



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





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

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REMARKS

ON

GENERAL BURGOYNE's

STATE

OF THE

EXPEDITION from CANADA.

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2

REMARKS

ON

GENERAL BURGOYNE's

STATE

OF THE

EXPEDITION from CANADA.

" Allied, alas! for ever, to the crime,
" No kind exemption can the perſon claim,
" But blackens downward on the lapſe of time,
" The equal object of eternal ſhame."

LONDON:
Printed for G. WILKIE, in St. Paul's Church Yard.
MDCCLXXX.

TO

LIEUT. GEN. BURGOYNE.

SIR,

HAD you ſimply informed the Public, that the expedition you commanded was originally planned upon the principle of a co-operation with the ſouthern army; that Sir William Howe declined a co-operation; that you heartily acquieſced in his determination, and ſuppoſing yourſelf able to act independently of him, undertook the enterprize alone, and thereby loſt your army; that you have long been ſenſible of your error, and ſincerely lament the misfortunes into which you plunged your companions, as well as the calamity with which you overwhelmed your country; you would have made an intereſt in the hearts of the compaſſionate, that miniſterial *vengeance* would have been unable to

reach. However open you might be to the *juſtice* of your country, ingenuouſneſs and misfortune interwoven would have rendered you invulnerable to the ſhafts of *malice*; the immoveable barrier of truth would have reſiſted the torrent of *party rage*; and though no laurel ſhould adorn your monument, nor ſplendid trophy reflect a luſtre on it, late poſterity, while they feel the effects of your indiſcretion, would have done equal juſtice to your candour and intrepidity.

But, having rejected the ſolid baſis of fact, and reſted your defence on equivocation, the ſuperſtructure, however finiſhed and decorated, muſt fall, and bury your reputation under its ruins, or ſtand only to perpetuate your infamy.

When we ſee you repeatedly making a winter's voyage from America, and on the inſtant of your arrival ſoliciting to be ſent back on arduous ſervice, we cannot think ill health to be the inducement. When a man is known to indulge in open and ſhameleſs gallantry, we cannot ſuppoſe his conjugal affection ſo

 vehement

vehement as to affect his public conduct. When we read in your letters, that you asked Sir Henry Clinton's advice whether you should persevere in executing *your* orders, and advised Col. St. Leger to consult his judgment whether he should persevere in executing *his* orders, it is impossible to believe that you deemed either so peremptory as to preclude the exercise of discretion. While you are arguing with Sir Guy Carleton to induce him to depart from his instructions, we cannot so readily admit your religious attachment to *your own*. When we learn by authentic documents that the magazine of Bennington was not even known to you till after Col. Baum had received his orders and begun his march, we cannot accede to its having been the principal object of the expedition. Convinced that you requested Sir William Howe to permit you to act independently of him, and knowing that he had acquainted you that you would have *no direct assistance from the southern army*, we can neither admit the justice of your complaint of having been left to fight your way *through a host of foes, alone*, or believe that you expected a *co-operating army at*

Albany. Evidence is irreſiſtible: whatever we may wiſh, the mind is ſo conſtructed, that we muſt conclude that ill health, conjugal affection, peremptory orders, Bennington magazine, and a failure of co-operation are mere pretexts, for other motives and ſprings of action that you wiſh to conceal.

When, in one letter, you admit that the Bennington expedition was "*out of the beaten track of military ſervice*;" and in another ſay it was juſtifiable on "*naked military principle*;" when in your letter to the Secretary of State (before paſſing the Hudſon) you ſay, "Had I a latitude in my orders, I ſhould think "it my duty to wait in this poſition (eaſt ſide), "or perhaps as far back as fort Edward, "where my communication with lake George "would be perfectly ſecure, 'till ſome event "happened to aſſiſt my movement forward;" and in the review of the evidence, "*that you* "*were compelled by the ſtate of things to act* "*as you did, independently of the peremptory* "*tenor of your orders*;" when we read in your proclamation, that the preſent unnatural rebellion has been made a foundation for the

completeſt

completeſt ſyſtem of tyranny that ever God, in his diſpleaſure, ſuffered to be exerciſed over a froward and ſtubborn generation; that arbitrary impriſonment, confiſcation of property, and torture unprecedented in the inquiſition of the Romiſh church, are among the palpable enormities; that theſe are inflicted by aſſemblies and committees, who dare to profeſs themſelves friends to liberty, upon the moſt quiet ſubjects, without diſtinction of age or ſex, for the ſole crime, often for the ſole ſuſpicion, of having adhered in principle to the government under which they were born, and to which, by every tie, divine and human, they owe allegiance; and in the ſtate of the expedition, find you comparing the ſame rebels with the *great prince of Orange* and the *Engliſh parliament*; when you are known ſometimes to approve, and ſometimes to reprobate the employing the native Indians; ſometimes to extol, and at others to decry the ſervices of the loyaliſts; whatever allowances the partiality of friends may make, the world in general will think you either deficient in memory or deſtitute of principle.

We

We may, now, it is presumed, congratulate you on the return of your health, without incurring your displeasure: and the Public might rejoice that the horrors of an American *winter* have vanished, were they not succeeded by the terrors of an American *prison*, and the fear of receiving your *death* from the hands of a people to whom you have been so great a benefactor.

In the review of the evidence, you complain of the noble lord, with whom you say you are at issue, for not making a *defence*, nor even *contradicting* any thing you alleged respecting his conduct, or your own.

I admit the parliamentary enquiries to have been as unsatisfactory as they were unprecedented; but I believe this is the first instance of a trial being challenged as unfair, by the party who reaped all the benefit of the partiality. You did indeed state your own case, and produce your own friends and favourites to support it, without interruption, opposition, or reply; if, therefore, all mankind do not with one voice approve and applaud your

your conduct, it is becauſe your cauſe is ſo bad as not to admit of colouring. To form a juſt eſtimate of this grievance, we need only reflect on the change of complexion, that the examination of two witneſſes only, wrought in Sir William Howe's enquiry.

I agree witn you, that there were many conſiderations in favour of your committing the care of your defence to your friends, or to anonymous publications. Your own panegyric would have been written with more grace by ſome friend, and ſtill greater would have been the effect, if a diſintereſted perſon had been the author of it; and the declaration that "it has been a reflection on *your character* that you addreſſed the noble lord as a patron and friend," would not have been quite ſo ludicrous in an anonymous publication.

I ſhall leave you in quiet poſſeſſion of a great part of your book, becauſe it is immaterial to the points in queſtion.

The

The epiſode of Lady Harriet Ackland would figure in a poem; a romance without an heroine would be an innovation; a tragedy without female diſtreſs would be a violation of the laws of the drama: and God forbid that I ſhould imitate the impiety of the rebels, who with more than Gothic barbarity interrupted the funereal honours of the gallant Frazer *!

