

# Statement

Secretary of  
State for  
External Affairs



# Déclaration

Secrétaire  
d'État aux  
Affaires  
extérieures

91/12

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## NOTES FOR A SPEECH BY

**THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,**

**THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK,**

**DELIVERED AT**

**THE ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**LONDON, England  
February 20, 1991**

Canada served on the Security Council during the last six months of 1990, when the world mounted the most extensive campaign of diplomacy in recent history, seeking Iraq's peaceful withdrawal from Kuwait. We were involved intensively in the negotiation and drafting of the Security Council resolutions respecting Kuwait and co-sponsored 10 of them. We pursued independent initiatives to ease the disruption of Iraq's invasion and to seek a peaceful withdrawal.

In August, Canada contributed \$75 million in humanitarian assistance, with disproportionate high amounts going to Jordan and Egypt and we delivered quickly on the money we promised. Throughout the period, Canada insisted on the central role of the United Nations and, in particular, urged the U.S. to act with the UN rather than alone.

On the assumption that Islamic leaders from developing countries might have more influence on Saddam Hussein than we do, we encouraged our friends in the Commonwealth and La Francophonie -- Bangladesh, Nigeria, Senegal and Mali -- to go to Baghdad, but Saddam Hussein would not receive them.

In late November, I met with Presidents Ozal and Mubarak, and with King Hussein and Prime Minister Shamir. Based on these discussions, Prime Minister Mulroney proposed elements of a peaceful settlement which Mr. Perez de Cuellar took with him to Baghdad: complete Iraqi withdrawal; identification of a process for settling Iraq's dispute with Kuwait; the guarantee of all borders; and an undertaking to settle the other problems of the Middle East.

These were essentially the elements proposed publicly by France some days later, after Saddam Hussein refused to discuss peace seriously with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Those elements represented the only general basis for settlement. Now Iraq says it wants a peaceful settlement. What a pity this conversion has come so late.

We were profoundly disappointed when Saddam Hussein rejected every attempt at peace and forced the world to war. Canada, like other active supporters of the UN, is engaged today in achieving by force what the world could not achieve by diplomacy. Some 2,500 men and women of the Canadian Forces are now in the Gulf, aboard two destroyers and a supply ship, working in a special field hospital unit and operating 26 CF-18 aircraft.

The direct results of Iraq's attack on Kuwait are truly terrible. Kuwait has been defiled. The Kuwait government reports 3,000 Kuwaitis are dead and 17,000 missing. Yesterday, the British House of Commons Human Rights Group heard chilling

eye-witness testimony of cruelty and violence directed against Kuwaiti civilians by the occupying force. An unknown number of Iraqis were killed, the indirect victims of Saddam Hussein's aggression. Hundreds of those Kuwaiti and Iraqi dead were Palestinians and the aggression and invasion set back sharply the prospect of progress on the Palestinian question generally. The fear and antagonism between Israel and the Palestinians has deepened. The natural environment has become a weapon of war.

Our immediate imperative is for Iraq to accept the Security Council Resolutions and withdraw from Kuwait, and to permit the world to begin to repair the terrible damage Saddam Hussein triggered when he attacked Kuwait.

But there is a larger dimension to this conflict. What brought the world together was the principle that aggression will not be tolerated as an exercise of state power. Nations united to defend the rule of law.

That principle is not new. It is the primary principle which infused the Charter of the United Nations, drawn up 46 years ago in San Francisco. It is the principle which lay behind earlier efforts, like the League of Nations, efforts which failed with such tragic consequences. It is the principle which all have accepted in theory, but too many have ignored in practice.

But if that principle is not new, our ability to act upon it is. The liberation of the United Nations from the shackles of the Cold War has removed old excuses. The UN is now free to defend its principles, or to disregard them. In responding as it has to the invasion of Kuwait, the members of the UN chose to defend its principles, not disregard them.

The question now is: will that willingness to make use of the UN extend beyond the crisis in the Gulf?

