

THE
CRAFTSMAN
EXTRAORDINARY.
BEING
REMARKS, &c.

[Price 6 d.]

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THE
CRAFTSMAN
EXTRAORDINARY.

BEING

REMARKS,
ON A LATE
PAMPHLET,

INTITLED,

Observations on the Conduct of
GREAT BRITAIN, &c.

PUBLISHED BY
CALEB D'ANVERS, Esq;

L O N D O N :

Printed for R. FRANCKLIN, under *Tom's Coffee*
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CRAFTSMAN *Extraordinary, &c.*

To CALEB D'ANVERS, *Esq;*

S I R,

TH E late Pamphlet, intituled *Observations on the Conduct of Great-Britain, &c.* being chiefly designed as an Answer to my first Letter on the pretended Project of a TRUCE, it may be thought incumbent on me to justify what I have written; for though this Piece (which consists of nothing but *Inconsistencies, Contradictions, Prævarications, and downright Falshoods*) is already sunk into that Contempt, which it deserves; yet when a *private Person* launches into Politicks, it is his Duty to pay some Regard to an Adversary, who produces the least Marks of *Authority*, however mean and despicable his Performance may be thought.

TH E Shortness of Time will, I hope, excuse any little Inaccuracies of Stile, or trivial Mistakes, which I may happen to fall into through the Course of this Disquisition, which every Body will perceive required Haste.

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I SHALL pass over all this little Sophistry on the *Freedom of Writing*, as well as his dirty Imputations of *Libelling*, *Disaffection* and ill Designs against the *Government* (those trite, worn out Topicks of every wretched Scribbler against you for above these two Years past) and come directly to the Points, upon which the whole Stress of his Arguments, such as they are, depends.

THE first Objection, which he undertakes to confute, is the *supposed Inactivity of our Squadrons*, and the *Depredations committed by the Spaniards upon our Merchants in the West Indies*.

IN order to do this, he hath given us, what he calls, the *Instructions to Admiral Hosier*, and the other Commanders of *our Squadrons* in those Parts.

I SHALL not enquire from *whom* he received these Lights; though it seems *very* extraordinary that a *little obscure Pamphleteer* should be favoured with Papers, of *such* a private Nature, as have been sometimes *refused*, even upon Applications in *Parliament*.

NEITHER will I offer to dispute whether these Instructions are *genuine and authentick*; though there are several Things in *them* which have a suspicious Aspect. By the *first Orders* given to Admiral *Hosier*, it looks as if *These*, who sent him, did not understand the Service they sent him upon; for they *direct*

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• rect him to block up the *Flota* and *Galleons* in the Port of *Cantabria*, which is indeed a proper Port to look for the *Galleons* in; but the *Flota* was never there, since the *Spaniards* traded to that Country. By the *second Instructions* they seem to be sensible of their Mistake, by giving him distinct Orders to take Care of the *Flota*, which makes it probable that, at first, they took the *Flota* and *Galleons* to be the *same Fleet*, and did not know that one came from *Peru*, and the other from *Mexico*.

NEITHER can I see the Reason for preferring the *Galleons*, in these *Instructions*, to the *Flota*; for if keeping the *Spanish Treasure* from going Home, was the Intent of that Expedition, the *Flota* was as material an Attention as the *Galleons*, having as much Money aboard them, and both might have been intercepted, had our Fleet been rightly station'd at first, *viz.* in the Bay of *Matanzas* in the Island of *Cuba*, where they might have stay'd more conveniently than at the *Bastimentos*.

INDEED stopping the *Flota* is made the next Point to stopping the *Galleons*; but considering the Port, from whence it comes, and the Course it steers, it was almost impossible that a Squadron lying at the *Bastimentos* should intercept them, or gain any Intelligence of them.

IN another Part of these Orders, Admiral *Hofier* is instructed to PERSUADE *the* Spaniards to let him take them, which I confess looks, at first Sight, somewhat *romantick* and *ridiculous*.

THESE Particulars, I say, might render the whole liable to Suspicion; but though I could not help taking some Notice of them, I would not be thought to infer *from thence* the Impossibility of their being *authentick*; for though I have a very bad Opinion of the *Pamphleteer*, I cannot think that he would dare to impose upon the World in a Matter of such Consequence; but since it was thought necessary to give the Publick some Satisfaction in this Affair, I could wish he had favoured us with ALL *these Instructions* at Length and entire (for this does not appear to be the Case) that we might have been able to form a true Judgment upon a View of the *Whole*, which cannot be so well done by *Scraps* and *Extracts*.