Your having ſupplanted Sir Guy Carleton, is rather a private concern between you and him, than a matter intereſting to the Public.

If he is ſatisfied with your conduct in that reſpect, or if Sir W. Howe ſuppoſes you had not concerted meaſures for ſupplanting him, in caſe you had been ſucceſsful in the Canada expedition, I don't know who has a right to complain. I ſhall only remark, that the circumſtance you plume yourſelf ſo much upon, viz. that the miniſter wrote to Sir G. Carleton,

* No diſreſpect is intended to Lady Harriet Ackland, but I do not ſee the propriety of G. B. introducing her ladyſhip into this controverſy.

in

in Auguſt 1776, that he was to remain in Quebec, is not concluſive, becauſe you were in England in the winter 1775, when you had an *opportunity* to ſolicit a ſeparate command by *adulatory intrigue*, and at that time your *ambition was not dead.* That Sir Guy was both diſappointed and diſpleaſed, appears from your letter to Lord George Germaine, of 14th of May, wherein you ſay, "that Sir Guy Carleton was anxiouſly deſirous of leading the military operations out of the province, is eaſily to be diſcerned;" and by your letter to General Harvey, of May 19, wherein you write, "that Sir Guy Carleton ſhould have wiſhed for the lead in active and important military operations, is very natural. That he thinks he has ſome cauſe of *reſentment* for the general terms of treatment he has received from ſome of the king's miniſters, is diſcernible, &c." Let me add, if his *reſentment* did not dictate the letter to you, of Nov. 12, it gave a *tinge* to it. It muſt be preſumed, that when that letter was wrote, Sir Guy was not apprized of the plan of operations that you had laid before the miniſtry, in which you not only ſpecified the corps for

the operating army, but defcended to the pofts and garrifons neceffary for the fecurity of Canada, which plan, fo far at leaft, was literally adopted. This extraordinary letter is manifeftly a conclufion from premifes contained in a letter from you, and it would be but fair to publifh that likewife.

You complain of "every difcretionary latitude which you propofed having been erafed." It may not be improper here to ftate the fubftance of your propofals for the operations of the campaign, the part that the miniftry took thereon, and then confider what inferences may fairly be made. You propofed to pafs Lake Champlain, and to reduce Ticonderoga.

Two propofals are then fubmitted. One for the army to proceed to Albany, and form a junction with Sir William Howe. The other, in cafe there fhould be a fufficient force at Rhode Ifland to co-operate with you, to take the route of the Connecticut. Each propofal fuppofed a co-operation and junction; the former, at, or near, Albany; the latter, at,

at, or near, Springfield, and whichever was adopted, was to be facilitated by a diverſion on the Mohawk. And as a ſecurity againſt a poſſibility of the army's remaining *inactive*, you ſuggeſted whether it might not be expedient to truſt the latitude of embarking the army by ſea to the commander in chief.

With reſpect to embarking by ſea, you ſay, " more force will be required to be left behind for the ſecurity of Canada, than is ſuppoſed to be neceſſary, when an army is beyond the Lakes; and I do not conceive that any expedition from the ſea, can be ſo formidable to the enemy, or ſo effectual to cloſe the war, as an invaſion from Canada by Ticonderoga. This meaſure ought not to be *thought* of but upon *poſitive conviction* of its neceſſity."

After having condemned the meaſure, it is a little extraordinary, that you ſhould complain of your not having been at liberty to purſue it, eſpecially as no neceſſity of the army's remaining *inactive* ever did exiſt.

It was neceſſary that the army ſhould paſs the Lakes, and there were ſufficient objects for its employment without proceeding to Albany. The total deſtruction of the rebels force on the Lakes, and the reduction of Ticonderoga, the key to the communication between Canada and New England, were neceſſary to preſerve Canada from inſults.

The reducing Fort George, Fort Edward, Fort Stanwix, and the adjacent country, were momentous objects, and muſt be as efficacious towards quelling the rebellion, as any expedition by ſea. Beſides, the ſervice neceſſary to be performed for the ſecurity of Canada, would require ſo much time as not to admit of your returning to Quebec, and embarking with any proſpect of effecting much in that campaign. Therefore that latitude was altogether unneceſſary, and had it been given, would have anſwered no purpoſe.

Let us now examine your propoſal of an expedition by the Connecticut. In the firſt place, this propoſal reſted intirely on the

principle of the army at Rhode Iſland being ſtrong enough to co-operate, which was by no means the caſe, and therefore it was altogether inadmiſſible. In the next place, ſuppoſing a co-operation, it was by far the moſt arduous and dangerous of the two propoſals, becauſe it required land-carriage for upwards of ſixty miles on the outſet, through a mountainous country, that abounded with dangerous defiles. Add to this, that when you ſhould have reached the Connecticut, you could have had no water-carriage, unleſs the craft had been carried with you in your progreſs from the Lake; and when the delays occaſioned by the ſhort carrying-places, on the route to Albany, are conſidered, it ſhews that this idea was utterly impracticable, and therefore wiſely rejected by adminiſtration. In the original plan, you mention it as the moſt difficult of the two propoſals, and yet, in your ſtate of the expedition, ſuggeſt that it was an expedient of *precaution*, and complain of not being at liberty to avail yourſelf of it. I venture to affirm, that had the purpoſed latitudes been given you, at no one period of the campaign would you have ſeri-

ouſly

ouſly thought of returning to Quebec in order to embark by ſea, or of taking the route by the Connecticut, as being more practicable and leſs hazardous than that you attempted. It is impoſſible that you ſhould think your force adequate to an expedition againſt the New England colonies, in caſe it were inſufficient to force your way to Albany; or that the army would have been more ſecure on the banks of the Connecticut, than it was on the banks of the Hudſon. In the career of your ſucceſs, indeed, you thought yourſelf equal to the attempt, but the Bennington diſaſter convinced you of the error.

Therefore the remaining propoſal, viz. "to "effect a junction with Sir William Howe to "be facilitated by a diverſion on the Mohawk, "which was the only practicable one (even "by your own ſhewing), was adopted."

But to conclude, from government having cautiouſly reſtricted you to the ſafeſt, and indeed only practicable propoſal, that the one adopted ceaſed to be yours, or that you were obliged at all events, even to the ſacrificing your whole

whole army, to carry it into execution, is a mode of reaſoning that I cannot ſee the force of.

The peremptorineſs of your orders ſeems to be your principal fort. There, whenever you are preſſed, you fly for ſanctuary. This therefore deſerves particular attention.

