

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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An Address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, at the Commencement Exercises, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, June 3, 1956.

It is my agreeable first duty, Mr. President, to express my sincere gratitude through you to Clark University in having done me this signal honour in inviting me to be the speaker this afternoon at your 66th Commencement ceremonies. I should like also to express to my fellow-graduates here assembled my congratulations on earning and securing their degrees, and to wish them all success and happiness in the years ahead. There is perhaps a certain element of injustice in these proceedings. You are now receiving your degrees, after four years of conscientious and demanding study. I receive mine for making one speech. Incidentally, I have noted, Mr. President, that you have been generous enough to confer this degree upon me even before I have spoken. In any event, I am happy to be with you on this occasion, and to receive this honour from a University which has won for itself an enviable reputation.

It is pleasant to reflect that, just as with many other centres of learning in the United States, Canada has long had fruitful connections with this University. More than thirty years ago, Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, Director General of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, and an old friend and colleague of mine, did his post-graduate work here at Clark University, and at present he is a representative of the alumni on your Board of Trustees. You have also with you, in your division of Business Administration, Professor James A. Maxwell, my sponsor today, and one of the many Canadians who can be found on the teaching and research staffs of United States universities.

For many years now, you have welcomed Canadian students, and made your scholarships as freely available to them as to your own citizens. Although we are not always happy when many of those who come to you decide to stay on this side of the boundary, it is, I think, true that academic

exchanges have enriched our university life and form some of the most important ties which bring our two countries together, in neighbourliness and friendship.

Although we in Canada are, and propose to remain resolutely Canadian, when we cross the border, we do so, I hope, as good neighbours and as good friends. I take the greatest pleasure, therefore, in speaking to you as a Canadian in this scholarly and friendly atmosphere.

In recent years there have been expressed in our two countries growing misgivings about certain educational trends, which seem to some to be leading to mass production of university graduates by a process of academic automation. We worry also lest in this process emphasis on the practical side of education - on its post-graduate cash value - should be at the expense of a grounding in those humanities which mould man's nature, enrich his spirit, and widen his horizons; and which are, and should remain, the basic support for any free society of educated men.

On the other hand, we worry - and with reason - about the fact that the number of trained engineers and scientists being graduated from our universities is inadequate for the growing demands made by a society whose techniques are increasing in complexity; and where material well-being, flowing from the transformation of yesterday's luxuries into today's necessities is increasingly dependent upon the scientist, the engineer and the technician.

It is well that we should think about this problem for what is happening in education, both on this continent and throughout the world, is a matter of the utmost importance to every citizen; and not least to those of us who are concerned with public affairs, domestic and international.

This, of course, is no new problem, although we may be seeing it in a new and more urgent manner. A proper education for the good life has been a subject which has long attracted the interest and the ingenuity of philosophers and scholars. I have been reading lately, for example, Henry Peacham's "The Compleat Gentleman", which first appeared in 1622, in which the author discusses at length how to produce the qualities and the accomplishments which were essential to the English gentleman of that day. What struck me most about his precepts, and the type of person to be produced by them, was the great versatility which Peacham's Compleat Gentleman must possess. It was taken for granted, for example, that he would be fully familiar with Greek and Roman literature, could play upon the viol and the lute, and turn his hand on suitable occasions to a song or an ode or a sonnet or a painting. He should be skilled in horsemanship and in the use of arms, in heraldry and in navigation. In other words, he had to be a summa cum laude and a five-letter man! Versatility was the keynote - while today it is specialization,

where the expert learns more and more about less and less; though not, I hope, reaching the point where he knows everything about nothing. The politician progresses, it is alleged, in the opposite direction until he comes to know practically nothing about everything!

From Plato - through Peacham - to our own time, it has been assumed that the purpose of education is to prepare a citizen for a rich and full life in terms of the society in which he will be living. But this society, as we know, is constantly in a state of change. In the last fifty years the changes have been more significant and far-reaching, I suspect, than in the previous two thousand.

Liberal education in the great Elizabethan age - restricted as it was to the few - was well designed to produce Peacham's desired product for that age; the well-informed and versatile citizen capable of turning his hand or his mind to a very wide variety of duties and accomplishments.

It would be agreeable to believe, although I think difficult to establish, that the mass educational procedures of our own day are equally well designed to produce citizens who are well-informed, wise and public-spirited; able to face and solve the problems of living in a world which has discovered the means of destroying itself as well as of enriching itself beyond all our dreams.