Canada believes it must. If nations, particularly powerful nations, were to back away from the UN now, that would feed a cynicism that, in the Gulf, the UN was nothing but a "nom de guerre" for countries exercising power in old ways for old reasons. That, in turn, would sharpen antagonism between developed and developing countries, and could imperil the capacity and standing of the UN.

If, however, the unanimity that was invoked to stop aggression can be applied to other issues, the international community will become much stronger. Canada believes that it is important to plan now, so that the UN can be as successful in post-crisis times as it has been in defending the principle of non-aggression.

I should declare a Canadian interest. We believe in the UN, and indeed, in the principle of multilateral action. We believe that kind of co-operation is most important to nations like ours and smaller nations that are not superpowers; nations that need a world with rules and with the ability to have these rules respected.

We prefer a UN that can act as well as talk; and we believe it is important to enlarge the number of areas where the members of the UN can act together. It was in that spirit that Canada proposed more than 30 years ago the concept of peacekeeping under UN auspices; and it explains why Canada, though our population is only 26 million, is the fifth-largest financial contributor to the UN family in the world. The term that ended in December 1990 was our seventh term on the Security Council -- more than any other country except the Permanent Five. We think we have learned some lessons about the UN and hope to apply some of them now.

Today, therefore, I would like to examine, from a staunch multilateral perspective, the issues of peace and security in the Middle East and, more generally, the implication of this crisis for the future role of the United Nations in international peace and security.

What are the issues at stake in the Middle East?

Saddam Hussein has tried to say that his very personal grab of Kuwait was somehow not an act of violent assault and outright theft, for the sole benefit of the Iraq he has done so much to destroy. He pretends it was part of a larger struggle, rooted in Palestinian injustice, the grievances of Arabs, the offended dignity of Muslims, and even the exhausted aspirations of the billions of poor of the Third World. His appropriation of these causes is ludicrous. But the causes themselves are real and compelling.

They fester particularly in a region whose history this century has been one of violence, war and deadly rivalries. Where enormous wealth in some quarters is contrasted by misery and poverty in others. Where the passion of religious doctrine can contribute to acts of extremism as well as those of solace.

Surely the lessons of five Middle East wars since 1945 illustrate the futility and danger of relying on competitive armed camps for security, on arming to the teeth rival poles of ambition. Saddam Hussein has shown what one pathological personality can do in such circumstances.

The foundations of real security need to be grounded in confidence-building. The region needs confidence in the intentions of all leaders and countries of the area. It needs

reassurance as to their capabilities. The people of the region need to know they can count on the prospects of peaceful pursuit of their opportunities, as well as in the preservation of what they most treasure.

For some time Canada has been consulting with leaders in the region and outside, to develop some specific ideas as to how to proceed in the short term and in the long term to encourage real and co-operative security. These ideas represent a contribution we must make, drawn from a perspective that is unreservedly internationalist.

Of course, solutions to conflict have to come from the region. But they need the legitimization of the United Nations, whose business is world peace and security.

This belief in the United Nations may distinguish the Canadian public in its views from public opinion in the U.K., in the U.S., or in France. But we believe the UN -- which is nothing more nor less than its constituent member states -- cannot be used as a way-station of convenience; we need to strengthen it as a matter of permanence. The UN is not an optional extra. It needs a central role in all three phases of reconstruction after the end of hostilities: the disengagement and peacekeeping phase; the recovery from war; and the building of durable peace.

In the short term, there has to be at some point a ceasefire and withdrawal of Iraq's forces from Kuwait. The timing of this is in the hands of Saddam Hussein. There is only one choice: quick and complete withdrawal. It is not clear that this reality has been unequivocally accepted.

Yesterday, Prime Minister Mulroney indicated that we were very grateful to Mr. Gorbachev for his initiative. But we hold the view that satisfaction of UN Security Council resolutions should include elements such as the following:

1. all Iraqi personnel to leave Kuwait within a specified and very short period of time;
2. the disposal of all equipment left behind as a result of compliance with the deadline to be the responsibility of the UN;
3. all weapons of mass destruction to be left behind and to be disposed of under UN auspices;
4. all land mines to be cleared by Iraqi personnel within a reasonable specified time period;

5. all prisoners-of-war to be exchanged immediately under the supervision of the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross);
6. inspection and verification of compliance to be under UN auspices;
7. humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for the victims of Iraqi aggression to be worked out under UN auspices, in accordance with the principles of international law.