Your orders are compriſed in the letter from the Secretary of State to Sir Guy Carleton. The material clauſes of which are theſe:

"With a view of quelling the rebellion as ſoon as poſſible, it is become highly neceſſary that the moſt *ſpeedy junction of the two armies ſhould be effected, &c.*"

"It is his Majeſty's pleaſure that you put under the command of Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne, the grenadiers and light infantry, &c. together with as many Canadians and Indians as may be thought neceſſary for this ſervice; and after having furniſhed him, in the fulleſt and completeſt manner, with artillery, ſtores, proviſions, and every other article neceſſary for

for his expedition, and ſecured to him every aſſiſtance which it is in your power to afford and procure, you are to give him orders to paſs Lake Champlain, and from thence, by the moſt vigorous exertion of the force under his command, to proceed with all expedition to Albany, and put himſelf under the command of Sir William Howe."

"It is the King's further pleaſure, that you put under the command of Lieut. Col. St. Leger detachment, &c. together with a ſufficient number of Canadians and Indians; and after having furniſhed him with proper artillery, ſtores, proviſions, and every other neceſſary article for his expedition, and ſecured to him every aſſiſtance in your power to afford and procure, you are to give him orders to proceed forthwith to and down the Mohawk river to Albany, *and put himſelf under the command of Sir William Howe.*"

"I ſhall write to Sir William Howe by the firſt packet; but you will nevertheleſs endeavour to give him the earlieſt intelligence of this meaſure, and alſo direct Lieut. Col. St. Leger

Leger to neglect no opportunity of doing the ſame, *that they may receive inſtructions from Sir William Howe.* You will at the ſame time inform them that, *until they ſhall have received orders from Sir William Howe*, it is his Majeſty's pleaſure that they act *as exigencies may require, and in ſuch manner as they ſhall judge moſt proper for making an impreſſion on the rebels, and bringing them to obedience;* but that in ſo doing, they muſt never loſe view of *their intended junctions with Sir William Howe as their principal objects.*"

The ſenſe and meaning of theſe orders, viz. That the *two armies* ſhould co-operate ſo far as was neceſſary to *effect a junction*, as the primary object of the campaign, and that until you ſhould receive orders from Sir William, you ſhould remain at liberty to act as exigencies ſhould require, or your own judgment direct, only taking care that you ſhould do nothing that would any way interfere with, or prevent a junction, whenever the correſpondent arrangements ſhould be made, are ſo very obvious, that common men could not miſtake them; a mere ſoldier

 could

could not. I will, however, endeavour to follow you in your excurſion from the plain road of intuition and common ſenſe.

By reading the correſpondence as it is placed, and blended with a variety of matter, in the Parliamentary Regiſter, there is danger of confounding ſituations, and the inſtructions they gave riſe to. It is only neceſſary to ſelect, and arrange in their natural order thoſe that relate to any given point, to be convinced that the ſeveral inſtructions which were from time to time iſſued by Government, were well digeſted, perfectly conſiſtent, and wiſely adapted to the circumſtances that occaſioned them; and that your inſinuation of "plans ſo inconſiſtently formed, and managed by the Secretary of State with ſo much ſeeming confidence, as to miſlead his generals, and ſo much real reſerve as to deſtroy them," is as unfounded as it is illiberal.

Oct. 9, 1775, Gen. Howe wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth, as follows: "I would propoſe 12,000 men for New York. This corps

corps to be employed in opening a communication with Canada in the firſt inſtance. The primary object of opening a communication being obtained *by the two armies*, and ſecured by proper poſts, &c. theſe corps might take ſeparate routes, &c."

In November, 1776, Sir William Howe, in his letter to Lord George Germaine, makes the following propoſal for the campaign, 1777, viz. for an offenſive army in the province of New York *to move up the North River to Albany*, to conſiſt of 10,000 men.

Dec. 20, 1776, Sir W. Howe alters his plan, and propoſes going to Philadelphia, with the main army, and to have only 3000 men on the Hudſon.

This propoſal was approved by Government. But Sir W. Howe, on the 20th of January, 1777, after demanding a reinforcement of 20, or 15,000 men, writes, " that if the reinforcements ſhould be ſmall, his operations would be much curtailed; and if

none ſhould arrive, he ſhould be confined to act *in one body in the Jerſeys*, leaving only a ſmall corps at Rhode Iſland, and another of ſufficient force for the *defence* of New York and its dependencies.

This diſpatch was received March 3, 1777, and this was the laſt intelligence from Sir W. Howe, that arrived, prior to your orders being iſſued.

Thus ſtood the various propoſals. His letters were as replete with indeciſion as his conduct. He was balancing whether he ſhould go north or ſouth, or act in Jerſey only: to which point he ſeemed inclinable and likely to fix. If any confidence was to be placed in Sir W. Howe, or any dependence to be made on his advices, a junction of the two armies was abſolutely neceſſary for an operative campaign, as the reinforcement from Europe would be but ſmall, at beſt, and even that could not arrive till late. It could not be ſuppoſed, after what he had written, that he would go ſouthward with the main army, without a reinforcement. And therefore your complaint of

 being

being "ſuffered to ſail, ignorant of Sir William Howe's plans," is groundleſs, for at that time he had none, and that which Government gave him was but the counterpart of your own.

In this ſtate of things, Government complied with Sir W. Howe's requeſt, and gave him the outlines of a plan, at leaſt for the firſt operations of the campaign, at the ſame time they adopted yours, which was "to effect a ſpeedy junction of the two armies."

The foregoing inſtructions were accordingly given to Sir Guy Carleton, and Sir W. Howe was immediately furniſhed with a copy of them, that he might make his arrangements correſpondent to thoſe of the northern army. And leſt there ſhould be a want of underſtanding, both you and Col. St. Leger are required to give Sir W. Howe the earlieſt intelligence of the meaſure; and leſt there ſhould be a failure of co-operation, and you or Col. St. Leger ſhould force a paſſage to Albany, without a communication having been opened with New York, and be deſti-

tute

tute of ſupport, the inſtructions direct, "that until orders ſhould be received from Sir W. Howe, both you and St. Leger ſhould act as exigencies might require, or ſhould be judged moſt proper for making an impreſſion on the rebels, and bringing them to obedience, only taking care not to loſe ſight of the intended junctions, as the principal object." It is evident, from *once* reading the inſtructions, that this clauſe was introduced to guard againſt thoſe very evils that you ruſhed headlong into. And as Sir W. Howe neither gave you orders, co-operated, or even took meaſures that admitted of a junction, you were, through the whole campaign, at full liberty to act as exigencies might require, or your judgment direct, as to proceeding to Albany or not, and in every other reſpect conſiſtent with making an impreſſion on the rebels, and bringing them to obedience.

It is aſtoniſhing that you ſhould hazard a charge ſo unfounded, as "that the Secretary of State made no mention of the northern expedition in any of his diſpatches to Sir W. Howe, in *March*, or *April*, or ſo unmili-

tary,

tary, as that he did not mention any orders or recommendation relative to co-operation, *verbally*, to Sir W. Howe's aid de camp, or any other confidential perſon, who ſailed about that time."

