled, but that he would have to tell his Government, until they were settled, I could not alter the position which our Cabinet had agreed was the only one on which we would be prepared to initial an agreement.

I then said to Sir Gerald there was one other matter which I thought would have to be understood before any agreement could be signed, if there was doubt in the minds of anyone concerning it, and that was as to administration of the scheme so far as training of Canadian airmen [was] concerned. Sir Gerald said that he did not think there was possibility of any misunderstanding on this; that he had discussed the matter with both Lord Riverdale and Captain Balfour, and had said from the start that administration would have to be under the Canadian Department of Defence. That he did not see how it could be otherwise. I told him that I could not see how it could be otherwise; that the position was much the same as that of Canadian forces in Great Britain. That we could not undertake to take responsibility here for operations in Britain. Similarly, our government would have to take responsibility for the operations in Canada.

In discussing the matter of principle of the air training scheme, Sir Gerald did not raise the point which I myself had detected in looking at the communication received from him, namely, that the latter was so worded as to indicate principle of agreement with respect to operation as distinguished from agreement as to air training scheme. He put the matter as indicated above on the basis of numbers, finances, etc. which, of course, is not a principle but the details which result from acceptance of a principle and which represent not the principle but the scheme itself. Sir Gerald did not raise this point, and I, myself, did not raise it.

Before leaving, Sir Gerald said he was sorry that I felt about the matter as I did. I said to him that I did not see why he was sorry I felt about the matter as I did; that I thought the true presentation of the situation would be that he might feel sorry that the British Government were unable to meet the recommendations of their own Mission, and to see matters as he, himself, saw them. He then said he was sorry the situation was what it is at the moment. I said I could agree with that, but that I felt quite clear in my own mind as to there being no responsibility on our government for any delays or willingness to do what was obviously fair to all concerned.

He then said he would have to see Riverdale and Balfour and see what he could do. I told him that he must make it plain to them and to the British Government that I would not, myself, make any decision on the matter of initialling the agreement until there was time for me to meet with my col-

leagues, and have the matter approved by them. That the necessity for the whole Cabinet considering the matter would not arise if the conditions agreed to and explained at Thursday's meeting of the Cabinet were met.

I stressed again that there was no need of waiting for Towers' arrival in London to settle that aspect. That if Balfour felt that it would require his personal explanation to get the matter cleared up, that was, of course, for him to decide.

In the course of our conversation, I spoke twice of the responsibility the government had to Parliament and through Parliament, to the people. I said I thought Ralston's statement last night would give the people a pretty clear understanding of the extent of obligations we had already assumed, and they would be quick to realize why we could not enter into indefinite commitments or [take] on obligations of present scheme without having some assurance which we would be able to give to Parliament and the country that this was regarded as more important than anything which might subsequently be requested, and also that we had settled the financial matters on which our ability to carry out our part in the undertaking was necessarily based. That if the plan could not go through because of our unwillingness to initial an agreement without these understandings being reached, we would just have to give the explanation to Parliament and to the people. That I knew the Canadian people well enough to know what their attitude would be to the whole matter when fully explained; that I thought they had sufficient trust in my loyalty and integrity to know that my action in a matter of this kind would be based on what I felt was owing to our own people and our own country in the effort it was putting forth at this time.

When Sir Gerald mentioned that there might be misunderstandings about Fairbairn and others leaving before an agreement was initialled, I said to him that I thought the British Government could avoid anything of the kind by requesting these gentlemen to remain until they had had time themselves to settle the points that he had raised, but that if they were unable to do this, I thought we would just have to let the people themselves know exactly why it had not been possible to initial an agreement all around, and that this, of course, we would be prepared to make clear if the necessity arose.

Sir Gerald spoke as he was going away about his own difficulties and the way in which the British Government pressed him. I told him I thought that the British Government's attitude was unnecessary and unfair; that I saw no reason why they should not communicate in despatches direct to our government; that I would like him to understand and also to make perfectly clear to the British Government that I could not make decisions myself without a chance of conferring with my colleagues concerning them, and did not wish to depart from that practice. To please keep this in mind in anticipating situations that might from time to time arise.

W. L. M. K[ING]

731.

72-T-38

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, November 25, 1939

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Following for Mr. Crerar. Begins.

1. Negotiations for air training have been proceeding continuously and in spite of difficulty created by sudden Australian change of position prospects are good for early agreement on terms. Last week we informed British Mission that our concurrence would be subject to two conditions, first that we should receive from the United Kingdom Government an assurance, which we would be free to make public if considered desirable, that Air Training scheme had preference or priority over any defence action by Canada other than existing commitments and second that discussions now taking place in London in which you would be joined by Towers on question of economic war time relations should lead to mutual and reasonably satisfying agreement. The British Mission agreed to recommend their Government to accept these stipulations.

2. Through the United Kingdom High Commissioner we have now been informed that his Government and the Mission here desire us to sign agreement on understanding that its operation will be made subject to settlement between the two Governments later of the matters covered in our two conditions. The reasons advanced are desire of members of various missions to return home, delay in settlement of financial questions owing to postponement of Towers' departure, and fact that British War Cabinet has not yet considered first condition.

3. Whole Cabinet have taken view that no agreement could be made until we had a definite answer from the United Kingdom on these two important points. We are anxious to expedite conclusion of agreement, but cannot sign anything until answer is received from the United Kingdom.

4. I would like you to impress this on British Government. Might also add presence of Towers was only suggested as further means of impressing upon British Government the financial position which had already been fully explained in our direct telegrams and your personal representations.
Ends.

732.

72-T-38

*Le ministre de la Défense nationale au sous-secrétaire d'État pour l'Air
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Minister of National Defence to Under-Secretary of State for Air
of Great Britain*

Ottawa, November 27, 1939

Dear Captain Balfour,

Since your arrival in Ottawa, you and I have had a number of discussions with respect to the future administration and organization of the air training plan in Canada. I now have pleasure in confirming my understanding of the conclusions we have reached regarding the recommendations we should make to our respective Governments.

(1) The air training plan in Canada will be administered through the organization of the R.C.A.F. and the executive command shall be in the hands of the R.C.A.F.

(2) You will recall that I pointed out to you that the R.C.A.F. command will be concentrated largely on the training scheme. As a result of this fact the work relating to administration, supply and operation for our other squadrons at home and abroad will be a comparatively small task in relation to that of the training plan.

(3) You readily accepted the view that, so far as the training plan operates within the boundaries of Canada, the Canadian Government must be responsible.

(4) For the general direction of the air training plan it is proposed to set up a Supervisory Board in Canada. The main duties of this Board would be generally to supervise the financial administration of the plan and to watch and check from time to time the progress that is being made in setting up the organization which, when fully developed, will be capable of completing the training of the desired number of pilots and crews.

(5) The Supervisory Board will be under the chairmanship of the Minister of National Defence and will include the following members: Minister of National Defence, Minister of Finance, Minister of Transport, Representatives of the United Kingdom Government, the Australian Government and the New Zealand Government, Deputy Minister for Air, Department of National Defence, Chief of Air Staff.

(6) The contact between this Board and the Government would be through the Chairman of the Board, and the contact with the R.C.A.F. would be through the Chief of Air Staff.

(7) Provision will be made for a separate financial control of the expenditures in accordance with the general agreement and arrangements will be made to keep the Board informed.

(8) It is understood that you will be making provision for the appointment of a Liaison Officer in Chief R.A.F. in Canada. This officer will, if you desire, have a seat on the Board as the United Kingdom representative.

It is assumed that the other interested Governments will make similar appointments.

(9) It is understood that the Liaison Officer in Chief will be free to report to your own Government in regard to the progress of the plan.

(10) He would have authority to visit any stations or units of the plan at any time.

(11) He would make any criticisms or suggestions to the Board having first given notice of his intention to do so to the Chief of Air Staff, in so far as they related to service matters.

(12) He would assist in keeping the R.C.A.F. advised as to any new developments in training technique.

(13) It is understood that Liaison Officers appointed by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand would have similar privileges and duties.

(14) With respect to the loan of staff and instructional personnel I made it clear to you during our discussions that we would appreciate the full co-operation of the various Governments concerned. Having regard to the proportions of the air training plan, we readily understand that we would require the loan of considerable numbers of R.A.F. personnel who would hold staff and instructor appointments within the Canadian organization. This will be not only necessary for the successful working of the air training plan, but will also express our mutual desire for continuing co-operation in the successful conduct of the plan.

(15) It is also hoped that officers for similar duties will be obtained from the Australian and New Zealand Air Forces.

Our discussions on these questions of administration and organization have been most valuable. I feel sure that any further points which may arise as the training plan develops will be settled on the same basis of consultation and co-operation by the Governments concerned.

Yours sincerely,

NORMAN MCL. ROGERS

733.

72-T-38

Le sous-secrétaire d'État pour l'Air de Grande-Bretagne au ministre de la Défense nationale

Under-Secretary of State for Air of Great Britain to Minister of National Defence

Ottawa, November 27, 1939

Dear Mr. Rogers,

Thank you for your letter of November the 27th on the question of the future administration and organization of the Air Training Scheme in Canada. Its contents confirm the general conclusions we have reached during our discussions since I have been in Ottawa.

I leave for England early tomorrow morning and amongst other matters, which I shall place before my government, I shall submit our proposals and take steps immediately to let your government know, through the High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, whether the conclusions we have come to are acceptable.

Yours sincerely,

HAROLD BALFOUR

734.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 111

London, November 27, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

As I understand the full reports which have reached me from Air Mission now at Ottawa we are within sight of agreement on Air Training Scheme which, with modifications now being made to meet points most recently raised by Australian and New Zealand delegations, retains its cooperative character as a Scheme of most far reaching importance. We are grateful for all that you and your Ministers have done to ensure success of these negotiations and we also appreciate greatly the co-operation extended to Mr. Osborne in the financial discussions which have proceeded [at] the same time on wider aspects of our wartime economic relations. These we hope to bring to a mutually satisfactory conclusion as soon as possible after Mr. Graham Towers has joined Mr. Crerar here.

2. I fully understand that contribution from Canada which Draft Scheme contemplates has been proposed subject to these financial discussions leading to a mutually and reasonably satisfying agreement and, given the good will which exists on both sides, there is no reason to suppose that such an agreement will not be reached.

3. I understand that, before initialling the agreement, you wish to have an assurance from us that the Canadian Government's views as to preference of effort are primarily for themselves to decide and that we would accept their decision in that spirit. I have no hesitation in giving this assurance as I entirely agree that it is for Canada to decide on priority of her effort and therefore [I] could not think of interfering in it whatever our own opinions might be.

4. I should explain that we ourselves have attached the highest priority to this training scheme, as indeed to our air effort as a whole, which we believe may be a decisive factor in the war. If the Canadian Government decided to contribute to the scheme on the scale contemplated, their policy will be in

the closest correspondence with our own. But we should not have liked to emphasize the priority of the training scheme lest it should have embarrassing effects on our relations with the French who are pressing us strongly to increase our effort on land.

5. I hope that what I have said will remove any misapprehensions which may exist as to the extent Canada would be committed by the initialling of the air training agreement before the Australian and New Zealand delegates leave Ottawa. In the circumstances I should like to appeal to you to agree to initial the agreement with us so that we may now take this essential step forward in our joint war effort. Ends.

735.

Privy Council Records, PAC

*Procès-verbal du conseil d'urgence (comité sur la politique générale)
du Cabinet*
*Minutes of Emergency Council (Committee on General Policy)
of Cabinet*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, November 27, 1939

A meeting of this Special Sub-Committee, with certain additional Ministers, named by the Prime Minister, was held in the Prime Minister's Office, in the East Block, at 4 p.m., today. There were present, the following Members of the Cabinet Sub-Committee: the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe), the Minister of Finance (Mr. Ralston), the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Rogers).

There were also present the following Ministers: the Minister of Pensions and National Health (Mr. Mackenzie), the Minister of Transport (Mr. Howe).

There were also present: the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Dr. Skelton), the Deputy Minister of Finance (Dr. Clark), the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister (Mr. Heeney).

1. THE PRIME MINISTER informed the meeting of his conversations with the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, on November the 25th. Sir Gerald, on behalf of his government, had enlarged upon a letter written to Mr. King on the same date, urging the Canadian government to initial a Memorandum which had been jointly prepared, embodying the revised proposals for the Air Training Scheme. Sir Gerald had emphasized his government's view that it was desirable that the Memorandum be initialed on behalf of the four governments concerned, and an announcement to that effect made, before the Australian Mission's departure this evening. He had, however, been unable to give satisfactory assurance that the United Kingdom government would agree to the two conditions stipulated as prerequisite by the Canadian government, namely the priority to be given by Canada to the

Scheme, and the satisfactory outcome of discussions in London upon general financial and economic relations between the two governments.

Mr. King had informed Sir Gerald that the Canadian government could not agree to initial the Memorandum until it had been fully discussed by the Cabinet, and until agreement had been reached with regard to the two conditions in question, particularly that relating to the priority to be given to the Scheme.

Mr. King drew attention to the terms of the telegram, received today, from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom concerning these two conditions. In his view Mr. Chamberlain's reply concerning the priority to be given to the Scheme was not satisfactory.

2. The meeting then discussed the terms of Mr. Chamberlain's telegram of November the 27th, and it was agreed that while the statement therein contained, concerning financial discussions, might be regarded as satisfactory, the two paragraphs (3 and 4) relating to the preference to be given to the Scheme, were insufficient to warrant the immediate conclusion of an agreement.

3. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE stated that it was desired to have from the U.K. government a statement expressing the preference which, in their opinion, should be given by Canada to the Scheme, in order that the Canadian government might be in a position to assess the relative merits of the various phases of war effort to which contribution might be made by Canada. While it was essential to have such an expression of opinion from the U.K. government, care should be taken to avoid any suggestion that it had been extracted from the United Kingdom by the Canadian government.

4. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE reported that subject to the two outstanding conditions to which reference had been made, the form and terms of a revision of the detailed proposals of the Scheme had been settled by himself and the other Canadian Ministers principally concerned, with the Missions representing the other three co-operating governments. A Memorandum in the revised form and embodying the revised terms had been drafted, and this he was prepared to submit to the government.

5. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE reported that an understanding had been reached between the United Kingdom Under-Secretary of State for Air, and himself, with regard to the administration and organization of the Scheme in Canada. It had been understood that the Canadian government should be responsible for the operation of the Scheme, and that its general supervision should be undertaken by a Supervisory Board, of which the Minister of National Defence would, himself, be Chairman, and upon which would sit representatives of the other governments. The terms of their understanding had been set out in a letter which he had written to Captain Balfour and which the latter had acknowledged. Copies of this correspondence had been made available to the heads of the Australian and New Zealand Missions, to whom the arrangements therein described were satisfactory.

It had been agreed that the matter of organization in the field should be held over for subsequent discussion, after which a separate agreement would be drawn up.

6. The meeting then discussed further the request of the United Kingdom government that the Memorandum be initialed by all parties prior to the departure of the Australian Minister for Air, this afternoon.

It was decided that the government should not initial the Memorandum until its terms had been discussed fully by the Cabinet, and until a satisfactory assurance, which the government would be free to make public, if it so desired, had been received from the United Kingdom government that, in its view, Canada's contribution to the Scheme would constitute the most essential military action that Canada could take.

At this point the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom was requested to enter the meeting.

7. THE PRIME MINISTER explained to the United Kingdom High Commissioner the view of his colleagues and himself that the Canadian government could not agree to initial the Memorandum without its prior consideration by a full meeting of the Cabinet, and until the condition with regard to priority had been satisfactorily cleared up. The position of the three Missions was quite different as they would initial, subject to the decisions of their respective governments.

8. The United Kingdom High Commissioner agreed with the Prime Minister that the telegram of November the 27th from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was not altogether clear upon the question of priority. The Canadian government was clearly free to decide for itself and announce its own view as to the preference which should be given to the Scheme. Such freedom of action was not in question. Perhaps the terms of his telegram to his own government, descriptive of the Canadian government's request had not been sufficiently precise.

Sir Gerald felt, however, that it would be unfortunate if the Australian and New Zealand Missions departed without the Memorandum being initialed. A mistaken impression might be created in the public mind.

9. THE PRIME MINISTER said that, if the members of the Australian Mission felt that they were compelled to leave at this stage, it was unfortunate, but this could in no way be attributed to the Canadian government, who had not been consulted. The objections to the Canadian government's initialing the Memorandum could not, however, be overlooked on that account. The Canadian government were prepared to say that they had agreed, in principle, with representatives of the other governments upon the basis of the Scheme, the details of which would be worked out and a final Agreement signed later on. It was not possible, however, at this stage, to make public the terms of an Agreement.

10. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE referred to the Secret Memorandum¹ for the United Kingdom Mission, presented on behalf of the Australian Mission

¹ Document 727.

and submitted to certain Canadian Ministers on November the 22nd. This had practically constituted an ultimatum. Since that statement had been received proposing a basic alteration in the Scheme, Canadian officials had been steadily engaged in trying to work out a new basis for agreement. The Canadian government was in no way responsible for any delay in negotiations.

11. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE pointed out that since the receipt of the Australian Memorandum the whole basis of the Scheme had had to be recast. He resented somewhat the suggestion from certain quarters that the delay had been due to the Canadian government. This was not the case.

12. THE PRIME MINISTER agreed with the United Kingdom High Commissioner that it was desirable that before the Australian and New Zealand Missions departed, some announcement should be made. In the circumstances, however, this could be only an announcement of agreement in principle.

The following were then requested to enter the meeting:

United Kingdom: The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Captain Balfour), The Chairman of the Air Mission (Lord Riverdale), Air Chief Marshal Sir H. R. M. Brooke-Popham, Air Force Member of the Air Mission (Air Marshal Sir Christopher L. Courtney).

Australia: Secretary of State for Air (Hon. J. V. Fairbairn), Treasury Adviser (Mr. C. V. Kellway), Air Adviser (Wing Commander George Jones).

New Zealand: Chief of the Air Staff (Group Captain H. W. I. Saunders), Air Secretary (M. T. A. Barrow).

13. THE PRIME MINISTER stated that neither he nor his colleagues of the government had had the opportunity of giving consideration to the Memorandum of proposed Agreement which had just been completed by the members of the Missions and the Canadian Ministers and officials concerned. It was necessary for the Memorandum to receive the consideration of the Cabinet before a decision could be made. In the circumstances, he did not feel that the Canadian government could agree to initial the Memorandum this evening, as had been suggested. The members of the Missions present had agreed on the terms of the Memorandum which would now be submitted to their respective governments for decision. The Canadian government equally required the opportunity for full consideration of its terms.

Mr. King suggested, however, that a joint statement might be issued at once, stating that a basis of agreement had been reached, in principle, and that the terms of agreement would be submitted, for decision to the governments concerned.

14. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM MISSION recognized the difference between the position of the Canadian government and that of the Missions. Should the Canadian government initial the Memorandum now,

such action would have the appearance of final agreement to its terms. Initialing by the members of the Missions would be subject to their respective government's review and decision.

Lord Riverdale enquired whether there would be any objection to the Memorandum being initialed by the Australian and New Zealand Missions before their departure.

15. THE PRIME MINISTER replied that any arrangement which the Australian and New Zealand Missions wished to make with the U.K. Mission, concerning the initialing of the Memorandum would not concern the Canadian government.

16. THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER FOR AIR was agreeable to initialing the Memorandum now, on behalf of his government. He stated that he had been authorized to negotiate and agree with the other governments represented. The Australian Prime Minister had been informed of the basis of agreement set out in the Memorandum.

17. THE NEW ZEALAND CHIEF OF AIR STAFF said that he was prepared to initial the Memorandum now, but that, so far as New Zealand was concerned, agreement was subject to the condition that sufficient sterling funds would be provided by the U.K. government. In any event, his agreement to the Memorandum was subject to the decision of the New Zealand government.

18. THE U.K. UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR enquired whether the Minister of Finance or the Minister of National Defence could initial the Memorandum, subject to decision by the Canadian government, as would be the case with the members of the Missions.

19. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE replied that his position would be quite different from that of members of the Missions, as he was a member of the government. His initialing might be regarded as final consent to the Memorandum by the Canadian government.

20. LORD RIVERDALE enquired whether there would be objection to the Australian and New Zealand Missions writing to and leaving with the U.K. Mission, letters expressing agreement with the terms of the Memorandum, and authorizing him to initial on their behalf.

21. THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he did not feel that it was for the Canadian Government to advise as to what procedure should be followed as between the three Missions.

It was, thereupon, agreed that the following statement, which was drafted and read in the meeting, should be issued forthwith, for publication:

The Missions and Committees, representing the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, have completed their discussions with regard to the joint Air Training Scheme. They have worked out a basis of agreement which is now being referred to the respective Governments for decision.

The meeting adjourned at 5.50 p.m.

A. D. P. H[EEENEY]

736.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 118

Ottawa, November 27, 1939

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

Discussions regarding Air Training Scheme have been proceeding favourably but we were not in a position to initial the agreement today as suggested. After consideration by the several Air Training Delegations today it was, however, agreed to make the following announcement which will appear in tomorrow's press.

The Missions and Committees, representing the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada have completed their discussions with regard to the joint Air Training Scheme. They have worked out a basis of agreement which is now being referred to their respective Governments for decision.

With reference to your telegram of today I shall reply after consultation with colleagues tomorrow. Ends.

737.

72-T-38

Mission aérienne de Nouvelle-Zélande au chef de la mission aérienne
de Grande-Bretagne

Air Mission of New Zealand to Chairman, Air Mission
of Great Britain

Ottawa, November 28, 1939

Sir,

The members of the New Zealand Air Mission accept in full the Scheme as outlined in the attached draft Memorandum of Agreement between the United Kingdom, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Governments,¹ are prepared to initial this Agreement for submission to the New Zealand Government for its consideration.

T. A. BARROW
 Air Secretary,
 Air Department,
 Wellington, New Zealand.

H. SAUNDERS
 Chief of the Air Staff,
 Royal New Zealand Air Force.

¹ Ce projet de mémorandum d'accord fut parafé par la mission aérienne d'Australie en même temps. Le Canada ne signa cet accord que le 17 décembre 1939.

¹ This Draft Memorandum of Agreement was initialled by the Air Mission of Australia at the same time. Canada did not sign the agreement until December 17, 1939.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLÔSURE]

*Projet de mémorandum d'accord entre la Grande-Bretagne, le Canada, l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande**Draft Memorandum of Agreement between Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand*

[Ottawa, November n.d., 1939]

1. It is agreed between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand that there shall be set up in Canada a co-operative air training scheme as set out in this agreement, and that the personnel so trained shall be allocated in accordance with Articles 14 and 15.

2. This agreement shall become operative at once and shall remain in force until 31st March, 1943, unless, by agreement between the Governments concerned, it be extended or terminated at an earlier date.

3. The Government of Canada will act as administrator of the scheme for itself and the other Governments concerned, as hereinafter provided, and it is understood that the undertakings given herein by the Government of Canada to the other Governments concerned are respectively subject to the due performance on the part of such Governments of their several undertakings given herein in support of the scheme.

4. The Government of Canada acting as administrator as aforesaid will take the measures it considers necessary for the setting up of an organisation which, when fully developed, will be capable of completing the training of the following numbers every four weeks:

Pilots (elementary flying training)	520
Pilots (Service flying training)	544
Observers	340
Wireless operator-air gunners	580

The Government of Canada will, moreover, endeavour to complete the organisation it considers necessary to give the above outputs so as to accord as nearly as may be found practicable with the programme of development set out in Appendix I.¹

5. (a) The Governments of Australia and New Zealand will endeavour to send from time to time enough pupils for training to Canada to keep filled the following proportions of places in the appropriate training schools,

¹ Non reproduit. Pour le texte final, incluant les appendices, tel que signé par le Canada et la Grande-Bretagne, voir C. P. Stacey, *Armes, hommes et gouvernements: les politiques de guerre du Canada 1939-45* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), pp. 594-607.

¹ Not printed. For the final text, including appendices, as signed by Canada and Great Britain, see C. P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada 1939-45* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), pp. 540-53.

as shown in Tables A, B and C of Appendix I, which proportions will be allotted to them for this purpose:

Australia	
Pilots (Service flying training)	$\frac{2}{16}$ ths.
Observers	$\frac{1}{10}$ th.
Wireless operator-air gunners	$\frac{1}{10}$ th.
New Zealand	
Pilots (Service flying training)	$\frac{1}{16}$ th.
Observers	$\frac{1}{10}$ th.
Wireless operator-air gunners	$\frac{1}{10}$ th.

(b) The Government of Canada will endeavour to provide from time to time enough pupils for training in Canada to keep filled the following proportions of places in the appropriate training schools as shown in Tables A, B and C of Appendix I, less the ten per cent or portion thereof supplied by the Government of the United Kingdom under the provisions of clause (c) hereof:

Pilots (elementary flying training)	The whole.
Pilots (Service flying training)	$1\frac{3}{16}$ ths.
Observers	$\frac{8}{10}$ ths.
Wireless operator-air gunners	$\frac{8}{10}$ ths.

(c) The Government of the United Kingdom may send and the Government of Canada undertakes, as administrator of the scheme, to receive pupils for pilot and observer training in Canada in numbers not exceeding ten per cent of the intake of the elementary flying training schools and air observer schools in Canada; and in addition the Government of the United Kingdom will endeavour to send and the Government of Canada undertakes as administrator of the scheme to receive pupils for training in Canada in sufficient numbers to keep filled any deficiency in the supply of such pupils from Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The numbers sent by the Government of the United Kingdom may also include pupils from Newfoundland.

(d) The numbers, and the categories of pupils sent, may be varied from time to time by agreement between the Governments concerned.

(e) It is agreed that if the Governments of Canada, Australia and New Zealand fail to keep filled the training places allotted to them respectively they will nevertheless bear their full respective shares of the costs and expenses as provided for in Article 10.

6. Pupils sent for training in Canada under the provisions of Article 5 will receive pay, allowances and other emoluments in accordance with the provisions set out in Appendix II to this Agreement.

7. The training to be given shall be in accordance with the syllabus of instruction laid down for each similar course of training in the United Kingdom.

8. To assist in the carrying out of the training scheme, the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand will lend per-

sonnel in such ranks and in such numbers as may be agreed upon with the Government of Canada as administrator of the scheme.

9. The share of the cost of the scheme to be borne by the Government of the United Kingdom will take the form of contributions in kind, to be delivered at such times and in such numbers as may be required for the efficient carrying out of the scheme in accordance with the programme of development set out in Appendix I, as follows:

(a) Engines for Moth airframes manufactured in Canada up to a maximum of 50% of the total number of aircraft required for the initial equipment and immediate reserve establishments for the full training capacity, in accordance with Appendix I, of the elementary flying training schools.

(b) All the Anson aircraft (without wings) that may be required for the initial equipment and immediate reserve establishments for the full training capacity, in accordance with Appendix I, of the advanced flying training schools, the air observers schools and the air navigation schools.

(c) All the Battle aircraft that may be required for the initial equipment and immediate reserve establishments for the full training capacity, in accordance with Appendix I, of the bombing and gunnery schools and the air armament school.

(d) The appropriate initial stock of spare parts for the airframes and engines to be supplied under the provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c).

(e) Such numbers of airframes and engines as may be required from time to time to replace the wastage resulting from loss or damage beyond economical repair of the airframes and engines to be supplied under the provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c).

(f) An appropriate stock of spare parts for the running maintenance of the airframes and engines to be supplied under the provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c).

(g) 533 Harvard airframes, 666 Wasp Engines and the appropriate share of the stock of spare parts, which have already been ordered for use in advanced flying training schools.

In addition, the Government of the United Kingdom will bear the cost of packing, loading and transporting to Canada the airframes, engines and equipment to be supplied under the provisions of clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) above. The cost of unloading and of transportation in Canada will be borne by the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme.

The types of aircraft and aircraft engines and spare parts to be supplied by the United Kingdom Government under the foregoing arrangements may be varied from time to time by agreement between the Governments concerned.

10. The Governments of Canada, Australia and New Zealand agree that costs and expenses paid or incurred by the Government of Canada as administrator of the scheme (exclusive of the contribution in kind and ex-

penses to be made and borne by the Government of the United Kingdom as provided for in Article 9) shall be apportioned between them as follows:

(a) The Government of Canada will bear the whole costs and expenses of the Initial Training and Elementary Flying Training.

(b) The costs and expenses remaining will be apportioned in the following percentages:

Canada	80.64
Australia	11.28
New Zealand	8.08

The foregoing percentages are based on the allocations of training places mentioned in Article 5; and it is agreed that if any substantial changes in these allocations are made by mutual agreement between the Governments concerned the percentages will be reviewed.

11. The Government of Canada will in the first instance advance all the costs and expenses which it incurs as administrator of the scheme, and the amounts so advanced shall be repaid in part by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand as herein provided for.

In this Agreement the term "costs and expenses" shall mean all expenditures, costs, charges and liabilities made or incurred by the Government of Canada as administrator of the scheme, and without restricting the generality of the foregoing shall include:

(a) Pay, allowances, and other expenses of the personnel lent under the provisions of Article 8 and a cash contribution (computed in accordance with recognized practice as between governments in such cases) towards the future non-effective benefits of such personnel.

(b) Transportation charges connected with the training of pupils in Canada from the dates of their leaving the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand or Newfoundland for the purpose of taking up training in Canada to the dates of their departure from Canada.

But such costs and expenses shall not include:

(c) The contribution in kind and expenses to be made and borne by the Government of the United Kingdom as provided for in Article 9.

(d) Costs and expenses of clothing and personal equipment of pupils other than such replacements as may be necessary during the period of training and other than flying clothing and equipment.

(e) Pensions or allowances to personnel lent under the provisions of Article 8 and to pupils or their dependants in respect of disability or death.

The costs and expenses mentioned in (d) and (e) above will be borne by the Governments lending the personnel and sending the pupils in respect of whom such costs, expenses, pensions or allowances are incurred.

12. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand will respectively from time to time (within one month after a summarized statement of accounts showing the net payments made during the preceding month by the

Government of Canada, as Administrator of the Scheme, has been presented to them) pay or cause to be paid to the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme, their due proportions, as agreed upon in Article 10, of such net payments. These monthly payments will be regarded as advances on account and will be subject to adjustment when the accounts for the financial year have been audited.

13. (a) The Government of Canada will, in consultation with the other Governments concerned, appoint an officer to act as its Financial Adviser in carrying out its functions as administrator of the scheme. Such proposals for expenditure as the said Financial Adviser may require shall be referred to him for approval and no expenditure on such proposals shall be incurred until his approval has been given. Any proposal disapproved by the Financial Adviser may at the instance of the officers responsible therefor be referred to the Minister of National Defence for final decision. Any reports made by the Financial Adviser shall be made available by the Government of Canada to all the other Governments concerned, and these latter shall be entitled to obtain from the Financial Adviser information on all matters affecting the cost of the scheme and their participation in it.

(b) Monthly financial statements shall be furnished by the Government of Canada to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand.

(c) A record of all expenditure and all sums received in connection with the training of pupils in Canada under this scheme will be maintained by the Comptroller of the Treasury of the Government of Canada, and will be audited by the Auditor General of Canada. This record will be made available after audit for examination by representatives of the Governments concerned.

(d) The Government of Canada shall make available to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, as early as possible after the close of each financial year ending the 31st March, a statement, accompanied by a certificate of the Auditor General, of the receipts and payments in connection with the scheme showing the expenditure under appropriate heads.

14. It is agreed that the Government of Canada may out of the Canadian pupils who complete their training under this scheme fill vacancies which occur in the Home Defence Squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Provided, however, that the numbers so disposed of shall not exceed the following:

Pilots	136 a year.
Air Observers	34 a year.
Wireless operator-air gunners	58 a year.

All the other pupils, on completion of their training, will be placed at the disposal of the Government of the United Kingdom, subject to that Government's making the arrangements indicated in Article 15, and bearing liability as provided for in Articles 16 and 17 of this Agreement.

15. The United Kingdom Government undertakes that pupils of Canada, Australia and New Zealand shall, after training is completed, be identified

with their respective Dominions, either by the method of organizing Dominion Units and formations or in some other way, such methods to be agreed upon with the respective Dominion Governments concerned. The United Kingdom Government will initiate inter-governmental discussions to this end.

16. The Government of the United Kingdom will, subject to the provisions of Article 17, provide the pay, allowances, pensions and other non-effective benefits, maintenance and other expenses of the pilots and aircraft crews who are trained in Canada (other than those made available for service with the Royal Canadian Air Force in accordance with the provisions of Article 14) with effect from the dates of their embarkation in Canada for service with or in conjunction with the Royal Air Force. The Government of the United Kingdom also undertakes to arrange for those pupils who are made available for service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force, to be embarked as speedily as possible after the completion of their training, and to defray the cost of their passages to the stations to which they are appointed on leaving Canada.

17. The pay, allowances, pensions and other non-effective benefits, maintenance and other expenses, for which the Government of the United Kingdom undertakes liability under the provisions of Article 16 will be as laid down in Royal Air Force regulations. If it should be decided by the Government of Canada, the Government of Australia, or the Government of New Zealand to supplement the amounts so issued, any such supplement will be borne by the Government concerned.

18. The Government of Canada as administrator of the scheme will have charge of the assets acquired for the purposes of the scheme. On the termination of this Agreement such of the said assets as have been acquired and paid for as part of the cost of the scheme will be disposed of as follows:

- (a) Any land, but not buildings, structures or fixtures thereon, acquired or improved for the purpose of the scheme will become the property of the Government of Canada.
- (b) The assets acquired for the purposes of the Initial Training Schools and the Elementary Flying Training Schools will become the property of the Government of Canada.
- (c) All other assets, except those contributed in kind by the Government of the United Kingdom, will be shared between the Governments of Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the same proportions as are laid down in Article 10 for the apportionment of the costs.
- (d) Any of the assets contributed by the Government of the United Kingdom which remain will revert to that Government.

The distribution of the assets under the above arrangements may be made in kind or otherwise, as may be agreed upon.

19. Arrangements will be made between the Governments concerned to facilitate communications between them under this Agreement or otherwise in connection with the Scheme either by means of cable or through representatives in Canada to be named by them.

738.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 120

Ottawa, November 28, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 111.¹ Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. I am much obliged by your observations on the two points which it was indicated the Canadian Government regarded as an integral part of an agreement on the joint air training scheme.

2. The position of the Government of the United Kingdom as indicated in your telegram and in communications from the United Kingdom High Commissioner has been considered by our Cabinet today.

3. As regards the necessity which we have been emphasizing for some weeks of reaching conclusions on the general financial and economic requirements before it could be determined how the air training scheme would fit into the arrangements, we have noted your conclusion that there is no reason to suppose that a mutually and reasonably satisfying agreement will not be reached.

4. As regards the question of priority of military efforts, there appears to be some misunderstanding of our position. Your telegram indicates that your Government understands that what is desired is an assurance that the Canadian Government's views as to preference of effort are primarily for ourselves to decide. We of course recognize that we, like the other Governments of the Commonwealth, must assume the primary responsibility for the nature and extent of the contribution we are to make to the joint war effort. We also believe, however, that it is essential to consult with our associates in the conflict, and it was for this purpose that from the outset we requested the opinion particularly of the Government of the United Kingdom as to what would be the most effective form our effort could take, and as far as conditions permitted, we have adopted the measures proposed.

5. After a programme largely based on the recommendations of the United Kingdom Government had been drawn up and was being put into force, your telegram of September 26th was received suggesting as an addition to the programme the air training scheme as being of vital and decisive importance. In our reply we indicated that we agreed that Canadian co-operation in this scheme would be particularly appropriate and probably the most effective military co-operation which Canada could furnish, and we would, therefore, be prepared to accept the scheme in principle and in the light of the scheme to review the plans already made for military and economic co-operation. We have on several occasions since indicated our view that

¹ Document 734.

an essential factor in our acceptance of the air training scheme would be an indication by the United Kingdom Government of its view that the proposed effort was the most essential military action that Canada could take. On November 14th at a meeting between the War Committee of the Cabinet and Captain Balfour and Lord Riverdale it was stated that as it was on the strong representations of the United Kingdom as to the vital necessity and decisive effect of this project that we had agreed in principle to undertake so great a task, we considered it essential to the agreement which we hoped to be able to reach that the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to have it made known that considering present and future requirements they felt that participation in the Air Training Scheme would provide more effective assistance than any other form of co-operation which Canada could give. It was entirely understood by the United Kingdom representatives that this was an essential factor in our concurrence in the scheme.

6. With regard to the possibility of difficulty with France, to which reference is made in your telegram, I may add that we had not intended to suggest that the United Kingdom should indicate in the statement the order of preference to be attached to its own war efforts.

7. The question of administration and also the question of identity and command of formations and units in the field have been discussed by the Minister of National Defence with Captain Balfour and we have every reason to believe that agreement will be reached on these points. On agreement being reached as to these points and as to the statement as to participation in the scheme providing most effective form of our co-operation, the Minister feels that he will be in a position to recommend our acceptance of the agreement. Ends. Message ends.

739.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 122

Ottawa, November 30, 1939

Following from Minister of National Defence for Captain Balfour on arrival London. Begins.

Suggest two slight revisions in text of my letter November 27th before reference to Government. In paragraph 4 line 1 substitute supervision for direction and in paragraph 7 line 1 substitute supplementary for separate. Have indicated these suggested changes in sending copies of correspondence to Fairbairn and Saunders. Ends.

740.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 116

London, December 1, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 120, November 28th. Following for your Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

1. I am very grateful to you for the full statement of your views which greatly clarifies the position.

2. I am satisfied that no question of principle divides us. Our common approach to the problem expressed most clearly in your personal and secret telegram of November 4th¹ [*sic*] proceeds on basis that there is no thought on the part of our Governments or our people of stinting or sparing our efforts or resources and that we are determined to throw ourselves into the war to our utmost capacity.

3. There are obvious limits to the efforts of which Canada is capable, as indeed there are to the resources of all parts of the British Commonwealth and our common concern is to put these resources to the best use in the prosecution of the war until victory is achieved.

4. I now understand that you consider it essential to publish the opinion of the United Kingdom Government that the Air Training Scheme should have priority in Canada's war effort. This is, in fact, our view and we have no objection to its being made public, provided it is made clear at the same time that we also attach very great importance both from a military and a psychological point of view to the presence of Canadian land forces in the theatre of war at the earliest possible moment.

5. We would therefore suggest that the announcement should be in the following terms. "The United Kingdom Government have informed us that, considering present and future requirements, they feel that participation in the Air Training Scheme would provide for more effective assistance towards our ultimate victory than any other form of cooperation which Canada can give. At the same time they would wish it to be clearly understood that they would welcome no less heartily the presence of Canadian land forces in the theatre of war." Ends.

¹ Document 720.

741.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du Premier ministre au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Prime Minister to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

SECRET AND PRIVATE

[Ottawa,] December 1, 1939

RE: TELEGRAM NO. 116, SECTION 5

I would suggest that the word "military" be inserted before the word "cooperation" in line 6 thereof, so as to make clear that military cooperation is not regarded as more important than economic co-operation. Members of the financial mission, in particular, have stressed the great importance of not permitting skilled mechanics to leave industrial establishments to enter any of the military services, repeatedly stating that the economic effort will probably count for most in the end.

I would also suggest that, at the beginning of the last line, the words "at the earliest possible moment" should be inserted. These are the words with which paragraph 4 concludes. Apart from mention of military and psychological points of view, they clearly indicate the importance attached by both the British and the French to a land force from Canada reaching the theatre of war at the earliest moment. It is only in that connection that the British Government have thus far expressed their desire for a land force from Canada. Indeed early despatches indicated that men were seeking to enlist much too rapidly and that the sending of too many men overseas would be an embarrassment. Not to insert these words is to destroy altogether the significance of any statement as to priority in its relation to the air training scheme as providing the most effective assistance towards ultimate victory.

It might be well to get from the Chief of Staff of the Department of Defence, an exclusive statement as to the significance of the word "military" as applied to all defence services, as applicable to army, navy and air services alike, and as distinguished from economic forms of war effort.

The word "would" in the second last line of the 5th paragraph should perhaps be changed to "will" in consequence of the other changes.

In a word, I am quite in favour of the British Government's position as stated in paragraph 4, and all that I would ask is that the British Government's position with respect to the matters referred to in paragraph 5 should not differ in possible meaning or emphasis from the meaning as set forth in paragraph 4. It is, of course, desirable that before any reply is finally despatched, that it should be approved by members of the government who have had most to do with the negotiations to date.

W. L. M. K[ING]

742.

72-T-38

Le chef de la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne au ministre des Finances
Chairman, Air Mission of Great Britain, to Minister of Finance

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, December 3, 1939

Dear Colonel Ralston,

In the course of our discussions about the proposed Memorandum of Agreement in regard to the scheme for training of pilots and aircraft crews in Canada, the question was raised as to difficulties which the Governments of Australia and New Zealand might experience in raising the Canadian dollars necessary to make the payments which under the scheme they undertake to make from time to time to the Canadian Government as the administrator of the scheme.

I am authorised by the Government of the United Kingdom to confirm what I told you when you last mentioned this point to me, namely, that the Government of the United Kingdom will be prepared, in case such difficulties arise, to find for the Australian and New Zealand Governments, if they so request, the Canadian dollars which will be required for this purpose.

Yours sincerely,

RIVERDALE

743.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] December 4, 1939

AIR TRAINING

Sir Gerald Campbell called yesterday after his return from Halifax to enquire whether any reply had been sent to Mr. Chamberlain's telegram No. 116. I told him that the matter was before the Prime Minister and the three Ministers immediately concerned. The Minister of National Defence, however, would not be returning until Monday night. The question would be considered on Tuesday and a reply sent then.

Sir Gerald said he had been glad to see that the sentence suggested regarding the air training priority had been agreed to. He admitted that at first glance he had been somewhat uncertain as to the effect of the second sentence, which no doubt had been put in by "honest Halifax" for fear of the effect on French opinion. On reflection, however, it seemed to him entirely clear that the sentence was meant to deal with present plans for sending a division to France rather than to apply to the future. (I did not tell him that the Prime Minister had considered emphasizing this present phase of the situation by suggesting the insertion of the words "at the earliest possible moment" found in paragraph 4 of Mr. Chamberlain's telegram). Sir Gerald referred to press articles, including the one in the *Mont-*

real Star of Saturday, referring to the scheme as costing eight hundred million dollars and Canada's share as being 80% as a reason for reaching conclusions as early as possible to avoid too erroneous guesses.

I told him that I understood it was still necessary to obtain the consent of Australia and New Zealand. Sir Gerald said that Fairbairn had sent a letter to Lord Riverdale authorizing him to initial the agreement provided no changes of any importance were made, and that Saunders had sent a letter to Lord Riverdale and himself to the same effect just before leaving. I said I was not clear whether their initialing meant final consent from the two Governments. He thought it did, but he would send us copies of Fairbairn's and Saunders' letters. He added he understood from Lord Riverdale that Colonel Ralston had gone over the agreement again and that any changes that would be made were clerical and not of importance.

In connection with revision of this second sentence, its application to the present could be made doubly clear if instead of saying that "they would welcome no less heartily the presence" they would say that "they have welcomed no less heartily the presence (or the arrival), etc." This phrasing, of course, would only be possible if the announcement were not being used until the actual arrival of the first division in England and if England can be called the "theatre of war".

744.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 125

Ottawa, December 5, 1939

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 116, December 1st. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. My colleagues and I have noted with pleasure the confirmation given by your telegram of the common approach made by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada to the problem of ensuring the most effective utilisation of the resources available for the successful prosecution of the war.

2. We appreciate the importance you attach to including in any public statement a reference to the presence in the theatre of war of Canadian land troops at the earliest possible moment. We quite concur in the inclusion of such a reference, and would suggest the incorporation in the announcement as set forth in paragraph 5 of your telegram [of] the phrase at the end of paragraph 4; that is, after the concluding words of paragraph 5, "in the theatre of war", add "at the earliest possible moment". We would also suggest a further clarifying modification in the first sentence of the announcement, by inserting the word "military" before "cooperation". With these modifications the announcement would be entirely acceptable to us. I assume a communication on the other points mentioned in paragraph 7 of my telegram No. 120 of November 28th will be sent as soon as there has been an opportunity of consulting with Captain Balfour. Ends.

745.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 120

London, December 7, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 125 of December 5th. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

1. We are willing in the circumstances to accept two modifications suggested in paragraph 2 of your telegram and are happy to think that this point is now disposed of to our mutual satisfaction.

2. As regards questions mentioned in paragraph 7 of your telegram No. 120 of November 28th, we shall examine proposals being brought by Captain Balfour immediately he arrives and will communicate with you about them as soon as possible. He has unfortunately been delayed by bad weather and has not yet arrived. Ends.

746.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre de la Défense nationale au chef de la mission aérienne
de Grande-Bretagne
Minister of National Defence to Chairman, Air Mission
of Great Britain

Ottawa, December 8, 1939

My dear Lord Riverdale,

Paragraph 15 of the memorandum of agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, relating to training of pilots and aircraft crews in Canada, and their subsequent service, reads as follows:

The United Kingdom Government undertakes that pupils of Canada, Australia and New Zealand shall, after training is completed, be identified with their respective Dominions, either by the method of organizing Dominion Units and formations or in some other way, such methods to be agreed upon with the respective Dominion Governments concerned. The United Kingdom Government will initiate inter-governmental discussions to this end.

In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I understand that you accept as the proper interpretation of this paragraph that Canadian personnel from the training plan will, on request from the Canadian Government, be organized in Royal Canadian Air Force units and formations in the field. I shall be obliged if you will confirm this interpretation of paragraph 15, by letter.

Yours sincerely,

NORMAN McL. ROGERS

747.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le chef de la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne au ministre
de la Défense nationale*

*Chairman, Air Mission of Great Britain, to Minister
of National Defence*

Ottawa, December 8, 1939

Dear Mr. Rogers,

I have considered your letter of today's date, about the interpretation of paragraph 15 of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, relating to training of pilots and aircraft crews in Canada, and I do not think that it would be in conflict with the provisions of paragraph 14 of that Agreement, in which it is stated that the pupils who complete their training, other than those placed at the disposal of the Government of Canada for the filling of vacancies which occur in the Home Defence squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force, will on completion of their training be placed at the disposal of the Government of the United Kingdom, for me to assure you that paragraph 15 of the Agreement implies that requests by the Canadian Government for the incorporation in Royal Canadian Air Force units in the field of Canadian pupils who have been trained in Canada under the Dominion Air Training Scheme will, in all circumstances in which it is feasible, be readily accepted by the Government of the United Kingdom.

Yours sincerely,

RIVERDALE

748.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du secrétaire principal au Premier ministre

Memorandum by Principal Secretary to Prime Minister

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, December 11, 1939

AIR TRAINING SCHEME—ORGANIZATION OF CANADIANS
IN R.C.A.F. UNITS AND FORMATIONS

1. On Friday evening, December the 8th, Mr. Rogers spoke to me on the telephone concerning the reply which he had just received from Lord Riverdale to his letter of December the 8th, regarding the interpretation of paragraph 15 of the Memorandum of Agreement. Mr. Rogers was sending copies of his letter and Lord Riverdale's reply, to the Prime Minister, and expressed the opinion that the terms of the reply were not satisfactory. I drew this to the attention of Mr. King.

2. On Saturday morning, December the 9th, the Prime Minister told me that he had considered the exchange of letters and agreed with Mr. Rogers that Lord Riverdale's reply was quite unsatisfactory. Before the Canadian government would agree to initial or sign the Memorandum, it would be necessary to obtain, from the United Kingdom Mission, a clear and unequivocal statement that, at the request of the Canadian Government, Canadian personnel from the training plan would be organized in R.C.A.F. units and formations in the field. This was a matter of principle which had been discussed on several occasions in the Cabinet, and all members of the government were agreed that it was essential to Canadian participation in the Scheme. If Lord Riverdale was unable to give assurance, in this respect, on behalf of the U.K. government, it would be necessary for the Canadian government to communicate direct, so that there should be no doubt whatever on this point, before the Agreement was signed.

Subsequently I explained the Prime Minister's views to Mr. Ralston and Colonel Maclachlan. Mr. Ralston spoke to Lord Riverdale on the telephone on Saturday afternoon, and subsequently Colonel Maclachlan called on Lord Riverdale and explained the position of the Canadian government, at greater length. He reported to me, later, that Lord Riverdale had said that he would consult his colleagues of the Mission. It was Colonel Maclachlan's impression that the Mission intended to cable their government for instructions on the point.

3. On Sunday morning December the 10th, Dr. Skelton, Colonel Maclachlan and I met Sir Gerald Campbell in Dr. Skelton's office, to discuss the question further. Sir Gerald urged that the Canadian government should agree to sign, the following day, without insisting upon an undertaking from the U.K. government on the matter of the organization of R.C.A.F. units and formations. The phrase "on request from the Canadian government" raised a difficult question. He had word from his government suggesting that difficulty would, in all probability, be encountered from Australia and New Zealand, if the United Kingdom were to give such an undertaking to Canada which would not extend to the other two Dominions. The United Kingdom were prepared to comply with the Canadian request concerning organization and administration of the plan and had already agreed to make the statement concerning the priority to be given to the Scheme in Canada's war effort. The organization of R.C.A.F. units and formations was a point which could safely be left to subsequent discussion between governments, under the terms of paragraph 15. The Canadian government should have confidence in the U.K. government that such discussions would lead to the "hammering out" of a satisfactory solution of the problem.

It was pointed out to Sir Gerald that the matter under discussion was not as he implied, a new question, but an old one. Colonel Maclachlan said that it had been the subject of discussion from the beginning of the negotiations; that the Canadian viewpoint in this respect had been well known to Captain Balfour, at least as early as November the 2nd, after the arrival of the

Australian delegation; that the reason why it had not been covered in terms within paragraph 15 was because it was not possible to find a formula which would fit the different views, on this subject, of the three Dominions concerned.

It was emphasized to Sir Gerald that the matter of the identification of Canadian personnel was regarded by the government as an essential feature of Canadian participation; that it had been discussed on many occasions by the Cabinet. Sir Gerald had spoken of confidence between governments in the working out of the plan. It was at least equally true that the United Kingdom should have confidence that the Canadian government would not make requests for the organization of R.C.A.F. units without preliminary exploration of the practical situation from the standpoint of joint military efficiency.

Sir Gerald reiterated the strong feeling of his government that the Memorandum should be signed immediately, particularly in view of the reports which had been made public. Further delay would create an unfavourable impression and might endanger the whole agreement.

Dr. Skelton, Colonel Maclachlan and I said that we would report to the Prime Minister the views of the U.K. government, as set out by Sir Gerald, and get into touch with him later in the day.

4. After lunch, Colonel Maclachlan saw Mr. Rogers at the hospital, and subsequently reported to me. He said that Mr. Rogers remained firmly of the view that a clear understanding should be reached with the U.K. government before the Agreement was signed. Perhaps it was unfortunate that the question had been put as a matter of interpretation of paragraph 15. It was rather that the admission of a principle was asked.

He would be prepared to regard an assurance by the U.K. government, that immediately following signature, an undertaking would be given that any request of the Canadian government concerning the organization of R.C.A.F. squadrons would be met, as sufficient. This might enable the Agreement to be signed at once, as the United Kingdom requested.

5. I reported to the Prime Minister, by telephone, the substance of our interview with Sir Gerald, and the suggestion which Mr. Rogers had made to Colonel Maclachlan.

The Prime Minister was emphatic that he could not and would not sign any Agreement until a categorical undertaking had been given by the U.K. government with respect to the organization of R.C.A.F. squadrons from Canadian personnel. This matter was regarded by the whole Cabinet as absolutely essential and was a prerequisite to signature by the Canadian government. Trouble had arisen in the last war over exactly the same principle and the Canadian government's attitude must be quite clear and incapable of misunderstanding.

If the U.K. High Commissioner and the U.K. Mission could not give the assurances required, the Canadian government would communicate directly with the U.K. government. Mr. Rogers' letter to Lord Riverdale did not represent a new request, but described the Canadian viewpoint which had been well known to those concerned with the negotiations, for some time. It was regarded as a fixed principle by the Cabinet.

6. At the Prime Minister's direction Colonel Maclachlan and I called later in the afternoon upon Sir Gerald Campbell, and explained the attitude of the Canadian government. It was quite impossible for Canada to sign until the point at issue had been completely cleared up. The issue was not a new one, as Sir Gerald appeared to think. Mr. Rogers' letter was simply intended to record an understanding which we had believed to have existed from an early stage of the negotiations. Lord Riverdale's reply to Mr. Rogers' letter came as a shock to the Canadian government, and far from satisfying our contention, it had, by the reservations which it contained, confirmed our view that the principle involved should be settled, quite clearly, before the Memorandum could be signed.

Sir Gerald reiterated what he had said in the morning, urged the importance of immediate signature, and pleaded for confidence that the United Kingdom would respect Canadian feeling in requests for the organization of R.C.A.F. units. He felt that the United Kingdom had already made several concessions in respect of the higher command, the priority to be given to the plan, and in other particulars, though strong arguments could be advanced for the contrary view, in each of these cases. It was impossible to give the assurance requested by Mr. Rogers, without referring further to London, and delay endangered the effect of the announcement of the Agreement.

Sir Gerald was informed that it was quite impossible for the Canadian government to recede from the position which it had taken upon this question. It was a reasonable attitude—it had been taken from the beginning; it was not a new request raised at the last moment; it was essential from the public point of view in Canada. The Canadian government had shown and would continue to show their determination to support the common cause. If the U.K. authorities felt that to admit the principle contended for would hamper efficient military action in the field, they gave little credit to the Canadian authorities who were equally desirous that the joint effort should be just as effective as it could be. Confidence would have to be shown on the side of the U.K. government, as well as on that of the Canadian government.

Sir Gerald said that he would prepare a cable, at once, to his government, setting out the Canadian viewpoint, and that he would report immediately he had word from London.

A. D. P. H[EENEY]

749.

72-T-38

*Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Wellington, December 11, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. New Zealand Government concur in arrangements made for announcement on Training Agreement, principles of which have their full approval. On approval of full text instructions will be issued for signature by the High Commissioner for New Zealand in London. Public statement on lines similar to your own will be made in New Zealand on Tuesday evening. Repeated to London and Canberra.

750.

72-T-38

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, December 11, 1939

Following for Mr. Crerar. Begins. Only point holding up signing of Air Training Agreement by Canada is unwillingness of the United Kingdom Government to accept our proviso that Canadian personnel from the air training plan will on request from the Canadian Government be organized in R.C.A.F. formations in the field. This is what our Government all along has understood. It is, of course, obvious that question of extent and rate at which R.C.A.F. formations would be organized would be question for decision in light of future circumstances. It might save time if you would let the British Government know how strongly our Government feel on this point. Ends.

751.

72-T-38

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
de Nouvelle-Zélande*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
of New Zealand*

TELEGRAM 14

Ottawa, December 11, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. Your telegram December 11th received.

I note that your government have approved principles of training agreement, but prefer that signature be made in London after receipt and ap-

proval of full text. We are of course quite ready to concur in this arrangement, and after consultation with United Kingdom delegation, propose to arrange for initialling here, to be followed by signature of four copies of agreement. Copies will be sent to London for signature there. As regards making public statement at time you propose, it will not be possible to initial agreement for one or two days longer. As it is desired to make announcements simultaneous in the four countries, we shall endeavour, in consultation with United Kingdom representatives here, to suggest date of public statements and to give adequate notice of such date to other countries concerned.

752.

72-T-38

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain

Ottawa, December 11, 1939

Dear Sir Gerald,

I enclose a copy of a telegram from New Zealand regarding the air training agreement.

You will note that the Prime Minister of New Zealand proposes to make a public statement on the lines of the press draft on Tuesday evening, which incidentally is very early Tuesday morning here. He has apparently so informed London and Canberra.

Mr. Savage also states that on approval of the full text, instructions will be issued for signature by the High Commissioner for New Zealand in London. Does this imply that he does not expect to give approval until the full text conveyed by Saunders has been received and examined, and that signature cannot take place until after that?

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

753.

72-T-38

Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Prime Minister of New Zealand to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Wellington, December 12, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. The proposed broadcast by New Zealand Minister of Defence on New Zealand Air Effort has been postponed until a later date.

754.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] December 13, 1939

AIR TRAINING

No direct telegram has yet been received on this subject and I have no communication from Sir Gerald Campbell on the matter.

I am perhaps unduly apprehensive, but I do feel there is a certain ambiguity in our proposal that the United Kingdom agree "that Canadian personnel from the training plan will on request from the Canadian Government be organized in Royal Canadian Air Force units and formations in the field". The arguments used by some of the proponents of this policy would lead logically to our undertaking to organize and maintain at the front all Canadian trainees. In any case there will be real difficulty in insisting on the one hand on our right to organize trainees in Royal Canadian Air Force units and on the other on the United Kingdom meeting the costs of the maintenance. There are, of course, various compromises that can be worked out whether on the line of our paying salaries of the men as distinct from the upkeep of machines or maintaining pilots and observers without ground crews or contenting ourselves with organizing a limited number of squadrons, but I do feel from what little I know of the discussions on these points that there is some danger of sliding into a position where we would have no answer either to the British Government or to some vociferous elements in the Canadian public if it were suggested that if we call the tune we should pay the Piper. I understood the eventual Empire Air Force of 196 squadrons would cost six hundred million pounds a year to maintain. Assuming that five-ninths of the men came from the Dominions and slightly over half of these from Canada it would mean £ 170,000,000 or \$750,000,000 a year for this branch alone of our war effort.

755.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] December 13, 1939

After your telephone conversation at noon today, I telephoned Sir Gerald Campbell, asking him if there was any information yet as to the United Kingdom reply on the air training question. Sir Gerald said "Nothing definite

yet". He understood a Ministers' Committee had discussed the matter and that the War Cabinet was dealing with it this morning. A telegram would then be framed and we should get it some time this afternoon or evening. I informed him that the Cabinet had endorsed the position taken with regard to the C.A.F. matter. If the United Kingdom reply was in the affirmative, the Prime Minister would be prepared to initial the agreement at once. If it was in the negative, we should like to know exactly what the reasons advanced were so that they might be given immediate consideration.

S[KELTON]

756.

Privy Council Records, PAC

Procès-verbal du Comité de guerre du Cabinet
Minutes of Cabinet War Committee

SECRET

[Ottawa,] December 14, 1939

A meeting of the War Committee of the Cabinet was held in the Prime Minister's Office in the East Block, on Thursday, December the 14th, at 6 o'clock in the afternoon.

There were present the following members of the Cabinet Committee: the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Rogers), the Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe), the Minister of Finance (Mr. Ralston).

There were also present the following Ministers: the Postmaster General (Mr. Power), the Minister of Transport (Mr. Howe).

There were also present: the Chairman of the United Kingdom Air Mission (Lord Riverdale), Member of the United Kingdom Air Mission (Air Chief Marshal Sir H. R. M. Brooke-Popham), the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom (Sir Gerald Campbell).

There were also present: the Acting Deputy Minister (Naval and Air Services) Department of National Defence (Lt. Col. K. S. Maclachlan), the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister (Mr. Heeney).

1. THE PRIME MINISTER referred to the draft formula which had been prepared by Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and Mr. Abraham of the U.K. Air Mission, with Colonel Maclachlan and Air Vice Marshal Croil, with respect to the organization of Canadians from the Air Training Plan into Royal Canadian Air Force formations and units in the field. He pointed out that this draft formula, which had been discussed in Council earlier in the afternoon, suggested that the organization of R.C.A.F. squadrons in the field should be dependent upon Canadian ground personnel, as well as Canadian air crews, being available for such purpose from time to time in sufficient numbers. This was quite a new suggestion. Paragraph 15 of the Memorandum of Agreement providing for the identification with their respective Dominions of the pupils from the Plan, made no reference to

ground personnel. The Canadian government had never contemplated supplying ground crews in proportion to Canadian air crews trained under the Plan, nor was any such suggestion to be found in the words of the Agreement.

The proposal in the draft formula that U.K. ground personnel should replace Canadian personnel engaged in the Training Plan in Canada, so that Canadian ground crews might proceed overseas, if accepted, would result in public criticism that Canadians were being substituted for U.K. personnel in zones of danger.

2. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE U.K. AIR MISSION pointed out that the draft formula provided for the replacement of Canadian ground personnel by personnel from the United Kingdom, so that the former might be available to service R.C.A.F. squadrons in the field. This proposal was intended to be helpful and to enable Canadian ground crews to proceed overseas and to make possible the organization of R.C.A.F. squadrons. The motive of this proposal was not to replace Englishmen by Canadians, in danger zones, but rather to meet the Canadian desire for opportunity for Canadian ground crews to serve in the field.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Canadian government had always assumed that the United Kingdom would provide the ground personnel for Canadian air crews trained under the Plan and that this would not prevent the identification as Canadian, under the terms of paragraph 15 of the Agreement, of squadrons so composed. This had been understood by Captain Balfour before he left Canada. The importance of identifying Canadian pupils in R.C.A.F. squadrons was, in the broad sense, political, not merely technical.

4. LORD RIVERDALE said that if the United Kingdom were to provide ground crews for Canadian flying personnel, four-fifths of the establishment of squadrons so composed would be from the United Kingdom, and one-fifth only from Canada.

Canadian pupils graduating from the Plan might be organized in the field in any one of three ways:

(a) In R.C.A.F. squadrons consisting of Canadian air and ground personnel;

(b) In "R.A.F.-Canada" squadrons with Canadian air and U.K. ground personnel; and

(c) In regular R.A.F. squadrons, as individuals, pending their posting to squadrons in one of the two other categories.

5. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE said that there was another method of organization which Lord Riverdale had not mentioned—one which the Canadian government had had clearly in mind early in the negotiations, namely the organization of Canadian air personnel from the Plan into R.C.A.F. squadrons, for which the ground crews would be provided from the R.A.F.

The identification in the field of Canadian pupils from the Plan in R.C.A.F. units and formations, should be upon the request of the Canadian government. This principle should govern the operation of paragraph 15 of the Agreement.

6. THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORT expressed the view that the proposal in the draft formula which had been discussed, that U.K. ground personnel should be sent to Canada to replace Canadian ground crews to release the latter for service in the field, offended common sense and was inefficient.

Did the U.K. Mission mean to suggest that while it was possible for R.C.A.F. air crews to join R.A.F. squadrons, it was, on the other hand, impossible for R.A.F. ground personnel to join R.C.A.F. squadrons?

7. LORD RIVERDALE replied in the negative to Mr. Howe's question, but said that the matter must be referred by the Mission to the U.K. Government. It raised constitutional difficulties in that, if the Canadian view were to be accepted, it would mean that appropriations for ground personnel from the United Kingdom for R.C.A.F. squadrons would have to be provided by the U.K. Parliament.

8. MR. RALSTON remarked that paragraph 15 of the Agreement was meaningless if it were intended that Canada would have to provide ground crews for all R.C.A.F. formations and units in the field. This had never been suggested before.

9. THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE saw no "constitutional difficulties" in the provision of ground personnel by the United Kingdom for R.C.A.F. squadrons. The Prime Minister agreed with Mr. Lapointe.

10. AIR [CHIEF] MARSHAL SIR ROBERT BROOKE-POPHAM expressed the view that it was surely not suggested that a "unit" was not "one". It must be homogeneous. He had never had the idea that R.C.A.F. squadrons would be otherwise than predominantly Canadian, both as to air and ground personnel.

11. MR. RALSTON enquired of the U.K. Mission why, if it had been intended that Canada provide ground crews for Canadian squadrons, no provision had at any stage been made for such ground personnel, in the estimates of cost. On the contrary it had never been understood that Canada should provide ground personnel for her squadrons, and the idea of replacing Canadian ground crews in Canada by personnel from the United Kingdom, had been suggested today for the first time.

12. THE PRIME MINISTER agreed with Mr. Ralston. The Canadian government had never thought of providing ground crews for formations in the field composed of Canadian pupils from the Plan. Was it not true that the word "pupils" throughout the Agreement referred only to air crews and nowhere was intended to include ground personnel? Canadian estimates had been based upon such an interpretation of the expression.

13. SIR ROBERT BROOKE-POPHAM agreed with the Prime Minister that "pupils" in the Agreement meant air crews only.

14. THE POSTMASTER GENERAL remarked that he had understood that what the United Kingdom wanted to obtain of Canada was Canadian pilots. It was obviously impossible for Canada to provide complete units.

15. THE PRIME MINISTER referred to the situation before the proposal of a joint training scheme when each country provided its own personnel independently. Organizations had been quite separate and distinct. This had been superseded by the idea of a common Plan, to be worked out together.

16. LORD RIVERDALE stated that it was obvious in the circumstances that he would have to cable to his own government for instructions. The U.K. government had told him that they were most anxious to do everything possible to meet the Canadian viewpoint in this matter. Today's discussions, however, clearly introduced a question upon which he would require specific instructions.

17. MR. RALSTON said that the Canadian government were also most anxious to reach agreement with the United Kingdom. The point under discussion, however, and the viewpoint which the Canadian government had expressed, was absolutely fundamental from the public point of view.

The meeting adjourned at 6.55 p.m.

A. D. P. H[EENEY]

Note—This meeting followed a meeting of the Cabinet at which, in addition to members of the government, the Acting Deputy Minister (Naval and Air Services), the Chief of the Air Staff and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister were present, to report the result of conversations with members of the U.K. Air Mission regarding the wording of a satisfactory formula with respect to the organization of Canadian pupils into R.C.A.F. units and formations in the field. The draft formula presented by Colonel Maclachlan and prepared by Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and Mr. Abraham, with Colonel Maclachlan and Air Vice Marshal Croil, proposed the organization of R.C.A.F. squadrons as and when sufficient Canadian air *and ground* personnel should be available. This proposal was considered by the Cabinet and found to be quite unsatisfactory in that it would limit the number of R.C.A.F. squadrons in the field to those for whom Canadian ground crews could be provided. This would mean quite inadequate Canadian representation, which would not satisfy public sentiment in Canada.

It was decided that a meeting of the War Committee should be held immediately to discuss the question further with the U.K. Air Mission.

A. D. P. H[EENEY]

757.

72-T-38

Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Canberra, December 15, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. I propose to make a statement for publication in the Australian press tomorrow morning Saturday with regard to Agreement between Great Britain and Australia in connection with Empire Air Training scheme. I am forwarding copies of my statement to you *en clair*.

758.

72-T-38

Le premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande au Premier ministre
Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister

TELEGRAM

Wellington, December 15, 1939

IMMEDIATE. The Prime Minister of Australia informs me he is making a statement for publication tomorrow morning, Saturday, concerning the Agreement between Great Britain and Australia in connection with the Empire Air Training Scheme. I should be glad to learn whether there is any immediate likelihood of arranging for synchronized release of agreed statement referred to in your telegram dated December 11th.

759.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre d'Australie
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister of Australia

TELEGRAM 24

Ottawa, December 15, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. Am much obliged by your advising me in your telegram of this date of your intention to make statement for publication in the Australian press of Saturday morning. Understanding here has been that agreed public statement would be issued in all four capitals at agreed time after initialling of memorandum. I believe United Kingdom authorities have taken up this matter with you. This agreed statement could then be followed by individual supplementary statements as each Government thought desirable. We are hoping very shortly to arrange matters for final initialling here and in that event would suggest the time for simultaneous release. I very much hope it will be possible for you to postpone statement in the meantime.

760.

72-T-38

Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Canberra, December 15, 1939

An Agreement has been signed by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Australia as part of the vast Empire Scheme of Air Training, the Prime Minister (Mr. Menzies) said today.

The whole scheme involves the expenditure of millions of pounds, the training of many thousands of pilots, observers and air gunners in Empire countries and the mobilisation of men and modern aircraft in an Empire air effort which will play a decisive part in this war.

The Empire scheme will afford a remarkable example of the unity and strength of Great Britain and the Dominions working together for supremacy in the air.

The extent of Australia's participation is in keeping with the bold sweep of the whole scheme. Australia will make a substantial contribution to the pooling of Empire air resources in this spectacular project. Not only will we be a unit in the massed Empire forces but we will add immeasurably to the defence strength of the Commonwealth by creating in Australia an organization which will be much bigger than we could ever have hoped to attain by ourselves.

At the Conference recently held in Ottawa between representatives of the Governments concerned in the air scheme, Australia sought and obtained the right to train completely a substantial proportion of the Australian quota of men in our own country. As the first objective of the scheme contemplates an Australian quota of 26,000 men the importance of this feature in increasing the strength of our own air arm may be appreciated.

The original conception of the scheme was that all Dominions should undertake their own elementary training but that all service training should be carried out in Canada owing to its special advantages in being closest to the United Kingdom, its greater potentiality for the manufacture of service type of aircraft and its proximity to the great resources of the United States of America.

Having regard to current economic considerations, the avoidance of exchange difficulties and the contribution the scheme will make to national security, both during the war and from the residual value of the organization developed, the Commonwealth Government represented that in addition to the elementary training of the full quota of pilots and the initial training of the full quota of air crews the service training of personnel should be carried out in Australia to the maximum of our resources, leaving only a relatively small proportion to be undertaken in Canada. Arrangements on these lines have now been made by Mr. Fairbairn.

An outline of the scheme as accepted is as follows:

PERSONNEL TO BE PROVIDED. On a population basis the Commonwealth is to train as soon as possible as a first objective a total of approximately 26,000, comprising 10,400 pilots and 15,600 observers and wireless operators and air gunners. All personnel will receive their elementary training in Australia and all will be completely trained in Australia, except some thousands who will receive their service training in Canada.

AIRCRAFT. Elementary Trainers. Australia is to provide all elementary training aircraft to be used in Australia but Great Britain will contribute free 50 per cent of the engines required in kind or in cash.

Intermediate Trainers. Australia is to provide all Wirraways for intermediate training but Great Britain will contribute the cost of a large number of Wirraways, calculated on the price of the corresponding type in United States of America or provide in kind an equivalent number of similar aircraft to the extent necessary to supplement local production [of] advanced training and service training aircraft.

Great Britain will contribute free all aircraft required in Australia for advanced training of pilots and for the training of air crews, except for the small number of aircraft necessary for the wireless training of air gunners. The types which will be supplied for this purpose will be Fairey Battles and Avro Ansons.

Wastage, Replacement and Spares. Great Britain will contribute free all aircraft to replace wastage of those originally contributed, also the appropriate maintenance spare parts.

Training Schools in Australia. Australia will accept responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of the necessary training schools and establishments in Australia except for the contribution in aircraft by Great Britain. The existing air force training organisation will be expanded considerably and the new schools to be formed are: 3 Initial Ground Training Schools, 9 Elementary Flying Training Schools, 7 Service Flying Training Schools, 4 Air Observers' Schools, 4 Bombing and Gunnery Schools, 4 Wireless Air Gunners' Schools, 1 Wireless Operators' School, 2 Air Navigation Schools.

INSTRUCTORS. Great Britain offers to provide on loan under the usual conditions the instructors necessary to supplement those which can be provided from our own resources.

Retention of Australian Identity. All trainees will be enlisted in the Royal Australian Air Force and on completion of training will be attached to the Royal Air Force from the date of embarkation for Great Britain, those completing air training in Canada will be attached to the Royal Canadian Air Force whilst in that country.

The details of the allotment and organisation of Australians in the Empire Air Force have not been finally determined but the Government has laid it down and it has been agreed that their Australian identity is to be retained as far as possible.

Pay of Personnel. Australia will accept the responsibility for all pay and allowances whilst personnel are serving in Australia.

Great Britain will bear the cost of pay, allowances and pensions at English rates from date of embarkation for England.

The pay of the quota being trained in Canada will be borne *pro rata* by all Governments at Canadian rates of pay until completion of service training.

The relation of these provisions to Australian rates of pay and pensions is being examined.

Cost. The cost of the training to be carried out in Australia has not yet been worked out in detail. An approximate estimate of the capital expenditure involved is £20,000,000 (Australian) and the maintenance expenditure for a full year at the maximum output (which will not of course be attained for some time) [will] be £15,000,000 (Australian). The total cost of the scheme within the next three years is estimated to be not less than £50,000,000 (Australian).

I would express the Government's appreciation of the able manner in which my colleague, the Minister for Air, has carried out the negotiations at Ottawa.

This scheme from the Australian aspect is one in which we have an aptitude for a notable contribution by reason of our growing air mindedness, ideal flying conditions and aviation resources both air force and civil which were expanded and developed as a matter of definite policy in the years preceding the war. The large proportion of local expenditure will be of some advantage and the aircraft industry will be greatly stimulated. The existence of extensive training establishments and large numbers of instructors, the great increase in the number of aircraft in the country and the regular output of pilots and crews will add to the defensive strength of the Commonwealth and render it more able to play its part in the war effort of the Empire generally. Message ends.

761.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 127

Ottawa, December 16, 1939

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following from my Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. After several days of conference between members of the Government and the United Kingdom Air Mission, on the important question of the status in the field of Canadian personnel trained under the training plan, Lord Riverdale, as Chairman of the Mission, asked me to meet him yesterday morning to see if we could not agree on the statement which, if made by him,

would be regarded as a satisfactory reply to a letter on this subject written to him by the Minister of National Defence on December 8th.

2. The letter of the Minister of National Defence was as follows:

My dear Lord Riverdale,

Paragraph 15 of the memorandum of agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, relating to training of pilots and aircraft crews in Canada, and their subsequent service, reads as follows:

The United Kingdom Government undertakes that pupils of Canada, Australia and New Zealand shall, after training is completed, be identified with their respective Dominions, either by the method of organizing Dominion Units and formations or in some other way, such methods to be agreed upon with the respective Dominion Governments concerned. The United Kingdom Government will initiate intergovernmental discussions to this end.

In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I understand that you accept as the proper interpretation of this paragraph that Canadian personnel from the training plan will, on request from the Canadian Government, be organized in Royal Canadian Air Force units and formations in the field. I shall be obliged if you will confirm this interpretation of paragraph 15, by letter.

Yours sincerely,

NORMAN MCL. ROGERS

3. Lord Riverdale and I agreed upon the wording of a statement which each of us regarded as expressing the true position, and which he was prepared to sign and I to accept, such acceptance to be followed by signature of the Agreement by Lord Riverdale and myself.

4. Lord Riverdale left my office to prepare a letter to the Minister of National Defence embodying this statement. To my surprise Lord Riverdale later telephoned me to say that, having shown the proposed communication to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom and to one of his colleagues on the United Kingdom Mission, they had said to him that, as cables had gone to London from Ottawa last night, they thought he should not sign until a reply to these cables had been received. I drew Lord Riverdale's attention to the announcement made yesterday by the Prime Minister of Australia that an agreement had been reached between Australia and the United Kingdom, which statement made public most of the features of the joint training plan. I pointed out that our Government had been greatly embarrassed in consequence, and I added that, seeing he and I were agreed on the solution of the only matter outstanding, it was most desirable that the Agreement itself should be signed without further delay.

5. I therefore suggested that Lord Riverdale communicate by telephone with London, advising the Air Ministry of the agreement that he and I had reached. To my surprise I received from Lord Riverdale this evening the following communication which, he informs me, was dictated to him over the telephone as the reply to be made to the Canadian Government instead of that which he had agreed with me that he would make to the letter of the Minister of National Defence.

6. The letter follows:

My dear Prime Minister,

I have discussed on the telephone this evening with Sir Kingsley Wood the matters which formed the subject of our conversation this afternoon relating to the letter which I received on the 8th December from the Minister of National Defence on the meaning of paragraph 15 of the Memorandum of Agreement.

I have now been authorized to reply to the above mentioned letter from Mr. Rogers in the following terms:

On the understanding that the numbers to be incorporated at any time would be the subject of agreement between the two Governments, the United Kingdom Government accepts in principle as being consonant with the intention of paragraph 15 of the Memorandum of Agreement that the United Kingdom Government on the request of the Canadian Government would agree to the incorporation of Canadian pupils when passing out from the training scheme into units of the Royal Canadian Air Force in the field.

The detailed method by which this will be done will be arranged by an Inter-Governmental Committee for this purpose under paragraph 15.

It would be a condition that the factor governing the numbers of such pupils to be so incorporated at any one time should be the financial contribution which the Canadian Government have already declared themselves ready to make towards the cost of the training scheme.

If the foregoing proposals meet with the approval of the Canadian Government I am authorized to sign the Memorandum of Agreement forthwith.

Yours sincerely,

RIVERDALE

7. After consultation with my colleagues, I have handed to Lord Riverdale a reply to his letter in the following terms:

Dear Lord Riverdale,

This morning you asked if I would meet you in order that, together, we might endeavour to reach a decision with respect to the one matter which has been holding up the signing of the agreement respecting the Joint Air Training Plan.

I met you at my office, and together we discussed the matter both before and after luncheon; before luncheon, in the presence of my colleague, the Minister of Finance, and after luncheon, in the presence of my colleagues, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of National Defence.

At the beginning of the afternoon's conversations, you presented us with a statement which you said you were prepared to embody in a letter to Mr. Rogers in reply to his letter to you of December the 8th. In the course of our conversations, a few slight changes were made in the statement. The statement was then rewritten in the light of these modifications, to read as follows:

Replying to your letter of December 8th, knowing the earnest desire of the United Kingdom Government that the Royal Canadian Air Force shall be directly represented in the field, I can readily agree that in carrying out paragraph 15 the United Kingdom Government will, if requested by the Canadian Government, arrange that the Canadian personnel from the training plan will be organized as Royal Canadian Air Force Units and formations in the field; the detailed methods by which this will be done to be arranged by an

inter-governmental committee to be appointed for this purpose under paragraph 15.

You stated repeatedly that you were prepared to reply to Mr. Rogers' letter in the terms of the statement above set forth, if on behalf of my colleagues, I would agree to this being a satisfactory reply.

As you will recall, I took the position with each of my colleagues that the above statement accurately embodied what the Government had considered acceptable as the policy to be followed in carrying out paragraph 15 of the Memorandum of Agreement, and I agreed to the letter which you proposed to send Mr. Rogers, and that upon its receipt by him, I would sign the Agreement itself on behalf of the Government of Canada.

At the time of this understanding between us, there was no question of the statement being subject to further revision.

In the concluding paragraph of your letter this evening, just received, a factor which was never so much as referred to in any conversations I have had with you is now being made a condition precedent to a reply on your part to Mr. Rogers' letter in the terms agreed to this afternoon. This factor is that the organization of R.C.A.F. units is to be measured by the cold consideration of financial contribution, disregarding entirely Canada's heavy contribution of fighting men in the way of pilots, observers and gunners.

My colleagues and I are prepared to abide by the terms of the Agreement reached with you this afternoon, and as soon as Mr. Rogers' letter has been replied to in accordance with the statement handed to us and agreed upon, I am prepared, on behalf of the Government, to sign the Memorandum of Agreement.

I regret to have to inform you that, in reference to this vital matter, the Government cannot regard your letter as a satisfactory reply to Mr. Rogers' letter.

Yours sincerely,

W. L. MACKENZIE KING.

8. I fear there is grave danger of the whole Joint Training Plan being seriously imperilled unless agreement between our two Governments can be reached without further delay.

9. Lord Riverdale has been present at most of the discussions which have taken place between members of his Mission and members of our Government, and I feel that in the statement which he agreed to this afternoon, he was sincerely expressing the opinion which he believed accurately described the intent and purpose of the clause in the Agreement to which it refers. My colleagues hold the same view. In these circumstances I feel that the Government of the United Kingdom would wish to support the head of their Mission.

10. I cannot too strongly impress upon you the importance which the people of Canada will attach to the principle involved in the letter of the Minister of National Defence, of December 8th, affecting as it does Canadian fighting personnel in the field.

11. We are most anxious to conclude the arrangement and get under way with the plan as rapidly as possible, and will greatly appreciate any steps which you may find it possible to take to ensure this end. Ends. Message ends.

762.

72-T-38

Le premier ministre d'Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM

Canberra, December 16, 1939

IMMEDIATE. I have received your telegram December 15th regarding Air Training Scheme. I greatly regret your request was not received until after statement had actually been released. Wish, however, to make it quite clear that statement related only to training etc. in Australia as proposed under United Kingdom-Australia Agreement and was issued after consultation and with the concurrence of the United Kingdom Air Ministry.

We are awaiting advice from you regarding final initialling of Empire Agreement and arrangements of time for simultaneous release. I shall be most happy to cooperate with you and other parties in this regard.

763.

72-T-38

Le Premier ministre au premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande
Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand

TELEGRAM 15

Ottawa, December 16, 1939

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram of December 15th regarding the Australian statement as to Air Training Scheme.

2. A telegram from Canberra was received here a little earlier yesterday morning, our December 15th, stating that the Prime Minister proposed to make a statement for publication in the Australian press on Saturday morning Australian reckoning. We immediately cabled suggesting the statement be deferred.

3. We have this morning received a further telegram from Canberra regretting our request was not received until statement had actually been released, adding that it had been issued after consultation with and concurrence of the United Kingdom Air Ministry. The Australian Prime Minister states that on advice from us regarding final initialling of Empire Agreement, which he distinguishes from the United Kingdom-Australian Agreement, he will arrange for simultaneous release.

4. We had expected to initial agreement yesterday afternoon. If this had been arranged we proposed to suggest immediate release of agreed press statement in New Zealand and Australia, and publication in United Kingdom and Canadian papers the following morning. I had also arranged to make

a broadcast on the evening of the succeeding day and to give further non-confidential details to the press a day later. There is, however, one matter affecting the United Kingdom and Canada still outstanding and while we have been doing our best to obtain a decision on this question it now appears that initialling will have to be deferred until after a reply from London has been received. We expect this will be settled very shortly and shall advise you of hour arranged for initialling after which agreed press statement may be issued as soon as meets your convenience. It has been our understanding that any government may supplement this preliminary common statement later by reference to any matters which it has not been arranged to keep secret. On this latter point I understand United Kingdom High Commissioner here has communicated with you. We shall send simultaneous telegram to Australia for such action as may there be considered desirable.

764.

72-T-38

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain

SECRET

Ottawa, December 16, 1939

My dear Sir Gerald,

We have this morning received a telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia in which he deeply regrets that our request for postponement was not received until after the statement had actually been released. He adds that he wishes to make it quite clear that the statement related only to training, etc., in Australia, as proposed under the Australian-United Kingdom Agreement.

He informs us further that this statement was issued after consultation with and with the concurrence of the United Kingdom Air Ministry. I imagine this will be as much news to you as it is to us.

The Prime Minister adds that on advice from us regarding the final initialling of the Empire Agreement and the arrangement as to the time for simultaneous release, he will be happy to co-operate with all parties in this regard. We have cabled New Zealand this morning regarding the Australian statement, adding that we hope to advise them shortly as to the time for simultaneous release of the agreed statement.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

765.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 128

Ottawa, December 16, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Air Training Agreement. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. In my telegram this morning I referred to announcement made yesterday by the Prime Minister of Australia. We were advised yesterday morning by Prime Minister of Australia that he proposed to issue a statement regarding Agreement between Great Britain and Australia. The Prime Minister of New Zealand cabled us he had received similar information. We immediately cabled suggesting statement be deferred in view of arrangement for simultaneous issue of agreed public statement in all four capitals after initialling of Memorandum.

2. We have this morning received a reply regretting that our request had not been received until after statement had actually been released. The Prime Minister of Australia adds that the statement related only to training in Australia as proposed under the United Kingdom-Australian Agreement and that it was issued after consultation with and concurrence of the United Kingdom Air Ministry. He adds that on advice of final initialling of Empire Agreement Australia will arrange for simultaneous release, presumably of agreed press statement. I am bringing this to your attention in view of the fact that announcement of Australian-United Kingdom Agreement, which is as was stated in that announcement yesterday "part of the vast Empire Scheme of Air training", is indicated as having been made with United Kingdom concurrence. I cannot begin to express my amazement that without consultation with the Government of Canada, the United Kingdom Air Ministry should have concurred in the issue of the statement by Australia before agreement had been reached between all parties. I need hardly add that the publication has caused great embarrassment to our Government in relation to other Commonwealth Governments as well as to the press and people of our own country. Ends.

766.

King Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du Premier ministre
Memorandum by Prime Minister

7.30 p.m.

Ottawa, December 16, 1939

COMMENTS BY COL. RALSTON

Brooke-Popham wished to strike out the word "the" before: "arrange that the Canadian pupils, etc.". Ralston said he would not slaughter his own

child; that the objective of the Agreement was to have all the Canadians formed into formations and units under their own command. That was the objective, and we wish to be free to say that, though we realized that it might not be possible to reach the objective. That the Canadian Government was conceding three factors; no one of which, strictly speaking, should be conceded. In the first place, they were allowing use in the memorandum of the word "numbers"—"that the numbers to be incorporated, etc." Secondly, they were asking the British Government to agree only in principle; and in the third place, they were leaving the working out of the scheme to an inter-governmental committee.

He said that Brooke-Popham wanted to have inserted the words: "the extent to which . . ." before the words: "the detailed methods by which . . ." but Ralston said he had already gone as far as he should go in meeting that point by agreeing to the reference to numbers, above. He, however, made this concession to Brooke-Popham: The draft had stood: "The detailed methods by which this would be done will be arranged . . ." He agreed to change the "will" to "can". This pleased Lord Riverdale very much. Brooke-Popham said he didn't see any difference, and asked what it meant. Ralston said it meant what it said: "That if it can be done, it should be done; if it can't be done, it can't be done." That that was something the Committee would work out and decide upon. By substituting "can" instead of "will" he had made the path easier. That if it can't be done, it won't be insisted upon.

I told Ralston that I would agree to the above text as an answer to Rogers' letter by Lord Riverdale, and I would undertake to speak for both Rogers and Howe. That, if he himself was agreeable and satisfied, I would be satisfied.

He asked me whether I felt that we should concede the words: "the extent to which." I was rather hesitant in my reply, and tried to indicate that I would go that far, inasmuch as it clearly is not going to be possible to include every individual. On the other hand, I agreed with Ralston that the third concession, above mentioned, afforded all that is necessary by way of protection to the British Government in that connection.

Ralston is leaving in an hour for Montreal by plane. He has offered to stay behind if necessary.

Ralston said that Lord Riverdale was all right. That he thought he was anxious to have this matter concluded for my birthday. I told Ralston that I thought it should be concluded tonight, so that it would be broadcast on my birthday.

I told Ralston to advise Riverdale of my willingness to accept the above draft, and of my readiness and desire to sign the agreement tonight. I suggested to Ralston to ring up Riverdale again, not only to tell him what I was prepared to agree to, but that I wanted to point out to him that our men would be landing at once, and that our Tuesday's papers would be devoted to that event. That I thought it would be very unfortunate if the Air Training project would be announced at the same time as the landing of our troops.

That the benefit of both would be, in large part, destroyed. That I thought the advantage to the British Empire in raising the spirits of its people, and the corresponding psychological effect in the spirits of the enemy would be very great if we could announce the Air Training Scheme in advance of the landing of our men and have one big stroke follow within a day or two of each other. That I thought he would realize the political significance of this and what his Government would wish to have done. And that I was speaking to him as Prime Minister of Canada, urging this on behalf of Canada's effort, and also on behalf of the British people themselves, and that I wanted him to see that this fact was made known to Chamberlain. That I regarded it as of the greatest possible importance.

Ralston rang me back after he had had his talk and said that Riverdale was much impressed by what I had said in this regard. That he would ring me up later on. (I had indicated my willingness to have him do so.) He had told Ralston he was having a very difficult time with Sir Brooke-Popham. That he wanted further time to think the matter over quietly. That he, Riverdale, was quite satisfied with the statement, and was anxious to have the matter settled at once.

Ralston said he would be at his office for another hour before taking the plane for Montreal, but would stay on for another hour if I wished him to do so.

W. L. M. K[ING]

767.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le chef de la mission aérienne de Grande-Bretagne au ministre
de la Défense nationale*

Chairman, Air Mission of Great Britain, to Minister of National Defence

Ottawa, December 16, 1939

Dear Mr. Rogers,

Referring to your letter to me of December the 8th.

On the understanding that the numbers to be incorporated or organized at any time will be the subject of discussion between the two governments, the United Kingdom Government accepts in principle, as being consonant with the intention of Paragraph 15 of the Memorandum of Agreement that the United Kingdom Government, on the request of the Canadian Government, would arrange that Canadian pupils, when passing out from the training scheme, will be incorporated in or organized as units and formations of the Royal Canadian Air Force in the field. The detailed methods by which this can be done would be arranged by an intergovernmental committee for this purpose under Paragraph 15.

Yours sincerely,

RIVERDALE

768.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 129

Ottawa, December 17, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

I am glad to advise you that shortly after midnight the Commonwealth Air Training Agreement was signed by Lord Riverdale and myself. Ends.

769.

72-T-38

Le Premier ministre au premier ministre d'Australie¹
Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia¹

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, December 17, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Air Training Agreement without any change in substance was signed by United Kingdom and Canadian representatives shortly after midnight. As no newspapers are published in Canada on Sunday, I shall give a general broadcast Sunday night at nine o'clock dealing with Canadian background and with general terms of Agreement. This broadcast with the agreed press statement will be published in our Monday morning press, and statement will also be published Monday morning in United Kingdom. I would therefore suggest that agreed press statement be released at any convenient time approximating nine o'clock Sunday night Ottawa time, followed at any time by such supplementary material as your Government considers desirable. We expect to release the non-confidential details to press here for Monday afternoon or Tuesday morning papers but see no reason why your Government should not release similar material at any time after issue of agreed release. Simple announcement that Agreement had been signed or initialled on behalf of all four Governments may be made on radio here Sunday morning and your Government may wish if convenient to adopt similar course before issuing the agreed press statement.

770.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 124

London, December 17, 1939

IMMEDIATE. I have today been present at disembarkation of Canadian Troops at Glasgow. No one who was there could fail to be deeply impressed

¹ Un télégramme identique fut envoyé au premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande.

¹ An identical telegram was sent to the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

and I feel highly privileged at having been able to take part in this moving historic occasion.

While at Glasgow I learnt with great satisfaction that Air Training Scheme Agreement was signed in Ottawa early this morning. I know that I express your view also when I say with confidence today's signature marks what will be an important stage in our progress to victory as well as in the Empire co-operation.

It is indeed a happy coincidence that these two significant events should have taken place on your birthday and I send you my greetings and hearty congratulations.

ANTHONY EDEN

771.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

SECRET

Ottawa, December 18, 1939

My dear Dr. Skelton,

Thank you for your letter of the 16th December regarding the telegram which you had received from the Prime Minister of Australia about his statement on the subject of the air training scheme.

Mr. Menzies' intimation that his statement was issued after consultation with and with the concurrence of the United Kingdom Air Ministry came as a complete surprise to me and immediately on receipt of your letter I took the matter up by telegraph with London. I have now received a reply stating that it seems clear that there was a genuine misunderstanding. The United Kingdom authorities thought that it had been impressed upon Mr. Fairbairn in conversation with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air that if the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth felt that he had no alternative but to make a statement at this stage, he should confine this to the United Kingdom-Australia agreement and, generally speaking, should not go beyond what Mr. Fairbairn had himself broadcast in Canada. The United Kingdom authorities further understood that Mr. Menzies would give advance intimation to them and to the other Dominions concerned of the purport of the proposed statement.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

772.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 126

London, December 21, 1939

SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins. On my return from France, I have been able to consider your telegrams December 16th, No. 127 and No. 128 and your telegram December 17th, No. 129. I thank you for informing me of signature of Agreement by your telegram No. 129, and am glad to think difficulties referred to in your telegram No. 127 were subsequently found capable of adjustment. As regards your telegram No. 128, I understand that our High Commissioner has since explained our position in the matter. It is evident that some regrettable misunderstanding must have occurred. I am happy to think these matters now belong to the past, and that Air Training Scheme, which is so important to all of us will now get under way as rapidly as possible.

For our part I can assure you that we shall spare no efforts to ensure its success. Ends.

773.

King Papers, PAC

Mémoire du secrétaire principal au Premier ministre
Memorandum by Principal Secretary to Prime Minister

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, December 22, 1939

RE: BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN, NEGOTIATIONS
 OF DECEMBER 15-16, 1939

The following is a brief summary of the course of negotiations leading up to the signature of the Memorandum of Agreement, in the early morning of December the 17th.

Friday, December 15th

1. During the morning, the Prime Minister telephoned me and directed me to call upon Lord Riverdale, and, on his behalf as Prime Minister of Canada, urge him, as head of the United Kingdom Mission to do everything in his power to see that the Agreement was signed forthwith. The premature announcement by the Prime Minister of Australia and the attitude which had been adopted, particularly on the previous day, by members of the U.K. Air Mission with respect to the organization of Canadians graduating from the Plan, in R.C.A.F. squadrons in the field (Mr. Rogers' letter to Lord Riverdale of December the 8th) threatened the entire Scheme. The matter had become even more serious—it threatened good relations within the Commonwealth.

2. I called on Lord Riverdale in the House of Commons shortly before twelve o'clock, noon, and conveyed to him the Prime Minister's message. Lord Riverdale said he also felt that the situation was most serious. He and his colleagues had strongly resented the suggestion which had been made at the meeting with the War Committee of the Cabinet the preceding evening, that the proposal that R.A.F. ground personnel should replace R.C.A.F. in Canada, was aimed at substituting Canadians for Englishmen in zones of danger. The proposal had been made solely to meet the expressed Canadian desire to have R.C.A.F. ground personnel in the field. We would have difficulty in restraining our ground crews in Canada—they would want to go to the front.

Lord Riverdale felt that after last evening's meeting with the War Committee, we were farther than ever from an agreement. He would, however, be glad to speak to the Prime Minister, if I thought that would help. I said that I thought it would, and he spoke to Mr. King on the telephone, and subsequently met Mr. King at the East Block.

3. Lord Riverdale saw the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance from about 12.40 to 1.10 p.m. It is my understanding that at this meeting a draft answer was prepared to the letter written by the Minister of National Defence, to Lord Riverdale, on December the 8th, regarding the organization of R.C.A.F. squadrons from the Training Plan.

4. The Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of National Defence saw Lord Riverdale, in the Prime Minister's Office, after lunch. It is my understanding that at this meeting the form of reply to Mr. Rogers' letter of December the 8th, which had been drafted before lunch, was typed and revised, and accepted by both the Prime Minister and Lord Riverdale as a satisfactory formula for agreement with respect to the organization of R.C.A.F. units and formations from Canadians graduating from the Training Plan. After this meeting Lord Riverdale left, presumably to prepare the letter for signature and inform his colleagues of what had taken place.

5. My understanding is that Lord Riverdale, later in the afternoon, telephoned to the Prime Minister to say that he had consulted his colleagues and that they had persuaded him that he should not sign the draft reply until answers had been received to cables sent to London, on the subject. Upon the Prime Minister's pointing out the extreme urgency, Lord Riverdale agreed to telephone London for instructions, and subsequently communicate with Mr. King.

6. At about 9 p.m., word was received that Lord Riverdale had spoken to Sir Kingsley Wood and was preparing a letter to the Prime Minister, in the light of instructions received.

7. At about 9.30 p.m., the Prime Minister came to the East Block, where he was subsequently joined by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of

Transport. Mr. Abraham delivered to the Prime Minister a letter from Lord Riverdale setting out a further revised reply proposed to be sent to Mr. Rogers' letter of December the 8th, and introducing the new criterion of financial contribution as a basis for the proportion of R.C.A.F. units to be organized.

The Prime Minister immediately drafted, (and subsequently revised with Mr. Ralston and Mr. Howe) a reply to Lord Riverdale's letter stating that the formula now proposed, was quite unacceptable.

8. At the Prime Minister's request, Lord Riverdale and Sir Robert Brooke-Popham attended at the East Block and remained in conference with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Transport until about 1 a.m. It is my understanding that at this meeting the Prime Minister expressed to Lord Riverdale his complete dissatisfaction with the terms of the last paragraph of the formula proposed in Lord Riverdale's letter. He also handed Lord Riverdale the reply which had been prepared.

9. After Lord Riverdale and Sir Robert Brooke-Popham had retired, the Prime Minister, with Mr. Ralston and Mr. Howe, dictated a long cable to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, describing what had taken place.

The text of this cable was gone over and approved for coding and despatch by Mr. Pickersgill and myself, at 2.45 a.m.

Saturday, December 16th

During the morning Mr. Abraham of the U.K. Mission called and asked me privately whether I thought the reply proposed in Lord Riverdale's letter of the previous evening would be acceptable to the Canadian government, if the concluding paragraph were omitted. I replied that I had no doubt that the last paragraph contained the matter principally objectionable from the Canadian point of view, but of course could give no assurance that its omission would be sufficient to our government.

10. At the Prime Minister's direction, I enquired of the Minister of Finance and the Minister of National Defence their views as to the sufficiency of Lord Riverdale's proposed reply, omitting the last paragraph. Mr. Rogers agreed that the draft, without the last paragraph would be acceptable, but queried the word "incorporated" and would have preferred adding "and formations" after "units". Mr. Ralston felt that dropping the last paragraph would mean some advance but still objected to "numbers" being subject to subsequent discussion between the governments.

The views of Mr. Rogers and Mr. Ralston were communicated to the Prime Minister some time after 3 p.m.

11. I understand that later in the afternoon Mr. Ralston met Lord Riverdale and Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and together they worked out a revised formula for Lord Riverdale's reply to Mr. Rogers' letter of December the 8th.

12. At 9.20 p.m. the Prime Minister directed me to attend with him at Government House as he had decided to lay the whole matter before His Excellency, as the representative of His Majesty, because of his view that the situation would become extremely serious if the Agreement were not signed immediately.

13. The Prime Minister was with His Excellency from about 9.30 to 10.00 p.m. On leaving Government House the Prime Minister told me that he had explained the situation fully to His Excellency and suggested that as the principal barrier to agreement seemed to be the views of Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and the technical men, His Excellency might agree to interview Sir Robert. The Governor General entirely agreed with Mr. King's view of the seriousness of the situation and that the Agreement must be signed forthwith; further, that the matter had now become one of high policy and signature must on no account be delayed.

14. At about 10.20 p.m. the Prime Minister called at the East Block, word having been sent to Lord Riverdale that Mr. King wished to see him there. Lord Riverdale arrived at about 10.50 p.m., having been summoned from a dinner party at Sir Shuldham Redfern's, and having called en route, I understand, to consult with Sir Gerald Campbell, at Earncliffe. In the meantime Sir Robert Brooke-Popham had been summoned to Government House to see His Excellency.

15. Lord Riverdale was closeted with the Prime Minister from 10.50 p.m., and during that time dictated a reply to Mr. Rogers' letter of December the 8th, in terms which the Prime Minister felt would be satisfactory to the Ministers concerned.

At 11.15 the Prime Minister telephoned Mr. Ralston in Montreal and obtained his agreement to the terms of this communication.

The letter was then signed by Lord Riverdale and handed to the Prime Minister, and at Mr. King's request, I obtained the copies of the Memorandum of Agreement, for execution.

16. At about 12.05 a.m., Lord Riverdale and the Prime Minister began to sign the five copies of the Memorandum of Agreement, in the presence of Dr. Skelton, Mr. Turnbull and myself. Mr. Abraham was also present, and Sir Robert Brooke-Popham arrived from Government House during the process of signature.

17. When signature had been completed, Lord Riverdale expressed, on behalf of his government, the great satisfaction which was felt that agreement had been reached, also his appreciation of the assistance and co-operation of the Canadian Ministers and officials.

The Prime Minister thanked Lord Riverdale and expressed satisfaction that the Agreement had been signed without further delay, and his feeling that the Plan would now be worked out in the same co-operative spirit and would prove an important factor in the successful prosecution of the war.

Sir Robert Brooke-Popham said that he was happy that the Agreement had been signed and that he and his colleagues could be counted upon to do their utmost in collaboration with the Canadian government, to see that the Plan proved a success.

18. Dr. Skelton had drafted a communication to the governments of Australia and New Zealand concerning arrangements for a press release, and the making public of further details. This was approved by the Prime Minister.

Dr. Skelton, Mr. Turnbull and I later attended at Earnscliffe where the High Commissioner and the members of the U.K. Mission approved arrangements concerning press releases. We left Earnscliffe about 2 a.m.

19. Sir Gerald, when we arrived at Earnscliffe, expressed himself as very upset that he had been unable to communicate, by telephone, with Lord Riverdale at the Prime Minister's Office prior to signature of the Memorandum of Agreement. He had tried three times to get through, but had been unable to. I explained that this was my responsibility; that on the first occasion on which he called, Lord Riverdale had been closeted with the Prime Minister and I understood that Sir Gerald wished to speak to Lord Riverdale only when the latter was free. I had later tried to get through to Sir Gerald without success and had then been summoned to the Prime Minister. In any event I was not aware that there was any urgency in the call. Sir Gerald said that nonetheless he had felt hurt, though the message which he had to communicate was a telegram from his government, which was most co-operative.

A. D. P. H[EENEY]

PARTIE 2/PART 2

LE PLAN EN VIGUEUR
THE PLAN IN OPERATION

774.

72-AZ-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

Ottawa, January 4, 1940

Dear Sir Gerald,

The Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence has brought to my attention a special question concerning the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. It relates particularly to the disciplinary control, administration, etc., of the United Kingdom personnel while undergoing training in Canada.

The Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, Chapter 21, Statutes of Canada 1933, makes provision whereby visiting forces may retain jurisdiction in respect of discipline, administration, etc., over their own personnel, or in the alternative provision for temporary attachment whereby the personnel would be subject to Royal Canadian Air Force laws and rules of administration.

It is my understanding that the latter alternative, namely temporary attachment, was in the minds of the various members of the Air Training Plan, and this attachment would become operative from the arrival of the personnel at a Canadian port.

I should be obliged if you would bring these matters to the attention of the appropriate authorities with a view to confirming this understanding.

A similar communication has been sent by telegram to the High Commissioner for Canada in Australia, and to the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

775.

72-AZ-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516X/216

Ottawa, January 17, 1940

My dear Mr. Skelton,

With reference to your letter of the 4th January, the High Commissioner wishes me to let you know that the Air Council agree that Royal Air Force personnel undergoing training in Canada under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, and instructors sent to Canada in connection therewith, should be temporarily attached to the Royal Canadian Air Force under Section 179 B(1) of the Air Force Act, and thus be subject for purposes of discipline to Canadian Air Force law.

In asking you to inform the appropriate authorities accordingly, Sir Gerald Campbell wishes me to add that the United Kingdom Government may desire later to put forward proposals for exceptions, adaptations and modifications as contemplated in the provisos to Section 6(3) of the Canadian Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, should experience show this to be desirable.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

776.

72-T-38

Décret du Conseil
Order in Council

P.C. 222

January 18, 1940

Whereas there has been laid before His Excellency the Governor General in Council a report, dated 18th January, 1940, from the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, representing:

That on September the 26th, 1939, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom proposed to the Prime Minister of Canada and to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, the undertaking, on a large scale, of a co-operative training scheme, for the training in Canada of large numbers of pilots and air crews from the United Kingdom and from the three said Dominions for service in the theatres of operations;

That the said proposal was accepted, in principle, by the government of Canada, in accordance with the terms of a telegram of September the 28th, 1939, from the Prime Minister of Canada to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and also by the governments of Australia and New Zealand;

That, subsequently, Missions, representing the governments of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, attended at Ottawa for the purpose of joint discussions with a view to agreement as to the institution and operation of the proposed training scheme;

That, following conversations in Ottawa between representatives of the Canadian government and the said Missions, a memorandum of agreement (with certain appendices thereto) embodying conclusions reached with respect to a training plan was prepared and submitted to the four governments concerned;

That, following consideration of the proposed terms of agreement by a Special Committee of the Cabinet appointed for the purpose, and by the War Committee of the Cabinet, and with the approval of Council, the Memorandum of Agreement with respect to the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (a copy of which, with appendices thereto, is hereto annexed to form part hereof) was signed on December 17th, 1939, by the Prime Minister, on behalf of the government of Canada;

That the said Memorandum of Agreement (with appendices thereto) was also signed on December 17th, 1939, by the Right Honourable Lord Riverdale, Chairman of the United Kingdom Air Mission, on behalf of the government of the United Kingdom;

That he is now informed that the said Memorandum of Agreement (with appendices thereto) was signed on January the 5th, 1940, at London, by the High Commissioner for Australia in the United Kingdom, on behalf of

the government of Australia, and by the High Commissioner for New Zealand in the United Kingdom, on behalf of the government of New Zealand;

That, in addition to matters dealt with in the said Memorandum of Agreement (and appendices thereto) representatives of the governments concerned considered and reached agreement concerning certain other matters arising out of the said Memorandum of Agreement and relating to the Air Training Plan, namely, the administration and organization of the Plan in Canada, and the identification of Canadian pupils from the Plan in Royal Canadian Air Force units and formations;

That the terms of agreement with respect to the matters mentioned in the preceding paragraph were set out in the following exchanges of letters, copies of which are hereto annexed to form part hereof:

re Administration and organization in Canada

- (1) Letter dated November 27th, 1939, from the Minister of National Defence of Canada, to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air for the United Kingdom;
- (2) Letter dated November 27th, 1939, from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air for the United Kingdom, to the Minister of National Defence of Canada;
- (3) Letter dated November 29th, 1939, from the Minister of National Defence of Canada to the head of the New Zealand Mission;
- (4) Letter dated November 29th, 1939, from the Minister of National Defence of Canada to the Minister for Air of Australia.

re Identification of Canadian pupils in R.C.A.F. units and formations

- (5) Letter dated December 8th, 1939, from the Minister of National Defence of Canada, to the Chairman of the United Kingdom Air Mission;
- (6) Letter dated December 16th, 1939, from the Chairman of the United Kingdom Air Mission to the Minister of National Defence of Canada.

Now, therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, with the concurrence of the members of the said Special Committee of the Cabinet, and of the members of the War Committee of the Cabinet, is pleased to approve the said Memorandum of Agreement with respect to the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, signed by the Prime Minister on behalf of the government of Canada, (a copy of which, with appendices thereto, is hereto annexed), and the terms of agreement with respect to the administration and organization of the Plan in Canada, and the identification of Canadian pupils from the Plan in Royal Canadian Air Force units and formations, set out in the exchanges of letters herein above described, (copies of which are hereto annexed), and they are hereby approved and confirmed to all intents and purposes accordingly.

777.

72-AZ-40

*Décret du Conseil**Order in Council*

P.C. 578

February 12, 1940

Whereas sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 6 of The Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, 1933, Chapter 21 of the Statutes of Canada, 1933, read as follows:

6. (1) The forces, other than home forces, to which this section applies are the naval, military and air forces of His Majesty raised in the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State, or Newfoundland.

(2) The Governor in Council,

(i) may attach temporarily to a home force any member of another force to which this section applies who is placed at his disposal for the purpose of being the service authorities of that part of the Commonwealth to which the other force belongs;

(ii) subject to anything to the contrary in the conditions applicable to his service, may place any member of a home force at the disposal of the service authorities of another part of the Commonwealth for the purpose of being attached temporarily by those authorities to a force to which this section applies belonging to that part of the Commonwealth.

(3) Whilst a member of another force is by virtue of this section attached temporarily to a home force, he shall be subject to the law relating to the Naval Service, the Militia, or the Air Force, as the case may be, in like manner as if he were a member of the home force, and shall be treated and have the like powers of command and punishment over members of the home force to which he is attached as if he were a member of that force of relative rank;

Provided that the Governor in Council may direct that in relation to members of a force of any part of the Commonwealth specified the statutes relating to the home forces shall apply with such exceptions and subject to such adaptations and modifications as may be so specified.

And whereas the Minister of National Defence reports that under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan a number of members of the Royal Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Air Force will be employed on instructional and other duties, and other members of said Air Forces will receive training;

That in pursuance of the said Air Training Plan those members of the Air Forces aforesaid will, whilst so employed or undergoing training, be attached temporarily to the Royal Canadian Air Force; and

That provision should now be made for the attachment temporarily to the Royal Canadian Air Force of members of the Royal Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Air Force, who, for the purposes of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, may be placed at the disposal of the Governor in Council by the Service Authorities of that part of the Commonwealth to which the said Forces respectively belong;

Now, therefore, His Excellency the Administrator in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of National Defence, and pursuant to the provisions of The Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act 1933, Chapter 21 of the Statutes of Canada, 1933, and under and by virtue of the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 Revised Statutes of Canada 1927, is pleased to order and it is hereby ordered that every member of the Royal Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force, and the Royal New Zealand Air Force who, for the purposes of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, has been placed at the disposal of the Governor in Council by the service authorities of that part of the Commonwealth to which the said Forces respectively belong, be attached temporarily to the Royal Canadian Air Force as of such date he is shown in the appropriate order of the Royal Canadian Air Force as having been attached thereto, and that he shall remain so attached until in a like order he is shown as being no longer attached.

778.

72-AZ-40

Le haut commissaire en Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 26

Canberra, February 16, 1940

Your telegram No. 3, January 5th.¹ Minister for Air agrees with your understanding that personnel would be subject to R.C.A.F. law and rules of administration, but require that provision of penalty imposed for breaches of discipline would not be more severe than under Australian law. This provision is required particularly because death penalty is not permitted under Australian law. Please cable if this is satisfactory.

Minister for Air would like copies of our laws and regulations, rules respecting penalty.

779.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 20

London, February 24, 1940

SECRET. Under Article 15 of Memorandum [of] Agreement relating to training of pilots and aircraft crews in Canada and their subsequent service, it falls to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to initiate inter-Governmental discussions as to methods by which pupils of Canada, Australia and New Zealand shall, after training is completed, be identified with their respective Dominions.

We should be ready for our part to enter upon these discussions at any time after the end of March and should be glad to have an expression of

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

Canadian Government's views as to a date which would be convenient for meetings between representatives of the four Governments. In this connection we realize that any suggestion for discussions during March might be inconvenient to the Canadian Government in view of general election; but we should hope that all Governments concerned may find a date towards the middle of April acceptable.

It will be recognized that decision on matters to be discussed involves detailed consideration of questions of organization and equipment (including supply and production) which are receiving constant study here in relation to United Kingdom Government's undertaking in Article 15. The immediate contacts which will be available on these matters if discussions are held here and prospect that discussions will thereby be facilitated and expedited lead us to think it is essential that they should take place in London.

We should be glad to learn whether Canadian Government agree to suggested date and place for discussions and what arrangements they have in mind as to representatives who will participate.

780.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 28

Ottawa, March 5, 1940

SECRET. Your No. 20. Canadian Government welcomes the initiation of inter-governmental discussions provided for by Article 15 and which, in accordance with Lord Riverdale's letter of December 16th, were to be carried on by an inter-governmental committee, but Canadian Government points out that, so far as Canadian pupils are concerned, the Committee would be composed only of representatives of the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments, since arrangements with the United Kingdom Government on this matter were the subject of separate discussions and arrangements by the respective Dominion Governments with the United Kingdom Government.

Canadian Government would prefer that these bilateral discussions take place in Ottawa to facilitate reference to members of the Canadian Government of any problems arising out of such discussions. United Kingdom Government will understand from cables and discussions leading up to Lord Riverdale's letter that this matter involves major questions of Canadian policy which can be better dealt with effectively and authoritatively by Ministers.

After conclusion of bilateral discussions here Canadian Government would be quite ready to send representatives to meetings in London to discuss any matters of organization and equipment (including supply and production) which might be properly the subject of discussions between all four Governments.

Regarding time for meeting, the Canadian Government appreciates the consideration indicated in Cable No. 20 in view of the special situation existing here. Obviously it would be impractical and ineffectual to attempt to hold bilateral discussions before the latter part of this month, but they would then be taken up immediately when convenient to whatever representatives United Kingdom might nominate. As soon as these were concluded Canadian Government would be prepared to send representatives to London to take part in four-party discussions as above in the light of decisions reached in bilateral discussions suggested to be held here.

781.

72-AZ-40

Le haut commissaire en Australie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 44

Canberra, April 18, 1940

Your despatch No. 16 of March 16th,¹ and my telegram No. 26 of February 16th. Order in Council of February 12th does not provide that penalty imposed for breach of discipline will not be more severe than under Australian law. As Australian authorities attach great importance to this provision, I suggest amending Order in Council be passed and that I be informed by cable. Please send copies of R.C.A.F. Laws and Regulations as requested in my telegram under reference.

782.

72-AZ-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Australie
Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Australia

TELEGRAM 40

Ottawa, May 3, 1940

Your telegram No. 44 April 18, 1940. Order in Council P.C. 1728 May 1st¹ provides that in relation to members of the Royal Australian Air Force who in pursuance of the Order in Council of 12th February, 1940, P.C. 578, are attached temporarily to the Royal Canadian Air Force, the penalties which may be imposed for breaches of discipline by aforesaid members of the Royal Australian Air Force while so temporarily attached shall not be more severe than those which could be imposed under the law of Australia pertaining to the Royal Australian Air Force for the commission of like breaches of discipline.

Copy of Order in Council is being sent by next bag.

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

783.

72-T-38

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 563

Ottawa, May 19, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. With the object of expediting Canadian output of pilots for overseas:

1. Can the Air Ministry send to Canada the full staff of key personnel of a Service Flying Training School, which is now being considered in addition to those contained in the Joint Air Training Plan as follows: Officers with the exception of the Commanding Officer, Administrative, Medical, Equipment and Accounting Officers. Airmen in the following trades: Armourers, Wireless Operators, Fitters I, Fitters II (E), Fitters II (A), Wireless and Electrical Mechanics, Airmen Pilots?

2. Can the Air Ministry send war experienced pilots to Canada for employment as instructors in the Joint Air Training Plan in exchange for newly trained personnel, at the rate of thirty-five per month? Reply requested by 19th instant.

784.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 634

London, May 19, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 563, May 19th. Matter taken up at once with Air Ministry who state full and immediate reply cannot be given. Forecast is that Air Ministry cannot complete Service Flying Training School as this will disturb present output of pilots here before Canadian output is available. No reply yet possible to paragraph 2 but matter under consideration. Pointed out this will also involve a delay as Canadian pilots would still have to go through last stage of training here and that therefore Canada would be receiving completely trained pilots in exchange for partially trained ones.

785.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 59

London, May 23, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Air Training Scheme. You will have already received through Sir Gerald Campbell a preliminary intimation that new phase of the war had made it necessary for us to consider whether some modification was demanded of air programme generally, including Air Training Scheme, and that Air Ministry were examining the question of modifying the measures now in estimates for our 1941-42 effort in order to provide for additional strength during the next 6 months. The conclusion reached is that as a result of very rapid changes in military situation in France and Belgium it is imperative that all practicable steps should be taken to make available for the R.A.F. the greatest possible number of operational aircraft during the ensuing three-four months. In view of increased probability that in the next phase of enemy bombing objectives will be air and aero-engine factories in this country, we have regretfully come to the conclusion that export of Battle and Anson aircraft (air frames and engines) should be suspended for 2 months subject to review in the light of war situation.

The effect of this decision on the Air Training Scheme would seem to be as follows:

Since Battle aircraft are used solely, they ought to be used for gunnery training either as target-towers or as attack aircraft, and Ansons are used for navigational training and twin engine pilot training. There need be no hold-up in training of single engine pilots in Canada.

It is understood that rates of delivery of Harvards to Canada is in advance of requirements of schools under existing opening-up programme and the Air Ministry suggest, therefore, that any surplus should be utilized to off-set as far as possible the loss of the Ansons for twin engine pilot training. The surplus of single engine pilots can be converted to twin engine pilots in accordance with requirements during their subsequent training at the operational training units in this country.

If, in the result, the proportion of pilots trained, whether on single engine or twin engine aircraft from any source, proves to be larger in relation to air crews than has hitherto been envisaged, there is no doubt that they will be urgently required.

Various possibilities are formally being examined with a view to minimizing interference with training scheme arrangements. Among these possibilities is the acquisition from the United States of America of training aircraft of comparable types to replace the Battles and Ansons. Another possibility is that in so far as the standard of Battles and target-towing aircraft or alternative types from the United States of America are not available to

complete air gunnery training in Canada, training efforts should be concentrated on ground observance instruction; we should then endeavour to give air gunnery instruction whilst the personnel were under training in operational training units in this country. We will communicate further with regard to these possibilities in due course.

In informing the Canadian Government of the conclusions we have unavoidably reached, we are confident that they will fully understand and feel able to accept the situation. We still attach the greatest importance to the Air Training Scheme and we earnestly hope that the Canadian Government will continue to exert every effort to make it productive to the fullest practicable extent in the shortest possible time.

Similar telegram is being sent to the Commonwealth Government. Ends.

786.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 753

London, June 1, 1940

Further to your telegram No. 563, May 19th. Air Ministry reply that they regret that it is totally impossible at the present moment to spare personnel, and that they can see no future [or] immediate prospect of meeting Canada's request in view of very difficult situation here.

MASSEY

787.

72-T-38

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 69

London, June 2, 1940

SECRET. Of eighteen Blenheim Mark IV aircraft due for delivery to Canada, thirteen were en route at the time when our urgent need for all operational aircraft was made known to the Canadian Government in my telegram No. 59 of May 23rd. We learn that Canadian authorities have turned round the ship containing these aircraft and I wish to express cordial thanks of United Kingdom Government for this very helpful action. May we assume that the Canadian Government would be prepared also to forego for the time being delivery of the remaining five Blenheims? Such a decision would be greatly appreciated. We would reconsider the position as soon as the situation here permits.

788.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 95

Ottawa, June 7, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 69, June 2, 1940, Canadian Government is prepared to forego present delivery of remaining five Blenheims in order to assist your Government at this time.

789.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 103

Ottawa, June 13, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram number 59 of May 23rd, advising interim suspension of U.K. contribution under Commonwealth Air Training Agreement of Battle and Anson aircraft.

1. In accord with your fifth paragraph we have been intensively engaged regarding alternative steps to overcome deficiencies in these types of aircraft due to the interruption and recognizing also necessity of assuring alternative supplies in order to minimize interference with Training Plan.

2. Following are some of these steps. Negotiations are being carried on for Menasco Engines as alternative to Gipsys. Anson redesigned to take Jacobs engine and American instruments and accessories and to substitute materials available in this country. Orders will be placed as soon as bills of materials are available and drawings completed. Order has been negotiated and placed for 2300 Jacobs engines involving a commitment of about 10 million dollars. Appendix "A" equipment will be manufactured in Canada for use when substitutes not possible. Production of Canadian Anson should reach required rate in nine months. To fill gap we are purchasing such second-hand Twin Engine aircraft as are available in Canada and United States. We are also investigating supply Beech and other Twin Engine aircraft. For bombing and gunnery schools we have asked United States to release 500 North American or similar aircraft; delivery of these doubtful. We are also ordering 200 Fleet Model 60 suitable for Intermediate Training which will release Harvards. No Target Towing aircraft in sight and must conserve Battles for this purpose. We still hope you can supply Battles if can effect early delivery, but most urgent requirements are Ansons to fill gap before Canadian production starts and spare parts for maintenance of those Ansons and Battles (including engines) which have already been delivered.

3. In our search for alternatives where time was the essence we have, as you will recognize, not hesitated to act without any stipulation regarding ultimate responsibility. Obviously we could not procure commitments to fill in precisely the contemplated gap and obligations assumed might quite probably result in surplus ultimately if United Kingdom contribution is resumed but under the circumstances we have considered possible surplus preferable to risk of scarcity which would balk plan.

4. Most of these steps have been the subject of previous personal discussion with individual members of the Supervisory Board. They were all reported at the regular meeting held on Monday last and the prudence and desirability of these steps were approved by the members of the Board, with reservation that the matter of responsibility was properly subject to discussion and adjustment between Governments concerned.

5. Regarding ultimate responsibility, we are quite content, if agreeable to you, to advise you of what Canada as administrator of the Plan has done and is doing, leaving that matter for discussion and adjustment, having regard to obligations under agreement, after situation has become more clarified at your end and when we all will know better what these emergent steps we are taking involve.

6. We hope that these steps will be regarded as endeavour to meet request that "the Canadian Government will continue to exert every effort to make it (the Air Training Plan) productive to the fullest practicable extent in the shortest possible time" and would be glad to have your comments on foregoing.

790.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 93

London, June 30, 1940

SECRET. We have fully realized, and deeply regretted, effect on Air Training Plan of suspension of export of aircraft from this country, which has been forced upon us by critical turn of events. We have learned with the keenest appreciation the steps which you have taken to fill the breach. We are entirely agreeable to course proposed in paragraph five of your telegram (103, June 13). We will arrange to send spare parts for Battle air frames and engines already delivered, and also for Anson air frames and engines which you have. We will also send Gypsy engines at the rate of 40 a month with spares. We will send more equipment if necessary and parts in due course. The vital importance of the Air Training Plan has increased rather than diminished, and efforts you are making to overcome difficulties and continue scheme at full pressure are most encouraging. We are deeply grateful.

791.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 127

Ottawa, July 4, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 93, June 30, 1940, Secret. Your message is acknowledged with thanks. It is noted with satisfaction that spares for 111 Battle aircraft and 121 engines together with spares for 59 Anson aircraft and 146 engines, already in Canada, will be forthcoming. The supply of 40 Gipsy engines per month, with spares, is also appreciated. The most urgent additional requirements if available are 134 complete Ansons with engines and as many Ansons without wings but with engines as can be spared to fill the gap before Canadian production starts in March, 1941, together with at least 20 spare Cheetah engines. At the request of the Department of Munitions and Supply Canada, a list of essential items of equipment urgently required by this country from the United Kingdom, for which no alternative sources of supply are available, was recently prepared for despatch to Mr. Asquith, a Munitions and Supply representative now in England, who is in close touch with the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada and the Air Ministry London, with a view to assisting these sources in selecting items most urgently required for the R.C.A.F. It is therefore suggested that liaison be effected forthwith between Mr. Asquith, the Dominions Office, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, in order that no duplication may occur, and that your offer of "more equipment if necessary and parts in due course" may be used to the greatest advantage by both Governments. Co-operation on the above-mentioned lines must have the results so ardently desired by our respective countries.

792.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 130

Ottawa, July 6, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Further to our telegram No. 127, July 4, 1940. Joint Air Training Plan is jeopardized by delay in delivery of aircraft and it is now essential that we should have for meeting of Supervisory Board on Monday 8th July information upon when deliveries of aircraft and engine spares for Anson and Battle will be forthcoming; also definite information upon possibility of resuming delivery of complete Ansons.

793.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 97

London, July 8, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 130, July 6th. Provision for spares for Battles and Ansons has been made and will continue to be made on full basis of original plans. Some twenty-five-thirty per cent already shipped. Urgency of your requirements fully realized and shipments will proceed as fast as practicable.

Shipment of complete Ansons will be resumed forthwith to meet your interim deficiencies so far as these cannot be met from the United States of America.

794.

72-AZ-40

Le haut commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures

High Commissioner in New Zealand to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 45

Wellington, August 21, 1940

Your despatch of March 16th, No. 6.¹ New Zealand Government enquire whether death penalty is permissible under regulations without reference to Governor in Council. If so, New Zealand Government would find it necessary to make a reservation on this point.

795.

72-AZ-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Nouvelle-Zélande

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in New Zealand

TELEGRAM 33

Ottawa, September 10, 1940

Your telegram No. 45 August 21, 1940. Under present Regulations sentence of death awarded by Court Martial to an officer or airman of the Royal Canadian Air Force serving in Canada must be referred for confirmation to the Governor in Council. The same provision applies to members of other forces attached, such as New Zealand trainees under Air Training Plan.

¹ Non reproduite.

² Not printed.

Pursuant to request by Australia, an Order in Council provides that, in the case of Australian trainees, penalties imposed for breaches of discipline cannot be more severe than could be imposed under Australian law. It is the view of the Department that a similar Order in Council respecting members of Royal New Zealand Air Force temporarily attached could be made if desired by the New Zealand Government.

796.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du conseiller juridique**Memorandum by Legal Adviser*

[Ottawa,] September 19, 1940

PARTICIPATION BY INDIA IN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
AIR TRAINING PLAN

1. Mr. Tymms is the representative of the Government of India on the British Purchasing Mission. He has been in New York for some time. His work in India is civil aviation and he has been with the Mission for some time but will return to India this autumn. His visit to Canada has been largely concerned with the purchasing of aircraft of various types for the Indian Government.

2. Mr. Tymms is sounding out the views of the Canadian Government as to Indian participation in the Joint Air Training Plan. He has no authority from the Government of India to propose or to request Indian participation. He is not in a position to bind his Government in anything. On the other hand, the Government of India wants a report from him as to whether a limited small scale Indian participation would be possible and would commend itself to the Governments interested in the Plan.

3. Mr. Tymms made it very clear that the current impression in this country and in the United States with regard to India is misleading. Indian opinion is deeply concerned with the war and is very anxious to promote Indian participation. A good deal of progress has been made with the development of the Indian Air Force, and there is now a squadron, the entire personnel of which is Indian. The Indians have proved their capacity to qualify in the air training and Mr. Tymms indicates that they have earned the confidence of the British air gunners who show no hesitation in serving in the same plane with Indian pilots under both training and service conditions. His own personal opinion was that Indian participation, even on a very limited scale, would meet with enthusiastic response in India and would counteract the irritation and unrest that is produced by Indian chafing at the limited character of their participation in the war.

4. Mr. Tymms thought that the participation would be of a very limited character, perhaps something like forty to fifty trainees within a year, or even less; the trainees, upon graduation, to go either to the R.A.F. or to the Indian Air Force or to be divided between these two.

5. The point arose as to whether the effect of the inclusion of India would lessen the total air power directed against Germany and Italy. It appeared that there would be no change in the balance. Assuming that there were forty trainees within a year, that would lessen the total number of trainees from other sources by the same number. On the other hand, assuming an even division between the R.A.F. and the Indian Air Force it would produce twenty Indian pilots, observers and air gunners for the R.A.F. and twenty for the Indian Air Force. The second group of twenty would release a corresponding number of British R.A.F. in India to proceed with their planes, say to Egypt. From a practical point of view the net effect would probably be a minor and relatively unimportant lessening of the Canadian contribution, both in expense and personnel, compensated by a not unimportant but relatively small contribution in money and personnel by the Government of India.

6. The Indian Government has already raised the point with the Air Ministry in London and the position there taken was that there was no room in the scheme for the Indian trainees.

7. The question does not seem to have been considered in England from the broader political point of view, and I do not think that there was any approach to the British Government as a whole as distinct from the technical approach to the Air Ministry.

8. In discussing the question as a whole with Mr. Tymms, the following points in favour of the proposal seem to emerge:

(a) Indian participation would undoubtedly annoy and dishearten Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini. There can be little doubt that they have been and are relying upon Indian discontent to hurt our cause. There can be no doubt that the thought of active participation by Indian army units on the Abyssinia flank would cause to these leaders many sleepless nights.

(b) The effect on the morale of the people in this country and in other parts of the Commonwealth, and the effect upon neutral public opinion, especially in the United States, would be most important.

9. In discussing the working out of the scheme the following points arose:

(a) The Indian trainees could be sent and attached to the R.C.A.F. as individuals just as if they were a number of students going to a school. Their Government would pay so much for each place that they occupied and would have no part in the scheme considered as a whole.

(b) The Government of India might come into the scheme theoretically on the same basis as the other participating governments. Practically there would be a difference in that the numbers involved would be of a different order from the numbers involved in the cases of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Further, practically, the Indian Government would not have a High Commissioner here and would not have an air liaison officer. Participation would necessarily be of a formal

character and would probably consist of the occasional presence of their Trade Commissioner in New York.

(c) Mr. Tymms thought that either of these arrangements would be workable. From the point of view of the moral effect of the project upon Indian opinion and also upon world opinion, the second arrangement might be preferable. It was thought that the idea of a representative of the Government appearing and sitting in in this sort of Commonwealth Council might have a very strong appeal to India and to world opinion. On the other hand, he fully recognized such a course could only be followed if it commended itself to the participating Governments and that the Government of India could not expect representation as a matter of right in view of the relative smallness of that Government's contribution.

(d) A minor point was raised by Mr. Tymms who suggested the possibility of racial prejudice affecting the project. It might be necessary to avoid placing Indian trainees in schools within a certain limited area in Canada. East of the Rockies, however, would be no problem.

(e) Another Canadian point is the climatic problem. It is probable that this scheme would only work if the arrival of the trainees was timed so that their work would begin not earlier than the 1st April and end not later than the last of October.

10. It is necessary to obtain a ruling as to whether the Department would be justified in intimating to Mr. Tymms that if the Government of India requested the privilege of participating the Canadian Government would give to this request its most careful consideration and would also take the matter up with the other interested Governments in order to obtain their approval.

797.

72-AZ-40

*Le haut commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in New Zealand to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 56

Wellington, October 19, 1940

Your telegram 10th September, No. 33. Prime Minister of New Zealand concurs with views of Department of External Affairs that an Order in Council be made on lines of P.C. 1728 (Canada)¹ to provide that penalties which may be imposed for breaches of discipline by members of the Royal New Zealand Air Force, temporarily attached to the Royal Canadian Air Force, shall not be more severe than those which could be imposed under the laws of New Zealand.

¹Le décret du Conseil C.P. 6986 du 29 novembre 1940 entérina cette proposition.

¹This was done by Order in Council, P.C. 6986, November 29, 1940.