But once complete withdrawal is accepted and commenced, the first step is for suitable arrangements for the observation of a ceasefire, and verification of the Iraqi withdrawal. This is, in our view, clearly a responsibility of the UN Security Council to mandate and organize. The authority for the use of force against Iraq is derived from the will of the Security Council. Verification that the requirements of Resolution 660 have been satisfied should also be vested in the United Nations.

It is also important that the immediate humanitarian relief the region will need be channelled through the UN. People will need food, shelter, water, medicine, surgery, rehabilitation -- physical and psychological.

In the last two days, I have met with foreign ministers of some of the principal staffing countries of UN peacekeeping forces in the Middle East: Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Finland which, together with Canada, compose almost half of the UN forces there. We agreed that, if requested, a truce observation and verification force could be swiftly put into place from among our forces in Lebanon, Cyprus and on Israel's border with its neighbours as well as Iraq's with Iran. We should convey to the Secretary-General our willingness to respond positively to such a request.

The next security phase needs to be comprised of peacekeeping. The UN Security Council authorized in Resolution 678 the use of whatever means were necessary to make the peace. Now it must turn to keeping the peace.

However, it must be asked to do so by the countries of the region. A force to keep the peace must be credible. It must be armed. It must be drawn from the countries most affected. They may argue that it should not be a UN force per se, with blue berets, but a combined force of Arab and other regional states, working with the UN. This would be a peacekeeping force of major dimension for the UN. Making it a UN force opens up some questions for the region and for the organization. Is viable regional security not best assured directly from a region? Would

we want to arm the UN in such a massive way? We are after answers which work -- for the region and for the UN.

The foreign ministers of Arab countries I have spoken with say that such a force could, however, be supplemented by traditional peacekeeping forces from outside the region. If so, Canada may be willing to play whatever role is useful.

In a still longer term, the inviolability of borders will have to be assured. As we have learned in the past, peacekeeping forces alone may not be enough. An interlocking series of mutual self-defence understandings will probably be necessary and their viability could obviate the need for future assurances of protection from elsewhere.

We hope we have seen the end of the East-West rivalry in the region. With the Cold War over, there should be no further need to arm surrogates to the teeth to promote or preserve the interests of East or West. Those interests should now coincide, which should leave the region freer to pursue its own interests which, surely, must be based upon a far greater degree of stability and security.

The sharpest threat to stability in the Middle East is coming from the Arab-Israeli conflict. It must be addressed forcefully and fully by all countries in the region and by those outside with influence and obligations.

Here, too, the decline of superpower rivalry can be of great help.

Israel needs security.

The Palestinians need justice.

Resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council need implementation, at last.

We reject the spurious parallels Saddam Hussein has drawn between his aggression against Kuwait and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Those situations are different in cause, context, and content. We reject linkage.

But rejecting linkage does not mean rejecting logic: the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict would ensure that this region will remain incendiary.

So much attention is paid to the process of reaching peace. Some say that only discreet bilateral land-for-peace deals will work. Others call for a large conference to discuss Arab-Israeli issues, to negotiate them in a group setting. Others call for an even larger conference, to try to

find the beginnings of solutions for all issues affecting the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf.

None of these techniques can alone provide an answer. Each has disadvantages, but each has merits. A judicious combination is what we need, within a UN context.

What we need above all is political will.

The war in the Gulf may have helped to promote it. A curious set of interdependencies emerged. Arab States acknowledge the restraint shown by Israel in the face of Iraqi SCUD attacks. Israel acknowledges the difficulties which King Hussein of Jordan has to confront in responding to his public opinion which is so anguished over the plight of Palestinians. Are these enough to enable Arab States to settle differences bilaterally with Israel, and for Israel to conform to relevant Security Council resolutions? The world must work, step-by-step, carefully but with a sense of urgency, to build an atmosphere of confidence that will allow, at last, Resolutions 242 and 338 to be implemented.