Government could not be ſo intimately acquainted with the circumſtances of the Southern Army, as by means of your written propoſals, and oral information, they were with thoſe of the Northern. Adminiſtration had been informed, in general terms, that little was to be expected from Sir W. Howe, unleſs he was conſiderably reinforced, but probably did not think themſelves competent to furniſh him with a plan in detail; nor in this inſtance could it be deemed neceſſary, for he had already chalked out the mode in caſe a junction of the *two armies* was to be effected.

But every one that caſts an eye over the inſtructions muſt ſee, that ſo far as relates to a junction, as the primary object of the campaign, they apply to and embrace *both armies*, and are equally obligatory on *Sir William Howe*

Howe and Sir G. Carleton. The *junction of the two armies* is the object of these orders. Philosophers tell us, that action and re-action are equal. If this be an immutable law of nature, the Northern Army could not join the Southern Army, unless the Southern joined the Northern at the same time. After declaring that it was necessary that a speedy junction of the two armies should be effected, and giving instructions for Gen. Burgoyne and Col. St. Leger to proceed to Albany, and put themselves under the command of Sir W. Howe, to communicate as early as possible with, and receive orders from, him, and after furnishing Sir W. Howe with a copy of those instructions, it was surely unnecessary to say to him, that he must make *correspondent* arrangements; and it must have discomposed the muscles of a stoic, if they had added, "You (Sir W. Howe) are not to go so far *south*, or enter upon any measure whatever that will render *a junction or communication impossible.*"

On the 19th of *April*, the Secretary of State writes to Sir William Howe, and referring

ferring to the inſtructions reſpecting the Northern Army, informs him, that the Hanau Chaſſeurs were alſo ordered *down the Mohawk to join his army*, and gives him orders reſpecting employing the Indians, and diſcontinuing the acting Brigadiers in the Northern Army after *a junction* ſhould have taken place. This letter was alſo received before Sir William Howe left New York; and had a doubt exiſted in his mind, reſpecting the line of conduct that Government intended he ſhould purſue, it muſt have removed it.

On the 18th of *May*, Government having received a Copy of Sir W. Howe's letter to Sir Guy Carleton, the Secretary of State writes, "As you muſt, from your ſituation and military ſkill, be a competent judge of every plan, his Majeſty does not heſitate to approve the alterations which you propoſe; *truſting, however, that whatever you may meditate, it will be executed in time for you to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada, and put itſelf under your command.*" Thus it is evident, that Government never varied from the original idea; and that

it

was conformable to your own, appears from your propoſals, wherein you ſay, "Theſe ideas (your and St. Leger's expeditions to Albany) are formed on the ſuppoſition that it be the ſole purpoſes of the Canada army to effect *a junction with Sir William Howe*, or after *co-operating ſo far as to get poſſeſſion of Albany, and open the communication to New York*, to remain on the Hudſon's River, and thereby enable that General to act with his whole force to the ſouthward." I am therefore juſtified in ſaying, that the inſinuation of the paragraph reſpecting co-operation having been inſerted in the official letter of the 18th of *May*, to ſerve a ſiniſter purpoſe, does you no honour.

The outlines which were ſketched, or rather adopted, by Government for the campaign 1777, were theſe: The Northern Army was to proceed to Albany, the Southern to co-operate ſo as to form a junction; and theſe great movements to be facilitated by two powerful diverſions; one on the Mohawk, the other on the coaſt of Maſſachuſets and New Hampſhire.

We

We have already ſeen the inſtructions reſpecting the three former operations; thoſe for the latter are contained in the letter from the Secretary of State to Sir William Howe, of March 3d, 1777. "I muſt inform you, that his Majeſty is alſo of opinion, that a warm diverſion upon the ſea-coaſts of the Maſſachuſets Bay and New Hampſhire would not only *impede the levies for the Continental Army*, but tend much to the ſecurity of our trade; and indeed it ſcarcely admits a doubt, but that theſe benefits muſt inevitably reſult from ſuch an arrangement; for as on one hand, it is ſcarcely to be expected *that thoſe provinces will part with men*, when their preſence muſt be wanted for the internal defence of their own reſpective diſtricts; ſo on the other, a ſalutary check will unavoidably be put to the ſucceſſes of the rebel privateers, &c.

This order was very wiſely adapted to the ſituation of the New England provinces; for they had been exempted from furniſhing their quota of men for Waſhington's army that campaign, that they might be at full liberty to oppoſe the Canada Army. The reluct-

ance of the militia to leave the ſea-coaſt, when there was no apprehenſion of an invaſion by ſea; and the violent * means that the Committees had recourſe to, in order to compel them to march to the frontiers, leave no room to doubt, but that if Lord Howe had detached a ſmall ſquadron of the eighty-one ſhips of war that he commanded, even if no land forces could be ſpared, it would have been attended with the moſt ſalutary effects. Government made ſuch dependence on this meaſure, that on the 6th of Auguſt the Secretary of State writes to Sir William Howe: "Your letter of the 3d of June, together with the intended diſtribution of the troops, has been laid before the King, and I am commanded to inform you, that his Majeſty is concerned that you ſhould find the propoſed diverſion on the coaſt of Maſſachuſets Bay not conſiſtent with the other operations now carrying on; as great advantages would certainly have ariſen from that mode of diſtreſſing and alarming the enemy."

* The priſons in the New England Colonies were filled with the delinquents. Some were hand-cuffed, and driven or carted through the country *in terrorem*.

None

None of theſe orders were ever countermanded; and had any one collateral operation taken place, it would have inſured ſucceſs to the Northern Army. This will be granted, I imagine, ſince the officers you called to the Bar of the Houſe of Commons were of opinion, that if Sir H. Clinton's attack on the Highlands had been only a week ſooner, it would have prevented the cataſtrophe of your army.

Had a communication between Canada and New York been opened and ſecured by proper poſts, the Northern and Southern Colonies thus ſeparated, and the great peninſula of New England been thus incloſed, I believe every one that knows any thing of America will allow, that it would have put an end to the rebellion.

Your ſentiments, at leaſt your declarations, are well known.

Sir William Howe wrote expreſsly, " *That little reſiſtance would be made to the progreſs of his*

his Majeſty's arms in the provinces of New England, the Jerſies, and Pennſylvania, after the junction of the Northern and Southern Army." The deſpondency every where viſible amongſt the Rebels, till it was known that Sir W. Howe had gone ſouthward with the main army, evinces that his opinion was founded.

Reaſon is confounded, and at a loſs for even pretexts and pretences for ſome of Sir William Howe's conduct.