How ever, it appears from *these Orders* themselves (as he hath thought fit to publish them) that *stepping the Gallions* was to be their *chief Care*, and that they were not to *risque the Success of it upon any Account*. I will therefore leave it to the Judgment of Mankind, whether any prudent Officer, under such a *strict and particular Injunction*, would run the least Hazard of failing in that *main Point*, by endeavouring

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ing to protect our *Merchants*. It is certain, at least, that the *Spaniards* did, and do still continue their Outrages with very little Molestation, and without any *considerable Reprisals* made on our Parts : Nay, the Commanders of our Squadrons were so far from giving any Assistance to our Merchants in those Seas, that it is well known the Exigences of the publick Service obliged them to make such an *Impress* on their Ships (to supply the great Loss and Destruction of the Men on Board our Squadrons) as rendered them unable to perform their Voyages.

HIS reasoning therefore on this Head is reduced to one of these Points ; either first, that the *Naval Force* sent to those Parts was not sufficient to perform such *different Services* ; or secondly, that our Admiral and Commanders did apprehend themselves to be *confined or embarrassed by some Cautions and Limitations* ; or thirdly, that they either *neglected*, or did not *understand* their Duty ; which would be such a Reflection upon the Skill, Courage and Integrity of those *excellent Officers*, as will not easily pass upon the World.

THE *Pamphleteer* hath produced Part of one Letter from Admiral *Hofier*, in which he gives an Account, contrary to the general Opinion here till this Time, that the *Spaniards* had disembarked their Treasure, and

and sent it back to *Panama*, before he arrived in the *Bastimentos*: Upon which this Writer observes, that he could not have taken any Thing but *empty Hulks*; and then seems to think himself very smart in asking, *Whether such a Pledge would have had much Influence on the Chiefs of Spain?* To which I reply, first, that this is nothing to the Purpose; because it is plain, that the Admiral had no Power, to seize the *Galleons*, in case they had not been unloaded; so that his Arrival could have no other Effect, than that of their own *Advice-Boat*, to make them *secure their Treasure*. Secondly, I do not think it would have been such bad Policy to have taken even the *empty Hulks*, or burnt them in the Port (so that the *Spaniards* could have no farther use of them) and to have sailed immediately to *Vera Cruz*, and seized the *Flota*, instead of lying so long to watch *empty Hulks*, till our own Ships became *rotten*, and almost *empty Hulks* themselves.

I COULD wish, for the farther Information and Satisfaction of the Publick, that the *Pamphlet* had found it convenient to give us the Sight of all Admiral *Nesier's* Letters; for no doubt he must have sent several during his long and disastrous Continuance on that Station; from whence perhaps we might have had some farther Light into this Affair, or collected at least what his Opinion was of
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the Nature of his *Instructions*, and the Conduct of that *Expedition*; however, it is well known in what Manner he expressed himself upon several Occasions, both at *Jamaica*, and in Letters to his Friends in *England*.

I AM ready to subscribe, with the greatest Pleasure and Sincerity, to all the Encomiums, which this Writer makes on Sir *Charles Wager*; whom I know to be a Gentleman of the most amiable Character both in *publick* and *private* Life. I am confident that no Difficulties or Dangers could deter him from doing his Duty; that no Temptations could prevail upon him to betray his Trust, and that he did not want the greatest Skill and Abilities to execute it. I have the same good Opinion of Sir *John Jennings*, and other Commanders, who were sent upon those Services; and when the *Pamphleteer* was in his panegyrical Strain, I could wish that he had done Justice to their Characters, and likewise paid some small Tribute of Gratitude to the Memory of those brave Officers, who had the Misfortune to perish (I was going to say, were sacrificed) in the Service of their Country. — But they are dead, and have it not now in their Power to *justify themselves* or to *accuse others*.