We, in Canada, have maintained for a long time that real security in the Middle East has to be built on more than protection from military aggression.

Peoples of the world wish co-operation with others.

Co-operation of a structural kind -- building together -- creates confidence. This was the great lesson in the building of Western Europe after the Second World War. It is the aspiration now of the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe.

The other great confidence-building, of course, is democracy itself. Democracies seldom aggress others -- not as often as dictators, anyway.

We agree with Arab leaders and others from the region who say that a regional approach to confidence-building is required in the Gulf, in the Middle East, and in West Asia generally. The European experience cannot be exported or imported.

But there are some precedents.

Precedents in military confidence-building, such as the exchange of data on military forces, and on manoeuvres, and the deployment of high-technology sensor equipment such as currently exists in the Sinai.



*Economic* confidence-building -- the creation of a regional development bank, for example. We are not talking of redistributing other countries' wealth -- Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are already generous ODA (official development assistance) donors -- we are talking of support for efforts to encourage region-wide investment and co-operation on the bases of shared goals. *Environmental* confidence-building through co-operation in maintenance of the fragile arid ecology. All of these efforts could make everyone in the region a shareholder in continued stability.

One area which cries out for such co-operation is fresh water. This is a resource as precious as oil representing the prospect of real cooperation. The people of the Middle East need irrigation trenches, not military trenches. This might be their equivalent of Jean Monnet's coal and steel community which first bonded post-war Germany and France in a common cause.

Finally, I believe it is imperative that the world declare that there be no Middle East arms bazaar. Ninety-five per cent of the weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein came from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the same Council which has had to respond to Saddam Hussein's aggression. During the Iran-Iraq war, 28 countries supplied both sides of the conflict, a situation which we must now see either as greed run rampant or as a short-sighted attempt to manipulate a region where control is impossible and where alliances can shift with remarkable speed. Our men and women now face weapons the Coalition provided Iraq. And surely, the financial costs of this conflict -- leaving aside the terrible human suffering -- outweigh by several orders of magnitude the commercial benefits arising from a decade of the arms trade.

Every country is entitled to defend itself, every country has an obligation to ensure that prudent defence does not become destabilizing offence. And it is time to act not by helping the weaker states, but by limiting the stronger. We must seek to build down, not build up.

The practical problems here are considerable. What weapons are defensive and what weapons are offensive? How much is enough? How can arsenals be controlled when political conflict persists and how can political conflict be brought to an end when arsenals continue to threaten? How can countries which have developed economies so dependent on the arms trade with the Middle East accept tighter controls which will cost jobs and profits? And what efforts can be mounted to bring all countries into a control effort, so that restraint on the part of some does not simply lead to a bonanza for others?

The problem of the conventional arms trade is coupled with the challenge of the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction. The presence of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East is a time bomb. It is unacceptable. The balance of terror is not a portable concept. Mutual Assured Destruction in that region would bring precisely that -- assured destruction. Exporting countries must act to tighten their export controls policies and practices, particularly on missile technology.

When it is reviewed this fall, we must begin the process to give the Biological Weapons Convention teeth in terms of verification.

The Chemical Weapons Convention now under negotiation in Geneva must move to an early conclusion resulting in a ban on possession and production which is comprehensive, complete and verifiable.

Efforts must be mounted to broaden and deepen the capacity of the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; this vital treaty needs extension in 1995, and the non-signatory states brought into it.

This should not have the character of telling developing countries that they can't be trusted with the military hardware commonplace for countries which are industrialized. We ourselves must build down -- the end of the Cold War provides this opportunity. And the last thing we want to see is diversion to the Third World of the weapons once manufactured for the over-armed states of the Warsaw Pact or NATO.

We in Canada have a proposal to help move this ahead. It will be greeted with cynicism by officials in some capitals in the West, particularly on the part of nuclear weapons states.

