

# STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION  
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## REVIEW OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Transcript of an interview in New York with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Howard Green, which was televised by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation on its programme INQUIRY on November 14, 1961. The programme was introduced by Mr. Davidson Dunton, President of Carleton University, Ottawa. Members of the panel were: Mr. James Wechsler, editor of the New York Post; Mr. Simon Mali, U.N. correspondent of Radio Tunis; and Mr. Clark Davey, Cable Editor of the Toronto Globe and Mail. The chairman was Mr. Knowlton Nash, CBC Washington correspondent.

Mr. Dunton: Look at him and you seem to see a man wearing an air of detached melancholy, perhaps what one would expect from our Minister of External Affairs in these days of the "Doomsday Bomb". But listen to him and you hear the voice of an eternal optimist, for one thing that characterizes Howard Charles Green is determined optimism in the face of persistent adversity. His is the frustrating task of striving for international agreement on disarmament when the obstacles are so enormous and while even some of his own cabinet colleagues don't seem to agree entirely on some of the issues involved for Canada. In this world of tension and brinkmanship Howard Green may be remarkable for his calm, but this doesn't prevent our unflappable Minister of External Affairs from following an extremely busy work schedule.

During the week that just passed, for instance, politician Green travelled far enough afield to see friends and acquaintances in British Columbia and to address the University of Toronto Progressive Conservative Association, while diplomat Green, among other things, had talks in Ottawa with the ambassadors of France and Guatemala before going on to New York and the deliberations of the United Nations. In New York City, the Honourable Howard Green now faces an international panel of Inquiry journalists: James Wechsler, editor of the New York Post; Simon Mali, U.N. correspondent of Radio Tunis; and Clark Davey, cable editor of the Toronto Globe and Mail. The chairman is Knowlton Nash.

Mr. Davey: Mr. Green, what are we trying to achieve with our Canadian foreign policy?

Mr. Green: Well at this particular time I think the main role for a country like Canada is to do what she can to reduce tension and to promote understanding, and to give what leadership a middle power can give. Mind you, we try to decide what policies we think are the most appropriate to meet conditions, and then we go out and advocate those and try to get support for them.

Mr. Davey: Could I just deal with a specific on one of those policies? I think you personally and the Canadian delegation took a great deal of satisfaction from the fact that the United Nations supported a call on Russia not to set off its 50 megaton blast. Why didn't Canada take the initiative and follow up that resolution with a resolution condemning the Russians or censuring the Russians at the United Nations for setting off the blast?

Mr. Green: You have to do what can be done practically. We were very lucky to get a resolution through the United Nations with 87 countries supporting us. The only ones opposed were the Communist countries plus Cuba and Outer Mongolia. Because that resolution went through with such an overwhelming majority it constituted a very clear focusing of world opinion on the Soviet Union for their plan to set off this test. Now after the test had been set off, if a resolution had been brought in I think it would have not got anything near so much support. That would have weakened the whole situation. That would have partially destroyed the effect which was gained by getting this overwhelming vote against the Russians in the first place.

Mr. Davey: Shouldn't we as a country take a stand on principle, though, not necessarily on whether a resolution is going to pass at the United Nations or not? After all, we appear to be the country most in the way of fall-out.

Mr. Green: Mind you, we're in a temperate zone, and as such subject to fall-out, but we have to do things that are practical and that will get some results. There's no use starting something in the United Nations which won't be adopted. That would have done no good whatever. It would have weakened our position.

Mr. Wechsler: I should like to ask you with respect to your relations with the United States whether it is your feeling that Canada would be moving on any different lines if it were not for the nature of American policy. Specifically I would ask you if you are satisfied with what we are doing about the problem of Red China, and then I'd like to get to Germany later, but I don't want to do too much at once.

Mr. Green: On most issues we agree with the United States and with the United Kingdom. This is because our backgrounds are similar and we have a great deal in common.

Mr. Wechsler: But on China you'd have some difficulty being with both of us.