798.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire, le gouvernement de l'Inde

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary, Government of India

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, November 9, 1940

Following for Frederick Tymms, Director, Civil Aviation. Begins.

1. Reference your discussions with Legal Adviser, External Affairs, concerning possibility of Indian participation in British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.

2. Question has been considered by Canadian authorities who regard proposal with favour.

3. It is thought that Indian trainees should come into plan as members of the Indian Air Force and that as such they would be administered by their own regulations in respect of clothing, pay, etc. and would only be affected by R.C.A.F. regulations whilst in Canada in accordance with the Visiting Forces Act.

4. As Indian Air Force trainees could only come into the plan to the exclusion of the corresponding number of trainees from the United Kingdom or Dominions, it is considered that the financial basis for the admission of Indian trainees would best be arranged by including them in lieu of part of the quota of the United Kingdom if the United Kingdom Government were willing. The financial adjustment would [then?] be a matter between the Indian Government and the Government [of] the United Kingdom only.

5. If on the other hand the Indian trainees were admitted to the exclusion of a small number from the United Kingdom and each Dominion, a revision of the Agreement ratified by all participants would be necessary.

6. It is proposed that this matter should be discussed immediately with the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Canada, the proposal being that the Indian trainees should be admitted in lieu of part [of] the United Kingdom quota.

7. Before taking this matter up with the United Kingdom authorities in this way, it would be appreciated if you would consult your Government and have the Government of India formally request the Canadian Government to commence negotiations along these lines. It is our understanding that you do not desire that United Kingdom Government should be approached until your Government has made a firm proposal. Ends.

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1793

Ottawa, November 14, 1940

SECRET. With reference to my telegram No. 1771 of November 9th¹ (paragraph H).

1. The Minister of National Defence has been requested by the Cabinet War Committee to discuss with the United Kingdom authorities the detailed methods by which Canadian pupils, when passing out from the Joint Air Training Plan, will be incorporated in, or organized as, units and formations of the Royal Canadian Air Force in the field, in accordance with the terms of a letter written at Ottawa, on December 16th, 1939, by Lord Riverdale, the head of the United Kingdom Air Mission, to the late Minister of National Defence.

2. For this purpose Mr. Ralston is authorized, if he deems it appropriate after arrival, to act as Canadian representative on an inter-governmental Committee, provision for the constitution of which was agreed to in Lord Riverdale's letter.

3. Be good enough to indicate the above to the appropriate United Kingdom authorities.

4. For your own information, the Dominions Office, in a telegram of February the 24th, suggested the initiation of inter-governmental discussions, in London, between all four governments, as to methods by which pupils of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, after training was completed, should be identified with their respective Dominions.

5. To this telegram we replied, on March the 5th, that we regarded the matter as one for bilateral discussions only, between representatives of the United Kingdom and Canadian governments, since arrangements made in Ottawa with Lord Riverdale were the subject of separate agreement between the United Kingdom Air Mission and ourselves. We also expressed the preference that these bilateral discussions take place in Ottawa, but agreed that after their conclusion, Canada would be ready to send representatives to meetings in London to discuss any matters of organization and equipment which might be properly the subject of discussions between all four governments.

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

800.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 202

Ottawa, November 14, 1940

MOST SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister.
Begins.

1. It is now possible to forecast with reasonable accuracy the output of air crew under the Commonwealth Air Training Plan. I am advised that the Plan will be operating at capacity before the end of next year. During 1941, the output of air crew will rise from something over 400 in January, to over 1,000 in May, and over 1,700 by December. It is anticipated that at full capacity, that is, from January of 1942 onwards, some 800 pilots will be turned out each fortnight, and 420 observers and 580 air gunners every 28 days. These figures do not, of course, include the output of such Royal Air Force schools as are or may be transferred to Canada under existing arrangements. This means that despite the many difficulties encountered, the Plan will have reached its peak considerably in advance of the date originally contemplated, as a result of the efforts which have been made by all concerned.

2. While this anticipated output of trained airmen is considerable, our Department of National Defence for Air regards as feasible a further substantial expansion of the present programme under the joint Plan.

3. As administrators of the Plan, under the agreement between the four co-operating governments, we are willing to undertake such a further substantial expansion of the joint programme, and would be glad to do so if the United Kingdom government, in view of their other sources of supply of air crew, the anticipated supply of training and operational aircraft, and their judgment of the probable development of the war, are of the opinion that the additional air crew who would result could be used effectively and would constitute a helpful contribution in the common effort.

4. The detailed arrangements under which such an expansion of the joint programme should be undertaken, and the financial implications of such a revision of the Plan would, of course, form the subject of discussion and agreement between the governments concerned.

5. My colleagues and I continue to be impressed by the great importance of air power in the struggle in which the Commonwealth is engaged. We continue to follow with admiration the splendid efforts which the United Kingdom is putting forward, under the most difficult conditions, to develop her air strength to the utmost. If the suggestion put forward in this telegram can assist in this great work, we will gladly undertake the further effort involved.

6. In the circumstances we should like to have an early expression of your views as to the desirability of undertaking the substantial expansion of the Commonwealth Air Training Plan to which I have referred. You will readily appreciate that if such action is to be undertaken, preparations should be set on foot with the least possible delay. Ends.

801.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 162

London, November 20, 1940

MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 202 of November 14th. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

1. I am most grateful to you for your message and for your very generous offer of affording facilities for a further expansion of the Joint Air Training Plan. I am confident that we shall be able to make excellent use of it.

2. A review of air training requirements in the light of latest developments is at present in progress, and it is of the utmost value to the War Cabinet in this connection to know that in such further measures as prove to be necessary they can rely on the continuance of the wholehearted assistance of the Canadian Government, which has already made such a notable contribution to our common effort.

3. As soon as our review is completed, I will let you know for your consideration what we think would be best direction for our further joint efforts.

4. As you mention in paragraph 4 of your message, any measures for extension of the Joint Training Plan must form the subject of discussion and agreement between all Governments concerned. Would you agree to my repeating to the Prime Ministers of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, text of your message and of this reply, or would you prefer to take this action yourself?

5. Subject to your agreement, we should like to offer a cordial invitation to Air Vice-Marshal Breadner to pay a visit to this country. Such a visit would be most valuable for the purpose of consultation on many training questions, and would give Air Vice-Marshal Breadner the fullest and most up to date information on our plans for the future development of the Air Force. Ends.

802.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 178

London, December 9, 1940

MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 202 of November 14th and my telegram No. 162 of November 20th. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. May I renew to you the deep satisfaction we feel over the offer which you are able to make to enlarge the joint training scheme. There could not be a more striking testimony to energy and efficiency with which the scheme has been operated. I send to you and your colleagues my admiration and my gratitude for an assistance which promises to be of major importance in the war.

2. I have now had the opportunity to review our training position. I find that it is not thought desirable to embark, at present, on an enlargement of the joint scheme. The decisive consideration is this: the Air Ministry is absorbed in current operations and in making ready for the spring battle. Until that battle has opened it will not be possible for me to take decisions about an extension of the joint scheme with the Secretary of State for Air. As soon as the situation has cleared, you may be sure that we will cooperate to the fullest in the admirable suggestion you make.

3. In the meantime the Secretary of State for Air will discuss plans at length with Colonel Ralston and Mr. Howe. He has arranged to meet Colonel Ralston on Tuesday next.

4. We should be most grateful if, in another direction, your Government could bring an additional measure of assistance to the training situation. It would be desirable to develop, as swiftly as possible, the production of training aircraft in the Dominion. Any steps which your administration might take to secure this object would have the complete cooperation and eager support of the Secretary of State for Air. In particular, the Secretary of State wishes to draw your attention to the possibilities of Anson aircraft, particularly if Jacobs engines can be got from the United States. He understands further that it is possible that North American Harvards might be built in Canada. This would be a most desirable project provided only that engines are available. You will understand how important it is that there should be no diversion of engines from Harvards already on order in the United States, and destined for Canada.

5. The proposed extension of productive capacity of the Dominion, which I now put forward for your consideration, would represent an important reinforcement of Canada's strategic role as a centre of training and supply. With complete confidence would we entrust it to an administration which has so amply excelled promise by performance. Ends.

803.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 227

Ottawa, December 12, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Your telegram No. 178, December 9. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

Colonel Ralston in position to inform you fully as to our aircrew training and Mr. Howe as to aircraft production. We are most anxious to co-operate in developing Canadian production of trainers and we are hopeful that this can be done as regards Ansons, essential however that promised supply of Ansons from United Kingdom between now and June 1st, 1941, be delivered. After that date we hope to obtain adequate supply from our own industry, and if you so desire will explore possibility of supplying United Kingdom with Ansons powered with Jacobs engines.

Re Harvards, we have on order in Canada two hundred and ten Harvards, delivery starts this week. Expansion depends on engine situation.

Could you release Pratt and Whitney Wasp S.3H1 engines from your United States allotment other than those now allocated to Canada? Would appreciate outline of number and delivery dates of trainer planes required by United Kingdom. Ends.

804.

72-T-38

Procès-verbal de la réunion au ministère de l'Air
Minutes of Meeting at Air Ministry

SECRET

London, December 13, 1940

PRESENT:

Captain Balfour (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State), Air Marshal Sir Christopher Courtney (Air Member for Supply and Organization), Sir Arthur Street (Permanent Under-Secretary of State), Mr. Abraham (Deputy Under-Secretary of State), Mr. Foden (F.6), Mr. Howard (S.8), Mr. Smyth (F.1), Mr. Stevens (Ministry of Aircraft Production), Mr. Holmes (Dominions Office).

Mr. Ralston (Minister of National Defence), Mr. Pearson (Office of the High Commissioner), Air Commodore Stevenson, R.C.A.F., Wing Commander Campbell, R.C.A.F.

1. THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE opened the meeting by extending a welcome to Mr. Ralston and expressing the hope that he would soon be fully recovered from his indisposition. He went on to say it was understood that at this meeting Mr. Ralston wished to discuss three matters, viz:

(i) financial responsibility for R.C.A.F. squadrons in the United Kingdom;

(ii) commitments entered into by the Government of Canada for the Joint Air Training Plan consequent on the interruption of deliveries of certain aircraft from the United Kingdom;

(iii) establishment of air route facilities in Greenland.

MR. RALSTON acknowledged the good wishes, and said that, if time permitted, he would like also to ask some questions about the proposal that Canada should undertake the production of more training aircraft.

2. *Financial Responsibility for R.C.A.F. squadrons in the United Kingdom.* MR. RALSTON referred briefly to the background of this question, and said that, in all the circumstances, the Government of Canada were willing to bear full financial responsibility for No. 1 and No. 112 Squadrons throughout and for No. 110 Squadron as from the 1st September, 1940.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE expressed appreciation of this offer which was acceptable to the United Kingdom.

It was agreed that, if it were found to be practicable, it would be desirable that the financial adjustments arising out of the equipping and maintaining of the squadrons should be settled on a broad basis by means of lump sum payments, the practicability of such a method and assessment of the payments to be considered by Mr. Abraham and Mr. Smyth for the Air Ministry and Air Commodore Stevenson and Mr. Hodgkins for the Government of Canada.

3. *Commitments entered into by the Government of Canada consequent on the interruption of deliveries of certain aircraft from the United Kingdom.* THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE expressed appreciation of the energetic action taken by the Canadian Government to secure the provision of aircraft when it became necessary last May to interrupt the delivery of Anson and Battle aircraft from the United Kingdom.

The following points were then made by the United Kingdom representatives on a first examination of the list of commitments furnished by Canada:

(a) the Air Ministry were now faced with a shortage of advanced training aircraft, and the Ministry of Aircraft Production were, in general, prepared to take over all such aircraft shewn in the list, thus enabling any aircraft produced to the orders of the Canadian government which were not required for the Joint Plan in Canada to be diverted elsewhere;

(b) certain of the types of aircraft included in the list of purchases furnished by Canada appeared to be alternatives to Harvards, and, as such, to be a liability of Canada, as administrator of the Plan, since the United Kingdom liability for this type will be completely discharged by the delivery of the 533 Harvards ordered while the Riverdale Mission was in Canada;

(c) there has been no question of suspending deliveries of Gypsy engines and spares, and consequently the Menasco engines and spares might be set against the proportion of this type to be provided by Canada, as administrator of the Plan;

(d) the provision of manufacturing facilities for Anson aircraft would require examination on aspects of ownership of property and plant, which would have to be taken up by the Ministry of Aircraft Production with Mr. Howe, the Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply, when he arrived in this country;

(e) although recognised to have been unavoidable in the circumstances, it was the fact that acceptance by the United Kingdom of its due share of the commitment incurred by Canada would involve the United Kingdom Government in greater expenditure than would have been incurred in the provision of corresponding aircraft, etc. from this country, and there was, in addition, the disadvantage of a dollar liability.

MR. RALSTON said that he had come to the meeting with the following suggested outline of principles:

(i) the United Kingdom to assume all costs reasonably incurred by Canada to overcome deficiencies in United Kingdom equipment and to assure alternative supplies in case of possible future interruption;

(ii) the United Kingdom to recognise that the additional commitments made by Canada as set out in the list furnished by Canada (Appendix "A")¹ were, in the circumstances, costs reasonably incurred by Canada, in the conditions existing and having regard to the obscurity of future developments, in order to prevent possible serious delays and as insurance against possible frustration of the Plan;

(iii) the United Kingdom to assume any additional costs due to increased requirements of twin-engined aircraft, resulting from the recent decision to increase the output of twin-engined pilots;

(iv) the United Kingdom to assume its share of additional costs resulting from the revision, acceleration or extension of the Plan.

He recognised that the United Kingdom approach to the problem as indicated above would very largely meet the suggestions at (i) and (ii). The Under-Secretary of State indicated that the United Kingdom could accept, in principle, the suggestions at (i) and (ii), subject to the lists of commitments incurred by Canada being examined in detail by representatives of the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments, with a view to recommending agreed allocations of liability. For the United Kingdom, the representatives would be Mr. Abraham, Air Commodore Hollinghurst, Mr. Foden (or deputy) and Mr. Smyth; for Canada, Air Vice-Marshal Breadner, Air Commodore Stevenson and Mr. Hodgkins. Pending a joint meeting, it was decided that telegrams should be sent to Air Vice-Marshal McKean (by the United Kingdom Air Ministry) and to the Canadian Air Ministry [*sic*] (by the Canadian High Commissioner), with a view to securing that information on certain points of doubt would be available when Air Vice-Marshal Breadner arrived in this country.

¹ Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.

The United Kingdom accepted, in principle, the suggestion at (iii), which would mean that the United Kingdom would adjust its supply of twin-engined aircraft (direct and through Canadian commitments taken over) and would receive a credit in respect of the saving to Canada, as administrator of the Plan, on single-engined aircraft. The Financial Adviser to the Joint Air Training Plan would be asked to assess the credit.

With regard to the suggestion at (iv), it was recognized by both sides that it would be extraordinarily difficult to assess what additional costs might be attributed to revision and acceleration of the Plan, and it was pointed out that one effect of the changes was to throw on to the United Kingdom costs for training at an O.T.U., which was to have been carried out at an F.T.S. in Canada under the Plan. It was decided that the question should be investigated by the representatives nominated to examine the lists of special commitments.

4. *Establishment of air route facilities in Greenland.* THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE gave the following explanation:

(a) to avoid shipping difficulties and to expedite delivery, the Air Ministry were anxious to arrange, wherever possible, that aircraft constructed in U.S.A. and Canada should be delivered to this country by air;

(b) it was desired, if possible, to establish a Labrador-Greenland-Iceland route for medium range aircraft;

(c) it would be necessary to establish an aerodrome, aircraft wireless station and meteorological station in Greenland; the wireless and meteorological stations would be useful in connection with other Transatlantic flights, even if the air route via Greenland could not, in the event, be established;

(d) the Canadian Government had been asked last August whether, after consultation with the United States' Government, they would be prepared to approach the Greenland authorities for facilities for a survey party, and it was suggested that, in view of the political considerations affecting Greenland, the Canadian authorities might be willing themselves to send the survey party and to establish and maintain all the facilities proposed if this proved to be practicable;

(e) the Canadian Minister in Washington had approached the State Department, who were unwilling to give a definite reply until a report had been received from Captain Lacey of the United States' Army Air Corps, who was then making a survey of Greenland;

(f) during September, Captain Lacey, who had by then returned, was interviewed by the Canadian Legation in Washington and by the British Air Attaché;¹

(g) in the light of Captain Lacey's report and of information available from other sources a memorandum on the establishment of aerodromes in Greenland was prepared (copy attached):²

¹ Voir les documents 1181-1186.

² Non reproduite.

¹ See Documents 1181-1186.

² Not printed.

(h) so far as is known, no further action has been taken in the meantime with the United States' Government;

(i) it was now proposed to ask the Canadian Government whether they would be prepared to undertake, as soon as conditions permit, an expedition to Greenland to decide whether it would be practicable to establish an aerodrome and permanent wireless and meteorological stations in that country, and, if so, to establish and maintain the facilities.

Before pursuing the matter further, it was desired to enlist Mr. Ralston's sympathetic interest.

MR. RALSTON said he was impressed with the importance of the project, but he emphasised the political difficulties.

MR. HOLMES said the Dominions Office were on the point of taking up the matter with the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada, and it was arranged that the substance of the proposed telegram should be passed to Mr. Ralston before despatch.¹

5. *Production of Training Aircraft.* With regard to the proposal that Canada should undertake the production of training aircraft, MR. RALSTON said he would like to have some indication of the types and quantities of aircraft required, with approximate delivery dates. THE AIR MEMBER FOR SUPPLY AND ORGANISATION replied that Ansons and Harvards were required and that the maximum numbers which could be produced in 1941 would be accepted, the position would have to be reviewed towards the end of that year, but most probably it would be desired that production should be maintained at a rate not lower than that then reached. MR. RALSTON remarked that the bottleneck would be engines and enquired whether it could be arranged to release, for Harvard aircraft, some more Pratt and Whitney "Wasp" engines from the United States allotment to the United Kingdom, in addition to those already allocated to Canada. THE AIR MEMBER FOR SUPPLY AND ORGANISATION undertook to take up the question with the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

805.

72-T-38

*Le quartier général de l'Aviation royale du Canada en Grande-Bretagne
au chef de l'état-major de l'Air*

*Royal Canadian Air Force Headquarters in Great Britain
to Chief of Air Staff*

TELEGRAM

[London, December 15, 1940]

SECRET. From Ralston for Prime Minister and Power. [Begins.] Identification Canadian pilots from Training Plan. As you know we have considered several formulae. Method No. 1 was to compute number of squadrons for which Canadian pilots could have provided the aircrew personnel, amounting to 112. Method No. 2 was to compute the number of squadrons which Cana-

¹ Voir les documents 1188, 1189.¹ See Documents 1188, 1189.

dian personnel at the training establishments could have manned entirely, amounting to 76. Both these methods questionable.

We therefore estimated number of squadrons which our Canadian aircrews plus personnel in training establishments, could man and maintain if we had also to maintain our own rearward activities and lines of communication. We call this method No. 3 and it gives approximately 27 squadrons, on basis of one man in a squadron for five behind the lines.

We realize that method No. 3 is open to the objection that under it we treat flying personnel as being only on a parity with other air force personnel, also the ratio of five to one may be large as the R.A.F., having its lines of communication and rearward activities already established, would not have to increase them in the ratio of five to one to take care of additional squadrons.

On the other hand, we had to remember that the U.K. [has?] provided ground crews, pay and allowances, and initial and maintenance equipment, our financial obligations being to the extent of our eighty per cent contribution under the Plan. As no mathematical formula could precisely take account of all the factors, we considered that there were two points which we must press.

First, there should be a substantial embodiment of the R.C.A.F. to represent to the Canadian public in some measurable degree, Canada's contribution, and to ensure that [in?] any operations in which this Canadian personnel took part, the press references to the formations would permit instant recognition of them as Canadian.

Secondly, there should be some provision for, or assurances of, consultation with Canadian authorities in the employment of this personnel in major operations.

We recognize that the number of squadrons which we could ask to be made R.C.A.F. [are] to be limited remembering the factors mentioned above.

We also felt that it would be unwise in arriving at this limited number of squadrons to accept precisely the results of any formula and thus be committed to that formula as a yardstick. We preferred if we could to procure the acceptance of a sizeable number of R.C.A.F. squadrons and if possible, to provide for the remainder of the personnel by way of some assurance that they would be kept together and Canadian officered as far as could be reasonably arranged.

The units to which they would go would be R.A.F. and might be identified with the word Canadian or Canada in brackets, or at least there should be individual identification of the personnel as Canadian.

Using method No. 3 as an indicator, although not a rule, to give us an idea of the number of R.C.A.F. squadrons we might ask for, and purely by way of exploration and not as a proposal, we suggested that the first 25 squadrons be R.C.A.F. in addition to fighter squadrons one and two and Army Co-operation Squadron 110.

We were agreeably surprised at what seemed to be the sympathetic reception of this suggestion. The numbers are justifiable under method 3, but we were not too hopeful of ready acceptance and expected some other compromise proposal.

Squadron identification of Canadians outside these R.C.A.F. squadrons seemed to give more trouble. The difficulty put forward was the matter of any commitment to preserve separate identity of these twilight formations as it were. There should, however, be no difficulty about individual identification by 'Canada' shoulder badges. We pointed out that 242 R.A.F. Squadron is already in this category, but the United Kingdom felt that while one squadron might be handled in this way, it was a very much more formidable task to deal with an indefinite number. As a matter of fact, the questions of these twilight formations will not presumably arise until the 25 squadrons are filled up, which may be a year.

Thirdly, we asked that some procedure be worked out for consultation with Canadian Government through Canadian authorities in London before decisions made on questions of policy such as major operations in which it may be proposed to employ substantial number of Canadian squadrons.

If there are any objections to our proceeding along the lines indicated, would appreciate comments by Monday morning next. The matter has been thoroughly discussed between Massey, Pearson, Air Commodore Stevenson and myself and Pearson and Stevenson were present and took part in conference Friday. Ends.

806.

72-T-38

*Le quartier général de l'Aviation royale du Canada en Grande-Bretagne
au chef de l'état-major de l'Air*

Royal Canadian Air Force Headquarters in Great Britain to Chief of Air Staff

TELEGRAM

London, December 23, 1940

Following from Ralston for Prime Minister and Power. Begins.

Text of memorandum of agreement as to arrangements to be made under Article 15 of the British Commonwealth Air Training Agreement and letter of December 16, 1939, from Lord Riverdale is as follows:

It is agreed that the arrangements referred to in Article 15 of the Air Training agreement for identifying with Canada the Canadian pilots and aircrews trained under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan shall be on the following lines,

1. These pilots and aircrews will be incorporated into squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force up to the number of 25 in addition to the three already serving in the United Kingdom.

2. The exact rate of formation cannot be guaranteed since it depends on the rate at which the projected Air Force expansion can be achieved;

nevertheless the endeavour will be to form these 25 squadrons within the next 18 months, in accordance with the following schedule:

By March 1941 three squadrons to be formed. June 1941 seven. September 1941 twelve. December 1941 seventeen. March 1942 twenty-two. April or May 1942 twenty-five.

3. To facilitate arrangements for posting Canadian pilots and aircrews, there will be established a central posting organization and a central record office, the staff of which will include Royal Canadian Air Force personnel.

4. All Canadian pilots and aircrews from the Air Training Plan not in Royal Canadian Air Force units or formations will continue to wear Royal Canadian Air Force uniforms.

5. The working out of the foregoing arrangements shall be reviewed in September 1941, in order to determine whether the schedule in Paragraph 2 can be maintained or accelerated and to consider the position and organization of Canadian pilots and aircrews in excess of those who may be absorbed in Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons under these arrangements.

6. Under the Air Training Plan and at the request of the United Kingdom government, the Royal Canadian Air Force has concentrated on the production of pilots and aircrews.

This has necessitated the provision and employment in Canada of ground personnel who would otherwise have been available for service with Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons overseas. It is recognized, however, as desirable, so far as it may mutually be considered practicable, that the United Kingdom ground personnel who, for the reasons stated above, will be required for the squadrons referred to in paragraph two should gradually be exchanged for Royal Canadian Air Force ground personnel employed on the Air Training Plan, with a view to achieving homogeneity of personnel in these squadrons.

7. The concentration of the Royal Canadian Air Force on the Air Training Plan may also, at the outset, result in a shortage of Royal Canadian Air Force officers with the necessary qualifications to fill posts as squadron commanders, etc. It is recognized that, if enough Royal Canadian Air Force officers with these qualifications are not immediately available, some of these posts may require to be filled by Royal Air Force officers.

The replacement of these Royal Air Force officers will be effected progressively as soon as qualified Royal Canadian Air Force officers become available for that purpose.

8. Nothing in these arrangements to implement Article 15 affects the financial responsibilities of the two governments under the Air Training Agreement, it being understood that the cost of the 25 squadrons referred to in Paragraph 1 above will be borne by the United Kingdom government, except that the pay, allowances, and non-effective benefits of Royal Canadian Air Force personnel who serve in the new squadrons will be borne by the United Kingdom government only to the extent provided for in Article 17 of the Air Training Agreement.

9. The Air Officer Commanding the Royal Canadian Air Force Overseas Headquarters, or a senior officer designated by the Canadian government for the purpose, will at all times have access to Commanders of stations and groups and to Commanders in Chief of commands in which Royal Canadian Air Force personnel are serving, and will be furnished by them with such information as he may desire.

He will also have access to the Chief of the Air Staff. He will be furnished with advance information about any major questions which arise from time to time affecting the employment of Royal Canadian Air Force personnel and squadrons. He will be at liberty to make representations to the Air Ministry on any of the above matters.

10. The arrangements in the preceding paragraph will not affect the existing procedure for consultation between the two governments on major questions affecting the employment of the Royal Canadian Air Force personnel and squadrons overseas. Agreement ends.

I have initialled this with Secretary of State for Air and am submitting it for your urgent consideration. I am cabling certain comments to you via External Affairs, but meanwhile thought you would like to have the text of the Agreement, which I hope you can approve. Ends.

807.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2139

London, December 24, 1940

Following from Ralston to the Prime Minister and Power. Begins. Following are comments on Memorandum of Agreement as to arrangements made under Article 15 of Air Training Plan, which was cabled you on December 23rd.

Regarding paragraph 2 of Agreement, slowness in forming squadrons is not due to any reluctance on the part of the United Kingdom to carry out spirit of the Agreement, but arises from the fact that air crews cannot simply be thrown into complete squadrons as they arrive in the United Kingdom. It will be obviously necessary to have the proper proportions of pilots, bombers, gunners, wireless and air navigation personnel, and also it may be necessary for them to have some preparatory operational training with experienced Royal Air Force units, thus giving them greater efficiency and avoiding casualties, which would result from forming them immediately into Royal Canadian Air Force operational squadrons.

Paragraph 3. Stevenson feels strongly that centralization of posting is in Canadian interests, and permits most effective employment of personnel, without the delays which would be incurred if Canadians were posted through

a separate organization to Royal Air Force squadrons while Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons in course of formation.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 provide for identification of all Canadians from the Air Training Plan, wherever serving, with the provision for reviewing the situation in September 1941, which will afford an opportunity to consider practicability of Royal Air Force Canadian squadrons in addition to the 28 Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons in paragraph 1 of the Agreement. As already indicated, the United Kingdom feel very doubtful about such a plan being effectively worked out, but they are willing to leave it open for further consideration. The six months period mentioned for this purpose was considered too short for sufficient experience to be gained to enable practical consideration to be given.

Paragraph 6. This is a new point. It is really not much more than an expression of hope that something may some time be done by way of exchange. The Royal Air Force service people were particularly anxious to have some paragraph of this kind; their earlier draft was much stronger, but, as you will note, final draft only binds as far "as may mutually be considered practicable". We could (hardly?) refuse to go this far, and I hope that (there will be no?) suggestion for change in this paragraph as it is the result of very considerable discussion and revision.

Paragraph 7 speaks for itself, and is designed to ensure operational efficiency.

Paragraph 8 speaks for itself.

Paragraph 9 is a consultation clause. We have made it as wide as we possibly could, and think you will be quite satisfied with it.

Paragraph 10 is designed to make it clear that consultation between service representatives of paragraph 9 is supplementary to and not any substitution for consultation between the Governments.

I should have made clear in my earlier telegram that my initialling was subject to confirmation by the Canadian Government, but at the same time I sincerely hope the Agreement can stand as initialled. Sir Archibald Sinclair, in his covering letter sending me a copy of the Memorandum of Agreement, says "at an earlier stage the Memorandum contained clause stating that arrangements would be made from time to time between the two Governments to effect changes between senior officers of the Royal Air Force and senior officers of the Royal Canadian Air Force. This has rightly been deleted from the Memorandum, but I think it would perhaps be well for us to take this opportunity of stating in writing that our respective Governments have it in mind to effect such changes as opportunity offers". We had suggested that this matter was really not part of the Agreement respecting the Air Training Plan, and that it be put forward in a separate communication. I see no objection to my confirming Sir Archibald's statement that "our respective Governments have it in mind to effect such exchanges as opportunity offers". Please confirm this as well. Ends.

MASSEY

808.

72-T-38

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 2036

Ottawa, December 27, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following from Prime Minister and Power to Ralston. Begins.

1. The Cabinet War Committee have now considered the text of the memorandum of agreement as to arrangements for identification of Canadians from the Air Training Plan, as contained in your Air Force Signal of December 23rd. Full consideration has also been given to the comments contained in your External Affairs telegram No. 2139 of December 24th.

2. The government are willing to confirm the agreement as set out in your telegram of December 23rd, and initialled by you, subject to what follows regarding paragraph six thereof as to exchange of ground personnel.

3. We are not sure as to what is intended by paragraph six, which appears to be capable of two interpretations. First, this paragraph may be interpreted as a proposal that the United Kingdom ground crews who are to be attached to the twenty-five R.C.A.F. squadrons will be replaced in due course, and as may be considered practicable by Canadian ground crews previously employed in the Training Plan, and that such R.C.A.F. personnel will in turn be replaced in Canada by equal numbers of United Kingdom personnel of similar categories. Second, paragraph six may be interpreted as requiring the raising of additional ground crews by Canada to take the place in the Training Plan of such Canadians as may proceed overseas to join the R.C.A.F. squadrons, in substitution for United Kingdom personnel. If the twenty-five R.C.A.F. squadrons are eventually to be fully manned by Canadians, this would involve, in due course, the raising by Canada of approximately 7,500 ground personnel, additional to the numbers at present contemplated.

We should like to have you clarify the meaning of this paragraph. Immediately we are sure of what is intended in this respect, we will let you have our decision.

4. Subject to what has been said in the preceding numbered paragraph of this telegram, you may regard this message as confirmation by the Canadian government of the memorandum of agreement with the government of the United Kingdom, and you may inform the Air Ministry accordingly.

5. The government have no objection to your confirming in writing to the Secretary of State for Air the understanding regarding the exchange of senior officers of the Royal Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force described in the final paragraph of your telegram of December 24th. Ends.

809.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2160

London, December 31, 1940

Following from Ralston for the Prime Minister and Power. Begins. Your telegram No. 2036, Memorandum of Agreement on Air Training Plan. First interpretation of paragraph 6, as outlined in your paragraph 3, is the correct one. Have consulted Dominions Office and Air Ministry who have written that their interpretation of this paragraph is that it contemplates that Royal Canadian Air Force ground personnel sent from Canada to the 25 Royal Canadian Air Force Squadrons would be replaced by Royal Air Force ground personnel sent to Canada. They add that this system of replacement is, of course, also covered, as regards both parties to the Agreement, by the words:

"So far as it may mutually be considered practicable".

With this interpretation, I assume that there is no objection to my signing the Agreement. [Ends.]

MASSEY

810.

72-T-38

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 24

Ottawa, January 2, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following from Prime Minister and Power for Ralston. Begins.

1. The Cabinet War Committee considered today your telegram No. 2160 of December thirty-first, regarding the interpretation of Paragraph six of the agreement regarding identification of Canadians from the Air Training Plan.

2. The government are now prepared to approve the paragraph in question on the basis that Royal Canadian Air Force ground personnel sent from Canada to the twenty-five Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons, will be replaced by Royal Air Force ground personnel sent to Canada, such replacement being subject to the stated condition, quote, so far as it may mutually be considered practicable, unquote. Your signature to the agreement, on the part of the government, is accordingly approved. Ends.

811.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 33

London, January 7, 1941

Your telegram No. 24 of January 2nd. Following for the Prime Minister and Power from Colonel Ralston. Begins.

Secretary of State for Air and I signed Memorandum of Agreement on Article No. 15 this afternoon. Previously we had exchanged letters, substance of which was as follows:

My letter.

As clarification of paragraph six of Memorandum has been satisfactorily effected by exchanges of letters between Canada House and Dominions Office, I am now in a position to sign Memorandum. Your suggestion re exchange of officers is concurred in. It is our understanding of the purpose of these exchanges that by them Royal Canadian Air Force officers will gain the experience which is necessary for them to qualify for higher command overseas. This will ensure that seniority of Royal Canadian Air Force personnel in Canada will not be restricted to training activities there for the duration of the war. The Canadian Government would also desire that, when practicable, Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons should serve together in stations and groups, and that Canadian officers should, when qualified, be given commands and staff appointments, not only in stations and groups in which Canadian squadrons would normally be serving, but also in the commands and at the Air Ministry, to the extent that such commands and appointments should be proportionate to the numbers of Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons serving overseas.

Substance of Sir Archibald's reply was:

I am in full agreement with what you say as to the purpose of the suggested exchanges between senior officers [of] the Royal Air Force and senior officers of the Royal Canadian Air Force, and as to the desirability of arranging that in so far as suitably qualified Royal Canadian Air Force officers are available, they should be given commands and staff appointments, not only in stations and groups in which Canadian squadrons would normally be serving, but also in the commands and at the Air Ministry. It would be our endeavour to arrange that such appointments were given to Royal Canadian Air Force officers in numbers fully proportionate to the number of R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas. We will also endeavour to arrange that where practicable, R.C.A.F. squadrons will be grouped together in the same stations and in the same groups, but, as I am sure you will appreciate, the first consideration must be to retain the high degree of officers which is essential to operational efficiency.

Discussed above exchange of letters with Air Vice-Marshal Breadner who concurs. Ends.

MASSEY

812.

72-T-38

*Extrait du procès-verbal de la réunion au ministère de l'Air**Extract from Minutes of Meeting in Air Ministry*

SECRET

London, January 7, 1941.

...

IV. *Extension of Joint Air Training Plan.*

23. COLONEL RALSTON referred to the Aide-Mémoire¹ which had been furnished him in connection with the extension of training facilities. He pointed out that the document included an explanation of the reasons why the United Kingdom had seen fit to explore the possibilities in connection with flying training in the United States, and expressed his anxiety that this might be interpreted as a reflection on the manner in which the Joint Air Training Plan was being carried out in Canada. He recalled that the Canadian Government had some time ago asked the United Kingdom Government whether they wished the Joint Air Training Plan to be extended and had received a reply that such an extension was not visualised in the immediate future. It now appeared that not only would it be necessary to extend the Plan but that training was also to be undertaken in the United States and this at a time when Canada felt that she had successfully carried out her undertakings in this regard, and had indeed offered to enlarge them. He thought that this might create a wrong impression and hoped that Canada would be given the opportunity of carrying out any extra training required. In so far as such extra training was found to be beyond the capacity of Canada, then the United States might be approached.

24. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR² in reply pointed out that he had never had any doubt about Canada's contribution to the Joint Training Plan. The Plan had been accelerated and was in fact producing air crews at a higher rate than was originally proposed, and this had, as he was fully aware, been due to the energy and resource with which Canada had tackled the problem of producing training establishments. The approach to the United States had arisen from the fact that there had been a serious shortage of pilots and the United Kingdom Government had hoped that they might find in the United States ready-made capacity, including aerodromes, instructors and advanced trainers, which could produce a flow of pilots in supplement to the flow from the United Kingdom and Dominions Training Schemes. Indeed, we had been given the impression by authorities in the United States that such capacity existed and that we might furthermore expect some diversion of advanced trainers from United States Army and Navy Air Force purposes to the training of pilots for us in the United States. As Colonel Ralston would be aware,

¹ Le texte de l'aide-mémoire se trouve au document 814.

² Sir Archibald Sinclair.

¹ Text of the Aide-Mémoire is contained in Document 814.

a serious restriction on extension of flying training was imposed by the general shortage of advanced trainer aircraft, and the only way of getting the use of United States advanced trainers was to undertake some training in the United States.

25. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR pointed out that, apart from the considerations which he had mentioned, it was highly desirable politically that we should make use of this opportunity to get the United States to take part in our common effort to win the war. He was appreciative of the point of view which had been expressed by Colonel Ralston, but nevertheless if it were possible for the United States in the near future to undertake training additional to that which could be undertaken in Canada he would not feel able to refuse the offer although he was not optimistic about the prospects of such an arrangement in the near future.

26. After further discussion, it was agreed that the paragraph in question should be deleted from the Aide-Mémoire.

813.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 37

London, January 8, 1941

Following from Colonel Ralston to the Prime Minister and Power. Begins. Secretary of State for Air has written to me concerning further expansion of the Joint Air Training Plan. He refers to Mr. Churchill's telegrams of November 14th and December 4th which deal with the possibility of developing production of trainer aircraft in Canada. He adds that this was not intended to mean that the United Kingdom had abandoned the idea of undertaking more flying training in Canada at a later stage, but it was not possible at the moment to give a final decision as to how much more training might be done in Canada, or whether it could better be provided by an extension of the Plan than setting up more transfer schools in Canada.

Attached to his letter was an Aide-Mémoire which summarizes the position, and which I am cabling separately through Air Ministry cypher. I have agreed that Air Vice-Marshal Breadner shall discuss questions in that Aide-Mémoire with Air Ministry here, pending consideration that will be given it in Ottawa. Ends.

MASSEY

814.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le quartier général de l'Aviation royale du Canada en Grande-Bretagne
au chef de l'état-major de l'Air*

Royal Canadian Air Force Headquarters in Great Britain to Chief of Air Staff

TELEGRAM

London, January 9, 1941

Following from Ralston for Prime Minister and Power through External. [Begins.] Following is text of Aide-Mémoire referred to in my telegram 37 of January 8th:

Canada's generous offer to provide more flying training facilities has been the subject of telegraphic correspondence between Prime Ministers ending with telegram No. 178¹ to the Prime Minister of Canada.

2. In that telegram we put first things first and the limiting factor in the expansion of flying training being the shortage of advanced trainer aircraft, we asked that Canada's first effort should be to increase its production of advanced trainers. This still remains the primary need.

3. The flying training organization has been planned to meet the needs of the operational force which it is hoped to complete in the course of the year 1942 and to provide some margin against the possibility of still further operational expansion beyond the force at present engaged for that year.

4. This training organization embraces 56 flying training schools and includes, of course, the schools provided by the British Commonwealth Joint Air Training Plan which in turn provides 25 of the 56 service flying training schools required for the complete training organization.

5. The course of the war has placed severe restrictions on flying training in the United Kingdom and this fact, together with the heavy aerodrome requirements for operational purpose in the United Kingdom, makes the completion of the United Kingdom portion of the authorized expansion of the flying training organization a matter of some difficulty. Indeed, account has to be taken of the possibility that all flying training other than operational training may in due course, have to take place outside the United Kingdom.

6. Canada has very generously agreed to provide accommodation for eight service flying training and six other schools to be transferred from the United Kingdom. Four of these service flying training schools we hope to occupy or begin to occupy by about the end of next month. Two existing schools are already transferred and one newly formed school is in process of being transferred. The fourth (a newly formed school) will leave later this month. We hope to transfer four more service flying training schools by August 1941.

7. The actual process of transfer involves a break in training and an immediate loss of output but this we must accept.

8. Canada has tackled the problem of providing a vast training organization with great energy and resource and we appreciate what a heavy strain this must involve. It is with some hesitation, therefore, that we ask Canada to contemplate at any rate before the middle of 1941, the transfer from the United Kingdom of additional training units. This possibility arises entirely from the considerations set out in paragraph five.

9. We have a balance of six additional service flying training schools in the United Kingdom portion of the programme and we have reached the conclusion that it is highly desirable that these should be located in the North American continent. The time factor is all important and consequently we cannot afford to neglect any possibility of securing the use of ready-made capacity.

¹ Document 802.

10. It remains to consider the need for capacity for observer and general reconnaissance training (in addition to that for which Canada is already providing accommodation) and we cannot see any means of providing it in this country. This additional training which makes use of Anson aircraft very largely must again depend on the availability of that type, or an equivalent type of aircraft. If and when an adequate supply of aircraft for this purpose can be foreseen, we should like to discuss the formation in Canada of more schools, giving these kinds of training.

11. Another way in which Canada might be able to help would be by extending the existing elementary flying training organization in Canada to cover the needs of any United Kingdom schools transferred to that Dominion.

12. It is realized that the planning and construction of additional training schools must take some considerable time, and that it is essential that the Canadian government should be furnished with definite proposals at an early date if the additional schools ultimately found to be needed in Canada are to be provided in time. It may well be that before Air Vice-Marshal Breadner leaves the United Kingdom we shall be in a position to indicate our needs with more precision. We should therefore be glad if Mr. Ralston would agree to our pursuing the question further with Air Vice-Marshal Breadner.

[Ends.]

815.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

No. 5

Ottawa, January 30, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Air Ministry are anxious that ground personnel of the Royal Air Force serving in the Dominions, who desire to transfer from ground duties to air crew duties and can be recommended for air crew training, should be allowed to transfer to such training. It would be convenient in such cases if the Dominion authorities would allow the necessary air crew training to take place in the Dominion in which the transferee is serving at the time of his transfer.

2. I have been instructed to approach the Canadian Government in this matter, and to enquire whether they are prepared to agree to the proposal, in so far as Canada is concerned. It is understood that this question was discussed with Air Vice-Marshal Breadner during his visit to the United Kingdom.

3. The United Kingdom Government would propose that any Royal Air Force volunteers serving in Canada who might be accepted for training in Canadian schools under this arrangement would be regarded as forming part of the United Kingdom quota under the Joint Air Training Plan.

I have etc.

W. C. HANKINSON

816.

963-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 272

Ottawa, February 24, 1941

A serious situation concerning operation of British Commonwealth Air Training Plan has arisen due to delays in shipment of training aircraft from United Kingdom. A monthly allotment of aircraft was promised by the Air Ministry but shipment is not being maintained and this aspect is causing anxiety since without the aircraft it will be impracticable for schools to open in accordance with schedule and for training to proceed.

Please consult British authorities to ensure that priority is given in allocation of shipping space to our requirements of Anson training aircraft. The difficulties in regard to shipping are fully recognized but it is considered that the arrival according to schedule of aircraft for this aspect of war training is of such vital importance as to justify special and urgent consideration.

Please take up with Air and Shipping Ministries reporting by telegram as soon as possible.

817.

963-39

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 352

London, March 1, 1941

Your telegram No. 272 of February 24th. Shipment of training aircraft to Canada. Have pressed this matter vigorously with the Air Ministry and Ministry of Shipping, who both have expressed their regret that during December/January period shipments fell further into arrears due not merely to lack of shipping but even more to production difficulties. During the last few weeks, however, position has improved, although it will be a week or so before effect of this improvement becomes apparent in Canada.

Air Ministry state that position as regards shipments for Joint Air Training Plan Schools is as follows: Anson requirements, 579; Shipped to February 4th, 431; Shipped to February 25th, 475; Battles requirements, 338; Shipped to February 4th, 235; Shipped to February 25th, 262.

Also on February 25th approximately 26 Ansons and 25 Battles were packed, and I am informed this morning that ships for most of them have now been allotted, and they will be probably despatched to Canada shortly.

Air Ministry state that they will continue to press their requirements with Ministry of Shipping, and have asked us to accept their assurance that they are doing all that they can to accelerate shipments.

MASSEY

818.

72-T-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain

No. 3

Ottawa, March 4, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your Note No. 5 dated the 30th January, 1941, with regard to the transfer of ground personnel of the Royal Air Force serving in this country to air crew duties.

The Department of National Defence here is in full agreement with your Government's proposal that Royal Air Force volunteers for Air Crew duties serving in Canada who might be accepted for training in Canadian schools will be regarded as forming part of the United Kingdom quota under the Joint Air Training Plan.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

819.

963-39

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 552

London, March 31, 1941

Further to your telegram No. 272 of February 24th, training aircraft from the United Kingdom. Minister of Shipping now admits that situation was not as satisfactory as previously stated (see my despatch No. A-134 of March 10th).¹ He now writes, however, that programme of shipment has been re-started, and that from March 19th to April 16th some 220 Ansons and Battles will have been packed for Canada and that shipping to convey these has already been booked or is being booked very shortly. About 87 will go on liners and the balance on tramps. Air Ministry state that programme for future monthly shipments to Canada is 70 Ansons and 25 Battles, and Ministry of Shipping do not expect any great difficulty in arranging for these shipments as planes become available.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

820.

963-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 60

Ottawa, April 13, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. As you are aware, under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, the United Kingdom is to supply certain aircraft, spare engines and spare parts for the maintenance of aircraft as an essential contribution in kind to the Training Plan in Canada. Deliveries of "Anson" and "Battle" aircraft from the United Kingdom are behind schedule. The delay in the receipt of "Anson" aircraft is handicapping training of pilots on twin engine aircraft although the effect of the shortage of "Anson" aircraft has been partially alleviated by the supply of aircraft from this Continent, and it is confidently expected that by the autumn our Canadian production of "Ansons" with American Jacobs engines will solve the problem of twin engine aircraft procurement. The problem of supply of spare parts for United Kingdom aircraft and engines already here or to arrive in the next few months is, however, causing us the gravest concern. Supply of spare "Cheetah" and "Merlin" engines and spare parts for "Anson" and "Battle" aircraft and "Cheetah" and "Merlin" engines has been totally inadequate for efficient maintenance of these aircraft and with the large number of airframes and engines now becoming due for complete overhaul, for which large quantities of spare parts will be required; in consequence we are faced with a serious curtailment of training or possible collapse of the Training Plan if an adequate supply of spare parts for these airframes and engines is not despatched from the United Kingdom at once. The Air Ministry is in possession of our requirements of spares for the next eighteen months. I would urge that everything possible be done to expedite despatch of six months' requirements of the above equipment, particularly spare "Cheetah" and "Merlin" engines and maintenance and overhaul spares for "Anson" and "Battle" airframes and "Cheetah" and "Merlin" engines. Immediate action is necessary in order to protect the Training Plan which we all expect will be such a great factor in the outcome of the present conflict. I have regarded this matter of sufficient urgency to bring it personally to your attention. Ends.

821.

963-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 76

London, May 6, 1941

MOST SECRET. Your telegram of April 13th, No. 60. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

I fully appreciate that equipment shortage referred to in your telegram No. 60 may have detrimental effect on Air Training Plan, as to vital importance of which we are all in agreement. But I am sure you will not underrate the difficulties imposed on us by enemy action. These include serious restriction on production by bombing of manufacturing centres, such as Coventry; destruction and damage by bombing of material which was ready to be sent to you; damage to the ports from which shipments have to be effected; and toll of sinkings in the Atlantic. Nevertheless we have spared no effort to supply you with what you need; for example, we have so far shipped to you over 900 aircraft, constituting 80% of programme to date.

2. The most serious shortages are due to the effect of enemy action on production of Cheetahs and Cheetah spares. We are doing our best to restore production, but unfortunately leeway cannot be quickly made [up for] this. I hope, therefore, you will be able to accelerate Canadian production of Ansons with Jacobs engines, of which we have such high hope. I understand that you also hope to manufacture certain Cheetah engine spares, and this too will be very welcome. In addition to doing all we can to accelerate production of Cheetah engines, we have just obtained a promise of 1150 suitable alternative engines from America, and we have already agreed that 650 of these shall be supplied to Canada to engine Anson airframes which we shall supply from this country. In this way Canada will obtain further relief, and an all round improvement in Cheetah situation will be produced.

3. Detailed comments follow:

(a) Ansons. Out of 719 promised by April 30th, 585 have been despatched to date. Our whole output is now devoted to joint Air Training Plan needs in Canada and Australia. If present forecast of output can be realized, we hope to clear off arrears by the end of July.

(b) Battles. Out of 444 promised by April 30th, 345 have been despatched to date. We have recently been compelled to divert packing capacity to packing of operational aircraft for the Middle East.

(c) Spare engines. Out of a total of 116 Merlins required, 40 have been despatched and 60 are awaiting shipment. We realize that shipments of Cheetah engines are greatly in arrears. Reasons for this have been explained above.

(d) Airframe and engine spares. We are sparing no effort to increase your stocks. Further spares are actually on the way and others are in the process of production and shipment. A special drive is being made in connection with these spares and, but for Cheetah engine range, we do not expect any further substantial difficulty.

4. There have been steady despatches of Battle airframes and Merlin engine spares, and an improved supply of Anson airframe spares may be expected. This is instanced by shipping tonnage, which is expected to reach 600 for April against an average less than 400 tons for preceding 3 months. Ends.

822.

72-T-38

*Le secrétaire, le gouvernement de l'Inde au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Secretary, Government of India to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 3052

Simla, June 21, 1941

Following for Read from Tymms. Your semi-official letter dated March 3rd.¹ Proposed admission of Indian pilots to Empire Air Training Scheme was taken up with His Majesty's Government who regretted inability to find vacancies for them this year. Proposal will be reviewed by Government of India unconditionally. Copy of my air mail letter dated April 7th¹ being sent.

823.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

No. 44

Ottawa, September 12, 1941

SECRET

Sir,

In the course of his recent visit to London the Minister of National Defence for Air asked the United Kingdom authorities to consider an increase in the number of Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons to be formed under Article 15 of the Commonwealth Air Training Plan Agreement. The United Kingdom Government have given careful consideration to this suggestion and I have been asked to communicate the following observations to the Canadian Government.

2. The present position is that twenty-five squadrons are due to be formed by the 30th June, 1942. It is expected that this commitment will be met. The programme may be three squadrons in arrears by the end of 1941, but these arrears should be cleared before the end of March, 1942.

3. A careful examination has shown that it is unlikely that it would be possible to form, by the 30th June, 1942, any more Dominions squadrons than those already agreed to. It is, indeed, probable that in order to meet the commitments entered into, and to conform to the requests of the Dominions as regards types of squadrons, almost all the bomber squadrons formed be-

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

tween now and June, 1942, will be Dominions squadrons. Aircraft are not coming off production, especially in the United States, at the rate originally estimated for this period, and in addition the rate of formation of squadrons has been slowed down by a decision to expand the Bomber Command by raising the Initial Equipment of squadrons from sixteen to twenty-four aircraft. These increases in Initial Equipment are now being gradually effected. It will be appreciated that the increase in Initial Equipment of squadrons means that each of the new bomber squadrons will be equal to one and a half of the old. Thus the fourteen R.C.A.F. bomber squadrons formed or to be formed by the 30th June are equal, from the point of view of absorbing aircrews, to twenty-one squadrons formed on the old Initial Equipment basis.

4. The formation of additional fighter squadrons beyond the number agreed for June, 1942, is precluded by operational difficulties which were explained in London to the Minister of National Defence for Air and the Canadian Chief of the Air Staff.

5. In informing the Canadian Government of the above, I have been asked to explain that, whilst the United Kingdom authorities are prepared sympathetically to consider any proposals which the Canadian Government may put forward, they regret that it will be impracticable in the circumstances for the formation of any additional squadrons which may be decided upon to be commenced before the 30th June, 1942.

I have etc.

PATRICK DUFF

824.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516X/346

Ottawa, October 23, 1941

SECRET

My dear Mr. Robertson,

The United Kingdom authorities are anxious to enter into discussions as soon as possible with other parties to the Joint Air Training Plan on the question of the continuation of the Scheme beyond March, 1943. They have no doubt that the situation will be found to call for the maintenance of the Scheme without any reduction, and the programme for the provision of trainer aircraft makes it necessary to look well ahead.

The United Kingdom authorities feel that negotiations on this subject can hardly be conducted by telegraph. A careful examination of the man-power position of each of the countries concerned, in relation to the maintenance of the Scheme, will no doubt be needed, and arrangements for the supply of trainer aircraft and equipment will necessarily be different from those laid down in the original Scheme. I have therefore been asked to enquire whether the Canadian Government will be prepared to nominate representatives with a full knowledge of the Scheme and its operation to discuss the question in London with representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

This enquiry is of a preliminary nature, and if the Canadian Government are disposed to agree in principle, a similar proposal will be made to the Australian and New Zealand Governments.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

825.

72-T-38

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

Ottawa, November 3, 1941

Dear Mr. MacDonald,

May I refer to your letter of October 23rd in which you inquire, on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, whether the Canadian Government will be prepared to nominate representatives to discuss in London with representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand the continuation of the joint Air Training Plan beyond March, 1943. I have been directed to state in reply that the Canadian Government agree that it is desirable that discussions of this kind should take place as soon as possible. It is hoped, however, that these discussions can take place in Ottawa rather than in London. It is felt that there are good reasons for holding the conference in this country, and it is hoped that this suggestion will commend itself to the United Kingdom Government.

Yours sincerely,

[N. A. ROBERTSON]

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

No. 64

Ottawa, November 7, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my Note No. 44 of the 12th September last on the subject of the proposed increase in the number of Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons to be formed under Article 15 of the Commonwealth Air Training Plan Agreement.

2. I understand that the Air Ministry made a similar communication at that time to Air Commodore Stevenson, Air Officer Commanding, Royal Canadian Air Force in Great Britain, and that the latter was subsequently instructed by the Department of National Defence for Air to ask the Air Ministry to establish five additional Royal Canadian Air Force Fighter Squadrons in lieu of five Bomber Squadrons, if the formation of Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons could thereby be expedited.

3. Air Commodore Stevenson then pointed out to the Department of National Defence that whereas the Bomber Squadron establishment is Air Crew 199 and Ground Crew 244, the Fighter Squadron establishment, less servicing echelon, is Air Crew 23, Ground Crew 107. The substitution proposed would thus result in over 1,000 less personnel in the Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons. An official request to proceed with five Fighter Squadrons has nevertheless been received "in order that the original programme can be met or accelerated", and the United Kingdom Government now state that these five Fighter Squadrons can probably be formed within the present target programme before the end of January, 1942.

4. In order, however, that there may be no misunderstanding I have been asked to inform the Canadian Government that although the United Kingdom Government will be happy to comply with the request to form five Fighter Squadrons in lieu of five Bomber Squadrons, this will result in larger proportions of Royal Canadian Air Force crew personnel being employed in Royal Air Force squadrons than would have been the case had the Canadian Government been prepared to wait until it was possible to form bomber squadrons.

I have etc.

MALCOLM MACDONALD

827.

72-T-38

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1786

Ottawa, November 13, 1941

Please deliver the following important message from Minister of National Defence for Air to the Secretary of State for Air. Begins.

1. I regret that it is necessary to advise you that the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan is endangered because of the non-supply of equipment to be contributed by the United Kingdom. The supply of spares from the United Kingdom has been inadequate to the point of failure.

2. By arrangement subsequent to original British Commonwealth Air Training Plan Agreement Canada was allowed to manufacture locally, at the expense of Great Britain, parts that could not be supplied in time from England. Action, however, was subject to prior approval of the United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission to Canada.

3. This arrangement has failed to provide a solution to our problem because the Liaison Mission, limited by the Treasury, can approve the manufacture of only small quantities of spares. The quantities so approved for manufacture in Canada are frequently insufficient to enable such manufacture to be proceeded with except at exorbitant cost on the ground that bulk supplies are continually being promised from Great Britain. These bulk supplies, however, never actually arrive in this country. There are certain items which cannot be manufactured in Canada in any event because of excessive cost or technical difficulties.

4. The situation is becoming so serious that the Training Plan will soon have to be drastically curtailed unless the shortage of spare parts for aircraft is remedied. For example: during August and September of this year, engines becoming due for overhaul exceeded the numbers overhauled by 120 per month. In October this figure was 163 and there is every prospect that in November the disparity between engines becoming due for overhaul and the number overhauled will be even greater. In addition, 48% of the Battle aircraft in Canada are at present unserviceable. This alarming situation is entirely due to the non-receipt of parts.

5. The situation in British Schools in Canada is equally serious. Forty-three percent of the two hundred and seventy-five Oxford aircraft in these Schools are now unserviceable due to the shortage of parts. Practically no spares of this type have been received so that the situation will continue to deteriorate rapidly.

6. I consider it essential that Canada be empowered to purchase parts on this continent as a charge against the United Kingdom account when such parts are not being supplied from the United Kingdom in sufficient time to prevent the Plan being seriously hampered by unserviceability of aircraft. Discretion in the use of this power must rest with Canada as the administrator of the Plan. In the meantime it is vital that a high priority be given to the issue and despatch of spares demanded by Canada for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Immediate deliveries from Canadian production are unlikely and a continued supply of these spares from the United Kingdom and also components, the manufacture in Canada of which is not feasible, is necessary.

7. Additional aircraft are required for Bombing and Gunnery Schools to meet revised Training Programme and to replace Battle aircraft for which airframe and engine spares are not available and which, from our experience, are unlikely to be supplied in adequate quantities. Total of 1248 aircraft required for ten Bombing and Gunnery Schools to April 30th, 1944. Present provisioning includes 891 only. Further provisioning of 357 aircraft therefore necessary. Bolingbroke aircraft being manufactured in Canada apparently only suitable type available.

8. Air Ministry (D.G.O.) have been advised that 150 Bolingbrokes can be released from operations in Canada and from current Canadian production on condition that 55 Hudsons are diverted from United States contract to Canada. 180 additional Bolingbrokes can be provided from 1942 Canadian production. Diversion 55 Hudsons approved and Air Ministry approval of purchase 180 Bolingbrokes awaited.

9. Estimated that shortage of airframe and engine spares will necessitate reduction 200 Battles to components during period ending March 31st, 1944. To replace these and to provide 27 aircraft to complete normal additional provisioning to March 31st, 1944 of 357 aircraft, will require purchase of 227 Bolingbrokes from 1943 Canadian production.

10. To complete this Bolingbroke programme will require release by Ministry of Aircraft Production of 450 Bristol Mercury XV engines for 1942 construction and 567 Mercury XV engines for 1943 construction. These quantities are in addition to present orders. Adequate spares for these engines are also essential.

11. Early approval for purchase 180 Bolingbrokes from 1942 Canadian production and 227 Bolingbrokes from 1943 production and adequate spares for these, and the provision of the Mercury XV engines for this programme, is urged.

12. I fully appreciate your own supply difficulties in these matters but I must emphasize again that the problem outlined above is immediate and urgent and, unless it is solved, will gravely endanger the success of the whole Commonwealth Air Training Plan. [Ends.]

828.

72-T-38

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

No. 61

Ottawa, November 19, 1941

Sir,

I wish to acknowledge your Note No. 64 of November 7th, concerning the proposed increase in the number of Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons to be formed under Article 15 of the Commonwealth Air Training Agreement.

Notwithstanding the fact that the formation of five fighter squadrons in lieu of five bomber squadrons will result in larger proportions of Royal Canadian Air Force aircrew personnel being employed in Royal Air Force squadrons, it is the desire of the Canadian Government to have Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons formed as quickly as possible, and accordingly it is requested that the formation of five Royal Canadian Air Force fighter squadrons be proceeded with at the earliest possible date.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

829.

72-T-38

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2171

London, November 20, 1941

Your telegram No. 1786 of November 14th containing message from Minister of National Defence for Air to Secretary of State for Air. Mr. Power's message was at once passed on to Sir Archibald Sinclair from whom a reply has today been received to the effect that he has ordered a full enquiry into the whole question of supply of spares and aircraft for Empire Air Training Scheme, which is being carried out urgently. The Secretary of State explains that a survey of this magnitude involving hundreds of thousands of items of spares is, however, bound to take time. He cannot therefore give an immediate answer.

(2) With reference to supply of aircraft for Bombing and Gunnery Schools (paragraphs 7 to 11 of your telegram under reference) the United Kingdom Government are ready to divert to Canada 55 Hudsons to fill gap created by using 150 Bolingbrokes for Bombing and Gunnery Schools and necessary instructions had already been sent to British Air Commission in Washington. United Kingdom Government also accept the further 180 Bolingbrokes for this role in 1942 as a requirement of the Empire Air Training Scheme, and necessary arrangements both for airframe and for Mercury XV engines are being made at once with Ministry of Aircraft Production.

(3) Of forecast of requirement of 227 Bolingbrokes for Bombing and Gunnery Schools in 1943, 200 arise from an anticipated shortage of spares for Battles. Sir Archibald Sinclair would therefore like to defer final consideration of this item until spares situation has been further clarified.

(4) The Secretary of State has asked that Mr. Power should be assured that the United Kingdom Government are giving remainder of his telegram most earnest consideration and that he will send me a full reply at the earliest possible date for transmission to Mr. Power.

MASSEY

CHAPITRE V/CHAPTER V

COOPÉRATION MILITAIRE AU SEIN DU
COMMONWEALTH

COMMONWEALTH MILITARY CO-OPERATION

PARTIE 1/PART 1

CORPS EXPÉDITIONNAIRES CANADIENS
CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

GRANDE-BRETAGNE, FRANCE, ISLANDE
GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ICELAND

830.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

SECRET

Ottawa, September 23, 1939

Dear Dr. Skelton,

Though the High Commissioner understands, from what you said to him in the course of conversation on the 21st September, that he will in due course be receiving an official reply from the Canadian Government to the suggestions regarding detailed military matters made at (b) in the memorandum enclosed in his letter of the 6th September¹ to you, he nevertheless reported to London in the meantime the official statement recently issued by the Department of National Defence on the decision to equip immediately 20,000 men with the contingency of overseas service, coupled with the intention to equip thereafter a further 20,000 men.

Sir Gerald Campbell wishes me to say that he has now received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs instructing him to convey to the Canadian Government the warm appreciation of the United Kingdom Government for this valuable step.

Yours sincerely,

PAUL MASON

¹ Volume 6, Document 1073.

831.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 354

Ottawa, September 23, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Informal exchanges have taken place between Chief of the General Staff, Ottawa, and Chief of the General Staff at War Office, through Colonel Loggie, Liaison Officer in London with regard to organization, despatch and equipment of Expeditionary Force. This has now reached a stage where it becomes both desirable and necessary that further communications on all matters of policy relating to organization, despatch and equipment of Expeditionary Force should be made through the regular channels including both Canada House and Earncliffe. In this manner, it will be possible for the questions of policy involved to be examined in relation to the other aspects of the general policy of co-operation that are a matter of concern to both Governments.

In matters of detail not involving policy exchanges can, of course, still be made through Colonel Loggie. In explaining the matter to him you should point out that the change should not be regarded as reflecting upon any action taken by him, but merely as indicating that a new stage had been reached in the negotiations involving this treatment. You should discuss this question with the appropriate authorities with a view to making immediate arrangements for the adoption of this course.

832.

902-A-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 84

Ottawa, September 29, 1939

SECRET. Your telegram No. 59 of September 6th and supplementary memorandum of same date from High Commissioner for the United Kingdom¹ regarding cooperation with United Kingdom.

1. With regard to the army section of this memorandum and particularly the suggestion for the provision of technical units for attachment to United Kingdom formations, the Canadian Government is prepared to despatch technical units as selected from following list to a total of from 5000 to 6000 all ranks.

¹ Volume 6, Documents 1072, 1073.

Date of despatch of such technical units from Canada will be determined when information is received as to the units which your Government considers would be most useful given in order of priority.

2. List begins.

(a) Medical. One general hospital (twelve hundred beds); one field ambulance; two Casualty Clearing Stations.

(b) Signals. One complete corps signals; one construction section; one wireless section General Headquarters; one wireless section Line of Communication; one Anti-aircraft brigade signals less two area sections.

(c) Engineers. One divisional engineers; one corps troops engineers; one corps field survey company; two Army Troops companies; one workshop and park company; one boring section; one road construction company less labourers.

(d) Transportation. One divisional Army Service Corps; one corps troops Army Service Corps.

(e) Ordnance. One ordnance field park; one ordnance store company; one ordnance workshop company; one Anti-aircraft brigade workshop less one section.¹

Certain staff officers to constitute a nucleus of Canadian headquarters in the United Kingdom to leave Canada in advance of other units.

3. In respect to technical units for employment with British formations following conditions apply.

(a) Units to remain intact as Canadian units.

(b) Canada will assume responsibility for pay and allowances of personnel including reinforcements for cost of subsistence for initial issue of clothing and for transportation to United Kingdom.

(c) United Kingdom to assume responsibility for equipping units and for maintenance personal and unit equipment until units revert to Canadian higher command.

(d) If Canada should at later date decide to increase her forces in field all or any of technical units provided to be available on request for return to Canadian higher command.

(e) On return of any units to Canadian higher command Canada to assume cost of maintenance of equipment.

(f) The assumption of cost of equipment then in use to be subject to mutual arrangements.

4. We would prefer to despatch first any technical units selected. War Office to state order of preference for despatch.

¹À la suite du télégramme 86 du 30 septembre 1939, une batterie moyenne fut ajoutée à cette liste.

¹One medium Battery was added to this list in Telegram 86 of September 30, 1939.

833.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 454

London, October 3, 1939

War Office enquiring whether Canadian Government would be in a position to assist by raising railway troop units and forestry companies for service overseas. Headquarters railway construction and maintenance group, railway survey and railway construction companies, Royal Engineers would be needed. War Establishment serial numbers for the above which are in possession of military authorities in Canada would be W. E. IV/1931 (/15) (/1) 13 (/2) 16 (/1) respectively. Establishment of company of Canadian Forestry Corps as in 1918. It is suggested that equipment for the Forestry units be provided in Canada and equipment for railway units be discussed. Understand that formal request will be sent through Dominions Office and if acceded to details of numbers of units and dates they will be required will be suggested. Please pass on this information to National Defence.

MASSEY

834.

902-A-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 87

London, October 7, 1939

SECRET. We are most grateful for your telegrams No. 84 [of September 29] and No. 86 of September 30th regarding proposals for despatch of technical units from Canada. These proposals are receiving urgent consideration and, as requested, the Army Council hope to be able to communicate their views very shortly.

In the meantime suggestion has been made that His Majesty's Government in Canada might be prepared to provide (1) Forestry companies and (2) Certain special transportation units.

Any assistance which the Canadian Government may be in a position to afford in these respects would be of the greatest value.

As regards (1) it has been suggested that, as in the last war, Canada would be the best source for provision of such companies. Forestry companies will shortly be required for work in France in forests taken over by British Expeditionary Force, and, if the Canadian Government should be prepared to fall in with this suggestion, we should be glad to supply detailed information as to the number of companies required and approximate dates at which they would be needed. It is hoped Canadian Government would be able to arrange for such companies to be completely fitted out with modern equipment in Canada.

As regards (2) we should be grateful for assistance in numbering of following units: W.E. 4/1931/15/1/-A Headquarters Railway Construction and Maintenance group, Royal Engineers. W.E. 4/1931/13/2-A Railway Survey Company, Royal Engineers. W.E. 4/1931/16/1-A Railway Construction Company, Royal Engineers.

The serial numbers as given above are those of war establishments of these particular units, copies of which it is understood are in the possession of the military authorities in Canada. The question of provisions for these units has been under preliminary discussion between the Director General of Transportation and Movements and the Canadian Military Liaison Officer in London. If the Canadian Government was able to assist in this way, we should be glad to be informed of details of assistance which can be provided.

835.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516/71

Ottawa, October 9, 1939

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

As you are aware I reported to the Government of the United Kingdom the decision recently taken by the Canadian Government, as announced in a statement issued by the Minister of National Defence, to make preparations for the establishment of a Canadian division for active service and for overseas service at the appropriate juncture.

I have now received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs from which I learn that the War Office have been considering the question of the issue of equipment, both for training and for war purposes, and also the question of the preparation of accommodation for such a force when despatched. You will readily realise that these questions have to be considered without delay because such arrangements require to be fitted into a carefully conceived programme.

I understand that for these reasons the War Office would be very grateful if it were possible to supply them with definite information, at as early a date as possible, as to the intentions of the Canadian Government regarding the despatch of the force referred to above.

May I ask that I should accordingly be supplied with such information as can be given to me on the subject in order that I may be able to communicate it to the authorities in London at the earliest possible moment?

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

836.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 462

Ottawa, October 20, 1939

SECRET. Your telegram Code No. 454, October 3, 1939. In respect to raising of railway troop units and forestry companies for service overseas, the Department of National Defence takes the position that pending negotiations in connection with Air Training Scheme, it is not considered desirable to give an affirmative answer at this time to the suggestions contained in your telegram.

837.

902-A-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

Ottawa, October 20, 1939

My dear Sir Gerald,

With reference to your Most Secret Immediate letter No. 516/71, dated 9th October, 1939, I am authorized to inform you that the Canadian Government has decided that the units of the 1st Canadian Division will be ready for their transportation abroad, to begin early in December. The Chief of the Naval Staff has been instructed to cable the Admiralty with a view to arranging for the provision of transports and protection.

The Department of National Defence has under consideration the question of the order of despatch of the units of the Division. As consultation with the War Office will be necessary with respect to some of the details before making a decision in this matter, that Department proposes to communicate regarding them through the office of the High Commissioner for Canada in England.

In the interests of the safety of the force while in transit, I would earnestly request that no publicity whatever be given to this matter, and especially that no mention be made of the proposed time of despatch.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

838.

902-A-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 97

London, October 25, 1939

SECRET. My telegram of October 7th, No. 87. The Army Council have now completed their examination of proposals put forward in your telegram No. 84 and your telegram No. 86 for despatch of technical units from Canada, and they have asked that an expression of their deep appreciation of this generous offer may be conveyed to the Canadian Government.

2. The Army Council would welcome the provision of units referred to in paragraph 4 below under conditions set out in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 84. It is understood that the Canadian Government assumes responsibility of transportation, subsistence, initial issues of clothing and personal equipment and for pay and allowances for all personnel, United Kingdom Government being responsible for issue and maintenance of unit equipment and for maintenance of personal equipment until units are absorbed into Canadian higher formation, when the unit equipment will be taken over by the Canadian Government at agreed valuation.

3. As personnel will presumably be paid at Canadian rates and conditions, it is felt to be essential that a small body of Canadian Pay Corps personnel should be sent over to deal with accounts of the units.

4. The following is a list, in order of preference for despatch, of units which would be most welcome. The number of Officers and other ranks are indicated for each unit. Numbers do not include first reinforcements except in the case of Royal Army Service Corps. List begins.

One Division of Royal Army Service Corps, consisting of: Divisional Royal Army Service Corps Headquarters, one Ammunition Company, one Petrol Company, one Supply Column, 38 and 1,144.

One Corps Troops Royal Army Service Corps, consisting of: one Corps Troops Ammunition Company, 13 and 698, one Corps Troops Ammunition Park, 39 and 1,438, one Corps Petrol Park, 8 and 365, one Corps Troops Supply Column, 20 and 618.

One Corps Troops Royal Engineers, consisting of: Engineer Headquarters, three Army Field Companies, one Corps Field Park Company, 24 and 894. Two Army Troops Companies, Royal Engineers, each 6 and 240. One Road Construction Company (less labourers), 4 and 101. One Anti-Aircraft Brigade Workshop Company, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, 6 and 139. One Ordnance Workshop Company, 7 and 368. One Construction Section, Royal Signals, 1 and 59. One Wireless Section (General Headquarters), 1 and 26. One Wireless Section (lines of communication), 1 and 47. One Corps Field Survey Company, provided trades as laid down in war establishment are available, 6 and 128.

Total 180 Officers, 6,505 other ranks.

List ends.

5. The Army Council have also had under review position in respect of Forestry Companies and Transportation Units (see my telegram No. 87, October 7th). The number of Forestry Companies required at present is two, and it would be appreciated if the Canadian Government would also consider whether they would be prepared to provide a further three Railway Construction Companies, making a total of: one Headquarters Railway Construction and Maintenance Group, one Railway Survey Company, and four Railway Construction Companies.

The Army Council would be grateful if the above units could be provided in addition to units listed in paragraph 4 above, but if the Canadian Government do not wish total personnel there indicated to be exceeded, it is hoped that Forestry and Transportation units might be provided in substitution for units of equivalent numbers at the bottom of list submitted.

839.

King Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 106

Ottawa, November 1, 1939

SECRET. Your telegram of October 25th, No. 97. Pending conclusion of discussions now taking place in respect of large Air Training Scheme, the Canadian Government do not see their way clear to assume additional military commitments. The technical units enumerated in my telegram No. 84 and my telegram No. 86 are mobilized or partially mobilized and are therefore existing commitments but the raising of Forestry Companies and Transportation units would constitute entirely new commitments. Consequently consideration of technical units is restricted to those mentioned in paragraph 4 your telegram No. 97 and as the Canadian Government is not prepared at present to exceed the maximum of 6,000 stated in my telegram No. 84, the technical units to be despatched in accordance with your expressed preference will be limited to the following. List begins:

One Divisional Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, consisting of: Divisional Royal Canadian Army Service Corps Headquarters, one Ammunition Company, one Petrol Company, one Supply Column, 38 and 1,144.

One Corps Troops Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, consisting of: one Corps Troops Ammunition Company, 13 and 698. One Corps Troops Ammunition Park, 39 and 1,438. One Corps Petrol Park, 8 and 365. One Corps Troops Supply Column, 20 and 618.

One Corps Troops Royal Canadian Engineers, consisting of: Engineer Headquarters, three Army Field Companies, one Corps Field Park Company, 24 and 894. Two Army Troops Companies, each 6 and 240. One Road Construction Company (less labourers), 4 and 101.

Total 158 officers and 5,738 other ranks.

List ends.

2. The despatch of the above units impracticable until completion of despatch of 1st Canadian Division commencing after 1st December according to arrangements now in hand.

3. Reference paragraph 3 your telegram No. 97, arrangements are being made for provision in England of personnel of Royal Canadian Army Pay Corps.

4. Certain disparity between strengths of some units given in your telegram No. 97 and War Establishments in possession National Defence will be taken up direct with Canadian military representatives in England.

840.

902-A-39

Décret du Conseil
Order in Council

P.C. 3391

November 2, 1939

Whereas the Minister of National Defence reports that the presence in the United Kingdom and elsewhere outside Canada of Military and Air Forces of Canada, on occasions when similar Forces of the United Kingdom and of other parts of the British Commonwealth are also present, makes it essential that the relationship and status of such Canadian Forces with that of the other Forces mentioned be established;

And whereas The Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, 1933, Chapter 21 of the Statutes of Canada, 1933, insofar as Canadian Forces are concerned, makes the necessary provision for the matters referred to above, and similar legislation exists with respect to the Forces of the United Kingdom and those of certain other parts of the British Commonwealth;

And whereas sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 6 of the said Act read as follows:

(4) When a home force and another force to which this section applies are serving together, whether alone or not:

(a) any member of the other force shall be treated and shall have over members of the home force the like powers of command as if he were a member of the home force of relative rank: and

(b) if the forces are acting in combination, any officer of the other force appointed by His Majesty, or in accordance with regulations made by or by authority of His Majesty, to command the combined force, or any part thereof, shall be treated and shall have over members of the home force the like powers of command and punishment, and may be invested with the like authority to convene, and confirm the findings and sentences of, courts martial as if he were an officer of the home force of relative rank and holding the same command.

(5) For the purposes of this section, forces shall be deemed to be serving together or acting in combination if and only if they are declared to be so serving or so acting by order of the Governor in Council, and the relative rank of members of the home forces and of other forces shall be such as may be prescribed by regulations made by His Majesty.

And whereas in respect of Canadian Military and Air Forces serving in the United Kingdom the provisions of paragraph (a) of sub-section (4) of the said Section 6, quoted above, would have the effect of establishing their relationship and status with members of corresponding Forces of the United Kingdom if, pursuant to sub-section (5) of the said Section 6, the said Forces were declared to be serving together;

And whereas, in this connection, a similar declaration with respect to the Military and Air Forces of the United Kingdom would be required to be made by the Army Council or the Air Council, as the case may be, under the corresponding provisions of the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act of the United Kingdom;

And whereas the fact of Canadian Military and Air Forces being declared to be serving together with Military and Air Forces of the United Kingdom, would in no way restrict the control and administration by the Government of Canada of such Canadian Forces whilst serving in the United Kingdom or elsewhere;

And whereas the Canadian Military and Air Forces serving on the Continent of Europe will of necessity be acting in combination with Military and Air Forces of the United Kingdom, and of other parts of the British Commonwealth, and provision is made in paragraph (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the said Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, 1933, for the exercise of command by the officer whom His Majesty appoints to command such combined Force;

And whereas, under sub-section (5) of the said Section 6, the said Forces would only be deemed to be acting in combination if they were so declared by the Governor in Council, and in the opinion of the Minister of National Defence it is desirable that such a declaration be made;

(A similar declaration with respect to the Military and Air Forces of the United Kingdom would be required to be made by the Army Council or the Air Council, as the case may be, under the corresponding provisions of the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act of the United Kingdom.)

Now, therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of National Defence and pursuant to the provisions of The Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, 1933, Chapter 21 of the Statutes of Canada, 1933, is pleased to order and doth hereby order and declare,—

1. That all Military and Air Forces of Canada present in the United Kingdom serve together with the Military and Air Forces, respectively, of the United Kingdom;
2. That all Military and Air Forces of Canada serving on the Continent of Europe shall act in combination with those Forces of the United Kingdom serving on the Continent of Europe with which they may from time to time be serving, and that they shall so act upon their

embarkation in the United Kingdom for the purpose of proceeding to the Continent of Europe; and

3. That, in respect of any Military and Air Forces of Canada serving in the United Kingdom, those parts thereof as may from time to time be detailed for that purpose by the appropriate Canadian Service Authorities as from time to time designated by the Minister of National Defence, shall act in combination with those Forces of the United Kingdom to which the same have been so detailed.

His Excellency in Council, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of The Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, 1933, is further pleased, on the recommendation of the Minister of National Defence and under and by virtue of the War Measures Act, Chapter 206, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, to authorize and doth hereby authorize the appropriate Canadian Service Authorities to take such action as may be necessary to effect the attachment of members of the Military and Air Forces of any other part of the Commonwealth to Canadian Forces and vice versa.

841.

902-A-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 106

London, November 18, 1939

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Your telegram No. 106, November 1st. In view of arrangements now being made for the despatch of the First Canadian Division, the Army Council, in consultation with Brigadier Crerar, have reconsidered the list of technical units which it is hoped Canadian Government will be prepared to provide. The following revised list which supersedes all previous lists, has accordingly been drawn up and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be glad to learn whether His Majesty's Government in Canada would be prepared to arrange for the despatch of these units as soon as despatch of the First Canadian Division has been completed. List begins:

CORPS TROOPS

Artillery. One medium regiment (6 inch Hows.). One Army Field Regiment.

Engineers. One Headquarters Corps Troops Engineers. Three Army Field Companies. One Corps Field Park Company. One Corps Field Survey Company.

Signals. One Medium Regiment Signal Section. One Army Field Regiment Signal Section.

Supply and Transport. One Corps Troops Ammunition Company. One Corps Troops Supply Column. One Corps Ammunition Park. One Corps Petrol Park.

Ordnance. One Army Field Work-shop (with necessary light aid detachments for Divisional and non-Divisional Troops).

Pay. One Field Cash Office.

L. OF C. TROOPS

Engineers. Two Army Troops Companies. One Road Construction Company.
Reception Corps. One Divisional Section.

Base Depots. One Company Infantry Base Depot. Proportion one Company
General Base Depot.

List ends.

As regards Transportation Units and Forestry Companies, it is noted, pending the conclusion of discussions taking place in respect of the Air Training Scheme, the Canadian Government do not see their way clear to assume additional military commitments. The need for transportation and additional Forestry Companies is, however, very pressing and units of this nature can only be raised in the United Kingdom with great difficulty and in small numbers.

Moreover an additional four Forestry Companies will be required early in 1940, and a further twelve Forestry Companies at intervals at a later date. In these circumstances it is hoped that His Majesty's Government in Canada will keep under consideration the possibility of providing Transportation and Forestry Units at as early a date as may be practicable.

842.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 641

Ottawa, December 8, 1939

SECRET. Important that Canadian papers get first word of landing of Canadian overseas forces. Opinion expressed that unless special arrangements to this end danger of American papers giving earlier publication.

Please endeavour to arrange for Canadian priority if possible or at least for simultaneous announcement with British press.

843.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 650

Ottawa, December 12, 1939

Following is copy of Memorandum from Chief of General Staff, approved by Minister of National Defence, delivered to General Officer Commanding First Canadian Division on seventh December. Begins.

Organization and Administration of Canadian Forces Overseas. 1. The control of the organization and administration of Canadian Forces Overseas, both in Great Britain and in the theatre of operations, will be exercised by the Minister of National Defence and the normal channel of communication between him and Commanders, whether in Great Britain or in the theatre of operations, will be through the Chief of the General Staff. In view of the practical difficulties of maintaining direct telegraphic touch with the Commander in the Field, communication for the present will be carried out through the High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain and the Chief of the General Staff.

2. All matters concerning military operations and discipline in the Field, being the direct responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in the theatre of operations, will be dealt with by the General Officer Commanding, Canadian Forces in the Field, through the Commander-in-Chief, whose powers in this regard are exercisable within the limitations laid down in the Visiting Forces Acts (Canada and United Kingdom).

3. Non-divisional units sent abroad to provide the 1st Canadian Division with requisite Canadian ancillary arms and services will, it is hoped, normally be employed with the 1st Canadian Division. While the employment of these units in the Field will usually come directly under the Headquarters of the Army Corps to which the 1st Canadian Division is attached, the channel of authority for training and administration of personnel, including such matters as all questions relating to commissions, promotions, appointments, transfers, exchanges, recalls and demands for officers, will pass through the G.O.C., 1st Canadian Division, to the Canadian Government through the channels referred to in para. 1 above.

4. Non-divisional units and details of the C.A.S.F. attached to the 1st Canadian Division in Great Britain will be under the command of the G.O.C., 1st Canadian Division, for all purposes. Upon departure from Great Britain of Headquarters, 1st Canadian Division, they will pass to the command of the senior combatant officer of Canadian Military Headquarters in Great Britain who will command all Canadian troops in Great Britain other than those of the 1st Canadian Division and troops attached thereto.

5. In matters of policy the Canadian Military Headquarters in Great Britain will communicate with the Chief of the General Staff, Canada, through the High Commissioner and in matters of detail it will communicate direct with the Chief of the General Staff.

6. While the High Commissioner will not make decisions on matters of policy, he may, however, desire information on military questions as they arise; it will be one of the duties of the Canadian Military Headquarters in Great Britain to inform the High Commissioner in this respect as required.

7. As regards the relationship between the Canadian Military Headquarters in England and the 1st Canadian Division, the former will exercise no command over the latter, even while the Division is in England. On the

other hand, it is essential that the closest liaison be maintained. In matters of policy the G.O.C., 1st Canadian Division, will deal with Canada through the High Commissioner. While he will not deal with the Canadian Military Headquarters on policy he will deal with it direct and vice versa in matters of mutual concern and in regard to details.

8. The relationship between the Canadian Military Headquarters in England and the War Office will be one of close liaison, but the former will be in no way under the latter. Details will be taken up direct between the two, but if questions of policy arise the channel of communication will be through the High Commissioner to or from the Department of National Defence. Ends.

844.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 794

London, December 14, 1939

MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 641, December 8th. Making every effort to secure Canadian rights. Military security against possible air attack requires that fact that Canadians are landing be not published until port is clear of troops, i.e. about 48 hours after arrival. Arranging with censorship to release cables for Canadian Press 2.00 a.m. second day after landing and for American press 5.00 a.m. This would allow simultaneous publication in morning papers of Canada, United Kingdom and United States of America while preventing premature publication by United States radio. Opinion of British authorities is that American publication could not be delayed longer without creating resentment. Important that Canadian radio does not publish news before morning papers. Stories will create impression that bulk of C.A.S.F. destined for overseas has arrived. Nothing must be (word omitted) newspapers in Canada to counter this impression. Should be no mention of total numbers; names of units or their place of origin; names of officers below the rank of Major General; names of ships; port of embarkation. Inform National Defence.

845.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 666

Ottawa, December 15, 1939

MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 794. Arrangements made with censorship to release cables for Canadian press 2.00 a.m. second day after landing quite satisfactory. No desire however to discriminate against American press.

Main thought is to guard against prior publication by American papers. In circumstance suggest simultaneous release to Canadian press and American press. It also appears undesirable and impractical to discriminate against radio. No control over American radio and in view of time difference East and West, hour suggested for release would not prevent Western radio announcement. As already indicated suggest 2.00 a.m. release to Canadian and American press with no restrictions. Imperative that we be advised as long as possible and at least twelve hours in advance of the date and hour set for release in order that we can arrange for simultaneous publication of supplementary material prepared by Director of Information. Other suggestions of your telegram have been noted.

846.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 670

Ottawa, December 18, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. In my message of December 15th, No. 666, I asked that at least twelve hours notice should be given of release of information regarding landing of Canadian overseas forces. I now learn through many sources that landing was completed at noon yesterday and I understand that Canadian Press have been advised that release may be expected tonight. Apparently United Kingdom censors have passed freely telegrams from members of troops to relatives in Canada. This makes position with respect to press most difficult and we would appreciate immediate word as to possibility of early release and hour arranged.

847.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 812

London, December 18, 1939

First flight of the Canadian Division reached port of arrival in Great Britain and received impressive official welcome at Greenock. Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs and I, with a small party from London, were present. Troops are now on way to camp.

MASSEY

848.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 671

Ottawa, December 18, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. My previous telegram this date. In view of numerous telegrams regarding disembarkation received by private parties all through Canada and probability of information reaching United States from these or other sources, our information authorities consider release tonight for Tuesday morning's papers imperative unless real military reasons against this course. Please advise immediately.

849.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 817

London, December 18, 1939

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 666 of December 15th, press arrangements. Your earlier telegram No. 641 had specifically stated that Canadian papers to get first word of landing of Canadian Overseas Forces. Unless arrangements were made as outlined in my telegram No. 794 and which were only made with difficulty, this could not have been guaranteed. Not easy therefore to understand reference in your later telegram disclaiming any desire to discriminate against American press. Without such discrimination in time of release could not ensure that Canadian papers get news first. We are therefore retaining priority for Canadian release as arranged. War Office has now decided that time of release for news 12.30 a.m., Greenwich Mean Time, December 20th. Canadian Press cables may be sent 10.30 p.m., December 19th, for flat release at hour given above. Important that news sent this way be not forwarded United States and that there be no broadcast by Canadian radio before release time.

850.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

London, December 18, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. To my intense surprise, The First Lord of the Admiralty,¹ in wireless talk now going on, has announced arrival of First Division.

MASSEY

851.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 673

Ottawa, December 18, 1939

MOST IMMEDIATE. After hearing speech of First Lord of the Admiralty announcing arrival of First Division instructions were given for immediate release of the story to the press here.

852.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 26

London, January 9, 1940

Your telegram No. 462 of October 20th. War Office wish to reopen the question of possibility of Canada supplying two Railway Survey companies for service with B.E.F. Matter now stated to be one of particular urgency as certain essential work necessary in France and personnel for that purpose with requisite training and experience not available in this country. Establishment of these two companies would involve total of fourteen officers and one hundred and twenty-eight other ranks. War Office suggest financial arrangements might be the same as those of the last war, namely the Canadian Government would bear the cost of pay, pensions, dependants' and field allowances, officers' mess allowances, cost of transport to and

¹ Winston S. Churchill.

from this country and all initial personal equipment, while all other expenses connected with equipment, work or maintenance would be borne by the United Kingdom.

I have been asked to emphasise the great urgency and importance of this matter.

MASSEY

853.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 98

Ottawa, January 29, 1940

Your telegram No. 110, January 28, 1940,¹ Prime Minister's reference to Second Division arose in the course of the discussion of the taking of the Soldiers' Vote. The Prime Minister stated:

This Government intends, as all honourable members know, if it is returned, to see that this first division is reinforced in strength from month to month and week to week, but it also intends to see that a second division is sent overseas as soon as may be possible.

854.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 165

Ottawa, February 14, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. War Committee of Cabinet has given consideration to message from General McNaughton to Minister of National Defence¹ giving proposals from conference held in War Office 9th February regarding future organization and disposition of Canadian forces overseas. It should be pointed out to War Office that announcement of future despatch of Second Canadian Division does not warrant changes in plans previously made for training programme and movement of First Division to France. Canadian Government has not authorized formation of Canadian Corps and no new arrangement should be based on such an assumption. Present plans have contemplated Second Division receiving large part of training here before proceeding to England and order for motor transport of the Division placed accordingly. For your information to pass on to General McNaughton consider it most important to avoid any question of further despatch of troops being injected into discussions during an election campaign as such questions should be kept apart from political controversy and it was for this reason that the announcement regarding despatch of Second Division was made

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

before dissolution of Parliament. Your discussions with War Office should proceed only on basis of offers and commitments actually and expressly made by Canadian Government. These commitments include the First Division now in training overseas as an expeditionary force, the special arrangements with War Office regarding ancillary troops now in England, and the announced decision to send the Second Canadian Division overseas in due course. Discussions regarding any further commitments involve major matters of policy and ought to be initiated by Governments. Apart from questions affecting organization of First Canadian Division including those referred to in message from General McNaughton, which questions will be given immediate consideration when further information requested is available, Government is strongly of opinion that barring some unforeseen emergency regarding which Government could of course be duly advised, discussions concerning any additional undertakings to War Office should await consideration until new Parliament is elected, when Canadian Government will be in a position to have direct discussions with United Kingdom Government regarding long-range programme of effective co-operation in all phases of war effort.

855.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 194

London, February 15, 1940

War Office enquires whether the Canadian Government in addition to two railway companies requested in our despatch No. A.13 of January 10th,¹ which units also referred to in McNaughton to Minister of the Department of National Defence telegram G.S.178 of February 14th,¹ would be willing to furnish on the same terms one headquarters of a railway construction and maintenance group, comprising three officers and twenty-two other ranks and four railway construction companies each comprising six officers and 265 other ranks. The respective establishments of these bodies are contained in war establishments IV/1931/15/1 and IV/1931/16/1. We have been asked to explain that this matter is of considerable urgency and War Office would be grateful for decision at earliest possible moment.

Australia have already agreed to cooperate over provision of transportation and forestry units and in response to request for details, have been asked to send one railway survey and three railway construction companies and two forestry companies. New Zealand have agreed to provide one headquarters railway construction and maintenance group, one railway survey company, one railway construction company and one forestry company, who are sailing from New Zealand next month.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

856.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 207

London, February 20, 1940

Your telegram No. 165 of February 15th. Information contained therein has been passed to General McNaughton who has cabled Minister of National Defence direct thereon. Questions in your telegram have been discussed with Canadian military authorities here who concur in observations below.

There has been no alteration in plan for training programme or movements of First Division as result of public announcement of despatch of Second Division. Such alteration as pointed out in General McNaughton's telegram G.S.190, February 18th,¹ was necessitated solely by delay in provision of motor transport from Canada. No discussions of any kind arising out of despatch of Second Division were held until public announcement in Canada had been confirmed officially by you in telegram No. 98, January 29th, when, as you state in telegram No. 165, its service overseas became a Canadian commitment. As your telegram No. 98 stated that this Division would be sent overseas "as soon as may be possible" the Canadian military authorities here felt they would have been negligent if they had not taken under their own consideration and discussed with War Office the problems arising out of and arrangements necessitated by its arrival and its relation to plans for eventual formation of a Canadian Corps. It will be appreciated that arrival of a Second Canadian Division is intimately related to United Kingdom plan for deployment of their [forces] which plan must be prepared many months in advance. Furthermore the fact that a Canadian Corps had never been specifically authorized was not thought to mean that there was any possibility of First and Second Divisions serving apart in separate higher formations. Therefore it was felt desirable to give consideration to arrangements regarding their serving together which would naturally have to be worked out in advance and not left to be settled later in haste. If, however, departure of this Second Division is not to take place for six months or so then there is no need for further discussion now of arrangements as indicated above. Information on this point would be appreciated as soon as possible.

I can assure you that no questions have been introduced by this Office or Canadian military authorities into discussions here except those arising out of existing and accepted military commitments. It was thought that examination of future Corps arrangements fell within that classification but any discussion of such arrangements, while advisable in light of information from Canada available here, was preparatory only and, of course, involved no commitment which in any case could only be made by the Government of Canada.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

857.

753-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 196

Ottawa, February 22, 1940

SECRET. 1. Discussion at yesterday's meeting of Cabinet Committee on War Finance and Supply of various recent cable communications relating to several aspects of our war effort leads us to feel that you possibly have not fully realized the implications of all we are trying to do and of the considerations which have determined the Government's decisions in these matters. We realize that this is quite possibly due to lack of complete information on your part and therefore are giving below certain highly confidential information which we think should be in your possession.

2. Canada's war expenditures for the first year of war, up to September first, are estimated at 375 millions. The estimates presented for the full fiscal year ending March 31, 1941, indicate 500 millions, an increase of nearly 50%. This figure approximates Canada's total expenditures including defence expenditures, under peacetime conditions, and it is over three times our total war expenditure in the corresponding fiscal year of the last war. Furthermore, while in 1915-16 we borrowed from the United Kingdom nearly one-quarter of our war expenditures of that year, in 1940-41 we are undertaking through our repatriation program to give financial assistance on a very large scale to enable the United Kingdom to make purchases of munitions, foodstuffs and raw materials in this country. This assistance is of course over and above our direct military expenditure.

Since the estimates for the fiscal year 1940-41 were submitted, the sending of the Second Division overseas has been authorized and this involves an additional cost of about 43 millions.

Yesterday the Committee had under consideration proposals for additional expenditures totalling about 15 million dollars: for reorganization of divisional engineers say, 6½ millions; increase in rifle personnel of existing battalions, First and Second Division personnel, over 5 million dollars; motor vehicle park and reception depots, \$1,200,000; and hospital ship and train, say, 2 million. It would appear that these additional expenditures will have to be assumed, bringing the aggregate direct war expenditures for the fiscal year up to, roughly, 560 millions.

In addition to all this, the suggestion has been made that we supply railway survey and construction companies and headquarters establishment therefor, costing about 2 millions, and tank battalions costing over 8 millions.

The above does not take account of the purchase of motor transport for ancillary troops which was to be provided by the United Kingdom nor does

it provide for equipment for the Army Co-operation Air Squadron which, as our cables¹ have already indicated, we understood was also to be supplied by them. Further as a result of the authorization of the sending of the Second Division overseas, there has to be contemplated the possible necessity of authorizing a Third Division in Canada costing about 35 millions for one year.

Repeatedly in your telegrams there have been suggestions about forming a Canadian corps or other Canadian higher formation which would involve equipment and maintenance of a corps headquarters and full complement of ancillary troops, costing probably 60 million dollars.

3. You will realize from what has been said above why it is so essential that Canadian Government should consider and determine matters of policy in the light of our financial and economic capacity and that embarrassment and misunderstanding be avoided which would result from premature discussion with War Office or other Governmental authorities in England which might be taken as implying commitments which have not been dealt with here and which require the gravest consideration. The Canadian Government must cut its coat according to its cloth and the figures given above will indicate what a full-out national effort is being put forward even at this early stage to make Canada's participation the most effective possible. Obviously it would be nothing but a disservice to the task we have in mind and to our allies for us to attempt to undertake something beyond our capacity. When you consider the figures which Mr. Crerar had with him showing prospective national income and compare that with the total prospective expenditures involved in commitments already made, you will see what an enormous responsibility the Government has assumed on behalf of the Canadian people in undertaking the obligations which we have already assumed.

We have not been lacking in frankness in stating our position to the United Kingdom. It has been explained here. It has been explained by Mr. Crerar in London and again to the Air Training Mission here. The figures we gave to the United Kingdom authorities last fall were, we think, evidence that we were doing all that we believed could possibly be done but it ought to be emphasized that since that time our undertakings have grown enormously.

This information is placed before you in order that when further proposals are made to us you and Canadian Military Headquarters may approach further discussions with War Office or other Governmental authorities with full knowledge of considerations which must influence Government here. Although much of information given you in this despatch is highly confidential you may use the facts in such discussions. You will also understand why it was decided in past month to defer action on series of separate proposals until we could obtain long-range view of present and possible prospective commitments.

¹ Documents 1027, 1030.

858.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 204

Ottawa, February 23, 1940

SECRET. With reference to your code telegrams No. 26, January 9th and No. 194, February 15th, regarding provision of railway troops for service with British Expeditionary Force the Canadian Government is unable to accept the request in view of additional commitments which have been undertaken arising from changes in the organization of 1st Canadian Division and from announced decision to send a second Canadian Division overseas in due course.

859.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 219

Ottawa, February 27, 1940

SECRET. Following the announced decision to despatch a second Canadian Division overseas, the Canadian Government has now decided about the 1st July next will be a suitable time for the Division to leave Canada providing satisfactory arrangements can be made with the Government of the United Kingdom for the necessary accommodation and training equipment. The selection of this date anticipates the assembly in England by the time the Division reaches England of the mechanical transport which Canada is supplying for it. It will also permit of a month's training in camps in Canada prior to departure thus giving an opportunity for the necessary reorganization of the divisional artillery into regiments. It is expected that the units of the Division will require three months training in England and therefore provision of reinforcements and replacements are being calculated on basis of Division proceeding to the front on 1st November.

With reference to G.S.175 of 13th February¹ from Canadian military Headquarters in Great Britain to National Defence Headquarters in which McNaughton favoured a proposal that the first Canadian Division and non-divisional units now in England should be employed as a self-contained formation directly under General Headquarters and also to your reference to this proposal in your telegram No. 188 of 13th February,¹ the Canadian Government considers it advisable, in the light of present circumstances, to

¹Non reproduit.¹Not printed.

adhere to original proposal under which First Canadian Division would be employed on arrival at front as part of a British Corps. In regard to non-divisional units, it is noted from your 754 of 6th December¹ that War Office agreed that they should normally be employed in the same Corps as the first Canadian Division as proposed in my telegram No. 598 dated 30th November.¹

860.

753-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 263

London, March 2, 1940

Your telegram No. 196, Canadian war effort. Information supplied most welcome and will help to overcome our difficulties here in discussions with United Kingdom authorities when we are so often ignorant of the grounds on which decisions are made in Ottawa. It is realized, of course, that misunderstandings and embarrassments will occur in premature discussions here unless every care is taken, but as pointed out in my telegram No. 207 of February 20th preparatory conversations on military arrangements are often essential in advance of decisions taken in Ottawa, otherwise those decisions cannot be implemented here with maximum speed and effectiveness. I can assure you, however, in any such discussions we will always be guided by the considerations so clearly outlined in your telegram.

MASSEY

861.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 265

London, March 3, 1940

Your telegram No. 219, February 27th. Canadian Military Headquarters here have drawn my attention in observations set out below, and in which I concur, to increasingly difficult situation which is developing here from on the one hand our policy of retaining full control over Canadian troops overseas and on the other hand from United Kingdom desire to be given a degree of responsibility for and disposition of Canadian division if as a consequence

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

of your instructions it is to be embodied in a United Kingdom corps; particularly as the United Kingdom are financially responsible for provision and maintenance of equipment of certain Canadian non-divisional troops which will also normally be in that corps.

Control of all Canadian overseas forces is vested in Minister of National Defence with General Officer Commanding the First Canadian Division responsible for training and administration of both divisional and non-divisional formations while in the United Kingdom. The War Office, however, has already issued general instructions covering "Third Contingent" which automatically would have placed Canadian divisional and non-divisional troops under General Officer Commanding Fourth Corps for training. Canadian Military Headquarters have objected to this as incompatible with present position under Visiting Forces Act and War Office Order therefore remains for the moment not effected. It is our view that proposal in McNaughton's telegram G.S. No. 175 of February 13th¹ that divisional and non-divisional troops should be a G.H.Q. formation would have helped to remove jurisdictional and organizational difficulties and to avoid any such War Office Order as that mentioned above. This proposal has, however, been rejected by you. Your instructions to adhere to alternative policy of employing Canadian division as organic part of a British corps in theater of war makes it difficult for us to maintain position that Commander of that corps now forming in this country should not be interposed between Canadian troops and Canadian authority.

There is also complicating factor of special position of non-divisional troops which has been defined by you as follows. These troops come under the command of G.O.C. First Canadian Division for all purposes while in the United Kingdom and should normally be employed in France in corps that division serves when their administration will continue to be responsibility of said G.O.C. At the same time we emphasize that until there is a Canadian corps in the field equipment of these troops is a United Kingdom financial responsibility which enforces a relaxation of our control.

Apart from this difficulty United Kingdom are uneasy over their financial responsibility in these circumstances especially as this responsibility seems to them to be indefinite in time in view of our contention that a Canadian higher formation is a Canadian corps in the field and of your telegram No. 165, February 6th [14th], that no arrangements should be based on assumption that any such corps will be authorized. United Kingdom authorities have argued that nothing in the financial agreement concerning non-divisional troops specifically states that Canadian higher formation or command is a Canadian corps and that in view of the fact that all Canadian troops in England are now serving and training together under Canadian command it may be held that a Canadian higher command now exists within the meaning of financial arrangements. We have opposed this view both at War Office and Dominions Office.

¹ Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on March 1st sent an official communication to me on this point. He feels that change in position of non-divisional units as stated in your telegram No. 117 of November 27th¹ made with the object of rendering them complementary to a division in a corps (no doubt?) in fact altered the basis of the original financial proposals so as to warrant treatment of these units as full Canadian liability from the beginning. However as we have taken view that the Canadian Government would not accept this interpretation United Kingdom will not press this contention but will accept financial liability in question provided that agreement can be reached defining clearly the period for which such liability should extend; this in turn depends on agreement on meaning of the term "Canadian higher formation". United Kingdom authorities feel that this meaning bears some relation to the character of employment of Canadian Division in France. They are willing to admit therefore that non-divisional troops would not be part of a Canadian higher formation in France if serving with Canadian division in a British Corps but that the opposite would be the case if the Canadian division were a General Headquarters formation (Mr. Eden's letter was written before receipt of your telegram No. 219, February 27th, which has not yet been communicated to United Kingdom Government).

United Kingdom Government now suggest that as a practicable and equitable solution of the problem agreement should be reached on a date namely July 1st next at which Canadian Government would assume full civil authority for all these non-divisional units irrespective of their precise employment and organization. This would mean that on the above date equipment of units in question would be taken over by Canada at valuation to be agreed upon.

Canadian Military Headquarters recommend acceptance of this proposal on grounds that increased expenditure involved is outweighed by

- (1) Advantages of simplicity in command, administration and financial accounting;
- (2) Removal of a source of controversy;
- (3) Removal of an obstacle to complete Canadian administrative control of Canada's Overseas Forces.

Under our interpretation of a Canadian Higher Command increased expenditure would be restricted to equipment depreciation incurred between July 1st and date of formation of the Canadian Corps. Unless it is intended to send the Second Division to France in October as part of United Kingdom corps then presumably this date would be in November of this year. The amount involved, therefore, is not considerable. Possibly it would be met by the restriction of some other form of military effort now under consideration as a commitment.

In view of the above, do you still feel that Canadian Division and non-divisional troops should become organic part of a United Kingdom corps rather than a self-contained G.H.Q. formation?

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.

862.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 315

London, March 16, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 204, of February 23rd. Provision of Railway Troops for service with British Expeditionary Force. War Office consider provision of Railway Survey Companies as of outstanding importance and state that as Canadian Government is unable to supply these troops they are considering despatch of a telegram to the Presidents of the Canadian National Railways and the Canadian Pacific Railway inviting them to make known to the members of their organizations that young engineers or surveyors are urgently required in the British Army. Terms offered volunteers would be enlistment in forces in United Kingdom with normal rates of pay, sea transport at United Kingdom expense from Canada to this country and from this country to Canada at the end of hostilities. Telegram would express the hope that the two Presidents would facilitate release of volunteers to a total number of sixty. Before taking this action Army Council would be glad to know that it meets with the approval of the Canadian Government and would further be glad of any assistance the Canadian Government could afford.

863.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 293

Ottawa, March 17, 1940

Following from Prime Minister for Massey. Begins. I would like you to know, and also General McNaughton, that Mr. Rogers and I have been keeping constantly in mind the matters referred to in recent long communication from you,¹ which McNaughton wished me to see. Until [election] campaign over it is of course quite impossible to have some of the points raised adequately considered. This message just to assure your colleagues as anxious as we are to have matters referred to taken up as soon after campaign as possible. Mackenzie King. Ends.

¹ Document 861.

864.

902-A-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 37

[Ottawa,] March 19, 1940

MOST SECRET. Following from our Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. Our High Commissioner has telegraphed me saying War Office considers provision of Railway Survey Companies as of outstanding importance and that as Canadian Government is unable to supply these troops they are considering despatching telegram to the Presidents of Canadian railways inviting them to make known to members of their organizations that young engineers or surveyors are urgently required in the British Army. Proposed telegram would express hope that Presidents would facilitate release of volunteers to total number of sixty. Message adds that before taking this action Army Council would be glad to know that it meets with approval of Canadian Government and would further be glad of any assistance the Canadian Government could afford.

2. As you are aware, an election campaign is just drawing to a close. Voters go to the polls on Tuesday next week. Thus far we have been fortunate in avoiding any injection into the campaign of controversy regarding commitments upon specific phases of Canada's war effort. A course such as is suggested by the War Office could not fail to precipitate a wholly unwarranted political controversy if taken at this time. I have in repeated telegrams made clear that my colleagues and I are most anxious to do everything we possibly can to meet reasonable requests but have also necessarily made it clear that until the elections are over and the position of Government definitely known, fresh commitments cannot possibly be undertaken without possibility of serious embarrassment.

3. I would deeply appreciate your good offices in seeing that War Office and Army Council refrain from taking the course suggested, at least until there is opportunity of having the whole matter carefully considered by the Cabinet. No such opportunity can be made until after election March twenty-sixth. Ends.

865.

902-A-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 28

London, March 21, 1940

MOST SECRET. Your telegram 19th March, No. 37. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins. I have received your message regarding railway survey personnel. I fully appreciate the considerations mentioned in your telegram: indeed, it was with a view to ensuring that

the despatch of such a message as that in question to the Presidents of the Canadian Railway companies should not take place without full knowledge and prior concurrence of the Canadian Government that enquiry was made through Mr. Massey. I should like to assure you at once that your wishes will be respected and that matters here will be deferred until such time as the Canadian Cabinet have intimated their views. We note that this will be after the general election, and we shall await a further message in due course. Ends.

866.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 335

Ottawa, April 1, 1940

SECRET. Your secret cypher No. 315 March 16th provision of Railway troops for service with British Expeditionary Force. Canadian Government has noted that War Office considers provision of railway survey companies as of outstanding importance and further suggestions that young engineers or surveyors are urgently required in the British Army. Our Government will be pleased to take initiative in obtaining services of sixty volunteers as requested, meeting all expenses up to arrival in United Kingdom for enlistment in British Army. May we take it that with provision of this personnel the requirements of War Office for transportation and forestry units will be completed?

867.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 355

Ottawa, April 5, 1940

SECRET. Your cypher No. 265 of March 3rd which has been previously acknowledged and indication given that it would be dealt with by Cabinet during present week. Further consideration has been given both by War Committee and full Cabinet to proposal that Canadian Division and non-divisional troops should become a self-contained formation under G.H.Q. (hereinafter referred to as "G.H.Q. proposal") instead of forming part of British Corps as had been agreed on in your Telegram 847 of December 23rd¹ and our reply 704 of December 27th¹ confirmed by our further telegram to you No. 219 of February 27. Without entering on discussion of

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

merits of various considerations put forward by Canadian Military Headquarters in your Telegram No. 265 of March 3rd Canadian Government is willing in order to make progress to accept "G.H.Q. proposal", provided a mutually satisfactory agreement can be reached with United Kingdom with respect to the financial implications of this proposed arrangement. Canadian Government holds strong view that "G.H.Q. proposal" does not constitute a return of such non-divisional units to Canadian higher formation in the sense fully understood when the original agreement was made, as per our telegram No. 84 of September 29th¹ and reply of War Office contained in Dominion Affairs Telegram No. 97 dated October 25, 1939.² It seems clear to us and it has always been assumed that the words "higher formation" referred explicitly to the possible formation of a Canadian Corps and this view is supported by the fact that most of the non-divisional units provided were of a kind that would normally be employed in a corps. It should also be pointed out that throughout entire discussions it has been understood by us and accepted by War Office that non-divisional units would normally be employed with Canadian division (see Telegrams Nos. 847, 704, and 219 above mentioned). Consequently, the formation under G.H.Q. does not alter this relationship in any essential feature. The suggestion of the U.K. Government that a date might be agreed upon for a change in the original financial arrangements which governed the employment of these non-divisional units has been noted and, in order to meet request of Government of the United Kingdom for a more definite time feature, Canadian Government would be willing to consider the selection of a date from which it would assume larger degree of financial responsibility but on understanding that this would be on the basis of depreciation and would not involve assumption of capital cost for initial equipment and maintenance. This aspect of the question will be discussed with the War Office by the Minister of National Defence who is leaving shortly for a brief visit in the United Kingdom. In this connection the supply by the Canadian Government of M.T. to be used by these ancillary troops would be an item of set-off for consideration in arriving at the balance of payments to be made on account of depreciation and in ultimately adjusting respective responsibilities of the two Governments if and when the contingency arises when Canada assumes cost of maintenance of equipment and cost of equipment which was to be subject to mutual arrangements under Telegrams No. 84 and 97 above mentioned. In order to negative any assumption that the matter of financial implications of "G.H.Q. proposal" was introduced by us here it perhaps should be noted that the question was first raised by the fact that your Telegram No. 188 of February 13th³ stated that "Canadian High Formation within the meaning of financial arrangements regarding equipping of non-divisional troops will soon be established either by formation of Canadian Corps Headquarters or by proposal that division plus non-divisional troops come directly under

¹ Document 832.

² Document 838.

³ Non reproduct.

* Not printed.

G.H.Q." This was taken to mean that War Office in conference held that day had raised this question by intimating their view that Canada's financial responsibility was the same in either case. It might also be noted that proposal to incorporate Division and ancillary units in same British Corps was the proposal of the War Office as shown by Telegram G.S. No. 11 of November 3rd¹ and confirmed by our telegram No. 598 of November 30th¹ and your reply No. 754 of December 6th¹ with channel of authority for training and administration direct through G.O.C. 1st Division to Canadian Government.

868.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 451

London, April 16, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Statements in London press today that there are now Canadian troops in Norway have no foundation, but United Kingdom authorities have requested that no action should be taken to deny these reports or to prevent their publication, since it is desirable that enemy should be misled and left in uncertainty as to Allied plans in Scandinavia and the scope of Allied effort.

MASSEY

869.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 460

London, April 17, 1940

CLEAR THE LINE. MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following from McNaughton for Minister of National Defence. Begins. G.S. 327. In consequence of developments of military situation in Norway, need for prompt action, and non-availability of sufficient suitably trained British troops, military exigencies of the moment require participation of Canadian troops. Accordingly and after full consultation with War Office on details, I have designated part of Second Canadian Infantry Brigade under command of Sansom plus ancillary detachments of artillery, engineers, signals, medicals and administrative totalling 1,300 approximately to act in combination with special British force being organized of 20,000 in combined operation with Royal Navy. Under present plan Canadian force leaves Aldershot 18.00 hours tomorrow April 18th. Utmost secrecy imperative and request therefore this information be confined to fewest possible persons. Prompt reports on progress of operation will be cabled to you as available. Ends.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

870.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures¹ au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs¹ to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 414

Ottawa, April 17, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 460 April 17th. Following from Acting Minister National Defence for McNaughton. Begins.

In view of circumstances set forth in your G.S.327² despatch of force mentioned is approved. It is considered however that such a commitment should not have been entered into without prior reference to National Defence and approval of Canadian Government. Report proposals regarding utilization remaining Canadian troops and what reorganization action referred to in your G.S.327 entails. Ends.

871.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 415

Ottawa, April 17, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 460 April 17th. Minister of National Defence is replying indicating approval in view of G.O.C.'s opinion as to urgent emergency and indispensability of the Canadian detachment for the purpose referred to. We would have expected that Canadian Government would have been informed by United Kingdom Government immediately participation referred to was required. Your telegram No. 451 and G.S.322 of 16th³ negated any idea of the move now mentioned. We feel that when consultations commenced intimation should have at once been given by yourself or G.O.C. to afford Canadian Government reasonable opportunity to pass on a disposition of such importance to the Canadian people as the diversion of a portion of the personnel of present formation to a special mission of this kind which is a radical departure from preconsidered policy and plans.

¹ J. L. Ralston.

² Document 869.

³ Non reproduit.

^{*} Not printed.

872.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 426

Ottawa, April 18, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 460, April 17th. If and when announcement of departure or arrival of United Kingdom and Canadian forces can be made it is essential, particularly in view of previous experiences, that as regards Canadian forces this announcement should be made from Ottawa first or simultaneously. Please furnish all information available for such public announcement as far as possible in advance of release to ensure coordination. Also for our information send now full particulars of units from which personnel has been selected and numbers from each unit.

873.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 462

London, April 18, 1940

Your telegram No. 415. At the time my telegram No. 451 and G.S.322¹ were written, no request had been received by the G.O.C. from the War Office for employment of Canadian troops and situation was as stated. But nothing in these telegrams referred to or was meant to negative any subsequent movement. Later on afternoon of the 16th, at the urgent request of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, a conference was held at the War Office when detailed information on military situation in Norway was given to G.O.C. and temporary assistance of detachment of Canadian troops definitely asked for. G.O.C. made full enquiries to satisfy himself that employment of these Canadian forces justified by exigencies of military situation. Having done so, situation required, in his opinion, immediate issue of orders on the 17th placing portion of Second Infantry Brigade and attached detail in combination with other British forces.

In the discharge of his responsibility in this matter actions of G.O.C. were based on designation of Minister under authority of P.C. No. 3391, dated November 2nd, 1939,² which requires that he should act as necessitated by military exigency of the moment.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduit.

² Document 840.

¹ Not printed.

874.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 431

Ottawa, April 19, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 462 of April 18th. I note your statement that on afternoon of April 16th request was made by War Office for assistance of Canadian troops. As I previously indicated, we consider any such proposal should have been made by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Government of Canada. From your telegram it does not appear why, immediately request was made by Chief of Imperial General Staff to G.O.C., advice was not given us to permit consideration pending receipt of observations and recommendations of G.O.C. arising from consultation with War Office. Action by the Canadian Service Authority under paragraph 3 of P.C. 3391 in detailing forces to act in combination is not considered to relate to service beyond the United Kingdom.

875.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 432

Ottawa, April 19, 1940

SECRET. Following for Minister of National Defence. Begins. Personal. You will have noted High Commissioner's telegram No. 460, our replies 414, 415 and 416¹ and High Commissioner's reply No. 462 and our reply No. 431 of today's date.

As you will gather Government seriously concerned regarding principle involved in action by G.O.C. without reference here and while understand difficulties due to time available feel imperative procedure should be arranged which would assure instant reference here when any move of far-reaching character such as this is contemplated. Particularly concerned regarding apparent misapprehension effect paragraph 3 of P.C. No. 3391 which of course only refers to service in England. Know you will feel essential have no misunderstanding regarding scope and seat of authority in matters of this kind and that you will have under consideration revising instructions and P.C. referred to if that appears necessary to make position clear.

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

876.

902-A-39

Le ministre en France au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in France to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 96

Paris, April 20, 1940

Sir,

On the assumption that the First Canadian Division will come to France, I wish to draw your attention to some questions which, during the last war, did not arise. Doubtless, the Departments of External Affairs and of National Defence are considering this matter but, in the absence of instructions, I feel it my duty to write to you.

2. The Statute of Westminster has come into being since the war of 1914-1918. The Canadian troops, therefore, when they disembark in France, will be part of the armed forces of a sovereign state and their Commander will be clothed with an authority which General Alderson¹ did not possess.

3. It would appear proper that Canada's new status should alter the relationship between its forces and the French Authorities; although in principle these relations would presumably be direct, I appreciate that in practice it would be necessary in the case of a relatively small force from a dominion to be incorporated for tactical and administrative purposes in the B.E.F. whose organization, training, etc., are similar.

4. In the light of the above considerations, certain questions, some of which follow, will call for answers:

5. ARRIVAL IN FRANCE:

Should not arrangements be made for the Canadian Division, on arrival, to be met and greeted officially by representatives of the French civil and military Authorities? Is it not advisable, therefore, that the Canadian Commander should pay a visit to France before the troops arrive, so that he may establish not only official but friendly relations with the French Authorities?

6. COMMAND:

(a) Doubtless the Canadian Government will wish the Canadian Force to be under the command of General Gamelin² in the same way as the B.E.F. What procedure will be followed to attain this object? Will the Canadian Government approach the French Government direct?

(b) I assume that as a matter of principle the Commander of the Canadian Force will have direct access to the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

¹Le général sir Edwin Alfred Hervey Alderson, officier général commandant du corps d'armée canadien, 1915-1916.

²Le général Maurice-Gustave Gamelin, Commandant en Chef des Armées alliées en France, septembre 1939-mai 1940.

¹General Sir Edwin Alfred Hervey Alderson, General Officer Commanding, Canadian Army Corps, 1915-16.

²General Maurice-Gustave Gamelin, Commander-in-Chief of Allied forces in France, September 1939 to May 1940.

(c) To what extent, if any, will the privilege of the direct access and, consequently, of independent action under the Allied Commander-in-Chief be extended in practice to operations and administration?

7. My attention has been called to Orders in Council 3391 of the 2nd November 1939 and 1066 of the 3rd April 1940. If the effect of these Orders in Council is to place the Canadian Division on exactly the same footing as a British division and to preclude the Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Force from having access to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, except indirectly through the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, I submit respectfully that consideration might be given to the question of remedying a situation which the French Authorities would find difficult to conciliate with the normal prerogatives of a Sovereign State.

8. I need hardly add that my purpose in raising this matter is not prompted by a desire to impair the unity of command—or in practice to make any change whatever—but only to establish a principle which appears to me to be in keeping with the spirit of the Statute of Westminster.

I realize, as an ex-soldier, how essential unity of command is to success.

I have etc.

GEORGE P. VANIER

877.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 469

London, April 20, 1940

MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 426, April 18th, publicity. Appreciate necessity of making every effort to ensure that principles you lay down should be observed. Present situation however in Norway and Canadian participation therein extremely difficult from publicity standpoint as operations largely dependent upon surprise and mystification, and first consideration must be to avoid giving enemy information which would prejudice their success. Only officers directing operations can judge whether items of news issued might have that effect. Hence news despatches must be censored in the United Kingdom. Would therefore suggest statements issued in Canada give no facts beyond those published in this country. A complicating factor is that news itself may break suddenly and in such volume as to make control difficult, but will endeavour to ensure fullest and earliest reports compatible with secrecy. Attempt to arrange simultaneous publication might involve delay in news reaching Canada, but will try to make arrangements that in official reports on Canadian participation priority will be given Canadian

press. Canadian press representatives will proceed to the front as soon as any correspondents permitted.

For your confidential information, and not to be published unless and until definite United Kingdom release given on composition of force, detachments consist of two infantry Brigade Headquarters ten, P.P.C.L.I. [Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry] and Edmonton Regiment forming 75 each, five Field Ambulance 55, all under command of Colonel E. W. Sansom. Force left Aldershot as indicated in my telegram No. 460. Again draw attention to importance of last two sentences of that message.

MASSEY

878.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 471

London, April 20, 1940

MOST SECRET. First Contingent of French forces has landed in Norway. For your very private information Canadian troops have not yet sailed. Despite newspaper reports from German sources, landings of Allied troops on Norwegian coast have taken place without enemy interference, and there have been no casualties.

MASSEY

879.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures¹ au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs¹ to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 437

Ottawa, April 21, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Your telegrams No. 469 and No. 471, Norway. We appreciate difficulties regarding announcement to which you refer and have had no desire that publicity should take form which would interfere in any degree with military objectives. The situation in Canada has, however, been made unnecessarily difficult by daily issue by United Kingdom press and B.B.C. of statements as to Canadians having landed which are declared to be official. Minister of National Defence has probably informed you of reasons why it is desirable in view of past incidents that prior or simultaneous announcement should be made in Canada. Your telegram indicates that you appreciate this necessity fully.

¹J. L. Ralston.

880.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 475

London, April 21, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. VERY SECRET. Following from McNaughton for Minister of National Defence. Begins. G.S.341. Very Secret. Further reference to G.S. 327 dated April 17th.¹ Operation of limited scope and period for which Canadian detachment was detailed has been cancelled owing to change in military plans. This force now in reserve at Northern United Kingdom port and possibility is that they will be returned to Canadian Division shortly. Ends.

MASSEY

881.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 476

London, April 22, 1940

Following from Honourable Norman Rogers. Begins.

1. Your telegram No. 432. Further consideration is now being given to effect of P.C. 3391 in the light of present circumstances for the purpose of arriving at a surer understanding and clearing up of existing legal situation. Will advise you later of any revision that appears to be necessary but wish to emphasize that there are dynamic features in the present military situation which argue against too rigid limitation upon actions taken to meet possible emergencies. Ends.

MASSEY

882.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 486

London, April 23, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Canadian detachments are now being returned to Division. Ministry of Information are issuing official statement tonight that there are no Canadian troops operating in Norway and denying press reports to the contrary.

MASSEY

¹ Document 869.

883.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH A.138

London, April 24, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to send you herewith Notes of a Conference held at Canada House on April 20th last with the Minister of National Defence, when various questions were discussed. These Notes were made by Canadian Military Headquarters, who no doubt have sent them to the Department of National Defence direct.

I have etc.

L. B. PEARSON
for [High Commissioner]

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Mémorandum de l'Officier administrateur du quartier général canadien
Memorandum by Senior Officer, Canadian Military Headquarters

SECRET

London, April 22, 1940

NOTES ON CONFERENCE HELD IN ROOM OF HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA
1030 HOURS, 20 APRIL 1940

Present: The Hon. Norman Rogers, the Hon. Vincent Massey, Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton, Major-General W. H. P. Elkins, Major-General H. D. G. Crerar, Major-General V. W. Odlum, Mr. L. B. Pearson, Captain H. A. Dyde.

1. The Minister stated that there were two main subjects which he wished generally to discuss at this meeting, firstly conditions under which agreement could be reached with the British authorities concerning the Canadian non-divisional units if these were embodied in a distinct Canadian formation and, secondly the policy and procedure to be adopted should it be decided to establish a Canadian Corps. Hon. Vincent Massey suggested, as regards the former, it might be useful if he read over to all present the text of External Telegram No. [355]¹ which dealt with the so-called "G.H.Q. proposal". This he proceeded to do.

2. At Mr. Rogers' invitation, General McNaughton then undertook to open the discussion. He stated that the advantages of establishing the 1st

¹Document 867.

Canadian Division and the Canadian non-divisional troops as one Canadian formation had been set forth in the long telegram on this subject which he had sent to the Minister personally (No. G.S. 169).¹ To accept the alternative suggestion of placing Canadian non-divisional troops under a British Corps or Army would create difficulties in administration and control, due to the inevitable dispersion of such Canadian units which would follow. General McNaughton quoted the two additional Canadian Machine Gun Battalions as examples of units which, under such conditions, would be undoubtedly used by British Corps or Army in support of other than the 1st Canadian Division. Again, the matter of adequate artillery support to Canadian troops required to be considered. The one Canadian Medium Regiment and two Army Field Regiments of the non-divisional troops which were now in this country, could be considered as the minimum additional artillery support required by the 1st Canadian Division in ordinary operations. The training of these non-divisional artillery regiments and the highly developed liaison which existed between all Canadian units made these artillery units a most important nucleus on which to build up further artillery support provided from British sources, in operations where considerable artillery reinforcements were a necessity. General McNaughton referred to the experiences of the Canadian Corps in 1918 when, as Commander of the Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery, he had convincing evidence of the importance of what he had just stated. He went on to say that his arguments for the establishment of a definite Canadian formation, which included both the 1st Canadian Division and existing Canadian non-divisional troops, were based on tactical advantages and the important results to be obtained from the co-ordination of all arms, which could only be secured if the various units were kept together.

3. Hon. Norman Rogers raised the question whether the alternative arrangement which had been agreed to, i.e. that Canadian non-divisional troops, even if forming part of a British Corps, would normally be used in support of the 1st Canadian Division, would not be really acceptable. General McNaughton in reply further emphasized the difficulty, if not impossibility, of keeping those Canadian non-divisional troops under his control under such an arrangement.

4. Hon. Mr. Rogers then enquired of General McNaughton whether the grounds on which he based his recommendation to establish the 1st Canadian Division and non-divisional troops as one formation were as strong as formerly. General McNaughton in reply stated that if anything the grounds were stronger and were based on the necessity of creating a balanced Canadian force. The Minister went on to enquire how General McNaughton saw that Canadian force being employed in the theatre of operations. General McNaughton stated that the force would be kept together and used as a whole, whether as part of a British Corps or under independent instructions

¹ Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.

from G.H.Q. It would not be used in parts or piecemeal, though this would not prevent him placing temporarily at the disposal of G.H.Q. or British higher formations, for special purposes, Canadian units and formations normally under his command. Hon. Mr. Rogers terminated this part of the discussion by stating that the principle of a Canadian formation coming under G.H.Q. rather than becoming a permanent part of a British Corps, had been accepted by the Canadian Government and what was now required was agreement on the financial aspects of this matter.

5. Hon. Mr. Rogers then went on to discuss the second principal subject, which concerned the future formation of a Canadian Corps. He emphasized that no official approval had been given by the Canadian Government as yet to the formation of a Canadian Corps but stated that, in his own personal opinion, it was desirable that a Canadian Corps should be established at some suitable future date.

6. Mr. Rogers went on to point out that in the earlier weeks of the war the British Government representatives in Ottawa had made it plain that the acceptance of the air training scheme was of primary importance and that on the arguments put forward at that time, no Canadian Government could have refused acceptance of this commitment. It was pointed out to the British Government representatives that the priority thus established in the matter of Canadian military participation, through the commitments which might be entered into on behalf of this air training scheme, was bound to affect other aspects of Canada's potential war effort. It followed that the establishment of a Canadian Corps had to be considered in its relation to the heavy commitments entered into under the air training scheme. Mr. Rogers added that the estimated Canadian expenditure during the next fiscal year on war account was in the neighbourhood of \$600,000,000 and it was necessary to realise that in view of the distance of the Canadian people from the actual scene of operations, they could not be expected to accept as heavy a burden of taxation as would the people in this country.

7. Reverting to the question of a future Canadian Corps, Mr. Rogers went on to say that it might be possible to consider such action if this did not involve the Canadian Government, at this stage, in raising an additional quota of non-divisional or Corps troops, this requirement apart from troops already mobilised in Canada being met by provision of British units which, for the time being, would function under Canadian command. General McNaughton remarked that such procedure would be in accordance with the method adopted during the last Great War and that, in consequence, an historical precedent was available. The Minister stated that it was his personal view that if he could advise the Canadian Government on his return that a Canadian corps could be formed with very little additional cost to present military commitments, this might be acceptable, and enquired whether General McNaughton could work out the minimum requirements of a Canadian corps of two divisions with requisite ancillary troops. General McNaughton stated that complete establishment for a Canadian corps of two divisions had

already been prepared and sent to Canada and that this had been drawn up as a basis for provision and not as a definite recommendation to provide. In view of the Minister's remarks, he would review this statement and give him the minimum requirements which he considered were necessary and which would need to be supplied from British sources.

8. General McNaughton pointed out that the previous telegrams sent by him dealing with the formation of a Canadian corps had been based on the statement of the Prime Minister, some time ago, that a 2nd Canadian Division would proceed to the United Kingdom "as soon as possible". Under such circumstances it was necessary for General Crerar and himself to consider in detail the implications of this statement and submit considered views as to the limiting factors which would be met. He had at no time pressed for the formation of a Canadian corps, though he thought that a corps was probably the smallest organization through which the Canadian forces in the field could be effectively administered and fought.

9. The Minister enquired as to a suitable date for the formation of a Canadian corps, if such should be decided upon by the Government. General McNaughton remarked that if 1st November were accepted as the date when the 2nd Canadian Division would reach the theatre of operations, then the formation of Canadian corps headquarters should commence, possibly, in August, and preferably not later than September. In reply to a question of Mr. Rogers', General McNaughton stated that the corps headquarters strength was in the neighbourhood of 400 all ranks, but that a proportion of these would already be established in France as a rear headquarters for the 1st Canadian Division, which would reduce the net increase required for corps headquarters by the amount they represented.

10. Hon. Mr. Rogers then raised the question of organizing a 3rd Canadian Division. He stated that in his opinion this might prove undesirable, as the limiting factor was the maximum force Canada could maintain in the field on the basis of voluntary recruiting. It was necessary to bear in mind, however, that this matter of a 3rd Canadian Division was under public discussion in Canada and pressure would be brought to bear to raise it. General discussion followed, in which Mr. Massey and General Odlum participated, the consensus of which was that a balanced Canadian corps of two divisions and ancillary troops might prove to be the maximum which Canada could maintain by voluntary recruiting in a war of long duration. It was emphasized by General McNaughton and General Odlum that from the military point of view it was much more effective to have a smaller formation promptly maintained to full establishment than a larger formation under strength by reason of a failure to have reinforcements immediately available. It was thought, therefore, that before any action was taken to form a 3rd Canadian Division the factors of existing commitments on man-power in the land and in the air forces, the requirements of industry, etc., would need to be carefully weighed.