BUT to return — I do not find by the Orders given to Sir *Charles Wager*, the 22d of *December* 1726, that he was impowered
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to intercept any Ships with *Stores, Ammunition* or *Provisions*, bound for the *Spanish Camp*, then in Sight of *Gibraltar*, in order to besiege it; nor instructed, even by the lost Endeavours of *Persuasion*, or otherwise, to get them or their Cargo into his Possession, in order to disable them from beginning Hostilities, notwithstanding the same Orders directed him to reinforce the Garrison of *Gibraltar*, which was then going to be besieged, by sending the *Land Forces* then on board *Admiral Hopson's Squadron*, and in case of Need, to give all the Relief and Assistance he was able to the said Garrison; though I have been credibly informed, the *Spaniards* were permitted to pass by our Squadron, even under the Stern of the Admiral, and safely land *Stores, Provisions, Ammunition* and other Necessaries for the Siege of that Place.

If this be true, as I am assured it is, I should be glad to know for what Reasons his Instructions ran in that soft Strain, or why so much Complaisance was shewn to the *Spaniards*, upon the Occasion of such an undisguised Design against that important Fortress. I am the more desirous to know this, because I am sure it could not proceed from any want of Vigilance or Zeal in that brave and excellent Officer, who is a Man of too established a Character to suffer in any Body's Opinion, by the oblique and un-

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generous. Insinuation of *this Writer*, after all his Compliments *that he does not attend-ed with his former good Name.*

THE *Pamphleteer*, having thus refuted the Objections against the *supposed Inacti- vity* of our Squadrons, by producing some Parts of the *Inscriptions* to the Commanders of them, and shown, as he tells us, *that the Losses of our Merchants have not been owing to any want of that Care, which the Government ought always to take for the Protection of our Trade*; he proceeds in the next Place, to give us some Account of *those Captures*, which he says are not *near so considerable as they have been re- presented*; and having prefaced this Part like- wise, with a great many angry Reflections, he produces a List of *Twenty six Ships*, which he would have us believe to be ALL that we have really lost. — His Address in cooking up this Account is very remark- able.

1. WE are told this is an exact List of all such Ships as have been taken by the *Spani- ards* in the *West Indies*, since the Conclusion of the *Treaty of Hanover*. But why should he confine it thus to *Place* and *Time*? I mentioned, indeed, only *three Years past*, because of the *Frequency* of the Captures during that Time; but if I had undertaken to give the Publick an Account of *all our Losses*, I should certainly have begun my Ac-
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count a great deal *farther back*. Much less should I have limited it to the *West Indies*; since I presume that Ships taken in the *Ocean* and other *Seas*, are as much Losses to our Merchants, as those taken in *America*, and that they have the same Right to expect Reparation for them.

2. This is a List of such *Captures only*, as have been, at any Time, conveyed to the Knowledge of the Government, either by the immediate Complaints of the Merchants concerned in these Captures, their Representations to the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, or the Accounts transmitted by his Majesty's Ministers and Consuls abroad; which is what I suppose he means by the most *authentick Testimonies*. But is it to be inferred from hence, as he seems to do, that no more Losses have been sustained than what have been *thus formerly complained of*? I grant indeed, that no Merchant can expect *Reparation*, who does not give in the *Particulars* of his Losses; but it is well known that many of these *Sufferers* did not do this, which might proceed from different Causes. Several Merchants, who reside in our *Plantations* and *Settlements* abroad, might not have Opportunity to transmit the *Particulars* of their Losses, and authorize their Agents to make a regular Complaint; for, if I am not misinformed, some Complaints

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plaints were actually brought in, after the Account was closed, and therefore not inserted in it. Others might neglect to do it, by despairing of Success, and thinking, perhaps, that the Prospect of Reparation would not answer the Trouble of complaining.

The Publick, I believe, will soon see a true Account of our Losses, by the Depredations of the Spaniards, both in the *West-Indies* and in *other Seas*, from a proper Period of Time, which will more fully shew the *Fallacy* of this *partial List*, which ought to be re-sented with the utmost Indignation, as an Insult on the Misfortunes and Calamities of the *British Merchants*.

I AM told that the *Pamphleteer* had a Design to oblige us likewise, in this Piece, with a *counter List* of those Ships which we have taken from the *Spaniards*, during the late Disturbances, and that this was *actually printed*, but afterwards *cancelled and suppressed*. I am sorry to hear that any Motives could induce so *impartial a Writer* to rob us of this Catalogue, which was not only very proper, but would no Doubt give great Satisfaction to the Publick.