Mr. Green: On China we have taken the same position that the United States has taken. We have not recognized Red China and we have not voted for her admission to the United Nations.

Mr. Wechsler: But you have traded with her considerably.

Mr. Green: Yes, that's right and we trade with the Soviet Union and with Poland, and with Communist countries.

Mr. Wechsler: Why did you follow the United States rather than Great Britain on the issue of Red China?

Mr. Green: We didn't follow the United States. I want to make that perfectly clear. We adopt this policy because we think it is the right policy. If we disagreed with the United States we would disagree regardless of what they thought.

Mr. Mali: Yet, when you come to the foreign policy of Canada which is to promote world peace and so on, why doesn't Canada take an active position or policy in order to promote East-West negotiations at this: most on Berlin for instance? The Afro-Asian nations and the undeveloped and the non-aligned nations in the world are really very disappointed to see countries like Canada which in recent years have once in a while taken initiative which separated from the United States and the big western powers, and the eastern powers, and taking initiative to bring the two big powers together.

Mr. Green: Well we have taken a very definite stand throughout in favour of having the Berlin question negotiated, and if you will remember in the opening speech at the United Nations a few weeks ago we advocated that there should be a United Nations presence in Berlin and on the access routes. We also said that in our opinion it would be wise to move some of the United Nations activities to Berlin - for example the European office. I think you're quite wrong when you say that we haven't taken any initiative at all about promoting mediation in Berlin because this has been our effort from the start. We're a little disappointed with the non-aligned countries because they didn't say very much when the Russians started setting off these tests.

Mr. Mali: Would you favour at this time immediate negotiations between the United States and the western powers and the Soviet Union on the German issue in Berlin?

Mr. Green: I don't understand that.

Mr. Mali: Would you favour immediate negotiations, that such negotiations should start immediately.

Mr. Green: I don't know about immediate negotiations but we have urged from the start that they should commence negotiations. There has never been any wavering in Canada's stand in that regard.

Mr. Wechsler: May I ask in all seriousness why the issue of Berlin has so long remained outside the domain of the United Nations? There hardly could be any clearer threat to peace than Berlin and why, in your view, has there not been a major movement to say that this issue must be brought into the council of the United Nations, whether it can be resolved there or not. I must say that I say this with criticism of my own government. I don't understand why from the moment this became the centre of the world's anxiety it was not the business of the United Nations to be brought into this issue in whatever form it could be.

Mr. Green: We take the position that wherever there is a danger to peace the United Nations should take steps. Mind you, in Berlin the four occupying countries are there as a result of the war and they have a special status in Berlin. Now that has made it a little difficult for the United Nations to move in. I think probably the U.N. could only move in if the four nations agreed to that step being taken.

Mr. Davey: Do you mean, Mr. Green, that there has been some reluctance on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom and France to have a United Nations presence in Berlin, and that we haven't been able to sell them on that idea?

Mr. Green: I don't know, of course, to what extent they would like to see the United Nations in Berlin, but some of these four countries have indicated that they would have no objection to some United Nations activity in Berlin.

Mr. Davey: Then why hasn't there been active initiative taken by Canada at the United Nations? We get back to that question again. Why haven't you people brought forward the resolution, or least canvassed the situation prior to bringing forward a resolution?

Mr. Green: Well, you know, we're not running the United Nations. Some people in Canada may think that we are, but we did make this suggestion at the opening of the present session, that the United Nations should participate in Berlin, and we're doing what we can to have action of that kind taken. But the primary responsibility in the question of Berlin rests with the four occupying powers. No other country can step in and force them to change their policy.

Mr. Davey: No, but couldn't the United Nations as a group of countries - not as one country - couldn't the United Nations as a group of countries bring overpowering pressure to bear on them?

Mr. Green: I don't think that that could be done on that issue. There are a great many countries in the United Nations which don't like to take a stand, some against the United States and others against the Soviet Union. They've got other things to think about. They have their own internal problems to worry about, particularly the new countries, and it isn't just that easy to line them up in a campaign against all of the large countries or against any one or more of these countries. This is why the vote on the 50 megaton test resolution was so significant. All these countries did line up against the Soviet Union in that case.