H. D. G. CRERAR

884.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 517

Ottawa, May 10, 1940

MOST SECRET. Please convey the following immediately to Government of United Kingdom. Begins.

1. In light of today's critical developments our Cabinet War Committee, in special meeting, have been considering the most useful additional methods of Canadian assistance to Allied effort and further means of immediate co-operation with Government of United Kingdom in the common cause.

2. The Government had already decided to make a Canadian Rifle Battalion available for service in the West Indies area, and have now authorized their despatch at the earliest possible moment to serve in substitution for United Kingdom unit. Chief of General Staff has communicated by telegram today, in this respect, with Canadian Military Headquarters, for information of War Office.

3. We are prepared to despatch immediately from Halifax to the West Indies two destroyers for duty in that area in co-operation with units of Royal Navy and United Kingdom Forces, if this is considered most effective use. Word of this has been sent by telegram today to the Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies Squadron, and repeated to Admiralty.

4. We have also had under consideration accelerating the departure of the Second Canadian Division overseas. We would be prepared to arrange Division's departure from Canada to take place June-July instead of July-August as previously contemplated.

5. No. 112 Army Co-operation Squadron Royal Canadian Air Force is ready to proceed Overseas at an early date and we are prepared to despatch them at once, if their presence in United Kingdom is regarded as a more useful contribution at the earlier rather than at the later stage.

6. We have been awaiting the return of the Minister of National Defence to review our programme of war effort in light of information brought back by him following consultations with United Kingdom authorities and heads of Canadian forces overseas. As regards any changes rendered advisable by developments since the Minister of National Defence sailed, we would be glad to give immediate consideration to any suggestions which the Government of the United Kingdom may wish to make. Ends.

885.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 585

London, May 11, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 517, May 10th. Conveyed offers in telegram under reference this morning to the United Kingdom Government who are deeply appreciative. Later today shall send you by telegram text of a formal reply from Dominions Secretary which I am to receive this afternoon.

MASSEY

886.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 589

London, May 12, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My telegram No. 585, May 11th. Have now received following from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs:

Many thanks for your letter of today. May I say at once how greatly the United Kingdom Government appreciate this prompt and welcome evidence of further co-operation on the part of the Canadian Government.

Immediate examination is being given to helpful suggestions referred to in your letter and I will communicate with you again as soon as possible.

Have just had message from the War Office to the effect that they gratefully accept the Canadian Government's offer of an Infantry Battalion for the West Indies¹ and suggest dates and detailed arrangements can be discussed between the respective Staffs.

I may say that message making offers of additional assistance to the Allies' efforts, contained in your telegram No. 517, May 10th, was received by the Government of the United Kingdom with expressions of very deep and sincere gratitude.

MASSEY

¹ Document 962.

887.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 633

London, May 19, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 517, May 10th. United Kingdom Government has sent further reply which again expresses warm appreciation of Canadian message and undertakes to give immediate consideration to any suggestions for further cooperation. Despatch of two destroyers already gratefully accepted. Message goes on:

... would be grateful if you would convey the following observations which represent the result of consideration given the matter by the Army Council.

Developments of the past few days on the Western Front have made it clear that Allied resources on land will be fully extended in withstanding the German attacks during the coming months. Apart from this immediate struggle, it is equally clear that we must build up our strength to defeat the German forces should they prove capable of sustaining a long conflict. It is thought that taking into account the despatch to the United Kingdom of the First Canadian Division which should, it is thought, be able to take the field somewhere between the middle of June and July, Canada could give no more useful immediate help than is detailed below. In so far as priority can be indicated between the forms of assistance, all of which would be of great value and importance, it would follow the order given in this letter.

An Infantry brigade is now being sent to garrison Iceland and it is anticipated that a garrison will have to be maintained there throughout the war. If the Canadian Government could undertake to provide and maintain this garrison with troops other than those required for their field force it would enable the division from which the brigade now being sent to Iceland has been drawn to be retained available for service overseas as a complete formation. It is understood that the equipment which the Canadian authorities would be able to provide would include rifles, Lewis guns and motor transport.

In the fifth paragraph of your letter you referred to the possibility of accelerating the departure overseas of the Second Canadian Division. This would, of course, be a great help and encouragement and while I cannot give any detailed information on the question of transportation immediately, I can say that everything will be done as regards necessary shipping in an endeavour to make such an acceleration possible.

The Army Council would next wish to suggest that detailed consideration should be given to the formation as soon as practicable of a

Canadian Corps, and that, if a decision in principle on this point could be reached by the Canadian Government, it would greatly assist to expedite the settlement of practical questions below.

The provision of necessary Corps, Army and General Headquarters Troops would then become a matter of great urgency, the units required may be dealt with as regards their availability from Canadian or United Kingdom sources under three categories:

(1) Units which have already been sent to this country from Canada, now available.

(2) Units which would or might be provided from Canada at once.

(3) Units which would have to be provided in the first instance from United Kingdom sources and might later be replaced by Canadian units.

The United Kingdom authorities are most anxious to facilitate the formation of a Canadian Corps and will endeavour to make available units required under category (3). It would, however, be extremely helpful if all possible steps could be put in hand to that effect in Canada for the provision of Canadian units in this category.

In the third paragraph of your letter, you refer to the despatch of a Canadian Rifle Battalion for service in the West Indies. This offer has already been accepted and has proved of great assistance in enabling a United Kingdom battalion to be sent from America to Curaçao. The return of this battalion to the United Kingdom would be of considerable value, and it would, therefore, be of great additional help to us if decisions could provide a further infantry battalion and thus assume all infantry garrison duties in the West Indies i.e. Jamaica, Bermuda, and Curaçao. We should also like to suggest that the Canadian Government would wish to consider the desirability of completing Canadian Corps, if and when that formation comes into existence, to normal standard of three divisions. If so it would, no doubt, be necessary to make arrangements at once for the formation of a Third Canadian Division which, it is needless to say, would prove of great military assistance and encouragement in prosecuting our common cause.

So far the suggestions have related to the proposed expansion of main Canadian Active Service Force and it is recognized that their acceptance will inevitably entail a considerable additional liability to finance of Canada's war effort. There remains one suggestion which falls in a rather different financial category.

It will be remembered that requests were made to the Canadian Government soon after the outbreak of war for certain forestry and transportation units, particularly railway survey and construction companies. In respect of these specialized troops it was suggested that arrangements might be made as in the last war whereby they should not be regarded as coming within the ordinary scope of the Canadian

Active Service Force and that the special financial arrangements, which were agreed to in the last war and have already been communicated to Canadian authorities, should apply. The War Office were in any case about to accept the Canadian Government's helpful offer in the letter from Canada House of April 2nd whereby the Canadian Government would arrange to despatch to this country 60 railway engineers and it is hoped that this may be done at the earliest possible moment. The United Kingdom Government would also be grateful if further consideration could be given to the provision (under the special financial conditions referred to above if the Canadian Government so wished) of forestry units and certain other transportation units, details of which could be supplied at once if the Canadian Government agree in principle. A further letter will be sent as soon as possible as regards air assistance including question of No. 112 Army Cooperation Squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force mentioned in paragraph 6 of your letter.

Third and fifth paragraphs of my letter mentioned above are second and fourth paragraphs of your telegram No. 517.

MASSEY

888.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 588

Ottawa, May 23, 1940

IMMEDIATE. With reference to your No. 633 of May 19th, the Cabinet War Committee have given careful consideration to the suggestions for further co-operation put forward by the Army Council, and have today reached the following decisions, which you are requested to communicate immediately to the United Kingdom government:

1. The Canadian government are willing to undertake to provide and maintain an Infantry Brigade for garrison service in Iceland and to provide the equipment described in your telegram. The organization of this force will be undertaken without delay. It is not yet possible to indicate when its organization will be sufficiently advanced to permit of its transportation. It is assumed that provision of such artillery, anti-aircraft, air and naval protection, as is considered appropriate, will be arranged by the United Kingdom government.

2. The Canadian government are prepared to provide a further available Infantry Battalion for service in the West Indies. This Unit can be ready for embarkation at an early date.

3. The Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons, on Monday, the government's decision to form a Canadian Corps in the field, in accordance with arrangements which have been discussed by the Minister of National Defence, with the War Office, and also the decision to undertake the raising of a Third Division, to be available for such service as may be required, in Canada or Overseas. For the present it is not contemplated that the Third Division should be included in the Canadian Corps.

It is intended that an Infantry Brigade from Units already mobilized will be detailed from the Third Division for Iceland garrison duty.

4. With regard to Forestry and Transportation Units, the Canadian government had already agreed to arrange the despatch Overseas of sixty railway engineers, and had asked you to make further enquiry in this connection. (See our No. 335 of April 1st last,¹ also our No. 564 of May 19th.²) On the financial conditions referred to in your telegram, Canadian government are also prepared, as soon as possible, to organize and despatch Forestry Units Overseas. So far as these and Transportation Units are concerned, the Canadian government agree in principle and wish to be informed as soon as possible which types of such units are most urgently required in the present circumstances.

5. For High Commissioner's confidential direction: It would be helpful if you could ascertain from War Office more precise information as to types and numbers of the Forestry and Transportation Units contemplated by Army Council. Ends.

889.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 670

London, May 23, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Following from Canadian Military Headquarters for the Department of National Defence. Begins. General Officer Commanding First Canadian Division with Senior Officers of Canadian Military Headquarters met Chief of the Imperial General Staff by urgent appointment at 10:30 hours today. General Officer Commanding with portion of Headquarters Staff leaves late this afternoon by destroyer for Calais followed tomorrow by First Canadian Infantry Brigade and attached troops, consisting of First Field Company two Batteries of A.T. Regiment, Third Field Regiment of two machine gun battalions, Fourth Field Ambulance, Provost Company, Divisional Signals detachment, and R.C.A.S.C. detachment, all transported [in] His Majesty's

¹ Document 866.

² Non reproduit.

³ Not printed.

ships. General Officer Commanding also takes over command of such British units as may be operating Calais area on arrival. Immediate object re-establishing of communications, road and rail, through St. Omer-Hazebrouck-Armentières by clearing enemy mechanized and armoured forces which have commenced raiding this area. General Officer Commanding First Canadian Division comes under Commander-in-Chief of British Expeditionary Force for these operations. Movement of balance of First Canadian Division dependent upon McNaughton's appreciation of situation following arrival at Calais. Ends.

890.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 672

London, May 23, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My telegram No. 670 of today's date. Importance of absolute secrecy regarding this move has been emphasized. We shall try to make arrangements so that when public announcement is made Ottawa will be given priority, or if this is not possible that it should be made simultaneously in London and Ottawa. Of course there is always danger of the news breaking from enemy sources.

MASSEY

891.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 597

Ottawa, May 23, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your telegram of this date No. 672. My colleagues and I have decided it is essential that I should speak to the Country in a broadcast tomorrow (Friday) early in the evening. We consider it most desirable that, if consistent with military considerations I should be able to announce briefly that Canadian forces under General McNaughton are now facing the enemy in France. This information should if possible be imparted in the first instance to the Canadian people from our own capital. Please advise urgently whether this is possible.

892.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 675

London, May 24, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 597. Situation respecting movement of Canadian troops remains as in G.S.481¹ from Canadian Military Attaché [*sic*] Headquarters to National Defence. Expect report from McNaughton very shortly when final decision will be taken. In the circumstances therefore no reference to Canadian Forces would be appropriate.

MASSEY

893.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 676

London, May 24, 1940

CLEAR THE LINE. MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Further to your telegram No. 597. If decision is to send Canadian forces immediately Canadian and British Military authorities, while fully appreciating national and general significance of such an announcement, which it would be hoped could be made first from Ottawa, are definitely of the opinion that it is of the highest military importance that no publicity concerning Canadian participation in active operations shall be given until it is clearly known that the enemy is aware of the presence of Canadian troops.

Steps have been taken to inform you as soon as possible after it is established that the enemy has obtained that knowledge.

MASSEY

894.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 678

London, May 24, 1940

Your telegram No. 588, May 23rd. Provision of railway troops. Army Council have sent formal grateful acceptance of offer to obtain 60 volunteers for Railway Survey Companies and have enclosed statements showing condi-

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

tions of service for officers and other ranks and technical qualifications required for railway surveyors which are being forwarded by mail. Army Council say impossible to foresee full ultimate requirements for railway and forestry service for British Expeditionary Force but numbers still fall a long way short of those found necessary for last war. Whole question now under consideration as a result of Canadian Government's offer of further assistance.

895.

902-A-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre en France
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in France

TELEGRAM 97

Ottawa, May 29, 1940

POSITION OF CANADIAN FORCES IN FRANCE

1. Reference your despatch No. 96, April 20, 1940,¹ position First Canadian Division in France, also Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act 1933 see Canadian Statutes 1932, 1933, Chapter 21.

2. Canadian Forces will be serving together with, and in combination with, United Kingdom Forces, under a Commander of the Combined Forces who, legally, is placed in the same position in respect of Canadian Forces as if he were an officer of Canadian Forces of the rank of General and holding the same command (see Section 6). This position is by virtue of Canadian legislation, and arrangements for unity of command are not in any way different in principle from corresponding arrangements, whereby the Commander of the Combined Forces is serving under the French Commander-in-Chief.

3. Accordingly, referring to your despatch:

Paragraph 5. No action is necessary in the special circumstances.

Paragraph 6. Command

(a) You should approach French Government, informing them that to facilitate unity and effectiveness of Defence Measures, it was not proposed that Canadian Forces should be placed directly under the command of the French Commander-in-Chief, but that Viscount Gort was the Commander operating under and by virtue of the Canadian Statute Law, as the Commander of the Combined British Forces.

(b) The Commander of the Canadian Forces will not have direct access to the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

Paragraph 7. The effect of the Orders in Council is not to place the Canadian Division on the same footing as a British Division. Canadian Forces continue to hold Canadian identity, and are governed by Canadian Law. Further, the Canadian Commander has the right of direct communication with Canadian Service Authorities, and, while in relation

¹ Document 876.

to the French Commander-in-Chief the position of the Canadian Forces is anomalous, I am sure that the French Authorities will realize that their acting in combination with the British Forces and under the British Officer appointed to Command the Combined British and Canadian Forces will simplify Command and add to the effectiveness of the operations against the enemy.

4. It is possible that later there will be ceremonial occasions when it may be necessary to break away temporarily from the present position which is dominated by military considerations.

896.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 747

London, May 31, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following from Crerar to Minister of National Defence. Begins. At the request of McNaughton, I communicate the following paraphrase of correspondence between the Director of Military Operations Troopers and himself regarding recently considered employment of Canadian forces, see Dominion telegrams 670, 675, and 676 and my telegrams¹ G.S.481, 485 and 494. Letter of Director of Military Operations dated May 27th, Begins.

Afraid your troops have spent much time on fruitless preparations which have come your way too often. Hope no further question of putting troops into Dunkirk will arise even though Gort tonight reopened the question by asking for fresh support there. Am absolutely convinced that to do so would be militarily quite wrong. Most they could do would be to hold the outskirts and this would not secure the port. Indeed, it would be throwing good material into a quicksand which is already engulfing too much. While difficult, it is of the greatest importance clearly to visualize the drama now going on before our eyes. We must remember we must win the war first by defending England and secondly by reconstituting a fresh field force. Your division and organization may be vital to the first task and with others the keystone of the second. These are the reasons which led me to advise against employing your division, or part of it, at Dunkirk. Role you were asked to play was extraordinarily difficult. You first went to Calais full of fire and determination to save the B.E.F. What you thought from the military aspect I do not know but you were determined to do all that was asked of you. Today, I think you share my feelings as to the unsoundness of committing more to Dunkirk. It was more difficult for you to express that because you would naturally be reluctant to give the impression that Canadian troops were not prepared to undertake a desperate adventure. We all know you too well to have entertained any such thought and I mention it only because I think it was in your mind. The opportunity to use the Canadian division will come soon enough but it must be in circumstances which are militarily practicable.

¹ Non reproduits.¹ Not printed.

Paraphrase of McNaughton's reply dated May 28th. Begins.

Much appreciate your friendly thought and sympathetic understanding of my difficult position these last few days. You have clearly appreciated the considerations governing my actions which is comforting. I was entirely in favour of the Calais operation because it appeared we might delay collapse of Dunkirk. Later proposal to despatch my small force to Dunkirk however did not appear to be practical operation of war. A French General with a division in movement could do so quicker than we, and as he was already exercising command with full staff he was in far better position to coordinate action of mixed forces than myself. I could only view Dunkirk proposal as rather valueless gesture which would use up our not too ample reserves. In the light of these and other considerations, I could not enthuse over this project. Later information confirmed my appreciations that to send us possibly to land on open beaches would have been act of folly and had I been sent I should have cut my force to minimum by eliminating transports and guns so as not to divert any more men and resources from defence of the United Kingdom than absolutely necessary. However, thanks largely to sound military judgment of yourself and Dill, this sacrifice was not required of us. Our problem is to beat Germany and to this end the coast of the United Kingdom must be held. All else is now secondary. We are now going full out to organize and place our force as a highly mobile, quick acting, hard hitting reserve which you can count upon for action.

Ends.

897.

902-A-39

*Le sous-ministre suppléant de la Défense nationale au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 4, 1940

Dear Sir,

I wish to inform you that information has been received from the Senior Officer, Canadian Military Headquarters, London, England, that the G. O. C. 1st Canadian Division has detailed the 1st Canadian Division and proportion of Ancillary Troops to act in combination with the Military Forces of the United Kingdom, serving therein from Midnight 2nd/3rd June until he otherwise shall direct.

Yours very truly,

H. DESROSIERS

898.

501-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 666

Ottawa, June 4, 1940

SECRET. My telegram No. 588 of May 23rd. Military cooperation. In telegram under reference we indicated willingness to provide infantry brigade for

garrison service in Iceland with certain equipment, and added it was assumed that United Kingdom was arranging such artillery, anti-aircraft, air and naval protection as was considered appropriate. Please advise what provision has been or is being made by the United Kingdom in these latter respects.

899.

501-A-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 792

London, June 6, 1940

Part I. Your telegram No. 666, June 4th, Iceland. Recent reconnaissance has shown that the proposed force insufficient to deny Reykjavik to the enemy or to provide for the security of the naval base. United Kingdom Government have, therefore, reached the conclusion that additional measures for the security of the island should, if possible, be commenced without delay and would be most grateful if Canada would agree to assume the responsibility for the defence of Iceland on increased scale considered necessary as a result of new appreciation of the situation. Chiefs of Staff Committee state that the principal troops required for adequate defence, in addition to the existing brigade, are as follows: two rifle battalions; one machine-gun battalion; six flying-boats; one battery of heavy anti-aircraft guns; some additional coast defences, together with probable need next winter for additional infantry battalion. Certain ancillary units are also required as detailed in Part II of this telegram. It would, of course, be for the Commander of the Canadian Force to make final recommendations to the Canadian Government as to numbers and disposition of troops required after making his own appreciation of the situation on the spot. Some Field Artillery and necessary coast defence equipment could be provided by the United Kingdom, but it is regretted that in the existing situation heavy anti-aircraft guns mentioned above, cannot, at present, be made available. As temporary expedient to meet emergency, requirements in air reconnaissance, refuelling and mooring facilities in Iceland are now being provided for. Royal Air Force flying-boat unit in the Shetlands and the question of the despatch of light aircraft to Iceland is under investigation. No flying-boats, however, which could be based in Iceland are available and the United Kingdom would therefore be very grateful if the Canadian Government could consider provision of a flight of general reconnaissance land-plane aircraft. Details of local conditions and facilities considered necessary are being investigated and will be communicated by the Air Ministry to Royal Canadian Air Force Headquarters in London.

If it would help, United Kingdom would provide the second battalion for service in the West Indies which the Canadian Government had agreed to make available. United Kingdom fully appreciate the heavy commitments already undertaken by Canada but hope that we will give the above suggestions immediate consideration in view of the present grave emergency

which necessitates such heavy calls on available military strength here for the defence of the United Kingdom and cooperation with the Allies. Urgency of the situation is such that very early reply would be appreciated. Part II follows.¹

Part II. List of ancillary units and of their numbers, referred to in Part I, and which cancels list transmitted to Department of National Defence by Canadian Military Headquarters in telegram No. G.S.493 of May 26th,² is as follows:

(a) Artillery already in Iceland. Approximate manning requirements follow in each case. Two 4-inch C.D. Guns, 100; two 3.7-inch howitzers, 25; four 2-pounder pom-poms, 25; two 3-inch case 1 A.A. guns, 50.

(b) Proposed additional coast defences. Four 6-inch guns (2 batteries), 240; two 12-pounder guns, 60; eight defence electric lights (4 batteries), 140.

In addition it will be necessary to provide personnel for Fire Command Headquarters (including reserve for casualties) which is estimated at approximately 60 and also signals personnel estimated at approximately 15.

(c) Ancillary troops now in Iceland [preceded] by number of officers and Commanding Officer in each case. Force Headquarters 18 and 70. Detachment Headquarters Field Security Police Section 1 and 5. Detachment Movement Control Group 3 and 10. Artisan Works Company R.E. 6 and 257. Detachment Dock Section 2 and 80. Brigade Signal Section 1 and 36. Detachment Wireless Section nil and 9. One supply Personnel Section (3 butchers attached) 1 and 22. One Sub-section Field Bakery nil and 24. One Section Mechanical Transport Company (including six motor ambulances) 2 and 96. One Sub-section Workshop Mechanical Transport Company nil and 21. Field Ambulance 12 and 234. Hospital Royal Army Medical Corps (200 beds) 36 and 99 (including 22 Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Staff). Field Hygiene Section 1 and 28. Light Aid Detachment 1 and 12. Detachment Ordnance Ammunition Company nil and 9. Detachment Base Ordnance Depot 1 and 15. Company Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps 3 and 275.

(d) Additional Ancillary Troops considered necessary by Officer Commanding Troops, Iceland. Despatch Riders with motorcycles 6. Linesmen 4. Wireless Telegraphy Operators for civil sets 6. Operators for number 11 sets 12. Military Police small detachment.

The requirements given in (c) and (d) relate to the force now in Iceland, namely, an Infantry Brigade of 3 Battalions.

It is not anticipated, however, that any material increase will be necessary for the larger force.

MASSEY

¹ La deuxième partie fut expédiée le 7 juin 1940.

² Non reproduit.

¹ Part II was sent on June 7, 1940.

² Not printed.

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 809

London, June 8, 1940

My telegram No. 791 June 6th.¹ Army Council grateful if Canada could organize and despatch:

- (a) One Headquarters Railway Construction Company and maintenance group;
- (b) One Railway Survey Company;
- (c) Two Railway Construction Companies together with
- (d) one Headquarters Railway Operating Company.
- (e) Before autumn 1941 two further Railway Construction Companies and two further Railway Operating Companies, and
- (f) one Railway Workshop Company will be needed.

Establishment of these units in officers and other ranks respectively is:
(a) 3 and 22, (b) 7 and 62, (c) 6 and 265, (d) 3 and 24, (e) 5 and 356,
(f) 5 and 380.

Financial conditions would be those stated in my telegram No. 26 of January 9th.²

Regarding forestry units, Allied timber supply position has gravely deteriorated, requirements have increased and import facilities impaired. As a result efforts are being made to double domestic production in the United Kingdom and France. This depends on additional labour, plants and machinery with 27,000 skilled and 56,000 unskilled workers required, in addition to those already engaged in this field. Such figures entirely beyond resources of the United Kingdom and France. Every effort being made to secure labour from other sources in Europe and elsewhere. Government here feels that assistance of Canada in this respect is essential for prosecution of common war effort.

With this background the United Kingdom hopes that Canadian forestry personnel can be made available in considerable numbers and with the least possible delay, and would be grateful if a Canadian Forestry Corps similar to that of the last war might be brought into being at an early date on which units

¹ Non reproduit.
² Document 852.

¹ Not printed.

immediately required could be based. Financial conditions same as in the case of transportation units.

As regards immediate requirements of the United Kingdom, suggest consideration be given formation of 20 Forestry Companies, 10 operating in the United Kingdom and 10 in France. This would be of the greatest possible assistance especially if the first arrivals could take place in late summer with further companies arriving later in the present year. Company establishment proposed is that adopted in the last war with units functioning in the same manner as then, though it may be necessary to suggest that organization be so arranged as to make it possible for smaller units such as half companies to operate in United Kingdom forces. The United Kingdom would be grateful if the Canadian Government could investigate whether necessary equipment including mills could be furnished from Canada and inform them of the extent to which this could be done. To secure continuous and intelligible [*sic*] flow of timber supplies at a time when war effort is likely to reach its greatest expansion, further 40 companies operating in the main in France would be needed from Canada in 1941. It is hoped that the Canadian Government would be prepared to take necessary steps to provide them. If the Canadian Government can see their way to cooperate on the above scale it is thought that they would themselves wish to initiate at a very early stage necessary staff for the effort and to send to the United Kingdom advance party with technical experts at the earliest possible moment. Steps have been taken in conjunction with the French Government to establish an Anglo-French Timber Production Commission which would be charged with selection of areas in which forestry units will work. This Commission would work in closest touch with suggested Canadian Forestry Organization. Our views on these proposals requested at the earliest possible date.

901.

902-A-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 79

London, June 11, 1940

MOST SECRET. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins. At this historic moment when Canadian division is proceeding to France for service in the field, I should like to send you for myself and my colleagues a word of greeting. Once again Canadians will be in the forefront of battle. Of Canada's own thoughts it is not for me to speak, but I know well the profound emotion with which in due time the people of this country will learn of Canadians' arrival in France and the encouragement which it will be alike to them and to our Allies. Our thoughts are with the people of Canada and our good wishes for success of Canadian arms. Ends.

902.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 828

London, June 11, 1940

SECRET. For reasons of military security it is important that the movement of the First Canadian Division to France be not made the subject of premature announcement. To this end, arrangements have been made that the first announcement be made by the Canadian Prime Minister at 21:00 hours British summer time on a date when the General Officer Commanding, British Expeditionary Force considers security reasons no longer require the news to be withheld from the enemy. Alternatively, should the enemy be presumed to have identified division, Canadian release should immediately be made on receipt of cabled word: "Chelsea". Release of Canadian press cables will be made 30 minutes after despatch of code word and War Office announcement one hour thereafter. Authorities here desire that the Prime Minister's announcement should be confined to simple statement that the Canadian troops are now operating in France in cooperation with the British and French forces coupled with such additional information as it may be possible to furnish at the last moment.

MASSEY

903.

902-A-39

*Le quartier général de l'armée canadienne au quartier général
de la Défense nationale*

Canadian Military Headquarters to National Defence Headquarters

TELEGRAM G.S.605

London, June 14, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. From Pope to C.G.S. [Chief of General Staff]. Pursuant to senior officer's instructions telephoned from Plymouth, spoke to Dewing, Troopers, tonight who said as reports from French Army indicated that organized resistance was no longer possible, decision had been taken *not* (repeated *not*) to commit 1st Canadian Division to France. In consequence first flight which had disembarked Brest today would re-embark tonight and return to United Kingdom.

904.

501-A-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 860

London, June 14, 1940

United Kingdom Government would be very grateful for early reply to my telegram No. 792, Iceland. Informed today, informally, that the War Office are considering leaving their brigade in Iceland even if additional Canadian troops go as increasing importance being attached to safeguarding the situation there.

MASSEY

905.

501-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 749

Ottawa, June 15, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 792 June 6th, Iceland.

1. Subject to approval of any recommendations which may be received from Canadian Force Commander now en route to Iceland, Canadian Government have approved in principle that Canada shall assume responsibility for providing military garrison mentioned on the understanding that armament, equipment and ammunition not available in Canada will be provided and maintained by War Office.

2. Arrangements being made for provision of Canadian equivalents for all miscellaneous military personnel and units mentioned in your telegram No. 792 including existing garrison and additional units mentioned. Personnel for manning coast defence and anti-aircraft armament and lights will not be available for approximately two months. Recruiting for some other units in your list has only recently commenced and will require to be trained before despatch. Ultimate strength of Canadian force including extra battalion for winter will be approximately 346 officers and 8464 other ranks. This paragraph 2 subject to information which may be received under paragraph 5.

3. Canada is not in a position to provide any aircraft.

4. Canadian Government accept the offer of United Kingdom to relieve Canada of responsibility for providing a second battalion for service in the West Indies.

5. In view of your No. 860, June 14th, indicating that British Brigade Iceland will remain there, please ascertain whether all personnel and units mentioned in your telegram No. 792 are still required to be sent from Canada. Early information desired as to any deletions which may be made from force we have been asked to provide.

906.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 753

Ottawa, June 16, 1940

SECRET. 1. In accordance with request outlined in your telegram of 8th June, No. 809, Canada will organize and despatch further forestry and railway units specified therein.

2. If present developments indicate any modifications of these requirements, or of our undertaking announced on June 7th to provide certain specialists and four forestry and four railway construction companies, please advise as promptly as possible with detailed particulars.

907.

501-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 754

Ottawa, June 17, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. You might inform [Dominions?] Secretary this morning that in accordance with request from United Kingdom Canadian troops are being sent to Iceland and first force arrived June 16th. Announcement will be made shortly.

908.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 756

Ottawa, June 17, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Please advise immediately whether all Canadian First Division troops have returned to England.

909.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 886

London, June 17, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 756. All First Canadian Division, with the exception of 75 officers and 1600 other ranks, have returned to the United Kingdom. From information just received and timed 11 a.m. today these latter with complete equipment, less field ambulances, were expected to embark at Brest during the course of today. Will report in further detail morning of June 18th.

MASSEY

910.

501-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 769

Ottawa, June 18, 1940

My telegram No. 754 of June 17th. We would appreciate information as to constitutional and administrative relations existing between British Commander and Icelandic Government, channel of communication between United Kingdom Government and Iceland authorities for political questions arising out of situation, and also arrangements between various units of force and local authorities respecting billeting, requisitioning, lighting, property rights, etc.

911.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 902

London, June 19, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Further to my telegram No. 888, June 18th.¹ War Office reports all, repeat *all*, personnel evacuated from Cherbourg, St. Malo and Brest, and McNaughton reports all personnel have arrived at Aldershot except portion of Headquarters, First Canadian Infantry Brigade, but no reason to believe this detail will not turn up during the course of today. All Canadian guns despatched to France have been returned. Some mechanized transports, however, could not be evacuated and therefore had to be destroyed.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

912.

501-A-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 905

London, June 19, 1940

Your telegram No. 749, June 15th, paragraph 5. All personnel and units mentioned in my telegram No. 792, June 6th, are still required to be sent from Canada.

MASSEY

913.

501-A-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 920

London, June 20, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 749, June 16th [sic].¹ Iceland. Further representations made here that changed situation on the continent has increased strategic importance of the Island and increased the danger of an attack on it by Germany at any moment. Force occupying Iceland must therefore be increased as soon as possible to at least one division with appropriate ancillary units, air and naval defences. Units now earmarked by Canada for Iceland will absorb more than two-thirds of infantry strength of division, and United Kingdom Government therefore suggest that the Canadian Government may feel in the circumstances that the Second Canadian Division, less such units as are not required for garrison, should proceed to Iceland. This would probably release United Kingdom infantry brigade now in Iceland for the defence of the United Kingdom itself. Have been asked to put the matter in this light before you in order that you may immediately consider the suggested employment of greater part of Second Canadian Division in Iceland. Pointed out that many details regarding subsidiary defences of the Island and forces to be maintained there, pending the arrival of further troops from Canada, will have to be arranged at the earliest possible moment, and it is suggested that this should form the subject of discussion between Canadian military authorities in this country and the appropriate defence departments. Should the Canadian Government decide to send the Second Division so constituted to Iceland, as soon as shipping and other conditions permit, it is pointed out that this need not be a permanent arrangement but that the Canadian Government might desire, on the completion of actual immediate training

¹ Document 905.

of Third Canadian Division, to send that force to Iceland in relief of the Second Division. This would enable the Second Division to be sent to this country when, subject to strategic position at the time, it would no doubt be the Canadian Government's wish as it would be the United Kingdom's, to see the formation of a Canadian Corps.

MASSEY

914.

501-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 834

Ottawa, June 27, 1940

SECRET. Part I. Your telegram 920 June 20th Iceland. While appreciating Troopers' desire for stronger force in Iceland the changing world situation and reported Japanese attitude makes it necessary to keep in mind needs of home defence in Canada. The only troops in Canada comparable in training to those of Second Division are the following: Westminster Regiment (M.G.), Perth Regiment (M.G.), Ontario Regiment (Tank), 1st Canadian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, Fort Garry Horse, Three Rivers Regiment (Tank).

During the winter recruiting in these was held in abeyance so that large numbers of their present strength are recruits in need of considerable training before units could take the field with confidence.

It will be some months before units of 3rd and 4th Divisions can be sufficiently trained. In the meantime it is felt that as much as possible of Second Division should be held in Canada unless the need for it elsewhere is paramount.

We have sent Royal Regiment of Canada from Second Division to Iceland and the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M.G.) and Fusiliers Mont-Royal of Second Division follow next week with undermentioned due to follow about July 5th as shown in Part II.

We feel that until 3rd and 4th Divisions have advanced considerably more in their training the remainder of the 2nd Division should be retained in Canada.

Whilst we do not wish to make any definite commitment so far in advance, we feel that by September 15th the 3rd and 4th Divisions, together with the 2nd Division, will form a force of fairly well trained units to meet any emergency which might arise.

Your suggestion that details regarding subsidiary defences of Iceland should form subject of discussion between Canadian and United Kingdom appropriate service authorities is concurred in as requirements should be determined whether further Canadian troops are or are not sent. These discussions should include any divisional troops requested and whether modifications to their establishments in both personnel and equipment are desirable in view of the nature of the country.

In regard to equipment much of 2nd Canadian Division Mechanical Transport has been shipped to England and further mechanical transport is not immediately available in Canada. In addition following main items of equipment are not available: Bren carriers, two inch mortars, three inch mortars, anti-tank rifles, anti-tank guns, field guns and trailers, complete signalling equipment.

We want assurance United Kingdom will provide these since we are reluctant to leave our Canadians without fullest possible protection.

Need for Air co-operation is apparent. This we cannot provide and we want assurances United Kingdom will do so.

It is to be noted that infantry troops being provided are from 2nd Canadian Division. It is considered that they should be eventually relieved by other troops since we feel that Canadian public opinion would not readily be reconciled to our forces being permanently in garrison abroad.

Part II. To summarize we have despatched to Iceland:

Royal Regiment of Canada.

We are sending about 25 June:

Cameron Highlanders.

Fusiliers Mont-Royal, Second Division.

We propose sending about 5 July:

Essex Scottish Regiment, Second Division.

Miscellaneous personnel for Force Headquarters.

Infantry Brigade Headquarters.

One Field Company.

One Infantry Brigade Signal Section and signal personnel operation
W/T Station.

One Field Ambulance.

One Field Hygiene Section.

Detachment Dental Company.

One Light Aid Detachment.

Detachment Base Ordnance Depot.

We wish to know whether United Kingdom will provide all troops required additional to those listed Part II.

915.

501-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 841

Ottawa, June 27, 1940

SECRET. My telegram No. 834 of 27th June. Iceland.

1. We should be greatly obliged if the Government of the United Kingdom could indicate more explicitly than has hitherto been done the nature of the expected attack on Iceland and the type of enemy forces that would probably be employed.

2. In telegram under reference we have requested assurance as to certain equipment and air cooperation being provided. You are aware that though our cooperation in the defence of Iceland has explicitly been made contingent upon provision by the United Kingdom not only of naval and air cooperation but of armament equipment and ammunition required for action on the Island itself, we are still without definite information on these points. Please ascertain what provision is being made in these respects by the United Kingdom, with dates when despatch of units or equipment is expected.

916.

501-A-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 989

London, June 28, 1940

Your telegram No. 769, June 18th. On political matters channel of communication between United Kingdom Government and Iceland Government is His Majesty's Minister in Iceland and Icelandic Chargé d'Affaires, London. As regards relations between British Commander in Iceland and local authorities, following paragraph appears in instructions given General Officer who recently left for Iceland. Begins.

It is of the utmost importance for you to bear in mind that status of the Island, being that of a foreign country, is in no way affected by military force under your command. Local political situation is a delicate one and you should exercise great tact and consideration with local authorities accordingly. You should do your utmost, in collaboration with His Majesty's Minister, to cultivate friendly relations with authorities and communities at large and, should it become necessary at any time while in the performance of your duties to make an official representation to the authorities, you should do so through His Majesty's Minister.

Ends.

Billeting is arranged between Commanders of units or detachments and appropriate local authorities. A hiring officer has been attached to the forces

sent from the United Kingdom and to him are delegated certain powers. Payments are dealt with through local banks by paymaster attached to forces. At request of Commander of the forces, Iceland Government have appointed a lawyer in Reykjavik to deal with such questions as may arise between forces and local authorities and to assist in disputes.

MASSEY

917.

501-A-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1001

London, June 28, 1940

Your telegrams Nos. 834 and 841 June 27th, situation in Iceland. Further review by War Office just submitted to us again emphasises great strategic importance of Island, pointing out that establishment of German base at Trondheim and reduction of German commitments in France have materially increased likelihood of early German attack on it. This might be timed to serve as diversion in connection with invasion of United Kingdom to draw off the main naval force, a stratagem employed in Norway operations. Furthermore establishment of Germans in Iceland would seriously prejudice our ability to exercise economic pressure and increase German ability to interfere with our trade. If German attacks on the Island were undertaken as diversion, sea-borne attack not likely to be larger than raid, though possibility cannot be ignored, one or two large ships evading blockade and landing several thousands of men with rations and stores for several weeks, including stores for bomber units. Island would be liable to light scale air attack from Norway, and there is always the possibility of airborne landings. Bombing attacks would also increase local internal security problem.

If German attack were undertaken as separate operation and not merely diversion, this might well be done on a larger scale than described above in spite of obvious risks. Interception of German sea-borne expedition from Norway to Iceland not certain, therefore garrison should always be sufficient to repulse any light scale attack, and in the event of large scale attack to prevent the enemy getting firmly established before arrival of reinforcements. Thought impossible to provide sufficient self-contained garrisons to withstand estimated scale of attack at all possible points, therefore recommend that Reykjavik area should be held in strength with detachments at major vulnerable points. Following are detailed military proposals stated to be concurred in by Canadian Commander of island contingent.

(a) ARMY. Following additional forces should be despatched as soon as possible: one infantry brigade; one field battery Royal Artillery; twelve heavy anti-aircraft guns; eight light anti-aircraft guns; four defence electric lights; Bren carriers for all battalions.

Additional to bring to completion modified Divisional Headquarters. Ancillary troops.

Majority of above forces being despatched forthwith but this does not apply to heavy anti-aircraft guns which will be sent as soon as available from production.

(b) AIR. As flying boats unavailable, Walrus aircraft being despatched H.M.S. *Argus* to carry out coastal patrols to obtain warning of enemy landings in distant parts of the Island. H.M.S. *Argus* will remain in Iceland until base and refuelling arrangements at points round the Island for Walrus aircraft have been established. One medium bomber squadron will be sent as soon as aerodrome is ready; this is to be constructed at Kaldadarnes as a matter of urgency.

(c) NAVAL. Nine additional local defence vessels are being provided.

Have also received from United Kingdom authorities brief note of physical characteristics etc. of the Island which shows that defence of Island is considerably more complex in the summer than in the winter. Am informed that information contained in this note sent to National Defence by Military Headquarters by letter May 30th.

Would appreciate knowing whether contents of this telegram modify conclusions set out in your telegram No. 834.

MASSEY

918.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1015

London, June 29, 1940

Further to your telegram No. 753, June 16th Forestry and Railway units. Official communication now received as follows:

Transportation units previously requested not at present required. United Kingdom regret necessary to cancel request and express great appreciation of Canadian response and hope they may rely upon our assistance again if, as still possible, situation may later make it necessary to ask for such units from Canada.

Urgent need still exists in the United Kingdom for 20 Forestry Companies previously requested which it is hoped will still be available by late summer. Suggested however that recruiting in excess of these 20 companies should be postponed.

Circumstances may make request for additional companies necessary later, but in any event total requirements will now fall greatly short of 80 companies originally asked for. Recent experience in France and military situation here, make it most important to ensure that Forestry Companies should have received appropriate scale of military training before they arrive here.

Military advisers here state this training will last approximately two months, of which five weeks would be devoted to ordinary military training including drill, musketry, anti-gas, and use of weapons, and about three weeks for training and construction of ordinary field works and elementary demolitions. Have been requested to emphasize the importance of this question of training; also that units should arrive fully equipped with operating and transporting equipment. Would be greatest difficulty in supplying such equipment here. If conditions as to training mentioned above are fulfilled, United Kingdom Government would be very glad if four Forestry Companies, now understood to be ready for despatch at an early date, could be sent over as soon as possible.

United Kingdom suggested that any further discussions of details connected with Forestry units might be conducted direct between Canadian Military Headquarters and the War Office.

This procedure would be greatly facilitated if, as previously suggested, the Canadian Government could send advance party with such technical experience as might be required at the earliest possible date to establish contact with military authorities in this country. Idea that Forestry units might be civilian in character has been abandoned.

MASSEY

919.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 870

Ottawa, July 2, 1940

SECRET. Your 1015 June 29th. It is noted that transportation units previously requested are not at present required.

Canadian Government will raise and despatch twenty Forestry Companies under financial arrangement stated in your telegram 26 January 9th.¹ Companies will be trained in Canada for two months in accordance with your proposal. Operating and transporting equipment will be supplied here as requested but will be a charge against United Kingdom Government in accordance with financial arrangement above referred to. Should it be found that all above equipment cannot be supplied in time to accompany companies overseas remainder will follow as soon as it can be obtained.

No recruiting has been done for the four companies you refer to and therefore none will be ready to sail before about end of September.

The United Kingdom suggestion that further discussion of details be conducted direct between Canmilitary and the War Office is concurred in.

Reference your last paragraph an advance party with technical experience will be despatched as suggested, date to be notified later.

¹ Document 852.

920.

501-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 890

Ottawa, July 5, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram 1001 June 28th. Appreciate the information supplied in response to our 841.

Reference Army on page two it is noted that majority of forces named are being despatched forthwith. It is assumed that despatch of Bren carriers mentioned will be sufficient to equip the three Canadian Infantry (rifle) battalions mentioned in Part II of our 834 but would like assumption verified. No mention made in your telegram of other six items of equipment (except your mention of field artillery) in respect to which we asked assurance United Kingdom would provide.

It is noted air co-operation is being arranged for.

The query in your last para. as to whether contents of your telegram modify conclusions set forth in our 834 is not understood.

921.

501-A-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1067

London, July 8, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegrams No. 834 and No. 841 of June 27th, Iceland. There follows summary of reply of the United Kingdom Government which supplements information given in my telegrams No. 989 and No. 1001.

(1) In addition to the information in my telegram No. 1001 on the possible scale of enemy attacks, it is thought that Germany would employ at least one mountain division for attack on Iceland and shipping is known to be available for two divisions. Two out of three mountain divisions are in Norway. Each division contains three regiments of three battalions. Divisional artillery consists of mountain artillery regiment of twenty-four 7.5 centimetre mountain guns, and each regiment has an infantry gun company, armed with eight 7.5 centimetre infantry guns. Division has also thirty-six 3.7 centimetre anti-tank guns. Germans would probably attempt to use tanks but

difficult nature of the landing places and the terrain would almost certainly prevent employment of other than light tanks, against which the anti-tank rifle is effective.

(2) Considerations respecting Canadian security mentioned in your telegram No. 834 are fully appreciated. United Kingdom Government justify their appreciation of the possibilities of Japanese attack on Canada on the assumption that such an attack would immediately result in bringing the United States forces into (action?). They would be glad to know whether the views of the Canadian Government on this coincide with their own. On this assumption they consider it most improbable that Japan would undertake such operations and that if she did so a land attack on Canada against opposition of the United States navy would not be a possible operation of war in view of the distance of the Japanese fleet bases from Canada and necessary absence of surprise.

(3) I am asked to submit the following other considerations:

As a result of the failure of the Allies and loss of equipment of the B.E.F. we are placed in a position where our resources are extremely strained. We are quite unable to provide military forces for operations which would, in any other circumstances, be considered not only desirable but absolutely necessary. The forces now available for the defence of this country, while perhaps large in numbers of men, in no sense form, when training and equipment are taken into consideration, any over-insurance against an attack from Germany. The time of greatest danger is undoubtedly the period of the next three months, and during this period we must expect some damage to our industry which may seriously curtail provision of equipment. After that period, provided that our industries have not suffered severely, we ourselves will have an increasing output of trained and equipped forces though this output may still fall far short of our desires. It is in the immediate future that we shall particularly welcome any additional help that Canada is able to provide.

(4) Reluctance of Canadian opinion to accept permanent absence of Canadian forces on garrison duty abroad is fully understood. The suggestion is repeated, which was reported in my telegram No. 920 of June 20th, that if the Second Division is now sent in its entirety to Iceland, it might be relieved by the Third Division as and when necessary stage of training and equipment is reached. Third Division might itself be relieved in due course so that no troops should be compelled to remain indefinitely in Iceland. United Kingdom Government, however, wish to emphasize strongly the great service of the Iceland garrison in common strategical situation, which makes denial of the Island to the enemy a matter of the highest skill.

(5) It is not intended to release any United Kingdom troops now in Iceland unless and until they can be replaced by similar Canadian forces. Their scale of equipment has been drawn up to meet special conditions there. It has not been possible, however, to provide full scale of certain items especially anti-aircraft artillery. As mentioned in my telegram No. 1001, eight 3.7 anti-aircraft guns are being sent as soon as possible and some light anti-aircraft guns are also available. Since United Kingdom troops have been

equipped on this lesser scale in all theatres of war, United Kingdom Government feel sure the Canadian Government will not consider their inability to provide full scale at present a barrier to acceptance of the responsibilities Canada is being asked to assume. As soon as equipment situation permits, every effort will be made to supply deficiency.

(6) Reply concludes as follows:

We most earnestly hope that, subject to a settlement of details appropriate to discussion between Canadian Military Headquarters and the Service authorities here, the Canadian Government will be prepared to accept the suggestions made in my letter of June 20th. (See my telegram No. 920). I would emphasize that, in present circumstances, this is thought to be one of the most valuable forms which Canadian co-operation in the common effort could assume.

MASSEY

922.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1098

London, July 10, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following is text of letter addressed to Under-Secretary of State, War Office, by Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces, under date of July 7th, copy of which was sent to McNaughton last night. Begins.

(1) It is requested that authority should be given for formation of a new Corps Headquarters (to be called Seventh Corps) and that War Office will take steps for its creation as soon as possible.

(2) Seventh Corps will be in G.H.Q. Reserve and will consist of: one armoured division, one Canadian division, New Zealand force, selected artillery troops.

(3) I desire to utilize services of Major-General McNaughton, as Commander with rank of Lieutenant-General; the staff to be selected both from Canadian and British resources.

Signed, E. Ironside, General, Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces.

Ends.

Enquiry at War Office indicates decision taken to form this Corps and we are to be invited to discuss matter tomorrow. Please telegraph your observations for guidance.

MASSEY

923.

501-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 926

Ottawa, July 11, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram 1067 July 8th, Iceland. It is noted that the United Kingdom Government justify their appreciation of the outcome of a possible Japanese attack on Canada on the assumption that such an attack would immediately result in bringing the United States forces into active participation. The Canadian Government consider that while this is probable it cannot be accepted as a certainty in all cases, and in any event it is obviously necessary for us to have sufficient forces available to provide effective co-operation with our neighbour and to assure the Canadian public regarding our defensive measures. The Canadian Government agree that while a sustained Japanese attack on Canada may be improbable there is a large Japanese population in British Columbia which might become disaffected and a serious menace even prior to any actual attack or even prior to any actual state of war. This was one of the dangers in mind when reference was made to the needs of home defence in the first paragraph of our telegram 834 of June 27th.

2. From Canmilitary telegram 707 of July 6th¹ it appears that upon arrival of Convoy "C" from the United Kingdom early this month the full complement of the military forces considered necessary for the defence of Iceland will have reached the island, except for the remainder of the Canadian troops mentioned in Part II of our telegram 834 and the heavy anti-aircraft guns referred to in your telegram 1001 of June 28th. The remainder of the Canadian troops referred to in Part II of our 834 is being despatched about July 18th. The despatch of the remainder of the 2nd Division would of course be in relief of United Kingdom forces and would not increase the defences of Iceland.

3. The Canadian Government have reviewed the whole matter, having regard to the needs here arising from the rapid changes in the situation but with a view to doing everything to despatch as many trained troops as possible. After careful weighing of the possibilities the Canadian Government have planned adjustments and dispositions so as to release an additional 3 battalions of the 2nd Division which with the Canadian troops now in Iceland and the troops to be despatched on July 18th as set out in Part II of our telegram 834 would make 2 Brigades of the 2nd Division and one additional battalion for duty on this special mission. This adjustment includes

¹ Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.

the releasing of the Black Watch Battalion now in Newfoundland which is a 2nd Division battalion to allow it to proceed as one of the three additional battalions and replacing it with another Canadian battalion which is unattached. As will be recognized, to send these additional 3 battalions to Iceland would completely thwart the completion of training and disrupt the organization of the 2nd Division. It would mean that 2 Brigades would be in Iceland, 1 Brigade and Divisional units would be in Canada and advance parties and instructional and Headquarters personnel would be in England. To permit the early utilization of the 2nd Division as a fighting formation the Canadian Government would very much desire that the Division (less one Brigade which is required in Canada until 3rd and 4th Division troops training is further advanced) should go to England, where training as a Division can be completed promptly and where in the meantime the two Brigades and Divisional troops would be available for defence in the United Kingdom. The Canadian Government therefore suggests the following as an alternative to sending the three additional Battalions to Iceland and completely breaking up the 2nd Division for the time being.

Proposal follows: Canada to send to Iceland, about July 15th, the Essex Scottish and the other troops to be despatched as per Part II of our telegram No. 834. Canada to send to England as soon as shipping and relief of Black Watch permit, the three additional battalions first above mentioned, and Divisional units of the 2nd Division. On arrival of these troops in England, the United Kingdom to relieve the four Canadian battalions which will then be in Iceland. The three battalions of the 2nd Division which will thus be relieved to go to England and the other Canadian battalion thus relieved to return to Canada. The remaining 6th Brigade of the 2nd Division now in Canada to join the Division in England just as soon as further troops are sufficiently trained to replace it. Proposal ends.

4. This would result in the concentration of the 2nd Division in England where winter training facilities are available and would also advance the date of the formation of the Canadian Corps while the force in Iceland would be a homogeneous division of the United Kingdom forces. Further it is pointed out that most of the mechanical transport of the 2nd Canadian Division has been sent to England and cannot be replaced in Canada for some time and also emphasized that advance parties of the 2nd Division are now in England and many of its Officers and other ranks are taking courses in anticipation of the arrival of the Division.

5. It is assumed that training equipment for the 2nd Canadian Division would be available in England as stated in Cannilitary G.S.576 June 9th.¹ Please indicate to the United Kingdom Government the strong preference which the Canadian Government have for this alternative proposal, and that they would appreciate having the views of the United Kingdom Government as early as possible.

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

924.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 930

Ottawa, July 11, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. 1. Cabinet War Committee considered today message from the War Office communicated in your telegram No. 1098, of July 10th, and you are accordingly authorized to inform United Kingdom government as follows:

2. Canadian government are agreeable to the creation of the new Corps on basis described in your telegram, and to the appointment of Major-General McNaughton as Commander, with rank of Lieutenant-General in accordance with request of the U.K. Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces.

3. It would be understood that the 2nd Division, C.A.S.F., if and when it proceeds to the United Kingdom would be included in the new Corps. See our telegram No. 926 of this date.

4. The intention is noted to select Corps staff from Canadian and British resources. The Canadian government assume therefore that if and when 2nd Division C.A.S.F., is included, appropriate readjustment of staff arrangement will be made on proportionate basis.

5. Canadian government presume that it is expected that General McNaughton will be paid in new rank by Canadian government.

6. Information is required as to what Canadian ancillary units, now in United Kingdom or Canada, are required for Corps purposes.

7. For your own information Chief of General Staff sending telegram direct through Canmilitary to McNaughton to the above effect.

8. It is desired that announcement of General McNaughton's appointment should be made in Canada at least simultaneously with announcement in United Kingdom, and you are requested to inform us by telegram immediately we are free to do this, indicating appropriate extent of reference to new Corps.

925.

501-A-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1121

London, July 13, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 926 of July 11th, Iceland. Informal conversations with War Office indicate their acceptance of your proposal that Second Canadian Division be concentrated in the United Kingdom as soon as reasonably practicable and that Canada should not be

further pressed to undertake the garrisoning of Iceland. This may be taken as firm. In these circumstances and also to observe due economy in respect of shipping, War Office propose the following program:

(1) That units enumerated in Part 2 of your telegram No. 834, June 27th, should not, repeat not, now be despatched to Iceland and shipping thus set free be utilized to transport troops to the United Kingdom;

(2) Second Canadian Division, less two infantry brigades, to proceed to the United Kingdom as soon as this move can be arranged;

(3) One British Infantry Brigade, with certain details from the United Kingdom, to proceed to Iceland at a date to be decided later returning transport to bring two Canadian Rifle Battalions to the United Kingdom. As respects this date, from United Kingdom operational point of view, it is most undesirable to interfere with Home Defence dispositions until latter part of August at the earliest by which time, either the invasion of this country will have been attempted or the danger of this contingency have become less imminent;

(4) Remaining Infantry Brigade of the Second Division to be despatched from Canada to the United Kingdom during the latter half of September.

It will be noted that the above program visualizes the concentration of the Second Division in the United Kingdom by the first half of October. On the other hand, because of acute shortage of machine gun battalions in United Kingdom, War Office strongly express the hope that Canada will continue to furnish one such unit for Iceland for an indefinite period and at any rate throughout the coming winter.

It is safe to act on the above information pending the receipt of official reply.

MASSEY

926.

501-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 951

Ottawa, July 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 1121 of July 13th Iceland.

1. Canadian Government note that proposal contained in their telegram No. 926 of July 11th has been accepted with the suggestion that Canadian Government continue to furnish one machine gun battalion for Iceland through the winter. This Canadian Government will endeavour to do subject of course to exigencies which might appear to us to make some other disposition imperative.

2. Canadian Government also notes that the relief of the two Canadian Rifle Battalions presently in Iceland may not be made until latter part of August. No exception is taken to this if United Kingdom Government find it

impracticable to arrange otherwise. As already stressed Canadian Government very much desire the maximum concentration practicable of 2nd Division be effected as promptly as possible.

3. Arrangements have been made for the despatch to England of the following units of 2nd Division.

Sixth Flight sailing about 18th July: Essex Scottish, Royal Hamilton Light Infantry or Le Régiment de Maisonneuve along with Corps troops listed in Paragraph 5 of this telegram.

Seventh Flight sailing about 23rd July: Headquarters 2nd Division, Headquarters Fourth Infantry Brigade, Royal Hamilton Light Infantry or Le Régiment de Maisonneuve.

4. First Battalion Black Watch of Canada presently in Newfoundland will be relieved and with remainder of 2nd Division Units (less Sixth Infantry Brigade which will be retained in Canada pending availability of further trained troops to replace it) will proceed overseas as soon as move and shipping can be arranged.

5. The following units, which were already proceeding to embarkation port for Iceland, will proceed to England, in Sixth Flight (mentioned in [paragraph 3] above sailing about July 18th) as part of Corps Troops requested in Canmilitary Telegram G.S.746.¹

One Army Field Company, One Corps Troops Field Ambulance, One Corps Troops Field Hygiene Section, Field Security Police (Six Other Ranks) and probably One Light Aid Detachment.

6. Despatch to Iceland of units enumerated in Part 2 of our telegram No. 834 June 27th has been cancelled.

7. Detailed consideration will be given to Canmilitary telegram G.S.746 and reply will be sent [as] soon as possible.

8. There has not been time to give consideration to your telegram 1118 July 13th¹ which was received just as this telegram was being despatched. Reply will be sent shortly.

927.

501-A-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1741

London, October 17, 1940

Just informed that United Kingdom units are to leave this country for Iceland very shortly, and it is expected that this will enable the two Canadian Rifle Battalions to leave Iceland for United Kingdom on October 27th.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

928.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2111

London, December 19, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Following from Ralston for the Prime Minister. Begins. I am convinced that considerations of morale and *esprit de corps* of Canadian Active Service Force serving in the United Kingdom, quite apart from the beneficial effects which would accrue in Canada from such a step, make it desirable to take early action to constitute the Canadian Corps. During the previous Great War the Canadian Corps was formed in September 1915, and it would seem desirable that in this war similar action should not be deferred for any substantially longer related period. Consequently I should think it would be better that this important step should be taken within the calendar year 1940. Our present commitment is to form a Canadian Corps in the field, but conditions in this war are such that the field for this purpose might well be considered the United Kingdom. In addition to that, we have already accepted financial responsibility for the Canadian ancillary troops now serving with the 7th Corps as from September 1st, and the High Commissioner's recent negotiations with the War Office (Massey to External telegram No. 1973 of November 27th)¹ make it clear that the United Kingdom will provide further ancillary units necessary for the completion of the Corps without cost to the Canadian Government, on the understanding that the Canadian Government will replace these units by Canadian troops as soon as practicable. Consequently there would appear no additional financial commitments involved by the immediate formation of the Corps beyond those undertaken, and my recollection is that provision was made in the Departmental estimates for the full cost of the Corps.

On December 17th I discussed this question with the Secretary of State for War as planned, and he expressed himself as being entirely favourable. A formal announcement to this effect seems therefore all that is required. It will be understood that Canada will progressively replace British personnel now making up a proportion (about 30 per cent) of the Headquarters 7th Corps. As equipment becomes available and sea transport makes possible, Canada will furnish the ancillary units still required to make up the full composition of a Corps of two divisions. The great bulk of these ancillary units, which are not yet in or en route to this country, have already been mobilized in Canada.

Would be glad of your cabled views on this proposal, including suggested date of constitution of the Canadian Corps if approved, in which event I will settle details with Eden and advise you as to the final arrangements. Ends.

MASSEY

¹Non reproduit.

¹Not printed.

929.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1977

Ottawa, December 20, 1940

IMPORTANT. Your telegram No. 2111 Canadian Corps. Following from Prime Minister for Mr. Ralston. Begins. Your proposal that steps be taken forthwith to constitute Canadian Corps has been considered by Government here and is approved on the basis set forth in your telegram. I would suggest you see Eden at once to settle details. If it is possible to make necessary arrangements, we consider the effective date for constitution of the Canadian Corps might be Christmas Day. We also consider that the news of the formation should be first announced in Canada. I would be prepared to make announcement on Christmas Eve if that can be arranged. Ends.

930.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1159

London, June 24, 1941

SECRET. My telegram No. 1015 of June 29th, 1940. United Kingdom Government wish to reopen the question of the Canadian Government supplying additional transportation units. They state that sources of supply in the United Kingdom for such units have already been fully exploited, and it is impossible to obtain further skilled personnel or to train unskilled men in the time available. United Kingdom Government would therefore be most grateful if Canadian Government could see their way to provide the following units.

One headquarters construction and maintenance group; one railway survey company; four railway construction companies; one headquarters railway operating group; four railway operating companies; one railway workshop company; one transportation construction company.

United Kingdom Government proposes that financial arrangements governing provisions of these units should be the same as those which have been agreed to as regards Canadian Forestry Corps in the United Kingdom.

United Kingdom Government state that they would consider this assistance as most valuable in present circumstances.

MASSEY

931.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1065

Ottawa, July 17, 1941

Your telegram No. 1159 June 24, 1941, concerning request of United Kingdom Government to reopen the question of Canadian Government supplying additional transportation units.

The Minister of National Defence has communicated with Mr. Power, suggesting that he should inform United Kingdom Authorities that the matter is being discussed with our railway officials here and that we are unable to give an answer pending a survey of the personnel situation in relation to industry requirements here and other factors involved.

Presumably this information has been brought to the attention of United Kingdom authorities by Mr. Power.

932.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1279

London, July 17, 1941

My telegram No. 809 of June 8th, and your telegram No. 753 of June 16th,¹ Forestry Units.

(1) Provision of further personnel for this work has been raised as a matter of urgency, and the United Kingdom Government express the hope that the Canadian Government will now be prepared to raise an additional 20 forestry companies for work in the United Kingdom, to be here in time to start work on January 1st, 1942.

(2) The tonnage available to bring timber from all sources of supply, of which Canada is the most important, is now so reduced that if home production is not increased above existing level with minimum delay grave danger exists that serious difficulty may arise in meeting requirements essential to successful conduct of the war.

¹ Documents 900, 906.

(3) It is hoped that as in the case of companies now in this country necessary technical equipment may be provided from Canada, and also that personnel should have received an appropriate scale of military training on lines indicated in my telegram No. 1015 of June 29th, 1940.¹ If companies are raised and sent to this country no doubt additional forestry district headquarters would be sent with them as required, and terms of agreement should be same as those settled for existing companies.

(4) The authorities are faced with a further problem; the great expansion of timber production in the United Kingdom has completely absorbed into production nucleus of skilled woodsmen in this country, particularly sawyers.

The process of dilution of labour by the training of semi-skilled and unskilled men by skilled woodsmen has now been exploited to the limit, and it is proposed that smaller stands of timber should be worked by such further unskilled or semi-skilled civilian labour as can be recruited here and leavened by such skilled civilian sawyers as can be obtained from elsewhere. The United Kingdom authorities would be very grateful if the Canadian Government would consider providing up to 350 skilled sawyers for this work on a civil basis. It is thought that there may be in Canada men over the age for military service who would be prepared to accept this type of employment.

(5) A copy of a communication addressed to me on this subject by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs follows by bomber bag, and as I am asked to put the matter before you as soon as possible, I should appreciate its receiving your early attention.

MASSEY

933.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1183

Ottawa, August 7, 1941

SECRET. With reference to your telegram No. 1279 of July 17th, please inform Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that Government have under way a careful survey of manpower available in Canada in the light of existing commitments and that at present it is not possible for Canada to provide further special forestry units of type requested in your telegram.

¹ Document 918.

934.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1429

London, August 11, 1941

My telegram No. 1159 of June 24th, transportation units. Interim reply in sense of your telegram No. 1065 of July 17th was communicated to United Kingdom authorities who are now pressing for final decision. Please telegraph as soon as possible advising what reply should be made.

MASSEY

935.

902-A-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1206

Ottawa, August 12, 1941

SECRET. Reference your telegram No. 1429 August 11th.

Please inform United Kingdom authorities that for the present at all events and pending completion of the survey of available manpower now in progress, Canadian Government will not find it possible to provide special transportation units for use in United Kingdom as requested in your telegram No. 1159 of June 24th.

936.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516/185

Ottawa, August 20, 1941

Sir,

On the 12th July the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs wrote to the Canadian High Commissioner in London expressing the hope that the Canadian Government would be prepared to raise a further twenty forestry companies for work in the woodlands of the United Kingdom, and stating the anxiety of the United Kingdom Government that these further companies might be provided within the course of the present year. In a reply dated the 17th July, Mr. Massey stated that this request had been transmitted to his Government. Since then, Sir James Calder, the Timber Controller in the

United Kingdom, has come to Ottawa and has been having discussions on this subject with the authorities concerned.

I have now received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in which it is asked whether, in case there is difficulty in arranging for the provision of the full twenty Forestry companies at once, a thousand expert men, sawers, loggers etc. could be recruited in the first instance. If this could be done, sufficient unskilled labour, male and female, could be drawn temporarily from pitwood operations in the United Kingdom to enable the skilled men to operate the twenty mills for the time being, until the Canadian Government find themselves, as it is hoped they will ultimately do, in a position to meet the whole application. The knowledge that these thousand men would be recruited would, moreover, enable the United Kingdom Government to proceed forthwith with the buying of the necessary machinery in Canada and to get that machinery supplied and shipped in time for their requirements.

I am to express the earnest hope that, as a temporary measure and while the provision of the full twenty companies is under consideration, the Canadian Government may find themselves able to authorise the recruitment of the thousand men referred to above.

I am etc.

MALCOLM MACDONALD

937.

902-A-39

Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures¹ au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs¹ to High Commissioner in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1279

Ottawa, August 22, 1941

SECRET. Following for Prime Minister. Begins. War Committee have discussed further request made by United Kingdom Government, through High Commissioner and personally by Sir James Calder, Timber Controller, that, as there is difficulty in providing for twenty Forestry Companies, Canada should provide 1000 expert men, sawers, loggers, etc. Committee see no reason to alter decision previously reached on this matter, but in view of persistent and repeated representations made feel you may wish to discuss question with McNaughton and with the Canadian Military authorities, as well as with United Kingdom Government. No reply will, therefore, be made to request until word has been received from you. Ends.

¹Ernest Lapointe.

938.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1601

London, September 4, 1941

Your telegram No. 1279 of August 22nd, alternative request for 1,000 expert sawers, loggers, etc. View of War Committee that there is no reason to alter decision previously reached, in view of survey of available manpower now in progress, is concurred in, and Sir James Calder may therefore be advised accordingly.

(2) United Kingdom authorities have been asked to review their outstanding requests for additional men for Canadian Forestry and Transportation Units, firemen, aerodrome construction crews, etc., to determine the relative urgency of their several requests. On the assumption that when our manpower survey has been completed and their various requests for aid have been vetted, we can then reconsider policy in the light of fuller information than is now available.

(3) General question has been discussed with McNaughton who agrees that foregoing policy is only one possible. He points out that apart from considerations which may determine Canadian manpower policy, limiting factor governing movement of personnel during next few months is likely to be shortage of shipping space which will be taxed to meet troop movements already planned.

MASSEY

939.

902-A-39

*Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516/184

Ottawa, October 9, 1941

My dear Mr. Robertson,

I think that I mentioned at our talk the other day on the subject of my letter to you of the 30th September¹ about the various calls which the United Kingdom have been making on Canadian manpower, that I had just received a further telegram from Sir James Calder on the subject of the Forestry Companies. The substance of that telegram was as follows: that if ten full Companies could be got by the end of the year and ten by next April that would be the best way of meeting the United Kingdom requirements. They

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

are most anxious to have whatever intimation can be given about the prospects of these Companies, or any of them, being forthcoming, as it would be necessary to get the requisite machinery for them and also to get the camps built.

I have been looking back over such papers as I possess on the subject about sawyers, which are mentioned in Section 2(3) of the Memorandum accompanying my letter of the 30th September. You will remember that we were a little at a loss as to the distinction between them and the personnel of the Forestry Companies. I see that in a letter, dated the 12th July, 1941, from Lord Cranborne to Mr. Vincent Massey,¹ there is a passage dealing with these men and I enclose it for facility of reference.

Yours sincerely,

PATRICK DUFF

940.

902-A-39

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain

Ottawa, October 18, 1941

My dear Sir Patrick,

With reference to your letter of October 9th on the subject of Forestry personnel from Canada for the United Kingdom, I am glad to advise you that the Government has authorized the sending forward of 1,000 additional Forestry personnel as soon as these can be recruited and given basic training.

Of these there are:—

Now enlisted and trained	327
In training camps and requiring about two months' training	112
To be recruited and given two months' training	561
TOTAL	1000

It is expected that only a portion of these would be skilled personnel, although endeavour will be made to have as many as possible who are familiar with lumbering operations.

They will be enlisted in the Canadian Forestry Corps and the matter of how they will be organized will be discussed personally by the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of General Staff with Canadian Military Headquarters.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

² Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

HONG-KONG/HONG KONG

941.

2670-A-40

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*¹

*Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*¹

TELEGRAM 162

London, September 19, 1941

MOST SECRET. In consultation with the late General Officer Commanding who has recently arrived in this country, we have been considering defences of Hong Kong. Approved policy has been that Hong Kong should be regarded as an outpost and held as long as possible in the event of war in the Far East. Existing army garrison consists of four battalions of infantry, and although this force represents bare minimum required for depot assigned to it, we have thought hitherto that it would not ultimately serve any useful purpose to increase garrison.

Position in the Far East has now, however, changed. Our defences in Malaya have been improved and there have been signs of a certain weakening in Japanese attitude towards us and the United States. In these circumstances it is thought that a small reinforcement of garrison at Hong Kong, e.g. by one or two more battalions, would be very fully justified. It would increase strength of garrison out of all proportion to actual numbers involved, and it would provide a strong stimulus to garrison and Colony; it would further have a very great moral effect in the whole of the Far East and would reassure Chiang Kai-shek as to reality of our intention to hold the island.

His Majesty's Government in Canada will be well aware of difficulties we are at present experiencing in providing forces which situation in various parts of the world demands, despite very great assistance which is being furnished by the Dominions. We should therefore be most grateful if the Canadian Government would consider whether one or two Canadian battalions could be provided from Canada for this purpose. It is thought that in view of their special position in the north Pacific, Canadian Government would in any case have wish to be informed of need as we see it for reinforcement of Hong Kong and special value of such measure, even though on a very limited scale at the present time. It may also be mentioned that the United States have recently despatched a small reinforcement to the Philippines. It would be of the greatest help if the Canadian Government could co-operate with us in the manner suggested, and we much hope they will feel able to do so.

If the Canadian Government agree in principle to send one or two battalions, we should propose to communicate with you again as to best time for their despatch, having regard to general political situation in the Far East.

¹Ce télégramme fut réacheminé d'Ottawa le 23 septembre 1941, portant le numéro 383, à la légation aux États-Unis avec instructions de le remettre au ministre de la Défense nationale.

¹The text of this telegram was repeated in Ottawa telegram 383 of September 23, 1941 to the Legation in the United States with instructions to communicate it to Minister of National Defence.

942.

2670-A-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 413

Washington, September 27, 1941

MOST SECRET. Assistant Military Attaché has returned from the west coast with a message from Minister of National Defence that he approves in principle proposal of United Kingdom authorities repeated in your telegram No. 383, September 23rd.¹ If the Canadian troops are despatched to Hong Kong Minister of National Defence considers they should be sent from troops now in Canada and not from England.

943.

2670-A-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 199

Ottawa, September 29, 1941

MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 162 of September 19th. Canadian Government agree in principle to send two battalions to strengthen Hong Kong garrison and will be glad to consider proposed arrangements for their despatch.

944.

2670-A-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 171

London, October 1, 1941

MOST SECRET. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are most grateful to His Majesty's Government in Canada for their ready agreement in principle of reinforcement of Hong Kong garrison. Further communications will be sent as soon as possible as regards proposed time and detailed arrangements for despatch.

945.

2670-A-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 176

London, October 9, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My telegram of October 1st, No. 171. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom now feel that in all circumstances it would be most desirable if the two Canadian battalions could be despatched at a very early date and hope that His Majesty's Government in Canada will be prepared to make arrangements accordingly. Details regarding movement are being taken up between War Office and Canadian Military Headquarters in London.

¹Voir la note au document 941.¹See footnote to Document 941.

946.

2670-A-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 177

London, October 10, 1941

SECRET. My telegram No. 176 of October 9th. With regard to question of financial responsibility of these battalions, War Office would be glad to know whether they are correct in thinking that it would be assumed by the Canadian Government on the same basis as it has been assumed for Canadian Corps now in this country.

947.

2670-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 187

London, October 28, 1941

MOST SECRET. My telegram No. 177 of October 10th. It will shortly be necessary to take formal action to regulate relations in the matter of discipline, etc., between Canadian military forces in Hong Kong and other forces of His Majesty. Appropriate procedure would seem to be:

(a) Mutual orders by Army Council under Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, 1933, and by the Governor General of Canada under corresponding Canadian Act, declaring that military forces raised in the United Kingdom and any military forces raised in Canada which are at any time serving in Hong Kong should act and serve together in combination. This would be on lines of action taken as regards Canadian military forces serving on the Continent at any time.

(b) Mutual orders on the above lines by the Governor General of Canada and Governor of Hong Kong relating to Canadian forces and to forces raised in Hong Kong.

(c) An order by the Governor of Hong Kong under Section 1 (5) of United Kingdom Act as applied to Colonies by S.R.O. 1940, No. 1373, on receipt of a request from Canadian authorities.

General Officer Commanding at Hong Kong has telegraphed asking that General Officer Commanding British troops in China be appointed to command the combined forces. If His Majesty's Government in Canada agree, it is assumed that they will be willing to issue a Courtmartial Warrant to the General Officer Commanding British troops in China without further formalities.

We should be grateful if we could be informed as soon as possible whether the Canadian Government concur in the above proposals, and are ready to take action so far as they are concerned.

948.

2670-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 224

Ottawa, October 30, 1941

MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 187, October 28, 1941, concerning Canadian Military Forces in Hong Kong.

2. Appropriate action has been taken by Order in Council including:

(a) Provision that Forces will serve together and that the Forces or parts thereof as detailed by appropriate Canadian service authority will act in combination, and provision for attachment along same lines as Canadian Military Forces now serving in United Kingdom.

(b) Provision for convening of Courts Martial and confirmation of sentences by the Canadian Commander with Warrant to such Commander.

(c) Incidental Orders in Council to deal with claims and like matters.

3. Copies of Orders in Council¹ will be sent by next Air Mail.

4. Canadian Government agrees to appointment of General Officer Commanding British troops in China as Commander of combined forces.

5. Canadian Officer Commanding will be designated as appropriate service authority and will have necessary instructions with a view to detailing the entire Canadian Force to act in combination.

6. Air Mail despatch² will give more complete explanation with regard to this matter.

949.

2670-A-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 191

London, November 7, 1941

MOST SECRET. Your telegram of September 29th, No. 199. We have been considering arrangements for publicity in connection with forthcoming arrival of two Canadian battalions in Hong Kong. Canadian Government will no doubt wish to issue an official *communiqué* announcing this arrival, and for their consideration the following form of words is suggested. Begins.

Units of the Canadian Army have for the first time arrived in Hong Kong and have joined the garrison. The troops are in the best of spirits after their voyage, and have rapidly made themselves at home in their new surroundings.

Ends.

¹Les C.P. 8020, C.P. 8021, C.P. 8022, et C.P. 8023 du 17 octobre 1941.

²Non reproduite.

¹P.C. 8020, P.C. 8021, P.C. 8022, and P.C. 8023 of October 17, 1941.

²Not printed.

2. It has been suggested that such a statement might be released in Ottawa immediately upon receipt from General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, of a "Most Immediate" telegram in plain language consisting of the word "ZEBULUN", addressed to External, Ottawa. General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, would be informed he is to be the sole judge of time at which security considerations would allow of release.

3. General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, would telegraph code word simultaneously to us and we would make arrangements for text of *communiqué* to be issued here 60 minutes after this telegram had reached us. There would thus be a sufficient interval for Canadian authorities to announce arrival before it was announced in London. War Office are anxious that statement should be issued here as well as in Ottawa to mark the occasion.

4. While naturally anxious that due attention should be given this movement of troops, we hope that the publicity will not be on such a scale as to overemphasize the strength of our defences in Hong Kong. They feel that if publicity is confined to fact of arrival, world press could draw their own conclusions as to its meaning. Suggested *communiqué* has been drafted with this in mind.

5. Arrangements for press accounts to be written and photographs to be taken locally are being made through Ministry of Information.

6. We should be grateful for an early reply.

950.

2670-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1734

[Ottawa,] November 7, 1941

MOST SECRET. With reference to Canadian Force known as Force "C" en route Hong Kong, it is proposed to issue following statement to Canadian Press when Force arrives at destination: Begins.

A Canadian Force, under the command of Brigadier J. K. Lawson has arrived at Hong Kong, the Canadian Government announced at Ottawa today.

In making this announcement, it was stated that Hong Kong constituted an outpost which the Commonwealth intended to hold and that in the circumstances it had been considered expedient to reinforce the garrison charged with its defence.

In consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom, the Canadian Government had welcomed the opportunity of assuming this further commitment to its war effort and had been glad to furnish the troops necessary to this end. In view of her special position as a Pacific Power, Canada could not be indifferent

to the question of security in that area and the Government felt that the effect of the action they had taken would not be without value to the cause for which we are fighting, not only in the Far East but in other parts of the world as well.

The Canadian troops will serve under the command of the General Officer Commanding British troops in China. The strength of the Force was not disclosed.

Ends.

Would be grateful for British concurrence in above message. General Officer Commanding British Troops in China has cabled that in order to enable first announcement to be made by Ottawa, he will cable Canadian Government first, and only release news to local press five hours after force's arrival. Force is expected to arrive Hong Kong on or about November 16th. Please make arrangements to insure that this news is released in Ottawa first.

951.

2670-A-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 228

Ottawa, November 11, 1941

MOST SECRET. Hong Kong. In view of your telegram No. 191 of November 7th, suggest that official *communiqué* should now read as follows:

A Canadian Force under the command of Brigadier J. K. Lawson has arrived at Hong Kong, the Canadian Government announced at Ottawa today. The troops are in the best of spirits after their voyage and have rapidly made themselves at home in their new surroundings.

In consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom, the Canadian Government had welcomed the opportunity of assuming this further commitment to its war effort and had been glad to furnish the troops necessary for this purpose. In view of her position as a Pacific Power, Canada has a special interest in the question of security in that area and the Government felt that the effect of the action they had taken would not be without value to the cause for which we are fighting.

The Canadian troops will serve under the command of the General Officer Commanding British troops in China. The strength of the Force was not disclosed.

It is thought that above text takes into consideration points mentioned in paragraph 4 of your telegram.

Arrangements outlined in paragraph 2 and 3 of your telegram satisfactory except that we feel there should be an interval of three hours rather than one hour from the time the telegram is received in London until its announcement there in order to allow for possible difference in time of transmission to Canada and to ensure that first announcement of arrival will be made by Canadian authorities.

Please cable if above text and arrangements satisfactory.

952.

2670-A-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 229

Ottawa, November 12, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Reference our telegram No. 228. On further consideration suggest that following text should be substituted for draft *communiqué* contained in that telegram. Begins.

A Canadian Force under the command of Brigadier J. K. Lawson has arrived at Hong Kong after a safe and uneventful voyage, the Canadian Government announced at Ottawa today. The Canadian troops will serve with the British troops making up the Hong Kong garrison. The strength of the force was not disclosed.
Ends.

953.

2670-A-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 196

London, November 13, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. 1. United Kingdom authorities consider text of proposed official *communiqué* contained in your telegram of November 12th, No. 229, quite appropriate. They would however, suggest substitution of the words "the other units of His Majesty's forces" for the words "the British troops" in the second sentence, as Indian and Colonial troops as well as units from this country form part of garrison. Grateful if you could let us know as soon as possible whether you approve this substitution.

2. Your telegram of November 11th, No. 228. To ensure that *communiqué* is published in London and Hong Kong simultaneously, it would seem best to arrange for release here and in Hong Kong three and a half hours after despatch of code message, rather than three hours after its receipt. We assume that this slight alteration will meet with your approval.¹

954.

2670-A-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1799

[Ottawa,] November 15, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Canadian Press despatch from London noon papers today refers to statement in *Daily Telegraph* concerning expected developments in

¹Le jour suivant, le gouvernement canadien envoya un télégramme approuvant le changement suggéré dans le communiqué.

¹The Canadian Government sent a telegram the following day, approving the proposed change in the *communiqué*.

Canadian participation in Far Eastern defence. Please telegraph at once text of above report in so far as it refers to the Far East. Government would be most disturbed if anything had appeared in London as seems likely, which destroyed the value of the news announcement of the Hong Kong arrival of Canadians. You will appreciate the trouble we have had in this regard in the past, and we had hoped that, on this occasion, it could have been avoided.

955.

2670-A-40

*L'Officier général commandant, Hong-kong, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Hong Kong, November 16, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. ZEBULUN repeat ZEBULUN.

956.

2670-A-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2132

London, November 16, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram of November 15th, No. 1799. Statement in *Daily Telegraph* November 11th was from their special correspondent, Singapore. Statement began:

Reports from Washington today of early concerted plans by Britain and the United States for strengthening their Far Eastern position have caused no surprise here.

2. Reference to Canadian participation in Far Eastern defence was as follows:

I have strongest reasons for stating that Canada has also been consulted recently about Far Eastern position, and is believed to be planning to play her part in defending Hong Kong, Far Eastern base.

The despatch of Canadian troops to certain places would not be entirely unexpected. In the light of this, the recent references to Far East by Mr. Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, and its importance to Canada should be regarded as significant.

MASSEY

957.

2670-A-40

*Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

950H/283

Ottawa, November 28, 1941

My dear Mr. Robertson,

I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, referring to his telegram to the Canadian Government No. 177 of the 10th October last about the question of financial responsibility for the Canadian battalions in Hong Kong.

The United Kingdom authorities do not want to press the Canadian authorities unreasonably on this point, but they say that, now that the troops have arrived in Hong Kong, it is very important from the point of view of administration and accounting arrangements that they should know whether the assumption made in that telegram is correct.

Would you be kind enough to let me know whether the Canadian Government are likely to be in a position in the near future to send a reply to that telegram, or whether you can inform me of their views on the point?

Yours sincerely,

PATRICK DUFF

958.

2670-A-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire adjoint
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

[Ottawa,] December 2, 1941

Dear Sir Patrick,

With reference to your letter of November 28th (950H/283) dealing with the question of financial responsibility for Canadian troops in Hong Kong, I have taken this matter up with the appropriate Canadian authorities and have urged on them the desirability of an early reply.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

ANTILLES¹ / WEST INDIES²

959.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au Secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

London, May 6, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. PERSONAL. Following for the Prime Minister. Begins. Secretary of State for War has informed Mr. Rogers and myself that it is possible the United Kingdom Government may wish to withdraw from Jamaica military force at present on garrison duty in that Colony. They wish to know, should this course be taken, if the Canadian Government would be prepared to send to Jamaica one infantry battalion to replace existing troops. There is certain additional information concerning this proposal which Mr. Rogers will transmit to you personally on his return. In the meantime Secretary of State for War would be very grateful if he could be informed as to Canadian Government's attitude towards such a definite request if made. If it is not thought possible to accede to such a request then War Office must make immediate arrangements for replacement of Jamaican troops should it be decided to move them. Ends.

MASSEY

960.

928-40

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR D.167

London, May 10, 1940

IMPORTANT. MOST SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. Question of the protection of Dutch West Indian Islands of Aruba and Curaçao has been for some time under consideration. These are of great strategical importance on account of large oil refineries dealing in bulk output of Venezuelan oil, the supply of which is of vital importance to our war effort. The security of the refineries might be threatened by (a) sabotage, (b) bombardment raid by armed merchant vessel or submarine, (c) attack by raiding parties from similar craft.

Question was discussed today with Dutch Minister and it was agreed that communication should be made to United States Government by His Majesty's Ambassador and Dutch Minister at Washington to the effect that United

¹ Voir aussi les documents 884, 886, 887, 888, 899, 905, 1000, 1016, 1017, 1029, 1032, 1035, 1038.

² See also Documents 884, 886, 887, 888, 899, 905, 1000, 1016, 1017, 1029, 1032, 1035, 1038.

Kingdom Government have offered and Netherlands Government have accepted a small additional force for security purposes, and that in case the United States Government would feel inclined to cooperate with the United Kingdom and Netherlands Governments in this matter, such cooperation would be most welcome to both Governments.

Arrangements are being made for immediate despatch to Curaçao of troops from Jamaica. Ends.

961.

King Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 48

London, May 10, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My telegram Circular D.167 of today. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. With reference to Canadian High Commissioner's personal message to you of May 6th, the United Kingdom Government would be grateful if they could be informed whether the Canadian Government could move a battalion to Jamaica to replace our battalion which is being despatched thence to Curaçao. If so we should be glad to know what is earliest date by which Canadian battalion could arrive in Jamaica.

Position here is that a battalion could leave this country for Jamaica on May 17th arriving there about May 24th. This move need not take place if the Canadian battalion could reach Jamaica not later than May 24th.

If the Canadian battalion could be sent only after some delay, we should still be very glad of this. In that event our battalion could be despatched on May 12th to remain at Jamaica pending arrival of Canadian battalion.

In the circumstances we should be grateful for a reply as soon as possible. Ends.

962.

King Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 70

Ottawa, May 11, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 48 May 10th. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. As Canadian High Commissioner has advised your Government, we are prepared to send Canadian Rifle Battalion to Jamaica. Battalion is now available and only delay may be caused by shipping arrangements. We expect arrangements can be made so that unit will reach Jamaica by May 24th. Ends.

963.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] May 11, 1940

BRITISH ACTION IN DUTCH WEST INDIAN ISLANDS OF ARUBA AND CURAÇAO

You will recall that I referred yesterday to the possibility of the United States and in fact all the Pan-American countries developing an interest in the question of the future of Dutch Guiana and the Dutch West Indies.

This morning's paper indicates the United States proposes to consult the Pan-American countries on this subject. A suggestion to this effect, as I recall, was first made by one of the Latin American countries, possibly Uruguay, a fortnight ago.

You will note also this morning's Dominions Office telegram Circular D.167 of May 10 indicating that the United Kingdom have recognized the necessity of consulting the United States Government regarding the British forces which are being sent to Curaçao. The attitude of the United States Government on the Dutch East Indies and Greenland questions and the occupation of Iceland by the British forces may all have a bearing on the situation. I should think the United States would recognize the necessity of temporary reinforcement to prevent sabotage, but it is quite possible they will ask for assurances against any permanent occupation, if they do not accept the suggestion of British action.

We have another interest in the matter in that the British forces going to Curaçao are being sent from Jamaica and are being replaced by our battalion.

O. D. S[KELTON]

964.

King Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 50

London, May 13, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram of the 11th May, No. 70. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. We are most grateful for offer of Canadian Government to despatch a battalion for service in the West Indies. We much appreciate this further evidence of Canada's determination to play her full part and gladly accept offer. As regards the last part of your message, the United Kingdom military staff are in touch with Canadian military authorities as to detailed arrangements. Ends.

965.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] May 13, 1940

NETHERLANDS WEST INDIES

Dominions Office telegram D.176 of May 12th¹ contains the following paragraph:

United States Secretary of State has expressed concern lest despatch of Allied troops to Curaçao and Aruba incites Japan to intervene in Netherlands East Indies, thus precipitating United States-Japanese crisis, which would be attributed to our action and arouse resentment against us in the United States of America. He recommends Allied withdrawal as soon as internal situation is secure.

You will recall I anticipated some possible reaction of this kind, though I had hoped Washington would acquiesce. It was fortunate that the United Kingdom authorities advised the United States of their intended movement.

If there is any possibility of the United Kingdom undertaking to withdraw its troops from Curaçao as soon as the internal situation is secure, that may affect the movement of our troops to Jamaica as they were being sent there to replace a battalion that went to Curaçao. Should we raise a question with London on this point?*

The despatch of a battalion to Jamaica presents a further question, namely, the relation of the battalion to the civil and military authorities in Jamaica and the application of the Visiting Forces Act generally. Mr. Read is examining this question. It is not as urgent as the other aspect as it could be dealt with while the battalion was on its way.**

O. D. S[KELTON]

966.

821-B-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 650

Ottawa, June 2, 1940

Reference Visiting Forces Acts Canadian and United Kingdom.

2. Order in Council P.C. 2218 May 28, 1940, has been made under Visiting Forces Act to cover position of Canadian Forces, Bermuda and Jamaica. This action is similar in principle to action taken by P.C. 3391

¹ Non reproduit.

Notes telles que dans l'original:

*Yes, I have advised Council of this matter.

**This statement read to Cabinet in reference to Greenland. W. L. M. K[ing].

¹ Not printed.

Notes as in original:

November 2, 1939¹ and amendments covering position of Canadian Forces in United Kingdom.

3. Summary of operative portion of Order is:

(1) That all Military Forces of Canada present in the West Indies and Bermuda serve together therein with the Military Forces of the United Kingdom and the Military Forces of the said Colonies, present in the West Indies and Bermuda;

(2) That in respect of any Military Forces of Canada serving in the West Indies and Bermuda those parts thereof as may from time to time be detailed for that purpose by the appropriate Canadian Service Authorities as from time to time designated by the Minister of National Defence, shall act in combination with those Forces of the United Kingdom present in the West Indies and Bermuda and those Forces of the said Colonies to which the same have been so detailed.

(3) . . . to authorize and doth hereby authorize the appropriate Canadian Service Authorities to take such action as may be necessary to effect the attachment of members of the Military Forces of the United Kingdom and of the said Colonial possession to the Military Forces of Canada, and vice versa.

4. Bermuda Forces will be detailed to act in combination at all stages.

5. It will be necessary for appropriate authorities to take such action as may be necessary to give effect to these arrangements. Special reference should be made to Section 5 of United Kingdom Act and to action taken by Army Council and other United Kingdom authorities, following upon P.C. 3391. It is not clear whether action in this case should be taken in London or in Bermuda and Jamaica, but you should see that the needful action is taken in London or, in the alternative that instructions are given to Bermuda and Jamaica for action to be taken by local authorities.

6. Please send copies of any Orders in Council that have been made, or any action taken under Section 5 of United Kingdom Act and also copies of any Orders or other action taken pursuant to this request.

967.

928-40

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, June 17, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to explain to you most confidentially that great importance is attached to preventing Aruba, Dutch possession north of Vene-

¹ Document 840.

zuela, at all costs from falling into the enemy's hands on account of the very valuable properties of oil resources of the island to which is largely due the superior performance of British aircraft.

It would be of greatest assistance if the Canadian Government, should it prove necessary, would undertake to relieve the French troops now in Aruba. The position as to the French garrison in that island is at the moment obscure, but it would be greatly appreciated if the Canadian Government could at once hold in readiness a force of one battalion and four field or light guns. This is thought to be a suitable garrison for the purpose. Lord Caldecote will telegraph further as soon as the position is clarified.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

968.

928-40

Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commission of Great Britain to Prime Minister

975E/31

Ottawa, June 20, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

My dear Prime Minister,

With reference to the High Commissioner's most secret letter of the 17th June about Aruba, the further telegram promised by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs has now been received.

Lord Caldecote states that the danger envisaged in the first paragraph of Sir Gerald Campbell's letter might arise at very short notice. In that event, the United Kingdom authorities might have to ask the Canadian authorities to despatch to Aruba the battalion of Winnipeg Grenadiers now in Jamaica, less a small rear party to be left in the latter island. Such a request for immediate action might have to be made whether or not the Canadian Government felt able to accept the responsibility for the security of Aruba for the duration of hostilities, though the United Kingdom Government naturally hope that they will do so.

Lord Caldecote states that if Aruba has to be protected by moving the Winnipeg Grenadiers from Jamaica and if the Canadian Government accept responsibility for the protection of that island during the war, the United Kingdom authorities would hope that another Canadian battalion might be sent for the defence of Jamaica.

The High Commissioner is informed that the officer commanding the garrison at Jamaica has been instructed to go by air to Aruba to make contact with the French authority there.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

969.

928-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain

SECRET

Ottawa, June 22, 1940

My dear Sir Gerald,

I desire to acknowledge your letter of June 17th and Mr. Hankinson's of June 20th, regarding Aruba. The question is under consideration by our Defence authorities.

I should be glad if you could advise the nature of the danger against which protection is suggested, also whether there has been any discussion of the situation with the United States, which has recently indicated an increasing measure of interest in the orphaned island colonies of European powers in the Caribbean.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

970.

928-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain

SECRET

Ottawa, June 25, 1940

My dear Sir Gerald,

With further reference to my letter of June 22nd, on the subject of Aruba, I should be glad if in addition to the points on which information was asked, you could inform me whether any report has been received from the Officer Commanding the garrison at Jamaica, who was instructed to go by air to Aruba, as to the attitude and reliability of the French garrison there.

Yours sincerely,

[O. D. SKELTON]

971.

928-40

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

975E/31

Ottawa, June 26, 1940

MOST SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

On receipt of your letter of the 22nd June about Aruba, I immediately sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking for the

information which you desired and I sent a further telegram on receipt of your letter of yesterday.

I have now received the following reply to my first telegram. Lord Caldecote states that as regards the nature of the danger apprehended at Aruba, the United Kingdom Government are primarily concerned at the possibility of sabotage of the oilfields and secondarily only of a sea borne raid from the Venezuela mainland. A raid by enemy ships cannot, however, be entirely discounted.

There has been no communication on the subject with the United States Government since that made to them by His Majesty's Ambassador and the Dutch Minister at Washington as indicated in the telegram to the Canadian Government of May 10th Circular D.167 (see also paragraph 7 of telegrams to the Canadian Government of the 12th and 14th May Circular D.176 and 181¹). The United Kingdom Government would, however, inform the United States Government if and when it became necessary to take action with regard to the garrison at Aruba and they would also obtain consent of the Netherlands Government.

An officer from the United Kingdom forces at Curaçao visited Aruba on June 21st and reported that the French naval and military commanders both received him cordially, were glad to see a British officer and displayed anxiety to continue the war. It is thought that the Officer Commanding the French troops there is likely to take his orders from the Officer Commanding Martinique. (It is hoped that some indication of French morale at Martinique will become available as the result of the impending visit of H.M.S. *Dunedin* to that Island).

The United Kingdom authorities appreciate that the Canadian authorities would be reluctant to send further troops from Canada to the Caribbean area. I have, however, been asked to represent at once the great importance which is attached to the Aruba position and the suddenness with which a dangerous situation there might develop. In these circumstances the United Kingdom Government hope that the Canadian Government will be prepared to agree that if the necessity arises they may without further reference to the Canadian Government send Canadian troops from Jamaica, either to Aruba to take charge there, or to Curaçao in relief of the United Kingdom garrison, if the situation were so urgent as to make it necessary for them to relieve the French garrison in Aruba from the United Kingdom garrison in Curaçao. The possibilities of the situation at Aruba are causing the United Kingdom authorities considerable anxiety and they would therefore be grateful if they could receive the Canadian Government's agreement to this course within the next day or two.

I will let you know immediately I receive a reply to the enquiry in your letter of yesterday.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

¹ Non reproduits.

¹ Not printed.

972.

928-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, June 27, 1940

My dear Sir Gerald,

I wish to acknowledge your letter of June 26 (975E-31) regarding Aruba.

The Canadian Government have considered the proposal and are prepared to agree to the Winnipeg Grenadiers now in the West Indies being sent to Aruba if the necessity arises.

It is noted that the French naval and military authorities now in Aruba have indicated a friendly attitude, but that further developments will likely depend on the attitude of the Officer Commanding Martinique. I should be obliged if we could be advised as soon as definite information is available on this point.

It is also noted that the United Kingdom authorities propose to obtain the consent of the Netherlands Government. The Canadian Government will discuss some phases of the question with the Government of the United States.

As regards a second Canadian battalion for service in the West Indies, I may add that if it were found possible to furnish such a battalion, it would not be available for service until about mid-September, 1940.

As the number of field guns presently available in Canada are all required for home defence and training, it is regretted that it would not be possible to despatch any field guns to Aruba.

The Minister of National Defence has had a telegram despatched to the Commander-in-Chief Jamaica, requesting information as to whether there is any artillery equipment and ammunition at present at Aruba which could be made available for use by a Canadian artillery unit.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

973.

928-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires
in United States*

TELEGRAM 125

Ottawa, June 27, 1940

URGENT. United Kingdom authorities have advised us they are apprehensive of damage, particularly from sabotage, to oil fields in Aruba, Dutch Island

near Curaçao, from which oil is derived, to which is largely due the superior performance of British aircraft. The Island is at present garrisoned by French troops. If they should not be willing to continue to cooperate, United Kingdom wish us to undertake to send Canadian battalion now in Jamaica. Consent of Netherlands Government would of course be obtained. We have no desire to increase our commitments in Caribbean, particularly in view of urgency of needs more within our ordinary sphere of interest. In view of emergency we propose, however, to inform United Kingdom that we are prepared to make a battalion available if necessary. I should like you to advise Secretary of State confidentially of the situation. I may add for your information that in response to inquiry whether United Kingdom authorities had taken the matter up with the United States, they replied that they propose to inform them if and when it became necessary to take action.

974.

928-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975E/31

Ottawa, June 28, 1940

IMPORTANT. MOST SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to my letter of the 26th June (975E/31) about Aruba, I have now received a further telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

Lord Caldecote states that a Royal Naval Intelligence Officer is stationed at Aruba and will keep the Officer commanding the British force in Curaçao informed of the situation regarding the French garrison.

Lord Caldecote refers to the visit paid to Aruba by the Officer from the United Kingdom forces at Curaçao (see paragraph 4 of my letter of the 26th June), and says that the Captain of H.M.S. *Dunedin* states that the attitude of the French Admiral at Martinique is weakening. The latter is still awaiting orders from the Bordeaux Government, particularly from Admiral Darlan, and in this connection Lord Caldecote refers to his message which was incorporated in Mr. Hankinson's letter of the 27th June (950E/95) regarding the *Emile Bertin*.¹

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

975.

928-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975E/31

Ottawa, June 29, 1940

MOST SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

Thank you for your letter of the 27th June about Aruba. I am passing on the substance to the authorities in London by telegram. I am sure that the United Kingdom Government will be very glad to hear that the Canadian Government are prepared to agree to the Winnipeg Grenadiers now in the West Indies being sent to Aruba if the necessity arises.

With regard to the third paragraph of your letter, I would invite reference to the letter which I sent you yesterday. This contains all the information which has so far reached me on this point and I am quite sure that the United Kingdom Government are fully aware of the interest of the Canadian Government in this matter and will telegraph further when there is anything to report.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

976.

928-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, June 29, 1940

My dear Sir Gerald,

I am much obliged for your letter of June 29th (975E/31), regarding Aruba.

In my letter of June 27th I perhaps should have made it more explicit that the Canadian Government would be reluctant to concur in the suggestion that without further reference to the Canadian Government the United Kingdom authorities might, if they considered the necessity arose, send Canadian troops from Jamaica either to Aruba or to Curaçao. It is hoped that it will be possible to inform the Canadian Government of any change in the situation so that a decision could be reached here as to despatching the troops.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

977.

928-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 143

Washington, June 29, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Reference your telegram No. 125 of June 27th, Aruba. Left yesterday confidential aide-mémoire at the State Department. Hickerson regrets it will probably be impossible to secure the Secretary of State's comments till Monday. Hickerson believes only oral comments will be made and that they will not interfere in any way with what Canada is proposing to do. After Canada has taken action Secretary of State will probably send me a note acknowledging aide-mémoire and reserving all rights of the United States. Hickerson added that obviously the United States would prefer to have Canadian troops in Aruba instead of French troops.

978.

928-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975E/31

Ottawa, July 2, 1940

MOST SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

With further reference to your letter of the 27th June about Aruba I have now received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to convey to the Canadian Government the warm appreciation of the United Kingdom Government of their willingness to allow the Winnipeg Grenadiers to be sent to Aruba if necessity arises.

Lord Caldecote states that the Captain of H.M.S. *Dunedin* at Martinique reports that, in his opinion, the French Admiral intends to carry out the Armistice terms but that the position is obscure and it is thought that there is still some chance of French ships scuttling if orders to return to European waters are received. It is, however, doubtful if facilities will continue to be afforded to His Majesty's ships in French ports in the West Indies.

The Officer Commanding the British troops at Curaçao has reported that the attitude of the French troops at Aruba is unchanged. The Second in Command of the French troops has stated that if demobilised he would go to French Canada to offer his services. There is so far no indication of French troops leaving Aruba.

I take this opportunity [of?] thanking you for your letter of the 29th June, the contents of which I have communicated by telegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

979.

928-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975E/31

Ottawa, July 3, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

With further reference to your letter of the 29th June about Aruba, I have just received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to let you know that the position is that the United Kingdom authorities have now received definite information from local sources that the French garrison in Aruba is being withdrawn. Lord Caldecote states that the Officer commanding troops in Jamaica leaves for Curaçao on the 5th July to consider the situation on the spot, and in particular to consider whether the United Kingdom battalion in that island could undertake protection of Aruba as well. It is not thought that the safety of Aruba can be left to the Dutch themselves.

As need for safeguarding the position at Aruba may arise very suddenly, the United Kingdom authorities would be very grateful if the Canadian Government could agree to send instructions to the Commanding Officer of the Canadian troops at Jamaica to be ready to despatch two Companies to Aruba immediately, and without further reference to them (the Canadian Government), if requested to do so by the Officer commanding troops in Jamaica should the Army Council decide, on receiving his report, that this course is essential.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

980.

928-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

IMMEDIATE AND MOST SECRET

Ottawa, July 5, 1940

My dear Sir Gerald,

I wish to acknowledge your letter of July 3rd, regarding Aruba (975E-31).

I note that the Officer Commanding troops in Jamaica leaves for Curaçao today to consider the situation on the spot, and in particular whether the United Kingdom battalion in Curaçao could undertake the protection of Aruba as well.

Consideration has been given to your enquiry whether the Canadian Government would agree to send instructions to the Commanding Officer of the Canadian Forces in Jamaica to be ready to despatch two companies of troops to Aruba immediately and without further reference to Ottawa, if requested to do so by the Officer Commanding troops in Jamaica in the event of the Army Council deciding on receiving the report from Curaçao, that this course was essential.

The suggested course is quite acceptable and the Acting Minister of National Defence has sent instructions to this effect to the Commanding Officer of the Canadian troops in Jamaica.

I previously advised you that we were taking up the matter with the United States, in view of the interest which the Government of the United States has taken in many different angles of the question of occupation of islands belonging to European powers, particularly in the Caribbean area. Our communication was received sympathetically. We are informed that the reply of the State Department will be to the effect that the United States Government has taken note of the information supplied by the Canadian Government, and is reserving until a later date its comment on how any action of Canada in this respect would be interpreted in the light of certain well-known policies of the United States itself.

I have no doubt you will advise immediately of any further developments in the situation.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

981.

928-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 152

Washington, July 6, 1940

IMMEDIATE. CONFIDENTIAL. My telegram No. 143 of June 29th, Aruba. Received today State Department's aide-mémoire of July 6th, taking note of proposed military dispositions, but reserving comments of United States Government on their bearing upon certain views and policies of United States Government which are long-standing, and well-known.

982.

928-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 1373

Washington, July 6, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 152 of July 6, in which I summarized the Aide-Mémoire which was given to me at noon today by Mr. Hickerson of the Department of State.

2. I enclose a copy of the Aide-Mémoire.

3. Mr. Hickerson in giving me the Aide-Mémoire stated that it had been drafted before the break between the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, but that this break had not necessitated any changes in the Aide-Mémoire.

4. Mr. Hickerson said that it was obviously unnecessary for him to define the meaning of the reference to the "certain long-standing and well-known views and policies" of the United States Government. I said that I assumed that a reference was being made to the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Hickerson agreed.

5. He said that clearly the United States did not like what was happening in the Dutch West Indies. If, however, the Canadian Government felt that the action which was contemplated was necessary, the Government of the United States did not want to stop them from taking that action.

6. In a previous conversation, Mr. Hickerson had said that Aide-Mémoires similar to that which has just been given me would be sent to the French and British Embassies at Washington, who have not yet received from the State Department any formal comments on the action which they took some time ago in sending armed forces to the Dutch Islands.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le Département d'État à la légation aux États-Unis
Department of State to Legation in United States*

Washington, July 6, 1940

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In an aide-mémoire dated June 28, 1940 the Canadian Legation informed the Department of State that in response to the expressed wishes of the authorities of the United Kingdom the Canadian Government proposed to

inform the United Kingdom that, subject to the consent of the Netherlands Government, Canada was prepared to make troops available, if necessary, for the purpose of insuring the safety of oil properties in Aruba.

Note has been taken of the proposed military dispositions, but for the time being the Government of the United States reserves its comments on the bearing which such dispositions have upon certain long-standing and well-known views and policies of the United States Government.

983.

928-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975E/31

Ottawa, July 8, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

Thank you for your letter of the 5th July about Aruba. I am communicating the substance of this immediately by telegram to the authorities in London.

In the meantime, I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that owing to the unavoidable diversion of the naval vessel by which the Officer Commanding Troops in Jamaica had been proceeding to Curaçao, he cannot report on the situation for some days, but to meet what are considered to be the immediate requirements, one company from the British Battalion at Curaçao is to be sent to Aruba as a temporary measure as soon as it is known that the French have left. I am informed that the Dutch Government have instructed the local authorities to welcome British military aid in Aruba.

Lord Caldecote adds that the Officer Commanding the Battalion in Curaçao will himself proceed to Aruba and report as soon as possible what force he considers necessary for its security.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

984.

928-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975E/31

Ottawa, July 12, 1940

MOST SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

With further reference to your letter of the 5th July, I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to

inform you that the United Kingdom Government are most grateful to the Canadian Government for agreeing that Canadian troops may, if necessary, be sent from Jamaica to Aruba.

Lord Caldecote adds that one company of a United Kingdom battalion at Curaçao has now reached Aruba and that a report on the scale of the defensive arrangements finally required there is awaited from the Brigadier commanding the troops in Jamaica, who was due to proceed to Aruba yesterday, July 11th.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

985.

928-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

957E/31

Ottawa, July 13, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to my letter of the 12th July (975E/31), I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to let you know that the question of the reinforcement of Aruba has been discussed by His Majesty's Ambassador with the United States Secretary of State, who expressed the hope that the British troops to be landed there would not exceed the numbers of the French troops who have left. The Ambassador has been asked to assure the Secretary of State that in any case the number of British troops, whether from the United Kingdom or Canada, will be less than the number of French troops, and also to explain to the Secretary of State that the redistribution of the forces necessitated by the withdrawal of the French, was being effected in full agreement with the Dutch Government, and the willing co-operation of the local authorities, and His Majesty's Ambassador is also to point out, if necessary, that the United States Government themselves declined to co-operate with the Dutch and United Kingdom Governments in ensuring the protection of these islands.

Mr. Cordell Hull also mentioned that if it were possible to send Canadian troops rather than United Kingdom troops to Aruba, it would make the position a good deal easier from the point of view of the United States. He is being informed that if any reinforcements in addition to the Company from the United Kingdom battalion at Curaçao are required, they will be drawn from the Canadian battalion at Jamaica. The report of the Brigadier to which I referred in my letter of the 12th July is, however, still awaited.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

986.

928-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975E/31

Ottawa, August 7, 1940

SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to my letter of the 13th July (975E/31) and connected correspondence regarding Aruba, I have now received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to inform the Canadian Government that the Brigadier Commanding the troops in Jamaica has recommended that the British Forces in the West Indies should be as follows:

Jamaica	three companies
Curaçao	four companies
Aruba	three companies

The retention of one company in Bermuda is also considered necessary. The Army Council agree with these recommendations.

In view of the opinion expressed by the United States Secretary of State as mentioned in my letter of July 13th, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel that the best course is that three companies of the Canadian troops now in Jamaica should be sent to Aruba. The United Kingdom Government therefore propose that in accordance with the arrangement recorded in your letter of July 5th, the Winnipeg Grenadiers in Jamaica should be moved to Aruba as soon as reinforcements from the United Kingdom can replace them in Jamaica. It is not expected that this relief can be effected before the end of the present month, and there will therefore be time for the Canadian Government themselves to issue general instructions to the Officer Commanding the Canadian troops at Jamaica.

I should be glad if you would be good enough to let me know as soon as possible whether the Canadian Government are issuing general instructions to the Officer Commanding the Winnipeg Grenadiers so that I may inform the Lieutenant General commanding the troops in Jamaica.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

987.

928-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 10, 1940

My dear Sir Gerald,

With reference to your letter of the 7th August and connected correspondence regarding Aruba, consideration has been given to the proposal of the United Kingdom Government that headquarters and three companies of The Winnipeg Grenadiers should be moved from Jamaica to Aruba to take over garrison duty there from the company of The King's Shropshire Light Infantry.

While considerable importance may be attached to the expressed opinion of the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Cordell Hull, who has indicated that it would be desirable to have Canadian, rather than United Kingdom, troops at Aruba, much of the significance of this argument would appear to be lost when it is remembered that the Island of Curaçao, which is also Dutch, is now occupied by United Kingdom troops (Headquarters and three companies, K.S.L.I.), and it is intended to add another company to the garrison there.

Whether or not The Winnipeg Grenadiers are properly organized to undertake this duty is also a matter for consideration. You will recall that when the French troops withdrew from Aruba it was proposed to send two companies of the Winnipeg Grenadiers and this proposal was agreed to by the Canadian Government. However, as a result of investigation carried out by him, the General Officer Commanding the Troops in Jamaica advised against this action and recommended the despatch of one company of The King's Shropshire Light Infantry from Curaçao instead.

From information available here, it would appear that the reason for this recommendation was the fact that The Winnipeg Grenadiers, being organized as an overseas garrison battalion, had an insufficient number of light machine guns and other equipment for the task. The three companies of Winnipeg Grenadiers now at Jamaica have fire-power equal to just one company of an infantry battalion on normal establishment, whereas the General Officer Commanding the Troops in Jamaica has indicated that three companies on the normal establishment are required. Considerable re-organization involving sending down both additional personnel and equipment of The Winnipeg Grenadiers would seem to be essential if they were to carry out the task successfully. As the time available is very short it is very doubtful if this re-organization could be carried out satisfactorily before the relief took place.

The move to Aruba would also increase the administrative difficulties that now exist due to the presence of a detached company at Bermuda. It would be much preferable from this point of view for the Canadian Government to have the battalion concentrated at one place.

The Canadian Government requests therefore, that consideration be given to the alternative of concentrating The Winnipeg Grenadiers at Jamaica and of finding the necessary company at Bermuda and the three companies for Aruba from available United Kingdom battalions. I should be obliged if we could be advised of the views of the United Kingdom authorities on these points so that a decision may be given. It is to be regretted that the time available for consideration of the matter is so very short.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

988.

928-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

Ottawa, August 18, 1940

My dear Dr. Skelton,

May I refer to your letter of the 10th August regarding Aruba. I immediately communicated by telegraph to the authorities in London the views of the Canadian Government as set out in your letter.

I have now received a reply stating that the danger of sabotage or of a landing at Aruba has not diminished and the United Kingdom authorities feel that they cannot continue to accept the risk at present involved by the inadequate force now at Aruba. As you are aware the United States Government have consistently deprecated the garrisoning of the Dutch island in question by United Kingdom troops only and it was for this reason that the United Kingdom authorities are embarrassed by the Canadian Government's reluctance to agree to the transfer of the Winnipeg Grenadiers from Jamaica to Aruba, since that course which [sic] would have been in accordance with the United States Government's own suggestion. I duly reported the military reasons which you developed against the despatch of the Winnipeg Grenadiers to Aruba but the United Kingdom authorities have evidently been acting on the information given them by the Officer Commanding the British troops in Jamaica to the effect that the Canadian troops in question would be an adequate garrison for Aruba.

In all the circumstances the United Kingdom Government very much hope that the Canadian Government will be prepared to withdraw their objections and to adhere to the plan to which they originally agreed. If, however, the Canadian Government feel that it would be impossible for them to adopt this course, the United Kingdom authorities would suggest that the most appropriate course would be for the Canadian Government themselves to inform the United States Government of the position which has arisen in such a way as to facilitate the only alternative viz. the reinforcement of the United Kingdom garrison at Aruba by further United Kingdom troops.

If the Canadian Government are prepared to discuss the matter with the United States Government on these lines, you should know, in case the United States authorities suggest that further Dutch troops should be sent to the Dutch West Indies, that the solution had already been considered in the United Kingdom but that no adequately trained Dutch troops were found to be available.

You will appreciate that the matter is of the greatest urgency especially as the United Kingdom troops destined for Jamaica are already on their way.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

989.

928-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

TELEGRAM 172

Ottawa, August 19, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Aruba. United Kingdom authorities have asked us to send Winnipeg Grenadiers from Jamaica to Aruba on the ground the United States would prefer Canadian troops there rather than United Kingdom troops. We consider both [*sic*] from point of view of immediate protective measures in Aruba that it is preferable United Kingdom which is garrisoning Curaçao should also garrison Aruba and that Canadian troops be all concentrated at Jamaica. Winnipeg Grenadiers are organized as an overseas garrison battalion and have no signal platoon or mortars and are very limited in light machine guns and transport which would take time to provide. There would also be difficulties in administration with Headquarters and three companies at Aruba and the fourth Company elsewhere. It is hoped, therefore, United States will put us in a position to assure the United Kingdom that under circumstances they have no objection to the Aruban duty being taken on by United Kingdom troops.

990.

928-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 1738

Washington, August 21, 1940

SECRET

Sir,

With reference to your cypher telegram No. 172 of August 19, 1940, and in confirmation of a telephone conversation with Dr. Skelton of the same date, I have the honour to inform you that the question of garrisoning Aruba was discussed at the Department of State on August 19th.

2. Mr. Macdonnell saw Mr. Hickerson, and outlined to him some of the difficulties in the way of sending Canadian troops to Aruba. Mr. Hickerson said that he felt that he could answer this enquiry without referring it to a higher authority. If the Department of State were in a position to pick and choose, they would prefer to have Canadian troops in Aruba, rather than United Kingdom troops. However, they realize that they are not in a position to pick and choose, and if it is felt necessary to send United Kingdom troops to Aruba, the Department could raise no serious objection.

3. They appeared to take it for granted, however, that they would be notified by the British Ambassador before the despatch of troops.

4. Later in the day, I passed the substance of this conversation on to the British Embassy.

I have etc.

LORING C. CHRISTIE

991.

928-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

SECRET

Washington, August 21, 1940

Dear Dr. Skelton,

I have your letter of August 19th,¹ with copies of communications on the subject of Aruba.

Your telegram of August 19th has been dealt with and a despatch has gone forward confirming what Mr. Macdonnell told you that day by telephone.

I think the State Department were a little disappointed, even though they realized the practical difficulties. I wonder if it would be possible as times goes on to work out some rearrangement so that all the garrisoning of

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

the islands on this side could be carried out by Canadians. This I suppose would not be too easy from the practical point of view, but I feel sure it would have many advantages from the political point of view.

Yours sincerely,

LORING C. CHRISTIE

992.

928-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre
aux États-Unis*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister
in United States*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 26, 1940

Dear Mr. Christie,

I have your letter of August 21st regarding Aruba.

The United Kingdom authorities have now undertaken to furnish the troops required for Aruba and will notify the United States authorities.

The attitude of the State Department has been very understanding. I think your suggestion as to working out some rearrangement so that all the garrisoning of the islands on this side could be carried out by Canadians is very well worth examination. When additional troops are trained and equipment increased, as will be the case in a few months, it might be technically possible to take this action. We will know better then what the political factors in the situation will be.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

PARTIE 2/PART 2

COOPÉRATION NAVALE/NAVAL CO-OPERATION

993.

1177-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, September 15, 1939

My dear Sir Gerald,

With reference to your letter of September 6th and the memorandum enclosed therein,¹ regarding defence co-operation with the United Kingdom, I am instructed to inform you that the Canadian Government have approved

¹Volume 6, Document 1073.

of action being taken on all the fourteen naval matters on which it was indicated that co-operation would be helpful. I enclose a memorandum setting forth in detail the action taken in each case.

I may say further that the need for securing asdics, guns and munitions from the United Kingdom as set forth in the Memorandum I enclose, is urgent.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Mémoire sur la coopération navale
Memorandum on Naval Co-operation

SECRET

[Ottawa,] September 15, 1939

1. Six destroyers to be placed under Admiralty orders.

Answer—Now awaiting passing of Report to Council to authorize H.M.C. Destroyers "to work in close co-operation".

2. Fitting of *Saguenay*, *Skeena* and 14 minesweepers with Asdics.

Answer—*Saguenay* fitted. *Skeena* will be fitted as soon as practical to spare her to lay up for eight weeks. Only five asdics in Canada other than those now fitted.

3. Anti-submarine booms Halifax and Esquimalt.

Answer—Now being placed at Esquimalt. Contract let for Halifax, completion date 1st November. Both harbours available for H.M. Ships.

4. 14 minesweeping vessels to be taken up for Sydney and St. John's, Newfoundland.

Answer—Vessels being taken up as rapidly as possible. No asdics presently available.

5. Provision of 30 thousands tons oil fuel Halifax.

Answer—Imperial Oil has informed us that they will complete to full capacity as soon as possible.

6. Small craft for anti-submarine and minesweeping duties in West Indies.

Answer—As for 4 above.

7. Provision of aircraft for seaward reconnaissance, Halifax.

Answer—R.C.A.F. now carrying out this reconnaissance.

8. Fleet air arm facilities, Esquimalt.

Answer—R.C.A.F. dealing with this. Accommodation for personnel available at both Esquimalt and Halifax.

9. Fitting *Letitia* as armed merchant cruiser.

Answer—Now underway at Vickers, Montreal, presumably at Admiralty expense.

Rajputana and *Monowai* will be undertaken as soon as they arrive Esquimalt. Esquimalt warned.

10. Canadian Government to proceed with arming of Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships.

Answer—Being done as ships arrive to the limit of guns now available in Canada. Additional guns will be required from United Kingdom. Guns' crews will be provided by Canadian Reserve Forces.

11. Two trained Officers will be sent Halifax to assist in handling of the Convoys.

Answer—Officers are now on way from England. Officer personnel available in Canada for all large Canadian ports.

12. Naval Reserve surplus to Canadian requirements to be made available for Royal Navy.

Answer—This will be recommended. Will mean additional recruiting all reserve divisions.

13. Recruitment from civilian life technicians, etc. for Royal Naval Volunteer commissions.

Answer—To be shortly commenced.

14. Examination of building vessels *Black Swans*, etc. in Canada.

Answer—Vessels up to and including Whaler catchers can be built in Canada. No armament available in Canada; will have to be provided by United Kingdom. For *Black Swan* or bigger overseers and naval constructors must be borrowed from United Kingdom.

994.

1177-39

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516/81

Ottawa, October 30, 1939

SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

In the memorandum enclosed in your letter of the 15th September you were good enough to inform the High Commissioner that the Royal Canadian Air Force were dealing with the Admiralty's requirements in connection with aerodrome facilities and accommodation for personnel, etc. at Esquimalt and Halifax, details of which were given in the memorandum enclosed in Sir Gerald Campbell's letter of the 6th September.

The High Commissioner has now been informed that the Admiralty would be grateful if paragraph 8 of the memorandum enclosed in the High Commissioner's letter could be regarded as cancelled in so far as it relates to Halifax, and if the amended list of requirements given in the memorandum which I now enclose could be substituted for that paragraph.

Sir Gerald Campbell has been asked to ascertain whether the Canadian authorities would be prepared to provide the facilities now desired. In this connection he has been instructed to state that the Admiralty do not wish to suggest that the Canadian Government should consider the erection of new buildings, but that they would be glad to learn whether the accommodation, etc. required could be provided in the existing buildings and if so whether the Canadian Government would be willing to set aside such buildings for the use of the Fleet Air Arm as required.

Sir Gerald Campbell would be grateful if he could be informed of the Canadian Government's views on this matter for communication to the United Kingdom authorities at a very early date.

As regards Esquimalt, Sir Gerald understands that the facilities mentioned in the memorandum of the 6th September are still required but that in view of the present position in the Pacific they are regarded as being of less urgency.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Mémorandum

Memorandum

[Ottawa, October 30, 1939]

1. Accommodation for one torpedo spotter reconnaissance squadron (24 Officers, 3 C.P.O.s, 9 Petty Officers and 79 men), maintenance H.Q. Flight (1 Officer, 1 Chief Petty Officer, 8 Petty Officers and 35 men) and administrative H.Q. (1 Officer, 2 Chief Petty Officers, 4 Petty Officers and 33 men), accommodation to be complete with contingent messing, latrines and bath-house accommodation.

2. (a) Two hangars of dimensions not less than Fleet Air Arm Bellman Hangars 187 feet by 13 feet with doors 20 feet in height.

(b) 1 building or hut for engine repair shop approximate size 60 feet \times 40 feet.

(c) 1 building or hut for stores approximate size 60 \times 40 feet.

(d) 1 building or hut for officers approximate size 60 feet \times 20 feet.

(e) Accommodation approximately 6,000 gallons petrol.

(f) Accommodation for oil.

Hard floors of concrete or other materials are required for (a), (b) and (c).

3. The above facilities to be provided if possible at Royal Canadian Air Force Aerodrome at Dartmouth, since Halifax Municipal Aerodrome does not meet operational needs.

995.

1177-39

Décret du Conseil
Order in Council

P.C. 3732

November 17, 1939

His Excellency the Governor General in Council on the recommendation of the Minister of National Defence and under and by virtue of the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 Revised Statutes of Canada 1927, and notwithstanding the provisions of any other Act or Regulations, is pleased to order and it is hereby ordered that all Canadian Naval Establishments and all H.M.C. Ships now in commission or to be commissioned, together with the officers and seamen serving therein, shall during the present war co-operate to the fullest extent with the Royal Navy, and with all other Naval Forces of His Majesty.

His Excellency in Council, on the same recommendation, is further pleased to cancel Order in Council of the 14th September, 1939, (P.C. 2638) and it is hereby cancelled accordingly.

996.

1177-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, November 24, 1939

Dear Sir Gerald,

I referred your letter, dated the 30th October, 1939, in which you transmitted a revision of paragraph eight of the Memorandum enclosed in your letter of the 6th September,¹ relating to aerodrome facilities and accommodation at Esquimalt and Halifax to the Department of National Defence for consideration. I have now received a reply from the Acting Deputy Minister.

The Royal Canadian Air Force will be glad to co-operate with the United Kingdom authorities to the extent of setting aside ground at the R.C.A.F. Station, Dartmouth, for the construction of the accommodation requested, on the assumption that these aircraft are intended as a reserve for shipborne aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm. You will, of course, understand that all coast defence, coast artillery co-operation and convoy control duties are being undertaken by squadrons of the R.C.A.F.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

¹ Volume 6, Document 1073.

997.

1177-39

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516M/59

Ottawa, November 25, 1939.

SECRET AND IMPORTANT

Dear Dr. Skelton,

The High Commissioner has been informed, in a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, that as the result of the loss of H.M.S. *Royal Oak* at Scapa Flow the Admiralty have had under consideration the means of providing a greater degree of security against the penetration of harbour defences by submarines.

It appears that, while the first lesson to be learned is the necessity for keeping boom gates open for as short periods as possible and for providing adequate surface patrol vessels to prevent the entry of submarines on the surface, there is still the possibility of a submarine either passing submerged through the gate while it is open or, where conditions are favourable, of creeping beneath anti-submarine nets.

The Admiralty have, therefore, decided that, so far as practicable, the defences of all harbours with net booms shall be augmented by the addition of a controlled minefield.

The High Commissioner has been instructed to say in this connection that the Admiralty would be grateful if the Canadian Government would consider, as a matter of urgency, the provision of a controlled minefield at Halifax, in the position considered most suitable by the Canadian naval authorities. He understands that it would not be possible for the necessary equipment to be supplied from the United Kingdom for at least a year: if, therefore, the Canadian Government decided to provide the minefield in question, it might be possible to consider manufacturing this equipment in Canada.

Sir Gerald Campbell would be grateful if the foregoing matters could be considered urgently by the appropriate authorities, and would ask to be informed of their views at the earliest possible date.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

998.

1177-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, December 2, 1939

Dear Sir Gerald,

I referred the questions raised by your letter of the 25th November, 1939, concerning additional anti-submarine defences at Halifax, to the Department of National Defence.

The Canadian Naval Service is prepared to investigate the matter fully and to submit proposals to the Government for the provision and installation of a controlled minefield in Halifax Harbour; but, in view of the fact that at present no up to date information concerning this type of harbour defence is available in Canada, it will be necessary to obtain from the Admiralty detailed information and advice.

I should be obliged, therefore, if you would request the Admiralty to furnish the Canadian Naval Service with advice and information regarding the latest type of controlled minefield, suitable for the purpose in view.

Yours sincerely,

[O. D. SKELTON]

999.

1177-39

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516M/62

Ottawa, December 23, 1939

SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to your letter of the 2nd December I write to say that the High Commissioner has received a telegram stating that the Admiralty have suggested that the harbour defences at Halifax, which is now regularly used by capital ships, might be improved by the installation also of a harbour defence asdic in the vicinity of Herring Cove. It appears that this form of defence is thought more suitable than an indicator loop, in view of the possibility of damage being caused to the latter by ships anchoring. Moreover, while indicator loop material manufactured in the United Kingdom could not be made available for approximately twelve months, a harbour defence asdic could be supplied about mid-January next.

Sir Gerald Campbell has been asked to ascertain the views of the Canadian Government on this proposal and, if it is agreeable to them, to enquire whether the Royal Canadian Navy could provide and train the personnel

necessary to man the installation. In this connection the Admiralty emphasise the importance of patrols fitted with asdics working in conjunction with the harbour defence asdic.

I should perhaps add that a telegram was addressed to the United Kingdom authorities conveying the request contained in the last paragraph of your letter of the 2nd December for advice and information about the latest type of controlled minefield, but that the information in question has not yet been received in this Office.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1000.

251-A-38

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 594

London, May 13, 1940

Further to your telegram No. 517 of May 10th.¹ The United Kingdom Government state that they are very glad to accept Canadian Government's offer of two destroyers for service in the West Indies. Naval Commander-in-Chief of America and West Indies is communicating direct with Chief of the Naval Staff at Ottawa with regard to employment of these vessels.

MASSEY

1001.

1177-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 673

London, May 23, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. United Kingdom have put forward additional suggestion for assistance considered to be of utmost value, namely, immediate reinforcement of home flotillas by Royal Canadian Navy destroyers now engaged on convoy work at Halifax. Urgency due to possibility in near future of sea-borne invasion of United Kingdom accompanied by aircraft escort. Largely by means of destroyers that such invasion would be opposed and sea-borne trade in home waters maintained. Recent developments and the attitude of Italy have left the United Kingdom sadly lacking in available destroyers in home waters for these tasks. Furthermore, submarines in the near future certain to be very active against shipping but more especially in waters adjacent to the United Kingdom than in wider oceans. To this extent, likelihood of submarine attack off Canadian shores has diminished. Message

¹ Document 884.

concludes by expressions of deepest appreciation of what has been done and assurance that this fresh contribution requested only because of absolute conviction of its necessity in present circumstances.

Asked also to mention as a smaller but important matter the possible provision of any available Canadian stocks of 4.7 high explosive shell temporarily short here.

MASSEY

1002.

1177-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 598

Ottawa, May 24, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your No. 673 of May 23rd. Please communicate at once to United Kingdom Government following decision of Cabinet War Committee at meeting held immediately upon receipt of your telegram:

1. In view of extreme emergency of situation, as described in High Commissioner's telegram, Canadian Government agree to make available at earliest possible moment, for service with home flotillas of Royal Navy, four Royal Canadian Navy destroyers presently based on Halifax.

2. Chief of Naval Staff will communicate by telegram direct to Admiralty within a few hours as to date of sailing from Canada, supply of ammunition and other details.

3. Inasmuch as despatch of four destroyers referred to above will leave no destroyers immediately available, owing to other Royal Canadian Navy destroyers being under repair and in West Indies, Canadian Government would appreciate, if considered practical by Admiralty, if *Caradoc* could be sent from West Indies to Halifax, or if some other arrangement could be made to cover Canadian East Coast.

1003.

1177-39

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 698

London, May 25, 1940

Your telegram No. 598 of May 24th. Prime Minister is sending you a message expressing high appreciation of the action which Canada is taking. First Lord of the Admiralty has also asked me to convey to the Minister of Defence his personal thanks for ready [understanding?] of need here. He adds

that they have given immediate consideration to suggestion that His Majesty's Ship *Caradoc* should go to Halifax and readily agree that this or another cruiser at Leeward Islands and West Indies Station should be sent. Admiralty also propose that *Fraser* should be sent to Halifax in order to provide measure of anti-submarine protection there.

1004.

1177-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 611

Ottawa, May 25, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 673, May 23, 1940, second paragraph. Request has been closely examined by Naval Staff and it is very much regretted that the small stock of 4.7 high explosive shells presently in Canada makes it impracticable for any to be spared.

1005.

830-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516P/33

Ottawa, July 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

The High Commissioner has been asked to approach the Canadian authorities in the following matter.

The Admiralty are considering placing orders in Canada for the construction of 12 minesweepers of the *Bangor* class, but the question depends very largely on the dates at which delivery could be effected since mine-sweeping vessels are needed in the near future.

It is understood that 18 of these vessels are now under construction for the Canadian Government and that 10 more are projected, and it has occurred to the Admiralty that the Canadian Government might perhaps be prepared to allow 12 of the vessels already under construction in Canada to be delivered to the Admiralty and themselves take in lieu 12 vessels to be laid down to Admiralty order.

The High Commissioner has been asked to enquire urgently whether the Canadian authorities would agree to this course.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1006.

830-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissariat
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission
of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, July 26, 1940

Dear Mr. Hankinson,

In reply to your letter of the 15th July in which you informed me that the Government of the United Kingdom is anxious to obtain twelve of the minesweepers now under construction in Canada, I am sorry to have to inform you that after careful consideration it has been decided that it will not be possible to accede to this request.