April 5th, Sir W. Howe writes to Sir G. Carleton: " Having but little expectation that I ſhall be able, from the want of ſufficient ſtrength in this army, to detach a corps in the beginning of the campaign to *act up Hudſon's River*, conſiſtent with the operations already determined on; the force which your Excellency may deem expedient to advance beyond your frontiers, after taking Ticonderoga, will, I fear, have *little aſſiſtance from hence to facilitate their approach.*"

 This

This paragraph, and the tenor of the whole letter, evinces that Sir William Howe knew that a co-operation was expected. It is indeed an apology for not co-operating.

" As I ſhall probably be in *Pennſylvania* when that corps is ready to advance into this province, it will not be in my power to communicate with the officer commanding it ſo ſoon as I could wiſh; *he muſt therefore purſue ſuch meaſures as may from circumſtances be judged moſt conducive to the advancement of his Majeſty's ſervice*, conſiſtently with your Excellency's order for his conduct."

Thus, Sir, you was early appriſed of Sir W. Howe's going ſouthward, and that you were to act ſeparately, and muſt ſhape your courſe according to circumſtances and contingencies.

He there refers to the friends of Government in Albany and its *environs*, and ſuppoſes that you will neither need, nor have, any other aſſiſtance there; and inſtead of a co-operation, or junction, propoſes only a corps

corps on the lower part of the Hudſon, to open the communication through the Highlands, &c.

But we ſhall ſee that he departed even from this idea. Inſtead of carrying only 10 or 11,000 men to Philadelphia, the extent of the force mentioned in his propoſals to Government for the Southern Expedition, and which would have given him a decided ſuperiority over every thing that Waſhington either did or could bring to oppoſe him; he carried 14,000 rank and file, and by that means left the garriſon at New York too weak to detach any conſiderable force. The number of troops intended to have been left was by Sir Henry Clinton deemed too inconſiderable, even for the defence of that poſt, and upon his remonſtrance was increaſed. The orders given to him we find in Sir W. Howe's letter to the Secretary of State, dated New York, July 7, 1777. Sir H. Clinton arrived here on the 5th inſtant, and *as this poſt is of the utmoſt importance*, he will *remain in New York*, with the command of 22 battalions, *diſpoſed according to the incloſed return.*

turn. The inſtructions I have taken the liberty of leaving with Sir H. Clinton are to be on the *defenſive*, with power to act otherwiſe according to *concurrent circumſtances*, without loſing ſight of the principal object, *the ſecurity of New-York.*

Thus, Sir H. Clinton was not *ordered* to open a paſſage through the Highlands, or to operate at all in favour of the Northern Army, having only liberty to ſeize any advantage that preſented, conſiſtent with the intire ſecurity of New-York*.

Accordingly in his anſwer to your meſſage by Capt. Campbell, wherein you ſay that you would not have given up your communication with Ticonderoga, had you not expected *a co-operating army at Albany*; that you wiſhed for orders whether you ſhould attack or retreat, and his poſitive anſwer whether he would open a communication with Albany; Sir Henry replies, " *That not having received any inſtructions from the Commander in Chief*

* Sir H. Clinton's enterprize on the North River was as unexpected to Sir W. H. as it was brilliant.

relative to the Northern Army, and unacquainted even of his intentions concerning the operations of that army, excepting his wiſhes that they ſhould get to Albany, he cannot preſume to give any orders to Gen. Burgoyne. Gen. Burgoyne *could not* ſuppoſe that he (Sir Henry) had an idea of penetrating to *Albany* with the *ſmall* force he mentioned in his letter. What he *offered* in that letter he has now undertaken; cannot by any means promiſe himſelf ſucceſs, but hopes it will be at any rate ſerviceable to General Burgoyne, as he ſays that even the *menace* of an attack will be of uſe."

October 22d, Sir William Howe writes, " I was *ſurpriſed* to find Gen. Burgoyne's declaration in his meſſage to Sir H. Clinton by Capt. Campbell, ' That he would not have given up his communication with Ticonderoga, had he not expected *a co-operating army at Albany*;' ſince in my letter to Sir Guy Carleton, I *poſitively* mention that *no direct aſſiſtance* would be given by the Southern Army. This letter I am aſſured was received by Sir G. Carleton, and carried by him to Montreal

before General Burgoyne's departure from thence.

It appears that Sir W. Howe not only rejected every idea of a co-operation and junction, but even that of the Northern Army's reaching New-York. July 7th, he writes, "The order respecting discontinuing the Brigadiers seems only intended to take place when the two armies absolutely *join*; which I do not suppose can happen *this campaign*, as I apprehend *General Burgoyne will find employment for his army against that of the rebels opposed to him.*"

In the last dispatch from Sir W. Howe before he left New-York, dated July 16, he writes, "By the movement of the enemy's army in Jersey towards King's Ferry upon the North River, since the embarkation of his Majesty's troops from Staten Island, he seems to point at preventing a *junction between this and the Northern Army*, which will no further affect my proceeding *to Pennsylvania*, than to make a *small change* in the distribution of the troops*."

Incredible

* Washington was so fully convinced of the necessity of Sir W. Howe's acting on the Hudson, that he supposed his sailing

from

Incredible as it may ſeem, Sir W. Howe carried the main army to Philadelphia at a time when he thought it not improbable that you would have Waſhington's army, as well as all New-England, to contend with, and without making any diverſion on the ſea-coaſt.

Thus the meaſures which Government had adopted, and the inſtructions they had iſſued, were totally diſconcerted and counteracted, and the plan formed on the beſt information and moſt mature deliberation, the execution of which muſt have brought all our troubles to a period, was totally fruſtrated.

On the 8th of May, Government received a copy of the letter from Sir W. Howe to Sir Guy Carleton. But, as you obſerve, it was known, that when the letter was wrote, Sir William Howe had not received the inſtructions reſpecting the Northern Army, and therefore Adminiſtration could not ſuppoſe that he would be wanting in attention to

from Staten Iſland was only a feint, and remained ſo long in the Jerſeys, that had Sir W. Howe landed at the Delaware, he would have met with no oppoſition at Philadelphia, the water force excepted.

them,

them, when they ſhould come to hand. And as he had wrote that the Northern Army muſt not be expected at Albany before the *middle of September*, had expreſſed an *impatience* to begin the campaign, and had alſo wrote, "That he had reaſon to believe, in caſe of ſucceſs in Pennſylvania, there would be found a conſiderable body of the inhabitants, who might be embodied as militia, and ſome as provincial troops, for the *interior defence of the province*, which muſt be a *great aid in the further progreſs of the War*;" it was natural to ſuppoſe, that in caſe the inſtructions reſpecting the Northern Army ſhould not divert him from going ſouthward, that he would be able to co-operate with the Northern Army, after the reduction of Philadelphia. Hence it is evident, that the paragraph in the Secretary of State's letter of the 18th of May, wherein his *Lordſhip truſts, that whatever he (Sir William Howe) may meditate, it will be executed in time to co-operate with the Northern Army, ordered to proceed from Canada, and put itſelf under his command*, was the natural reſult of the correſpondence between the Miniſter and Sir William

liam Howe, as well as perfectly conformable to your own ideas; and it places the malevolence of the ſuggeſtion, of its having been inſerted in conſequence of the fall of your army being foretold, in a ſtriking point of light.