Mr. Wechsler: But wasn't this a rather crucial moment in the life of the U.N. when Russian and American tanks confronted each other as they did in Berlin for that fateful moment when if someone had gone berserk we might not be here now? And it still seems to me now hard to understand how the general sentiment of nations like Canada and others not directly involved in this conflict would not have been that this is the largest emergency we ever had, which may occur again tomorrow or a week from tomorrow, and that it would have been so important I think for American opinion if Canada and other nations had spoken up and said that this belongs at the United Nations if there is any reason for the U.N.

Mr. Green: Canada did say that. But a great many of these countries were not interested in the Berlin question to such a large extent. As I said a moment ago, they have other problems and the Berlin question is a remote problem for them. It's a very direct question for us. We are directly involved. But for most of the countries that is not the case.

Mr. Mali: Is it also maybe one of the reasons of it is that the majority of the United Nations members wouldn't have followed the western powers in their stand on Berlin? At the United Nations which we are following every day you have a definite feeling that the overwhelming majority of the Africans and Asians and one might say some of the Latin American nations are not at all in favour of the policy of force and power and strength on the Berlin issue.

Mr. Green: Yes, I think that's true. As a matter of fact, every nation large and small has taken the position that it doesn't want war over Berlin. Certainly there is a tendency among the uncommitted nations to say a plague on both your houses, and we don't want to be bothered with either side. I think you're quite right. There is that tendency at the United Nations.

Mr. Davey: One other problem is nuclear testing. Could you tell us whether you feel that there should be no more nuclear testing period, or whether the United States, in view of the situation, should conduct atmospheric tests?

Mr. Green: Canada's position for some time has been that there should be no nuclear tests - in the air, underground, or anywhere else by any country. That is still government policy.

Mr. Mali: Yet, in the General Assembly the position of Canada was not for a moratorium as demanded by some of the African and Asian countries.

Mr. Green: Oh no, we voted for the moratorium.

Mr. Mali: Yes, but in the voting paragraph by paragraph of this resolution you abstained a couple of times giving the impression that you may not be completely.....

Mr. Green: No, no, we voted for that moratorium. I forget whether we abstained on one or two paragraphs. As you know that happens very frequently in the United Nations. You may not agree with the whole of a resolution, but the test is whether you vote for it or not, and we voted for that moratorium.

Mr. Wechsler: Could we go back to the China issue for a moment. I don't think I reflect the overwhelming sentiment of my own countrymen when I raise the issue in these terms. Yet, I must say that I still see no logic or sense in the view that we can keep this country out much longer and hope to achieve disarmament or any form of international stabilization. I wonder, if I may say so as I suggested earlier, why it has been the Canadian view that there is greater wisdom in the American position than there is in the British position on this issue?

Mr. Green: On the Chinese question, we don't think that Formosa should be handed over to Red China and the policy of Red China is that she will not accept recognition or admission to the United Nations unless at the same time it is acknowledged that she has the right to take over Formosa. We're not prepared to do that.

Mr. Wechsler: Well, I certainly would agree with that position, but it doesn't seem to me that there has been any effort made or any aggressive diplomacy directed towards a solution which would create the two China solution that we all know about. Would it not be your disposition to feel that that was the only hope in this situation?

Mr. Green: It would certainly make it much easier to solve this question if this attitude of Red China could be overcome.

Mr. Wechsler: But on the other hand Chiang Kai-Shek would say that he is opposed to the two China solution so that we are in this terrible deadlock in which neither side seems to be prepared to accept even a discussion of this formula. But I wondered whether it would not be quite helpful to the United States if Canada broke through this stalemate and at least suggested that it favoured this kind of solution. I certainly agree that the notion of turning over Formosa to the Chinese Communists would be intolerable and unacceptable.