The number of minesweepers laid down in the building programme of the Royal Canadian Navy was that considered necessary as a minimum for operations in Canadian waters in order to provide against the scale of attack then envisaged. The enemy has not yet chosen to lay mines in Canadian waters, and, so far, the minesweeping equipment of the Royal Canadian Navy has not been called into action except for daily exploratory sweeps. That the immunity of Canadian waters in these matters is due to design on the part of the enemy and not due to any lack of ability to lay mines in our waters is borne out by the fact that mines have been laid in waters of all the other British Dominions.

Delivery of minesweepers already on order for the Royal Canadian Navy is expected to be four by December 1940, ten by April 1941, and all eighteen by July 1941. Arrangements have been made to man and employ these vessels on delivery.

If, by the time these vessels become available, the situation with regard to minesweeping is similar to that at present enjoyed, consideration will be given to lending ships and crews for service in United Kingdom waters or where the British Admiralty considers it most desirable, in the same way that four destroyers have already been lent. It will be necessary, however, to reserve the right to recall all or any of these minesweepers to Canadian waters if, in the opinion of the Canadian Government, the situation in Canadian waters is sufficiently serious to warrant it.

We are unable to estimate what delivery dates could be guaranteed to the United Kingdom Government if an order for twelve minesweepers were placed by them in accordance with this enquiry, but we should prefer that the ten minesweepers of the Royal Canadian Navy's projected programme, for which contracts have not yet been placed by the Department of Munitions and Supply, should be given precedence in Canadian yards.

Yours sincerely,

[O. D. SKELTON]

1007.

830-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516D/33

Ottawa, September 24, 1940

SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to your letter of the 26th July, I write to say that the Admiralty have now given further consideration to the possibility of building minesweepers in Canada on their own account, and are most anxious to avail themselves of this source of supply, but the difficulty remains that unless some improvement in the delivery position can be secured, the vessels would not be available to them at the time when they would be most needed, viz: during 1941.

The present position, it is understood, is that the Canadian Government are building eighteen vessels on their own account to be completed by July 1941, and that they have a further programme of ten vessels in mind to be completed at the rate of two per month thereafter. On this basis the capacity of Canadian yards is likely to be fully absorbed until late in 1941, so that if the Admiralty were now to place an order for the vessels which they require they could hardly expect to obtain delivery of more than two such vessels by the end of 1941.

The Admiralty's present policy is not to order vessels for completion after 1941. Yet their needs are great and pressing. They very much hope that as a result of the Canadian offer conveyed in your letter of the 26th July, which they greatly appreciate, a certain number of the eighteen vessels to be completed by July 1941 may be made available to them, but they are most anxious to assure themselves of at least twelve vessels in addition, and they feel impelled to ask whether the Canadian Government could not help them in this difficulty by waiving the suggestion in the last paragraph of your letter. If the Canadian Government could agree that after the completion of the eighteen vessels to be built on Canadian account by July 1941, the Admiralty might be allotted sanctioned vessels (up to a maximum of 12) which could be completed by the end of 1941, this would be of very great assistance to the Admiralty.

In making this communication to you, I have been asked to explain that the United Kingdom Government are most reluctant to have to press this request when they know that the Canadian Government are anxious to complete their own programme, but that they are compelled to do so by the exigencies of the situation in United Kingdom waters and the imperative need of providing for the Admiralty's requirements.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1008.

830-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, October 9, 1940

Dear Sir Gerald,

In reply to Mr. Hankinson's secret letter of the 24th September I am now able to give you certain further information in regard to the possibility of the United Kingdom Government building minesweepers in Canada during 1941.

While the situation in regard to the Canadian requirements remains as was explained in my letter of the 26th July, it has been found, as a result of a careful examination of Canadian productive capacity, that it will be possible for the United Kingdom Government to obtain eight steel minesweepers, duplicates of the Canadian steam-driven type, between May and September, 1941, provided a decision is made immediately. The necessity for an early decision results from the fact that discussions are under way in connection with cargo shipbuilding and an additional Canadian naval programme which may affect the minesweeper programme.

Should the Admiralty make a decision quickly information should also be given concerning whether auxiliary machinery made in Canada would be desirable and acceptable.

In addition to the eight minesweepers which are mentioned above it may be possible to arrange for further vessels of this class to be produced for the United Kingdom count between September and December, 1941. We shall be glad to receive an indication of the Admiralty's wishes in regard to this matter also.

The proposals outlined above do not affect the offer which was made in my letter of the 26th July, which can perhaps be elaborated by stating most definitely that should there be no indications of mines being laid off our convoy assembly ports by the time the Canadian programme vessels are completed these ships, complete with Royal Canadian Naval crews, can be detailed for service in United Kingdom waters or in any other area which may then demand greater consideration than the Canadian waters for which they are being built. However, should the safety of convoys be endangered by minefields off the assembly ports, we believe that the United Kingdom Government will agree that the united war effort can best be served by our retaining sufficient minesweepers to ensure the safety of the Empire's vital shipping.

In conclusion may I reiterate that if the United Kingdom Government wishes to obtain the eight minesweepers which can be promised for May-

September, or additional vessels during the period September-December, it will be necessary to inform us of their desires in the immediate future.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

1009.

830-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516P/33

Ottawa, October 16, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton

With further reference to your letter of the 9th October, the High Commissioner has now received a reply from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that the Admiralty gratefully accepts the offer of eight steel minesweepers between May and September 1941. They are considering the suggestion that further vessels of the same class might be obtainable between September and December 1941 and also the enquiry as to auxiliary machinery and Lord Cranborne promises a further telegram on these points will be sent as soon as possible.

The High Commissioner has been asked to convey an expression of the Admiralty's warm appreciation of the Canadian Government's helpful attitude in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1010.

1332-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 208

Ottawa, November 19, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins.

1. The vital importance of the war at sea continues to impress my colleagues and myself with the urgency of doing everything possible to develop our shipbuilding facilities to the utmost.

2. In Canada we have already built, and are building, both for the Royal Navy and for ourselves, the smaller types of naval vessels, namely, corvettes, minesweepers, motor launches and motor torpedo boats.

3. We believe that it would be entirely practicable to undertake, in Canadian yards, the building of destroyers and cruisers as well, if the Admir-

alty could assist us by providing a number of key men and constructors, either from their own or from private yards in the United Kingdom.

4. The Chief of our Naval Staff has already communicated to the Admiralty the Canadian government's wish to initiate the building of destroyers in Canada, at the earliest possible date.

5. We trust that this proposal will commend itself to your judgment as a helpful undertaking on the part of this country in the common cause. Ends.

1011.

1332-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 187

London, December 18, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram November 19th, No. 208. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. I am very grateful for your message, and we fully appreciate all the work that you are doing for us in smaller types of ships. Rapidity with which you have produced these craft has been a great help to us, and so has the personnel which you have provided for many of the vessels.

With regard to building larger vessels in Canada, such as destroyers and cruisers, there are two questions which must be considered.

Firstly, a considerable proportion of special apparatus would in all probability have to come from the United Kingdom, and it is this part of the equipment which is nearly always the main difficulty.

Secondly, provision of a number of key men and constructors presents great difficulty. You will realize that there has necessarily been a great expansion in this country, where technical experts have had to be spared for supervision of the large programme which we have in hand, and also for all the small private yards. In addition to this, we have had to establish bases and augment repair facilities in a large number of places abroad, such as Alexandria, Freetown, Gibraltar, Simonstown, Durban, Bombay and Calcutta. These commitments have used up all of our key men and constructors, and although we are trying to [ob]tain more from every available source, we are still short of requisite numbers. We have regretfully concluded therefore that it is impracticable to carry out your proposal exactly as you suggest in your paragraph 3. I think however that it might be feasible, and would certainly be of the greatest assistance to the common cause, if you could undertake building, say a flotilla of destroyers to the latest American design, obtaining technical help from the United States. It would probably also be possible to obtain from the same source much of the special equipment for ships. This is usually a bottleneck here and provision from United States would save shipping space.

I should be grateful for your views on this proposal. If you agree, would you desire to approach the American Government directly, or would you like me to make a suggestion in the first place? Ends.

1012.

1332-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 238

Ottawa, December 29, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. With reference to your secret telegram of December 18, 1940, No. 187 regarding destroyers.

The predominant factor in the minds of the Canadian Naval Staff in endeavouring to have destroyer building undertaken here, was the feeling that since in this war our destroyers have to cooperate so closely with United Kingdom units in European Waters, a common building design would be highly desirable. It was also the opinion of the Naval Staff that since Canada has been willing to place, and actually has placed destroyers for service in European Waters, and since they estimated that destroyers could be built almost as quickly here as in the United Kingdom, nothing would be lost and something might be gained by having destroyer building undertaken in this country. In this connection it is observed that the two destroyers now being built in England for the Royal Canadian Navy are several months behind schedule.

The United States destroyers handed over to the United Kingdom and Canada recently are not equal in sea-going and other qualities to British destroyers of similar age. The latest United States types may be better and this question will be explored by the Canadian Naval Staff, together with the possibility of having American designs varied to conform somewhat more closely to British models. Whether American workmen could successfully undertake these variations is yet to be ascertained, and whether the United States would allow such workmen to leave that country is not known. These matters will be investigated immediately and a further communication will be addressed to you as soon as the situation has been clarified.

1013.

1177-39

Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures

High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

516/178

Ottawa, July 7, 1941

Dear Mr. Robertson,

We have received a telegram from the Admiralty stating that they have had under consideration the disposition of minesweepers proposed in the Canadian Government's Naval Appreciation dated the 6th October, 1940.¹

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

It is recommended that the *Bangor* class minesweepers should be organised in flotillas of eight ships, their duty being to clear an area of enemy mines whenever they are reported, and to maintain the searched channels at the ports where they are stationed. At other ports of lesser importance it is recommended that auxiliary minesweepers organised in groups of four should be stationed to search for and give warning of mines laid. The scale of mining attack in home waters remains high, and the Royal Navy have to meet increasing commitments abroad. There is at present a lesser risk of mining in North American waters. The Admiralty would therefore be grateful if, after two flotillas have been organised to meet the requirements on the East Coast of North America, the next two minesweeper flotillas coming into service could operate in home waters. It is suggested that the most suitable bases for the flotillas defending North America are at Halifax and St. John's, Newfoundland. Should a Japanese threat require a flotilla at Esquimalt, a flotilla from home waters would be returned. At the same time any corvettes operating from St. John's, Newfoundland fitted as minesweepers would be available in emergency.

I should be very grateful if you could communicate this message to the appropriate authorities.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1014.

1177-39

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission of Great Britain

SECRET

Ottawa, July 24, 1941

Dear Mr. Hankinson,

In reply to your letter of July 7, No. 516/178, concerning the disposition of minesweepers proposed in the Canadian Government's Naval Appreciation of October 6, 1940,¹ I may say that two flotillas of minesweepers, each comprising eight vessels, will be made available for operation in United Kingdom waters as requested by the Admiralty.

It is expected that approximately three flotillas will be ready by December of this year and one of these will be sent to the United Kingdom. A second could be despatched in an emergency, provided the situation in North American waters justifies such a diversion. At least one more flotilla will be ready by the spring of 1942.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

¹ Non reproduite.

² Not printed.

PARTIE 3/PART 3

COOPÉRATION AÉRIENNE / AIR CO-OPERATION

1015.

King Papers, PAC

*Le Premier ministre au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne**Prime Minister to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, September 12, 1939

My dear Sir Gerald,

The Government have been carefully considering how they might now co-operate most effectively with the United Kingdom Government, and in that connection have been glad to have the benefit of the information and suggestions contained in the Memorandum transmitted with your letter of September 6th¹ in response to my request that the United Kingdom Government furnish us such an outline. I understand from the Dominions Office telegram No. 59 of the same date,² which the Memorandum supplements, that we may shortly expect information also as to the nature of the war plans which the United Kingdom Government and their Allies have in view.

At the moment I am writing with reference to Air Force co-operation, which is treated in section (c) paragraphs 16 to 19, of the Memorandum. The following represents in broad outline what, so far as immediate measures are concerned, my colleagues and myself think could be put into effect.

The rapid expansion of Royal Canadian Air Force training facilities for officers and airmen is being put in hand immediately with the object of providing the maximum possible number of trained pilots, observers, air gunners, W/T operators and tradesmen.

A number of Canadian officer pilots with considerable flying experience on civil types but untrained in service duties, plus a number of newly enlisted airmen of various trades, can be made available for despatch to the United Kingdom within six weeks. These Canadian personnel, if desired, can be made available on loan for supplementing Royal Air Force Establishments. Indications of the numbers of personnel available for early despatch will follow.

It is the desire of this Government that Canadian Air Force units be formed as soon as sufficient trained personnel are available overseas for this purpose, such squadrons to be manned by and maintained with Canadian personnel at the expense of the Canadian Government. Owing to the shortage of service equipment in Canada, Canadian squadrons overseas would require to be completely equipped by the United Kingdom authorities at Canada's expense.

¹ Volume 6, Document 1073.

² Volume 6, Document 1072.

As indicated, this letter represents the lines of an immediate project. We have not been able in the time at our disposal to examine fully the possibilities of our air action, and we should wish it to be understood that the form of action here suggested does not preclude our adopting a different form after the situation becomes clearer.

We should also like it to be understood that, if the Canadian Government should later decide upon the organization of distinctive Canadian air units for service overseas, the Canadian personnel who might have entered the Royal Air Force in pursuance of the present immediate suggestion would be available for transfer to such Royal Canadian Air Force units according to some orderly plan.

We should be glad to have the United Kingdom Government's observations upon the foregoing as soon as possible in order that we be in a position to proceed effectively with an air program. Should these proposals prove acceptable it is suggested that the Air Ministry Staff be authorized to enter directly into the necessary technical discussions with the Chief of Staff, Royal Canadian Air Force.

Yours sincerely,

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

1016.

251-A-38

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516/60

Ottawa, September 18, 1939

SECRET AND IMMEDIATE

Dear Dr. Skelton,

The High Commissioner has asked me to invite reference to the Prime Minister's letter of the 12th September, giving details of the immediate programme of co-operation with the United Kingdom in war matters drawn up by the Canadian Government and to his reply of the 13th September.¹

A telegram has now been received from London stating that the proposals contained in this immediate programme are greatly appreciated by the Government of the United Kingdom, that they are receiving urgent consideration and that detailed reply will be sent very shortly.

In the meantime Sir Gerald Campbell has received instructions to approach the Canadian Government urgently, quite independently of the immediate

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

programme referred to above, on the following matters which the United Kingdom Government feel require consideration as they affect immediate operational requirements.

The Air Ministry are most anxious to secure the establishment, at the earliest possible date, of a general reconnaissance squadron at Kingston, Jamaica, possibly with a detachment at Trinidad. They regard this as only second in importance to the meeting of similar requirements at Halifax, but it is not possible at present to supply such a squadron from United Kingdom resources.

The United Kingdom Government would, therefore, greatly appreciate it if the Canadian Government felt able to supply a squadron of this type for service at Kingston at as early a date as practicable. In putting forward this request they are naturally anxious not to appear to be seeking the diversion of aircraft which the Canadian Government would be unable to spare from their own primary requirements. As a tentative suggestion, however, they would be grateful to know whether the idea would commend itself to the Canadian Government of utilising the Lockheed Hudson aircraft which were recently flown from California to Canada before the Canadian Government's declaration of war and which are now, it is understood, at the disposal of the Canadian Government, for the purpose of forming a land-based squadron at Halifax. In that event might it be possible to release the flying boats at present based at Halifax and to transfer the latter to form a general reconnaissance squadron in the West Indies based on Kingston?

Sir Gerald Campbell would be very grateful if the foregoing considerations and suggestions could be considered by the appropriate authorities and if he could be informed of their views as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

PAUL MASON

1017.

251-A-38

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

SECRET AND IMMEDIATE

Ottawa, September 29, 1939

Dear Sir Gerald,

May I refer to Mr. Mason's letter, dated the 18th September of this year, concerning your Government's suggestion that the Canadian Government should establish and maintain a general reconnaissance squadron at Kingston, Jamaica, possibly with a detachment at Trinidad.

This matter has been given the most careful consideration but, while the Government is most anxious to co-operate with the Government of the United Kingdom, it is regretted that at the present moment Canadian commitments and a shortage of suitable aircraft make it impossible to accede to this request. I do not wish to imply that this would be impossible at a later date, but I think that you will appreciate from the following explanation of the situation the reasons why nothing can be done at the moment.

The Royal Canadian Air Force has not as yet obtained the requisite number of aircraft to equip the squadrons required for the defence of its coasts and approaches thereto and could not divert new aircraft from these duties without seriously impairing the needs of Canadian Defence.

Although with the arrival of winter conditions in the Gulf of St. Lawrence area it will be possible to withdraw a number of aircraft from coastal reconnaissance duties there, they are not of a type which it is considered could be recommended for employment in the Caribbean. They are single-engined Northrop Delta float planes, a civil type converted as far as possible to military use. The type of aircraft which it is recommended for Jamaica or Trinidad would be flying boats, but the only flying boats available are guarding the approaches to Halifax and are only employed there as a temporary measure until General Reconnaissance land planes are available. The flying boats then are to be transferred to the West Coast as a replacement type for a squadron at present equipped with obsolete flying boats of short range and inferior performance. As you are probably aware, the West Coast does not lend itself to the employment of land planes.

With respect to the suggestion that the 10 Lockheed Hudson aircraft might replace the squadron at Halifax, your Government have apparently lost sight of the fact that these aircraft, in effect, only partially replace the 18 Blenheims ordered from England which have not as yet been delivered. These Hudson aircraft alone are insufficient for requirements and are to outfit a second General Reconnaissance squadron based at Yarmouth, Nova Scotia.

Even though further General Reconnaissance land planes become available, the situation will not be materially eased as owing to the extremely small number of flying boats in the Royal Canadian Air Force, it is impossible to consider the assignment of a squadron to the West Indies.

Should, however, your Government be in a position to release to the Royal Canadian Air Force sufficient flying boats to form a squadron in Jamaica, with a detachment at Trinidad, it might be possible for the Royal Canadian Air Force to furnish the necessary personnel, and operate them. The adoption of this suggestion might well afford a practical solution to the problem confronting your Government.

Yours sincerely,

[O. D. SKELTON]

1018.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516X/84

Ottawa, September 29, 1939

MOST SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

May I invite your reference to my letter to the Prime Minister of the 13th September (No. 516/56)¹ and to previous connected correspondence regarding the Canadian Government's proposals in regard to Air Force co-operation with the United Kingdom?

I have now received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in which I am instructed to state that the Air Council would welcome, as an immediate step, the formation of a Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron overseas at the earliest possible date in accordance with the suggestion contained in the fifth paragraph of Mr. Mackenzie King's letter to me of the 12th September.

It is suggested that such a squadron might be provided from trained Canadian personnel, whether in the United Kingdom or specially despatched, service aircraft being provided in the United Kingdom: and that the total personnel should be, if possible, sufficient not only to fill the squadron establishment but also to replace the initial wastage which, e.g. as a result of sickness or accidents, may begin at an early date after the formation of the squadron.

I should add in conclusion that I have been made aware of the comprehensive scheme for the training of personnel in Canada which has recently been communicated personally to Mr. Mackenzie King by the United Kingdom Government,² but that the latter are anxious that immediate consideration should be given to the scheme referred to in my present letter quite apart from examination of the wider scheme to which I allude.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

¹ Non reproduite.² Document 688.¹ Not printed.

1019.

King Papers, PAC

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, September 30, 1939

My dear Sir Gerald,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 29th September, indicating that the Air Council would welcome the formation of a Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron overseas at the earliest possible date, in accordance with the suggestion contained in Mr. King's letter to you of the 12th September.

The proposal was brought to the attention of the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence.

As you indicate, a comprehensive scheme for air training in Canada has been drawn up by the Government of the United Kingdom and is now receiving consideration. The Government have indicated their readiness in principle to join in a cooperative scheme for the training of an enlarged air personnel, and in the light of the examination now being made here and of the information expected from London as to availability of instructors and training planes, and the financial arrangements involved, they will be able shortly to decide on what scale they would cooperate in a comprehensive plan. This will obviously have a bearing on the present proposal, but I have no doubt the Government will wish to give immediate and simultaneous consideration to the latter suggestion.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

1020.

King Papers, PAC

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, October 14, 1939

My dear Sir Gerald,

May I refer to your letter dated 29th September, 1939, in which you stated that you had received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs with regard to the formation of a Royal Canadian Air Force squadron overseas at the earliest possible date.

This suggestion has been considered by the Department of National Defence, and the views of that Department have been brought to my attention in order that they might be communicated to you.

The records available in the Department show that 268 persons have proceeded overseas as pilots from 1935 to the present date. In addition, an unrecorded number of individuals have proceeded overseas at their own expense to join the Royal Air Force. There is no record of Canadians serving as mechanics in that Service, nor is any information available with respect to the state of training of the Canadian personnel serving in the Royal Air Force.

The Department of National Defence has noted that the Air Council would welcome the early formation of a Royal Canadian Air Force squadron overseas, and that the United Kingdom Government are anxious that immediate consideration should be given to this project, quite apart from the comprehensive scheme for training personnel in Canada. In this connection it may be observed that the organization of a Royal Canadian Air Force squadron overseas to be maintained in accordance with para. (5) of the Prime Minister's letter to the High Commissioner dated 12th September, would entail the formation of an R.C.A.F. Headquarters, a pool of officers, and a pool of airmen to replace wastage. It would also demand that a constant flow of personnel be available from this country as replacements.

Whilst it is for many reasons desirable that Canada's contribution in the air should be recognized and confirmed by the early participation of Royal Canadian Air Force units overseas, it must be borne in mind that the immediate despatch of even one unit would seriously detract from the inception and development of the scheme for training in Canada. In view of the most recent communications on the subject of training received from the United Kingdom, it is considered that Canadian participation in the form of an overseas squadron at this stage should not now be contemplated.

It has been suggested in para. (3) of your letter that a squadron might be provided from trained Canadian personnel now in the United Kingdom. If the Royal Air Force is prepared to form a squadron from trained Canadian personnel now in the Royal Air Force, and so far as may be possible maintain it as a unit manned by Canadians until our training produces a flow of personnel from this country, and until the Royal Canadian Air Force can assume the full commitments for this unit, the much to be desired recognition of Canadian participation will have been initiated. As Canadian contribution increases this squadron could be taken over as a Royal Canadian Air Force squadron and new units added to form an overseas force commensurate with Canadian effort and position in the Commonwealth.

Yours sincerely,

J. E. READ
for the Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

1021.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516/80

Ottawa, October 27, 1939

SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

May I invite a reference to your letter of the 14th October on the subject of the formation of a Royal Canadian Air Force squadron for overseas.

I conveyed the substance of your letter and, in particular, the suggestion contained in the concluding paragraph to the United Kingdom authorities by telegraph. I am now in a position to convey the following observations bearing upon that suggestion.

The United Kingdom authorities suggest that one of the new fighter squadrons now about to be formed in the United Kingdom should be composed as far as possible of Canadian-born personnel. It appears that a Squadron Leader and a complete squadron of pilots are available for the purpose of such a formation.

The United Kingdom authorities feel that to proceed on this basis would be better than to withdraw Canadian personnel from their squadrons, as the latter would involve extensive posting as well as loss of efficiency.

The United Kingdom authorities suggest that this squadron should be called Number (Canadian) Squadron, Royal Air Force, until such time as the Royal Canadian Air Force assumes full commitments for it as foreshadowed in your letter.

I should add for your information that the squadron which would be earmarked for this purpose subject to the concurrence of the Canadian Government is Number 0242 Squadron, which is about to form at Church Fenton.

I shall be much obliged if you will be good enough to inform me as soon as possible of the views of the appropriate Canadian authorities upon the suggestions made in this letter.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

1022.

King Papers, PAC

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain

SECRET

Ottawa, November 14, 1939

Dear Sir Gerald,

May I refer to your letter dated the 27th October, 1939, concerning the formation of a Royal Air Force Squadron to be composed of Canadian-born personnel.

I have discussed this matter with the Department of National Defence and have received the following statement and inquiry from the Acting Deputy Minister (Naval and Air):

I am in agreement with the suggestions contained therein. However, it is not clear from the High Commissioner's letter whether or not it is desired that this squadron retain the number 0242, or whether a Canadian number will be acceptable. If the latter, it is suggested that this squadron be known as No. 3 (Canadian) Fighter Squadron, Royal Air Force until such time as the R.C.A.F. can assume full commitments when the squadron will be renamed No. 3 (Fighter) Squadron, Royal Canadian Air Force.

The manner in which this squadron will be taken over, that is, whether gradually or at one time can be determined later.

I assume, therefore, that you will let me know what action is being taken with regard to the numbering of the squadron. The question as to the arrangements for taking the squadron over is, of course, a matter that will arise at a later date.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

1023.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 704

London, November 28, 1939

Following from Air Commodore Breadner for Chief of the Air Staff. Begins. During conversations which took place recently with the Secretary of State for Air, at which Mr. Crerar was present, Sir Kingsley Wood touched on question of provision of Army Co-operation Squadrons for Canadian Field Forces. He pointed out that present normal requirements in this respect is one Army Co-operation Squadron per corps, and that while Royal Air Force

had planned to provide a squadron for corps of which First Canadian Division would form a part, the United Kingdom authorities would be glad, if Canada so desired, to substitute therefor a squadron of Royal Canadian Air Force. If this consisted of personnel only they were prepared to equip and supply it. This squadron would be equipped with eighteen I. E. Lysander aircraft and when in the field might be expected to be subject to personnel wastage of 6 crews of 2 per month for which provision might be allowed. Sir Kingsley said that it was desirable that if our Government were desirous of providing a Canadian squadron for service with Canadian Field Forces they make their intention known as soon as possible. It was explained that if such a Canadian squadron were contemplated it should leave Canada if possible with Canadian Division to ensure ample time for its equipment and such further training as might be required. It was particularly stressed, however, that from the United Kingdom standpoint the development of the training scheme was considered of primary importance. Ends.

1024.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516/87

Ottawa, November 28, 1939

SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

As I said in my letter of the 16th November (516/87)¹ the High Commissioner telegraphed to London the enquiry contained in your letter of the 14th November regarding the formation of a Royal Air Force Squadron to be composed of Canadian personnel.

The Air Ministry have now informed Sir Gerald Campbell that there is already a Number 3 Squadron in the Royal Air Force and that they feel that it would be impracticable to have another Royal Air Force squadron bearing the same number and operating in the same theatre.

They suggest that the squadron now forming should continue as Number 242 (Canadian) Squadron, Royal Air Force, and that the wastage of personnel in that squadron should be replaced from such Canadian personnel as are available in excess after the manning of Royal Canadian Air Force units has been provided for. Such personnel would join the Royal Air Force in the usual manner.

If necessary and practicable the replacement of the wastage referred to above might also be assisted by the transfer of further Canadian personnel from other Royal Air Force units.

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

The Air Ministry feel that the conversion of Number 242 Squadron into a Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron would involve the disadvantage that the Canadian personnel serving in the Royal Air Force in that squadron would have to be dispersed to make way for personnel belonging to the Royal Canadian Air Force.

They therefore suggest that the complete personnel for a Royal Canadian Air Force Fighter Squadron should be sent over when ready, and should be formed into Number 3 (Fighter) Squadron, Royal Canadian Air Force. Aircraft and equipment for this Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron would be provided, either by disbanding an existing Royal Air Force Squadron, or from other resources, according to the situation at the time.

Sir Gerald Campbell will be much obliged for early information as to the views which the competent Canadian authorities may hold on the foregoing points.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1025.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 648

Ottawa, December 11, 1939

SECRET. Your telegram No. 704, November 28, 1939. No. 110 (City of Toronto) (Army Co-operation) Squadron, R.C.A.F. at present being manned and trained for despatch overseas. Canadian Government would like this Squadron employed in same corps as first Canadian Division, if possible.

Desired bring Squadron reasonable state of proficiency before despatch. This will be approximately middle February. Squadron will bring no equipment other than [personal] clothing and accoutrements individuals. Assurance requested that arrangements satisfactory Government United Kingdom.

1026.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, December 20, 1939

Dear Sir,

May I refer to your letter, dated the 28th November, 1939, with regard to the formation of a Canadian squadron in the Royal Air Force.

In view of the possibility of confusion, the suggestion made for the re-numbering of No. 342 [*sic*—242?] (Canadian) Squadron Royal Air Force, is now withdrawn. The arrangements made are entirely satisfactory, and I have been requested by the Department of National Defence to express appreciation of the action taken by the Air Ministry in the organization of a Royal Air Force Squadron of Canadian pilots. Pending the final settlement of organization and identity of Canadian personnel from the Air Training Plan, it is considered desirable that replacement should be effected through further transfer of Canadian personnel from other R.A.F. units.

The Canadian authorities also concur in the further suggestion that the formation of a Royal Canadian Air Force fighter squadron for service overseas be considered at a later date, depending upon the situation at the time.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

1027.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 31

Ottawa, January 8, 1940

SECRET. Your No. 2 of January 1st.¹ Canadian Government prepared to bear following costs in connection with 110 (AC) Squadron whilst overseas, and its necessary reinforcements plus small Headquarters unit in London and necessary ancillary details in United Kingdom and France: Full pay and allowances and ocean transportation between Canada and United Kingdom for duration of hostilities. The United Kingdom Government to bear all other costs of accommodating, equipping, training, maintaining and operating above in United Kingdom and France less London Headquarters accommodation. Personnel of squadron and details will arrive complete with personal clothing, web equipment and gas masks. Reinforcements to be supplied on basis of one month reinforcements in France and 2 months in England. Reply soon as possible if above arrangements agreeable to Government United Kingdom.

1028.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 65

London, January 18, 1940

Your telegram No. 31 of January 8th, Army Co-operation Squadron. United Kingdom authorities are surprised at arrangements suggested as they had never

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

thought that promise to provide and maintain equipment included financial responsibility. As the Squadron is a Canadian formation they felt that Canada would meet the expenditures involved. As I am unaware of any understanding or arrangements which may have been reached in Ottawa on this matter I am in some difficulty in discussing it with them. I had assumed that apart from the Air Training Scheme itself and such cases as ancillary troops, where special arrangements had been made, that Canada was bearing the cost of overseas military and air forces.

I would appreciate information as to your understanding of the relationship of the arrangements suggested for this Squadron to above principle.

MASSEY

1029.

251-A-38

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516/98
SECRET

Ottawa, January 22, 1940

My dear Dr. Skelton,

The High Commissioner has received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that great importance is attached by the Admiralty and Air Ministry to the provision of long range reconnaissance aircraft in the Caribbean where attack by raider would be exceedingly dangerous owing to the concentration of shipping which occurs at focal points at the Bahamas and in the Windward and Mona passages. In addition the Trinidad oil refineries provide a very vulnerable and valuable target. At present this area is dangerously bare of protective forces but it is naturally suited to the operation of flying boats with advanced fuelling bases.

Sir Gerald Campbell is advised that other and even more urgent commitments make it impossible for a long time to come for the Air Ministry to provide flying boats for Caribbean reconnaissance duties and it would thus not be possible for the United Kingdom authorities to avail themselves of Canada's conditional offer of personnel contained in the last paragraph of your letter of the 29th September.¹ In these circumstances, in view of the great need in the Caribbean the Admiralty and Air Ministry would be most grateful if the Canadian Government would reconsider the possibility of undertaking the Caribbean work with the Stranraer flying boats instead of transferring them to the Pacific. If need for flying boats on the West Coast should become pressing at a later date the squadron could return to Canada. It is realised that, as explained in your letter of the 29th September, land planes are less suitable than

¹ Document 1017.

flying boats for the West Coast but Sir Gerald Campbell is informed that it would be of great assistance if in present circumstances the limitations of land planes for the Pacific Coast could be accepted and the flying boats thus released. In this connection it is understood that the situation as described in the fifth paragraph of your letter of the 29th September has now changed; a further eighteen Hudsons have since been released and these are additional to the Blenheims on order.

Sir Gerald Campbell would be much obliged if the above could be put before the appropriate Canadian authorities for their consideration.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1030.

King Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 153

Ottawa, February [12], 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 65 of January 18th, Army Co-operation Squadron. In the light of previous correspondence and discussions the Canadian Government is greatly concerned regarding the contents of this despatch. Interpretation placed here on proposal of United Kingdom Government as set out in [telegraphic] despatch No. 704 of November 28th and your A311 of December 4th¹ to equip and supply this squadron was that this involved acceptance of financial responsibility therefor by United Kingdom, and it was taken as being in line with what was understood to have been arrived at in discussions here with United Kingdom Air Training Mission re Air Training Plan. In the course of these discussions it was understood that the United Kingdom Mission concurred in the readjustment of the provisions previously made in Canada's estimates for air participation overseas whereby three Army Co-operation Squadrons were to be supplied and equipped by Canada by restricting this provision to personnel, pay and allowances for one Army Co-operation Squadron, the United Kingdom to provide and maintain aircraft, thus placing it in the same position as squadrons later to be formed from personnel of Air Training Plan. This was done in order to make possible increased contribution by Canada to the Plan, which was regarded as of primary importance. Canadian Government believes that reference to Air Training Mission will confirm this understanding. Conforming to this readjustment to meet the needs of the Plan it was also clearly understood that reinforcements for this Army Co-operation Squadron would be drawn from Air Training Plan. Decision here to send forward such a Squadron was based on the assumption that this understanding was satisfactory.

¹Non reproduite.

¹Not printed.

Canadian Government would also like further to point out that Army Co-operation Squadron is not part of Canadian Divisional Organization in the Field but is attached to British Army Corps, and as appears from [telegraphic] despatch No. 704 of November 28th, Royal Air Force had planned to provide a Squadron for Corps of which First Canadian Division would form a part. Canadian Government consider that their interpretation of exchange of despatches was warranted in the circumstances and trust that proposed arrangements as set out in [telegraphic] despatch No. 31 of January 8th will be found acceptable by the United Kingdom.

1031.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 190

London, February 13, 1940

Your telegram No. 153, February 12th, Army Co-operation Squadron. Have conveyed your observations to United Kingdom authorities but in informal conversation feel it unlikely that they will accept your interpretation of their responsibility for provision of equipment as including financial responsibility. Am bound to say that at Air Ministry meeting November 23rd I did not understand United Kingdom commitments in this sense. Suggest in this connection you consult Mr. Crerar and Air Commodore Breadner who were present. So far as understanding stated to have been arrived at in discussion with United Kingdom Air Training Mission in Ottawa is concerned, it is unfortunate that we have had no information on this point, or no record of discussion, which is serious handicap in the present conversations. Our efforts to convince United Kingdom authorities are not likely to be very effective when we are given brief cabled information on such an important point some two months after the discussion in question.

MASSEY

1032.

251-A-38

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures
au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 19, 1940

Dear Sir,

May I refer to Mr. Hankinson's letters, dated 30th January, 1940¹ and 22nd January of the same year, both dealing with a question of provision

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

by the Canadian Government of long-range reconnaissance aircraft in the Caribbean.

The question of undertaking the Caribbean work with the Stranraer flying boats, instead of transferring them to the Pacific, has received most careful and sympathetic consideration by the Government. A reply had been delayed, in the hope that the general situation and demand upon the Royal Canadian Air Force equipment and personnel might improve to the extent where this reconnaissance could be undertaken by the R.C.A.F.

It is now evident, however, that the number of flying boats and qualified flying boat personnel will no more than provide adequate reconnaissance aircraft for duty on the East Coast of Canada.

The aerodrome development in Nova Scotia is behind schedule to the extent that certain land-base B. R. Squadrons will not be able to operate from strategic points such as Sydney and Yarmouth till well into the summer of 1940. The Stranraer aircraft previously earmarked for transfer to the West Coast will therefore have to be left on the East Coast indefinitely.

This change in Canadian policy is essential to ensure adequate escort and reconnaissance aircraft for convoys from Eastern Canadian ports, which task will increase in the spring and early summer with the opening of navigation in the St. Lawrence.

It is very much regretted, therefore, that the Government is not in a position to comply with the request of your Government to undertake air reconnaissance duties in the Caribbean.

Yours sincerely,

LAURENT BEAUDRY

1033.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 344

London, March 26, 1940

My telegram No. 190, February 13th, Army Co-operation Squadron. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs writes that until my recent communications on this subject were received, the United Kingdom Government had not understood that there was any proposal to make distinction as regards financial responsibility between the above Squadron and the Canadian Division now in England. For the latter the Canadian Government have, of course, accepted full financial responsibility and the Squadron will, when the time comes for it and present Canadian contingent to go overseas, be working with the Division or with such other higher Canadian formations

as may eventually come into existence. So far as record of meeting held at the Air Ministry on November 23rd is concerned, to which the Canadian Government attaches importance, Air Ministry's representatives, in stating that Squadron could be completed with aircraft and equipment from Royal Air Force resources, were referring purely to physical provision of equipment which it was assumed the Canadian authorities would not be able to find for themselves. Mr. Eden adds that the general sense of Mr. Crerar's own remarks suggest that he too was not thinking in terms of finance. In this connection Mr. Crerar's recorded remarks on page 3 of the Minutes¹ of the above meeting are mentioned.

With reference to your mention of Ottawa discussions, Mr. Eden states understanding here, confirmed by United Kingdom members of Mission, is that these discussions could not be interpreted as committing the United Kingdom to responsibility for equipping this Squadron but rather the contrary. In these circumstances, he adds, it might be helpful if we could let him know on what the Canadian understanding of relevant discussions at Ottawa is based.

MASSEY

1034.

King Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 488

Ottawa, May 4, 1940

Your letter March 27th¹ enclosing letter from the Honourable the Secretary of State for the Dominions dated March 22nd and your telegrams 344 and 537¹:

The letter from the Secretary of State for the Dominions with reference to the financial responsibility for equipping and maintaining #110 Army Co-operation Squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force has been noted.

It is suggested in the Secretary of State's letter that he be advised on what the Canadian understanding was based. The reply is that apart from the discussions in London which have been referred to in the correspondence with the Under-Secretary it was based on the discussions here with the United Kingdom Air Training Mission and on the changes which were made in the Canadian estimates of defence expenditures as a result. The Canadian estimates for defence expenditures which were used by the Canadian Ministers at the conferences had, up to the time these changes were made, contained an item for the cost overseas of Army Co-operation Squadrons, which included the cost of equipping and maintaining No. 110 Squadron and two others.

¹Non reproduit.

¹Not printed.

There was an exploration of the possibility of apportioning financial responsibility for the Plan by Squadrons, some to be equipped and maintained by each Dominion and others to be paid by respective Dominions but equipped and maintained by U.K.

A stage in the discussions was finally reached in which it was understood that if Canada could undertake suggested percentage formula for apportionment of financial responsibility for the Air Training Plan, Canada's financial responsibility for the equipment and maintenance of the three abovementioned Squadrons would be eliminated this cost to be undertaken by the United Kingdom similarly to that for the equipment and maintenance of the personnel from the Air Training Plan.

After that time the estimates of cost to Canada were revised to eliminate costs of equipment and maintenance and the footnote in the final estimates of cost used by the Canadian Ministers at the conferences is quote Pay and Allowances and other personnel costs for the three Army Co-operation Squadrons (about 4.4 millions per year) are included in the defence totals above unquote.

The works sheets of Mr. Bryce who was working with the Canadians in the matter of costs corroborate the fact that this division of costs was made for the purpose of including in the Canadian costs only that for personnel. Mr. Bryce's recollection is quite in accord with the view of the Ministers.

Suggest Minister of National Defence bring these further circumstances to attention of the Secretary of State for the Dominions to see if members of the British Air Training Mission may not, on further consideration in light of the above, concur in Canadian view of the effect of the discussions.

1035.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 636

London, May 19, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Referring to last paragraph of my telegram No. 633 of today,¹ following additional communication has now been received from the United Kingdom Government.

United Kingdom would welcome early despatch of the No. 112 Army Co-operation Squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force. In so far as consideration has hitherto been given to equipment of this squadron, it has been understood that equipment would have to be provided in the United Kingdom. In the present circumstances it is suggested that as the Royal Canadian Air Force has a number of Lysander aircraft and as this type is being produced by us, Canadian Government might consider the possibility of sending as many fully equipped Lysander aircraft as possible for use by the No. 112 Squadron in the United Kingdom.

¹ Document 887.

Having regard to last sentence of your letter of May 11th¹ in which you indicated that the Canadian Government would be glad to give immediate consideration to any other suggestions which the Government of the United Kingdom might wish to make, Air Council have examined the other forms of air assistance which Canada might be prepared to consider as a matter of urgency, and they have the following suggestions to offer.

The first would be that the Canadian Government should consider the possibility of making available a Royal Canadian Air Force Fighter Squadron, both aircraft and personnel, at an establishment, if possible, of sixteen initial equipment.

The second would be that the Canadian Government should consider the possibility of agreeing that the whole of the output of Hurricane fighters from the Fort William factory should be diverted to the Royal Air Force for the time being.

There is a third measure of assistance which Canada might be prepared to consider. At an earlier stage, a request was made to the Canadian Government that they would consider the provision of flying boats for reconnaissance duties in the Caribbean area. Canadian Government, at the time, were unable to accede to this request. United Kingdom Government have, up to the present, sent no unit to the Caribbean, and have not earmarked one to go there. Nevertheless, this is a liability with regard to which the United Kingdom Government is at present unable to meet. United Kingdom Government would be most grateful if the Canadian Government would consider the possibility of sending six flying boats to operate in the Caribbean if the situation should demand the presence of general reconnaissance aircraft in that area.

MASSEY

1036.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 646

London, May 20, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. In view of present military situation crews of aircraft of certain Royal Air Force Army Co-operation Squadrons have been withdrawn from France to the South East of England. Ground personnel however of these Squadrons not yet arrived from France and Air Ministry have therefore requested help from Royal Canadian Air Force by loan of a maintenance party as a temporary measure from the 110th Squadron immediately. This has been arranged but would emphasize that it does not impair the operational integrity or status of the Squadron. If military situation deteriorates, very secret plan exists whereby Squadrons now in England and not employed on operations, can be so employed. Air Ministry have requested that 110th Squadron be included in this plan. This has been agreed to and with your concurrence the Squadron will be declared to be acting in combination with Royal Air Force in Great Britain if and when plan put into effect. In view of present grave emergency am assuming your concurrence in above arrangements, which will not affect eventual employment of the Squadron with the Army in which the Canadian division will be serving.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

1037.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 575

Ottawa, May 21, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. 1. Your No. 646, entirely approve of your putting at disposal of Air Ministry 110th Squadron and all available R.C.A.F. personnel to act in combination with R.A.F. in Great Britain. Please inform Air Ministry at once.

2. Your No. 636, suggestion re R.C.A.F. Fighter Squadron being investigated at once, will communicate with you, in this connection, later today. Ends.

1038.

King Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 577

Ottawa, May 21, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 636 of 19th May, 1940.

1. Canadian Government are sending No. 112 Army Co-operation Squadron R.C.A.F. earliest possible moment. The Squadron can be equipped with 12 only Lysander Aircraft of Canadian manufacture, as initial equipment. These all available Lysander Aircraft and provision necessitates closing Army Co-operation School for training air crews for No. 110 and No. 112 Army Co-operation Squadrons. This equipment can only be provided if United Kingdom undertakes supply of reinforcements from United Kingdom sources.

2. We are sending at earliest possible moment No. 1 Fighter Squadron, R.C.A.F. together with all available Hurricane Fighters, 14 in number, it being understood United Kingdom will provide reinforcements as required there being no facilities for training here.

3. We accede to request that the whole of the output of Hurricane Fighters from Fort William factory should be diverted to R.A.F. for time being.

4. We are studying ways and means to provide Flying Boats for reconnaissance duties in Caribbean area and will advise later what assistance can be given this respect.

1039.

769-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires
in United States*

TELEGRAM 84

Ottawa, May 26, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Government of United Kingdom have instructed British Ambassador to request United States authorities allow a certain number of pilots to undergo training at civilian flying schools in United States, on civilian basis if necessary. They have asked us to associate our representative in Washington with British Ambassador in this connection. You are instructed to see Ambassador at once and cooperate in making representations. Discuss with Air Attaché. It should be made clear that this plan would be supplement not substitute for Empire Air Training Scheme and would also not be substitute for our effort to purchase additional United States training planes for use in Canada in place of those United Kingdom cannot now send.

1040.

769-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 97

Washington, May 27, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 84, May 26th. Instructions followed out. Accompanied British Ambassador to Department of State 12 midday where request was presented to Welles who will furnish answer as early as possible.

1041.

769-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 109

Washington, June 4, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. My telegram No. 105 of May 31.¹ Moffat states that diversion of any considerable pilot production to training Canadian pilots will disrupt United States training programme and would seriously delay bringing United States air defences into state of readiness. Even if Canadians entered as civilians they would not be accepted as students without additional statutory authority. It is, therefore, hoped that Canadian authorities will choose not to press this particular request. Despatch by bag.

¹ Non reproduit.² Not printed.

1042.

72-J-38

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 125

Ottawa, July 2, 1940

SECRET. Last week Canadian Government officials discussed at length with representatives Ministry of Aircraft Production possibility of acquiring from stocks recently taken over from French in the United States certain aircraft and engines etc. deemed essential for defence programme in Canada. These requirements were communicated to London with strong recommendation by Morris Wilson that they be released to Canada. It now appears that in view of fact that he and the Minister of Aircraft Production are Canadians it might be better if the decision were made by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs rather than the Ministry directly concerned. We therefore earnestly request you to make a prompt and favourable decision and would emphasize that by negotiation our request has been reduced to absolute minimum necessary if in response to strong public opinion we are to do anything promptly for local defence.

1043.

72-J-38

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

No. 26

Ottawa, July 11, 1940

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to state that I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to inform you that the United Kingdom Government have been considering urgently the question which was discussed by the Minister of Munitions and Supply with Mr. Purvis, Mr. Morris Wilson and Sir Henry Self in New York about a fortnight ago, as to the possibility of Canada acquiring from stocks taken over from the French in the United States certain aircraft and engines, etc. deemed necessary for the defence of Canada.

2. The Secretary of State asks me to say that the scale of the present and impending air attacks on the United Kingdom against which the United Kingdom Government must provide by every means in their power, render it imperative for them to scrutinise with the utmost care any suggestion for releasing or for giving delivery of aircraft of operational value which they have or can get immediately into the United Kingdom.

3. With every appreciation of the difficulties with which Canada is confronted and of the sacrifices she is making in local defence, the United Kingdom authorities have been forced to the conclusion that the danger threatening the United Kingdom is such that all operational aircraft available, or becoming available, up to the end of September, will be required to meet the needs of the Royal Air Force.

4. Regretfully, therefore, they cannot see their way to divert to Canada in the immediate future the 144 Fighters and 88 twin-engined Bombers referred to in the discussions.

5. The United Kingdom authorities hope, however, that it will be possible to arrange for these requirements to be met in due course and it is their intention to inform the Canadian Government not later than the beginning of next month, of the aircraft of operational types which can be made available from American or Canadian production.

6. With regard to flying boats, the shortage of aircraft of this type is so acute, and the United Kingdom requirements in the changed situation now confronting them, are so greatly increased that the United Kingdom Government do not see how they can possibly make available for the Canadian Government any flying boats coming forward from American production in the near future. In reaching this conclusion, the United Kingdom Government have not overlooked the responsibilities which they have asked the Canadian Government to assume in the West Indies, Iceland and elsewhere.

7. The United Kingdom Government are grateful for the generous offer of 92 Lysander air frames, but they do not think that they ought to take advantage of it since they have enough of this type. They suggest that the air frames should be retained in Canada in the hope that engines can be made available for them at a later date.

8. Similarly, they suggest that the Bolingbroke air frames should be retained in the hope that it will be possible to supply the engines for them in due course. They regret that they cannot for the present spare any of the R.1535 engines asked for as they are all urgently required in the United Kingdom.

9. With regard to training aircraft, the United Kingdom Government are, of course, most anxious to give every support to the Canadian Government's efforts to make the utmost progress with the Air Training Scheme. Of the aircraft mentioned in the course of the discussions, the United Kingdom authorities agree that 80 Northrop A.17 aircraft can be diverted to the Air Training Scheme in Canada if the United States Government will release them. For the reasons already given above as regards operational aircraft, they regret that they cannot agree to the diversion of the V.156 bombers to the Training Scheme. They are, however, willing that the 125 N.A.65 trainers referred to in the course of the discussions should be diverted to the Training Scheme, also the 33 Stinson 105 type aircraft lying at Halifax. The Secretary of State's telegram to the Canadian Government No. 97 of July 8th¹ dealt with

¹ Document 793.

the question of the provision for spares for Battles and Ansons in connection with the Training Scheme. The United Kingdom authorities understand that a recalculation is now being made by the Royal Canadian Air Force of the minimum monthly requirements of Ansons to the end of the year to meet interim deficiencies and they would be glad to have particulars as soon as possible.

10. I understand that a further meeting to discuss possibilities in regard to the allocation of aircraft was held in New York yesterday, at which Mr. Howe was present, and that as a result of that meeting, a further report was to be made by Sir Henry Self to the authorities in London. It will be appreciated that the telegram on which this Note is based, was drafted before any report of yesterday's meeting could have been received and considered by the United Kingdom Government.

I have etc.

GERALD CAMPBELL

1044.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] July 15, 1940

BRITISH AIR SCHOOLS IN CANADA

Sir Gerald Campbell mentioned incidentally this afternoon that he had informed Mr. Power yesterday that the British Government would like to transfer four or so air training schools to Canada. The matter was going to be considered, he understood, by the Supervisory Committee this evening.

I asked Sir Gerald what stage of training these schools provided and whether they would affect in any way the Commonwealth Air Training scheme. He replied they were, he thought, elementary, and that they would not affect the scheme materially, though some doubling up of facilities might be required in one or two instances.

I told him it would be desirable to make clear from the start the governmental relationships involved, in view of the difficulty that had arisen in the discussions of 1938 and 1939. I said I assumed, however, that this matter had been brought to the attention of Council by Mr. Power this morning.¹

O. D. S[KELTON]

¹Note telle que dans l'original:

²Note as in original:

Agreed to by Council—16th July-40.

1045.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Mémemorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] July 19, 1940

UNITED KINGDOM AIR TRAINING SCHOOLS

Mr. Power telephoned this morning that after discussion in Council he had informed Sir Gerald Campbell that we would concur in their proposal to send four air training schools here. They have now come back—in Sir Gerald's own words—"having given them an inch they want an ell". They had in mind something almost on the dimensions of the Empire Air Training Scheme, eight training schools, navigation schools, etc. Mr. Power told Sir Gerald that this altered the picture as to control. There might be ten or twenty thousand men here. He thought himself something could be worked out bringing them under our general administrative control with local economy [autonomy?]. He was not sure that the Visiting Forces Act would apply precisely. He asked if there was anyone in our Department who was familiar with the previous scheme, particularly in its drafting. I told him we had carried on the discussions with the United Kingdom but the question of the agreement and drafting had been largely under the Finance Department and the Air Staff. I said Mr. Read was generally familiar with this subject and I thought could be free to go over, if he desired. He said he would be very glad if Mr. Read could come and see him this morning and consider an alternative relationship. I saw Mr. Read and he was of the opinion that the Visiting Forces Act might be applied and the schools here be treated much as our First Division was in England. I said I had some doubt about this. The question of relative dimensions in each case affected the picture and it also had to be considered whether an entirely detached scheme would be held to be a reflection on the administration of the existing Empire Training Scheme.

1046.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne

Minister of National Defence for Air to High Commissioner
of Great Britain

[Ottawa,] July 20, 1940

Dear Sir Gerald,

Your communication of July 18th,¹ has been duly considered, and I beg to advise you that—

(1) The Canadian Government can make available four aerodromes for S.F.T.S.'s [Service Flying Training Schools] to be located at stations al-

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

ready nearing completion and to be ready for occupation on or about the date mentioned by you, namely, the end of September.

(2) *Four additional S.F.T.S.'s at R.I. or other aerodromes to be developed immediately.* Work on the development of additional main and relief aerodromes for four schools is being started immediately, and it is anticipated that at least the main aerodromes can be made available by October 31st, 1940.

(3) *Two Air Observation and Navigation Schools.* It is anticipated that two of the aerodromes already nearing completion for Air Observers Schools of the J.A.T.P. [Joint Air Training Plan] can be allotted for this purpose.

(4) *One bombing and Gunnery School.* A reserve Bombing and Gunnery School site can be developed to meet this requirement by October 31st, 1940.

(5) *One General Reconnaissance School.* It will be necessary to select and develop a new aerodrome for this purpose but a site near Saint John, New Brunswick, on the Bay of Fundy is believed to be capable of quick development and to be suitable for this school. Immediate advice as to whether this school is to be established and as to your requirements in connection therewith is required.

(6) *One Air Navigation School.* A site which is being developed for an Air Navigation School of the J.A.T.P. will be available by October 31st, 1940.

(7) *One [Torpedo] Training School.* It is anticipated that a site can be made available for this School but a decision cannot be made until receipt of specific information regarding the requirements for it.

(8) While we would like to meet your wishes regarding concentration of these sites, we are afraid that it will not be possible to avoid a fairly wide distribution.

(9) You will recognize that the provision of these Schools for the purposes of the United Kingdom Training Scheme is only made possible by the decision of the Canadian Government made some time ago to accelerate the completion of the construction portion of the J.A.T.P. even though the Joint Plan did not call for the actual opening of some of the schools until considerably later. We should point out therefore that it is considered essential in the interest of the Plan itself and in order to maintain confidence in and support of the Plan by the Canadian public that aircraft to be supplied under the plan by the United Kingdom be provided in time for the opening of the eight S.F.T.S.'s which the Canadian Government had planned to open before December 31st, 1940. It, therefore, becomes necessary for us to stress the importance of the United Kingdom giving assurance that the supply of Anson and Battle Aircraft requested in Air Vice-Marshal McKean's signal No. 398 of July 13th¹ to Holling-

² Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.

hurst Air Ministry be forthcoming on the delivery schedules mentioned therein.

(10) It is understood that all additional expense involved will be for account of the United Kingdom. Details to be arranged later.

(11) In respect of the proposal that land for the additional aerodromes be leased, it has not been found economical to lease land for aerodrome development as land costs would be relatively low and rentals relatively high. The suggestion of United Kingdom authorities will, however, be kept in mind.

(12) This present proposal made by the United Kingdom Government differs radically from that made in Cable No. 6171, July 1st¹ to you from the Secretary of State, London, which you showed to me. Among other things, it involves a much larger number of schools and personnel than were proposed in the July 1st cable, and also a heavy increase in the number of schools and personnel proportionately to our own schools and personnel. Consequently, the suggestion to the effect that the control and administration should be vested in the United Kingdom is not now considered practicable or advisable. For one reason it is not possible to concentrate the desired units in any one section of the country. In consequence, centralized control seems desirable to obviate possible sources of friction and undesirable duplication of administration staffs. Another factor is the contiguity of some of the proposed schools to those under the J.A.T.P. and the advisability of having Canadian authority in a position to deal with the use of facilities where such use might result in interference in operations, in the absence of central authority. The Canadian Government considers, therefore, that the situation would be better met if the Schools being sent to Canada are under the Canadian Air Officer Commanding the area in which the school is located, and the administration under the control of the Royal Canadian Air Force in a manner similar to the Joint Air Training Plan. The legal position would be that of Units acting under the Visiting Forces Act in combination with the Royal Canadian Air Force and under the same command. The detailed arrangements can, of course, be worked out subsequently by negotiation.

(13) The reference to supplying rations, petrol, equipment and stores, works maintenance, special equipment, clothing, etc. has been noted and we shall endeavour to see what can be worked out in that respect.

(14) With regard to your last paragraph, we note that you recognize that some interference with the Joint Air Training Plan will be unavoidable in carrying out the arrangements outlined above. All that we can say is that the Canadian Government is just as anxious as we know the United Kingdom Government is, to have as little interference as is reasonably possible, and that every endeavour will be made toward that end.

Yours very sincerely,

[CHARLES G. POWER]

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

1047.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air

High Commissioner of Great Britain to Minister of National Defence for Air

SECRET

Ottawa, July 27, 1940

Dear Major Power,

I communicated the contents of your letter of the 20th July to the authorities in London and in the first place I am asked once again to express the warm appreciation of the United Kingdom Government of the ready and comprehensive way in which the Canadian Government have met their wishes.

With reference to the preparations for the various schools I am asked to convey the full authority of the United Kingdom Government for the placing on their behalf of all the necessary contracts required to prepare and equip in all respects the stations for the following:

- (a) eight service flying training schools,
- (b) two air observer schools,
- (c) one bombing and gunnery school,
- (d) one torpedo training school,
- (e) one general reconnaissance school.

Information with regard to the special requirements for the torpedo training school mentioned in paragraph 7 of your letter under reply were at once obtained from the Air Ministry by cable and have already been communicated to the R.C.A.F. authorities by the United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission.

You will observe that the authority to proceed includes the general reconnaissance school and I am advised that particulars of the exact requirements may be expected very shortly.

With regard to the air navigation school, I am advised that it is not now expected that this will be required before next summer.

In view of the fact that the operational position may compel the premature transfer of some of the schools the United Kingdom Government would be grateful if work in regard to all except the air navigation school could proceed as soon as possible. The present intention is actually to transfer by December next four service flying training schools, one air observer and navigation school, one bombing and gunnery school and one general reconnaissance school. Unless events compel the earlier movement of the remaining schools the United Kingdom authorities would propose to effect their transfer during

the spring and summer of next year. They are anxious that there should be no misunderstanding about the possibility that under the foregoing arrangements certain of the schools to be provided may not actually be occupied during next winter. They fear that this is unavoidable but they feel sure also that the Canadian Government will understand that they must provide against the very serious situation which would arise if schools situated in the United Kingdom had to be shut down because of the operational situation before the end of the winter and no alternative accommodation was available for them.

With regard to the equipping and furnishing of the schools referred to in paragraph two above, it is to be understood that the authority covers the full scale laid down for similar R.C.A.F. schools, including barrack furniture, mechanical transport, special winter equipment, petrol tank storage, etc., and also such special winter clothing as may be judged necessary.

On the subject of control referred to in paragraph 12 of your letter, the United Kingdom Government appreciate that their latest proposals differ radically from the earlier one and they accept in principle the proposal that the schools transferred to Canada should be under the Canadian Air Officers Commanding the areas in which the schools are situated and under the general control of the R.C.A.F. They recognize that this will entail a serious addition to the responsibilities of the R.C.A.F. and, if the Canadian Government so desire, they will be prepared to send experienced officers to help in the discharge of these increased responsibilities.

With regard to the leasing of land, the United Kingdom Government are prepared to buy the land outright if and when this course appears to be the most economical.

On the question of publicity to which you referred in your letter of the 25th July,¹ the United Kingdom authorities feel that any publicity in connection with the proposed transfer of R.A.F. schools to Canada might have serious consequences, and for this reason they would rather not have anything said at this time. They trust you will agree.

As regards the provision of aircraft for the Joint Air Training Plan, the United Kingdom authorities have asked me to make it clear that no aircraft are being diverted from the Plan to facilitate the transfer of the R.A.F. training schools, although it would have considerably eased the United Kingdom problem if this had been practicable. The United Kingdom authorities will do all in their power to deliver aircraft for the Plan at the rates informally communicated to the R.C.A.F. authorities.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

1048.

72-T-40

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 130

London, September 5, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins. We have been reviewing in War Cabinet the arrangements for transfer of R.A.F. training establishments to Canada. First let me say again how grateful we are for the readiness with which you and your colleagues agreed to accept this further addition to the heavy responsibilities you are already shouldering in connection with air training. I have heard of the great progress which you have already made. Since mid-July, when we laid our proposals before you, we have witnessed development of air attack on these islands, and battle is now raging with unabated vigour. This may be a decisive event in the war and must dominate all other considerations. We have no doubt about the final issue but we feel at this moment it would not be right to separate too large a portion of our reserve of skilled pilots or of potentially operational aircraft from the fighting strength of the R.A.F. in this country. We cannot tell what new form the enemy's attack may take; nor what our losses will be; nor what damage will be done to our factories, both of new production and repair. We do not know with any certainty the size of the air force which the enemy may yet bring against us. It is certainly very much larger than our own.

Therefore, we have reached the conclusion the programme for moving training establishments to Canada should be slowed down for the time being and we shall look at the whole question again at the beginning of next month in the light of the fortunes of battle. Meanwhile, there could not safely be any relaxation of your efforts to get facilities ready for us. On the contrary, I ask that the utmost effort should continue to be made against the possibility that events may compel us to work to original programme. Our High Commissioner in Ottawa is being furnished with particulars of modifications which we propose. I am sure you will understand the reasons for our change of plans and will be at one with us in our decision. Ends.

1049.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 1558

London, September 16, 1940

Your telegram 9th August, No. 1240.¹ Financial responsibility of R.C.A.F.

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

squadrons in the United Kingdom. Views of the United Kingdom are set out below and the Canadian Government invited to give their consideration.

Formation of a Canadian Corps in the United Kingdom instead of in France as previously contemplated does not, in the view of the United Kingdom, affect the arrangement regarding the 110th A. C. Squadron as outlined by Eden's letter attached to our despatch A.149, May 11th,¹ since the Squadron will still undertake army co-operation duties required by a Canadian Corps. Suggested that the Canadian Government should now undertake full financial liabilities for this Squadron as from same date as that accepted for non-divisional troops, namely, September 1st.

As regards the 110th Army Co-operation Squadron and No. 1 Fighter Squadron, the United Kingdom feel that rather different circumstances have attended their despatch to this country. In this connection reference made to Canadian Government's offer, embodied in your telegram No. 517, May 10th,² to give immediate consideration to any suggestion which the United Kingdom Government might wish to make in connection with the programme of Canada's war effort. Among specific possibilities mentioned was despatch of 112th Squadron at an earlier rather than a later stage if considered desirable here. United Kingdom welcome[d] this suggestion and also asked that the Canadian Government might consider possibility of making available an R.C.A.F. fighter squadron. The Canadian Government accepted both these suggestions.

In the circumstances, the United Kingdom authorities have assumed that financial liabilities in respect to above two squadrons do not arise, and that they would be regarded in the same light as C.A.S.F. for which the Canadian Government are, in general, assuming full financial liabilities.

MASSEY

1050.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2037

London, December 9, 1940

Following from Ralston. Begins. There is to be a meeting with the Air Ministry later this week to discuss, among other things, financial responsibility for 110, 112, No. 1 Fighter R.C.A.F. Squadrons. After thoroughly going into the files and correspondence, my own conclusion is that we should accept the proposal in High Commissioner's telegram No. 1558 of September

¹ Non reproduit.

² Document 884.

¹ Not printed.

16th. In this connection see memorandum from Acting Deputy Minister for Air dated October 25th¹ and approved by Mr. Power.

Would appreciate authority to deal with this matter along lines suggested above.² Ends.

MASSEY

1051.

72-AN-40

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

No. 11
SECRET

Ottawa, March 10, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to discussions which have taken place between the United Kingdom Liaison Mission and the Royal Canadian Air Force authorities with regard to future arrangements for the ferrying of American aircraft across the Atlantic.

2. I have now been instructed to acquaint the Canadian Government that the United Kingdom Government have carefully considered the proposal that the aerodrome at Debort should be diverted from its original purpose under the Joint Air Training Plan and used instead as a Royal Air Force station under arrangements similar to those agreed upon for the R.A.F. transferred schools.

3. As [an] R.A.F. station Debort would be used to house two units, namely,
- (1) an operational training unit for the training of pupils in operating the types of aircraft which are to be ferried across the Atlantic, and
 - (2) an aircraft receipt and despatch unit which will be a civilian organisation under Atfero [Atlantic Air Ferry Organization].

The Commanding Officer of the R.A.F. operational training unit would be the Station Commander whose relations with the R.C.A.F. would be similar to those of the Commanding Officers of other R.A.F. transferred schools. Technical and operational responsibility for the receipt and despatch unit would be vested in Atfero.

4. The United Kingdom Government are reluctant to propose any modification of the J.A.T.P. arrangements which, under the efficient management of the R.C.A.F., are making such excellent progress, particularly as so much depends on them but, in view of the importance and the urgency of the need for establishing the ferrying service on a sound basis, they feel that they have

¹ Non reproduit.

² À la suite du télégramme 1932 du 10 décembre 1940, le colonel Ralston reçut ce pouvoir.

³ Not printed.

² Colonel Ralston received in Telegram 1932 of December 10, 1940, the authority he requested.

no alternative but to suggest the use of Debert for the purposes now proposed. The United Kingdom Government would accordingly be very grateful if the Canadian Government would signify their early concurrence in the proposal and arrange for the necessary constructional work to be put in hand at once.

5. It would be the intention (and the Ministry of Aircraft Production concur) that the whole expense of providing Debert and adapting it to its altered purpose would be borne by the Air Ministry. This would simplify the financial arrangements from the point of view of the Canadian Government, and settlement would be made in the same way as for the transferred R.A.F. schools.

6. I have also been asked to inform the Canadian Government that the United Kingdom Government would propose to employ J.A.T.P. pilots, officers and W/T operators to help in ferrying the aircraft across the Atlantic. This will entail little delay in their employment on operational duties.

7. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand, as partners in the J.A.T.P., will be interested in the proposed modifications in the existing arrangements and they are therefore being informed by the United Kingdom Government.

I have etc.

W. C. HANKINSON

1052.

72-T-40

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire
d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs*

516X/367

Ottawa, March 12, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

My dear Mr. Robertson,

I understand that when the Minister of National Defence was in England he attended a meeting at the Air Ministry on Thursday, the 7th January,¹ for the purpose of discussing certain questions among which were the offer of the Canadian Government to provide more facilities for flying training in Canada and the question of arranging for a certain amount of flying training for the R.A.F. to be undertaken in the United States.

At that meeting, the Secretary of State for Air explained that the needs of the United Kingdom were such that if flying training capacity could be obtained in the United States with aerodromes, instructors and all the necessary training aircraft, the United Kingdom Government would feel bound to use it as a reinforcement of the training facilities developed in the different parts of the British Commonwealth. He pointed out that there were obvious political advantages also in arranging for a certain amount of training to be done in the United States.

¹ Voir le document 812.

¹ See Document 812.

I believe that a paragraph explaining this was included in the original draft of the aide-mémoire furnished to Colonel Ralston in connection with Canada's offer to provide more training facilities, but it was finally omitted from the aide-mémoire at Colonel Ralston's request.

The Secretary of State for Air, in agreeing to this omission, made it clear that this did not mean that the United Kingdom Government could abandon the idea of obtaining training facilities in the United States, and reiterated that if it were found possible to obtain such facilities the United Kingdom Government would be bound to take advantage of them.

I am informed that a definite offer has now been received of flying training facilities in the United States, (which at the time when it was made was subject to the passing of the Lease-Lend Bill). Under this offer the United Kingdom will obtain the use not only of aerodromes but also of instructors and training aircraft which could not be obtained in any other way; moreover a good deal of the expenditure involved will come under the Lease-Lend scheme. Financially, therefore, the offer is an extremely favourable one. In these circumstances the United Kingdom Government feel that they must take advantage of the offer and are taking the necessary steps accordingly.

The United Kingdom Government have been anxious that the position as outlined in the foregoing paragraphs of this letter should be explained to the Canadian Government as early as possible, and it is hoped that the Canadian Government will agree that the action which is being taken is fully justified, particularly as, in the interval which has elapsed since the discussion with Colonel Ralston, it has become abundantly clear that the use to be made of the Canadian Government's offer of extended training facilities will tax Canadian capacity to the full.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1053.

72-AN-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire suppléant
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

No. 7
SECRET

Ottawa, March 25, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your note #11, dated 10th March, 1941, with regard to the use of the facilities of the air station at Debert, Nova Scotia.

This matter was brought to the attention of the Minister of National Defence for Air, who asked that the following points should be brought to your attention:

The air station at Debert, N.S., was built originally as a second line aerodrome for use of the R.C.A.F. in the defence of the Atlantic Coast. Associated with the aerodrome is an R.C.A.F. Explosives Depot.

When, on 27th July, 1940, Sir Gerald Campbell, on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, urgently requested facilities in Canada for certain R.A.F. schools, the Debert aerodrome was selected as the site for a General Reconnaissance School and an Air Navigation School.

Hangars, buildings, aprons and taxiways to meet the requirements of the General Reconnaissance School were constructed and are now complete.

As the R.C.A.F. needs accommodation at this aerodrome for emergency use, additional hangars, buildings, etc., to accommodate two squadrons are being built as an R.C.A.F. commitment and as these buildings would have been suitable for the Air Navigation School, it was intended to loan the group of buildings for use by the R.A.F. Air Navigation School, subject to evacuation in an emergency.

It is now proposed to accede to Mr. Hankinson's request and allot the hangars, buildings, etc., which were built for the General Reconnaissance School, and the R.C.A.F. buildings to the Air Ministry.

The R.C.A.F. Explosives Depot, which is a separate group of buildings, will remain in use by the R.C.A.F.

The proposal that the Commanding Officer of the R.A.F. Operational Training Unit be the station commander whose relations with the R.C.A.F. would be similar to those of the Commanding Officers of other R.A.F. transferred schools is satisfactory.

The Department of National Defence for Air will arrange for the construction of such additional buildings as may be necessary on receipt of advice of the specific requirements.

In keeping with the primary reason for the development of Debert aerodrome, it is intended that the Canadian Government shall retain title to the property and to the buildings which are being built for emergency use of the R.C.A.F. The Canadian Government should not ask the United Kingdom Government to reimburse it for the development of the aerodrome to its present state, nor for buildings built for R.C.A.F. use, but all commitments to meet the requirements of the R.A.F. and Atfero Units and for operation and maintenance of the aerodrome should be recoverable from the Air Ministry.

To provide for the R.A.F. General Reconnaissance School and Air Navigation School which have been displaced by these arrangements, the aerodrome, hangars, buildings, etc., which have been developed at Charlottetown, P.E.I., to accommodate the Bombing and Gunnery School of the J.A.T.P. will be allotted, and in consequence the entire expenditure by the Canadian Government as administrator of the J.A.T.P. for the development and the construction of this aerodrome, buildings, etc., will

be recoverable from the United Kingdom Government on the same basis as the other aerodromes allotted for the accommodation of the R.A.F. Schools.

Mr. Power has asked me to assure you that the buildings completed at Debert are ready for immediate occupancy.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

1054.

72-T-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting
High Commissioner of Great Britain*

SECRET. IMMEDIATE

Ottawa, March 25, 1941

My dear Mr. Hankinson,

Your letter of March 12th with reference to the proposed establishment of Royal Air Force training schools in the United States, has been considered by the War Committee of the Cabinet.

They fully appreciate the desirability of a policy which will take advantage of all possible available training facilities wherever they may be situated, particularly if the provision of these services is under such favourable conditions as anticipated in your letter, namely, the provision of schools fully equipped *ab initio* with aerodromes, instructors and aircraft, and with the added assistance of the benefits of the lend lease bill. Upon these premises there can be no logical criticism of such a course.

I am directed, however, to make certain observations on the following statement in the last paragraph of your letter, viz: "it has become abundantly clear that the use to be made of the Canadian Government's offer of extended training facilities will tax Canadian capacity to the full".

In this connection I might draw your attention to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs' telegram No. 178 of December 9th last,¹ in which, after expressing the greatest satisfaction in regard to Canada's effort at that time, he indicated that in the opinion of the United Kingdom Government it was not thought desirable to embark upon an enlargement of the Joint Air Training Scheme. This telegram went on to emphasize the view that the efforts of the Canadian Government should be directed to pressing the production of training aircraft, particularly the Anson type.

¹ Document 802.

In the later discussions which Colonel Ralston had with the United Kingdom Air Ministry in London, he pointed out that Canada had successfully carried out her undertakings in the matter of the Training Scheme and had indeed offered to enlarge them.

The Joint Air Training Scheme is at present functioning considerably ahead of the contemplated schedule. A number of aerodromes have been developed for transfer of schools of the Royal Air Force, which have not yet been occupied. In this connection I am enclosing a summary statement¹ of the present position in respect of the various transfer projects. In addition a large number of aerodrome sites have been investigated and reported upon at the request of the British Liaison Mission in connection with the tentative proposals of the Air Ministry to transfer further training schools and operational training units to Canada. The Royal Canadian Air Force have never expressed any inability or reluctance to supply any facilities asked for or suggested by the Royal Air Force.

In these circumstances the competent Canadian authorities have no hesitation in saying that Canada has by no means reached the limit of her capacity in the provision of air training facilities. The use of any such assumption as a guiding reason for the establishment of schools in the United States is not, in their opinion, accurately expressing the situation.

If, for other cogent reasons, R.A.F. training schools are established in the United States, it is felt very strongly that simultaneously the training facilities in Canada should be pressed forward aggressively, preferably by the further transfer of Royal Air Force schools.

Yours very sincerely,

[N. A. ROBERTSON]

1055.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

516X/383

Ottawa, April 8, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

My dear Prime Minister,

In the letter which he addressed to Mr. Hankinson on 25th March last, Mr. Norman Robertson set forth the attitude of the War Committee of the Cabinet in regard to the proposals of the United Kingdom for availing themselves of flying training facilities in the U.S.A.

It was explained in the first place that the Canadian Government recognised the desirability of taking advantage of all available training facilities wherever

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

situated, and did not feel disposed to criticise the proposal, in view of the very favourable conditions upon which the facilities in the United States were expected to be made available. I should like to say at the outset that the United Kingdom authorities appreciate the attitude of the Canadian Government in this matter, and have been very glad to note that in principle the Canadian Government do not see fundamental objections to the course proposed.

Nevertheless it is clear from the considerations set out in the second half of Mr. Robertson's letter that the Canadian authorities are in some doubt as to the precise nature of the proposal and in regard to its effect on the arrangements already made or to be made for training in Canada, and I have been asked to make the following explanations on these points.

(a) In the first place the United Kingdom Government wish me to set out the very great advantages which will be derived from this scheme. It enables the R.A.F. to get the use of 540 additional training aircraft which could not be obtained in any other way and which their training effort most urgently needs; secondly, it enables them to obtain the services of additional instructors, of which there is an equally urgent need; thirdly it is hoped that the scheme will enable volunteers from the United States, who would not otherwise be forthcoming to be brought into training; and finally, it has political advantages, in that it will strengthen the ties of friendship and goodwill which exist between the United States and the British Commonwealth.

(b) For the above reasons the United Kingdom authorities felt bound to accept the facilities offered. These were sufficient, it is estimated, to provide for the establishment of six schools in all, which it was understood could be prepared, complete with all facilities within six to twelve weeks of acceptance. I now understand that there is a possibility of more extended facilities of the same nature being offered by the United States authorities, and if this proves to be the case the United Kingdom Government will be equally obliged to accept this further assistance.

(c) At the same time, the United Kingdom Government are very sensible of the considerations set out in Mr. Robertson's letter in regard to the offers which the Canadian Government have repeatedly made to expand the training facilities available in Canada, and also of the promptness, thoroughness and efficiency with which all requests for assistance in the provision of training capacity have been met. Their acceptance of facilities in the United States is based solely on the considerations set out in paragraph (a) above, and on the fact that shortage of training aircraft and instructors is now the principal limiting factor in the expansion of our training programme.

(d) As regards the utilisation of facilities in Canada, I have been informed that the United Kingdom authorities hope in the very near future to be able to indicate the dates on which the remainder of the fourteen establishments listed in the enclosure in Mr. Robertson's letter will actually

be occupied by transferred schools from the United Kingdom. Every effort is being made to hasten the arrival of these schools. Furthermore, I understand that consideration is being given to the possibility of transferring additional schools to Canada; this, however, is still in an elementary stage of examination and I am unable at present to give particulars. I am, however, in a position to say that the United Kingdom authorities have every intention of availing themselves to the fullest possible extent of the facilities which Canada can provide, and which the Canadian Government have been so ready to grant.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

1056.

72-AN-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975Y/6

Ottawa, April 10, 1941

My dear Mr. Robertson,

With reference to your Note No. 7 of the 25th March, the High Commissioner asks me to tell you that he has now received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs regarding the use of the facilities at the Air Station at Debert, Nova Scotia.

The United Kingdom authorities are extremely grateful for the readiness which the Canadian Government have shown to make the required facilities available, and they agree with the terms suggested for the use of this aerodrome. The Air Ministry also concur in the proposal to locate a general reconnaissance and an air navigation school at Charlottetown.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1057.

769-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

Ottawa, April 19, 1941

My dear Mr. Robertson,

May I refer to the correspondence about the facilities which have been offered us in the United States for the training of pilots for the Royal Air

Force. I am now informed that for the present pupils for the civil schools which are being placed at our disposal in the United States will come mainly from the United Kingdom and that the first 100 are expected to leave today, the 19th April, and the second 100 early in May. These arrangements are said to be definite and the expectation is that subsequent departures from the United Kingdom will be 100 on each of the following approximate dates: May 21st, May 28th, June 11th, June 25th, July 2nd, July 16th and July 30th.

Because of shipping uncertainties it is probable that the arrival of pupils in Canada will not be closely related to the dates when the courses in the United States civil schools are due to begin and it may, therefore, be necessary for pupils to wait for a short time in Canada. Arrangements will, therefore, need to be made for some form of personnel transit centre for the accommodation of pupils arriving from the United Kingdom and, later on, for pupils returning after completing their training at the United States schools. The United Kingdom Government would be most grateful if the arrangements for the reception and movements of this personnel could be made under the auspices of the R.C.A.F. It is understood that the R.C.A.F. have had in mind the establishment of some form of personnel reception and disposal depot as distinct from the embarkation depot at Halifax, and if the proposal set out above should be acceptable to the Canadian Government it might be found desirable to make some addition to the plans to allow for movements of R.A.F. personnel to and from the United States civil flying training schools. Meanwhile it might be found necessary to accommodate those arriving in the very near future at the R.A.F. station at Debert.

Pupils coming from the United Kingdom will travel in uniform but will carry civilian clothes with them. It will be necessary to withdraw their uniforms at the transit centre in Canada and hold them for re-issue on the return journey of the pupils.

The United Kingdom Government are anxious to know as early as possible whether the Canadian Government will be able to help them in this matter, and I would be grateful for an early reply. If this proposal could be approved in principle it would be helpful, in view of the need to make urgent arrangements for the reception of the first arrivals, if the details could be settled between R.C.A.F. Headquarters and the United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission. It is understood, of course, that the United Kingdom Government accept responsibility for the costs which would arise out of the above proposals.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1058.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

516X/383

Ottawa, April 28, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

My dear Prime Minister,

May I ask you to refer to my letter of the 8th April, in which I gave certain explanations regarding the proposals of the United Kingdom for availing themselves of flying training facilities in the United States of America.

I have now received a further telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, in which I am informed that the relevant negotiations in the United States are proceeding rapidly and are expected to reach a successful conclusion in the near future. The offer which is under discussion is for the United States Army Air Corps to place at our disposal

(a) one-third of its expanding capacity for primary, basic and advanced pilot training: and by the end of 1941 this will equal the capacity of seven and a half full sized R.A.F. service flying training schools with matching elementary flying training schools: and

(b) the entire capacity of the Pan-American Airways Air Navigation School at Miami.

Entry of United Kingdom pupils can begin in June, and entry on the enlarged scale at Miami can begin in August.

This is training capacity which the United Kingdom Government most urgently need and cannot obtain quickly enough in any other way. In endeavouring hitherto to obtain it by alternative methods, they have been faced by the impossibility of supplying either the instructors or the aircraft in time to produce the trained pilots and observers by the dates on which they will be required. The offer therefore provides a most satisfactory way out of the difficulty which had previously seemed insoluble and the United Kingdom Government feel that they have no alternative but to accept it. They point out that the more quickly they can increase the pilot and observer strength during the next twelve months the more quickly will final victory be achieved.

In informing me of this decision the Secretary of State expresses the view that it will tax our combined resources to the utmost to provide all the instructors, aircraft spares, etc. that will be needed for the schools already established or agreed to be established in Canada and the other Dominions. Indeed, as the Canadian Government are only too well aware, shipping difficulties and interference with production in the United Kingdom have prevented the United Kingdom Government from supplying all the aircraft and spares they are due to supply for the Joint Air Training Plan schools and for the United Kingdom schools already transferred.

It seems probable that despite all efforts to keep to schedule, the position in regard to the supply of instructors and aircraft will tend in the near future to become worse rather than better as the number of schools located in the Dominions increases, even if no more schools than it has already been decided to establish in the Dominions are actually established there. Demands for additional staff for the expanding training organisation can only be met by appropriating for it personnel who would otherwise be posted to operational units where they are very badly needed, and in some instances the choice may well be between forming new training units or forming new operational units, and the decision may have to go in favour of the latter.

The Secretary of State adds, in this connection, that the United Kingdom Government are very grateful for the financial offer recently made by the Canadian Government in their telegram No. 46 of the 27th March,¹ but points out that, as you are aware, it imposes on the United Kingdom Government the obligation to scrutinise very carefully any proposals involving an increase in the holding of sterling by Canada, and a careful scrutiny of the financial position leads to the conclusion that expenditure in Canada beyond that to which the United Kingdom is already committed ought so far as possible to be devoted to the purchase of food and munitions rather than to a still bigger extension of flying training than has already been contemplated.

In this connection, you will be interested to have the following further particulars which I have received regarding the actual establishment in Canada of the schools already agreed upon. This matter was referred to in the enclosure in Mr. Robertson's letter to Mr. Hankinson of the 25th March last. The position is as follows:

(a) of the fourteen schools programme, the R.A.F. have already transferred or are in process of transferring four Service Flying Training Schools, one General Reconnaissance School, one Air Navigation School, one Air Observer School and one Bombing and Gunnery School. The remaining four Service Flying Training Schools are scheduled to leave the United Kingdom in time to commence training in Canada one in September, two in October and one in November. The date of transfer of the Torpedo Training School depends on the results of discussions now in progress between the Air Ministry and the United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission, but it is hoped to transfer it in time for it to commence training by the 1st September. The date of the transfer of the remaining Air Navigation School is uncertain, but it may be July, to commence training in August. I hope to be able to confirm this shortly.

(b) As regards Elementary Flying Training Schools to match the eight transferred Service Flying Training Schools, one of these leaves the United Kingdom for its temporary location in Canada immediately.

¹ Document 638.

Departure of the second is delayed for a short period pending a clearing of the instructor situation. No date has yet been fixed for the remaining six. In general, however, the United Kingdom authorities would be prepared to form all these Elementary Flying Training Schools as soon as aerodromes are ready for them in Canada.

(c) As regards Operational Training Units, the Canadian Government are already aware of the proposals for the Hudson Operational Training Unit at Debert. The United Kingdom authorities would be prepared to form Hurricane and Hampden Operational Training Units when aerodromes are ready. The date of formation of the remaining Operational Training Units which will be equipped with American aircraft cannot yet be given.

The United Kingdom Government appreciate that this is a very large programme for Canada to undertake in addition to the Joint Air Training Plan, and they are extremely grateful to the Canadian Government for so readily undertaking it and for the speed and efficiency with which they have carried through the Joint Plan and have prepared the aerodromes and buildings for the additional units. This is a really remarkable and unique contribution to the Commonwealth war effort, and the help which the Canadian Government are generously giving with the Atfero organisation will make further heavy demands on their resources.

The Secretary of State has asked me on behalf of the United Kingdom Government to express their deep appreciation to you and your colleagues not only for the ready and generous help which you have at once extended to all our proposals, but also for your understanding of our difficulties and our need, in the common cause, to take advantage of training facilities offered to us elsewhere.*

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

1059.

769-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne

Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission of Great Britain

SECRET

Ottawa, May 10, 1941

Dear Mr. Hankinson,

I wish to refer to your letters of April 19th and May 3rd¹ regarding arrangements to be made for the accommodation of the United Kingdom pupils passing through Canada to and from the United States in connection with the use of air training facilities in the United States, and to inform you that the War Committee have approved of the establishment of a depot in eastern

* Note telle que dans l'original:

Read to W[ar] C[ommittee]. 30-4-41. K[ing].

* Footnote as in original:

¹Not printed.

¹Non reproduite.

Canada for this purpose. No definite decision has yet been taken as to the most suitable location for the proposed reception depot. I am informed that pending its selection arrangements can be made for the interim accommodation of pupils destined for training in the United States who may arrive during the next few weeks.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

1060.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

516X/383

Ottawa, May 13, 1941

My dear Prime Minister,

I am writing about the proposal that the United Kingdom Government should avail themselves of certain facilities for civil flying training in the United States of America, which Sir Archibald Sinclair discussed with Colonel Ralston at the time of the latter's visit to London.

The United Kingdom Government are grateful for the Canadian Government's co-operation in the consultations on the subject which have proceeded between the two Governments since, and are glad that there is agreement that the proposal offers advantages that we should unhesitatingly accept. The United Kingdom Government wish me to repeat at the same time that these plans will in no way reduce the scope of the Joint Air Training Plan in Canada, which, together with those other measures of assistance in the field of air training so generously afforded by the Canadian Government, are being developed much beyond the maximum degree originally planned and at a pace which is far ahead of the original schedule. This constitutes a remarkable achievement by the Canadian authorities who are mainly responsible for this scheme, which will, we believe, be one of the most weighty and decisive factors in gaining victory for our arms.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

1061.

King Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 92

London, June 2, 1941

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins. I received on May 29th following message from President Roosevelt. Begins.

In spite of the best efforts of the organization now handling flight delivery of combat aircraft from this country to England, I am advised that substantial numbers of these planes are accumulating in this country, and that this condition is apt to grow worse as production reaches an accelerated rate over the next few months.

In our common interest, and in order to relieve situation as much as possible, I am prepared to direct the army and the navy to assume full responsibility of transfer of American built aircraft from factory to point of ultimate take off, and to supply maintenance and servicing facilities along the way and at ultimate landing field. This should release a number of civilian pilots now delivering planes. Many such pilots can reasonably be expected to increase pool corps of Atlantic ferry pilots now engaged in this work. Since military and naval pilots and ground crews would be engaged in delivery of planes, I am advised that closest co-operation, necessary to carry through successfully this continuous operation, can best be obtained if responsibility for Atlantic flights could be undertaken by their sister services under Air Ministry, using, of course, the present civilian pilots and such additional ones as may become available. This procedure would enable planes to be brought under control and direction of Royal Air Force prior to scheduling of take off and approach to their designated landing fields in England. The success of this operation would depend in large part upon provisions for adequate westbound aircraft transportation, but I am confident that with goodwill on both sides, such problems can be solved and greater assurances given of ability to handle delivery of increased quantity of combat aircraft anticipated during the summer months. I hope you will comment frankly on this proposal.

For example, the American Army and Navy could deliver planes at Botwood, Newfoundland, ready and serviced for R.A.F. to take them over and fly them across. Later, and depending on developments, we might be able to deliver them to your people in Iceland.

Ends.

I replied on May 31st as follows. Begins.

(1) Am deeply grateful to you for your proposals of May 29th which we at once accept in principle.

(2) I must, moreover, consult the Canadian Government, but I have no doubt about their response.

The Air Ministry has been instructed to plan the reorganization of ferrying service in accordance with your views. A senior officer will be sent out at once to study the problem on the spot and to consult your Navy and War Departments.

(3) We are bent on speeding flow of aircraft from your factories to our squadrons, and the R.A.F. will welcome the opportunity of working with the officers of the United States services on this task.

Ends.

2. Arrangements proposed by the President will presumably involve use by United States service personnel of same aerodromes in Canada and Newfoundland as are at present used as intermediate stops in ferrying route via Newfoundland, and they will no doubt wish to establish ground and maintenance crews at these aerodromes. These and other arrangements could be worked out in detail once principle is accepted, and I would propose that senior R.A.F. officer whom we are sending to the United States should proceed via Canada.

3. I know you will recognize the vital importance of this matter to us. May I ask for your acceptance and count on your co-operation in putting into effect arrangements which President Roosevelt has proposed.

4. I am causing the Governor of Newfoundland to be informed of these proposals and asking him to co-operate with the Canadian Government. I should be very grateful for an early reply.¹ Message ends.

¹ Non trouvée.

² Not located.

1062.

72-T-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*
*High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516X/400

Ottawa, June 3, 1941

SECRET

My dear Mr. Robertson,

You will remember that in your letter of the 25th March last you referred to the fact that a large number of aerodrome sites in Canada had been investigated and reported upon in connection with the tentative proposals of the Air Ministry to transfer further training schools and operational units to Canada in addition to those already agreed upon. The High Commissioner informed the Prime Minister, in the last paragraph of his letter of the 8th April, that these proposals were still in an elementary stage of examination, but indicated that the United Kingdom authorities had every intention of availing themselves to the fullest possible extent of the facilities which Canada was willing to provide.

The High Commissioner has now received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that the Air Ministry have had the opportunity fully to consider these plans. They regret that they have not been able to formulate them earlier, and trust that this delay will not seriously impede the preparation of the necessary sites and buildings.

The additional units which it is proposed should be located in Canada are set out in the enclosed memorandum.¹ It will be seen that in addition to the establishment in Canada of certain Operational Training Units and specialist schools, the Air Ministry now contemplate the probable transfer of a further six Service Flying Training Schools from the United Kingdom.

The High Commissioner has been asked to seek the concurrence of the Canadian Government in this programme. The United Kingdom authorities realise, of course, that an additional programme of this size must necessarily take time to complete, and that the unavoidable delay in taking decisions has not helped in this respect. Nevertheless, their previous experience of the capacity of the R.C.A.F. to tackle problems of this nature energetically leads them to hope that some of the stations may be ready this year. The United Kingdom authorities add that any information which it may be possible to provide as to the dates by which the stations are likely to become available will be of incalculable assistance to the Air Ministry for planning purposes.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

1063.

72-AN-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975Y/13

Ottawa, June 9, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

My dear Mr. Robertson,

The High Commissioner has received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking him to express to the Canadian Government the gratification with which the United Kingdom Government have learned of their acceptance of the proposals in regard to the trans-Atlantic ferry service, which formed the subject of Mr. Churchill's most secret and personal message to Mr. Mackenzie King in telegram No. 92 of the 2nd June.

Lord Cranborne states that Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill is being appointed to take charge, under the Air Ministry, of the trans-Atlantic ferrying arrangements. It is proposed that he should fly to Canada via Newfoundland by a Liberator aircraft, leaving about the 13th or 14th June. He will be accompanied by a party of three or four, including a finance representative, and the Air Attaché at Washington is being asked to arrange to join the party either at Gander or Montreal and to accompany Sir Frederick Bowhill on his tour.

The purpose of his visit is to study the problem on the spot and to consult with the responsible authorities in Canada and the United States and with the Newfoundland authorities so far as may be necessary. It is proposed that he should return to the United Kingdom as soon as possible with proposals for the formal assumption of control of ferrying arrangements.

The United Kingdom authorities would like to make a provisional programme for Sir Frederick Bowhill's movements. Presumably the Canadian authorities would wish to have him met by the R.C.A.F. on arrival at Gander, where the Newfoundland Government will no doubt wish also to send a representative to meet him. They would assume that, at that stage, only a very brief stay should be contemplated to look at local facilities, and that he should proceed by air as soon as possible to Montreal. Although the Administration of the Newfoundland airport is the responsibility of the R.C.A.F., the question of facilities there for the ferry service was expressly reserved by Newfoundland in the negotiations between Newfoundland and Canada regarding the airport. For this reason, and for others of a more general nature, the United Kingdom authorities feel that it is desirable that Newfoundland representatives should be associated so far as may be appropriate with the discussions in Canada. It may be convenient, therefore, that Newfoundland repre-

sentatives should proceed to Canada for the purpose. The question of how long to allow for the discussions in Canada before Sir Frederick Bowhill goes on to the United States could be settled on his arrival, but it is hoped that it will be possible to make rapid progress with them.

The High Commissioner has been asked to discuss the matter with the Canadian authorities and report at the earliest possible date, and Mr. MacDonald will hold himself at their disposal for this purpose.

Lord Cranborne adds that it is most important that information as to Sir Frederick Bowhill's appointment should be treated as strictly confidential pending an official announcement which is not likely to be made for several days.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1064.

72-T-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1267

London, July 14, 1941

SECRET. From Power to Ralston for Finance. Begins. The question of placing R.A.F. special schools in Canada on a capital cost and annual maintenance on a lump sum basis has been fully reviewed by and with all officials concerned. United Kingdom are now agreeable to accepting principle of such a settlement on broad terms and are willing to enter into an agreement to conclude this matter as soon as costs and mechanics of equipment accounting are finally completed. Details in this regard are now being worked out for submission. Details of costs that are obtainable here are also being reviewed. Air Ministry intend to bring establishments of special schools in Canada on to basis of similarity with schools in J.A.T.P. which will simplify acceptance of figures of certain J.A.T.P. schools. Air Ministry also agreeable to principle that all matters of special commitments other than special schools or J.A.T.P. that may arise in future should be reviewed for settlement on a lump sum or per capita basis. Ends.

MASSEY

1065.

72-AN-40

*Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

Ottawa, July 20, 1941

My dear Mr. Robertson,

In his letter of the 9th June last, the High Commissioner informed you that Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill was being appointed to take charge, under the Air Ministry, of the Trans-Atlantic ferrying arrangements. I have now been asked to inform the Canadian Government of the following further progress which has been made in this matter.

The Canadian Government are already aware that the President of the United States has offered to make arrangements for the delivery by United States service personnel of American-built aircraft up to the ultimate take-off point across the Atlantic. For this purpose the United States Government have created a United States Army Air Corps Ferrying Command.

It was a condition of this offer that arrangements should be made whereby such aircraft could be handed over direct to the Royal Air Force, and for this purpose, the Secretary of State for Air appointed Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill to be Commander-in-Chief, the Royal Air Force Ferrying Command, with the duty of organising and controlling all ferrying arrangements. After Sir Frederick's visit to Canada and the United States in June, discussions took place in London with the Canadian Minister of National Defence Air Services, the Honourable C. G. Power, and the Canadian Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal Breadner, on various questions arising out of the formation of this Command. It was agreed, subject to the formal approval of the Canadian Government, that the Commander-in-Chief, Royal Air Force Ferrying Command, should make his headquarters in Montreal, and in order to facilitate the closest co-operation between this Command and the R.C.A.F. authorities, it was suggested that an R.C.A.F. officer should be attached to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief as a Liaison Officer.

Sir Frederick Bowhill, as you know, has now returned to Canada, and is conducting further discussions here on questions of personnel, with a view to taking over the responsibilities of his Command in the immediate future. I should be very grateful to learn, as soon as possible, that the above arrangements are acceptable to the Canadian Government.

Yours sincerely,

PATRICK DUFF

1066.

72-AN-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain

SECRET

Ottawa, July 28, 1941

Dear Sir Patrick,

With reference to your letter of July 20th, concerning certain arrangements in connection with the Trans-Atlantic ferrying service, I have been asked to state that these arrangements are acceptable to the Canadian Government.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

1067.

72-T-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain

SECRET

Ottawa, August 11, 1941

Dear Mr. MacDonald,

I wish to refer to Mr. Hankinson's letter of June 3rd and my reply of June 19th,¹ relative to plans for the transfer of additional R.A.F. schools to Canada, and to inform you that the War Committee of the Cabinet have approved in principle of the transfer, at the expense of the United Kingdom Government, of the sixteen additional R.A.F. schools referred to in Mr. Hankinson's letter.

For your records, I am enclosing copy of a memorandum of July 4th from the Department of National Defence for Air,¹ showing the locations designated for each of the new schools. I am also enclosing copy of a memorandum of July 24th,¹ showing the dates at which the several stations are likely to become available. I understand that the contents of these memoranda have already been communicated to the United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

1068.

King Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 153

London, September 6, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. We wish to draw your attention to a most serious difficulty which has arisen in connection with the battle of the Atlantic, and one on which we should greatly appreciate your assistance.

2. Relying on figures supplied to us by sources in the United States, we have been counting on receipt of some 150 Catalina aircraft by July 1941 and April 1942. With these aircraft we plan to re-equip five existing squadrons in Coastal Command, form necessary operational training units and meet our estimated wastage. We hoped also that this allotment would enable us to form two new squadrons, one in September and one in November 1941, and others cover areas inadequately protected by our existing forces.

We have recently been informed that total number of Catalinas which can be delivered to us up to April 1942 is twelve.

3. The U-boat attack is now concentrated in eastern half of the Atlantic and effect of this very heavy reduction in our expectations is likely to be serious. Flying boat resources of Coastal Command will not be sufficient to maintain our present effort, and we may be compelled to disband squadrons in order to keep others up to strength. This is a measure which we should be most reluctant to adopt with enemy effort at its present scale, and we have to expect enemy operations will be more effective in the winter months.

4. Our urgent need therefore between now and April 1941 [*sic*] is provision of a total of 80 Catalina aircraft; 56 of these are required for re-equipment of existing squadrons and to meet their wastage over a period of three months.

It is in this direction that we seek your help.

5. We understand the Royal Canadian Air Force is due to receive fifty complete Catalina aircraft, including Amphibians, between July and December 1941, and in addition parts for assembly in Canada of a further 94 aircraft. We ask whether you would be willing to consider affording us temporary assistance in the following forms.

(1) Release to Air Force of 50 Catalina aircraft due to be delivered to Canada this year, repayment to be made at the rate of 11 aircraft per month beginning in May 1942, and

(2) Loan to us for operations in western approaches of any flying boats that are now manned and available, and of R.C.A.F. squadrons as they become ready for service.

6. The aircraft loaned under paragraph 5(1) above would be supplied to squadrons already formed and manned by experienced pilots, and we should

avoid necessity for disbanding existing squadrons and decreasing our operational output. It would moreover allow us to develop operational training units which are badly needed.

7. Transfer of R.C.A.F. squadrons to the United Kingdom would allow us to bring some of our Catalina squadrons up to strength by disbanding recently formed squadrons, and it would give us spare aircraft to meet wastage.

8. Before making this request we have considered carefully effect of meeting it on defence of Canada. We suggest that proposal is not likely to [affect] adversely protection of shipping in Canadian waters; it represents in our opinion the most effective disposition of our combined resources in north Atlantic area as a whole. In appreciating the situation, we have taken into consideration fact that the United States (whether belligerent or not) is intending to employ in that area four squadrons of flying boats on convoy escort, of which three will be based on western seaboard and one in Iceland. It is understood that they plan to increase this force to a total of 12 squadrons, majority of which is to be employed on western seaboard, based on Shelburne, Halifax and Argentia. We feel that these forces should provide adequate protection against enemy threat in western hemisphere, but if conditions change we would of course agree to transfer to western hemisphere of such squadrons as situation demands.

9. We should be grateful if you will give our request your earnest consideration and advise us as soon as possible whether you are able to afford us assistance we need.

1069.

King Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 187

Ottawa, September 18, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 115 [153] September 6th, Catalina Flying Boats.

Canadian Government have given very serious consideration to this matter and propose following arrangement:

1. Of the 50 Catalina aircraft for delivery to Canada during balance of 1941, 14 required here. Balance (36) to be made available for operations in western approaches.
2. If desired and feasible these aircraft be manned by R.C.A.F. personnel and organized as R.C.A.F. squadrons.
3. Squadrons formed as above should be available for return to Canadian operations should the situation in the opinion of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff warrant it.

PARTIE 4 / PART 4
LE RADAR / RADAR

1070.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

Ottawa, June 10, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

When I had the pleasure of seeing you the other day to enlist your sympathy and possible support in the matter of what is termed R.D.F. [Radio Direction Finding], you asked me to let you have an outline of the project for your own information.

It has taken a little time to compile this, as I wanted to make sure of my facts, but here it is and I will let you know if and when I hear from home that it would be of real value if a further (and most important) step could be taken.

With kindest regards etc.

GERALD CAMPBELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Mémorandum du haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
Memorandum from High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

VERY SECRET

[Ottawa], June 10, 1940

R.D.F. [RADIO DIRECTION FINDING]

Short radio waves can be used, like visible light but at much greater range and under all conditions of visibility, to detect and locate aircraft, ships, etc. from which they are reflected. R.D.F. has already played an important part in the air defence of Great Britain and will play an increasingly important one.

It is known that analogous methods have been developed in the United States, and that work on various applications of R.D.F. is already being undertaken by the National Research Council of Canada.

Some of the most important applications of R.D.F. have not yet been developed to the practical stage of service use. When they are they will provide a major advantage in air defence, for attacking the enemy both from the air and from the ground.

It has been suggested

(1) That R.D.F. development, both in Canada and Great Britain, would

be greatly accelerated by co-operation with the resources of the United States:

(2) That the special resources of Canada in this field should be more fully utilised for the joint effort:

(3) That if United Kingdom research stations or factories are damaged by enemy action, work can still continue uninterrupted in Canada: and

(4) That if it were found possible to open up collaboration in this matter between United Kingdom and United States authorities, with Canadian intermediation, this would facilitate further steps, with beneficial results.

1071.

917-A-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

No. 18

Ottawa, June 26, 1940

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to state that the United Kingdom authorities are anxious to obtain as many as possible suitably qualified men for R.D.F. Service (i.e. recently developed radio directional finding against enemy aeroplanes, submarines and surface craft).

2. It is understood that Dr. R. W. Boyle of the National Research Council has been in close touch with the Admiralty over this question and, as a result of a letter from the Admiralty to the Canadian High Commissioner in London, twenty physicists and electrical engineers have already gone to the United Kingdom, and eleven more will proceed shortly, as officers in the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve for duties in connection with special R.D.F. sets.

3. The High Commissioner is informed that there is now a very urgent demand for civilian trained and experienced wireless physicists and engineers in the Air Force, Army and Admiralty, for experimental development work and work on design for production. The need is for men of considerable practical experience, i.e. with higher qualification than the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve personnel which has already been sent. It is understood that some candidates with suitable qualifications were willing to proceed to England for such civilian positions but they desired to have the protection afforded to and salary advantages enjoyed by similar employees of the Canadian Government and therefore were not prepared to accept United Kingdom appointments.

4. The United Kingdom authorities would very much appreciate any assistance that the Canadian Government might feel able to give to enable the

services of any such suitable personnel to be made available to the United Kingdom. It has been suggested that a possible solution might be for the Canadian Government to send such civilian personnel to the United Kingdom under Canadian auspices, thus assuming the financial responsibility and paying them at such rates as might be thought appropriate.

I have etc.

GERALD CAMPBELL

1072.

917-B-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain

No. 23

Ottawa, July 5, 1940

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your secret note of the 26th June, 1940, No. 18, and I shall be obliged if you will let me have an idea of the approximate number of wireless physicists and engineers that the authorities in the United Kingdom are desirous of obtaining from Canada. The Canadian Government is disposed to assist in this matter if proper arrangements can be made, but before reaching any decision it will be necessary to have a general idea of the scale upon which such assistance is desired.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

1073.

917-B-39

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs

No. 33

Ottawa, July 22, 1940

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to state that, on receipt of your Note No. 23 of the 5th July, I sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

asking whether it was possible to furnish an estimate of the approximate number of wireless physicists and engineers that the United Kingdom authorities were desirous of obtaining from Canada.

2. I have now received a reply stating that the United Kingdom requirements for radio direction finding work are six engineer physicists capable of carrying out experimental work in the laboratory and six trained engineers skilled in designing radio apparatus. In both cases considerable practical experience of work on radio apparatus operation on wave lengths of less than ten metres is essential.

3. The United Kingdom authorities very much hope that, if candidates with these qualifications can be secured, the Canadian Government will be prepared to enable them to go to the United Kingdom under arrangements on the lines suggested in my Note No. 18 of the 26th June.

I have etc.

GERALD CAMPBELL

1074.

917-B-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

510C/4

Ottawa, October 4, 1940

SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

In my notes to the Secretary of State for External Affairs Nos. 18 and 33 of the 26th June and 22nd July last I referred to the desire of the United Kingdom Government for assistance in obtaining in Canada the services of six engineer physicists and six trained engineers for experimental work in connection with R.D.F.

I have now received further instructions from my Government which show that, in addition to civilian personnel for experimental work, the Royal Air Force are in urgent need of recruits for the actual maintenance and operation of R.D.F. equipment in the United Kingdom. As you know, R.D.F. work is a very recent development, and war conditions are forcing the pace. In view of its great operational value the supply of the necessary apparatus has been very greatly expedited in the United Kingdom in recent months, and there is now a serious shortage of trained radio personnel, both officers and men, for the maintenance of the available equipment. I enclose herein for your information a note¹ setting out the various types of personnel required in this connection. The present deficiency is most serious in the categories of radio officers and radio mechanics, and I have been asked to ascertain whether the Canadian Government would be willing to assist

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

in meeting the urgent need of the Royal Air Force in this connection by recruiting men in Canada who have radio experience for service as radio officers and radio mechanics with the Royal Air Force.

The United Kingdom Government recognise that in Canada also there is likely to be development of R.D.F., and that the Canadian Government are therefore likely to be considering urgently the question of suitable personnel for the needs of their own Services. The Canadian Active Service Forces will of course have the first call on personnel recruited in Canada, but I am authorized to say that the Air Ministry would be grateful for the opportunity to take into service with the Royal Air Force any fully trained radio mechanics, including volunteers from the United States, who can be obtained in Canada and who are not required by the Royal Canadian Air Force. The conditions under which such men would be taken over by the Royal Air Force would be the same as those proposed in Major Power's letter to me No. 927-1-3 of the 15th August last¹ in the case of men recruited as wireless operators.

As regards radio officers, it is known that the Air Ministry is anxious to obtain at least one hundred candidates but I have not yet received definite instructions as to the basis on which they could be commissioned. I expect to receive further information on this point in the near future.

In view of the above, the United Kingdom Government hope that the Canadian Government will see their way to undertake as soon as possible the recruitment of all available suitably trained personnel, on the understanding that any radio mechanics not required by the Royal Canadian Air Force will be gladly accepted for service with the Royal Air Force. At the same time I should be glad to learn whether the conditions of service for such men, as mentioned above, would be acceptable.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

1075.

917-B-39

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

510C/6

Ottawa, October 16, 1940

SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

In recent letters I have communicated to you certain proposals regarding the enlistment in Canada of personnel for R.D.F. work in the United Kingdom. The High Commissioner has now received a telegram from the Secretary

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

of State for Dominion Affairs which deals with an aspect of the same general question, but which the United Kingdom Government suggest can best be treated separately.

The Air Council foresee the possibility that when Radio Direction Finding is installed in the Dominions they may be asked to send out officers from the United Kingdom to give instruction in its use. As the resources of personnel for such a purpose are, as you of course know, very strained, the Air Council have suggested that Dominion Governments should send to the United Kingdom one or two serving signals Officers for a two or three months course in R.D.F. work, and thus obviate the necessity of asking for personnel from the United Kingdom for purposes of instruction.

Sir Gerald Campbell has been asked to enquire whether this proposal is acceptable to the Canadian Government. If so, the officers chosen should have first-class knowledge of radio technique. A scientific training as a background would, of course, be an additional advantage.

Details of the proposed scheme will be arranged when the views of the various Dominion Governments have been obtained.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1076.

917-B-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

Ottawa, November 21, 1940

Dear Sir Gerald,

I wish to refer to your letter of the 16th of October (file 510C/6) in which it was proposed that men from the Royal Canadian Air Force should be sent to the United Kingdom for a two or three months course in Radio Direction Finding work.

I am pleased to inform you that the Canadian Government is glad to avail itself of your kind offer. The Department of National Defence for Air has just notified me that three Royal Canadian Air Force Signals Officers with an excellent knowledge in the various phases of radio technique are now ready to proceed overseas. These personnel have been posted to the United Kingdom and it is our intention to let them proceed on or about the 30th of November, if this date is agreeable to you.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

1077.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

510C/9

Ottawa, January 6, 1941

IMMEDIATE AND SECRET

My dear Prime Minister,

You will recall that in October last, under instructions from the United Kingdom Government, I approached the Canadian Government with a view to their undertaking the recruitment of all available trained personnel for Radio Direction Finding work in the United Kingdom. The prompt response which the Canadian Government made to this request was very much appreciated by the United Kingdom Government and has resulted already in a considerable number of men being sent to the United Kingdom for this work.

I have now, however, received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs which shows that the needs of the United Kingdom in this respect are far greater than can be met from recruitment in Canada alone, and I have been asked to approach the Canadian Government immediately with a view to securing their co-operation in the enlistment of volunteer United States radio mechanics, up to a total of 8,000, for work with the Air Force and the Army, with possibly a few for Naval purposes.

In making this request I have been asked to explain that it is impossible to overrate the importance of securing large numbers of experienced radio personnel. Since the recent request for 1,000 Canadian radio mechanics for the Royal Air Force, to which I have referred above, and to which the Canadian authorities responded so promptly and energetically, Radio Direction Finding in its various applications in all three Services has assumed even greater proportions than were then envisaged. It is, I am informed by Lord Cranborne, no exaggeration to say that Radio Direction Finding was a decisive factor in winning the Battle of Britain, and our experts look to it to play a vital part in meeting the problems of the night bomber and attacks on merchant shipping. For these reasons the further expansion of Radio Direction Finding has been allotted the highest priority by the Cabinet.

Large numbers of radio mechanics will be required to maintain the apparatus which is in production, and other apparatus which is being rapidly developed. The need to get this help into service with the minimum delay is so urgent that we cannot afford to wait until inexperienced personnel have received *ab initio* training.

A Committee, formed by Lord Hankey to comb all sources in the United Kingdom, has found that only a proportion of the requirements in experienced radio personnel will be available there, and the recent drive by the Royal Canadian Air Force to secure radio mechanics has shown that immediately available Canadian sources are exhausted. This being so, and greatly as they welcome the training scheme which the Canadian authorities are organising in this country, the United Kingdom Government are forced to explore the United States field, which is the only remaining potential source of the numbers required.

The difficulties of attracting United States volunteers in the first place and of organising their subsequent reception and enlistment are fully appreciated, but the need is so urgent that it has been decided that the attempt must be made. In this connection the United Kingdom Government have been encouraged by the views of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, who believes, first, that the support of the United States administration could be enlisted without difficulty and some priority for our needs arranged, and secondly that if the necessary publicity were properly handled there is "a reasonable hope that a fair proportion of the 8,000 applicants required would be forthcoming".

I have accordingly been asked to enquire whether the Canadian Government would be prepared in principle to co-operate in this problem by enlisting all available United States volunteers for service overseas. It is felt by the United Kingdom Government that if your Government are prepared to help in this manner they may prefer to undertake the entire organisation themselves. For this reason, though the United Kingdom Government are prepared to assist in any way that is desired, no detailed suggestions are being put forward at this stage. In case, however, it is of assistance to the Canadian authorities in considering the matter, I enclose herein a résumé¹ of various suggestions which His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Washington has set forth in regard to the general lines on which it might be found desirable to proceed. For example, it is clear that some organisation for providing information and for the preliminary selection of candidates would need to be set up in the United States before any publicity were attempted. Arrangements would also have to be made to avoid enemy agents being planted, in view of the secret nature of the work. If the Canadian Government are willing to undertake this task it is felt to be for them to say what form the organisation should take, and whether for example the Clayton-Knight organisation, necessarily extended and reinforced, would be best or whether it would be desirable to start a separate organisation. This applies equally to the questions to what extent and through what channel the help of the United States administration should be sought.

¹ Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.

The volunteers should be of the same type as those recently recruited as radio mechanics by the Royal Canadian Air Force. Approximately half of those recruited from the United States will be required for ground duties with the Royal Air Force, and the remainder for service with the Army. Precise allocation is not possible at this stage. Naval requirements, if any, will be only a very small proportion.

Lord Cranborne has particularly stressed that the need is most urgent in respect both of the air and land forces, and indeed I am authorized to make it clear that the extent to which enemy attacks on the United Kingdom can be successfully driven off depends to a very large degree on the requirements of this type of personnel being met as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

1078.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le quartier général de l'armée canadienne au quartier général
de la Défense nationale*

Canadian Military Headquarters to National Defence Headquarters

TELEGRAM MIN. 41

London, January 7, 1941

SECRET. From Ralston to Prime Minister and Power. Begins. Hankey saw Magee and myself regarding need for R.D.F. personnel and I have seen his telegram to the United Kingdom High Commissioner of 4th January 1941 asking possibility of Canadian cooperation in enlisting and organizing. He seemed to assume that the United States would make no objection, at which I was surprised until he showed me a telegram from Butler, Chargé d'Affaires Washington, which certainly gave the impression that United States authorities would be entirely sympathetic. I know from conversation here how vital the operation of this equipment is, particularly in defence against night bombing which has been so destructive. It may be possible that Butler is making wishful assumptions regarding United States Government's attitude. Think it would be very useful to have Christie talk with Butler and find out the latter's grounds for assuming favourable United States attitude and then if the facts warrant it to follow up with enquiries made more directly. What Hankey asks is whether the Canadian Government are prepared to help. I think that depends on whether the United States attitude makes it possible for us to help. What I want to convey is that the matter is in my view definitely very important and any help which we could give would be a useful contribution. Ends.

1079.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du conseiller juridique au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Legal Adviser to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] January 8, 1941

Escott Reid¹ telephoned with regard to the question of recruiting Radio personnel for the R.A.F. and the British Army.

2. He has discussed the matter with Butler at the Embassy.

3. Butler's impression is that the United States authorities would not raise any objection to recruiting of such personnel. This impression is not based upon any concrete facts. It is rather in the nature of a general impression based upon conversations from time to time and the general attitude of the United States Government and officials.

4. Butler knows nothing about the specific problem, that with which we have had to deal in the case of the Clayton-Knight Committee,² and he has never been informed with regard to the position placed before us by Hickerson.

5. I think that it is clear that Butler is mistaken in his assumption that we could go ahead with recruiting of Radio personnel by the R.C.A.F., with impunity, whether under the aegis of the Clayton-Knight Committee or otherwise. Further, I am inclined to think that, if our Legation were authorized to let him know about the trouble with which we had met in that case, he might change his views

6. *Personal Remarks.* I am inclined to think that this matter should be discussed with somebody high up in Washington, or possibly with Mr. Moffatt here, before embarking on a recruiting campaign. It is possible that the United States Army people would be very keen to have this valuable experience gained by United States citizens, and they might even want to get some of their own army men into it.

1080.

King Papers, PAC

*Le Premier ministre au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne
Prime Minister to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

Ottawa, January 9, 1941

My dear Sir Gerald,

I am in receipt of your letter of January 6th, regarding the recruiting of personnel for radio direction finding work in the United Kingdom. I immediately discussed this question with my colleagues.

¹Deuxième secrétaire, légation aux États-Unis.

²Comité chargé de recruter des aviateurs américains pour l'Aviation royale du Canada.

¹Second Secretary, Legation in United States.

²A Committee to recruit United States airmen for the R.C.A.F.

We realize the high importance of the work in this field. I may say at once that the Canadian Government will be very anxious to help in any possible way.

Further enquiry is being made as to the feasibility of recruiting or training Canadian personnel for this work.

We are not clear, however, how the Canadian Government could usefully undertake to enlist several thousand men in the United States for such service overseas. The men so enlisted would apparently be serving with the Royal Air Force or the Army in the United Kingdom rather than with any Canadian Force. We are informed that it is considered by the United Kingdom authorities that nothing less than Royal Canadian Air Force rates of pay should be offered, as the type of men wanted would not serve under Royal Air Force rates; whether under present conditions of military and civil employment in the United States, any large number of men would be available at Royal Canadian Air Force rates is a question on which further information appears desirable. The confidential character of the work would require careful investigation into the qualifications and background of possible recruits, and as the Canadian Government has no Consular Service in the United States, this could apparently be done more effectively through the British Consular Service than any other established agency. It has been suggested that use might be made by the United Kingdom of members of the United Kingdom Air Missions or Royal Air Force schools at present in Canada.

We have noted that the Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy in Washington believes that the support of the United States Administration could be secured without difficulty, and even some priority for United Kingdom needs ensured. Enquiries made of the Chargé d'Affaires through the Canadian Legation in Washington indicate that this opinion was based on a general appreciation of the sympathetic attitude of the Administration towards the Allied war effort, and was not based on any definite indication of approval of the present plan or of enlistment in general. As regards the Clayton-Knight organization, the Canadian Government recently found it necessary, after discussions with the United States authorities, to modify the organization and procedure with regard to the enlistment of air personnel in the United States, and to confine the enlistment to civilian purposes such as instruction and ferrying planes. We have not thought it desirable to make any approach to the United States authorities at the present stage.

While we have not been able to ascertain any ground for believing that this enlistment might more appropriately and effectively be carried on by Canada than by the United Kingdom, I might repeat our desire to assist the project in any feasible way and our readiness to examine the question further at any time.

Yours sincerely,

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

1081.

King Papers, PAC

Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, January 13, 1941

My dear Prime Minister,

On my return to Ottawa yesterday I found your letter of the 9th January about the recruitment in the United States of Radio Direction Finding personnel for service in the United Kingdom.

I think that I ought to explain to you that the decision of the United Kingdom Government to seek the assistance of the Canadian Government in this important matter was based on a number of considerations. In the first place, it was felt that on general and geographical grounds it would be altogether more appropriate for such a scheme to be initiated and controlled from Canada rather than from the United Kingdom. Experience has shown that United States citizens wishing to take any part in the present war find it more natural to join Canadian than United Kingdom units; for this, if for no other reason, it seemed appropriate to suggest that Canada would find it easier, and would indeed prefer, to be the operating partner with the United States in a matter of this kind.

Secondly, it was of course known that the Royal Canadian Air Force already possess an extensive machinery for the reception and recruitment of technicians of this kind, as well as an experience of conditions on the American continent, which the Royal Air Force could not have acquired and could not now acquire without long delay; discussions with the Canadian authorities tend to indicate that these facilities, duly adapted and expanded, could be made adequate to deal with the problem in question. As regards the machinery for considering applicants in the United States, the British consular authorities would of course be ready to place their services in this, as in all other matters, at the disposal of the Canadian Government in exactly the same manner as if the United Kingdom Government were organising the scheme. In addition to the collaboration of the consular officials, it would certainly be necessary, whichever Government were operating the scheme, to enlist the help of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whose assistance in checking the standing and reliability of volunteers for the forces has already proved valuable in other connections.

In your letter you raise the question whether in fact under present conditions of employment in the United States any large number of men would be available, even at Royal Canadian Air Force rates of pay. Careful enquiries were actually made into the prospects and, although it is obviously impossible to guarantee beforehand what response would be forthcoming, there are the strongest reasons to believe that there is a very large potential supply of suitable men in the United States. Squadron Leader Russell, who recently visited the United States to examine this particular problem, estimated the

total field at between 20,000 and 30,000 men, mostly the graduates of technological institutes. It is the considered opinion of our experts—and I believe that the Canadian air authorities are disposed to support the view—that the requisite number of men should be forthcoming.

The question of obtaining the approval of the United States administration is, of course, a vital one, and I note the information conveyed to you by the Chargé d'Affaires of the Canadian Legation in Washington; but in writing to you as I did, I based my remarks on recent indications that circumstances are now such that the prospects of enlisting the administration's support in this matter are distinctly favourable; I feel no doubt that the United Kingdom Government are most anxious that the attempt should in any case be made.

I have set out the above considerations at some length, because I feel that my previous communication on the subject may perhaps have failed to give a sufficiently clear idea of the nature of the assistance which we were seeking from the Canadian Government, and of the reasons why this assistance was so essential. I should be very much obliged if you would let me know whether the Canadian Government, on examining these points, would wish me, in reporting to London, to add anything to the views set out in your letter.*

I am etc.

GERALD CAMPBELL

1082.

1680-40

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs*

510C/10

Ottawa, February 6, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

Dear Mr. Robertson,

You will remember that I recently mentioned to you that we were still awaiting the reply of the Canadian Government on the question of the recruitment of R.D.F. personnel in the United States, which formed the subject of Sir Gerald Campbell's letter to the Prime Minister of January 13th.

You already know, of course, the extreme urgency and importance of this matter, but I ought to tell you that I have today received a further telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that the United Kingdom Government are most anxious to know, with the least possible delay, the final attitude of the Canadian Government in the matter. They

* Note telle que dans l'original:

* Footnote as in original:

Skelton, I understand, informed Sir Gerald Campbell, nothing to add. K[ing].

understand the position to be that the Canadian Government have generously consented to receive recruits for radio work from the United States, but have not yet expressed their intention in regard to the actual recruitment of personnel in the United States. In this connection you will recall that as a result of an informal approach recently made in Washington it has been ascertained that President Roosevelt has no objection to recruitment of this kind, and that provided recruiting stations were not actually opened in the United States, we could do almost anything we liked. The United Kingdom Government feel, for the reasons stated in Sir Gerald Campbell's letter, that the Canadian Government are in a much better position than themselves to carry out this work, and they earnestly hope that the Canadian Government will agree to do so.

The United Kingdom authorities are most anxious that the necessary arrangements should be put in hand as soon as possible and they would much appreciate a very early indication of the extent to which the Canadian Government are prepared to co-operate in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1083.

1680-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne
Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain*

IMMEDIATE AND MOST SECRET

Ottawa, February 10, 1941

Dear Mr. Hankinson,

In reply to your letter of February 6th, I may say that I am informed that the War Committee of the Cabinet have again reviewed the position with respect to the recruitment of radio mechanics from the United States. Its members are fully seized of the importance and urgency of this question and are, as you know, not only doing their utmost to expedite the recruitment in Canada of men qualified to perform R.D.F. work but are ready to give every facility to the enlistment in Canada of radio mechanics from the United States. They feel, however, that they should not, under present conditions, undertake any recruiting of these men in the United States.

Arrangements might be made for the Royal Canadian Air Force to initiate recruiting measures within Canada which would reach United States centres with a view to inducing suitable radio mechanics to come to Canada for enlistment in the Royal Canadian Air Force, if this could be done without conflicting with United States laws and policies and without prejudicing other and perhaps more important forms of assistance which our Governments, as belligerents, expect to receive from the United States. Under present circumstances, this type of limited and indirect recruiting would appear to be the

only feasible method. Recruits coming to Canada under such arrangements could be enlisted in the Royal Canadian Air Force at R.C.A.F. rates of pay and could proceed, without delay, to the United Kingdom for further training by the Royal Air Force.

Consideration has been given to various alternative plans for helping your Government to meet, from the United States, its pressing need for additional R.D.F. personnel. Each of them, however, would involve a measure of recruiting activity in the United States, which would appear to be incompatible with the neutrality laws of the United States and [to] be at variance with the Canadian Government's understanding of the United States Government's wishes and with its appreciation of the requirements of United States public opinion at the present time. In the opinion of the Canadian Government any initiative which it could usefully take in the matter would have to avoid

(1) the payment of travelling expenses by the Canadian authorities for persons coming to Canada for enlistment;

(2) the despatch of Canadian personnel to the United States for the purpose of soliciting, engaging, or examining recruits; and

(3) the giving of any undertaking to prospective recruits by Canadian personnel in regard to payment of travelling expenses or other remuneration.

These limitations appear to exclude any effective organization of a recruiting campaign within the United States. What remains is, as I have suggested, the acceleration of recruiting measures within Canada, designed to reach United States centres with a view to bringing home to Americans of desired qualifications, the need and opportunity for their services in this work.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

1084.

917-B-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 261

London, February 14, 1941

United Kingdom authorities are giving urgent consideration to problem of providing skilled radio personnel for fighting services, especially in officer category. Apart from short range efforts to comb out civilian occupations as well as fighting services for already qualified personnel, United Kingdom authorities are now undertaking long term project to train necessary personnel.

2. To this end arrangements are being made with all universities in the United Kingdom to give third year students of Physics and Light Electric Engineering a special radio communications course. It is hoped by this

method to train in the course of the year a number of students, who, if selected, would be qualified to pass into fighting services immediately after graduating. In addition, students in other branches of Science, such as Mathematics, Physical Chemistry and possibly Botany, Zoology and Geology, graduating this summer, are to undergo a further course to qualify them for similar service. It is hoped by this means to obtain five to six hundred suitable men in the course of this year. This number however is not expected to satisfy service requirements.

3. United Kingdom authorities hope, therefore, that some help may be forthcoming from the Dominions in this connection, and that consideration might be given to increasing number of skilled men along lines adopted in the United Kingdom, if this has not already been done.

4. I should appreciate early advice as to reply I should give to United Kingdom authorities. It is felt that Dominion personnel would gain valuable experience under service conditions, as well as being of extreme service to this country.

5. Since dictating above, my attention has been drawn to interchange of telegrams between Dominions Office and United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada towards the end of last year, regarding scheme outlined by Education Department of Ontario for training a large number of radio mechanics in the province. United Kingdom has adopted a scheme for training mechanics as well, but I understand that university scheme is a little further advanced. I should be grateful for information on progress of this training scheme.

MASSEY

1085.

917-B-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne
Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain*

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

Ottawa, February 20, 1941

Dear Mr. Hankinson,

With reference to my most secret letter of February 10th, outlining arrangements which might be made for securing additional R.D.F. personnel, I am enclosing, for transmission to your Government, a memorandum outlining

(1) the plans that the Canadian authorities have in hand for obtaining R.D.F. personnel in Canada, and

(2) the arrangements for securing personnel from the United States.

The Canadian Government will be grateful for the earliest possible reply to the questions set forth in paragraph 5 of the enclosed memorandum.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne¹*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain¹*

[Ottawa, February 20, 1941]

1. Previous discussion of the question of recruiting radio mechanics (R.D.F.) has shown that there are two possible sources of recruits, namely Canada and the United States.

2. Dealing first with Canada, there are two ways in which it is proposed to obtain R.D.F. personnel (a) through the usual recruiting channels of the three Services for men with experience, which method is being started at once and (b) by the training of green men. As many as possible will be recruited under (a) but it is not expected that this will be productive of any considerable number as there are not many more men available. Under (b) examination is now being made of the possibility of providing training courses through the facilities of Canadian Universities or otherwise.

3. Under these plans the Canadian Government will endeavour to recruit up to 2500 men in the three Services. These will probably be mainly Army and Air Force with a relatively small number in Navy.

4. Recruiting of personnel from the United States also falls into two parts: (a) through the facilities of the Royal Canadian Air Force we will endeavour to attract men from the United States in the manner already indicated in previous letter of February 10th, who will come to Canada in order to enlist here; (b) by direct recruiting in the United States. This latter activity is being left to Squadron Leader Russell who has been in close touch with the Royal Canadian Air Force. All men whether they are recruited directly under (a) or indirectly under (b) will be enlisted in the Royal Canadian Air Force on arrival in Canada as it is felt that the Air Force will be more attractive to them than either the Navy or the Army.

5. In connection with these plans several questions arise on which the Canadian Government would appreciate receiving information from the United Kingdom Government.

(a) The total numbers required for each Service.

(b) Proportion of officers in each Service.

(c) Status and qualifications of officers and men in each Service.

(d) Rate of flow to the United Kingdom in each case.

(e) How it is proposed to meet the costs of the scheme with special reference to the following heads, namely, recruiting costs including trade-testing; training costs; clothing and personal equipment; pay and allowances in Canada; maintenance and subsistence in Canada and en route; transportation; and pay and allowances after reaching the United Kingdom.

¹Ce mémorandum fut télégraphié au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne.

¹This memorandum was telegraphed to the High Commissioner in Great Britain.

6. A telegram just received from Mr. Massey¹ would seem to indicate that there is still another class of men desired, namely, advanced students in Physics, Electrical Engineering and other branches of Science. The Canadian Government would appreciate particulars of these requirements.

1086.

917-B-39

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire
d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs*

510C/11

Ottawa, March 6, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

My dear Mr. Robertson,

With reference to your letter of the 20th February last, I have now received by telegraph from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs the reply of the United Kingdom authorities to the memorandum which you were so good as to enclose regarding the arrangements for R.D.F. personnel.

I am asked in the first place to express the warm thanks of the United Kingdom Government for the co-operation and the valuable advice which the Canadian Government have given in this matter, and to say that they gratefully accept the offers contained in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the memorandum.

As regards paragraph 5, the replies to the various points raised by the Canadian Government are as follows:

(a) R.A.F. radio mechanics. 8,000 adequately trained and experienced type of men.

(b) Proportions of R.A.F., Army and Navy officers are 300, 100 and nil respectively.

(c) R.A.F. officers to be commissioned from the ranks in the R.C.A.F.; airmen to be enlisted in the R.C.A.F. Qualifications for R.D.F. officers are as follows:

A scientific degree or equivalent standard, provided physics was taken; a sound knowledge of elementary electricity and magnetism, the principles of wireless, telegraphic and telephonic communications, transmitter circuits, and modern wireless receiving apparatus; in addition, some practical knowledge is considered essential. Owing to the difficulty of defining the precise qualifications required for further guidance, copies are being forwarded of the questionnaire used in the examination of candidates in the United Kingdom.

¹ Document 1084.