The only Objection, says the *Pamphleteer*, *that remains to be considered upon this Point of the Spanish Depredation, is with regard to Letters of Marque and Reprizal, by which the Traders might have been authorized to make themselves Reparation.* He acknow-

ledges that the Merchants, *in the Situation we were then in with Regard to Spain, had a Right, both by our own Law and that of Nations, to demand such Letters.* He then proceeds to justify the Ministry (which I hope wants no justification) by shewing that *such Letters were not refused.* Those are his Words. But how does he shew it? why, he gives us *two Instances* of Owners of Ships, who did *apply* for them (upon an Order published in the *Gazette*) and were actually *refused*, and does not produce one Instance of any Man whatsoever, to whom they were *granted*.

He tells us indeed, by Way of Apology for this Rebuttal, *that the Præliminary Treaty having been for some time negotiating at Paris, his late Majesty thought it proper to defer issuing these Commissions, till he should see the Success of that Negotiation.* He adds, that the *Præliminary Articles* were signed at Paris, the 20th of May, and that *Dranguins of Insurrections to the Lords of the Admiralty, for granting Letters of Marque,* were signed by his late Majesty after the 21st of April. Is therefore the *Præliminary Treaty* had been some time negotiating at Paris, the Question is, whether *this Treaty* was not actually negotiating at the Time, when *this Order* was published in the *Gazette*; and if it was, why was the *Order* published at all? since it could only tend to putting the
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Merchants upon equipping Ships, for this Service (as I am told several did at *Bristol*) to my Purpose, and at a great Expence.

There is therefore is such a *Justification* of this *Business*, as I am sure you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, would be afraid to publish.

HE proceeds, in the last Place, to expose the *Clamour*, that hath been raised against the *Negotiations* at *Vienna*, and the *Project* of Accommodation, which hath caused so much Dispute.

I CONFESS, it gives me some Pleasure to find that I was right in my Conjecture, that if any such *Project* were really in Agitation, it would not bear the Name of a *Truce*; for lo! it is not called a *Truce*; It is a *provisional Treaty*; though, for my Part, I am not able to discover any Difference between them, unless it be in the *Sound*: for a *Provisional Treaty* does not seem to imply, any more than a *Truce*, a *final Determination* of all Differences (which is so much wanted) but only a *Suspension* of them for a Time.

THE *Preliminary Treaty* was, properly speaking, a *Provisional Treaty*, as it was to *provide for something further* at the Congress; but that the *Negotiations* at this Assembly should end in a *Provisional Treaty only*, is not what we had Reason to expect from the *Assurances* so often given us.

I CANNOT forbear observing, in this Place, the *various Denominations* under which

which this Treaty hath passed. At first we were promised a *full, formal and established Peace*; but soon after the Conclusion of the *last Session*, it was called, in the Foreign Prints, a *Pacification*; and after that an *Idea of a Pacification*; then it was a *Truce*, and bore that Name in all Papers, Foreign and Domestick, for several Months together; at last, according to this Writer, it is neither a *Peace*, nor a *Pacification*, nor an *Idea of a Pacification*, nor a *Truce*, but a *Provisional Treaty*.

WELL! if a *Peace* could not be obtained, and a *Truce* would not go down; e'en let it be a *Provisional Treaty*, or what else they please. I scorn to insilt upon *Names* with these Gentlemen; but will examine the *Treaty* it self, as it is given us by the *Pamphleteer*.

IT is somewhat strange, that a *Writer*, who takes upon himself such an *Air of Authority*, should condescend to borrow his Materials from the *Post-Boy*; and more strange, that he should charge me with *affecting to call this Treaty a Truce*, when he cannot be ignorant that the *Post-Boy*, from which he quotes the *Articles*, as well as the *Dutch Prints*, from whence the *Post-Boy* translated them, and *all Papers*, for at least two Months before I wrote my *first Letter*, called it constantly by *that Name*.