Mr. Green: Well I am very hopeful that something along that line can be worked out.

Mr. Davey: Mr. Green have you had any comments from United States officials in relation to our large trade with China that has developed over the last year?

Mr. Green: Not officially, no. I think the American government understands the situation very well. I don't doubt some of the American press have commented adversely on the fact that Canada has been selling wheat to Red China.

Mr. Wechsler: The government may understand it here, but have you had any indication that the U.S. government doesn't like it?

Mr. Green: No.

Mr. Mali: Can I ask you a question in another field? There is a strong feeling among the non-aligned countries, the anti-colonial countries at the

United Nations and in the world that Canada has its hands tied with the issue of anti-colonialism; that you, Canada, apply double standards regarding the colonial issues; that at a time where you are asking for the Afro-Asians to support you on issues like Hungary, you refuse to support the Algerians in their struggle for independence; that at a time where you are basically against all kinds of discrimination, colour or otherwise, you do not support sanctions against South Africa at the United Nations, and so on and so forth.

Mr. Green: Well I think that's a very severe judgment that you are rendering on Canada. We don't have two standards on the colonialism question and incidentally, I don't think that half enough credit is given to the United Kingdom for what she has been doing on the issue of colonialism - launching nation after nation, and launching them with proper trained people to run the countries and so on, and in each case these new nations deciding to remain in the Commonwealth. In the Commonwealth we don't think we have very much to apologize for on the practical work being done to meet the colonial issue. We think the Soviet Union has a great deal more to apologize for. You never hear of Ethonia or Latvia or Lithuania getting any chance to get their independence. Now, I think your judgment is a very rough and ready one.

Mr. Mali: How would these people feel when they hear that because one East German has jumped to the river in order to join the West Germans and he is shot, the whole western world is shouting and screaming when thousands and thousands of Africans, whether Algerian, or in South Africa, Angola or Mosambique are treated worse than animals and there is not a single finger lifted in their defence by western powers, including Canada.

Mr. Green: Well now, it's just yesterday that Canada voted on a resolution which condemned Portugal and we did the same thing last year.

Mr. Green: We did not support the decision regarding the sanction against South Africa. We abstained on the sanction section. We voted for the Indian resolution against apartheid. We abstained on the sanction paragraph because we didn't think that that does very much to meet the situation.

Mr. Davey: But suppose the General Assembly passes the sanctions, calls for a blockade against South Africa. Would Canada recognize and accept that resolution and put such a blockade into effect?

Mr. Green: Well, I don't know, that would have to be decided at the time and on the conditions under which the resolution. We abstained on that resolution on November 13th and we haven't - we've never voted for sanctions. The sanction proposal went very far. For example, withdrawing ambassadors and not allowing ships to come into ports, and all this sort of thing - something that I think has never been done by the United Nations against any country.

Mr. Wechsler: Doesn't the South African issue have a curious reflex with respect to the Chinese problem? I happen to have opposed, as an editor, the move to exclude South Africa from the United Nations or to throw them

out on the grounds that I believe that the U.N. must be based on the principle of universality or it means nothing. It can't be an honour society because there are too many people in it who don't deserve being in it. But if we accept the proposition that the South African regime and many others shall be in it, I just cannot see the moral or logic of the exclusion of Communist China which is certainly properly a defacto government. Now I recognize again your point that we cannot accept the assumption that Formosa is given to Communist China, but it seems to me that in the United States at least if I may say so, there is total lack of realism or understanding or morality about this issue. We oppose any move to throw the South Africans out although they are guilty of the greatest crimes against humanity. Yet we say we mustn't let Communist China in because they are guilty of crimes against humanity.

Mr. Green: This is a problem I am afraid you will have to take up with the United States government. I am afraid I can't speak for them.

Mr. Wechsler: I was just hoping you would help us a little bit on this.

Mr. Nash: Mr. Green, specifically on this question that Mr. Wechsler has raised about China, why does Canada not recognize Communist China?