Qualifications for radio mechanics are as follows:

A good practical knowledge of modern super het wireless receivers and of servicing and fault-finding. Ability to read and interpret valve circuit diagrams is essential. They should preferably have some experience of short wave receivers and have mastered at least the elementary basic principles of radio transmission and reception. Keen amateurs who had spent some years making and operating their own sets are eligible provided their knowledge is practical as well as theoretical. Owing to the difficulty of defining the precise qualifications required, copies of the questionnaire used in the examination of candidates in the United Kingdom are being forwarded for further guidance.

(d) Rate of flow: for officers, preferably not less than 20 per month: for radio mechanics, 200 per week.

(e) The financial arrangements for the scheme are still under discussion, and I have been assured that a further telegram on this subject will follow shortly.

With regard to paragraph 6 of the Canadian Government's memorandum, dealing with the telegram received from Mr. Massey, I am informed that the United Kingdom authorities are always glad to obtain the services of suitable university graduates in scientific subjects bearing on radio work, who have shown such outstanding merit as to qualify them for research work. When accepted, they work in research establishments and differ, therefore, from the Service categories dealt with above.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1087.

917-B-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain*

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

Ottawa, March 15, 1941

My dear Mr. Hankinson,

With reference to previous correspondence and conversations regarding the financial aspects of your Government's project for recruiting additional R.D.F. personnel, I am directed to inform you that the War Committee of the Cabinet, who have again had this matter under consideration, have come to the following decisions.

It was decided that the Canadian Government should take no part in the recruiting of the 5,500 trained radio mechanics whom it is hoped to secure from the United States. If the United Kingdom Government proceeds to recruit in the United States and the men are conveyed to Canada, the Canadian Government are prepared to enlist them in the R.C.A.F. on the understanding

that the United Kingdom will bear all costs arising out of their enlistment, i.e., the initial expenditure for equipping these men, for their pay and allowances while in Canada, and for their transportation to be made in the first instance by the R.C.A.F., subject to an undertaking by the United Kingdom authorities to reimburse the Canadian Government for these expenditures on the basis of a flat rate per man to be agreed upon. After embarkation from Canada, the pay and allowances of these men at R.C.A.F. rates would be the responsibility of the United Kingdom as would be their pensions and other postwar costs.

The Canadian Government are prepared to pay all costs prior to embarkation of the 2,500 men to be recruited in Canada, i.e., 500 trained radio mechanics and 2,000 untrained men who, after enlistment, would receive training in the thirteen weeks' course to be supervised by the Canadian universities. Thereafter they would pay these men the difference between R.C.A.F. and R.A.F. rates of pay, as well as their pensions and other postwar costs. In other words, the Canadian Government are prepared to bear the same proportion of costs in respect of the 2,500 men to be recruited in Canada as they do in the case of any other Canadian graduates of the Joint Air Training Plan. They are also prepared to pay the cost of training the men who will require the special university course.

In advising you of the Government's decision in this matter, and in particular of the costs which they are prepared to assume, I have been asked to refer to the circumstances under which the Canadian Government assumed certain costs in connection with 300 wireless operators previously enlisted for service with the R.A.F., and 1,000 radio mechanics who have been or will shortly be despatched to the United Kingdom. On August 9th, 1940, Sir Gerald Campbell, High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, wrote to the Honourable C. G. Power, Minister of National Defence for Air, in connection with the initial request of the United Kingdom for 300 wireless operators. In his letter he suggested that the men be enlisted in the R.C.A.F. but stated that the United Kingdom would pay all their pay and allowances including the difference between the R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. rates. In his reply dated August 15th, Mr. Power suggested that instead of enlisting and sending to the United Kingdom 300 wireless operators who would not be fully trained, these should be supplied from the pupils of No. 1 Wireless School, B.C.J.A.T.P. [British Commonwealth Joint Air Training Plan].

While Mr. Power's letter dealt more with the method of recruiting and dispatching the men in question, he did state that "These airmen are to be considered in all respects as trainees from the Commonwealth Air Training Plan . . .". Apparently this was interpreted by the United Kingdom authorities to mean that the financial arrangements in connection with these 300 operators would be on the same basis as any other graduates of the Plan, i.e., that Canada would pay for all costs prior to their graduation and thereafter would pay the difference between R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. rates of pay, and in addition would pay their pensions and other postwar costs. No question

seems to have been raised respecting the division of the costs in connection with the 1,000 radio mechanics which were requested by the United Kingdom some time later. Actually these have been treated in the same way as any other graduates from the Air Training Plan.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

1088.

917-B-39

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire
d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs*

510C/11
MOST SECRET

Ottawa, March 17, 1941

My dear Mr. Robertson,

In your letter of the 20th February you enclosed a memorandum on the subject of arrangements for recruiting additional R.D.F. personnel. In connection with paragraph 5(a) of this memorandum, I subsequently had discussions with Colonel Magee of the Department of National Defence who asked me to obtain certain further information from the United Kingdom authorities in regard to the manner in which recruits from Canada should be enlisted.

I have now received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that it is considered desirable that all recruits should be enlisted into the R.C.A.F. unless they specially wish to enlist in Canadian (or United Kingdom) naval or military forces. The Air Ministry undertake that Canadians so enlisting into the R.C.A.F. would remain members of that force even though attached to army or naval units in the United Kingdom, and would not, of course, be transferred against their own wishes to any other Service.

It will be seen from the above that if 2,500 recruits are available from Canadian sources it would be expected that most of them would be enlisted into the R.C.A.F., the needs of the R.A.F. in England being predominant. If, however, any recruits were especially anxious to join the Canadian or United Kingdom naval or military forces and to be employed on naval or military radio work, the United Kingdom authorities would expect to be able so to employ a limited number, and if demands for the other Services prove greater than is at present expected, they might be met by an attachment, but not transfer, of Canadians who had elected to join the R.C.A.F. *ab initio*.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1089.

917-B-39

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire
d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs*

510C/11

Ottawa, March 19, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

My dear Mr. Robertson,

As I informed you in my letter of the 15th March,¹ I communicated at once to the authorities in London the decision of the Canadian Government in regard to the financial aspects of the scheme for recruiting radio mechanics, as set out in your letter of the 15th March.

I have now received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that the United Kingdom Government are most grateful for the Canadian Government's generous offer in regard to the recruitment of Canadians for radio duty, and they have asked me to accept it on their behalf with an expression of their warm appreciation. The United Kingdom Government also note the Canadian Government's proposals in regard to the enlistment of such recruits from the United States as may be forthcoming, and they agree to the conditions indicated in the second paragraph of your letter.

Lord Cranborne has asked me to explain that the United Kingdom authorities are hoping to obtain up to 8,000 recruits for this purpose from the United States in addition to the 2,500 whom it is hoped to obtain from Canada herself. The Secretary of State hopes that this increase of United States recruits from 5,500 to 8,000, will cause no difficulty to the Canadian Government and has asked me to express regret that his previous message appears to have led to a misunderstanding on this point.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1090.

917-B-39

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire
d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs*

510C-14

Ottawa, March 24, 1941

SECRET

My dear Mr. Robertson,

As you of course know, informal discussions have been taking place between representatives of the R.C.A.F. and the Air Ministry over the past

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

few months on the various aspects of the R.D.F. problem. In the course of these discussions it has been indicated that the R.C.A.F. are considering the possibility of starting an R.D.F. training school in Canada to meet their own requirements, and I understand that in this connection they have been anxious to know whether the United Kingdom Government would wish to co-operate in such a school, as a means of supplementing their own training facilities.

I have now been informed that the United Kingdom Government would be glad to co-operate with the Canadian Government in the establishment of an R.D.F. training school in Canada. They understand that the total number of trainees in such a school who would be required by the R.C.A.F. for their own purposes would be small, and as the R.A.F. would wish to make quite considerable use of the facilities, they suggest that the school should be an R.A.F. school, to be administered, like the transferred flying training schools, by the R.C.A.F. but paid for by the United Kingdom Government except in so far as it may be used to train pupils for Canada's own requirements. The United Kingdom Government contemplate also that technical equipment and the majority of the instructors for the proposed school would have to come from the United Kingdom.

It is suggested that the school should be capable of training up to 650 pupils at a time, which would mean that the total establishment would probably be something between 750 and 900, and the United Kingdom authorities hope that it may be possible to hire an existing building suitable for the purpose.

I should be glad if you would let me know whether the Canadian Government approve in principle of the above proposal and whether they agree that the details of the plan should be worked out between the R.C.A.F. and the United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1091.

1920-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

510C/15
MOST SECRET

Ottawa, April 18, 1941

My dear Mr. Robertson,

I have been asked by the High Commissioner to write to you informally to explain the present position in regard to our plans for the recruitment of radio personnel in the United States.

In the memorandum enclosed in your letter of the 20th February last it was stated that men recruited direct in the United States under arrangements to be made by the United Kingdom Government would be enlisted in the R.C.A.F. on arrival in Canada; and this understanding was confirmed in your letter of the 15th March, with the stipulation that the United Kingdom would bear all the costs arising out of the enlistment of such men. The conditions set out in your letter of the 15th March were accepted by the United Kingdom Government, as recorded in my letter of the 19th March, and I explained in the same letter that the United Kingdom authorities hoped to obtain up to 8,000 recruits for R.D.F. work from the United States under this arrangement.

Our original intention, as you may know, was that these men should be recruited in the United States by some civilian organisation, and that they should proceed to Canada ostensibly with a view to joining a civilian training school here, being enlisted immediately upon arrival. A scheme based upon this principle was discussed in March by our Ambassador with President Roosevelt, who expressed his strong wish to assist in every possible manner, and gave his personal approval to the proposals. Subsequently, however, as a result of further discussions with the highest legal authorities, it has been found necessary on legal grounds to abandon this scheme and to adopt an alternative which cannot be regarded as constituting concealed enlistment. To this end the State Department have now officially approved a proposal to recruit in the United States an "Overseas Civilian Technical Corps", the outlines of which are set out in the enclosed memorandum drawn up in agreement with the State Department.

This scheme is now under active consideration in London. It is understood that, in the event of the Cabinet accepting the scheme, the 8,000 radio mechanics should be the first of the candidates to be sought in the United States under its provisions, but I believe (although on this I have no certain information at present) that it is contemplated that efforts should also be made to obtain very considerable numbers of technicians and skilled personnel of various types for the three Services. Pending definite instructions on these points, the High Commissioner has been asked to consult the Canadian authorities informally, and to ascertain what is likely to be the Canadian Government's attitude towards the formal approach which will be made to them if and when the Cabinet approves the scheme. The aspects in which the assistance of Canada is likely to be required may be summarised as follows:

(a) The Canadian National Railways, the Canadian Pacific Railway and Thos. Cook and Son, have offered the use of their offices and staff throughout the United States for publicising the scheme. It is hoped that the Canadian Government will give approval to this offer.

(b) It is hoped that the Canadian Government will allow the use of Canadian territory for the enrolment of recruits as members of the corps and that they may be willing to provide, through an appropriate Canadian civil or Service organisation, the requisite facilities for handling these men. If this proves unacceptable, no doubt the Canadian Government would

allow the United Kingdom Government to establish enrolment agencies in Canada themselves.

(c) It is hoped also that the Canadian authorities would be ready to arrange for the onward passages of enrolled personnel to the United Kingdom.

(d) It is anticipated that some volunteers recruited for the corps may, after arrival in Canada, express a wish to enlist in the R.C.A.F., or possibly in the Royal Canadian Navy, or the Canadian Army. The United Kingdom Government hope that the Canadian Government would be willing to assent to this on the understanding that such men would be enlisted for service in the United Kingdom and that the whole cost would be borne by the United Kingdom Government.

The object of the proposed Overseas Civilian Technical Corps is, of course, to attract men from the United States, and it is understood that the terms and conditions of service have been drawn up with this object. Membership of the Corps would not be open to residents in the United Kingdom and there is no intention of accepting volunteers from other parts of the Empire unless, in the case of the scheme being extended beyond radio mechanics, the Canadian Government particularly desire that membership for technicians of other types should be open to residents in Canada. You will appreciate that it may be difficult to draw up the regulations in a form which specifically provides for the limitations contemplated, but the United Kingdom Government would always be anxious to avoid in any way embarrassing the Canadian Government in regard to their own problems of man-power or labour, and fully realise that any expansion of the scheme must not be allowed in any way to cut across Canadian plans for the development of their own military and industrial resources by attracting Canadian personnel needed for their own purposes.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémoire du haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire
d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from High Commission of Great Britain to Acting
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa, n.d., 1941]

OVERSEAS CIVILIAN TECHNICAL CORPS SCHEME. MEMORANDUM AGREED WITH
THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

The scheme would provide that His Majesty's Government should establish through appropriate legislation or executive orders a Civilian Technical Corps. The purpose of the Corps would be to furnish technically competent persons to service and repair radio and other technical equipment in use by British agencies, Departments or Services. As described more fully below, the

Corps would be entirely non-combatant and civilian. Members would not be enrolled in armed forces and would perform no combatant functions whatever.

The legislative or executive act establishing the Corps would provide that it should be a civilian corps, would state its duties and functions as outlined above, would set out the rates of pay to be given to those enrolled according to their various classifications and would contain provisions as to food, clothing and lodging. It would lay down the period of service and authorise the head of the Corps to promulgate appropriate rules and regulations for its governance. The legislative or executive act would, moreover, state that members of the Corps would be subject to the civilian authorities and were not to be tried by courts martial or subject to military law except in such situations where such courts apply to all civilians. Members of the Corps, however, would be required to comply with the applicable laws of the country and community to which they would be sent, to the same extent as other civilian workers in the same or similar classifications.

The method of enrolling in the Corps would be by contract, in which the applicant would agree to serve in the Corps for a specified legal period and to perform such functions as were assigned to him and otherwise comply with the appropriate rules and regulations issued by the head of the Corps. Under this plan offices would be opened in the United States for the purpose of publicising the Corps and its duties, pay and opportunities, examining candidates respecting technical competence, prior experience, health, etc. Final acceptance of candidates would probably take place in Canada after they had been subjected to final testing and examination. If accepted there they would enter into the contract referred to above and after such training, if any, as might be deemed necessary, each candidate accepted would be assigned to appropriate units of the Overseas Civilian Technical Corps, wherever the services of such a member might be necessary.

It would be no part of this plan to hold out any inducements or solicitations of any sort to persons in the United States to enter military service. The sole purpose of the offices in the United States would be to interest persons in enrollment in the Overseas Civilian Technical Corps.

1092.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

510C/15

Ottawa, April 22, 1941

MOST SECRET

My dear [Mr.] Robertson,

In my letter of the 18th April I outlined to you informally the position in regard to the plans of the United Kingdom Government for the recruitment of radio personnel in the United States.

The High Commissioner has now received a further telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, stating that the United Kingdom Cabinet have approved the scheme to recruit an "Overseas Civilian Technical Corps." In these circumstances Mr. MacDonald would be grateful if you would regard the contents of my previous letter as constituting an official approach to the Canadian Government, and he asks me to express the hope that the United Kingdom Government may have the co-operation of the Canadian authorities on the lines set out in the fourth paragraph of my letter.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1093.

1920-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission
of Great Britain*

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, April 29, 1941

Dear Mr. Hankinson,

I wish to refer to your letter of April 18th outlining the present position regarding plans for the recruitment of radio personnel in the United States and enquiring whether the Canadian Government would be prepared to co-operate in carrying out those plans.

The plans for the establishment of the Overseas Civilian Technical Corps worked out in consultation with the United States authorities contemplate Canadian assistance under four heads which have been considered by the War Committee of the Cabinet.

As regards point (a) of your letter under reference, I wish to confirm my telephoned message to Mr. Shuckburgh of April 24th that the Canadian Government entirely approve of the offer of the Canadian National Railways and the Canadian Pacific Railway and Messrs. Thomas Cook and Sons, to use their offices and staff throughout the United States to give publicity to the scheme for establishing the Overseas Civilian Technical Corps.

As regards point (b), the Canadian Government will be glad to allow the use of Canadian territory for the enrolment of recruits as members of the Corps. They are further prepared to provide such required facilities as can be made available for the examination and acceptance of candidates at an appropriate capitation rate, having regard to charges for similar services for Canadian establishments in the United Kingdom. It is thought, however, that the actual personnel required for the enrolment officers should be appointed and controlled by the United Kingdom Government. The question of what Canadian civilian or service organizations could best provide the requisite

facilities is still under consideration. I am informed, however, that it is felt that it would be unwise to attempt to undertake the organization and establishment of a civilian corps under the aegis of a Defence Department. Further consideration is therefore being given to the question whether the Department of National War Services or the Department of Transport might appropriately be designated as the Canadian Government agency which would co-operate with the United Kingdom authorities in the assembly and organization of the Overseas Civilian Technical Corps in Canada.

As regards point (c), I am to inform you that the Canadian authorities would be ready to arrange for the onward passages of enrolled personnel to the United Kingdom, on the understanding which I think is explicit in your letter that the cost of such passages would be borne by the United Kingdom Government.

As regards point (d), it is agreed that candidates for the Corps who express their desire to enlist in the fighting services, may do so. Such personnel would be accepted upon the same basis as other non-Canadian R.D.F. personnel enlisted in the Royal Canadian Air Force for service in the United Kingdom.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

1094.

1920-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

510C/15

Ottawa, May 2, 1941

MOST SECRET

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I write to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th April, in which you conveyed to me the decisions of the War Committee of the Cabinet on the subject of the proposed Civilian Technical Corps in the United States. (The word "Overseas" is being dropped from the title at the suggestion of the United States authorities.)

These decisions were at once communicated to the United Kingdom Government, who I feel sure will greatly appreciate the helpful attitude of the Canadian Government in this matter. In the meantime, the High Commissioner has received from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs the further instructions to which I referred in the fourth paragraph of my letter of the 18th April, on the subject of the wider uses to which it is hoped to put the organisation of the Civilian Technical Corps. The position is as follows:

Since the decision to recruit mechanics in the United States was made, it has become apparent that the United Kingdom must seek further help from the United States by way of the recruitment into the Civilian Technical Corps of highly skilled craftsmen of various kinds for work with the three fighting services over the next twelve months. The total number of men whom it is now hoped to obtain in this manner from the United States, mainly in the engineering and electrical trades, may be of the order of 21,000 up to March, 1942, in addition to the 8,000, or possibly 9,000, radio mechanics.

It is contemplated that as much as possible in the way of preliminary testing and vetting of the volunteers will be done in the United States, so that the men should arrive in Canada all ready for immediate enrolment for despatch to the United Kingdom. The possibility is also being considered of enrolling a certain proportion of these men in the United States with a view to direct despatch to the United Kingdom, but I am not yet in a position to say how far this will prove practicable.

The Canadian authorities will doubtless already have considered, in connection with the radio mechanics, the question whether it may not be necessary to enact special regulations to provide for the discipline etc. of the Corps while its members are in Canada. In case it may be useful for the guidance of the legal authorities concerned, I am enclosing herein a copy of the Draft Regulations for the establishment of the Corps,¹ which have been drawn up in the United Kingdom, together with a copy of the Order¹ to be issued by the Secretary of State under paragraph 2 (iii) of the Regulations, and of Instructions by the Secretary of State¹ to be issued under the same paragraph.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1095.

917-B-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

510C/15

Ottawa, June 27, 1941

SECRET

My dear Mr. Robertson,

Would you be good enough to refer to Mr. Hankinson's letter No. 510C/14, dated 24th March, 1941, on the subject of the setting up of the R.D.F. training school in Canada.

¹ Non reproduits.

¹ Not printed.

I understand that this school is expected to be ready for occupation by about the end of July, and I would in the first place like to say how much the United Kingdom Government appreciate the magnificent way in which all those concerned have worked in order that the very early date set for the opening of the school might be adhered to. As you may know, the major part of the pupil population will in the beginning be provided from trainees recruited by the R.C.A.F. in accordance with your letter dated 15th March, 1941. The first of these pupils will not be ready for entry into the school until the early part of September and there will thus be a short period of from four to five weeks when the school can be made available for other purposes. The United Kingdom Government are anxious to offer facilities at the school during this period to the United States Army and Navy Departments for the training of officers and airmen. The proposal would be to give them a short intensive course of four weeks beginning approximately the 4th August. The United Kingdom Government would also like to be able to offer some fifty vacancies on subsequent regular courses to the same Departments, until such time as they have established their own R.D.F. school.

I do not need to lay stress upon the importance the United Kingdom Government attaches to the advantages which they see in thus making the facilities of the school available to the United States authorities, and I feel convinced that their views will be shared by the Canadian Government. There is, perhaps, one particular advantage which I may be permitted to mention, namely, the desirability of United States Service personnel being instructed on equipment of British type. This is desirable not only because of the potential operational possibilities, but also because of the need for ensuring from the production aspect the maximum degree of standardization of the R.D.F. apparatus which I am given to understand is one of great delicacy and complication.

If, as I most earnestly hope, the Canadian Government agree in principle to the proposal that the United States Service personnel may be trained in the school, I would be most grateful, as time is short and many detailed arrangements have to be made, if it could be agreed that these details may be discussed directly between Air Vice-Marshal McKean and the Chief of the Air Staff. There is, perhaps, one point of detail which I should bring to your attention because it is one on which your Government might wish to express their views. This is whether the trainees, assuming the proposal is found acceptable, should be permitted while undergoing instruction at the school to wear the uniform of their own service.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Major Power.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

1096.

917-B-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

No. 31

Ottawa, July 5, 1941

SECRET

Sir,

In reply to your secret letter of June 27th, No. [510]C-15, I have the honour to state that the proposal as outlined has now been approved in principle by Council. It is understood that the facilities of the School during the period prior to the date when other pupils will be available will be offered to the United States Army and Navy Departments for the training of officers and airmen. This involves a short intensive course of four weeks beginning approximately August 4th, and it is the intention to offer to the same United States Departments some fifty vacancies on subsequent regular courses.

Approval has also been given to the request that, while undergoing instruction at the School, these United States trainees be permitted to wear the uniforms of their own Service.

In view of the fact that Council has found the proposal generally acceptable appropriate discussions may be initiated at once between Air Vice-Marshal McKean and the Canadian Air Staff.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

1097.

917-B-39

*Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

516X/450

Ottawa, November 17, 1941

Dear Mr. Robertson,

As you know there has been in operation for the last six months a scheme under which some three hundred men a month have been given preliminary training as radio mechanics at a number of universities in Canada.

On the 27th October last, the Chief of the Air Staff wrote to Air Vice-Marshal McKean to the effect that no difficulty had been experienced so far in enlisting three hundred suitable men a month for this training. He also expressed the view that this figure might safely be increased to four hundred

per month without adversely affecting aircrew requirements and without lowering the present physical or educational qualifications, and that this figure might be augmented by remustering Standard General Duties airmen and C.I.T. [C/T?]¹ aircrew who are qualified in all respects to undertake this training. Air Vice-Marshal Breadner also indicated that he would suggest that the situation be again reviewed in two or three months to determine the possibility of increasing the number to five hundred per month.

Air Vice-Marshal McKean replied to this communication on the 29th October, expressing the hope that approval might be obtained as early as possible for these increases, and giving an assurance that there would be no difficulty in absorbing these higher numbers into training, since any excess which could not be fed into No. 31 Radio School, Clinton, could readily be absorbed into training in the United Kingdom.

In accordance with the arrangement reached between our two Governments, Air Vice-Marshal Breadner has now indicated that this request should be transmitted officially to the Canadian Government, either through Canada House or through this Office. This is entirely in tune with the undertaking which we gave you that we would endeavour to route all requests for Canadian personnel through a single channel. You will remember that in the memorandum which I forwarded to you under cover of my letter of the 30th September last² the requirements for Radio Mechanics for R.D.F. work had the highest priority of all requests for manpower from the United Kingdom. I, therefore, would like to express the earnest hope that the Canadian Government may give their approval to the proposed increase in the intake of pupils for the university courses which are proving of the utmost value in this vital field.

Yours sincerely,

PATRICK DUFF

1098.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] November 25, 1941

REQUEST OF UNITED KINGDOM FOR ADDITIONAL RADIO MECHANICS

By an agreement reached in February last between Canada and the United Kingdom, we undertook to endeavour to obtain 2500 radio mechanics; 500 of

¹ Personnel navigant n'ayant pas réussi leurs cours, d'où «ceased training».

² Aircrew who have not come up to the required standard and hence have "ceased training".

* Non reproduite.

* Not printed.

them experienced men and 2000 untrained men who would receive training in special courses at Canadian universities. No difficulty has been experienced—according to the Chief of the Air Staff—in enlisting 300 men per month required under the above agreement. Air Marshal Breadner has also stated that this number might safely be increased to 400 per month without prejudicing Canadian aircrew requirements or lowering present qualifications. He also indicated that the situation might be reviewed in two or three months to determine whether the number might not be increased even to 500 per month.

Air Vice-Marshal McKean has stated that there would be no difficulty in absorbing the higher numbers into training.

The United Kingdom have, therefore, through Sir Patrick Duff, asked the Canadian Government to approve the proposed increase to 400 per month in the intake of radio pupils for the university courses; with the possibility of this number, in the light of experience, being raised to 500 per month.

It will be recalled that in the United Kingdom list establishing priority for requests made in Canada, radio mechanics for R.D.F. work had the highest priority of all.

So far as financial arrangements are concerned, they are not mentioned in Sir Patrick Duff's letter, but it is presumed they will be the same as in the earlier agreement, namely, the Canadian Government to pay all costs of the men recruited prior to embarkation, including the cost of the special university courses, and thereafter the difference between R.C.A.F. and R.A.F. rates of pay, as well as pensions and other post-war costs.

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

PARTIE 5/PART 5

DÉFENSE DE L'AMÉRIQUE DU NORD
DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA

1099.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 35

Ottawa, March 2, 1941

MOST SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister, Begins. Since outbreak of the war we have, on the advice of the Chiefs of Staff, consistently followed a policy of sending all possible aid to the United

Kingdom, despite the fact that this has necessarily involved the weakening of Canada's own defences. We have recently requested the Chiefs of Staff to review the state of home defences and to advise the Government whether any modification should be made in present policies in the light of their appreciation of the military situation. The text of the Chiefs of Staff appreciation of the present position is given, for your information, in my immediately following telegram. We should of course be glad to receive from time to time any appreciation of the war situation which may affect Canada or Canadian defence in any way and which has received the approval of your Cabinet.

2. Naval defences do not appear to be adequate to deal effectively with "tip and run" raids of the kind which must be regarded as a possibility with the coming of spring. Naval protection for the Atlantic Coast consists at present of one R.C.N. destroyer fit for service and more powerful units engaged from time to time in convoy duty to and from Canadian ports, and forces in the West Indies area.

3. On the Atlantic Coast we have now four bomber-reconnaissance squadrons, one of which can operate 600 miles from its base, capable of acting as a deterrent to raids by enemy naval units. Trained pilot personnel in these squadrons has been reduced to meet demands for instructors in the Air Training Plan.

4. Coast defences from the army viewpoint are reasonably strong except as regards anti-aircraft guns and equipment, in respect of which existing provision is inadequate.

5. Summary in the preceding paragraphs in respect of naval, air and Coast defence position of Eastern Canada should be read as supplementing memorandum of Chiefs of Staff Committee. Together they indicate a situation which has been causing War Committee of Cabinet a good deal of concern. We have, from the beginning, realized the serious implications in regard to home defence of sending you every possible assistance, naval, military and air. Our Chiefs of Staff believe the policy followed has been wise and justified by results. At the same time we cannot be unmindful of our direct responsibility for the defence of Canadian shores, and of the effect upon the common effort and Canadian morale should our coast and harbours be attacked and our defences prove inadequate to an emergency. In particular the importance of adequate protection for the convoy assembly port of Halifax and strategic approaches thereto cannot be too strongly emphasized. We should be very glad to have your views on the situation and to learn whether, having in mind the requirements of various theatres of war, it will be possible to strengthen those features of our home defence position which Chiefs of Staff's analysis has shown to be inadequate. [Ends.]

1100.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 36

Ottawa, March 2, 1941

MOST SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister. Begins. Following is brief appreciation by Chiefs of Staff Committee of Defense position as of February 24th. Begins.

1. The probable Forms and Scales of Attack, which have been and are now accepted by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in respect to direct action against Canadian territory and territorial waters, are given in the Defence of Canada Plan, dated August 1940, Part I. These are generally as follows:

Atlantic Coast—bombardment by a capital ship; one or two 8" cruisers; or by a merchant raider mounting 6" guns; attack by submarines and small surface craft; attack by small raiding parties; torpedo, bomb or gas attack by shipborne or long-range shore-based aircraft on sea-borne, coastal and inland objectives.

Pacific Coast—similar to above but on a smaller scale and lesser intensity.

2. It will be particularly noted that the Chiefs of Staff Committee do not anticipate any attempt at invasion by actual or potential hostile Powers. It is the opinion of the Committee that no such attempt would be feasible so long as the defence of the British Isles successfully continues. Even should Germany succeed in overcoming the resistance of our Empire Forces and the conquest of the United Kingdom ensue, there is still no probability that a large scale attack on these shores, with a view to invasion, is a contingency we need anticipate or plan for. A German-dominated Europe, and an Eastern Asia controlled by Japan, could wield such tremendous economic pressure that there would be no need on the part of enemy Powers to attempt a most difficult military invasion in order to force Canada (and the United States) eventually to accept humiliating terms of peace.

3. On the other hand, the greater the need for Germany to obtain a quick decision—and this situation increasingly obtains—and the more important and effective the assistance given by the United States to the British Empire countries, the more obvious it must become to Hitler that no consideration on his part can deter the United States from pursuing a course aimed at his eventual overwhelming defeat. In these circumstances, every day increases

the chances of "tip-and-run" sea and air raids against ports and other military objectives in Newfoundland and Eastern Canada.

4. Should Japan join with the Axis Powers in war against us—and this eventuality is becoming more probable—it may be that she will actively engage in similar raids against our Pacific Coast. Such a contingency, however, should be considered as a possibility rather than a probability, as there are important political (U.S.A.), strategic and tactical reasons for Japan retaining all her forces in the Western Pacific.

5. Our plans for the defence of the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts are still in course of execution. In general, it may be said that our Army formations now manning Coast Defences, or in Mobile Reserve in Coastal Areas, are sufficient rapidly to contend with any limited enemy raiding forces which might attempt to land in the vicinity of suitable objectives and attack them; but we continue to find ourselves inadequately furnished with Naval and Air forces, and with anti-aircraft guns and equipment, to ensure that raids by hostile naval or air forces against ports, the shipping in them, and other important objectives, are met with adequate resistance. In the existing circumstances, covering forces provided by the Royal Navy in the form of ocean escorts are a vital part of the defences of the western Atlantic, but these are barely adequate for this essential duty.

6. The maintenance and protection of Canadian Defended Ports, of focal points of shipping, and of the North Atlantic sea-routes, are essential to British victory. To ensure this, we must have adequate Naval and Air forces to protect our shipping lanes and bases. The Chiefs of Staff Committee is of the opinion that in the defence of the North American continent, Newfoundland represents a highly important outpost, and is in many ways our first line of defence. Flanking as it does the trans-Atlantic air and sea-routes to North America, a strongly held Newfoundland upon which are based adequate Navy, Army and Air forces, represents a powerful deterrent to enemy air and surface action against our coasts and territorial waters.

7. On the Pacific coast, the possibility of serious attack by surface-vessels or ship-borne aircraft of the Axis Powers is remote. The volume and importance of shipping in the Eastern Pacific is far less than that in the Atlantic, and there are no military objectives of sufficient importance to justify other than very small-scale tip-and-run raids, the effect of which would have little military significance. An actual attempt at invasion on this coast by Japanese forces is considered highly improbable.

8. Conclusions. The Chiefs of Staff Committee consider that in the present circumstances and in those likely to obtain in the near future, the basing of adequate Naval and Air Forces to provide a Striking Force adequate to protect our shipping is of the first importance. These Naval and Air forces must operate from secure bases. An increase of Naval and Air forces on the East Coast of Canada is therefore necessary, and this is only possible by the active co-operation of such United States forces as can be made available for this purpose. Ends. Message ends.

1101.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 47

London, March 24, 1941

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Your telegram of March 2nd, No. 35. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

We have been weighing very carefully important questions raised in your messages No. 35 and No. 36 of March 2nd, and my immediately succeeding telegram sets out views of our advisers on these matters.

We think these views are sound. The position is bluntly that we have not all the equipment that would enable us to give complete protection on both sides of the Atlantic, and the question is therefore how can we make best use of material we have, having regard to what the enemy is trying to do and probabilities as to his future course of action. The issue of war will clearly depend on our being able to maintain traffic across the Atlantic. All our advice is that our present dispositions afford best means of achieving this. If we were to divert any substantial part of our forces from their present area of operations to cover wider areas where there is admittedly some risk of enemy action, we should only imperil the whole and play into his hands.

We are indeed most deeply appreciative of all that Canada has done, and in particular how you have stripped yourselves of protection on your Atlantic coasts to help us. As soon as we get more ships, or should dangers of enemy attack on western side of the Atlantic become greater, we shall not hesitate to consider relocations at once. Ends.

1102.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 48

London, March 24, 1941

MOST SECRET. Your telegram of March 2nd, No. 35, and your telegram No. 36. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have studied most carefully your views, and are in full sympathy with your anxieties and responsibilities regarding adequacy of Canadian defences. Military advisers have also examined your Chiefs of Staff analysis of Canadian home defence position. The following summarizes our assessment of the situation and our ability to assist.

2. In weighing possibility of assisting in strengthening of those features of Canadian home defence position to which Canadian Chiefs of Staff have drawn attention, we have had to bear in mind most carefully position here, and in other theatres where we are facing the enemy's attack. As you are

aware, Germany is now making a supreme effort both at sea and in the air against our trade. We, ourselves, are making corresponding effort to defeat these attacks by assembling all the escort vessels we can lay our hands on, by transferring anti-aircraft weapons from our home defences to merchant shipping, and by diverting still more air forces to defend our ships against German long-range aircraft which attack our shipping in areas hitherto regarded as immune. At the same time, with improving weather conditions, we have to be ready to meet increasing attacks of German bomber force against objectives in this country. Finally, we have from now on to be fully prepared to meet a large scale attempt at invasion. Our military advisers have just completed a detailed examination of requirements necessary to meet these threats, and it is clear that if we are not to fall below the danger line we have very little to spare from the force immediately available at home. At the same time, the recent developments in the Balkan and the Middle East theatres make it essential for us to maintain flow of our reinforcements to the Middle East. We have the fullest confidence in our ability to defeat threats to this country and to build up our growing offensive power, but you will appreciate that we are bound in common interest, referred to in your Chiefs of Staff appreciation, to weigh with the greatest care any additional withdrawals from the United Kingdom and its north western approaches.

3. While we fully realize the possibility of tip and run raids on Canadian eastern seaboard, we are of the opinion that such raids are unlikely in view of risk raiders would run of air attack and possible shadowing. They are more likely to attack shipping routes in western Atlantic. Moreover, an additional deterrent is likelihood that operations against Canadian seaboard must precipitate entry of the United States into the war. This we feel is particularly the case in the neighbourhood of Newfoundland, where our enemies must realize sensitiveness of United States to operations in area of her newly acquired bases.

4. We note that Canadian Chiefs of Staff make no specific reference to strengthening anti-submarine protection of shipping near Canadian coast. In view of indication that U-boat activity may be extending to western Atlantic, the question of strengthening naval and air forces now available in Canada for anti-submarine duties is now under consideration between the Admiralty and Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa. We are of the opinion that enemy will only adopt less economical use of submarines in western Atlantic for the purpose of making us over-insure ourselves there at the expense of decisive areas in western approaches. Every effort will be made to strike right balance between providing essential anti-submarine force for Canadian coast and maintaining our freedom on this side of the Atlantic.

5. With regard to air attack, the threat of attack by German land-based aircraft is virtually non-existent as no German aircraft is capable of making Atlantic flight from existing air bases with any appreciable bomb load.

6. It is in this light that we have considered request in final paragraph of your telegram. We feel in view of situation shown in paragraph 2 of above,

our present combined naval dispositions not only are best in common interest in existing circumstances, but are adequate to deal with scale of attack which we think probable in western Atlantic. Nevertheless, you may rest assured that redistribution will be made if situation there changes.

7. We agree that four reconnaissance squadrons, covering Canada's Atlantic approaches, are hardly adequate for area in question. In view, however, of urgent and pressing need for this type of aircraft elsewhere, it is difficult, at present, to provide aircraft for formation of additional squadrons. We are giving full consideration to your views on expansion of Royal Canadian Air Forces in preparation of revised air training programme. Ends.

1103.

Skelton Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 57

Ottawa, April 10, 1941

SECRET. Your telegrams Nos. 47 and 48 of March 24th. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins.


1. I wish to acknowledge and thank you for your personal telegram to him [me?] of March the 24th.

2. The views of your military advisers, as set out in your telegram No. 48, of March the 24th, have been considered carefully by the Cabinet War Committee, and referred to our Chiefs of Staff for their examination.

3. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff have now expressed their agreement in the views of the U.K. government's military advisers, as described in your telegram No. 48, but desire to point out, with regard to Paragraph 4 of that telegram, that the statement therein, that, Quote, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff make no specific reference to strengthening anti-submarine protection of shipping near Canadian Coast, Unquote, does not appear to take into account Paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Appreciation.

4. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff observe that all forms of attack were included in their Appreciation, although no specific reference was made to detailed defensive measures of any particular type. They desire to make it clear that Canada has spared no effort to build up and strengthen anti-submarine measures for the protection of shipping near the Canadian coasts. They draw attention, in this connection, to the fact that already large sums have been spent on this score and that every effort is being made to provide as many ships and aircraft fully equipped with anti-submarine devices, as possible.

5. We feel it desirable to have these observations drawn to the attention of the United Kingdom government, lest there be any misunderstanding of the importance which the Canadian government and their service advisers attach to this matter, or of the extent of the measures being taken by Canada to meet this problem. [Ends.]



CHAPITRE VI/CHAPTER VI

LE PROBLÈME DU GROENLAND
THE PROBLEM OF GREENLAND

PARTIE 1/PART 1

LA CRYOLITHE: DÉFENSE DU GROENLAND
CRYOLITE: DEFENCE OF GREENLAND

1104.

267-J-40

*L'«Aluminum Company of Canada» au ministère des Affaires extérieures
Aluminum Company of Canada to Department of External Affairs*

Ottawa, April 9, 1940

Dear Mr. Robertson,

You will recall our conversations regarding cryolite, and will understand how essential this raw material is to the aluminum industry and, therefore, why we are so deeply disturbed this morning to learn of the German occupation of Denmark, since natural cryolite is found only at Ivigtut, in Greenland.

The Aluminum Company of Canada, at a yearly production rate of 160,000 tons of aluminum, requires approximately 3,500 tons of cryolite annually, without which it would be impossible to produce a pound of metal. We have purchased 3,000 tons of cryolite for delivery from the mines of Ivigtut, early this summer, and had intended to purchase another cargo of equal tonnage. A larger tonnage is required to "break-in" new production than that mentioned above.

While artificial cryolite has been made and used in the production of aluminum, there are problems involved in its manufacture and use, and aluminum smelters throughout the world prefer the natural mineral if it can be reasonably obtained.

Since only a limited quantity of the cryolite is mined, and it would be difficult to replace tonnages lost within a reasonable time, we are anxious that steps be taken to ensure that delivery is made of the shipment which is presumably ready for us at Ivigtut. Unless we can obtain sufficient Greenland cryolite, we may have to face a situation which would seriously hinder our

ability to keep our production rate to schedule. As Norway has also been invaded, and Great Britain and France have relied on Norwegian smelters for a sizeable tonnage of aluminum, the importance of Canadian aluminum production, and, consequently, Greenland cryolite, cannot be stressed too strongly.

Should it be decided to occupy Ivigtut, we would be only too glad to place our extensive mining experience at your disposal, and operate these mines for the benefit of the Allies. In any case, action should be taken quickly, because at this time of year a supply ship sets out for Ivigtut, the non-arrival of which, due to the present unsettled conditions, may seriously hamper operations.

This matter, in fact, is so important to us, and to the Allied aluminum industry, that we urge the Canadian Government to see that immediate action is taken to protect the Greenland cryolite mines and ensure their production for the Allies.

Yours faithfully,

FRASER W. BRUCE

1105.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary

TELEGRAM 47

Ottawa, April 9, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Reports of enemy ships heading in direction of Iceland and Southern Greenland force consideration of risks of enemy interference with cryolite production at Ivigtut, Greenland, upon which maintenance of essential aluminum output depends. Understand that winter's production is awaiting shipment from Ivigtut and that destruction of stocks accumulated there would seriously threaten planned rate of aluminum production in Canada, other allied countries and the United States.

1106.

267-J-40

Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] April 10, 1940

POSITION OF GREENLAND

The occupation and control of Denmark by Germany raises the question of the position of three North Atlantic areas allied with or belonging to Denmark.

The Faroe Islands between Shetland and Iceland are an integral part of Denmark. It would obviously be impossible for the Allies to tolerate German

occupation and with the co-operation of the Governor of the Faroe Islands the United Kingdom is taking steps to prevent this.

Iceland is an independent Kingdom united with Denmark by a personal union under the same King. The United Kingdom has in contemplation precautionary measures similar to those which have been adopted regarding the Faroe Islands, but no reply has yet been received from the Iceland authorities.

Greenland is now a Danish possession. Its control was long a matter of dispute between Denmark and Norway, but Denmark's sovereignty over the whole area was recognized by the Allied and Associated powers in 1920 and a reference to the Hague Court in 1932 was accepted by Norway.

It is interesting to note that when the question of recognition of Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland was under consideration in 1920, the Canadian Government proposed that the British Empire's recognition should be conditioned upon Denmark giving an undertaking that in the event it was decided to dispose of Greenland in the future the British Empire should be given a prior right of purchase. This proposal was conveyed by the British Foreign Office to the Government of Denmark and to the principal Allied and Associated powers. The Danish Government declined to accept the proposal and the United States Government replied that "it was not disposed to recognize the existence in a third government of a right of pre-emption to acquire this territory if the Danish Government should desire to dispose of it and accordingly reserves for future consideration what position it may take in the event of a specific proposal for such a transfer". The British Government, therefore, proposed a modification, which was accepted by the Canadian Government. On September 6th, 1920, a Foreign Office communication¹ was sent to the Danish Minister in London informing him "that His Majesty's Government recognizes His Danish Majesty's sovereignty over Greenland, but in view of its geographical proximity to the Dominion of Canada, His Majesty's Government must reserve their right to be consulted, should the Danish Government at any time contemplate the alienation of this territory".

The chief peacetime value of Greenland is its importance as one of the future crossroads of the air. The only product of special significance is cryolite, a mineral essential for the production of aluminum and available only at mines at Ivigtut on the southwest coast. Most of the production is sent to Denmark, the United States and Canada.

The population of Greenland is about 400 Danes and 16,000 people of Eskimo and mixed race, scattered in many settlements along the coast, mainly on the west or inner side. It is generally conceded that Denmark has developed and looked after the interests of the natives in excellent fashion.

The question will probably arise whether any action should be taken to prevent German occupation of this area. If so, it may be considered that if

¹ Volume 3, la pièce jointe au document 533. ² Volume 3, Enclosure to Document 533.

Canada were in a position to occupy strategic coastal points such a solution would be more acceptable to United States opinion, in view of the Monroe Doctrine and the general political attitude to European intervention on the American continents, than intervention by the United Kingdom or France. At the same time, it is obvious that no such action would be possible unless the control of the North Atlantic remained with the British and French navies. If any action were contemplated, it would probably be desirable to discuss the matter not only with London but with Washington. The Department of National Defence has doubtless been considering the implications of recent developments. The Northwest Territories Bureau of Mines and Resources and the Northwest Territories Council have much information regarding Greenland, which is touched during the annual East Arctic expedition.

O. D. S[KELTON]

1107.

267-J-40

*Mé morandum du conseiller*¹
*Memorandum by Counsellor*¹

[Ottawa,] April 11, 1940

CANADA, GREENLAND, AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Disregarding certain Norwegian protests relating to East Greenland, it may be accepted that the whole of Greenland is recognized internationally as a part of the Danish domain. Thus, in taking over the control of Denmark with the acquiescence of the King and Government of that country, it may be said that theoretically Germany has also placed Greenland under German suzerainty. The same rights that Germany now possesses in Denmark, the Reich also possesses, in legal theory at least, in Greenland.

Under these circumstances the Allied Powers are fully justified in treating Greenland as enemy territory. By taking possession of that country they will violate no rules of International Law and no principles of equity. If they were to refrain from taking control of Greenland Germany, with the (enforced but legal) approval of the Danish Government, would certainly make use of Greenland and its resources.

The necessity for Allied action to prevent Germany from gaining advantages from the possession of Greenland is based on the following considerations:

- (a) Greenland is the only source of cryolite, which is essential to the production of aluminum. Even a brief period of control would enable Germany so to damage the cryolite workings that months of delay in aluminum production would result.
- (b) There are innumerable bays and harbours which could be developed and used as bases for German submarines or surface raiders.
- (c) Germany might establish air bases in Greenland which would

¹H. L. Keenleyside.

enable German planes to interfere with trans-Atlantic air traffic and Allied shipping.

(d) The Greenland production of oil, sealskins and fish, while not of great importance, might be of some value to Germany—if it could be transported.

Under the circumstances it would seem to be essential for the Allies to establish at least two or three small naval and air bases on the Greenland coast. At least one of these—that at Ivigtut, the site of the cryolite deposit—should be established at once as naval sources state that certain German vessels are reported to be heading for Greenland. The forces required for these purposes are small but they will need to be highly efficient as the difficulty of maintaining regular air and sea patrols in Arctic waters will be considerable.

If it is decided that Greenland should be taken under Allied control, the decision as to what agency should be used for that purpose will arise. The choice of the agency should be based on

- (a) convenience;
- (b) effectiveness;
- (c) acceptability to neutral powers.

On the points of convenience and effectiveness, it would probably be simpler to establish and maintain posts in Greenland from a base in Canada or Newfoundland than from any other part of the Allied territories. It may also be assumed that Newfoundlanders and Canadians would be more suited by experience and temperament to the conduct of such operations than would aviators and sailors from either the United Kingdom or France. This is particularly true because of Canadian experience in dealing with the Eskimo (who comprise about 98% of the 17,000 inhabitants of Greenland), and in Arctic flying. In relation to the latter, Canadians are probably better equipped by experience than any other people in the world, with the possible exception of the Russians.

With regard to the interests of neutral powers consideration need be given only to the possible reaction in the United States.

There can be little doubt that if British naval and air forces are sent to take over control of Greenland an opportunity will thereby be provided for an outburst of anti-British sentiment in certain quarters in the United States. Senator Holt, for example, can be trusted to see sinister implications in such an action, and his diatribes will get a certain amount of publicity in some parts of the Union.

Another consideration in relation to the attitude of the United States is the fact that there would be nothing dramatic or exciting about a British occupation of Greenland. On the other hand, if a small Canadian Force is sent into the Arctic for this purpose the expedition will arouse sympathetic interest throughout the United States. There will be front page headlines and favourable editorial comment in almost every newspaper in that country.

Most important of all, the selection of Canadians (or Newfoundlanders) to carry out this operation will eliminate any likelihood of hostile elements in the United States being able to seize upon and dramatize "the invasion of Greenland" as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.

It is often forgotten that the Monroe Doctrine was not enunciated with the Latin American States and their fears of European aggression solely in mind. In part at least the Doctrine was enunciated at the time and in the form selected because of European encroachment *in Arctic America*.

The exact scope and precise interpretation of the Doctrine has varied from time to time and at any given time among different groups in the United States. Its essence is to be found in the original statement that while the United States had no intention of interfering with "the existing Colonies or Dependencies of any European power" it would consider any attempt on the part of such powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous" to American peace and safety.

The subsequent history of the United States has made it clear that whatever the precise phrasing or intention of the original message, the Government and people of the United States would be prepared to resist by force any extension of the boundaries of existing colonial possessions in the area to which the Doctrine applies. But this is not all. It has repeatedly been made clear that *the United States is not prepared to agree to the transfer of American possession from one European power to another*. This was particularly emphasized by President Polk on the 2nd December, 1845, when in his annual Message to Congress he said:

No future European colony or *dominion* shall with our consent be . . . established on any part of the North American continent.

In interpreting this Message John Bassett Moore writes as follows:

By pronouncing against the establishment by a European power of any 'dominion'—*a term which included even the voluntary transfer of territory already occupied*—President Polk expressed a conception which has come generally to prevail . . .

This view is confirmed by Samuel Flagg Bemis in his summary of the major principles of United States foreign policy. His third principle is the following: "*Opposition to the transfer of any existing European colony on the American continent to any non-American sovereign.*"

Any study of the Monroe Doctrine and the attitude of the people of the United States towards it reveals a singular irresponsibility in the use of such terms as "this hemisphere", "the American continent" and "the new world". If the phrase "this hemisphere" were to be taken literally it would include not only Greenland but territories as distant as New Zealand. The fact probably is that the incidence of the Doctrine varies with any variation in United States interests. Whether or not its principles can be taken to apply to a marginal country like Greenland will probably depend upon the existing interest of the United States in Greenland and the current attitude of the United States towards the country that proposes to take it away from Denmark.

Certainly Greenland is close enough to the continent of North America to provide a basis for criticism which would be quickly seized upon by those elements in the United States that are hostile to Great Britain. They would not fail to argue that by seizing Greenland Great Britain would be violating a sacred principle of American national policy.

Such arguments could not be effectively used if Canada, itself an American state, were to take the action proposed. (The Canadian position would, of course, be very much stronger if the Dominion had emphasized its American character in the past by participating in the Pan-American Union.)

In summary it may be said that if Greenland is taken over and controlled by a small Canadian Expeditionary Force those steps can be just as efficiently and effectively performed as they would be by a force emanating from the United Kingdom. The use of Canadians for this purpose, moreover, will result in the avoidance of such criticism in the United States as will inevitably develop if the action is undertaken by the United Kingdom.

An early decision would seem to be imperative.

1108.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] April 12, 1940

GREENLAND SITUATION

Colonel Ralston saw Nelles¹ and Anderson² this morning and they are to report what steps would be necessary and possible if the Government decided to intervene in that area. On first discussion Nelles thought that the ice-breaker *McLean*, with naval and military personnel, might be sent up to protect the mine against raiding parties. It was not probable that Germany would be able to spare a large vessel or that such a vessel would be able to evade the British and French blockade. In addition to protecting the mine, the danger must be faced of an attempt being made to establish a submarine or other base in a Greenland harbour.

If any intervention were decided upon, it would have to include taking over or supervising the civil administration on the long western coast, including the provision of food and fishing supplies and the marketing of furs; all trade in Greenland has been a Government monopoly.

I have sent full documentation to National Defence and also to the North West Territories Branch of Mines and Resources, which sends a ship up to the Arctic every year, calling at Greenland. Mr. Keenleyside is going into the whole situation fully.

¹ Vice-amiral P. W. Nelles, chef de l'état-major naval.

² Maj.-gén. T. V. Anderson, chef de l'état-major général.

¹ Vice-Admiral P. W. Nelles, Chief of the Naval Staff.

² Maj.-Gen. T. V. Anderson, Chief of the General Staff.

Colonel Ralston suggested that it might now be feasible to make some preliminary enquiries in London and Washington. I told him I would prepare something and send it out for your consideration. Draft attached.¹ Probably boats could not get in to Western Greenland harbours before mid-June.

1109.

267-J-40

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] April 12, 1940

GREENLAND

The Prime Minister stated today that we should not jump into the position of announcing we were ready to take over Greenland. It was impossible to foresee the implications both during the war and after the war of such an undertaking. It might involve similar action regarding Newfoundland. It would be sufficient to let the British Government know of the danger that existed and let them take the necessary action. There was the danger also of disturbing American opinion. The recent developments in Europe were likely to lead to demands for sending more contingents to Europe, and we should keep this in mind.

I said I realized the necessity of considering very carefully the implications of any action. In any case it was clear we could take none but local action and must rely on the United Kingdom to hold the sea against anything but an occasional raid or local disturbance. We should be careful also to make clear that any action we were taking was purely precautionary and temporary, and that we were concerned in the situation on behalf of Denmark. As regards the United States, they were much more likely to accept action on our part than on the part of the United Kingdom. As regards Canadian public opinion, I thought this comparatively limited action would afford an outlet for the desire for action and present an alternative to much more extensive action in Europe.

All that was proposed in the present draft telegram was that we should take action to protect the Cryolite mines. I thought we would have to consider also providing the usual supplies for the native inhabitants. The Prime Minister said the unemployed in Canada would criticize looking after Esquimaux in Greenland's icy mountains, or India's coral strand, rather than Canadians at home. I said that any aid we gave might, if desired, be met by the receipt of furs we would take. We might set up a special trustee account with Denmark.

The Prime Minister later approved the draft telegram with a slight amendment, and a further slight revision was made by Colonel Ralston.

¹ Non reproduit.² Not printed.

1110.

267-J-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 393

Ottawa, April 12, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. German occupation of Denmark and the precautions already taken by the United Kingdom as regards the Faroe Islands and Iceland have led the Canadian Government to consider whether any action by Canada in the Greenland area is called for and feasible in the present emergency. Aside from the possibility of the establishment of German bases, there is apprehension as to possible raiding attack on the exposed cryolite mines at Ivigtut. This product is essential for the production of aluminum. United Kingdom authorities are not only urging maximum possible tonnage of aluminum from Canada but seeking large additional supplies of cryolite.

2. Much interest in Greenland situation is developing in Washington. If any local action were to be taken in that area obviously such action by Canadian forces is much less likely to meet with criticism than action by United Kingdom or France. You will recall correspondence which took place in 1920 regarding recognition of Danish sovereignty over Greenland.

3. The feasibility of local action by Canada with special reference to safeguarding the cryolite mine to which access by sea is probably now open is being examined by Service authorities. It is obvious that such action would be possible only through continued British success in blockading any large raiding force in North Atlantic.

4. I should like you to discuss this question immediately with United Kingdom authorities and ascertain their appreciation of the situation and any action they have in contemplation in or west of Iceland.

1111.

267-J-40

*Le ministère de la Défense nationale au ministère des Affaires extérieures
Department of National Defence to Department of External Affairs*

Ottawa, April 13, 1940

Dear Mr. Keenleyside,

Herewith is copy of memorandum on Greenland as promised. Since drafting this I have been to a meeting of the Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee at which Colonel Pope thought the scale of attack we recommended should be allowed for was low and should be raised to "attack by one cruiser". He had information which stressed the importance of the Cryolite supply more than I had visualized in suggesting the probable scale of attack. Even so I think an attack by a cruiser is unlikely.

2. I have just been talking to Mr. Porsild of the Department of Mines & Resources, a Dane who has been to Greenland, and he states that ships can

reach Ivigtut and Godthaab at any time of the year though normally ships do not endeavour to do so before May.

Yours sincerely,

J. W. R. Roy

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Mémorandum au chef de l'état-major de la marine

Memorandum to Chief of the Naval Staff

[Ottawa,] April 13, 1940

OCCUPATION AND DEFENCE OF GREENLAND

Considerations.

(a) That Greenland, consequent to the occupation of Denmark by Germany, should be treated as enemy territory is indisputable and the reasons given in External Affairs' memorandum "Canada, Greenland and the Monroe Doctrine" why Canada should assume the task of occupying this Danish possession are fully concurred in.

(b) The inhospitality of the coast, the fact that the coast is free from ice for only a very short portion of the year and the distances from focal points make Greenland very unsuitable for the establishment of Naval bases of any sort.

(c) Unless air bases are already established which is unlikely, it is almost impossible for Germany to construct and provide facilities for aircraft in Greenland in the face of the present Allied control of the sea.

(d) Whilst the occupation of Greenland offers no immediate advantage to the Allied cause it is essential to do so to prevent enemy nationals gaining a foothold there and giving them the opportunity to sabotage the important Cryolite mines.

(e) There are two distinct problems involved, firstly "the occupation of Greenland" and secondly, "the defence of the Cryolite mines at Ivigtut".

2. As regards the occupation of Greenland the inhabitants are so scattered and the communications are so poor that even if they were desirous of doing so could offer very little opposition. Only a small force will therefore be required and once established a small police detail at the two or three more important centres is all that it will be necessary to maintain.

It is understood that for the purpose of Government Greenland is divided into two districts, the Northern one being administered from Godhavn and the Southern one from Godthaab. It is recommended therefore that both these places be occupied and Ivigtut as well on account of the Cryolite mines.

3. In considering the personnel best suited to enforce the occupation of this territory it is suggested that the R.C.M.P. due to their training and experience in a similar climate is the force to do the job. Small detachments of three or four men at each of the abovementioned places are all that will be required.

4. None of H.M.C. Destroyers nor Minesweepers can be detached for this service at the present time nor should any of these ships be risked in the ice conditions prevalent in the Davis Strait. The C.G.S. *N. B. McLean* is however ideally suited for these waters and she can easily be armed with 4 in. guns.

5. From what information on ice conditions I have been able to gather to date it would appear that if the expedition were to leave at the end of May it could make Godhavn early in June reaching Godthaab and Ivigtut later. It is recommended that in addition to the R.C.M.P. details a naval party 30 to 40 strong should be embarked in the *N. B. McLean*. This force it is considered would be ample to overcome any opposition that, though unlikely, might be met with.

6. As regards the defence of Ivigtut, this is purely a Military problem. The following remarks are submitted:

(a) Ivigtut lies about 12 miles up Arsuk Fiord and appears capable of being easily defended from the seaward.

(b) The scale of attack to be provided for under existing circumstances is considered to be a disguised armed raider or one submarine.

(c) Information is required as to how vulnerable to gunfire the Cryolite mines are.

(d) If gun defences are contemplated a most suitable site which commands both entrances to Arsuk Fiord is the point on the west side of Webbershavn.

(e) Any shore defences should be decided on after the place has been investigated by a competent Military officer who could be embarked in the *N. B. McLean* and report his recommendations by W/T if necessary.

J. W. R. Roy
Commander, R.C.N.

1112.

267-J-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 441

London, April 13, 1940

MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 393, April 12th. Took action as instructed immediately telegram received. United Kingdom authorities very much interested and greatly appreciate suggestion contained in your message. Lord Halifax has promised immediate consideration of the matter. Understand that no steps have as yet been taken by the United Kingdom authorities regarding Greenland.

MASSEY

1113.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 716
CONFIDENTIAL

Washington, April 13, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to state that I saw the Secretary of State at his request at noon today and he spoke about the position of Greenland in the light of the recent events affecting Denmark.

2. Mr. Hull said he had seen the British Ambassador yesterday on this subject and it was understood then that Mr. Hull would also speak to me for the information of the Canadian Government. He initialled and handed me a carbon copy of an Aide-Mémoire which he was about to send to Lord Lothian in pursuance of their conversation of yesterday and I enclose a copy of it herewith.

3. Mr. Hull explained that when the United States purchased the Danish West Indian islands they had given Denmark an assurance that they recognized Danish sovereignty over Greenland. Denmark having asked Great Britain for the same assurance, the British Government had attached to their reply a condition that they be notified if ever Denmark contemplated selling Greenland, with an implication—as it appeared to the United States—that the British might have a right to acquire this territory in such an eventuality. Accordingly in June, 1920, the United States Government had communicated with the British Government in the sense expressed in the first paragraph of the enclosed Aide-Mémoire.

4. Mr. Hull further explained that the current speculations in the press and elsewhere about the subject of Greenland—much of it probably inspired by pro-Nazis and other elements seeking trouble—were in his opinion likely to gather volume. He felt it was in the interest not only of the United States but of Great Britain and Canada as well that something be done to bring the matter to a head. Further, the Danish Government must now be regarded as acting under duress, and this circumstance had to be taken into account in view of the possibility of orders being issued to the authorities in Greenland which might affect shipping or other matters.

5. I asked Mr. Hull whether the United States had anything further in mind or whether what he had communicated to me was as far as their minds had yet gone. He said they had nothing more in contemplation at the moment. He went on to say that in the event of an Allied victory

the position of Denmark would presumably be restored and the problem would no longer exist; otherwise, of course, the problem would require further consideration.

6. Mr. Hull said that at present it was not his intention to publish the fact of his having made this communication to the British and Canadian Governments.

7. Since seeing Mr. Hull I have spoken to Lord Lothian. He is communicating the matter to his Government and suggesting that they consult with the Canadian Government.

8. In view of Mr. Hull's communication to Lord Lothian and myself, it would seem a reasonable deduction that the United States Government, as at present advised, regard Greenland as a part of the Western Hemisphere and subject to the Monroe Doctrine, but do not so regard Iceland.

I have etc.

LORING C. CHRISTIE

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Washington, April 13, 1940

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In June 1920 the Government of the United States informed the Government of Great Britain that there had been appended to the Convention between the United States and Denmark for the cession to the United States of the Danish West Indies a declaration made by the Secretary of State on August 4, 1916 to the effect that the Government of the United States would not object to the extension by Denmark of her political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland; that it would not be disposed to recognize the existence in a third government of the right to acquire the territory in question should the Danish Government desire to dispose of it; and that it reserved for future consideration the position which it might take in such an eventuality.

Without assuming that the Government of Great Britain has any thought of interfering with the present status of Greenland but having in mind the existing situation resulting from the war in Europe and particularly as it relates to Denmark, it is deemed appropriate to call attention to the above mentioned communication of 1920 and to say that the position of the Government of the United States remains unchanged.

C[ORDELL] H[HULL]

1114.

267-J-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 447

London, April 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Further to your telegram No. 393, April 12th, Greenland. United Kingdom Government have expressed to me officially their great appreciation of consideration being given by the Canadian Government to possible action in Greenland, particularly for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the cryolite mines. They hope we will proceed with any plans that are feasible. They have made following suggestions which no doubt have already occurred to you. They would like to be informed before any action is taken and would wish to instruct their Ambassador at Washington to associate himself with Canadian Minister in any prior notification given the United States Government of such action. They stressed advantages of emphasizing in such notification temporary nature of any occupation, and that it is intended to purchase cryolite at current prices and to reimburse rightful owners of mines as soon as Denmark has regained her independence and Greenland handed back to her. Question of a suitable notification to local authorities in Greenland would no doubt be borne in mind. In this connection see my telegram No. 445 of today's date¹ for Faroe Islands procedure.

Following observations are offered from military point of view:

- (a) It appears highly improbable Germany would attempt to seize mines at Ivigtut;
- (b) There is perhaps a possibility Germany might attempt to destroy exporting facilities at mines, and scale of attack might vary from bombardment by an armoured ship to destruction by a landing party;
- (c) It is thought possibility of attack by air is extremely remote;
- (d) Germany might also attempt to use remote inlets on Greenland coast for fuelling surface raiders or submarines. This possibility is, however, not thought to be greater now than it was before occupation of Denmark.

It is not considered there is sufficient likelihood of a German attack on Ivigtut to warrant provision of defences which would be necessary to meet the scale of attack which is actually possible. In view, however, of importance attached to mines, it is thought that despatch of a small detachment to act as a deterrent would be justified. There would also be some advantage in watching Greenland coast either by naval or air patrols, more especially when German submarines are known to be operating in North Atlantic waters.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

1115.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

TELEGRAM 55

Ottawa, April 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. 1. As a result of German aggression against Denmark, the Canadian Government has been giving urgent consideration to the position of Greenland and its inhabitants. In our view there are three aspects of the problem which are of great importance to Canada and indeed to other countries:

A. the danger of the establishment in Greenland of a base for German submarine, surface or air raiders;

B. the danger of an attack by German landing parties on the unique cryolite mine at Ivigtut. Any interference with the output of this strategically vulnerable property would result in a serious disruption in the production of aluminum, a great proportion of which is manufactured in Canada and the United States;

C. the necessity on humanitarian grounds of providing for the inhabitants who are cut off from their normal source of supplies and from the market for their exports.

2. As a result of this situation, the Canadian Government is considering whether it would be necessary to send a small defence force to Greenland to guard against the dangers noted above and to cooperate with the local administrations in North and South Greenland with a view to providing for the needs of the native inhabitants. These defence measures would be purely of an emergency character and would not be intended as affording a basis for any future claim to acquisition of a title of sovereignty. The Canadian Government would be acting, for the period of the war, in the capacity of trustee for a restored and independent Danish Government, for which a full accounting would be kept.

3. You will appreciate the necessity of an early decision being reached in regard to this matter. We are communicating with the Government of the United Kingdom, and I consider it most desirable that you should speak frankly, but most confidentially, to the Secretary of State along the lines indicated above. We have noted in press reports that the United States is interested in both the humanitarian and defence aspects of the problem, and if the Administration is seriously considering the possibility of intervention in Greenland the plans which we are now examining would naturally have to be reviewed in the light of that possibility.

4. Will you, therefore, get in touch with the State Department today and ascertain what substance there may be to the press reports to which I have referred and obtain, if possible, an indication of how the Government of the United States would be likely to view the consummation of the tentative programme which is under consideration here.

5. Since above was prepared we have received your despatch No. 716 of April 13. We are not clear as to what course is referred to in Secretary's reference to bringing the matter to a head. We appreciate the secrecy which the Secretary is maintaining as to these discussions.

1116.

267-J-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

SECRET

Ottawa, April 16, 1940

Dear Mr. Christie,

With further reference to our cypher telegram No. 55 of April 15th, regarding Greenland, I enclose copies of telegram No. 393 of April 12th which was sent to the High Commissioner for Canada in London, and of two telegrams which were received in reply, No. 445¹ and No. 447 of April 15th.

The suggestions made are largely in conformity with the conclusions on the subject which had been reached by the Canadian Government. The suggestion as to the purchase of cryolite at current prices and reimbursement to the rightful owners of the mine later had already been discussed and was included by implication in the reference to the trustee policy contained in our telegram to you yesterday.

As regards the intimation that the Government of the United Kingdom would like to be informed before any action is taken and to instruct the Ambassador at Washington to associate himself in the prior notification given the United States Government of such action, we assume this refers to formal notification in the event of a decision to intervene being taken. In that case we shall discuss with the United Kingdom authorities the question of the advisability or otherwise of joint action.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

1117.

267-J-40

La légation aux États-Unis au Département d'État
Legation in United States to Department of State

SECRET

[Washington,] April 16, 1940

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. The Canadian Government has been urgently considering Greenland's position and that of its inhabitants because of Germany's aggression against

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

Denmark. The three aspects of the problem which, in the Canadian Government's view, are of great importance not only to Canada but to other countries are as follows:

(1) There is the danger of there being established in Greenland a base for German submarines, surface or other raiders;

(2) There is also the danger of attack by German landing parties at Ivigtut on the unique cryolite mines there. The result of any interference with the output of this strategically vulnerable property would be a serious disruption in the production of aluminum, a large proportion of which is manufactured in the United States and Canada.

(3) Humanitarian grounds make it necessary that the inhabitants of Greenland who are cut off from markets for exports and from their normal source of supply be provided for.

2. The Canadian Government is considering, as a result of this situation, whether it would be necessary to send to Greenland a small defence force to guard against the above mentioned dangers and to cooperate with the local administrations in North and South Greenland in providing for the needs of the native inhabitants. These measures would not be intended as affording the basis for any future claim to acquire a titular sovereignty but would be purely of an emergency character. For the duration of the war the Canadian Government would be acting as trustee for a restored and independent Danish Government and full accounting would be maintained for that Government.

L[ORING] C. C[HRISTIE]

1118.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM 61

Washington, April 16, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram April 15th, No. 55, concerning Greenland. I made representations this morning at State Department in the sense of your instructions leaving a memorandum based on first two paragraphs of your telegram, and emphasizing points mentioned by Doctor Skelton this morning, namely, the temporary nature of the proposed action and the intention to make cryolite available to the United States as well as to Canada and United Kingdom consumers. Matter will be taken up immediately with the Secretary of State and we shall receive their views within a few days. Upon their request I assured them that Canada did not contemplate taking action until securing their views. It was also mentioned that while action might not be necessary, immediately, they consider it desirable that a decision be made as soon as practicable as to what action should be taken.

They had already received representations from Penn-Salt Limited.

1119.

267-J-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 413

Ottawa, April 17, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Your telegrams No. 447 of April 15th and No. 455 of April 16th¹ re Greenland.

1. Appreciate very much suggestions offered by United Kingdom on both procedure and military requirements. We would of course inform Government of United Kingdom before any action were taken and would also wish to discuss at that time whether in view of United States attitude it would be advisable to adopt suggestion that the British Ambassador at Washington should associate himself with the Canadian Minister in any prior notification of action given the United States Government.

2. Canadian Minister was given by Secretary of State on April 13th copy of aide-mémoire which had been given to British Ambassador previous day. Following receipt of your telegram No. 455 we have today obtained from the British High Commissioner substance of oral discussion on April 12th.

3. Canadian Minister was instructed on April 15th to advise Secretary of State that as result of German aggression against Denmark, Canadian Government had been giving urgent consideration to position of Greenland and its inhabitants and particularly to three aspects—

(a) possible danger of establishment in Greenland of a base for German naval or air action;

(b) danger of interference with production of indispensable cryolite at Ivigtut and

(c) necessity of providing for inhabitants who would be cut off from normal supplies and markets.

Under these circumstances Canadian Government was considering whether it would be necessary to send small defence force to Greenland to guard against the danger and to cooperate with local administration to provide for needs of inhabitants. Defence measures would be purely of emergency character and not intended as affording a basis for future claim to acquisition of title of sovereignty. Canadian Government would be acting for period of war in the capacity of trustee for a restored and independent Danish Government. Full accounting would be kept and in the meantime cryolite supplies would be made available to United States as well as Allies at same prices. The Minister was asked to ascertain attitude of United States toward

¹ Non reproduit.

² Not printed.

Greenland problem and toward tentative programme which was under consideration here.

4. Canadian Minister made representations accordingly April 16th and was informed United States views would be given within a few days. It was made clear in response to specific inquiry that Canada did not contemplate taking any action without further consultation.

5. Situation has been rendered embarrassing to Canada by publication of alleged interview of United States press representatives with British Ambassador yesterday. The Associated Press reported Ambassador had said that neither Britain nor Canada would undertake occupation of Greenland unless absolutely certain that Germany was sending an expeditionary force, which was most unlikely. *New York Times* reported that in response to inquiry he stated he knew nothing of report that Canada might occupy Greenland, nevertheless that if Britain decided that Greenland should be occupied to forestall a German move the undertaking would be carried out by Canada in order to avoid complications involving the Monroe doctrine. Everyone recognized that Greenland came under the Monroe doctrine.

6. Ambassador personally informed Canadian Legation this morning that he had made no statement to press implicating Canada.

7. Canadian service departments are considering details in event of decision to act.

8. It may be necessary to consider possible bearing of any action in Greenland on somewhat analogous situation that may arise in Dutch East Indies.

1120.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

TELEGRAM 58

Ottawa, April 18, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Information received here that a Greenland Committee is being formed under the direction of the Danish Minister to the United States. According to the reports the Committee will be organized to handle problems of finance, import and export, and it will provide for the continuance of the present form of Administration in Greenland. There is a further suggestion that the Committee is being organized with official American assistance and with British concurrence.

Please ascertain from the State Department at once what basis there may be for the report of official assistance in the establishment of the Committee. Then enquire from the British Embassy whether any indication of British approval has been given and if so obtain exact form and authority of commitment. Report results of your enquiries today.

1121.

King Papers, PAC

*Extrait du mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Extract from Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs to Prime Minister*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] April 18, 1940

4. Regarding our own small problem of Greenland, it is conceivable that the attitude of the United States may be influenced by possible analogies drawn between Greenland and the Dutch East Indies. It occurred to me yesterday that Washington, with its special interest in the Pacific, might be concerned lest occupation of Greenland left orphaned by the German invasion of Denmark, be held to afford a precedent for occupation by some other country of the Dutch East Indies left orphaned by a German invasion of Holland. A report last night from Washington appeared to confirm that possibility.

5. Aside from this new angle, the United States attitude appears to be definitely sympathetic. Christie saw the State Department Tuesday and informed them that in view of the danger of Greenland being made a base for attack, the necessity of protecting the cryolite mining operations essential for aluminum production, and the necessity of assisting the local administration in obtaining supplies and marketing its products, we had been considering the possibility of local action for these purposes, with no thought of a permanent occupation or political control. Cryolite would be made available to the United States or the United Kingdom at current prices. Christie enquired whether the United States had any plans under consideration themselves, and what their attitude would be to this tentative Canadian programme. The State Department promised to reply within a few days.

In the meantime, Lord Lothian gave one of the most incredibly stupid and embarrassing interviews ever given by a public representative. The Associated Press reported he had said that neither Britain nor Canada would undertake occupation of Greenland unless absolutely certain that Germany was sending an expeditionary force, which was most unlikely. The *New York Times* reported that in response to a press inquiry he stated he knew nothing of the report that Canada might occupy Greenland. Nevertheless, if Britain decided that Greenland should be occupied to forestall a German move, the undertaking would be carried out by Canada in order to avoid complications involving the Monroe doctrine. This apparent assumption of a right to speak for Canada was greatly resented by Colonel Ralston and other members of Council. The State Department was informed that Lothian had not been authorized to speak for Canada. The Ambassador, after being furnished with a report of the Canadian representations on the subject, informed the Canadian Legation yesterday that he had made no statement to the press implicating Canada. He has, however, not issued any public denial. London has been advised of all developments in this respect.

1122.

267-J-40

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] April 19, 1940

GREENLAND

I spoke this morning to Mr. Christie who had returned last night from Virginia. He said he understood the question of analogy between Greenland and the Dutch East Indies might trouble the State Department. If the question came up he should, of course, make it clear that we fully realized the very great importance of the East Indies problem and the position which Mr. Hull had taken with regard to it. At the same time, it might be pointed out that there was not a real analogy between the two cases. Greenland was immediately contiguous to Canada, not 2000 miles away; Germany was at war with Canada and her activity in such territory would be a real danger; Germany, of course, was not at war with Japan, neither was there any thought in the Greenland case of territorial expansion or permanent occupation.

Mr. Christie, I gathered, thought that what was in mind in Washington was that Japan might say if anything was done on this side—"You have your Monroe Doctrine; very well, we have our Monroe Doctrine for Asia, and we want no intervention here by an outside power. If a situation arises that needs protecting, we'll do the protecting".

Mr. Christie said he understood that Lothian was quite chastened and nervous as a result of his press statements. He really thought he had learned a lesson. The press representatives around the State Department appeared to make a dead set on him whenever he came out and he seemed anxious to cultivate their goodwill. He seemed to have the firm conviction that he should act in every respect in a diametrically opposite way to Lindsay.¹

1123.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM 65

Washington, April 19, 1940

SECRET. My telegram No. 64, April 18th,² and previous correspondence concerning Greenland. At Dunn's³ request I called upon him this morning to receive State Department comments on my representations of April 16th.

¹ Sir Ronald Lindsay, ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne aux États-Unis, 1930-39.

² Non reproduit.

³ James C. Dunn, conseiller sur les relations politiques, Département d'État.

¹ Sir Ronald Lindsay, Ambassador of Great Britain in United States, 1930-39.

² Not printed.

³ James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations, State Department.

2. Dunn states that Secretary of State considers it would be highly inadvisable for Canada to take proposed action in respect of Greenland. He is insistently anxious that this be not done. It had been intended that position of United States on possible Canadian action should have been made clear in Secretary's interview with me April 13th. For the present and public (word omitted) United States action in Greenland will be based entirely upon humanitarian considerations. United States is however prepared to base its future actions on all aspects of situation and all relevant considerations. I intervened to ask whether all aspects included possibilities of sabotage and interference with supply. Dunn replied that they would consider all aspects emphasizing these two words.

3. United States policy in respect of Greenland must be framed in the light of possible analogy which Japanese might draw in respect of Netherlands Indies. The Secretary attaches much importance and is most concerned over possible developments in Netherlands Indies. The United States therefore wants to be certain that no action which it might take or acquiesce in respecting Greenland would interfere with carrying out of policy which it considers desirable in Western Pacific. If Canada, United Kingdom or France were to send defence forces to Greenland, Japanese would claim on this analogy they were entitled, in the event of the Netherlands being involved in war, to send defence forces to Netherlands Indies.

I commented that analogy is not perfect, since Japan is not a belligerent. Dunn answered that the Japanese do not need a perfect analogy, and said that they would use any of three arguments concerning Greenland which Canadian Government had brought forward or might bring forward:

- (a) Necessity of protecting shipments of essential raw materials;
- (b) Possibility of establishment of bases for hostile operations against Canada or trade with Canada;
- (c) Proximity of area to Canada.

4. In answer to a question from me, Dunn stated that the Canadian Government can be assured that the United States will transmit to it any information which it gathers on any matter relating to the situation in Greenland, including possibility of sabotage, and will keep it in close touch with developments in attitude and policy of the United States. In return the United States will welcome similar information from the Canadian authorities.

5. He pointed out that the United States Government has an Ice Patrol ship constantly in the North Atlantic and that it thus is in touch with developments in that area. He is of the opinion that for another two or three weeks it will not be possible for boats to reach Greenland and that even at the end of two weeks or three weeks only an ice breaker can reach Greenland ports.

[6.] He pointed out that one assurance which Canadian Government has that the United States will protect sources of supply of cryolite in Greenland is that the United States is the largest consumer of cryolite.

7. Throughout his conversation Dunn emphasized the highly confidential nature of the statement which he was making. The United States is anxious for as long as possible to be able to affirm publicly that its action respecting Greenland is based solely on humanitarian considerations and they must, therefore, proceed very carefully. Main reason for this is danger of creating a precedent re Japan and the Netherlands Indies as indicated above.

8. I asked Dunn whether there was any truth in the story mentioned in the first paragraph of your telegram No. 58 of April 18th concerning Greenland Committee. Dunn answered there was some truth in it, but that it did not express the whole truth. He would not deny that the suggestion had been made to the United States Government that such a Committee should be set up. The United States Government has as yet however taken no action on this suggestion and had not made a decision. So far the only action which has been taken was the President's request to Norman Davis¹ that an investigation be made immediately by the American Red Cross of the needs of the people of Greenland. State Department will keep Canadian Government informed on developments arising out of this investigation and have no objection to my discussing matter direct with Norman Davis. Do you wish me to do this?

9. Dunn brought up question of Danish ships plying between Greenland and the United States. He stated that a Committee, representing agents of Danish shipping lines, had been formed in the United States to deal with these ships, and that an effort was being made by this Committee to make an arrangement with the United Kingdom Government under which these ships would not be considered by the United Kingdom as being belligerent ships. The United Kingdom was obviously in a position to prevent Danish ships from sailing between Greenland and Europe.

10. In conclusion Dunn stated that the United States would be glad to have acquiescence of Canadian Government in proposed policy of the United States of America concerning Greenland.

1124.

267-J-40

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures²
au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs² to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 438

Ottawa, April 21, 1940

MOST SECRET. Our telegram No. 413 of April 17th, Greenland.

1. State Department have now given reply to Canadian representations of April 16th regarding Greenland. As forecast in my telegram under reference the Secretary of State attaches great importance to possible analogy which

¹Président de la Croix-Rouge américaine.

²Chairman, American Red Cross.

³J. L. Ralston.

Japan might draw between preventive action in Greenland and action on their part in Netherlands Indies and on that ground expresses hope we refrain from any military action at present time. While analogy is far from exact we recognize it might afford plausible argument and recognize also importance of maintaining friendly and active interest of United States in Pacific situation.

2. It was also stated in conversation that while United States present interest in Greenland would be based entirely on humanitarian grounds i.e. relief to inhabitants, they are prepared "to base their future actions on all aspects of situation and all relevant considerations" including possibility of sabotage or interference with supply.

3. Some private interests in United States, with cooperation of Danish representatives there, are apparently considering seek[ing] control of cryolite production. Attitude of United States Government to these plans is not yet clear but would be important consideration in our conclusion. Our immediate interest as regards both defence and Allied requirements of aluminum is naturally relatively greater than United States interest.

4. In view of these developments we are considering whether it would be desirable to suspend for present plans involving military action. As preliminary arrangements were set on foot here in case such action should be decided upon, we should like to have view of United Kingdom Government as early as possible on first, relevance and importance of analogy with Netherlands Indies, second, value of oral assurances referred to in second paragraph, and third, general cryolite situation including developments referred to in paragraph three.

1125.

267-J-40

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au ministre
aux États-Unis*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister
in United States*

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM 60

Ottawa, April 23, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 65 of the 19th April, Greenland.

1. The Canadian Government fully appreciates the force of the considerations placed before you by the Department of State. The whole question of political and military action is being re-examined and I hope to communicate with you again within the next few days in regard to these aspects of the problem. In the meantime no action will be taken.

2. We have been disturbed by the pronounced activity of certain interests in the United States on phases discussed in paragraphs 8 and 9 of your telegram under reference and we would express the hope that if approval of the United States Government is sought, it will not give a decision until we have an opportunity shortly of discussing this together with the other aspects of the question. Ends.

1126.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM 71

Washington, April 24, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Spoke to Dunn at State Department this morning in the sense of your telegram No. 60, April 23, re Greenland, emphasizing that in present circumstances Canada is more immediately and directly concerned than others as regards both cryolite and defence aspects.

He replied that they would be glad to have anything I could communicate at any time. So far as Departments are concerned there has been no change since his communication of April 19th. The whole matter is being very carefully considered in all aspects, including legal, which he emphasized as requiring great care. From general tenor of his observations I would not anticipate their reaching decision rapidly.

He said that they would keep me informed without necessarily waiting for further communications that might come from you. In view of Canada's special concern, which they recognized, they would welcome any information in your possession which could be used in connection with their own studies.

1127.

267-J-40

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

SECRET

[Ottawa,] April 24, 1940

GREENLAND

The present situation is as follows:

1. *United States Government.* The State Department have indicated their strong desire that no preventive military action be taken that would afford a precedent in connection with the Japanese-Netherlands-Indies situation. They have given orally definite assurances of interest in the event of hostile action against Greenland. As to positive action to be taken by or in the United States, the State Department is more vague. The only action authorized is an enquiry by the Red Cross as to the feasibility of assistance to the inhabitants of Greenland. They agree they have been in touch with the Danish Minister, Kauffmann, about the formation of a Greenland committee but no decision has been made.

2. *United Kingdom Government.* We have sent two communications to the High Commissioner for discussion with the United Kingdom, Nos. 413 of April 17 and 438 of April 21st, but have not yet had any reply. In the latter telegram we set out the State Department's view and asked the opinion of the United Kingdom Government so that we could reach an early decision as to continuing or discontinuing the preparations for military action.

3. *Danish Minister in the United States.* The Danish Minister has been communicating actively with the local Danish authorities in Greenland. The telegrams from him and from Penn-Salt have been intercepted by our cable censor and in all cases have been sent on after being translated and examined. No replies have yet been intercepted, though it is clear from Kauffmann's telegrams that replies have been sent. On the whole Kauffmann's communications have been definitely helpful. In a telegram of April 20 (?) to District Administrators, Kauffmann, who incidentally states this viewpoint is concurred in by the State Department, urges administrators not to communicate with or to acknowledge communications from Denmark. He adds that during Denmark's occupation he regards the District Administrators as the supreme authority for dealing with all questions arising in Greenland. In a telegram of April 23rd he states that the District Administrators are likely to receive instructions from Copenhagen with regard to their relations with the German Embassy at Washington and urges again that they should not accept any such instructions and advise him if they are received.

There are, however, some passages as to which more question might arise. In the telegram first quoted, for example, he states that in Greenland's and Denmark's interests he requests that all questions pertaining not only to Greenland's position vis-à-vis the U.S.A., but all questions and communications concerning Greenland's position to other powers be dealt with and presented by himself, though he adds that in all questions concerning Greenland he will work in accordance with the wishes of the District Administrators. In his message of April 21st he states that he has conferred with President Roosevelt, the American Foreign Minister and the Allied Ambassadors; that England and Canada will not occupy Greenland but would, in a given case, prevent others from doing it; that President Roosevelt has indicated that the Monroe Doctrine covers Greenland "so that the U.S.A. will only permit the Danish flag in Greenland". He adds that he hopes to arrange for an American Coastguard cutter to be sent to Greenland, and will convey with pleasure to the American Government the communication from the District Administrators and District Councils, thanking the American Government for its interest.

In his message of April 21st, Kauffmann states "I am appointing Danish Greenland Committee next few days."

4. *Penn-Salt.* The District Administrators have, according to a telegram of April 21st from Kauffmann, been taking an "energetic initiative concerning the cryolite". Kauffmann says he has already secured, in principle, the same promise from Penn-Salt, though they will not be able to sign [a] contract according to Greenland's formula. He adds that Penn-Salt desires eventually to take 30,000 tons in 1940, possibly more, and asks to be advised as soon as possible how much the mine can deliver, also whether there is a ship en route from Denmark.

We have also intercepted telegrams sent direct in clear from Penn-Salt to Cryolite Mines, April 22nd, asking if they could count on several additional cargoes under contract terms. He adds that they have cabled UBBELOHDE and

CHEMDEYS requesting specifications and quantity required and indicating they could supply if ample crude ore available. (Apparently this has to do with certain orders of aluminum). No information is yet available as to the meaning of the two words in capitals.

Subject to further considerations and to any suggestions that may be received from London, it would appear

(1) that in view of present pre-occupation of German Naval forces in other quarters and the strong attitude of the United States regarding the Pacific analogy, it would not be desirable to take any preventive military action at present. It might, however, be considered necessary to continue present military preparations on a restricted scale in case the necessity for positive action would arise later.

(2) if a decision to the above effect is reached, we might advise the United States that we appreciate the importance of the consideration regarding the Pacific which they have advanced, i.e. that Japan might base action or argument on analogy if a North American neutral (or belligerent) took preventive action against Greenland. In view of the present straits of the Germany navy and of the considerations put forward by the Secretary of State, it is, therefore, not our intention to take any present preventive military action. We appreciate also the indication of the readiness of the United States, as indicated by Mr. Dunn, to base future action on all aspects of the situation. We shall have pleasure in exchanging information with the United States and consulting regarding any action which we may have in mind in the event of more imminent danger of German intervention in Greenland or a change in the Pacific situation.

5. As regards cryolite, in view of the fact that the Canadian supply has always in the past been derived from the United States Company, Penn-Salt, which under contract with the Danish Government, has had the sole right to distribute all supplies not sent to Denmark, we should encourage the Canadian Aluminum Company to carry on negotiations with Penn-Salt as to the large increased supplies that will be necessary. This should be done on a commercial basis without any reference to political aspects or our knowledge of the activities of Penn-Salt and the Danish Minister.

As regards the attempt to set up in the United States a Greenland Committee, practically controlling or directing the local Greenland administration, we might indicate to the proper quarters, including the State Department, that we have no objection to the Danish Minister continuing to advise the local administrators to have nothing to do with German-controlled authorities in Denmark or the German Embassy in the United States. Further, our own view would be that the local administration should continue to operate. We, however, must point out that it would not be acceptable to Canadian opinion that exclusive control should gradually be assumed by any organization in the United States. We have been considering bringing into the picture the Danish Consul General in Montreal who, incidentally, is also Consul General of Iceland, and who has indicated his intention to object to all instructions from

German-controlled authorities. Further, we are considering the advisability of sending some direct reassuring communication to the Greenland local authorities.

6. As regards the suggestion that the German Embassy at Washington may endeavour to take a hand in remote control of Greenland, it may be assumed the United States Government will not look on any such attempt with favour.

1128.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

SECRET

Washington, April 24, 1940

Dear Dr. Skelton,

I think I had better supplement in this way the cypher telegram (No. 71) we sent today about the Greenland question.

I feel from this morning's conversation with Dunn at the State Department that they are anxious to take fully into account the Canadian position.

As regards the so-called Greenland Committee, he tells me this is not a matter of the Department's initiative and that they will have to be careful, particularly in view of the legal aspects, before giving any approbation to activities on United States soil. He pointed out that the Danish Minister here has taken the position that he will not act on instructions received from his Government in Copenhagen since he regards such instructions as given under duress (the Danish Minister, who is a very attractive man of high character, told me the same thing in the course of a general conversation after dinner the other evening, though Greenland was not mentioned). Consequently, anything he or a committee under him might do would raise delicate questions of international law, and the State Department have their own concern about what takes place on United States soil. I understand that the so-called Committee, whoever they may be, have retained eminent legal counsel, and so has the Danish Minister.

Dunn mentioned having learned that some local administrative council in Greenland had communicated with the Danish Minister here, asking whether he would co-operate with them. I gathered that in this they were basing themselves on their economic necessities, their need for markets, and for supplies (I formed an impression that this information was obtained from some radio message or messages which had been picked up, but am not sure of this). Dunn thought they were rather shrewd in basing themselves on the economic position.

The question of Danish shipping is regarded as rather separate from that of Greenland and as raising different and broader considerations. It also is being very carefully studied by the State Department, particularly from the legal aspect.

I was also informed that the whole matter, so far as the State Department is concerned, has now been placed in the hands of Mr. Adolf Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, and Mr. Green Hackworth, the Legal Adviser of the Department, so that hereafter, whenever necessary, I shall be in communication with Mr. Berle.

It is also worth mentioning that Mr. Hull sent a letter to Warm Springs, so that the President would be informed on the subject should it come up in conversation between him and the Prime Minister during Mr. King's visit there.

As I have said over the telephone, if you should have any factual material or expert appreciations regarding the Greenland situation which could be handed to the State Department, I feel it would be welcomed and might be useful.

I am wondering whether you are considering doing anything in the way of relief for Greenland. It strikes me it would also be interesting to be a little more clear about the local administrative council in the island. I suppose, however, that the difficulties of communication and access are such that the whole position there is still somewhat obscure.

Yours sincerely,

LORING C. CHRISTIE

P.S. Perhaps I had better mention again that the State Department keep on indicating their desire that this whole matter be treated on a specially confidential basis.

1129.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 806
CONFIDENTIAL

Washington, April 26, 1940

Sir,

The Danish Minister called on me this afternoon, saying that he had wished to speak to me before about the position in Greenland, but during recent days he had been under extreme pressure.

2. Mr. Kauffmann began by describing the position he personally had taken from the outset of the German occupation of Denmark. On April 9th he had made statements at a press conference and by radio, which are shown in the enclosed clippings from the *New York Times* of April 10th.¹ At the same time he had seen Mr. Sumner Welles, the Under-Secretary of State, and had spoken to him in the same sense. He had gone on to say to Mr.

¹ Non reproduites.

¹ Not printed.

Welles that, having arrived here as the representative of a free and independent Denmark, he did not propose to accept instructions from the Government of Denmark in present circumstances, as these could only be treated as given under duress. Denmark was going through dark days, but she had done this before, and he was acting in the faith that she would again be free and independent. Mr. Welles had assured him that the United States Government would continue to recognize him as the representative of Denmark.

3. In answer to a question Mr. Kauffmann told me the German Embassy here had as yet made no approaches to him and if they did he would ignore them. He did not know how long the present state of affairs so far as he was concerned would go on, but he felt the German Government might attempt no steps for some time, wishing to make it appear that Denmark is cooperating with them.

4. Mr. Kauffmann then spoke of Greenland in particular. There were two local Governors, one at Godthaab in the southern part and the other at Godhavn in the northern part. He said, in answer to a question, that these local authorities were adopting the same position and line of reasoning which had governed him, namely, that they would not accept instructions in present circumstances from Copenhagen. His view was that, as the authority of the Government of Copenhagen could not be recognized for the time being, the local officials should assume authority and the functions of government in the island. He had had some communication with them, but telegraphic communication was not very satisfactory and he was thinking of sending up a representative to hold discussions on the spot.

5. I told Mr. Kauffmann of the Canadian Government's practical concern, both as regards the supplies of cryolite and as regards the defence aspects. He said he fully realized this Canadian concern, and he wished to assure me that as far as he was concerned he would do everything to see that supplies to Canada were continued. He mentioned having discussed the matter with Mr. Beale of Penn-Salt, Limited, to whom the Aluminum Company of Canada had expressed their anxieties about the supplies, and he felt there would be no real difficulty.

6. I mentioned having heard of the idea of a "Greenland Committee" being set up in this country. Mr. Kauffmann said that as a matter of fact he had just finally appointed an "American-Danish Greenland Commission" with headquarters in New York and that he was making an announcement to the press today. I enclose a copy of an announcement¹ which he gave me later. The first two named members of the Commission—Mr. Sonne, the son of a prominent business man in Denmark, and Doctor Bentzen, who happened to have been born in Greenland—would do the real work of the Commission. In answer to a question, Mr. Kauffmann said that this Committee would have no political functions whatever and that in the nature of things they could not have such functions. He could not confer such functions on them. In

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

this field the Greenland Governors and Council would have to be regarded as his principal and he as their representative, though he would try to give them as much advice as possible. The Commission's functions would be confined to humanitarian and commercial aspects. They would advise and assist him in respect of relief and supplies. At the State Department today he had seen Mr. Berle, who had approved the announcement.

7. Mr. Kauffmann told me in confidence that he was proposing to suggest to the State Department that they send a Consul to Greenland. He thought this might have some value in supporting the position of the authorities in Greenland at this time. He particularly asked me to treat this as confidential, since he had not yet mentioned it to the State Department.

8. Mr. Kauffmann said more than once that he wished me to understand his full desire in all this matter to act to the satisfaction of the Canadian and British Governments as well as of the United States Government. He was ready at any time to give me any information in his possession that might be of interest to the Canadian Government, and he would be glad to keep in touch and answer any enquiries I might have to make. I thanked him for his call and expressed my appreciation of what he had told me. Perhaps I may add here that Mr. Kauffmann strikes me as a most attractive man of high character, in whose integrity and ability one can have a great deal of confidence. I believe he has gained a high standing in various quarters here since his arrival last summer.

9. Perhaps I may add that it seems to me open to the Canadian Government to consider getting into direct touch with the Greenland authorities as well as the sending of some representative, such as a Trade Commissioner. Possibly the Danish Consul in Canada might consider the appointment of some Committee of representative Danes and others in Canada along the lines of the body appointed by the Danish Minister here.

I have etc.

LORING C. CHRISTIE

1130.

267-J-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

Ottawa, April 27, 1940

Dear Mr. Christie,

I had intended to send a despatch this morning on Greenland following our conversation but have been so swamped with other matters it has not been possible.

Mr. Lapointe is out of town today and I have not thus far been able to see Colonel Ralston.

I am inclined to suggest for the Prime Minister's consideration:

1. As regards action by Canada—

(a) We have been assuming that preventive military action at present

is out of the question. As we informed you this morning the Greenland radio stations have been silent for several days. It is probable that this is due to the local authorities not having decided on the course they will take towards the efforts of the Danish Minister in Washington to advise them, though it is very possible it may mean some German interference or local sabotage. We are continuing to watch this aspect of the case.

(b) *Communication with Greenland.* I am inclined to think the Canadian Government should send a wireless communication to the Greenland authorities indicating that we have had to take note of the possibility that following the occupation of Denmark Germany may seek to control or utilize Greenland for hostile purposes; that the Canadian Government assume the local administrative authorities in Greenland will refuse to take any hostile or detrimental action under instructions from German-controlled authorities in Denmark; and that the Canadian Government will be prepared to cooperate, so long as that is the case, with the local authorities in any trade or supply questions that arise.

(c) We might ask the Danish Consul General in Montreal, who is determined not to accept Copenhagen orders, to associate himself with us in consideration of Greenland affairs.

2. As regards the United States, Colonel Ralston has wished to defer a reply till we hear from London. We have sent two telegrams to London without any response and on Thursday telegraphed asking for a reply.

I have, however, asked you this morning to let the State Department see the copies we have of communications that have been going from the Danish Minister and Penn-Salt to Greenland and, also, to advise of the facts as to the silence of the Greenland radio stations and the despatch of a wireless from Iceland to the German Embassy in Washington, which came to our attention this morning.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

1131.

267-J-40

L'«Aluminum Company of Canada» au ministère des Affaires extérieures
Aluminum Company of Canada to Department of External Affairs

Ottawa, April 27, 1940

Dear Mr. Keenleyside,

If the report in the press, with reference to the formation of a Committee under the direction of the Danish Minister to the United States, to administer the cryolite property at Ivigtut, Greenland, be true, we trust that at least a Canadian representative will be appointed to this Committee, to ensure that the vital interests of the Allies in this matter are guarded.

We believe that we have put our case, and the case of the British and French aluminum producers, with respect to Greenland cryolite, on record as forcibly as possible, and it is unnecessary to further stress the importance of this material to the Allied war effort.

In our opinion, the only way in which these interests can be properly protected is to have the Canadian Government occupy and control the output of the mine. Certainly a Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Danish Minister, with the best intentions in the world, is in no position to protect the property against enemy action. Under any such arrangement, we cannot possibly feel that our supplies of this essential material are ensured.

We, therefore, strongly urge that the Canadian Government take the only action which, in our opinion, would guarantee adequate supplies of natural cryolite to the Allied producers—namely, the occupation and protection of the mine at Ivigtut by Canadian or Allied forces, and, if this is not possible, that it at least insist on the appointment of a representative to this Committee, to make certain that the interests of the Allies are protected as much as possible.

Yours faithfully,

F. W. BRUCE

1132.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 74

Washington, April 27, 1940

IMMEDIATE. CONFIDENTIAL. At his request I saw Berle at the State Department this morning, who said that he wished to keep me informed regarding Greenland developments, in pursuance of assurances given me some days ago by Dunn.

First, United States Government proposed sending a Consul to Greenland, the Danish Minister consenting. This is most confidential for the present.

Secondly, regarding announcement published this morning of American-Danish-Greenland Commission, Danish Minister had shown him proposed announcement yesterday. He had told Minister that this was his own (business?), but that State Department had no objection. Berle did not regard establishment of this Commission as an action for which the United States were in any way responsible. He did not regard Commission as having any functions beyond those indicated in announcement. In answer to questions, he did not see how Commission could be regarded legally as having any political functions. No one here could confer such functions. If later on the Greenland local authorities should attempt to confer such functions in any way, that would be a new question calling for consideration, but no such situation had arisen yet.

Berle expressed a wish to remain in touch and keep me informed.

1133.

267-J-40

Le ministre du Danemark aux États-Unis au ministre aux États-Unis
Minister of Denmark in United States to Minister in United States

Washington, April 29, 1940

Sir,

The German invasion of Denmark has caused grave difficulties for Greenland, as this colony thereby is deprived for the duration of the occupation of the supplies which hitherto have been shipped from Denmark every summer.

With the normal supply line to Greenland cut off, I have felt it my duty, as official representative of Denmark, to take the necessary steps to avert this threat to the welfare and the vital interests of the inhabitants of Greenland, by securing facilities for the Greenland Government's purchase in this country of necessities for the maintenance of the population of the colony.

To assist me in this task I have appointed a commission with headquarters in New York City. This body which is called "The American-Danish Greenland Commission" and has its office at 107 Wall Street, New York City, N.Y. (cable address: GREENMARK), is composed as follows: Mr. Hans Christian Sonne, who will act as Chairman of the Commission and, assisted by Dr. Paul Bentzen, will carry out the administrative functions under my general directions, while the following have been invited to join the Commission as advisory members: Mrs. Ruth Bryan Rohde, former American Minister to Denmark, Mr. John Dynely Prince, Professor at Columbia University and former American Minister to Denmark, Dr. Henry Goddard Leach, President, The American-Scandinavian Foundation, Dr. Isaiah Bowman, President, Johns Hopkins University, Mr. Leonard T. Beale, President of the Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Company, Captain Bob Bartlett, New York.

Please accept etc.

HENRIK KAUFFMANN

1134.

267-J-40

Mémoire du conseiller¹ au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures

Memorandum from Counsellor¹ to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

SECRET

[Ottawa,] April 30, 1940

GREENLAND

The views expressed in this memorandum are of course subject to revision in the light of what we may be told by the Prime Minister when he returns tomorrow. If our present understanding of the situation is not altered, however, by what Mr. King reports on his visit to Washington, perhaps the views

¹H. L. Keenleyside.

and recommendations embodied in this note may be found worthy of consideration.

The following individuals and organizations have a direct and valid interest in the position of Greenland during the war:

(a) *The Canadian Government*, which for political and strategic reasons must be in a position to exercise an immediate and effective influence in the affairs of Greenland.

(b) *The Aluminum Company of Canada*, which has been asked to increase its output of aluminum and which depends almost entirely upon the availability of Greenland cryolite.

(c) *The United States Government*, which has political interests of a general and very important character in anything that may happen in Greenland.

(d) *The Danish Minister in Washington*, who has broken his allegiance to the controlled Government of Denmark and is endeavouring to reorganize Danish interests in the Western Hemisphere.

(e) *The American-Danish Greenland Commission*, which has been organized in the United States and which proposes to take charge of certain commercial and humanitarian aspects of the problem.

(f) *The Delegate of Greenland*, who is being sent to the United States.

(g) *The Pennsalt Company of Philadelphia*, which has control over cryolite distribution in this Hemisphere and is seeking, according to certain reports, to obtain practically the whole output for the present year.

(h) *The Allied Powers*, which depend to a considerable degree upon the availability of Greenland cryolite for the continued and expanded production of aluminum which is an essential element in their war policies.

Our primary purpose is, of course, to protect the interests of the Canadian Government through the maintenance of Canadian prestige, the establishment of Canadian security, and the provision of cryolite supplies for Canadian industry. Canada also of course has a natural interest in the humanitarian aspects of the Greenland situation.

Recognizing the primacy of Canadian interests, it becomes necessary to consider how those interests can be protected most effectively and most surely. This can be achieved only by ensuring that the other interested parties, or at least the more important of them, are satisfied with the arrangements that are made. In order that they may be satisfied it is essential that an exact definition of their claims and interests should be available. In view of these considerations it is proposed that the following steps be examined with a view to their adoption as a course of policy by the Canadian Government:

(a) The Canadian Government should immediately send a telegram to the existing authorities in North Greenland (Godhavn) and in South Greenland (Godthaab), assuring them of our interest in their welfare and that of their dependents, and inviting an expression of their views as to any steps that Canada might take which would contribute to their independence and the happiness of their people.

(b) The Canadian Government should then propose to the Government of the United States that an informal and, if possible, secret conference should be held at which, in addition to the Governments, representatives of the Aluminum Company of Canada, the Pennsalt Company, the Danish Minister in Washington, the American-Danish Committee, and the Delegate from Greenland, should be invited to be present. At this meeting a free exchange of views might be expected and a mutually satisfactory basis for a solution of the more important aspects of the problem might well be discovered.

(c) As soon as the meeting referred to above is concluded and with the approval of the participants in it, the Canadian Government should arrange for the departure of the *Nascopie* on a brief survey trip, and should leave in Greenland an "accredited representative" who would be in a position to co-operate with the local authorities and with the United States Consul who is to be appointed in overseeing the execution of the terms agreed upon by the interested parties at the meeting referred to above.

It is suggested that only through such a programme as that outlined above can the Canadian Government avoid a loss of prestige and at the same time ensure, through a mutually satisfactory co-operative agreement, with the other interested parties, that the essential supplies of cryolite will be available for Canadian industry.

1135.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

SECRET

Washington, May 1, 1940

Dear Dr. Skelton,

I received on April 29 your letter of April 27 on Greenland.

I was able to give a copy of your letter to the Prime Minister, who indicated that he would take the points up with you on his return to Ottawa.

In accordance with the instructions contained in the final paragraph of your letter, I saw Mr. Berle this morning and gave him a set of the telegrams. This was the first opportunity I had had to see Mr. Berle since receiving your instructions. On looking through the telegrams he noted the phrase at the beginning of the telegram dated 25/4/40¹ "with concurrence of American Government I have informed American-Danish Greenland Commission." He stated that he did not regard the phrase "with concurrence of American Government" as a strictly accurate statement of the position which the United States Government had taken, but reiterated what I had reported to you in my telegram No. 74 of April 27 that, when the Danish Minister had shown him the proposed announcement of the appointment of the Commis-

¹ Non reproduit.² Not printed.

sion, he had told him that this was his own business, but that the State Department had no objection.

I mentioned to Mr. Berle that I had been informed by Ottawa that the Greenland radio stations had been silent for some time in spite of insistent demands from the Danish Minister and others in this country for answers to their messages. Mr. Berle said that he thought that communications had now been resumed, since the State Department had heard through Mr. Kauffmann that the Greenland authorities would like to have the United States send a consular officer to Greenland.

I informed Mr. Berle that the Canadian authorities had on April 27 picked up a short wireless message in code sent from Iceland to the German Embassy in Washington. Mr. Berle regards it as possible that this message was being sent from Greenland via Iceland to the German Embassy in Washington and thence to Berlin.

Yours sincerely,

LORING C. CHRISTIE

1136.

267-J-40

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] May 2, 1940

GREENLAND

The Prime Minister discussed this question with the President and the Secretary of State.

The President said that the dominant consideration in their approach to the question was the possible effect which military intervention in Greenland might have upon Japanese action towards the Netherlands East Indies. The United States Government was anxious not to give any ground for Japanese action in the event of German occupation of Holland. The interest which the United States was taking in this Western Pacific area was definitely to the advantage of the United Kingdom and France. Japanese occupation of these Islands would of course not be to their advantage nor would it be wholly to their advantage if the United States were compelled to intervene actively in that quarter and thus tie their hands to some extent in other directions. The United States fleet in the Pacific were safeguarding British interests there, leaving the British fleet free for Atlantic operations. The President referred to their intention to appoint a United States Consul General to Greenland. (This was a suggestion originally made, I understand, by the Danish Minister in the United States). Possibly the Canadian Government might consider taking similar action. Such action would not interfere in any way with the administration or control of the local authorities. He made some suggestion as to the need being that of keeping station look-outs on various high points along the coast, who might sound the alarm, if

occasion arose. Mr. King made it clear that the Canadian Government had not had in mind any preventive military occupation or assumption of political control. They desired to ensure a continuous supply of cryolite, which is essential to the United States as well as the Canadian aluminum industry, and they wished to be assured that no German submarine or air base for raiding purposes could be established in Greenland. He asked the President and Mr. Hull what would be the position in the event of no military precautions being taken and a German raider appearing. The President seemed to think this was not probable; in that event it would be necessary for the Allied naval forces to take action. Mr. Hull said it would raise another question, viz., application of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. King indicated that the suggestion as to Canada taking some immediate action was based on the assumption that any action taken by Canada would be more acceptable to United States public opinion than action by the United Kingdom.

The President suggested that Mr. King discuss the matter with Mr. Norman Davis as well as with Mr. Hull.

Mr. Hull repeated the point as to the bearing of any military action on the Netherlands East Indies situation. He saw no reason why the United States and Canada should not go along on a parallel basis. Mr. King referred to the annual despatch of the *Nascopie* to the Canadian Eastern Arctic, and said it might call at Greenland as well. Mr. Hull concurred in the view that such a step might be advisable.

Mr. Davis said he had been asked by the President to go into the possibility of relief being afforded to the inhabitants of Greenland, perhaps under Red Cross auspices. He referred to the press interview which the President had very shortly after the German occupation of Denmark. He considered the Danish Minister in Washington a very dependable and fair-minded man, and said that the Minister believed in encouraging the local administration of Greenland to carry on, with non-military co-operation from the United States and Canada. Mr. King put the same question he put to the President, as to what would happen in the event of a sudden German attack, and Mr. Davis replied that in his personal view, that would at once bring the United States navy into the question. Mr. King pointed out to Mr. Davis the difference between his view on that matter and the President's.

Mr. King's general impression was that the United States was quite prepared for parallel action by our two countries in the way of observation and economic assistance if required.

The President said the United States might send a revenue cutter to Greenland—the need there was communications—it might take up radio sets and binoculars so that the coast could be watched and alarm given; fires might be started on hill tops, etc. He thought it would be well for the Canadian Captain of the *Nascopie* and the United States Revenue Cutter Captain to have a conference at Montreal or elsewhere before either started off.

1137.

267-J-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 527

London, May 2, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 460, April 25th, Greenland.¹ United Kingdom Government answers to questions, paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 438, are as follows:

As to third, as supply of cryolite essential, Greenland only known natural source of it, and as previous Danish control of mines has disappeared, now necessary that this control should be assumed and mines operated by some other authority. United Kingdom Government take the view therefore that it would be inexpedient and indeed dangerous in the present circumstances if the present position (which is, in effect, mines are derelict and liable to possible destruction by enemy attack) were allowed to continue.

As regards question one Mr. Hull's view of analogy with Netherlands East Indies, United Kingdom Government agree that this analogy cannot be regarded as in any way complete. Since Denmark is wholly in occupation of the enemy it is entirely within legal rights of the Allies to take such action as they may see fit in relation to Greenland as to any other Danish territory. The action taken by the United Kingdom authorities in respect of the Faroe Islands may be mentioned in this connection. If the Japanese Government were to seek a pretext in respect of the Netherlands East Indies action taken as regards the Faroe Islands would supply one. In fact, however, the United Kingdom do not think that the Japanese Government would base their decision as to the action in relation to the Netherlands East Indies on any such grounds. Their principal deterrent would be their fear of United States action.

Your account of communications between Canadian Minister at Washington and United States authorities does not suggest to the United Kingdom Government that United States Government would oppose action on the part of Allied Governments to provide for security of cryolite production in Greenland, the maintenance of which is as much in the interests of the United States as those of the Allies. Any general objections could, it is thought, be avoided if it were made clear that proceeds derived from the assumption of control of cryolite production in Greenland were used so far as might be necessary for the benefit of territory, and any balance retained for conveyance to Danish authorities as soon as Denmark has been freed from enemy occupation. It would, of course, be understood that supplies of cryolite obtained would be made available to cover United States and other world's requirements as well as those of the Allies.

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

In these circumstances, United Kingdom Government will be glad if the Canadian Government would consider the immediate despatch of an expedition to Greenland for the purpose of taking control of cryolite mines. In order to meet points raised by United States Secretary of State, expedition could presumably be described as Relief Expedition and could carry supplies for local population in the area. Apart from this, object would be to ensure continued production of cryolite and consequently of aluminium in Canada and other parts of the Empire and in United States, and to take the necessary measures to guard against danger of enemy action by sabotage or other means.

Views of the United Kingdom authorities as to the scale of probable attack and defensive measures suggested were indicated in my telegram No. 447 of April 15th. In the opinion of United Kingdom authorities, it would not be necessary to make a formal communication to United States Government before expedition is despatched, although they suggest that the Canadian Government would, no doubt, advise the United States Government as soon as the expedition had arrived, and that it might be useful at that stage to offer to concert with the United States Government in further measures which might be desirable on humanitarian grounds for assistance to the population of Greenland and for disposal of cryolite obtained so far as United States requirements are concerned.

The United Kingdom Government have asked to be informed as soon as possible of decision of the Canadian Government in the matter.

With regard to the second question in the final paragraph of your telegram No. 438, April 21st, regarding the value of oral assurances given by the Secretary of State to Mr. Christie, United Kingdom Government have expressed no opinion. Message ends.

MASSEY

1138.

King Papers, PAC

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 536

London, May 3, 1940

IMMEDIATE. My telegram No. 527 of May 2nd. Director of Naval Intelligence states that Chief Officer of the *Julius Thomsen*, a vessel owned by the Cryolite Mining Company which is understood to be owned at least partially by the Danish Government has approached British naval authorities with regard to protection of cryolite mines at Ivigtut. Above vessel, which was originally on a voyage for Ivigtut with workers and stores for the mine, is at present detained at Kirkwall. Its Chief Officer states that mines are very

close to the shore and are excavated to a depth of 200 feet which is 100 feet below sea level. The company were in process of building a breakwater to prevent the sea breaking in and Chief Officer states that a small amount of explosive would be sufficient to destroy mines. He has an excellent large scale chart of Ivigtut and states that he would be willing and able to pilot in any British warships through the Fjord which is very deep. There is, incidentally, a wireless telegraph station there.

MASSEY

1139.

King Papers, PAC

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 76

Washington, May 3, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL. Re Greenland. United Press despatch published this morning reports Danish Government considering sending commission of experts to United States to take care of Danish interests in Greenland. State Department has no information. They have informed their Legation in Copenhagen of the press report, and have requested them to take no action without consulting Department. Necessity of securing visas would make it impossible for commission to leave Copenhagen without their knowledge. They think that possibly German authorities are trying to get reaction of United States and Canada. They will keep us in touch with any development.

1140.

267-J-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

PERSONAL AND SECRET

Ottawa, May 4, 1940

Dear Mr. Christie,

I enclose two telegrams regarding Greenland, which I received from the High Commissioner in London this week, Nos. 527 and 536. We had already arranged to send up the *Nascopie* to carry supplies and bring back cryolite. I should be greatly surprised, however, if we followed the advice in No. 527 as regards cooperation or lack of cooperation with the United States. The mentality revealed by this telegram must be that of the genius who organized the campaign in Norway.

Sincerely yours,

O. D. SKELTON

1141.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] May 6, 1940.

GREENLAND

Attached are two telegrams which came in from London last week and one from Washington, Nos. 527, 536 and 76, respectively.

Some of the people in London evidently have not a very adequate grasp of the United States point of view or of the importance of keeping the United States interested both in the Western Pacific and in the Greenland situation. At the same time, whether it was based on knowledge of the situation or not, their suggestion regarding an expedition requires consideration. I am inclined to think that the situation can be met somewhat along the lines of the attached memorandum which Mr. Keenleyside and I prepared today. It is a matter on which a decision should be reached very early.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre¹*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister¹*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] May 6, 1940

PROPOSALS FOR A CANADIAN POLICY RELATING TO GREENLAND

I. Canadian concern with developments in Greenland is urgent and serious. As a result of the divergence in the views of the United Kingdom and the United States, Canada is in danger of being burdened with a responsibility which cannot be discharged except by disregarding the wishes of the United States. The purpose of this memorandum is to outline a policy which might provide a basis for the resolution of this dilemma.

II. Canadian Interests

Canadian interests in Greenland may be summarized under the following heads:

- (a) *Defence*: Protection against the use of Greenland as a base for surface or submarine raiders. The danger of such use is not considered to be very great.

¹ Les modifications apportées de la main même du Premier ministre au texte du présent document sont indiquées entre guillemets dans les renvois en bas de page. Les réponses de M. King à des questions d'ordre politique précises sont indiquées en italiques entre parenthèses dans le corps même du texte.

¹ Pencilled amendments made by the Prime Minister in the text of this policy paper are shown in quotation marks in the footnotes. Mr. King's answers to specific policy questions are shown in italics within round brackets in the text itself.

(b) *Cryolite Supply*: This is of the utmost importance in view of difficulty of obtaining substitute material. The vulnerability of the mine is emphasized by the United Kingdom, by the Aluminum Company of Canada, and by everyone who has visited Ivigtut and whose reports we have seen.

(c) *National Prestige*: The Canadian Government would be exposed to criticism both at home and abroad if Ottawa left the whole problem to be handled by Washington.

(d) *Humanitarian Considerations*: These are comparatively unimportant as the American Red Cross has made plans to take the necessary steps. Nevertheless, for reason noted in (c) it would probably be desirable for Canada to assist in any relief programme that may be undertaken.

Essentially and for immediate purposes Canada's interest may be said to consist in the defence of the cryolite supply and the maintenance of national prestige.¹

III. The Attitude of the United States

A simple solution of the problem of the defence of Canadian interests could be found in the execution of the plans developed by the Department of National Defence to send a small expedition to Greenland on the *N.B. McLean*. (This would give rise to a very serious problem.) This project, however, has been met with objections by the Government of the United States. (The bases of these objections are set out in Mr. Christie's telegram of the 19th of April 1940, No. 65.) While protesting against the Canadian proposal the Government of the United States has not offered any satisfactory substitute. The only positive actions so far promised by Washington consist of the decision to send a Consul to Greenland and to encourage the American Red Cross to extend necessary aid to the native inhabitants. In spite of the fact that the Secretary of State is "insistently anxious" that Canada should not send a defensive expedition to Greenland, his representative in discussions with the Canadian Minister would go no further in regard to the matter of the defence of the cryolite supply than to say that the United States is "prepared to base its future actions on all aspects of the situation and all relevant considerations" including "sabotage and interference with supply". He added that the United States Government has an Ice Patrol ship constantly in the North Atlantic and that it is thus in touch with developments in that area. From the standpoint of the defence of the cryolite mine the assurances so far given by the United States are practically valueless as it would probably take a German raider or submarine less than an hour to put the mine more or less permanently out of operation.

IV. The Attitude of the United Kingdom

The Government of the United Kingdom approved the original Canadian suggestion of a defensive expedition (?) and has now expressed the opinion

¹ [Substitute] "aversion of criticism" [for] "maintenance of national prestige".

that it would be "dangerous in the present circumstances if the present position (which is in effect that the mines are derelict and liable to possible destruction by enemy attack) were allowed to continue". London refuses to accept the Washington argument that the defence of Greenland by Canada might be used as a justification for a Japanese occupation of the Netherlands Indies should the Netherlands be over-run by war. The Government of the United Kingdom (Mr. Massey's telegram of the 2nd of May, 1940, No. 527) gravely underestimates the strength of American opposition to the proposed Canadian expedition and even suggests that Canada should not inform the United States until the expedition has reached Greenland!(?) In conclusion the United Kingdom has asked to be informed as soon as possible of the Canadian decision.

V. Canadian Position

Canada is thus in an uncomfortable and even dangerous¹ position which may be summarized as follows:

A—The Greenland cryolite supply is of very great importance to the Allied cause.

B—There is a real danger² of a German raid which would destroy the mine.(?)

C—Canada is³ prepared to send a small defensive expedition to Greenland. (*No.*)

D—The United Kingdom is urging Canada to take this action and makes it apparent that Ottawa will be held responsible if failure or delay results in the loss of the mine. (*Must explain situation.*)

E—The United States is strongly opposed to such action by Canada and has so far made only very general commitments in regard to the defence of Greenland.

Thus if Canada moves the United States will be seriously offended; if she does not act the cryolite may be lost and the United Kingdom will be able to lay the responsibility directly on Ottawa. (*May have been so but not since conversations in Washington.*)

VI. The Problem

In the light of all that has been said above it is apparent that Canada must find⁴ a solution which will

A—protect the cryolite mine;

B—avoid antagonizing the United States;

C—defend the national prestige;

D—contribute to any humanitarian programme that may be undertaken.

¹ [Omit] "and even dangerous".

² [Change] "real danger" [to] "possibility".

³ [Substitute] "was" [for] "is".

⁴ [Change] "find" [to] "seek".

VII. Proposals for a Solution

It is suggested that the following proposals might be considered as a basis for a programme which would meet the problem with which Canada is faced:

A—The Canadian Government should immediately send a telegram to the existing authorities in North Greenland (Godhavn) and in South Greenland (Godthaab),¹ assuring them of our interest in their welfare and that of their dependents,² and inviting an expression of their views as to any steps that Canada might take which would contribute to their independence³ and to the happiness of their people.

DECISION REQUIRED: Shall such a telegram be sent (*O.K. if on lines as revised.*)

B—While taking the steps outlined below in relation to the United Kingdom and the United States the Canadian Government should make an agreement with the Hudson's Bay Company to rush the preparation of the *Nascopie*. She should be despatched "on her annual voyage" to Greenland within the next fortnight, be armed with a small gun (?)⁴ and be instructed to remain in the danger zone for two or three weeks while negotiations with the United States have time to crystallize.⁵ Consideration might also be given to having the *Nascopie* take a load of supplies either as a free gift to the people of Greenland⁶ or—if arrangements can be made—to be used in trade. (The latter may be difficult to arrange because of the peculiar organization of the Greenland economy and because of the many interests involved.) Arrangements might also be made with Pennsalt and the Aluminum Company of Canada to have the *Nascopie* bring back a cargo of cryolite ore. (*Yes.*)

Consideration should also be given to the feasibility of keeping the *N. B. McLean* and the military formations which have been prepared for the Greenland expedition in being to the extent that they can be readily prepared and despatched if the need should arise. (?) This could probably be done without interfering too seriously with their regular work.

DECISIONS REQUIRED:

1. Shall the *Nascopie* be sent? (*Yes.*)
2. Shall a gift of supplies be sent? (*If needed in reply to telegram.*)
3. Shall efforts be made to arrange for trading facilities for the *Nascopie*? (*Yes.*)
4. Shall efforts be made to arrange for a return cargo of cryolite? (*Yes.*)

¹ [Insert] "inquiring as to position in which Island has been placed".

² [Insert] "also our interest in supply of raw material".

³ [For] "independence" [substitute] "social and industrial security".

⁴ [Substitute] "with mountings similar to revenue cutter" [for] "be armed with a small gun".

⁵ [Substitute] "such time as may be advisable" [for] "two or three weeks while negotiations with the United States have time to crystallize".

⁶ [Substitute] "as requested" [for] "as a free gift".

5. Shall the *N.B. McLean* and the related military formations be kept available with a view to re-assembly if necessary? (*Depends on circumstances to be discovered.*)

C—Canada should send a Consul to Greenland on the *Nascopie*. He might be left at Julianehaab (which is close to Ivigtut) where he will be a constant reminder of Canadian interest in Greenland and could keep the Canadian Government informed of developments at the mine and elsewhere on the Island. Consideration might be given to the selection of a Canadian of Scandinavian background—preferably Icelandic or Danish—for appointment to this post.

- DECISIONS REQUIRED:
1. Shall a Consul be sent? (*Yes.*)
 2. Shall his exequatur be issued under the Seals Act? (*If possible, yes.*)
 3. To whom shall his credentials be addressed? (*Information is being obtained as to United States action in this matter.*) (*O.K.*)

D—To the United Kingdom Canada might reply that whether United States arguments are valid or not the continued direct and friendly interest of Washington in the Western Pacific as well as in Greenland is of great importance. The views expressed by the Secretary of State are very strongly held and it would be a serious mistake to alienate United States sympathy by disregarding American views. Canada intends to press¹ for a more specific commitment regarding Greenland and will point out the grave danger to Allied and United States interests resulting from the vulnerability of the cryolite mine.

The United Kingdom might also be informed that Canada is sending the *Nascopie* north as an interim step, that the *N. B. McLean* will be kept available (*No*), and that consideration is being given to the advisability of sending² a Consul to Julianehaab. The United Kingdom should be asked to hold at Kirkwall the Danish Government vessel which was despatched to Greenland before the invasion of Denmark, until after the *Nascopie* has arrived in Greenland (*O.K.*). The vessel referred to, the *Julius Thomsen*, is now at Kirkwall. The question of the flag under which she should sail might be discussed with the United Kingdom.

It should also be urgently represented to the Government of the United Kingdom that they should not send British warships to Ivigtut as is indirectly suggested in Mr. Massey's telegram of the 3rd of May, No. 536. (*No.*)

¹ [Change] "intends to press" [to] "is recording this position in the matter in setting forth the need".

² [Change] "consideration is being given to the advisability of sending" [to] "[it has] been decided to grant".

DECISIONS REQUIRED: 1. Is the substance of the reply to the United Kingdom approved? (*With revisions.*)

E—To the United States it might be represented that while Canada appreciates the importance of the views expressed on behalf of the Secretary of State by Mr. Berle and Mr. Dunn this country is still apprehensive that irreparable damage may be done to the very vulnerable mine at Ivigtut unless some more concrete understanding is reached as to the protection that will be made available. (*O.K.*) Canada's responsibility to her Allies as well as to her own interests requires some more specific basis than the very general assurance to which the State Department has so far confined itself. There would seem to be no obstacle at present to a sudden German raid which could destroy the mine in an hour's visit(?) The United States could then be informed of the plans for the *Nascopie* and for the sending of a Consul to Julianehaab. (*Yes.*) A discussion might also be initiated in regard to the production and distribution of the cryolite, particularly with regard to the maintenance of Canadian supplies and the blocking of channels leading to Germany and Denmark. (*O.K.*) This discussion might involve the participation of representatives of Pennsalt, the Aluminum Company of Canada, and perhaps the Danish Minister to the United States. (*O.K.*)

DECISIONS REQUIRED: 1. Is the substance of the reply to the United States approved? (*Yes as revised.*)

F—When the major questions and policy are solved attention can then be directed towards the following:

1—The best method for handling the economic problems of the inhabitants of Greenland.

2—The extension of medical and other essential aid.

These matters could be made the subject of a discussion with the various interests involved. They do not require the immediate attention that is necessary in relation to the questions of policy outlined above.

1142.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 79

Washington, May 8, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL. Reference our telegram No. 78 of May 8th, concerning Greenland.¹ State Department says *Comanche* will not reach St. John's, Newfoundland until May 15th or 16th. As far as they know nothing has been decided in Denmark about a Commission referred to in [our] telegram No. 76 of May 3rd. They expect that something may be decided soon.

Provisional recognition of Penfield as Consul was secured through the Danish Minister at Washington. State Department informed the Danish

¹ Non reproduit.

² Not printed.

Minister that the United States would like to open Consulate if agreeable. (It was definitely decided to omit phrase after "agreeable," since otherwise it would be necessary to decide to whom it should have been agreeable). The Danish Minister communicated with the two Governors in Greenland and was given warm welcome. The Danish Minister's admission of this approval to the State Department is being considered as provisional recognition.

So far as at present contemplated the State Department is not going to take the second step which is normal in the appointment of Consuls i.e., it is not going to ask for formal recognition and for the issue of a formal Exequatur.

What is abnormal in the procedure adopted by the State Department is not that the Consul is taking up his post with merely provisional recognition, but that they did not plan to take the second step and get formal recognition. It is quite normal for a Consul to be six or eight months at a post such as Batavia before a dilatory Foreign Office will get around to issuing an Exequatur.

The second problem which is less important is whether an Assignment Commission will be issued to Penfield.

1143.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

TELEGRAM 67

Ottawa, May 9, 1940

With reference to my telegram of this date No. 68, Greenland. What, in your opinion, would be the reaction of the United States administration and the Danish Minister to a suggestion that the local authorities in South Greenland should be requested to mount and man a gun for defensive purposes at the entrance to Ivigtut Harbour? The gun could be "purchased" from the United States or from Canada and Danish or Icelandic nationals could probably be found to man it.

1144.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

TELEGRAM 68

Ottawa, May 9, 1940

SECRET. With reference to your telegram of the 19th April, 1940, No. 65,¹ Greenland.

1. The considerations advanced by the Department of State have been examined most carefully and have been compared with the views placed

¹ Document 1123.

before us by the Government of the United Kingdom. Certain tentative conclusions have been reached and it is desired that they be placed before the United States authorities at the earliest convenient opportunity.

2. The Canadian Government recognizes the importance of the considerations relating to possible developments in the Western Pacific and appreciates the anxiety of the United States administration that nothing done in the North Atlantic shall provide a basis for intervention in the Netherlands Indies. While the Canadian Government has decided not to despatch a defensive force to Greenland at present, it desires to point out that no alternative measure for preventing a sudden raid and destruction of the cryolite mine at Ivigtut has been suggested by the United States.

3. The cryolite mine which is of great importance to Allied production and to Canadian and United States industry generally, is so vulnerably situated that it could be irreparably damaged by a landing party from an enemy submarine or raider by a few minutes' work. The United Kingdom authorities believe it would be inexpedient and indeed dangerous if the mine were to become derelict and liable to possible destruction by enemy attack. Mr. Dunn's statement does not suggest that effective preventive measures are being considered. The difficulty is that the problem of securing the cryolite supply cannot be met by measures which would take effect only after a raid had occurred.

4. As reported in the Prime Minister's recent discussions in Washington, the Canadian Government intends to send the *Nascopie* north in the near future. On this voyage calls will be made at Greenland and if the need is indicated by the local authorities, who will be informed before the vessel leaves Canada, certain medical or other supplies may be taken in her cargo. (As the *Comanche* is not calling at a Canadian port it will not be possible for the Captains to meet as was suggested when Mr. King was in Washington).

5. You may inform the State Department that consideration is being given to the advisability of sending a Canadian Consul to Greenland.¹ If it is decided that this step should be taken, the person appointed may go north on the *Nascopie*. This might also be discussed with the Danish Minister.

6. Assuming that the cryolite mine is not damaged by sabotage or by enemy action the problem of arranging for increased production, for expanded transportation facilities, and for an equitable arrangement for purchase of the output, will still require examination. You might refer to this matter in your consultations with the State Department and the Danish Minister and report their views. Possibly a meeting might later be arranged between representatives of the various interests involved.

7. As time is an important factor in this situation an early indication of the reception accorded the views outlined above will be received with satisfaction here.

¹ Voir les documents 156-158.

¹ See Documents 156-158.

1145.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 82

Washington, May 10, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Reference your telegrams Nos. 67 and 68, concerning Greenland. As instructed put your views before Berle and Moffat at State Department and discussed matter with Danish Minister.

(1) State Department and Minister would welcome appointment of Canadian Consul. Danish Minister had already written Greenland Governors via *Comanche* that he would endorse appointment. He feels it is desirable Consuls in Greenland be confined to United States and Canada. He states appointment could be taken up with Greenland authorities either through Danish Consul General in Canada or with him. Former would in any case consult him.

(2) Danish Minister raised no objection to your suggestion in your telegram No. 67. State Department received suggestion favourably and will give definitive answer shortly. They suggest Greenland authorities be asked by United States and Canada, through Danish Minister, for their views of proposal, on the type of armament required, and on whether necessary personnel is available in Greenland.