True it is, that this diſpatch was not received by Sir W. Howe till Auguſt. But ſurely this is not the fault of the Miniſter. Had Sir W. Howe either attended to the diſpatches he received from Government before he left New York, or adhered to what he had written himſelf, this letter alſo would have been received in time to have had its full effect.

But when this diſpatch arrived at New York, no one there could divine in what part of the terraqueous globe Sir William Howe and his noble Brother were. After having counteracted the inſtructions they had received, they had betaken themſelves out of the reach of any new ones that might be tranſmitted, and, for upwards of four months, Govern-

Government knew not where to direct to their general and admiral.

It is curious to trace the route of Sir W. Howe. The operations of the whole campaign indeed are believed, only becauſe we have living vouchers. The hiſtory will be read by poſterity with the ſame incredulity that the fabulous legends of antiquity are read by us.

On the 14th of June, he took the field with the whole army, and marched within a few miles of Waſhington, at Quibbletown. With a force ſufficient to have cruſhed the enemy to atoms in his works, or after leaving a force ſufficient to hold Waſhington in check, to have advanced with the remainder, and reduced Philadelphia (which might have been effected with eaſe in three days, as the army was provided with pontons for paſſing the Delaware, and there were not at that time an hundred continental troops in all Pennſylvania); to the inexpreſſible joy of the rebels, and equal mortification of the King's troops, he turned his back on the enemy, and re-

turned

turned to Brunſwick. From thence he marched to Amboy, croſſed over to Staten Iſland, and embarked his troops in tranſports, in which he lay till the 23d of July before he ſailed. On the 30th of July, he arrived off the Capes of [illegible]ware. After taking a look into that river (as ſome one obſerves, to ſee if it were navigable), he put to ſea again, and arrived at Cheſapeak Bay on the 16th of Auguſt; and on the 25th, debarked his army in ſo ſickly and exhauſted a condition, that a fortnight more was neceſſary to refreſh and recruit the troops, as well as to ſupply the loſs which the long voyage, and longer confinement on ſhipboard, in that ſultry ſeaſon, had occaſioned in his horſes. So that all the ſpring and ſummer, and a great part of autumn, were intirely waſted, and the remainder of the campaign turned to no other account than that of getting comfortable winter-quarters at Philadelphia. On the 22d day of October, having received intelligence of the fate of the Northern Army, as though he had now arrived at the ſummit of his ſublunary wiſhes, he writes to Adminiſtration for leave to reſign his command.

I cannot

I cannot forbear juſt to give a ſketch of this General's indeciſion. In November he propoſes that an army of 10,000 men ſhould move up the North River to Albany. In December he propoſes going to Philadelphia with the main army, and to have 3000 men only on the North River. In January he writes, that unleſs he received a re-inforcement, he ſhould act in Jerſey only. In July he ſailed for Philadelphia without having received a reinforcement. In April he writes to Sir Guy Carleton, that a corps were to act on the Hudſon in favour of the Northern Army. In July he goes ſouthward, and leaves no orders for a corps to act on the Hudſon. In April he writes to Government, that he ſhould carry 11,000 men only to Philadelphia. In July he carries 14,000. On the 7th of July he wrote, that the two armies could not join that campaign, as Gen. Burgoyne would find employment for his army againſt that of the rebels oppoſed to him. On the 16th of the ſame month he wrote, that Gen. Burgoyne would meet with little interruption, unleſs Gen. Waſhington ſhould attempt to force him; and even then he was not afraid of the

conſequence. He firſt propoſed to go north, then ſouth, and afterwards became ſtationary. He firſt propoſed to invade Pennſylvania by land, then to do it by land and ſea at the ſame time, and finally by ſea only. On the 16th of July he wrote to Government that he ſhould go up the Delaware, and in a fortnight after ſailed for Cheſapeak Bay.

I will now return from that dreary barren waſte, where the ſpectator ſickens at the indolence, indeciſion, and error, that every where catch his eye, to a different, but not more cheerful clime; to a region teeming with raſh projects, viſionary enterprizes, and diſaſtrous events.

I muſt indeed apologize for being detained ſo long by Sir William Howe. He is not intended for the principal figure: but in order to give your proportions, it was neceſſary to draw him at full length. It will not ſoften your features, though his complexion ſhould be deemed a ſhade or two darker than your own.

Before

Before you left Montreal Sir W. Howe's letter was communicated to you, by which you knew, that according to the operations then determined on, the principle on which you had relied in propoſing, and Government in accepting the plan for the expedition *to Albany*, would not take place, and that the object of that expedition could not be attained.

Had you not acquieſced in Sir William Howe's determination to go ſouthward, you ſurely would have made him acquainted with your diſſatisfaction: and, for the honour of human nature, I will ſuppoſe, that had you informed him that the ſafety or ſucceſs of your army depended on a co-operation, he would not have deſerted or betrayed you.

In your letter from Ticonderoga, which was received by Sir William before he left New-York, you ſay nothing of a co-operation.

Camp before Ticonderoga, July 2, 1777.

" I wait only ſome neceſſaries of the heavy " artillery which have been retarded by con- " trary winds upon Lake Champlain, to open

 " batteries

" batteries upon Ticonderoga. *The army is* " *in the fullest powers of health and spirits. I* " *have a large body of savages, and shall be* " *joined by a larger in a few days.* Ticonde- " roga reduced, I shall leave behind me pro- " per engineers to put it in an impregnable " state; and it will be garrisoned *from Canada,* " where all the *destined supplies* are safely ar- " rived. *My force will therefore be left com-* " *plete for future operations.*"

The evidence rises still higher. In your letter from Skeensborough of July 11th, you write, " Your Lordship will pardon me if I a " little lament that my orders do not give me " the latitude I ventured to propose in my " original project for the campaign; to make " a real effort instead of a feint upon New-Eng- " gland. As things have turned out, were I " at liberty to march in force immediately by " my left instead of my right, I should have " little doubt of subduing, before winter, the " provinces where the rebellion originated. " *If my late letters reach Mr. Howe, I still* " *hope this plan may be adopted from Albany.*"

The

The letters alluded to are ſuppreſſed, and, as you and Sir W. Howe make common cauſe, it is not probable that the Public will ever have a ſight of them. There is, however, ſufficient ground to conclude, that they contain the fulleſt aſſurance of your ability to act independent of the Southern Army, and a requeſt for liberty to do it; and that it was upon the ſtrength of theſe advices, that Sir William Howe, notwithſtanding he had wrote on the 7th of July that no junction could be formed that campaign, as you would find ſufficient employment againſt the rebels oppoſed to you, only nine days after writes, that you would meet with little interruption, unleſs Waſhington ſhould attempt to force you; and even then, ſuch was your ſtrength, that he ſhould be under no apprehenſion from the event. And in this way only can we account for his abandoning the idea of a corps acting on the Hudſon in your favour, carrying 14, inſtead of 11,000 troops to Philadelphia, and thereby leaving the garriſon at New York too weak to detach.