The test of the value of your education to you, as a person, may well be whether, when you have to call on yourself in moments of crisis or decision, you find "anybody at home". The test of its value to you as a citizen will be your wisdom and your sincerity and your understanding in reaching the judgments which collectively determine a nation's policy - for better or for worse.

These tests for education are more significant, I suggest, than one provided by the question which we hear so often these days: "Are we in the free world turning out as many scientists and technical experts and engineers as the Soviet Communist world?" That, I admit, is an important question, indeed a vital one, so long as "science is harnessed to the chariot of destruction" in a contest between worlds deeply divided by fear and hostility and ignorance. Nor is the answer one to give us much comfort.

In 1955 the United States trained 23,000 engineers, about half the number of five years ago. More alarming even is the fact that there is a progressively increasing shortage of science teachers.

Soviet scientific and technical training, on the other hand, is producing far greater numbers of trained graduates than we seem likely to be able to do on this continent, and that number is increasing.

A recent survey showed that, in 1953, there were 5,800,000 people in the United States with higher education. In the U.S.S.R. there were only about 2,000,000; but the number at work in the applied sciences was about the same as in the United States.

In 1954, 60 per cent of Soviet graduating classes had majored in science; in the United States only 8 per cent. In the same year, the U.S.S.R. graduated more engineers and scientists than the United States and Western Europe together. One count shows that last year the U.S.S.R. graduated 60,000 engineers, the United States 22,000, and the United Kingdom 3,000.

We have no means of comparing exactly the standards of training between the Soviet and North American education, but I think it would be unrealistic on our part to doubt the fact that the U.S.S.R. is now quite capable of producing scientists, engineers and technicians, comparable in ability and training to those of any of the non-communist countries.

The Soviet educational system which produces this result operates on two basic rules: obedience and industry. The individual is brought into the system at the age of three and remains in it for fourteen years or so. Then, if he can qualify, he proceeds to higher institutions of learning where he works a six-day week, and works hard. The principle of education without pain or of learning through play is wholly rejected.

Furthermore, 47 per cent of the students' working time is devoted to science and mathematics. By comparison a recent survey showed that only 8 per cent of United States students study chemistry, 5 per cent take physics and a little over 20% take general science.

We do not, then, come off very well in comparison with Soviet Russia in the test applied to our educational system of quantitative results in the engineering and scientific field. That test, however, is not the most important one that we face; though it is important enough, in all truth.

Even if this continent turned out engineers and scientists by the hundreds of thousands each year, that would not alone enable us to meet the new communist challenge of "competitive co-existence." In the short run it would give us a greater feeling of security. In the long run, it would not by itself give us much hope for the future.

Education is more than experiment and achievement in the natural sciences. It is more than proficiency with a test tube or an atomic reactor. It is, above all - and ever has been - the process of learning how to think honestly and straight; to appreciate quality and beauty wherever it may be found; and to participate with intelligence and tolerance, and be encouraged by society to do so, in that most important of all forms of free enterprise, the free exchange of ideas on every subject under the sun and with a minimum of every restriction, personal, social or political.

If we can not base our society on educated men of this type - and also get more and more of them into public service - we will have great difficulty in solving the political problems that face us - nationally and internationally.

I wish that I had time to discuss with you some of these problems; particularly in the international field, where I am supposed to be more or less at home, having been working in it now for about thirty years. I will mention, however, only two.

The first of these problems is the current - and I hope, searching - re-appraisal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - in its non-military aspects, and of ways and means of developing greater unity in the North Atlantic Community. This work is being undertaken by a committee of three NATO Foreign Ministers who, incidentally have begun their work with one strike against them by being dubbed "The Three Wise Men".

NATO stands today at the very heart of the security of the free world, but a lot of people are so ignorant about it that they think it is a kind of breakfast food. Its defences protect the moral and spiritual basis of a vital segment of that world - as well as its physical security. Those defences are still needed. The danger of military aggression remains. So does the importance of collective strength to deter and, if necessary, repel it.

NATO also faces, however, at this time, a new challenge in the all-out political and economic offensive from Moscow. Our methods, especially in the fields of closer political and economic consultation must be adapted to meet this new challenge.

When NATO's task was almost exclusively military, the ways and means of providing defence against aggression could be thought of in terms of men and missiles. But the strength which NATO now needs, to cope with competitive

co-existence has to be cultivated also in terms of public attitudes and of consultation and of voluntary and close co-operation between all member governments.