(3) United States Consul to Greenland has been instructed immediately on arrival to visit Ivigtut mines and report on what steps are necessary to prevent sabotage. His recommendations will be received before the Coast-guard cutter *Campbell* sails for Greenland on June 1st.

(4) State Department is prepared to discuss equitable distribution of output of cryolite and would welcome meeting between representatives of interests involved to discuss increased production which would involve additional machinery and equipment, capital for which they think could probably be provided by principal consumers.

(5) Berle agrees that question of how to prevent raid on Ivigtut must be clarified especially in view of possible effect of conquest of Norway upon control of North Atlantic, and after further discussion with competent authorities will give State Department's views.

1146.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 516

Ottawa, May 10, 1940

With reference to your telegram of the 2nd of May, No. 527, Greenland.

1. The Canadian Government has given careful consideration to the views of the Government of the United Kingdom as reported in your telegram

under reference and in other telegrams on the same subject. You are now authorized to reply to the United Kingdom authorities in the following sense.

2. The Canadian Government recognizes the logical weakness of the analogy referred to by Mr. Hull. We now have reason to believe, however, that this weakness would not deter the Japanese from citing Greenland as a justifying precedent if the opportunity were offered. Indeed it is known that the argument has already been used by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. In any event it is, in the opinion of the Canadian Government, of the greatest importance that the direct and friendly interest of the United States in the Western Pacific as well as in Greenland should be maintained.

3. While informing Washington that Canada is holding in abeyance plans for sending to Greenland a defensive guard for the cryolite mines, we are pointing out that no alternative measures for preventing a sudden raid on and destruction of the mine at Ivigtut have been suggested by the United States. We have drawn particular attention to the fact that the problem of securing the cryolite supply cannot be met by measures which would take effect only after a raid has occurred.

4. The United States Government, after consultation with the Danish Minister in Washington, and with the local authorities in Greenland, have decided to appoint a Consul and Vice Consul to Greenland and are sending them North on a small Coast Guard vessel, the *Comanche*, which leaves to-day calling at St. John's, Newfoundland, about the 15th of May. A Red Cross Society representative will also be carried and will return after a brief survey of conditions in Greenland.

5. The United States authorities have expressed their readiness to exchange full information regarding their plans and consider that parallel action by Canada would be helpful. You will realize, in view of general friendly relations of the United Kingdom and Canada with the United States and their readiness to discuss freely this special situation, it would appear to be most inadvisable to carry out the suggestion that the United States Government should be advised only after action has been taken by Canada.

6. While awaiting a reply from the United States the Canadian Government proposes to take following interim measures:

A. The *Nascopie* is being sent north at once on a voyage that will keep it in the vicinity of Southern Greenland for about two weeks. It will carry a 3 inch or 4 inch gun, as will also the *Comanche*.

B. The Canadian Government is communicating with the local authorities in Greenland and offering to assist them with medical supplies or in any other way that they may suggest.

C. We propose to inform the Greenland authorities that we intend to send a Consul to Greenland as soon as an appointment can be made.

D. We are asking Christie's advice as to the probable reaction of the United States authorities and the Danish Minister in Washington to a suggestion that South Greenland should be requested to mount and man

a gun at the entrance to Ivigtut Harbour. The gun could be "purchased" from the United States or from Canada and Danish or Icelandic nationals could probably be found to man it.

7. We would suggest that the *Julius Thomsen* which is referred to in your telegram of the 3rd May, 1940, No. 536, should be held at Kirkwall until the situation becomes clarified. In this connection we are pointing out to Washington that once the security of the cryolite mine is assured the problem of arranging for increased production, expanded transportation facilities and for an equitable arrangement for the marketing of the output, will require immediate consideration. It is being suggested that a meeting of representatives of the various interests involved might be arranged for an early date.

8. We have asked Mr. Christie to obtain an early reply from the United States authorities and we will be glad if you will communicate the comments of the Government of the United Kingdom as soon as possible.

1147.

267-J-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 525

Ottawa, May 12, 1940

SECRET. With reference to my telegram of the 10th of May, No. 516, Greenland. Canadian Minister in Washington has had further consultations with the Department of State and the Danish Minister. The result of his discussions may be summarized as follows: Begins.

The State Department and the Minister both welcome the Canadian decision to appoint a Consul, and the Minister has already written the Greenland Governors that he would endorse the appointment. He considers it desirable that only Canada and the United States should send Consuls to Greenland at present.

Both the Minister and the State Department received favourably a Canadian suggestion that the local authorities in South Greenland should be requested to mount and man a gun for defensive purposes at the entrance to Ivigtut Harbour. The Danish Minister will communicate with Greenland authorities to ascertain whether necessary personnel is available there.

The United States Consul who is proceeding North on the *Comanche* has been instructed to visit the Ivigtut mine and report on what steps are necessary to prevent sabotage. His recommendations will be received before the United States Coast Guard cutter *Campbell* sails for Greenland on the 1st of June. The State Department agree that the question of how to prevent a raid on Ivigtut must be clarified, especially in view of possible effective conquest of Norway upon control of North Atlantic. The competent authorities are being consulted and concrete proposals may be expected shortly.

The State Department is prepared to discuss problems relating to increased production and equitable distribution of cryolite, and welcome our suggestion of a meeting between representatives of the various interests involved. They consider that capital for additional machinery and equipment could probably be provided by principal consumers. Ends.

The United States position outlined above marks a definite advance on previous situation. An indication of the views of the Government of the United Kingdom will be of material assistance to us in planning our programme for the immediate future.

1148.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM 83

Washington, May 13, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Reference our telegram No. 82 regarding Greenland, paragraph 4. Danish Minister suggests Aluminum Company should send representative to discuss production distribution of (word omitted) in future of cryolite with Pennsalt and Sonne of Greenland Commission. State experts on Greenland will probably arrive New York in about six weeks via *Comanche*. He believes increase in production is not necessary since whole fifty thousand tons output would be available for Pennsalt which can also easily expand its refining capacity. Main difficulty the Greenland Commission is encountering is in finding special type of ship which is necessary to transport cryolite and he suggests that the *Julius Thomsen* now at Kirkwall should be used for this purpose, perhaps under Canadian flag. He states Sonne had instructed a representative of his in Canada to take up the question of securing guns which will be necessary for the defence of Ivigtut.

1149.

267-J-40

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures
High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 606

London, May 15, 1940

Your telegram No. 539, May 14th, Greenland.¹ Comments of United Kingdom authorities just received.

United Kingdom Government share view of Canada as to importance of maintaining the direct and friendly interest of the United States in this matter,

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

and concur in the opinion that the present United States position marks an advance on their previous attitude. They welcome action which Canadian Government are prepared to take in this matter and note that while acting in concert with the United States Government they are willing to undertake responsibility for security of Greenland.

It is also noted that the Canadian Government have drawn the attention of the United States Government to the fact that the problem of securing supply of cryolite cannot be met by measures which would take effect only after a raid had occurred; it is further understood that the United States Government agree that the question of how to prevent a raid on Ivigtut must be clarified, that the competent United States authorities are being consulted for this purpose and that concrete proposals may be expected shortly. United Kingdom Government would be glad to learn as soon as possible what further action is contemplated as a result. In the meantime they desire to offer the following observations regarding arrangements for immediate action.

In view of vulnerable position of mines in Greenland it is considered there is a serious risk of an enemy attack; if future supplies of cryolite are to be assured it is felt that any further delay in providing for security of mines might be most dangerous and that immediate action is required to forestall any possibility of sabotage or enemy attack. In these circumstances United Kingdom Government are in some doubt whether arrangements so far suggested are adequate to secure mines against possibility of an attack in the near future. They would accordingly suggest that the Canadian Government should consider the desirability of arranging for appropriate officers with training in artillery and with mining experience and for members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to be sent on board the S.S. *Nascopie*; they would also suggest that the *Nascopie* should sail forthwith to Ivigtut and should remain there until United States coast guard cutter has arrived and until joint party are satisfied that adequate steps have been taken to ensure security of mines.

United Kingdom authorities point out that as already indicated *Julius Thomsen* is at present at Kirkwall and in accordance with suggestion of the Canadian Government steps have been taken to hold vessel there. It is understood, however, that it has on board not only supplies for the population of Greenland but also personnel and equipment essential for season's production of cryolite. Very early departure of this vessel for Greenland is thus a matter of urgency in order to ensure continuance of cryolite supplies from Ivigtut. United Kingdom Government would, therefore, be glad to learn as soon as possible that the situation in Greenland will be such that the vessel's arrival would conform with the Canadian Government's arrangements and would be free from risk. In any event, when vessel leaves, appropriate precautions including placing of some form of guard on board will be taken to ensure that there is no danger of its being used in the interests of the enemy.

1150.

King Papers, PAC

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 85

Washington, May 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Reference your telegram No. 70, May 14, concerning Greenland.¹

Campbell is being rearmed and will have by June 1st when it leaves for Greenland two 5 inch 51 calibre guns, three 3 inch anti-aircraft guns, four 50 calibre machine guns.

State Department approve in principle your suggestion re gun at Ivigtut and will present specific proposals to me in two or three days and will also discuss then general question of protection of cryolite mines against raids.

Despatch¹ by bag May 14th gives text of Consul's Assignment Commission and State Department Note to the Danish Minister proposing establishment of Consulate.

1151.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur,
Groenland du Nord

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor, North Greenland

[Ottawa, May 15, 1940]

1. In common with all other free and democratic States, Canada has been greatly perturbed by the invasion of Denmark and the subjugation of its Government to an alien dictatorship.

2. The Canadian Government understands that pending the restoration of Danish freedom the local authorities in North and South Greenland have decided to administer their territories on their own responsibility and to refuse to accept instructions forwarded under compulsion from Copenhagen. On the understanding that this is the case the Government of Canada is prepared, if so desired, to cooperate with and assist the Greenland authorities in promoting the welfare of their people. The Canadian Government will be glad to consider suggestions from the Greenland authorities as to the form in which such cooperation and assistance can best be effected.

3. The ship *Nascopie*, which carries supplies annually to the Canadian Northwest Territories outposts, and which has called at Greenland ports in other years, will be leaving Halifax about May 20th with a cargo of usual staple supplies (such as fuel oil, salt, ammunition and foodstuffs.) Should you require any part of these, or anything else of a special nature that might be included in the *Nascopie's* cargo or could be delivered later, please indicate your needs either by wireless message to Ottawa, or by communication

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

with our representative on the ship after the *Nascopie* reaches Greenland. Arrangements could be made also for return cargo of about two thousand tons. As there is little time before sailing we will appreciate prompt advice as to your needs.

4. As you are aware Canada is greatly interested in the security of the cryolite mines at Ivigtut and is hopeful that the ore production this year may be considerably increased. It is hoped that early consultation with the Greenland and United States authorities in regard to production, transportation and marketing of this ore may be arranged. In this connection consideration might be given to the possibility of having the *Nascopie* bring back a cargo of cryolite ore on her present trip.

5. The Danish Consul General at Montreal, the Danish Minister at Washington and the United States Government are being informed of the contents of this telegram.¹

1152.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

TELEGRAM 73

Ottawa, May 15, 1940

With reference to your telegram of the 13th May, 1940, No. 83, Greenland. Please inform the Department of State and the Danish Minister that a representative of the Aluminum Company of Canada and a representative of the Canadian Government will be prepared to meet representatives of Pennsalt, the Greenland Commission and—if the United States Government so desires—the State Department, early next week to discuss all aspects of the cryolite situation. Canadian representatives would be prepared to go to New York for the meeting and suggest Monday or Tuesday the 20th or 21st of May.

If this proposal is accepted please get in touch with State Department, Pennsalt and the Greenland Commission and make definite arrangements as to time and place of meeting.

1153.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

TELEGRAM 74

Ottawa, May 15, 1940

With reference to our telegram of the 9th of May, No. 68, Greenland. We have today addressed telegraphic communications to the local Governments in North Greenland and South Greenland informing them of the

¹ Ce télégramme fut envoyé en danois. Un télégramme identique fut envoyé au gouverneur du Groenland du Sud.

¹ This telegram was sent in a Danish translation. An identical telegram was sent to the Governor of South Greenland.

prospective trip of the *Nascopie*, and offering to assist them with supplies or otherwise as might be required. We also suggested that the *Nascopie* might bring back a load of cryolite at the end of her four weeks' voyage. A copy of our telegram is going forward to you by the next bag.

You might inform the State Department and the Danish Minister of our action.

1154.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM 88

Washington, May 16, 1940

SECRET. Your telegrams Nos. 73 and 74 of May 15. I have advised Danish Minister and State Department. May I give Minister copy of your telegraphic communication referred to in your telegram No. 74?

Minister, Sonne and Beale approve of meeting in New York. Sonne would like to send medical supplies and vegetables on *Nascopie*. Sonne's Canadian representative, referred to in our telegram No. 83, is Gilbert Jackson, of Toronto. State Department will receive today from Navy Department outline of minimum project for defence at Ivigtut, calibre of gun, its mounting and site, fire control and range finding instruments.

Personnel. House for them, and what equipment is available in the United States.

State Department most anxious that no communication concerning Ivigtut defence be sent to Greenland authorities until it may be sent in cypher to their Consul since danger Germans would intercept message.

1155.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

TELEGRAM 77

Ottawa, May 17, 1940

Your telegram of the 16th May, 1940, No. 88. No objection to giving Minister copy of telegrams to Greenland.

This will confirm information given Reid by Keenleyside that we are not at present prepared to recognize Jackson or any other "Canadian representative" of the Greenland Commission. Consideration may be given to this matter after meeting on Tuesday.

Please forward substance of United States proposals as soon as possible as we should like to discuss them before Keenleyside leaves for Washington.

We have said nothing to Greenland about proposals for defence of Ivigtut.

1156.

267-J-40

*Les gouverneurs, Groenland du Nord et du Sud au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Governors, North and South Greenland to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM

Godhavn, May 17, 1940

1. We express our thanks for the communication of May 15th from the Canadian Government and we appreciate the interest for the welfare of Greenland thus expressed by your Government.

2. You are correct in assuming that we for the present time administer Greenland independently since we are unable to carry out instructions received from Copenhagen.

3. We accept with thanks your kind offer to ship supplies via S.S. *Nascope*, and we ask your Government to advise the American Danish Committee, New York, cable address GREENMARK whom we have advised regarding the matter.

4. The cryolite mine is in full operation and we anticipate a normal production. About this later.¹

5. We shall be thankful also for special considerations regarding export to Canada of other Greenland products. Regarding such exports we should like reserve decision until later this summer.

GOVERNOR SVANE, GOVERNOR BRUN

1157.

267-J-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 562

Ottawa, May 18, 1940

With reference to your telegram of the 15th May, 1940, No. 606, Greenland.

1. Views of the Government of the United Kingdom are receiving careful consideration.

2. Arrangements have been made for a member of my Department to meet State Department officials in Washington on Monday when it is hoped that final agreement for coordination of plans regarding Greenland can be

¹ Référence du traducteur, A. E. Porsild,
futur vice-consul au Groenland:

¹ Note of translator, A. E. Porsild, later
Vice-Consul in Greenland:

Meaning we shall inform you in detail about this at a later date—A.E.P.

reached. This will be followed by meeting with Pennsalt, Greenland Commission and Aluminum Company of Canada in New York. You will be informed at once of outcome of these discussions.

3. Will you please make it clear to the Government of the United Kingdom that while we have agreed to take certain steps and to endeavour to obtain the active participation of the United States in providing safeguards for Ivigtut, we have not at any time agreed "to undertake responsibility for the security of Greenland".

4. With regard to the *Julius Thomsen* we would suggest that this vessel be released in time to reach Ivigtut between the 3rd and 6th of June. This will be shortly after the arrival of the *Nascopie*. We assume that necessary steps are being taken to ensure the loyalty of the personnel that will be travelling on the *Julius Thomsen*. Please ascertain what plans are being made for the disposition of the guard after the vessel reaches Greenland. Has the *Julius Thomsen* been taken in prize or what is its national status?

5. We would like to know, in time for Monday's meeting, what mining personnel and mining equipment will be carried by the *Julius Thomsen*.

1158.

267-J-40

*Mémorandum du conseiller*¹*Memorandum by Counsellor*¹

[Washington,] May 20, 1940

GREENLAND

At 11 o'clock on the morning of Monday, the 20th of May, 1940, I had an appointment with Mr. Adolf Berle at the State Department, to which I was accompanied by Mr. Escott Reid of the Canadian Legation in Washington. Mr. Berle was joined in the discussion by Mr. Pierrepont Moffatt, head of the European Division of the State Department, and Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., of the European Division.

The subject under discussion was Greenland, and the following is a summary of the points covered.

The State Department was informed this morning that the *Comanche* had arrived at Ivigtut today, and that there were in Greenland waters two Danish Coast Guard Cutters. The present plan of the United States is to have the *Comanche* remain at Ivigtut long enough for Mr. Penfield and his Vice Consul to examine the situation at the cryolite mine. Mr. Penfield has been instructed to report as quickly as possible by wireless to the State Department. The *Comanche* will then go on to Godthaab, where Mr. Penfield and the Vice Consul will be left. The vessel's future movements will be decided in the light of the report made by the Consul. It is probable, however, that the *Comanche* will go on as far north as Godhavn and return to the United States some time in June.

¹H. L. Keenleyside.

In the meantime the *Campbell* is being prepared for its northern voyage and will be ready to leave by the 25th of May. It will probably not start, however, until about the 1st of June. Depending upon Mr. Penfield's report, the United States Government will decide just how much defensive armament will be required at Ivigtut and will be prepared to send it north, probably although not certainly, on the *Campbell*. The State Department has received a rather elaborate plan from the naval authorities involving the despatch of about sixty men to handle a shore battery. This, however, will probably be cut down, and it is hoped that personnel to manage the gun or guns decided upon can be found in Greenland or among Danes resident in the United States. In any event, the United States is prepared to supply the gun or guns, together with the necessary technical equipment and ammunition.

In reply to a question as to what action the United States would be likely to take if information were received that an attack on Ivigtut was impending, Mr. Berle stated that he would only go so far as to say that Washington would like to receive such information at the first possible moment. He indicated clearly that suitable measures would be taken.

It was ascertained that it is the intention of the United States to leave both the Consul and Vice Consul at Godthaab. It has not been decided whether they should remain in the North for the winter, but supplies are being sent up on that assumption. A house is being made available by the Greenland authorities. Incidental information was received to the effect that in addition to salary and the necessary food and housing, the Consul and Vice Consul are to be "generously treated" in regard to allowances. They were also provided before leaving with necessary clothing and personal equipment.

A general discussion developed in regard to the status of the Danish Minister in Washington and the Danish Consul General in Montreal, the Greenland Commission, and the delegate from Greenland. No new information was obtained except that the United States is inclined to emphasize the existence, and if possible the status, of the delegate from Greenland. Consideration is being given to the possibility of his being designated a Consul. The theory underlying the emphasis being placed on the Greenland representative is, of course, that the Greenland Government are to be recognized as the present source of existing political authority in that country. I suggested that if Greenland should decide to send such a Consul or other permanent delegate to this continent, he should be accredited jointly to the United States and Canada. Mr. Berle and his assistant saw no possible objection to this, and would be prepared to endorse such a proposal.

It was agreed that perhaps the most important aspect of the Greenland problem is the maintenance of the economic life of that country, and Mr. Berle accepted our view that this could best be handled by some co-operative agreement or understanding between the authorities in Greenland, the Canadian and American Governments, and the economic organizations with special commitments in connection with the cryolite situation. Mr. Berle endorsed the proposal that this problem, particularly in its financial aspects

should be given careful attention at the meeting which is to be held tomorrow in New York between representatives of the Canadian and American Governments, the Penn Salt Company, the Aluminum Company of Canada, and the Greenland Commission. It was quite apparent that the Americans would be prepared to support any reasonable working arrangement that might be reached by these representatives, and there was no evidence that the United States Government would be inclined to insist upon any special prerogatives being given to the Penn Salt Company.

In conclusion, Mr. Berle stated that the United States Government would keep us fully and carefully informed in regard to all developments relating to Greenland and expressed the hope that Canada would reciprocate. In reply I assured Mr. Berle that we would continue to keep them advised as to any developments in this field.

1159.

267-J-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 987
CONFIDENTIAL

Washington, May 22, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to previous correspondence concerning Greenland, and to enclose three copies of a draft memorandum prepared by Mr. Reid of the conversations held in the office of Mr. Sonne in New York on the morning of May 21, 1940. This memorandum was prepared at the request of Mr. Keenleyside. I should be grateful if you would in due course let me have a copy of the memorandum when it has been revised by Mr. Keenleyside.

2. I should also be grateful if I might be given two copies of the lists referred to in paragraph 9 of the memorandum, since I should like to have one copy for the Legation files and to be able to give one copy to Mr. Cumming of the Department of State.

3. Mr. Reid this afternoon reported to Mr. Keenleyside by telephone that Mr. Cumming had telephoned him on the evening of May 21 to say that he had reported to Mr. Berle on the discussions in New York, and that Mr. Berle was perturbed about the possibility of a final agreement being reached at the discussions in New York which were to take place this morning with regard to the additional 30,000 tons of cryolite before the State Department had a chance to be consulted. Mr. Berle desired to emphasize that he trusted that no final agreement would be reached between Canada and the Greenland Commission until the State Department had been consulted. Since Mr. Reid was unable to get in touch with Mr. Keenleyside, he telephoned Mr. Powell of the

Aluminum Company of Canada. Mr. Powell said that, as far as he was concerned, any agreement reached would be subject to the approval of the Department of External Affairs. When this information was given to Mr. Cumming, he expressed himself as being satisfied, since he knew that the Department of External Affairs would not approve the agreement before the State Department had been consulted.

4. After speaking to Mr. Keenleyside this afternoon, Mr. Reid telephoned Mr. Cumming and informed him that Mr. Keenleyside's understanding of the discussions in New York of May 21 was that any agreement drawn up by Mr. Beale, Mr. Powell, and Mr. Sonne would be subject to revision and approval by both the United States and the Canadian Governments.

5. Both the State Department and the Danish Minister have been informed that you are today sending a communication to the Danish Consul General in Montreal on the subject of the appointment of a Canadian Consul and Vice-Consul to Greenland.

6. The Danish Minister has informed us that on May 20 he telegraphed to the Greenland authorities that Canada would probably be approaching them shortly on the subject of the appointment of a Canadian Consul to Greenland. He has now received a telegram from the Governors of Greenland, reading as follows:

We wish to express our sincere appreciation of the interest in the welfare of Greenland shown by the Canadian Government in sending a Consul to Greenland. The Consul shall be very welcome but it will be necessary to call the attention to the fact that, after the establishment of the United States Consulate and of a Central Office for Greenland no housing accommodation is available, so it will be necessary to build a special house. Fitted boards, timber etc. together with plans for a house must therefore be brought along whereupon the house shall be built immediately. Temporary but less satisfactory accommodation can be counted upon.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Mé morandum du deuxième secrétaire¹

Memorandum by Second Secretary¹

CONFIDENTIAL

Washington, May 22, 1940

MEMORANDUM ON CONVERSATION CONCERNING GREENLAND HELD IN THE
OFFICE OF MR. H. C. SONNE OF THE AMERICAN-DANISH GREENLAND
COMMISSION, NEW YORK, TUESDAY, MAY 21ST, 1940

There were present: Mr. H. C. Sonne, Chairman of the American-Danish Greenland Commission; Mr. L. T. Beale, President of the Penn Salt; Mr. Hugh Cumming, Jr., State Department; Mr. H. L. Keenleyside, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa; Mr. Escott Reid, Canadian Legation, Washington; Mr. Ray Edwin Powell, President of the Aluminum Company of Canada.

¹ Escott Reid.

1. Mr. Keenleyside stated that the Canadian Government had suggested that the meeting be held so that information regarding Greenland might be exchanged. It was also felt that there should be a general examination of the mutual and, if any such cases existed, the divergent interests in relation to Greenland of the Government of Canada, of the Government of the United States, of economic organizations in the two countries and of the persons or organizations represented by the American-Danish Greenland Commission.

2. *American-Danish Greenland Commission.* In response to a question, Mr. Sonne explained the history, status, and functions of the Commission. Before the occupation of Denmark the Copenhagen Government in its dealings with Greenland had had the advice of experts in Copenhagen on the economic and other problems of Greenland. The Danish Minister in Washington had felt that, as the occupation of Denmark had thrown the Greenland authorities on their own, it was desirable to set up in the United States an organization which would advise the authorities in Greenland and which would take the place of the previously existing committees in Copenhagen. The Danish Minister in Washington, acting as the adviser (representative?) in the United States of the authorities in Greenland, had therefore appointed a Commission. The Commission had set up two committees: a small committee to advise on business matters, and a larger committee to advise on such questions as the treatment of explorers, tourists, the recruitment of nurses, doctors, etc. Mr. Sonne later presented a copy of a memorandum describing the membership of the Commission.

After some discussion, Mr. Keenleyside suggested (speaking personally) that consideration might be given to the possibility of appointing Canadian members to the existing Commission or of establishing a parallel organization in Canada. Mr. Sonne agreed that some such step would be desirable and promised to discuss it further at a later date. (This proposal should be followed up.)

3. *Status of the authorities in Greenland.* In response to a question from Mr. Powell, Mr. Sonne explained that before the occupation of Denmark the two Governors in Greenland had been appointed by the Danish Government and were responsible to it. They were assisted in their administration of Greenland by local and district councils. They were not, however, responsible to these councils and were under no obligation to follow their advice. Under the law the two Governors had the power, in the event of an emergency, to assume absolute control. They had exercised this power after the occupation of Denmark. Mr. Sonne referred to the Resolution adopted by the United Greenland Councils at their meeting at Godhavn on the 3rd May and to the message sent by the United Greenland Councils to the King of Denmark. (See Legation despatch of the 10th of May, No. 894.¹) The Southern Governor is senior to the Governor of the Northern Province. (Mr. Reid was informed subsequently by the Danish Minister that an office for the United Greenland Councils has been established at Godthaab.)

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

Mr. Cumming explained that the State Department was working on the following theory, though he warned that it could not be pushed too far: The sovereignty of Denmark is not extinguished by the mere occupation of that country by Germany; it still exists in the unoccupied territory and over Danish interests abroad, including individuals and shipping.

Mr. Keenleyside stated that there was no disposition on the part of the Canadian Government to question the authority of the authorities in Greenland. In fact, quite the contrary was the case: the Canadian Government looks upon them as the present ultimate authority in Greenland. For practical reasons Canada is prepared to recognize the Danish Minister in Washington and the Danish Consul General in Canada as channels of communication with and as representatives of the Greenland authorities.

4. *Ownership and Control of the Cryolite Mine in Ivigtut.* In the course of the main discussion on the cryolite question which is referred to below, Mr. Powell asked for information on the present legal status of the company operating the cryolite mine at Ivigtut and on the legal status of contracts made by this company before the occupation of Denmark.

Mr. Cumming stated that previous to the occupation the control of the company had been shared equally between (a) the Danish Government at Copenhagen, (b) the private company which had had at one time a lease of the mine, and (c) the private Danish Company which refined the ore. As a result of the occupation, the one-third control which had belonged to the Danish Government had now passed to the Greenland authorities. Mr. Cumming suggested that the United Greenland Councils should pass a decree stating that they are taking over complete control of the mine at Ivigtut as in practice no payments will in any case be allowed to go to the Danish Government or to either company in Denmark. Mr. Sonne agreed with this suggestion and said that he would discuss it with the Danish Minister at Washington. He emphasized the importance which he attached to a clarification of the legal position in respect of the mine. If he were to be authorized to sign contracts on behalf of the Greenland authorities, he would need a power of attorney, and it was essential that the principal who gave him his power of attorney had power himself to take such action.

5. *Status of contracts entered into by the Cryolite Company before the occupation.* Mr. Sonne and Mr. Beale insisted that the contract entered into before the occupation between the Cryolite Company and Penn Salt was still valid. This contract gave Penn Salt a monopoly over the North American market. They agreed, however, that as a result of the occupation the Cryolite Company (or the Greenland authorities if they took over control) was now free to deal as it wished with the cryolite which had formerly gone to countries outside North America.

Mr. Keenleyside, while reserving the right to question the present rights of the Cryolite Company, agreed that Penn Salt was entitled in equity to a continuance of its proportionate share of the output of the mine.

6. *Present production at cryolite mine.* Mr. Keenleyside asked how the production was now being handled at the cryolite mine. Until he had learned from the telegram from the Greenland Governors of 17th May that the cryolite mine was in full operation and they anticipated a normal production, he had assumed that the mine could not operate at capacity until the *Julius Thomsen* arrived in Greenland, since it had on board supplies and personnel for the mine. Ordinarily the supply ship arrives before the mining season commences.

Mr. Sonne gave figures on the present production of the mine and on its loading capacity and said that apparently the *Julius Thomsen* was carrying spare parts for the mine, which were not, however, needed immediately. (It subsequently developed that both personnel and materials are badly needed at Ivigtut.)

Mr. Cumming stated that Mr. Penfield, the United States Consul in Greenland, had been instructed to send in a report on how the mine was operating. He promised to give the Legation a copy of this report as soon as it was received.

7. *Problems of the American-Danish Greenland Commission.* Mr. Sonne outlined the four-fold problems which the Commission had to face:

- (a) Cryolite (discussion below).
- (b) A monetary policy.

Even before the occupation of Denmark the Greenland krone had been distinct from the Danish krone, though it had been maintained at par with it. The legal backing for the Greenland krone is probably, however, Danish krone[n] deposited with the Central Bank of Denmark in Copenhagen. Mr. Sonne thinks it is essential to maintain, if at all possible, a stable price level in Greenland, since it would be very difficult to explain to an Eskimo why he had to pay twice as many Greenland kronen for his supplies as was customary. Mr. Berle is understood to concur in this opinion. Mr. Sonne will therefore try, if possible, to fix the exchange value of the Greenland krone in terms of United States dollars at a point which will result in a suitable price level in Greenland. He tentatively proposes an exchange rate of five or six kronen to the United States dollar. If it should prove necessary to cut down imports into Greenland by, say, 10 per cent, he will be authorized to depreciate the krone to the necessary extent. He is going to discuss the exchange situation with the United States Treasury and will give the Canadian Government a copy of the agreement which he reaches with the Treasury.

- (c) Imports to Greenland.
- (d) Exports from Greenland.

Mr. Sonne has informed the Greenland authorities that for another month he will send only urgently needed supplies to Greenland. Other supplies will be bought for Greenland after the arrival in New York on the *Rita* of two technical experts from Greenland. The advice of these two technical experts is essential, since Greenland is accustomed to purchase specialized types of goods.

The trade of Greenland (export and import) was a Greenland Government monopoly and will continue to be a monopoly. He believed that, apart from cryolite, the outside representative of this monopoly should be Gillespie & Company, an import-export house of New York, which was accustomed to act as purchasing agent for some of the British West Indian colonies. This house will have to build up in the United States a market for the specialized products of Greenland, which are mostly furs and fish, and it will probably have to recommend to the Greenland authorities that changes be made in the character of the goods produced in Greenland.

Mr. Keenleyside stated that the best way of handling trade between Greenland and Canada will probably be through the Hudson Bay Company. Mr. Sonne expressed the hope that it would be possible to make an arrangement of this nature.

Mr. Sonne said that he would want to be assured that any balance accruing to the credit of the Greenland Government in Canada from the sales of Greenland products to Canada, after deducting the cost of goods purchased in Canada for Greenland, would not be blocked but would be transferable into United States funds. The Greenland Government intended to carry out the suggestion of the United States Government that they set up their bank account in the United States. This account will be blocked under the presidential proclamation, and the Treasury and State Departments will control its use and will allow only those transfers which are necessary in order to pay for supplies for Greenland. The Canadian Government will thus have an assurance that the sales of Greenland products will not benefit Germany. Mr. Keenleyside agreed that this would be given consideration and that he did not imagine that any insuperable difficulties would be encountered.

8. *General Problem of Cryolite.* Mr. Keenleyside gave an explanation of the attitude of the Canadian Government.

(1) When Germany occupied Denmark, the immediate feeling of the Canadian Government was that Canada should send a small expedition to Greenland to protect the mine. After some consideration and after consultation with the State Department, the Government had decided not to take this action because (a) they did not want to set an example which might be used by other nations elsewhere in the world to the detriment of weak or colonial governments, and (b) the contemplated action was unnecessary since arrangements for the defence of the mine could be made by the local authorities in Greenland. The Canadian Government was, however, prepared to assist the people of Greenland with supplies or in other ways.

(2) Having decided, on what might be described as altruistic grounds, to stay out of Greenland, the Canadian Government felt that it was not unreasonable that Canada should have a voice in determining the distribution of the unassigned cryolite which was now available because of the occupation of Denmark.

(3) In the past Penn Salt had had a monopoly for North America, and had taken one-third of the cryolite produced. As a result of the occupation, the remaining two-thirds was now available for distribution. It was not unfair

to suggest that a portion of this cryolite should be made available to the Aluminum Company of Canada.

(4) The primary interest of the Canadian Government was to make sure that Canada, the United Kingdom, and France received sufficient cryolite for war purposes. The secondary interest of the Canadian Government was to increase the production of cryolite in Canada in order to strengthen the Canadian economy in war time, and to increase the revenues of the Canadian treasury.

(5) In addition, the Canadian Government desired to have such effective control of supplies and distribution of cryolite that there would be no danger either of cryolite reaching Germany or of the supply of cryolite for the Allies being interfered with because of a conceivable change of policy on the part of Penn Salt or of the United States Government.

The participants in the discussions were in complete agreement that effective control of the exports of cryolite to countries other than Canada, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom must be established. Mr. Sonne suggested that no exports be made to such countries without authority from some governmental or intergovernmental committee, and agreed in effect that the Canadian Government should be given a practical veto on all exports.

Following a prolonged discussion two alternative proposals were made:

A. *By Canada.* Without publicity the Aluminum Company of Canada will take over for the duration of the war the place formerly occupied by the Company in Copenhagen, i.e., refining cryolite and selling it to non-North American markets—especially France and the United Kingdom. Mr. Powell and Mr. Beale will work out between them the most economic method of expanding production of refined cryolite, and will try to avoid the expenditure for the purpose of the \$75,000 contemplated by Mr. Beale. The contract between Penn Salt and the Aluminum Company of Canada would remain in existence, unless modified with the consent of both parties, and the refining plant of the Aluminum Company of Canada would be used to the fullest extent. The assumption by the Aluminum Company of Canada of control over exports outside North America would give the Canadian Government control over every shipment abroad. Under such an arrangement the Aluminum Company of Canada might, if it proved to be eventually advantageous, refine cryolite for part of the United States market, while Penn Salt might receive compensation by selling the more carefully refined cryolite which is required by the French and other markets.

B. *By Mr. Beale.* Penn Salt would take over the job formerly done by the Copenhagen company. He would go ahead with his plans for expanding the refining capacity of his plant. He would undertake to make no exports without consultation with an Allied governmental authority, and he would undertake to use the facilities of the Aluminum Company of Canada as much as possible, so long as it was commercially sound to do so. The sales of cryolite outside Canada might be through the cooperation of the Canadian company.

Mr. Keenleyside emphasized that the Canadian Government could agree to no proposal which did not ensure an increase in production in Canada.

It was agreed that both proposals were for the duration of the war only, and that the situation will have to be reviewed at the end of the war. In spite of this common agreement, Mr. Beale felt that if the Canadian proposal were accepted, a valuable asset would be handed Canada on a silver platter, and when the war was over it would be difficult to get Canada to hand it back.

Mr. Sonne said that as far as the two conflicting proposals were concerned, he had an open mind, although it seemed reasonable to him that Canada should take over the share of the cryolite heretofore handled by Copenhagen while Penn Salt retained the North American monopoly. He did, however, feel that it would look better if, as a matter of form, the job of the Copenhagen company were turned over to Mr. Beale and then turned over by him to the Aluminum Company of Canada. He would rather have the control appear to lie in a neutral country. Mr. Keenleyside was not prepared to accept this proposal as it would place the Aluminum Company of Canada in a position of subordination to Penn Salt, which there was nothing to justify and which might cause trouble later.

During the course of the discussion on the question of refining and distributing cryolite, the following other points were touched upon:

Mr. Powell stated that the refinery of the Aluminum Company of Canada could immediately, without any expansion of plant, supply the demand of the aluminum business in both Canada and the United States, since these countries required a cryolite which was only 90 per cent pure. To supply this demand it would require about 15,000 tons of cryolite a year, of which 6,000 to 8,000 tons would be for the Aluminum Company of America. (Mr. Beale said that he thought that 5,000 tons was a closer estimate.) Mr. Beale stated that Europe demanded a cryolite which was 99 per cent pure, and this could at the moment be supplied only by Penn Salt. The United Kingdom and France required 7,000 to 8,000 tons over the next 12 months. Mr. Powell believed that although the Aluminum Company of Canada could not immediately produce 99 per cent pure cryolite, it could produce such cryolite in four or five months.

Mr. Beale stated that his problem would not be diminished were the Aluminum Company of Canada to refine cryolite for the Aluminum Company of America. He could refine 90 per cent pure cryolite merely by using his present unused equipment. The pinch was in refining the 99 per cent pure cryolite and for this an expansion in the refining capacity of his plant was necessary. The cost of this plant expansion would be about \$75,000. His proposal was that the Greenland Commission should provide two-thirds (up to a maximum of \$50,000). He would provide the remaining one-third outright and would advance to the Greenland Commission the other two-thirds, and would be repaid without interest over a period of years.

Mr. Beale contended strongly that if the Allies wanted to be assured of adequate supplies of cryolite during the war, the quickest and surest way is to put everything in Penn Salt's hands. He does not want, however, to go ahead

with his project of expanding his refining capacity without complete authority and agreement from all concerned. He is entirely willing to obey orders from the Allies on overseas shipments.

It was agreed that Mr. Sonne, Mr. Powell, and Mr. Beale should meet at 10 a.m., Wednesday morning, May 22, to work out an agreement to be referred to the State Department, the Canadian Government, and the Greenland authorities.

9. *Shipment of Supplies by Greenland Commission on "Nascopie"*. Mr. Keenleyside gave Mr. Sonne a list of the supplies which were being shipped by the Canadian Government on the *Nascopie*. After consultation with his advisers, Mr. Sonne suggested that certain additional supplies be sent by the *Nascopie* for the Greenland Commission. (Mr. Keenleyside agreed to give the Legation a copy of the list of supplies being sent by the Canadian Government and the list of supplies being sent on the *Nascopie* for the Greenland Commission. Copies of the list are to be given to Mr. Cumming of the State Department.)

1160.

267-J-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 661

London, May 22, 1940

Your telegram No. 562 of May 18th, Greenland. As instructed in paragraph 3 of your telegram, I have taken steps to point out to the United Kingdom Government that the Canadian Government have not agreed to undertake "responsibility for the security of Greenland".

With regard to questions raised in paragraphs 4 and 5:

(a) *Julius Thomsen* will sail from Kirkwall on May 23rd or 24th. Admiralty calculate that she should reach Ivigtut between June 3rd and June 6th.

(b) Personnel will consist of thirty-three persons, all connected with the cryolite mines. Equipment will include thirty or forty items in small quantities, such as welding wire, spare parts, iron rails, bearings, cables, timber, oil, leather belts, etc. In fact, complete equipment for working the mines, also supplies of hardware and canned goods.

(c) *Julius Thomsen* is a former Danish vessel owned by the Kryolite Mining Company, part owned by the Danish Government; taken in prize and now registered in London.

(d) Authorities at Kirkwall have examined the personnel who will, of course, be under the surveillance of the guard. Admiralty prefer to leave the question of the disposition of the guard until after the vessel reaches Greenland. Vessel will be accompanied by interpreter and Contraband Control Official.

MASSEY

1161.

267-J-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 106

Washington, June 3, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. At Berle's request saw him this morning at the State Department. He is very disturbed over information that he has received of two recent developments concerning Greenland.

- (1) Presence of three British naval officers on the *Julius Thomsen*.
- (2) Presence on the *Nascopie*, not only of artillery officers and mining engineers about whom he had been informed in advance, but also Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers and some soldiers.

He has taken up former matter with the British Embassy which is today cabling the Foreign Office for explanation.

Berle would be grateful if you would state:

- (a) Whether the *Nascopie* does carry these persons;
- (b) If so, purpose of their visit;
- (c) Whether they will remain in Greenland or merely look over the situation and return shortly.

He obviously fears that Aluminum Companies will attempt through the Canadian Government to secure possession of cryolite mines. He was very blunt and stated that the President had said he would be "very angry" if Canada attempted to occupy Greenland.

May I communicate substance of your reply to the British Embassy? Despatch follows today.

1162.

King Papers, PAC

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 1089

Washington, June 3, 1940

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 106 of June 3rd concerning my conversation with Mr. Adolf Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

2. At Mr. Berle's request, I called on him at his office in the State Department this morning. Mr. Reid accompanied me, and Mr. Hugh Cumming Jr. of the State Department was also present.

3. Mr. Berle stated that up to the present the United States and the Canadian Governments had been working in harmony over Greenland. The

problem of the production and distribution of cryolite was, he understood, being satisfactorily ironed out, though the Aluminum Company of Canada had apparently had the idea that they had fallen heir to the cryolite mines in Greenland. At the suggestion of the Canadian Government, the United States Government had drawn up a defence project for Greenland. The armaments for this project had been supplied by the United States at a nominal price and were now on their way to Greenland.

4. The State Department had, however, received information of two developments which might complicate the problem. One of these concerned the United Kingdom Government, and he had already taken this matter up with the British Embassy. (Mr. Hoyer Millar, First Secretary of the British Embassy, had been in Mr. Berle's office just before I arrived.)

5. The development which concerned the United Kingdom was that the State Department had been informed that the *Julius Thomsen*, which had passed Iceland and was expected in Greenland shortly, had on board not only the Canadian Consul, but also three United Kingdom naval officers.

6. The development which concerned Canada was that the State Department had been informed that the *Nascopie*, which had now arrived in Greenland, had on board not only the Canadian Vice Consul, but also an artillery officer, some officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, two mining engineers from the Aluminum Company of Canada, and some soldiers. The Canadian Government had informed the United States Government that the *Nascopie* would have on board an artillery officer in mufti and mining engineers who were to look over conditions at the mine and return to Canada almost immediately. The Canadian Government had not, however, mentioned that they were going to send soldiers and members of the R.C.M.P. Mr. Berle, however, admitted that perhaps the R.C.M.P. formed part of the normal complement of the *Nascopie*. He remarked parenthetically that he could not see that the presence of mining engineers was necessary, since there were sufficient mining engineers at the mine at Ivigtut.

7. He said the State Department was disturbed by this information. They felt that the presence of these people in Greenland, as well as the presence of the three United Kingdom naval officers, might be interpreted as meaning that the Canadian Government intended to assume control of Greenland. He would therefore be grateful if the Canadian Government would inform him whether these people were going to stay in Greenland, or whether they were there merely to look over the situation and would return to Canada shortly.

8. He said, "I am being very blunt about this, and I could put our feelings in more diplomatic language, but I feel that I should report to you that I have discussed the matter with the President and he said that he would be 'very angry' if the Canadian Government attempted to occupy Greenland." Mr. Berle said that this was not the time for this type of 1890 imperialism and that the days of Cecil Rhodes had passed. He said that the mining engineers were from the Aluminum Company of Canada, and he indicated his belief

that the Aluminum Company of Canada was trying to take advantage of the present situation in order to get control of the cryolite mines.

9. He said that after all there were very few white people in Greenland, and that a few armed men from another country could quite easily assume control. He did not see that the presence of these men was necessary in Greenland in order to protect the cryolite mines against attack. Minor attacks could be dealt with by the local Greenland authorities with the material with which they had now been provided. Major attacks could not be prevented unless a first-class base were established in Greenland, and we had not yet got around to that.

10. If, as the result of developments in Europe, the whole situation changed, then, of course, the Canadian and the United States Governments would have to get together to reconsider the whole matter. The United States, however, wanted to preserve the *status quo* in Greenland as much as possible, so that, if conditions in Europe returned to normal, the *status quo* which existed in Greenland before the war could be re-established.

11. Mr. Berle emphasized the bad effect on opinion in the United States of any action by the Canadian Government which could be interpreted as an effort to secure control of Greenland. This would make it more difficult for the United States Government to deal satisfactorily with large problems which might emerge in the near future, should the position of Great Britain and France weaken.

12. I asked whether Mr. Berle had heard anything of the possibility of German submarine operations in the North Atlantic. I mentioned that I had read of the operation of German submarines off the Spanish coast. Mr. Berle replied that he had heard nothing of the operations of German submarines in the North Atlantic and, though he was not an expert on strategy, he thought it was more likely German submarines and other craft would, in the near future, be operating in the Mediterranean.

13. I informed Mr. Berle that his representations would immediately be brought to the attention of the Canadian Government, and that I expected to be able to give him shortly the assurances of the Canadian Government on the points which he had raised.

14. After our meeting with Mr. Berle, Mr. Reid called on Mr. Hoyer Millar at the British Embassy. Mr. Millar said that Mr. Berle had first given him an outline of the policy of the United States concerning Greenland and that he had then spoken to him in very much the same terms as those which he used later in speaking to me. The Embassy is today cabling the Foreign Office asking whether there are in fact three naval officers on the *Julius Thomsen* and, if so, what the purpose of their visit to Greenland is.

15. Mr. Berle's dislike of the Aluminum Company of America is well known. This dislike probably explains in part the annoyance which he very clearly showed this morning.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY

1163.

267-J-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires
in United States*

TELEGRAM 94

Ottawa, June 4, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram of the 3rd of June, 1940, No. 106, Greenland. You will please make an immediate appointment with Mr. Berle and give him the following information.

(1) *Julius Thomsen*. We have been informed that the United Kingdom placed a temporary guard on this vessel to prevent sabotage and to see that it did in fact go to Greenland as ordered. This seems to us to be a reasonable minimum precaution.

(2) We did not state that there would be artillery "officers" on the *Nascopie*. We informed Mr. Berle that one such "officer" in plain clothes would make the round trip. This is what is being done.

(3) There is no Royal Canadian Mounted Police Officer on the *Nascopie*. Two constables were sent and four civilians were deputized to assist in handling the two machine guns which with one spare and a few rifles constituted the total defensive equipment carried by the *Nascopie*. (This of course does not in any way compare with the armament carried by the U.S. Coast Guard cutters.) The *Nascopie* always carries members of the R.C.M.P. on its northern trips.

(4) There are no soldiers on the *Nascopie* other than the one officer referred to above.

(5) The whole complement of the *Nascopie* will return on that ship.

(6) The only way in which the Aluminum Company of Canada enters the picture is in connection with the negotiations regarding the division of the cryolite which are now proceeding with Penn Salt, the outcome of which, as Mr. Berle knows, is subject to review by both Governments.

(7) Even if the erroneous reports received by the State Department were true it is difficult to see how they could be interpreted as a Canadian attempt "to occupy Greenland". We have already informed the United States that we have no intention of occupying Greenland.

You may then add that from the first the Canadian Government has kept the Government of the United States fully informed of all its plans relating to Greenland. In return we feel justified in asking that our statements be accepted by the officials of the State Department.

You may show this reply to the British Embassy, and to the Danish Minister. Please see our immediately following telegram.

1164.

267-J-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires
in United States*

TELEGRAM 93

Ottawa, June 4, 1940

My telegram of this date No. 94, Greenland. Please inform British Embassy that in our opinion the guard on the *Julius Thomsen* should return on the *Nascopie* or else on the *Julius Thomsen* itself if the latter is to proceed to a Canadian or United Kingdom port after leaving Danish personnel and cargo at Ivigtut. This will demand early action as the *Julius Thomsen* is now due in Greenland.

1165.

267-J-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 111

Washington, June 5, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegrams No. 93 and No. 94 of June 4th, Greenland. Instructions carried out except regarding Danish Minister who was not available today. Embassy cabling the Foreign Office concerning *Thomsen*. Berle relieved and emphasized State Department's concern was not on its own account but because of nervousness of the Greenland authorities and the possibility that this nervousness might become known in the United States and increase local demand for United States occupation of Greenland.

1166.

267-J-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975E/24

Ottawa, June 6, 1940

MOST SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

The High Commissioner has received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, saying that the United Kingdom Government would be grateful if he could let them have any further information as to the

arrangements which have been reached between the Canadian and the United States authorities for the defence of Greenland and the security of the cryolite supply.

Sir Gerald Campbell understands that certain correspondence on the subject has taken place between the Canadian High Commissioner in London and the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and that the subject has been discussed recently by the Canadian Minister in Washington and the United States authorities. In particular, the United Kingdom authorities would be glad to have information regarding the defensive personnel and equipment sent by the Canadian Government to Greenland on board the *S. S. Nascopie*, and the High Commissioner understands that the reason why the United Kingdom authorities desire this information is that the Admiralty are anxious to be in a position to assess the degree of security which will exist, having regard to the measures taken by the Canadian and United States authorities, and such other assistance as the arrival of the *Julius Thomsen* from the United Kingdom should afford, in order that they may be in a position to know what steps, if any, are necessary on their part in respect of foreign vessels known to be in northern waters and liable to suspicion.

Sir Gerald Campbell would be much obliged if you would let him have, as early as practicable, such information on the subject as would be of assistance to the Admiralty in their consideration of the question.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1167.

267-J-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

No. 17

Ottawa, June 12, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

In reply to your letter of the 6th of June, 1940, No. 975E/24, I have the honour to inform you that the *Nascopie* is armed only with machine guns and rifles. An artillery officer in mufti joined the ship at Halifax with the intention of examining and reporting on conditions at Ivigtut. In addition there were two members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and four deputies selected especially for this trip.

As a result of our discussions with the United States Government, the Navy Department in Washington prepared a defence project for Ivigtut and have supplied the following equipment at a nominal price to the local authorities in Greenland:

50 Springfield rifles, 6000 rounds of ammunition for same; 8 Lewis machine guns; 39 Drums of ammunition (94 rounds per drum); 3680 rounds of 30 calibre ammunition; 1 three inch 50 calibre anti-aircraft gun together with pedestal mount (dual purpose—anti-aircraft and also for use against surface craft); 150 rounds three inch anti-aircraft ammunition; 150 rounds three inch common shell.

This list was drawn up on the basis of estimates made by the United States Consul in Greenland, the Controller at Ivigtut and the Commander of the Coastguard cutter *Comanche*. The plan will be carried out by the local authorities in Greenland who believe that it would give adequate protection against surface raiders, aircraft and disloyal individuals. The personnel will be found locally, as a large number of the Danish miners have had military training.

The United States Coastguard cutters which will be in the vicinity of Greenland during the summer carry the usual armament of that class of ship.

We shall be glad to receive further information in regard to your statement that foreign vessels of a suspicious character are known to be in northern waters. If this information can be accepted as authentic we should like to be able to inform the United States Government of that fact. If such evidence indicates the need of further naval protection on the part of Washington we have reason to believe that it will be immediately forthcoming.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

1168.

267-J-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 729

Ottawa, June 13, 1940

The Aluminum Company of Canada and the Penn Salt Company are working out an agreement for the equitable distribution of the cryolite being mined at Ivigtut. This agreement will be subject to the approval of the Greenland authorities who have taken over complete control of the mine and of the Canadian and United States Governments. The interests of the United Kingdom and France are being carefully preserved by reserving for the Aluminum Company of Canada a sufficient proportion of the cryolite production to enable that Company to supply all the needs of the United Kingdom and France which were previously met from the Copenhagen refinery. As soon as the terms of the agreement have been approved detailed information will be forwarded to you for transmission to the Government of the United Kingdom.

1169.

267-J-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

No. 14

Ottawa, June 15, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note No. 17 of the 12th June and to state that the information contained therein is being communicated by telegraph to the United Kingdom authorities who are being asked whether further information can be supplied regarding the matter dealt with in the last paragraph of the Note.

I take this opportunity of informing you that His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has been instructed to assure the United States Government that the United Kingdom Government desire to act in close co-operation with them in regard to Greenland and have welcomed the measures which they and the Canadian Government have mutually agreed upon. Lord Lothian has also been asked to state that the naval personnel and small guard which accompanied the *Julius Thomsen* did so solely for security reasons and to ensure that the ship should not be used in the interests of the enemy, and that it is intended that they shall return to the United Kingdom as soon as the ship's voyage to Greenland has been completed.

I have etc.

GERALD CAMPBELL

1170.

267-J-40

Le consul au Groenland au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Consul in Greenland to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 6

Godthaab, July 14, 1940

Sir,

In my despatch No. 2 dated June 24th,¹ I outlined certain difficulties which resulted in delay to the R.M.S. *Nascopie* while at Ivigtut. These difficulties were ascribed to shipping and wharfage problems. I have the honour to supplement that despatch with certain additional observations concerning the somewhat unfavourable reception of the Canadian Government supply ship the *Nascopie* at Ivigtut, and its consequences.

2. The arrangements for the sending of the *Nascopie* to Greenland with various supplies were concluded hastily in Ottawa, apparently in close consultation with the United States Government and the American-Danish Greenland Commission. The arrangements were communicated to the Greenland

¹Non reproduite.¹Not printed.

authorities by telegram by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, on May 15th; and acknowledgement was telegraphed by the Governors of North and South Greenland jointly on May 17th. I am not fully informed of the various steps taken by the Canadian Government prior to the departure of the *Nascopie*.

3. From personal letters I have received from Canada dated June 15th, there evidently had been widespread rumours that the Canadian Government proposed to send Canadian troops to Greenland. I had no information whatever on this matter, but the rumour may have reached the ears of the Greenland authorities, and given them some cause for anxiety. At any rate, there has continued an underlying suspicion that Canada had some undisclosed plans possibly of military nature in Greenland. There was before the Greenland authorities the example of the British military garrisoning and naval protection of Iceland during the early part of May.

4. This suspicion was not allayed when the *Nascopie* arrived at Ivigtut on June 1st. The local Controller, Mr. Albrecht Fischer, at once called on the Master, Captain Thos. F. Smellie, and the leader of the Government party on board, Major D. L. McKeand; and happened to learn that besides carrying general supplies for Greenland, which were welcome, the vessel carried a Canadian artillery officer, Major MacDonal, R.C.A.; two uniformed constables of the R.C.M.P.; four ununiformed R.C.M.P. personnel; and certain machine guns and ammunition. Although it was explained, then and later, that Major MacDonal, who was in civilian clothes the whole time, had no duties or instructions of military character concerning Greenland; that the two uniformed R.C.M.P. constables were Danish and Norwegian interpreters, and had no other special functions; that the whole six R.C.M.P. personnel were not military, but merely police, and that it was customary for the *Nascopie* to carry such police constables on its normal Arctic cruises; and that the machine guns and munitions had not been and would not be unpacked unless the Greenland authorities expressly requested them,—these circumstances contributed to a sense of doubt as to the real motives of the Canadian Government ship.

5. Mr. Fischer furthermore learned that there were certain engineers or geologists (Mr. Hendra and Mr. Miller) representing the Aluminum Company of Canada on board, and may have suspected that they had the intention of investigating or surveying the Danish mine property at Ivigtut (an action jealously guarded against at all times by the mine authorities), and also the intention of negotiating for a monopolistic market in Canada for the total output of Greenland cryolite (a proposal which could not be entertained because of the monopolistic contracts and agreements already existing with the Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Company of Natrona, Pa.)

6. Mr. Fischer extended an invitation to Major McKeand to enable him to pay a courtesy call on the Controller ashore, which by a misunderstanding was not at once accepted; Major McKeand, reversing the invitation, asked Mr. and Mrs. Fischer to take tea on board the *Nascopie*, from which the

latter excused themselves. This small *contretemps* unfortunately resulted in none of the *Nascopie* personnel going ashore at Ivigtut for several weeks.

7. All these circumstances resulted in a certain degree of coolness toward the *Nascopie*; an attitude which was realized by the Canadian Consul as soon as he arrived at Ivigtut on the *Julius Thomsen* on June 4th. His dubious welcome, as being officially associated with the misunderstood Canadian Government's party on the *Nascopie*, was made more dubious by being officially associated (or so it was interpreted) with the British Naval Armed Guard in charge of the *Julius Thomsen* itself. Mr. Fischer was clearly in a rather unappreciative and unfriendly mood. To my requests for conferences ashore by the *Nascopie* party on various questions of supplies, cryolite shipments, and mining matters, as well as to my requests for permission for the British Naval officers to go ashore, Mr. Fischer evasively asked that his consent be deferred until the awaited arrival of his superior, Governor Svane—which arrival was, as it turned out, delayed considerably by ice conditions along the coast. On Governor Svane's arrival, matters were explained and more fully clarified, and a more friendly attitude was shown—perhaps largely due to the urging, through personal friendship, of Mr. Corp, the Swedish Manager of the Mine, who had travelled from Kirkwall on the *Julius Thomsen* with me.

8. Nevertheless, this early misgiving over the *Nascopie's* motives and thus the Canadian Government's motives, lingered, and continues to produce some degree of restraint on the part of the Greenland authorities not shown toward the United States Consular officers, with their two supporting armed Coast Guard cutters. It has been the task of Mr. Porsild and myself to break down in every way possible this attitude of early suspicion and to reassure the authorities as to Canadian good will and absence of ulterior motives. This task has been rendered somewhat more difficult by the awkward requests by the Greenland authorities for the Canadian Consul e.g. to assist in releasing the *Julius Thomsen* from British control: to procure the removal of the British Naval guard: to obtain the release of certain contraband articles in the *Julius Thomsen's* cargo: to arrange for the admission to Canada of certain Ivigtut workers either for permanent employment or for temporary leave: and to arrange for Canadian educational facilities for Danish children in Greenland to continue their schooling abroad. Failure to accede readily to these pressing requests, or only after long delay, was looked upon as rather a negation of the professed wish of the Canadian Government to cooperate with and assist the Greenland Government during its difficult period of transition and autonomous reorganization. The underlying fact that Canada, associated with Britain, is a belligerent; that British occupation of Iceland is not altogether a welcome precedent in the eyes of the Greenland authorities; that British jurisdiction over a Greenland ship and cargo has not been happily regarded here; and that the belligerents cannot be free of a certain self-interest in their "protective" steps toward Greenland, whereas—in the eyes of the Greenland authorities—United States protection is more altruistic and disinterested,—makes the position of the Canadian Consul here more embarrassed than that

of the United States Consul. This latent prevailing doubt—only gradually being dispelled—has been a handicap to the successful functioning so far of our consular mission. My own efforts, greatly aided by the invaluable contacts and intimate conversations in Danish by Mr. Porsild, have been directed to overcoming the doubts created in the early stages of our new undertaking through a series of rather unfortunate misunderstandings and false impressions.

I have etc.

K. P. KIRKWOOD

1171.

267-J-40

*Mémorandum du conseiller*¹
*Memorandum by Counsellor*¹

[Ottawa,] July 19, 1940

NOTES ON A MEETING CONCERNING GREENLAND WHICH WAS HELD IN
NEW YORK ON WEDNESDAY, 17TH JULY, 1940

1. The meeting was held in the office of Mr. H. C. Sonne, Chairman of the American-Danish Greenland Commission, at 96 Wall Street, and was attended by: the Danish Minister to the United States, Governor Eske Brun, of North Greenland, Mr. A. Fischer, Government Controller at Ivigtut, Mr. Corp, Mine Manager, Mr. H. L. Keenleyside, Department of External Affairs. The meeting was followed by a luncheon given by Mr. Sonne at the Downtown Club.

2. The following paragraphs summarize the points covered in the discussion.

3. *The Julius Thomsen*. I informed the Danish Minister and Mr. Sonne, that the British Government, at our request, had agreed to allow the *Julius Thomsen* to be transferred from British to Greenland registry. The High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Canada has been given authority to sign the agreement of transfer. It was pointed out that the British Government, in agreeing to the proposed transfer, had stipulated that certain undertakings would have to be given by the Greenland authorities, and it was agreed that there would be no likelihood of difficulties arising on this score. Reference was also made to the items on the *Julius Thomsen* manifest which, according to the British Government, the Master of the vessel had agreed to return to the United Kingdom. On this point Governor Brun stated (a) that most of the items in question consisted of machine parts which were destined for use in the mine at Ivigtut; (b) that much of the remainder consisted of Rhine wines which had been partly consumed; and (c) that the Master denied having given any undertaking to return the items in question to the United Kingdom. It was agreed that this matter would be considered again when the Greenland Delegation comes to Ottawa. Governor Brun was anxious that the transfer

¹H. L. Keenleyside.

of registry should take place as soon as possible, and some question was raised as to the propriety of the vessel travelling, as has been the case ever since she left Kirkwall, under the Danish flag, although she is presently registered in London. I pointed out that this was legally improper except as a *ruse de guerre*, and expressed the opinion that the use of the British flag until the transfer is completed would cause no inconvenience and would be the proper course to follow.

4. *Canadian Membership on the American-Danish Greenland Commission.* Mr. Sonne pointed out that when it was decided to establish the Commission he and the Danish Minister had approached the State Department with a list of names of persons who might be appointed to such an organization, and had asked for approval and advice. The State Department indicated, however, that they did not wish to be associated in the responsibility for the establishment of such a body, nor did they wish to exercise any authority in regard to the personnel of the Commission. At the Danish Minister's request, however, they did agree to look at the list submitted and, informally and unofficially, expressed approval. In Mr. Sonne's opinion it would be appropriate and advisable for a similar policy to be followed in connection with Canadian appointments. Inasmuch, however, as advice as to Canadian personnel had been sought from Dr. Skelton and myself when Mr. Sonne was in Ottawa, it was agreed that consideration should be given to certain names which I mentioned. As it worked out the names in question were, in several instances, the same as those under consideration by Mr. Sonne and his associates. It was finally agreed that a selection of three or four persons would be made from the following: Professor Gilbert Jackson, Mr. Ralph Parsons, Mr. J. F. Lash (of Toronto), Mr. W. E. Segsworth, Mr. R. E. Powell.

Mr. Sonne pointed out that, while it would be very appropriate to have Mr. Powell on the Commission, if Mr. Beale the President of the Pennsylvania Salt Company remained a member, the fact was that Mr. Beale had on several occasions suggested that he ought to resign because of his business connection with Greenland. It was at once agreed that if Mr. Beale should resign Mr. Powell's name should not be considered for appointment. The name of Mr. D. C. Coleman was also brought into the discussion, but it was felt that Mr. Parsons would probably be a more useful representative of the Hudson's Bay Company because of his long and active experience in the North.

In response to my query it was suggested by Mr. Sonne that the Canadian members should join the present Commission rather than set up a separate Commission in Canada. The general Commission would meet occasionally but there would be in each country a small executive group which would carry on the active work of caring for Greenland interests.

5. *Location of Canadian Consulate.* The Greenland Delegation and the others participating in the discussion were unanimous in expressing the opinion that the Canadian Consulate should be established at Godthaab. In a subsequent conversation with Mr. Penfield, United States Consul to Greenland, he expressed the same view.

6. *Trading Arrangements.* It was agreed that, in view of the difficulties facing the people of Greenland the only sound and just principle for the expenditure of their funds on supplies purchased from this continent would be that the supplies in question should be bought in each instance in the most favourable market. This would mean that there would be no effort to equate the purchases in Canada or the United States with sales to either of these countries. It was felt by those present that experience would doubtless show that certain things could be obtained more economically in Canada and others in the United States, and that the Greenland authorities should make their purchases accordingly.

With regard to the handling of the payments for the cryolite and for Greenland's purchases on the continent it was agreed that on the visit of the Greenland Delegation to Canada detailed discussions on the technique to be followed would be held with representatives of the Department of Finance and/or the Foreign Exchange Control Board.

7. *Cryolite Contracts.* Mr. Sonne explained that it had been decided that separate contracts would be made by Greenland authorities with the Aluminum Company of Canada and the Pennsylvania Salt Company. These contracts would be in accordance with the agreement as to the distribution of the cryolite which had been worked out in principle some time ago. Each contract, before signature, would be subject to examination by the Department of External Affairs and the State Department. Mr. Sonne stated that there would be inserted in the Pennsylvania Salt Company's contract a provision that all sales abroad would be subject to review by the Danish Minister in Washington; and Mr. Kauffmann stated that in any case where a question was likely to arise as to the propriety of such sales (as, for example, in the case of sales to Japan) he would discuss the matter with a representative of the State Department or a representative of the Canadian Legation in Washington. It had already been agreed by the Pennsylvania Salt Company that they would sell no cryolite to any purchaser who might be considered to be acting directly or indirectly in the interests of Germany and its associated powers. If any suspicion should attach to any sale on this score, Mr. Kauffmann agreed that he would take action under the provision of the contract which gives him the power of veto.

8. *Visit to Ottawa.* It was agreed that Governor Brun, Mr. Sonne, Mr. Fischer and Mr. Corp would visit Ottawa in the near future, probably towards the end of the week of July 21st. While in the Canadian Capital they would expect to complete the signature of the contract with the Aluminum Company of Canada if it has not been done before that time; sign the agreement for the transfer of registry of the *Julius Thomsen*; work out a detailed technique for the handling of exchange and other related problems; and complete the arrangements for Canadian membership on the Commission.

Mr. Fischer and Mr. Corp provided a great deal of information in regard to conditions in Ivigtut and this information was substantially increased and supplemented by descriptions of conditions in other parts of Greenland in my subsequent conversation with Mr. Penfield.

1172.

267-J-40

*Mémorandum**Memorandum*

Ottawa, July 29, 1940

MINUTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GREENLAND
ADMINISTRATION AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

Participants: Dr. O. D. Skelton, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Dr. Charles Camsell, Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources; Commissioner S. T. Wood, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Mr. B. G. McIntyre, Comptroller General, Department of Finance; Mr. R. A. Gibson, Deputy Commissioner, Northwest Territories; Mr. G. C. Bateman, Controller of Metals, Department of Munitions and Supply; H. L. Keenleyside, Counsellor, Department of External Affairs; Governor Eske Brun of North Greenland; Mr. H. C. Sonne, Chairman, American-Danish Greenland Commission; Mr. S. O. Corp, Mine Manager; Mr. Valdemar Nicolaisen.

A. Dr. O. D. Skelton, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, acted as Chairman and opened the meeting with a brief statement welcoming the representatives of Greenland and expressing the hope that mutual knowledge of the two countries might be expanded. He added that the Canadian Government and people were anxious to be of assistance to their neighbours in Greenland and hoped that practical suggestions to this end might arise from the discussions initiated at this meeting.

B. (1)¹ Mr. Corp, who had been at Kirkwall and had sailed thence in the *Julius Thomsen* to Greenland, stated that he was quite sure that it had not been made clear to the Captain of the ship that it was his duty to return the thirty items on the manifest to the United Kingdom. He explained that in any event these items consisted chiefly of iron and iron products for use in the mine and in the building of the new dam at Ivigtut. Smaller items were certain German wines and soda. Mr. Corp explained further that these items, although originating in Germany, had in most cases been imported into Denmark, before the outbreak of war, and he felt that the iron would be of little use to the British, while it would be of great value to the people of Greenland. Dr. Skelton explained that, while it would be impossible for the Canadian Government to decide that Greenland could keep the articles in question, Canada would recommend to the United Kingdom that, in view of all the circumstances, this matter should be dropped.

(2) The draft agreement, which had been prepared in the Department of External Affairs and which had subsequently been submitted to the United Kingdom, was approved with one small alteration in Article IV. As amended

¹ Les lettres et les chiffres correspondent à l'ordre du jour qui avait été au préalable remis aux participants.

¹ The Minutes are lettered and numbered to correspond with an agenda previously circulated to the participants.

this Article reads, in part, after the word "trade": "and not against the Allied interest". It was agreed that this change would be reported to the United Kingdom High Commissioner and that arrangements would be made as soon as possible for the signing of the agreement.

C. (1) Mr. Sonne explained the way in which the American-Danish Greenland Commission had come into being; and, after some discussion, it was accepted that the Danish Minister at Washington, in his capacity as representative of Greenland, and the Danish Consul General in Canada, in a similar capacity, would decide on the Canadian personnel to be appointed to the Commission. Among the names mentioned as possible appointees were: Messrs. Segsworth, Lash, Parsons, Jackson and Tisdale.

(2) In describing the organization and functions of the Commission Mr. Sonne said that the Commission as a whole had been designed to offer advice on such matters as social welfare, Red Cross Services and education. He pointed out that, especially if the War should last for some years, it would be necessary to obtain assistance in these fields. On the other hand a smaller executive committee in the United States has been kept very busy advising and assisting in purely business matters. He visualized the functioning of a similar small executive committee in Canada. Following an interrogation on the point, it was decided that at first it would probably not be advisable to have the executive committee in Canada incorporated as a Company. It was the consensus of opinion that the executive Committee in Canada should follow the same policy as that followed by the corresponding Committee in the United States and employ an import-export house to do the actual work of purchasing and shipment.

(3) It was suggested that the Commission should be known as the American Greenland Commission.

D. (1) As at present arranged in the United States the American-Danish Greenland Commission, acting under the authority of the Greenland Government, employs a private company to place orders, ship goods and handle invoices on all exports to Greenland. In the same way imports from Greenland into the United States are handled by a private agency. Payments to the company that does the purchasing are made immediately and in cash through a financial company in New York. It was suggested that a similar general arrangement might be made in Canada and that possibly the Hudson's Bay Company might be selected to act as the agent for the Canadian executive committee of the American Greenland Commission.

(2) Mr. Sonne stated that all plans for Greenland trade were based upon the assumption that the trade would be handled in terms of United States dollars. The convenience of this arrangement was explained in some detail. On the other hand it was pointed out that it might be desirable to leave certain funds which will accumulate in Canada in Canadian dollars, possibly on deposit with the agent company. Arrangements might even be made to have the company pay interest on such deposits. Mr. McIntyre pointed out that it would be necessary to obtain permits from the Foreign Exchange

Control Board in order to enable the Aluminum Company of Canada to buy United States dollars in order to pay for their cryolite purchases. Against this would be offset the purchases of Canadian dollars to pay for all goods obtained by Greenland from Canada.

(3) Mr. Sonne stated that his committee was prepared to pay the present account as soon as it is presented. Mr. Keenleyside agreed to obtain a complete statement from the Hudson's Bay Company and present it within the next few days.

E. (1) and (2) Mr. Sonne explained that the two contracts were not yet in completely final form but he believed that no material changes would be made. Copies of both contracts were presented for filing. It was explained that the contracts embodied the terms of the Agreement previously outlined in correspondence and discussions between the Companies, Mr. Sonne and Mr. Keenleyside.

(3) A prolonged discussion developed as to the amount of cryolite reserves at Ivigtut. Mr. Corp gave a general estimate of 1,000,000 tons. This subject was pursued in some detail in a discussion between Mr. Corp and Mr. Bateman. Dr. Camsell suggested that if it would be of any assistance to the Greenland authorities the Geological Survey of Canada would probably be willing to allow a geologist to go to Greenland to assist in making a study of the origin and extent of the cryolite deposits and in the work of prospecting for further sources. Governor Brun expressed his gratitude and stated that this suggestion would be taken into consideration as soon as the present rush of varied activities might allow.

F. Governor Brun stated that daily meteorological reports are sent from Julianehaab to Copenhagen. He will give consideration to the possibility of stopping these reports. He stated also that local stations send out, by long wave, meteorological information for the guidance of local shipping. This, he believed, would not be dangerous to Allied interests. Mr. Keenleyside was asked to prepare a memorandum setting forth the action which would be most helpful to the Allies. This memorandum is to be forwarded to Governor Brun who will decide what steps can be taken.

G. It was decided that when conditions permit attention will be given to the possibility of a more adequate exchange of news between Greenland and Canada.

1173.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État des États-Unis au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State of United States to Minister in United States

Washington, September 23, 1940

Sir,

In an aide-mémoire dated April 13, 1940 regarding the position of the Government of the United States toward Greenland, I had the honor to call

to your attention that in June 1920 the Government of Great Britain had been informed that in a Declaration made by the Secretary of State on August 4, 1916 it was stated that the Government of the United States would not object to the extension by Denmark of her political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland; that it would not be disposed to recognize the existence in a third government of the right to acquire Greenland should the Danish Government desire to dispose of that territory; and that it reserved for future consideration the position which it might take in such an eventuality.

Recent events on the East Coast of Greenland and in the waters adjacent thereto, impel me to inform you that the position of the Government of the United States as above set forth remains unchanged, and to add that in view of the geographical position of Greenland and the well-known policies of the United States with respect to the Western Hemisphere, my Government could not acquiesce in any political, military or naval steps which constituted a permanent occupation or change in the status of Greenland.

CORDELL HULL

1174.

267-J-40

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

No. 3

Ottawa, January 23, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your Note, No. 17, of the 12th June last and connected correspondence regarding the steps which were being taken last summer by the United States for the protection of the cryolite mine at Ivigtut in Greenland.

2. I have now received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that the United Kingdom Government would be glad to learn what is the present position regarding these defences and whether the Canadian and United States Governments are satisfied that the defences are efficient and adequate.

I have etc.

W. C. HANKINSON

1175.

267-J-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires
in United States*

TELEGRAM 22

Ottawa, January 27, 1941

IMMEDIATE. We have received an inquiry from the United Kingdom Government with regard to the present status of the steps taken for the protection of the cryolite mine at Ivigtut. Please ascertain from the United States Government whether the guns which were supplied last year have now been mounted and what other safety provisions are now in effect at Ivigtut. We should be glad to know whether the United States Government is satisfied that the steps which have been taken are sufficient to ensure the safety of the mine.

1176.

1868-40

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 942

Washington, April 10, 1941

Sir,

With reference to previous correspondence concerning Greenland, I have the honour to report that on April 9, the Secretary of State and the Danish Minister signed an "Agreement relating to the defense of Greenland".

2. The signature of the Agreement was announced today by the President and by the State Department. Ten copies of the President's statement and of the State Department's press release (No. 167 of April 10) are enclosed.¹

3. The State Department's press release contains:

(a) a statement on the background of the Agreement;

(b) the text of the Agreement;

(c) the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the Danish Minister, which preceded the signing of the Agreement (note dated April 7 from the Secretary of State; note dated April 9 from the Danish Minister).

4. The essential provisions of the Agreement are:

(1) The United States "reiterate[s] its recognition of and respect for the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark over Greenland." (Article I).

¹ Non reproduites.

¹ Not printed.

(2) The United States "accepts the responsibility of assisting Greenland in the maintenance of its present status". (Article I).

(3) The United States is granted "the right to construct, maintain and operate such landing fields, seaplane facilities and radio and meteorological installations as may be necessary" in order that the United States may assist Greenland to maintain its present status. (Article II).

(4) The grant of these rights include[s] "the right to do any and all things necessary to insure the efficient operation, maintenance and protection of such defense facilities as may be established"—e.g. deepening harbours, installing aids to navigation by air and by water, constructing roads, fortifications, etc. (Article III).

(5) "The landing fields, seaplane, harbor and other defense facilities that may be constructed and operated by the Government of the United States . . . will be made available to the airplanes and vessels of all the American Nations for purposes connected with the common defense of the Western Hemisphere". (Article IV).

(6) "This Agreement shall remain in force until it is agreed that the present dangers to the peace and security of the American Continent have passed." (Article X).

5. Three comments suggest themselves:

(1) The United States appears to have been granted the right to construct all kinds of "defense facilities" in any part of Greenland—that is it might establish one or more naval bases as well as one or more air bases.

(2) The Agreement will not terminate until the United States as well as Denmark decides that it is time it should terminate.

(3) The "defense facilities" in Greenland may be used by the aeroplanes and vessels of Canada "for purposes connected with the common defense of the Western Hemisphere"—an imprecise phrase which could be stretched to cover any activity by the Royal Canadian Air Force or Royal Canadian Navy.

6. The preamble to the Agreement includes an explanation of the legal theory under which the Danish Minister at Washington could without instructions from his Government enter into an international Agreement of such importance: the King of Denmark is still sovereign of Greenland; the German occupation of Denmark prevents the Government in Denmark from exercising its sovereign powers over Greenland; the Danish Minister at Washington acts "on behalf of His Majesty the King of Denmark in His capacity as sovereign of Greenland" and with the concurrence of the King's "authorities in Greenland".

7. The press release giving the background of the Agreement stresses the activities of German ships and aeroplanes on the Eastern coast of Greenland during the summer and autumn of 1940 and last month. These activities made it appear necessary that "further steps" for the defence of Greenland be taken "to bring Greenland within the system of hemispheric defense envisaged by the Act of Habana".

8. (A newspaperman or Congressman, noting the words "further steps", could legitimately ask what previous steps the United States had taken. He might also be struck by the statement that the landing parties sent by Germany to Greenland in the summer of 1940 "were eventually cleared out.")

9. Clearly the Agreement, read along with the accompanying official documents, constitutes a warning to Germany to keep its ships and aeroplanes and "meteorologists" out of Greenland and its territorial waters. Presumably the Agreement means that the United States is prepared to use force if Germany does not heed the warning.

10. The President in his statement draws attention to the fact that the "Agreement was signed on the anniversary of the day on which German troops invaded Denmark".

11. Mr. Wrong discussed the Agreement this afternoon with the Danish Minister, at the latter's request. The Minister explained that the final signature of the Agreement had been arranged rather hurriedly because he was anxious that it should be completed and published before any inkling that the Agreement was being negotiated should reach the German Government. He had noticed some indications that there was a danger of a leak to the press in Washington. He frankly admitted that the validity of the Agreement might be challenged, but the main thing was that it was accepted by the Government of the United States. Some difficulty had been experienced in finding a formula covering his authority to sign the Agreement.

12. Mr. Kauffmann, who is a strong partisan of the cause of the Allies, drew particular attention to the phrase granting the use of the facilities built in Greenland by the Government of the United States to "all the American Nations" and emphasized that this phrase was intended to include Canada, without any question.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG
for the Minister

1177.

267-J-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis¹

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States¹

TELEGRAM 192

Ottawa, May 26, 1941

IMMEDIATE. With reference to previous correspondence relating to the defence of Greenland:

1. The Canadian government are gravely concerned over the vulnerability of Greenland, the defence of which is of common interest to Canada and the United States.

¹ Texte communiqué au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne dans le télégramme 796 du 26 mai 1941.

¹ The text of this message was repeated to the High Commissioner in Great Britain in Telegram 796 of May 26, 1941.

2. Recent enemy activity in the Greenland area, and in particular the presence there of major units of the German fleet, has emphasized the danger to the cryolite mine at Ivigtut upon which the production of aluminum in Canada and the United States so largely depends. Neither sea nor shore defences on the present scale would suffice to protect the mine against attack by enemy forces in any strength.

3. In the circumstances it is desired that you should bring this matter urgently to the attention of the United States authorities, and suggest to them that immediate consideration be given to the strengthening of the Ivigtut defences.

4. Canada would be prepared to co-operate in carrying out any agreed plan of defence, and you might say that we are prepared immediately to provide a Canadian garrison. In this whole connection the State Department will recall the proposals which were put forward by the Canadian government in our telegram No. 55 of April 15th, 1940.¹

5. This matter will be presented to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence when it meets in Washington on Wednesday, May 28th, but it is hoped that its consideration will not await a recommendation by the Board.

Please report the result of your representations as soon as possible.

1178.

267-J-40

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*²

*Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*²

TELEGRAM 211

Washington, May 29, 1941

My telegram No. 204 of May 27th, Greenland.³ Reply in writing has not yet been received to aide-mémoire left at State Department on May 27th. Berle states verbally that full information will be furnished about United States dispositions and plans for defence of Greenland. Military and Naval Attachés will secure this information this week when a further report will be submitted.

Berle considers that steps taken or planned by United States authorities provide reasonable protection for cryolite mine; appropriate instructions have been issued to United States naval forces in the North Atlantic, and construction party about to proceed to Greenland will be equipped for defence. He points out that German attack on Greenland would mean war with the United States and that this alone is very strong deterrent.

There is no desire on the part of the United States Government for Canadian garrison to be despatched to Greenland, especially since the United States assumed responsibility for defence of Greenland under agreement with the Danish Minister here.

¹ Document 1115.

² Text communiqué au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne dans le télégramme 824 du 30 mai 1941.

³ Non reproduit.

⁴ The text of this message was repeated to the High Commissioner in Great Britain in Telegram 824 of May 30, 1941.

⁵ Not printed.

1179.

267-J-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1061

London, June 6, 1941

Your telegram No. 796 of May 26th,¹ and your telegram No. 824 of May 30th, Greenland.² Information contained in these telegrams has been communicated to United Kingdom Government who expressed their gratification at your action in reminding the United States of necessity for ensuring that Greenland should be fully protected against enemy attack.

Information contained in your telegram No. 824 had been communicated to the United Kingdom Government by the United Kingdom High Commissioner.

MASSEY

1180.

267-J-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 1608

Washington, June 7, 1941

SECRET

Sir,

With reference to your Telegram No. 192 of May 26th, 1941, I have the honour to enclose four copies of an aide-mémoire³ on the defences of Greenland which was handed to Mr. Berle at the Department of State on May 27th. Mr. Berle gave a verbal reply to this on the following afternoon, after the Canadian proposals had been considered by an interdepartmental meeting. The gist of his reply was conveyed to you in my Telegram No. 211 of May 29th. Mr. Berle has now given me a written answer, four copies of which are the second enclosure of this despatch. This recites in very general terms the steps taken by the United States Government for the defence of Greenland and, after stating that these measures are believed to be all that are practical, expresses the belief that the proffered assistance of the Canadian Government is not required.

2. Pursuant to Mr. Berle's verbal undertaking that detailed information would be furnished by the Service Departments, I requested the Naval and Military Attachés to make the requisite enquiries. Some delay was experienced by them in securing information because United States officers concerned were occupied with the proceedings of the Permanent Joint Board

¹ Voir le document 1177, note 1.

² Voir le document 1178, note 2.

³ Non reproduit. Le télégramme 192 du 26 mai 1941 (le document 1177), reprit substantiellement l'aide-mémoire en question.

¹ See Document 1177, footnote 1.

² See Document 1178, footnote 2.

³ Not printed. The substance of the aide-mémoire was identical with that of Telegram 192 of May 26, 1941 (Document 1177).

on Defence. The third enclosure (three copies) is a report from the Military Attaché,¹ giving the results of his approach to the War Department. The Naval Attaché has provided me with the following comments, based on the information which he has received from the Navy Department.

I am informed by the United States Naval authorities that an agreement now exists between the United States and the Greenland Government for its protection against invasion. No one at the Navy Department was in a position to give me a definite yes or no as to whether the United States fleet would attack any enemy ships close to the shores of Greenland, but from the preparations which the United States authorities are making, which were given to me in detail, it is fairly obvious that any enemy ships approaching those shores would be fired upon and attacked by aircraft.

I have examined their plans [of] operation for that purpose and consider that their preparations in the climatic conditions in Greenland will be adequate to meet any attack considering the great distance of Greenland from any enemy bases. At present due to recent winds there is a protection of 30 to 40 miles deep of packed ice around the whole coast which renders invasion or bombardment nearly impossible. I am informed that at present air reconnaissance is being carried out by United States planes based on Iceland, and they are also taking photographs in order to find more locations for Naval and Military bases on that island. A certain number of Naval ships and transports are leaving about the middle of this month to complete the establishment of the United States bases at Greenland. These forces should reach Greenland about the 1st July. When the ice clears there will be a sufficient number of United States Naval ships to protect the coast. All Naval forces in that district will come under the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, United States Navy, who is, as you already know, patrolling more or less on the trade lanes of the Atlantic, and he is therefore in a position to give reinforcements to the Naval forces operating around Greenland. From the operation orders I am of the opinion that reasonable protection will be afforded to the cryolite mine at Ivigtut.

3. Doubtless you will be in a position to secure a detailed report on some aspects of this question from Squadron Leader Logan, R.C.A.F., who was due to arrive from Greenland in the United States on June 6th and will presumably proceed at once to Ottawa. I should be glad to know whether, in view of the information furnished by the United States Government, it is desired that I should approach the Department of State once more in this matter.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG
for the Minister

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Le Département d'État à la légation aux États-Unis
Department of State to Legation in United States

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Washington, June 6, 1941

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State has taken note of the concern of the Canadian Government, as expressed in the Canadian Legation's aide-mémoire of

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

May 27, 1941, with respect to the vulnerability of Greenland to attack, and of the suggestion of the Canadian Government that immediate consideration be given to the strengthening of the defenses at Ivigtut in which connection it offers its cooperation.

Under the Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland signed on April 9, 1941 by the Secretary of State and the Minister of Denmark in Washington the Government of the United States undertook the defense of Greenland. Since the signing of that Agreement officers of the United States Army and Navy have, as the Government of Canada is aware, been engaged in certain survey work in Greenland in connection with the establishment of defense installations there. Upon the basis of data submitted by the survey parties and of information obtained from other sources the United States War and Navy Departments have drawn up plans for the defense of Greenland against attacks which might be launched against it under conditions obtaining from time to time.

Since the measures which have been and will be taken by the Government of the United States to implement its undertaking to defend Greenland against attack are believed to be all that are practical both from the point of view of timeliness and of extent, the Government of the United States, while greatly appreciating the offer of the Government of Canada to assist in this matter, does not believe such assistance to be required.

PARTIE 2/PART 2

BASE AÉRIENNE AU GROENLAND

GREENLAND AIR BASE

1181.

987-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975E/38

Ottawa, August 19, 1940

SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

The High Commissioner recently received a telegram from London stating that the United Kingdom authorities have had under consideration the advantage of delivery by air to the United Kingdom of aircraft constructed in Canada and the United States. Arrangements have already been made for such delivery, direct via Newfoundland, in the case of long range aircraft, but in view of the very large numbers of short range Canadian and United States aircraft in prospect, it is desired also to arrange, if possible, for a route

via Labrador, Greenland and Iceland. For this purpose it would be necessary to establish an aerodrome, an aircraft wireless station and a meteorological station in Greenland. The wireless and meteorological stations would be useful in connection with other trans-Atlantic flights even though an air route could not be infallible via Greenland. In the first instance it would appear necessary to send a party to Greenland to carry out a survey to decide whether these facilities could be established.

The United Kingdom Government would be glad to receive the general observations of the Canadian Government on this matter and to learn whether they are aware of any previous aerodrome surveys in Greenland, other than that carried out by the United Kingdom. If the Canadian Government agree that the route is likely to be worth investigation, would they be prepared to approach the Greenland authorities for facilities for a survey party, after any necessary consultation with the United States authorities?

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1182.

987-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

DESPATCH 558

Ottawa, August 20, 1940

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose a copy of a communication from the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom dated the 19th August, 1940, in which it is stated that the United Kingdom authorities are considering the advantages to be obtained by arranging for delivery by air of aircraft constructed in Canada and the United States. You will note that it is stated that in order to facilitate such delivery it will be necessary to establish an aerodrome, an aircraft wireless station and a meteorological station in Greenland. The United Kingdom Government wishes to obtain the general views of the Canadian Government in regard to this proposal.

Before considering other aspects of the proposal set forth in the letter under reference we would like to have an indication of the probable attitude of the Government of the United States if such a proposal were to be made in definite form. I shall be grateful, therefore, if you will discuss the matter tentatively with the appropriate officer of the State Department. You should make it clear that we are not at present proposing the establishment of the facilities mentioned but are initiating the present inquiries prior to the devotion of any serious consideration to the proposal.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

1183.

987-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 1787

Washington, August 30, 1940

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your Secret Despatch No. 558 of August 20 concerning the tentative proposal that an aerodrome, an aircraft wireless station, and a meteorological station be established in Greenland.

2. In accordance with your instructions, Mr. Reid on August 24 raised the matter with Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Cumming of the Department of State. He made it clear that Canada was not at present proposing the establishment of these facilities in Greenland but that you would appreciate it if the United States could indicate its probable attitude if such a proposal were made.

3. Mr. Cumming asked Mr. Reid to call on him at the State Department on August 29. Mr. Cumming said that the question had been discussed with Mr. Berle and with officers from the War and Navy Departments. The army and navy officers confessed that they were giving only offhand opinions. They said, however, that they were impressed with the practical difficulties both of conducting a survey in Greenland and of constructing the bases. They pointed out that the difficulties of conducting a survey at this time of the year would be great, since the days are becoming shorter and the difficulties of navigation greater.

4. The State Department was not willing at the present time to indicate its probable attitude if a proposal were made that an aerodrome, an aircraft wireless station and a meteorological station be established in Greenland.

5. Mr. Cumming indicated that they had no objection in principle to our sending a survey party, but he asked that even this be not considered as a definite answer. They would like, before giving a definite answer on this question, to have some further information.

6. They asked whether the urgency is so great that Canada or the United Kingdom want to go ahead and make a survey at this time of the year in the face of considerable difficulties. They feel that probably time will be saved in the long run if we were to wait for the report of Captain Lacey of the United States Army Air Corps. Captain Lacey went to Greenland on the Coast Guard Cutter *Duane* in July. He returns early in October. He has a scouting plan and is accompanied by photographers, and is making a survey from the point of view of military possibilities in Greenland. He will be reporting among other things on the possibility of establishing air bases in Greenland. The United States would be glad to make Captain Lacey's report available to Canada. They feel that his report will enable us to decide where to go ahead with further surveys, since his surveys will

no doubt indicate that there are only certain areas in Greenland in which it would be possible to establish an aerodrome, an aircraft wireless station and a meteorological station.

7. Mr. Cumming added that the Danish Navy had started, though not completed, a survey of the west coast of Greenland, and that Captain Lacey had been given a copy of this survey in Greenland. Mr. Cumming expressed the offhand opinion that probably Germany had made the best surveys of the east coast of Greenland.

8. I gather from what Mr. Cumming told Mr. Reid that Mr. Berle and the army and navy officers who were consulted were extremely interested in the possibility of our proposing to establish an aerodrome, an aircraft wireless station and a meteorological station in Greenland. They do not, I think, want to pour cold water on the scheme. They are, however, unwilling to indicate their attitude so long as the proposal is so tentative. My impression is that they will not indicate their attitude until the surveys have been made. They would then be able to take into account conditions as they exist at that time.

9. Now that the Joint Board on Defence is a going concern, I venture to suggest that you consider whether this tentative proposal might not suitably be referred to the Board for examination before taking a decision. The lack of any definite answer to our inquiry appears to arise from the lack of certain data of a technical character. The matter is one which appears to me to fall under the Board's Agenda as so far established and upon which the Board, as I understand its function, might appropriately be asked to report to the Governments.

I have etc.

LORING C. CHRISTIE

1184.

987-40

Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain

SECRET

Ottawa, September 4, 1940

Dear Sir Gerald,

I am now in a position to reply to your letter of the 19th of August regarding the possibility of delivering planes by air to the United Kingdom. Immediately on receipt of your letter in question we asked our Minister in Washington to discuss with the appropriate authorities of the United States the attitude that would likely be adopted by that country if we were to make a definite proposal covering the establishment of an aerodrome, an aircraft wireless station and a meteorological station in Greenland. The discussion with the State Department was continued over a number of days.

The ultimate conclusion of the conversations between the Legation and the State Department may be summarized by saying that the United States authorities are not prepared to offer a definite opinion at the moment and that they suggest the advisability of awaiting the report which is to be made to them by Captain Lacey of the United States Army Air Corps. Captain Lacey went to Greenland on the Coast Guard Cutter *Duane* in July and will return early in October. He had a scouting plan and was accompanied by photographers and is making a survey from the point of view of military possibilities in Greenland. Among other things he will be reporting on the advisability of establishing air bases there. The United States is prepared to make Captain Lacey's report available to Canada, and the State Department officials think that this report will enable them to decide whether to go ahead with further surveys since his examination will no doubt indicate that there are only certain areas in Greenland in which it would be possible to establish an aerodrome and an aircraft wireless station.

In the course of the discussion in Washington it was ascertained that the Danish Navy had started, though it had not completed, a survey of the West coast of Greenland and that Captain Lacey had been given a copy of this survey. We are asking our Legation to obtain a copy if possible.

It was the opinion of our officers in Washington that the United States officials did not want to pour cold water on the scheme. They were not prepared, however, to indicate a final attitude so long as the proposal is so tentative. It is likely that they will continue to hesitate until the surveys have been made.

Under the circumstances it would rather seem as though time and effort might be saved if we should decide to wait until Captain Lacey's report becomes available before instituting any further programme of surveys in Greenland. I should be glad to learn the views of the United Kingdom Government in regard to this suggestion.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

1185.

987-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 227

Washington, September 17, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Greenland. Air Attachés at this Legation and of British Embassy, and Reid, have seen Captain Lacey.

He was pessimistic about possible landing facilities in Greenland. His survey and that of his coastguard colleague covered the coast of Greenland and the interior up to depth of about 60 miles from point 100 miles north northeast of Cape Farewell around that point to 1000 miles north northwest of Cape Farewell.

In his opinion only sites offering any promise as landing ground for all year round establishment are two areas of flat ground at the head of Sondestrom Fjord, and also area 300 miles further north. He considers that those at Sondestrom Fjord could be converted by steam shovel and dredging. In winter, snow could be impacted. Ships can navigate up to the head of the Fjord until about October 15th when it becomes ice-bound. It would be impossible to reach the landing ground sites after October 15th unless a road up to them could be found from nearer the coast. Ice in the harbour at Julianehaab could probably be used for three months January, February and March.

When questioned, Lacey admitted that ice cap might be used as far south as possible. He is of opinion that within ten miles of Julianehaab ice cap is sufficiently flat to make perfect landing ground. Air Attachés doubt whether sites at Sondestrom Fjord and vicinity are worth further investigation since they are too far north and too far distant from Newfoundland to be of assistance as far as Atlantic ferrying concerned, unless landing ground is constructed in Labrador. This would require very considerable ground for organization, and flying operations involved would at all times be extremely hazardous.

Attachés consider possibility of using ice cap near Julianehaab deserves further investigation and recommend that another survey of this area be made as soon as possible. They do not know, however, whether fuel and supplies can be got up to the ice cap. Furthermore, thorough navigational aids would be essential owing to the fact that the glare from ice makes no horizon visible.

Lacey's complete report will be available in about two weeks.

1186.

987-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 229

Washington, September 17, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Greenland. Lacey has given Reid:

- (1) Following corrections to telegram No. 227.
 - (a) His survey covers Cape Farewell up to and including Disko Island;
 - (b) Most promising sites are at Sondestrom Fjord, though emergency landing strips could be made north of Holsteinborg;
 - (c) Close navigation of Sondestrom Fjord November 1st, not October 15th;
 - (d) From his observations of ice cap near Ivigtut landing ground might be found on the ice cap 20 miles from Julianehaab though some peaks stick up out of the ice cap in from Julianehaab.

(2) Following additional information.

(a) Doubt if ice cap worth considering unless to be used on large scale. Supplies could be hauled in only after about January 1st following heavy snow fall when caterpillar tractor might be used. Otherwise route would probably have to be blasted out of the rock. Hangars cannot be built and heavy gales would blow aeroplanes off;

(b) Sondestrom Fjord fields could be used in winter merely by impacting the snow. For use during the rest of the year portions of the area would have to be built up 4 or 5 feet with retaining wall to make an area solid above floor.

Cumming's personal advice is that before further survey is made United Kingdom authorities should, if they had not already done so, instruct Royal Geographical Society prepare immediate memorandum estimating possibility of using ice cap or Sondestrom Fjord. This memorandum to be based on published materials in *Canadian Geographical Journal*, *Geographical Review*, technical German journals, two books on Wegener Expedition, reports of Greenland expeditions in four volumes of University of Michigan studies. Cumming draws special attention to Hobbs' article in *Aero Digest* November 1929, suggesting route of Sondestrom Fjord to Angmagssalik which [where?] Flight Lieutenant d'Aeth, Royal Air Force, had base.

1187.

King Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa.] November 5, 1940

RECENT PRESS REPORTS RE CAPTURE OF GERMAN PARTY ATTEMPTING TO
ESTABLISH METEOROLOGICAL STATIONS IN GREENLAND

The *Montreal Gazette* for November 3rd, and the *New York Times* of the same date carried a brief story concerning a German language broadcast by the B.B.C., on Saturday, November 2nd, which stated that "a German expedition of 50 men had been captured in an unsuccessful attempt to seize the meteorological station in Greenland", and that "the Norwegian patrol boat, the *Friedhof Nansen* had made them prisoners".

An outline of the facts of this incident is set down below:

The authorities of the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada have been aware of the existence of certain meteorological stations at various places in Greenland which were suspected of providing information of military value to the enemy.

The Danish meteorological stations in Greenland were situated at:

Scoresby Sound
 Angmagssalik
 Julianehaab
 Godthaab
 Godhavn

Under previous treaty rights, Norwegian stations in Greenland were situated at:

Myggbukta
 Torgilsku [Torgilsbu?]

The incidents in connection with transmissions of meteorological reports have occurred only in connection with the Norwegian stations listed above, and with sporadic German or German-controlled efforts to establish new stations. Arrangements with Greenland authorities over control of transmission of reports from Danish stations have been satisfactorily completed.

(1) THE *VESLEKARI* INCIDENT. According to information given by the United States State Department to the British Ambassador in Washington, and transmitted to the Canadian authorities on the 7th August, it was reported that a German-controlled expedition had sailed for North-East Greenland from Tromso on the S.S. *Veslekari* with the ostensible object of conducting a "scientific investigation". The United Kingdom authorities believed that a more likely object of the *Veslekari's* trip was to facilitate the relief of pro-Nazi observers at Norwegian meteorological stations in Greenland at Torgilsku and Myggbukta.

Arrangements were then made to despatch the Norwegian vessel, the *Friedhof Nansen*, carrying an armed British naval party to sail from the United Kingdom via Iceland and Myggbukta, where the British armed party would be landed to protect the wireless station. The *Friedhof Nansen* was sent solely for the purpose of protecting the radio stations and preventing them from falling into enemy hands. The *Friedhof Nansen* was to try to intercept the *Veslekari*, if possible, and effect its capture.

This proposal was placed before the State Department, where it was noted that the President would have no objection to the *Friedhof Nansen's* actions, provided:

- (i) That the expedition be represented as a meteorological expedition;
- (ii) That the landing party should not remain, but withdraw as quickly as possible;
- (iii) That no publicity be given to this matter.

On August 29th this Department was informed that the *Friedhof Nansen* had successfully secured the stations at Torgilsku and Myggbukta and that the *Veslekari* had been captured and had been conducted to Iceland.

(2) THE *RINGSSEL* INCIDENT. On August 22nd, it was reported by the United States Consul in Greenland that another Norwegian vessel, the *Ringsel*, with a crew of 11, and armament of 4 rifles and 4,400 rounds of ammunition, had arrived at Angmagssalik. On August 31st it was reported to have landed supplies and relieved the radio station at Torgilsku (Norwegian). The *Ringsel* sailed on September 2nd for Norway, and the *Friedhof Nansen* had been unable to effect its capture. The *Friedhof Nansen* is now proceeding to Torgilsku.

(3) THE *FURENAK* INCIDENT. On September 3rd a Naval message was received that the sealer *Furenak* with Norwegian crew and flag, together with 4 Danish members (one known to be pro-German) sailed from Alesund on August 16th with instructions to establish meteorological stations on the East coast of Greenland at Ella Island. An intercepted telegraph report from Germany to the Commander-in-Chief, Norway, also referred to a "Jan Mayen plan", (referring to Jan Mayen Island off the East coast of Greenland), but nothing further is known of this.

On September 12th a telegram from the Canadian Legation in Washington gave the essence of the President's views that there would be no objection to United Kingdom or Canadian authorities seizing the *Furenak*, subject to conditions outlined above with reference to the *Veslekari*.

The last report on this subject is contained in a despatch of September 14th from the United Kingdom High Commissioner stating that, according to a report received, the *Friedhof Nansen* had successfully secured Jan Mayen Island, burned the station and removed the operator. The station established by the *Furenak* on the North shore of the entrance to Flemings Inlet was also discovered, and a party of Danes was removed with instruments for 4 stations, rifles for 20 men, machine guns and stores. This station was also burned down.

SUMMARY:

It is believed that these reports to Germany and German-occupied territories have now ceased.

By arrangement with Greenland authorities:

(1) Godthaab and Godhavn now transmit reports in a special code to Julianehaab, for relay to the United States and Canada. There have been no further broadcasts to Denmark since August 31st.

(2) Arrangements are to be made for the same procedure regarding reports from Angmagssalik and Scoresby Sound.

(3) Torgilsku is transmitting reports in code to United Kingdom.

(4) All other stations are closed down.

1188.

987-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975E/40

Ottawa, December 18, 1940

SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to my letter No. 975E/38 of the 9th September,¹ regarding the proposal for establishing an aerodrome and aircraft wireless station and meteorological station in Greenland, I write to say that I have received from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs a telegram stating that the Air Ministry have now examined the reports available as to the possibility of establishing an aerodrome in Greenland including a summary of Captain Lacey's report. In view of the lack of working details available they doubt if further particulars of practical value could be obtained by approaching the Royal Geographical Society, (a suggestion which was, I believe, originally made by the United States authorities to the Canadian Minister in Washington and subsequently communicated to the United Kingdom authorities by the Canadian High Commissioner in London).

The Air Ministry therefore consider it most desirable that a further expedition should be sent to Greenland as early as possible in 1941 to investigate from all aspects the possibility of establishing an aerodrome in the region near Julianehaab and of presenting a report on the problems to be overcome. This proposal follows recommendations made by the Air Attaché, Washington, after discussions with Captain Lacey.

Whether or not it proves practicable to establish an aerodrome, the Air Ministry wish to establish a permanent wireless and meteorological station in southern Greenland to provide additional information to assist in weather forecasts for the North Atlantic air routes from Newfoundland to Iceland and to Northern Ireland.

I have accordingly been asked to enquire whether the Canadian Government would be prepared to undertake an expedition to investigate the matters referred to in the second and third paragraphs of this letter as soon as weather conditions permit. If so, the Canadian Government will no doubt wish to consult the United States Government with a view to an approach being made by either the Canadian or the United States Government to the Greenland authorities. The Air Ministry would of course be ready to give all possible assistance in connection with the expedition, which they recommend should, if possible, be so constituted as to be able to carry out initial work towards establishing whatever facilities are found practicable. It is also hoped that the Canadian authorities would subsequently be able to provide personnel and material for the completion and maintenance of these facilities.

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

I am informed that the matter has been discussed between the Air Ministry and the Minister of National Defence and I understand that Colonel Ralston will also be communicating on this subject with the Canadian Government direct.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

1189.

987-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2112

London, December 19, 1940

Following from Ralston, Begins. Dominions Office have cabled their High Commissioner to take up with you question of establishing a wireless and meteorological station, and if possible, an aerodrome, in southern Greenland. Air Ministry have discussed with me;¹ they consider it to be one of urgent importance. I am impressed by their views and think matter warrants consideration. Recognize international difficulties which have been mentioned to them. Ends.

MASSEY

1190.

987-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, December 20, 1940

Dear Sir Gerald,

This will acknowledge receipt of your communication of the 18th December regarding the proposal to establish an aerodrome, aircraft wireless station and a meteorological station in Greenland. I note that the United Kingdom Air Ministry, having examined the available reports, has proposed that the Canadian Government should be asked to undertake an expedition to investigate the possibilities in this field as soon in 1941 as weather conditions permit. This proposal is now being urgently examined by the interested departments of the Canadian Government, and as soon as a conclusion has been reached I shall communicate with you again. Any action that should be decided upon in this connection will, of course, as you have pointed out, require to be discussed with the United States authorities before final steps are taken.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

¹ Voir le document 804.

¹ See Document 804.

1191.

King Papers, PAC

Mémorandum du conseiller au Premier ministre
Memorandum from Counsellor to Prime Minister

[Ottawa,] December 28, 1940

PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AN AIR BASE, AIRCRAFT WIRELESS STATION
AND METEOROLOGICAL STATION IN GREENLAND¹

1. The original proposal for the establishment of an aerodrome, an aircraft wireless station, and a meteorological station in Greenland was advanced in a despatch of August 19th, 1940, from the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom. It was suggested that an air base in Greenland would greatly facilitate the delivery to Great Britain of short range Canadian and United States planes by a route utilizing bases in Newfoundland, Greenland and Iceland. The wireless and meteorological stations, it was said, would also be useful in connection with other trans-Atlantic flights, even though an air route could not be assured via Greenland.

2. This proposal was tentatively discussed by the Canadian Legation in Washington with officials of the State Department. The latter were unwilling to give a definite answer, and suggested that any further survey of Greenland be postponed until after the report of the aerial reconnaissance undertaken by Captain Lacey of the United States Army Air Corps had been received.

3. Captain Lacey had gone to Greenland in July on the United States Coastguard cutter *Duane*, for the purpose of conducting an aerial survey of Greenland from the point of view of military possibilities and potential air-base facilities. Captain Lacey's survey was carried out from August 7th to September 7th, 1940, and covered the coastal region of West Greenland from Cape Farewell at the southern tip to Disko Island, about 1000 miles north.

4. A copy of Captain Lacey's report was made available to the Canadian authorities on November 5th.

5. In general, it may be said that Captain Lacey was pessimistic about possible permanent landing facilities in Greenland. In his opinion, the most practicable sites for all-year landing grounds were two areas, one at the head of Sondestrom Fjord and another, about 300 miles north. The construction difficulties involved, however, would be considerable, in view of the freeze-up after November 1st, and the problem of moving materials to the prospective sites. The Canadian and British Air Attachés in Washington felt that these two sites were too far north and too distant from Newfoundland to be useful for the purpose in view.

¹Le Comité de guerre du Cabinet prit en considération ce mémorandum le 2 janvier 1941, et de nouveau le 8 janvier 1941.

¹This memorandum was considered by the War Committee of Cabinet on January 2, 1941, and again on January 8, 1941.

6. A third suggestion, which Captain Lacey advanced, was the possibility of using the ice-cap itself which within 10 miles of Julianehaab is sufficiently flat to make a possible landing ground. The Air Attachés consider that this possibility merits further investigation.

7. In a subsequent despatch dated December 18th the United Kingdom High Commissioner stated that the Air Ministry had examined available reports concerning the possibility of establishing an aerodrome in Greenland, including a summary of Captain Lacey's survey based on the reports of the British Air Attaché in Washington. In view of the lack of working details, and following the recommendations of the British Air Attaché in Washington, the Air Ministry advanced the following proposals for the consideration of the Canadian Government.

(1) That a further expedition should be sent to Greenland as early as possible in 1941 to investigate from all aspects the possibility of establishing an aerodrome in the region near Julianehaab.

(2) That even if the project of establishing an aerodrome is impracticable, it would be desirable to establish a permanent wireless and meteorological station in South Greenland to assist in weather forecasts for the North Atlantic air routes from Newfoundland to Iceland and to Northern Ireland.

(3) That the Canadian Government should consider whether it would be prepared to undertake such an expedition to investigate these questions as soon as weather conditions permit. The Air Ministry would be prepared to lend all possible assistance to this expedition, which, it was suggested, should be so constituted as to be able to carry out initial work towards establishing whatever facilities are found practicable. It was also hoped that the Canadian authorities would be able to provide personnel and material for the completion and maintenance of these facilities. Such action, of course, was to be discussed fully with the United States authorities before final steps were actually taken.

8. This proposal was transmitted to the Department of National Defence for Air and to the Civil Aviation Division of the Department of Transport. It is understood that the Minister of National Defence for Air expressed his views at the meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on December 27th. The Director of Air Services has reported that

(a) the Civil Aviation Division is equipped to undertake the required survey of aerodrome sites if called upon to do so;

(b) the Radio and Meteorological Divisions of the Air Services Branch are prepared to establish a Radio and Meteorological Reporting Station near Julianehaab if directed to undertake this task.

9. It would seem to be clear that if Canada is to undertake or to participate in the proposed activities in Greenland the first step should be a detailed discussion with the United States Government. It will be essential to keep in

mind Washington's sensitivity in regard to anything that might look like an "occupation" of Greenland. It might be possible to work out some scheme whereby the Greenland authorities could themselves undertake the construction that is ultimately decided upon—with United States assistance. In any case the first step, if the proposal is to be pursued further, is to clear the ground by discussions with Washington. If this is to be done it should be done at once.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE

1192.

987-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires
in United States*

DESPATCH 915

Ottawa, December 31, 1940

Sir,

With reference to previous correspondence relating to the possibility of establishing an air base and meteorological station in Greenland, I have the honour to forward, herewith, a copy of a secret communication from the United Kingdom High Commissioner, dated the 18th of December, 1940, in which Sir Gerald Campbell transmits to the Canadian Government a proposal for a further survey which it is hoped that Canada may undertake.

I shall be very much obliged if you will discuss this matter informally and tentatively with the United States authorities and let me know, in due course, what the views of the United States Government would be likely to be if Canada were to adopt the proposal made by the Government of the United Kingdom. You may also ascertain whether there would be any disposition on the part of the United States itself to undertake the work of establishing an aerodrome near Julianehaab and installing an aircraft wireless station and meteorological base in Greenland.

For convenience, I enclose also a copy of a memorandum giving the background of the present proposals.¹

I have etc.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

¹ Document 1191.

1193.

987-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

TELEGRAM 5

Ottawa, January 9, 1941

With reference to my despatch of December 31st No. 915 regarding airplane base and meteorological and wireless stations in Greenland. We have been informed by the United Kingdom authorities that during the current year ten to twelve thousand short range planes must be forwarded to the United Kingdom, and that it will be exceedingly difficult to obtain shipping space for these planes in crates. Alternative is to fly the planes but their range will be little over one thousand miles. This would necessitate establishment of landing field and highly efficient meteorological and wireless service on southern tip of Greenland. We would be prepared to send a Canadian mission to examine the possibilities of such establishments at once.

Please place these views before United States authorities and ascertain their views and readiness to assist in working out a scheme which would meet their approval and accomplish the desired ends. Every day that can be saved will be of value.

1194.

267-J-40

Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures

Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

DESPATCH 231

Washington, February 1, 1941

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 44 of January 31 concerning Greenland.¹ In that telegram I summarized the information given in this despatch.

2. Mr. Cumming of the Department of State asked me to call on him late yesterday afternoon in order that he might be able to give me at least a tentative answer to the two enquiries which I had recently made at your request.

3. Mr. Cumming, who had just had an interview with Mr. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, said that the Department of State had telegraphed to Mr. Penfield, United States Consul in Greenland, on January 29 informing him of the nature of the representations which I had made to the State Department concerning the proposed establishment of an aerodrome, aircraft wireless station and meteorological base in Greenland. These representations had been

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

based upon your despatch No. 915 of December 31, 1940, and your telegram No. 5 of January 9, 1941. The State Department's telegram had gone on to remind Mr. Penfield that United States policy had been based upon an endeavour to keep Greenland as part of the Western Hemisphere free from belligerent operations. Mr. Penfield was instructed to make the friendly suggestion to the Greenland Government that they request the United States to send experts immediately to Greenland to investigate the possibility of the Greenland authorities establishing a civil aerodrome and an aircraft wireless station and meteorological base in the south of Greenland. He was to say to the Greenland authorities that if they were to make this request of the United States, the United States would be glad to accede to their request and to meet all the consequent costs. Mr. Penfield was instructed that this matter was of great urgency.

4. Pending a reply from Mr. Penfield the whole question of the defences of Greenland is being referred to the War Plans Division of the Army and Navy which will meet late next week to discuss it. The "whole question" includes consideration of the proposed mission and of the subsequent establishment of an aerodrome, aircraft wireless station, and meteorological base, the defensive measures which should be taken at Ivigtut and the possibility of extending the coastguard patrol off East Greenland.

5. Mr. Cumming then outlined the tentative plans which had been made for extension of the United States coastguard patrol and for further defence measures at Ivigtut. He emphasized that these plans were subject to revision by the War Plans Division of the Army and Navy. He said, however, that unless the War Plans Division decided against them they would be carried out in substantially their present form.

6. The Coast Guard patrol is to be extended along the entire east coast of Greenland as far north as ice conditions will permit. One Coast Guard cutter will maintain the patrol from Julianehaab to Angmagssalik, at least one and possibly two vessels will jointly patrol the coast from Angmagssalik north as far as possible. The *Northland* will be assigned to this section of the coast. It is possible that the other boat for the northern section will be the *Bear*, the United States naval boat which is now in the Antarctic. Before being used for this work the *Bear* would be transferred from the Navy to the Coast Guard. The consent of the Navy has not yet been obtained to this transfer.

7. Mr. Cumming volunteered the explanation that this proposed extension of the Coast Guard patrol was not inconsistent with the information given us on January 10 that the Navy Department have no present intention of extending their patrol in North Atlantic waters (My telegram No. 17 of January 10).¹ The patrol off Greenland would be a Coast Guard patrol, not a naval patrol.

8. The cutters will be armed and each cutter will have one scout plane. The cutters will be equipped with radio monitoring apparatus, in order to maintain a twenty-four hour monitoring service on messages despatched from

¹ Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.

and received at the radio stations on the East Coast of Greenland. The Greenland Government will not be informed of this monitor service.

9. The three-inch dual-purpose 50-calibre gun which was sent to Ivigtut last year (see my telegram No. 98 of May 28, 1940)¹ has now been mounted and test-fired. It is mounted on the opposite side of the fjord from the mine. Mr. Cumming understands that a twenty-four hour watch is now being maintained at the gun. The necessary signalling and communicating equipment is being obtained and will be installed this spring. At the beginning of the navigable season the Greenlanders will maintain at the entrance to the fjord a lookout point and an inspection station for the examination of incoming vessels. This lookout patrol will cover both entrances to the fjord. Telephonic communication will be installed between the lookout and the mine at Ivigtut and there will be blinker communication from the mine to the gun position. Range tables are being worked out for the fjord.

10. Study is being given to the advisability of installing one additional three-inch dual-purpose 50-calibre gun.

11. The chief policeman of the "mine guards" employed by the Ivigtut Mine Company is now on his way to the United States. These "mine guards" are members of the United States Coast Guard Service (see my telegram No. 166 of July 16, 1940).¹ When the chief policeman arrives in Washington, consideration will be given to the advisability of increasing the number of "mine guards" from their present number of 15 to 21 or 23. This would make it possible to maintain a twenty-four hour service of the gun and a twenty-four hour watch at the lookout point and over the communications system. It would also leave enough guards on hand at the mine to serve the machine guns and the small arms.

12. Two small patrol boats, approximately 70 feet in length, which belong to the Greenland Government will be armed with at least one one-pounder apiece. Study is being given to the advisability of increasing the armament of these boats. These two patrol boats will have a triple mission. They will assist in the maintenance of the patrol off Ivigtut; they will maintain a patrol along the south and west coasts of Greenland from Cape Farewell westward; they will keep an eye on the foreign fishing fleet which operates off the west coast of Greenland and which, this season, will probably be mostly Portuguese and Icelandic.

13. The other defence equipment at Ivigtut is still what it was when I reported on it to you in my telegram No. 98 on May 28, 1940, except that a few rifles and a small amount of ammunition have been distributed along the east coast of Greenland at Torgilsbu and Angmagssalik. A small amount of ammunition was, of course, used in the test-firing of the three-inch gun.

14. At the conclusion of our discussion Mr. Cumming impressed upon me that this outline which he had given me of the proposed measures for the patrol of Greenland waters and the defence of Ivigtut was subject to approval by the War Plans Division of the Army and Navy.

¹ Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.

15. Mr. Cumming made it clear that the Administration has not yet decided what policy it would adopt if the expert mission sent to Greenland reported that it was possible to establish an aerodrome and if Canada or the United Kingdom then desired to use the air base in Greenland to facilitate their delivery to Great Britain of short-range Canadian and United States planes. He said that the Administration was not crossing any bridges until it came to them. He seemed himself to doubt whether it would be possible to establish an aerodrome in South Greenland and said that some of the War Department people he had talked to thought that in any event it would be a three-year job.

16. I asked Mr. Cumming whether the United States proposed that the expert mission be so constituted that it could carry out the initial work on whatever facilities are found to be practicable. He replied that this is one of the questions which is being put up to the War Plans Division of the Army and Navy. As a layman he was afraid that to constitute the mission in this way might involve considerable delay since it would be necessary to get supplies and workmen together.

17. Mr. Cumming is himself, I think, prepared to recommend that Canada should be asked to appoint one expert to go on the proposed mission to Greenland. The expert would be a civilian or travel as a civilian. He felt that the presence of a Canadian expert would be advantageous in case the mission recommended that the establishment of an aerodrome was impossible.

18. You will recall that in my telegram No. 29 of January 21¹ I reported that the question of the aeroplane base and meteorological and wireless stations in Greenland was to be taken up with the President. Though Mr. Cumming did not say so yesterday afternoon I think therefore that it is clear that the President has himself approved of the general lines of the telegram which was sent to Mr. Penfield on January 29 and of the reference of the tentative plans concerning Greenland to the War Plans Division of the Army and Navy.

19. I have not told the British Embassy anything about my conversations yesterday with Mr. Cumming, since Mr. Berle said he would prefer me not to. If they inquire I shall merely say that we are making progress in our discussions.

20. Mr. Cumming tells me that Professor Wm. H. Hobbs of the University of Michigan will be in Washington early next week—probably Monday or Tuesday, February 3 or 4. Mr. Hobbs had asked whether there would be any impropriety in his talking to officials at the British Embassy about the possibility of establishing an aerodrome in Greenland. He has been told that Mr. Berle would prefer him to talk to the Canadian Legation. He may therefore be calling at the Legation next week. If so I shall, unless you see any objection, ask the Air Attaché to take part in my discussions with Mr. Hobbs.

I have etc.

ESCOTT REID
for Chargé d'Affaires

¹Non reproduit.

¹Not printed.

1195.

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*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au haut
commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High
Commissioner of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, February 3, 1941

Dear Mr. Hankinson,

With reference to our letter of December 20, 1940, addressed to Sir Gerald Campbell with relation to the proposed establishment of an aerodrome, aircraft wireless station and a meteorological station in Greenland, we have now received an interim reply to our representations on this subject from the State Department in Washington.

The United States authorities have instructed their Consul in Greenland to discuss with the Greenland authorities the desirability of the latter establishing at once a civil aerodrome and meteorological and wireless station in the south of Greenland. Washington is prepared to assist the Greenland authorities in this matter by sending experts at once to investigate the possibility of carrying through such a programme.

In the meantime the whole question of the defence of Greenland, including the establishment of an aerodrome, the extension of the coast guard patrol and further defence measures at Ivigtut is being referred to the War Plans Divisions of the Army and Navy which are to meet during the current week.

I hope to be able to communicate with you again on this subject in the near future.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

1196.

987-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] February 5, 1941

GREENLAND AERODROME

In conversation today with Mr. Escott Reid of our Legation in Washington, I asked him to impress again on the State Department the urgency and importance of early action toward the establishment of an aerodrome in Southern Greenland which would be available as a ferrying stage for the transport of shorter range aircraft across the Atlantic. We were anxious that

the earliest possible decision be taken on this project in advance of and, if necessary, independently of action on other aspects of Greenland defence mentioned in the Legation's telegram No. 44 of January 31st.¹ He had been in touch with Cumming, the State Department officer responsible for Greenland questions, yesterday and would see him again this afternoon to expedite favourable action at the meeting of the War Plans Division of the Army and Navy which is to take place tomorrow.

In view of the United States Government's sensitiveness about discussing Greenland questions directly with the United Kingdom representatives and of their request that the information contained in Legation despatch No. 231 of February 1st be not, at present, communicated to the British Embassy, Reid did not think he could discuss the aerodrome developments with Sir Gerald Campbell,² as had been suggested by one or two Ministers in War Committee, without getting the State Department's consent. In view of the importance of early, agreed action, he thought they would probably agree to this.

1197.

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*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*
*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 47

Washington, February 5, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Reference to Robertson's telephone message concerning Greenland. State Department official assures me that they are seized with the urgency of the aerodrome problem, and that decision on aerodrome and consequent action is not being delayed by consideration they are giving to general problem of defence of Greenland and they agree about possibility of sending expedition in the immediate future. Penfield has been asked to check on report he has just sent in, that floe of ice is already reported near Julianehaab, and that navigation in that vicinity may be difficult, though not impossible, until perhaps May.

Penfield reports Greenland authorities would be pleased to receive group of United States experts to investigate possibility of aerodrome, etc.

Have talked situation over with Campbell, and reported to him on action we and State Department have taken.

War Plans Division meets tomorrow afternoon.

¹ Non reproduit.

² Ministre à l'ambassade britannique, Washington, il était auparavant le haut commissaire britannique au Canada.

¹ Not printed.

² Minister at British Embassy, Washington, formerly British High Commissioner in Canada.

1198.

267-J-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 328

Washington, February 13, 1941

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to previous correspondence concerning Greenland. At Mr. Berle's request, I called on him at the State Department this morning. I was accompanied by Mr. Reid. There were also present at the discussions Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Cumming.

2. Mr. Berle said that there had been no delay on the part of the United States in answering our enquiries as to their attitude on the establishment of an air base, an aircraft wireless, and a meteorological station in Greenland. The enquiries which we had made, however, raised important questions of policy.

3. He assumed that Canada, in making this enquiry about Greenland, had been acting in concert with the United Kingdom. As far as the United States was concerned it was necessary, however, for them to distinguish clearly in this instance between the United Kingdom and the Canadian Government. He explained this necessity later in the discussion. He said that he realized the importance of the proposed project to the United Kingdom and to Canada because of the problems of forwarding short-range planes to the United Kingdom. He said also that the recent bombings and machine-gunnings in Iceland had served to emphasize the importance attached to the Greenland problem.

4. United States policy in respect of Greenland was based on three desiderata:

(1) The United States consider Greenland to be part of the Western Hemisphere and to come within the general sweep and scope of the Monroe Doctrine. Thus the obligations of the United States to defend the Western Hemisphere extend factually, if not theoretically, to Greenland.

(2) As a practical matter, one would have to recognize the dominant interest of the United States in Greenland because of the immediate defence problems of the United States, as well as its interest in the defence of the Western Hemisphere.

(3) The United States desired that Greenland as part of the Western Hemisphere be kept free from belligerent operations.

5. The United States also recognized the existence of "a free Danish Government in Greenland".

6. The United States therefore proposed to take the following action:

(1) It would negotiate with the Danish Government in Greenland with respect to the establishment by them of an air base, etc.

(2) It would assimilate any scheme worked out with the Danish Government in Greenland with the general scheme of hemisphere defence. In other words, it would assimilate the Greenland scheme to the spirit of the Act of Havana.

(3) The United States would give Greenland financial and technical assistance in the construction of the facilities decided on.

(4) The facilities in Greenland would be made available to all the nations of the Western Hemisphere for purposes of hemisphere defence. In this way the facilities would be made available to Canada as one of the American nations for its use for purposes of hemisphere defence. Canada would be considered as an American nation.

(5) The United States would at the proper time notify the other American Governments of what it was doing and would offer the facilities of the air base to them just as it had already offered them use of the bases acquired from Great Britain.

(6) In all the foregoing the United States intends to work in close co-operation with Canada, and in this connection would probably propose to Canada that Canada send an observer to accompany the expedition to Greenland which would investigate the possibility of establishing the facilities.

7. This programme of action leaves over for later decision a number of questions, most of which hinge on the proposed use by Canada of the Greenland air base as a stopover station for the flight of short-range aircraft from Canada to the United Kingdom. The United States desire to preserve some colour of "neutrality" of Greenland. (When Mr. Berle made this statement, he himself put the word "neutrality" within quotation marks). One suggestion which had been made, and which might prove to be feasible, was that the use by Canada of the airfield should be assimilated in some way to the use of neutral ports by belligerent warships. The application of the rules which govern the use of neutral ports by belligerent warships would mean, for example, that the aeroplanes could stay in Greenland for only a limited time, and that they could take off from Greenland with only a limited amount of gasoline.

8. Mr. Berle emphasized the necessity of ensuring that any action taken in Greenland was by Canada and not the United Kingdom. It was possible for Canada to be given use of the facilities in Greenland because Canada was an American nation and it could be argued that in making use of these facilities it was taking action which was necessary in order that it might defend itself.

9. In answer to a question as to whether the United States considered that the measures taken at Ivigtut were sufficient to defend the cryolite mine, Mr. Berle said that if the measures contemplated in southern Greenland were taken the question of the defence of the cryolite mines would take on an entirely different aspect.

10. The expedition of experts to Greenland would be sent as soon as possible. They could not, however, leave before two or three weeks from now and their departure might have to be delayed a little because of snow conditions on the possible sites for landing fields. (Mr. Cumming later explained to Mr. Reid that Mr. Penfield, the United States Consul in Greenland, had reported that the proposed sites would at the earliest not be free from snow until the end of March, and that even this estimate was based on the assumption that there would be no heavy snowfall between now and the end of March.)

11. Mr. Reid this afternoon called on Mr. Cumming in order to clear up certain points in the conversation of this morning. Mr. Cumming said that Mr. Hull had placed before the President yesterday memoranda which Mr. Berle and Mr. Cumming had prepared, that the President had approved of the proposals made in these memoranda, that these proposals were those which had been mentioned to us this morning by Mr. Berle, and that the President had directed the Army and Navy to carry out the proposals. The various technical questions about the proposed expedition were therefore now being considered by the Army and Navy. They had not yet decided whether it would be practicable to so constitute the expedition that it would be able to carry out initial work towards establishing whatever facilities were found practicable.

12. Mr. Cumming emphasized the necessity of giving no publicity to the proposals which had been made and of maintaining the strictly confidential character of the discussions which had taken place.

13. Mr. Reid said that he had been interested to note that Mr. Berle had in the morning referred to the existence of "a free Danish Government in Greenland", whereas in the past, as far as he remembered, the State Department had referred to the "Greenland authorities" or the "Greenland Government". Mr. Cumming explained that Mr. Berle had in departmental memoranda referred ever since the occupation of Denmark to the "free Danish Government in Greenland". Mr. Cumming's own opinion was that it was now necessary to emphasize the existence of the sovereignty of the government in Greenland, since the United States under the proposals which had been made would be entering into agreements with the Greenland authorities.

14. Mr. Berle on at least three occasions this morning referred to Canada as "an American nation". He presumably did this with the approval of the Secretary of State and the President since the whole United States scheme under which Canada will be able to use the air base is based upon the recognition of Canada as an American nation. In a subsequent despatch I shall comment on the significance of this recognition of Canada as an American nation, especially in the light of the Panama Declaration on the Panama safety zone.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY

1199.

987-40

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

975E/40

Ottawa, February 24, 1941

SECRET

Dear Mr. Robertson,

You will remember that in your letter of the 3rd February you told me that the whole question of the defence of Greenland was being referred to the War Plans Division of the United States Army and Navy, and that you hoped to be able to communicate with me again in the near future about the proposed establishment of an aerodrome, an aircraft wireless station and a meteorological station in Greenland.

I have now received a telegram stressing the urgency which the Air Ministry attach to this question, and pointing out once again that if the Greenland route is to be used during the coming summer preparatory steps must be taken as soon as possible.

In the circumstances I would appreciate any further information which you may be able to let me have on this subject.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1200.

987-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 467

Washington, March 1, 1941

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 65 of February 28¹ in which I informed you that the expert expedition to Greenland was sailing about March 15 and that a Canadian officer has been invited to go on the expedition as an observer.

2. Mr. Cumming of the Department of State, acting under instructions from Mr. Berle, told Mr. Reid yesterday afternoon that the expedition would sail on a coast guard cutter from Boston. The cutter will probably be the *Modoc*. It will leave Boston not later than March 15 and may sail a day or two earlier.

¹ Non reproduit.² Not printed.

3. The officer in command of the expedition will be Commander William Sinton, who is a navy pilot. The other naval officer has not yet been named, but he will be a communications expert. It is probable that Captain Lacey, who conducted last year's survey in Greenland will be the United States army pilot on board the expedition. There will also be an army engineer officer, who will be an expert on construction problems.

4. The term which the navy is using in describing the expedition is "Southern Greenland Survey Expedition".

5. Canada is invited to send an officer as an observer attached to the expedition. In appointing the Canadian observer, I know that you will take into account the desirability of his having a rank junior to that of the United States officer in command of the expedition.

6. The United States suggests that in order to minimize the possibility of publicity being given to the presence of a Canadian officer on board, it would be best if the Canadian officer were picked up by the coast guard cutter at St. John's, Newfoundland. If the cutter sails from Boston on March 15, it will be due in St. John's on Monday, March 17, or Tuesday, March 18.

7. The United States authorities will no doubt be letting me know in the near future whether they think it would be best for the Canadian officer to travel in civilian clothes.

8. The duration of the trip is unknown.

9. The coast guard cutter is not taking an aeroplane with it since the experts have reported that there is still too much ice in the fiords to use an aeroplane at the present time. The four possible sites for an aerodrome near Julianehaab can be reached either by the cutter itself or by smaller boats which can be obtained locally.

10. The expedition is also going to investigate the possibility of finding a suitable aerodrome site in the Sondestrom Fiord on the west coast.

11. In order to save time I recommend that it would be advisable for you to consider what your attitude would be should the expert expedition discover that it would be equally easy to establish an aerodrome in Sondestrom Fiord as near Julianehaab. In other words, if everything else is equal, would you prefer an aerodrome near Julianehaab to one in the Sondestrom Fiord? Apparently the distance from Sondestrom Fiord to Reykjavik in Iceland is about the same as the distance from Julianehaab. In one case the aeroplanes would have to go over the icecap, and in the other case they would be travelling over water.