On

On the 17th of July, Sir William Howe writes to you from New York, "My intention is for *Pennſylvania*, where I expect to meet Waſhington; but if he goes to the northward, contrary to my expectations, and you can keep him at bay, be aſſured I ſhall ſoon be after him, to relieve you."

"After your arrival at Albany, the movements of the enemy will guide your's; but my wiſhes are, that the enemy be drove out of this province before *any operation takes place in Connecticut*. Sir Henry Clinton *remains in the command here*, and will act as occurrences may direct. *Putnam is in the Highlands with about* 4000 *men*."

This letter ſhews, that there was a perfect underſtanding between you and Sir W. Howe. He knew you were deſirous of turning your force againſt *New England*, but wiſhed you firſt to clear the province of *New York* of rebels; and ſo far from holding up any encouragement of a co-operation, the whole tenor of the letter ſhews that he had not an idea of it (unleſs Waſhington ſhould go northward),

nor even of opening a paſſage through the Highlands. And your letter of Auguſt 6, wrote after the receipt of Sir W. Howe's, is a further confirmation of your reſting ſatisfied with his meaſures. In this diſpatch, which Sir H. Clinton was to read in its paſſage to Sir W. Howe (which circumſtance proves that you ſuppoſed him to be gone ſouthward), you neither aſk, nor appear to expect any co-operation. On the contrary, you make ſuch a diſplay of your brilliant ſucceſs and rapid progreſs, and of the ſervices rendered by your numerous Indian auxiliaries, as muſt have induced both Sir Henry Clinton and Sir William Howe to think, that you did not even wiſh for any aſſiſtance from New York.

Thus, Sir, it is evident that you were not barely a quieſcent: If you were not a principal, you were equally culpable as an acceſſary, in preventing the intended co-operation from New York, though you modeſtly impute its failure to the neglect of the Miniſter.

Sir H. Clinton might, therefore, very juſtly remark, that "General Burgoyne *could*

not

not ſuppoſe that he had an idea of penetrating *to Albany*:" And Sir W. Howe might well exclaim, "I was ſurpriſed at General Burgoyne's declaration, that he would not have given up his communication with Ticonderoga, had he not expected a *co-operating army at Albany*, ſince I *poſitively* mentioned that he could have no direct aſſiſtance from the Southern Army."

Notwithſtanding the principle of a co-operation or junction was ſo totally abandoned, you every where conclude from it. You would induce the world to believe, that becauſe you were ordered to force your way to Albany, to form a junction with Sir William Howe, you were therefore obliged to force your way to Albany, after you knew that he was gone ſouthward, and could neither join nor ſuccour you. In one caſe it was practicable, in the other chimerical. In the former, you could be ſupplied and ſuccoured from New York; in the other, it was impoſſible to procure ſubſiſtence for your army. Without magazines having been previouſly formed, your army could

could ſcarcely have ſubſiſted at Albany in a time of profound peace; but *flagrante bello* with an enemy determined to burn and drive all the country before you, as you ſay the rebels were, and without a communication either with Canada or New York, it was utterly impoſſible *.

Pray what was Albany to you, without a co-operation of the Southern Army? It is not an object of itſelf. Albany is an inconſiderable town, ſituate near the confluence of the Hudſon and Mohawk, without a ſingle fortreſs, and ſurrounded by commanding heights. The inhabitants were generally well affected to Government, but they were diſarmed, and you had not arms to put into their hands. Could you have forced your way to the ſpot, you would probably only have had the melancholy view of its ruins; for the rebels would rather have laid it in aſhes, than ſuffered it to ſhelter the King's troops.

* This is admitted in the State of the Expedition.

As the point of the junction, Albany was indeed important; but as soon as that idea was abandoned, it lost all its consequence.

Besides, the co-operation of Sir W. Howe and Col. St. Leger would have enabled you to have reduced the country as you advanced, and to have secured it by proper posts. This would have been effectual; whereas the barely marching through a tract of country, with an enemy rising up behind you at every step, had very little tendency to quell the rebellion, which was the object of the war. In short, by Sir William Howe's going southward, the whole system of operation, of which the expedition to Albany was a constituent part, was unhinged; and your remaining in the vicinity of Ticonderoga became necessary, even for the security of that post *.

* Gen. Burgoyne had no sooner crossed the Hudson, than Gen. Lincoln marched directly upon the ground over which the British Army had passed, and five days afterwards retook 100 prisoners, took 293 royalists, Mount Defiance, Mount Hope, the French Lines, the Block-House, the Landing, 200 batteaux, &c. and as soon as Gen. Burgoyne surrendered his army, Ticonderoga was abandoned as untenable.

But,

But, Sir, as you adhere ſo cloſely to the letter of your inſtructions in one part, may I aſk, how it happened, that after reading them an *hundred* times, you diſregarded the letter in others? You might have read, that "the expedition could not be advantageouſly executed without the aſſiſtance of the Indians." Government, at an immenſe expence, had obtained you that aſſiſtance. Your army, you confeſs, was "by no means in a condition to diſpenſe with them;" yet you advanced after they had left you in diſguſt.

You muſt have read, that your expedition was to have been facilitated by a diverſion on the Mohawk; yet after that had failed, you continue your progreſs.

Your inſtructions alſo required you to proceed (literally) "with all expedition," yet you encumbered your army with forty-two pieces of artillery.

And even in the inſtance you fix upon, viz. "to force your way to Albany," you are

partial in a double ſenſe; for you reject the latter half of the ſentence, "*and put yourſelf under the command of Sir William Howe,*" as nugatory.

In the inſtance of a few detached words you adhere to the letter, againſt the ſenſe, and in every other part counteract both ſenſe and letter.

You were not, indeed, by the letter of your orders, reſtrained from advancing, in caſe you found it impoſſible to feed your army, becauſe ſuch an exception had hitherto been deemed a needleſs precaution.