To this end, the first task of NATO is to look to its internal strength and unity, and to resist those forces which would weaken it. This means that our cohesion must find a more durable basis than the fear which originally brought us together in 1949. We must seek out new ways of providing not only for the continued maintenance of a defensive shield against aggression, but also for strengthening the existing ties which bind members of the Atlantic Community more closely together. These ties, moreover, are not artificial creations; they existed long before NATO.

Since the war, the nations of Western Europe, with their vast reserves of knowledge, skills, and initiatives have moved toward a closer unity, the outward and institutional expression of which takes many forms.

Viewed against the background of narrow concepts of sovereignty and ancient enmities, the progress which has been made in the last ten years towards European unity is encouraging, though it is not as fast as some impatient souls would desire. Furthermore, expressed in practical forms, it gives Europeans more - not less - authority in playing their proper role on the world stage. And that is all to the good.

The island state of Britain, with its world as well as European responsibilities, can play an important part in this move to European integration by helping to bridge the gap between the interlocking and developing communities of Europe and the Atlantic. At the same time, the North American countries - the United States and Canada - must more than ever before realize that their destinies extend across the Atlantic.

While the other countries concerned have their part to play, it is, I think, true to say that European integration and the cohesion of the Atlantic Community - neither of which excludes the other - will proceed as far and as fast as the United States and the United Kingdom make possible by recognizing the importance of their own roles in bringing it about; and in a way which will strengthen the Atlantic area as a whole.

This, then, is the first task of the new NATO - to strengthen the internal unity of the alliance, to prevent centrifugal forces from sundering it; to build upon the

existing foundations of European and Atlantic unity, and to aid and assist the various initiatives to this end within the framework of the Atlantic community, and against the background of the broader international arrangements in which the Atlantic countries are participating as good citizens of the world.

Its second task will be to take advantage of any and every opportunity new soviet tactics may present to break through the vicious circle of suspicion and fear in the "cold war", in an effort to test Soviet aims and to bring about genuine negotiation. If we cannot do this by a forward looking and flexible diplomacy, and without yielding to the temptation to relax our defence effort, (though we may have to alter its character), then NATO will hardly survive.

We cannot move, of course, from open hostility or sterile "co-existence" to constructive international co-operation without the searching testing period which would be provided by attempts to settle the several important issues which still unhappily divide the Communist and non-Communist world. These issues will not settle themselves; nor will they be settled either by brandishing our swords, or by throwing them away. We must be certain in NATO that if they are not settled, it will not be our fault.

The unification of Germany by the free choice of its people; effective and agreed disarmament, the right of captive European peoples to decide their own future; a European security system; a united effort by the major world powers to make the United Nations work as it was originally intended to work; all these are the testing grounds of the future on which the Soviet peace offensive must be judged.

It would be rash indeed to be dogmatic, either positively or negatively, about the real significance of the changes which have taken place in Soviet policy since the death of Stalin. We should avoid unreasonable optimism, for orthodox communist revolutionary tenets may still be dominant in Russia, and there is no peace in them. But also we would be unwise to reject out of hand the possibility that a new and pragmatic approach to internal affairs may be developing among the Soviet leaders, combined with a desire on the part of their peoples to return to a more normal relationship with other peoples. If this tendency were to extend, or could be made to extend, to the conduct of Soviet foreign relations and to the many problems which still divide us, we could at last begin to see more solid grounds for hope and confidence than we have now.

Therefore without illusions or without despair we must hold ourselves ready to strengthen and encourage

any elements which wish to deal with the world as it in fact exists rather than as Marxist dogma pictures it. We must also be prepared, however, for the contingency that no such elements do exist, at least in a form seriously to influence policy.

This process of testing - of examination and discovery may be a long and difficult one. During it there is an obligation for NATO to maintain itself in readiness to deal with any emergency, military or diplomatic. By doing so, by steadfastly maintaining its basic purposes, and by demonstrating to the world that its continued existence is essential to the future of free men, it can play a vital part in leading the way forward from the bleak prospects of "cold war", or of a harshly "competitive co-existence", to the more distant horizons of world co-operation.

There is one other problem that I would like to mention, which those words, "world co-operation", bring to mind. It is that of international economic assistance. The problem here is to reconcile our obligations to the international community with those to our own people, to whom a government owes its first duty. But it is more than that. It is a problem, not only of what to do (and no country in the world has ever done as much as this country); but of how and why to do it.

The need for assistance to those countries which have not shared in our industrial and technical advances is real and demanding. It will never be satisfactorily met, however, merely by pouring in assistance in a form which, economically, may be a way of putting people on the dole; politically, may give rise to suspicion that there are strings attached to it; and technically, is beyond the capacity of the receiving peoples to administer effectively.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations uttered some wise words on this subject the other night when he said:

"We should not forget that it may be more difficult to live on the dole than to pay it. Few friendships survive a long drawn-out economic dependency of one upon the other. Gratitude is a good link only when it can be given and received without an overtone of humiliation."