Mr. Green: I thought I explained the main reason a few moments ago when I said that China won't accept recognition at present unless we recognize her right to take over Formosa. Well, we're not prepared to do that.

Mr. Nash: This is the only thing that stands.....

Mr. Wechsler: But isn't it technically true with respect to recognition they do not insist that you accept their proposition. Recognition as a matter of fact is a diplomatic formula, isn't it? You don't have to accept the conditions. You recognize or you don't recognize, don't you?

Mr. Green: No. This is a very practical situation. Canada has never been prepared to admit that Red China has a right to take over Formosa.

Mr. Wechsler: I understand that, but do you think that it would be a prerequisite of your decision to acknowledge their right to representation in the U.N. to concede that they must take over Formosa. Couldn't you simply state that it is your belief that they should be represented in the U.N. and that Formosa itself should be represented.

Mr. Green: As I understand it they won't even take membership in the United Nations unless their right to take over Formosa is acknowledged.

Mr. Wechsler: My only point is wouldn't we all be in a much better position if the United States and Canada said to Red China, you have a seat here. The independent government of Formosa also has a seat. Then let them fight with Chiang Kai-Shek about whether they can bear to sit in the same room.



Mr. Green: Of course that isn't the case yet. It hasn't gone along that far.

Mr. Nash: Your argument certainly doesn't apply to Canadian recognition of Red China. It would be possible for us to recognize Red China without acknowledging their right to take over Formosa.

Mr. Green: No, Red China won't accept recognition unless Canada and other nations proposing to recognize her admit her right to Formosa. The Prime Minister of China has made that very clear on more than one occasion.

Mr. Nash: Have we explored the possibility with them lately of recognition?

Mr. Green: No. As a matter of fact Great Britain recognized them quite a few years ago and I think Canada is more highly respected in Red China than Great Britain is. The British have never been able to get an ambassador even into Peking. They only have a charge.

Mr. Davey: Why do you say we are more highly respected, sir, because we didn't recognize them?

Mr. Green: No, but I think that's the case, that we have a higher standing in Red China than the British have.

Mr. Davey: Could that be because Red China doesn't grow very much wheat?

Mr. Green: This was long before the question of wheat came into the picture.

Mr. Mali: Sir, as a part of the American hemisphere, does Canada intend to do anything in order to settle this issue of Cuba, the relations of Cuba and the United States? You are maintaining relations with Cuba and you are having trade with Cuba. Is there any possibility or prospect of Canada playing any role in bridging up the present rift?

Mr. Green: Now I'd get into a great deal of trouble with Mr. Wechsler, if I suggested that Canada was willing to try and help settle the Cuba problems.

Mr. Wechsler: Not with me, but you might get into trouble with a few other people.

Mr. Mali: Are you actually ready to interfere, to intervene to help settle this problem.

Mr. Green: I wouldn't comment on that question. We have already had quite a lot of criticism on this score some months ago.

Mr. Davey: I gather from you say, though, that there was a point when we were prepared to take the initiative and we were rebuffed.

Mr. Green: I'm not commenting at all on that question, Clark.

Mr. Davey: Could we go back to something you said in Ottawa recently after the Russians set off their fifty megaton blast. I can't recall your exact quote and I couldn't find it here in New York, but I believe that you said that since the Russians have shown that they don't intend to pay any attention to world opinion, perhaps the world will have to change its policy towards Russia. What specifically did you have in mind? What sort of changes in policy would make any sense in the present situation?

Mr. Green: I said if the Russians have reached the stage where they no longer care what world opinion thinks of them, then western policies may have to be changed. I'm not convinced that the Russians have reached that stage. I think that they are still very worried about being popular in the world. The types of change might have to be worked out. It might mean that we will have to live in an armed camp. On the other hand it might mean that the Soviet Union would become so unpopular in the United Nations that most of the member nations would be unwilling to work with them and would have no sympathy for them. Now that might change the whole attitude of the United Nations. I don't know what course would be followed.

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