12. The United States authorities have been engaged for some time in working out arrangements for shipping supplies, men and equipment to Greenland if the report of the expert expedition is favourable to the establishment of an aerodrome.

13. This decision of the United States to send the expert expedition on about March 15 is based on a communication which they received a few days

ago from Mr. Penfield, the United States Consul in Greenland, in which he reported on weather and snow conditions near Julianchaab and in the Sondstrom area.

14. The United States authorities are going to do their best to see that nothing about this expedition gets into the newspapers. I assume that you will take the same precautions. Unfortunately, a number of articles hinting at the possibility of an expedition have appeared lately. I enclose a copy of an article from the *Washington Star* for February 26.¹ I am told that a somewhat similar article also appeared in the New York *World Telegram* of February 27. I have ordered copies of the *World Telegram* for that day and will send you a copy of the article by next bag.

15. For your information I also enclose an article entitled, "Keeping Watch on Greenland", which appeared in the New York *World Telegram* for February 10,¹ and an article, "The Weather goes to War", which appeared in a recent number of *This Week* magazine.¹

16. An official in the State Department has telephoned this morning to say that the Coast Guard Service would like to know as soon as possible the name of the Canadian Officer who will be accompanying the "Southern Greenland Survey Expedition". I should be grateful if you will telegraph me his name as soon as the appointment is made.²

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY

1201.

987-40

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 633
SECRET

Washington, March 17, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to previous correspondence concerning the Southern Greenland survey expedition.

2. In discussion this morning with Mr. Wrong and Mr. Reid, Mr. Berle brought up the subject of Greenland. He said that he hoped that the Southern Greenland survey expedition would, within four weeks, be sending in a report on the kit required for construction. He, himself, is urging that the expedition first go ahead with the construction of a temporary landing field for short-range aircraft and, when that job is done, undertake the construction of more

¹ Non reproduit.

² Le télégramme 51 du 6 mars 1941 lui apprit la nomination du chef d'escadrille R. S. Logan en tant qu'observateur canadien.

¹ Not printed.

² Telegram 51 of March 6, 1941, informed him that Squadron Leader R. S. Logan had been appointed as the Canadian observer.

permanent facilities. The temporary facilities should be constructed as rapidly as possible so that they could be used this summer. They would consist merely of a landing field and of facilities for refuelling.

3. After this had been done, one problem which would have to be faced was defence against German long-range bombers. He thought that this problem would also have to be faced in Iceland.

4. He added that the United States intended that the facilities in Greenland should be constructed by the United States army engineers.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY
for the Minister

1202.

987-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

DESPATCH 372
SECRET

Ottawa, March 30, 1941

Sir,

With reference to recent correspondence regarding the possibility of establishing an aerodrome, aircraft wireless station in Greenland, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter dated March 29th, 1941, which has just been received from the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Ottawa.

2. You will observe that Mr. Hankinson states that the British Admiralty are most anxious to bring about the erection near Julianehaab of a radio station to combat submarine and raider activities in the Atlantic. This proposal is in line with the possibilities that are being examined by the expedition which has recently departed for Greenland, but it is the desire of the United Kingdom that we should urge upon the United States authorities the necessity of early action in relation to the establishment of a broadcasting station.

3. I shall be obliged if you will discuss this matter with the appropriate authorities in Washington and ascertain whether there is any step that could usefully be taken with a view to hastening the accomplishment of this particular aspect of the tentative programme for Greenland. An early reply would be deeply appreciated.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

1003/1

Ottawa, March 29, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

My dear Mr. Robertson,

I understand that the Admiralty are most anxious to obtain the erection, near Julianehaab in Southern Greenland, of a radio H/F D/F station to combat submarine and raider activities in the Atlantic. In view of the part which is being played by the Canadian Government in connection with various Service requirements in Greenland, there would be considerable advantage if the necessary arrangements for such a station could be made between the Canadian Government and the United States Government; and, further, if the Canadian Government could either secure permission themselves to set up and man a station or alternatively, could induce the United States Government to do this.

I have been instructed by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to bring this matter to the attention of the Canadian Government, and to express the hope that they may feel able to take up the project themselves, and that they will do their best to secure the consent of the United States Government to it. The matter is regarded by the United Kingdom Government as vitally important, and a speedy decision is essential. If the proposal is acceptable to both the Canadian and the United States Governments the question of which should establish the station will no doubt be settled by direct discussion between Ottawa and Washington. The Embassy at Washington have been informed that this proposal is being submitted to the Canadian Government, and will be glad to concert with the Canadian Legation any approach to the United States Government.

I believe that Canadian Naval Service Headquarters were advised recently by the Admiralty that this proposal was to be submitted to the Canadian Government, and no doubt it has already been considered by the Canadian Naval authorities in its relation to Canadian defence policy.

In this connection I might perhaps invite reference to your letter of the 26th February¹ regarding the proposed establishment of an aerodrome, aircraft wireless station and meteorological station in Greenland. I am informed that

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

the Air Ministry would be grateful if the Canadian authorities could impress upon the United States Government the great importance which is attached to the development of these facilities with all possible speed; in particular, the Air Ministry would like to be assured that both the Canadian and United States Governments have June, 1942, in mind as the date when fully equipped facilities would be available.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1203.

King Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

No. 14
SECRET

Ottawa, April 9, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to Mr. Hankinson's secret letter of April 2nd (1003/1),¹ and to previous correspondence concerning the establishment of a radio station at Julianehaab.

2. A member of the staff of the Canadian Legation at Washington has discussed this matter with Mr. Cumming of the Department of State. Mr. Cumming stated that the United States was as interested as Canada and the United Kingdom in establishing this station, and that the United States authorities had always assumed that the erection of a radio station to combat submarine and raider activities was included by inference in the original proposals concerning the establishment of an aerodrome, aircraft wireless station, and meteorological station in Greenland. The United States authorities had therefore proceeded to make their plans on that basis. Special consideration will now, however, be given to the desirability of the establishment of this station as quickly as possible and the matter will be referred to the War and Navy Departments.

3. Mr. Cumming said that, on instructions from the President, the establishment of these facilities was being considered as "highly urgent". The plans which are being made by the United States authorities contemplate the construction of these facilities at the earliest possible moment. Until reports are received from the Southern Greenland survey expedition, it is impossible to set a date for the completion of the project. However, if it is at all possible, the United States intends that facilities should be constructed this summer.

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

I understand that Mr. Berle is urging that the expedition first go ahead with the construction of a temporary landing field for short-range aircraft, and when that job is done, undertake the construction of more permanent facilities, and that he believes that the temporary facilities should be constructed as rapidly as possible, so that they could be used in the summer of 1941.

4. Mr. Cumming is leaving for Greenland by the Coast Guard cutter *Northland*, which sails from Boston on Monday, April 7. He will return by another Coast Guard cutter, and expects to be back in Washington in from four to six weeks. He will be visiting Godthaab, and probably Ivigtut. The main purpose of his visit is to bring Mr. Penfield, the United States Consul, up-to-date on United States policy concerning Greenland, and to have a series of discussions with the two Governors of Greenland. One advantage which the State Department sees in Mr. Cumming's visit to Greenland is that it will make it unnecessary for the Governors to visit the United States this year. Mr. Cumming indicated that one of the probable topics which he would discuss with the Governors was the arrangement which would have to be made with Greenland for the construction of the aerodrome, aircraft wireless station, and meteorological station. From what he has said on previous occasions, it is perhaps reasonable to conclude that he is bringing with him to Greenland a draft agreement between the United States and Greenland for the construction and use of these facilities.

5. Mr. Cumming reported that the Southern Greenland survey expedition was due at Julianehaab almost any time. It had been delayed by ice conditions.

6. The Legation has also reported that a four-engined German aeroplane had flown over Scoresby Sound on March 27. Two or three days later a two-engined German plane also flew over Scoresby Sound. Mr. Cumming believed that the first plane may have dropped meteorologists, and that the second plane was sent to find out how the meteorologists were getting along.

7. In previous communications on this subject it has been reported that the proposal that cyphers be dropped at Angmagssalik and Scoresby Sound was being put before Governor Svane by the United States Consul in Greenland. I have been advised that on April 3rd Governor Svane sent the necessary instructions to Angmagssalik and Scoresby Sound.

I have etc.

NORMAN ROBERTSON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

1204.

987-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
of Great Britain*

No. 26

Ottawa, May 30, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch of the 16th May, No. 23,¹ and to previous correspondence, concerning the Southern Greenland Survey Expedition.

2. I have been advised that, during a recent conversation between Mr. Hume Wrong of the Canadian Legation in Washington and Mr. Berle of the State Department, the latter alluded to the results of the Greenland survey. He said that he felt that there was not much chance of finding a site for an airdrome on the East coast or of establishing an emergency landing field on the icecap. Since the ice did not go out of the waters adjacent to the East coast until August, an effective survey could not be made at present. They had received no reports, however, which indicated that they were likely to discover a suitable site which could act as a way station between the site at Julianehaab and Iceland. The distance from the Julianehaab site to Iceland was too great to permit fighter planes to fly the route. He thought, however, that the Julianehaab site would prove to be very useful, and he said that he had cleared the passports and other documents to cover the despatch of a construction party with suitable equipment who were leaving for Julianehaab.

3. Mr. Berle said that attention had been directed to the Julianehaab site by a professor of meteorology, who had picked it as a possible place for a landing ground because it was there that Leif Ericson had established his first settlement in Greenland. The professor knew from the Icelandic sagas that the settlers had a considerable number of cattle, which indicated the presence of meadow land. Starting from this and consulting all the available surveys, he advised the expedition to proceed at once to Julianehaab, which they had done with fortunate results.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

1205.

987-40

*La légation aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Legation in United States to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

SECRET

Washington, June 4, 1941

Dear Mr. Robertson,

In my letter of May 27th¹ I said that the State Department had received no information leading them to believe that a satisfactory site for an airdrome would be discovered on the east coast of Greenland, where it could be used as a way station from Julianehaab to Iceland. Berle, however, has now told me that they have had a report which indicates that there might be a possible site at just about the right point. He was not sure of the name of the place, but said that it was on the east coast about halfway between Cape Farewell and the Straits of Denmark. He is afraid, however, they will not be able to get to the site for two months because of ice conditions.

Yours sincerely,

H. H. WRONG

1206.

987-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*

DESPATCH 1090

Ottawa, August 4, 1941

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to previous correspondence concerning the construction of aerodromes in Greenland by the United States Government.

The High Commissioner for the United Kingdom informs me that the Air Ministry of the United Kingdom are anxious to obtain certain information concerning the facilities to be provided in connection with the North Atlantic Air Route via Greenland and Iceland. I should be most grateful if you would try to secure this information from the State Department for transmission to the United Kingdom authorities through this Department.

The information which the United Kingdom Air Ministry would like to have is as follows:

- (1) The probable location of the aerodromes;
- (2) The length of the runways;
- (3) The estimated time for construction;
- (4) Details of the approaches to the aerodromes;

¹ Non reproduite.² Not printed.

(5) Confirmation that the aerodromes, wireless station and the meteorological station will all be manned and administered by United States personnel;

(6) What stocks of aviation fuel and lubricating oil will be laid down. (The Air Ministry of the United Kingdom assumes that 87 and 100 octane fuel will be provided and also 100 and 120 viscosity oil);

(7) Will night flying facilities be available at the aerodromes;

(8) Details of the meteorological facilities being provided. (Any information on local weather conditions which becomes available before the meteorological station is set up would be useful);

(9) Quantities and types of wireless equipment being installed, and the communication channels which the United States authorities propose to cover. (You will recall the proposals put forward by the United Kingdom High Commissioner, which were transmitted to you in my despatch No. 504 of April 23rd, 1941¹).

The Air Ministry of the United Kingdom realizes that information under all of these heads may not be available at once, but the Air Ministry would be glad to have the information as and when it becomes available, and they would be grateful if they could be regularly informed of the state of progress of the different projects.

One general question which you might raise informally with the State Department is the use of the facilities in Greenland by the Royal Air Force Ferrying Command, which is in charge of ferrying planes across the North Atlantic. The Royal Air Force Ferrying Command may desire to use the facilities for emergency landings. It is even possible that they might want to use them regularly for the ferrying of bombing and other aircraft.

You will recall that the agreement entered into by the United States for the defense of Greenland speaks of the use of the bases in Greenland by "American Nations".

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON
for the Secretary of State
for External Affairs

1207.

987-40

Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 2644

Washington, September 1, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 2514 of August 20, 1941,¹ in which I promised to send you the information which the Assistant Air

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

Attaché had obtained on the question of using bases in Greenland in connection with ferrying aircraft across the north Atlantic.

2. Discussions which Wing Commander Bryans has had with the War Department, and papers which he has been shown, make it abundantly clear that the War Department expect the Greenland bases to be used for ferrying aircraft. These discussions were concerned with the question of constructing an aerodrome at North West River, Labrador (see Legation telegram No. 325 of August 2, 1941¹ and previous correspondence) which would be used among other things as a stop for aircraft being ferried by the Greenland route and also as an alternative to Newfoundland Airport, for direct trans-Atlantic flight. Two references in particular may be quoted:

(1) On June 23, 1941, a memorandum was prepared for the Senior Army Member, Permanent Joint Board of Defence, by Brigadier General Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, on the subject "Aircraft Staging Field in Labrador and on Baffin Island". The memorandum begins as follows: "In order to facilitate ferrying of aircraft to Great Britain, the War Department is undertaking the immediate construction of a staging field near Julianehaab, Greenland." Later in the memorandum the following statement occurs: "To further facilitate ferrying of aircraft (particularly short range aircraft) to Great Britain, a survey party is en route to the east coast of Greenland with a view to locating a staging field in the Angmagssalik area. A companion site near Holsteinborg, West Greenland, has been located." The complete memorandum was sent by Mayor La Guardia to Colonel Biggar on July 16th.

(2) The Assistant Air Attaché on August 19th, sent to the Department of National Defence for Air a map showing north Atlantic air routes between America and Europe as prepared by the Air War Plans Division of the War Department. Accompanying this map is a report summarizing the information available about aerodrome sites in Iceland, Greenland, Labrador and Newfoundland. The use of Greenland bases for ferrying aircraft, when practicable, is clearly envisaged.

3. Since the War Department is so definitely committed to the use of Greenland bases for ferrying planes to the United Kingdom, if sufficient bases, (e.g. near Angmagssalik) can be found, we should be able to regard this question as settled. There is perhaps a remote possibility that the State Department might, in line with its announcement that Greenland bases would be available for "American nations" (and not for others?) raise objections to use by the Royal Air Force. However, it is difficult to believe that the State Department would try to upset all the plans that have been made by the War Department by objecting at this stage, on a technical question of whether aircraft were under the control of a Canadian or a United Kingdom service. I shall send you any further information on this point which we may be able to pick up.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG

¹ Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.

CHAPITRE VII/CHAPTER VII

ORGANISATIONS ET CONFÉRENCES
INTERNATIONALES

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
CONFERENCES

PARTIE 1/PART 1

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

1208.

65-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR B.340

London, September 19, 1939

United Kingdom Government, in consultation with French Government, have had under consideration the question of their representation at, and date of meetings of, League of Nations Council and Assembly, originally convened for September 8th and September 11th respectively.

In present circumstances, the considered views of United Kingdom Government are as follows:

1. They feel that while it is impracticable to consider meetings at the moment, meetings should be held as soon as possible, and at the latest by the end of the year. If no meetings were held League budget would presumably not be passed and in consequence League Organization, and in particular, International Labour Organization would collapse.

Meeting would also be necessary for election of Judges for Permanent Court in which many countries are interested. These two functions would, in the opinion of the United Kingdom Government, alone justify convocation of Council and Assembly. In addition there are elections to Council and

possible discussion of Report of Mr. Bruce's Committee on collaboration with non-member States.

2. The most serious difficulties would arise if political questions such as discussion of Chinese appeal, Czechoslovakia, etc., were brought before the League at this time, and in present circumstances any such discussions would be likely to prove more embarrassing and ineffective than on previous occasions.

3. Remaining question on Council Agenda, namely, Report of Permanent Mandates Commission, would also, in the opinion of the United Kingdom Government, be a highly embarrassing subject for discussion at Geneva in present circumstances. It is probable neither Jews nor Arabs would wish at the present time to create additional difficulties for His Majesty's Government, and in consequence there would probably be no effective opposition to suggestions of League Council, and consequently Assembly should suspend all consideration of the Report until suitable opportunity presents itself.

4. As regards question whether anything should or could be done at Geneva in connection with present conflict with Germany, United Kingdom Government doubt if speeches in Council or Assembly condemning Germany would be either useful or effective, and they might even be considered by the Swiss Government as prejudicial to Swiss neutrality. As was stated in my telegram Circular B.328 of September 3rd,¹ regarding Optional Clause, United Kingdom Government regard League's machinery for maintenance of peace as having collapsed, and, though they reserved their rights as Member of the League, they are under no illusion regarding any attempt to invoke Article 17 at this juncture.

In all the circumstances United Kingdom Government, for their part, incline to view that if any statement of Allied case against Germany is to be made at Geneva it should be in general terms, couched in moderate language, confined in the main to facts, and in any event only delivered should consultation between the Secretary-General and the Swiss Government show that such a course was not open to insuperable objections.

5. Having regard to the position as a whole, United Kingdom Government are inclined to suggest Agenda of both Council and Assembly should be confined to minimum indispensable items necessary to maintain in existence essential machinery of League, and as scope of League's discussions will to a great extent depend on what machinery still exists, they feel that final decision might well be postponed until position can be considered in the light of reports of Supervisory Commission which would be available almost at once. United Kingdom Government is anxious that the course of action suggested should not run counter to wishes of the Dominion Governments, and they would be grateful for observations in the matter at earliest possible opportunity, preferably by telegram.

¹ Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.

1209.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent,
Société des Nations*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate,
League of Nations*

TELEGRAM 36

Ottawa, September 21, 1939

Your telegram No. 39 September 12th.¹ Question of Geneva staff is receiving consideration and we hope to send you definite reply next week. It is possible that if your transfer from Geneva were arranged this would not be done until after next meeting of Assembly. What is latest information as to when adjourned meeting will be held?

1210.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 46

Geneva, September 22, 1939

Your telegram 21st September, No. 36. While no definite date has been fixed, Assembly will probably meet during first half of November. Session is likely to be concluded in less than a week with the adoption of the Budget chief business. Delegates are expected to be almost entirely diplomatic representatives in Berne, Geneva and Paris.

My opinion that there is no prospect of useful activity for permanent delegation during war-time is shared by other delegates and the senior officials of the Secretariat. At present we have nothing whatever to do. Can you suggest any useful employment?

1211.

65-39

*Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 56

Geneva, October 7, 1939

I have discussed with Secretary General prospects for the Assembly. Probable dates are November 27th or December 4th with duration of about

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

five days. Secretary General thinks that speeches of plenary session should be avoided and only two Committees appointed one for the budget and one for other matters. Delegation of two ought to be sufficient.

Proceedings are expected to follow the course indicated in my despatch No. 186, September 14th¹ except that Permanent Court of International Justice election will probably be postponed. This seems desirable especially since the election for the new Court might prevent the revision of Court Statutes for nine years. The Court expenses probably can be substantially decreased without a new election. Election of Council has lost almost all importance. If Central Committee proposed in Bruce Report is established all technical activities would be left to it.

I should be glad to return to Geneva for the Assembly as you suggest in your telegram No. 38.¹

General opinion here is that the League should mark time inconspicuously for the present, continuing such publications and technical activities as possible and retaining a nucleus of best officials.

1212.

65-39

*Le Secrétaire général, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Secretary General, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Geneva, October 24, 1939

Having consulted President, Assembly propose that twentieth ordinary session open on fourth December. Unless majority expresses disagreement convocation will be issued next week.

AVENOL

1213.

65-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent,
Société des Nations.*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate,
League of Nations*

TELEGRAM 42

Ottawa, October 27, 1939

Please inform Secretary General that Canadian Government concurs in proposal that Assembly meet December 4th.

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

1214.

65-39

*Le Secrétaire général, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Secretary General, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Geneva, November 11, 1939

Reference my telegram of October twenty fourth several members League have replied that they consider convocation Assembly present circumstances inopportune. Netherlands and Swedish Governments propose convocation fourth committee Nineteenth Assembly of which session has not been closed in order examine draft budget 1940, said draft after adoption by fourth committee being submitted by correspondence to Governments for confirmation. Grateful be informed urgently if you accept this suggestion. If it is accepted by majority meeting fourth committee might be held on date previously suggested for Assembly, namely December fourth.

AVENOL

1215.

65-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 665

London, November 17, 1939

Following from Wrong. Begins. On the assumption that proposal in Secretary General's telegram of November 11th is accepted, please telegraph whether you wish me to attend the meeting of the Fourth Committee. I am inclined to think that this might be desirable. The Secretary General has enquired whether I shall be present as Rapporteur of Allocation Committee. Ends.

1216.

65-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 553

Ottawa, November 19, 1939

Your telegram No. 665. Following for Wrong. Begins. Geneva is being informed today that we concur in suggestion. In event of it being adopted we should like you to attend meeting of Fourth Committee and are so advising Geneva. Ends.

1217.

65-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent, suppléant, Société des Nations¹

Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Permanent Delegate, League of Nations¹

TELEGRAM 48

Ottawa, November 19, 1939

Your telegram No. 68 of November 12th.² Please advise Secretary General in reply to his telegram of November 11th that while considering there are other than budgetary questions which it would be desirable to deal with through a full Assembly the Canadian Government are prepared to concur in the proposal to convoke the Fourth Committee of the Nineteenth Assembly to examine the draft budget of 1940, to be confirmed by correspondence if no other procedure is found feasible.

For your information, if Committee of last Assembly meets delegates will have to be drawn from last year's list. We shall, therefore, ask Wrong to proceed to Geneva in event Committee meets and would ask you to cooperate in the Committee's work.

1218.

499-34

Le délégué permanent suppléant, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Acting Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 76

Geneva, November 22, 1939

His Majesty's Government in Great Britain has notified Secretary General of indefinite suspension of Naval Armament Limitations Treaty signed at London, March 25th, 1936 and has informed him France, Italy and United States of America have notified His Majesty's Government in Great Britain of their suspension of this Treaty. This action is taken under Article XXIV of instrument because of state of war with Germany. Notification is made only "on behalf of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain" and no mention is made of Canada. As Canada is also a signatory I think that notification should be made by His Majesty's Government in Great Britain on behalf of Canadian Government. Australia and New Zealand in similar position.

Suspension of Naval Agreement with U.S.S.R. London July 17th, 1937 and with Poland April 27th, 1938 is also being notified.

¹ Alfred Rive.

² Non reproduit.

^{*} Not printed.

1219.

499-34

Mémorandum du conseiller juridique
Memorandum by Legal Adviser

[Ottawa,] November 28, 1939

NOTE — SUSPENSION OF LONDON NAVAL TREATY AND OF ANGLO-SOVIET
AND ANGLO-POLISH NAVAL AGREEMENTS

1. The Canadian Government has caused notification to be given to the French, United States and Italian Governments of the suspension of the London Naval Agreement.

2. The Canadian Government has received notification of suspension from the French and United States Governments, but has received no separate notification from the Italian Government. The text of the Italian notification to the United Kingdom is not at hand, so that it is not practicable to state with certainty whether it was designed to cover Canada as well.

3. The United Kingdom Government has notified the Secretary General of the League:

(1) of suspension of London Naval Treaty;

(2) of receipt of notification from France, Italy and the United States. The notification of the Secretary General apparently did not refer to the notification by the United Kingdom of the other interested Governments.

4. The question arises as to what action should be taken by Canada. It is submitted that the following action is indicated:

(1) The Permanent Delegate should be instructed to notify the Secretary General of the indefinite suspension of the Naval Armament Limitations Treaty, signed at London, March 25, 1936.

(2) He should also inform the Secretary General that appropriate notifications had been sent and received to and from the other Governments interested.

(3) The Governments should not be specified, owing to the failure to date of the Italian Government to send appropriate notification to Canada and owing to the Canadian omission to send notification to the Government of India.

5. No action should be taken with regard to the Anglo-Soviet or Anglo-Polish Agreement. Canada is not a party to these Agreements and, consequently, no action would be necessary.¹

¹Note telle que dans l'original:

¹Note as in original:

1220.

499-34

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent,
Société des Nations*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate,
League of Nations*

TELEGRAM 53

Ottawa, November 28, 1939

Your telegram No. 76, November 22, 1939, concerning London Naval Treaty. You should make a formal notification to the Secretary General on behalf of the Government of Canada of the indefinite suspension of the Naval Armament Limitations Treaty signed at London, March 25, 1936. You should, at the same time, inform him that appropriate notifications have been sent and received to and from the other Governments interested.

The notification should not be made in the name of the Government of the United Kingdom, and no action should be taken with regard to the Anglo-Soviet or Anglo-Polish Agreement.

1221.

65-D-39

*Le Secrétaire général, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Secretary General, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Geneva, December 3, 1939

I have received the following letter of December 3rd, 1939, from the Permanent Delegate of Finland accredited to the League of Nations:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with which Finland, since the signature of the Treaty of Peace at Tartu in 1920, has maintained neighbourly relations and signed a Pact of Non-Aggression which should have expired only in 1945, unexpectedly attacked on the morning of November 30th, 1939, not only frontier positions but also open Finnish towns spreading death and destruction among the civilian population, more particularly by attacks from the air. Finland has never engaged in any undertaking directed against her powerful neighbor. She has continually made every effort to live at peace with her. Nevertheless alleging so called frontier incidents and adducing Finland's alleged refusal to acquiesce in the strengthening of the security of Leningrad, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics first denounced the above mentioned Pact of Non-Aggression and then refused the Finnish Government's proposal to have recourse to the mediation of a neutral Power. In consequence, acting on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring the foregoing facts to your knowledge and to request you in virtue of Articles 11 and 15 of the Covenant forthwith to summon a meeting of the Council and the Assembly and to ask them to take the necessary measures to put an end to the aggression. I will forward to you in due course a complete statement of the reasons and circumstances which have led my Government to request the intervention of the League of Nations in a dispute which has brought two of its members into conflict with one another. Signed Rudolf Holsti.

In accordance with Article 11, paragraph one, of Covenant, I request members of Council to meet at Geneva on Saturday, December 9th, at noon. I am submitting to President of Assembly proposal convoke Assembly on Monday, December 11th. Shall confirm date.

AVENOL

1222.

65-39

*Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 80

Geneva, December 4, 1939

With reference to Secretary General's telegram of December 3rd, Secretary General considers convocation of Council and Assembly in accordance with Finnish request mandatory under the Covenant. I shall remain in Geneva on the assumption that you wish me to represent Canada at Assembly. I shall cable later concerning probable course of events at Council and Assembly.

With regard to Fourth Committee, I am assuming that instructions on Budgetary questions given in note on the Agenda for the Twentieth Assembly still apply apart from modifications necessitated by the course of events. Revised Budget and Supervisory Commission's proposal in their Third Report seem acceptable; if you agree no additional instructions on these points are required. Attempt may be made to secure adoption of Bruce Report on technical activities, and I would support failing instructions to the contrary.

WRONG

1223.

65-39

*Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 81

Geneva, December 5, 1939

My telegram December 4, No. 80. The Secretary General is today despatching Notice of Convocation of Assembly for December 11th. This will not be further session of the Nineteenth Assembly, but it is not clear whether it will be regarded as Special or Twentieth Ordinary Assembly, probably latter. It will, therefore, be necessary to inform the Secretary General of the composition of the Canadian Delegation, and to issue credentials.

I shall cable later information concerning the nature of the Finnish appeal and other matters which may arise.

1224. King Papers, PAC

*Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 82

Geneva, December 6, 1939

Concerning Finnish appeal, Soviet Government informed the Secretary General yesterday that they considered convocation of Council and Assembly unjustified on grounds that they were in friendly relations with Democratic Republic of Finland which had asked for assistance to liquidate "very dangerous seat of war" created by former Finnish rulers; if Council and Assembly meet Soviet Government will not take part.

Finnish Government has informed Secretary General that they are laying mines in territorial waters of Aland Islands, fortifying islands in accordance with Articles VI and VII of 1921 Convention.

Argentine Government has telegraphed the Secretary General protesting against Soviet aggression which "justifies immediate expulsion of Soviet Union from the League of Nations." Uruguayan Government has telegraphed that they will withdraw from the League if the Soviet Union remains member. Venezuela sending representative to Assembly although they have not been represented at any meeting since notice of withdrawal in 1938.

Course of action concerning Finnish appeal remains uncertain. Under Article 16, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, expulsion of the Soviet Union is question for Council alone and it is doubtful whether unanimity could be secured. (China and Latvia are members but their term expires when new elections take place, probably early next week). Finland will probably request transfer of dispute to Assembly under Article 15, paragraph 9 and paragraph 10. Possibly results will be Assembly Resolution along lines of that of October 6th, 1937, expressing support for China.

1225.

75-25

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent,
Société des Nations*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate,
League of Nations*

TELEGRAM 54

Ottawa, December 6, 1939

It is desired that you should address to the Secretary General of the League of Nations a letter in the following terms:

1. The Canadian Government has found it necessary to consider the position, resulting from the existence of a state of war with Germany, of

the Canadian acceptance of the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The acceptance of this Clause was for ten years from the date of ratification, which took place on the 28th July, 1930.

2. The general acceptance of the Optional Clause providing for compulsory adjudication of certain issues was part of system of collective action for the preservation of peace established under the Covenant of the League. It is clear that the conditions assumed when the Optional Clause was accepted do not now exist and that it would not be possible that the only part of the procedure to remain in force should be provisions restricting the operations of countries resisting aggression.

3. I am, therefore, directed to notify you that the Canadian Government will not regard their acceptance of the Optional Clause as covering disputes arising out of events occurring during the present war.

4. It is requested that this notification may be communicated to the governments of all the States that have accepted the Optional Clause and to the Registrar of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

1226.

King Papers, PAC

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent,
Société des Nations*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate,
League of Nations*

TELEGRAM 55

Ottawa, December 6, 1939

It is desired that you should address to the Secretary General of the League of Nations a letter in the following terms:

1. The Canadian Government has found it necessary to consider the position, resulting from the existence of a state of war with the German Reich, of the Canadian acceptance of the General Act. The acceptance of the General Act was for a five-year period ending on the 16th August of this year. In view of the fact that no action was taken by the Canadian Government, it is understood that the obligations would extend for another five-year period dating from that date.

2. In view of the circumstances referred to in letter of this date dealing with Canadian adherence to the Optional Clause and of the fact that considerations therein set forth apply with equal force in the case of the General Act, I am, therefore, directed to notify you that the Canadian Government will not regard their acceptance of the General Act as covering disputes arising out of the events occurring during the present war.

3. It is requested that this notification may be communicated to the Governments of all the States that have accepted the General Act.

1227.

65-39

*Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 83

Geneva, December 8, 1939

IMMEDIATE. My telegram No. 82, December 6th. Most probable course of events seem[s] to be reference of Finnish Appeal to Assembly by Council and appointment of large Special Committee of Assembly to make recommendations. Argentine delegation with considerable support will demand expulsion of U.S.S.R. from the League of Nations. Special Committee may at least propose Resolution similar to Resolution on China and might support expulsion.

French are said to favour expulsion. No information is available yet on British or Scandinavian position. Swiss Government are nervous; Secretary General has assured them Polish situation cannot be discussed at Assembly since it is not on Agenda.

De Valera may attend and would probably be elected President.

Anything done here cannot help or harm Finland much. Belligerents and European neutrals will judge Finnish Appeal solely by effect on course of war. Germany might welcome expulsion as encouraging U.S.S.R. to join forces with her. On the other hand strong League condemnation of U.S.S.R. might increase great distrust in Germany of Soviet alliance. If Canada is offered membership on Special Committee should we accept? It seems desirable that as many belligerents as possible should be represented.

1228.

65-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent,
Société des Nations*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate,
League of Nations*

TELEGRAM 57

Ottawa, December 8, 1939

Your telegram No. 83 of December 8th.

1. Appreciate review of situation. It appears probable that so far as political issues are concerned, the Assembly will be confined to considerations of Russo-Finnish dispute. I would not seek membership on special committee

but no objection to accepting if it is proposed. A resolution on former lines regarding China would warrant support. Apparently British and French opinion is strengthening in favour of expulsion of Russia but we should like to reserve judgment on that point until the views of those countries are more definitely indicated. Presumably there will be no substantial support for any proposal for application of Article Sixteen.

2. If, as seems advisable, elections to Council and Permanent Court and consideration of Special Committee for Cooperation, Economic and Social Affairs are included in the agenda, previous instructions hold good.

3. I have telegraphed Secretary General that you and Rive will act as delegates. If occasion arises we may ask Canadian Minister in Paris to act as Third Delegate.

1229.

65-39

*Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 84

Geneva, December 10, 1939

Your telegram No. 57, of December 8th.

1. The Assembly is unlikely to consider political issues other than the Finnish appeal but the French and British Delegates in speaking on this will probably put Russian aggression into perspective in relation to the war with Germany. The Resolution asking the Council to expel The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be proposed and adoption expected with French and British support. There will be some abstentions and possibly a few negative votes but unanimity not necessary under Article 15, paragraph 10. Other action on the Finnish appeal likely to be along the lines previously indicated.

2. The Session expected to end Thursday or Friday. There seems no need for Third Canadian Delegate. Postponement of Permanent Court of International Justice elections probable. The Central Committee proposed in the Bruce Report likely to be established with Canada among the members. The Fourth Committee has approved the revised budget without amendment.

3. The Proceedings at the Council yesterday formal, the Finnish Delegate merely requesting reference of the dispute to the Assembly. Russia was not represented.

1230.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 85

Geneva, December 11, 1939

Delegations from forty-three countries are present at the Assembly. Hambro elected President and Permanent Delegate of Canada one of eight Vice Presidents. Entire Agenda postponed excepting Finnish Appeal, Council Elections, Budget and Bruce Report.

Special Committee on which I have consented to serve, appointed to consider the Finnish Appeal. At its first meeting urgent appeal was despatched to the U.S.S.R. to cease hostilities and accept mediation of the Assembly with a request for reply by Tuesday night.

1231.

65-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au délégué permanent,
Société des Nations*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Delegate,
League of Nations*

TELEGRAM 58

Ottawa, December 11, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 84 of December 10th. You indicate a resolution asking Council to expel Soviet Russia will be proposed and its adoption is expected with French and British support. There seems to be some increasing doubt on this point so far as attitude of neutral countries is concerned. The neutrals near the centre of disturbance would require greater consideration than the few distant Latin American states. Attitude of belligerents will presumably be determined in last analysis by forecast of the effect of such action on outcome of conflict with Germany. If the United Kingdom supports the resolution for expulsion you should also support it.

1232.

65-39

*Le délégué permanent, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Delegate, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 87

Geneva, December 13, 1939

Your telegram of December 11th, No. 58. Chance favours Soviet expulsion by Council although still uncertain whether unanimity can be secured. France and the United Kingdom would support it. In the Assembly vote will be taken

on either direct recommendation to Council to expel or suggestion that Council consider expulsion. Latin Americans are pressing for former but Finns might prefer the latter as causing fewer abstentions.

Resolution condemning Soviet aggression and urging help to Finland will be strongly worded. Application of Article 16, except paragraph 4, unlikely. If it were applied, purely optional form now in force against Japan would be used. See my despatch No. 439 of October 7th, 1938.¹

1233.

Skelton Papers, PAC

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] December 14, 1939

You will note from Mr. Wrong's telegram of today¹ that the resolution which you have seen in the morning press has been adopted by the Assembly, with certain abstentions which do not affect its validity. Unanimous action would be required by the Council, which in November consisted of the following members:

<i>Permanent Members</i>	<i>Since</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1920
France	1920
Italy	1920
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	1934

Italy's resignation became effective on December 11th. She is no longer a member of the League or of the Council.

<i>Non-Permanent Members</i>	<i>Date of Election</i>
Bolivia	1936
New Zealand	1936
Sweden	1936
China (provisional seat)	1936
Latvia (provisional seat)	1936
Belgium	1937
Iran	1937
Peru	1937
Yugoslavia	1938
Dominican Republic	1938
Greece	1938

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

The elections to the Council were divided into two stages. South Africa and Finland were elected in place of New Zealand and Sweden respectively, but the question as to whether China should be re-elected was put off for another day. This was done in order to relieve China of the embarrassment that would be caused if as a member of the Council, it had to face a decision between—

(1) voting to expel from the League the only country which has given it any substantial assistance in its resistance to Japan, and

(2) appearing, by voting against expulsion, to condone the attack on another capitalist victim of aggression. The question of a Latin American state was also deferred. Possibly if Argentina remains a member of the League, she may be elected to the Council in place of Bolivia. Latvia is still a member of the Council, and under Russian pressure it is conceivable it may block the resolution of expulsion. Even if that were done and Latvia were the only member of the Council opposing expulsion, Russia would probably resign in any case.

The League resolution invites countries to give humanitarian and material assistance to Finland, and asks the Secretary General to organize and coordinate this assistance. It is doubtful whether any adequate military assistance could be given to Finland in time to prevent her being over-run. It is conceivable the result of the action will be to revive in some measure the ghost of sanctions for future use when France wants it without giving any effective aid to the victim in the present case.

1234.

65-39

*Le délégué permanent suppléant, Société des Nations¹ au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting Permanent Delegate, League of Nations,¹ to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 89

Geneva, December 15, 1939

Assembly not closed but adjourned after delegating authority to Bureau to decide questions submitted by Secretary General or Supervisory Commission. Secretary General authorized to convene Bureau at any time, consisting of President of Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Belgium, United Kingdom, Canada, Egypt, France, Greece, Portugal and Switzerland.

¹ Alfred Rive.

1235.

65-N-39

*Le Secrétaire général, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Secretary General, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Geneva, July 25, 1940.

Since impossible hold meeting of Council and Assembly, I have honour make following communication individually to States members League Nations.

In 1932 Council League Nations, and in its turn Assembly, unanimously elected me Secretary General. Unanimity of those who appointed me imposed on me duties which I have never despaired of fulfilling. Until September 1936 I believed that certain inevitable reforms would enable League Nations, in order that its task might be successful, regroup forces which were moving away from it. Since that time amendment of Covenant has formed part of Agenda of League Nations, but situation has constantly deteriorated. Nevertheless there still seemed to be some hope in attempting, with view to future, to establish on as wide basis of collaboration as possible, great economic, social and humanitarian work started and developed by League which was not necessarily bound up with organisation contemplated in Covenant of 1919.

On my proposal draft scheme for creation of General Committee for Economic and Social Questions was adopted. Its constitution at once simple and elastic was intended enable this body whilst leaving it large measure of initiative re-establish collaboration between States members and non-member States on questions of concern to all alike, and place this collaboration outside discussions of Covenant of 1919. Important States, although not League members, had already shown their interest. But when Assembly ratified scheme in entirety war had broken out. Since then has been my painful duty reduce step by step expenses of League Nations to constantly declining level suitable to its financial resources. When Assembly laid down rules to be followed to this end I was given special powers to carry them out. It has been my constant care keep finances of League in such condition that risk complete interruption should never deprive States members of their freedom of decision.

As it has been impossible for a majority of its members to meet, I have not had benefit support of Supervisory Commission which would have been the more valuable to me as difficulties increased. Commission will be summoned meet August.

I have felt deeply departure many loyal fellow workers. I have made it a rule maintain, notably in technical sections, an experienced staff which can

keep alive tradition of competence and devotion of Secretariat. Since Assembly, Council and Committees cannot meet at present time, constitutional powers of Secretary General are in fact in suspense. Duties which remain principally administration of small body of officials, and management of finances of League Nations no longer justify maintenance of political high direction which is no longer consistent with realities of situation. Work of technical sections could well be continued for present in form of organisation which would be better adapted to needs of hour whilst effecting substantial economies.

Therefore, while expressing my deep gratitude to all members League Nations who have been good enough give me support of their goodwill and confidence, I ask them relieve me of task with which they have entrusted me. I propose notify date on which my resignation would take effect after coming meeting of Supervisory Commission. I am anxiously considering appropriate measures to ensure that administration and work of Secretariat shall continue. I shall make proposals on this subject in due course.

AVENOL

1236.

65-N-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1215

Ottawa, August 6, 1940

Following for Wrong, Begins. I understand League Treasurer is now in London. Please advise which members of the League have made or are expected to make contributions for current year and what proportion of nominal assessment is usually being paid, also what course is being followed by the United Kingdom. Ends.

1237.

65-N-39

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR B.134

London, August 8, 1940

SECRET. Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister. Begins. Following is summary of information available here as to recent developments in connection with League of Nations Secretariat.

On June 14th the Institute for Advanced Studies of Princeton University offered to provide accommodation at Princeton for technical services of League of Nations. On June 21st, Secretary General stated that if this invitation had been transmitted through an official United States channel he would have submitted it to States members of the League and accepted it probably even before the Governments had replied, but as offer lacked support of the United States Government he felt himself unable to agree to it. M. Avenol proposed alternatively that technical services of the League of Nations might be incorporated in International Labour Office and that both should eventually go to America. On June 25th, we sent a case [*sic*] to M. Avenol expressing surprise that invitation should have been refused without consultation, and asking that if definite refusal had been sent it should be rescinded until there had been time for general discussion. We noted the suggestion that technical services of the League should be incorporated in International Labour Office, but considered that Princeton proposal should be preferred. On June 27th, in view of this case, [*sic*] M. Avenol promised to inform the United States Government that we were officially sponsoring question of invitation from Princeton. He considered, however, that the United States Government would be unlikely to agree and that his second proposal was more likely to be acceptable. No invitation from the State Department offering to give hospitality to International Labour Office was however received.

2. On July 11th, Princeton University sent to M. Avenol a revised invitation suggesting that technical sections need not be separated from the main body of the League, that their legal seat would remain in Geneva and that after the war personnel would return there. It was only necessary that a proportion of the personnel should proceed "on a mission" for the duration of the war to Princeton where they could conduct their work in a more favourable environment than Geneva. The State Department were understood to be sympathetic towards this revised proposal but they were unable to give it their official approval. As soon as we heard of this step, and after making certain enquiries in Washington, we conveyed to M. Avenol our support of this invitation. On July 25th, M. Avenol approved despatch of the Financial Intelligence Section, consisting of Mr. Lovekoo [Loveday?]¹ and of nine others with their families, on a mission to the United States. On the same day, he announced his resignation as Secretary General, with probable effect on August 31st, and circulated to all States members a telegram explaining his reasons for this step and his intention of submitting proposals for carrying on the work of the League. My immediately following telegram contains our provisional views as to substance of reply to be sent to M. Avenol. Ends.

¹ A. Loveday, Directeur du Département économique, financier et du transit, secrétariat de la Société des Nations.

¹ A. Loveday, Director, Economic, Financial and Transit Department, League of Nations Secretariat.

1238.

65-N-39

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR B.135

London, August 8, 1940

SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. My telegram Circular B.134. Following are draft proposals regarding organization of the League Secretariat which are under consideration here as basis for a reply to the Secretary General.

1. M. Avenol's resignation must, with reluctance, be accepted. In view of difficulties of making any fresh appointment, the Deputy Secretary General, Mr. Lester, will automatically become officer administering Secretariat as Acting Secretary General.

2. Uncertain situation and difficulty of any League work being performed at Geneva make it desirable that fullest advantage should be taken of Princeton invitation. Officials of Health, Opium and Social sections should be sent to Princeton as soon as possible. The Secretariat, Permanent Central Opium Board and Supervisory Body should also be transferred to the United States of America, if necessary, after the United States Government has been consulted informally.

3. There would be left in Geneva a small personnel (e.g. Mandate Section and administrative staff, the Treasury and Library).

4. The staff of the International Labour Office is moving to Canada.

5. The arrangements for the Permanent Court of International Justice, President and Registrar, which are now in Geneva, are for the President of the Court to make, though financial position of the Court may require consideration as part of general financial question.

6. The budget for 1941 is another question affecting transfer of League activities to the United States of America and to Canada; further economies and reductions of staff, require expert discussion. It is unfortunately not at present possible to hold a duly constituted meeting of the Supervisory Commission, either in Switzerland or elsewhere. It is therefore suggested that proposals on basis of scheme outlined in paragraphs two to five above should be worked out at an *ad hoc* meeting at Geneva to be called by M. Avenol, which may include members of Supervisory Commission and His Majesty's Minister at Berne. Co-option of the latter as a member of the Commission would however be irregular, and meeting could not be regarded as a meeting of Supervisory Commission, and it would have none of the powers of the Commission. It should, however, be possible to secure approval of M. Hambro¹ and Sir C. Kisch,² as well as of Director of Inter-

¹Président de la Commission de surveillance de la Société des Nations.

²Membre de la Commission de contrôle des finances de la Société des Nations.

¹Chairman, Supervisory Commission of League of Nations.

²Member, Supervisory Financial Commission, League of Nations.

national Labour Office, for main recommendations which might then be regarded as decisions of Supervisory Commission. The Norwegian Minister at Berne might act as channel of communication for M. Hambro.

7. The control of League finances must be assured with as little disturbance of existing arrangements as possible. The liquid funds of the League are already outside Switzerland, but in view of uncertain outlook it is desirable that further safeguards should be devised. The existing powers of signatures possessed by the Treasurer and Mr. Bieler¹ will continue, and resignation of the Secretary General cannot be held to affect validity of these signatures. The signature of officer administering Secretariat should, if possible, be added to them. It may also be possible to devise additional safeguards.

8. As soon as opportunity offers, the officials of the League Treasury might move overseas. This move would be justified in view of fact that for the duration of the war the main work of the League would be done on the American continent. Ends.

1239.

65-N-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1324

London, August 9, 1940

Following from Wrong. Begins. Your telegram No. 1215 of August 6th.

1. League Treasurer has not been in London and is not expected. Little information is available here concerning contributions paid or expected. United Kingdom Government paid in full soon after beginning of the fiscal year in accordance with undertaking given last year. Australia has made no payment but High Commissioner states that they will pay full amount when satisfactory arrangements for administration of Secretariat are made.

2. Jacklin² recently told British Minister to Switzerland that he could tide over this year and next provided that (a) there was real retrenchment, especially in International Labour Office and, (b) he could count on collecting same contributions next year as this year, say 40% of total. This figure indicates he relies on taking over full contributions from British Commonwealth members. There is no prospect of any payment by States occupied by Germany, or by China and Spain; these with U.S.S.R. were assessed at 35% of total of current budget. It is dubious whether France, assessed ten

¹ Membre de la section du trésor de la Société des Nations.

² Trésorier de la Société des Nations.

¹ Member, Treasury of League of Nations.

² Treasurer of League of Nations.

per cent, will make any payment. Larger defaults than usual are to be expected among the Balkan, Latin American and some other members assessed altogether about 20%.

3. United Kingdom Government are informing you of their proposals to meet situation caused by impossibility of convening any League body. I think that their suggestions are sound and should be adopted. We might either withhold payment of contribution until we see how the situation develops or pay now perhaps one fourth and withhold remainder. Ends.

1240.

65-N-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1261

Ottawa, August 14, 1940

Your telegram No 1324 of August 9th. Please inform United Kingdom Government that the Canadian Government is of the opinion that the forthcoming meeting of the Supervisory Commission in Geneva should limit its Agenda to (1) the acceptance of Mr. Avenol's resignation; and (2) the setting of a date for the next meeting.

You might explain confidentially that it is felt that no satisfactory results could ensue from the discussion of the budget at an improvised meeting at Geneva and that it would be preferable to leave this to a later and more representative meeting which might be held at Lisbon after Lester has taken over. Understand from Winant¹ Avenol agrees to this procedure. In our view first consideration in framing a budget must be given to the requirements of the technical services and the International Labour Office which are carrying on outside Geneva.

1241.

65-N-39

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 1367

London, August 16, 1940

Following from Wrong. Begins. Your telegram No. 1261, August 14th. Meeting at Geneva to be held August 20th will be informal and will make recommendations only. Budget is unlikely to be discussed. Those attending will probably be British Minister, Argentine Permanent Delegate and President of the League of Nations Council who is the Bolivian Delegate. Foreign

¹ Directeur du Bureau international du travail.

² Director, International Labour Office.

Office suggest it would be helpful if you cable Secretary General on lines of final sentence of your telegram or instruct me to do so. If you agree, reference might be made to desirability of other technical service[s] going to Princeton in addition to economic and financial sections. Ends.

1242.

65-N-39

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain

TELEGRAM 1288

Ottawa, August 17, 1940

Your telegram No. 1367, August 16. Following for Mr. Wrong. Begins. In your capacity as Permanent Delegate you should inform Secretary General of Canadian Government's view expressed in last sentence of my telegram No. 1261 and add that we consider it most important that the other technical services should be transferred to Princeton. Our views as to agenda of Geneva meeting may be transmitted if thought desirable. Ends.

1243.

65-N-39

Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 1393

London, August 20, 1940

Following from Wrong. Begins. Your telegram No. 1288 of August 17th.

1. My immediately following telegram, *en clair*, is text of telegram addressed to the Secretary General. It seemed necessary to send this as reply to his circular telegram of July 25th.

2. Avenol's resignation will probably take effect from August 31st. Informal meeting mentioned in my telegram No. 1367, may not take place and Avenol may instead present report to Costa Du Rels as President of the Council. I understand he wishes to remain in Switzerland and retain some connection with the League, but opposition to this is likely.

3. Regarding contributions, Foreign Minister of Sweden has stated in *Riksdag* Sweden will pay nothing this year. Swiss budget for 1941 makes no provision for next year's contribution. Defection of these faithful contributors means the League income will be almost wholly derived from the British Commonwealth and a few small States, although International Labour Office can count on payments by the United States and some others not belonging to the League. Arrangements are likely for payment of contributions in dollars in New York. Ends.

1244.

65-N-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1394

London, August 20, 1940

Following is text mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram. Begins. In reply your telegram July 25th to member states. Canadian Government recognize with regret, conditions leading to your resignation. Regarding immediate future of League organizations Canadian Government are of opinion that first consideration in framing 1941 budget must be requirements of technical services, and International Labour Office, which are carrying on outside Geneva. They consider it most important that other technical services should be temporarily transferred to Princeton, in addition to Economic and Financial sections. They assume budget will be considered later this year by some meeting more representative than any now possible in Geneva. Ends.

WRONG

1245.

65-N-39

*Le Secrétaire général par intérim, Société des Nations, au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting Secretary General, League of Nations, to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

Geneva, September 6, 1940

On taking over responsibilities devolving upon me I do so with earnest hope that your government will give support necessary to maintain unimpaired such League activities as circumstances now permit.

LESTER

1246.

65-N-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Secrétaire général par
intérim, Société des Nations*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Secretary General,
League of Nations*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, September 11, 1940

I am in receipt of your telegram of September sixth. Canadian Government wish you well in your new duties, and may be counted upon to continue their support of such League activities as it may be found advisable to carry on under existing circumstances.

PARTIE 2/PART 2

ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DU TRAVAIL
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

1247.

806-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1123

London, July 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Director of International Labour Office urgently enquires whether Canadian Government will invite International Labour Office to come to Canada for the duration of the war. United Kingdom Government strongly support this request. Director states that continuance of office in Geneva has become impossible and that movement abroad of staff is necessary. Geneva is now too isolated for any effective work to be done there. He also fears pressure on Swiss Government from Germany for surrender of certain officials on German Black List.

2. Number involved in move would be not more than fifty, all certified by the Director to be absolutely trustworthy. League funds are available in New York for payment of expenses and there would be no charge whatever on the Canadian Government. Director would like to establish office in some eastern Canadian city with good library facilities. He possesses authority from Governing Body to move office on his own initiative.

3. United States Government were first approached but Secretary of State apparently takes the view that extension of official invitation at the present moment would start a hare for isolationists which might prejudice handling of vital issues. There is therefore no chance of early invitation from the United States, and Canada is by far the most suitable safe destination.

4. To permit officials to secure transit unrestricted visas in Geneva, it would be necessary to authorize British Consul to give Canadian visas to those on Director's list. Winant emphasizes that departure as soon as possible may be matter of life or death for some of his staff. He is flying to New York, leaving Lisbon July 16th and may go to Ottawa immediately on landing. He hopes to receive your reply on arrival. His Washington address is International Labour Office, Jackson Place.

5. After discussing situation with Winant and Foreign Office, I strongly support extension of official invitation to come to Canada. Wrong, as Canadian representative on Governing Body, shares this view.

Please inform me of decision.

MASSEY

1248.

806-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 982

Ottawa, July 19, 1940

Your telegram No. 1123 of July 15th. International Labour Office. Canadian Government are prepared to give suggestion sympathetic consideration and have advised Mr. Winant's Office that we will be glad to see him in Ottawa. I understand arrival of Lisbon plane was delayed.

1249.

806-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] July 25, 1940

TRANSFER OF I.L.O. TO CANADA

A discussion between Mr. Winant and Mr. Robertson, Mr. Rive and myself took place today.

Mr. Winant was informed that the Canadian Government were agreeable in principle to the proposal to transfer the headquarters of the I.L.O. temporarily to Canada. It was to be understood they took no financial responsibility in this connection beyond whatever share of the League expenses they might continue to make.

As regards finances, Mr. Winant stated that Jacklin had got two people out with authority to sign for funds. The League's reserves and current funds were largely in the form of gold in London and dollar balances in the United States. The United States contribution to the I.L.O. had been paid; it was understood it was \$400,000, to the credit of the I.L.O. in the United States. As to future needs of the I.L.O., salaries had been reduced, and quarters would be necessary on a modest scale, and a good deal of printing required. Possibly one-third of the past budget of the I.L.O. would cover current needs.

As to transit, it was thought the probable route would be by way of Lisbon. The United States Consulate in Geneva might give visas individually or *en bloc*, and the Canadian Immigration Officer at Lisbon could facilitate matters further. Mr. Winant pointed out it was absolutely essential to maintain secrecy in regard to the proposed movement in order to prevent any attempt from German sources to block the movement of various anti-Nazi members of the I.L.O. to Canada. Mr. Winant gave a list of the present staff. As regards the British list, it was understood that half at least of these people would remain at the I.L.O. Office in London, and as regards the French, only a very limited number would be admitted at first; others might be considered in the light of developments. Nearly all were single.

1250.

806-40

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

TELEGRAM 146

Ottawa, July 26, 1940

IMMEDIATE. CONFIDENTIAL. Please communicate letter in following terms to John G. Winant, Director, International Labour Office, who will call at the Legation this morning. Begins.

Confidential. I am authorized to state that the Government of Canada will have pleasure in agreeing to your proposal that the International Labour Office be transferred temporarily to Canada. It is understood that this involves no special financial obligation on the Dominion. The Canadian Government will be prepared to admit to Canada on Visitor's Visa those members of the staff of the International Labour Office together with their immediate families agreed upon in your discussion with the Government in Ottawa yesterday. The necessary Visitors' Visas will be provided at London or Lisbon.

Ends.

You may inform Mr. Winant we understand this question is to be kept entirely confidential for the present but that he is free to communicate your letter to the United States authorities.

1251.

806-A-40

Mémoire du conseiller juridique au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim
aux Affaires extérieures

Memorandum from Legal Adviser to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] April 8, 1941

SPECIAL POSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE

1. In approaching this question, consideration needs to be given to two provisions of the Treaty of Versailles:

(a) Article 392 reads:

The International Labour Office shall be established at the seat of the League of Nations as part of the organization of the League.

(b) Article 7 reads, in part:

Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.

2. There can be no doubt that this country is subject to a definite legal obligation, under the provisions of this Treaty, to accord diplomatic privileges and immunities to the officials of the International Labour Office, and also to make provision for the inviolability of the buildings and other property occupied by the I.L.O. This organization is a part of the organization of the League, and the position both of the organization and of its personnel is the same as that of the League Secretariat.

3. The Canadian Government has power, under the Treaties of Peace Act 1919, to make such Orders in Council as are necessary for the carrying out of the treaties and for giving effect to any provisions of the treaties. There can be no doubt, therefore, as to the validity of an Order in Council giving effect to the obligations imposed upon this country by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Such an Order in Council will be valid, whether or not it is confined to matters in respect to which legislative authority is given to Parliament by Section 91 of the B.N.A. Act.

4. Apart from matters in respect of which this country is under a definite legal obligation arising out of the Treaty, there are other questions which present more difficulty. They include privileges which have been accorded to members of the I.L.O. in other countries as a matter of courtesy, and not as of right. They would extend to exemptions from taxation of various sorts, including customs privileges. Certain of these matters have already been dealt with by special arrangements with the Canadian administrative authorities. There is, however, outstanding, the special question of liability of officials to Canadian taxation upon incomes, and presumably also to other Canadian direct taxations.

5. In dealing with the special problems which are regarded as privileges accorded as a matter of courtesy, and not as of right, the policy followed might be:

(a) Generally to accord privileges comparable to those which have been given in Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

(b) In according these privileges, to base them upon the position of the personnel in the organization and not upon their nationality. It should be recognized that it is a proper thing for a Canadian to be a member of the I.L.O. staff, and Canadian members should not be discriminated against, but should be given treatment not less favourable than that which is accorded to members of the staff who are aliens in this country.

6. It would, therefore, be desirable to deal, at the present time, with the problem of Income Tax, which would, of course, include the National Defence Tax. It is thought that this could be dealt with by recognizing an exemption from taxation upon income imposed by any Canadian Government Agency upon those persons who would be regarded as international civil servants. Other employees, who were temporary officials of the I.L.O. would be subject to Canadian taxation, in the same manner as persons engaged in other employment within this country.

7. The exemptions would be limited to federal taxation. Any fiscal privileges in provincial and municipal matters would need to be the subject of separate negotiation.

8. The annexed draft Report to Council¹ has been prepared, based upon the foregoing principles. It should be submitted to the Deputy Minister of Labour, the Commissioner of Income Tax and the Deputy Minister of Finance, and brought to the attention of the Deputy Minister of Justice. It might also be advisable to furnish a copy to the Quebec Government for their information, but not for their approval.

1252.

806-A-40

*Décret du Conseil**Order in Council*

P.C. 6283

August 14, 1941

Whereas the Secretary of State for External Affairs, with the concurrence of the Minister of Labour, reports,

(1) That by Article 7 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 6 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization, the International Labour Office as part of the Organization of the League enjoys diplomatic privileges and immunities;

(2) That by reason of the ratification of the Treaties of Peace, the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization constitute obligations of Canada as part of the British Empire towards foreign Countries within the meaning of Section 132 of the British North America Act, 1867;

(3) That Section 1 of the Treaties of Peace Act, 1919 (10 George V., Chapter 30) empowers the Governor in Council to make such Orders in Council and do such things as appear to him to be necessary for carrying out these Treaties and for giving effect to any of their provisions;

(4) That with the approval of the Canadian Government, the Director of the International Labour Office has transferred a part of the staff of the International Labour Office to Montreal in order to permit of the continuation of the work of the International Labour Office in present circumstances; and

(5) That it is therefore desirable to define in certain respects the status in Canada of the International Labour Office and its staff.

¹ Non reproduit.

¹ Not printed.

Therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Canada, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and under and by virtue of The Treaties of Peace Act, 1919, is pleased to order and doth hereby order as follows:

1. This Order may be cited as "The Treaties of Peace (Status of the International Labour Office) Order, 1941".

2. The International Labour Office shall have legal capacity to conclude contracts and to assume and discharge obligations.

3. The International Labour Office shall have the right to sue and be sued, but no suit or other proceeding (other than a proceeding by way of set-off, counter-claim or cross-action) against the International Labour Office shall be entertained by any court without the express consent in writing of the Director of the International Labour Office.

4. The premises occupied by the International Labour Office are inviolable, that is to say, no peace officer, sheriff, bailiff, member of the armed forces, or other public authority of like nature, may enter them, in the exercise of his duties, without the consent of the Director of the International Labour Office.

5. The archives of the International Labour Office are inviolable.

6. (1) The members of the international administrative staff of the International Labour Office shall enjoy immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction in Canada unless such immunity is waived by the Director of the International Labour Office.

(2) The list of the members of the international administrative staff shall be published from time to time in the *Canada Gazette* by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

(3) The other members of the staff of the International Labour Office shall enjoy exemption from civil and criminal jurisdiction in Canada in respect of acts performed by them in their official capacity and within the limits of their functions unless such immunity is waived by the Director of the International Labour Office; but they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Canadian courts in respect of acts performed by them in their private capacity.

7. The International Labour Office and all salaries paid by the International Labour Office to permanent members of its staff shall be exempt from all direct taxes imposed by the Parliament or Government of Canada, such as income tax and National Defence Tax.

Provided that this exemption shall not apply to salaries paid to temporary members of the staff, that is to say, members whose contracts of employment with the International Labour Office were made for a period of less than one year.

PARTIE 3/PART 3
UNION PANAMÉRICAINNE
PAN-AMERICAN UNION

1253.

786-40

*Mémorandum du conseiller¹ au sous-secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Counsellor¹ to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] July 11, 1940

PAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE AT HAVANA

During the week of June the 16th the United States Government entered into communication with the Governments of twenty-one American Republics and ended by convoking another consultative meeting of Pan-American Foreign Ministers. The place of the meeting is Havana, Cuba, and the date of convocation the 20th of July.

The twenty-one Foreign Ministers or their representatives met at Panama last September shortly after the outbreak of the European war. It was clear at that time that the conflict in Europe would directly affect conditions in the Western world. President Roosevelt issued a statement on the 20th of June in which he expressed his belief that the problems envisaged in September had now taken a sufficiently concrete form to justify their further exploration. The formation of an inter-American organization to take charge of the marketing of important staple exports of all the American countries is the main feature of his plan. Presumably questions of hemispheric defence will also be considered.

It is understood that all the Latin American countries have decided to be represented at the Havana Conference.

Canada has not been invited to attend the Conference, although there have been numerous references to the possibility of such attendance in the American and Canadian press. If it should be desired that Canada attend, this might be arranged either on the basis of full participation or through the appointment of an observer.

It would not seem appropriate for Canada, after having refused to participate in Pan-American Conferences prior to the outbreak of war, to take the initiative now and suddenly ask to be allowed to take part as an equal member in the present Conference. Such a step would create the impression that we were running for shelter.

On the other hand it might be possible to arrange to have President Roosevelt address a special invitation to Canada in which he would point out that the problems facing the other American countries are problems

¹H. L. Keenleyside.

in which Canada is also interested and that a solution of these problems cannot be confidently expected unless Canada will participate. He could then suggest that while Canada apparently is not anxious immediately to take up membership in the Pan-American Union, the United States and the other American countries would appreciate Canadian participation in this particular Conference through the appointment of an observer who would be able to keep the Canadian Government informed at first-hand of the views expressed and the policies considered and who in turn might be able to indicate some of the special Canadian aspects of the various problems under review.

If President Roosevelt should issue an invitation in terms of this kind Canada could accept without either offending the more Imperially-minded of her own people or without creating the impression that the Dominion is seeking the shelter of Pan-American power.

If steps of the nature envisaged above are to be taken they, of course, must be taken at once as the meeting will commence in just nine days from the date of this memorandum.

1254.

786-40

Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Ottawa,] July 16, 1940

HAVANA CONFERENCE

Mr. Brooke Claxton, M.P., telephoned me this morning that at a meeting of the Montreal [Canadian] Institute of International Affairs group it was noted that Canada was not proposing to send an observer to the Havana Conference, and it was suggested that perhaps the Institute might be able to perform a useful service by sending Percy Corbett¹ to Havana to report on the conference for the Institute and if desired to pass on his observations to the Government. Mr. Corbett had telephoned E. J. Tarr² who thought the idea first rate and J. M. Macdonnell³ who raised some question as to finance and the necessity of doing nothing that would embarrass the Government. I told Mr. Claxton I saw no objection whatever to the proposal and many reasons why it might be helpful. He said Corbett had been studying Spanish for some time and he would have letters of introduction to private persons in Havana. I told him that we were discussing the general phases of the conference through Washington.

¹ Professeur de droit international, Université McGill.

² Président, «Monarch Life Assurance Co.», et président de l'Institut canadien des Affaires internationales.

³ Président, «National Trust Company», et membre de l'Institut canadien des Affaires internationales.

¹ Professor of International Law, McGill University.

² President, Monarch Life Assurance Co., and President, Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

³ President, National Trust Company, and member, Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

1255.

2226-40

*Mémorandum du deuxième secrétaire¹**Memorandum by Second Secretary¹*

[Ottawa,] July 7, 1941

CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE PAN-AMERICAN SYSTEM

1. A Meeting of Foreign Ministers or a Conference of the American Republics may be convened this year. Since probably little advance notice will be given, it would be useful if the Canadian Government were now to give consideration to the question whether Canada should participate.

2. The arguments against Canadian participation in the Pan-American system, which were valid before the war and during the first year or so of the war, have now lost their validity as a result of changed conditions. The question of participation must be decided *de novo*.

3. Because Paris is the cultural capital of Latin America, every increase in hostility between France and the Allies strengthens the Nazis in Latin America. The Nazis are already using Havas as an organ of German propaganda in Latin America and will, no doubt, make increasing use of French agents from now on. These agents will depict the war as an Anglo-American, protestant effort to dominate Roman Catholic, Latin Europe, and will contend that United States policy in Latin America is part and parcel of the Anglo-American protestant effort to dominate the world. They will also try to preach a Catholic crusade against Communist Russia, the Ally of Great Britain.

4. Canada is the only allied state which is naturally equipped to meet this propaganda. It is a small power, which like the states of Latin America, must constantly defend its national integrity against the pull of the only great power in the hemisphere; one-third of Canada has affinities with Latin culture; over forty percent of Canada is Roman Catholic; French Canada is the custodian and heir of French culture in this hemisphere.

5. The mere presence of a representative Canadian delegation at a Pan-American Conference would therefore demonstrate to Latin America the falsity of much of Nazi propaganda, especially if the members of that delegation made clear to Latin Americans, what they doubtless do not realize at present, that Canada is the second most important power now actively at war against Germany.

6. Canadian participation in the Pan-American system would be in accord with the spirit of the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park declarations since the main purpose of Canadian participation would be to co-operate with the United States in bringing Latin America into line with the United States policy of intervention in the war. Canadian participation would thus be a contribution to the common defence of the northern half of the Western hemisphere.

¹ Escott Reid.

7. The United States has embarked on a drive to draw this hemisphere more closely together—politically, economically, culturally. Unless Germany should win the war and dominate Latin America, this drive will continue. A sweeping Anglo-American victory will cause it to slow down but will not stop it. The attempt of the United States to make this hemisphere economically more self-sufficient—especially in essential, critical, and strategic raw materials—is now a well-established, long-term policy of the United States. Measures to implement it will therefore come up at all future Pan-American meetings. Canada is directly concerned in such measures and might protect its interests more effectively if it were represented at the meetings.

8. The direct personal relations established between representatives of Canada and representatives of Latin American countries at Pan-American conferences should facilitate the expansion of trade between Canada and Latin America.

9. Canadian participation in the Pan-American system is an insurance policy for Canada against some of the losses and dangers which would result from the occupation of the British Isles by Germany. In that event Canada would be suspected by many citizens of the United States of being in favour of giving up the struggle against Germany even if the United States were willing to fight on to the bitter end.* Canadians would be suspected of being fifth columnists. The more Canada emphasizes its independent American nationhood, the weaker those suspicions are likely to be. Canada can—without adversely affecting the interests of the United Kingdom—emphasize that American nationhood by participating in the Pan-American system.

10. There appears to be general agreement that, in the event of an Anglo-American victory, post-war international organization should consist of a number of regional systems enclosed within the framework of a universal system. If this judgment is sound, Canada will, after the war, be faced with the question of whether to enter the Pan-American system. The advantage of some sort of immediate participation is that such a step would make it possible for Canada to help determine the post-war relationship between the Pan-American system, and the British Commonwealth and the universal system. That relationship is fraught with difficulties, on the overcoming of which the success of the post-war international structure will largely depend. If Canada is associated with all three systems it can make a most useful contribution to the vital task of overcoming these difficulties.

11. The following are the main arguments against Canadian participation in the Pan-American system:

(i) *Relations with the United States.* Though it is in Canada's interest to be recognized throughout this hemisphere as one of the American nations, it would be dangerous for Canada to be constantly lumped by the United States with the twenty American republics, since this might make it difficult for Canada to get specially favourable treatment from

* Note telle que dans l'original:

* Note as in original:
I don't get this. L.B.P[earson].

the United States. It would also obscure the essential qualities of Canada's relationship with the United States—the real community of interest, the mutual understanding, the common way of life. Certainly any United States official who did not want to give Canada specially favourable treatment could, if Canada was a member of the Pan-American system, always take refuge in the formula that any concession granted Canada would have to be generalized among all the other members of the Pan-American system.

(ii) *Relations with Latin America.* Participation in the Pan-American system will involve Canada in disputes among Latin American states, and between the United States and Latin American states. If Canada does not participate in the system, it need not become involved in these disputes and need not in consequence endanger its friendly relations with all the states in this hemisphere. At the present time due to Canada's belligerency and the trend to belligerency in the United States, Canada and the United States would probably be found on the same side on most important questions coming before Pan-American meetings. Canada might, as a result, come to be regarded by many Latin American nations as a catspaw of the United States and would incur the odium which naturally attaches to the catspaw of a great power. After the war, and especially if the good neighbour policy is reversed, Canada may find itself aligned with the Latin American countries against the United States, thus endangering Canada's friendly relations with the United States.

(iii) *Relations with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth.* The government and people of Great Britain might feel that Canadian participation in the Pan-American system indicated a desire on the part of the government and people of Canada to withdraw from the Commonwealth and from the constitutional, political tie with Europe which results from membership in the Commonwealth. This would be bad for British morale.

12. Comments on these arguments against Canadian participation:

(i) There is undoubtedly a danger that Canadian participation in the Pan-American system might, in the long run, prejudice Canada's relations with the United States. The danger is lessened, however, by the existence of special Canadian-United States boards, commissions and agreements, such as the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the Joint Economic Committees. Shrewd Canadian diplomacy would enable Canada to make the best of both worlds—at one time to claim equality of treatment with the twenty American republics, at another time to claim exceptionally favourable treatment because of the peculiarities of Canada's relations with the United States.* Concessions granted by the United States to the American republics would become the mini-

* Note telle que dans l'original:

* Note as in original:

If Canada joined, such specially favourable treatment would undoubtedly cause the other members to consider Canada as a U.S. satellite in the Union. [L. B. Pearson].

imum in Canadian-United States relations. There is no need for the minimum to become the maximum.

(ii) The second argument—if valid at all—is valid against Canadian participation in any international organization which does more than pass pious resolutions. It has particular force when applied to an international organization such as the Pan-American system or the British Commonwealth which includes only one great power. It cannot however, be accepted as a conclusive argument unless it is assumed that Canadian statesmen are incompetent to play a successful game of international politics.

(iii) The third argument has less weight today than it had before the war or than it probably will have after the war. Before the war it could be argued that emphasis by Canada on its American nationhood, might have increased the danger of war since it might have led the enemies of Great Britain to believe that Great Britain could not count on Canada as an ally. After the war it may be interpreted as indicating a decision by Canada never again to participate in a European war. Today Canada's increasingly effective participation in the war, the constant flow of its soldiers and airmen to Europe, will give the lie to any statement that Canadian participation in the Pan-American system means Canadian withdrawal from the Commonwealth and from Europe.

13. Since the advantages of participation in the Pan-American system outweigh the disadvantages, it is recommended that Canada participate in the next Pan-American Conference or Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American States. Informal and confidential discussions should be opened as soon as possible with Mr. Pierrepont Moffat to discuss whether it would be possible to secure a special invitation to the Canadian Government to send a delegation to the next conference or meeting—the members of the delegation to have all the rights of members of other delegations except the right to vote.

1256.

2226-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures¹
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs¹
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] November 21, 1941

CANADA AND THE PAN-AMERICAN UNION

1. The Honourable Mr. MacKinnon, in a report of his Trade Mission to South America, will urge that Canada should join the Pan-American Union. I understand that, in addition, he proposes to urge the Cabinet to take immediate action on this matter.

¹H. L. Keenleyside.

2. In these circumstances the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, as head of the Department charged with the conduct of our international relations, will be expected to express his views on the question of policy.

3. Relations with Latin America fall within the field of responsibility of the American Division of the Department. The members of that Division are unanimously and strongly of the opinion that Canada should now join the Pan-American Union.

4. The arguments in favour of this course have been expounded so often that it is perhaps a work of supererogation to go over them again in this memorandum. However, there is something to be said for bringing the whole situation into focus in one place. In the opinion of the members of the Division, the arguments in favour of joining the Union may be summarized as follows:

(a) As a member of the Pan-American Union Canada can help the United States in its present difficult and important task of bringing Latin America into line with the Anglo-American front in the war. Membership in the Union would give Canada an opportunity to convince wavering Latin Americans that the democratic powers will win the war.

(b) Because of the strength of the French and Roman Catholic elements in Canada the representatives of Canada, working through the Pan-American Union, could bring to bear a sympathetic influence that would be much more effective than anything that the United States can do outside the realm of economics and military strength.

(c) Canada, by encouraging the Latin American countries to cooperate with the United States in its good neighbour policy, can make more likely the continuance of that policy. This is a matter of considerable importance to Canada itself.

(d) The United States is engaged in an effort to draw the component parts of this hemisphere more closely together politically, economically and culturally. For reasons of security Washington wishes to make the hemisphere more nearly self sufficient economically. Canada will be in a position of disadvantage unless it seizes every opportunity to keep on the inside in this movement.

(e) As a member of the Union Canada can assist in defeating the efforts of those who are trying to drive a wedge between Great Britain and the United States through playing on their long standing and bitter rivalries in Latin America.

(f) Canadian participation in the work of the Union might offset to some extent the weaknesses caused by the traditional inadequacy of British diplomatic representation in Latin America.

(g) Anglo-American cooperation after the war is of the utmost importance. One of the rocks upon which that cooperation may be shattered is Latin America. Ottawa should be in a position to assist London and Washington to avoid this rock.

(h) Canadian membership in the Pan-American Union should result in increased trade because of increased knowledge of mutual needs and capacities.

(i) It is quite clear that the Latin American states expect Canada to join the Union and that such action would be welcomed by the United States.

5. There are certain additional considerations. The sudden and radical change in even the most Imperialistic and partisan Canadian newspapers during the last two years, and particularly during the last few months, makes it apparent that there would be no serious opposition from any part of this country if the Canadian Government should decide to join the Pan-American Union at the present time. With Canada engaged in making an all-out contribution to the defence of Great Britain and the Commonwealth generally, no possible accusation of disloyalty could result from Canadian participation in the activities of the Union of American states. Such participation would, in fact, be looked upon as a part of the Canadian effort to strengthen the position of the anti-Fascist allies. On the other hand if Canada stays out of the Union now but applies for membership when the war is over, such an application coming at that time might well be interpreted as a post-war reaction against the Imperial connection.

6. In other words, Canada could join the Union at this time with the almost unanimous approval of her own people and with the approbation of the other parts of the Commonwealth. It is possible that neither of these conditions would be wholly applicable if the initial step were to be taken in the post-war period. Yet it is as certain as any political development can be that Canada will, now or eventually, join the Pan-American Union. Thus it becomes almost wholly a question of timing and on this point the choice seems obvious.

7. So far as the members of the American Division are concerned there are no arguments of substance that can be advanced against the proposed action. Membership in the Union will cost a few thousand dollars annually and it will involve greater pressure on Canada to participate in cultural, scientific and other hemispheric conferences. The latter is a field of international relations in which Canada has been grossly negligent, and it will be nationally beneficial rather than otherwise for Ottawa to be under the moral obligation to play a larger part in this branch of international activity. If the luxury of inertia can be considered as an argument it also might be used as a reason for inaction. Even this may prove a delusion, for there is evidence to support the belief that public opinion will push the Government into action if it does not take the initiative in this matter.

8. In all the circumstances, therefore, it is the opinion of the members of the American Division that the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs would be wholly justified in advising the Government to accept the proposal of the Minister of Trade and Commerce that Canada should now arrange to apply for admission to the Pan-American Union.

PARTIE 4/PART 4

CONFÉRENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR LE BLÉ
INTERNATIONAL WHEAT CONFERENCE

1257.

149-33

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissariat
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission
in Great Britain*

Ottawa, September 27, 1940

Dear Mr. Pearson,

I brought your letter of September 2nd,¹ forwarding a communication from the Secretary of the Wheat Advisory Committee to the attention of the Cabinet Wheat Committee in a letter which said:

In connection with the general question of the possible future usefulness of the Wheat Advisory Committee, I might draw your attention to the fact that in a recent communication from the United Kingdom Government to the United States Government regarding the desirability of some joint exploration of problems of export surpluses in general, the following statement was made:

'Where possible it would seem to His Majesty's Government that such questions should be dealt with on an international basis and that where international organisations exist they should be called into action. The advisability might be considered of asking the chairmen of such bodies, e.g. of the Wheat Advisory Committee and International Sugar Council, to summon informal meetings to consider the possibilities of appropriate action in the international field'.

I am now in receipt of a letter from the Minister of Trade and Commerce, who is Chairman of the Cabinet Wheat Committee, in which he says:

My colleagues and I are still of the opinion that very little useful purpose can be served by continuing this committee at the present time.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

1258.

149-33

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1738

London, October 16, 1940

Following from Pearson for Skelton. Begins. Your despatch [sic] of September 27th, Wheat Advisory Committee. Does last paragraph mean that I should now inform the Secretary of the Committee that in the view of the Canadian Government it should be wound up? Ends.

MASSEY

¹ Non reproduite.

¹ Not printed.

1259.

149-33

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1649

Ottawa, October 21, 1940

Following for Pearson from Skelton. Begins. Your telegram No. 1738 of October 16th. Last paragraph of my letter of September 27th represents Government's views as to actual usefulness of Wheat Advisory Committee, but should not be construed as an instruction to serve notice of Canadian withdrawal from it under present conditions. [Ends.]

1260.

149-33

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs*

541C/9

Ottawa, February 3, 1941

SECRET

Dear Mr. Robertson,

You will be aware that, in approaching the United States Administration last autumn with a view to their co-operation in dealing with the general problem of surplus commodities, the United States Government suggested that in so far as certain commodities are dealt with by international bodies (e.g. wheat and sugar) there might be advantages in informal meetings being summoned, preferably on the initiative of the United States Government, to consider the possibilities of appropriate action in the international field. Details of this approach will be found in Sir Gerald Campbell's letter to the Prime Minister, No. 941C/7, of the 6th September.¹

The United Kingdom Government understand that (as was the case in connection with the previous approach made to the United States Government in July) close contact was maintained by Lord Lothian with the Canadian Minister at Washington in outlining to the United States Government their ideas on the surplus problem generally. No indication has, however, reached the United Kingdom Government, directly or indirectly, of

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

the Canadian Government's views in regard to the particular suggestion mentioned above. I am informed that what the United Kingdom Government had in mind in the case of wheat was that the problem of world surpluses was one which could only be dealt with satisfactorily by international action and that progress could best be facilitated through the medium of the Wheat Advisory Committee on which all of the principal Governments concerned are represented.

Discussions in Washington in regard to a general attack on the problem have in fact been proceeding very slowly and no considered reply has yet been received from the State Department to the proposals put to them by Lord Lothian. There has, however, been a full exchange of views with State Department officials, as a result of which it would appear that the United States Administration are not yet prepared to commit themselves to any joint plan of action covering the whole field and consider that most effective progress will be made by an individual approach to particular commodities. The officials concerned have particularly stressed their interest in wheat, and have let it be known that a definite suggestion for the summoning of the Wheat Advisory Committee would elicit a favourable response from them.

The United States Department of Agriculture has now informed the Commercial Counsellor at the Embassy in Washington "that if Canada and the United Kingdom should propose to the United States Government that the Advisory Committee should be invited to meet in Washington at an early date to consider the wheat surplus problem, the Department of Agriculture would support the proposal and recommend the State Department to accept." The Department of Agriculture consider that a meeting of the major countries concerned could more conveniently be held in Washington than in London.

Indications are that the United States Government may be making a test case of wheat, and that the response of the United Kingdom Government to their suggestions will be an important factor in determining their attitude towards co-operation on the surplus problem as a whole. The United Kingdom Government have reason to believe that, rightly or wrongly, the United States Government feels that neither the United Kingdom nor Canada have ever been in earnest in coming to grips with the problem of wheat and ascribe to United Kingdom and Canadian hesitations the poor progress made as a result of various initiatives which they themselves have taken during the last seven years. The United Kingdom Government are anxious therefore to take full advantage of the suggestion which the United States authorities have now made.

Apart from the desirability on general grounds of co-operation with the United States, it seems to the United Kingdom Government that it would be very much in the interest of Canada to join with the United States and the

United Kingdom in exploring the wheat problem and to see whether steps can be taken to restrict the crude accumulation of wheat surpluses and to secure some international agreement as to the future marketing of such surpluses. The latter would seem to be of the utmost importance to Canada as she would suffer most from the grave depression of world wheat prices which would inevitably result from the unregulated competition of distress selling accentuated by subsidisation of exports by countries which could afford it.

The United Kingdom Government feel bound to do everything in their power to secure the co-operation of the United States in agreed arrangements on the one hand for preventing the accumulation of surpluses of primary products to an extent which will be ruinous to all producers, and on the other hand for organising supplies to be made available to the countries of Europe as and when they are liberated. The first aspect involves consideration of the amount of stocks that can be stored without unduly affecting the market and of the possibility of regulating production within that limit. The second aspect involves consideration of financial and other arrangements for the orderly marketing of these stocks after the war. On both aspects co-operation with the United States will be essential, and the United Kingdom Government feel that they cannot afford to decline the suggestion now put forward which the United States evidently regard as the first step to a general discussion on the subject of surpluses, storages and supply to Europe.

In these circumstances the United Kingdom Government attach the utmost importance to returning a prompt and favourable reply to the United States suggestion, and they earnestly hope that they may count on the Canadian Government to join with them in returning such a reply. If the Canadian Government agree, it would not be proposed to issue invitations to the Wheat Advisory Committee as a whole. The intention would be to arrange for the meeting of a preparatory committee only at this stage, thus confining the discussions to the representatives of the five countries primarily concerned, namely, Canada, the Argentine, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. In accordance with the United States suggestion this meeting would be held at Washington as soon as it could be convened.

I should be very grateful for an expression, at the Canadian Government's earliest convenience, of their views on the foregoing, and I understand that in the meantime the United Kingdom Government are sending an interim reply to Washington saying that they welcome the suggestion which the United States authorities have made and are consulting the Canadian Government upon it.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1261.

149-33

*Le haut commissaire suppléant de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

541C/110

Ottawa, March 28, 1941

SECRET. IMMEDIATE

My dear Mr. Robertson,

With reference to my letter of the 3rd February regarding the possibility of a meeting of the Wheat Advisory Committee to consider the wheat surplus problem, I write to say that I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs informing me that the Embassy at Washington have received from the United States authorities renewed enquiries as to the attitude of the United Kingdom authorities towards the summoning of the Committee, and the United Kingdom authorities feel that their reply to this approach cannot now be delayed longer.

In the circumstances I have been asked to approach the Canadian Government and to say that the United Kingdom Government are most anxious to receive the earliest possible expression of the Canadian Government's views on the question raised in my letter of the 3rd February.

I understand that all that has happened since my letter was written has strengthened the conviction of the United Kingdom authorities that they cannot afford to take any other course but that of acceptance of the United States suggestion, and they earnestly trust therefore that the Canadian Government will be able to assist them by agreeing that a favourable reply should be returned.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1262.

149-33

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] April 11, 1941

On February 3rd, the United Kingdom Government enquired, through Earncliffe, as to the views of the Canadian Government regarding the possibility of holding a meeting of the Wheat Advisory Committee to consider the world wheat surplus problem. The United States Department of Agriculture had informed the British Embassy in Washington that "if Canada and the

United Kingdom should propose to the United States Government that the Wheat Advisory Committee should be invited to meet in Washington at an early date to consider the wheat surplus problem, the Department of Agriculture would support the proposal and would recommend the State Department to accept". The United Kingdom Government indicated that they attached the utmost importance to returning a prompt and favourable reply to this United States suggestion and hoped that the Canadian Government would join with them in returning such a reply. The intention was to arrange for a meeting of the Preparatory Committee only at this stage, confining discussions to representatives of the five countries primarily concerned, viz., Canada, the Argentine, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Copies of this letter were sent to the Ministers of Agriculture, Trade and Commerce and Finance.

On March 28th we received another communication from Earncliffe to the effect that the United States Authorities have been renewing their enquiries as to the attitude of the United Kingdom toward the proposed summoning of the Committee. The United Kingdom authorities did not feel that their reply to this American approach could be delayed much longer. They did not wish to go ahead with the United States in an examination of the international wheat situation unless Canada thought this examination would be useful and would associate itself with it. This communication was also sent to the members of the Cabinet Wheat Committee.

Under present conditions, I cannot see that there is anything to be lost while there is possibly something to be gained from taking up the American suggestion of a joint discussion of the wheat problem. It would, in any case, be helpful to have an expression of opinion from the Cabinet Wheat Committee on which we could base a reply to these unanswered enquiries from the United Kingdom High Commissioner.

1263.

149-33

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures
au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, April 21, 1941

Dear Mr. MacDonald,

I am directed by the Prime Minister to refer to Mr. Hankinson's letters of February 3rd and March 28th regarding the possibility of a meeting of the Wheat Advisory Committee to consider the wheat surplus problem, and to inform you that the Canadian Government will be glad to associate itself with your Government in welcoming the United States suggestion that the Committee should be invited to meet in Washington at an early date to consider the wheat surplus problem. It is understood that it would not be proposed, at this

stage, to issue invitations to the Wheat Advisory Committee as a whole but to confine the discussions to the representatives of the five countries most concerned, viz., the Argentine, Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

1264.

149-33

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État
par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

541C/10

Ottawa, May 5, 1941

SECRET

My dear Mr. Robertson,

With further reference to your letter of the 21st April, I write to state that the High Commissioner has received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs informing him that it was with great gratification that the United Kingdom Government learned of the willingness of the Canadian Government to join with them in agreeing to the United States proposal that the Wheat Advisory Committee should meet at an early date.

Mr. MacDonald learns that a telegram has now been sent to the Embassy in Washington asking the Ambassador to inform the State Department of the attitude of the Canadian Government. Lord Halifax has been asked further to state that the Canadian Government agree with the United Kingdom Government's suggestion that it would be inadvisable at this stage to issue invitations to the Wheat Advisory Committee as a whole, and that for the time being discussions should be confined to representatives of the five countries most concerned, viz., Argentina, Australia, Canada, the U.S.A., and the United Kingdom. Representatives of the Governments of these five countries attended all the meetings of the preparatory Committee held in London during February-August, 1939, under the chairmanship of Mr. Ray Atherton of the United States State Department.

Lord Halifax has been instructed to ask for the views of the United States Government as to the date on which they think that the proposed meeting should be held. In this connection the United Kingdom Government assume that it will not be possible to make the necessary arrangements in time to hold the meeting before the United States Wheat Marketing Quota Referendum is taken on the 31st May.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

1265.

149-33

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

DESPATCH 602
 SECRET

Ottawa, May 8, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 480 of April 21st¹ regarding discussions which have been taking place between the United Kingdom and the United States Governments relative to the feasibility of convening a meeting of the Wheat Advisory Committee in Washington, and to enclose, for your information, copy of a letter of May 5th from Mr. W. C. Hankinson of the Office of the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Ottawa. It is, perhaps, a little irregular for the United Kingdom Ambassador in Washington to be advising the United States Government of the attitude of the Canadian Government on any given question. In the ordinary course, such communications would normally be made by you. In the present instance, the informal discussions which have resulted in the agreement of the Governments concerned to consult together were initiated by the United States Department of Agriculture in conversations with the Commercial Counsellor of the British Embassy. I take it that when the United States authorities move to invite the principal wheat producing countries to be represented at the Wheat Advisory Committee in Washington they will approach the Canadian Government either through their Minister here or through your Legation.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON
 for the Secretary of State
 for External Affairs

1266.

149-33

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH 1350
 SECRET

Washington, May 16, 1941

Sir,

With reference to your Despatch No. 602 of May 8th, 1941, regarding the proposal that the International Wheat Committee should meet in Washington at an early date to consider the wheat surplus problem, I have the

¹ Non reproduite.¹ Not printed.

honour to inform you that on May 6th, when the Legation learned of the action taken by the British Ambassador, in which he advised the United States Department of State of the attitude of the Canadian Government towards the proposed meeting, Mr. Mahoney mentioned this irregularity in procedure to Mr. Harry Hawkins, Department of State. The latter said that the British Ambassador's note had been referred to the Secretary of Agriculture. In these circumstances, Mr. Mahoney explained that in this particular instance the Legation would not send a separate note to the Department of State. Later on Mr. Mahoney also mentioned the matter to Mr. Hickerson who assured him that in the event the wheat producing countries are invited to be represented at the proposed meeting, approach to the Canadian Government will be either through the United States Legation at Ottawa or through this Legation.

2. I may add that the British Ambassador's note was prepared by the Commercial Counsellor of the Embassy. Our attitude towards this irregular procedure on the part of the Embassy will be brought to his attention at the first opportunity.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY
for the Minister

1267.

149-33

*Le ministre des États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État par interim
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister of United States to Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

Ottawa, June 21, 1941

My dear Mr. Robertson,

Confirming my telephone conversation with Mr. Escott Reid this morning, I am writing to inform you that the date for the opening of the wheat discussions in Washington has now been definitely fixed for Monday, June 30th. For your information, Argentina and Australia will both be participants.

Very sincerely yours,

PIERREPONT MOFFAT

1268.

149-33

Le ministre des États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister of United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

No. 419

Ottawa, June 27, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my recent letters to Mr. Robertson on the subject of the wheat discussions which had been scheduled to commence in Washington on June 30 and to state that the first meeting has, in deference to the views of the Canadian Government, now been postponed to July 10. In extending the invitation to the Canadian Government to send representatives on this date, I have been asked to characterize the meeting as one of officials interested in wheat.

Accept etc.

PIERREPONT MOFFAT

1269.

149-33

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 271

Washington, July 2, 1941

IMMEDIATE. My despatch of June 24th, No. 1813.¹ Tentative agenda for wheat meeting July 10th follows. Begins.

(1) Review of present and prospective wheat situation: as a whole and in each individual country.

(2) Résumé of discussions at London in 1939.

(3) Discussion of salient points for inclusion in wheat agreement.

(4) Consideration of revision which would be required in draft agreement of April 24th, 1939, in the light of previous discussions. (This draft has been circulated as Circular No. 31 of Wheat Advisory Committee, under date of November 13th, 1939).¹

(5) Further procedure.

Ends.

Above agenda furnished Legation informally by Hawkins, State Department. He hopes to be able to distribute prior to meeting one or two background documents which may be helpful to those attending the meeting.

¹ Non reproduit.¹ Not printed.

1270.

149-33

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States

DESPATCH 912

Ottawa, July 5, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your telegram No. 271 of July 2nd and to previous correspondence concerning the wheat discussions which are to take place in Washington beginning July 10th.

Mr. George H. McIvor will be the chief Canadian representative at these discussions. Mr. McIvor is Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Wheat Board. He will be accompanied by Mr. R. V. Biddulph, European Commissioner of the Canadian Wheat Board, and Dr. C. F. Wilson, Chief of the Agricultural Branch of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. These members have all been nominated by the Department of Trade and Commerce. In addition, the Department of Agriculture will be represented by Mr. A. M. Shaw, Director of Marketing Services. Mr. J. E. Coyne, Financial Attaché of the Legation, will also be a member of the Canadian Delegation, in order that the Legation and this Department may be kept fully informed of the proceedings of the meeting.

I should be grateful if you would transmit this information to the State Department.

I have etc.

[N. A. ROBERTSON?]

for the Secretary of State
 for External Affairs

1271.

149-33

Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures

Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State
for External Affairs

DESPATCH 2361

Washington, August 8, 1941

Sir,

In continuation of Legation Despatch No. 2139 of July 22, 1941,¹ I have the honour to report that the Washington Wheat Meetings which convened here on July 10th recessed on August 3rd to meet again on August 18th.

2. I enclose herewith five copies of a Provisional Draft Agreement² prepared by the delegates during the course of the proceedings. It is the intention that during the period of adjournment this draft should be considered by

¹ Non reproduite.² Non trouvé.¹ Not printed² Not located.

the Governments concerned and that the delegates be furnished with instructions which will enable them to prepare a definite text when they reconvene. It seems doubtful, however, whether the Argentine Government will return an answer as early as August 18th.

3. I am informed by the Secretary of the Meetings, Mr. Andrew Cairns, that copies of the draft were airmailed yesterday afternoon to each of the Canadian representatives. Mr. Cairns also informed me that he has not been able to prepare minutes of the recent meetings. Copies will be forwarded to you as soon as he makes them available.

4. I also enclose copies of the text of a statement prepared for the press by the officials of the four Governments which was released to the press on August 4th by the Department of State.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY
for Chargé d'Affaires

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Communiqué à la presse N° 376

Press Statement No. 376

[Washington,] August 4, 1941

INTERNATIONAL WHEAT MEETING

There follows the text of a statement prepared for the press by officials of the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who convened in Washington on July 10, 1941 to consider the present situation and outlook with respect to international trade in wheat:

The representatives of Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America who have been considering world wheat problems in Washington since the 10th July recessed on the 3rd August to meet again on 18th August. A provisional draft agreement is being submitted to Governments forthwith, together with a request for instructions which will enable the delegates to prepare a definitive text when they reconvene.

The range of the wheat discussions has been considerably wider than hitherto. The problems of furnishing post-war relief to countries which have suffered from the devastation of war occupied a prominent place in the agenda. The need for an equitable sharing of world markets to avoid cut-throat competition was fully considered as a new phase of an old problem. Stocks available for export at the end of July 1941 amounted to about two years' normal requirements of imported wheat and, in consequence, the representatives of the exporting countries have been compelled to face the necessity of controlling production in order to prevent stocks from continuing to rise above their present record high level.

The representatives have recognized that when the war is over European agriculture will be distorted, livestock herds will be severely reduced by the acute shortage of feed grains, farm equipment will be dilapidated and, in consequence, there will be urgent need and opportunity for reconstruction.

The advance of knowledge about the relationship of food to health suggests that this reconstruction should result in the provision for each country of diets more adequate for health and happiness, thus improving upon pre-war conditions.

Much progress has been made in the consideration of all these problems in the hope that by the establishment of an ever-normal granary and of a large pool of relief wheat, the consumers of the world may be guaranteed abundant post-war supplies at prices reasonable both to them and to producers and free of charge to those in need of relief.

1272.

149-33

Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures
*Memorandum by Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*¹

Ottawa, September 11, 1941

Mr. Moffat called on Mr. Pearson this afternoon and recalled that the officials of the various governments participating in the wheat discussions in Washington, after having prepared a provisional draft agreement, recessed on August 3 and planned to reconvene there on August 18, after their respective governments had had an opportunity to consider the draft. It was subsequently learned that not all the participating governments would be able to instruct their officials in time for them to resume the discussions on August 18 and it was decided to postpone further discussions to a date to be agreed later, probably after the beginning of September.

Mr. H. F. Carlill, chairman of the wheat meeting, has now approached the officials of the American Government with a view to determining a definite date for continuing the discussions which might be agreed to by all the governments concerned and has suggested in this connection September 22. Mr. Moffat has been requested to ascertain from the appropriate Canadian authorities whether this date would be acceptable and, if not, the earliest possible date thereafter which would be. He was instructed to add that the Government of the United States attaches great importance to the early conclusion of a wheat agreement and that September 22 is acceptable to the United States for resuming discussions to that end.

As soon as the Canadian answer is forthcoming Mr. Moffat will telephone it to Washington.

1273.

149-33

La légation aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Legation in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 439

Washington, October 8, 1941

Wheat meetings postponed until 10.30 a.m. Tuesday, October 14th.

MAHONEY

¹L. B. Pearson.

1274.

King Papers, PAC

Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 188

London, October 28, 1941

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. Wheat.

1. We have followed with close interest discussions in Washington of Preparatory Committee of Wheat Advisory Committee and have studied with care preliminary draft agreement drawn up by the Committee for each of the five participating Governments. From the moment when the United States Government first suggested that the Preparatory Committee should be summoned to consider wheat problem in its broadest aspects, we have been most anxious to do what we could to promote successful sketching out of an international agreement, both in general interests of economic co-operation with the United States, and also because of the intrinsic importance of wheat as foremost staple commodity and the great part which it is bound to play in plans for relief of occupied countries in the immediate post-war period. The fact that Canada and Australia are as vitally interested as the United States in an equitable distribution of wheat markets of the world has naturally increased our desire to assist the Committee to arrive at a common understanding on future policy.

2. There are, however, certain features of the draft agreement as it at present stands which have caused us serious concern in view of their possible repercussions on the war situation at this stage. In particular the draft gives the impression that it is contemplated to force on wheat importing countries of Europe, as a condition of immediate post-war relief, a series of obligations, including a drastic restriction of their wheat production, which would vitally affect their agricultural systems. Any agreement capable of this construction would, in our view, be most inopportune and indeed dangerous in the extreme. It would supply Nazi propaganda in Europe with a most potent weapon, and would be bound to arouse suspicion as to the use which the British Commonwealth and the United States intend to make of their power when the war has been won. We regard it as essential at this stage therefore to remove from the draft agreement all provisions implying interference by the British Commonwealth and the United States in European agriculture policy.

3. A further point is the position of Russia in relation to proposals outlined in the draft. Russia was still a neutral country when arrangements for meeting of Preparatory Committee were made. But as things are now it appears to us virtually out of the question either to conclude an agreement which may seriously affect her interests without consulting her, or to approach her on such a matter at a time when she is engaged in a life and death struggle, and when her richest wheat fields are being overrun by the enemy.

4. We have endeavoured to devise means of overcoming these special difficulties, but have reached the conclusion that it is almost impossible to do so while leaving intact the present framework of the draft agreement. In these circumstances we have been considering whether it might not be the wisest course for the Preparatory Committee to deal first with immediate practical issues, such as the establishment of a pool for postwar relief, provision for an "ever-normal" granary, and other features of present draft which could not be regarded as prejudicing in any way the interests of unrepresented countries. The other issues of policy would, no doubt, be discussed by the Committee, and there might be great advantage in this, but conclusions upon them might be deferred until a later date.

5. Tentative suggestions on these lines were recently made by the Prime Minister in a private and personal message to President Roosevelt which drew special attention to considerations mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 5 [*sic*] above. The Prime Minister has now received a message from President Roosevelt in reply, the substance of which is as follows:

(1) The President fully agrees as to the importance of avoiding any impression as in paragraph 2 above, and sees no objection to our delegation stressing this consideration in discussions.


(2) The President also agrees as to importance of considering interests of Russia, but he suggests it should be feasible to arrive at a framework which would leave the way open for Russian adherence later.

(3) President states that the United States Government have not looked upon these discussions as a conference in any formal sense, but rather as an exchange of ideas between experts in a position to reflect the views of their Governments.

(4) He is pleased at the progress made in July and August but holds no brief for precise form or wording of draft agreement. Much of the draft will no doubt require revision, but he hopes that it will be possible to find a large area of agreement. He adds that special importance is attached by the United States Government at this juncture to plans for equitable sharing of post-war markets and to our co-operation as largest importer.

6. We have instructed our delegates in the light of this exchange of messages with the President, and we hope that after a full exchange of views on draft agreement in its present form some means for overcoming difficulties which we foresee may be found. We have informed them that in exploring possibilities with their colleagues they should stress considerations mentioned in the Prime Minister's message to the President, particularly those in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, and should refer home for further instructions if discussions should develop in such a way as to prejudice any of the main points which, as explained above, we consider it essential in the present circumstances to safeguard. Ends.

ILLUSTRATIONS



Arrivée de la première Division canadienne en Grande-Bretagne, décembre 1939.

Arrival of the First Canadian Division in Great Britain, December 1939.



Anthony Eden, secrétaire aux Dominions, visitant les troupes du Régiment royal de Montréal à Aldershot (Hampshire) le 14 mars 1940. Au centre en partant de g.: Vincent Massey, l'amiral Bromley, Eden, le maj.-gén. A. G. L. McNaughton.

Anthony Eden, Dominions Secretary, inspecting troops of the Royal Montreal Regiment, Aldershot, Hants., 14 March 1940. Left to right at centre: Vincent Massey, Admiral Bromley, Eden, Maj.-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton.



La signature de l'accord du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth, Ottawa, le 17 décembre 1939. Assis: King, Lord Riverdale; debout: A. D. P. Heeney, O. D. Skelton.

Signing of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, Ottawa, 17 December 1939. Seated: King, Lord Riverdale; standing: A. D. P. Heeney, O. D. Skelton.




Malcolm MacDonald visitant les troupes canadiennes en Grande-Bretagne, en 1941, avant d'assumer le poste de haut-commissaire au Canada. Au centre en partant de g.: MacDonald, le lieutenant-général A. G. L. McNaughton, Vincent Massey.

Malcolm MacDonald visiting Canadian troops before taking up the appointment of High Commissioner in Canada, Britain, 1941. Left to right at centre: MacDonald, Lieut.-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, Vincent Massey.




Les premiers ministres Winston Churchill et W. L. Mackenzie King à Londres, septembre 1941.

Prime Ministers Winston Churchill and W. L. Mackenzie King in London, September 1941.



Des visiteurs éminents au quartier-général du Corps d'armée canadien, Headley Court (Surrey) 1941. De g. à d.: le général Sikorski, le lieut.-gén. A. G. L. McNaughton, Winston Churchill, le général Charles de Gaulle.

Distinguished visitors to Canadian Corps Headquarters, Headley Court, Surrey, 1941. Left to right: General Sikorski, Lieut.-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, Winston Churchill, Gen. Charles de Gaulle.



Le premier ministre d'Australie, R. G. Menzies, à une réunion du Cabinet, Ottawa, mai 1941. De g. à d.: J. G. Gardiner, Ernest Lapointe, Menzies, King, et le sénateur R. Dandurand.

Prime Minister of Australia R. G. Menzies at Cabinet Meeting, Ottawa, May 1941. From left: J. G. Gardiner, Ernest Lapointe, Menzies, King, Sen. R. Dandurand.



Le consulat canadien, Godthaab (Groenland). La plaque consulaire se trouve près de la porte.

Canadian Consulate, Godthaab, Greenland. The consular plaque is on the wall beside the door.



Défilé de troupes canadiennes dans les
rues de Hong-kong, le 16 novembre 1941.

Canadian troops marching through
streets of Hong Kong, 16 November 1941

INDEX

A

- Accords commerciaux: 15, 45, 67, 168, 212, 235-6, 244, 278, 384-92, 459, 461, 469-70, 475-7, 491-2, 501, 505-6, 973, 1004, 1007-8, 1028-31, 1111-2, 1120-5
voir aussi sous prêt-bail
- Accords commerciaux de guerre: 384-92
- Accords sur la défense: 159-60, 168, 209-16, 312, 316-8, 534-5, 641-7, 674, 694-706, 1033-5, 1060, 1078-80
voir aussi sous Axe; Charte de l'Atlantique; Commonwealth; coopération économique; coopération militaire; Corps de techniciens civils; Ogdensburg; Plan d'entraînement aérien
- Acte de l'Amérique du Nord britannique: 1100-1
- Acte général: 1083
- Aéronavale: 226, 266, 313, 839-42, 857-8, 867, 905-6
- Affaires extérieures, ministère des: 422, 433-4
voir aussi sous consuls; représentation diplomatique; voies de communication
- Afrique du Sud: 1-2, 6-7, 25-6, 192, 200, 205, 207, 211, 228, 249, 252, 254-5, 260, 262, 280, 358, 377-8, 429, 437
voir aussi sous Cabinet impérial de guerre; Commonwealth; Conférence impériale de guerre; Smuts; voies de communication
- Allemagne:
—commerce et accès aux matières premières: 304, 384-92, 538, 540, 960
—forces armées: 264, 266, 276, 281-2, 289, 302, 304, 309, 314, 386-7, 391-2, 533-4, 538, 541, 549, 571, 767, 788, 791, 884, 941, 953, 960, 965, 1035-6, 1045-7
—politique étrangère: 55, 135-7, 144, 164-5, 167-84, 190, 194, 252-3, 259, 263-4, 344, 346, 386-7, 391, 537, 972, 974, 976, 978, 987, 1084, 1097-8
—relations avec le Canada: 73, 124, 126, 134, 141-6, 188, 193
voir aussi sous armistice; Axe; crimes de guerre; guerre, théâtres des opérations; *Graf Spee*; Hitler; nazisme; Pacte russo-allemand; propagande; propositions de paix; puissances protectrices; règlement d'après-guerre; territoires occupés
- Aluminum Company of Canada*: 482, 947-8, 973, 976, 978-9, 981-2, 988, 993, 999, 1002, 1005, 1008, 1013-5, 1017-8, 1024, 1028
- Amérique latine: 45-89, 533-48, 1034, 1060, 1082, 1086, 1094, 1103-10
voir aussi sous les noms des pays; Union panaméricaine
- Antilles—*voir sous* Antilles britanniques; corps expéditionnaires; guerre, théâtres de la, Antilles; Pays-Bas
- Antilles britanniques: 277, 282, 411, 765-6, 768-9, 776, 781, 816-39, 877; relations avec le Canada 469-70, 475-7
- Antilles néerlandaises—*voir sous* Pays-Bas
- Approvisionnements de guerre:
—denrées alimentaires et matières premières 95, 231-47, 304, 376, 380-2, 384-95, 398, 401-4, 406-7, 458-68, 471-6, 478, 480-2, 491-4, 496, 498-500, 599, 743, 778-9, 789-90, 801-4, 816, 824-5, 947-1039, 1111-25
—matériel militaire 238, 289, 299, 376, 392-8, 459, 477-80, 483-90, 493-8, 500, 507-9, 550, 552, 555, 560-1, 563-4, 588-90, 596, 599-603, 743-4, 767, 776-7, 779, 781, 786, 788-9, 791-3, 795, 802, 804, 834, 839-41, 843-54, 858, 867-8, 872-3, 876-8, 883, 888-93, 895-906, 942-3, 945, 947-8, 1013-5, 1022
voir aussi sous blocus; contrebande; Groenland; marine marchande; missions d'achat; politique monétaire; prêt-bail, Loi du; règlement d'après-guerre; secours; *voir aussi sous* rubriques connexes, e.g. avions, blé, munitions, politique commerciale

- Argentine: 47-9, 51, 402, 461-2, 1082, 1084, 1119, 1122; relations avec le Canada 45-58, 67, 69-71, 73, 75, 77-80, 82, 85-6, 97, 139-41
voir aussi sous blé; puissances protectrices; Société des Nations; Union pan-américaine
- Armée: 11, 13, 381, 487, 553, 637-8, 664, 723-838, 913, 915, 931
voir aussi sous corps expéditionnaires; France; Grande-Bretagne
- Armements, limitation des: 174, 182, 198, 204, 1078-80
voir aussi sous désarmement; munitions
- Armements navals, suspension du Traité sur la limitation des: 1078-80
- Armistice franco-allemand: 118, 209, 305, 310-2, 315-23, 827
voir aussi sous France
- Aruba—*voir sous* Pays-Bas, Antilles
- Australie: 26, 98, 182, 186-7, 198-9, 206-7, 223, 252, 279-81, 287, 298, 309, 357, 369, 416, 437, 523, 559, 566, 571-2, 588, 608, 612-3, 615-6, 626-34, 639, 643-4, 653-6, 676, 678, 741, 1119, 1122; relations avec le Canada 1-3, 377-8, 414, 609, 613, 660-1, 665, 672
voir aussi sous Cabinet impérial de guerre; Commonwealth; Menzies; Plan d'entraînement aérien; prêt-bail, Loi du; propositions de paix; réunions inter-alliées; voies de communication
- Autriche: 173, 178, 194
- Aviation: 11, 13, 487, 551-4, 559, 561, 585-7, 592, 617, 620-1, 633, 641-52, 656-9, 663-4, 668-9, 672, 676, 694-706, 715-6, 718, 721, 765, 769, 776, 839-40, 842, 855-74, 878, 883-6, 889, 891, 894, 900-1, 903, 905-6, 911-12, 914-21, 923-9, 931, 936-8, 940, 942, 945
voir aussi sous Aéronavale; commandement de bombardement; corps expéditionnaires; escadrons de coopération avec l'armée; Grande-Bretagne; Plan d'entraînement aérien, unités distinctes de l'A.R.C.; reconnaissance
- Aviation royale du Canada—*voir sous* aviation
- Avions: production et approvisionnements 303, 487-9, 550, 552, 555-6, 562, 572, 588, 631, 654-5, 680-5, 693-7, 708, 710-1, 719-20, 776, 781, 876-8, 1039, 1053; venant des États-Unis 279-84, 287, 298, 588, 600-3, 693, 898-9, 1039, 1053
- Axe: 100, 118, 133, 138, 187, 221, 291, 316, 324, 328, 332-3, 444, 941, 942

B

- Balkans: 197, 350, 558, 944
- Bases militaires: aériennes 11, 271, 451-2, 697-8, 776, 789, 840, 867, 870, 879-80, 886, 888-90, 893, 899, 942, 944, 956, 1034, 1038-45, 1048-52, 1072; navales 11, 280, 282, 298, 303, 384, 453-5, 538, 541, 788, 792, 827, 839-40, 942, 944, 953-6, 963-4, 988, 1034
voir aussi sous Groenland; Irlande; lignes aériennes; Plan d'entraînement aérien; Terre-Neuve
- Bataille de Grande-Bretagne: 254, 264, 314, 434, 436, 714, 876-7, 884, 913, 941, 944
- Beaudry, Laurent: 23, 110, 112, 142-3, 870
- Beaverbrook, lord: 238, 442, 876
- Belgique: 194, 217-8, 248-52, 259, 267-75, 292-7, 680; relations avec le Canada 22-3, 42, 63, 125, 272, 274-5, 277, 285, 293-7, 301-2, 311, 321-2, 386
voir aussi sous gouvernements en exil; Léopold III; propositions de paix; réunions interalliées
- Benes, Edvard: 23-5, 27, 29, 31
- Berle, Adolf: 975, 977, 979, 982-3, 996, 1005-7, 1016-20, 1037, 1041-2, 1059-62, 1064-5, 1069-70
- Bessarabie: 161-4
- Blé: 46, 56, 235-6, 244, 382-3, 398, 401-4, 406-7, 461-8, 471-5, 479, 558, 599, 611, 1111-25
voir aussi sous Conférence internationale sur le blé; politique commerciale
- Blocus: 233, 235, 253, 282, 288-9, 304, 314, 325-6, 329, 346, 377, 387, 788, 953, 993
voir aussi sous contrebande; marine marchande; opérations navales
- Bohême: 126-7

Bois de coupe: 392, 394, 482, 778-9, 801-6

voir aussi sous corps expéditionnaires

Borden, sir Robert: 436

Breadner, vice-maréchal de l'Air L.S.: 692, 710, 716, 863, 869, 903, 938-9

Brésil: 50-4, 59-62, 67-71, 73, 75, 85-6, 148, 533

voir aussi sous Union panaméricaine

Brise-glaces: 953, 957, 968

Bulgarie: 326, 340-2, 350, 354

Burchell, C. J.: 3, 16-18

Bureau international du Travail: mesures prises en vue d'en éviter la fermeture durant la guerre 1073, 1091-9; statut diplomatique 1099-1102

C

Cabinet: 185, 192-3, 413, 418, 434, 446, 485, 559, 565, 596, 608, 614-5, 618-9, 625-6, 643, 652, 751, 819*n.*, 878

—Comité de guerre 13, 20, 241, 247, 362, 422, 477, 483, 586, 606, 616, 636, 649-52, 668, 704, 740, 743, 751, 769, 796, 804, 846, 890-1, 897, 916, 920, 925, 933-4, 940, 945, 1050-1

—Comité du blé 236, 1111, 1116

—Conseil d'urgence (Comité sur la politique générale) 552, 565, 586, 600, 604, 623

voir aussi sous Cabinet impérial de guerre

Cabinet impérial de guerre: (1917) 378, 380, 434-7; proposé (1940) 416, 431-51

voir aussi sous Conseil supérieur de guerre

Campbell, sir Gerald: ministre britannique à Washington, auparavant haut commissaire à Ottawa 1057-8

Caoutchouc: 385

Caraïbes—*voir sous* Antilles; guerre, théâtres des opérations

Chamberlain, Neville: et le blocus 387;

le Cabinet impérial de guerre 408-11; les conditions de la paix 167-8, 173,

176-7, 183, 194, 248, 250, 259, 263-4, 569; le financement de la guerre 479; le Plan d'entraînement aérien 549-51, 553,

586, 603, 622-4, 637, 641

Chars de combat et transport motorisé: 395-6, 743, 783, 786, 795

voir aussi sous guerre des chars

Charte de l'Atlantique: 237-47, 507, 511; texte 238-9

Chefs d'état-major: 553, 638, 939-45, 953, 955-7

Chili: 50, 64-82, 88

Chine: 139-40, 807, 809, 1084; relations avec le Canada 73, 89-94, 101-3

voir aussi sous guerre sino-japonaise; Hong-kong

Christian X du Danemark: 63, 950, 1034

Christie, Loring: 56, 422; et l'Argentine 47-8; les États-Unis comme puissance protectrice 125-6, 128; le Groenland 958-9, 963, 967-9, 971, 974-7, 982-3, 986, 998-9, 1041-2; les troupes canadiennes dans les Antilles 837-8

Churchill, Winston S.:

—premier lord de l'Amirauté 739, 846

—Premier ministre 442, 445-6, 450

—échanges avec Mussolini 278; Roosevelt 281, 284, 306, 898-9; Smuts 280, 283-4; Staline 351, 359

—propositions concernant la Conférence impériale et le Cabinet impérial de guerre 416, 419-20, 425-9, 444

—rencontres avec les dirigeants français 284, 286, 295, 301, 305-7, 313, 316-7; avec Roosevelt 237-9

—et l'appel à Roosevelt 283-4; les approvisionnements de guerre du Canada 478, 487; la campagne de France 276-7, 284, 295, 305-7, 313; les destroyers 846, 852; les écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques 884; l'effort de guerre des Alliés 313-4; l'Irlande du Nord 456; la livraison d'avions au Canada 714; la livraison d'avions en Grande-Bretagne 899, 901; le Plan d'entraînement aérien 692-3, 708; les priorités en matière de défense 943-5; les troupes canadiennes 779; les unités préposées pour les chemins de fer 750-1

voir aussi sous Charte de l'Atlantique

Clause facultative: 1074, 1082-3

- Colonies: 217, 264, 269-70, 275, 277, 317, 411, 765-9, 776, 781, 813, 816-38, 965-71, 997
- Comité Clayton-Knight: 914, 916-7
- Comité interallié des besoins de l'après-guerre: 216, 219, 231, 235, 242-3, 246
- Commandement de bombardement: 313-4, 487, 715-6, 721, 789, 885
- Commission géologique du Canada: 1031
- Commission de neutralité, républiques américaines: 539, 544
- Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense: 10, 22, 1036-8, 1042, 1072, 1107
- Commonwealth:
- consultations concernant:
 - approvisionnements de guerre et financement de la guerre 375-408, 458-513, 838-54, 876-83, 898-9
 - Cabinet impérial de guerre et conférences impériales 408-51
 - Charte de l'Atlantique 237, 240, 243-5, 247
 - consulats finlandais, détention des membres du personnel des 346-7
 - consuls ennemis, sort des 142-6, 148-9, 151, 156
 - corps expéditionnaires—*voir sous cette rubrique*
 - déclaration anglo-française 208-12
 - déclaration anglo-franco-polonaise 213-6
 - déclaration de guerre à la Finlande, à la Hongrie et à la Roumanie 349-73; à l'Italie 324-37
 - déclaration de solidarité des Alliés 216-31
 - défense de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Islande et des Antilles—*voir sous* corps expéditionnaires
 - défense du Groenland: base aérienne et installations 1039-40, 1042-3, 1048-57, 1062; mines de cryolithe 955, 957, 960, 964-5, 969-70, 985-7, 989-90, 996-1000, 1015; poste de radio 1066-7
 - échanges diplomatiques avec l'Inde 19-21—*voir aussi sous* hauts commissaires
 - entraînement aérien 549-722, 875-98
 - escadrons distincts de l'A.R.C.—*voir sous* Plan d'entraînement aérien
 - États baltes, statut des 158-63
 - études interalliées des politiques économiques d'après-guerre 232-5, 239, 242-3, 245-6, 512-3, 1111-9
 - évacuation des enfants britanniques 514-33
 - France, débâcle et appel à l'aide des États-Unis 279-91, 302-30
 - Gouvernement provisoire tchécoslovaque 32
 - Norvège, échanges diplomatiques avec la 35-7
 - objectifs de guerre 167-208, 248-63
 - Panama, protestation contre l'incident du *Graf Spee* et réponse 533-48
 - propositions françaises concernant les objectifs de guerre 184-7, 192, 196-208
 - propositions de paix, réponses aux: allemandes 167-84, 252-7; belges et néerlandaises 248-52; suédoises 258-63
 - protection des intérêts canadiens par le gouvernement suisse 138
 - techniciens de radar 907-39
 - coopération économique:
 - approvisionnements en denrées alimentaires et en matières premières 376, 380-2, 384-95, 401-4, 407, 458-513, 981, 1014-5, 1031
 - contribution au programme d'évacuation 516, 521, 523-4, 530-1
 - contrôle des vaisseaux ennemis et neutres 325-6, 327-8, 330, 338, 341, 384-92, 542-3
 - fabrication d'équipement: avions 487-9, 555-6, 562, 572, 588, 631; chars 395-6, 693-7, 719-20, 876-7; munitions 395-7, 459, 477, 483-92, 843-5; navires de guerre 246, 840, 847-53
 - financement de la guerre—*voir sous* corps expéditionnaires; Plan d'entraînement aérien; politique monétaire

- fourniture d'aérodromes et d'installations aéronavales 839-42, 880-3; défense des ports 843-5, 854—
voir aussi sous écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques; Plan d'entraînement aérien
- coopération militaire—*voir particulièrement sous* armée; coopération aérienne; coopération militaire; coopération navale; corps expéditionnaires; défense des côtes; écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques; Groenland, base de livraison d'avions, cryolithe, ravitailleurs; livraison d'avions; Plan d'entraînement aérien; radar; voies de communication
- Plan d'entraînement aérien—*voir sous cette rubrique*
- relations constitutionnelles 8-10, 12, 14, 16, 19-20, 378, 427, 431-4, 436-7, 440, 445-8, 453, 543-4, 547, 565, 581-5, 757-8, 1107; responsabilité des Dominions en ce qui touche leurs propres politiques 429, 437, 452-8, 667, 686
- représentation diplomatique 1-19
- unité diplomatique 53, 77, 90-1
- Communications: 118, 303, 434-5, 438, 441-2, 446-7, 634, 737-9, 926, 956, 972, 976, 978, 983-4, 1001, 1003, 1034, 1045-7, 1055, 1065
voir aussi sous météorologie, stations de; radar; voies de communication
- Communisme: 173-4, 188, 194, 202, 257, 320, 344, 360, 427, 1105
- Compagnie de la Baie d'Hudson: 991, 1012, 1027, 1030-1
- Compagnies de chemin de fer Canadien National et Canadien Pacifique: 749-51, 930, 933
- Conférence impériale (1932): 237, 241
- Conférence impériale de guerre, projetée: 408-30, 441
- Conférence internationale sur le blé: 235-6; 1111-25
- Conscription: 420-1, 424, 430, 456-8, 574
voir aussi sous recrutement
- Conseil national de recherches: 907-8
- Conseil supérieur de guerre: 216-24, 295, 432
- Conseils de guerre—*voir sous* Cabinet; Cabinet impérial de guerre; Conférence impériale (1932); Conférence impériale de guerre; Conseil supérieur de guerre; réunions interalliées; tarif préférentiel impérial
- Considérations stratégiques—*voir sous* Antilles britanniques; approvisionnements de guerre; bases; coopération militaire; cryolithe; défense des côtes; défense territoriale; Groenland; guerre, théâtres de la; guerre des chars de combat; guerre sous-marine; marine marchande; Pays-Bas, Antilles; pétrole
- Consuls, nominations et relations consulaires: 12, 30-2, 38, 50-1, 67, 72-3, 95-6, 105-24, 161, 356, 983, 992, 994-6, 1006, 1027; consuls ennemis 141-58, 338-42, 344-8; exequaturs 107-8, 994
voir aussi sous relations diplomatiques
- Contrebande: 116-7, 326, 384-5, 387-92, 1005, 1015, 1025, 1029
voir aussi sous marine marchande; matières premières
- Contrôle des changes—*voir sous* politique commerciale; politiques monétaires
- Contrôle des exportations—*voir sous* blocus; contrebande; politique commerciale
- Convois: 13, 528, 840, 842, 845, 850, 870, 906, 942, 944
- Coopération aérienne: 279-85, 549-722, 765, 769, 789, 839-42, 855-939, 949, 951, 1039-45, 1048-72
voir aussi sous avions; bases; Commonwealth; écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques; livraison d'avions; Plan d'entraînement aérien; radar
- Coopération économique:
 - Alliés 37, 197, 212, 375-408, 477-92, 496-501, 505-6, 555-6, 560-1, 563-4, 588-93, 603, 609-11, 619, 622, 631-4, 743-4, 778-9, 871-3, 886-91, 948, 963-4, 979, 990, 1013-4
 - Alliés-États-Unis 231-47, 253, 279-82, 304, 350, 385, 461-2, 486-90, 493-513, 522, 600-3, 682, 693, 707, 714, 852-3, 876-8, 905, 964, 976-9, 982, 984, 986, 995-6, 998, 1002, 1014-5, 1030, 1109, 1111-25

- Canada-États-Unis 108, 244, 421-2, 498-9, 556, 602, 694, 857, 875, 905, 973, 993, 1006-15, 1016-8, 1107
- entre pays de l'hémisphère 47, 49, 1106, 1110
- voir aussi sous* accords commerciaux; approvisionnements de guerre; Commonwealth; contrebande; Crerar, T. A.; politique commerciale; politique monétaire; règlement d'après-guerre; réunions interalliées
- Coopération militaire:
- Alliés, y compris le Commonwealth 10-11, 15, 16, 27, 33, 35, 38, 116, 209-47, 254, 265, 267, 279, 290-1, 295-314, 376, 408-58, 535-7, 549-945, 948-9, 954, 956, 960, 970, 984-7, 1025, 1031
- Alliés-États-Unis 13-4, 219-21, 240-7, 279-84, 413, 432, 444, 507-10, 535-40, 600-3, 697, 736, 814, 816-7, 852-3, 875-8, 890-2, 895, 899, 901-4, 906, 913-21, 929-37, 950, 958, 960-2, 974, 978, 983, 993, 996-8, 1021-3, 1040-72
- Canada-États-Unis 13, 14, 87, 116, 218, 221, 413, 421-3, 435, 595, 794, 824-5, 827, 829-31, 836-8, 942, 958-9, 961-3, 964-5, 969, 971, 996-1000, 1005, 1017, 1021-2, 1034-9, 1059-61, 1105
- Grande-Bretagne-États-Unis 220, 237-9, 281, 284, 350, 494, 506-10, 818-9, 823-5, 832, 875-6, 887-8, 890-2, 893-9
- Grande-Bretagne-France 197, 209-12, 276, 279, 283-4, 290, 295, 299-300, 306-7, 313-7, 321, 323, 535-6, 558, 623, 636, 820-3, 825, 827-8
- Grande-Bretagne-Pays-Bas 816-9, 823-4, 828, 832, 836
- entre pays de l'hémisphère 48, 70, 75-6, 218, 277, 509, 533-48, 818, 1032-5, 1059-60, 1103, 1105, 1109
- voir aussi sous* accords sur la défense; Axe; Commonwealth; corps expéditionnaires; échange de renseignements; guerre, théâtres de la; Panama, déclaration de; Plan d'entraînement aérien; prêt-bail, Loi du
- Coopération navale: 11, 13, 282, 298, 304, 306, 314, 438, 537, 542-3, 787-9, 792, 823-7, 839-54, 950, 960, 989, 998, 1000-1, 1005-8, 1015, 1019-20, 1022-7, 1038, 1041-2, 1047, 1054-5, 1064
- voir aussi sous* Aéronavale; Commonwealth; convois; défense des côtes
- Corps expéditionnaires:
- Armée: 1^o et 2^o Divisions 309-10, 639-40, 728-64, 780, 784-6, 792, 794-7; 3^o et 4^o Divisions 744, 764, 768, 770, 785, 792; bataillons d'infanterie 765, 767-70, 775, 781-5, 787-9, 791-8, 816-38, 877
- Aviation: commandement de bombardement 487, 715-6, 721, 789, 885; escadrons de coopération avec l'armée 744, 765, 863-6, 868-74, 885; escadrons de reconnaissance 789, 856-8, 867-70, 945; officier au Groenland 1063-4
- Marine: destroyers 327, 839, 845-8, 853, 940; dragueurs de mines 848, 850-4; escortes de convoi 13, 840, 842, 870, 942; navires marchands armés 840; Réserve navale volontaire 840-908
- affectation des effectifs: en Grande-Bretagne 487, 664-6, 715-6, 721, 736-8, 795-7, 799-806, 845-6, 885; en France 299, 309-10, 410, 740, 748, 757-8, 770-5, 779-80, 782-3, 873, 885-6; à Hong-kong 807-15; en Islande 776-89, 791-8, 877; à Terre-Neuve 11, 13, 327; en Norvège 753, 755, 759-60, 987; aux Antilles 765-6, 768-9, 776, 781, 816-38, 845-7, 857-8, 877
- Corps expéditionnaire canadien 742, 748, 763-4, 768, 785, 793, 796, 799, 800, 855, 885
- commandement 642-6, 649-52, 656-9, 662-5, 731, 740, 742, 745-8, 751-8, 761-4, 767-8, 773-4, 819-20
- coordination des politiques 381, 553, 723-4, 728
- équipement 726, 743, 745-6, 752, 767, 769, 776-7, 779, 783, 786-8, 790-3, 795, 797, 802, 824, 834, 843-5, 850, 854
- financement 725, 729, 743-4, 747-8, 751-2, 763, 768-70, 778, 790, 796, 799, 809, 815
- publicité 664, 728, 736-8, 771-2, 780, 800, 810-14
- unités techniques: chemins de fer 726-8, 730, 734, 741, 743, 745, 749-51, 768-70, 778, 782, 789, 800-1; services auxiliaires 725-6, 777, 786,

- 789, 798-9, 867; techniciens de radar 908, 912-3, 915, 937-9; unités forestières 726, 728, 730, 734, 751, 770, 778-9, 782, 789-90, 800-6
voir aussi sous aviation; Grande-Bretagne; Groenland; marine; Plan d'entraînement aérien; radar
- Corps de techniciens civils: 930-5
voir aussi sous corps expéditionnaires; unités techniques; main-d'œuvre; radar
- Corps permanente de justice internationale: 949, 1073, 1076, 1083, 1085, 1092
- Cranborne, vicomte: 32, 35, 431, 441, 806, 901-2, 915, 928
- Crerar, le général H.D.G.: 381, 406, 553, 733, 764
- Crerar, T.A., mission en Grande-Bretagne: 205, 375-408, 437, 479, 599, 603, 609-11, 619, 622, 646, 744, 863, 869, 871; Plan d'entraînement aérien 553; programme d'évacuation 515-8, 521, 523-7, 532
- Crimes de guerre: 211, 213-6, 259, 261-2, 264, 297, 386, 1080
- Cripps, sir Stafford: 278, 349
- Croix-Rouge: 969, 971, 989, 997
- Cryolithe—*voir sous* Aluminum Company of Canada; Groenland
- Cuba: 50
- D**
- Danemark: 63, 108, 114, 259, 265, 947-61, 963, 975-6, 980, 987, 1009, 1033-5, 1047; ministre aux États-Unis 965, 969-70, 972, 975-7, 981, 984, 993, 995-6, 998, 1006, 1030, 1034-5; relations avec le Canada 109-14, 128, 338, 386, 973, 975, 1035
voir aussi sous Christian X; Groenland; îles Féroé
- Darlan, amiral Jean: 306, 310, 318, 321, 323, 825
- Déclarations anglo-françaises: 208-12, 291, 312, 316-8
- Déclaration anglo-franco-polonaise: 210-16
- Déclaration en huit points de la Grande-Bretagne et des États-Unis—*voir sous* Charte de l'Atlantique
- Défense des côtes: 13, 313, 327, 451, 486, 542-3, 775-6, 788-9, 842-5, 847, 854, 905-6, 940, 942, 944-5, 1034; patrouilles américaines 968, 984, 998, 1001, 1006, 1019, 1041, 1054-5, 1064
voir aussi sous défense territoriale; Groenland; marine marchande; opérations navales
- Défense territoriale: 10-1, 486, 785-6, 792, 794, 824, 842, 845-6, 848, 876, 906, 911, 939-45, 1034
- de Gaulle, le général Charles: 242, 315-6
- Denrées alimentaires—*voir sous* approvisionnements de guerre; blé; Comité interallié; Commonwealth; règlement d'après-guerre; réunions interalliés; sucre
- Désarmement: 174, 179, 187, 198, 239
- Destroyers: 246, 303-4, 327, 765, 767, 839, 845-7, 851-3; des États-Unis 852-3
- Désy, Jean: 22-3, 52, 56, 61-3, 98, 125, 267, 272, 274-5, 277, 285, 293, 300, 311, 321-2
- de Valéra, Éamon: 452-4, 456-7, 1084
- Dettes de guerre: 506, 510, 512
- Dettes de guerre actives: 508-9, 584, 634, 889
voir aussi sous politique monétaire
- Doctrine Monroe: 254, 384, 595, 829-31, 950, 952-3, 956, 959, 965, 967, 984, 1032, 1059
- Dragueurs de mines: 847-51
- Droit international, violation du: 211, 213-6, 386-7, 391, 534, 536-8, 540, 542, 545, 949-50, 974, 979, 985, 1027
voir aussi sous Cour permanente de justice internationale; droits maritimes des pays belligérants; questions juridiques
- Droits de l'homme: 188-92, 203, 256-7, 538, 1089
voir aussi sous crimes de guerre; secours
- Droits maritimes des pays belligérants: 536-8, 540-1, 545-6, 1060

Dunkerque: 254, 290-1, 295, 313-4, 774-5
 Dupuy, Pierre: 22-3, 41-2, 63, 105, 118-21, 123, 301

E

Eberts, C.C.: 118-21

Échange de renseignements: 114-5, 234, 389, 508, 595, 825, 914, 918, 968, 971-3, 978-9, 983, 986, 997, 1007, 1009, 1031, 1041-2, 1045-7, 1050

Écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques au Canada: 709-10, 719, 878-84, 886-91, 896-7, 902, 904; entraînement de pilotes aux États-Unis 707-8, 875, 887-8, 890-8

Économie: 14-5, 381-3, 400-3, 413, 483-5, 495-7, 589, 597-9, 743-4, 763, 1013

voir aussi sous politique commerciale; politique monétaire

Eden, sir Anthony: 100, 246, 360, 398, 665-6, 766, 799-800, 871

Effort de guerre: 189, 194, 218-9, 306-7, 313-4, 399-401, 411-3, 417, 422-3, 430, 465, 483-5, 494-5, 517, 553, 570, 573, 589-90, 598, 607, 615, 622, 635, 664, 691, 743-4, 746, 765, 768, 779, 811, 850, 890, 897-8, 1108

Élection (1940): 210, 412, 414, 418, 422, 677, 740-1, 749-51

Embargo sur les armes (É.-U.): 556, 572, 588, 600

Escadrons de coopération avec l'armée: 744, 765, 769, 863-74, 885

Espagne: 318, 320-2, 326

États baltes: 158-65, 170, 358, 392, 394, 1088; relations avec le Canada 160-1, 164-5; souveraineté de l'U.R.S.S. 161-5

voir aussi sous Finlande

États-Unis:

—neutralité 55, 137-8, 314, 355, 384, 413, 417, 445, 542, 572, 588, 595, 600, 906, 920-1, 930, 965-71

—politique de défense et forces armées 11, 13-4, 75, 87, 219-21, 234, 237-9, 279-80, 284, 310, 507-10, 535-6, 542, 547, 588, 595, 707-8, 792, 807, 814, 818-9, 822, 829-31, 834-5, 853, 875, 899, 903, 906, 916, 918-20, 942, 944, 954, 967-8, 983-4, 997, 1006, 1018, 1033-9, 1041, 1059-61, 1072, 1105-6

—politique économique et commerce 97, 101, 231, 234, 237-9, 385, 387-8, 487-90, 502-5, 507-10, 556, 572, 588, 600-3, 693, 698, 970, 972-4, 981, 1006-7, 1026-31, 1106, 1112-25

—presse et opinion publique 284-5, 350, 355, 357, 458, 594-5, 687, 736-8, 914, 921, 951-2, 954, 958, 961, 965-6, 969, 975, 984, 987, 990, 1018, 1020, 1034-5, 1097

—puissance protectrice 124-38

—relations avec le Canada 70-1, 75, 101, 121-33, 188, 191, 220-1, 231, 283-4, 297-8, 411, 418, 421-2, 498-9, 501-2, 509-13, 547, 595, 693-4, 818-9, 824, 827, 830, 836-8, 852-3, 916-8, 930-5, 954, 973, 983-5, 995, 1016-72, 1119-25

—relations avec l'Allemagne 135-8, 543, 1036; l'Amérique latine 70-2, 75, 87, 533-48, 818, 1061, 1103-10; l'Australie 286, 298; le Danemark 949, 959, 972, 974, 980, 1033-5, 1059-61; les États baltes 162; la Finlande 344, 350, 352, 356-7, 361; la France 306-7, 487, 489, 830; la Grande-Bretagne 135-7, 231, 237-9, 302-3, 503-12, 535, 543, 819, 830, 832, 835, 958, 1058; le Groenland 105, 107, 108, 981, 983-4, 997, 1025, 1034, 1059-61; l'Italie 135-8, 154; le Japon 97, 101, 103-4, 417; les îles Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 117; la Société des Nations 190, 1091

voir aussi sous avions; Berle, Adolf; Charte de l'Atlantique; coopération économique; coopération militaire; Doctrine Monroe; écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques; Extrême Orient, crise en; Groenland; Hyde Park, déclaration de; Hull; neutralité; Ogdensburg, Déclaration d'; Plan d'entraînement aérien; prêt-bail, Loi du; puissances protectrices; radar; Roosevelt; Union panaméricaine; volontaires

Étrangers: 142, 144, 153, 338, 341-2, 356, 362-4, 366, 421, 794

Évacuation: dirigeants français 301, 321; enfants britanniques 303, 514-33; gouvernement belge 285, 321-2; gouvernement néerlandais 275; missions diplomatiques 22-3, 272, 274-5, 277, 285, 293, 300-1, 308, 311, 321-3; services de

la Société des Nations et du B.I.T.
273-4, 1091-3, 1095-1102

Extrême-Orient, crise en: 90, 97-8, 100-1,
103, 139-41, 278, 304, 351, 413, 417,
444-5, 785, 792, 807-15, 819, 854, 942,
965-71, 973, 997

voir aussi sous Guerre sino-japonaise;
Japon

F

Fascistes au Canada: 147, 149, 153, 155-
6, 158

Finlandais au Canada: 344, 351, 355-6,
362-4, 366

Finlande: 161, 164-5, 344, 349-73, 505,
1080-2, 1084-8; relations avec le Canada
132, 164-5, 343-73

voir aussi sous guerre, déclaration de la;
Guerre russo-finlandaise; puissances pro-
tectrices; Société des Nations

Foster, le brigadier W.W.: 99-100, 102,
104

France:

—colonies 317, 823

—débâcle de la France 118, 255, 278-
80, 286, 288, 289, 293-4, 299-323,
528, 680, 774-5, 778, 780, 788-9,
792

—forces de défense 27, 284, 286, 290-1,
299-300, 302, 306, 309-10, 775;
flotte 306, 310, 312-3, 318-9, 321,
323, 528, 537, 823, 825, 950; garni-
son à Aruba 821-38

—moral 255, 257, 276, 294, 307-8, 319,
639

—relations étrangères 116, 121, 184-7,
192, 197-8, 208-12, 214-5, 312, 316-
22, 386, 535-6, 623, 1085-6

—relations avec le Canada 15, 22-3, 56,
105-6, 116-21, 278, 300, 308, 319-20,
322-3, 421, 435, 1079

voir aussi sous armistice; corps expédi-
tionnaires; Darlan; déclarations anglo-
françaises; de Gaulle; France Libre;
Gamelin; objectifs de guerre; Pétain;
réunions interalliées; Reynaud; Saint-
Pierre-et-Miquelon; Vichy

France Libre: 15, 217, 219, 233, 241-2,
321

Fraser, P.: 285, 288, 353-4, 420, 426, 428,
443, 450-1

G

Gamelin, le général M. G.: 284, 757n.