A cynic might doubt whether gratitude, so often a "lively anticipation of favours to come", is a good link at all. The feeling of mutual assistance and co-operative effort is surely better. But that requires careful and sensitive planning; a clear understanding of why you are helping and are being helped.

This understanding can surely best be achieved by using the United Nations more and more as the clearing house for all forms of such assistance; as a place where plans can be discussed and related to each other; where purposes can be clarified and, if necessary, exposed. Where, on the other hand, suspicions can be removed when they are unjust and unwarranted.

This does not mean that bilateral aid such as Point IV, or aid under such arrangements as the Colombo Plan, should be abandoned, or taken over by the United Nations. That would be unnecessary and undesirable as well as politically unrealistic. But the United Nations should be brought more and more into the picture, and all its members pressed to accept their full responsibility. In this way, as Mr. Hammarskjold put it, we may find "a sound basis for the reconciliation of the natural national interest with valid international considerations."

But why bother at all? Haven't we enough to do at home? I could spend an hour or so on this question. Here I can only say that while the element of goodwill and neighbourliness does enter into these matters, as it does in their domestic manifestations, equally or more important is the long-term consideration of our own enlightened self-interest.

Today we all want peace; more anxiously, perhaps, than ever before, because the alternative could be total annihilation. But we are not always willing to do the things or make the sacrifices that ensure peace. Are we willing to accept, for instance, the proposition that there will be no peace in this small world if it consists of Presidential areas surrounded by slums."

The domestic analogy applies here. Every free democratic government today accepts the fact - and most of them act on it - that national stability, welfare and progress are not possible if the poor are allowed to get poorer while the rich get richer. Inequalities and deprivations that are considered intolerable mean unrest, ferment and ultimate explosion.

The same result will inevitably and inexorably occur internationally, if hundreds of millions of people feel condemned indefinitely to an existence below or on the edge of subsistence; hopeless and helpless and bitter; the easy victims for extreme ideas and extremist agitators.

The main and the final responsibility for avoiding this situation lies with the governments and the peoples concerned. We in more favoured parts of the world can only supplement their efforts, unless of course, those efforts are hostile to us. But, we would be well advised to do that, and primarily in our own interest.

Nor should we expect, as I have just said, much gratitude; least of all the United States of America which, I think, deserves it most, in terms of the magnitude of the assistance given.

The United States is the most powerful and the richest country in the world. Yet while great national wealth and power can achieve international recognition and respect, it rarely gains affection - and not too often even understanding. This is something to which the giant has to become accustomed.

All history shows this to be the case, and most recently, the history of the British Empire.

I was reading the other day an article by Mr. Eugen Weber, a British Professor at the University of Iowa, entitled, "European Reactions to American Policies", which contained some witty and perceptive reflections on this score. I will quote two paragraphs, while refusing to take responsibility for all the expressions he uses:

"The Greeks despised the Romans as Barbarians; no doubt the Egyptians in their turn despised the Greeks. We British have also had our time of greatness - our time of world supremacy. What were we in those days? We were perfidious Albion. We were a nation of long-shanked, long-toothed milords; of lean and angular spinsters; patronizing Cook's tours, gaping at European culture (which we were not supposed to understand), and calling loudly wherever we went for tea and for porridge. Now we are decaying, and only the memories of this great tradition still live on. We have gathered the distinction of decay. People prize us, like one of the riper sorts of cheese. We are supposed to enshrine and guard admirable traditions, a great cultural heritage, which no one seemed to suspect (or at any rate admit) a generation or two ago. It is wonderful what a little failure can do!

"Meanwhile, the Americans have taken over, more nilly than willy, the banner with the strange device of the white man's burden. They provide the perfidy, they provide the comic relief, they provide the gaping, uncultured tourists chewing gum and sipping cokes. They are the powerful and the rich, and for this they

must pay the penalty; and one part of the penalty is that they cannot be loved when they are feared .. or exploited."

On a day like this, however, I would not like to end on a note which suggests that one cannot be loved. Everything about this commencement suggests a happier and more hopeful mood. I know that you who are graduating are the beneficiaries indeed the very centre of that mood today. I hope that it may follow you in the months and years ahead when you will be privileged to put into action the sound principles and the good training that you have received at this University.

S/C