W H E N

WHEN I first undertook this Examination of the pretended Project of a *Truce*, I treated it as *chimerical*, or the *Invention of ill designing Men*, and argued from the *Defects of the Articles*, that I could not believe them to be *genuine*. What therefore could induce *this Writer* to affirm, *that we have not so much as pretended to shew that this Project is deficient, in not providing for all those Points, that have been the Subject of the late Disputes between Great Britain and foreign Powers*; when the whole Tenor of *that Letter* was to prove the *Defects* of it, by a very circumstantial Induction of Particulars? — But in this he not only advances a *Falshood*, but *contradicts* himself, as such Writers are apt to do ; for in the very Page before this Assertion, that *we have not so much as pretended to shew that this Project is deficient*, he tells us, *that he shall make some Observations on the OBJECTIONS which these Writers have made to it.*

NEITHER can it surely be forgot, that the Author of the *British Journal* represented *this Project*, and these very *Articles* in the same Manner as *chimerical*, and charged me with trumping them up, *in order to asperse the Ministers with odious Designs*. He called them besides *unintelligible Projects, dark Things* and *ill meant Reports, which bear no Sign of Credibility, and do not deserve the Name of*

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Intelligence; so that when *these Articles* had been given up, in this Manner, by a *Writer* (who, I was informed, had Access to a *Person in Authority*) it would have been ridiculous to enter into a farther Detail of the *Defects* of them. — But now (according to the usual *Inconsistency* of these Men, and their *defectory* Method of Reasoning) we are to *unbelieve* every Thing which we were taught to believe about *six Weeks* ago. Their *unintelligible Projects*, which it was *difficult* at that Time even to mention, are now acknowledged to be really *genuine*: the whole Success of our Negotiations is put upon them, and they are made the Basis of our *future Settlement*. — Some farther Observations therefore are now become seasonable and requisite.

HE tells us that, by *this Treaty*, we obtain the plainest and most direct Acknowledgment and Confirmation of our Right to all our Possessions, and to all our Privileges in Trade, even those which had been disputed, in Opposition to preceeding Treaties. But in what Manner is this Acknowledgment and Confirmation obtained? The *Pamphleteer* proves it thus: By the second Article, the Treaties of Utrecht, Rastad and Baden, the Treaty of the Hague in 1717, together with the Quadruple Alliance, and ALL the Treaties and Conventions antecedent to 1725; the Preliminary articles, and the Con-
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tion signed at the Pardo, which are made the Basis and Foundation of the present Treaty; and being expressly confirmed by it, without any Restriction of Time, whatsoever hath been stipulated in our Favour, in any of those Treaties and Conventions, receives a new and perpetual Sanction by This — upon which I observe,

1. THAT I cannot comprehend how a *Temporary Treaty*, which I take a *Provisional Treaty* to be, can give a *perpetual Sanction* to any Thing.

2. CAN a *Treaty* be properly called *perpetual* (though not *expressly limited to any Time*) or be said to give a *perpetual Sanction*, which does not *finally adjust* one Point in Dispute, but leaves them to the Determination of *Commissioners*, and consequently subject to *future Debates*?

3. SUPPOSING *this Treaty* leaves us upon the Foot of *former Treaties*, is it not well known that the Sense of *some of these Treaties* hath been *disputed*; and may they not be *disputed again*, and occasion the *same Disturbances*?

I WILL instance only in the Case of *Gibraltar*. As the *second Article* of this *Treaty* is *verbatim* the same with the *second Article* of the *Preliminary Treaty* (both of which relate to our *Possessions in general*; for *Gibraltar* is not particularly mentioned in either) I cannot see how we are better secured against the Pretensions of *Spain* to

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this Place, than we were by the Preliminary Articles; and is it not notorious that the Spaniards have insisted, and do yet insist, that their Pretensions, founded upon a Promise under the Hand of his late Majesty, in the Year 1721, is confirmed by the said Preliminaries? And as they insist to have this pretended Promise cleared and adjusted in the Congress in their Favour; so as we maintain, on the other Hand, that these Pretensions to Gibraltar, however founded, are given up by this second Article, it is equally incumbent upon us to insist that the Preliminaries should be so explained in our Favour, as to exclude all Doubts and Questions upon them for the future; for as this is the most important Point with Relation to Great-Britain, it is reasonable that it should be secured to us, in this Treaty, by a particular Article to explain it, as some other Things of less Consequence have found, which seem to require no Explanation, and are as fully and clearly provided for, in the second Article of this Treaty.