You were not inſenſible of the neceſſity of eſtabliſhing a chain of poſts as you advanced, or of your *duty* in that reſpect; for in your letter of July 29, to Sir G. Carleton, you write, "A breach into my communication muſt either ruin my army intirely, or oblige me to return in force; to reſtore which, might be the loſs of the campaign. To prevent a breach, *Ticonderoga* and *Fort George* muſt be in very reſpectable ſtrength; and I muſt, be-

ſides,

ſides, have poſts at *Fort Edward* and other *carrying-places.*"

I muſt ſtand acquitted of *judging by events*, or from *after-knowledge of facts and circumſtances*, becauſe your own letters and evidence furniſh me with almoſt every fact that I ſtate, and indeed amoſt every inference that I ſhould have made, and evince that they occurred to you at the time. In your lucid intervals, truth and reaſon appear, though the infatuation that ſeized you was fatally predominant in the end.

Under the before-deſcribed circumſtances, it is demonſtrably certain, that you were not bound by your *orders* to proceed to Albany; of courſe you became reſponſible for the operations of the campaign.

Friendſhip may wiſh to conceal, and intereſt may labour to remove, but the landmarks of truth are fixed and permanent. The faithful pen of hiſtory will record, that

The

The Canada expedition was planned upon the principle of a co-operation of the Southern Army, ſo far as to effect a junction of the two armies as the primary object.

Sir W. Howe and Gen. Burgoyne underſtood the inſtructions in that ſenſe, but wiſhed to act ſeparately; the Northern Colonies having as powerful attractions for the one, as the Southern Colonies had for the other.

In this ſtate of mutual repulſion, Sir W. Howe propoſed, and Gen. Burgoyne heartily acquieſced in, the carrying on their operations intirely independent of each other.

At firſt, General Burgoyne's ſucceſſes were rapid and brilliant; and had they been followed up with all poſſible expedition, the iſſue would probably have been fortunate; but his unneceſſarily forcing his way through an immenſe foreſt, with incredible labour and fatigue, gave time for the panic the rebels had been thrown into, to ſubſide *.

Incum-

* To force a paſſage, it was neceſſary to conſtruct above forty bridges, beſides repairing cauſeways, one of which was of

Incumbered with forty-two pieces of artillery, besides baggage incompatible with a rapid march, his movements were slow.

In order to obtain a supply of live cattle and *baggage* † horses, he detached five hundred men to make a detour of two hundred miles, through the most dangerous and rebellious part of the country, and directly in the face of the rebel army. This detachment was intirely cut off, having scarcely advanced

of log work, and more than two miles in extent; by which means the army was twenty days in advancing as many miles, when, by taking the route of Lake George, they would have had level roads, and plain sailing. Those that conclude, that the operations of the campaign were not retarded by this movement, because the enemy was finally a-head of the provisions, do not consider the difference that the same labour, applied to the transport of provisions from Lake Champlain to Lake George, would have made. The same kind of logic is used to prove, that the artillery and baggage were no impediment. They affect not to consider, that if the horses, carriages, and water-craft, which transported the park of heavy artillery and the baggage, had plied only in the commissary of provisions department, that it would have enabled the army to move with celerity.

† Col. Baum was ordered to obtain 1300 horses to assist in transporting the *no* baggage of the army.

thirty

thirty miles, and a reinforcement came near ſharing the ſame fate.

This diſaſter turned the fortune of the war, completed the defection of the Indian auxiliaries, whom the General had before diſguſted, occaſioned the failure of the expedition on the Mohawk, diſcouraged the well-affected provincials from riſing, and drew together the whole rebel force of the Northern Colonies *.

Knowing that every collateral operation had failed; with only a month's proviſion; having an enemy in front *confeſſedly* ſuperior; and aſſured of a large body taking place immediately behind him, Gen. Burgoyne croſſed

* Gen. Burgoyne's obſervation, "That when a Miniſter ſtates a common accident of war to have been fatal to a whole campaign, of which he directed the progreſs, and apportioned the force, he makes but an ill compliment to his own judgment," is unfounded, becauſe it ſuppoſes the Miniſter to have directed the army to proceed to Albany without any co-operation. This fallacy pervades all the General's exculpatory and criminating performances. It is abundantly proved by the General's own witneſſes, that the means were adequate to the end, in caſe there had been a co-operation, and therefore the Miniſter muſt for ever ſtand acquitted.

 the

the Hudſon, and abandoned his communication with Canada and his magazines, without any proſpect of one being opened with New-York.

Five days afterwards, the rebels gave him battle, the fortune of which was ſo equivocal, that each army claimed the victory.

If the royaliſts were not repulſed, they were effectually checked, and the impracticability of advancing was ſelf-evident. It was, however, yet in his power to retreat; but he ſat down ("in the jaws of famine, and inveſted by quadruple numbers"), and betrayed a conſciouſneſs of inferiority by fortifying his camp *.

In order to keep up the ſpirits of his army, he gave in orders, "that powerful armies were co-operating with them †," and remained

* Gen. Burgoyne began to fortify his camp before the receipt of Gen. Clinton's letter.

† Gen. Burgoyne conſtantly held up this idea from the time he iſſued his proclamation at Putnam Creek, to the 3d of October, when he gave it in orders. The officers tell us, that

 they

mained ſo long in his fortified poſition, that in a council of war he declared, "Should General Clinton be where reported, yet the diſtance is ſuch as to render any relief from him improbable, during the time our proviſions could be made to laſt." "A defeat is fatal to the army; a victory does not ſave it, as they have neither proviſions to advance or retreat againſt an enemy."

After fighting another battle, in which the enemy had the advantage, he retreated two days with all his incumbrances, without loſs, and in good order, then halted; and without any further ſtruggle committed his brave companions to the honour and faith of rebels and traitors, upon the vain expectation that they would allow his army a free paſſage to England, to relieve an equal number of troops, who were to aſſiſt in quelling the rebellion the next campaign.

they did not know the contrary till after the convention. It is not therefore to be wondered at, that the Generals Phillips and Frazer expreſſed no diſapprobation at paſſing the Hudſon, or that Gen. Burgoyne's orders were executed with alacrity.

Thus

Thus, by a ſeries of miſconduct, increaſing in ſuch a ratio, that each ſtep ſeems calculated to efface the memory of all that preceded; by manœuvres which were all his own, and precluded a poſſibility of ſucceſs; by means, the bare ſtating of which carries with it ſuch intuitive evidence as to ſuperſede all argument, General Burgoyne totally loſt his army, and reduced his country to a predicament diſgraceful as it was calamitous; and finally, having exhauſted all the reſources of ſimulation and diſſimulation, he forfeited the claim to pity.

Thus this uncommon meteor, eccentric as a comet, and baneful as a malignant planet, ruſhed from a blaze of light into darkneſs and obſcurity.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

Page 31, line 19, for, *He there*, read, *He then*.
Page 47, line 18, for, *a quiescent*, read *acquiescent*.