But I don't believe their political leaders can be cynical. Their publics won't allow it. Public opinion is outraged by what we have learned about the history of arms sales to Iraq.

We wish to see convened a World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Not a drawn-out conference of detailed negotiation. Leave this to the negotiating fora I have mentioned.

But a conference of political leadership. What this issue needs is political will.

There are few moments in history where the psychology is right for a change of course. A Summit on Arms Control, properly prepared, could achieve such a change.

It won't end weapons sales. But it could agree to make them transparent. So that we all know what is going on.

We could agree to restraint and reduction; to openness, rather than the convenience of the blind eye, not just to obvious arms, but to technology whose use is dual.

Last autumn, there was a World Summit on Children held at the United Nations in New York. Two days, to make some fundamental political commitments to build a better world for children. Only heads of government or state could participate: 82 did because, politically, they could not stay away.

It was a success because it galvanized action. The most significant problem is the absence of means.

The parallels between the two summits are far from complete. But the Children's Summit is relevant to an Arms Summit for two reasons. One, summits can work. Two, the means to save children are in the savings to be made from arms.

Does this call for controls, for bureaucracy, for interference? If it did, I'd still be in favour, but it doesn't. It calls for responsibility and the recognition that all states are in this together.

The institution all states share together is the United Nations.

Surely this -- the need to deal now with arms control -- and the need to promote the United Nations, these are among the great lessons of the Gulf crisis.

We must improve the UN. The original concepts of a genuine international civil service must be restored. The authority of the Secretary-General's Office, which Mr. Perez de Cuellar has restored with courage, must be reinforced. The large powers must see such steps as being acts of realism.

Even if this is not a war to end all wars, let us make it the war to begin a new and better peace. Potential aggressors will know that the UN no longer cries foul and then cries wolf, that it means what it says. Powerful countries will not be able easily to discard later the precedent they declare is now being created or the principles of common consent they now claim to defend.

If the UN succeeds here, it can succeed elsewhere. If it fails here, it will succeed nowhere. A United Nations which can win this war and build this peace will be a United Nations which can turn, confident and empowered, to the other problems which plague this planet, the new challenges to global security

-- the poverty cycle in the Third World; global warming; terrorism, the drug trade; epidemics like AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome); or the scourge of untrammelled population growth and the related floods of refugees.

In earlier decades of this century, this Royal Society played a role in the great debate which raged over whether or not a state's interests were best pursued unilaterally through the traditional instruments of power or best pursued co-operatively through compromise and concertation. That debate was known as one between Realists and Idealists. That debate is now over because its terms have been reversed by reality.

Those who would persist in the belief that order can be imposed unilaterally, that security lies solely in arms, that the UN is a forum for the weak and not an institution for the world -- they are not the realists of today. They are the victims of a dangerous nostalgia, a hubris this world can no longer afford. They are dreaming as the old idealists dreamt decades ago.

The war in the Gulf makes the point. The costs of unilateral action for Iraq are those we see. The costs of unilateral counter-actions would have been high as well, even if the cause was just, not in shorter military terms perhaps, but in longer political terms. A coalition of effort has been necessary, forged from all sorts of countries of the United Nations. This was the resort of realists.

The type of order countries like Canada have always required is the type of order the whole world now needs. The global village was once a slogan. It is now a description. And in that new neighbourhood, we are all connected to each other in fact and in fate. Building a new order in the Gulf and in the world will not be easy. Order means trust. Order means responsibility. Order means ceasing to be selective. And order always means sacrifice.

In facing Saddam Hussein, the world said the time for talk was over and the time for action had come. In building world order, the time for talk is also over. Here too, it is time for action.

Difficulty must not distract us from necessity. The members of the United Nations who now oppose aggression must work together to preclude aggression. The nations of the world who now fight to restore order must work together to build order. The peoples of the world who yearn for security must now work together to construct security co-operatively. The countries which fight now to defend law must work together to strengthen law.

Let us respond to another gulf, the gulf which exists between our aspirations and our achievements. Let us become united nations. That is our opportunity and our challenge. We must make it our accomplishment.