It must be farther observed, says the Pamphleteer, that by this Article, and by the third and fifth, we are effectually secured from all the dangerous Engagements, contained in the publick and private Treaties of Vienna.—Those dangerous Engagements were, as he tells us,

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Spain MORE FAVOURABLY *than those of* Great-Britain. But this appears to be false from the *Treaty* it self, which mentions only that they should be treated as the *most favoured Nations*, which *other Treaties* provide for *us*, who are to be always looked upon as *Gens amicissima*; and consequently whatever Privileges the *Emperor*, or any *other Prince*, may obtain for their Subjects, from his *Catholick Majesty*, must be conceded to us, at the same Time, by Virtue of *those former Treaties*. But how are we now secured from the *dangerous Engagements* of the *Vienna Treaty*, unless by a Declaration of his *Catholick Majesty*, that he never understood to grant, by the said *Treaty of Vienna*, any Privilege contrary to the *Treaty* confirmed with us, nor to give to the Subjects of his *Imperial Majesty* any greater Advantages than those enjoyed by any other Nations; This is no more than what both the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* have from the Beginning declared. Yet as this hath been a laboured Point, and strenuously asserted by us, as well in Parliament as elsewhere, and made the Basis of the *Hanover Treaty*, as of the utmost Importance to this Kingdom, a *Declaration* only in this Case can be of no more Force and Virtue than it hath hitherto been, whilst the *Vienna Treaty* subsists in every Part as much as it did the first Day it was made.

2. *That the Emperor, in Case his good*

Offices were ineffectual, would assist his Catholick Majesty to recover Gibraltar by Force — This likewise does not appear by the *Treaty*; nor did his *Imperial Majesty*, as far as I ever heard, give the *Spaniards* the least Assistance, when they actually besieged *that Fortress*.

3. *That Spain would by Arms assist the Emperor in carrying on the Ostend Trade, which is to be suspended by this Treaty.* It must be owned indeed the *Dutch* are extremely happy (if this *Provision* content them) in having such Advocates, or rather Champions, to support their Quarrels; whilst our Fleets and Armies, at the Expence of our Treasure, and the Lives of so many brave Men, have procured them these Concessions, and they remain unactive in all Parts, reaping the Benefit of our Quarrels, and driving on the Trade of the whole World, and at the same Time courted (to say no more) to espouse their own Interest.

AND here it must be repeated, that though it has been disputed whether the *Ostend Charter* is an Infraction of former Treaties; yet since it is made a *Point*, and insisted upon to be prejudicial to our Commerce, and we are bound by Treaties to support the *Dutch* in these *Pretensions*, it might seem perhaps absolutely necessary to have this Affair finally adjusted, so as never to break out again, or at least to be received in any short Time; whereby *Europe* may be engaged in the like Quarrel,

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Quarrel, in which *England* must bear the greatest Part, if not made the *only Principal*; and therefore it is not so absurd to expect that the *Emperor* should put an End to this Dispute by *revoking his Charter*.

BUT it is pretty extraordinary, that considering the great Interest we have in this Affair (as it is affirmed) and the *Point* we have made of it, there should be no Notice taken of us, in the Article, which *provides* for its *Suspension*, nor so much as a Compliment made to us for our generous Interposition.

4 *And lastly*, (pray observe him!) our Apprehensions were, that there might be *Engagements in Favour of the Pretender* — Alas! how do the *Observations* fall short of that Spirit, which appeared in the *Enquiry*. There we see the Author rousing up the Nation to a just Resentment of those *dangerous Engagements in Favour of the Pretender*. We see him affirming, with the greatest Confidence, that soon after the Publication of the *Vienna* Treaties of Peace and Commerce, they had *positive Intelligence, and Intelligence from more than one Person, and such as could be intirely depended on, that one express Article of this Alliance between the Emperor and Spain contained an Obligation in Favour of the Pretender*. We have not his Authority for it only, but the Assurance of a certain Gentleman, in Parliament, that he *knew*, and was *absolutely convinced* of the Truth

Truth of this. We had the *Addresses* of the whole Kingdom justly inflamed on this Occasion. We had his Excellency Mr. *Isaac Lebeup's* vigorous Remonstrances at the Diet of *Ratisbon*, in the very Teeth of the *Emperor*, concurring in and affirming the same Charge. Nay, we had still much greater Authority, even Authority from the *Throne*; for did not his late Majesty declare that * he had *certain* and *undoubted Intelligence* that it was resolved to attempt an *Invasion* of these Kingdoms, in Consequence of a *secret Article* to this Purpose, and was not the *Imperial Minister* ordered to depart the Kingdom, in a very abrupt Manner, for denying any such *Engagement* or *Design* in his *Master's* Name? And after all these repeated *Assurances*, after all these extraordinary Steps, are we fallen so low as to acknowledge that we had *Apprehensions only that there might be Engagements in Favour of the Pretender*? — If *this Scribbler* takes upon him to advance Facts of less Consequence, he may depart from them (as he generally does, when *Expedients* are wanting) without hurting any Body; but in Affairs of this high Nature, he ought not to meddle, let who will be his *Instructor*, without good Grounds and sufficient Authority?