Garanties—*voir sous* règlement d'après-
guerre; U.R.S.S.

Gardiner, James: 432, 437-8, 441, 475

Gendarmerie royale du Canada: 116, 121,
146-7, 149-52, 339, 341, 348, 363, 956-
7, 1000, 1016-7, 1019, 1021, 1024

Gouvernements alliés—*voir sous* coopé-
ration économique; coopération militaire;
gouvernements en exil; Plan d'entraîne-
ment aérien; propositions de paix; ré-
unions interalliées

Gouvernements en exil: 21-45, 73, 216-
36, 241-3, 245-7, 275, 292, 294, 300,
311, 321-2

voir aussi sous États baltes; évacuation;
France Libre; représentation diplomati-
que; réunions interalliées

Gouverneur général: 670

Graf Spee: 533-7, 539, 541, 544, 546

voir aussi sous Panama; zones neutres,
eaux latino-américaines

Grande-Bretagne:

—accords bilatéraux 375-408, 477-90,
496-501, 519-24, 629, 677-8, 690,
700-6, 740-53, 767-70, 799-800, 806-
10, 838-74, 896-7, 902, 925-7, 936-7,
1000, 1015, 1026

—forces militaires et politique de dé-
fense 254, 288-90, 303-5, 313-4, 528,
558, 788-9, 792, 845-6, 876-8, 884,
905, 915, 941, 944, 1025, 1065-7

—aviation 279, 281, 283-4, 289, 300,
313, 549-50, 558, 571, 622, 680,
682-3, 714, 776, 876-8, 883, 895,
905-6

—corps expéditionnaires 266, 271,
279, 280, 284, 286, 290, 292, 306,
309, 314, 726, 759, 771, 773-4, 776,
780, 782, 784, 792, 798, 809-13,
816-38, 944, 987, 1046

—marine 266, 280, 282-3, 289, 298,
304, 313, 438, 527-8, 533-9, 787-9,
816, 823, 825, 944, 950, 983

—politiques économiques et financières
212, 231-2, 237-47, 330, 380, 383,
400-1, 404-5, 458-68, 470-5, 493-4,
502-5, 513-4, 518, 521, 585, 588-9,
597, 603, 614, 616, 622-3, 631-2, 634,
639, 752, 888, 896, 986-8, 1112-4,
1124-5

- presse et publicité 168, 194, 236, 378-9, 426, 438, 449, 450, 497, 515, 530, 592, 759-60, 771, 811
- relations étrangères avec l'Allemagne 135-7, 141-2, 144-5, 172-7, 179-81, 197, 199-200, 255, 259, 263-4, 292; la Belgique 292, 311-12; la Bulgarie 340-1; l'Espagne 278; les États baltes 163; les États latino-américains 533-48; les États-Unis 237-47, 253, 350, 385, 462, 493-9, 501-10, 527, 823, 892, 930; la Finlande 344-7, 349-50, 361, 364, 505; la France 184, 186, 196-8, 200, 207-16, 311-2, 315-7, 323, 380, 505, 830; la Hongrie 341, 350-70; l'Irlande 451, 455-6; l'Islande 63, 783, 787, 949; l'Italie 154, 278, 324-33; le Japon 139, 389; le Mexique 85, 87; la Norvège 543; la Pologne 1078; la Roumanie 341, 350; les îles Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 116-7; la Société des Nations 1073-4, 1086; la Tchécoslovaquie 23-4, 27-30; l'U.R.S.S. 95-6, 168, 278, 352, 359-60, 389, 1078, 1085-6
- voir aussi sous* Bataille de Grande-Bretagne; Cabinet impérial de guerre; Chamberlain; Charte de l'Atlantique; Churchill; Commonwealth; Conférence impériale (1932); Conférence impériale de guerre; coopération économique; coopération militaire; évacuation; Groenland; Keynes; Massey; objectifs de guerre; Plan d'entraînement aérien; prêt-bail, Loi du; réunions interalliées; tarif préférentiel impérial; voies de communication
- Grèce: 33-4, 42, 217, 228-30, 326, 350, 558
- voir aussi sous* réunions interalliées
- Groenland:
 - accords commerciaux et financiers 962, 985, 995, 1002, 1004, 1011-2, 1028, 1030-1; contrôle de la production de cryolithe 962, 985, 992, 995, 1010-5, 1022, 1024, 1029-31
 - accord relatif à la défense avec les États-Unis 1033-6
 - base de livraison d'avions, installations météorologiques et radiophoniques 697-8, 949, 951, 1039-45, 1048-72; poste de radio britannique 1065-7; relevé 1060-5, 1067-70
 - bases militaires 950-1, 956, 984, 988, 1018, 1034, 1038, 1041, 1043, 1050
 - Commission du Groenland 965, 969-74, 976, 978-83, 993, 1003, 1009; participation du Canada 1009, 1027, 1030
 - G.R.C., rôle de la 956-7, 1000, 1016-7, 1019, 1021, 1024
 - Indes orientales néerlandaises, lien avec le cas des 965-71
 - installation des dispositifs de défense et patrouille des côtes 1034, 1038, 1045-7, 1054-5, 1057
 - intérêts au Groenland, du Canada 108, 110, 411, 949-55, 961-7, 970-1, 976, 981, 984, 988-93, 1012-5, 1019; des États-Unis 818, 952, 955, 958-9, 961, 966, 968-9, 973, 981, 983, 989, 993, 996, 1001, 1003, 1005-18, 1025, 1031-9, 1059-61, 1067-8, 1072; de la Grande-Bretagne 960, 985-7, 989-90, 992, 1000, 1021, 1025, 1039-40, 1042-43, 1049-53, 1062, 1065, 1070-1
 - mines de cryolithe, protection des 108, 948-9, 953-61, 979, 983, 985-7, 989-90, 993, 995-6, 1012, 1017-8, 1021-2, 1032, 1036, 1038, 1060; armes à Ivigtut 994, 996-9, 1003, 1006, 1033, 1054-5; navires ravitailleurs *Nascopie* et *Julius Thomsen* 982, 984, 986-7, 991, 993, 995, 999-1005, 1011, 1015-26, 1028-9; occupation proposée 951, 953, 955-7, 960, 968, 979, 986, 988-95, 1000, 1005, 1016, 1019, 1024
 - relations avec le Canada 105-14, 974, 977-8, 981, 983, 992, 995-7, 1001-4, 1006, 1008, 1010, 1012, 1027-8, 1030-1, 1046-7,
 - secours et approvisionnements 968-9, 971, 980-1, 984, 989-91, 993, 995, 997, 1000, 1006, 1011, 1028
 - souveraineté 107-10, 949-50, 955-56, 958, 963, 972-3, 977, 994, 996, 1001, 1004, 1006, 1009-10, 1025, 1033-4, 1059, 1061; proposition de tutelle 951, 961-4
- voir aussi sous* Aluminum Company of Canada; Compagnie de la Baie d'Hudson; Danemark
- Guerre, déclaration de la: à l'Allemagne 143; à la Finlande, la Hongrie et la Roumanie 349-73; à l'Italie 274, 324-37; au Japon 140-1, 351, 355

Guerre, théâtres des opérations:

- aux Antilles et sur l'Atlantique Sud 277, 350, 528, 533-4, 537-8, 540-1, 544, 546, 765, 768, 816-38, 845-6, 873
 - en Asie et sur le Pacifique 90, 100, 103, 139-40, 278, 304, 413, 444, 807, 809, 811-2, 814, 941-2
 - sur l'Atlantique 11, 13-4, 306, 313, 417, 527-8, 532-3, 714, 843, 845-54, 905-6, 941-5, 973, 996, 1018
 - en Europe: front est, États baltes et Balkans 96, 126-7, 164-5, 167-9, 170, 172-9, 182, 194-5, 197, 202, 264, 268, 343-4, 351, 353-4, 360, 365, 369, 392, 394, 427, 549, 558, 944, 1074, 1080-4
 - en Europe: front ouest 194, 248, 265-323, 410, 413, 483, 528, 640, 680, 714, 753, 755, 767, 770-2, 780, 783, 788, 791-2, 873, 876-7, 884, 913, 941, 954, 961, 975-6, 1097, 1105, 1108
 - Groenland, Islande et îles Féroé 254, 413, 767, 770, 781-2, 784, 786-9, 791-2, 818, 948-9, 955, 961, 984-5, 996, 1021-2, 1024-5, 1032, 1034, 1036, 1045-7, 1059, 1065, 1068
 - sur la Méditerranée, au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique 221, 226, 254, 264, 304, 310, 317, 325, 327-30, 416, 687, 944, 1074
- voir aussi sous* coopération militaire; corps expéditionnaires; défense des côtes; guerre des chars de combat; Guerre russo-finlandaise; Guerre sino-japonaise; guerre sous-marine; opérations aériennes; opérations navales
- Guerre des chars de combat: 218, 276, 289-90, 314, 791-2
- Guerre russo-finlandaise: 132-3, 164-5, 344, 349-53, 358-62, 364, 1080-2, 1084-8
voir aussi sous guerre, déclaration de la
- Guerre sino-japonaise: 90, 102-3, 139-40, 1088
- Guerre sous-marine: 839, 841, 843, 845, 847, 905, 908, 944-5, 953, 960, 963, 989, 1018, 1065-6
- Gustave V de Suède: 258

H

Haakon VII de Norvège: 37, 543

Haïti: 82-3

Halifax, lord: 30, 167, 301, 356-7, 367, 444, 639, 957, 1117-9

Hauts commissaires: 1-21, 377, 434-6, 614, 684, 735-6

Havane, Conférence de La—*voir sous* La Havane

Heeneey, Arnold: 596, 605, 607, 642-5, 667-71

Hitler, Adolf: 167-9, 170-80, 183-4, 189, 194-5, 197, 199, 252, 254, 257, 265, 291, 313, 558, 566, 569, 941

Hong-kong: 469, 807-15

Hongrie: 165, 326, 341-3, 350-9, 364-73

voir aussi sous guerre, déclaration de la

Hongrois au Canada: 351-2, 355-6, 366

Howe, C. D.: 441, 651, 663, 669, 693-4, 696, 878

Hull, Cordell: et la déclaration de la guerre contre la Finlande 356-7; le Groenland 958-9, 962, 967-70, 975, 984-5, 989, 993, 1031-2; le Japon 101, 104; le libre échange 502-3; les troupes alliées aux Antilles 819, 827, 832-3; relations avec W. L. M. King 307, 421

Hyde Park, Déclaration de: 75, 499, 1105

I

Îles Féroé: 254, 948-9, 955, 985

Immigration, politique relative à l': 122-3, 527, 1098-9

Inde: 209, 437, 440, 686-9, 715, 813; relations avec le Canada 18-21, 1079

Indes orientales néerlandaises—*voir sous* Pays-Bas

Indiens (de l'Inde) au Canada: 19-21, 688

Industrie, production de guerre: 299, 351-2, 355, 376, 393, 395-7, 421, 438, 467, 479, 482-5, 490, 494-7, 500, 555, 588, 602, 631, 682, 694, 801, 851-2, 874, 947-8, 973, 976, 978-9, 981-2, 991, 995, 1002, 1005, 1013-5

Institut canadien des Affaires internationales: 1104

Iran: 132-3, 282

Irlande: 192, 437, 451-8; relations avec le Canada 1, 7-10, 377, 414

Irlande du Nord: 456-8

Islande: 63, 948-9, 978; occupation par les Alliés 767, 769, 776-7, 781-89, 791-5, 797-8, 818, 877, 955, 1024-5; intérêts américains en Islande 818, 906, 959

Italie: 130-2, 135-7, 152, 170, 187, 190, 217, 267-8, 291, 295, 324-30, 332-3, 845; relations avec le Canada 73, 147-58, 193, 324-37, 386, 390, 1079

voir aussi sous Axe; fascistes au Canada; Mussolini; guerre, déclaration de la

J

Jamaïque: 411, 768, *passim* 816-38, 857-8

Japon: 20, 103, 139-41, 187, 190, 278, 351, 355, 358, 361, 792, 807, 819, 942, 967-71, 983, 997; relations avec le Canada 97-107, 148, 150-1, 421, 430

Japonais au Canada: 99, 421, 794

K

Keenleyside, H. L.: et les consulats aux États-Unis 121-4; la coopération économique 231, 478-83; le Groenland 950-3, 956, 980-2, 988-93, 1003, 1005-15, 1026-8, 1050-2; le Japon 97-8; les propositions de paix 255-7; les relations anglo-américaines 501-5; les îles Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 115; Terre-Neuve 10-3, 117

Kelly, J. H.: 8-10, 455-6

Keynes, J. M.: 502-5

King, W. L. Mackenzie:

—comme Premier ministre 411, 421-5, 427, 445, 614

—déclarations et discours 6, 50, 202, 244, 307, 342-3, 440, 449, 478-9, 665, 770

—message à Reynaud 307-8

—relations avec Roosevelt 283, 307, 418, 421-2, 499, 975, 980, 982-4, 995

—visite en Grande-Bretagne 239-40, 243, 448-50

—et le blé 462, 464-5; le Cabinet 614, 618; le Cabinet impérial de guerre 433-5, 439, 444-9; la Conférence impériale de guerre 409-11, 416, 420-5, 427-8; la coopération pour la défense 638-40; le Corps expéditionnaire canadien 800; la défense territoriale 939-42; les destroyers 851-3; l'effort de guerre 400-1, 589, 593, 615, 897; l'évolution de la guerre 289-90, 307-8; l'Extrême-Orient 445, 814; le Groenland 114, 954, 984, 989-93;

l'Inde 19-21; l'Irlande 9, 452-3, 456-7; l'Islande 770; Léopold III 296-7; les objectifs de guerre 169-71, 177, 180, 185-93, 569; le Plan d'entraînement aérien 553-7, 559, 565, 569, 576-7, 586, 591-3, 596-9, 605-6, 612-8, 623-7, 638, 660-1, 691; la production d'avions 694, 713; la production de guerre 477, 483-6; le radar 907; le recrutement 916-7, 919; les relations diplomatiques 38, 40-3, 50, 65, 67-8, 73, 95, 102; les responsabilités empêchant des voyages à Londres 410-3, 417-8, 420-5, 427-30, 443; les troupes 740, 771, 780, 800; l'Union panaméricaine 1103-4, 1108-10; les unités de l'A.R.C. 649-52, 656-9; les unités préposées aux chemins de fer 750; la visite de Menzies 415-6; les zones neutres, les eaux latino-américaines 543

Kirkwood, K. P.: 12, 106-8, 110, 123, 272, 1023-6

L

Labrador—*voir sous* Terre-Neuve

La Havane, Conférence et Loi de: 1034, 1060, 1103-4

Lapointe, Ernest: 192, 420, 424, 427, 554, 651

Laureys, Henry: 7

Laurier, sir Wilfrid: 436

Léopold III de Belgique: 63, 172, 248-52, 292-7, 300-2

Lettonie—*voir sous* États baltes

Lignes (routes) aériennes: 695, 697-8, 942, 949, 951, 1039, 1048, 1050-1, 1069, 1070-2

Livraison d'avions: 697-8, 886-90, 893, 897-9, 901-4, 917, 1039-45, 1048, 1053, 1070-2

voir aussi sous Groenland, bases; Terre-Neuve, bases

Lloyd George, D.: 437

Loi sur les crédits de guerre: 3, 4, 7-8, 18, 118, 601; États-Unis 497

Loi sur les mesures de guerre: 18, 118, 363, 676, 733, 842

voir aussi sous Ordre général d'interdiction

Loi des Traités de paix: (1919) 1100-1; (1941) 1102

Loi sur les troupes présentes (Commonwealth britannique): 582-3, 671-2, 675-6, 678, 689, 731-3, 735, 747, 773, 809-10, 819-20, 879

Lois de neutralité: 384, 387, 572, 916-7, 920-1

voir aussi sous embargo sur les armes

Lothian, marquis de: 277, 958-9, 965-7, 1112-3

Luxembourg: 229, 231, 242, 259, 269

M

Macdonald, J. S.: 26n., 435-7

MacDonald, Malcolm: accessibilité aux écoles de pilotage aux États-Unis 893, 897-8; blé 1116-7; compagnies forestières 804; écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques 900-4; Groenland 1067, 1069; Plan d'entraînement aérien 717-8; radar 936-7

Macdonnell, R. M.: 837

Mahoney, M. M.: et l'Argentine 47, 49; le blé 1119, 1122-3; le Chili 69; la débâcle de la France 310; les États baltes 163; le Groenland 1008, 1018, 1061, 1064-5; le Mexique 85, 88; Premier consul général aux États-Unis 123; les puissances protectrices 130, 132

Main-d'œuvre: 552, 801-3, 805, 931

voir aussi sous recrutement

Mandchourie: 139-40, 391

Marine: 11, 13, 115, 220, 246, 306, 327, 438, 765-6, 839-40, 842-54

voir aussi sous coopération navale; États-Unis; France; Grande-Bretagne; opérations navales

Marine marchande: 103, 115-6, 377, 380, 393-4, 407, 460, 462, 469, 482, 493, 711-2, 845, 850, 982, 984, 986, 991, 995, 1000-3, 1005, 1015-9, 1021-6, 1029; des pays alliés 37, 233-5, 242, 350, 386; des pays ennemis 103, 303, 325-6, 338, 344, 363, 386, 538, 542-3, 545-6, 816, 1045-7; des pays neutres 325-6, 329, 350, 385-6, 545, 969, 974; protection de la 324, 327, 527-8, 540-1, 788, 845, 850, 867, 906, 913, 942-5, 951, 968, 1021, 1031, 1038; *Julius Thomsen* 969, 974, 992, 998, 1000, 1005, 1015, 1025-6; torpillage des navires 391, 532, 714; transport des troupes 728, 795, 797, 799, 801, 805, 817, 894

voir aussi sous armements navals, Traité sur la limitation des; blocus; contrebande; convois; coopération navale; défense des côtes; Groenland; guerre sous-marine; opérations navales

Massey, Vincent: haut commissaire 439; et les Antilles 816-7; l'Argentine 46; le Cabinet impérial de guerre 439-41; les corps expéditionnaires 739-40, 742, 746-8, 761, 771-2, 780, 799; les destroyers 845-6; les États-Unis 137; les évacués de Grande-Bretagne 524-5, 529-31; la Finlande 352; la France 276, 278, 283, 309-10, 319; le Groenland 960, 985-6; l'Inde 18-19; l'Islande 788; la Norvège 36; les objectifs de guerre 167-8; le Plan d'entraînement aérien 551-2, 554, 603, 614; les relations avec la Grande-Bretagne 378-9; les réunions économiques 384-6; la Tchécoslovaquie 24-5; les techniciens de radar 921-2, 924; le transfert du B.I.T. au Canada 1097; l'Union soviétique 95-6; la Yougoslavie 43-4

Matières premières—*voir sous* approvisionnements de guerre; blé; bois de coupe; cryolithe; métaux; papier; pétrole; règlement d'après-guerre

McGreer, E. D.: 98n., 100, 103, 105-7, 109, 123

McNaughton, le général A. G. L.: 480, 740-2, 745, 749, 753-6, 760-4, 770-2, 774-5, 783, 796, 804-5

Menzies, Robert: 182, 186-7, 192, 198-9, 223, 279-81, 283-8, 298, 309, 415-6, 428, 437, 441-3, 445, 449, 653, 657, 660-1, 666-7

Métaux: 385, 388-93, 460, 481-2, 947-8, 950, 955, 963, 972-3, 981, 984, 1013-5, 1036

Météorologie, stations de: 697, 1031, 1039-72; contrôle par l'ennemi des 1045-7

Mexique: 50, 71-2, 82-8

Ministres, nomination et échanges de: 22-3, 34-94

Missions d'achat: 477-501, 686, 876
voir aussi sous Crerar, mission en Grande-Bretagne; Plan d'entraînement aérien; politique commerciale, mission commerciale

Moffat, J. Pierrepont: 70-2, 101, 104, 117, 154, 157, 916, 1120, 1123

Molotov, V. M.: 349

Moravie: 126-7

Munitions: 238, 376, 395-7, 459, 477, 480, 483-90, 496-7, 500, 587, 590, 743, 767, 769, 776-7, 781, 783, 786, 788-9, 791-2, 824, 834, 839-40, 843-5, 847, 942
voir aussi sous approvisionnements de guerre; industrie

Mussolini, B.: 172, 257, 267, 278, 326

N

Nazisme: 142, 188-9, 195, 201, 224, 238-9, 253, 255, 267, 306-7, 362, 451, 455, 538, 958, 1105

Neutralité—*voir sous* États-Unis; Irlande; Lois de neutralité; Panama, Déclaration de; pays neutres; zones neutres

Norvège: 35, 37, 38, 231, 259, 265-7, 271, 278, 386, 410, 753, 755, 758-60, 788, 791, 948-50, 987, 996; Mission maritime 37-8; relations avec le Canada 34-9, 41, 127, 129; stations météorologiques au Groenland 1046-7
voir aussi sous corps expéditionnaires; gouvernements en exil; Plan d'entraînement aérien

Nouvelle-Zélande: 25, 205-7, 252, 285, 288, 353-4, 369, 450-1, 523, 543, 561-2, 566, 588, 615-6, 629-30, 643, 646-7, 665, 685-6, 688, 741; relations avec le Canada 1, 4-5, 377-8, 414, 461, 491, 501, 505-6, 613, 626-34, 661-2
voir aussi sous Commonwealth; Fraser; Plan d'entraînement aérien; prêt-bail, Loi du; réunions interalliées; voies de communication

O

Objectifs de guerre: 167-247, 558, 566, 569-70, 1074; français 184-7, 192-208
voir aussi sous propositions de paix

Ogdensburg, Déclaration d': 75, 1105

Opérateurs de radio: 887, 911, 926
voir aussi sous communications

Opérations aériennes: 254, 264, 270-2, 274, 276-7, 279, 281, 283, 289, 304, 313-4, 549, 558, 571, 680, 714, 736, 788, 873-4, 876-7, 884, 905-6, 913, 944, 1034, 1059, 1065, 1068

Opérations navales: 266, 280, 306, 391, 417, 532-46, 714, 788, 843, 845, 849, 853-4, 944, 1045-7

voir aussi sous blocus; contrebande; corps expéditionnaires; guerre sous-marine

Opinion publique: 189-91; blé 462-3; coopération aérienne 573-4, 595, 618, 644, 652, 662, 699, 880; défense territoriale 876; effectifs terrestres 554; évacués britanniques 525-6; Groenland 954, 973, 981, 989-90; Islande 786, 792; sacrifices financiers, étendue des 400-3, 592, 598-9, 743-4, 764; Union panaméricaine 1105

voir aussi sous États-Unis; Grande-Bretagne; presse et publicité

Ordre général d'interdiction: 338

P

Pacte russo-allemand: 168, 170-1, 174, 178, 194, 571, 1084

Palestine—*voir sous* Société des Nations, Commission permanente des mandats

Panama, Déclaration de (1939): 533-48, 1061, 1103

Pape Pie XII: 172, 271

Papier et papier-journal: 14-5, 385, 390, 395, 482

Parlement: 210, 362-3, 414, 416, 418, 422, 447, 454, 469, 524-5, 592, 616-8, 1100
voir aussi sous Cabinet; élection; King, W. L. M.

Passeports: 121, 122

Pays-Bas: 38, 194, 231, 248-52, 259, 267-75; territoires d'outre-mer 217, 264, 269-70, 275; Indes orientales néerlandaises 275, 278, 818-9, 965-71, 983, 997; Antilles 816-38; relations avec le Canada 22-3, 42, 125, 386

voir aussi sous gouvernements en exil; pétrole; propositions de paix; réunions interalliées; Wilhelmine

Pays neutres, rôle des, et relations avec eux: 147, 161, 170, 176-7, 180, 189-91, 201, 258, 260, 285, 325-6, 384-92, 402-3, 413, 437, 556, 951, 1014, 1060, 1080, 1084, 1086, 1124

voir aussi sous les noms de pays; accords commerciaux de guerre; marine marchande; puissances protectrices

Pearson, Lester B.: et les arrangements financiers avec la Grande-Bretagne 399; le blé 1111-2, 1123; le Cabinet impérial de guerre 431-2; la Charte de l'Atlantique 241, 245-6; l'identification des unités canadiennes en campagne 761; la Loi du prêt-bail 509-10, 512; l'Union pan-américaine 1106-7

voir aussi passim les documents signés au nom du haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne

Pêcheries: 11, 14-5, 327, 1055

Pérou: 71-2, 88-9

Pétain, le maréchal: 278, 295, 301, 317-8

Pétrole: 274, 289, 304, 314, 385, 391, 816, 821, 824-5, 839

Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth britannique: 549-722

—accord, memorandum d' 605-6, 609-19, 622-34, 636, 641-7, 665, 667-71, 673-4; article 15 694-706; continuation du Plan 716-8; élargissement du Plan 707-10; 715-6, 890, 898

—Inde 686-9, 715

—mise en vigueur du Plan:

—administration 552, 580-5, 596, 617, 620-2, 624-5, 629, 632, 636, 671-9, 681, 685, 688, 693, 707, 879, 881, 886-7, 897

—aérodromes, écoles et équipement 550-2, 554-7, 584-5, 588-9, 631, 654-5, 677, 680-5, 690, 698, 708-9, 711-4, 716, 719-22, 877-8, 880, 883, 886-7, 889, 895-6

—personnel 550, 552-3, 557-8, 584-5, 586-93, 596-9, 602, 605-9, 614, 624, 631-4, 648, 656, 659, 689, 695-7, 744, 887, 926

—Mission de liaison aérienne britannique (Mission Riverdale) 479, 551, 557, 563-4, 568, 570, 575, 579-81, 585, 586-93, 596-603, 605-7, 610-28, 636, 640-52, 656-9, 662-5, 667-71, 673-4, 872

—participation australienne et néo-zélandaise 560-2, 565-6, 571-2, 578-80, 582, 585, 589-90, 596-7, 606, 608-9, 612-3, 615-6, 622, 625-34, 639-43, 646-7, 653-6, 660-2, 665, 670-1, 675-6, 678, 685-6, 688, 887; accord Australie-Grande-Bretagne 653-6, 660, 666

voir aussi sous continuation, et administration, du Plan, ci-haut, et publicité, ci-bas

—publicité 551, 557-8, 566-78, 594-5, 605, 611, 637, 640, 644, 646-7, 653-7, 660-1, 664, 666-7, 699

—questions de politiques:

—coûts et financement 400, 406-7, 551, 555, 557-8, 584-93, 596-9, 602, 605-9, 614, 616, 624, 631-4, 648, 651, 656, 659, 689, 695-7, 744, 887, 926

—étendue et priorité de l'entreprise 550, 558-9, 566, 568, 570-1, 573, 575-6, 589, 597-8, 601, 607, 610, 615-9, 622, 624-5, 635-7, 639-41, 643, 645, 683, 691-3, 716-7, 763, 890

—unités distinctes de l'A.R.C. outre-mer 551, 554, 559, 581, 587, 590-1, 593, 596, 602, 633, 641-52, 656-9, 662-4, 668-9, 690, 695-706, 715-6, 856, 859-63, 864-6

—rôle des États-Unis 550, 556, 572, 588, 594-5, 680, 682, 693, 695, 698, 707, 714, 720

voir aussi sous aviation; écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques; radar

—Terre-Neuve 604, 607-8

Politique commerciale: 14-5, 108, 199, 231-47, 304, 375-408, 458-513, 1011-5, 1028, 1108

—contrôle des permis et Règlements sur le commerce avec l'ennemi 97, 101, 325-8, 338, 341-2, 384-92, 538, 542, 1028

—contrôles et contingentements à l'exportation et à l'importation 73, 97, 330, 377, 381-2, 385, 388-90, 459-60, 466-7, 469-70, 1012-4, 1028, 1111; surplus 235-6, 1112-4, 1116-7, 1122-3

—mission commerciale en Amérique latine 89, 1108

—tarifs 11, 14, 237, 239, 241, 253, 469-70, 476, 492, 502-5, 507, 509-13

voir aussi sous accords commerciaux; accords commerciaux de guerre; approvisionnements de guerre; Commonwealth; contrebande; coopération économique; marine marchande; missions d'achat; politique monétaire; tarif préférentiel impérial

Politique monétaire: budget 14, 70, 73, 382-3, 400, 482, 494-5, 497, 598-9, 631-4, 648, 743-4, 763, 768, 871-2, 1013; contrôle des crédits 330-1; cours et contrôle des changes 45, 73, 339, 342, 363, 405-6, 496, 498-501, 513, 613, 1012, 1028, 1030-1; exemptions fiscales 1100-2; financement de la guerre 381-3, 398-401, 404-8, 464-8, 478-82, 488-90, 493-501, 557-8, 584-93, 599, 610, 619, 631-4, 659, 695-6, 739-40, 743-4, 747-8, 769, 799, 809, 855, 871-2, 896, 902, 925-7, 999; gel des valeurs actives 103, 331, 363; prêts et obligations 467, 482, 497-8, 600-3; prix 14-5, 401-4, 406-7, 464-5, 480-4, 489; soutien des évacués 516, 521, 523-5, 530-1

voir aussi sous coopération économique; corps expéditionnaires; dettes de guerre; dettes de guerre actives; Grande-Bretagne; Plan d'entraînement aérien; prêt-bail, Loi du; politique commerciale; Société des Nations

Pologne: 167-77, 180, 190, 194-5, 210-1, 214-6, 218, 220, 242, 250, 255, 335-6, 549; relations avec le Canada 39-43, 126, 193

voir aussi sous crimes de guerre; Déclaration anglo-franco-polonaise; gouvernements en exil

Power, C. G.: 553, 878-83, 886, 888-90, 902-3, 926

Première Guerre mondiale: 141-2, 185, 196-7, 378, 380, 427, 434-7, 485, 510, 644, 763, 769, 779, 799

Presse et publicité: 191, 218, 332, 379, 415, 454, 516, 533, 592, 605, 639-40, 660-1, 664-5, 671, 687, 699, 734, 736-9, 753, 755, 758-9, 771, 780, 786, 792, 796, 810-4, 883, 902, 920-1, 930, 954, 973, 1045, 1063, 1103, 1110

voir aussi sous corps expéditionnaires; États-Unis; Grande-Bretagne; King, W. L. M.; opinion publique; Plan d'entraînement aérien; propagande

Prêt-bail, Loi du et projet d'Accord: 238, 493-501, 503, 506-13, 888, 890

Production de guerre—*voir sous* approvisionnements de guerre; industrie

Propagande: 35, 146-7, 182, 189-91, 211, 213, 229, 236, 245, 252-3, 255, 595, 759, 1105, 1124

voir aussi sous objectifs de guerre; presse et publicité

Propositions de paix et commentaires: allemands 167-84, 252-4, 259, 264, 566; américains 172; belges et néerlandais 194, 248-52, 543; britanniques 167-215 *passim*; canadiens 193; sud-africains 254-7; suédois 258-64

voir aussi sous armistice; Charte de l'Atlantique; objectifs de guerre; règlement d'après-guerre

Puissances protectrices: Argentine 55, 139-41; États-Unis 55, 124-38, 292, 297-8, 300, 365, 367-8; Japon 148, 150-1, 154-5, 157; Suède 161-2; Suisse 134-8, 140-1, 143

voir aussi sous voies de communication

Q

Questions constitutionnelles—*voir sous* Christian X; Commonwealth; Groenland; guerre, déclaration de la, à la Finlande; Léopold III; Loi sur les troupes présentes

Questions juridiques: 270, 340-2, 362-3, 581-5, 651, 676, 678, 685, 688, 751-60, 788, 879, 881, 916-7, 920-1, 930, 932, 935, 971, 1010

voir aussi sous crimes de guerre; droit international; questions constitutionnelles

Questions nationales—*voir sous* conscription; défense territoriale; effort de guerre; King, W. L. M.; opinion publique; presse et publicité

R

Radar: 907-39

—enrôlement 923, 927, 930-1, 934

—financement 909, 917, 923, 925-9, 933-4, 939

—formation dans une école de radar 928-9, 935-7; aux universités 922-5, 937-9

—personnel: pour la recherche 907-10, 924-5; techniciens 910-35, 937-9; forces armées des États-Unis 935-7

—recherche d'instructeurs 912, 921-2

—recrutement au Canada 908-11, 922-3, 926-8; aux États-Unis 913-21, 923, 925-7; Corps de techniciens civils des États-Unis 929-35

Ralston, le colonel James L.:

—ministre des Finances 613; sur le financement de la guerre 406-7; et le financement du Plan d'entraînement aérien 553, 586, 588, 590-3, 601-2, 605, 615, 618, 623-6, 640, 643, 651-2, 662-4, 668-70, 693-708 *passim*; le prix du blé 472, 475

—ministre de la Défense 694; et l'affectation des troupes 754, 808; les approvisionnements d'avions 693-8; le Corps expéditionnaire canadien 799-800; la déclaration de Lothian 966; les escadrons de l'A.R.C. 694-5, 885-6; le Groenland 695, 698, 953-4, 1049, le Plan d'entraînement aérien 707-10; le radar 915; sa visite en Grande-Bretagne 437, 441, 693-706, 799, 885-8, 891, 1049

Read, J. E.: et l'administration du Plan d'entraînement aérien 581-5; le Comité Clayton-Knight 916; la déclaration de la guerre 340-2, 362-3; les écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques 879; la participation de l'Inde au Plan d'entraînement aérien britannique 686-88; le statut du B.I.T. 1099-1102; la suspension des accords sur la limitation des armements navals 1079; les troupes présentes 583, 585, 819, 860-1; la zone neutre 542

Reconnaissance: 710, 776, 789, 839, 842, 856-8, 867-70, 893, 940, 942, 945

voir aussi sous aéronavale; défense des côtes; Groenland, relevé

Reconnaissance diplomatique: 23-32, 158-65

Recrutement: 24, 27, 279, 570, 580, 749-51, 764, 785, 790, 799, 804, 840, 908-35 *voir aussi sous* Comité Clayton-Knight; conscription; main-d'œuvre; volontaires

Réfugiés: 197, 297, 301, 515-6, 518

Règlement d'après-guerre: crimes de guerre, punition des 213-4; denrées alimentaires, approvisionnements en matières premières, commerce 197, 225, 231-47, 502-4, 506-7, 510, 512-3, 1114, 1122-5; garanties 180-5, 194-7, 201, 220-1, 225, 238, 359-60; reconstruction 186-7, 189-99, 201-4, 218-26, 256-7, 282, 409, 436, 1106

voir aussi sous Charte de l'Atlantique; Comité interallié des besoins de l'après-guerre; dettes de guerre; dettes de guerre actives; objectifs de guerre; Première Guerre mondiale; réunions interalliées

Reid, Escott: et l'Amérique latine 74-5, 87-9; le blé 1119; la Chine 89-90; la Conférence de La Havane 1105-8; le Groenland 1007-15, 1041-4, 1053-9, 1061-2, 1064; le recrutement aux États-Unis 916; Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 117

Relations diplomatiques, rupture des: 141-58, 324-73

voir aussi sous Bureau international du Travail; consuls; évacuation; guerre, déclaration de la

Relations fédérales-provinciales: 16, 19, 21, 99, 421, 516-7, 521, 532, 1101

Renaud, P.: 272

Réparations: 177, 184, 201

Représentation diplomatique: Commonwealth 1-23, 439; états d'Europe 33-44, 94-96; états d'Extrême-Orient 89-94, 97-104; états d'Amérique latine 45-88;

voir aussi sous consuls; hauts commissaires; ministres; reconnaissance diplomatique; Service des délégués commerciaux

République dominicaine: 81-2

Réunions interalliées: 216-47, 496-501, 510

Reynaud, P.: 295, 301, 305-8, 312, 315-8

Riddell, W. A.: 4-5

Ritchie, C. S. A.: 246-7

Rive, A.: 273*n.*, 1078*n.*, 1088*n.*

Robertson, Norman A.: et le blé 1119-20; le Cabinet impérial de guerre 444; la Charte de l'Atlantique 239, 244; la coopération économique 235-6, 496; les denrées alimentaires 244; les dragueurs de mines 853-4; les écoles d'entraînement aérien britanniques 890-2; l'entraînement aérien 890-2; les États baltes 164-5; le Groenland 947, 1057-8, 1062, 1065-71; Hong-kong 815; le Japon 101; la livraison d'avions 898, 900-2, 904; les missions diplomatiques 40-1,

45-6, 55-6, 70-93; prêt-bail, la Loi du 511-2; protocole, les entorses au 1118-9; le radar 920-9, 932-4, 937-9; Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 117; Terre-Neuve 13-6; les unités forestières 805; la zone neutre 542

Rogers, Norman McL.: ministre de la Défense 747; administration du Plan d'entraînement aérien 586-7, 590-1, 593, 600-1, 605, 609, 615, 620-1, 623-6, 636, 639, 641, 693, 695-6, 698; Antilles 816; commandement 749, 760-4; Division canadienne 410-11, 727; unités de l'A.R.C. en campagne 590-1, 593, 641-2, 644-5, 657-9, 663-4, 668-9; visite en Grande-Bretagne 409-12, 477-8, 761-5, 816, 846

Roi George VI: 543

voir aussi sous guerre, déclaration de la; représentation diplomatique

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: Président 257, 281, 418; appel des Alliés à 253, 279-84, 287-8, 298, 306-7, 1103-4, 1125; appel à Hitler en vue de pourparlers visant à éviter la guerre 172; Keynes 503-5; King, W. L. M. 101, 418, 422, 499, 975; le ministre danois 972; ré- unions et échanges avec Churchill 237-9, 306, 898-9; Reynaud 306-7

—déclarations et opinions: le blé 1125; la coopération États-Unis-Grande-Bretagne sur les questions économiques et la défense 237-9, 506-9, 512; la Doctrine Monroe 972; l'effort de guerre des Alliés 298, 305-7; le libre échange 503-5; la livraison d'avions et les bases aériennes 898-9, 903, 1056; la Loi du prêt-bail 506-9; les opérations des Alliés aux Antilles 277; au Groenland 983, 1016, 1046-7; le recrutement des techniciens de radar 920, 930

voir aussi sous Charte de l'Atlantique; Hyde Park; King, W. L. M.; Ogdensburg; prêt-bail, Loi du; Voie maritime du Saint-Laurent

Roumanie: 165, 220, 326, 338-42, 350, 353-9, 364-73, 386

voir aussi sous guerre, déclaration de la

Royaume-Uni—*voir sous* Grande-Bretagne

S

Sabotage: 148, 158, 538, 545, 816, 818, 823-5, 835, 956, 968, 978, 986, 989, 1000, 1019

Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon: 11, 15, 16, 413; relations avec le Canada 115-21

Sanctions: 97, 101, 103, 190, 538, 546, 1088

Secours: 235-6, 961, 969, 971, 980-1, 984, 989, 995, 1015, 1088, 1114, 1122-3
voir aussi sous approvisionnements de guerre; Groenland; règlement d'après-guerre

Service des délégués commerciaux: 21, 51, 73, 75, 122-3, 127, 129, 150, 386, 389-90, 977

Simon, sir John: 398-9, 401-2

Skelton, Oscar D.: sous-secrétaire 422; et les accords sur la limitation des armements navals 1079; le Cabinet impérial de guerre 437-8; la Conférence de La Havane 1104; les dragueurs de mines 848; les États-Unis et les Antilles 818-9, 822, 828-9, 834-5; la France 185; le Groenland 948-50, 962-3, 983-4, 987-93, 1029, 1045-7; l'Inde 19-20; l'Irlande 452-5; l'Italie 153-6, 327-8; les objectifs de guerre 176-7, 185, 193-5, 205-8, 218, 260-1; le Plan d'entraînement aérien 557-9, 571-4, 585-6, 591-3, 639-40, 648-9, 671; les relations diplomatiques 34, 36-7, 48, 50-1, 64-5, 85-6; Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 116; Terre-Neuve 12; le transfert du B.I.T. 1098; l'Union panaméricaine 51; l'Union soviétique, expulsion de la Société des Nations 1087-8; la zone neutre panaméricaine 542-3

Smuts, le général Jan Christiaan: 6, 200, 254-7, 260, 280, 283, 300, 426-9, 436, 443

Société des Nations: 189-90, 204, 218, 273-4, 1073-1102

—amendement du pacte 1074, 1083, 1089, 1101

—arbitrage 204, 1086

—Commission permanente des mandats 1074

—communication de la position du Canada sur l'Acte général 1083; sur la clause facultative 1074, 1083; sur le traité sur la limitation des armements navals 1078-80

- Comité spécial, participation du Canada 1084-6
 - élections à la Cour permanente de justice internationale 1073, 1076, 1085
 - évacuation du bureau canadien 273-4
 - financement 1073, 1075, 1077-8, 1081, 1085, 1089-90, 1092-5, 1098
 - Italie, retrait de l' 1087
 - questions politiques: agression allemande 1074; appel de la Finlande et expulsion projetée de l'U.R.S.S. 1080-2, 1084-8
 - Secrétaire général: clause facultative et Acte général 1082-3; démission 1089-96; règlements de l'assemblée 1074-82, 1085, 1088
 - transfert des services techniques de la S.D.N. et du B.I.T. 1091-1102
- voir aussi sous* Bureau international du Travail; Cour permanente de justice internationale; évacuation; traités

Spaak, Paul-Henri: 294-7, 300, 302

Staline, Joseph: 194, 349, 351, 357, 359, 361, 366

Statut de Westminster: 378, 431-40, 565, 757, 758

Stone, T. A.: 594n.

Sucre: 476, 482, 491-2, 1111-2

Sudètes, région des: 173, 178

Suède: 132, 161-2, 258-64, 350, 386

voir aussi sous pays neutres; propositions de paix; puissances protectrices

Suisse: 134-8, 140-1, 326, 385-6, 388, 1080, 1084, 1086, 1097; relations avec le Canada 134, 386

voir aussi sous pays neutres; puissances protectrices

T

Tarif préférentiel impérial: 237, 239, 241, 465, 469, 476, 507, 509-12

voir aussi sous politique commerciale

Tarifs—*voir sous* tarif préférentiel impérial; politique commerciale

Tchécoslovaquie: annexion 168, 172-3, 175, 190, 194, 218; relations avec le Canada 23-32

voir aussi sous gouvernements en exil; reconnaissance diplomatique

Terre-Neuve: bases 11, 13, 854, 899, 901-2, 942, 944, 951, 954, 1039, 1060, 1072; Plan d'entraînement aérien 604, 607; relations avec le Canada 10-8, 117, 901-2

voir aussi sous Commonwealth; livraison d'avions et lignes aériennes; Ogdensburg, Déclaration; Plan d'entraînement aérien

Territoires occupés—*voir sous* les noms des pays; crimes de guerre; gouvernements en exil; guerre, théâtres de la; objectifs de guerre; réfugiés

Thaïlande: 140

Towers, Graham: 45, 48, 382, 398-405, 407, 472, 605, 612-4, 618-9, 622

Traités, communication de la position du Canada—*voir sous* Société des Nations, communication

Traités, violation des—*voir sous* États baltes; Guerre russo-finlandaise; objectifs de guerre; Société des Nations

Traités et accords:

—Accord États-Unis-Danemark sur la protection du Groenland 1033-5

—Accord naval anglo-polonais 1078-80

—Accord naval anglo-soviétique 1078-80

—Acte général 1083

—Convention de La Haye 214-5

—pacte, Société des Nations 190, 1074, 1081, 1083, 1089, 1101

—Pacte de non-agression soviéto-finlandais 1080

—Traité d'assistance mutuelle Lettonie-U.R.S.S. 159-60

—Traité sur la limitation des armements navals 174, 1078-80

—Versailles 182, 185, 201, 257, 1099-1100

voir aussi sous accords commerciaux; accords commerciaux de guerre; Charte de l'Atlantique; Pacte russo-allemand; Plan d'entraînement aérien; Société des Nations; Voie maritime du Saint-Laurent

Transport—*voir sous* chars de combat; corps expéditionnaires; livraison d'avions; marine marchande

Turgeon, W. F. A.: 57-8, 79-81

Turquie: 132-3, 329, 350, 558

U

Union panaméricaine et conférences panaméricaines: 51, 539, 544-5, 953; projet de participation du Canada 1103-10
voir aussi sous La Havane

Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques:

—approvisionnement 95, 278, 1124-5

—invasion par l'Allemagne 96, 165, 194, 343-5, 349, 351-2, 427

—invasion des États baltes et de la Finlande 132-3, 158-65, 170, 344, 351, 353, 358, 1080, 1082; garanties proposées à la Finlande 359-60; intention de déclarer la guerre à la Finlande, la Hongrie et la Roumanie 349-73; renvoi de l'appel de la Finlande à la Société des Nations 1080-2, 1084-8

—invasion de l'Europe de l'Est 168, 170-1, 174, 176, 185, 187, 194, 202, 204

—menace japonaise 351, 355-6, 361, 1088

—relations avec le Canada 73, 90, 94-7, 133, 165, 352, 355, 362, 364

voir aussi sous communisme; Grande-Bretagne; Guerre russo-finlandaise; Guerre sino-japonaise; Pacte russo-allemand; Staline

Unités forestières—*voir sous* corps expéditionnaires, unités techniques; papier; bois de coupe

Unités préposées aux chemins de fer—*voir sous* corps expéditionnaires, unités techniques

V

Vanier, le lieutenant-colonel Georges: 22-3, 56, 98, 278, 299, 300, 308, 319-20, 322, 757-8

Vichy: 15, 56, 116, 118-21, 421, 830, 1105

Voie maritime du Saint-Laurent: 422

Voies de communication: avec l'Allemagne 167, 318, 320, 983; les Alliés 34, 42-3, 217; l'Amérique latine 51-3, 59, 72, 78, 81-6, 89; la Chine 90, 140; les États-Unis 413, 914, 917, 966, 1048, 1118-9; la Finlande 360, 364-5, 367, 368; la Grande-Bretagne et le Commonwealth 10-11, 15, 221, 375, 377, 381, 414, 418, 427, 431-2, 434, 438, 440, 614, 618, 634, 645, 667, 671, 724, 735-6, 744, 756, 804, 938; le Groenland 107-8, 972, 994, 996, 998, 1010; l'Islande 783, 787; la Norvège 34-8; Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 117; la Société des Nations 1091, 1093; la Suisse 134-5, 140; l'U.R.S.S. 94, 96; Vichy 118-9

voir aussi sous communications; corps expéditionnaires, commandement; puissances protectrices; relations diplomatiques; représentation diplomatique

Volontaires: 161, 279, 750-1, 861, 892, 908-35; des États-Unis 284, 911, 915-6, 918-20, 929-35

voir aussi sous corps expéditionnaires; main-d'œuvre; radar; recrutement

W

Weygand, le général M.: 284, 295, 299, 305, 310, 312, 321

Wilgress, L. D.: 387, 389-90, 399

Wilhelmine, reine des Pays-Bas: 172, 248-52, 543

Wrong, Hume: 52, 94, 164, 387, 399, 1008, 1035, 1038, 1064, 1069-70, 1072, 1077-8, 1094-5, 1097

Y

Yougoslavie: 41, 43-5, 229-31, 326, 343, 350

Z

Zone de combat, définition américaine: 384

voir aussi sous contrebande

Zones neutres: eaux latino-américaines 533-48; opinions de la Norvège 543

voir aussi sous Doctrine Monroe

INDEX

A

- Air co-operation: 279-85, 549-722, 765, 769, 789, 839-42, 855-939, 949, 951, 1039-45, 1048-72
see also air ferrying; aircraft; bases; British air training schools; British Commonwealth air training plan; Commonwealth; radar
- Air ferrying: 697-8, 886-90, 893, 897-9, 901-4, 917, 1039-45, 1048, 1053, 1070-2
see also Greenland, Newfoundland bases
- Air force: 11, 13, 487, 551-4, 559, 561, 585-7, 592, 617, 620-1, 633, 641-52, 656-9, 663-4, 668-9, 672, 676, 694-706, 715-6, 718, 721, 765, 769, 776, 839-40, 842, 855-74, 878, 883-6, 889, 891, 894, 900-1, 903, 905-6, 911-12, 914-21, 923-9, 931, 936-8, 940, 942, 945
see also army co-operation squadrons; bomber command; British Commonwealth air training plan, separate R.C.A.F. units; expeditionary forces; fleet air arm; Great Britain; reconnaissance
- Air operations: 254, 264, 270-2, 274, 276-7, 279, 281, 283, 289, 304, 313-4, 549, 558, 571, 680, 714, 736, 788, 873-4, 876-7, 884, 905-6, 913, 944, 1034, 1059, 1065, 1068
- Air routes: 695, 697-8, 942, 949, 951, 1039, 1048, 1050-1, 1069, 1070-2
- Aircraft: production and supply 303, 487-9, 550, 552, 555-6, 562, 572, 588, 631, 654-5, 680-5, 693-7, 708, 710-1, 719-20, 776, 781, 876-8, 1039, 1053; from U.S. 279-84, 287, 298, 588, 600-3, 693, 898-9, 1039, 1053
- Aliens: 142, 144, 153, 338, 341-2, 356, 362-4, 366, 421, 794
- Allied governments—*see* British Commonwealth air training plan; economic, military co-operation; Governments-in-exile; inter-allied meetings; peace proposals
- Aluminum Company of Canada: 482, 947-8, 973, 976, 978-9, 981-2, 988, 993, 999, 1002, 1005, 1008, 1013-5, 1017-8, 1024, 1028
- Anglo-French declarations: 208-12, 291, 312, 316-8
- Anglo-French-Polish declaration: 210-6
- Anglo-U.S. eight-point declaration—*see* Atlantic Charter
- Argentina: 47-9, 51, 402, 461-2, 1082, 1084, 1119, 1122; relations with 45-58, 67, 69-71, 73, 75, 77-80, 82, 85-6, 97, 139-41
see also League of Nations; Pan-American Union; protecting powers; wheat
- Armaments, limitation of: 174, 182, 198, 204, 1078-80
see also disarmament; munitions
- Armistice, Franco-German: 118, 209, 305, 310-2, 315-23, 827
see also France
- Arms embargo (U.S.): 556, 572, 588, 600
- Army: 11, 13, 381, 487, 553, 637-8, 664, 723-838, 913, 915, 931
see also expeditionary forces; France; Great Britain
- Army co-operation squadrons: 744, 765, 769, 863-74, 885
- Aruba—*see* Netherlands, West Indies
- Atlantic Charter: 237-47, 507, 511; text 238-9
- Australia: 26, 98, 182, 186-7, 198-9, 206-7, 223, 252, 279-81, 287, 298, 309, 357, 369, 416, 437, 523, 559, 566, 571-2, 588, 608, 612-3, 615-6, 626-34, 639, 643-4, 653-6, 676, 678, 741, 1119, 1122; relations with 1-3, 377-8, 414, 609, 613, 660-1, 665, 672
see also British Commonwealth air training plan; channels of communication; Commonwealth; Imperial War Cabinet; inter-allied meetings; lease-lend; Menzies; peace proposals

Austria: 173, 178, 194
 Axis: 100, 118, 133, 138, 187, 221, 291,
 316, 324, 328, 332-3, 444, 941, 942

B

- Balkans: 197, 350, 558, 944
 Baltic States: 158-65, 170, 358, 392,
 394, 1088; relations with 160-1, 164-5;
 U.S.S.R. sovereignty 161-5
see also Finland
- Bases, military: air 11, 271, 451-2, 697-8,
 776, 789, 840, 867, 870, 879-80, 886,
 888-90, 893, 899, 942, 944, 956, 1034,
 1038-45, 1048-52, 1072; naval 11, 280,
 282, 298, 303, 384, 453-5, 538, 541,
 788, 792, 827, 839-40, 942, 944, 953-6,
 963-4, 988, 1034
see also air routes; British Common-
 wealth air training plan; Greenland;
 Ireland; Newfoundland
- Battle of Britain: 254, 264, 314, 434,
 436, 714, 876-7, 884, 913, 941, 944
- Beaudry, Laurent: 23, 110, 112, 142-3,
 870
- Beaverbrook, Lord: 238, 442, 876
- Belgium: 194, 217-8, 248-52, 259, 267-
 75, 292-7, 680; relations with 22-3, 42,
 63, 125, 272, 274-5, 277, 285, 293-7,
 301-2, 311, 321-2, 386
see also Governments-in-exile; inter-
 allied meetings; Leopold III; peace
 proposals
- Belligerent maritime rights: 536-8, 540-1,
 545-6, 1060
- Benes, Edvard: 23-5, 27, 29, 31
- Berle, Adolf: 975, 977, 979, 982-3, 996,
 1005-7, 1016-20, 1037, 1041-2, 1059-62,
 1064-5, 1069-70
- Bessarabia: 161-4
- Blockade: 233, 235, 253, 282, 288-9, 304,
 314, 325-6, 329, 346, 377, 387, 788,
 953, 993
see also contraband control; naval
 operations; shipping
- Bohemia: 126-7
- Bomber Command: 313-4, 487, 715-6,
 721, 789, 885
- Borden, Sir Robert: 436
- Brazil: 50-4, 59-62, 67-71, 73, 75, 85-6,
 148, 533
see also Pan-American Union
- Breadner, Air Vice-Marshal L.S.: 692,
 710, 716, 863, 869, 903, 938-9
- British air training schools in Canada:
 709-10, 719, 878-84, 886-91, 896-7, 902,
 904; pilot training in U.S. 707-8, 875,
 887-8, 890-8
- British Commonwealth Air Training Plan:
 549-722
- Agreement, Memorandum of 605-6,
 609-19, 622-34, 636, 641-7, 665, 667-
 71, 673-4; Article 15 694-706; con-
 tinuation of plan 716-8; expansion of
 plan 707-10, 715-6, 890, 898
 - Australian and New Zealand parti-
 cipation: 560-2, 565-6, 571-2, 578-
 80, 582, 585, 589-90, 596-7, 606, 608-
 9, 612-3, 615-6, 622, 625-34, 639-43,
 646-7, 653-6, 660-2, 665, 670-1, 675-
 6, 678, 685-6, 688, 887; Australia-
 U.K. agreement 653-6, 660, 666
see also continuation of plan, above,
 and administration, publicity, below
 - British Air Liaison (Riverdale) Mis-
 sion: 479, 551, 557, 563-4, 568, 570,
 575, 579-81, 585, 586-93, 596-603,
 605-7, 610-28, 636, 640-52, 656-9,
 662-5, 667-71, 673-4, 872
 - India 686-9, 715
 - Newfoundland 604, 607-8
 - operation of plan:
 - administration 552, 580-5, 596, 617,
 620-2, 624-5, 629, 632, 636, 671-9,
 681, 685, 688, 693, 707, 879, 881,
 886-7, 897
 - aerodromes, schools and equipment
 550-2, 554-7, 584-5, 588-9, 631,
 654-5, 677, 680-5, 690, 698, 708-9,
 711-4, 716, 719-22, 877-8, 880, 883,
 886-7, 889, 895-6
 - personnel 550, 552-3, 557-8, 584-5,
 586-93, 596-9, 602, 605-9, 614, 624,
 631-4, 648, 656, 659, 689, 695-7,
 744, 887, 926
 - policy issues:
 - costs and financing 400, 406-7, 551,
 555, 557-8, 584-93, 596-9, 602,
 605-9, 614, 616, 624, 631-4, 648,
 651, 656, 659, 689, 695-7, 744, 887,
 926

- scale and priority of undertaking
550, 558-9, 566, 568, 570-1, 573,
575-6, 589, 597-8, 601, 607, 610,
615-9, 622, 624-5, 635-7, 639-41,
643, 645, 683, 691-3, 716-7, 763,
890
 - separate R.C.A.F. units overseas
551, 554, 559, 581, 587, 590-1, 593,
596, 602, 633, 641-52, 656-9, 662-4,
668-9, 690, 695-706, 715-6, 856,
859-63, 864-6
 - publicity 551, 557-8, 566-78, 594-5,
605, 611, 637, 640, 644, 646-7, 653-7,
660-1, 664, 666-7, 699
 - U.S. role 550, 556, 572, 588, 594-5,
680, 682, 693, 695, 698, 707, 714, 720
see also air force; British air training
schools; radar
 - British North America Act: 1100-1
 - British West Indies: 277, 282, 411, 765-6,
768-9, 776, 781, 816-39, 877; relations
with 469-70, 475-7
 - Bulgaria: 326, 340-2, 350, 354
 - Burchell, C.J.: 3, 16-18
- C**
- Cabinet: 185, 192-3, 413, 418, 434, 446,
485, 559, 565, 596, 608, 614-5, 618-9,
625-6, 643, 652, 751, 819*n.*, 878
 - Emergency Council (Committee on
General Policy) 552, 565, 586, 600,
604, 623
 - War Committee 13, 20, 241, 247, 362,
422, 477, 483, 586, 606, 616, 636,
649-52, 668, 704, 740, 743, 751, 769,
796, 804, 846, 890-1, 897, 916, 920,
925, 933-4, 940, 945, 1050-1
 - Wheat Committee 236, 1111, 1116
see also Imperial War Cabinet
 - Campbell, Sir Gerald: as British Minister
in Washington, formerly High Comis-
sioner in Ottawa 1057-8
 - Canadian Institute of International Affairs:
1104
 - Canadian National and Canadian Pacific
Railways: 749-51, 930, 933
 - Caribbean—*see* war, theatres, Caribbean
also British West Indies; Netherlands
 - Chamberlain, Neville: on air training
plan 549-51, 553, 586, 603, 622-4, 637,
641; blockade 387; Imperial War
Cabinet 408-11; peace terms 167-8, 173,
176-7, 183, 194, 248, 250, 259, 263-4,
569; war financing 479
 - Channels of communication: with Allies
34, 42-3, 217; China 90, 140; Finland
360, 364-5, 367, 368; Germany 167, 318,
320, 983; Greenland 107-8, 972, 994,
996, 998, 1010; Iceland 783, 787; Latin
America 51-3, 59, 72, 78, 81-6, 89;
League of Nations 1091, 1093; Norway
34-8; St. Pierre and Miquelon 117;
Switzerland 134-5, 140; U.K. and Com-
monwealth 10-11, 15, 221, 375, 377,
381, 414, 418, 427, 431-2, 434, 438,
440, 614, 618, 634, 645, 667, 671, 724,
735-6, 744, 756, 804, 938; U.S.A. 413,
914, 917, 966, 1048, 1118-9; U.S.S.R.
94, 96; Vichy 118-9
see also communications; diplomatic
relations, representation; expeditionary
forces, command; protecting powers
 - Chiefs of Staff: 553, 638, 939-45, 953,
955-7
 - Chile: 50, 64-82, 88
 - China: 139-40, 807, 809, 1084; relations
with 73, 89-94, 101-3
see also Hong Kong; Sino-Japanese War
 - Christian X, King of Denmark: 63, 950,
1034
 - Christie, Loring: 56, 422; on Argentina
47-8; Canadian troops in West Indies
837-8; Greenland 958-9, 963, 967-9, 971,
974-7, 982-3, 986, 998-9, 1041-2; U.S.
as protecting power 125-6, 128
 - Churchill, Winston S.:
—as First Lord of the Admiralty 739,
846
—as Prime Minister 442, 445-6, 450
—exchanges with Mussolini 278; Roose-
velt 281, 284, 306, 898-9; Smuts 280,
283-4; Stalin 351, 359
—meetings with French leaders 284,
286, 295, 301, 305-7, 313, 316-7; with
Roosevelt 237-9
—proposals re Imperial War Cabinet
and Conference 416, 419-20, 425-9,
444

- views on: air ferrying 899, 901; air training plan 692-3, 708; aircraft deliveries 714; allied war effort 313-4; appeal to Roosevelt 283-4; British air training schools 884; Canadian troops 779; defence priorities 943-5; destroyers 846, 852; French campaign 276-7, 284, 295, 305-7, 313; Northern Ireland 456; railway units 750-1; war supplies from Canada 478, 487
see also Atlantic Charter
- Civilian Technical Corps: 930-5
see also expeditionary forces, technical units; manpower; radar
- Clayton-Knight Committee: 914, 916-7
- Coastal defence: 13, 313, 327, 451, 486, 542-3, 775-6, 788-9, 842-5, 847, 854, 905-6, 940, 942, 944-5, 1034; U.S. patrols 968, 984, 998, 1001, 1006, 1019, 1041, 1054-5, 1064
see also Greenland; home defence; naval operations; shipping
- Colonies: 217, 264, 269-70, 275, 277, 317, 411, 765-9, 776, 781, 813, 816-38, 965-71, 997
- Combat Zone, U.S. definition: 384
see also contraband control
- Commercial agreements: 15, 45, 67, 168, 212, 235-6, 244, 278, 384-92, 459, 461, 469-70, 475-7, 491-2, 501, 505-6, 973, 1004, 1007-8, 1028-31, 1111-2, 1120-5
see also lease-lend
- Commonwealth:
 - air training plan—*see* British Commonwealth air training plan
 - constitutional relations: 8-10, 12, 14, 16, 19-20, 378, 427, 431-4, 436-7, 440, 445-8, 453, 543-4, 547, 565, 581-5, 757-8, 1107; Dominions' responsibility for own policies 429, 437, 452-8, 667, 686
 - consultations re:
 - air training 549-722, 875-98
 - allied declaration of solidarity 216-31
 - Anglo-French declaration 208-12
 - Anglo-French-Polish declaration 213-6
 - Atlantic Charter 237, 240, 243-5, 247
 - Baltic States, status of 158-63
 - Canadian Corps, formation of—*see* expeditionary forces
 - Czechoslovak Provisional Government 32
 - declaration of war on Finland, Hungary and Romania 349-73; on Italy 324-37
 - defence of Britain, France, Iceland and West Indies—*see* expeditionary forces
 - defence of Greenland: air base and facilities 1039-40, 1042-3, 1048-57, 1062; cryolite mines 955, 957, 960, 964-5, 969-70, 985-7, 989-90, 996-1000, 1015; radio station 1066-7
 - diplomatic exchanges with India 19-21—*see also* High Commissioners
 - enemy consuls, treatment of 142-6, 148-9, 151, 156
 - evacuation of British children 514-33
 - Expeditionary forces—*see* separate listing
 - Finnish consular staff, detention of 346-7
 - French collapse and appeal for U.S. aid 279-91, 302-20
 - French war aims proposal 184-7, 192, 196-208
 - Imperial War Cabinet and conferences 408-51
 - Inter-allied discussions on post-war economic policy 232-5, 239, 242-3, 245-6, 512-3, 1111-9
 - Norway, diplomatic exchanges with 35-7
 - Panama declaration, protest re *Graf Spee* incident, reply to 533-48
 - peace proposals, replies to: Belgian and Netherlands 248-52; German 167-84, 252-7; Swedish 258-63
 - radar technicians 907-39
 - separate R.C.A.F. squadrons—*see* British Commonwealth air training plan
 - Swiss protection of Dominion interests 138

- war aims 167-208, 248-63
 - war supply and financing 375-408, 458-513, 838-54, 876-83, 898-9
 - diplomatic representation 1-19
 - diplomatic unity 53, 77, 90-1
 - economic co-operation:
 - contribution to evacuation scheme 516, 521, 523-4, 530-1
 - control of enemy and neutral shipping 325-6, 327-8, 330, 338, 341, 384-92, 542-3
 - food and raw material supplies 376, 380-2, 384-95, 401-4, 407, 458-513, 981, 1014-5, 1031
 - manufacture of equipment: aircraft 487-9, 555-6, 562, 572, 588, 631, 654-5, 682-6, 693-7, 719-20, 876-7; munitions 395-7, 459, 477, 483-92, 843-5; naval vessels 246, 840, 847-53; tanks 395-6
 - provision of aerodromes and facilities: 839-42, 880-3; harbour defences 843-5, 854—*see also* British air training schools; British Commonwealth air training plan
 - war financing—*see* expeditionary forces; British Commonwealth air training plan; monetary policy
 - military co-operation—*see especially* air co-operation; air ferrying; army; British air training schools; British Commonwealth air training plan; channels of communication; coastal defence; expeditionary forces; Greenland (air ferrying base, cryolite, supply ships); military co-operation; naval co-operation; radar
 - Communications: 118, 303, 434-5, 438, 441-2, 446-7, 634, 737-9, 926, 956, 972, 976, 978, 983-4, 1001, 1003, 1034, 1045-7, 1055, 1065
see also channels of communication; meteorological stations; radar
 - Communism: 173-4, 188, 194, 202, 257, 320, 344, 360, 427, 1105
 - Conscription: 420-1, 424, 430, 456-8, 574
see also recruitment
 - Constitutional questions—*see* Christian X; Commonwealth; Greenland; Leopold III; visiting forces act; war, declaration of, on Finland
 - Consular appointments and relations: 12, 30-2, 38, 50-1, 67, 72-3, 95-6, 105-24, 161, 356, 983, 992, 994-6, 1006, 1027; enemy consuls 141-58, 338-42, 344-8; exequaturs 107-8, 994
see also diplomatic relations
 - Contraband control: 326, 384-5, 387-92, 1005, 1015, 1025, 1029
see also raw materials; shipping; smuggling
 - Convoys: 13, 528, 840, 842, 845, 850, 870, 906, 942, 944
 - Cranborne, Viscount: 32, 35, 431, 441, 806, 901-2, 915, 928
 - Crerar, General H. D. G.: 381, 406, 553, 733, 764
 - Crerar, T. A., Mission to Britain: 205, 375-408, 437, 479, 599, 603, 609-11, 619, 622, 646, 744, 863, 869, 871; British Commonwealth air training programme 553; evacuation programme 515-8, 521, 523-7, 532
 - Cripps, Sir Stafford: 278, 349
 - Cryolite—*see* Aluminum Company of Canada; Greenland
 - Cuba: 50
 - Czechoslovakia: annexation 168, 172-3, 175, 190, 194, 218; relations with 23-32
see also Governments-in-exile; recognition
- D**
- Darlan, Admiral: 306, 310, 318, 321, 323, 825
 - Defence agreements: 159-60, 168, 209-16, 312, 316-8, 534-5, 641-7, 674, 694-706, 1033-5, 1060, 1078-80
see also Atlantic Charter; Axis; British Commonwealth air training plan; civilian technical corps; Commonwealth; economic co-operation; military co-operation; Ogdensburg
 - de Gaulle, General Charles: 242, 315-6
 - Denmark: 63, 108, 114, 259, 265, 947-61, 963, 975-6, 980, 987, 1009, 1033-5, 1047; Minister in U.S. 965, 969-70, 972, 975-7, 981, 984, 993, 995-6, 998, 1006, 1030, 1034-5; relations with 109-14, 128, 338, 386, 973, 975, 1035
see also Christian X; Faroe Islands; Greenland

- Destroyers: 246, 303-4, 327, 765, 767, 839, 845-7, 851-3; from U.S. 852-3
- Désy, Jean: 22-3, 52, 56, 61-3, 98, 125, 267, 272, 274-5, 277, 285, 293, 300, 311, 321-2
- de Valéra, Éamon: 452-4, 456-7, 1084
- Diplomatic recognition—*see* recognition, diplomatic
- Diplomatic relations, breaking of 141-58, 324-73
see also consular; evacuation; I.L.O.; war, declaration of
- Diplomatic representation: Commonwealth 1-23, 439; European states 33-44, 94-96; Far Eastern states 89-94, 97-104; Latin American states 45-88
see also consular; High Commissioners; Ministers; recognition, diplomatic; Trade Commissioner service
- Disarmament: 174, 179, 187, 198, 239
- Domestic issues—*see* conscription; home defence; King, W. L. M.; press and publicity; public opinion; war effort
- Dominican Republic: 81-2
- Dunkirk: 254, 290-1, 295, 313-4, 774-5
- Dupuy, Pierre: 22-3, 41-2, 63, 105, 118-21, 123, 301
- Dutch East and West Indies—*see* Netherlands
- E
- East Indians in Canada: 19-21, 688
- Eberts, C. C.: 118-21
- Economic co-operation:
—Allied 37, 197, 212, 375-408, 477-92, 496-501, 505-6, 555-6, 560-1, 563-4, 588-93, 603, 609-11, 619, 622, 631-4, 743-4, 778-9, 871-3, 886-91, 948, 963-4, 979, 990, 1013-4
—Allied-U.S. 231-47, 253, 279-82, 304, 350, 385, 461-2, 486-90, 493-513, 522, 600-3, 682, 693, 707, 714, 852-3, 876-8, 905, 964, 976-9, 982, 984, 986, 995-6, 998, 1002, 1014-5, 1030, 1109, 1111-25
—Canada-U.S. 108, 244, 421-2, 498-9, 556, 602, 694, 857, 875, 905, 973, 993, 1006-15, 1016-8, 1107
—hemispheric 47, 49, 1106, 1110
see also commercial agreements; Commonwealth; contraband control; Crerar mission; inter-allied meetings; monetary policies; postwar settlement; supply; trade policy
- Economy: 14-5, 381-3, 400-3, 413, 483-5, 495-7, 589, 597-9, 743-4, 763, 1013
see also monetary policy; trade policy
- Eden, Sir Anthony: 100, 246, 360, 398, 665-6, 766, 799-800, 871
- Election (1940): 210, 412, 414, 418, 422, 677, 740-1, 749-51
- Evacuation: Belgian Government 285, 321-2; British children 303, 514-33; diplomatic missions 22-3, 272, 274-5, 277, 285, 293, 300-1, 308, 311, 321-3; French leaders 301, 321; Netherlands Government 275; League of Nations services and I.L.O. 273-4, 1091-3, 1095-1102
- Exchange controls—*see* monetary policy; trade policy
- Expeditionary forces:
—Air force: army co-operation squadrons 744, 765, 863-6, 868-74, 885; bomber command 487, 715-6, 721, 789, 885; reconnaissance squadrons 789, 856-8, 867-70, 945; officer to Greenland 1063-4
—Army: First and Second Divisions 309-10, 639-40, 728-64, 780, 784-6, 792, 794-7; Third and Fourth Divisions 744, 764, 768, 770, 785, 792; infantry battalions 765, 767-70, 775, 781-5, 787-9, 791-8, 816-38, 877
—Navy: armed merchant ships 840; convoy escort 13, 840, 842, 870, 942; destroyers 327, 839, 845-8, 853, 940; minesweepers 848, 850-4; Naval Volunteer Reserve 840-908
—allocation of forces: to Britain 487, 664-6, 715-6, 721, 736-8, 795-7, 799-806, 845-6, 885; to France 299, 309-10, 410, 740, 748, 757-8, 770-5, 779-80, 782-3, 873, 885-6; to Hong Kong 807-15; to Iceland 776-89, 791-8, 877; to Newfoundland 11, 13, 327; to Norway 753, 755, 759-60, 987; to West Indies 765-6, 768-9, 776, 781, 816-38, 845-7, 857-8, 877

- Canadian Corps 742, 748, 763-4, 768, 785, 793, 796, 799, 800, 855, 885
 - command 642-6, 649-52, 656-9, 662-5, 731, 740, 742, 745-8, 751-8, 761-4, 767-8, 773-4, 819-20
 - co-ordination of policy 381, 553, 723-4, 728
 - equipment 726, 743, 745-6, 752, 767, 769, 776-7, 779, 783, 786-8, 790-3, 795, 797, 802, 824, 834, 843-5, 850, 854
 - financing 725, 729, 743-4, 747-8, 751-2, 763, 768-70, 778, 790, 796, 799, 809, 815
 - publicity 664, 728, 736-8, 771-2, 780, 800, 810-14
 - technical units: ancillary services 725-6, 777, 786, 789, 798-9, 867; forestry 726, 728, 730, 734, 751, 770, 778-9, 782, 789-90, 800-6; radar technicians 908, 912-3, 915, 937-9; railway 726-8, 730, 734, 741, 743, 745, 749-51, 768-70, 778, 782, 789, 800-1
- see also* air force; British Commonwealth air training plan; Great Britain; Greenland; navy; radar

Export controls—*see* blockade; contraband control; trade policy

External Affairs, Department of: 422, 433-4—*see also* channels of communication; consular appointments; diplomatic representation

F

- Far Eastern crisis: 90, 97-8, 100-1, 103, 139-41, 278, 304, 351, 413, 417, 444-5, 785, 792, 807-15, 819, 854, 942, 965-71, 973, 997
- see also* Japan; Sino-Japanese War
- Faroe Islands: 254, 948-9, 955, 985
- Fascists in Canada: 147, 149, 153, 155-6, 158
- Federal-provincial relations: 16, 19, 21, 99, 421, 516-7, 521, 532, 1101
- Finland: 161, 164-5, 344, 349-73, 505, 1080-2, 1084-8; relations with 132, 164-5, 343-73
- see also* League of Nations; protecting powers; Russo-Finnish war; war, declaration of

Finns in Canada: 344, 351, 355-6, 362-4, 366

Fisheries: 11, 14-15, 327, 1055

Fleet Air Arm: 226, 266, 313, 839-42, 857-8, 867, 905-6

Food—*see* Commonwealth; inter-allied meetings; postwar requirements committee; postwar settlement; sugar; supply; wheat

Forestry—*see* expeditionary forces, technical units; paper; timber

Foster, Brigadier W.W.: 99-100, 102, 104

France:

- collapse of 118, 255, 278-80, 286, 288, 289, 293-4, 299-323, 528, 680, 774-5, 778, 780, 788-9, 792

- colonies 317, 823

- defence forces 27, 284, 286, 290-1, 299-300, 302, 306, 309-10, 775; fleet 306, 310, 312-3, 318-9, 321, 323, 528, 537, 823, 825, 950; garrison in Aruba 821-38

- foreign relations 116, 121, 184-7, 192, 197-8, 208-12, 214-5, 312, 316-22, 386, 535-6, 623, 1085-6

- morale 255, 257, 276, 294, 307-8, 319, 639

- relations with 15, 22-3, 56, 105-6, 116-21, 278, 300, 308, 319-20, 322-3, 421, 435, 1079

see also Anglo-French declarations; armistice; Darlan; de Gaulle; expeditionary forces; Free French; Gamelin; inter-allied meetings; Pétain; Reynaud; St. Pierre and Miquelon; Vichy; war aims

Fraser, P.: 285, 288, 353-4, 420, 426, 428, 443, 450-1

Free French: 15, 217, 219, 233, 241-2, 321

G

Gamelin, General M.G.: 284, 757*n*.

Gardiner, James: 432, 437-8, 441, 475

General Act: 1083

General Proscription Order: 338

Geological Survey of Canada: 1031

George VI: 543—*see also* diplomatic representation; war, declaration of

Germany:

—armed forces 264, 266, 276, 281-2, 289, 302, 304, 309, 314, 386-7, 391-2, 533-4, 538, 541, 549, 571, 767, 788, 791, 884, 941, 953, 960, 965, 1035-6, 1045-7

—foreign policy 55, 135-7, 144, 164-5, 167-84, 190, 194, 252-3, 259, 263-4, 344, 346, 386-7, 391, 537, 972, 974, 976, 978, 987, 1084, 1097-8

—relations with 73, 124, 126, 134, 141-6, 188, 193

—trade and access to raw materials 304, 384-92, 538, 540, 960

see also armistice; Axis; *Graf Spee*; Hitler; Nazism; occupied areas; peace proposals; postwar settlement; propaganda; protecting powers; Russo-German pact; war, theatres; war crimes

Governments-in-exile: 21-45, 73, 216-36, 241-3, 245-7, 275, 292, 294, 300, 311, 321-2

see also Baltic states; evacuation; diplomatic representation; Free French; inter-allied meetings

Governor General: 670

Graf Spee: 533-7, 539, 541, 544, 546

see also neutral zones, Latin American waters; Panama declaration

Great Britain:

—bilateral arrangements and agreements 375-408, 477-90, 496-501, 519-24, 629, 677-8, 690, 700-6, 740-53, 767-70, 799-800, 806-10, 838-74, 896-7, 902, 925-7, 936-7, 1000, 1015, 1026

—economic and financial policies 212, 231-2, 237-47, 330, 380, 383, 400-1, 404-5, 458-68, 470-5, 493-4, 502-5, 513-4, 518, 521, 585, 588-9, 597, 603, 614, 616, 622-3, 631-2, 634, 639, 752, 888, 896, 986-8, 1112-4, 1124-5

—foreign relations: with Baltic States 163; Belgium 292, 311-12; Bulgaria 340-1; Czechoslovakia 23-4, 27-30; Finland 344-7, 349-50, 361, 364, 505; France 184, 186, 196-8, 200, 207-16, 311-2, 315-7, 323, 380, 505, 830; Germany 135-7, 141-2, 144-5, 172-7, 179-81, 197, 199-200, 255, 259, 263-4; 292; Hungary 341, 350-70; Iceland 63, 783, 787, 949; Ireland 451, 455-6;

Italy 154, 278, 324-33; Japan 139, 389; Latin American states 533-48; League of Nations 1073-4, 1086; Mexico 85, 87; Norway 543; Poland 1078; Romania 341, 350; St. Pierre and Miquelon 116-7; Spain 278; U.S. 237-47, 253, 350, 385, 462, 493-9, 501-10, 527, 823, 892, 930; U.S.S.R. 95-6, 168, 278, 352, 359-60, 389, 1078, 1085-6

—military forces and defence policy 254, 288-90, 303-5, 313-4, 528, 558, 788-9, 792, 845-6, 876-8, 884, 905, 915, 941, 944, 1025, 1065-7

—air force 279, 281, 283-4, 289, 300, 313, 549-50, 558, 571, 622, 680, 682-3, 714, 776, 876-8, 883, 895, 905-6

—expeditionary forces 266, 271, 279, 280, 284, 286, 290, 292, 306, 309, 314, 726, 759, 771, 773-4, 776, 780, 782, 784, 792, 798, 809-13, 816-38, 944, 987, 1046

—navy 266, 280, 282-3, 289, 298, 304, 313, 438, 527-8, 533-9, 787-9, 816, 823, 825, 944, 950, 983

—press and publicity 168, 194, 236, 378-9, 426, 438, 449, 450, 497, 515, 530, 592, 759-60, 771, 811

see also Atlantic Charter; Battle of Britain; British Commonwealth air training plan; Chamberlain; channels of communication; Churchill; Commonwealth; economic, military co-operation; evacuation; Greenland; Imperial (various); inter-allied meetings; Keynes; lease-lend; Massey; war aims

Greece: 33-4, 42, 217, 228-30, 326, 350, 558

see also inter-allied meetings

Greenland:

—air ferrying base, meteorological and radio facilities 697-8, 949, 951, 1039-45, 1048-72; survey 1060-5, 1067-70; U.K. radio station 1065-7

—bases, military 950-1, 956, 984, 988, 1018, 1034, 1038, 1041, 1043, 1050

—cryolite mines, protection of 108, 948-9, 953-61, 979, 983, 985-7, 989-90, 993, 995-6, 1012, 1017-8, 1021-2, 1032, 1036, 1038, 1060; gun at Ivigtut 994, 996-9, 1003, 1006, 1033, 1054-5; proposed occupation 951, 953,

- 955-7, 960, 968, 979, 986, 988-95, 1000, 1005, 1016, 1019, 1024; supply ships *Nascopie* and *Julius Thomsen* 982, 984, 986-7, 991, 993, 995, 999-1005, 1011, 1015-26, 1028-9
- defence agreement with U.S. 1033-6
- defence installations and coastal patrol 1034, 1038, 1045-7, 1054-5, 1057
- Dutch East Indies, analogy with 965-71
- Greenland Commission 965, 969-74, 976, 978-83, 993, 1003, 1009; Canadian membership 1009, 1027, 1030
- interests in: Canadian 108, 110, 411, 949-55, 961-7, 970-1, 976, 981, 984, 988-93, 1012-5, 1019; U.K. 960, 985-7, 989-90, 992, 1000, 1021, 1025, 1039-40, 1042-3, 1049-53, 1062, 1065, 1070-1; U.S. 818, 952, 955, 958-9, 961, 966, 968-9, 973, 981, 983, 989, 993, 996, 1001, 1003, 1005-18, 1025, 1031-9, 1059-61, 1067-8, 1072
- R.C.M.P., role of 956-7, 1000, 1016-7, 1019, 1021, 1024
- relations with 105-14, 974, 977-8, 981, 983, 992, 995-7, 1001-4, 1006, 1008, 1010, 1012, 1027-8, 1030-1, 1046-7
- relief and supply 968-9, 971, 980-1, 984, 989-91, 993, 995, 997, 1000, 1006, 1011, 1028
- sovereignty 97-10, 949-50, 955-56, 958, 963, 972-73, 977, 994, 996, 1001, 1004, 1006, 1009-10, 1025, 1033-4, 1059, 1061; trusteeship proposal 951, 961-4
- trade and financial arrangements 962, 985, 995, 1002, 1004, 1011-2, 1028, 1030-1; control of cryolite output 962, 985, 992, 995, 1010-5, 1022, 1024, 1029-31
- see also* Aluminum Company of Canada; Denmark; Hudson's Bay Company
- Guarantees—*see* postwar settlement; U.S.S.R.
- Gustaf V, King of Sweden: 258

H

- Haakon VII, King of Norway: 37, 543
- Haiti: 82-3

- Halifax, Lord: 30, 167, 301, 356-7, 367, 444, 639, 957, 1117-9
- Havana Conference and Act: 1034, 1060, 1103-4
- Heeney, Arnold: 596, 605, 607, 642-5, 667-71
- High Commissioners: 1-21, 377, 434-6, 614, 684, 735-6
- Hitler, Adolf: 167-9, 170-80, 183-4, 189, 194-5, 197, 199, 252, 254, 257, 265, 291, 313, 558, 566, 569, 941
- Home defence: 10-1, 486, 785-6, 792, 794, 824, 842, 845-6, 848, 876, 906, 911, 939-45, 1034
- Hong Kong: 469, 807-15
- Howe, C.D. 441, 651, 663, 669, 693-4, 696, 878
- Hudson's Bay Company: 991, 1012, 1027, 1030-1
- Hull, Cordell: allied troops in West Indies 819, 827, 832-3; declaration of war against Finland 356-7; free trade 502-3; Greenland 958-9, 962, 967-70, 975, 984-5, 989, 993, 1031-2; Japan 101, 104; relations with W.L.M. King 307, 421
- Human rights: 188-92, 203, 256-7, 538, 1089
see also relief; war crimes
- Hungarians in Canada: 351-2, 355-6, 366
- Hungary: 165, 326, 341-3, 350-9, 364-73
see also war, declaration of
- Hyde Park Declaration: 75, 499, 1105

I

- Icebreakers: 953, 957, 968
- Iceland: 63, 948-9, 978; occupation by Allies 767, 769, 776-7, 781-9, 791-5, 797-8, 818, 877, 955, 1024, 1025; U.S. interests in 818, 906, 959
- Immigration policy: 122-3, 527, 1098-9
- Imperial Conference (1932): 237, 241
- Imperial preference: 237, 239, 241, 465, 469, 476, 507, 509-12
see also trade policy
- Imperial War Cabinet: (1917) 378, 380, 434-7; proposed (1940) 416, 431-51
see also Supreme War Council

Imperial War Conference, proposed: 408-30, 441

India: 209, 437, 440, 686-9, 715, 813; relations with 18-21, 1079

Industry, war production: 299, 351-2, 355, 376, 393, 395-7, 421, 438, 467, 479, 482-5, 490, 494-7, 500, 555, 588, 602, 631, 682, 694, 801, 851-2, 874, 947-8, 973, 976, 978-9, 981-2, 991, 995, 1002, 1005, 1013-5

Intelligence and information exchange: 114-5, 234, 389, 508, 595, 825, 914, 918, 968, 971-3, 978-9, 983, 986, 997, 1007, 1009, 1031, 1041-2, 1045-7, 1050

Inter-allied meetings: 216-47, 496-501, 510

International Labour Office: measures to prevent wartime collapse 1073, 1091-9; diplomatic status 1099-1102

International law, violations of: 211, 213-6, 386-7, 391, 534, 536-8, 540, 542, 545, 949-50, 974, 979, 985, 1027

see also belligerent maritime rights; legal questions; Permanent Court

International Wheat Conference: 235-6, 1111-25

Iran: 132-3, 282

Ireland: 192, 437, 451-8; relations with 1, 7-10, 377, 414

Italy: 130-2, 135-7, 152, 170, 187, 190, 217, 267-8, 291, 295, 324-30, 332-3, 845; relations with 73, 147-58, 193, 324-37, 386, 390, 1079

see also Axis; Fascists in Canada; Mussolini; war, declaration of

J

Jamaica: 411, 768, 816-38 *passim*, 857-8

Japan: 20, 103, 139-41, 187, 190, 278, 351, 355, 358, 361, 792, 807, 819, 942, 967-71, 983, 997; relations with 97-107, 148, 150-1, 421, 430

see also Axis, Far Eastern crisis; protecting powers; war, declaration of

Japanese in Canada: 99, 421, 794

Joint Air Training Plan—*see* British Commonwealth Air Training Plan

K

Keenleyside, H. L.: on Anglo-U.S. relations 501-5; consulates in U.S. 121-4; economic co-operation 231, 478-83; Greenland 950-3, 956, 980-2, 988-93, 1003, 1005-15, 1026-8, 1050-2; Japan 97-8; Newfoundland 10-13, 117; peace proposals 255-7; St. Pierre and Miquelon 115

Kelly, J. H.: 8-10, 455-6

Keynes, J. M.: 502-5

King, W. L. Mackenzie:

—as Prime Minister 411, 421-5, 427, 445, 614

—message to Reynaud 307-8

—relations with Roosevelt 283, 307, 418, 421-2, 499, 975, 980, 982-4, 995

—statements and speeches 6, 50, 202, 244, 307, 342-3, 440, 449, 478-9, 665, 770

—views on: air training plan 553-7, 559, 565, 569, 576-7, 586, 591-3, 596-9, 605-6, 612-8, 623-7, 638, 660-1, 691; aircraft production 694, 713; Cabinet 614, 618; Canadian Corps 800; defence co-operation 638-40; destroyers 851-3; diplomatic relations 38, 40-3, 50, 65, 67-8, 73, 95, 102; Far East 445, 814; Greenland 114, 954, 984, 989-93; home defence 939-42; Iceland 770; Imperial War Cabinet 433-5, 439, 444-9; Imperial War Conference 409-11, 416, 420-5, 427-8; India 19-21; Ireland 9, 452-3, 456-7; King Leopold III 296-7; Menzies' visit 415-6; neutral zone, Latin American waters 543; Pan-American Union 1103-4, 1108-10; radar 907; R.C.A.F. units 649-52, 656-9; railway units 750; recruitment 916-7, 919; responsibilities preventing trips to London 410-3, 417-8, 420-5, 427-30, 443; troops 740, 771, 780, 800; war aims 169-71, 177, 180, 185-93, 569; war effort 400-1, 589, 593, 615, 897; war outlook 289-90, 307-8; war production 477, 483-6; wheat 462, 464-5

—visit to Britain 239-40, 243, 448-50

Kirkwood, K. P.: 12, 106-8, 110, 123, 272, 1023-6

L

- Labrador—*see* Newfoundland
- Lapointe, Ernest: 192, 420, 424, 427, 554, 651
- Latin America: 45-89, 533-48, 1034, 1060, 1082, 1086, 1094, 1103-10
see also listed countries; Pan-American Union
- Latvia—*see* Baltic states
- Laureys, Henry: 7
- Laurier, Sir Wilfrid: 436
- League of Nations: 189-90, 204, 218, 273-4, 1073-1102
—amendment of Covenant 1074, 1083, 1089, 1101
—arbitration 204, 1086
—evacuation of Canadian office 273-4
—financing 1073, 1075, 1077-8, 1081, 1085, 1089-90, 1092-5, 1098
—Italy, withdrawal of 1087
—notification of Canada's position on General Act 1083; on naval limitation agreements 1078-80; on Optional Clause 1074, 1083
—Permanent Court elections 1073, 1076, 1085
—Permanent Mandates Commission 1074
—political questions: Finnish appeal and proposed expulsion of U.S.S.R. 1080-2, 1084-8; German aggression 1074
—Secretary-General: Assembly procedures 1074-82, 1085, 1088; Optional Clause and General Act 1082-3; resignation 1089-96
—Special Committee, Canadian membership 1084-6
—transfer of League technical services and I.L.O. 1091-1102
see also evacuation; I.L.O.; Permanent Court; treaties
- Lease-Lend Act and draft agreement: 238, 493-501, 503, 506-13, 888, 890
- Legal questions: 270, 340-2, 362-3, 581-5, 651, 676, 678, 685, 688, 751-60, 788, 879, 881, 916-7, 920-1, 930, 932, 935, 971, 1010
see also constitutional questions; international law; war crimes

- Leopold III, King of Belgium: 63, 172, 248-52, 292-7, 300-2
- Lloyd George, D.: 437
- Lothian, Marquess of: 277, 958-9, 965-7, 1112-3
- Luxembourg: 229, 231, 242, 259, 269

M

- Macdonald, J. S.: 26*n.*, 435-7
- MacDonald, Malcolm: British air training schools 900-4; flying school facilities in U.S. 893, 897-8; forestry companies 804; Greenland 1067, 1069; British Commonwealth air training plan 717-8; radar 936-7; wheat 1116-7
- Macdonnell, R. M.: 837
- Mahoney, M. M.: on Argentina 47, 49; Baltic states 163; Chile 69; collapse of France 310; Greenland 1008, 1018, 1061, 1064-5; Mexico 85, 88; protecting powers 130, 132; senior consul-general in U.S. 123; wheat 1119, 1122-3
- Manchuria: 139-40, 391
- Manpower: 552, 801-3, 805, 931
see also recruitment
- Massey, Vincent: as High Commissioner 439; on air training plan 551-2, 554, 603, 614; Argentina 46; Czechoslovakia 24-5; destroyers 845-6; economic meetings 384-6; evacuees from Britain 524-5, 529-31; expeditionary forces 739-40, 742, 746-8, 761, 771-2, 780, 799; Finland 352; France 276, 278, 283, 309-10, 319; Greenland 960, 985-6; I.L.O. move to Canada 1097; Iceland 788; Imperial War Cabinet 439-41; India 18-19; Norway 36; radar technicians 921-2, 924; relations with Britain 378-9; Soviet Union 95-6; U.S. 137; war aims 167-8; West Indies 816-7; Yugoslavia 43-4
- McGreer, E. D.: 98*n.*, 100, 103, 105-7, 109, 123
- McNaughton, General A. G. L.: 480, 740-2, 745, 749, 753-6, 760-4, 770-2, 774-5, 783, 793, 796, 804-5
- Menzies, Robert: 182, 186-7, 192, 198-9, 223, 279-81, 283-8, 298, 309, 415-6, 428, 437, 441-3, 445, 449, 653, 657, 660-1, 666-7

- Metals:** 385, 388-93, 460, 481-2, 947-8, 950, 955, 963, 972-3, 981, 984, 1013-5, 1036
- Meteorological stations:** 697, 1031, 1039-72; enemy control of 1045-7
- Mexico:** 50, 71-2, 82-8
- Military co-operation:**
- Allied, including Commonwealth 10-11, 15, 16, 27, 33, 35, 38, 116, 209-47, 254, 265, 267, 279, 290-1, 295-314, 376, 408-58, 535-7, 549-945, 948-9, 954, 956, 960, 970, 984-7, 1025, 1031
 - U.K.-Netherlands 816-9, 823-4, 828, 832, 836
 - U.K.-France 197, 209-12, 276, 279, 283-4, 290, 295, 299-300, 306-7, 313-7, 321, 323, 535-6, 558, 623, 636, 820-3, 825, 827-8
 - Allied-U.S. 13-4, 219-21, 240-7, 279-84, 413, 432, 444, 507-10, 535-40, 600-3, 697, 736, 814, 816-7, 852-3, 875-8, 890-2, 895, 899, 901-4, 906, 913-21, 929-37, 950, 958, 960-2, 974, 978, 983, 993, 996-8, 1021-3, 1040-72
 - Canada-U.S. 13, 14, 87, 116, 218, 221, 413, 421-3, 435, 595, 794, 824-5, 827, 829-31, 836-8, 942, 958-9, 961-3, 964-5, 969, 971, 996-1000, 1005, 1017, 1021-2, 1034-9, 1059-61, 1105
 - U.K.-U.S. 220, 237-9, 281, 284, 350, 494, 506-10, 818-9, 823-5, 832, 875-6, 887-8, 890-2, 893-9
 - hemispheric 48, 70, 75-6, 218, 277, 509, 533-48, 818, 1032-5, 1059-60, 1103, 1105, 1109
- see also* Axis; British Commonwealth air training plan; Commonwealth; defence agreements; expeditionary forces; intelligence; lease-lend; Panama declaration; war, theatres of
- Minesweepers:** 847-51
- Ministers, appointment and exchange of:** 22-3, 34-94
- Moffat, J. Pierrepont:** 70-2, 101, 104, 117, 154, 157, 916, 1120, 1123
- Molotov, V. M.:** 349
- Monetary policy:** budget 14, 70, 73, 382-3, 400, 482, 494-5, 497, 598-9, 631-4, 648, 743-4, 763, 768, 871-2, 1013; credit control 330-1; exchange rates and controls 45, 73, 339, 342, 363, 405-6, 496, 498-501, 513, 613, 1012, 1028, 1030-1; freezing of assets 103, 331, 363; loans and securities 467, 482, 497-8, 600-3; maintenance of evacuees 516, 521, 523-5, 530-1; prices 14-15, 401-4, 406-7, 464-5, 480-2, 483-4, 489; tax exemptions 1100-2; war financing 381-3, 398-401, 404-8, 464-8, 478-82, 488-90, 493-501, 557-8, 584-93, 599, 610, 619, 631-4, 659, 695-6, 739-40, 743-4, 747-8, 769, 799, 809, 855, 871-2, 896, 902, 925-7, 999
- see also* British Commonwealth air training plan; economic co-operation; expeditionary forces; Great Britain; League of Nations; lease-lend; trade policy; war assets, debts
- Monroe Doctrine:** 254, 384, 595, 829-31, 950, 952-3, 956, 959, 965, 967, 984, 1032, 1059
- Moravia:** 126-7
- Munitions:** 238, 376, 395-7, 459, 477, 480, 483-90, 496-7, 500, 587, 590, 743, 767, 769, 776-7, 781, 783, 786, 788-9, 791-2, 824, 834, 839-40, 843-5, 847, 942
- see also* industry; supply
- Mussolini, B.:** 172, 257, 267, 278, 326

N

National Research Council: 907-8

Naval cooperation: 11, 13, 282, 298, 304, 306, 314, 438, 537, 542-3, 787-9, 792, 823-7, 839-54, 950, 960, 989, 998, 1000-1, 1005-8, 1015, 1019-20, 1022-7, 1038, 1041-2, 1047, 1054-5, 1064

see also coastal defence; Commonwealth; convoys; fleet air arm

Naval limitation agreements, suspension of: 1078-80

Naval operations: 266, 280, 306, 391, 417, 532-46, 714, 788, 843, 845, 849, 853-4, 944, 1045-7

see also blockade; contraband control; expeditionary forces; submarine warfare

Navy: 11, 13, 115, 220, 246, 306, 327, 438, 765-6, 839-40, 842-54

see also France; Great Britain; U.S.

- Nazism: 142, 188-9, 195, 201, 224, 238-9, 253, 255, 267, 306-7, 362, 451, 455, 538, 958, 1105
- Netherlands: 38, 194, 231, 248-52, 259, 267-75; overseas territories 217, 264, 269-70, 275; East Indies 275, 278, 818-9, 965-71, 983, 997; West Indies 816-38; relations with Canada 22-3, 42, 125, 386
see also Governments-in-exile; inter-allied meetings; oil; peace proposals; Wilhelmina
- Neutral countries, role and relations with: 147, 161, 170, 176-7, 180, 189-91, 201, 258, 260, 285, 325-6, 384-92, 402-3, 413, 437, 556, 951, 1014, 1060, 1080, 1084, 1086, 1124
see also listed countries; protecting powers; shipping; war trade agreements
- Neutral zones: Latin American waters 533-48; Norwegian view 543
see also Monroe doctrine
- Neutrality—*see* Ireland; Panama declaration; U.S.; neutral zones
- Neutrality Acts: 384, 387, 572, 916-7, 920-1
see also arms embargo
- Neutrality commission, American republics: 539, 544
- New Zealand: 25, 205-7, 252, 285, 288, 353-4, 369, 450-1, 523, 543, 561-2, 566, 588, 615-6, 629-30, 643, 646-7, 665, 685-6, 688, 741; relations with 1, 4-5, 377-8, 414, 461, 491, 501, 505-6, 613, 626-34, 661-2
see also British Commonwealth Air Training Plan; channels of communication; Commonwealth; Fraser; inter-allied meetings; lease-lend
- Newfoundland: British Commonwealth air training plan 604, 607; bases 11, 13, 854, 899, 901-2, 942, 944, 951, 954, 1039, 1060, 1072; relations with 10-18, 117, 901-2
see also air ferrying and routes; Commonwealth; Ogdensburg
- Northern Ireland: 456-8
- Norway: 35, 37, 38, 231, 259, 265-7, 271, 278, 386, 410, 753, 755, 758-60, 788, 791, 948-50, 987, 996; meteorological stations in Greenland 1046-7; relations with 34-9, 41, 127, 129; shipping mission 37-8
see also British Commonwealth air training plan; expeditionary forces; Governments-in-exile
- O**
- Occupied areas—*see* listed countries; Governments-in-exile; refugees; war aims, crimes, theatres
- Ogdensburg declaration: 75, 1105
- Oil: 274, 289, 304, 314, 385, 391, 816, 821, 824-5, 839
- Optional Clause: 1074, 1082-3
- P**
- Palestine—*see* League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission
- Panama declaration (1939), protest under terms of: 533-48, 1061, 1103
- Pan-American Union and Conferences: 51, 539, 544-5, 953; proposed participation by Canada 1103-10
see also Havana
- Paper and newsprint: 14-15, 385, 390, 395, 482
- Parliament: 210, 362-3, 414, 416, 418, 422, 447, 454, 469, 524-5, 592, 616-8, 1100
see also Cabinet; election; King, W.L.M.
- Passports: 121, 122
- Peace proposals and comments on: Belgian and Netherlands 194, 248-52, 543; British 167-215 *passim*; Canadian 193; German 167-84, 252-4, 259, 264, 566; South African 254-7; Swedish 258-64; U.S. 172
see also armistice; Atlantic charter; postwar settlement; war aims
- Pearson, Lester B.: on Atlantic charter 241, 245-6; financial arrangements with Britain 399; identification of Canadian units in the field 761; Imperial war cabinet 431-2; lease-lend 509-10, 512;

- Pan-American Union 1106-7; wheat 1111-2, 1123
see also passim for documents signed on behalf of High Commissioner in Britain
- Permanent Court of International Justice: 949, 1073, 1076, 1083, 1085, 1092
- Permanent Joint Board on Defence: 10, 22, 1036-8, 1042, 1072, 1107
- Peru: 71-2, 88-9
- Pétain, Marshal H. P.: 278, 295, 301, 317-8
- Poland: 167-77, 180, 190, 194-5, 210-1, 214-6, 218, 220, 242, 250, 255, 335-6, 549; relations with 39-43, 126, 193
see also Anglo-Franco-Polish declaration; Governments-in-exile; war crimes
- Pope Pius XII: 172, 271
- Postwar Requirements Committee, Inter-Allied: 216, 219, 231, 235, 242-3, 246
- Postwar settlement: Food, raw material, supplies, trade 197, 225, 231-47, 502-4, 506-7, 510, 512-3, 1114, 1122-5; guarantees 180-5, 194-7, 201, 220-1, 225, 238, 359-60; reconstruction 186-7, 189-99, 201-4, 218-26, 256-7, 282, 409, 436, 1106; war crimes, punishment of 213-4
see also Atlantic Charter; inter-allied meetings; postwar requirements committee; war aims, assets, debts; World War I
- Power, C. G.: 553, 878-83, 886, 888-90, 902-3, 926
- Press and publicity: 191, 218, 332, 379, 415, 454, 516, 533, 592, 605, 639-40, 660-1, 664-5, 671, 687, 699, 734, 736-9, 753, 755, 758-9, 771, 780, 786, 792, 796, 810-4, 883, 902, 920-1, 930, 954, 973, 1045, 1063, 1103, 1110
see also British Commonwealth air training plan; expeditionary forces; Great Britain; King, W. L. M.; propaganda; public opinion; U.S.
- Propaganda: 35, 146-7, 182, 189-91, 211, 213, 229, 236, 245, 252-3, 255, 595, 759, 1105, 1124
see also press and publicity; war aims
- Protecting powers: Argentina 55, 139-41; Japan 148, 150-1, 154-5, 157; Sweden 161-2; Switzerland 134-8, 140-1, 143; U.S. 55, 124-38, 292, 297-8, 300, 365, 367-8
see also channels of communication
- Public opinion: 189-91; air co-operation 573-4, 595, 618, 644, 652, 662, 699, 880; British evacuees 525-6; financial sacrifice, scale of 400-3, 592, 598-9, 743-4, 764; Greenland 954, 973, 981, 989-90; Iceland 786, 792; land forces 554; local defence 876; Pan-American Union 1105; wheat 462-3
see also Great Britain; press and publicity; United States
- Purchasing missions: 477-501, 686, 876
see also British Commonwealth air training plan; Crerar mission; trade policy

R

- Radar: 907-39
 —enlistment 923, 927, 930-1, 934
 —financing 909, 917, 923, 925-9, 933-4, 939
 —personnel: research 907-10, 924-5; technicians 910-35, 937-9; U.S. armed forces 935-7
 —recruitment in Canada 908-11, 922-3, 926-8; from U.S. 913-21, 923, 925-7; U.S. civilian technical corps 929-35
 —search for instructors 912, 921-2
 —training in radar school 928-9, 935-7; in universities 922-5, 937-9
- Radio operators: 887, 911, 926
see also communications
- Railway units—*see* expeditionary forces, technical units
- Ralston, Colonel James L.:
 —as Minister of Finance 613; on financing of air training plan 553, 586, 588, 590-3, 601-2, 605, 615, 618, 623-6, 640, 643, 651-2, 662-4, 668-70, 693-708 *passim*; war financing 406-7; wheat prices 472, 475
 —as Minister of Defence 694; on air training plan 707-10; aircraft supply 693-8; allocation of troops 754, 808; Canadian Corps 799-800; Greenland

- 695, 698, 953-4, 1049; Lothian statement 966; R.C.A.F. squadrons 694-5, 885-6; radar 915; visit to Britain 437; 441, 693-706, 799, 885-8, 891, 1049
- Raw materials—*see* cryolite; metals; oil; paper; postwar settlement; supply; timber; wheat
- Read, J. E.: on administration of air training plan 581-5; British air training schools 879; Clayton-Knight Committee 916; declaration of war 340-2, 362-3; India in air training plan 686-88; neutral zone 542; status of I.L.O. 1099-1102; suspension of naval limitation agreements 1079; visiting forces 583, 585, 819, 860-1
- Recognition, diplomatic: 23-32, 158-65
- Reconnaissance: 710, 776, 789, 839, 842, 856-8, 867-70, 893, 940, 942, 945
see also coastal defence; fleet air arm; Greenland, survey
- Recruitment: 24, 27, 279, 570, 580, 749-51, 764, 785, 790, 799, 804, 840, 908-35
see also Clayton-Knight Committee; conscription; manpower; volunteers
- Red Cross: 969, 971, 989, 997
- Refugees: 197, 297, 301, 515-6, 518
- Reid, Escott: on China 89-90; Greenland 1007-15, 1041-4, 1053-9, 1061-2, 1064; Havana Conference 1105-8; Latin America 74-5, 87-9; recruitment in U.S. 916; St. Pierre and Miquelon 117; wheat 1119
- Relief: 235-6, 961, 969, 971, 980-1; 984, 989, 995, 1015, 1088, 1114, 1122-3
see also Greenland; postwar settlement; supply
- Renaud, P.: 272
- Reparations: 177, 184, 201
- Reynaud P.: 295, 301, 305-8, 312, 315-8
- Riddell, W. A.: 4-5
- Ritchie, C. S. A.: 246-7
- Rive, A.: 273*n.*, 1078*n.*, 1088*n.*
- Robertson, Norman A.: on air training 890-2; air ferrying 898, 900-2, 904; Atlantic Charter 239, 244; Baltic states 164-5; diplomatic missions 40-1, 45-6, 55-6, 70-93; economic co-operation 235-6, 496; Finland 165, 343-4, 347-8, 351-2, 362; food 244; forestry units 805; Greenland 947, 1057-8, 1062, 1065-71; Hong Kong 815; Imperial War Cabinet 444; Japan 101; lease-lend 511-2; mine-sweepers 853-4; neutral zone 542; Newfoundland 13-16; protocol, breach of 1118-9; radar 920-9, 932-4, 937-9; British air training schools 890-2; St. Pierre and Miquelon 117; wheat 1119-20
- Rogers, Norman McL.: as Minister of Defence 747; administration of air training plan 586-7, 590-1, 593, 600-1, 605, 609, 615, 620-1, 623-6, 636, 639, 641, 693, 695-6, 698; Canadian Division 410-11, 727; command 749, 760-4; R.C.A.F. units in the field 590-1, 593, 641-2, 644-5, 657-9, 663-4, 668-9; visit to Britain 409-12, 477-8, 761-5, 816, 846; West Indies 816
- Romania: 165, 220, 326, 338-42, 350, 353-9, 364-73, 386
see also war, declaration of
- Roosevelt, Franklin D.: as President 257, 281, 418; allied approaches to 253, 279-84, 287-8, 298, 306-7, 1103-4, 1125; appeal to Hitler for talks to avert war 172; meetings and exchanges with Churchill 237-9, 306, 898-9; Danish Minister 972; Keynes 503-5; King, W. L. M. 101, 418, 422, 499, 975; Reynaud 306-7
—statements and opinions on: air ferrying and bases 898-9, 903, 1056; allied war effort 298, 305-7; allied operations in Greenland 983, 1016, 1046-7; in West Indies 277; free trade 503-5; lease-lend 506-9; Monroe doctrine 972; radar recruitment 920, 930; U.S.-U.K. economic and defence co-operation 237-9, 506-9, 512; wheat 1125
see also Atlantic Charter; Hyde Park declaration; King, W. L. M.; lease-lend; Ogdensburg; St. Lawrence waterway
- Royal Canadian Air Force—*see* air force
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police: 116, 121, 146-7, 149-52, 339, 341, 348, 363, 956-7, 1000, 1016-7, 1019, 1021, 1024
- Rubber: 385
- Russo-Finnish War: 132-3, 164-65, 344, 349-53, 358-62, 364, 1080-2, 1084-8
see also war, declaration of
- Russo-German Pact: 168, 170-1, 174, 178, 194, 571, 1084

S

- Sabotage: 148, 158, 538, 545, 816, 818, 823-5, 835, 956, 968, 978, 986, 989, 1000, 1019
- St. Lawrence Waterway: 422
- St. Pierre and Miquelon: 11, 15, 16, 413; relations with 115-21
- Sanctions: 97, 101, 103, 190, 538, 546, 1088
- Shipping, merchant: 103, 115-6, 377, 380, 393-4, 407, 460, 462, 469, 482, 493, 711-12, 845, 850, 982, 984, 986, 991, 995, 1000-3, 1005, 1015-9, 1021-6, 1029; allied 37, 233-5, 242, 350, 386; enemy 103, 303, 325-6, 338, 344, 363, 386, 538, 542-3, 545-6, 816, 1045-7; *Julius Thomsen* 969, 974, 992, 998, 1000, 1005, 1015, 1025-6; neutral 325-6, 329, 350, 385-6, 545, 969, 974; protection of 324, 327, 527-8, 540-1, 788, 845, 850, 867, 906, 913, 942-5, 951, 968, 1021, 1031, 1038; sinkings 391, 532, 714; transportation of troops 728, 795, 797, 799, 801, 805, 817, 894
- see also* blockade; coastal defence; contraband control; convoys; Greenland; naval (various); submarine warfare
- Simon, Sir John: 398-9, 401-2
- Sino-Japanese War: 90, 102-3, 139-40, 1088
- Skelton, Oscar D.: as Under-Secretary 422; on air training plan 557-9, 571-4, 585-6, 591-3, 639-40, 648-9, 671; diplomatic relations 34, 36-7, 48, 50-1, 64-5, 85-6; France 185; Greenland 948-50, 962-3, 983-4, 987-93, 1029, 1045-7; Havana Conference 1104; I.L.O. transfer 1098; Imperial War Cabinet 437-8; India 19-minesweepers 848; naval limitation agreements 1079; Newfoundland 12; Pan-American Union 51; Pan-American neutral zone 542-3; St. Pierre and Miquelon 116; Soviet Union, expulsion from League 1087-8; U.S. and West Indies 818-9, 822, 828-9, 834-5; war aims 176-7, 185, 193-5, 205-8, 218, 260-1
- Smuggling: 116-7
- see also*—contraband control
- Smuts, General Jan Christiaan: 6, 200, 254-7, 260, 280, 283, 300, 426-9, 436, 443
- South Africa: 1-2, 6-7, 25-6, 192, 200, 205, 207, 211, 228, 249, 252, 254-5, 260, 262, 280, 358, 377-8, 429, 437
- see also* channels of communication; Commonwealth; Imperial war cabinet; war conference
- Spaak, Paul-Henri: 294-7, 300, 302
- Spain: 318, 320-2, 326
- Stalin, Josef: 194, 349, 351, 357, 359, 361, 366
- Statute of Westminster: 378, 431-40, 565, 757, 758
- Stone, T. A.: 594*n.*
- Strategic considerations—*see* bases; coastal defence; cryolite; Greenland; home defence; military co-operation; oil; shipping; submarine, tank warfare; supply; war, theatres of; West Indies
- Submarine warfare: 839, 841, 843, 845, 847, 905, 908, 944-5, 953, 960, 963, 989, 1018, 1065-6
- Sudetenland: 173, 178
- Sugar: 476, 482, 491-2, 1111-2
- Supply, war:
- food and raw materials 95, 231-47, 304, 376, 380-2, 384-95, 398, 401-4, 406-7, 458-68, 471-6, 478, 480-2, 491-4, 496, 498-500, 599, 743, 778-9, 789-90, 801-4, 816, 824-5, 947-1039, 1111-25
 - military equipment 238, 289, 299, 376, 392-8, 459, 477-80, 483-90, 493-8, 500, 507-9, 550, 552, 555, 560-1, 563-4, 588-90, 596, 599-603, 743-4, 767, 776-7, 779, 781, 786, 788-9, 791-3, 795, 802, 804, 834, 839-41, 843-54, 858, 867-8, 872-3, 876-8, 883, 888-93, 895-906, 942-3, 945, 947-8, 1013-5, 1022
- see also* blockade; contraband control; Greenland; lease-lend; monetary policy; postwar settlement; purchasing missions; relief; shipping; *also* separately listed items—eg., aircraft, munitions, trade policy, wheat

- Supreme War Council: 216-24, 295, 432
- Sweden: 132, 161-2, 258-64, 350, 386
see also neutrals; peace proposals; protecting powers
- Switzerland: 134-8, 140-1, 326, 385-6, 388, 1080, 1084, 1086, 1097; relations with 134, 386
see also neutrals; protecting powers

T

- Tank warfare: 218, 276, 289-90, 314, 791-2
- Tanks and mechanical transport: 395-6, 743, 783, 786, 795
- Tariffs—*see* Imperial preference; trade policy
- Thailand: 140
- Timber: 392, 394, 482, 778-9, 801-6
see also expeditionary forces
- Towers, Graham: 45, 48, 382, 398-9, 400-5, 407, 472, 605, 612-4, 618-9, 622
- Trade Commissioner Service: 21, 51, 73, 75, 122-3, 127, 129, 150, 386, 389-90, 977
- Trade policy: 14-5, 108, 199, 231-47, 304, 375-408, 458-513, 1011-5, 1028, 1108
 —export-import controls and quotas 73, 97, 330, 377, 381-2, 385, 388-90, 459-60, 466-7, 469-70, 1012-4, 1028, 1111; surpluses 235-6, 1112-4, 1116-7, 1122-3
 —licensing controls and trading with the enemy regulations 97, 101, 325-8, 338, 341-2, 384-92, 538, 542, 1028
 —tariffs 11, 14, 237, 239, 241, 253, 469-70, 476, 492, 502-5, 507, 509-13
 —trade mission to Latin America 89, 1108
see also commercial agreements; Commonwealth; contraband control; economic co-operation; Imperial preference; monetary policy; purchasing missions; shipping; supply; war trade agreements
- Transportation—*see* air ferrying; expeditionary forces; shipping; tanks
- Treaties and agreements:
 —Anglo-Polish Naval Agreement 1078-80
 —Anglo-U.S.S.R. Naval Agreement 1078-80
 —Covenant, League of Nations 190, 1074, 1081, 1083, 1089, 1101
 —General Act 1083
 —Hague Convention 214-5
 —Latvia-U.S.S.R. Mutual Assistance Treaty 159-60
 —Limitation of Naval Armaments 174, 1078-80
 —U.S.-Denmark Protection of Greenland Agreement 1033-5
 —U.S.S.R.-Finnish Non-Aggression Pact 1080
 —Versailles 182, 185, 201, 257, 1099-1100
see also Atlantic Charter; British Commonwealth air training plan; commercial agreements; League of Nations; Russo-German pact; St. Lawrence waterway; war trade agreements
- Treaties of Peace Act: (1919) 1100-1; (1941) 1102
- Treaties, notification of Canada's position
 —*see* League of Nations, notification
- Treaties, violation of—*see* Baltic states; League of Nations; Russo-Finnish war; war aims
- Turgeon, W.F.A.: 57-8, 79-81
- Turkey: 132-3, 329, 350, 558

U

- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
 —invasion by Germany 96, 165, 194, 343-5, 349, 351-2, 427
 —invasion of Baltic states and Finland 132-3, 158-65, 170, 344, 351, 353, 358, 1080, 1082; proposed declarations of war on Finland, Hungary and Rumania 349-73; proposed guarantees for Finland 359-60; reference of Finnish appeal to League 1080-2, 1084-8
 —invasion of Eastern Europe 168, 170-1, 174, 176, 185, 187, 194, 202, 204
 —Japanese threat 351, 355-6, 361, 1088
 —relations with 73, 90, 94-7, 133, 165, 352, 355, 362, 364

—supply 95, 278, 1124-5
see also Communism; Great Britain;
 Russo-Finnish war; Russo-German pact;
 Sino-Japanese war; Stalin

United Kingdom—*see* Great Britain

United States:

—defence policy and armed forces 11,
 13-4, 75, 87, 219-21, 234, 237-9,
 279-80, 284, 310, 507-10, 535-6, 542,
 547, 588, 595, 707-8, 792, 807, 814,
 818-9, 822, 829-31, 834-5, 853, 875,
 899, 903, 906, 916, 918-20, 942, 944,
 954, 967-8, 983-4, 997, 1006, 1018,
 1033-9, 1041, 1059-61, 1072, 1105-6

—economic policy and trade 97, 101,
 231, 234, 237-9, 385, 387-8, 487-90,
 502-5, 507-10, 556, 572, 588, 600-3,
 693, 698, 970, 972-4, 981, 1006-7,
 1026-31, 1106, 1112-25

—neutrality 55, 137-8, 314, 355, 384,
 413, 417, 445, 542, 572, 588, 595, 600,
 906, 920-1, 930, 965-71

—press and public opinion 284-5, 350,
 355, 357, 458, 594-5, 687, 736-8, 914,
 921, 951-2, 954, 958, 961, 965-6, 969,
 975, 984, 987, 990, 1018, 1020,
 1034-5, 1097

—protecting power 124-38

—relations with Canada 70-1, 75, 101,
 121-33, 188, 191, 220-1, 231, 283-4,
 297-8, 411, 413, 418, 421-2, 498-9,
 501-2, 509-13, 547, 595, 693-4, 818-9,
 824, 827, 830, 836-8, 852-3, 916-8,
 930-5, 954, 973, 983-5, 995, 1016-72,
 1119-25

—relations with Australia 286, 298; Bal-
 tic States 162; Denmark 949, 959, 972,
 974, 980, 1033-5, 1059-61; Finland
 344, 350, 352, 356-7, 361; France
 306-7, 487, 489, 830; Germany 135-8,
 543, 1036; Great Britain 135-7, 231,
 237-9, 302-3, 503-12, 535, 543, 819,
 830, 832, 835, 958, 1058; Greenland
 105, 107, 108, 981, 983-4, 997, 1025,
 1034, 1059-61; Italy 135-8, 154; Japan
 97, 101, 103-4, 417; Latin America
 70-2, 75, 87, 533-48, 818, 1061,
 1103-10; League of Nations 190, 1091;
 St. Pierre and Miquelon 117

see also aircraft; Atlantic Charter; Berle,
 Adolf; British air training schools; Brit-
 ish Commonwealth air training plan;

economic, military co-operation; Far
 Eastern crisis; Greenland; Hyde Park
 declaration; Hull; lease-lend; Monroe
 doctrine; neutrality; Ogdensburg decla-
 ration; Pan-American Union; protecting
 powers; Roosevelt; radar; volunteers

V

Vanier, Lt-Colonel George: 22-3, 56, 98,
 278, 299, 300, 308, 319-20, 322, 757-8

Vichy: 15, 56, 116, 118-21, 421, 830, 1105

Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth)
 Act: 582-3, 671-2, 675-6, 678, 689,
 731-3, 735, 747, 773, 809-10, 819-20,
 879

Volunteers: 161, 279, 750-1, 861, 892,
 908-35; U.S. 284, 911, 915-16, 918-20,
 929-35

see also expeditionary forces; manpower;
 radar; recruitment

W

War, declaration of: on Finland, Hungary
 and Romania 349-73; on Germany 143;
 on Italy 274, 324-37; on Japan 140-1,
 351, 355

War, theatres of operation:

—Asia and the Pacific 90, 100, 103,
 139-40, 278, 304, 413, 444, 807, 809,
 811-2, 814, 941-2

—Atlantic 11, 13-4, 306, 313, 417,
 527-8, 532-3, 714, 843, 845-54, 905-6,
 941-5, 973, 996, 1018

—Caribbean and South Atlantic 277,
 350, 528, 533-4, 537-8, 540-1, 544,
 546, 765, 768, 816-38, 845-6, 873

—Europe: Eastern front, Baltic and Bal-
 kans 96, 126-7, 164-5, 167-9, 170,
 172-9, 182, 194-5, 197, 202, 264, 268,
 343-4, 351, 353-4, 360, 365, 369, 392,
 394, 427, 549, 558, 944, 1074, 1080-4

—Europe: Western front 194, 248,
 265-323, 410, 413, 483, 528, 640, 680,
 714, 753, 755, 767, 770-2, 780, 783,
 788, 791-2, 873, 876-7, 884, 913, 941,
 954, 961, 975-6, 1097, 1105, 1108

—Greenland, Iceland and Faroe Islands
 254, 413, 767, 770, 781-2, 784, 786-9,

- 791-2, 818, 948-9, 955, 961, 984-5, 996, 1021-2, 1024-5, 1032, 1034, 1036, 1045-7, 1059, 1065, 1068
- Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa
221, 226, 254, 264, 304, 310, 317, 325, 327-30, 416, 687, 944, 1074
- see also* air, naval operations; coastal defence; expeditionary forces; military co-operation; Russo-Finnish, Sino-Japanese war; submarine, tank warfare
- War aims: 167-247, 558, 566, 569-70, 1074; French 184-7, 192-208
see also peace proposals
- War Appropriation Act: 3, 4, 7-8, 18, 118, 601; U.S. 497
- War assets: 508-9, 584, 634, 889
see also Monetary policy
- War councils—*see* Cabinet; Imperial (various); inter-allied meetings; Supreme War Council
- War crimes: 211, 213-6, 259, 261-2, 264, 297, 386, 1080
- War debts: 506, 510, 512
- War effort: 189, 194, 218-9, 306-7, 313-4, 399-401, 411-3, 417, 422-3, 430, 465, 483-5, 494-5, 517, 553, 570, 573, 589-90, 598, 607, 615, 622, 635, 664, 691, 743-4, 746, 765, 768, 779, 811, 850, 890, 897-8, 1108
- War Measures Act: 18, 118, 363, 676, 733, 842
- War production—*see* industry; supply
- War trade agreements: 384-92
- West Indies—*see* British West Indies; expeditionary forces; Netherlands
- Weygand, General M.: 284, 295, 299, 305, 310, 312, 321
- Wheat: 46, 56, 235-6, 244, 382-3, 398, 401-4, 406-7, 461-8, 471-5, 479, 558, 599, 611, 1111-25
see also international wheat conference; trade policy
- Wilgress, L. D.: 387, 389-90, 399
- Wilhelmina, Queen of The Netherlands: 172, 248-52, 543
- World War I: 141-2, 185, 196-7, 378, 380, 427, 434-7, 485, 510, 644, 763, 769, 779, 799
- Wrong, Hume: 52, 94, 164, 387, 399, 1008, 1035, 1038, 1064, 1069-70, 1072, 1077-8, 1094-5, 1097

Y

- Yugoslavia: 41, 43-5, 229-31, 326, 343, 350

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