FOR my Part, I was always willing to believe (for the Honour of his *late Majesty* and the *British Nation*, as well as out of

* *Vide*, his Speech at the opening of the Session in 1727.

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Regard to *those* who drew, or advised, or approved *that Speech*) that we had something more than *bare Apprehensions* to justify us in such *Declarations* and *extraordinary Proceedings*; for the *Honour of the Crown* is a Thing of a very sacred Nature and ought not to be trifled with on any Occasion, or made an Instrument to serve *ministerial Purposes*.

KING *James the first* observes very justly (in a *Speech* to his Parliament, in the first Year of his Reign & which is, perhaps, the *best* that he ever made) *that Speeches from the Throne should be plain and sincere*. By Sincerity (says he) *I mean that Uprightness and Honesty, which ought to be in a Kings whole Speeches and Actions; that as far as a King is, in Honour, above his Subjects, so far should he strive, in Sincerity, to be above them all; and that his Tongue should be the true Messenger of his Heart*.

YET *this King*, at the latter End of his Reign, was drawn in by *Buckingham* to make a false Representation of the *Spanish Affair* to his Parliament; which had its Effect so far, as to make *Buckingham* a little popular for the present, at his Majesty's Expence; but as soon as the People found themselves imposed upon, they gave no Credit to the *Assertions* and *Assurances* of this *lying Minister* any more.

NAY, we have a much later and more remarkable Instance of the Effect of any supposed Endeavours to *prostitute the Honour of*
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the Crown; for it cannot be forgot that a certain Gentleman thought fit to make it an *Article of Impeachment* against the late Earl of *Oxford*, that he had corrupted the sacred Fountain of Truth, and put falsehoods into the Mouth of Majesty, in Order to obtain the Sanction of Parliament to his traiterous Proceedings.

I HOPE this Digression, upon so important a Point, will not be thought unseasonable.--I now return to the *Provisional Treaty*; the *eighth Article* of which is so very remarkable, that I must beg Leave to transcribe it at Length.

VIII. *Commissioners shall also be appointed on the Part of his Most Christian Majesty, his Catholick Majesty, and the States-General, who shall examine all Grievances whatever, without any Exception, which the said Parties concerned had to propose respectively, either for the Restitution of Ships seized or taken, or in Relation to Commerce: And the examining of what is stipulated both by the present Article, and the foregoing (which relates likewise to Commerce and Prizes) must not exceed the Term of two Years.*

THIS Article, I think, stands in need of very little Animadversion. What Reason could there be why *we* are not included in this Commission, as well as the *Spaniards*, who are equally Parties, and are made, by this Article, Judges of the Dispute between themselves and us? I shall only observe farther,

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farther, that our Privileges in *Trade* will no doubt be very gloriously adjusted and secured, when *one Power*, who is our *worst Enemy*, and *two others*, who are our *most dangerous Rivals*, are made the *Arbitrators*.

BUT, to conclude ; if it is really true, that the *Emperor* and the *King of Spain* did enter into *all*, or *any of these dangerous Engagements*, I could wish to see them *formally renounced* and *annihilated*; for I still think *that a solemn Cassation of the Treaties of Vienna, would secure these our, most important Interests more effectually than is done by the fore mentioned Articles*, which leave them upon the precarious Foot of *former Treaties*, which we have already found *ineffectual* to these Ends.

FOR, when different Interpretations have been put upon the same Treaties by different Powers; when Objections have been started on both Sides; when contrary Claims and Pretensions have been made, and embroiled *Europe* for several Years; what other effectual Method can be used to secure us against the like Disputes and Disturbances for the future, than finally to adjust the Sense of such Treaties, and confirm the respective Rights, Privileges and Possessions of the Powers concerned, in the *plainest, most direct and explicate Manner?*

AND if the Powers, with whom we are concerned, do really understand *these Articles* in the same Sense, which the *Pamphle-*

teer hath put upon them, why should they refuse to make us easy by a *particular Explanation*? Or, if they do actually refuse this, is there any Room to doubt, that they have some Reasons for preferring *dark and ambiguous Terms*?

BUT *it may be objected*, says the Pamphleteer, *That I have mispent my Time and Labour, in endeavouring to silence the Clamours which have been raised against that particular Form of a Peace, which hath been the Object of our late Negotiations, since it does not appear that the King of Spain is disposed to accept even of these Terms.* Why truly that is a very material *Objection*, and may arise perhaps from a determined Resolution, not to come to any Terms with us, after what hath passed, without obtaining his favourite *Ends*.

HE tells us indeed, but *two Lines before*, in his usual self-contradicting Stile, *that none of the Powers concerned have hitherto given just Cause to conclude that they will reject it.* Now methinks where there is an *apparent Disposition not to accept*, there is *some Cause to conclude that they will reject it*; but whatever Reasons there may be against it *abroad*, I am sure there are many *at Home*.

IT is, at best, by his own Confession, only a *Plan* or a *Project* which is not yet accepted. But let us suppose it *accepted*, for *Argument sake*. Nay, let us go farther, and for *Argument sake* likewise, suppose it to be
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a *good one*; the Question will still return, Whether we have taken the *shortest*, the *least dangerous*, or the *least expensive* Methods to accomplish it. But to glory in *Measures*, which have not *succeeded*, whether commendable or not, and have only a *bare Probability of Success*, is certainly very extraordinary.

LASTLY, Let us examine this Affair with respect to the Time we have been about it. The *Pamphleteer* indeed says, and seems to triumph upon it, that *this Progress towards the Establishment of a general Peace hath been made in a few Months, after the opening of the Congress*. But how much *Time*, as well as *Money*, did we spend in *Expeditions, Embassies, Negotiations, Preliminaries and Ratifications* before the *Congress was opened*? Nay, though we date the present Disturbances but *three Years* back, it is certain that we have not been in a State of *perfect Amity*, and *free Commerce* with *Spain* for above these *seven Years* past. But by the great Sagacity and Penetration of *certain Gentlemen* (to say nothing of *secret Service Money*) we have at last (according to *this Writer*) some Hopes of being, one Time or another, in almost as good a Condition as we were in, before our Affairs were thus embroiled.

THIS puts me in Mind of Sir *Epicure Mammon*, in the *Alchymist*, who when he had spent his *whole Estate* in search of the *Philosopher's Stone*, was comforted after

after all his *Cost*, though disappointed of his *main End*, with the hopes of a *little something to cure the Itch*.

HE tells us, at the Conclusion, *that this Nation never acted a Part more suitable to its DIGNITY and CHARACTER*; and that *to the Firmness and Fidelity of our Allies, and to these Measures we owe our PRESENT TRANQUILITY*. I shall say nothing of that *glorious Part*, which we have been lately acting, nor of the *firmness and Fidelity of our Allies*. I neither know what they *engaged to do*, nor what they have *actually done for us*. But to boast of the *present Tranquility*, when we are at best only in a State of *Political Purgatory* between *Peace and War*; when our *Ships are every Week taken*, as in time of *War*; when we are at all the *Expences* and under almost all the *Inconveniencies of a War*; to talk and boast of *Tranquility*, I say, at such a Time, must either be an egregious Banter on the *Ministry*, or an *Insult on the Nation*; and let the *Pamphleteer* take his Choice.

I HAVE but one thing more to mention, before I conclude, which is that the Author of this wretched *Pamphlet* hath the Insolence to make the *Regal Character* subservient to his *Designs*. Whatever *Measures*, or whatever *Conduct* he finds it necessary to approve, are the *King's Measures*, and the *King's Conduct*. This is a mean Artifice, which hath been constantly practised of late, by these Men, when other Arguments are wanting. But I hope it will not put a Stop to your Enquiries; for every *Englishman* hath a Right, by our *Laws*, to judge and debate these Affairs; and I am sure *his Majesty* will abhor the Thoughts of abridging this Liberty, though *weak and wicked Men* endeavour to screen themselves under the Protection of his *sacred Name*. I am,

S I R,

W. RALEIGH,